EUROPEAN SECURITY AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION `

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, **"European Security and Nuclear Non-proliferation"** submitted by **Pallavi Yadav** in partial fulfilment of the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** is her original work and has not been submitted for the award of any degree of this or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

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Dedicated to

my parents . . .

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At first I thought writing this piece of work would be like any other piece of academic commitment. But at the end of it, besides enlightening me it has fostered and strengthened so many of my relationships. For to see the final output in this bounded form. I feel I have really graduated and becoming capable enough to produce this research work. I thank my supervisor **Prof. Sushil Kumar** *for the great patience and understanding he had shown. I am at loss of words to give him the thanks for his guidance and support.*

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CHAPTER- 1

INTRODUCTION

The present study tries to critically examine the security concerns of Europe in the post-Cold War era with special reference to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, Despite the changing security environment wherein hard military threats related to bipolar rivalry are being replaced by 'soft' security issues like ethnicity, human rights etc. nuclear non-proliferation remains a matter of concern. Europe does promote & advocate nuclear non-proliferation as a policy aimed at achieving global peace and stability. The proposed research seeks to address these issues by comprehensively analysing the security threats facing Europe and suggest a framework that best serves the security needs of the region.

The European security environment has been witness to a profound change, thanks to the end of the Cold War. No longer security concerns emanate from bipolar rivalry, as was the case during the cold war. Contemporary challenges to European security may by divided into three broad categories: the re-emergence of nationalism and ethnic strife; the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and 'soft' security issues. The soft threats include migration and human rights.

European Union's (EU) position on nuclear non-proliferation raises contentious issues. EU condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan arguing that they have caused a setback to the

non-proliferation regime. No doubt, the western powers, the European Union included are seriously concerned about the nuclearisation of South Asia. The reasons are however not hard to seek. Apart form the oft-repeated statement that nuclear proliferation in South Asia challenges the non-proliferation regime, it also endangers the security of the countries situated in the southern periphery of Europe. The perceived threat though secondary and indirect does merit attention and a detailed analysis. Moreover, EU's own efforts towards further integration of the Union in matters of nuclear policy and security entail the emergence of a federated European state with nuclear weapon status; this scenario poses challenges to the desired goal of non-proliferation.

In response to a combination of a growing recognition of the need to develop structures, to deal with new risks and threats, and national interests, there are three broad, yet conflicting visions for the future security of Europe. These are represented by three institutions. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now called an ·OSCE (Organisation for Security and cooperation in Europe), WEU (Western European Union), led by Russia and several Central and East European states; those who argued for a pan-European security structure that would encompass all the states of Europe place their hopes on the OSCE. The United States and Great Britain who wish to maintain a strong transatlantic component in European Security Favour NATO, France with support form Germany seeks the development of an autonomous defence capability for the EU & calls for the strengthening of the WEU. The Mastricht treaty of 1991 calls for the formation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in this respect.

The nuclearisation of the Indian sub-continent was neither a capricious nor an unexpected move by the South Asian states. It reflected a continuing concern for security and belief that still had a role to play. The policies of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) towards nuclear weapons and toward nuclear nonproliferation have done nothing to change this view.

With the ending for tensions between the two cold war block attention shifted to the problem of loose nukes'. Concern for the possible leakage of materials and weapons to "rogue" was accentuated by the cases of Iraq and North Korea, signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which violated its provisions. Emphasis accordingly was put on potential violators coupled with restrictions on technology transfers.

Debate in the US often alludes to the need to keep nuclear weapons for possible regional contingencies. European NWS living in a security community and under the US nuclear umbrella, were not becoming 'repentants'. They still needed these weapons.

Attitudes toward aspirant proliferates has varied tot he point of "selective indignation". This combined with inconsistency, ambivalence about renouncing these weapons and policies in which NWS are actually purveyors or relevant technology, has done little for the moral authority of the Perm-5.

Yet nuclear nonproliferation has changed. In the Cold War the principal rationale for (non-) proliferation was 'strategic' i.e. tied to considerations revolving around the central balance. Today the prime concern is security in its regional context.

Harold Miiller in *European Security* (edited by Wilfried Von Bredow, Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel) argues that nuclear weapons should play a highly marginal role in European Security in an age of nuclear de-emphasis.

Tom Lansford in an article, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War", published in the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (March 1999, pp. 1-28) contends that NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe's security architecture and that neither the OSCE nor the WEU has evolved to the point where they are capable of addressing Europe's security needs.

Jasjit Singh in another article, "India, Europe and non-Proliferation Pokhran II", published in the *Strategic Analysis* (November 1998: pp. 111-1122) points out that "the status of Europe appears to have a stake in the continuation and perpetuation of nuclear weapons for security, prestige and power even if through reflected glory and extended deterrence of a military alliance in an essentially non-aligned world".

The present study seeks to address the following questions:

1. Does the emergence of a European Nuclear Union-European union with a nuclear weapon status weaken/strengthen for the non-proliferation regime and if so for what reasons?

2. To what extent does nuclear proliferation in south Asia constitute a security threat to southern and eastern Europe?

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Towards the above end the study starts with the hypothesis that Europe's advocacy of nuclear proliferation, as a global security policy stems less from a concern to preserve global security than from a need to protect its own security interests, to that extent global policies are promoted to serve the regional needs.

The chapter "Different Dimensions of European Security" seeks to analyze the various kinds of security threats faced by Europe, both hard and soft.

Chapter III on "Nuclear Policy of Europe " explores the various ideas prevailing within the EU on the nuclear issue. It tries to find out the possibility of the emergence of a common EU policy on the nuclear issue.

"Nuclear Tests in south Asia: Its Impact on European Security" chapter seeks to address the security concern of the Europe with south Asia initiating a new regional perspective to the region with its nuclear tests. How far do these tests pose a danger to Europe? The geopolitics of the region is quite interesting and may have a much deeper role to play in the regional security as such.

Research Methodology

Qualitative method has been used relying basically on secondary data which included books, journal, newspapers, online services and periodicals. Primary sources were obtained through speeches, proceedings of conferences and press briefings.

Chapter - II

DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN
SECURITY

The end of the Cold War effectively removed the immediate risk of a direct large-scale military attack on Western Europe. There was also a corresponding decline in the risk of a massive nuclear exchange on the continent. Yet even as the hard military threats of bipolar rivalry diminished there was a recognition that Europe still faced a host of security concerns. In general these 'new' challenges to European security can be divided into three broad categories, the re-emergence of nationalism and ethnic strife, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and 'soft' security issues.

Nationalism

Nationalism emerged as a security concern for Western Europe due to a variety of reasons; there was concern that the end of the Cold War would lead to a renationalisation of West European states as the conformity forced by the bipolar system evaporated. The reunified Germany would attempt to assert itself in security matters which would force other states to renationalise their defence policy in response. The post-Cold War emergence of nationalism in the East is of particular concern to the West since few of the emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe have homogenous populations or settled borders, and nationalism has been increasingly defined along religious or ethnic lines which often cross national borders. For example by 1991 all of the states

of the former Eastern Bloc, including those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had pressing minority problems that ranged from armed strife in the former Yugoslavia to questions of citizenship and status as in the Baltic States[1].

The fact that the majority of these minority questions remain unsettled and the geographic proximity of several conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe means the West must develop a mechanism to deal with future Bosnia or Chechneyas.

On a higher level Western Europe must also be prepared for the possibility of a re-emergence of Russian nationalism – to the point that Moscow would attempt to reassert itself as a potential power on the European continent. In addition, the West must also be prepared for any spillover which might emerge from internal instability within the Russian federation. The sheer size of Russian nuclear and conventional forces demands healthy respect from the West Europeans. This is not to contend that the West should risk alienating the Russians by condemning them to be a perpetual enemy, but it is clear that the present Russia on the Eurasian continent requires an equal military counter weight as the best guarantee for future stability and that at the very least Russia needs to be included on a consultative basis in the evolution of Europe's security architecture.

Nationalism outside Europe has also become increasingly a significant factor in security equations. Ethnic strife in various regions around the globe can endanger the national interests of EU states or, more broadly, have wide ramifications for Europe as a whole. This is especially true with the religious nationalism of

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[1]   Stephen Iwan Griffiths, 'Nationalism in Central and South – Eastern Europe' in Colin Melnnes (ed.), Security and Strategy in the New Europe (NY: Routledge 1992) pp.64-5.

radical Islam. In general West European states have been able to maintain sound economic and political relations with most of the Arab World.[2]

Nonetheless, specific case such as Algeria or Libya point to the potential for instability to affect European interests[3]. In addition the militarization of both the Gulf region and North Africa could pose serious risks to European economic interests, especially energy imports, and even to the continent itself[4].

Proliferation Issues

The militarization of the Middle East and North Africa point to a second major security concern of Western Europe – the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Direction (WMD). For Europe proliferation threats revolve around three main areas: the control and maintenance of the nuclear stockpile and infrastructure of the former Soviet Union; the development of indigenous means of production of WMD by rogue or pariah states; the sale of WMD delivery systems capable of hitting Western Europe such as ballistic missiles.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, concerns about the control and accountability of its nuclear arsenal have been paramount for European security. Despite some progress in the dismantling of its existing nuclear stockpile and the collection of

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[2] See for instance 'The Southern Policies of the EC Keeping the Mediterranean safe for Europe' in Enzo Grills The European Countries and the Developing Counties (NY: Cambridge UP 1993) pp.180 – 211.

[3] As a region the Mediterranean constitutes the EU's third largest partner with an annual volume of trade approaching $65 billion a year; Andre's Ortega, 'Relations with the Maghreb' in John N. Holmes (ed.), Madstrom: The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenge of the Mediterranean Region (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Fdn 1995) p.135.

[4] See Ian.D. Lesser. Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1993).

warheads from other former Soviet republics, the Russian Federation retains the world's second largest arsenal. The deteriorating morale and low pay of the state's Strategic Rocket Force raises serious questions about the Kremlin's ability to adequately control its inventory. Tight export controls promised by Russian President Boris Yelstin in 1991 have yet to be implemented[5]. To further complicate matters, the loss of employment and prestige for the estimated 3000-7000 scientists and engineers who worked on the design and production of Soviet nuclear weapons may tempt many to sell their services to those states in the process of developing their own nuclear weapons.[6]

The possible transfer of nuclear technology and secrets is especially troubling since several states in North Africa and the Gulf region have ongoing programmes to develop WMD. The nuclear programmes of Iraq and Libya seem to have halted for the time being but both nations still possess considerable capabilities in producing Chemical Weapons (CW)[7]. Syria also has a significant CW program. In addition, in 1991, Algeria was discovered to have a secret nuclear research facility near Onssera and was accused by the CIA of attempting to develop a nuclear bomb with the aid of China and Iraq.[8] Although Algeria has since considered to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), doubts continue about the direction of the nation's nuclear program, especially given the construction of a second reactor with Chinese help.

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[5]   Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder (NY: St Martin's 1994) p.52.
[6]   Ibid. pp. 52-3.
[7]   See for instance, R. Jeffrey Smith, 'Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon's List of Threats' Washington Post, 12 April 1996, p.32.
[8]   Mark Stenhouse, 'The Maghreb: 'The Rediscovered Region' International Defense Review: Defense '95 (Feb 1995) p.86.

Proliferation concerns are exacerbated by the transfer or sale of delivery systems. Algeria and Iran now possess 'kilo' class submarines. In addition, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria have FRO 4-7 missiles, and Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Libya have Scud– B/C missiles[9]. Most of these states have acquired Russian Su-24 strike bombers. By 2000, several North African states including Algeria and Libya may have missiles of air delivery systems capable of targeting all of the major Southern European cities.[10] The continued proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, especially in states with known ties to terrorist organizations has created an impetus for collaborative defense planning and intelligence exchanges to counter such risks. The nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway in March 1995 has demonstrated the potential of terrorists using CW, and the ongoing struggle of groups such as the Irish Republican Association (IRA) or the Basque separatist movement raise the possibility of terrorist groups using WMD or the threat of WMD to accomplish politico-military goals.[11]

Soft Security Issues

In Western Europe, national security has come to be defined less by concerns over the sanctity of borders and more by issues surrounding the personal safety and well-being of individual citizens. Direct or 'hard' or 'soft' threats to the continent have been mostly replaced by indirect or 'soft' threats to security and stability. The most significant and immediate of these soft security threats

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[9] Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) 'Parliamentary Cooperation in the Mediterranean'; WEU Document 1485, 6 Nov. 1995.

[10] Ian O Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1993).

[11] Joachim Kranse' The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Risks of Europe: Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation' Challist Papers 24 papers 24 (Paris: Inst. for security Studies 1996).

include migration and human rights[12]. The increase in ethnic conflicts throughout the world has elevated migration to a level of special concern for Western Europe. With chronic high levels of unemployment throughout much of Europe immigration has become an increasingly contentious political matter[13]. This is especially true in France where the government is eyeing Algeria warily in case an escalation of the conflict there unleashes a new flood of refugees.[14]

With the end of the Cold War, human rights issues have become increasingly relevant to European security as the aforementioned rise in ethnic conflict has led to larger number of refugees.[15] In response to the number of conflicts and rise in refugees, European security institutions such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and West European Union [WEU] have been called upon to conduct an ever expanding number of humanitarian operations. From Bosnia to Iraq alliances forces have been deployed in a wide range of peacekeeping and place enforcement operations. In fact, the Bosnian crisis was one of the main factors behind the initial debate over NATO's need to develop out of area approach.

The Extra Regional Security Environment of Europe

Western strategists have become accustomed to thinking about security in terms of discrete threats - 'European Security',

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[12] Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder (NY: St. Martin's 1994) p.57.

[13] Andre Jack, 'French Planning Together Curbs on Immigration', Financial Times, 21 April 1996. P.2

[14] Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt. 'Algeria's War on Itself', Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995) pp. 138-40.

[15] In 1983 there were approximately 12 million refugees and displaced persons in the world. By 1994, that figure had risen to over 40 million; Lionel A. Rosenblatt and Larry Thomson; Humanitarian Emergencies: Saving Lives and Resources', SAIS Review 15/2/ (Summer 1995) p.92.

'Middle Eastern Security' – with relatively little independence across regions (a notable exception to this tendency could be seen early and late in the Cold War, when protracted conventional conflict between East and West seemed possible and 'theater interdependence' and 'horizontal' strategies became fashionable notions). In the future such compartmentalized thinking will be less useful as development across the Middle East raises the prospect of more direct effects on the security of Europe, Eurasia, and even Asia.

The end of the Cold War has been influential in defining the changes in the relationship between Europe and its southern neighbours. Prior to 1990, the geostrategic value of the Mediterranean region stemmed from its potential ability to influence the balance of power between the former Soviet Union and the United States. Owing to the dynamics of the Cold War, the period following decolonization, which should have resulted in the diminished importance of the South ensured its continued importance.[16] However as the centre-periphery relationship based on continued super power competition for regional dominance is no longer relevant, the geostrategic value of this region is thrown into question, indicating that regional threats may not demand immediate attention. The disappearance of the system of patronage is reflected not only in the loss of strategic weight by the countries of the South but also in the appearance of new regional actors.

In recent years, the steadily growing problems of the South have been put on the sidelines and emphasis has instead been placed on the process of European integration. Rising Euro centrism, focusing on the integration of the former Eastern Bloc

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[16] The term 'south' is for purposes of simplicity is used here to refer to countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean stretching from Moscow to Turkey.

into the family of Europe, has meant a declining interest in the problems of the Mediterranean. The interest in Eastern and Central Europe stems from its greater facility to assimilate culturally with the West, while providing, potential new markets for European investment with more predictable political risks. This will invariably result in political fallout, certain to give rise to international instability if not addressed in a timely and thorough manner.

Pivotal states in the Mediterranean

In the category of pivotal states in the Mediterranean Basin, Egypt, Algeria and Turkey are identified as fulfilling most of the essential requirements.[17] They are those regional actors that will be capable of playing a leading role in confronting with the West with an alternative choice. Their importance is not only in their capacity to affect the region from which they stem, but equally in their impact on international stability. Their internal problems include overpopulation, economic crisis, ethnic conflicts and environmental deterioration which has the potential to affect international stability through spillover effects of migration, weapons proliferation, terrorism and trade disruptions to name but a few.

Egypt

Egypt has historically assumed the role of regional leadership and fulfils the criteria of a radical leadership state. Its sheer size, population, and geostrategic position afford it this role. In the course of its history, it has been the focus of colonial attention and Great Power rivalries. Additionally, Egypt's location

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[17] For a more complete assessment of the criteria that determine a 'pivotal state' see Chase et al. (1996).

in an oil-region as well as its role in the Arab-Israeli peace process confirm its continuing prominence. The concern over Egypt's future is increased in the face of the rising tide of Islamic militancy evident in the 1996-97 bombings of tourist target. According to Chase the coming to power of an Islamic fundamentalist government would affect both regional and international stability in ways that may outweigh that of the Iranian revolution in 1979 would additionally provide encouragement in much the same way as the Iranian revolution did to other opposition groups in the region engaged in a struggle with secular politics.[18] This would, in turn, affect the politics of oil world-wide as well as international financial markets.

The picture of the Islamic movement in Egypt is extremely complex. There are Islamic sympathizers to be found within the cadres of Hosni Mubarak's government and approved religious institutions like Al-Azhar University. More extreme Islamic organizations include the Muslim brotherhood and al Jama'a al-Islamiyya[19] as well as smaller groups such as Al-shwquwon and Tahreer Jihad. To many observers, the present troubles in Egypt took off in 1992 when the state declared war against al-Jama'a, the Islamic groups, an underground expression of political Islam in Egypt. However, the state had early in the 1970's encouraged the growth of the Islamic tendency to counterbalance the political left. With the diminishing threat from the Left, the current government is struggling to stem the growth of Islamist resistance. If one is to understand the present nature of the Islamic challenge in Egypt, it

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[18]. Chase, Robert S., Hill, Emily B. & Kennedy, Paul (1996) 'Pivotal States & US Strategy', Foreign Affairs, 75(1) : 35-51.

[19] The spelling of al-Jama'a al- Islamiyya varies in its transcription into English and is often referred to as the Gamaat Islamiyya. For practical purposes, it will here be referred to in the shortened version al-Jama'a.

is necessary to analyse the agenda of the two most important groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Jama'a.

The major differences between the two lie in the region from which they originate, the Al-Jama'a stemming primarily from the south of Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups originating in the north.[20] This has been formative in defining their relationship to the government in Cairo and in deciding their agendas. The differences between the two are so fundamental as to make the possibility of a merger like that of the Algerian FIS, highly unlikely. From its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood focused its attention on international effort of liberation from Western domination, spreading its message across the region. However, this message is of greater relevance to the experiences of the north rather than the south, which did not undergo the colonial experience and historically was not a region of great interest to central government. There has therefore been a lack of comparable development in the south. An effort at improving the economic climate was made through the economic liberalization (infitah) policies of Sadat, but they have, in fact, had little impact. Thus, the agenda of the Al-Jama'a is primarily one of regional dissatisfaction with a government it regards as unjust. It does not, unlike the northern groups, consider those in power in Egypt as un-Islamic. And also unlike the Muslim Brotherhood which focuses its attention on international Middle Eastern question, Al-Jama'a addresses the poverty and grievances rising from the south.

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[20] Fandy, Mamoun (1994) 'Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?', The Middle East Journal, 48(4).

The economic and political crisis facing Egypt are not restricted to the southern regions and the growth of various Islamist groups indicative of an increasing search for alternative solutions when the present ones seem to be failing. The economy is particularly suffering, with one-third of the population resigned to living in poverty (an increase from 20 to 25 per cent in 1990). While the chasm between the rich and the poor continues to widen, unemployment is also on the rise with the 1994 figures at 1.5 to 2 million.[21] The government job creation plans over five years have targeted the creation of 400,000 jobs annually when actual figures indicate that 700,000 jobs are necessary to address unemployment and underemployment.[22]

While outside observers optimistically note that the infrastructure of Egypt has improved under Mubarak (owing to large infusions of aid), ordinary Egyptians have not felt this change. For while macro-economic performance has improved, microeconomic performance, which determines public assessment has dropped severely. There have also been the additional pressures of population growth at a rate of 2 percent per annum compared with an estimated Gross Domestic Product [GDP] growth rate of 1 per cent for 1993-4 resulting in a negative per capita GDP.

The economic crisis has been worsened by the lack of faith in the Mubarak government. The growing tide of the young dispossessed are increasingly flocking to the cranks of extremist opposition groups in much the same way as occurred in both Iran and Algeria. Political participation which could provide a vent for public dissatisfaction, has also been curtailed in the interest of 'stability'.

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[21] Cassandra, 'The Impending Crisis in Egypt', The Middle East Journal, 49(1), 1995.
[22] Ibid., p.12.

In response to the increasing popularity of Islamist parties the Mubarak regime has wavered on its policies towards the Islamists. The government has opted to follow a policy of greater flexibility towards the inclusion of religion in cultural life. Although there has been some dialogue with the Islamists since the 1970's particularly with the Muslim, Brotherhood which it regarded as more approachable than Al-Jama'a, the level of contact between the Muslim groups and the government fluctuates with the political climate. Mubarak in a Newsweek interview in June 1995, denied that the government since 1992 had any interest in a dialogue with the 'illegal' Muslim Brothers and the so-called Islamic Groups.

The regime's response to the Islamists has been met with reproach from both human rights groups and the Egyptians intellectual and political classes. Military courts, from which there is no appeal, passed 50 death sentences. From the start of 1993 to April 1994, with several defendants tortured to sign confessions.[23]

Mubarak's legitimacy is further undermined by charges of corruption at high levels extending to his own family. Additionally, his decision to continue for a third term on office in 1993, thus breaking his promise to limit himself to two terms, and his refusal to designate a successor has raised questions about the legitimacy of his leadership.[24] Mubarak has been unable to provide Egypt with a visionary leadership to make the burden of economic austerity to bear, nor has he been able to generate political reform that would allow for an acceptable expression of discontent to emerge.

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[23] Ibid., p.17.

[24] Not only does this level criticism upon his present rule but it also throws doubt on who would have been in a position to succeed Mubarak had the assassination attempt in Ethiopia in June 1995 has been successful.

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Egypt's Role in the Middle East Peace Process

The internal difficulties faced by Egypt remain a factor relevant to its role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Fundamentally, Egypt's national interest has in the increase of internal security that would be a long-term result of the peace process. However, ironically its regional role in the Arab world has been enhanced by the difficulties confronted through the peace process. Historically, Egypt has been a leader on international issues in the Arab world. The relations between Israel and the Arab states have been to a great extent determined by the Egyptian position. Egypt has aspired to maintain this position by coordinating a common Arab policy toward Israel as evidenced in the December 1994 mini-summit with Saudi Arabia and Syria and the June 1996 summit of Arab leaders in Cairo.

The contest is one between historical rivals in the region. The peace process under Rabin/Peres diminished Egypt's mediator role between Israel and the Arab states. Israel has improved its economic position through its contacts enhancing its potential to become an economic power in the Middle East, while Mubarak's regime is faced with economic crisis that threaten its leadership role. The loss of public faith in Mubarak's regime is such that it could not weather the loss of regional influence without playing into the hands of the Islamists. However, normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states is necessary as the failure to achieve eventual peace would send an even clearer signal of encouragement to extremes groups in the region. The May 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu allowed Egypt the unique opportunity to once again ascertain its leading position in the Arab world while affirming the Arab commitment to peace.

Turkey

At a crossroads between North and Southeast and West Turkey is in a unique position to serve as a regional influence. It shares many common characteristics with Egypt. Like Egypt it has had a history of empire and leadership although it did not undergo the former's colonial experience Westernizaion was imported into Turkey by Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s through programmes which were replicated by Nasser in his efforts at creating a modern state. It has struggled like Egypt with internal difficulties brought on by civil unrest, both of an ethnic, and to a lesser degree of a religious nature. The fundamentalist movement in Turkey has grown for the most part, within the context of parliamentary democracy without the resort to militancy found among certain Egyptian groups. And finally, Turkey also faces the economic difficulties of a semi-industrialized economy where macroeconomic performance outstrips microeconomic.

Fundamentally, the challenges that Turkey faces are a result of an uncertainty of identity owing to a combination of its geographical position and the underlying doctrines that define the modern republic. Geographically stretching across the Dardenelles, its political centre, Ankara, is in the east while its business and historical centre, Istanbul, is located in the west. This duality is also expressed in the Turkish identity which alternately places its allegiances with Europe or the Middle East.

Turkey has struggled historically to find its place in the world. Its indefinite geographic position, neither fully in Europe nor in the Middle East, has been both a burden and an opportunity. Under the leadership of Ataturk, the modern state emerged from the remains of the Ottoman empire in 1923. Ataturk, aspiring to a

seat for Turkey at the European table enacted reforms to purge the country of its Islamic culture which he regarded as detrimental to its progress. These included the secularization of society through decisive measures such as the abolition of the Caliphate, the religious schools, the Ministries of Seriate (Islamic law) and Evkarf (Pious foundations) one year after the foundation of the new republic.[25] Ataturk also sought to sweep aside cultural Islam from the removal of the Arabic alphabet, replacing it with the Latin, through to his insistence on adopting Western styles of dress. Most important in defining Turkey's secular status was the 1928 decision to remove the clause denoting Islam as the official religion of the Turkish state.

His fervour in pursuing secularism was matched by his belief in the importance of unitary nation-state, that, owing to its fragility, did not allow for the emergence of separate cultural identities. This was also a reaction to the attempts at creating an Armenian and a Kurdish state in Anatolia following World War I. The Turkish identity that Ataturk wished to forge was inclusive of all ethnic groups, identities in the interest of state whereon. The changes brought about by Abaturk were of a profound nature, overturning much of the traditional culture this determination to develop Turkey into a modern European state involved the rejection of its Ottoman past with all its corollaries. Some of the internal difficulties that Turkey is currently undergoing find their root in this dramatic upheaval.

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[25] Ayata, Sencer, 'Patronage, Party & The State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey', The Middle East Journal, 50(1), 1996.

Redefining Turkey's Strategic Position

Turkey's geostrategic position has altered following the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, it served as a firm NATO ally, and once again provided its allegiance to the West during the Gulf crisis in 1991. However with the declining importance of NATO in the post cold war era and the concomitant rise of global divisions based on religious and ethnic differences, Turkey has been repositioned in the Middle East.[26] This fact was further emphasized to a better Turkish population by EU's 1997 rejection, once again of Turkey's application for membership. Additionally, persistent conflicts with Greece have forced the EU to take sides, further distancing Turkey from Europe.

Turkey has sought to remedy its relative loss of geopolitical power by taking a more active role in the newly independent Central Asian republics. Although it has taken an initiative in the region from the Balkans to the Middle East and Central Asia, it will have to be able to resolve internal difficulties if it is to serve as a regional role model. Its most pressing concerns include the more than decade-long conflict in the south-east with Kurdish insurgents, its slow-growing economy and the rise of a fundamentalist Islamic movement.

The Kurdish Question

The Kurdish nation is scattered from south- eastern Turkey into Syria, Iraq, Iran and parts of Armenia. Almost 20 per cent of Turkey's population is Kurdish.[27] Historically the Kurdish people have rebelled against all their leaders they Turk, Arab or Persian.

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[26] Huntington, Samuel, P., 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 1993, pp.22-49.
[27] Figures vary due to assimilation and intermarriage but an estimate is 10 million to 15 million, with official Turkish figures much lower (Abramovitiz quoted in Tunander 1995).

In the mid 1980s, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) led by Abdullah Ocalin stepped up its activity in Turkey ruthlessly with the aim of creating a Marxist –Leninist Kurdish state out of Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Syria & Turkey. Initial victims were not only Turks but Kurds, mostly villagers, whose leaders would not support the PKK. As the campaign continued, government action to destroy the movement at its inception was equally harsh, placing the inhabitants of Kurdish villages between PKK terror on the one hand and state terror on the other. The costs incurred in human lives and drainage of the budget have been substantial as well as the criticism of Turkey's human rights record which has been instrumental in delaying its integration into the European Union.[28]

The difficulty in resolving the conflict is intensified owing to the support the insurgents receive from Turkey's neighbours, Syria and Iraq, who have in the past used the conflict to achieve evolving that recognizes that the only means to achieve peace in the region will be through dialogue with moderate Kurdish leaders, accepting Turkey's human rights problem, assuring cultural harmony and developing a stronger economic structure.

Economic Difficulties : Economically, it is not only the south-eastern region that experiences difficulties. While the economy is on the upturn in the late 1990s, this is not always the perception of the majority of the population. After the generals yielded power to civilian government in the 1980s, the privatization of the statist economy began. The economy encouraged greater foreign

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[28] Although most Turks, including the former president Ozal & a good number of foreign observers maintain that the unstated reason for exclusion is Turkey's identity.

investment, export import controls were removed and the lira was made freely convertible in 1982.[29]

However, there is still a great deal of structural reform required to activate a lasting social transformation. The economic problems faced by turkey are representative of those faced by semi-industrialized economies.

The pauperization of certain portions of the population has been instrumental in mobilizing the demand for an alternative strategy. This is further strengthened by the diminished influence of ideology in the politics of the left. Thus, the final great challenge to Turkish internal stability is to be found in the form of the growing Islamist movement.

The Islamist Movement in Turkey

Among the internal reasons held accountable for the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey are the centre-right government's policies and government institutions, the effectiveness of Islamic parties in addressing the dissatisfaction of society in the face of ever increasing wealth differentials, and allegation of power. External factors, such as the increasing power of Muslim Middle Eastern oil producers and the threat of left-wing subversion directed from external sources, also play a part.

A step-by-step Islamization process has taken root particularly through the education system, and ironically through the support of the state. Religious schools have been instrumental in providing a suitable environment for the recruitment of fundamentalists.

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[29]   Church George, 'Across the Great Divide', Time, 19 October 1992.

While the trends have provoked concern within the country, with parallels being drawn with either Algeria or Iran, the Islamic resurgence, with few exceptions, has not been marked by the violence associated with either of these two countries. Allowing the Islamists into mainstream democratic politics has been the route to moderation as coalition building has required compromise.

It was hoped, that, by cooperating with the moderate Islamists, Turkey would provide a model for other Arab states struggling with Islamist movements. However, the experiment was short-lived and therefore of limited value as an example. Nonetheless, the Islamist movement remains as a substantial element in the political landscape, and the manner in which the Islamists and other parties in Turkey adapt to one another will influence the Western outlook on the possible consistence of fundamentalism with pluralism.

Algeria : Equally important to regional security in Algeria, caught in a relentless civil war between Islamic militants and the army- the conflict is increasingly polarizing, civil society, adding to the risk of escalation.

The growing force of social unrest in Algeria over the past ten years has had the effect of strengthening the Islamic movement as an alternative several factors explain the build-up to the Algerian strength of the military, the declining standard of living and the weak foundation on which the democratic experiment was tested in 1991. The Algerian state has already faced accusations of complicity in the political violence. While this may or may not be the case, the state can be held accountable for their lack of effort to step the carnage. Both the forces of the military and the militant Islamists have the potential to incite more violence in Algeria which

could put an end to those tentative first steps towards a resolution of the conflict.

Should the situation worsen, not only would the toll on human casualties be great but it would additionally endanger the stability of international oil and gas markets as well as the security of Mediterranean sea-lanes. The establishment of an anti-Western regime in Algeria would result in losses by Spain, France and Italy of considerable investments. They would also be the first to feel the flood of middle–class secular Algerian refugees. The regional consequences of Algeria's fundamentalists coming to power without the agreement of a civil pact would be significantly destabilizing. The .1979 revolution in Iran ignited the fear of the spread of radical Islam. However, Iran is neither an Arab state, nor Sunni (the majority following within Islam). While the Iranian revolution has certainly had and would have a greater impact on the Sunni Arab world, it would provide impetus to the Egyptian movement, jeopardizing the Arab-Israeli peace process. However it must be stated that the potential of universalist militant Islam should not be exaggerated, as the Arab world is renewed for its division along geographical, nationalistic ethnic, cultural and religious lines.

The Effect of Regional Instability on European Security

Instability in the Mediterranean Basin has the potential of threatening European security. While this has been recognised by the states of Southern Europe in close proximity to this region, the nature of today's security dilemmas are such that they do not respect national borders. Challenges arising from this region can be categorized as either hard security threats such as weapons proliferation and terrorists, or 'soft security' relating among other things to human rights and migration. Additionally, it is necessary

to recognize the propensity for regional insecurity to result in spillover that is capable of affecting world order on a systemic level through its influence on the global economy.

Hard security threats such as proliferation, and more particularly terrorism have been emphasized in the media. The end of the cold war has resulted in a diminished importance for the region, where previously, within the context of the East West confrontation, the non-aligned movement held a respected position and political clouts. The post cold war environment has weakened the concept of alignment even if the issues of the North South agenda remain important. This, in turn has instigated the search for an alternative means to establish geopolitical weight, resulting, in some cases in the build up of conventional and unconventional arsenals. For the time being, despite much speculation on then consequences that the build up of arms will have for European security, the motivation behind proliferation has been regional, increasing political leverage in South–South issues. While there have been calls for an 'Islamic bomb', this is unlikely to happen owing to the lack of solidarity among regional actors and the lack of a clearly defined threat.

Terrorist threats emanating from this region will have a more perceptible impact on European security owing to their high profile in the media. Western generations linking radical Islamic movements and political violence present an inaccurate picture of international terrorism. Only 8 per cent of all terrorist incidents are the product of militant Islamist organizations. However, one loses sight of this fact when this small proportion of incidents represent 30 per cent of the fatalities incurred. The reputation for violence stems from the lethality of religious groups who are willing to waive moral constraints in the interest of serving their God. The

effects of terrorism emanating from the south are increasingly being felt in Europe through incidents such as the spate of bombings in Paris in the summer of 1995 by Algerian extremists angered by France's continued economic assistance to the regime in power. In addition to religiously motivated terrorism. Europe is also witnessing cross border separatist terrorism as in the 1993 terrorist campaign by the PKK on several Turkish commercial and diplomatic centers in Germany and France.

There are several explanations for why European cities are increasingly being targeted. First, the tough security measures imposed by southern regimes do not allow for opposition groups to voice their dissent. While this is evidently not the case for the majority, there are a percentage who choose to adopt violent means to make known their opposition in the open and consequently more vulnerable, cities of Europe. The existence of these small extremist groups within European countries also places a restriction on any form of intervention in the Muslim world without due consideration of its implications for a backlash in the form of terrorist incident.

Equally challenging for Europe are the soft security issues of human rights and migration. In 1993 there were some 13 million foreign immigrants living in European Union countries.[30] Of this 8 million were EU nationals stemming their families in Germany as well as creating policies to encourage reputation through awarding premiums, which had the effect of antagonizing immigrants.[31] The political difficulty in attaining citizenship exacerbated their frustrations. However, following the increase in racist attacks in

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[30] Soysal, Yasemin N., 'Immigration and Emerging European Polity', in Svein S. Andersen & Kjell A. Eliassen (eds.) Making Policy in Europe, London: Sage, 1995.

[31] This was revoked as it was seen to be creating a dissatisfied and unemployed immigrant underclass.

Germany in 1993, debate opened about the difficulty of attaining citizenship, resulting in a slight improvement in the regulations.

The 1990s also saw the growth of extreme right wing political parties throughout Europe. Once again referring to Germany, the Republican Party increased in popularity from less than 1 per cent in 1983 to 8.3 per cent in 1993. At a more extreme level neo-Nazi attacks perpetrated in 1992 in Molln and on immigrants. The problems encountered in Germany parallel the concerns of other European countries. In France the dispute over the reeling of Muslim girls at school erupted in 1989 and again in 1994 provoking much controversy around cultural integration. Like Germany, France has also witnessed the increasing strength of the right wing National Front led by Jean Marie Le Pen who received 15 per cent of the vote in the French Presidential election of 1995.[32] Similarly other right wing parties in Europe are increasingly focusing their attention on the problem of Muslim immigrants, discouraging the incentive for integration.

Nor is it only the parties of the far right that have come to regard continued immigration as a threat to the social fabric of European societies. Mainstream parties are equally adopting immigration policies that reflect these attitudes, moving in the direction of zero immigration. Nonetheless, the more pressing threat for the time being is the growth of racist and exclusionary inclinations, sustaining the rise of extremist groups that not only challenge the security of democratic regimes but also strain the relations between the countries of the Mediterranean Basin and Europe from North Africa, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Indian sub continent. This made up 2.5 per cent of the total EU population

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[32] Halliday, Fred, <u>Islam and the Myth of Confrontation,</u> London: Tauris, 1996.

and 6.7 per cent of the EU labour force. Muslim populations are dispersed among European countries with 2 million in France, 2 million in Germany, 1 million in Britain and 500,000 in Spain.[33] The figures of migration have steadily increased: in the 1970s there were around 30,000 asylum seekers a year, but by 1992 threat were 700,000.[34] However this figure does not reflect the actual numbers that are granted permanent residency, nor does it reflect the fact that these numbers are in fact minor in relation to migration flows elsewhere in the world.

Although economic reasons have been the favoured justification for stemming immigration, they do, in fact, tend to play a secondary role to cultural or ethnic entity. It is the perception of cultural incompatibility that forms the backbone of political debate on migration. This is particularly relevant for Muslim communities. Cultural differences are intensified by the traditional and religious backgrounds of many Muslim migrants. For example, those coming from rural areas such as South-eastern Turkey do not assimilate easily into Western urban culture, alienating themselves from the society in which they live and in some cases embracing their traditional culture more adamantly.

Despite the pressure exerted by the growing tide of immigration, European governments have been slow in taking positive action to erase the integration process. A particular example is that of Germany which was the chosen destination of a great number of asylum seekers and economic refugees from the 1960s onwards. Riding on the anti-immigrant wave, legislation was

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[33] Fuller, Graham E & Lesser, Ian O, A Sense of Seige: The Geopolitics of Islam & The West, USA: Westview, 1995.
[34] Berthiaume, Christiana, 'Asylum under Threat', Refugees, 3(101), 1995.

passed in the 1970s to discourage immigration by denying work permits to migrants rejoining.

This EU's Mediterranean policy, focusing on development and encouraging investment is guided by the need to stem the migratory flow. The Spanish EU Presidency in 1995, with the support of France and Italy chose to focus on improving economic relations with the South, which had to a large extent been overshadowed by expansion plans to the east. Eastern and Central Europe have over the past four years been promised twice as much money in loans and gifts as the countries of the south despite the South's projected doubling in growth in the next fifteen years.[35] While increases in trade figures alone will not be enough to secure the future of the countries of the Mediterranean basin, without an improvement in the economic climate there can be no solid background from which to instigate other reforms.

In addition to improving the economic base, it will be necessary to encourage further democratization. With the end of the cold war human rights have arrived on the public agenda. Discussions on security have focused on the stabilizing influence of democracy. However while western governments criticize the tough security measures taken against Islamic opposition groups, they are challenged by ruling regimes to regard the repression of fundamental Islamic groups as a security necessity rather than a breach of human rights. In truth, while criticism is prevalent actions against governments that blatantly disregarded human rights are not taken. Should western governments unequivocally

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[35] By the year 2025 the population of Turkey and Egypt are estimated to reach 100 million each while the member states of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMO), Mauritania, Moscow, Algeria, Tumisra and Libya will amount to 127 million. The combined population of the aforementioned will equal that of the current European Union (Loescher quoted in Fuller and Lesser, 1995:75).

support regimes against popular moderate Islamist movements, these opposition groups will formulate their policies accordingly. Most experts agree that the political, economic and cultural crises that elicited the rise of fundamentalist movements cannot be silenced in the long run by repressive regimes.

NATO, WEU and the EU

NATO has been the primary security organization for Western Europe since the Second World War. Through the US security guarantee, Europe has been able to integrate economically and politically without also having to establish independent military and defense capacities. However, the role of NATO has been increasingly questioned after the Cold War and there is a desire to raise the European profile in security and defense matters.

Partly as a result of this, the role of WEU has slowly been strengthened. According to the Maastricht Treaty, WEU shall be the 'European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance'. The Treaty also opens the possibility that the EU can develop a separate defense identity and aspire to a 'common defense'. The increasing desire by the EU to gain a more prominent and stronger role in defense has also been recognized by NATO, and there are now attempts at building a European security and defense identity (ESDI) inside NATO, and closer ties have been established between NATO and WEU.

At the EU Amsterdam Summit (1997) it was agreed that the WEU could be used to 'plan and implement the Union's decisions that had defense implications'. This includes areas such as humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and peacekeeping operations. It was also proposed to merge WEU with the EU, but

there was not enough support for this. Such a move could have caused significant problems for the four neutral EU states.

Should the WEU be merged with the EU in future, then it will be under the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where there is an intergovernmental decision-making process. As a result, states can veto any proposal, thus making a strong and coherent policy more difficult. However the fact that the EU would have a military organization at its disposal would be an important step in giving the EU the full powers available as an international actor and also a symbol of its role in international affairs.

Both NATO and WEU give a security guarantee to their full members. The WEU was established by the Treaty of Brussels (1948). Article V in this treaty provides for automatic intervention by the other signatories. However, the WEU lost much of its role with the establishment of NATO in 1949 and was only reactivated in 1984. By this stage NATO was firmly established as the defense organization for Western Europe, and had proved its worth and capability throughout the Cold War. The security guarantee in the WEU has therefore never been put to the test as it was seen as being taken care of by NATO. Article V in the Washington Treaty that established NATO does not have the same automatic intervention clause as the WEU, but during the Cold War it was taken for granted that NATO would intervene owing to the integrated command structure inside the Alliance.

WEU is dependent on NATO for the means and capability to take on missions outside the NATO framework. There are moves to combine the two organizations in a more effective way, where they can cooperate and complement each other. An important

development is the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), which would enable the WEU to use European NATO forces and equipment in pursuit of the EU's CFSP. CJTFs are to be 'separable but not separate' capabilities that can be used by either NATO or WEU. However, operations under WEU auspices will be under monitoring by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and thus the Americans will have a large say in the running of these operations. It can be argued that the CJTF concept removed the need for the WEU to duplicate the capabilities that already exist inside the Atlantic Alliance, but it also clearly reflects the dependence of the EU on NATO and therefore, in the end, on the US.

It is unlikely that the EU will be able to develop into a strong military or defense component without the support of the US. Also, there does not seem to be the political will or the financial resources available to build and establish the security organizations required to take care of European security needs in the near future. The European states have difficulty in agreeing on how to proceed, and how to share responsibility. NATO is therefore likely to remain the prime security organization in Europe for the time being.

Today, the EU is often described as 'an economic giant and a political dwarf'. It has considerable economic power, but it lacks the ability to pursue a clear and strong foreign and security policy. In order to do this the EU will have to considerably develop CFSP (including a defence component).

There was some development with regard to the CFSP at Amsterdam. A planning unit to prepare foreign policy initiatives will be established under the Council of Ministers. It is hoped that such a planning unit will contribute to defining the security aims

and goals of the Union. However, the European Council will still have to agree unanimously on the Union's foreign policy strategies, but the implementation will be done with. majority voting amongst the foreign ministers.

The crisis in Bosnia, and NATO's role in the conflict, reflect the failure of developing a more coherent European capability to deal with 'European' problems. Bosnia is, strictly speaking, out-of-area for NATO. However, it was NATO and the US that had to take the leading role in dealing with the crisis, while the EU and the UN were put on the sideline.

For the US, it is also useful to have an organization like NATO that can be responsible for crisis management in these areas. There are likely to be strong reactions if the US acted unilaterally, whilst NATO gives them a European alibi for acting in and around Europe. Strictly speaking everything outside the NATO member states is out-of-area, but recent developments in the former Yugoslavia have shown that NATO is both able and willing to take on operations outside its formal area of responsibility.

Framework for EU Enlargement

At the end of the Cold War the EU established Europe agreements with many of the former Warsaw Pact states. These provide for comprehensive cooperation in political, economic, trade and cultural spheres. They also provide a framework for rapid progress towards free trade and closer cooperation.[36] At present there are twelve states that have such agreements. The possibility of enlargement to the East made a major step forward during the

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[36] . Cameron, Fraser, 'The European Union & the Challenges of Enlargement', in Enlargement to the East, Oslo: ARENA, University of Oslo, 1995.

Copenhagen summit (1993) where it was agreed that 'the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union'. It was also agreed that a country must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities, a functioning market economy, and the ability to accept the obligations of membership, including the aims of political, economic and monetary union, before it would be considered for membership. At the Essen Summit (1994) the pre-accession strategy was laid out for the associated states. This was meant to help the associated states prepare the ground for future membership and includes issues such as putting in place 'legislative and regulative systems, standards and certification methods compatible with those of the EU' as well as the acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*. There are also economic and political conditions that have to be fulfilled before these countries can join the Union, and in this way the EU encourages these countries to develop systems more similar to those inside the EU.

In 1993 the French proposed a Stability Pact for Europe (also known as the Balladour Plan). The plan is to contribute to stability in Europe by preventing conflicts from breaking out, and is not intended to deal with states that are already in conflict.[37]Its focus is on the Central and Eastern European states and it encourages states to deal with questions that can develop into large-scale conflicts. Once these have developed into large political or military conflicts, the states are much more difficult to get to the negotiation table, and once such a crisis has broken out it will also to a much larger extent have an influence on other states national

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[37] Heiberg, Esben Oust, 'EU & Enlargement to the North & the East: What will this mean for a Common Foreign & Security Policy in the European Union?', Working Paper 1996/3 CEAS, Norwegian School of Management.

interests and hence be much more difficult to solve. Such preventive diplomacy and problem solving can inspire further cooperation between the states and help promote trust between neighbours who are still uncertain of each other's intentions.

In July 1997, the Commission presented its opinion on which countries from Central and Eastern Europe the EU should open negotiations with. Thus Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, have been made members of the EU since year 2000.

Enlargement to the East is occurring simultaneously with other major political initiatives and obstacles facing the EU. In itself, it will be difficult for the Commission to negotiate with six countries simultaneously as well as dealing with regular EU business. In addition there is the introduction of the EMU as well as a number of other problems, including unemployment, that the EU has to deal with.

The large financial contributions required for NATO enlargement are already a challenge, and it is unclear what will be the result if the electorate also have to pay large sums of money to get these countries into the EU. Enlargement is also likely to shift to the East the large funds that today are spent on various support programmes in Southern Europe. This is likely to meet with considerable opposition from the present recipients of support in Southern Europe.

These are just some of the challenges facing the EU: they will have to be solved rapidly or they could hamper the enlargement process. There is already talk in Brussels that the new Central European members will not be able to join before 2005-10.

The 1996 IGC and its conclusion at the Amsterdam summit were intended to prepare the EU for further enlargement. This included reorganizing the institutions and making them more efficient and effective. However, the summit failed to come to agreement on institutional reform, and instead it agreed to have an intergovernmental conference one year before the total number of EU members passes twenty to discuss the composition and functioning of the EU institutions. This makes it more likely that the first round of enlargement will only take in a maximum of four new members in order to avoid passing this limit.

Accepting all in one block would create a clear dividing line in Europe, in addition to giving the EU an institutional shock. It would set a number of states clearly outside the EU and leave them with little hope of joining the Union. By taking in only a limited number of states it will continuously leave open the opportunity for other states to attain membership in the future and thus help to ensure that they strive to achieve developments that are compatible with membership. So until the EU makes clear that it has reached the limit of what it defines as Europe, there will not be made a clear dividing line between the 'ins' and the 'outs'.

NATO Enlargement

Since the Cold War NATO has been restructured to enable it to participate in the development of cooperative security structures for the whole of Europe. It has also transformed its political and military structures in order to adapt them to peacekeeping and crisis management tasks undertaken in cooperation with countries which are not members of the Alliance and with other international organizations. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance in 2000.

Together with the national defence organizations, NATO is in charge of much of the hard security in Europe. It is through the US security guarantee that Western Europe has been able to develop and prosper during the last 50 years and this has enabled the European integration process to go ahead without having been hampered (until now) by questions regarding foreign, military and security affairs. NATO has 'kept the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down'. However, it has now become an organization that is increasingly likely 'to be called on to keep the peace elsewhere than to defend its own territory'.[38] It has also been argued that out-of-area operations will become the core of the North Atlantic relationship.[39]

There has been surprisingly little argument surrounding the decision to enlarge NATO. It seems increasingly clear that the decision to enlarge was taken as a consequence of a domestic debate on national security in the US. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the role of NATO was increasingly questioned in Washington, and there was a growing feeling that Europe ought to pay more for its own defence. The internationalist camp realized that they needed to strengthen the support for US engagement in Europe and NATO enlargement was the best means of gaining this support. Enlargement also enlisted the support of the influential Polish-American lobby and other ethnic groups. Thus the issue of enlargement served two purposes: it gave NATO a new lease of life as well as enhancing President Clinton's reelection chances.[40]

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[38] 'No Turning Back', The Economist, 29 June 1996, p.16.
[39] Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York, Touchstone, 1995.
[40] MccGwire, Michael, NATO Expansion & European Security, London Defence Studies, 37, London: Brassey's Centre for Defence Studies, 1997.

The West emphasizes defence as the most important means of guaranteeing security, but this makes cooperation difficult and can have adverse affects on the policies of Moscow who may see themselves forced to reestablish a stronger security network around Russia.

Joining NATO has large financial costs for the applicant states. Not only do they have to change the structure of their military forces to be more similar to NATO's, but they also have to update and change much of their military material to make it NATO compatible. This will have adverse effects on other aspects of the economy and will leave fewer funds for later adaptations to EU requirements and economic development.

There is also a large question of who will pay the Alliance's costs involved in enlargement. There is increasing uneasiness in the US Senate and Congress about paying the bill for enlargement. There are also tight and declining budgets in most of the EU states and this makes such contributions both difficult to finance and unpopular. So the enlargement process can be stopped by both security and economic concerns in the existing member states.

Furthermore, the economic and political costs connected with NATO enlargement can be a threat to later EU enlargement. Politically this is so because of Russian opposition and fear of encirclement. Economically, it is because after a NATO enlargement, there will be less money to spend on EU enlargement.

Russia and NATO Enlargement

The decision to enlarge the Alliance has prompted fears of a Russian reaction. Russia is, and considers itself to be, a European power. The exclusion of Russia from discussions on European

security and development can be very dangerous and a good relationship with Russia is crucial in order to ensure peace and stability.

Even though NATO and Russia have signed the Founding Act, there is still fear of what the enlargement of NATO can mean for the long-term relationship with Russia. It can be a significant factor in reviving Cold War thinking (for example, spheres of influence) and result in the drawing of a new dividing line in Europe. Furthermore it might also result in a strengthening of the nationalist groups in Russia, thus undermining the *rapprochement* that we have been seeing over the last few years. There is a danger that NATO enlargement plays into the hands of Russian nationalists.

The decision in Madrid to invite three countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, to join the Alliance has set a precedent and has left many Russians feeling that they have been left out. For the Russian politicians, led by Boris Yeltsin, the acceptance of the Treaty with NATO was a necessity in order to ensure continued support and aid as part of the reform process in Russia. However, there is a strong feeling among large parts of the political class and the population of being encircled. According to SIPRI 'in 1996 NATO expansion was opposed by almost the entire spectrum of the political elite and all significant parties in Russia' and there is little reason to believe that this has changed'.[41] Furthermore, after their anti-enlargement rhetoric the Russian leaders are under strong domestic pressure to act. It is also important to remember that many Russians still see NATO as a

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[41] SIPRI (1997), Armaments Disarmament and International Security; SIPRI Yearbook 1997, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford, OUP.

Cold War actor which is directed towards Russia. Therefore NATO enlargement is by many perceived as a way to contain Russia rather than to promote peace and stability in Europe. This can make Russia feel increasingly isolated from Europe and increase its contacts with, for example, China or other states like Iran in order to counterbalance what it sees as an increasing threat from the West. The fear of encirclement can also make Russia more inclined to oppose EU enlargement.

It has been convincingly argued that Russia feels deceived by the West with regard to NATO expansion.[42] They thought that Partnership for Peace (PfP) was a means to postpone NATO enlargement more or less indefinitely and thus accepted it. The Russians were therefore surprised at the speed with which enlargement took place and that it did so without consultation.

Even though the US administration does its best to justify NATO enlargement, there is still strong opposition to it in large parts of the US foreign policy establishment. Many see this as an ill-conceived and dangerous idea that will undermine the relations with Moscow, and in a letter to the US Secretary of State in 1995 a group of retired State Department officials stated that NATO enlargement will 'convince most Russians that the United States and the West are attempting to isolate, encircle, and subordinate them, rather than integrating them into a new system of collective security'.[43]

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[42] Dannreuther, Roland, Eastward Enlargement: NATO & the EU, Institutt for Forsuarsindustri, 1/1997, Oslo, 1997.

[43] MccGwire, Michael, NATO Expansion & European Security, London Defence Studies, 37, London: Brassey's Centre for Defence Studies, 1997.

Security Implications

Both EU and NATO enlargement are in response to a new international situation that emerged after the Cold War. The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECS) look to NATO for military security and to the EU to ensure their economic development. However there is a strong link between the two, as strong economic development is difficult without security and security is difficult to achieve without a well-functioning economy. Ideally the two ought to be reconciled inside an EU enlargement, but this is difficult as long as the EU does not have a defence dimension. Furthermore, the states in the East still see the US as the best guarantor for their security, and based on historical experience they also fear the long term interests and developments in Russia and Germany.

Lying between Russia and the reunified Germany, the CEECs fear the role of these two large European powers who have frequently carved up or fought over their territory. Russia is still recovering from the collapse of communism and is led by people who are eager to be on good terms with the West, but there are strong nationalist tendencies and desire for Russia to regain control over its 'near abroad'.

Germany is still firmly anchored into both the EU and NATO. With leaders that still remember the last war and are firm believers in European integration, Germany has so far accepted US domination in strategic matters and French political leadership in the EU. However, there is a growing assertiveness in the reunited Germany and it is already a dominant partner in the EU and is likely to become even more so when a new generation of political leaders takes over. This is one reason why many of the potential

member states from the east look to the US and NATO to ensure their security.

The CEECs also want to join NATO as the EU does not have a credible defence organization. It can be argued that the new members will get increased military security through membership of the EU. This is because new members will be able to join the EU and thus also come under its security guarantee. Even if the new member states do not join the WEU, there is an implicit security guarantee in EU membership. This is through the EU's economic weight and its role in the international arena, which give the EU considerable leverage and clout. It is unlikely that the member states would accept an act of aggression against another member state as this would threaten the idea of a united and integrated Europe as well as the credibility of the Union. It would not be possible for the EU to allow this to happen if it is to retain its international prestige and role in global affairs.

In case of aggression against one of the member states the EU will be obliged to act, but it will only be within what is acceptable to Washington. Since it looks as if Europe will remain dependent on the US for its security for the foreseeable future, the new member states much prefer the US guarantee through NATO which both can protect them against Russia and also keep some of the larger European states at bay.

In the EU, hard security issues are presently organized on national lines but under the overarching defence pact within NATO. The US is, however, the final guarantor of European security. This worked well during the Cold War when it was clear both *what and who* the threat was, and until the collapse of communism the development of the EC was dependent on the Cold War nuclear

security system. The European NATO members allied behind the US and were willing to put past conflicts behind them in order to counter the communist threat from the USSR. With this threat gone, there has been a return to an emphasis on national interests when faced with new challenges and where history and old political ties have played a role.

Historically, the various EU member states have strong and varied foreign and security interests. States perceive their security interests in relation to their relative strength, economic base, military capability, geography and history. Thus the national perspective on security can vary considerably amongst the members of the EU. The states have a variation of political or economic ties with different countries and each want to maintain its allies. A result of this is that the interests of the member states easily conflict. This was not a big obstacle during the first decades of the EC's existence since the emphasis was on economic development, and differences on foreign and security policy were minimized owing to the overarching threat from the USSR during the Cold War. However, such links are resurfacing again and the member states are increasingly preoccupied with security issues. A good example of the various interests of the member states is the Yugoslav conflict.

Because hard security has been, and looks as if it still will be, to a large extent taken care of by NATO, it is possible that EU enlargement will follow NATO enlargement. In this way the EU will not get entangled in other countries that it will be difficult for them to defend without the US security guarantee. It will be difficult for the EU to enlarge to countries that are not members of the NATO Alliance as it will be very difficult to defend these in case of attack without the support of the US. For the EU itself, enlargement both

enhances and reduces its security. Enlargement can be very positive for the member states, but it can also deflect attention from other important areas to the detriment of security in that area. It can also alienate other states and thus lay the groundwork for later conflicts. Some of the recent member states will feel that their security is diminishing as there will be less economic support and focus by the EU on their problems. This is particularly for the southern European states, while, for example, Germany will feel that its security is greatly improved as it will no longer be on the border of the EU and will have gained important new markets and new member states that will have a more 'German' mentality.

In an increasingly globalized and interdependent world, states will have to be very large or pool some of their sovereignty into regional organizations such as the EU in order to have influence in international affairs. If the European states are to have a say, they will have to make the EU a strong organization that can participate in setting the global agenda. In order to achieve this it is also necessary that the states have a sense of shared political and security interests. But without a major threat it is difficult for the EU to define common objectives and what some see as increasing security may by others be seen as decreasing it.

From a military viewpoint enlargement will in the long run give the EU greater resources to draw on, but it also gives the EU a much larger territory to protect and one which does not in many places offer specific geographic advantages. It will draw the EU into much closer geographical contact with Russia and it will thus be of increasing importance for it to have a strong and coherent CFSP to deal with security issues. A possible benefit of expanding security guarantees to the East is that it may contribute to stopping the renationalization of defence in that region and thus help in

defusing tensions. The former Warsaw Pact countries need to come into a art making bilateral stable security environment, otherwise they may start making alliances that could destabilize the region.

Politically, enlargement enhances the Union's international role. Also, the new member states from the East will gain considerably. The stability and economic development that is likely to come from EU membership will enhance the strength and stability of those countries and, with economic of living, their internal stability will be development and a higher standard improved. The new members will also have aligned themselves with like-minded powers and thus be under less political pressure. By being part of the Western security arrangements they will also have become part of a larger security area, and reduce some of the more direct and immediate threats. Furthermore, enlargement would also put Germany at the geographical as well as the political core of the Union. Even though many of the new member states have historical reasons to fear Germany, they still have a similar mentality and look to Germany as an economic model.

This will further strengthen German influence in Europe. EU membership can also contribute considerably to the economic development of the new members. This would of course have to be handled carefully as full membership with the full application of the *acquis communautaire* would most likely destroy the uncompetitive industries in many of these countries. However, a gradual and sensible integration of these states into the internal market should benefit them enormously and create a better economic environment for both business and individuals. Economic development and EU legislation would also contribute to solving many of the environmental problems in the East that also constitute a threat to the citizens in the present member states.

Enlargement of the EU can also significantly contribute in the spheres of soft security. These countries need help to develop their economies and democracy, not just strengthen their military capability. This is where the EU can and ought to contribute. Through an EU enlargement these countries would get access to a much larger market, become more attractive to invest in and become firmly part of Western Europe with the added security that this brings with it.

As long as there is no outer border for how far the European Union will expand, those outside are likely to at least strive for membership and try to gain preferential agreements. In this way, the area around the EU will be more 'stabilized' through their efforts to join and it will also be in the interests of the EU to help these countries develop economically and politically as this will enlarge the security cordon around Europe. Economic progress is also important in giving citizens a greater stake in both economic and political development.

Enlargement of the EU to the East is likely to defuse a number of potential conflicts there. This is through both economic development and participation in a greater European entity, but the opening of borders and increasing contacts across borders and between citizens are likely to foster greater understanding and reduce the desire to reconquer formerly lost territories. By decreasing the potential for conflicts in the East, there will be less threat or danger for the present member states. However, there will always be states that are on the borders of the EU and it is important to also help these develop, as instability in the border areas can spread to the EU.

Chapter- III

NUCLEAR POLICY OF EUROPE

By Cold War standards Europe has been virtually 'denuclearised'[1]. All former. Soviet weapons have been removed from Eastern Europe to Russia, the US maintains only a few hundred warheads in some countries & France & the UK have significantly cut their arsenals. The Czech Republic, Poland & Hungary which were admitted to NATO in March 1999 have effectively been denuclearised in advance by the Alliance's declaration in December in 1996 that it has 'no intention, no plan & no reason' to base nuclear weapons on their territory.[2]

Another, perhaps less noticed feature of Europe's new nuclear landscape is the gradual harmonization of doctrines. France, the UK and the US now share the same basic doctrinal principles. No enemy is currently recognised as such and British, French and the US missiles routinely carry no targeting information. Deterrence is addressed 'to whom it may concern'; as Sir Michael Quinlan has nicely put it.[3] The dialogue on nuclear policies begun by France and

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[1]   During the Cold War some 13,000 NATO & Soviet nuclear weapons from low-yield artillery shells and atomic demolition munitions to powerful radium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) were permanently stationed in Europe.

[2]   Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Communiqué M-NAC – 2 (96) 165, 10 Dec. 1996, para 5. qtd. in Bruno Tertrais Nuclear Policies of Europe, Adelphi Paper 327, International Institute for Strategic Studies, NY: OUP 1999.

[3]   Michael Quinlan, 'Thinking about Nuclear Weapons', Whitehall Paper 41 (London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 1997 qtd in Bruno Tertrais.

the UK in 1992 has evolved to the point where the two countries know that there is no fundamental difference between their doctrines. NATO's collective nuclear needs are now entirely politically driven and as the Alliance has moved further away from the concepts of nuclear war fighting, reductions have focused attention on issues such as sufficiency and minimal deterrence.

Russian doctrine has also changed.[4] In 1993, Moscow announced that it reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first. In making its position explicit, Russia was at the same time proclaiming negative security assurances (NSAs) – commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that were the same as those of the West. By the same token, the country was also warning any of its neighbours tempted to ally with the West that they would not be immune from Russian nuclear arms. In this way, Moscow was seeking to give coherence to its defence strategy by taking account of its shortcomings in conventional weaponry. The fundamental Cold War asymmetry – Eastern conventional superiority balanced by the West's reliance on nuclear weapons has been reversed.

Despite these changes, Russia & NATO remain the twin poles of nuclear Europe. Pessimistic predictions notwithstanding, nuclear proliferation on the continent has not resumed. Unified Germany has confirmed its renunciation of nuclear weapons. The three former Soviet Republics in which nuclear weapons were stationed – Belarus, Kazakistan & Ukraine have transferred them all to Russia under the 1991 Lisbon Protocol to he Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I

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4   See IISS, 'Nuclear Weapons First in Russia's Defence Policy', Strategic Comments, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1998.

Treaty. No other European country is reported to be considering the development of a nuclear arsenal. NATO now acts as a strategic magnet towards which not only former Warsaw Pact members, but also neutral and non-aligned countries are increasingly attracted.

Nuclear weapons have left centre stage in the European defence and security debate. The attention of defence planners and governments now focuses on more salient problems such as conventional power-projection, peace-support operations or the opportunities of information technologies. However, long-standing NATO nuclear issues persist. The role of British and French nuclear weapons, NATO extended deterrence and the value of the US guarantee, the rationales for the US nuclear presence on the continent; and the impact of missile defences on deterrence in Europe. The future of nuclear weapons in Europe hinges on two broader issues that of nuclear weapons in general and that of European security and integration. How will Europe react to the considerable nuclear changes taking place worldwide? Where does the nuclear element fit into Europe's new strategic and political landscape.

Residual Deterrence in Europe

Despite significant quantitative restrictions, on the surface at least the end of he Cold War has not fundamentally altered the European consensus. No European state challenges either the necessity of maintaining a collective deterrent, or questions European participation and collegiate policy-making. No major political party

seems ready to defend the idea of an immediate renunciation of nuclear deterrence.[5]

Although social-democratic and left-learning political movements tend to be less favourable towards nuclear deterrence than their centre-right or conservative counterparts, attitudes towards nuclear weapons seem to be shaped more by national cultures than by party affiliation. There is a 'core' nuclear Europe, comprising those countries at the historical heart of Western Europe: the Benelux states, France, Germany, Italy and the UK. While not immune to nuclear sensitivities, these states have remained in favour of nuclear deterrence, and are the key players in European nuclear-policy debates. Around this core are four other groups. 'Northern' countries have developed a strategic culture focused on promoting disarmament and peacekeeping, and are deeply interested in the fate of Russia. Neutral or non-aligned states, such as Austria, Ireland & Sweden, often break ranks with the core countries when nuclear issues are tackled in multinational fora such as the UN General Assembly. 'Central/Eastern' countries mostly former members of the Warsaw Pact, are newcomers to European & Alliance strategic debates, but seem at least willing to consider the advantages of nuclear deterrence. Most Central & Eastern European political leaders have refrained from hostile declarations about nuclear deterrence and NATO's new member states in the region seem to welcome the opportunity to participate in the Alliance's consultative process.[6] Finally Southern

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5   Summary Report of the Allied Control European Workshop on Post Cold War Concepts of Deterrence (Cambridge, MA; Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis/National Security Planning Associates 1996).

6   Ibid.

countries generally participate actively in the same nuclear debates although in Greece & Spain major anti-nuclear activism associated with perceived US political domination has broken out in the past. These countries are less immediately concerned with Russia and tend to be more sensitive to proliferation issues given their relative proximity to potential proliferants in North Africa and the Middle East.

Europe's NATO members have diverse positions on nuclear weapons. The UK commits all its forces to the Alliance's integrated military structure. France, while working closer to this structure in 1996, does not participate in the collective nuclear planning and consultation process. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey are believed to host US nuclear weapons; Denmark and Norway decided in 1957 that they would not do so.[7] Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain have similar policies.

NATO's nuclear solidarity relies on two main collective elements. The first is a set of institutions and procedures. Through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which comprises all NATO members except France (Iceland has observer status), Europeans are briefed by the US and UK on their national postures and policies. They also discuss arms control, proliferation and Russia's nuclear weapons, debate deployment issues, and review Alliance nuclear policy. Meetings are chaired by the NATO Secretary-General, and organised by the NPG Staff Group. A key subordinate body is the High

[7]   'Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meetings of the Defence Planning Committee & the NPG' Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG – 2(96) 173, 17 Dec 1996, para 7 'Nuclear Notebook: where the Bombs Are, 1997', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sep 97, p.62.

Level Group (HCG), which is chaired by the US. The HCG comprises government experts and meets several times a year. It is traditionally seen as NATO's internal think tank for nuclear policy and planning. NATO also organises exercises, seminars and conferences dealing with nuclear related issues such as radiation detection, the safety of nuclear materials and weapons dismantling, NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries are included in some of these activities.

The collective nuclear arsenal permanently stationed in Europe is the second means by which nuclear solidarity is maintained. These weapons – principally US nuclear gravity bombs for US and European aircraft – are 'an essential and enduring political and military link' between Europe and America. The participation of non-nuclear countries in NATO's nuclear posture 'demonstrates Alliance solidarity, the common commitment of its member countries to maintaining their security, and the widespread sharing among them of burdens and risks.[8] These weapons also have more implicit functions as vehicles for US influence in Europe, and as safeguards against nuclear proliferation there. Finally, permanently maintaining nuclear weapons in Europe can be justified on the grounds, that should a direct military threat again emerge, it would be easier to augment an existing capacity than to start building one from scratch.[9]

According to most public sources, the US nuclear presence in Europe now amounts to only several hundred gravity bombs, the bulk

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[8]   'NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment', NATO Fact Sheet, Nov 97.

[9]   Stanley R Sloan, NATO Nuclear Strategy Issues for US Policy, CRS Report for Congress 96-653-F (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), 25 July (1996), p.10. qtd. in Bruno Tertrais Nuclear Policies of Europe, Adelphi Paper 327, International Institute for Strategic Studies, NY: OUP 1999.

of which are stationed in Germany, Italy and Turkey (for US & host country dual-capable aircraft), and in the UK (for American aircraft only). Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands reportedly host a small number of bombs in one air base such solely for use by national aircraft. Legal & budgetary arrangements are contained in bilateral Programs of Cooperation (POCs). European host nations provide logistic support & other services required by US custodial units.[10] Thus air forces are trained, and their aircraft equipped, to deliver US nuclear weapons in wartime under a system requiring a formal US release. NATO weapons with no nuclear role would be expected to participate in nuclear missions by 'contributing to the conventional support packages (sweep, escort, defence suppression, electronic warfare, tanker, AWACS [airborne warning and control system] etc. that would be needed to allow (dual-capable aircraft) to penetrate their targets.

European officers, mostly British and German are assigned to NATO nuclear staff in the small International Staff's Nuclear Policy Directorate, and in the International Military Staff's NBC Policy Branch. They are also assigned to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Special Weapons Branch which is responsible for conducting NATO's collective nuclear planning. During the Cold War, there was a European presence at the now-disbanded US strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha, Nebraska, where 'deconfliction' (eliminating redundancies, for eg between NATO and US) strategic targeting was achieved. Americans still hold the key

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[10] Andrew G.B. Wallace, 'New Thinking about the Unthinkable?', Unpublished Paper, Oct 1996.

positions in both the military and civilian sides of the Alliance's nuclear machinery. The US nuclear role in NATO and the country's general influence in the Alliance military command structure remain closely linked to one another. The fact that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is of American nationality is believed to be at the heart of the transatlantic security contract.

In 1990, NATO's London Summit communiqué referred to nuclear systems as weapons of last resort.[11] However, the following year, while preparing the strategic concept to be adopted at NATO's Rome Summit, President George Bush's administration quietly dropped this expression because it could imply a downgrading of nuclear deterrence, with which the France and the UK were uncomfortable. The strategic concept issued in Rome was vague, essentially making nuclear weapons a decisive, but hidden, advantage. Under the concept, nuclear arms make a 'unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable, even though the circumstances in which their use might have to be contemplated by NATO have become 'even more remote'.[12]

No public collective statement has complemented this purposely minimalist doctrinal corpus. However, statements by British officials hit at the existence of two concepts strategic use, and sub or non-

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[11] The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliances, 'Summit of Alliance Heads of State and Government, London, 6 July 1990, para 18 qtd in Bruno Tertrais.

[12] The Alliance's Strategic Concept', Summit of Alliance Heads of state and Government, Rome 7 Nov 1991, paras 55 & 56 qtd in Bruno Tertrais.

strategic use, which would be a 'political message of the Alliance's resolve to defend itself'.[13] As described by a British official:

> a substrategic would be the limited and highly selective use of nuclear weapons in a manner that fell demonstrably short of a strategic strike, but with a sufficient level of violence to convince on aggressor who had already miscalculated our resolve and attached us that he should halt his aggression and withdraw or face the prospect of a devastating strategic strike.[14]

In 1997, the Allies made a political commitment to Russia not to undertake any major modifications to their strategy and, in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, reiterated that they saw no need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy. In the run up to the Washington Summit in April 1999, the Alliance's three nuclear powers, agreed that it was not necessary to change the strategic concept's language on nuclear weapons, a view shared by most NATO's non-nuclear members.

Deterrence thus in Europe seems increasingly to be comprised of two components. The first, including the bulk of forces in terms of numbers and explosive power is made up of submarine launched ballistic missiles. It remains largely national, and acts as a deterrent against a major threat. The second component comprises nuclear air forces, which complement the first, and allow selective strikes in order to deter more limited threats. American, British and French policies

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[13] Armed Forces Minister John Read, Written Answers to Questions, UK House of Commons, 20 May 1997 qtd in Bruno Tertrais.
[14] David Omand, Nuclear Deterrence in a changing world: The view from a UK Perspective, RUSI Journal, Vol. 141, no. 3, June 1996, p.19.

are leading to a simplified, residual and less visible nuclear deterrent, based on a silent or 'default' consensus.

The Rationale for NATO's Nuclear Deterrence

Traditionally nuclear weapons have a strategic as well as a political function and should serve at least three core purposes:

❖ To contribute nuclear capability of NATO. In that sense they must fulfill a military strategic role to have a political effect.

❖ To provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North America Allies and to symbolize nuclear risk sharing within NATO.

❖ To enable the European NATO partners to participate in nuclear consultations and nuclear planning processes within NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

However as far as the strategic rationale for these weapons is concerned there seems to be a widening gap between the actual weapons deployed and the roles and missions assigned to them. This holds true for the classical function of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nuclear threats and is even more true for the new role of nuclear deterrence against nuclear threats and is even more true for the new role of nuclear deterrence against other WMD challenges. If one assumes an unlikely nuclear threat coming China, India, Pakistan or from one of the potential future nuclear countries, it is difficult to attribute any strategic logic to the few and aging nuclear bombs deployed in Europe. Even in extreme case of a newly antagonistic Russia falling back into the confrontive patterns of the

past, these free fall bombs would, most likely, be the least credible component of any Western response to a Russian military threat. The fighter bombers currently available in Europe to deliver the bombs cannot reach targets in Russia and return without difficult air-refueling arrangements. This is even more true for the threats posed by other WMDs. Almost all possible sources of attacks from biological or chemical weapons against NATO territory or against NATO forces are geographically located beyond the European borders - in North Africa, the Gulf region or in Asia. In case of a threat along the lines of the three potential scenarios outlined above NATO's nuclear deterrence will hardly be bolstered by the bombs deployed in Europe. Instead, should an ally of NATO face a WMD threat, NATO's deterrence message would presumably be based upon American nuclear cruise missiles or submarine launched ballistic missiles. But almost certainly not by American nuclear bombs in Europe which have to be mounted under a Tornado aircraft to be flown over vast distances into the crises region.

Challenges to Europe's Nuclear Status Quo

Since the early 1990s, both the scope and the means of nuclear deterrence have been restricted, and the number of countries giving up procuring a nuclear arsenal, or removing nuclear weapons from their territory, has increased. Nuclear arsenals have been steadily reduced, and the development of nuclear warheads has been constrained by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] and self-imposed fissile-material-production cut-offs. Non-aligned countries and NGOs are increasingly voicing their opposition to the continued possession of nuclear weapons. As a result of these changes, claims

that nuclear deterrence is in danger of being 'delegitimised' have become common -place.

While these developments are meaningful, the importance of this trend seems overrated, and its novelty arguable. Delegitimisation has been a key term in the Western strategic debate since the 1980s. As far back as the 1970s, Alliance countries had effectively ceased to consider nuclear weapons as war fighting tools. Delegitimisation was boosted in the 1980s with the Reagan administration's promotion of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The complete elimination of nuclear weapons was considered at the US-Soviet summit in Reykjavik in 1986. The world's first nuclear-disarmament agreement, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, was signed in 1987. Anti-nuclear resolutions were regularly adopted by the UN General Assembly during the Cold War. Indeed, nuclear debates today make less impact on public opinion than they did at peak periods of East-West tension, when demonstrations in Bonn, Brussels, London or Madrid attracted hundreds of thousands of people.[15]

There are in fact, good reasons to believe that nuclear weapons will be with us for some time to come. The NPT has been renewed indefinitely. The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) advisory opinion failed to condemn the possession of nuclear weapons, or in extreme circumstances, their use. Implementing a START III Treaty would only cut the number of accountable strategic weapons to 1960s' levels – when there was already talk of 'overkill'. The concept of nuclear

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[15] See David S Yost, 'The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?', Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 16, no. 4, Summer 1990, pp. 487-508.

deterrence has survived the end of the Cold War. In large parts of the world, nuclear weapons seem to have more, rather than less, legitimacy. Both India and Pakistan have shown themselves willing to challenge the international nuclear order, while Russia and China increasingly view nuclear weapons as key elements of their military power & international status. Half the world's people and land surface remain under a 'nuclear shàdow'.

Nonetheless, the deterrence status quo in Europe faces many challenges. The consensus on deterrence is not as solid as it may appear at first sight, rather, it is volatile and becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. For Europe's political elites, conservative and social-democratic alike, managing proliferation rather than maintaining deterrence strategy, is now the key issue. Trafficking in fissile material, the dangers of the proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the potentially disastrous condition of nuclear-power plants in Eastern Europe - even if more exaggerated than real - all contribute to the growing perception that nuclear dangers are becoming unacceptable. Nordic countries particularly emphasise the risks posed by Russia's huge tactical theatre nuclear arsenal, and by the significant amounts of nuclear waste in Murmansk region. In Northern and Central/Eastern Europe and elsewhere, doubts over the wisdom of large-scale nuclear energy programmes, particularly in countries outside Europe's 'nuclear-core', indirectly fuel the nuclear weapon debate.[16] In Austria, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, the total renunciation of nuclear energy has come to be seen as a realistic policy goal.

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[16]   Eurobarometer 1993 (Brussels: European Commission, 1993).

Changing US attitudes towards nuclear weapons, including in an Alliance context, pose the second challenge to Europe deterrence status quo. US strategic culture appears to be in a flux. The taboos governing the fundamentals of traditional deterrence – the option to use nuclear weapons first, extended deterrence and the forward presence of US nuclear weapons are rapidly eroding.[17]

The third challenge to the Cold War consensus on deterrence stems from changes in the framework of Euro-Atlantic political and security relations. As new countries join NATO, questions arise over whether they should be covered by the same nuclear 'umbrella' enjoyed by older members, while the evolving relationship with Moscow raises doubts over whether it is desirable and feasible to maintain some form of deterrence in relation to Russia. Second as European integration proceeds, should it assume a nuclear dimension? Could this coexist with an unchanged NATO deterrent?

The fourth challenge to nuclear deterrence in Europe stems from the growing strategic importance of WMD proliferation. Broadly European countries could be directly affected by WMD threat in two situations. An adversary could use WMD in an attempt to disrupt coalition military operations in a theatre, or could attempt to blackmail intervening countries or their allies by threatening to use WMD – armed missiles against their cities. The possible role of nuclear weapons in deterring threats such as these have become a new subject of debate in Europe.

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17 See IISS, 'The US No-First-Use Debate', Strategic Comments, vol. 2, no. 9, Nov. 1996.

Nuclear Threats and other WMD Challenges for Europe

The potential threats by nuclear weapons to Europe result not only from the spread of fissile material or warhead technology, but also by the increased number of nuclear players in international relations which is further exacerbated by the fact that more and more countries have access to long range missiles and other means of delivery. In the longer run the combination of both tendencies could lead to the situation where Europe comes within the range of nuclear threats from regions which had been neglected in the past - at least with regard to risk assessments. Hence, in the medium and long term threat analyses, technological progress will turn geographical distance into a factor of decreasing value. As a consequence, nuclear weapons may not only pose an indirect threat to Europe. The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disintegration of the nuclear sector in Russia had the potential to cause the fissile material, nuclear know-how and even nuclear weapons to end up in the trouble spots of the world Direct nuclear challenges have become more plausible as a result of an unintentional use of Russian nuclear weapons due to its crumbling nuclear security structures.

In principle there are three categories of direct nuclear challenges imaginable. The most direct nuclear threat will be the detonation of a nuclear weapon on the European territory. At present, this seems to be a very unlikely scenario, since the only country theoretically able to target the whole of Western Europe is Russia, which still has vast numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery means at its disposal. However, even in light of the deterioration of the West European Russian relation as a consequence of the war in Kosovo, an

'international' employment of Russian nuclear weapons against countries is almost unimaginable.

With respect to the so-called 'rogue states' adjacent to the European periphery and beyond, the situation for the time being seems not to be too alarming either. Countries which have recently proven their ability to develop nuclear weapons or those which are still suspected to have clandestine nuclear weapons programme (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) are at least currently lacking strategic missile capabilities to threaten Western Europe directly, if we ignore for the sake of argument the American homeland. At present, most of the rogue states have missiles with ranges from 600 to 900 km - mostly based on old Soviet Scud technology or on Chinese missile developments. However, these countries will certainly be able to expand the range of their missile forces significantly, which provide the political leaderships with a strategic military capability for use against targets in Western Europe. It is also worth noting that due to geographical realities certain European members of NATO are more exposed to those threats than others. For instance, it would not require Libya to obtain an intercontinental ballistic missile capability to target French or Italian territory.

Much more likely than a direct attack on European territory, however, is the threat to NATO's military forces engaged in humanitarian missions or peace support operations. Given the slow but continuous spread of nuclear weapons technology it is certainly imaginable that members of NATO would become engaged in a crises management operation outside of Europe where the adversary or a neighbouring country engaged in the conflict could be suspected of

having nuclear weapons. Given the totalitarian political structures in most states and in light of the 'radical' views that leaders like Saddam Hussein and Ghadaffi have expressed over nuclear weapons, it is well imaginable that they would threaten to employ such weapons under certain circumstances. This would confront NATO with a new kind of threat, which would change their risk assessments completely.

The third dimension of immediate nuclear threats is the danger that in a military operation of NATO outside Europe a close ally in the region might be threatened by nuclear rogue states in order to undermine the cohesion of the Alliance. Such a scenario would be comparable to Saddam Hussein's threat to use chemical weapons against Israel which intended to split the anti-Iraq coalition during the Gulf War.

The US Nuclear Missile Defence (NMD) System and Europe

The US NMD issue figured like a specter hovering over the European sky. The NATO Foreign Ministers Conference at May 24, 2000 Conference discussed this topic as the main issue. Observers say the NMD may bring far-reaching influence on European security, and now that its deployment is confirmed, though there seems to be initial euphoria in Europe the real effects can be far-reaching.

The US claims that deploying NMD is aimed mainly at coping with three possible threats: First, accident occurs with the Sino-Russian missile launching system wherein missiles are inadvertently fired toward the US; second taking retaliatory measures, China and Russia would launch missiles towards the US; third Iran and Iraq and other so-called hooligan countries, or rogue states, would take the US

as the target of missile attack. Americans, both in power and not in power, admit that the possibility for the occurrence of the first two threats currently does not exist, but the possibility for the occurrence of the third threat is on the increase.

Most of the US countries do have a skeptical attitude toward US NMD system. They worry that this US practice would worsen US-Russian relations and hamper the process of US-Russian nuclear disarmament. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty reached between the US and the former Soviet Union in 1972 stipulates that both sides should not develop and deploy missile defence system. The present practice of the US has obviously violated this treaty. If the US insists on deployment or unilaterally withdraws from this treaty, it is bound to force Russia to deploy and develop the 'missile defence system'. This will cause Britain, France and other European countries to loose nuclear deterrent.

Developing a European Nuclear Identity

The political role of US nuclear weapons in Europe is long standing, supposedly fostering Alliance cohesion and coupling the US to Europe. But a second, emerging political role concerns only British and French nuclear weapons. For some, these arms could be instruments of European political autonomy, including in relation to the US, and could promote a general European defence identity.

On several occasions since the mid-1980s, Europeans have engaged in dialogue on nuclear issues. The WEU Council of Ministers meetings in Noordwijk in the Netherlands in November 1994 and Madrid in November 1995 adopted seminal texts on European

security interests, including their nuclear dimension. The NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 - the occasion of an EU 'joint action' - was also important in developing common nuclear policies within the Union, EU members have also worked closely together to reinforce the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Union has set up a permanent civilian working group on nuclear issues linked to the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). With the exception of Austria, Ireland and Sweden, all EU members generally vote together on nuclear issues in the UN General Assembly. In addition, since the early 1990s the European Parliament has tackled nuclear-weapon issues, and has organized seminars and hearings on the subject.

France has taken the lead in promoting further European cooperation on nuclear issues. On 10 January 1992, Mitterrand unexpectedly raised the issue of a common European nuclear doctrine, stating that it would 'quickly become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defence'[18]. There is general consensus in this area in France.

France does not intend to replace the NATO deterrent, but would like to have a specifically European dimension. The idea is to draw a logical conclusion from the growing solidarity between European countries. Economic and political integration and the free flow of people, goods, information and capital are making the existence, security and well-being of European nations ever more dependent upon each other and European vital interests are

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[18] . Francois Mitterand, qtd. in Bruno Tertrais Nuclear Policies of Europe, Adelphi Paper 327, International Institute for Strategic Studies, NY: OUP 1999.

increasingly intertwined. Nuclear weapons are viewed as a key to Europe's strategic autonomy, without which European integration will be incomplete. Furthermore, lessening the differences in nuclear status in Europe could be valuable by preventing them from becoming potential obstacles to integration; nuclear 'have-not' states could become 'have-a-little' ones within a future single political entity.

French ideas have been met with skepticism elsewhere in Europe. Some viewed them as a means to sweeten the bitter pill of nuclear testing. It also appears that the echoes of the European nuclear debates of the 1970s and 1980s still reverberate. In Germany, Italy and Spain, many in the political classes were relieved that nuclear issues had disappeared, and were not interested in reopening the debate unless compelled to do so. Probably a stronger argument against the French initiatives is that most countries have declared themselves satisfied with current NATO arrangements, and do not see the immediate need for a *concertation* on nuclear deterrence.

This is the case in the UK, where the view is widespread that what France is suggesting already exists within NATO. But British officials and experts, who are keen to recall that UK forces already protect Europe through the NATO collective deterrent, are nevertheless generally open to discussing the principle of a European *concertation* on nuclear issues. Although more reluctant than France to pursue deeper European integration in general, London has been much more at ease than Paris in recognizing common vital interests in Europe. It took three years - and a change in leadership - for France publicly to agree, through the November 1995 declaration,

that there were such shared interests, a view suggested by the British government as early as 1992.

Germany has also been cautious. Most German political leaders for example - have stated that they would support the idea of a European dialogue on nuclear matters, and welcome a European contribution as a 'complement' or 'reinforcement' of the US 'complement', or as a 'support' to the European pillar of NATO in the conventional field. Karl-Heinz Kamp has argued that 'a European Union capable of forging a common currency can hardly exclude its national nuclear posture from common considerations. Others have welcomed the idea of a nuclear discussion as a catalyst for a broader domestic debate on security needs, and on Germany's attitudes towards nuclear weapons'.[19] However, some wish to avoid tackling such divisive issues, believing that doing so could be counterproductive for the European political debate, or the national defence debate. Others reject the French initiatives as being rooted in national self-interest. Some have even insisted that European nuclear discussions 'could only mean that the countries of Europe jointly organize the abandonment of nuclear weapons'.[20]

There is also concern in German policy circles that growing European cooperation on nuclear deterrence could prompt an unwanted downgrading of the US nuclear guarantee, or lead to a questioning of the US nuclear presence in the country. There is also concern that Germany's increased European nuclear cooperation

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[19] . Kamp, 'Reshaping Nuclear Europe', Defense News, vol. 12, no.16, 14 April, 1997, p. 19.

[20] . Miller & Others in 'France's Nuclear Tests and Germany's Nuclear Interests', Comparative Strategy, vol. 15, no.4, 1996, p.171.

could, outside the country, be taken to indicate a willingness to move its hand closer to Europe's two nuclear buttons. At the same time, the question of the country's international status is no longer taboo. Germany might consider that reducing the difference in status between itself and France and the UK would be an asset in the debate on reforming the UN Security Council.

Southern European countries have shown some interest in French ideas. Italian support for multinational deterrence concepts is long-standing, and several Italian analysts have written in favour of increased European nuclear cooperation While Europeanists' seem to have lost ground in Rome's defence policy-making circles, strong interest in the concept persists among leading analysts such as Carlo Jean and Giuseppe Cucchi. Some Spanish defence analysts close to government circles have written positively on European deterrence. Benelux countries, traditionally pioneers of European integration, are also receptive to the concept, and to the idea that the vital interests of European counties are increasingly intertwined. The French ideas have occasionally met with an interested, and some cases sympathetic, response in Central and Eastern Europe. However, most counties there either share Germany's cautious approach to any moves that could weaken transatlantic links, or place the French initiative in the broader context of a supposed rivalry between France and the US within NATO.

Northern European counties, where strong anti-nuclear sentiment is combined with reluctance to consider a common European defence policy, have most adamantly opposed cooperation on nuclear issues, while Ireland is also sensitive about it. In 1994,

Norway was deeply reluctant about making specific references to nuclear deterrence in WEU texts for fear that doing so would undermine public approval of the country's entry into the EU. Oslo is not ready to open a new nuclear debate. Sweden claims that Europeans should take the lead in disarmament, rather than promote new nuclear concepts, and overtly opposes a dialogue on nuclear deterrence. Denmark and Finland, which frequently vote differently from the other neutral and nonaligned countries on nuclear issues in multinational fora, remain skeptical.

Prospects for European Dialogue and Cooperation

It is clear that French ideas are unlikely to be developed quickly or fully, since French leaders themselves want to move cautiously. It could be argued that, far from being, as Solana puts it, the 'roof' of a European common defence policy, the nuclear dimension could be its 'foundation': that agreement on Security's last resort would assist cooperation on other defence issue.

The Franco-German Strategic Concept adopted by Chirac and Kohl in December 1996 highlighted how sensitive nuclear issues remain in Europe. The concept included two short and seemingly innocuous sentences on nuclear deterrence in the midst of a 20-page document devoted essentially to political-military issues and bilateral conventional cooperation. However, because the text, which was supposed to be kept secret until both parliaments had read and discussed it, was leaked to the French newspaper *Le Monde, the* 'nuclear paragraph' became the focus of intense interest. In the US and other Allied countries, officials and experts speculated over what the French and Germans intended in announcing that 'our countries

are ready to engage in a dialogue concerning the role of nuclear deterrence, in the context of European defence policy'.[21] In the French parliament, many members declared that they were shocked by the language used, according to which 'the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is assured by the strategic forces of the Alliance, in particular those of the United States', before mentioning the specific role of British and French nuclear weapons.

German insistence on placing future bilateral nuclear dialogue in a general Alliance context- which would make it acceptable in Germany - collided with French Socialist and nationalist sensitivities about the country's *rapprochement* with NATO.

This bilateral dialogue will be a slow and sensitive process, and is unlikely to develop quickly into a strong nuclear relationship. But there are grounds for agreement. It seems that, if European nuclear discussions are to be acceptable, they should not be limited to deterrence policy and strategy, but should also include nonproliferation, disarmament and missile defences. An incremental approach therefore would be probably preferable, building on existing discussions on fissile-material trafficking, the control of dual-use technology and WMD proliferation. Discussions of the post-Cold War role of nuclear weapons could then follow. The nuclear element's place in European integration, and the possible European roles of British and French forces, would be tackled only after these issues had been addressed.

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[21] Franco-German Common concept on Defence & Security, Nurenberg, 9 Dec, 1996, qtd. in   Bruno Tertrais <u>Nuclear Policies of Europe</u>, Adelphi Paper 327, International Institute for Strategic Studies, NY: OUP 1999.

Discussion of nuclear-deterrence issues in a formal EU setting is unlikely since the Union includes a large number of neutral and nonaligned countries opposed to the idea. EU enlargement will make formal dialogue on these issues even more difficult. A more fruitful approach may be informal discussion with all interested countries in an *ad hoc* institutional framework, possibly under WEU auspices.

A key step would be to develop a European nuclear doctrine a detailed text, along the lines of NATO guidelines, drafted by Europeans themselves. The convergence of French and British doctrines makes this possible, since both agree on fundamental principles, such as protecting 'vital interests' and being able to inflict 'unacceptable damage' to deter an adversary. A common European text on nuclear doctrine could have not only political value, but also important practical consequences if it included provisions for European-only nuclear planning and consultation during a crisis. However, Europeans would find it difficult to agree on principles that differed substantially from those underpinning the Alliance deterrent as a whole. It is hard, for instance, to imagine Europeans agreeing to a no-first-use doctrine in the face of US opposition. On the other hand, Europeans might be keen to emphasize the need for strong and swift nuclear retaliation directly against an adversary's territory. This was always a controversial subject in Cold War NATO debates, because the US was more cautious for fear of risking a counter-strike on its own territory.[22]

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[22] . Bluth, Britain, <u>Germany & Western Nuclear Strategy</u> (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

While the issue of a European doctrine is thus linked with the broader political issue of the relationship between France and NATO, this point is not as salient as it was in the past. British officials are keen to emphasize the 'clear convergence of thinking' between France and the UK on these concepts. The French have stopped stressing alleged fundamental doctrine of their own.

A European nuclear doctrine taking account of these various factors may potentially take the following form:

1. Nuclear weapons are for deterrence purposes only and can under no circumstances be considered as war-fighting weapons. Only common vital European interests are protected by European nuclear weapons; the independence and integrity of the EU, its territory and population feature prominently among these vital interests.

2. The role of nuclear weapons is to deter all possible forms of aggression against European vital interests, whatever the means employed. It is not exclusively limited to deterrence against nuclear weapons, although this is an essential function. In the present strategic context, no conventional threat is perceived that would warrant a nuclear response.

3. Deterrence would be achieved by threatening an adversary with strong and swift nuclear retaliation on its own territory, inflicting unacceptable damage and targeting those assets most highly valued. Nuclear options more limited in scope could be envisaged for situations where an adversary had misjudged European resolve, and to ensure that deterrence would be credible whatever

the nature and scope of the threat against European vital interests. The aim of a more limited strike would be to convince the adversary of this resolve, to defend vital interests, to restore deterrence and to cause an adversary to stop its aggression.

4. The fundamental principles of international law, including self-defence, would be applicable to any use of nuclear weapons.

5. While the authority to use nuclear weapons ultimately remains in the hands of nuclear powers, the use of these weapons to defend common interests would require prior consultation between all countries concerned.

A 'European Deterrent'?

A common doctrine would give credence to the idea of Europeans exercising by themselves some form of deterrence in common, as an addition or a complement to the US/NATO one. Building a true European deterrent would mean some type of, nuclear operational cooperation among states, and would represent a much more, important step forward. Several arguments have been given in support of building a European deterrent:

❖ that it would be the ultimate step in European defence integration;

❖ that, in the long term, only a common European deterrent could ensure that no non-nuclear European country would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons; and

❖ that it would make credible the 'supplementary' nature of European nuclear protection by creating a 'second center of

decision', thus transposing this British concept into a European framework.

The last argument is probably the most persuasive. In the eyes of an adversary, there could be situations in which the US nuclear guarantee would not apply. European 'supplementary' protection would, however, persuade an adversary that, even if the US hesitated, Europe would not do so if its vital interests were at stake. With the end of the Cold War, threats against Europe will be more limited in character and scope than in the past; for those who doubt whether US protection can be taken for granted in all circumstances, there is a strong incentive to consider acquiring an additional insurance policy. More broadly, the possession of a nuclear arsenal by Europe as a whole would also guarantee greater freedom of action in international affairs. France and the UK found this reasoning persuasive in deciding to build national deterrent forces in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez *debacle,* when both countries faced pressure from the US and the Soviet Union to withdraw from Egypt.

France and the UK have long given some thought to a European deterrent. For the British, a wider European role for nuclear forces is not a conceptual problem in itself - as long as it is in an Alliance context - since the UK considers that its vital interests would be threatened to the point of warranting a nuclear response if those of one of its NATO allies were endangered. Thus, the idea of an overt role for British and French forces in protecting Europe tends to be viewed favourably, along with the country's more balanced attitude to its security relations with Europe on the one hand, and the US on the other. For France, the idea of common vital interests is also not that

new, despite the country's image of 'splendid isolation' during the Cold War.

The gradual development of an Anglo-French European nuclear-deterrent core could ultimately lead to the creation of a single virtual nuclear power, with 'two fingers on the button' in the defence of common interests, in the first or second decade of the twenty-first century. Joint development of next-generation launchers could be considered although, as far as nuclear technologies are concerned, doing so would require agreement with the US given the depth of UK-US cooperation in this field.

Possible Outcomes

Several outcomes unfavourable to nuclear deterrence can be envisaged. The first would be a 'transatlantic drift/rift', including a severe crisis in NATO, due for example, to unilateral US moves such as withdrawing nuclear weapons from Europe or adopting a no-first-use doctrine. Other possible development would concern the value of the US guarantee to Europe. NATO enlargement to encompass Eastern Europe may prompt divisive political debate, for instance in the US Congress, or the US could decide to give priority to its strategic relationship with Russia in the context of START III and follow-on negotiations. Under these circumstances, the US could be tempted to trade 'scope for space' by devaluing the Alliance in return for Russian acquiescence in its expansion. The development of missile defence systems could also devalue nuclear deterrence.

Overtly downgrading the nuclear dimension of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would damage Alliance cohesion since Europeans

would be unlikely to follow suit. Many would agree with French expert and former IISS Director Francois Heisbourg that the particular advantage the US has in the conventional field should not be allowed to prompt Americans into promoting the view that nuclear weapons are illegitimate'.[23] A future US move towards a 'pure-no-first-use' policy the idea that the sole utility of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use could place severe strain on the Alliance. Some would welcome it but France, the UK and other European countries would be apposed. Despite Foreign Minister Fischer's statements in 1998, the issue would be likely to prompt heated debate in Germany. In 1992, prominent German experts Thomas Ender, Holger Mey and Michel Riihle Warned that a 'US no-first use declaration would politically invalidate extended deterrence almost entirely.[24] Some would argue that the first use option could be kept open in a NATO context, but it is difficult to see how the US could credibly sustain such doctrinal schizophrenia. One side effect of a US no-first use pledge could be to encourage Europeans to look more favorably on increased nuclear solidarity among themselves. During the Cold War, the prospect of swift nuclear disarmament raised by the 1986 Reykjavik Summit prompted then British PM Thatcher to seek nuclear rapprochement with France. However, it is by no means clear that building a European deterrent over the remnants of transatlantic solidarity would result in a net security gain.

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[23] Framous Heisbourg, Three Possible Futures, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Security – The Next 25 years, Future Roles Series paper 3 (Albuquerque NM: Sandia National Laboratories, May 1996). P.16.

[24] Thomas Ender, Holger H. Mey & Michel Riihle, 'The New Germany and Nuclear Weapons', in Garrity & Maaranen (eds), Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World, p.136.

A second outcome of withdrawing the US nuclear guarantee might be renewed nuclear proliferation in Europe.[25] This is however, unlikely given the absence of a major threat, the progress in European integration and the readiness of European nuclear powers to play a larger role in EU security. The temptation for non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons would be felt only if three circumstances arose simultaneously: serious threats to European security emerged; extended deterrence disappeared; and a major crisis took place in the European integration process.[26] Possible nuclear-weapon candidates include Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey. Turkey is a specific case because it has been excluded from the mainstream of European integration. If US nuclear protection significantly eroded, and Turkey felt increasingly left out of new European security arrangements, Ankara could seriously consider developing nuclear weapons, not least given the proliferation threat in the Middle East.

Under a third scenario, nuclear deterrence could decay or 'fade away', leading to a de facto 'denuclearisation' of Western strategy in the first decades of the twenty-first century. This could possibly stem from continued international and continental stability, further pressure in favour of disarmament, a 'de-emphasis' of nuclear deterrence and the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. With the accession to power of social democratic oriented political parties in many European states, notably in Germany, it is conceivable that

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[25] See Solcombe, 'The Future of US Nuclear Weapons' and Jane Sharp, 'Europe's Nuclear Dominos', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, pp. 29-33.

[26] See Holger Mey, The Future Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A German Perspective Future Roles Series Paper 4 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories Jan 1997) pp. 10-11.

Europeans could band together in a courted effort to reduce the emphasis on nuclear deterrence in the Alliance.

In a more positive outcome for supporters of nuclear deterrence the Alliance succeeds in managing its looming dilemmas. France's reconciliation to NATO's integrated structure, British moves towards the EU and the emergence of a European defence identity allow for the gradual development of a European nuclear identity within the Alliance. At least in the medium term, this would coexist with NATO's collective deterrent. NATO and Russia would cooperate against the WMD threat, and nuclear deterrence would be acknowledged to play a role in this area in extreme circumstances. The arms control process would continue in Europe, while all five recognised nuclear powers would engage in talks on stability and alter levels and the feasibility of expanding bilateral treaties such as the ABM and the INF into multilateral arrangements. Later, the UK and France might participate in 'post-START IV' negotiations, after the US & Russia had reached a symbolic level of about 1,000 warheads each.

Barring the emergence of a serious threat to the Alliance, the most probable outcome in the short term is strategic inertia, under which conservatism & a fragile, muted consensus prevail. Most national interests tend in this direction. The US has an interest in leaving current nuclear arrangements untouched. Many in Europe realise that significant changes in Alliance nuclear arrangements would create unmanageable problems. Eastern European countries, which will become key political players, want to be seen as responsible new members of NATO Governments in France & the UK will want to appear conservative on defence issues, while public

interest is less likely to focus on nuclear debates in the absence of few, visible nuclear programmes or deployments. Only the Nordic countries are willing to embark immediately on radical changes, but their political weight in Europe is limited.

This inertia may not, however last. As demonstrated by the early no-first-use debate, pressures created by new dilemmas and challenges posed by the nuclear question will force governments to take a position one way or the other, and publicly discuss major deterrence issues. Moreover, inertia could be dangerous, nuclear apathy could easily lead to slow but inexorable denuclearisation, leaving the Alliance vulnerable to 'moves made by other actors seeking to capitalize on the reluctance of many allied officials to address nuclear issues.

Chapter-IV

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA: ITS IMPACT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

On May 11, 1998, two concurrent events of great importance occurred which opened a new chapter in India's history and evolution. One was the nuclear tests at Pokhran which naturally attracted worldwide attention and even concerns of diverse nature, while at the national level there was unabashed pride at the scientific achievement. The tests were important in many ways. But the issue of for reaching significance was the second occurrence of the day when India formally declared itself as a nuclear weapon state.

Following India, Pakistan too carried out six nuclear tests during the period 20-30 May, 1998. The fears of triggering an arms race in the South Asian region as a consequence of India's nuclear tests came true. Europe too did not fail to respond strongly to India's provocation. As reported by an Indian website:

"Cynicism, anger, frustration and even hope has peppered reactions across Europe and in disarmament corridors as people begin to digest the news of India's three successful nuclear tests conducted on Monday. While a lot of criticism has been along the expected lines, there is another story being told about India's concerns vis-à-vis China and the West's hypocrisy especially when confronted with a restive China supplying advanced ballistic missile technology to Iran and Pakistan that is new. There appears to be a new-found patience with India's position. Not because New

Delhi is right but because the nuclear weapon states have gone too far.

The comments pouring in are interestingly succinctly summed up by a Western diplomat from one of Europe's small countries who told the Indian Express 'International Diplomacy is a mugs game if you don't hit hard, no one will take you seriously. It's a great pity but that's the only way to survive'.

Major news wires, radio and television stations across Europe cut, into their programmes to announce India's tests and Tuesday sees a myriad group of experts and the ubiquitous intellectuals theorizing about Mahatma Gandhi's India.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) which reconvenes in Geneva on Thursday is expected to hear a lot of condemnation of India led by Pakistan. But some disarmament diplomats who secretly admire India's courage and most of whom are that New Delhi may succeed in 'blasting' the body to the negotiating table to talk about total nuclear disarmament, something which it has refused, to do. Two years ago the self appointed keepers of the world's nuclear conscience – China, US, France, UK and Russia were willing to accept a meaningless Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) rather than have India on board by conceding to its demands for simultaneous negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Through Monday afternoon and Tuesday, CNN is replaying the 1996 shots of former Indian ambassador to Geneva Arundhati Ghosh telling the United Nations that India will not sign the CTBT because it is an unequal treaty.

India has also stayed out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as that has divided the world into two - those with nuclear weapons and those without.

Europe's major dailies have carried the predictable stories across their front pages condemning, criticizing and complaining about India and everything from the timing of India's test to the colour of the BJP government has been dissected.

The Gurdian of London, has sensibly, seen 'seeds of hope in the show of strength to say that the only response to India's tests is negotiations on nuclear disarmament, something the West has stubbornly resisted.

There are other ways of placating India but the newspaper says......... only obviously progressing nuclear disarmament will remove the justifications for decisions like those which India has taken......'

The daily which appears most shocked is The International Herald Tribune which ran a headline across the front-page saying 'India's Atomic Tests Rouse Old Fears'.

The conservative Swiss daily Neue Zurcher Zeitung has signaled the event by printing a photograph of the Indian Prime Minister on page one - the newspaper rarely if ever has pictures on the front page.

The German Frankfurter Rundschan has adopted a cynical note welcoming India in the nuclear club while Spain's El Pais talks of an 'alarma mundial' or international alert.

The highly-respected French daily Dernieves Nouvelles Dlsace has asked editorially if Bill Clinton's America has the means

to halt the arms race in Asia while it is unable to do anything to the Government of Israel or Belgrade".[1]

Following is the Resolution on nuclear testing by India and Pakistan adopted by the European Parliament on 19 June 1998.

"The European Parliament,

❖ Having regard to its previous resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing and the work of the Canberra Commission for a nuclear weapon- fee world,

❖ Having regard to the terms of the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

❖ Having regard to the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),

❖ Having regard to the statements made by a council of the European Union, the GT, the UN Security Council and the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

A.   Whereas the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have committed themselves to the objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons,

B.   Whereas over the past decades the two main nuclear powers have reduced the number of their nuclear warheads and envisage continuing this reduction through a number of bilateral agreements,

C.   Whereas these reductions do not, as yet point to rapid progress towards full elimination of these weapons,

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[1]   Subramanian Chitra, 'Shell Shocked But Hopeful: Europe's Mixed Nuclear Reaction", The Indian Express, 13 May 1998. <http://www.indiainfo.com//.

D. Noting with great concern that India carried out five nuclear tests during the period 11-13 May, 1998.

E. Noting with great concern that Pakistan then carried out six nuclear tests during the period 28-30 May 1998.

F. Noting that a number of countries, including some EU Member states, the US and Japan have decided to impose sanctions on both countries in response to these nuclear tests.

G. Noting that both countries already allocate a disproportionate part of both their GNP and their budget on military spending and on military, nuclear research and development,

H. Whereas the nuclear tests are likely to damage both the Pakistani and Indian economies, in view of their effect on foreign loans and investment, which in turn will affect the already low social condition of the population,

I. Emphasizing that in order to strengthen stability and security in the region and in the world as a whole it is necessary for India and Pakistan on the one hand to adhere to the NPT without any modification thereof, and on the other hand to adhere to the CTBT immediately and unconditionally, thus facilitating its entry into force,

J. Noting the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there is an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control.

1. Condemns the recent nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and then by Pakistan and expresses its deep concern about the danger to peace, security and stability in the region and in the world as a whole provoked by these tests, remains convinced that the NPT and the CTBT are the cornerstones of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential bases for progress towards nuclear disarmament;

2. Urges the Indian and Pakistani governments to refrain from any further nuclear tests, to adhere to the NPT without any modification of this Treaty and to adhere to the CTBT immediately and unconditionally,

3. Calls on the Indian and Pakistani governments to give a commitment immediately not to assemble or deploy nuclear weapons and devices, and to halt the development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

4. Calls on the Indian and Pakistani Governments to start talks immediately to reduce tension in this region, to establish a framework for reconciliation and cooperation and thus to promote peace security and stability in South Asia and throughout the continent; calls on the council and the Member States to assist the Government of India and Pakistan, where necessary and possible, in this process of reconciliation and cooperation possibly by (co-) sponsoring a regional conference on security and confidence-building measures,

5. Calls on the Council and Member States to present the export of equipment, materials and/or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for

nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of carrying such weapons; .

6. Calls on Member States which have not yet done so to ratify the CTBT immediately, in order to facilitate its entry into force as soon as possible;

7. Calls on the five nuclear weapon states to interpret their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

8. Asks the council and the commission to examine ways and means to promote further progress towards the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons and calls on the council to present a regular progress report to Parliament.

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the commission, the council, the UN Security Council, the governments of the Member states and the governments & Parliaments of India and Pakistan"[2]

Implication of South Asian Nuclear Tests on the International System

The nuclear tests in South Asia heightened tensions, raised the prospect of an accelerated arms race and risked deepening the region's chronic poverty by reducing investor confidence, increasing defence expenditure and slowing economic growth. India's claim to greater international status and leadership was weakened, relations with China were aggravated and internal political stability in Pakistan was put at risk. Nor did claim to nuclear weapon status diminish the risks of conflict. The

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[2]   http://www.wagingpeace.org//.

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argument, popular in India used is untenable until it breaks down, and does not in case seem to be shared by Pakistan. Islamabad's readiness to support infiltrators in Kashmir first a year after the tests revealed that it did not appreciate how the situation had changed. There can be no certainty that in some future conflict, there will be no attack. Although the possibility should not be exaggerated it is dangerous to rely on an assumption that nuclear weapons will never be used in South Asia.

The nuclear tests also affected arms-control and non-proliferation regimes. Although progress in these areas is difficult for reasons that go beyond South Asia, the tests may make other states feel less constrained in pursuing their own programmes. Pakistan's actions may impinge on Iran. Tehran is already concerned about the influence of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan, which receives at least moral support from Islamabad. Military developments in India could affect China and hence the wider region.

The legacy of 50 years of acrimony between India and Pakistan, along with India's long standing rivalry with China will not be easily erased. Tangible progress over the underlying problems remains a distant prospect. There is little appetite outside the region for grappling with the Kashmir problem. Indian sensitivity over any third-party engagement, coupled with Pakistan's attempts to secure an exclusive focus on Kashmir has limited the scope for constructive discussions about wider aspects of South Asian stability, such as trade, the environment, terrorism, drug trafficking and poverty.

The other players in Asia try to use the present ambivalent balance of power to extend their own influence. Israel for example

is in some way in a similar position like India. It's bargaining position in negotiations is to a certain extent based on its fears against the Kurdish people in northern Iraq and its readiness to fight against Syria is continuing indefinitely being member of the NATO and an important strategic ally in the region. Iran, another potential nuclear candidate is not only trying deliberately to come out of the isolation enforced by the US on an Islamic regime representing a State Threatening International Peace and Security (STIPs), but is also facing increasing difficulties in its immediate neighbourhood. These difficulties imply economic contest for the strategic energy supply routes from Central Asia as well as political conflict with Afghanistan's pre-capitalist variety of Taliban brand of Islam.

The spillover of religious fundamentalism on domestic structures and already existing conflicts threatens not only South Asia, but also China, Russia and Central Asian republics.

We can also observe the construction of a new chain of crisis emanating from the Middle East and stretching upto the Far East. Indeed, the non-existence of an uncontested inner-power structure of the international system adequate to the economic determinants of the globalisation process leads to apparently increasing conflicts of various kinds. This is reflected in the American perception of this phenomenon basically on the narrow lines of threat potentials, as expressed in the security strategy of May 1997. There is a feeling in US policy circles that a number of states still have the capabilities and the desire to threaten US vital interest through either offensive capabilities, including efforts to obtain, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. In other cases unstable nations, internal conflicts or failed states may threaten to further destabilize regions where US has clear interests. Identifying the three "big

transnational states viz. Russia, China and India as crucial for Asian stability the conflicting scenario in the area may follow four major trends:-

1)   The attempt to secure direct strategic involvement or to confer representation of interest on emerging regional powers as part of global responsibilities in a new world order at present only performed by the US according to Paul Kennedy this would include the 'pivotal states' viz. India and Pakistan.

2)   The continuation of former relationship of dependence of former hegemonic powers, example (Russia) based on economic necessities, the existence of substantial Russian minorities (eg in Kazakhstan) and security considerations (Uzbekistan & Tazikistan) in this category would also Russia's readiness fail to respond militarily against Afghan violations to Central Asian states.

3)   Attempts of regional actors to take over hegemonic positions either in the whole are or at least part of it. This policy is especially practiced by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in a competitive race for representing the 'real' Islam. Islamisation in Turkey and Pakistan as well as remote liberalisation in Iran are expressions of this strive.

4)   Big transitional states viz China and India are bind to find their own strategy to deal with the emerging scenario. Bilateral conflicts between the Indian ways of projecting the necessity of nuclear tests has come as a major threat for in and around the region.

There are large cases of various ethnic religious or tribal minorities at the periphery of their respective countries which are spread across international boundaries in South Asia.

Sources of Conflict in Asia

The weapons of mass destruction represent the principal means by which national security can be threatened on a large scale. The outbreak of major war in high-risk area is extremely important. This is so because national security is generally indivisible, a fact captured by the phrase 'anarchy is seamless'. This is important because it is power-political. All conflicts have 'demonstration' and contagion effects. The former refers to those effects that provide inspiration for future behaviour, as for example when Saddam Hussain's unfettered use of chemical weapons (CW) against the Kurds presaged both the later use of CW in the Iran-Iraq war and the current efforts at acquiring such weapons on the part of Iran. The latter refers to those advertent and inadvertent effects that may be precipitated in third countries as a result of war between two others for example – when Palestinian pressure groups in Jordan effectively constricted Jordan's strategic choices after the successful Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Preventing on ending the outbreak of 'distant wars' may also be worthwhile for other reasons for one, a conflict could change the local balance of power in a given area down the line - a Sino-Indian conflict or a renewed Iran- Iraqi war would be pertinent examples in this regard. Conflict assumes significance in another way when it threatens to involve WMD. Here a breakdown of the evolving taboo against WMD use as well as the pernicious demonstration

effects that would surely assume from successful WMD use. An Indo-Pakistani war would be the best example of such a possibility.

Emerging Regional Trends in South Asia

The first salient trend is that all South Asian states are increasingly taking their bearings from strategic developments along a wide canvas than the local areana alone, and their responses will thus contribute to the elimination of the subcontinent's traditional isolation.

The relative strategic isolation of South Asia today appears to be on the verge of disappearing as a result of dramatic changes both within and outside the region. The Indo-Pakistan security competition which was the most familiar future of local politics will continue, but it will be increasingly less a bilateral affair than a unilateral one. Pakistan by virtue of its weakness, fragility and continued fear of India, will attempt to 'compete' with its larger regional neighbour to preserve its security and autonomy. Having lost its traditional Cold War supporter, the US, Pakistan will increasingly attempt to rely on Chinese protection weaponry and technology in its struggles against India.[3]

India, in contrast has changed direction completely. It still seeks the regional hegemony it believes is warranted as heir to an ancient civilization, possessing a large population and an extensive land mass, and having great economic, technological, and military potential. But, in a dramatic departure from its traditional grand strategy which sought hegemony at the price of direct competition

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[3]   President Leghari Addresses Defence College on National, Regional Security, "FBIS- NES-96-138, July, 17, 1996, pp 67-71.

with Pakistan, New Delhi's new strategic orientation calls for the benign neglect of Islamabad.

Replacing the previous 'Pakistan Observation' is a new effort to look beyond the constraining environs of South Asia to pursue the large great-power capabilities that eluded India throughout the Cold War. This new approach centered upon both internal economic reforms and concerted political attempts at making new friends- particularly among its neighbours in South Asia, with the 'tigers' in East Asia and of course, the US- does not entail adjuring the quest for hegemony within the Indian sub-continent. Rather, this approach implies that the requisites for local hegemony will be treated as a 'lesser included capability', which automatically derives from India's capacity to stand shoulder to shoulder with the great powers in Asia and beyond.

This reorientation in perspective is driven primarily not by an Indian desire to 'beat' Pakistan this time around by an 'indirect approach', but by fears of increasing dangers in the regional environment and by a recognition that continuing underdevelopment will make India only more insecure than before. The rise of China to the north is viewed with anxiety and apprehension because of what enhanced Chinese capabilities imply for the outstanding border deputes as well as for Sino-Indian political competition more generally. China's transfers of nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan and its gradual penetration of Myanmar are already perceived as a covert - long, range effort at outflanking India. Coupled with the looming uncertainties in the trans-Caucacus, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf-where Indian energy dependence promises only to increase - New Delhi's fears of a deteriorating regional environment become more manifest at a time when old friends such as Russia seem to be truly enervated

and new friends such as the US have yet to live up to their expected promise.

All these factors taken together have forced a perception that the strategic isolation traditionally enjoyed by South Asia is steadily disappearing, and hence India has to pull itself up by its bootstraps to accommodate a much more extensive range of threats than previously encountered. These threats include the nuclear and missile treats mounted by both China and Pakistan, the theater ballistic missile capabilities resident in the Persian Gulf as well as the evolving chemical, biological and long-range conventional attack capabilities steadily proliferating around the Indian subcontinent. Not surprisingly, therefore, all the South Asian states for different reasons are increasingly condemned taking their bearings from strategic developments along a wider canvas and in the process, the subcontinent's traditional isolation, too, is condemned to finally disappear.

The second salient trend is that there are critical regional power transitions under way in South Asia, transitions that will bequeath India local hegemony while increasing the intensity of Sino-India competition down the line.

Precipitated in part by fears of impending changes in the threat environment, all the South Asian states have begun a series of consequential economic reforms aimed at liberating their economic systems from the clutches of bureaucratic regulation and state control. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have all joined Sri Lanka (which began first) in embarking on wide ranging economic reforms. The results thus far have been spectacular. 'Growth rates have generally exceeded 6 per cent per annum through the 1990s, and on the expectation that current trends will continue, most

analyses conclude that South Asian region will be the new growth pole"[4] in Asia. The power political consequences of these developments are equally critical implying a coming power transition that will make India, in particular, among the most important actors in Asia.

The studies undertaken at RAND by Charles Wolf et al.[5] suggest that assuming conservative growth rates of 5.5 per cent, the Indian economy will grow from $1.2 trillion in 1994 to $3.7 trillion in 2015, an increase from 26 percent of Japan's 1994 GNP to 2 per cent of its GNP in 2015. Similarly, on the heroic assumption that China continues to grow at the present rate of 12 per cent plus, India's GNP is expected to increase from 24 per cent of China's total to 27 per cent by 2015. Because the Chinese economy will in all probability be unable to sustain its present growth rates over the long term, the size of the Indian economy will be larger - relative to China - than these figures suggest - assuming off course, that India can sustain a growth rate of 5.5 per cent over the long run. Other analysis suggest that this is not improbable. It is in fact estimated that the Indian economy could sustain an average growth rate of at least 8 per cent per annum if the present reforms are successfully extended and more attention is paid to increasing investments in power and infrastructure.[6]

Such growth in economic capability leads directly to increased military potential, as is evident from the fact that India's military capital stock similarly shows dramatic improvement. From

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[4]   Ernest Stern "Developing Asia: A New Growth Pole Emerges", Finance and Development, Vol 31, No.2, June 1994 pp 18-20.s

[5]   Charles Wolf Jr. et al, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends 1994-2015, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, pp 1-2.

[6]   Prabhu Chawla, 'Gambling on Growth', India Today March 31, 1997 pp. 35-45
       Neelesh Mishra, 'Chidambaram forecasts 8% Growth by the year 2000', India Abroad, March 14, 1997, p. 20.

79 per cent of Japan's 1994 stock, it is estimated to increase to 204 per cent of Japan's 2015 stock (assuming Japanese military growth does not exceed 1 per cent of GNP). And India's stock is expected to constitute 79 per cent of China's military capital stock by 2015 (assuming stable growth in China), and actually exceed China's military capital stock (if disrupted growth in China is assumed).[7] In summary, then, given current trends India will not only attain local hegemony in South Asia but will also become world's fourth largest economy some time in the first quarter of the next century. While it will remain the weakest of the Asian great powers (including china and Japan), India will nonetheless become the dominant entity along the northern Indian Ocean and will serve to diminish emerging Chinese power by functioning as a potent military threat along Beijing's southern flank assisting the South east Asian states in their efforts to preserve their autonomy against potential Chinese penetration and dominance possibly participating in some future US-led containment strategy aimed at restraining China. As a consequence, India will increasingly play an important role in continental geopolitics, thanks to the fact that it will 'emerge as the only Asian power not seriously challenged regionally.'[8]

The third salient trend is that internal stability could interact with changing military-technical and power political capabilities to make the incipient power traditions in South Asia relatively unstable.

The coming regional power transitions like those occurring previously in history could be accompanied by potentially serious

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[7] Wolf et al. 1995.

[8] Sandy Gordon, "South Asia after the Cold War," Asian Survey, vol. 35, No.10, Oct 1995, p.895.

instability. In the South Asian case, this instability could be even more problematic for both technical and political reasons. The technical reasons essentially center on the fact that that the general power transactions unfolding in the background are occurring amidst the steady proliferation of WMD and the acquisition of new delivery systems. WMD competition for the most part still centers on nuclear weapons, perhaps the most lethal form of WMD and engages both the Indo-Pakistani and the Sino-Indian dyads. Indo-Pakistani interaction promises to be the more dangerous interaction of the two for a variety of reasons. First, there are active political disputes between the two entities that have resulted in three past wars and currently involve an ongoing war waged by proxy. Second, the nuclear programmes on both sides are currently in a state of precarious evolution, and weapons stockpile is likely to be relatively small and may be unreliable.

Drivers of Conflict in South Asia

According to Hilary Synnott there can be three drivers of conflict in South Asia.[9] The first driver is Indian, Pakistani and Chinese decisions with respect to supporting insurgencies in each other's territory. Clearly, the dyadic competition between the first two states is often what receives most public attention, in part because their low-intensity conflicts are highly visible, have occasionally threatened to lead to high-risk escalation, and take place under the shadow of relatively weak nuclear capabilities. Despite these considerations, however, it is important to recognize that low-intensity conflicts have occurred in the Sino-Indian case as well. China has supported insurgencies in the Indian northeast off and on for more than four decades, and India, historically, has

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[9]   Hilary Synnott "The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests', Adelphi Paper 332, International Institute for Strategic Studies, NY: OUP 1998.

assisted the Tibetan insurgents in their struggle against Beijing[10]. This pattern of interactions will become more significant over time, in part because geographic limitations constrain - but certainly do not eliminate - more conventional forms of military competition. Moreover, both India and China have relatively less well integrated but nonetheless strategic border areas that lend themselves as arenas for low-intensity war. In the near-to-medium term, however, Sino-Indian competition is likely to be muted as both states attempt to secure breathing space to complete their internal economic and political transformations.

It is in this time frame, however, that Indo-Pakistani decisions about low-intensity warfare will be crucial. In particular, two sets of decisions are pivotal. The first relates to the choices Pakistan makes with respect to the present insurgency in Kashmir. The Kashmiri rebellion has for all practical purposes reached the limits of success. Whether Pakistan chooses to escalate by altering either the quantity or the quality of support offered to the insurgents will make an important difference to the future of Indo-Pakistani security competition in the near term. The second set of choices relates to the decisions made by the present government and its successors in New Delhi. Both Indian and Pakistani decisions are in some sense interdependent and therefore immediate Pakistani choices with respect to Kashmir will determine prospects for the kind of conflict between them.

The second driver is Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese decisions with respect to conventional and nuclear modernization. It is not an exaggeration to assert that deterrence stability on the Indian

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[10] This problem might reassert itself, or may even arise outside of New Delhi's control as a younger generation of more relative Tibetan émigrés in India takes over the leadership of the exiled Tibetan community in India after the passing of the Dalai Lama.

continent today is simply a function of the Indian, Pakistani and Chinese inability to prosecute and win major conventional wars.

What could change the status quo, however, are Indian and Chinese innovations in the realm of technology, organization or war fighting doctrine. Such change becomes possible as China and India grow rapidly in economic terms. The resulting increases in prosperity will lead to increase in prosperity as the state, availing itself of more resources than it had previously, acquires new military capabilities that in turn, increase the range of feasible political choices, including war. Chinese improvements in logistics, air power (both defensive and offensive), communications and the capacity to unleash accurate deep ties could tilt the balance towards deterrence instability along the Himalayas. Similarly, Indian improvements in the realm of combined-arms maneuver warfare, especially involving organization and war-fighting doctrine and in the arena of strategic applications of air power, could tilt the current stand-off on the western battlefields towards India's favour, thereby making deterrence unstable if these military trends are not controlled by larger political considerations.

A similar set of transitions in the nuclear realm could drive instability. Most of these transitions may occur in the Indo-Pakistani case rather than in the Sino-Indian case for reasons explored earlier, and most of them may in fact occur even before the potential transformations in the conventional arena came about. The principal changes in question here center mostly on the kinds of nuclear weapons, the kind of delivery systems, and the kind of deterrence doctrines that may be developed by both states. The issue of stability becomes particularly urgent, because both India and Pakistan are in the process of acquiring relatively short-ranged theater ballistic missile systems, some of which may not be

survivable but may nonetheless be armed with (or, at any rate be perceives as being armed with) nuclear warheads. The instabilities caused by such deployments were in many ways a staple of Cold War concerns but oftentimes do not appear to be publicly understood or discussed in South Asia. Mutual deterrence in the Sino-Indian case is today an oxymoron, but even when that changes, the transition is likely to be less troublesome than the Indo-Pakistani case.

The third driver is the future character of political regimes in India, Pakistan and China. In the first two instances, the issue of the political regime essentially hinges on the survival and flourishing of moderate centrist parties in domestic Indian and Pakistani politics. In India, the centrist Congress Party has been battered to the point where non-Congress alternatives will probably continue to govern the country in the future. The key question, however, is which alternative. It is still uncertain whether strongly nationalist parties like the BJP have in fact peaked. Even if they have peaked, there is still a possibility that they could come to power as part of a coalition of regional parties that care less than the BJP does for international and security related problems, and essentially give the latter a free hand in these issue areas. If this includes the pursuit of more radical agenda -- both internally and externally - the stage could be set for greater regional confrontation than heretofore, although this is unlikely because the BJP would have to discover the virtues of moderation if it is to secure power and hold on to it. In Pakistan, it is unlikely that radical Islamist parties would come to power in the near term, but their ability to constrain the fragile centrist civilian regimes into following otherwise undesirable policies cannot be underestimated. There is a troublesome possibility of diversionary efforts at domestic

mobilization, especially with respect to issues like Kashmir, which could lead to self-reinforcing spirals of escalation of a new conflict. Of perhaps greater concern is the structural viability of Pakistan as a state. Contrary to much popular commentary on the subject, however, it is important to recognize that Pakistan is not a *"failed state"* and is highly unlikely to become one. The real challenge facing Pakistan is not state failure but enervating stagnation - an end-product of severe macro economic imbalances coupled with simmering ethnic tensions, both of which could be exploited by external actors with deleterious consequences for stability. Both future decisions relating to the initiation of war, it is important that extra regional powers - especially critical actors with a disproportionate impact on Asia such as the US, Russia and Japan pay careful attention to the nature of the political signals transmitted to New Delhi, Islamabad and Beijing in the context of their bilateral relationships with the greater South Asian states. In this context, it is equally important that all extra regional powers pay particular attention to their policies in so far as they relate to arms transfer and territorial disputes. To the degree that such policies suggest a willingness to countenance dramatic changes in the regional balances of power or encourage territorial revisionism through coercion or force, the stage would be set for serious discord among India, Pakistan and China.

It has become a cliché in the arms control community that the Indian-Pakistan border is the most likely area for nuclear confrontation and the use of nuclear weapons. Briefly, the reasoning is as follows:

1) geography favours India as Pakistan has little strategic depth and could be overrun conventionally quickly giving it an

incentive to move or threaten nuclear weapons quickly in conflict;

2) physical adequacy, contiguity, ensures friction and sparks especially over Kashmir which will be difficult to contain and which risk escalation to nuclear threats or use;

3) distances are short, there will be little accurate intelligence hence little warning time, hence an incentive to launch missile quickly even preemptively;

4) domestic politics in each country encourage jingoism, brinkmanship and miscalculation;

5) deficiencies in technology and command and control entail risks of accidental release and unauthorized decisions;

6) the triangular nuclear geometry between India and Pakistan which wants to deter Chinese aggression through nuclear weapons and Pakistan which wants to do the same versus India, is complicated;

7) one state, Pakistan feels existentially threatened. At the same time its policies in Kashmir may result in conventional skirmishes with India which could leave Pakistan with few options but escalation to nuclear weapons use.

Today the prime concern in security is its regional context. The tendency to treat proliferation separate from its regional context, as a global issue has been irresistible. Given the differentiation made between developed and less developed states and selectivity toward allies, the tendency has been to pursue a 'one size fits all' policy. The need for crisis management and dialogue is self-evidently increased under these conditions. India

has offered a voluntary moratorium on further testing, hinted at an interest in joining the CTBT under certain conditions and a fissile cut off agreement. It has also declared a doctrine of no first use of NWS. India has hinted that it seeks only a minimum deterrent, a small arsenal of NWS for deterrence rather than war fighting purposes. Pakistan has been more reticent but will not agree to a no-first use agreement: its NWS are in part intended to deter any, including a conventional, attack from India. While Pakistan is eager to internationalize the Kashmir issue and support all initiatives to this effect, India seeks to keep the issue bilateral, consistent with the Simla agreement of 1992.[11]

The ability of the outside powers to influence the policies of the states on the subcontinent appears limited in the absence of a willingness to commit themselves meaningfully to their security concerns. Without offering security guarantees, which may or may not be credible and may or may not be stabilizing (it could widen and escalate a dispute, or encourage adventurist behaviour by the state that is thus reassured), the P-5 should offer their good offices to promote dialogue, military exchanges etc. between India and China and India and Pakistan. Agreement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons; cooperative monitoring and other confidence building measures should be encouraged. What the existing NWS cannot do with any conviction is to deny the security concerns of other states or to dictate them how they should be met. Some analysts like, T.Graham and Henry Kissinger, observed that the most important effect of the development on the subcontinent would be in the encouragement of others.

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[11] Mark Nicholsan, "India spurns attempts to broker talks" The Financial Times, June 5, 1998p.6; "The Tinderbox of Kashmir" The Economist, June 13, 1998 p.68.

Impact on the Greater Middle East

Israel, the only other threshold state has sought to retain the strategic benefits of ambiguity about the status of its nuclear capabilities without specifically acknowledging them. Since 1990, however Israel's traditional policy of neither denying nor claiming a capability, while retaining nuclear weapons as a last resort against an existential threat, has come under pressure. The Gulf War saw the use of long-range missiles against Israel. The spread of these capabilities, notably to Iran, and the related spread of weapons of mass destruction capabilities, chemical and biological, in the region to Syria and Iran as well as Iraq, is another source of pressure. Another new feature is the quest for nuclear capabilities by Iran (as well as Iraq). Israel suspects that Iran and Iraq would become involved in any future war. At the same time, the Arab and Iran states have become vociferous about Israel's nuclear 'monopoly'. Some have tied their ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to Israel's adherence to the NPT. Many have resisted further discussions about Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) under the Madrid peace.

Europe and Middle East

There is a high degree of interdependence between Europe and the Middle East in the economic sphere, particularly with respect to petroleum reserves. As was demonstrated in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, as well as both Gulf conflicts, instability and military conflict in the region can disrupt oil supplies to Europe. The threat of such disruptions has clearly had an impact on the policies of European states. Although the level of dependency on Middle East oil has declined somewhat in the past decade, with the development of North Sea and other alternative

sources, Europe continues to have a major interest in maintaining access to these sources. Most recently this linkage has led to the participation of many European states in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The potential of spillover of military conflicts from the Middle East into Europe has increased with the proliferation of long-range delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction (including massive stockpiles of advanced conventional weapons). Southern Europe is in close proximity to the Middle East, and states that acquire medium (500 to 1500 km) or long-range ballistic missiles (1500 to 2000 km) or combat aircraft will have the capability of striking targets in Europe. Many of these states already have significant arsenals of chemical weapons, and are seeking access to biological and nuclear weapons. Military planners have begun to consider the implications of these capabilities and the potential for direct involvement in Europe in Middle Eastern conflict scenarios.

The security of Europe is also affected by domestic social and political instability, as well as political and religious radicalism in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This instability leads to conflict, which creates large movements of refugees, and also contributes to social upheaval. Terrorist actions in Europe have been increasing, in large part due to the spillover effects of domestic political and social instability in North Africa and the Middle East.

The proliferation of WMD in the Middle East is a prominent item on the agenda of most discussions of arms limitations and conflict prevention in the region that have or are seeking to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the Middle East is steadily increasing. Many of these states have acquired or are

actively seeking long-range missiles and other delivery systems. In addition, the massive stockpiles of conventional weapons platforms including advanced tanks and combat aircraft, that continue to be concentrated by some states in the region, also pose dangers to the survival of small states in the region, also pose dangers to the survival of small states. Large-scale conventional attacks are capable of destroying cities and inflicting large-scale casualties to civilian populations.

The Middle East has been a major market for weapons and military technology, and European suppliers, from both East and West, have been very active. The region continues to be one of the world's largest markets of weapons and military technology (although East Asia may be emerging as a bigger market). Realistically, it is important to acknowledge that European suppliers have an interest in maintaining a large share, thereby providing jobs, income, and profits for major firms.

Conflict management and resolution are difficult and tenuous under any circumstances, and caution is always necessary. As events in the Balkans have reminded all of us, intense ethno, national and religious conflicts that have their roots in ancient history may be controlled for some time, but sudden political shifts and changes in the military balance of power can trigger a resumption of conflict. It is in this context that European security is greatly affected by any conflict-driving issue in and around the region.

WMD Proliferation and EU

The direct WMD threat to European territory is at present limited or non-existent. However post Cold-War developments,

such as the reported cooperation between China and North Korea and various Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Basin countries on ballistic missiles and technologies are of growing European concern. At least 20 states are reported to have a chemical and/or biological-weapons program for military purposes. While the number of countries armed with nuclear weapons is likely to remain limited, Iraq and North Korea show how difficult it is to curb a nuclear-weapons program undertaken by motivated leaders. WMD are attractive because they are seen, rightly or wrongly, as cost-effective strategic tools, either as weapons or as instruments of political power. In particular, they have come to be perceived as equalizing, politically or militarily, a powerful conventional adversary or coalition.

Broadly, European countries could be directly affected by a WMD threat in two situations. An adversary could use WMD in an attempt to disrupt military operations in a theater or could attempt to blackmail intervening countries or their allies by threatening to use WMD-armed missiles against their cities. The possible role of nuclear weapons in deterring threats such as these has become a new subject of debate in Europe.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 revealed supplementary challenges. Europe cannot remain immune to the emergence of two nuclear powers, particularly since France and the UK are 'official' nuclear-weapon states and Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. While the UN, the Group of Eight (G-8) industrial nations and the US, rather than Europe, have been at the forefront of these tests, many believe that a dialogue between European countries and India and Pakistan would be both legitimate and useful. The tests have also highlighted the fragility of the link between nuclear weapons and permanent membership

of the Security Council. The idea that non-nuclear countries such as Germany or Japan deserve a permanent seat is already widespread. If the suggestion that India should give up its nuclear weapons in order to gain a similar privilege gained support, the link would be strained further. Although this is a longer term issue, it could affect thinking in France and the UK, both about their position, and that of Europe as a whole, in the world.

Following issues emerge for the security concerns of Europe as a consequence of the South Asian nuclear tests:

There is a widespread feeling that the tests though meant to carry a deterrent objective hey have triggered an arms race in the whole of region in and around South Asia. Its affect can be far reaching, beyond South Asia as a spillover effect to the Middle East where rogue states like Iraq exist. It is the Mediterranean and Middle East spillover that carries greater criticality in the European context. To that extent Europe cannot remain immune to the South Asian tests.

The India-China-Pakistan triangle carries importance in this respect too. China, off late has been trying to gather more power and acceptance in the international system. Its alliance with Pakistan off late has been getting too closer and recently it has openly supported Pakistan's stand on Kashmir issue. The power struggle prevailing in the region has a great potential of destabilizing the international security.

Europe's fears of inadvertent landing of nuclear missiles on its land are not too far-fetched. Though they seem far-fetched but their occurrence cannot be ruled out. As perceived by US defence strategists when they try testing those 'war games' the regional

conflict issue may turn out to be finally emerging as international issue. In that respect Europe's concerns of proliferation of weapons in the South Asian region are quite rational for its own security.

The above analysis of European concerns of South Asian nuclear proliferation lends another angle to the whole issue. Security today has greater stakes in the regional context than at the international level for the world is no more divided on cold war lines.

Europe has expressed its concern of South Asian proliferation around that framework only. If had it not been so how would one explain the keen interest in nuclear tests by France and Britain, and also support to NMD project of US by Europe, though the ;later one seems to be a bit far-fetched.

Chapter – V

CONCLUSION

Throughout the 1970s the arms race in Europe marked the culmination of a line of political and strategic thought that sees in reciprocal deterrence the supreme regulator of relations between states. Despite more than three centuries of civil and scientific development, and despite two world wars and the creation of arms that have radically changed the nature of war seems as if nothing or little has changed in political thought since the beginning of modern era.

European countries have long been used to considering their security as almost exclusively dependent on global factors. Assessments of the international balance of power have been dominated in the last 10 or 15 years by two interpretative trends: the decline of American powers with respect to the USSR and the relative increase in power of a large number of countries. Deeper changes are at the root of Western Europe's changes in regional security perceptions. They have obliged Europeans to reconsider the influence of regional factors, in particular, those coming from the developing countries in two main directions:

❖ regional factors affecting East-West relations and consequently, security relations between Western European countries and the US.

❖ regional   factors that constitute a direct threat to Western European countries, quite aside from East-West relations. At any rate, these more profound changes have achieved the same result.

Not only have they brought regional factors back into the strategic equations of Western European countries, but they have also led them to intervene militarily numerous times in Third World crises and to redefine and expand their aid and economic cooperation policies in the North South framework.

Thus there are two dimensions to the rethinking in Western European countries of the impact of regional factors on security as a whole, and military intervention. The first is geopolitical, which justifies the political action or even the military intervention on the basis of threats to national security interests. The second might be called trans-Atlantic: Western European countries intervene in relation to threats that they do not necessarily perceive as such, but that are so perceived by the US. The first dimension reflects the greater political and military importance that Third world countries - and especially Mediterranean and Southwest Asian countries definitely nearer to Western Europe - have acquired. The second dimension reflects the erosion of the US power of control. This dimension is more complex and important than the first. It is, in fact, just one of the symptoms of a much broader problem of political, economic, and institutional reorganization of the West, which will have to be dealt with in the future.

The threat to Europe coming from the Third World is actually received as coming from the Mediterranean, Africa, and Southwest Asia. Although the regional view of Western Europeans has become

"globalized", the consequences of World War II actually restricted it to the nearest Third World regions. Great Britain's intervention in the Falklands is the only exception, and there is some doubt as to whether France - the only other European country with some national territory overseas - would intervene under similar circumstances.

Linked to local factors rather than the East-west conflict, this threat is seen by Europeans as being new and autonomous, to be met both in consultation with the US and independently of it. This new perception has led to numerous European actions outside of the NATO area since the end of the 1970s with the formation of the Multinational force Observers in the Sinai and the presence of several fleets in the Arabian sea during the Iranian crisis.

Chapter II highlights the dynamics of regional factors with respect to European security. The European borders are highly sensitive region and it remains an issue of deep concern for the European region. The Middle East and the Mediterranean region are highly volatile and the spillover effects in case of any conflict may prove to be too costly for Europe. Keeping that in mind Europe has to be vigilant enough for its security and prevent any escalation or emergence of war in that area. Its utterances on South Asian Nuclear Test was a direct result of these concerns.

Chapter III gives a broad outline of the nuclear policy of Europe. Though it stands out to be quite blurred but it throws light on the thinking going well in Europe about the emergence of a European Nuclear Union. However the idea seems far-fetched till the time the differences on CFSP in EU even out and nuclear threats are more direct. Nevertheless it portends to be a great force in strengthening

European integration much deeper. But for the nuclear non proliferation regime it may have an adverse consequences, to that extent the European signals of preventing nuclear proliferation in the region be that may even South Asia works towards global interest.

As chapter four highlights the South Asian Nuclear tests have far reaching consequences even for the European states for Europe cannot remain immune to the regional dimension. The recent US utterances on NMD expose the double standards existing at the global level. Europe too is not untouched.

Europeans today will have to take on greater responsibility and will thus have to take into consideration the impact of regional factors, both those coming from the developing countries and strictly Europeans ones. If the allies' increased coresponsibility were to become particularly penetrating and the Europeans were to start taking on the global view in international relations that distinguished them up to the catastrophic World War II, the regional factors would become more 'global' in the strict sense of the word and would take on even greater importance for European security.

Anyone linking European interests for the Third world to colonialism would certainly look with concern upon a European political and military presence there in addition to the aid and economic cooperation offered in the postwar period. On the other hand. it is ironical that, any of the third world countries continue to rely on the intervention or mediation of Europeans in their crisis. They see the Europeans as a useful corrective to US power, and the superpowers in general.

The South Asian nuclear tests have yet again confirmed the persistent significance of nuclear deterrence. Even with the end of Cold War, states continue to feel insecure- with so many diverse threats playing in and around the region. Be that may- nuclear deterrence prevents war escalation; but complimentary threats arising from the existence of nuclear weapons continues to exist - in the form of accidental threats or proliferation and spread of weapons beyond borders. The response of various international actors to the South Asian tests was a direct consequence of such impressions they had. Undoubtedly Europe too cannot claim that it has never supported nuclear weapons - they continue to exist on its soil. Europe's concern for the South Asian tests have deep rooted implications. They imply not just a genuine concern for nuclear proliferation but threat originating to the region as such.

Europe has stood firmly for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons during the past five decades. But it has done little to press for nuclear disarmament after the end of cold War. This is even more marked in the case of states that are part of NATO alliance which leaves these states 'non-nuclear' only in narrow legalistically technical terms rather than in any practical form. Through the decades, nuclear weapons have been stationed on their soil, their military forces integrated in the doctrine and strategies for the employment of nuclear weapons, and their security depends on the nuclear weapons of the primary nuclear weapon states. And in case of crisis situations, military commanders of these 'non-nuclear weapon' states would have received delegated authority to use nuclear weapons which only legally belonged to recognized nuclear weapon states. The states of Europe thus would appear to have a stake in the continuation and

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perpetuation of nuclear weapons for security, prestige and power, even if through reflected glory and 'extended deterrence' of a military alliance in an essentially nonaligned world. The bottom line is that while the nuclear weapon states have not honoured the bargain of the 1960s of NPT, the so-called non-nuclear weapon states of Europe allied to the NATO have also little to see its implementation.

The 1990s will always be remembered in history, for firstly, the unambiguous shift from nuclear disarmament to nonproliferation by the international community led by the five nuclear weapon states; and secondly, for flowering of proliferation. As regards the first, it is generally believed that · Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons' programme in spite of its commitment to the NPT as a member has largely been responsible for this shift. Equally important although far less publicized, has been the role of a large number of industrialized countries mostly from Western Europe who violated their own obligations under the NPT to allow nuclear weapons technology and material to be transferred to Iraq for commercial or strategic interests. The North Korean example even conveyed the impression that nuclear proliferation actually pays!

The second development of flowering of proliferation represents a negative trend compared to the accession of South Africa, Argentina and Brazil to nonproliferation norms and regimes. The most significant maturing of the proliferation process was that of Pakistan which acquired nuclear weapons know-how and technology from Europe and North America in the 1980s and received substantive assistance in terms of technology transfers from China in the 1980s and 1990s. Pakistan possessed only a primitive

level of indigenous nuclear science and technology. But acquisition of technology from external sources has helped it to acquire nuclear weapons.

The US, abandoned its nonproliferation objectives in Pakistan after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. North Korea also moved ahead in its clandestine nuclear weapons programme in violation of its NPT obligations. The West continues to doubt Iran about its nonproliferation commitments. There were reports that Saudi Arabia had clandestine plans to pursue a nuclear weapons programme.

The nonproliferation order has remained fundamentally flawed and fragile because of its discriminatory nature which legitimized possession by a few states, and expects others, especially those that have security concerns emanating from nuclear dangers not to acquire similar capabilities. The violations and deviations by the acknowledged weapon states and their allies added to that fragility.

The study started with the hypothesis that European utterances against South Asian nuclear interests were motivated more by national interests than global interests on nuclear proliferation. As the analysis throws light there are sufficient reasons for Europe to be concerned about the regional implications of nuclear proliferation - for today security is perceived in a regional context than local one. The term "National Interests" has a wide connotation. It arises from various kinds of threats and opportunities a nation faces. As human interests are self-driven so are regional/national interests. There is no thing actually existing as global interests.

Europe's concerns too conform to the same pattern. The global policies are a blend of dominant interests of major powers in the international system. While, India and Pakistan had their own compulsions and 'national interests' on going 'nuclear' – nevertheless they have exposed various other nations to 'nuclear threats'.

Nonetheless, the wider issue is not of interests or to say achieving the ends is more important than the means. Nuclear weapons are a hard reality of the present times – one with which we have to live with. The global community today has to decide and work out ways of fostering global prosperity for in it lies national and regional interests. That would mean friendly cooperation between countries and compromising where required for only that would lead to building up of economic power. Conflict reduction through mutual cooperation is hence important. Deliberations, summits, conferences on reduction of arms race may continue at their own level. But the highest and ultimate goal of nations to walk towards a higher pedestal of growth should be seen as the prime motive for existence of the nation state and the human race.

The closer European economic integration is the best bet in that regard setting global standards. South Asia too may soon follow. But to live in a world of utopia and any pretension of genuine bonhomie would be a folly - a recognition of wider realities of the national, regional and the international interests should remain a burning issue for any actor in the international political system.

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The Hindu (New Delhi)

The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

The Times of India (New Delhi)

Time (New York)

NUCLEAR STATUS 1998

Nuclear-Weapon States

Non-NPT Nuclear-Weapon States: These nations (India, Israel, and Pakistan) are believed to be able to deploy one or more nuclear weapons rapidly or to have deployed them already.

High-Risk States: North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya have taken steps in the past several years to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.

Abstaining Countries: These industrialized countries have the technological base, but thus far not the desire, to develop nuclear weapons. A number have installations under international inspection that can produce weapons-grade nuclear material.

Recent Renunciations: Several nations in this category had, or were believed to have had, active nuclear-weapon programs during the 1980s, but recently renounced such activities by opening all of their nuclear facilities to international inspection and by joining the non-proliferation regime. Following the Soviet breakup, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states, and cooperated in the removal of all remaining nuclear weapons to Russia.

From:-

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 1998, A Guide in Maps & Charts by Rodney W. Jones & Others