

MORO INSURGENCY IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES //

JAI BHAGWAN

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

**CENTRE FOR SOUTH SOUTH-EAST AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
1982**

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

Centre for South, South-East and
Central Asian Studies,
School of International Studies.

Gram : JAYENU

Telephone : 652282
652114

New Mehrauli Road,
NEW DELHI-110067.

It is certified that the dissertation
entitled "Moro Insurgency in the Southern-
Philippines," submitted by Mr. Jai Bhagwan in
partial fulfilment of the requirement for the
Degree of Master of Philosophy of the University,
is a bonafide and original work to the best of
our knowledge and may be placed before the
examiners for evaluation.



(Dr. Bimal Prasad)
Chairman



(Dr. B. P. Arora)
Supervisor

20 Jan. 1982

C O N T E N T S

	Page(s)
PREFACE	I-III
<u>CHAPTERS</u>	
I INTRODUCTION	1-14
II INSURGENCY IN ITS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES	15-45
III MORO REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND CHRISTIANS ATTITUDE	46-70
IV ARAB-ISLAMIC SUPPORT AND ORGANIZED INSURGENCY	71-94
V CONCLUSION	95-103
APPENDICES	104-111
BIBLIOGRAPHY	112-119

P R E F A C E

Generally speaking the scholars have attempted to supplement the work already done in the field. Very few have broken fresh ground and analysed through the study of such microcosms some of the difficulties which the minorities within themselves and in their interaction with the ruling elites in South-East Asian States are facing.

It is a well known fact that a very scanty interest has been shown toward the peculiar 'minority problem' in most of the South-East Asian countries. And very little literature is available about a grave problem like 'Moro insurgency' in the southern Philippines. That explains why the gap in information in research regarding this problem cannot be helped.

This study about the Moro society as an integral component of the whole Filipino society is inspired by the gravity of the problem itself.

An attempt has been made to identify different dimensions of the problem. Corresponding to these dimensions, the study divided into four parts.

Beginning with the first, i. e., introductory part, an endeavour is made to present a brief sketch of the taxonomy of the Moro society. This part also contains the survey of the nature of social stratification, the

II

classification of various groups and their cultural ethos. On the whole the purpose of the introductory part is conceived to be to work like a mirror to reflect the nature and composition of the Moro society.

Second part of the study is devoted to the analysis of the historical perspective of the Moro problem. It deals with Spanish colonization and Christianization as seen in the context of its interaction with the already Islamized southern Philippines. After a detailed study of Spanish-Moro relations, this part turns to the American occupation of the Philippines and its mandate of sovereignty over South. Thus, the second chapter of the study throws light on the legacies of Spanish and American colonialism and their role in creating the Moro problem.

Third part of the study deals with post-independence Philippine Government policies toward the southern Philippines and Moro responses to these policies. In the main, this chapter deals with the causes which have perpetuated various dimensions of insurgency in the late 1960s and 1970s.

Fourth chapter of the study is an attempt to reveal the international and regional dimensions of the Moro Insurgency problem. This part presents the Arab-Islamic reaction to the Moro Problem as also its regional implications.

III

And finally, the work is concluded with a suggestion about the establishment of 'regional autonomy' as an attempt to move in the direction of resolving the age-old problem. The conclusion forms the reflection of the problem, as we comprehend it.


For this work I am deeply indebted to Dr. B.D. Arora, who not only supervised this work but bore the patience and understanding of my personal problems during this period. My heartfelt acknowledgements are also due to Dr. Vishal Singh, Professor in the Centre for South, South-East and Central Asian Studies, whose constant care and inspiration generated lot of research interest in me and enabled me to complete this study. My thanks are also due to the staff of the libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Council of World Affairs and Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, who always extended much needed cooperation in the execution of this study.

Finally I cannot forget the workmanship of Mrs. Kunjamma Varghese who accomplished the typing work.

Bhagwan

(JAI BHAGWAN)

18th of January, 1982.




PHILIPPINES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA



LEGEND

- ① Maranaos
- ② Maguindanaons
- ③ Taosugs
- ④ Samals
- ⑤ Yakans
- ⑥ Jama Mapuns
- ⑦ Badjaos*
- MUSLIM CONCENTRATION

*Badjaos are scattered throughout Sulu Archipelago-



SULU SEA

BORNEO

⑥ CAGAYAN SULU I.

④ SIBUTU I.
 TAWI TAWI I.
 TAWI TAWI GROUP
 SULO ARCHIPELAGO
 TAPUL GROUP
 JOLO I.
 JOLO GROUP
 ③
 PANGUTARAN GROUP
 BASILAN I.
 ⑤
 TAPSANTAKA GROUP
 SAMALI GROUP

Surigao
 SURIGAO DEL NORTE
 CAMIGUIN I.
 Butuan
 SURIGAO DEL SUR
 Tandang
 AGUSAN DEL NORTE
 Bayugan
 AGUSAN DEL SUR
 MALAYBELAY
 MISAMIS OCC.
 Dipolog
 Ortuqueto
 Zamboanga
 Mero Gulf
 ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR
 LANAO DEL NORTE
 Iligan
 Morawi
 LANAO DEL SUR
 ①
 BUKIDNON
 DAVAO DEL NORTE
 Tagum
 DAVAO OR.
 Mati
 Cotabato
 ②
 CITY OF DAVAO
 Davao
 Digos
 DAVAO DEL SUR
 Gen. Santos
 SARANGANI I.

CHAPTER-I
INTRODUCTION

History of modern human civilization is full of instances of violence deriving from the hatred of one religious community against another, or one race against another. Millions of people have been killed or driven out of their homeland because of their differences with the dominant racial, religious or linguistic groups. Many minority communities have been crushed, condemned to wither away or denied the right even to survive. South-East Asian region has witnessed many scenes of such conflict between majority and minority.

On the politically dominant community whose institutions are more or less formed and stable the marginal community can have little effect. It leads to serious confrontation if the socio-cultural milieu of a minority group is deep-rooted, but not moving ahead as integral part of the social whole. When marginal community experiences the influx of dominant majority in its land, the fear of seizure of patrimony generates very often ceaseless cycle of violence with mutual hatred as the forceful basis of interaction.

South-East Asia has witnessed many such ghastly spectrums of communal violence between majority and minority. Today many of these considerably significant

communities have begun to attract the attention of the students of world politics and military strategy.

Introduction and Framework

No serious student of South-East Asian affairs today can afford to ignore potentially disruptive, if not subversive, role, which strategically placed minorities in the Philippines, Thailand, Burma and Malaya might play in the future. These minority groups exert influences on the course of events in South-East Asia. Through their geographical locations or their religious affiliations or both they can create an internal situation which will have international implications. South-East Asia's geographical situation in the crossways between China and India and its general development as a colonial enclave are primarily responsible for the presence of huge-sized discontented minorities. Minority communities are so complex and widespread in each country that they rank among the top problems for which the need to find solution presses harder upon a national than a colonial administration.

Throughout the history these minority communities had at some time or other suffered from aggression and exploitation at the hands of dominant people. Colonial powers developed some areas economically under profit motive while neglected and left undeveloped others.

Because of this uneven process of socio-economic development, political awakening remained at the lowest ebb. As everywhere else in the colonised world, in South-East Asia also, relatively stronger and larger ethnic groups and communities were used and counterpoised against weaker groups. It happened in the Philippines where Christian soldiers formed the backbone of Spanish expeditions and aggressions against Muslims in the South.

In some of the South-East Asian countries full circles of revolt, suppression, concession and dissidence are being experienced by ethnic minorities. Some of these ethnic groups are very strong either because of their own or external existence. Transition from colonial to a national state has made them restive. In almost every case they are less concerned with political rights than for the preservation of their cultural integrity and religious autonomy.

In the Philippines minority problem has taken grim dimensions. Muslim Filipinos or Moros as they are known, are in considerable number and inhabit large areas of the archipelago. In recent years they have been organized under new leadership and are equipped with new ideology and sophisticated weapons. They have gone to the extent of demanding an Independent Moro Republic. Thus strongly organized Moro insurgency is bound to create political instability and social chaos to hinder the economic growth.

As a whole, contrasting situation of internal unity and diversity along with the socio-economic life patterns is of vital significance to understand the insurgency problem.

The terms "Moro" and "Muslim Filipino" identify a variety of sub-societies located in Mindanao, Palawan and Sulu group of islands. People in these islands belong generally to the same racial, social, cultural and linguistic matrix like the vast majority of the Filipinos, 80 per cent of whom are Roman Catholics. Various estimates at 8 million Muslims, there is a general agreement on the main groups: Tausug, Samal, Maguindanao, Maranao, Sangil, Takan, Badjan, Palawani, Tagbanua, Kuder and Jama Mapun.¹ If this estimate is accurate, then there are more Moros in the Philippines than there are American Indians in the United States.

In the tropic islands of southern Philippines, agriculture and fishery are main sources of Moro livelihood. They produce rice, corn and fruits in abundance apart from vegetables, jute, sugar, coconut and tobacco. Forestry and mining along with expected oil and natural gas production are potential sources of further economic growth of the region.

1. Isidro Antonio and Saber Hamitus ed., Muslim Philippines, Marawi City, 1968, p.4.

Anatomy of Moro society and their cultural values throws a light on the different aspects of their social milieu. The Muslims in the Philippines constitute a local minority in many senses of this diminutive term. But at the international level they belong to a world fraternity of multi-million members who profess Islam and are widely spread over different continents and islands of South-East Asia. Viewing them as a distinct religious entity from outside, they are an integral part of the country's dominant racial stock and whatever degree of external affinities they cherish, they share common citizenship with the larger Philippine group.

Generically they are also being called "Moro" and formerly "Mohammedan" - a part of "non-Christians," only to demonstrate a sectarian contrast from the majority Christian group. They vehemently reject the last two given names and are often confused whether to reject or accept the first when term connotes variant meaning in the minds of those who associate with them.²

These Muslims constitute one of the most significant human resources of this country and their development toward more active participation in national life will mean a considerable contribution to nation-building. The barrier to closer integration of the Muslims into the

2. Ibid., p.5.

Philippine society arises from their deep sense of cultural and social distinctiveness. Many, especially among the uneducated Muslims, think of the national government as a foreign and Christian government whose authority they are forced to accept through imposition. Their customary way of referring to the government as *gobierno a sarwang a tao*, the government of the different (i.e. foreign) people reveal this state of mind.³

Although the terms "Moro" and "Muslim Filipino" are often used interchangeably, there are occasions when one may be more appropriate than the other. Some of those to whom these terms are applied reject the Spanish calling "Moro," just as the Christian Filipino sneered at the colonial name, "Indio." They prefer to be identified as "Muslim Filipinos." Technically, the term Moro is often more appropriate than Muslim especially when speaking of the tales of men whom many regard as "Moro brave" in their historic defence.

The obvious feature of the Moro community is their Islamic faith and certain traits that are related to religious belief. The customary practice of polygamy among the highly prestigious Moros has religious sanction respected even by members of the society who do not

3. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, ed., The Muslim Filipinos, Manila, 1974, p.x.

actually practise plural marriages. Similarly, the liberal divorce practices which are religiously and socially sanctioned in Muslim society mark another point of difference with Christians who are expressly forbidden to do so according to the Christian-influenced marriage and divorce laws of the Philippines.

Despite these many similarities, there is little political or social unity among the Muslim groups. They are separate sub-societies, and traditional hostilities based on ethnocentric group attitudes have helped to maintain the separation. On the other hand a feeling of generic kinship among the Moros might emerge at times of conflict with non-Muslims. This is revealed during the past resistances put up by the Filipinos against the Spaniards, the Americans and more recently the Japanese.

Each Muslim group speaks a different language. The name given the language is usually the name of the group. Some of the languages are mutually intelligible. There are also disparities in the degree of Islamization among the Moro groups. Although all are nominally Muslims, their knowledge and observances of the rites and beliefs are not often equal. These variations within the same ethno-lingual group are the consequence of geographical locations. Generally more Islamized groups dwell in areas with greater access to urban ways.

Much more significant are the traditional systems of social and political organizations variously called the sultanate, datuship, the region's identity, a bilateral kinship system and other factors.

The sultanate combines kinship and political structure. Thus in addition to family loyalty, the people are blended together under the Sultan and the subordinate datus who function like a "Council of Elders." This government is a legal system based upon traditional laws and the Holy Koran. In the past and to some extent in the present, the followers of the datus paid tribute from their harvest. The datus of the council of elders settled disputes within their jurisdiction. The sultans, datus and their followers are usually drawn together by customary social events in the community, such as marriage codification, funeral religious ceremonies, enthronement of dignitaries and other forms of social, political and economic activities. The building, repair or construction of a mosque is to them an important activity requiring community action.

Like any power system, there is a reciprocal relationship between leaders and followers in the sultanate. Historically, the sultanate had a military function to defend its territories and institutions. Under present day conditions a sultan or datu participates in the political campaign during elections. One of the many sources of the weakening of the traditional organization arises from the rivalries of datus and sultans for modern political offices.

The traditionally acceptable formal system of political organization of the Moros reveals unique characteristics of the Moro society. It distinguishes the area from the rest of the Philippines. Changes are occurring in this traditional system, which are gradually reducing the unique characteristics of Muslim Filipino society.

With their rich cultural heritage and profoundly fertile valleys with sufficient economic resources, the Moros are living in turbulence in southern Philippines. Moreover, their response to the governmental policies adopted with respect to them by the Spaniards, the Americans and the Republic of the Philippines is frequently hostile and generally negative. They find themselves in the position of being an "immovable object" confronting the seemingly irresistible force of Philippine national identity. A full scale uprising organized for secession from the Philippines can end in another Biafra; otherwise the insurgency problem has become a composite fracture at the vital veins of Filipino society. If secession of Mindanao and the Sulu from the Philippines is not a viable proposition, neither is genocide tolerable.

Moro problem which has assumed threatening dimensions, is a composition of economic, social and psychological factors. Professor C.A. Macartoney, Secretary of the

Minority Committee of the League of Nations, once said, "A national state and national minorities are incompatible. Minorities are still a problem while the desirable mainstream has semantically been replaced by the phrase 'body politic.'" Now, the term integration has become a polite euphemism for assimilation. In the past four years in the Philippines the focus on the inability of the Muslims to join the mainstream has caused serious concern and led to the formation of many governmental agencies designed to implement national integration policy. But instead of solution it has aggravated the problem to alarming proportions. Policies and programmes of government have not succeeded in creating a community of understanding between Muslims and Christians. And mutual hostility compounded by sanguine violence are still unbearable truths.

Historically, the people of Mindanao and Sulu group of islands in the South were able to resist successfully the attempts to subjugate them. This strong resistance further increased the obsession of the Spanish colonial government and church hierarchy to conquer the South and convert the people to Catholicism. It generated mutual execration in the minds of the people of both communities. Congressional report on the 'Moro Problem' in 1954 stated briefly about the problem as follows: As an individual, Muslim refuses to concede that he is a part of the entire

Filipino citizenary.⁴ He identifies himself by his religion. Today most of the educated Muslims do refer themselves as 'Muslims Filipinos,' but the people living in interior areas, with little or no formal education, usually identify themselves by tribe or religious groups. In academic circles, both Muslims and Christians use the term 'Moro' in positive sense of 'Muslim Filipinos,' but popular usage considers this as a derogatory term among both the groups.

It cannot be denied that Muslims are lagging behind in economic development; they lack proper education and proper leadership. There is a tussel for power between the elite groups of the two communities in the South. With Muslims owning too many guns and Christians having too much property, it is the historical and psychological problem assuming the ideology of a movement to be independent of the Philippines; of government neglecting peace and order, community development plans. It is primarily the problem of not understanding the Muslims.⁵ There is a yawning gap in understanding and disparity in standards of living of Muslims and Christians. If the

4. Ibid., p. 45.

5. Malvin Hedrick, "Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization," Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 39-52.

government ever had some programmes and policies to bridge this gap, while executing these, the Christian dominated bureaucracy worked to prevent the development of tolerant understanding.

Christians, who are a majority community in the Philippines, are prejudiced toward minority Muslim community. This phenomenon is one of the legacies of more than three hundred years of Muslim-Christian hostility, initiated and perpetuated under Spanish colonial rule and during half a century of American public-policy wavering between separation and integration. The Muslim-Christian hostility is fed today by an ignorant and biased media assisted by some members of the educated elite. There is ample evidence that Christians continue to measure out of their fertile imagination, an image of the Filipino Muslims as 'brute' treacherous bandits and pirates. In Luzon and the Visayan group of Islands the Moro term (with all its derogatory implications) is a household instrument of social control for misbehaving children.

Obviously, as a legacy of the past, there are basic contradictions in relationship between Christians and Muslim Filipines. Presently, the problem boils down to the differences between socio-political institutions and attitudinal dilemmas. One sociologist puts this idea clearly thus: "The friction between Muslim and Christian

Filipinos can be accurately described as an encounter between two communities with different traditions and rival economic interests, suffering from different historical hangovers.⁶

In the midst of varying levels of economic and political development accentuating problem, it assumes, no doubt, varying shapes and forms. For an effective ultimate solution of the problem we must examine more clearly and critically diverse factors such as economic, political, educational and legal. The complex nature of the Moro problem requires an investigation of its components.

It can be proposed at this level that a proper representation of the Moros in the governing institutions of the country and careful safeguarding of their interests can lead towards the solution of the problem. It involves the willingness and commitment of the Filipino government and Christian majority community to contribute to the maximum extent possible in the establishment of peace in Moroland. Appropriate political participation assured through Moro representation in political institutions, and safeguards against infringement of Muslims religious, cultural and economic rights, might help in promoting

6. Cited in Robert D. McAmis, "Muslim Filipinos: 1970-72," Solidarity, Vol. 8, No. 6, June 1973, pp. 3-6.

peace and harmony. Representation assimilates the positive aspects of Muslim law and Muslim cultural prosperity while 'safeguard' provides a guarantee for Muslims to work in harmony with Christians.

The proposed model requires a deep analysis of the problem in historical perspective. To maintain the objectivity of the study through this framework, the 'governmental policies' and 'Moro reaction' are necessary aspects of the study. As the Filipino Muslims are supported by Arab Islamic countries, the incorporation of this aspect is also significant part of the analysis of the Moro insurgency problem.

CHAPTER-II

INSURGENCY IN ITS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Muslims throughout the world have generally tended to look at their history as a process tending towards justice provided men make the effort to work for it. Besides, there is the widespread belief that the historical process is not solely the result of man's intentions and actions but there is also the merciful and compassionate deity who is involved in the direction of such a process. Thus concomitant with the belief that life on earth is a severe moral test, there is always the hope that living the Islamic way of life makes it more purposive and tends to bring about a social situation where justice and good life become operative.

Because of all this, it becomes understandable why Muslims in the Philippines believe that the coming of Islam to the Philippines and hence their being Muslims, constitutes an instance of Allah's mercy and grace. Also understandable is the belief that their bitter wars against Spaniards and Americans, their resistance to any form of European colonial design or foreign economic exploitation, and even their internecine quarrels and the chronic epidemics that have united them have served to maintain their integrity as an Islamic community.

A careful analysis of the history of the Muslims in the Philippines will reveal that the character and attitudes of present day Muslims are not only the result of what they have made out of themselves but also of what others have forced them to become. It is logically necessary to know how Islam was introduced and how it expanded in the Philippines. We need to know also those forces which came into conflict with Islam, forces which helped to shape the character of the present day Muslim Filipino.

Moroland Before the Western Contact

Traditions in the Sulu and other parts of the region state that before the advent of Islam towards the end of 13th and beginning of 14th century, the natives of Sulu and Mindanao worshipped stones and other inanimate objects and society was divided into many small communities. Each of these communities was known as Banua with its own territory, ruler and followers. There were alliances among the banuas for the purpose of trade and mutual defence. These Banuas were similar to those in the Barangays in the northern parts. Coming of Islam changed the beliefs of these natives from polytheism to monotheism. Establishment of Sultanate unified the Banuas in cemented units ruled by Sultans. These sultanates were flourishing with highly developed social norms, earlier than any other part of the Philippines archipelago. Islam

completely eradicated the pre-Islamic customs (adat) of the Sulus;¹ it brought new knowledge and civilization. Islam gave to the Sulu people a sophisticated sense of identity, history and nationalism.

The Sultanate of the Sulu was first organized native state in the archipelago. It lasted for more than four and a half centuries, i.e. from around 1450 to 1915. At the height of its glory, its territorial domains included the entire Sulu, Basilan, Palawan, some coastal areas of Zamboanga and Northern Borneo.² As the highest chief of the state, the sultans exercised both civil and religious authority. In law making and policy matters he was assisted by Panglimas and other lesser officials, like Maharajas and Ulangkayas. In religious affairs, Chief Rudi or the Ulama was the main adviser. Thus before the arrival of the Spaniards, Muslims had developed their own civilization and a unified state system, while this was not the case in other parts of the archipelago. In the words of Saleeby: "While Manila and Cebu were still small and insignificant settlements, Jolo had reached the proportions of a city, and was without exception richest and foremost settlement of the prime importance."³

1. Hajeed, Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion, Manila, 1905, p. 11.

2. Agib Cesar, Sajul, "Succession in the Old Sulu Sultanate" Philippine Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1964, pp. 252-53.

3. Cited in, Ibid., pp. 265-66.

Before the Spaniards arrived, the power of the Sulu sultanate was felt "all over Luzon and Visayan islands, the Celebes sea, North Borneo and the China sea." Their trade extended from China and Japan at the one extreme to Malacca, Sumatra and Java at the other.⁴ Not surprisingly, therefore, when the Spaniards tried to subjugate the Moros, the entire Morolandia rose immediately to resist the force of "Her Catholic Majesty." The Moros countered every external invasion to preserve the glory of Islam which they had already achieved.

Contact with Spaniards

Spaniards came with Dual purpose of Christianisation of the heathens under the guidance of the "Last will and Testament of Isabella, the great queen of Castile," and of extending the imperial dominions of Spanish monarchy. Though this assessment of Spanish objectives is an oversimplification, it is not far from the truth. Their arrival stopped the gradual spread of Islam in the northern islands and stifled the commercial influence of the Sulu sultanate. It also resulted in the socio-political and economic separation of the Muslims from the rest of the Filipinos. And what was worse, people of the same racial ancestry were made to fight and hate each other as evidenced by the 'Moro-wars.' The long series of bloody battles between the Spaniards aided by

4. Ibid., p. 270.

the newly converted Christian natives in the North and the Muslims in the South, lasted for more than three centuries. Together with this fierce struggle, the Spanish officials and scholars, mostly friars, waged incessant propaganda against the Muslims, calling them "henchmen of the devil," "Pirates," "bandits," "savages," etc.

History of Muslim resistance against Spaniards is generally known as 'Moro wars' by the historians. It reminds us that the Muslims resisted Spain until the doom of the Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines and extended such resistance even up to the first decade of this century, through the American regime. Indeed there was no stage of 'Moro wars' where they were completely defeated to extirpation.⁵

In the course of the Spanish expeditions, the Spaniards very frequently confronted strong resistance in the North. The datos in the South also stood gallantly against them. The conquistadors and missionaries marched side by side, the former conquering new vassals and territories for the king by the might of the sword and the latter winning more souls by the sign of the Cross.

Having conquered the Visayas and Luzon, the Spaniards attempted to impose their rule on Mindanao and

5. Cesar A. Majul, "The Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People," Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, August 1966, pp. 270-71.

Sulu by the same methods. They failed and started consolidating their rule in the pacified northern provinces and developing the exciting possibilities of the galleon trade. But the fierce Moros led by non-challant satus, fell with fury on the coasts of Cebu, Negros and Panay and ravaged the villages with fire and sword.⁶

Influenced by the bravery of the Moros and with their desire for plunder, the Dutch at the end of the 19th century were engaged in forming an alliance with the Moros. Moreover, the Dutch found in Moros a ready ally against Spaniards in the Philippines.

The Dutch wanted to wrest spice trade from the Portuguese in the Moluccas. In order to blockade the Manila-Galleon trade, and to bring Spaniards to their knees, they found a reliable ally in the Moros. They engaged in combined operation with the Achinese of north Sumatra against Malacca and with the Sulus against Manila. Thus while Dutch men-of-war bombarded Iloilo or blockaded the entrance to Manila Bay, the Sulu fleets struck at the Spanish shipyard in Camrines and Panamao islands.⁷

6. F. Delor, Angeles, "The Moro Wars," University of the East Liberal Arts and Science Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1964, p. 106.

7. Ibid., p. 109.

Spaniards were left with no alternative but to invade and control the South. Fear of invasion and extirpation of Islam forced the Muslims to adopt the war-path. They declared 'Jihad' against Spain and intensified devastating raids against Christian towns and villages.⁸ In these punitive Spanish expeditions in the South and the impregnable Moro resistance, the Christianized natives constituted the army of Her Majesty. This created a hatred in Muslim minds against Christians and the Muslims rose to sack the Christian towns, burn the houses and churches, they captured many native Christians, men, women and children upon whom they inflicted murders, cruelties and outrages.⁹ Naturally, if these impressions created an adverse image of the Moro that would be displayed through plays from generation to generation - an image that Moro was a treacherous, butcherer, pirate, devil and bandit - only perverse logic would deduce the possibility of affectionate co-existence of the two communities.

Thus from the last quarter of sixteenth century to the last quarter of 19th century, i. e., in 1878 when Jolo was finally occupied, the Muslims repelled every attempt to subjugate them and safeguard Sulus and

8. Ibid., p. 112.

9. Ibid., p. 112.



TH-950

Mindanao for Dar-ul-Islam. Even at the cost of their life they defended Islam.

Consequences of Moro Wars

Based on historical narratives of the Moro response to the Spanish colonialism, it can be stated that the present contradictions between the Muslims and Christians are the bitter consequences of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines and the Moro wars. History is resolute witness that Spain was never satisfied with having colonized and Christianized the natives in the North. To feed its colonial hunger, it waged a war on Muslims with the help of Indios, the Christianized natives. These wars will always explain the religious character of Moro-Christian confrontation.

For their part, the Spaniards brought with them a fanatical hatred towards Islam, born of hundreds of years of Moorish domination of Iberian peninsula. Spaniards never abandoned that hatred. In January 1893, Luis de la Torre, a Spanish officer, wrote to the Governor General of the Philippines: "The Moro race is completely antithetic to the Spanish... and ever be our eternal enemy." It is well, he continued, "that we are stronger, that our friendship suits their interests because we are backed by force - which is the only argument they can understand, the instant they will

antagonise us, will be promptly and severely punished." ¹⁰
It is a plain reflection of brutal image of Moros in the minds of Christians. This ghostly picture of treacherous Moro operates in Christians' mind till today. There is also an equally negative view about Christians prevailing amongst the Muslims. The Christian is coward, an enemy of Islam. As will be shown, these inherited dirty psychological epithets were perpetuated in the mental make up of the two communities during the American rule in the Philippines.

American Occupation

The Spanish-American war of 1898 found the Muslims and Spaniards fighting in the jungles of Moroland. After 300 years of invasion Spain had failed to conquer and convert the fierce Muslims. In May 1898, American troops occupied Jolo and in December of the same year they took control over Zamboanga.

Poignant views of soldiers and Christian missionaries were set forth for the information and guidance of the Americans, the successors of Spaniards in the Philippines. Suffice it to say, that while not motivated by a general hatred of Islam or any particular zeal to convert or annihilate the Moros (which characterized

10. Quoted in Peter G. Cowling, Mandate in Moroland, Quezon City, 1977, p. 14.

the Spanish Moro policy), the Americans nevertheless adopted a policy strikingly similar to that of their predecessors.

American Policy

The Republicans and Liberal Democrats in America debated for six months over the question of the Philippines. The former yielded perhaps to more latent 'urge to Empire,' to vague notions of 'manifest destiny' as a specific power and to ill-defined sentiments about picking up the 'whiteman's burden.' Democrats, some of them ablest, and most notable citizens of America, called for a recognition of the Philippines' independence under American protection. In the end the Republicans won the game and the US, then headed by President William McKinley, signed with Spain the Treaty of Paris, on 10 December 1898. This treaty provided for the transfer of sovereignty to the United States over the Philippine archipelago along with Moroland.¹¹

America's unilaterally conceived mandate in the Philippines to develop, to civilize, to educate and train the Filipino people in the art of self-government, was ipso facto its particular mandate in Mindanao and Salu. And this cosy assumption of picking-up 'whiteman's burden' stimulated reaction from Muslims, because it touched some of the most sensitive tissues of Islam.

11. IBIA, p. 18.

The effective period of mandate in Moroland extended from May 1898, when the first United States army contingent landed in Jolo, until May 1920, when the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was abolished and Frank W. Carpenter retired from the governorship. After four years of army occupation (1899-1903), there followed a decade of transition from military to civil rule organized under Moro province (1903-1913). This was followed by six years of civil government, which was primarily responsible to the Philippines Commission and to the Governor General in Manila. Thus in 1916, the legislative powers over Moroland were transferred to the Philippine legislature in accordance with the Jones Law of 1916. By 1920 the supervision of the Muslim affairs was to all intents and purposes in the hands of Filipino officials, although a few Americans held offices and the American Governor-General retained certain appointative powers in Mindanao and Sulu.¹²

The initial occupation of the Moroland was incidentally to the Filipino-American war raging mainly in northern parts of the archipelago. In this situation it was of serious concern to Americans that Moros might not take a common cause with revolutionary nationalists of the North. The Filipino insurgents had actually initiated correspondence with the Sultan of Sulu towards

12. Ibid., p. 6.

some sort of alliance. On January 18, 1899, President Aguinaldo addressed a letter to his "great and powerful brother Sultan of Jolo," pledging that "Philippine Republic could respect absolutely the beliefs and traditions of each island, in order to establish on a solid basis the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests."¹³ Aguinaldo gave highest assurance of mutual respect to the Sultan. The Sultan was advised that "if in the war we regain our independence and are successful in preventing the enemy from gaining foothold the country will always render a tribute of homage and gratitude to our memory." But unfortunately for Moros, the Sultan gave no reply to these appeals, possibly because neither he nor his adviser could see any real gains in aligning with their traditional enemies, the Christian Filipinos. Sultan Jamal-ul Kiran II, who had recently returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca, under the influence of pro-American Sultan of Ottoman Empire, was persuaded to sign an agreement to acknowledge American sovereignty. An American assurance for the respect of Moro traditions and customs, apart from the payment of monthly salaries (in Mexican dollars to the Sultan (\$ 250) and members of his Raza Bichara (\$ 75)).¹⁴

13. Dean L. Worcester, The Philippines, Manila, 1965, p. 227.

14. See, Gowing, n. 10, p. 29.

Bates agreement signed between the Moros and Americans on 20 August 1899, served the core purpose of American diplomacy i.e., neutralizing the Moros in the confrontation between the Filipino nationalists and Americans.¹⁵ As the war in the North subsided, especially after the middle of 1901, both the civil and military branches of the government were forced to do some hard thinking about hundreds of thousands of Muslims living in the southern islands.

Late in 1902 General Davis arriving from Zamboanga, arrogantly stated: "When these born pirates feel the weight of our power they will believe we are in earnest and respect us, but until then they will despise and hate us."¹⁶

In April 1900, President McKinley gave instructions to the second Philippines Commission, as approved in July 1902 by the American Congress and adopted in the Philippines Bill. These instructions served as general policy guidelines regarding the civil and military administration in the Philippines with respect to the Muslims and other 'civilized' peoples.¹⁷ The instructions

15. Ibid., p. 30.

16. See the Annual Report by Major General George W. Davis, Manila, 1902, p. 17.

17. W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Boston, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 321.

road: "In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of these islands the Commission should adopt the same course of action followed by the Congress in the case of our North American tribal Indians, to maintain their tribal organizations and government surrounded by a civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should be, however, subjected to wise and firm regulations and without undue interference constant and active efforts should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and they should be introduced to civilized customs."¹⁸

Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes

In October 1901, the Philippines Commission created a Bureau of non-Christian tribes. The first chief of the Bureau, Dr. Davis F. Arrows, suggested: "The government of these peoples must for long time continue to be exercised by some agency that has at its back an active force, ready any moment to overpower these armed fanatics and compel them to observe the rules of well-being, that we observe in our relations with our fellowmen."¹⁹ Actually General Davis, among others, had a number of ideas about the Americans' Moro policy. He suggested that: "There can be an inseparable reason forbidding the sale of a Mohammedan

18. See, War Department Annual Report (ARWD) by General George W. Davis, Manila, 1902, p. 17.

19. Ibid., p. 566.

Malay King of his royal sovereign domain for an extensive region and the allegiance which his subjects owed to him.²⁰ The General then went on to surmise that the Sultan of Gulu might accept a money consideration paid by US in exchange for cessation of his kingly rights or pretensions over his lands and vassals in Gulu. He also suggested that through such cessation for a small annual payment the Muslim overlords could be induced to retire and leave the United States to deal with the Muslims in befitting manner according to American objectives, i.e., to develop the Muslims on the road to civilization and abolish the slavery, piracy and polygamy, to establish schools and training centres for Muslim youth and to turn his blades of spears and kris into utensils of industry. It would take a long time to do this, but the presence of the Sultan, who was conceded by US (Americans) to possess the royal rights and dignities was a positive obstacle for the execution of such a policy - he must be removed before any progress was made.²¹ General Davis was impressed by the way the Dutch and the British had handled their administration of Muslim Malays. They did not overrun the native rulers, rather governed through

20. Ibid., p.496.

21. Ibid., p.517.

them, using Sultan as a puppet princeling or arrangement of indirect rule through residency system.

Plans for the Moro Province

So called 'Philippines Bill' passed by the United States Congress on July 7, 1902, recognized the distinction between the Muslim, Christian and Pagan Filipinos, and provided different forms of government for each. Americans formulated a policy for the pacification of the Muslims thus barring their entry into the mainstream of national life. In the end, the Americans took a page from the Spanish book to govern the 'pacified region' of the Philippines and created a sort of politico-military province i.e., the Muslim province. In a special report on Moro affairs, prepared in October 1901, General Davis recommended that (1) the Datus Agreement be abrogated; (2) no Sultan or King be recognized as head of entire Muslim community; (3) Datu should be recognized as headman, who will receive payments for public services only, if performing well; if incapable of performance, no salary or pension be granted to them; (4) military form of government to be established over the province, and those guilty of capital offences and slave catching be tried and punished by courts established by the 'supreme government' (this recommendation traversed the original Muslim judicial system and took away power from the Muslim chiefs and provoked Muslims more than any other

incursion on the Islamic system); (5) trade in domestic products of Moroland by the Muslims with any part of the Philippines should be conducted under American flag and would be free, unlimited and undutiable; export taxes and Moro products should be assumed for ten years.²²

From time to time every provision in these recommendations, apparently modified, was adopted by the Moro province, created by the Philippines Commission Act 787;²³ an act providing for the organization of the Government of the Moro province. Thus for the greater part of the period there was what the Spaniards used to call 'politico-military' province in Moroland.

While American policy was beginning to be crystallized in the carefully thought out design about the Moro province, American troops were engaged more and more frequently in armed clashes with dissident Muslim leaders and their followers. Violence and rebellion resulted from the taxation mechanism and judicial system as provided for in the framework of the Moro province. As long as the Americans followed a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Muslims there was not much trouble. The Muslims were deeply antagonized whenever their customs and traditions were replaced or reformed. In no way Muslims were ready to accept themselves as inferior to Americans.

22. Ibid., p.539.

23. See, Peter G. Gowing, n.10, p.144.

Muslims felt that Americans were determined to subjugate them. And a threat to Islamic system could not be allowed to go unchallenged by Muslims. From its very inception Muslim province idea headed on a collision course with the Moros. This was because of three interrelated reasons. First, the provincial government with its policy of direct interference brought home to Muslims the fact that they had been invaded by foreigners who would distribute their lands to the Christians. Muslims knew that the transfer of sovereignty from Spaniards to Americans was a fallacy. Spain had no sovereignty over Muslim land and Muslims were not consulted before the transfer took place. The warfare that took place a year after the creation of Moro province was not of Moros' choice, but, as Vic Hanley remarked: "Americans brought the war to Mindanao."²⁴ Second, the introduction of American legal and judicial system was suspected as a severe blow to the Islamic system. And lastly, the very objective of Moro province idea being to grab the power from Muslim chiefs, it created general unrest.²⁵ Consequently Muslims, some of them with arms, rose up in defense of 'Dar-al-Islam' against American infidels.

24. Cited in, Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier, New York, 1919, p. 375.

25. Peter G. Gowing, n. 10, p. 250.

The major beneficiaries of American policy on education, trade and commerce were the migrant Christian Filipinos settled in the South. Later with a little experience, the Christian Filipinos demanded with confidence the places in government not only in the North but in the South as well. Moros could never tolerate the fact that a Christian should administer over them in their own home. In this slowly aggravating situation some American officials suggested the separation of Muslim land from the rest of the Philippines (not to the liking of the nationalist leadership).²⁶ This encouraged the Americans to tighten their grip over Moroland by the use of force. They stressed the need for military presence by arguing that the Christian minority in the South would be slaughtered if the situation deteriorated further and riots broke out.

During Governor General Davis administration, nationalist Filipinos lived in amicable relations with Muslims. The latter supported the former enthusiastically against the Americans. Christian revolutionaries were granted entrance into Muslim territories and shelter in their homes.²⁷ Filipino nationalist newspapers gave a wide coverage to the controversy. Americans were deliberately spreading enmity between Muslims and Christians as

26. Ibid., p.253.

27. Forbes, n.17, vol.20, p.45.

part of 'Machiavellian' divide and conquer' policy designed to annex Mindanao and the Sulu. La Vanguardia published an editorial (31 August 1910) entitled "The Greatest Inquiry." It read in part: "A menace was seen in the alliance and friendship of Muslims and Christians, a menace for the government of military character. Every method is brought in practice to break up this alliance. And the banner of Machiavelli came to substitute the flag of liberty and traditional 'divide and conquer' has become motto."²⁸ On 8 February 1913, La Democracia published an editorial 'Imperialist Machiavellism.' It declared: "In the Mindanao and Sulu the military government has endeavoured to deepen the difference between the Christian population of Zamboanga and Muslim inhabitants, stipulating a state of affairs which is far from the reality in which the Muslims appear as irreconcilable enemies of their brothers, the Christian Filipinos." In order to make the division between Christian and Muslim Filipinos more effective, the imperialists have taken special care to foment hostility among them, putting the latter in backlog and showing special attention to Christians in order to create the mutual arrogance. And

28. Peter G. Cowling, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920," Asian Studies, Vol. 6, June 1968, p. 374.

most of all, corrupt datus are being instigated to join anti-Christian fury."²⁹

Philippinization of the Government Personnel: A Discriminatory Policy

In 1916, a further step was taken in the reorganization of the administration which initiated the policy of Philippinization of bureaucracy. Till 1914, all key personnel of the Mindanao and Sulu Department were Americans. From then onwards Christian Filipinos were infused more and more in administration. This policy did not result in predicted violence probably because the Muslims started realizing that Christian Filipinos would devote their time in staggering the warfare of the inhabitants regardless of their religious affiliation. Most of the officials in Mindanao and Sulu were anxious to perform well (Filipino nationalists emphasized efficient and just performance) in order to demonstrate their capacity to govern non-Christian minorities. One of the arguments Americans made against granting independence was the Christian Filipinos' incapability to govern the non-Christian groups. One very significant development of this period of temporary Muslim-Christian brotherhood was that the Muslims were allowed to take oath of allegiance in office according to Holy Quran.³⁰

29. (quoted in, Gowing and McAmis, eds., n.28, p.79.

30. Francis Austin Harrison, The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence, New York, 1922, p.109.

It assured the religious tolerance of Christian Filipinos and official recognition of Islam as also a guarantee of non-interference in their religious affairs.

Gradually Muslims began to complain that Philippinization meant 'Christian Philippinization.' Majority of the office holders were Christian Filipinos. In the beginning it seemed that the Americans were going to appoint a large number of Muslims for governmental positions. When Muslim resentment mounted, it was against Christian Filipinos and not against Americans. Muslims believed that through Philippinization, the Christians would worsen the administration of the Muslim land. The reluctance of Christians in this regard was one of the major complaints the Muslims lodged with the 1921 Wood-Forbes Mission.³¹ Some of the leading datu of the Sulu province presented a "petition" to the President of the USA from the people of the Sulu archipelago. The petition asked that the Sulu be governed separately from the rest of the Philippines. The document also charged Christian Filipinos with abuse of power.

Similar charges were heard frequently during Leonard Wood's governor-generalship (1921-27). In 1924 another petition addressed to the US Congress was drawn up by a delegation of Muslim leaders and presented to Wood.³²

31. Quoted in, Peter G. Gowing, n.10, p.311.

32. For full text of the petition see, Forbes, n.17, Vol.II, Appendix XXI.

Without speaking against the Americans, the document charged the Christian officials with misuse of power. The signatories of this document threatened to form an "independent constitution" and a sultanate to be known as 'Moro Nation,' "if the petition went unheeded."³³

The growing animosity was a result of preferred treatment given to Christian Filipinos in Moroland. This discriminatory attitude later became a guiding principle for making policies regarding trade, commerce, agriculture and education. During the first decade of this century when surging tide of nationalism posed a potential threat to American colonialism, the Americans intentionally adopted the policy of 'divide and rule,' which was strongly exposed by nationalist publications as 'Machiavellian Imperialism.'³⁴

A thorough analysis of American colonial period shows a deliberate pursuance of dismal policies which promoted the age-old Muslim-Christian rivalry. This rivalry was intensified as a result of American policies regarding Moroland.

33. Gowing, n. 10, p. 322.

34. See, Sidney Glazer, "The Moro as a Political Factor in Philippine Independence," Pacific Affairs, 14, March 1941, p. 82.

It has already been noted that the American Moro policy developed in three successive stages. During the first stage, i.e., of military occupation of Moroland, the US sought to secure the acknowledgement of its sovereignty over Moroland and to keep the Moros neutral in the Philippine-American war being fought in northern parts. These objectives were achieved through a shrewd diplomacy. Through Bates Agreement and other treaties, non-interference in religious affairs was guaranteed. The Sultan and his chiefs were to be paid some endowments. Concerned authorities took notice of the Muslim affairs, made observations and surveys and began to formulate policies for the administration of Mindanao and the Sulu. Public health, sanitation and schools were introduced, taxes were levied and exploring expeditions became frequent.

Muslims could not help but speculate that this escalation of policy meant security regarding religion. Sometimes, their uneasiness and suspicion erupted in violence. Isolated instances of assaults on American soldiers occurred with increasing frequency. The growing number of Americans and the multiplication of their activities, brought two cultures into an abrasive contact.

The Americans fully recognized the importance of natural resources of Mindanao and the Sulu. They decided to give up the policy of non-interference in favour of utilisation of human resources and natural wealth of Moroland. This model was taken from Spanish 'Politico-Military District.' Carefully selected military officials were appointed to administer the public works programmes and to supervise modernisation programmes for the development of commerce and agriculture on the basis of conveniently developed infrastructure in order to exploit the natural wealth of Mindanao and the Sulu. The Americans and Christians from the North were encouraged to settle in the South. The establishment of provincial and district governing bodies, whose official decrees were enforced by troops, undermined the authority and status of Muslim chiefs - particularly in judicial affairs. Collection of cedula (registration tax) and other kind of taxes violated the religious Muslim parameters, and American and Christian settlers in the South were facilitated to grab the land. The Muslims also strongly opposed the industrial policy, the major beneficiaries of which were Christian settlers. Newly introduced educational system was suspected to be 'anti-Islam,' which would break the traditional fabric of Muslim society based on cherished Islamic values.

American policy of direct rule in Moro province constituted a severe threat to Islamic way of life. General Wood's preferred Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism and 'puritanical calvinist' values were instrument for the psychological demise of a Muslim. General Wood found nothing worth preservation in Muslim laws and customs. It is not surprising that American administration of Moroland sought to 'cut the Moro foot to fit the American shoe.' Neither is it surprising that some of the Muslims fought vehemently against such an endeavour.

Wood's successors, General Bliss and Pershing, continued to fight 'bandits and savages,' but the Moros resisted to death. J. Halston Hayden rightly remarked that 'never during the continental expansion of US, were armed encounters between Americans and Indians so frequent and so serious as conflicts that took place between Moro and American forces from 1904 to 1914.'³⁵

In 1913 Moro province was re-organized into Department of Mindanao and Sulu and Governor-General Harrison accelerated the move towards Philippines independence. The policy of Philippinization was vigorously pursued in which Christian Filipinos assumed greater responsibility in the governmental administration in Moroland. During the recognition of Philippines Government

35. Quoted in, ibide, p. 87.

after Jones's Law (1916), the Philippine legislature became legislature for Mindanao and Sulu. Calling it the 'policy of attraction,' Filipino officials administered the policies in Mindanao and Sulu. During six years of the history of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, there was unity of purpose between the Americans and Christian Filipinos with respect to the incorporation of Muslims into a united Philippines. With the abolition of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu and arrival of Leonard Wood in 1920 as Governor-General, this Filipino-American unity of purpose vanished. Now, Filipino Christians and U.S. Wood were at loggerheads in Mindanao and Sulu. Americans and Moros both claimed that inexperienced Filipinos were seriously abusing power. There were charges of unnecessarily harsh and suppressive measures adopted by constabulary. Some datos who opposed Philippine independence were mysteriously murdered. The old story of 'divide and conquer' policy and continued influx of Christian Filipinos promoted the Moro unrest. Complaints were lodged about the Christian Filipinos' reluctance to accept Moroization of administration in Mindanao and Sulu.

Consequences of American Occupation

The Muslims paid a heavy price as the recipients of American good intentions. Their society was disrupted and threads of their social life were broken in battling for the protection of their independence and religion. Because of grossly discriminatory American policies, Moros were pushed into abysmal backwardness and this engendered antipathy against dominant Christian Filipinos. Hayden observes: "The chief cause of this retrogression in Muslim-Christian relations, was the actual abuse of power by the Christians in Moroland. Serious abuses against the persons and property of the Muslims were committed by officials and constabulary and troops. School girls were molested, Muslim leaders were beaten up and robbed, Muslims were thrown out of land, which they considered incontestably theirs, official positions were misused to punish the enemies and reward the friends."³⁵

Difficulties arose in the process of assimilating Muslims into a national mainstream coloured by Christian domination. Filipino nationalists always emphasized at racial and cultural harmony, through their focus on 'original' element of both being Malay. But cultural achievements and history of the Muslims was never recognised. The Philippine government accelerated the

36. Ibidi, p. 89.

migrations from North to South and encouraged settlements in Muslim areas. In some of the southern parts Muslims were outnumbered by Christians, reduced in minority, and treated as second-rank citizens in their own land. In the light of the analysis of general socio-economic conditions in Moroland, Hayden's belief seems reasonable, while he says: "Although their country urgently needed the Mindanao and Sulu's wealth; Christian Filipinos were not ready to bear the responsibility in favour of Moros."³⁷ Americans conquered Moroland by force and implemented the mandate by use of force: who did not believe that Americans would develop welfare processes in Moroland, taking care of Muslim interests. Doubtlessly some of the Muslims felt betrayed when Americans precipitously relinquished the government of Moroland to the Christians. They realized that having been honourably defeated and disarmed by the Americans, they were now delivered in the hands of Christians. "You have left us defenseless," wrote a Muslim delegation to the US Congress in 1924, "and it is your duty to protect us from Christian atrocities."³⁸

The Americans exercised direct rule for less than a generation. Economic prosperity affected the Muslims only very marginally. Americans, Chinese, Spanish and Christian Filipinos, who owned the business and plantations, profited most. A western model of education

37. See, Peter G. Gowing, Ibid., p.338.

38. Ibid., p.342.

had been introduced, yet in 1919 more than 60 per cent of Muslim children were out of classes. Hospitals and other public welfare facilities could not improve the conditions of Muslims.

Although Filipino nationalists had the vision of integrated Filipino nation including Moroland, the Americans vitalized the prevailing streak of Spanish legacy of 'hatred' for each other, and rather perpetuated the intense execrations in the minds of Muslims and Christians against each other.

CHAPTER-III

MORO REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND CHRISTIANS' ATTITUDE

The governments of independent Philippines could not sort out the Moro problem - rather they are facing the age-old problem with new and threatening dimensions. Many Christian Filipinos still possess the ugly image of Moro, treacherous, cruel, savages, who had to be fought, subdued and civilized. Many Muslims still regard the government in Manila as the 'government of the foreign peoples,' and they look upon Christians as bullies, cheat and grabbers. Despite nearly half a century of independence, Filipino government failed to resolve the Moro problem; it could not erase from the Muslim minds, the psychological fears, brought in by the colonial history. Muslims are afraid that they would be alienated from their religion, their cherished values and traditions, would be mercilessly neglected, their land and home grabbed and they would be rendered helpless slaves of Christian government. Seen in the context of the government of the Philippines and Christian majority community, Moro problem can be analysed in four different aspects. Economic problems generated by Christians migrations in the South from northern provinces helped in rendering the Moros permanently backward. Muslim social and political structures always confronted the reluctantly adopted

development programmes and resisted the modernization policies. Muslim religious and legal system based on Koranic laws always sustained the obsolete judicial mechanism in a way that a Moro is perceived as a 'fanatic creature' or 'Juramentados' necessarily to be declared 'criminals' in the eyes of twentieth century jurisprudence. Absolute spiritualism hanging between blind faith and poverty always feared modern education as vehicle of degeneration and anti-Islam. The net result was that Muslims in southern Philippines who thwarted greatest European powers in Mindanao, became the 'prisoners of history' in these tropical islands.

Poverty and backwardness which is partly a side effect of Muslim religious and social values is primarily a product of massive migrations of Christians in fertile Muslim lands. Muslims fear that they would be displaced from their ancestral homeland. Where once the Muslims occupied most of the areas of Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu archipelago, now they are left only with 17 per cent of the land area of two Lanaos, Basilan and North Cotabato.² The rapid contraction of the Muslim land holdings was brought about by governmental programme like National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), Land Settlement and Development Corporation

1. Rita G. Baltazar, "Islam and Secession," Solidarity, VI, 4 (April 1971), p.70.

2. Mamintal A. Tanso, Report on Deteriorating Peace and Order Conditions in Cotabato, Filed by Committee on National Minorities, Manila, April 1971, p.22.

(LABEDICO), Rehabilitation and Development Corporation (EDCOR), Land authority and now the United Authority for Rehabilitation and Settlement (UAR).³ Every programme sponsored by government encouraged still more Christians to settle in the South. From the early 1900 till now there is influx of settlers in the Kagayan valley, Lake Lanao and Mindanao. It was a response to 'land hunger' appeased by discrimination against Muslims. In fact successive generations from Luzon, Samar, Leyte, Bohol, Cebu, Panay and Romblon moved further in deep South.⁴

Since 1939, the southern Mindanao provinces of Cotabato, Davao and Zamboanga, have consistently positive balance of net migration. The Visayans and Tagalog migrants were mainly looking for agricultural land.⁵

Between 1948 and 1960 more than two million Christians were added to the Muslim population of Mindanao. Other 1.3 million were found new arrivals between 1960 and 1970. Due to these mass migrations best fertile land

3. Alunan C. Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration? Quezon City, 1969, p.26.
4. Damascio Alonto, "Coping with Internal Migration in the Philippines," Solidarity, Vol.VIII, No.1, July 1973, pp.16-17.
5. Wernetdt, Frederick L. and Ginkins, Paul D., "Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXV, No.1, November 1965, p.102.

in Mindanao and in other areas of southern Philippines was occupied by the Christians. This resulted in direct confrontation between the two communities. To add to the wrath of the Muslims most of the commercial centres as Iligan, Cagayan de Oro and Davao etc. also came under the control of the Christians.⁶ In the rural areas of Mindanao and Sulu, the ethnic balance was altered by this influx of migrants. It had been estimated that from 1903-1906, the proportion of Muslim Filipinos in the population of Mindanao had gone down from 31 per cent to 20 per cent and the pressure of Christian settlers had been so heavy that in the predominantly Muslim province of Cotabato, where they were about 80 per cent in 1935, in 1960 they constituted only about 35 per cent of the total population.⁷

In the Lanao-Cotabato area the Muslims are evenly matched with a considerable Christian population as shown in the following table.

Table-1
Muslim-Christian Population Distribution, 1948

Province	Muslim	Christian	Total
Lanao (Sur and Norte)	237,215	104,300 ¹	341,512
Cotabato	167,700	230,470 ¹	387,970 ³

6. Ibid., p.104.

7. Calculated from Journal of Philippine Statistics, Vol.V, Table 7, p.16.

The above table shows that in Cotabato the Christians have a numerical majority over the Muslims, but in Lanao the latter still constitute the majority. Instead of Muslim majority according to the 1939 census, there are almost an even number of Muslims and Christians settling or cross-penetrating into each others community as shown in the table below.

Table-2
Population

<u>Muslim Area</u>	<u>Muslims</u>	<u>Christians</u>
Marawi City (formerly Dansalan)	16,995	2,643
Baloi Municipality	8,250	3,248
Malabang Municipality	8,533	1,806
Canassi District	9,235	338
Tamparan District	10,371	357
Lumbatan District	8,599	505
Total	61,983	8,897

<u>Christian Area</u>	<u>Muslims</u>	<u>Christians</u>
Iligan City	2,338	24,632
Kapatagan Municipality	6,997	6,975
Kasugan Municipality	1,218	9,756
Kolembagan Municipality	1,120	18,239
Tubod Municipality	481	31,201
Total	12,154	90,803

Obviously, situation shown by the tables is a serious correlation of ethnic and cultural contact where

the problem of "integration" is of grave concern to government administration and the national programme of community development. Peaceful accommodation in these areas seems a remote possibility.

It is difficult to estimate how many of these migrations were encouraged by government itself. Wernsted and Simkins opine that around 10 per cent of these migrants in Mindanao can be ascribed to stimulation through government-sponsored projects.⁹

The schemes for migrations were initiated by American authorities. The 'homestead' idea was introduced in 1957 under the public land act. Instead of improving the conditions of small farmers (which it posed to do), the Act encouraged big farmers and corporations to invest in Mindanao's resources. Prominent among these corporations were large Japanese Abaca (Manila Hemp) plantation in Davao, pineapple plantation in Del Norte and Bukidnon and several coconut plantations in Basilan and Zamboanga.¹⁰

8. Hunt, Chester, "Ethnic Stratification and Integration in Cotabato," Philippine Sociological Review, Manila, January 1957, p. 28.

9. Wernsted and Simkins, n.5, p. 87.

10. Edralin, Joseja, "Programme that Directly Affect Migration in the Philippines," Report A-3, UP-Internet Project, 1972 (typescript).

The essential failure of 'homestead' system to attract small and middle peasants and farmers resulted in the introduction of 'agriculture colonies' subsidized by the government. Such colonies were started in 1913; by 1917 it became clear that they were also doomed to failure. By 1918 the government introduced a new scheme, suiting to the interests of the already rich farmers.¹¹

However, because of the Second World War and other reasons, the New Land Settlement Administration was able to open only two settlements, one in Cotabato and the other in Isabela. In 1950 the New Land Settlement Administration was dissolved and replaced by Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASE DECO). Its functioning having been characterized by corruption, inefficiency and favouritism, this agency lasted only for four years. On 18 June 1954, the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration was created to help speed up the free distribution of agricultural land of the public dominion to the landless tenants and farm workers and encourage migrations in scarcely populated areas.¹² Under this scheme subsidies were extended to Christian settlers in frontier areas. These settlers were provided numerous facilities and free land in southern Philippines. During

11. Ibid., p. 17.

12. Wernstedt and Ginkins, n. 5, p. 92.

this early phase of migration Mindanao was publicized as the 'land of promise' triggering off numerous migrations. Government provided infrastructure, built roads and bridges which made an easy access to southern parts of the country for the migrant settlers. Enough medical facilities were extended to the Christian migrants in Mindanao.¹³

We need not belabour the fact that various Filipino governments since the American occupation up to the present have launched settlement programmes for Christians like LAGUDEC, NARBA, EDCOR etc. There is, however, not even a single example of this kind of effort for the development of Muslims. There are thousands of landless Muslims - in severe lack of primary initiatives and ordinary facilities for their proximity to virgin land.

This discrimination against Muslims in South in the development programmes and land/resettlements has produced a genuine apathy in Muslim mind. They think that their future is bleak in the Philippines. One of the findings of the Senate Committee on 'National Minorities' about 'Catabato war' is that Muslims are

13. Ibid., p.95

pessimistic about their future. They were convinced that justice and equal opportunities were being denied to them by the Christian government.¹⁴

This antipathy is not the product of some recent happenings, although it has been exacerbated by the successive government programmes. In a huge gathering on 18 March 1935, at Davao (now Marawi city) a declaration was read out and forwarded to the American Congress. It stated with considerable prophetic insight: "We foresee, what conditions we will be in and our children when independence is granted to these islands. The future conditions will be characterized by the sufferings, unrest and misery; our Christian associates have for many years shown their desire to be the only privileged with fortunes of development and modern cities, their provinces progress by leaps and bounds and our areas lay behind."¹⁵

It is quite true that since 1946 special laws have been passed for special benefit of the minorities, including the Muslims, like Republic Act No. 1888, which created the Commission for National Integration. Nevertheless, these laws are far away from the fulfilment of their

14. Mamintal A. Tamano, "How to Solve the Muslim Problem without Bullets," Solidarity, Vol. VIII, No. 6, December 1973, p. 21.

15. Ibid., p. 26.

basic objectives. These massive regulations and enactments have been rendered bulky heap of papers because of vested interests. And one finds a yawning gap between reality i.e., worsening conditions of Muslims and ideal-the development of Filipino Muslims, as is projected in the legislation.

Muslims feel that they are treated as second-rate citizens, who are denied any participation in decision-making process of government. They think they are victimized in a country dominated by Christians. It is a pity, they believe, that they can play significant role in national and international affairs, but they are miserably neglected.

Muslims know that they do not have a justiciable share in the developing economic gains of the nation. Although industries have bourgeoned in proximity to the predominantly Muslim areas, it is ironical that the benefits of industrialization and urbanization have scarcely touched the lives of the Muslims. Most of the mills, factories, industries in these areas do not have even supervisory staff taken from local Muslim community. Most of the private firms, pasture lease concessions and tourist centres in predominantly Muslim areas are owned by Christians and the Muslims are considered 'squatters'

in their own homeland.¹⁶ While the Muslims did not migrate to Christian dominated islands, own mining, plantation, run Islamic schools in Christian localities, the Christians have seized the economy from Muslims. Obviously, the Muslims also have their share in the creation of the problem which is basically the outcome of governmental policies of discrimination and Christians general attitude of hatred towards them.

The Commonwealth period saw the adoption of a policy of socio-economic development of the cultural minorities. President Queson, speaking to the people of Lanao on 6 June 1946 remarked: "Mohammedans and you the Christians constitute one people, and over you preside a chief executive and national Assembly elected by you and you alone. Muslim Filipinos will receive exactly the same consideration, the same protection, the same treatment as the Christian Filipinos. In this country Muslim Filipinos will feel the weight of justice as much as the Christian Filipinos."¹⁷ Later, noting that there no justification for the existence of Bureau of non-Christian Tribes (BNCT), he told before the first national Assembly: Considering the marked advancement in civilization and general progress of the inhabitants of the special

16. Cesar A. Majul, The Historical Background of the Muslims in the Philippines and the Present Mindanao Crisis, Calcutta City, 1972, p.54.

17. Peter G. Gowing, and Macaris Robert D. eds., The Muslim Filipinos, Manila, 1974, p.260.

provinces, the so-called non-Christian problem has been reduced to one of solidification and development.

On 24 October 1935 the office of the Mindanao and Sulu was created to replace the BECT and was charged with the responsibility of administering special provinces, municipalities and municipal districts in Mindanao and Sulu and directing and coordinating the development work there. This office undertook the assignments of construction of infrastructural network and the supervision of socio-economic development of Mindanao and Sulu. President Quezon emphasized in his speeches at the development of southern Philippines and also suggested a 'radical change' in existing system in Mindanao and Sulu. He pointed out that "the Government is dutybound to protect the common people from the control and exploitation of these Muslims-Christian Filipinos, whether they be called Sultans, Datu, leaders, hacenderos and caciques, who would exploit or abuse them." Governors and municipal presidents were given instructions to deal with datu, Sultans and caciques under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu.¹⁸

But the governmental policies of modernization and development and equal treatment to Sultan, Datu or ordinary

18. Charles A. Barriner, "Progress in the Southern Philippines," Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, February 1960, pp. 10-15.

Muslim could not produce desirable results partly because Quezon government like others had its own limitations in the execution of the policies, particularly in economic development process and partly because of resistance provided by traditional social dichotomies deep-rooted in Islamic system and supported by rigid Muslim mentality. The government was forced to change its policy. It even sought active cooperation of Sultans and datos to implement the programmes if any.

Representation of different groups in various professions and occupations are as follows:

Table-3¹⁹

Birth Place and Occupation of those Listed in Cotabato

Occupation	Ilocos	Mindanao	Visayas	China	Cotabato	Cent. Luzon
1. Farmer	8	10	12	0	10	4
2. Govt. official	9	4	32	0	24	11
3. Business	2	3	12	10	6	5
4. Teacher	7	2	10	0	2	5
5. Lawyer	4	1	5	0	1	10
6. Doctor	2	7	0	0	1	8
7. Others	9	0	9	0	2	10

Another selected sample from Cotabato is as follows:

19. Ibid., pp.121-31.

Table-4²⁰

Ethnic Origin of Professionals and Businessmen
in Cotabato

Occupation	Moro	Chinese Mestizo	Chinese	Christians
1. Lawyers	1	7	0	38
2. Physicians	1	2	0	10
3. Scientists	0	1	0	10
4. Engineers	0	1	1	25
5. Pharmacists	0	1	0	13
6. Other Professionals (excluding teachers)	0	0	1	37

The economic stratification reflects traditional lines of endeavour with agriculture shared between Moro and Christians; the Christians are predominant on governmental and professional work and the Chinese hold a commanding position in business. Masa J.O. Masa, a Philippine sociologist, who has lived in the area summarizes Moro-Christian tensions as follows: "The critical point of friction between the Muslims and Christians of today, is in relation to land distribution. It is a prevailing Muslim belief that the lands in the province including the uncultivated areas, are theirs by right of being the original settlers in Mindanao. So

20. Ibid., p.132.

for others to claim the lands even under the auspices of a governmental policy would smack of violation of this right."²¹ This explains the fact that especially in earlier years, a number of Christian settlers were stealthily liquidated by Moro elements in spite of the Christians acquisition of the land through governmental permission.

Policy of National Integration

The programmes of the government are referred to as the policy of 'National Integration' under Republic Act No. 1888. The term integration is defined as the mid-point between two extremes of assimilation and acculturation. In political terms it seeks to reconcile divergent cultures with minimum friction of legal equality between the two groups of people in unique circumstances of development.²²

A climate of unrest in predominantly Muslim areas characterized by a deteriorating peace and order situation, preceded the passage of Republic Act 1888. A considerable number of armed forces was utilized to quell the uprising led by Hadji Kamlon in Twi-twi, Sulu and Lanao Del Norte.

21. J.O. Masa, "Integration in Cotabato," Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review, Vol. XIX, March 1954, pp. 73-76.

22. Tamano Mamintal A., "Problem of the Muslims: A National Concern," Solidarity, Vol. IV, No. 3, March 1969, p. 14.

By 1954 the situation was so acute that the Philippine Congress established a committee to look into the 'More-Problem' - the problem of integrating the National Cultural minorities into the body politic by inculcating in their minds that they are part of Filipino nation.

In 1957 the Third Congress of the Philippines established the Commission of National Integration (CNI) through Republic Act No. 1888. Its purpose was to bring about rapid social, economic, moral and political advancement of the cultural minorities and to make "real, complete and permanent the integration of all the national cultural minorities."²³ Republic Act No. 1888 was amended by Republic Act No. 3852 in June 1957. It stated that from this time, the policy of government is to "foster, accelerate and accomplish by all means, and in a systematic and rapid manner, the advancement of non-Christian Filipinos, henceforth these groups will be called National Cultural Minorities (NCMs)."²⁴ Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1888 enumerates the various powers, functions and duties of the Commission thus: (a) to engage in industrial and agricultural enterprises and establish processing

23. Gowing and McAmis, eds., n. 17, p. 262.

24. Ibid., p. 263.

plants and cottage industries to lead HCHs in such pursuits and up on the attainment of the objectives, to sell such enterprises to them. (b) To construct, operate and maintain irrigation system, power structure for generating plants, electric, light, heat, power to inhabitants in the areas deprived of these services. (c) To co-operate with government agricultural experiment centres or demonstration farms to acquire knowledge of better methods of agriculture. (d) To effectuate the settlement of landless minority members, processing homelands to them in resettlement projects of National Resettlements and Rehabilitation Administration. (e) Establishment of more educational institutions and schools and encourage minority groups to attend the same. (f) To promote community life among the National Minority Communities by the establishment of civic centres, clubs, agro-industrial firms and communication services. (g) Subject to the approval of President, to contract laws if deemed necessary. (h) To acquire, lease or own such real and personal property as it deems necessary. (i) To train and assist in finding employment for minority members. (j) To grant financial assistance and scholarships to promote higher education. (k) To promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary for the successful implementation of this Act. In municipalities, provinces

and cities, inhabited by the NDCs, the CMI under direct control of presidency is the exclusive custodian of them. CMI is sole incharge of natural resources in the areas inhabited by NDCs since 1957. For the proper exploration and utilisation of these resources for minority welfare the Commission stipulates in section 6 of Republic Act 1988: To request the assistance of any official or employee of any department under government control or affiliated to it.²⁵ In order to protect the rights of minorities CMI is authorized to provide legal assistance through its legal division sending trial lawyers. Provisions are also made by Legal Division to provide legal assistance for the acquisition of the ownership of land and property which the minority occupied since the time of its forefathers.²⁶

CMI sponsors the 'spot surveys,' research projects, and investigation and brings out reports about the problems of minority communities. In 1967, a Tribal Research Centre (TRC) was established as an integral unit of the Commission. The TRC has worked for collecting bibliographical material regarding the development programmes and problems of minority communities. It has embarked upon a world-wide publication exchange programme and has contributed services of a trained researcher to write the history of accomplishment of CMI from 1957-1967. Furthermore, it has organized

25. Ibid., p.264.

26. Op.cit., in Manintal A. Tamano, n.2, p.18.

convocations with University of the Philippines, hastened the preparatory 'commission on the study of Muslim Filipinos,' and laid the foundations for making CMI a prospective grantee of Asian Foundation, SEATO, UNESCO Fund for Peace Programme etc.²⁷

The Heard and the Ugly Truth

Criticism has been levelled against CMI. Much of it resulted from either a lack of understanding or information regarding CMI's objectives. This is true that CMI could not do much about integration for which it was created in 1957.. President Marcos expressed the failure of the Commission in a speech, when he said: "Integration could be truly accomplished when there would be no need of a specialized agency such as CMI to cater to the needs of cultural minorities."²⁸

Undeniably there exists huge mass of landless destitute and ignorant minority. We will find minority groups who have not yet acquired a sense of belonging to the Philippines.

CMI failed in the fulfilment of its objectives because of the following reasons:

27. Ibid., p.21.

28. Mamintal A. Samano, "How to Solve Muslim Problem," Solidarity, Vol.VIII, No.6, December 1973, pp.17-18.

(a) Legal Deficiencies: It was not given fixed tenure in office. As a result long term projects could not be pushed through. Untimely changes required a change in administrative machinery and the new comers were unaware of previous work and initiated new things.

(b) Political Motives: It has to be taken into account for proper safeguard that political motivations are not the basis of any appointment.

(c) Financial Deficiencies made the fulfilment of objectives really impossible.

Most significant points of the policies framed by government and CBI remained unimplemented. There is nothing strange about the failure of CBI because of legal-financial deficiencies and even politically motivated personnel appointments. Had there been enough time and fixed tenure, there would have been some result. Basic objectives are prone to be boiled by vested interests. It happened in the case of CBI also. It should be noted to bring efficiency that future policies should not be plagued by vested interests.

Consequently, the contradictions between Muslims and Christians hence became more pronounced than in the past. The cleavages are taking new forms of confrontation as Muslims find themselves in the whirlpool of poverty, misery and deprivation even in Moroland. These contradictions can be explained in numerous ways.

Contrary to the position of contemporary Filipino historians, the Muslims assert that their struggle against Western colonialism constitute an integral part, if not the primary basis, of the development of Filipino nationhood. It can be stated that well-known Filipino historians have grossly misrepresented the Moro resistance against foreigners. Such a heroic resistance as that of Moros is usually associated with 'brutal raids' and 'piracy.' This unfair description and distortion serves as the continuous divisive factor between the Muslims and Christians. To illustrate this point it might be interesting to know how Agoncillo and Guerrero briefly describe Moro resistance against Spaniards. "The Moros as they were derisively referred to by the Spaniards, retaliated by pilfering coastal towns under Spanish control and carrying off hundreds of defenseless natives for sale in slave markets of Borneo and the East Indies. Moro raids often depopulated the fringes of the colony and resulted in neglect of economic development of these areas."²⁹

The charge of piracy cannot be denied, but it was never an officially declared policy of Moro sultanates. Moro government strangely indicated their dislike for piracy and promised time and again to curb this dangerous practice. In the words of Dr. Majul: "It is true that

29. See, Gowing and McAmis eds., n. 17, p. 267.

there were Sulu and Maranao pirates, but these gave the sultanate too the cause for concern, common with the Spaniards. But Spaniards found it convenient to lament the charges of piracy only on Moros and used this excuse for invasions of Muslimland.³⁰

Filipino history speaks much of the Christian heroes, of Burgos, Rizal, Bonifacio, Aguinaldo, Luna, Mabini and others, but it is completely silent about the heroism of Raja Suleyman of Manila, Sultan Wasit I of Sulu, Sultan Qadarat, Datu Uto, to mention a few. This less-than-fair interpretation of history forces Muslims to think that in the eyes of this nation, heroism is the monopoly of Christians only. Moreover, the school textbooks only speak of the heroism of northerners in alliance with western colonisers against Moros. This led them to believe that their heritage and history are not given due recognition. The exceptions are brief accounts on the introduction of Islam and 'Moro wars' where Muslim heroism is labelled as piracy. One is tempted to say that Filipino historians being victims of prejudice, do not find the sense of patriotic fervour in Muslim nationalism, that this nation may be proud of.

30. Ibid., p.269.

The Spanish interpretation of word 'Moro' was derogatory and linked with 'pirates' and 'juramentado.' The Christians today see the Moro in the same image. Traditional hatred of Spaniards about a Muslim was taught to Filipinos also. They preached that a Moro is a sworn enemy of their newly acquired faith. We should bear in mind that Spaniards did it to divide the two communities in order to conquer the Moroland.

The character of Moro is very often equated with 'Juramentado' who, according to some biased scholars, feel too happy to kill a Christian.

Like most of the Philippines, life in Moroland is primarily based on agriculture. But during the American regime the traditional system of land-holding in the South was replaced by a western model. In those days acquiring land ownership was alien to Muslims. For centuries land-holding system was governed by customary law (adat) which recognized ownership without any legal title. Under such circumstances it was easy for the Christian settlers from the North and influential persons from the South to acquire land titles.

Aside from these, very limited opportunities were provided to the Muslims for education and employment. Discriminatory attitudes towards education serve to perpetuate community division, while common pressure

towards the acquisition of western culture tends to bring together students from different groups. Each group maintains its own educational system. Though recently some attempts have been made to systematize and broaden education, the traditional Moro schooling was confined to wandering imams who held informal classes, where students learned to read, but not to interpret, Arabic script.

While the formal Islamic school may be a potent factor for future development, the main factor which separates Moros educationally is an indifference to education for boys and a widespread hostility to education for girls. Following table show a poor Moro interest in education:

Table-5³⁷

Maguindanao (Moro) Students in the Public Schools in Cotabato

Primary (Grade I to IV)	
Boys	653
Girls	194
Intermediate (Grade V and VI)	
Boys	217
Girls	28
High School	
Boys	165
Girls	18

37. Calculated from Journal of Philippine Statistics, Vol. V, No. 2, May-August, 1979, Table 9, p. 20.

In summary, one finds that many Moro children never enter the school and the great majority of those who do enrol, end formal education before reaching the fifth grade. The problems created by lack of education among Moros are compounded by growing incidence of dispossession of lands among them. A study completed by Senate Committee on cultural Minorities in 1963, pointed out to the significance of the problems arising from agrarian livelihood.³²

To a Moro his religion is his way of life. He feels that his religion is constantly decried and attacked by Christians. It erodes the Muslim's confidence in justice provided by the government and creates a feeling that there is an unspoken policy to alienate him from Islam. They do not find any justification in the legal system based on Christian morality, New Civil Code, which is essentially Spanish, and Code Napoleon.³³ Muslims remark: "Putting the shoe on other's foot, how our Christian brothers feel the pain; what will be their opinion if they are governed by Koranic law."³⁴ Muslims resented that Christian morality cannot bear respect for the Islamic sensitivities. For instance

32. Antonio Isidro, "Education of the Muslims," Solidarity, Vol.4, No.4, March 1969, p.10.

33. Chester L. Hunt, n.8, p.28.

34. Ibid., p.30.

pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the basic principles of Islam, and it cannot be compared to Christian pilgrimage to Rome or Jerusalem. Therefore, the government should never restrict it, nor should interfere with its conduct except to look after the safety of pilgrimage and other orderly duties regarding it.

Besides above-mentioned socio-economic and religious factors, there are cultural and psychological factors which generate animosity between two communities. Prejudice refers to subjective feeling while discrimination refers to behaviour which is normally manifested in differential as well as preferential treatment of individuals. In a study of ethnic attitudes in cities, it was found that the most rejected people were the Muslims, followed closely by the Chinese in the Philippines. This discrimination as shown by researchers was based on emotional decisions.³⁵ Muslims are accused of not contributing to the national development.

It can be summed up that based on governmental neglect, Christians' discrimination and Muslims' pacificism and pessimism the Christian-Muslim contradiction open up several times in violence and sharpened the differences. This confrontation is posing itself in new forms and changed dimensions.

35. See, Cowing and McAuliffe, eds., n. 17, p. 275.

CHAPTER-IV

ARAB-ISLAMIC SUPPORT AND ORGANIZED INSURGENCY

Because of long history of conflict between Christians and Muslims in the Philippines, the Muslims have developed their own prejudices towards the Christians and government. It has been observed that whenever cultural, economic and political interests and institutions of ethnic groups clash, a set of negative traits is attributed by one group to the other and is standardized as a result of the conflict.¹ The stereo-type of the Muslims as juramentado has a counterpart in the Christian as a rapacious and opportunist person and today a stereo-type of Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) have counterparts in Philippine Constabulary and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

It happened to be true in Philippines, where prejudice and discrimination exhausted the patience of Muslims when their problems got social, political and economic dimensions. These dimensions assumed treacherous form of strife resulting in bloodshed. It was for the first time after independence that in 1960s the Muslims rose in an organized movement against the Christians.

1. Alunan C. Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration? Quezon City, 1969, p. 26.

Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was organized by former Catabato governor Datu Uctog Matalam on May 1, 1968, following the Corregidor Massacre in March of the same year. Although the movement is something new, its history could be traced back to the American regime. When Filipinos were striving for independence from America, some Muslim leaders of repute expressed their separatist sentiment.

In 1910, during a public meeting, Datu Mandi of Sulu said: "If Americans do not want the Muslim province, they should give it back to us."² In 1923 Muslims in Zamboanga demonstrated during the celebrations of Jose Rizal Day and declared through their placards: "We Muslims are not with Christians in their pursuit of independence. We wish our country should be separated from Luzon and Visayan islands."³ In 1935 Muslim leaders of Lanao gathered at Dansalan and made a protest to the US Government on the inclusion of Morolandia into what is now the Republic of Philippines. Early in 1960s a Congressman of Sulu sponsored in the Congress a move to have Sulu declared a Republic.⁴

2. Ibid., p.27.

3. Ibid., p.28.

4. Ibid., p.33.

May 1, 1968 marks the beginning of this movement. There were demands for radical change in relations between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao. It was on this date that Datu Uctog Matalam signed a 'manifesto' calling for the establishment of an Islamic state including entire Muslim South to be known as 'Republic of Mindanao and Sulu.' The target date for the secession from the Republic of Philippines was July 4, 1969.⁵

The initial Muslim response to these declarations was characterized by lack of interest. It was thought to be the ploy of a disgruntled Muslim politician who had lost in election to a fellow Muslim. It is a fact that the MIM could not get massive support. Nevertheless, it bore serious consequences.

Christian settlers in the South became apprehensive of Muslims' activities. There were reports of evacuation from some parts. But generally Christian settlers resolved to stay back where they were in majority in order to defend their already acquired properties against expected Muslim attack. Thus tension grew and a situation of sporadic conflict emerged as 1969 drew to a close.⁶

MIM invoked the principle of 'self determination' for a Muslim state based on Islamic system. It cited the

5. Ibid., p.9.

6. Ibid., p.12.

example of Corregidor massacre and the terroristic activities of Christian 'Ilagas' in Muslim areas. It protested against the government policy of encouraging Christian migrations in the South.⁷

There were numerous reports about the Muslim secessionist movement and about Muslim youth getting arms training in the Middle East and neighbouring countries.⁸

On 22 March 1970, there was a sort of a signaling of 'shooting war' in Mindanao where six persons were reported killed in Upi. Shooting spread in other parts of South. Troubles in Catabato sprang up in course of time and NIM leaders capitulated over it for struggle for power.⁹ In response to Muslims' assertiveness, Ilagas started to organize community self-defence units to protect the Christians. Ilagas developed into goons with guns and became part of the criminal lawless elements in Mindanao. Violence and killings resulted in the closing of schools and mass evacuation of innocent victims. By

7. Rita O. Baltazar, "Muslim Filipinos: 1970-1972," Solidarity, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1963, p. 7.

8. Hilario Gomez, "A Christian Approach to Filipino Muslims," Church and Community, Vol. X, No. 4, July-August, 1970, p. 14.

9. Ibid., p. 20.

By the end of 1970 more than 30,000 Muslims and Christians had left their homes and farms, according to the estimates of Social Welfare Administration.¹⁰

In June 1971, newspapers screamed in headlines: "70 Muslims Massacred" in a square at Barrio Manili, North Cotabato. It was reported that Muslims - men, women and children - were killed by Ilagas while waiting there, for a peace conference between Muslims and Christians. These accounts also described how Ilagas were terrorizing other towns supposedly under the control of Philippines Constabulary (PC). Shortly before this incident a Muslim Senator warned to launch a 'Jihad' in Cotabato.¹¹ Additional forces were dispatched to bring about enforced peace. Some Muslims accused the government forces of being allies of Ilagas. Conflict spread in 1971 in Lanao del Sur, North Cotabato, Bukidnon boundary areas and thousands of Maranao Muslims reportedly evacuated and went to the lake Lanao area.¹² It provoked Muslims to form small groups called as 'Blackshirts' to counter Ilagas. Soon there were reports of Christians being ambushed and their houses burnt. This chain

10. Melvin Mednick, "Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization," Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1957, p. 40.

11. Robert B. McAsia, "Muslim Filipinos: 1970-1972," Solidarity, Vol. 8, No. 2, February 1973, p. 7.

12. Ibid., p. 9.

reaction led to a heavy loss of life and property of the common man. There were bloody clashes in Lanao del Norte, Cotabato between Christian armed bands, the Ilegas and Muslim counterparts known as Baracudas as between Philippine Constabulary and Baracudas.

Local and foreign Muslim leaders began the cry of 'genocide' and claimed that government forces were supporting Ilegas¹³ against Muslims. It resulted in the demand for negotiations to establish peace. A team including a Muslim Senator and Secretary for National Defense was dispatched by government to arrange a cease-fire. It brought about a very transitory peace. Reports of conflict between Baracudas and Ilegas, supported respectively by Muslims and Christians, revealed mass evacuations from conflict-torn areas. New attacks and massacres were experienced in southern Philippines. Thus the beginning of 1970s saw the horrifying scenes of murders and devastations.

Government's policy was ineffective. It rather helped in intensifying the conflict. Basically the government's policy was based on enforced peace with the help of army and constabulary. It was a very

13. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis eds., The Muslim Philippines, Manila, 1974, p.46.

superfluous attempt to solve such a serious problem. This was also coloured by petty electoral politics. President Marcos appointed committees to bring peace but electoral victory became the major objective of committee members. The emphasis shifted from surveying reporting committees to landing of Armed Police Forces.

In the first half of 1970s, the developments in the southern Philippines received a new dimension. Preparing themselves for the struggle, Muslim leaders now sought for external support. From then on, leadership of the Muslim mass support also became vigorous. It was helped by conservative Islamic ideas and reinforced by the systematic policy and programmes of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which emerged in 1971. Government's policy consequently shifted from 'armed operation' and 'blind suppression' to 'carrot-and-stick' approach. Cross interaction between Christians and Muslims, though of conflict, now underwent some new changes. Christians, from now on, did not think of 'Muslim's abolition' from the Philippines. Muslims also raised through MNLF no more cry that Christian was his 'industrial foe intent on massacres.'

The significant factor for these changes was the involvement of Arab-Islamic countries in the conflict. This enhanced the bargaining power of the MNLF, the Muslim's representative organization.

When the incidence of fatal raids and murders was touching its peak in late 1960s, a batch of young educated Muslims was reported having gone for training in remote areas of southern Philippines and nearby Malaysian state of Sabah.¹⁴ The people of Sulu archipelago had centuries' old relations and even family ties with their co-religionists in Sabah and the Indonesian islands of Sulawesi and Makassar. The then Chief Minister of Sabah, Datu Mustafa Datu Harun, was himself a Tausug warrior of Japanese occupation period having personal influence and family ties with the Sulu people.¹⁵ Muslims of the Philippines also approached West Asian countries with which they had contacts, centuries before the arrival of Spaniards. Muslim leaders also started participating in Islamic Conference meetings, though they were stopped by the Philippines government very often.¹⁶ These contacts had a meaningful impact on the Arab-Islamic opinion towards Muslim Filipinos. As the violence was perpetrated by the Ilagas supported by the Philippine Constabulary, the Arab-Islamic world came to the support of the Filipino Muslims. The Libyan delegate raised the issue of mass killings at a meeting of the sub-commission

14. Ibid., p.47.

15. Ibid., p.49.

16. Ibid., p.51.

of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNCHR) in August 1971. He was supported by some other Muslim countries as well.¹⁷ Significantly enough, the issue was raised at an International forum for the first time and it put the Philippine Government on the defensive. The UNCHR asked the Philippine Government to look to the complaints lodged with it, and some envoys of Islamic countries, including those from Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia, visited Mindanao. These diplomats reportedly confirmed that there were murderous assaults on Muslims. They, however, declared that it was an internal affair of the Philippines.¹⁸

The Muslims were encouraged to note that the Arab-Islamic world support to their cause was readily forthcoming. In February 1972, in the third Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, King Faisal of Saudi-Arabia referred to the 'Muslim massacres' and stressed the need for solidarity and cooperation. The Conference also nominated a team of Muslim leaders to look after the affairs of their Muslim brothers in the Philippines.¹⁹ In response to President Marcos's approach through the Muslim Speaker of the Philippines House of Representatives

17. Ibid., p.52.

18. Ibid., p.67.

19. Ibid., p.13.

Pendaltun, Egyptian President Sadat ordered urgent aid for the development of Muslim Filipinos. Various Arab countries assured the visiting Speaker aid for about half a million displaced Muslims.²⁰ Without a slight change in the official Philippines support to Israel, Pendaltun expressed Marcos's desire for Arab economic assistance. In a tough tone President Khaddafi of Libya charged Filipino Government with inspiring the Christians for genocide in southern Philippines and declared every kind of support to Muslims through Muslim leadership.²¹ There were some reports in 1972 about the supply of Libyan arms through Pakistan. The same kind of reports of 'armed training camps in Sabah' were referred to by the Manila Government in 1972.²²

Egyptian-Libyan Mission

The Islamic Conference mission visited the Philippines from 1 to 9 July 1972 and spent four days in Mindanao. In his talks with the Mission President Marcos de-emphasized the religious content of the conflict in the South and stated instead that extremists and leftists were provoking the violence. He also stated that

20. Ibid., p. 14.

21. Ibid., p. 15

22. Ibid., p. 21

some dissidents were inciting Muslim wrath.²³ The Mission, however, did not accept these justifications whole-heartedly. It accepted that there was no genocide campaign, but felt that the conflict between Muslims and Christians was becoming a religious war. The Mission also recommended to the government of Libya and Egypt the dispatches of relief aid for Muslim refugees and stated that unless the government stopped this mutual killing of Christians and Muslims, a major religious war loomed over South.²⁴ Later in a statement in Beirut, the Libyan delegate revealed that the Mission had called upon the Philippine President to stop the massacre of Muslims and to return their usurped lands; he compared the situation in southern Philippines to that of pre-1948 Palestine.²⁵

The Benghazi Conference

Muslim rebellion in southern Philippines and their tough fight with Philippine armed forces attracted the serious attention of the Fourth Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Benghazi (Libya) in March 1973. Already in 1972-73, a Libyan envoy had visited various Islamic countries including Indonesia and Malaysia in

23. B.D. Arora, "Insurgency in the Southern Philippines: Domestic and Foreign Implications - I," Foreign Affairs Report, (ICWA, November 1975, p. 184.

24. Ibid., p. 184.

25. Arab Report and Record, No. 13, 1-15, July 1972, p. 343.

this connection. He had carried the message from President Khaddafi seeking support for the Libyan proposal to condemn or sever diplomatic relations with the Philippines.²⁶ In his inaugural address to the Conference the President of Libya gave a call to the Muslims to unite to resolve the problems of the Islamic world. Libyan Foreign Minister Mansur Al-Kikhia stated that 4 million Muslims in the Philippines were facing collective genocide by Marcos and his Christian groups.²⁷ But Malaysian and Indonesian delegates played a very significant role in shifting the approach of the Conference towards Muslim problem, i.e. a suggestive and reformist approach. A Mission consisting of foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Somaliland and ambassador of Senegal to Egypt visited the violence-ridden areas in southern Philippines. It held discussions with Muslim leaders and people in general and assured Islamic countries' economic assistance to them. It is reported that delegates in the Mission were convinced of the sincerity of President Marcos in solving the problems of Muslims.²⁸

Regional Implications

At Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) ministerial meeting at Pattaya (Thailand) in April 1973,

26. B.D. Arora, n.23, p.185.

27. Patriot, New Delhi, 27 March 1973.

28. Asia Research Bulletin, April 1973, p.7, Vol.2, No.11, pp. 1-31.

Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, Carlos P. Romulo, thanked the Indonesian and Malaysian delegates for their attitude of friendship and co-operation at the Benghazi Conference. He emphasized at the unity amongst ASEAN members to solve the regional problems.²⁹ However, the approach of the Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, as quite contrary to the one adopted by the ex-Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, really helped in diffusing the problem in the tense atmosphere that prevailed at the Conference.

This encouraging development now depended on the Filipino Government's attitude towards long-standing dispute over Sabah. In May 1973 there were some reports that Filipino Government had proposed to Malaysia a quid-pro-quo, suggesting renunciation of its claims over Sabah, if the latter gave the assurance that Mustapha Government of Sabah would not give sanctuary to Muslim rebels. But Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak denied such reports and emphasized that 'Muslim problem' was an internal problem of the Philippines.³⁰ All this showed that there were some serious discussions in the process between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah.

29. See text of the Press Statement in Foreign Affairs Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Vol.6, No.2, June 1973, pp. 29-31.

30. See, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol.6, No.2, September 1973, p.41.

At the second Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in 1974, both Indonesia and Malaysia endeavoured to change the hard stance of Islamic countries towards Philippines. Over a month and a half before the Conference, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik declared in a statement that "Indonesian participation in the Conference is conditioned on the Conference confining to the question of peace in West Asia." "Indonesia," he said, "wanted to avoid the type of embarrassment it had suffered at the Benghazi Conference on the issue of Muslim Insurgency in Philippines."³¹ A couple of days before the Conference, Premier Razak stated that "We have conveyed our concern over recent happenings in southern Philippines." He, however, realized that it was an internal affair of the Philippines.³² At the Summit Conference Prime Minister Razak made it clear that the Conference should not discuss the problem of southern Philippines because it was now taken up by ASEAN.³³ While Libyan delegate raised the issue vehemently and proposed a separate Muslim state in southern Philippines, the Indonesian and Malaysian delegates brought to light the different

31. Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 11, March 1973, p. 9.

32. Times of India, 12 January 1974.

33. See, B. D. Arora, n. 23, p. 197.

programmes of economic development launched by President Marcos. Malaysia and Indonesia thus set the tone of the Conference for a subsequent resolution calling upon the Philippine Government to desist from all measures which resulted in the killing of Muslims and proposed further that the Philippine Government should negotiate with the MNLF for a peaceful solution of the problem.³⁴

The attitude of Malaysia and Indonesia in subsequent Islamic Conferences towards the Philippines shows that some serious negotiations were going on over Sabah dispute. It seems that the attitude of the Philippine Government towards Sabah dispute was not against Malaysia. The outcome of the Conference showed that it was because of the Malaysian and Indonesian approach towards the Muslim problem in the framework of unity among the ASEAN partners that the pressures of Arab-Islamic countries, especially Libya, failed to move the Philippine Government in finding an immediate solution in favour of Muslim Filipinos. Amity between Malaysia and the Philippines was the net regional implication and its cost is being paid by Muslim Filipinos. Malaysian national interests in its relation with the Philippines prevailed so much so that at Kuala Lumpur Conference in 1975 the demand for separate Muslim

34. M.G.G. Pillai, "Razak: The Peacemaker," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 26, 1 July 1974, pp. 12-13.

state in southern Philippines was disapproved by Malaysia.

One of the most significant outcome of the Arab-Islamic support to the cause of Muslim Filipinos was the emergence of MNLF as a representative political organization. Its organized leadership pressurized the Islamic states to help the Muslim Filipinos, and this brought a change in the mode of struggle.

Relations between the MNLF and the Arab-Islamic states and the latter's readiness to extend support showed religious content of the MNLF's ideology. Its leaders claimed that MNLF was a nationalist organization with the objective of liberation of Bangsa Moro people.³⁵ It declared that though Islamic ideals could not be neglected, the objective of the MNLF would be to eliminate exploitation and oppression to which the Bangsa Moro people have been subjected by the big leaders and capitalists among themselves. The MNLF thus started on the basis of heroic age-old struggle of the Moros against colonialism. At the present stage of its struggle, however, new elements in its leadership are well educated and include a significant number of radicals, who had been associated with Kabataan Bazar - a radical student

35. Harrey Stockwin, "Rebellion's Communal Fallout," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 9, 4 March 1974, pp. 12-13.

organization formed by Jose Ma Sison, Chairman of the outlawed Communist Party. MNLF has a Central Committee, Political Bureau, propaganda system, Internal Bureau and a regular army known as Bangsa Moro Army. This advance structural machinery shows the profound indoctrination and ideological strength of the MNLF. It can be said that the MNLF is a radical, nationalist Muslim organization based on the pattern of some other guerrilla separatist organizations like PLO.

Islamic Mission formed at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Lahore (1974), submitted an investigation report at Kuala Lumpur Conference (1975). This Conference made five recommendations, one of which urged upon President Marcos to consider MNLF as the representative of Muslim Filipinos.³⁶ Now onwards MNLF would work as chief negotiator and driving force of the Muslims' cause.

During her visit to Libya in late 1974, First Lady Imelda Marcos agreed with President Khaddafi to open the negotiations between MNLF and Filipino Government. In the first round of talks in Jeddah in January 1975, Muslim demand for autonomy for the whole of southern Philippines caused a stalemate. As tough fighting was in progress in southern Philippines, the demand for 'total' autonomy was again turned down in the second round of talks at Tripoli in December 1975.

36. Ibid., p. 14.

Both sides were adamant on their positions and only a 'ceasefire agreement' could be reached at, starting from 24 December 1975 to be consolidated by January 1976. A Committee of 52, comprising equal number of MNLF and government representatives with Islamic Conference members was given the responsibility to initiate another round of talks in Tripoli and then a peace agreement was scheduled to be signed in Manila on 7 April where President Khaddafi had been invited.³⁷

The question of grant of autonomy to 19 disputed provinces was discussed. The provinces were Cagayan Sulu, Sibutu, Twi Twi, Tapai, Jolo, Gamals, Pangutaran, Filas, Basilan, Tapiantana, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Misamis, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davavo, Davavo del Sur, Cotabato, South Cotabato.³⁸ This was in the face the original MNLF demand for the whole of the Mindanao and Sulu region consisting of 27 provinces.

The exact area to come under this proposed Muslim region is still to be debated. The government has remarked that regional autonomy, not a federal system, is allowed under Article II of the Filipino Constitution which stipulates that "local governments may group themselves or

37. Rodney Tasker, "Marcos Moves Closer to Southern Peace," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, 7 January 1977, p. 24.

38. Ibid., p. 25.

consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources for the purpose of common benefit to them."³⁹ Strangely enough, this is precisely the article the MNLF wanted to invoke, but it is unacceptable to the government.

Joint ceasefire commission constituted under the Tripoli Agreement of December 1975 surveyed the conflict-torn area and reported that the number of homeless Muslims was increasing and their land was seized by Christians. It also reported that despite the "Cease-fire Agreement," government-dispatched troops were keeping their guns ready. There was a fear amongst Christians about the eventual establishment of the Muslim Security Forces mentioned in Tripoli talks. But finally it was felt on the basis of cooperative and constructive attitude of MNLF that success of coming round of talks in Manila depended on the government's attitude towards the problem. In January 1977 members of the Islamic Conference and MNLF representatives came to Manila for talks with President Marcos. In their statements they appreciated the cooperative attitude of the government to bring about peace.

Contrary to the spirit of this agreement, President Marcos began working on a loophole, which could reduce the

39. Ibid., p. 28.

size of the area to be granted autonomy. He announced that under the Constitution there should be a plebiscite in the affected areas. This was a move which, it is said, was not discussed in Tripoli.⁴⁰ The President worked on the assumption that the plebiscite would come out in favour of government. Following the next round of talks in Tripoli in February 1977, President Marcos declared that a plebiscite would be conducted in 13 southern provinces. MNLF resented that the plebiscite would result in the still bloody confrontation between Christians and Muslims.⁴¹ Talks in February thus had ended in smoke. Later, after a visit of the First Lady Imelda Marcos and her talks with President Khaddafi, the latter agreed with President Marcos through a cable exchange, "that autonomy to 13 southward provinces should be granted first and a provisional government thereby established with due participation of MNLF and then a referendum should be conducted to set administrative details of the autonomous region."⁴² President Marcos was, however, endeavouring to utilize the vague clause of the Tripoli Agreement and also misusing the talk of referendum in cable exchange. In reality government

40. Rodney Tashor, "The Moro Rebellion: Who Calls the Shots?" Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 2, January 14, 1977, p. 18.

41. Ibid., p. 20.

42. See, "The Legacy of Strike," ibid., p. 21.

feared the truth that if things moved according to Tripoli Agreement, Muslims would have their own educational system, their own judiciary to enforce the Muslim code of law and above all their own 'security forces' which could challenge the sovereignty of the Manila government. The government seemed to be caught on the wrong foot.

Ignoring this commitment thus, President Marcos gave a go ahead for a plebiscite which was subsequently held on 17 April 1977. It resulted in a predictable victory for Marcos, and all the 13 provinces consisting of Christian majority voted against the MNLF's demand for autonomy.

Reactions in Libya were quite adverse. The Libyan ambassador to Philippines, Mustafa Driess, took a different view of the plebiscite when he said: "This is not what was agreed up on in Tripoli and in cable exchange between the two presidents - rather it was an embarrassing distortion of the agreement."⁴³ It is not very clear whether Libyan leaders agreed to a plebiscite before the grant of autonomy and the establishment of a provisional government as committed by President Marcos. They, however, felt very much embarrassed at the results of the plebiscite.

43. Rodney Tasker, "Tight Rope Test for Marcos," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, January 21, 1978, p. 11.

Thus, after the breakdown of second round of negotiations, and a round of charges and counter-charges for the violation of 'Peace Agreement,' tension and violence erupted in place of temporary peace. The truce lay broken. President Marcos declared that the MNLF was now running on secessionist lines.⁴⁴ On the other hand, the MNLF leaders declared that the government was reluctant even to confer some concessions to Muslims and was totally disinterested in their economic and cultural development. Though the major demand of insurgents was autonomy for southern Philippines, they had stated that any negotiations with government were possible only when (a) venue of talks was outside Philippines; (b) it should be according to the framework set up in the Tripoli Agreement of December 1976; (c) it should be under the auspices of the Islamic Conference.

The government is still not declining negotiations and is trying hard to diffuse the problem through economic development programmes in the South and winning over the rebels to its side through economic inducements and high posts in government machinery. Still there are hill-side skirmishes and shooting between well-equipped and organized Bangsa Moro rebels and government forces. And the

⁴⁴. Sheilah Ocampo, "Marcos Still Calls the Shots," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 105, No. 32, August 10, 1979, p. 26.

peace-loving Muslims and Christians are yet to see permanent peace.

After the dead end reached at Tripoli, the ceasefire broke down in March 1977. Simultaneously, however, a considerable growth had taken place in the strength of Bangsa Moro Army (BMA - armed wing of MNLF). How this outlawed militia can be adjusted in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is a very serious question now as it was during and after the Tripoli Agreement of December 1975. In MNLF itself there has emerged a visible rift between moderates and radicals.⁴⁵ Because of this growing feud between the two factions, conservatives under the leadership of Cairo-based religious scholar Hashim Salamat, with its central Mindanao Command, have broken with MNLF in 1975. The radical militia of MNLF is being reported engaged in serious military activities sometimes resulting in massacres. In 1981 in Petta Brigadier General Teodulfo Batista was slayed by BMA along with 34 AFP soldiers. After this daring and damaging action of BMA, government is adopting militaristic and suppressive measures in southern Philippines. Very recently some changes are introduced

45. Richard Vokey, "Islands Under the Gun," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 112, No. 20, May 8, 1981, p pp. 36-40.

in the various commands of AFP in southern Philippines. And the appointment of Brigadier General Defin Castro in November 1981 in place of B.G. Jose Siazro Chief of Central Mindanao Command, shows that government changing its strategy from "carrot and stick" to strong stick to counter the MNLF forces.⁴⁶

To understand the present sequence of developments it is necessary to analyse three factors. There is a visible rift in Muslim leadership between Cairo-based moderates and pro-Libya Mission faction. Naturally under the influence of Islamic Socialist ideology, MNLF is more militant and properly organized. In the militant MNLF, on the other hand there is meek contradiction between conservative old and young leadership. Secondly, because of new radical orientation of MNLF it is leaning towards action coordination with outlawed Communist guerrillas. And lastly because of these reasons Philippine Government is employing strict suppressive-military measures to contain the MNLF influence.

46. Rodney Tasker, "The Drift to the Left," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 113, No. 35, August 21, 1981, pp. 17-22.

CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSION

Peace can be established if human destiny is guided by reason. Very often, reason is perceived as unconcrete and abstract. And the truth is exactly reverse of it. In the case of Moro insurgency problem, the objective circumstances are replete with unrest, conflict, antipathy, tensions, fear and despair. From our detailed analysis of plans of government regarding southern Philippines and of Moro reaction to it, we are impelled to conclude that a confusion and discordant massive overlapping helped in the stage by stage escalation of the problem. It also appears that most government policies aimed at solving the problem through 'integration' and 'assimilation.' These policies require a proper correlation with the objective conditions in Moro society in order to be effective for the promotion of peace. Formation of an autonomous Moro Province with genuine legal-constitutional mechanism grounded in Moro socio-cultural conditions can soothe the flames in the South.

The demand for an autonomous Moro province can hardly be met with decorative regional autonomy which does not cover socio-economic and cultural guarantees.

An autonomous province with properly defined boundaries and widely debated constitution, can be reorganized within the federal system of government.

The question of establishment of autonomous Moro province as a genuine solution of the Moro problem, can be analysed in various dimensions keeping in view 'cognitive value' in Philippine society as also its historical perspective.

First of all the government of the Philippines will have to realize what centuries of bloodbath and tension have clarified, that is, Muslim Filipinos cannot be annihilated enmasse. Neither the problem could be solved with piecemeal programmes for economic and social development. If the government is an agency to establish peace and harmony, it will have to rise above the interests of various influential groups in society. We have seen that once the government strove to establish peace through the creation of autonomous province, it received the hearty cooperation of different peace-loving groups of Christian and Muslim communities. The attitude of non-Muslim Filipinos appears to be passive in general. But it can be observed that the establishment of an autonomous Moro province would not face much opposition.

Regarding the economic, social and cultural development of Moros in the mainstream of national life, the Christians will have to sacrifice only their obsolete religious prejudices. Though social development in general has been dependent on the level of economic forces the educative role of government-sponsored agencies on the path of progress of prime importance. If the government of the Philippine and Christian Filipinos seek peace and progress, it is necessary that they should pay the attention towards advancement in economic, social, cultural and educational aspects and the Moros should be given their due in these spheres of life. Though it is a difficult condition to be fulfilled, it is desirable for national integration and social harmony.

Moros throughout modern history have been victims of propaganda based on smug religious obscurantism. Though it always suited the interests of rulers, it served in tearing asunder the Moros from the rest of the society. Obviously, it necessitates justice for Moro social milieu in the Philippines. These are ethical and social responsibilities imposed on Filipino society and need to be carefully implemented through proper political machinery for the well-being of society.

The discharge of these heavy responsibilities appears the only way for the realization of peace.

Another significant requirement is the changing level of social development. Moros, though backward economically, have sufficient grounds for their claim for autonomy. History of their relations with Spaniards, Americans, and later on with Filipinos, provide glaring evidence to the fact that a reasonable degree of autonomy is the only genuine solution to their problems. Though the nature of their confrontation had been religious till the archipelago obtained independence from United States, present contradictions are emerging in economic and political forms. It is certain that long history of their struggle has kept the Moros in the morass of poverty and backwardness, but given a suitable environment, it would not take much time to improve the material lot of the people.

Socially, there is no doubt that Islamic way of life has held Moros in poor and miserable conditions; but this is a way of life which has the potential to coexist with modern society. Here arises a question of advancement in socio-economic fields. Progress in science and technology will not only loosen the ethnic ties but also remove ignorance of all kinds.

In the present conditions we do not find strong base for the establishment of an autonomous Moro Province. Nevertheless, the southern Philippines possess huge stores of natural wealth and fertile land. It requires a

judicious allocation of resources and national exploitation for the benefit of all. A justifiable distribution can only be accomplished by honest and dedicated leadership. Although, very often in history the demands for national self-determination are raised by strong emerging class of bourgeoisie and intellectuals, yet lack of organic development in the mode of production and of education has handicapped the Filipino Muslims in producing a strong nationalist leadership. In this context the ideological orientation of MNLF leadership seems to be in consonance with the demands of the present situation.

From MIM to MNLF, through the process of the Moros' struggle, there has emerged strong leadership with qualitatively different mode of thinking. The MNLF leadership, instead of playing on communal sentiments is aware of the basic ethos of the Moro society and possess a lucid understanding of socio-economic dichotomies. Present leaders with their internationalist outlook and broad-mindedness are striving hard to solve the political impasse. Their strategic pressure on Filipino Government and society may cut short the birth pangs of an autonomous Moro state within the Republic of the Philippines.

Anatomy of Autonomy

The Muslims of the southern Philippines did not, after all, develop their culture and society in a vacuum. They have been active participants throughout the long centuries in the dynamic process of production and cultural change in the whole Malay island world. These processes were weakening, when the Muslim Filipinos resorted to arms to maintain their identity. They felt threatened when they were forced to integrate with the rest of the country through Christianization. This confrontation reflects that integration is not a cultural or religious problem. Cultural and religious dimensions of Moro-Spanish rivalry and a determined Moro resistance to any American interference in these affairs proves the political nature of the problem. But politics is connected with broad horizons of material development in general. Both these aspects lead towards peaceful and integrated development, which in its turn require not only integration of Moros in the Philippine society but autonomy for the Moros' political and economic development.

Autonomy for Moroland, if analysed and understood with all its four factors, i.e. the government of the Republic of the Philippines, Filipino society in general, Moros and MNLF, is a logical corollary of historical

development. In all its aspects an autonomous Moro province can serve as the hub of peace in the Philippines.

All signs for the future point to the probability that many Muslim Filipinos will (as many now do) preserve their identity by increasingly active participation in the newly revived Islamic institutions and organizations which have come up with post-war resurgence of Islam and in separatist insurgency. There are already hundreds of pensionados at present studying at Islamic educational centres abroad, who can be looked upon as future leaders of the Moro society. Zealous, informed leadership, coupled with efficient organizations, such as MNLF, Muslim Progress Movement, Muslim Association of the Philippines, is already providing Muslim Filipinos with a cohesiveness and unity which make them a force to be reckoned with on the national scene.

Thus autonomy must be understood in the light of the fact that the Philippines is and is likely to remain a plural society. Attempts to do away with this pluralism so as to eliminate the minorities entirely, or even to "fuse them into one body politic" are likely to end in failure and will only multiply misery in the process. Rather, there needs to be an understanding of integration that includes the efforts to make the Muslims feel that they are not second-class citizens, that they have

certain rights (and obligations) guaranteed to them as citizens of the Philippine Republic, and that among these is the right to pursue their way of life without interference (so long as peace and order is maintained) and to be protected in the free exercise of their religious customs and traditions. Muslims must not be made to feel that their religion and culture are held in contempt, but are respected, even prized, as part and parcel of the rich religious and cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

The logic of the argument leads to the conclusion that if there are to be changes in Muslim society of such a character as to enhance the welfare of Muslims as human beings and also to promote harmonious coexistence with non-Muslims in the modern Philippines state, then those changes must be acceptable to Moros. These changes should not constitute a threat of "psychological death" to the Muslims. Better it would be if this process was generated within their society and not imposed from outside.

As a rule, Muslim Filipinos do not have to be persuaded that literacy is better than illiteracy, education is better than ignorance, health is better than disease, peace is better than warfare, electric lights are better than oil lamps, and so forth. But they will

like to have these better things on their own terms and in such a way as to relieve them of the suspicion that these things come as agents of subtle subjugation. Moreover, the Muslims must be prepared for change. Their receptivity will be the least painful when specific changes are shown to be not contrary to the essentials of their Islamic way of life. These changes and reforms themselves will remove the darkness of ignorance and blind faith.

Change would come more readily to Muslim Filipinos when it comes from within the society, or when it is mediated by those for whom the Muslims have utmost respect and trust, notably fellow Muslims. Viewing regionally, of course the problem of Moro insurgency has been contained and Arab Islamic intervention has been checked but the problem remains unsolved. The only solution seems to be a reasonable degree of autonomy keeping in view the religious and cultural moors of Muslim society.

Politically, for the realization of this transformation, autonomy for Moroland is a necessary prerequisite for peace and viability of the Philippine nation as exhibited in the process. Autonomy that, inter alia, implies integration and assimilation, alone can serve as the hub of peace in the Philippines.

APPENDICES

Appendix-A

Treaty between the Sultan of Sulu and the United States 1842. ¹

I, Mohamed, ² Sultan of Sooloo, for the purpose of encouraging trade with the people of the United States of America, do hereby promise and bind myself that I will afford full protection to all vessels of the United States, and their commanders and crew visiting any of the islands of my dominions, and they shall be allowed to trade on the terms of the most favoured nation, and receive such provisions and necessaries as they may be in want of.

Secondly, in case of shipwreck or accident to any vessel, I will afford them all the assistance in my power, and protect the persons and property of those wrecked, and afford them all the assistance in my power for its preservation and safe-keeping, and for the return of the officers and crews of said vessels to the Spanish settlements, or wherever they may wish to proceed.

Thirdly, that any one of my subjects who shall do only injury or harm to the commanders or crews belonging to American vessels, shall receive such punishment as his crime merits.

In witness where of I have hereunto set my hands
and seal, in presence of the datus and chiefs at Soung
island of Sooloo.

February 5th, 1842.

Here follows a
signature in Arabic chara-
cters.

Witnesses:

Charles Wilkes,
Commanding Exploring Expedition.

William L. Hudson,
late Commanding U.S. Ship Peacock.

R. R. Waldron,
Purser, U.S. Exploring Expedition.

1. From, Peter Gordon Gowing, Mandate in Moroland,
Quzon City, (1972), p. 347.
2. The Sultan was Jamal-ul Kiram I who resigned
from 1823 to 1842.

Appendix-B

Agreement Between General John C. Bates, United States Army and the Sultan Sulu, Together with Certain Sulu Chief, signed at Jolo.

August 20, 1899¹

Between Brig. Gen. John C. Bates, representing the United States, of the one part, and His Highness the Sultan of Jolo, the Dato Rajah Muda, the Dato Attik, the Datto Calbi, and the Dato Jaakanain, of the other part, it being understood that this agreement will be in full force only when approved by the Governor General of the Philippine Islands and confirmed by the President of the United States, and will be subject to future modifications by the mutual consent of the parties in interest.

Article I: The sovereignty of the United States over the whole archipelago of Jolo and its dependencies is declared and acknowledged.

Article II: The United States flag will be used in the archipelago of Jolo and its dependencies on land and sea.

Article III: The right and dignities of His Highness the Sultan and his datos shall be fully respected, the Moros shall not be interfered with on account of their religion; and all their religious customs shall be respected; and no one shall be prosecuted on account of his religion.

Article IV: While the United States may occupy and control such points in the archipelago of Jolo as public

interests seem to demand, encroachment will not made upon the lands immediately about the residence of His Highness the Sultan, unless the military necessity requires such occupation in case of war with a foreign power; and where the property of individuals is taken, due compensation will be made in each case.

Any person can purchase land in the archipelago of Jolo and hold the same by obtaining the consent of the Sultan and coming to a satisfactory agreement with the owner of the land; and such purchase shall immediately be registered in the proper office of the United States Government.

Article V: All trade in the domestic products of the archipelago of Solo, when carried on by the Sultan and his people with only part of the Philippine Islands and when conducted under the American flag, shall be free, unlimited and undutiabla.

Article VI: The Sultan of Jolo shall be allowed to communicate direct with the Governor-General of the Philippines Islands in making complaint against the commanding officers of Jolo or against any naval commander.

Article VII: The introduction of firearms and war material is forbidden except under specific authority of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands.

Article VIII: Piracy must be suppressed, and the Sultan and his datos agree to heartily cooperate with the

United States authorities to that end, and to make every possible effort to arrest and bring to justice all persons engaged in piracy.

Article IX: Where crimes and offenses are committed by Moros against Moros, the government of the Sultan will bring to trial and punishment the criminals and offenders, who will be delivered to the government the Sultan by the United States authorities if in their possession. In all other cases persons charged with crimes and offences will be delivered to the United States authorities for trial and punishment.

Article X: Any slave in the archipelago of Jolo shall have the right to purchase freedom by paying to the master the usual market value.

Article XI: In case of any trouble with subjects of the Sultan, the American authorities in the island will be instructed to make careful investigation before resorting to harsh measures, as in most cases serious trouble can thus be avoided.

Article XII: At present, Americans or foreigners wishing to go into the country should state their wishes to the Moro authorities and ask for an escort but it is hoped that this will become unnecessary as we know each other better.

Article XIII: The United States will give full protection to the Sultans and his subject in case only foreign nation should attempt to impose up on them.

Article XIV: The United States will not sell the island of Jolo or any other island of the Jolo archipelago to any foreign nation without the consent of the Sultan of Jolo.

Article XV: The United States Government will pay the following monthly salaries:

	Mexican Dollars
To the Sultan	250
To the Dato Rajah Muda	75
To Dato Attik	60
To Dato Calbi	75
To Dato Joakanain	75
To Dato Puyo	60
To Dato Amir Hussin	60
To Hadji Butu	50
To Habib Mura	40
To Serif Seguin	15

Signed in triplicate, in English and Sulu, at Jalo, this 20th day of August, A.D. 1899 (13th Arabul Abil 1317).

(Signed) J.C. Bates
Brig. Gen. US

Volunteers

(sgd) The Sultan of Jolo
(sgd) Dato Rajah Muda
(sgd) Dato Attik
(sgd) Dato Calbi
(sgd) Dato Joakanain

Appendix-C

Value of Exports from the Major Ports of the
Moro Province, 1910 and 1913.

Table-1¹

(in Pesos)

Port	1910	1913
Zamboanga	1,082,679.78	2,946,592.89
Jolo	937,350.33	1,546,876.25
Davao	906,531.60	1,408,327.43
Cotabato	137,892.13	391,135.78
Iligan	82,311.97	31,344.94

Table-2²

Estimated Population of the Moro Province by Groups,
1913

Moros	324,816
Pagans	103,358
Christian Filipinos	85,148
Chinese	3,186
American and Europeans	1,461
Japanese	1,029
Total	518,698

1. See, Peter G. Gowing, Mendate In Moroland, Quezon City, 1977, p.222.

2. Ibid., p.243.

Table-3³

Total Value of Exports and Imports, Department
Mindanao and Sulu, 1918-1919 (in Pesos)

	1918		1919	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Agusan	2029295.93	1715000.00	1699414.95	1800989.31
Bukidnon	501700.00	78750.00	269100.00	109107.50
Cotabato	448800.39	419041.91	760426.00	543378.76
Davao	11080000.00	5225358.00	4765513.63	3992559.80
Lanao	92756.92	338691.59	92750.92	338691.59
Sulu	3215203.03	2914942.48	4744601.09	
Zamboanga	3285057.36	1201548.00	5619300.50	1848024.13
Total	20652813.63	11893331.98	18081113.52	9354831.58

Table-4⁴

Enrolment, Number of Schools and Teachers in
Moroland, March 1913 and November 1919

	Annual Enrolment		No. of schools		No. of teachers	
	March	Nov.	March	Nov.	March	Nov.
	1913	1919	1913	1919	1913	1919
Cotabato	425	3866	5	58	11	133
Davao	2079	7286	20	92	31	213
Lanao	1104	4122	9	51	14	113
Sulu	1044	6212	10	52	14	120
Zamboanga	2916	7253	28	83	46	109
Total	7568	28739	72	336	116	788

3. Calculated from Journal of Philippine Statistics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1957), Table II, p. 16.

4. Ibid., Table 15, p. 19.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Selected Bibliographies

- Griffin, A.P.C.
(Compiler). List of Books with Reference to Periodicals on the Philippine Islands, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914.
- Huke, Robert E. Bibliography of Philippine Geography, 1940-63: A Selected List, Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College, 1964.
- Kiefer, Thomas and Stuart A. Schlegel. Selected Bibliography: Philippine Moslems, Chicago: Philippine Studies Programme, University of Chicago, 1965.
- Tiamson, Alfredo. Mindanao - Sulu Bibliography: A Preliminary Survey, Davao City: Ateneo de Davao, 1970.

Primary Sources

Public Documents:

Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Census of the Philippines 1960 Population and Housing, Vol. I, Report by Province: Sulu, Manila Bureau of the Census and Statistics, 1962.

Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, Circular of Information by David P. Barrows, Chief of Bureau, Manila, 1901.

Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Report of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (Philippine Islands) 1914, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916.

Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Message of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison to the Fourth Philippine Legislature, delivered on October 16, 1916, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1916.

Moro Province Governor, First Annual Report by Major General Leonard Wood, Zamboanga: September 1, 1904.

Secondary Sources - Books:

Agoncillo, Teodoro A. A Short History of the Filipino People, and M. Alfonso. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960.

- Alip, Eufronio M. Ten Centuries of Philippine - Chinese Relations, Manila, Alip and Sons, 1959.
- Anderson, William H. The Philippine Problem, New York 1939.
- Angeles, F. Delor. Mindanao: The Story of an Island, Davavo City, 1964.
- Ariff, M. O. The Philippine Claim to Sabah: Its Historical, Legal and Political Implications, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Barrows, David P. A Decade of American Government in the Philippines 1903-1913, New York: World Book Co., 1914.
-
- History of the Philippines, Manila: Ginn and Co., 1954.
- Benitez, Teresita V. The Politics of Marawi, Quezon City: University of the Philippine Press, 1969.
- Blount, James H. The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912, New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1912.
- Bruno, Juanito A. The Social World of the Taosug, Manila: L.C. McCullough Co., 1915.
- Encyclopedia of the Philippines, Volume XI: "Religion" edited by Z.M. Galang, Manila, 1952.
- Encyclopedia of Islam, 6 volumes, edited by M. Th. Houtma, T.W. Arnold, et.al., Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1913-1938.
- Fisher, Charles A. South-East Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1964.
- Forbes, W. Comeron. The Philippine Islands, 2 volumes, Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1928.
- Fox, Robert B. The Philippines in Pre-History Times, Manila: UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines, 1959.

- Ginsburg, Norton ed. The Pattern of Asia, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1958.
- Glang, Alunan C. Muslim Secession or Integration? Manila: R.R. Garcia Publishing Co., 1969.
- Gowing, Peter G. Islands Under the Cross: The Story of the Church in the Philippines, Manila: National Council of Churches, 1967.
-
- Mosque and Moros: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines, Manila: Philippine Federation of Christian Churches, 1964.
- Gowing
- Mandate in Moroland, Quezon City: University of the Philippines System Diliman, 1977.
- Gowing, Peter G. and Robert D. McAmis, eds. The Muslim Filipinos: Their History, Society and Contemporary Problems, Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974.
- Grunder, Garel A. and William E. Livezey. The Philippines and the United States, Norman: university of Oklahoma Press, 1951.
- Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, Third Edition, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964.
- Harrison, Francis Burton. The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence, New York: The Century Co., 1922.
- Hayden, J. Ralston. The Philippines: A Study in National Development, New York: MacMillan, 1935.
- Hendry, Robert S. Atlas of the Philippines, Manila: Phil-American Publishers, 1959.
- Hurley, Victor. Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1936.
-
- Southeast of Zambaonga, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1935.
- Isidro Antonio. The Moro Problem: An Approach Through Education, Marwi City: University Research Centre, Mindanao State University, 1968.

- Isidro Antonio. Muslim-Christian Integration at the Mindanao State University, Marawi City, University Research Centre, Mindanao State University, 1968.
- Jocano, F. Landa ed. Filipino Cultural Heritage, Manila: Philippine Women's University, 1966.
-
- Our Living Past, Quezon City: Alemer-Phoenix Publishing House, 1963.
- Kalaw, Maximo M. The Philippine Question: An Analysis, Manila, 1931.
- Kiefer, Thomas H. Armed Conflict: The Social Organization of Military Activity in a Philippine Muslim Society, Research Series No.7, Chicago: Philippine Studies, Programme, University of Chicago, 1969.
-
- The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Muslim Society, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.
- Kirk, Grayson L. Philippine Independence: Motives, Problems and Prospects, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936.
- Landor, Arnold
Henry Savage. Gems of the East, London: Harper and Bros., 1904.
- LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the Conquest and First Years of Occupation, 2 volumes, Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1914.
-
- Philippine Life in Town and Country, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905.
- Majul, Cesar Adib. Muslims in the Philippines, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press for the Asian Centre, 1973.
- Mayo Katherine. The Isles of Fear: The Truth About the Philippines, New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1966.
- Morison, Samuel
Eliot. The Oxford History of the American People, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.

- Palmer, Frederick. Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker H. Bliss, New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1934.
- Pelzer, Karl J. Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics, New York: American Geographical Society, 1945.
- Phelan, John L. The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959.
- Pickthall, Marmaduke. The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, New York: New American Library, 1953.
- Rasul, Jainal D. The Philippine Muslims: Struggle for Identity, Manila: Nueva Era Press, 1970.
- Roosevelt, Nicholas. The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem, New York: J.H. Sears, 1926.
- Root, Elihu. The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports, edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916.
- Russel, Charles Edward. The Outlook for the Philippines, New York: Century Co., 1922.
- Saber, Mamitua and Abdullah Madale, eds. The Marsnag, Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1975.
- Saleeby, Najeeb M. The History of Sulu, Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, Inc., 1963.
-
- The Moro Problem, Manila: E.C. McCollough Co., 1913.
-
- Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion, Ethnological Survey Publications, Volume IV, Part I, Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905.
- Saniel, Josefa M. Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1898, Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1962.
- Scott, Hugh Lenox. Some Memories of a Soldier, New York: A. Appleton and Co., 1919.

Storey, Moorfield
and Marcial P
Lichauco.

The Conquest of the Philippines by
the United States 1898-1921,
New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1926.

Zamora, Mario D.
ed.

Studies in Philippine Anthropology
(in Honour of H. Otley Beyer),
Quezon City: Alemar Phoenix publish-
in House, 1967.

Articles

Afable, Lourdes, B.

"The Muslims as an Ethnic Minority
in the Philippines," Philippine
Sociological Review, 8, No. 1-2,
January-April, 1960, pp. 16-33.

Angeles, F. Delor.

"The Mindanao Phase of the Philippine
Revolution," Philippine Historical
Bulletin, 7, 1963, pp. 138-42.

"The Moro Wars," University of the
East Liberal Arts and Sciences
Journal, 1, No. 2, 1964, 105-13.

Arnedo, Cleto.

"History of the Province of Lanao,"
Philippine Review, 6, February 1921,
pp. 100-104.

Arora, B.D.

"Insurgency in the Southern
Philippines: Domestic and Foreign
Implications - I," Foreign Affairs
Report, Indian Council of World
Affairs, November 1975, pp. 182-97.

Baltazar, Rita G.

"Islam and Secession," Solidarity,
VI, No. 4, April 1971, pp. 61-71.

Bateman, Cephas C.

"Progress Among the Moros," American
Monthly Review of the Reviews, 28
December 1923, pp. 689-93.

Bernard, Miguel A.

"Father Ducos and the Muslim Wars,
1752-1759," Philippine Studies,
16, No. 4, 1968, 690-28.

Cloman, Sydney A.

"Myself and a Few Moros," World Today,
43, March-April, 1924, 366-73.

- Costa, S.J. Horacio de la. "Muhammad Alimuddin I of Sulu: The Early Years," Asian Studies, 2, No. 2, 1964, pp. 199-212.
- Ducommun, Dolores. "Sisangats: A Sulu Fighting Community," Philippine Sociological Review, 10, 1962, pp. 91-107.
- Ewing, J. Franklin. "Juramentados: Institutionalized Suicide Among the Moros of the Philippines," Anthropological Quarterly, 28, No. 4, 1955, pp. 148-55.
- Glang, Alunan C. "Modernizing the Muslims," Solidarity, IV, No. 3, March 1969, pp. 1-7.
-
- "Why the Shooting Won't Stop," Solidarity, VII, No. 4, April 1972, pp. 6-8.
- Glazer, Sidney. "The Moros as a Political Factor in Philippine Independence," Pacific Affairs, 14, March 1941, pp. 78-90.
- Gowing, Peter G. "Christians and Moros: The Confrontation of Christianity and Islam in the Philippines," South East Asia Journal of Theology, 10, No. 2-3, 1969, pp. 80-98.
-
- "How Muslims are Muslim Filipinos?" Solidarity, 4, No. 8, 1969, pp. 21-29.
-
- "Muslim Filipinos Between Integration and Secession," South East Asia Journal of Theology, 14, No. 2, 1973, pp. 64-77.
- Hayden, J. Ralston. "What Next for the Moros?" Foreign Affairs, 6, 1928, pp. 633-44.
- Hunt, Chester L. "Ethnic Stratification and Integration in Cotabato," Philippine Sociological Review, 5, No. 1, January 1957, pp. 13-38.
- Jones, O Garfield. "Our Mandate Over Moroland," Asia, 20, July 1920, pp. 609-15.
- Lynch, S.J. Frank. "The Jesuit Letters of Mindanao as a Source of Anthropological Data," Philippine Studies, 4, No. 2, 1956, pp. 247-72.

- Majul, Cesar A. "Islamic and Arab Cultural Influence in the South of the Philippines," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 7, No. 2, September 1966, pp. 61-73.
-
- "Political and Historical Notes on the Old Sulu Sultanate," Philippine Historical Review, 1, No. 1, 1965, pp. 229-251.
-
- "The Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People," Asian Studies, 4, No. 2, August, 1966, pp. 303-315.
- Mastura, Michael O. "Maguindanao Hopes and Fears from the Constitutional Convention," Solidarity, VII, No. 4, April 1972, pp. 18-24.
- Saber, Mamitua. "Some Observations on Maranao Social and Cultural Transition," Philippine Sociological Review, 11, Nos. 1-2, 1963, pp. 51-56.
- Takano, Mamintel A. "Problem of the Muslims - A National Concern," Solidarity, IV, No. 3, March 1969, pp. 13-23.
- Wernstedt, Frederick L. and Paul D. Simkins. "Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao," Journal of Asian Studies, 25, November 1965, pp. 83-103.

Periodicals and Journals:

Asia, New York.

Asian Studies, Quezon City.

Asian Survey, Berkeley, California.

Current History, Philadelphia.

Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong.

Foreign Affairs, New York.

Pacific Affairs, Vancouver, B.C.

Philippines Free Press, Manila.

Solidarity, Manila.