

**Determining Factors of South Africa's Foreign  
Policy and its Impact on India (1994-1999)**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of the  
Degree of

**Master of Philosophy**

**Prem Chand**



**Centre for West Asian and African Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University,  
New Delhi – 110 067.  
2000**



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI - 110 067

Centre for West Asian & African Studies  
School of International Studies

TEL 6107676, 6167557  
Ext 2372.

GRAM JAYPNU  
Fax 91-11-6165386

**21 July, 2000**

## **CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**Determining Factors of South Africa's Foreign Policy and its Impact on India (1994-1999)**" submitted by **Prem Chand** in fulfillment of six credits out of total requirement of twenty-four credits for the award of the Degree of **Master of Philosophy (M.Phil)** of the University, is his original work according to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

*S. N. Malakar*  
**Dr. S.N. Malakar**

**Supervisor**

*Gulshan Dietl*  
**Prof. Gulshan Dietl**

**Chairperson**

**Chairman**  
Centre for West Asian and African Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067.

**To**

**My Parents,**

**and Elder Brothers, Rajbir and Kailash**

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## **PREFACE**

*Following its transition to non-racial democracy in April-May 1994, South Africa has come out of its decades of self-induced isolation and has made a triumphant return to the world stage. South Africa's geographic and strategic location naturally influences its foreign relations. Simultaneously with the foreign economic priorities, South Africa proclaims itself as a good global citizen, placing and right so, human rights and defence of democracy at the centre of its foreign policy. South Africa as the economic powerhouse of the African continent, particularly in Southern Africa, would be expected to take a leading role both in the international affairs of Africa and in representing the continent in the global setting. More so, Southern African countries are in the prime focus of South African foreign policy. Besides this, South Africa also wants to play an important role internationally with special emphasis on Third World in general and India in particular.*

*National interests are the cardinal basis of South African foreign policy where economic and strategic concerns are major determining factors. South Africa sees India as a major economic and strategic partner in her foreign policy perspectives and for that its foreign policy has impacted India not only in bilateral cooperation but also in multilateral cooperation. In the new global order, South Africa can play an effective role in promoting peace and cooperation in the company of like minded*

*countries, such as India with which it is proclaiming “strategic partnership”. My dissertation is an attempt to find out the historical roots of South African foreign policy and its key determining factors, which runs its foreign policy. Post-apartheid South African foreign policy has a new look towards India which have tremendous impacts on both sides. The literature on the post-apartheid South African foreign policy is very thin and I hope this dissertation fills some of the lacunae in the field.*

*This dissertation is the product of the support, cooperation and contribution of many individuals, institutions and libraries. In the completion of this work I am indebted to many. First and foremost I express my deep and profound sense of gratitude to my supervisor Dr. S.N. Malakar for seriously going through my draft and giving critical comments and suggestions. He rendered all the possible intellectual supports at every critical stage of my work.*

*I must record my gratefulness to Dr. Ajay Dubey. He gave me his critical and analytical comments on my work. I must express my gratitude to our Chairperson Prof. Gulshan Dietl for generating my enthusiasm for completing my dissertation. I am very grateful to Prof. Vijay Gupta for his kind support. I am very thankful to Sh. Hari Sharan Chhabra, editor “World Focus” to provide me very valuable material on this subject.*

*My special thanks due to H.E. Maite Nkoana Mashabane and her staff of South African High commission, New Delhi for their kind support to me.*

*I am obliged to the staff of JNU Library, Delhi University Library, IDSA Library, Ministry of External Affairs (Govt. of India), for their kind cooperation and permission in allowing me to utilise the library facilities.*

*Many thanks are due to my sister Manisha for her manual support for getting the draft prepared. On the cost of her study, she helped me a lot when I needed the most. My deep sense of gratitude to my friends, Vidhan Pathak, Surender, Vijoo Krishanan and others who helped me in whatever they could.*

*Let me record my gratefulness to my parents, uncle J.S. Dahiya, brothers, Ramesh Chander, Satyavir, Rajbir, Kailash, Battilal, Rajesh and many thanks to my younger brother Rakesh and niece Nisha, who endured so much for my academic activities.*

*I am thankful to Mr. Sanjay, Mahesh and Laxman for their best effort in typing out my dissertation meticulously and in a short span of time.*

*I am alone responsible for the views expressed and whatever shortcomings in the present work.*

*Prem Chand*  
**(PREM CHAND)**

## Chapter - I

# A HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

### Introduction

Historical evolution of South African foreign policy is marked with the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 when the direct British Colonial rule yielded place to self-governance. With the colonial state formation the Union of South Africa pursued a kind of foreign policy which broadened its based among the big international actors of that period. It became a highly respected member not only of the British Commonwealth but also of the League of Nations that established in 1919. Eventhough the resistance posed to colonial rule by African National Congress (ANC) since its formation in 1912, could not stop the area of its influence. As the colonial state had tightened its hold on mineral and vital resources of South Africa, it developed the powerful defence and industrial base "a link in the Commonwealth chain of defence whenever South Africa was threatened by outside powers"<sup>1</sup>. Till 1945, South African foreign policy led by colonial power remained unaffected and undisturbed but due to the resistance posed to the

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<sup>1</sup> J.E. Spence, *Republic Under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy*, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, P.2.



colonial powers by the forces of national liberation and rising new awakening against colonialism at world level exerted heavy pressure on South African foreign policy. Seldom was the international spotlight of condemnation thrown on the nation's internal affairs. Even the input of General J.C. Smuts<sup>2</sup> at the San-Francisco Conference in May 1945, proved to "a watershed in South Africa's international standing, thereafter the country steadily declined into international unpopularity and eventful ostracism"<sup>3</sup>. The contrast of South Africa's pre and post second world war position with its decline in international status was a revealing reality.

In the early post second World War years, South Africa, by virtue of its status as most developed economy in Africa, entertained the notion of itself as a greatpower having a role to play in shaping the course of events in the dependent African territories. But, these schemes of a regional or Pan-African union came to naught. Although both the Commonwealth and the UN remained important international forums for South Africa, even before the National Party surprise election victory in

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<sup>2</sup> General J.C. Smuts was a great Commonwealth man. Over the years since the Act of Union in 1910, he had become increasingly convinced that South Africa's interests, both externally and internally, were best served by staying close to Britain and by retaining the British Commonwealth and Empire as one of the major forces in international politics. During his Premiership, Smuts dominated South Africa's foreign policy which was shaped by his individual will. In addition to his contribution to the formation of the League of Nations at the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Smuts played an important role in drawing up the preamble to the United Nations Charter in 1945. See, James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970*, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 9-14.

<sup>3</sup> D.J. Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy in Making*, Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984, p.6.

1948, Pretoria was beginning to find itself isolated from the world community. An opponent of the National Party, Smuts was nevertheless severely criticized in the UN over South West Africa, the mandate over which had been ceded to South Africa at the end of World War I, and over the Union's treatment of its Indian minority.

Any understanding of South African foreign policy thus demands knowledge of the Republic's domestic situation and related forms of state, government and politics, the nature and features as well as any regional intra and inter-state activity; and the dynamics of post-1945 world politics. In South Africa's case, the very nature of the Republic's internal order meant that the impact of domestic policy upon foreign policy has been far more pronounced than is usual. Conversely, changes in the regional context were often perceived as posing the gravest danger to the survival of the South African regime. Indeed, alternations and developments in the post second World War order made it increasingly difficult for Pretoria to maintain the distinction between domestic and foreign policy, an effect that placed other states at a certain advantage in their dealings with the Republic.

For the purpose of analyzing the evolution of South African foreign policy, the post second World War era has been divided up into various phases which will be traced out with its specific characteristic. This will make it possible not only to chart the evolution of policy, but also to

weigh the influence of individuals, to attribute the South African governments reaction to the changing international and regional environment and to the deteriorating internal security situation.

### **Legacy of Second World War and its Aftermath (1945-1948)**

It is necessary to set South Africa foreign policy in changing international context that emerged at the end of second World War. The post-war world differed profoundly from that which preceded it. The systematic persecution and extermination of the Jews by Nazi Germany promoted a new sensitivity about human rights. In the wake of holocaust it came to be regarded as morally indefensible and politically repugnant to create an elaborate and socially divisive system based purely on racism. This rejuvenated concern was clearly reflected in the United Nations Charter.

Concurrent with this internationalization of morality was the emergence of anti-colonialist sentiments and a desire for self-determination. These developments provided a common denominator and binding political link between Third World states, which also faced problems of poverty and underdevelopment. The importance of this grouping as a highly visible and vociferous voting coalition in the UN, as markets for Western goods, or as part and parcel of politically expansionist or global containment strategies made their allegiance a major objective of superpower competition. It also gave them very special

political leverage on such issues as social basis for political power in South Africa.

Despite these considerations, South Africa was quick to attribute its related internal and domestic security problems to a Cold War scramble for territory and influence. Later it elaborated this view into that of a "Total Onslaught" against South Africa. Portraying itself as a natural ally of the West under threat of being overthrown by lackeys of the Soviet Union, the government projected the challenges to South African security as a part of a wider global struggle.

The post war era also witnessed enormous technological improvements, especially in the area of mass communications. These in turn served to disseminate knowledge of South Africa's political system and stigmatize its politics. The media revolution internationalized the immorality of South Africa domestic system, strongly influencing the relations between South Africa and other states in the international system.

The years between 1945 and 1948 plainly mark the start of a new era in South Africa's foreign policy. The issues that were raised, the attacks which were directed against the Union and her response to these attacks, mark a break with the past. They also mark the end of Smut's long years in office. His admirers will remember the days when he was a dominant, international and Commonwealth figure, when he had vitality

and certainty of touch which is captured in his London statue- the lithe, stretched body, the confident forward thrust of the head. His detractors will remember the final years when that certainty had gone, when he become the heavy, seated, brooding figure of the Cape Town statue.<sup>4</sup>

### **The Nationalists Establish their Rule (1948-1960)**

The period between 1948 and 1960 saw major developments in international affairs. The Cold War was its height and in Africa the colonial powers (with the exception of Portugal) started to shift their policies towards eventual withdrawal. It was a time of reassessment and growing uncertainty in the continent, but from the South African viewpoint the period had coherence as a new government established itself in power. The change in government came with the surprising election victory of the National Party. The Nationalists, with two further substantial election victories in 1953 and 1958, had established themselves as the ruling party in South Africa.

In opposition Nationalist had criticized Smuts for concentrating too much of his attention on international affairs, and when they came to power their main concern was internal affairs- the introduction of National Party policies within the Union and securing the party's hold on the government. Partly because of these internal commitments and

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<sup>4</sup> James Barber, op. cit., pp.41-42.

partly because the international options open to South Africa was increasingly circumscribed the objectives of foreign policy became less expansive and more closely tied to domestic policies. The personal interests of Dr. D.F. Malan and Mr. Johannes Strijdom, the first two post-war Nationalist Prime Minister, reflected the change of emphasis. Both had their major interests in internal affairs. Yet, because of their office and the constant interaction between domestic and foreign policies, they had a significant role in foreign affairs.<sup>5</sup> South Africa's foreign relation was exacerbated by the advent of Malan's National Party government in 1948, which was committed both to the achievement of republican status and the creation of a new domestic order, apartheid. Apartheid was in part designed to counter feelings of black self-determination being espoused elsewhere in Africa. Consolidation of the colonial order in Africa, it was hoped, would safeguard South Africa's domestic status quo.<sup>6</sup>

Upon assuming office the new Prime Minister, who was also minister of external affairs, D.F. Malan, in a nationwide broadcast (June 4, 1948) outlined his government's foreign policy. The interests of South Africa would always be placed first, he said, but the new ministry did not subscribe to an isolationist policy. However, Dr. Malan declared that

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p.46.

<sup>6</sup> Greg Mills and Simon Baynham, "Changing the guard : South Africa's foreign policy in the 1990s". *Africa Insight*, Vol.20, No.3, 1990,p.177.

South Africa had accepted membership in the United Nations “on the unequivocal understanding that there was to be neither external interference in our domestic affairs nor any tampering with our autonomous rights”. The new ministry also wished to continue friendly relations with Great Britain and other members of the British Commonwealth, but the prime minister emphasized that cooperation with them would be possible only if it did not detract from South Africa’s status and freedom as a sovereign state, and only if it involved no intervention in their domestic affairs.<sup>7</sup>

Malan’s Africa Charter proposed guidelines for the development of the continent along the lines of Western European Christian civilization. This led him to the ironic assertion that British imperial control, which the Nationalist had always argued, and argued bitterly, was detrimental for the whites, was beneficial for the non-whites. This claim was based not only on their technical and economic achievements, their political independence, and their experience of African conditions, but on their conviction that, as a Western European people, they had a natural predominant position. It was the assertion of a superior culture.<sup>8</sup> Pretoria canvassed the idea of an African Defence Organization for African states in a series of talks involving the colonial powers, the

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<sup>7</sup> Union of South Africa, State Information Office, *Foreign Policy of the Union of South Africa* (Pretoria, n.d.), pp.4-5 as quoted in Amry Vandenbosch, *South Africa and the World*, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky (1970),p.130.

<sup>8</sup> James Barber, *op.cit*, p.102.

Commonwealth and the United States. These efforts came to nothing. Instead they further identified South Africa with the colonial order by encouraging close links with white communities elsewhere in Africa, communities whose experiences during the transition to black majority rule were to have a profound effect on South Africa's external policies.

The independence of Ghana in 1957 gave emphasis to South Africa's growing realization that its future lay not in exclusive identification with the old colonial order, but rather as an independent African power. This acknowledgement that it had to adjust to new realities within the continent, coupled with the need to offset Pretoria's growing international isolation, were evident in H.F. Verwoerd's (1958-1966) policy of separate development. He declared that total racial segregation was the ideal, the objective of his party and government, but because of the economic and social structure which had been allowed to develop before 1948, this objective could not be achieved quickly, as that would disrupt the economy and arrest industrial development. The objective would be reached in stages. Political separation, but the process of physical separation would be carried out gradually over a long period.<sup>9</sup> By providing for Bantu "homelands", which might ultimately become independent states, Verwoerd tried to identify with the decolonizing trend in Africa. He outlined plans for regional co-operation, initially focusing on

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<sup>9</sup> Amry Vandebosch, *op.cit.*, p.264.



South Africa, the homelands, and the British High Commission territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS states), though he envisaged in time a Commonwealth-type relationship of economically dependent states covering the entire subcontinent.

However, these proposals came to nothing. Intensifying international and domestic pressure over the country's internal policies and mounting violence at home left South Africa in position to launch any major new foreign policy initiative. Instead its domestic policies were responsible for frustrating its long held aspiration to incorporate the High Commission territories. Significantly, the reactions to Verwoerd's initiatives demonstrated that foreign opinion had an influence upon domestic policy, and domestic policy imposed constraints on the conduct of external affairs. Further ways in which apartheid affected South Africa's foreign relations were in the forming of economic and military links with the West. Militarily, there was the issue of Pretoria's domestic strategies and its efforts to enter into a formal defence alliance with the West. By presenting the internal and external threats to South Africa's security as part of an international communist offensive, Pretoria asserted that it was a major bulwark against communism. By making this appeal it sought to make common cause with the Western alliance and thereby enlist the support of its members in defence of white interests in South Africa. The Western powers did not share South Africa's fears of imminent communist penetration of the subcontinent,

however, while Pretoria would have liked NATO to extend its cover into the South Atlantic, either in form of a broader African alliance, or a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) including several South American states. Western antipathy towards apartheid combined with other strategy considerations to preclude such an arrangement.

An identical relationship between domestic and foreign affairs can also be identified in South Africa's economic links with its major trading partners. Again the purpose was to align South Africa closely with the West commercially and industrially. This concept of maximizing integration and stressing the primacy of economic considerations over political differences was also manifest in Verwoerd's policy towards black Africa, the hope being that such an approach would spill over to the benefit of diplomatic relations.

Although its domestic policies consistently frustrated its foreign policy ambitions. South Africa's prospects appeared relatively secure until the Sharpeville crisis of March 1960. At that time there was the cordon sanitaire of white-ruled states to the north; the Simonstown Agreement of 1955 which assured a British defence commitment against external aggression, and at home, a black opposition which remained largely apolitical, in no position to challenge the state in armed confrontation. Sharpeville crisis marked a new stage in the Union's deteriorating international position. The banning of the African-National

Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), together with the imprisonment of their leaders undermined those of South Africa's political allies who were prepared to support Pretoria's claim that it was a major force in the maintenance of political order and democratic values in the subcontinent. South Africa's moral and political order became major international issues, vigorously debated at the UN and elsewhere, they led to demands for international economic sanctions against Pretoria. It was only through Verwoerd's "politics of security"<sup>10</sup>- the restoration of order through repression and consolidation- that South Africa found a new basis upon which it could reconstruct its foreign policy.

### **The Outward Movement: Vorster's Search for International Acceptance through Detente (1961-1974)**

South Africa's prime minister H.F. Verwoerd's "political of security" restored white confidence in South Africa through the suppression of internal violence and stress on economic growth. The mood of optimism created during this period of consolidation enabled Prime Minister Balthazar J. Vorster to embark on the "outward movement" phase of South African foreign policy, which sought rapprochement with black Africa. Despite initial fears, this mood was little altered by the declaration

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<sup>10</sup> N.M. Stultz, "The politics of security : South Africa under Verwoerd, 1961-1966", *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol.7, No.1, April 1969.pp.3-20.

of South Africa as a Republic in 1961, a change which appeared to do little further harm to Pretoria's international relationship.

The South African government hoped that by improving relations with black Africa, it would improve the Republic's international position. Although the outward movement was primarily directed at northern African states. South Africa hoped to capitalize on its economic hegemony in the region. By seeking to maintain close economic and technological co-operation among all the countries in the area, Vorster sought the eventual creation of a Southern African economic community. Like Verwoerd before him, he hoped that functionalist approach would spill over into the political and diplomatic fields, thereby acquiring the tacit acceptance of a white ruled South Africa and its internal policy of separate development. Yet, while his predecessor had attempted to provide a domestic policy consistent with the requisites of South Africa's foreign policy. Vorster's initiative was essentially externally oriented and implicitly denied that foreign policy demanded a domestic corollary.

In the event, the outward movement made little progress towards formalizing relations with either black Africa, or the newly independent states in the region. Diplomatic relations were established with Malawi in 1967, the first and only such formal link with a black African states. Drawing diplomatic capital from these links, the South African Government said that they demonstrated that black states were not

uniformly opposed to contact with the Republic, and they showed that South Africa was prepared for peaceful co-operation with any state, provided there was an acceptance of non interference in each other's affairs. In Malawi's case the South Africans had more to gain because Malawi was less dependent on the Republic. The diplomatic exchange with Malawi was a major breakthrough for the government's 'outward policy', and Vorster followed it up by visiting Malawi in 1970, his first visit to a black state.<sup>11</sup> Closer links were achieved with the BLS states through a revision of the Customs Union Agreement in 1969, and in the mid-1970, Presidential Summit meetings were held with the Ivory Coast, Zambia, Senegal and Liberia. With this, 'the South Africans hoped that it would help to buttress them against their enemies, they also saw it as a major link in the extension of the outward policy'.<sup>12</sup>

Vorster's initiative was lost in the escalation of the guerrilla conflicts in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, for it was politically disadvantageous for any black African regime to be seen to be co-operating with the South African government, it was intended for the benefit of the black states themselves. Indeed, Pretoria's attempts at both dialogue with black Africa and at regional détente encountered vociferous rhetorical opposition. For example, in April 1975, the Organization of

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<sup>11</sup> James Barber, *op.cit*, pp.248-249.

<sup>12</sup> James Barber, *ibid*, p.245.

African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers- an organization from which the Republic was excluded- adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration on South Africa which included the statement that “any talk with the apartheid regime is such nonsense that it should be treated with the contempt it deserves”.<sup>13</sup> In addition, this African block was instrumental in terminating South African membership of various non-political specialized UN agencies.

South Africa’s efforts to achieve diplomatic legitimacy were evident also in its deep reservations about the Ian Smith government’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, and in its willingness to enter into negotiations over the question of Namibian independence. These reservations together with South Africa’s commitment to the maintenance of economic growth in the region, meant that the Republic’s search for international acceptability found certain sympathy in Washington and London. Though this amounted to tacit acceptance of the Republic’s external policies, it was not as Pretoria would have liked- translated into a repeal of the voluntary UN Arms Embargo of 1963.

The realization that South Africa could not count either on Western help in the event of an external attack, or an arms purchases, was behind the massive programme in the 1960s aimed at the modernization of the SADF. This received added impetus from deterioration in internal

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<sup>13</sup> *Southern African Record*, No.2, June 1975,p.39.

security and the dangers of a more unstable international environment. The guerrilla wars in Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories threatened to spill over into the Republic. There were the beginnings of a violent international struggle in Namibia. These external developments fuelled the growth of a “garrison-state” idea, a psychology central to the evolution of the Total National Strategy of the late 1970s. The Republic’s siege mentality was emphasized by the forging of close links with other pariah states, such as Israel, Paraguay, Taiwan and Chile. The Israeli connection in particular was to become essential in providing South Africa with the technology and equipment with which to modernize its security forces.<sup>14</sup>

Despite substantial economic and military aid to the Smith regime, the occasional and studiously vague outburst about putting out one’s neighbours fires and the threat voiced by Prime Minister Vorster “to hit (Zambia) so hard that they will never forget it,”<sup>15</sup> the primary role of this increased military capability and growing militarization was internal. Any large-scale intervention would have irrevocably damaged South Africa’s shaky international position, and set back Vorster’s search for détente. Though it undoubtedly provided a measure of external deterrence, the military instrument played on insignificant role in South African foreign policy up to 1974.

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<sup>14</sup> Greg Mills and Simon Baynham, *op.cit.*, p.179.

<sup>15</sup> Amry Vandenbosch, *op.cit.*p.280.

## **The Development of the Total National Strategy (1975-1980)**

The early years of P.W. Botha's premiership saw substantial domestic, regional and international change. The sudden collapse of Portuguese control in Mozambique and Angola set in motion a chain of events that considerably altered South Africa's foreign policy options, forcing a policy retreat to within the boundaries of Southern Africa. By the mid-1970s South African foreign policy had made little progress towards its ultimate objective of securing international acceptance of the White government and its domestic policies. The ill-fated military involvement in the Angolan conflict and the subsequent failure of the Anglo-American peace initiative for Rhodesia were primarily responsible for ending the era of détente which had promised to legitimize South Africa's role in the region.

Encouraged by assurances of American aid, and assistance from several African states, Prime Minister Vorster committed an estimated 3000 SADF troops in support of non-Marxist FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) guerrilla in Angola. However, South African troops were forced to withdraw after having come close to the capital Luanda, when US support failed to materialize. By then, Cuba had rushed with between 15,000 to 20,000 troops supported by massive supplies of Soviet war material to help the Marxist MPLA (People's



Movement for the Liberation of Angola) launch a counter-offensive. Defence Minister P.W. Botha, who had reportedly pressured Vorster into intervening in the first instance, was especially disillusioned by the absence of the West in general. Botha, says on this event over two years later, spoke with bitterness:

We intervened in Angola with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But they left us in the lurch. We are going to retell that story. The story must be told of how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch by an undertaking that was broken...<sup>16</sup>

The Angolan episode, planned and coordinated without the knowledge of foreign Affairs, must have represented an unprecedented opportunity for the South African defence establishment. A cooperative military effort with the West could both demonstrate South Africa's strategic value and potentially serve as a catalyst for the long-sought formal alliance. Coming on the heels of the British Labour Party's cancellation of the Simonstown Agreement a devastating personal blow for Botha and one that left South Africa. Without any formal security links in a time of grave crisis the prospect of a joint, or at least tacitly joint, covert campaign with the West would undoubtedly appear to South African officials to be a risk worth taking. It was the OAU's recognition of

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<sup>16</sup> Debates of the House of Assembly (Hansard) 17 April 1978, (Pretoria : Government Printers), Cols. 4852, as quoted in Chris Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand : The Rise and fall of the South African Security State*, London: Macmillan, 1996, pp.39-40.

the MPLA government and condemnation of South African involvement, coming on the heels of the American withdrawal of support, which ultimately forced a reassessment of Pretoria's policy. By 22 January 1976, the SADF had pulled back to a narrow buffer zone along the Angolan/Namibian border.<sup>17</sup>

In the wake of the recriminations over the Angolan intervention, one lesson in particular seems to have been drawn by the South African military establishment- that the West could not be relied upon, even in the face of direct Soviet military involvement, to come to the defence of South Africa. The military, for their part, became dissatisfied with the politicians handling of the war.

With the independence of Mozambique and Angola came a major escalation in the guerilla wars on the borders of Namibia and Rhodesia. SADF involvement in Angola ended any prospect of enduring co-operation between South Africa and the Frontline states designed to resolve the Rhodesian issue. The creation of these two new states, together with the SADF's retreat from Angola, arguably encouraged the civil unrest, which began in Soweto in June 1976.

After Soweto, rioting spread rapidly around the country. The events which followed, including the death in detention of the Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko and the harsh internal security

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<sup>17</sup> Chris Alden, *Ibid*, p.39.

clampdown in October 1977, hastened “the Republic’s slide into deeper international opprobrium and ostracism”.<sup>18</sup> This deterioration in South Africa’s relations with the West was aggravated further by the impasse over Namibia and by the threat to economic stability and investment derived from internal and external reactions to apartheid. The boom of the 1960s was succeeded by economic crisis in South Africa. The early 1970s brought a wave of strikes and a substantial outflow of foreign capital and skilled manpower. Western countries realized that important social change was essential if their economic and political interests were to be secured. In essence this was the basis upon which the West, and USA in particular, founded its constructive engagement policy of the 1980s; (lead to) cataclysmic political upheaval, they maintained, could be prevented only through political and economically support for internal reform.

As Vorster was preparing to step down as Prime Minister in 1978, his administration was rocked by the “Muldergate” scandal.<sup>19</sup> This involved criminal and political wrongdoing on the part of senior officials in the South African Department of Information. They had been conducting a covert propaganda and espionage campaign as part of the government’s outward movement, designed to discredit South Africa’s

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<sup>18</sup> D.J. Geldenhuys, “Recrossing the Matola threshold”, *South Africa International*, Vol.13, No.3, January 1983,p.153.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Scott Jaster, *The Defence of White Power : South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure*, London: Macmillan, 1988, p.33.

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critics and improve the regional international image. Exposed by the Muldergate affairs, their efforts were shown to be self-defeating and only served to aggravate relations with Western governments, some of whom had themselves been targets of the campaign.

These events, the imposition of a mandatory Arms Embargo in 1977, and the increasing antipathy of the Carter administration towards South Africa's race policies, heightened Pretoria's perceptions of vulnerability and threat and set the stage for fundamental policy reappraisal. South Africa was simultaneously vulnerable to attack from external aggressors and internal revolutionary forces, the threat to its security became depicted in terms of a Marxist-inspired master plan. From this perspective, the black nationalist groups, especially SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) and the ANC (African National Congress) were each portrayed as conscious, or even inadvertent, agents advancing the aspirations and responding to the dictates of international communism. In order to thwart the perceived menace of a foreign-inspired onslaught, South Africa deemed it necessary to develop an integrated plan in which all functions of the state apparatus were geared to one overriding security consideration. Drawing its inspiration from a range of post-war counter-insurgency campaigns, and from the theoretical and empirical discourses of such men as Andre Beaufre and John J. McCuen, a "Total Strategy emerged as the guiding ideology for

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white survival”.<sup>20</sup> It was only in the aftermath of the collapse of Portuguese authority in Southern Africa, however, that this strategy was spelled out in specific terms. In one of the clearest statements describing the total response, the White Paper on Defence, 1977 identified the dynamic linkage between the military and political dimensions of South Africa’s counter-revolutionary strategy:

It is... essential that a Total National Strategy be formulated at the highest level. The defence of the Republic of South Africa is not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary... it is the responsibility of every population group.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, a successful response “demands interdependent and coordinated actions in all fields- military, psychological, economic, ideological, cultural etc...”.<sup>22</sup> Reviewing the contents of the white paper, it declares that South Africa is facing a total onslaught from both the external and internal environment. Manifesting itself in the form of black unrest, Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola and an international campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically, this total onslaught by nature requires a ‘total response’ on the part of the South African government in order to successfully combat its effects.<sup>23</sup> The

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<sup>20</sup> Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1963); and J.J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), as quoted in Chris Alden, op. cit, p.41.

<sup>21</sup> Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, Pretoria : *White Paper on Defence, 1977*, p.4.  
<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Chris Alden, op.cit.,pp.46-47.

manifestation of this response was most evident in the construction of a sophisticated National Security Management System(NSMS), at the apex of which stood the State Security Council(SSC). The only one of four principal cabinet committees to have been established by law (the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act of 1972), and SSC aroused considerable speculation about its role in domestic and foreign policy making.

With the publication of the 1977 White Paper on Defence, South Africa had firmly committed itself to the concept of Total Onslaught and its solution in the form of total strategy. For many white South Africans, the case for the existence of a multi-dimensional onslaught against the Republic had taken concrete form. A new "go-it-alone" strategy, independent of the West, was evolved. This in essence had two main objectives : First, the creation of a peaceful constellation of Southern African States; and Second, the defence of South Africa against external interference in every possible way. These policies formed an integral and major part of South Africa's Total National Strategy. Armed with clear definition of the threat South Africa and the requisite counter response- Total National Strategy- the military establishment increasingly appeared to be the only governmental institution prepared to meet this national crisis. The unravelling of Vorster's position in the wake of the Information Scandal in 1977, gave Botha an opportunity to make a bid for the premiership. Narrowly selected to replace Vorster by the NP

caucus in October, 1978, Botha found himself in a position to activate the Beaufreian prescriptions contained within Total National Strategy.<sup>24</sup>

Although Prime Minister Botha inherited the concept of a “constellation” from his predecessors, the events of the mid-1970s and the resultant break up of the Republic’s perceived cordon sanitaire elevated the idea into a major foreign policy initiative. Constellation of Southern African states (CONSAS) was to have included the BLS states. Malawi, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, the TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei)<sup>25</sup> and possibly Zambia and Mozambique as well. Economic co-operation would be formalised into specific areas, a key to the success of this scheme being the support of private capital from South Africa. Like Vorwaerd and Vorster, Botha hoped that economic co-operation would acquire a functionalist dynamic, thereby producing regional interaction in the fields of politics and security. Not only would the inclusion of the TBVC states result in tacit recognition of South Africa’s homeland policies, but such co-operation would also improve the Republic’s international position as Western nations would find themselves under less pressure from black Africa to break off ties with South Africa. However, this strategy did not rest either on a clear perception of the new regional realities, or on a realistic evaluation of South Africa’s various policy options.

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<sup>24</sup> Chris Alden, *op.cit.*, p.50.

<sup>25</sup> Ciskei only became independent in December 1981 and would have joined CONSAS later.

The blunt refusal of participation by the BLS states and the independence of Zimbabwe under the premiership of Robert Mugabe in 1980, sounded the death knell for the constellation scheme. Instead, Zimbabwe-along with the BLS states, Angola, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania- joined forces in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), designed to reduce their dependence on the South African economy. These developments forced South Africa to amend its ideas on a constellation and restructure it to include only the TBVC states. This inner constellation was, however, of little relevance to South Africa's foreign relations, as the homelands have never been recognized internationally and do not, in effect, constitute sovereign states.

### **Regional Repression and Limited Internal Reform (1980-1984)**

Already in the process of re-establishing its presence inside the Republic, the ANC, and to a lesser extent the PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) were able to exploit the political exhilaration generated by the Soweto riots to recruit and train dissidents for a campaign of sabotage and assassination. Following the first wave of violence between June-November 1976, thousands of young blacks left the country, many of them to enlist in the ANC, which used the neighbouring states either a training bases, administrative centres or conduits into South Africa. From the late 1970s the scale of infiltration of ANC cadres into the



country increased markedly. As a result, between 1976-80 nearly seventy attacks and explosions were reported by the security forces. In the early 1980s the activities of armed saboteurs expanded dramatically with the attacks on targets of significant strategic, economic and symbolic importance.

As far as the regional policy of South Africa in Southern Africa is concerned, the Regime obviously would not have admitted to destabilizing its neighbours. However, in line with this tit-for-tat policy, South Africa warned that if the neighbouring states continued to harbour anti-South African forces, they should not be surprised if South Africa considered doing the same to them. These operations, together with large-scale assistance for pro-South African dissident armies such as UNITA in Angola and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR/RENAMO) in Mozambique, underlined South African military supremacy in the subcontinent. Because of the importance of Namibia and Angola in South Africa's regional policy calculations, some further elaboration is required on South African activities in these areas.

Since the time the territory was taken from Germany under a League of Nations mandate in 1919, South West Africa issue was critically linked to the Pretoria. Namibia, as the territory came to be known, held a unique position in the South African government's view both because it was geographically contiguous and because it had long-

standing ties of a political, economic and cultural nature with South Africa. The initiation of guerrilla warfare in 1966 in the northernmost region of the territory by the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), coupled with a sustained effort by the international community to deny the legality of South African administration of the territory, continually raised the costs of the South African involvement. By the mid-1970s, the situation concerning Namibia transition to independence had reached a virtual impasse. The issue behind this were complex, for South Africa's Namibian policies became hostage to wider domestic political, economic and security considerations. The collapse of colonialism in Angola in 1974 and the intervention of the superpowers in that country's civil war marked the elevation of the Namibian question to that of a regional conflict with global security dimensions.

The passage of UN Security Council Resolution 385 in 1977, which called for elections supervised by the UN and the withdrawal of the South African presence, set the parameters for international acceptance of Namibian independence. In anticipation of the resolution of the Namibian question, the South African government supported the emergence of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a coalition of moderate ethnically based parties whose election would ensure a cooperative non-communist government in Windhock. Calling for the establishment of a confederal system of government incorporating the homelands in an independent Namibia, this initiative marked the high

water mark of South African optimism that the electoral process could produce a moderate and pliant government in a neighbouring state.<sup>26</sup>

The change in government in South Africa in 1978, putting P.W. Botha at the helm, saw a shift in government policy towards the Namibian situation. While the South African government continued to pursue a two-track approach based on the implementation of counter-revolutionary strategy in the territory while simultaneously engaging in negotiations with the international community, under Botha there was a willingness to put the military options to greater use. South African strategy came to consist of three basic components : a counter-insurgency programme, a civic action programme and restructuring of the political system. Coupled with this was the utilization by Pretoria of the tools of direct and indirect strategy against Swapo's host government in Angola.

Furthermore, since the late 1960s South Africa had been confronted by Swapo guerrillas. For the most part, these forces operated from bases in neighbouring Angola. Virtually guaranteed strong support because of their wide recognition as the only organization to have militancy fought for the departure of the South Africans, Swapo was by contrast portrayed by Pretoria as a communist organization and a tool of

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<sup>26</sup> I.W.Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution : Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1985, p 130.

the Soviet Union. After Angola's independence in 1975, the threat posed by Swapo became considerably more effective and demanded the massive use of South African forces against them.

To prevent Swapo guerrillas seizing control of the country, a large South African military presence was maintained in Namibia. These forces made numerous raids against Swapo camps in Angola. The SADF also co-operated with Jonas Savimbi's Unita's rebels who are engaged in a civil war against Angola's government. According to the Pretoria authorities, this foreign communist presence was the main stumbling block to a peaceful resolution of the Namibian conflict. The US government shared this view, and both its military support for Unita and its insistence that South African participation was a necessary condition for a Namibian settlement, provided South Africa with an important Western ally in the region. As long as Unita could present itself as a genuine alternative to the Angolan government, it appeared that South Africa would be able to justify its intervention. Until the end of the 1980s, the Angolan and Namibian issues remained as inseparable, and important for South Africa's foreign policy makers.

During the early 1980s Botha's strategy of regional destabilization and limited internal reform appeared to prosper. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs was able to take advantage of the situation made possible by the adoption of the military's pragmatic

strategy in the area. Early in 1984, South Africa concluded a cease-fire agreement with Angola (The Lusaka Accord) which provided for the joint disengagement out of southern Angola by South African, Cuban and Swapo forces. In March, 1984, South Africa concluded a non-aggression pact with Mozambique(The Nkomati Accord) designed to halt SADF support for the MNR in exchange for Mozambique denying military bosses to the ANC. Two weeks after Nkomati Accord was signed, it was disclosed that South Africa had reached a similar accord with Swaziland, which had remained secret since its conclusion in 1982. This agreement-particularly Nkomati-were hailed both within the Republic and the Western countries as major diplomatic coups for the South African government. However, Angola was the major foreign policy fiasco for South Africa in the seventies and eighties.<sup>27</sup>

In the wake of Nkomati there was a significant improvement in South Africa's relations both with its neighbours and with Western countries. On the evidence of P.W. Botha's official European visit in May 1984, it appeared that Pretoria was at last emerging from political isolation. Western leaders welcomed Botha's efforts both at "regional détente" and his internal reforms. These changes in the regional milieu also enabled South Africa to demonstrate to the white electorate its resolve towards a process of reform, at its own pace, even in the face of

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<sup>27</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, *South African Foreign Policy : Principles-Options-Dilemmas*, New Delhi: African Publications, 1997, p.15.

international, regional and right-wing domestic pressures. The support of the white voters found expression in a two –to-one majority in a 1983 referendum in favour of a tricameral parliamentary system to include the coloured and Indian minorities. However, it was Botha's cautious pace towards internal reform and the failure to accommodate the political aspirations of the black majority that were to prove the undoing of the Republic's international position and its domestic stability.

### **The State of Emergency (1985-1989)**

South Africa's internal policies have been viewed as the crucial determinant of its international foreign policy response. Such a perspective has been evident in the universal moral condemnation of apartheid since the early 1960s. There was never more evident than in the period following the declaration of the first state of emergency in July 1985, when the South African authorities faced a major political and security crisis. This manifested itself in an escalation of organized and sporadic opposition in both urban and rural black township. Rioting had broken out initially in September 1984 in response to unaffordable rent increased in some black townships. The issue, however, was only part of wider political and economic tensions affecting the black population as a whole. The economic recession had already reduced black living standards to unacceptably low levels relative to those of white South Africans. Furthermore, South Africa had made no attempt to

accommodate black political aspirations in the tricameral parliamentary system introduced in September 1984. The establishment of the United Democratic Front –though at first used to mobilize various anti-apartheid organizations against the new constitution–provided an umbrella organization through which these frustrations could be channeled.

The decision to impose emergency regulation was made only after some agonizing on the part of the cabinet and its security advisers. It is understood that the views of the military and police chiefs prevailed against those who felt that the declaration would damage foreign investment in South Africa. Indeed, these measures aroused immense international concern, and led to the sharp fall in the value of the rand and repeated calls for economic sanctions from Western governments. Given almost unfettered powers of search, arrest, detention, interrogation and censorship under the sweeping emergency provisions, SADF and police action was ruthless enough to curb most instances of violent mass action. As a consequence, and in an attempt to present a picture of returning normality to international and domestic audiences alike, the emergency was lifted on 7 March 1986. This, however, did not help South Africa abroad.

With the success of South Africa's efforts at regional diplomacy in 1984, there was hope that some sort of regional modus vivendi might serve to stimulate domestic rapprochement within South Africa.

However, the violations of the Nkomati Accord and the deterioration in relations with neighbouring states after 1985 signaled the failure of South Africa's regional policy to facilitate internal political accommodation. Indeed, the declining fortunes of South Africa's foreign policy prospects were directly related to the unrest and violence, which erupted from late 1984. By the mid 1980s, South Africa's domestic security considerations took precedence over its regional and international policy aspirations. This compelled a significant change in Western attitudes towards South Africa, culminating in the imposition of both public and private sanctions.

On 6 May 1987, landslide election victory of President Botha's demonstrated that while electorate was firmly behind the emergency provisions and the domestic and regional actions of the security forces. If anything, the emergence of the ultra-right wing Conservative Party as the official opposition illustrated that Botha's internal reform were moving too fast for the white population. The use of anti-US rhetoric in the run-up to the election showed that the government was prepared to give priority to the stabilization of internal, rather than international environment, thereby enabling controlled change to take place. The use of this anti-Western platform created some doubt as to the exact role this international equation might be likely to play determining a future outcome in South Africa.



During this period, the external environment posed an acute and contradictory dilemma for the South African foreign policy. The direct military threats to the Republic continued to be limited in nature, focused exclusively on the Angola and Namibia issue. Outside of this area, the Southern African region remained not only quiescent but, in the case of Mozambique, actually moved closer diplomatically to South Africa. However, on the international front, event in 1986, which saw the imposition of economic and financial sanctions by the United States, the Commonwealth and other Western states, marked the high point of the international campaign to isolate South Africa. While by the late eighties the international sanctions campaign had come to a virtual standstill, its impact in South Africa was only beginning to be felt.<sup>28</sup>

Thus by the end of the 1980s, it was apparent that Pretoria operated under constraints imposed by a number of factors. First, since the declaration of the state of Emergency, South Africa had been fighting a losing battle in its efforts to stave off internal sanctions. A more belligerent regional posture would only have added fuel to these flames. Second, international sanctions had conversely made the country more dependent on its African neighbours, which Pretoria was well aware of despite its posturing over the threat of counter sanctions. Third, South Africa faced an increasingly expensive struggle to maintain its pre-eminent military position in the region. Any further demands on the

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<sup>28</sup> Chris Alden, *op.cit.*, p.241.

SADF would severely stretch an economy already weakened by sanctions and in the depths of a major recession. Although South Africa's more militant regional policy did have its successes in the various bilateral non-aggression pacts, the Namibian peace accords and the related closure of the ANC's military bases in Angola demonstrated both the limits of South African military power and the wide scope for diplomacy in the region. Furthermore, the agreements also ended the viability of the Total Onslaught concept, which had been fed to the white South African public since the independence of Angola and Mozambique. Constructive dealings with the Soviet Union during the course of these negotiations discredited the white perception of it as the mastermind and sponsor of a black revolution. Thus, paradoxically, by the end of P.W. Botha's tenure of office the use of South Africa's military force in the region was likely to endanger rather than protect the survival of white power.

#### **From Apartheid to New South Africa (1990-1994)**

P.W. Botha's final months in office marked the launching of a reassessment of the government's approach towards its long-standing opponent, the ANC. While the security situation had been brought under control through the implementation of the full state of emergency, the reform process remained deadlocked over the government's inability to woo black South Africans to participate in its negotiation forum. Faced with steadfast opposition, there developed a realization amongst

government officials that the proposed next stage of reform would only succeed if the ANC itself was directly brought into the process. At the heart of this change was a determination that the transformation of the international environment, reflected in the amicable settlement of the Angola-Namibia issue and the stable internal situation, provided the government with an unparalleled opportunity to seize and maintain the initiative in a negotiated settlement with their erstwhile enemy. In light of this analysis, tentative steps were taken towards bridging the gap between government hard liners, Botha among them and the ANC, which resulted in the thawing of the climate of mutual hostility. As Botha was himself moved closer to considering Nelson R. Mandela's unconditional release. But Botha's resignation paved the way for the emergence of F.W. de Klerk as NP leader.

In many ways President F.W. de Klerk inherited an environment not dissimilar to that of his predecessor. Although he initially continued with the visit to black African states begun by Botha in the wake of the Namibian agreements, his approach was totally different. Recognizing that South Africa's international position could not be improved without internal political accommodation. The President de Klerk embarked on the most radical period of political reform and transformation in South Africa. This had enormous foreign policy ramifications. His initial actions were followed by the dramatic unbanning of liberation movements (including the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress and South African

Communist Party), the release of political prisoners like Walter Sisulu, Ibrahim Kathrada in 1989, and more importantly, the freeing of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 and its lead to a sea-change in the politics of South Africa.<sup>29</sup> These actions confirmed the realization that internal security could never be achieved either through regional repression or foreign diplomatic exercises.

Despite these achievements, the coup de grace which ended the stand-off between the protagonists and paved the way for direct negotiations, was delivered by normative and structural changes in the international system itself, rather than by the ANC's strategy of confrontation on all fronts. The end of Cold War, and the "de-ideologisation" of foreign policy that accompanied the collapse of Soviet Russia, forced both sides to rethink their basic positions, particularly with regard to regional and domestic conflict resolution issues. While F.D.de Klerk's took advantage of this window of opportunity to initiate a new political dispensation involving the offer a negotiated settlement within a power-sharing framework the ANC was initially wrong-footed. Suffering the material and ideological pains of patron-bereavement, and actually aware that the sanctions weapon was being rendered in effective as the international community sought to reward the de Klerk reform initiatives, the ANC experiences a number of diplomatic setbacks.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Hari Sharan Chabra op.,cit.p.34.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid,p.36.

After decades of severe diplomatic isolation the Republic reacted swiftly to the new political space opened up by regional global developments. In what was presented as a major foreign policy review in 1989, Neil van Heerden formally ushered in South Africa's 'New Diplomacy'. The ostensible objective of the new diplomacy was open up the region to South African commerce and trade, but the ulterior goal was undoubtedly to the hands of any future ANC-led government with respect to South Africa's geographical position as regional hegemon. Besides apparent shift from entrenched visions of South Africa as a European outpost on the tip of Africa, the new diplomacy also recognised the disutility of military power in the face of new security agenda. However, the idea of South Africa as the dominant regional power remained intact in the new diplomacy but the means used to promote this goal changed. Non-coercive instruments of policy-diplomacy, trade and economic cooperation were now to define South Africa's relations with her neighbours.<sup>31</sup>

Thus the ANC was confronted with the uncomfortable fact that its principle foreign policy objectives-diplomatic isolation and the retention of punitive sanctions until the new government was in place had been finessed by Pretoria's shrewd grasp of the structural and normative changes in regional and global politics. Although Nelson Mandela

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<sup>31</sup> Graham Evans, South Africa in remission: The foreign policy of an altered state, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1996, p.256.

embarked on a strenuous world tour designed to off-set that of de Klerk, and to stiffen up support for the ANC Alliance, not even his enormous personal moral stature could hide the fact that for the most of the developed world at least, economic considerations now took priority over ethical concerns. Indeed, Nelson Mandela himself became the ANC's main foreign instrument during the long drawn out negotiating period. But notwithstanding his populist appeal as the international champion of human rights, ill-advised 'solidarity' visits to Fidel Castro, Muammar Quaddafi, and Yasser Arafat, amongst others, indicated that the ANC leadership had not yet adjusted to the political realities implicit in the new international order.<sup>32</sup> The difficult trek down had begun in earnest at the national conference held in Durban in July 1991. The conference had an importance of retaining international support during the negotiation phase was a key sub-text. In order to retain some control over the process of lifting sanctions the conference adopted a policy of 'phased withdrawal' pending the installation of an interim power sharing government. This was a tacit admission that a reappraisal of foreign policy was urgent if the ANC was to avoid being overtaken by events.

Realising that it was rapidly losing control of the situation as de Klerk forged ahead with his international initiatives, the ANC bowed to the inevitable. In a series of policy documents and statements during 1992-1993, the leaders of the organization ditched their long-standing

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<sup>32</sup> Graham Evans, *ibid*, p.237.

commitment to 'liberation politics' and began the process of policy convergence with the new diplomacy. As the ANC prepared for government, its Department of International Affairs, headed by Thabo Mbeki (Now President of South Africa) and Aziz Pahad (Now Deputy Foreign Minister of South Africa), spelt out the normative and structural characteristics of the contemporary world that would guide and inform foreign relations in the post-apartheid period. They included recognition of the following :

- The general collapse of the social world order.
- The unipolar nature of the international system.
- The emergence of 'geo-economics' and the dominance of three powerful economic blocks: The European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- The marginalisation of Africa.
- The universal tendency to favour political system featuring multi-party democracy, respect for human rights, and market oriented open economies.
- The interdependence of states, and the harmonisation of trade practice and security complexes.<sup>33</sup>

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African National Congress, *Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, May 1992.

This is the structural context in which the ANC's foreign policy has emerged, and signals a complete break with the past. Unlike previous articulation of ANC's understanding about foreign policy, it is neither 'idealist' nor overtly 'internationalist' in tone. It acknowledges acceptance of, and signifies a willingness to work within, the prevailing order. It is rooted in the notion of the primacy of domestic politics and the belief that the national interest, properly conceived, can sit comfortably with the international interest. It contains some remnants of old thinking, for example, a preference for 'non-alignment'. But apart from a greater framework, it is virtually indistinguishable from the over all philosophy underpinning Neil Van Heerden's New Diplomacy.

Given this, it is hardly surprising that the policy prescriptions that flow from these ANC guidelines are those which guided de Klerk's administration: full membership of international organisations, including Western financial institutions; honoring treaty obligations including the non-proliferation Treaty, expansion of trading links in Africa and elsewhere, good neighbourliness, and a co-ordinated multilateral approach to development and disarmament, as well as environmental and human rights issues.

During the life of Transitional Executive Council, which immediately preceded the Government of National Unity in 1994, the ANC had worked closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs(DFA). By



the time that the New South Africa was established on 27 April, 1994, the ANC's Department of International Affairs was worked in harness with DFA. By the time of the elections in April 1994, in foreign policy terms at least, South Africa had become more or less a unitary state actor.

Understandably, then the foreign policy of GNU had concentrated on developing the foundations laid during this period. It has been preoccupied with questions relating to the end of isolation and readmittance into multilateral institution and bilateral relationship from which it was previously excluded.

## **Chapter – II**

### **DETERMINING FACTORS OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

Under the Apartheid regime South African foreign policy was severely constrained by the well high universal hostility, which the country's racial policies generated abroad. Unable to play a role in major international organizations ranging from the Olympic Committee to the Organization of African Unity, the government for much of the post-war period was forced into defensive mode-seeking allies where it could. This had varying degrees of success even when it tried to make itself indispensable to the west in economic and strategic terms. The linked endgames of the cold war and apartheid were the contest in which South African began to reformulate its foreign polices and recast its international relations. South Africa's first democratic government emerged at a time when the international order was a period of transition.

During the years of constitutional negotiations, the major actors understandably concentrated their efforts on devising a new political structure to give expression to black political aspirations and at the same time incorporate a variety of power sharing devices into the interim constitution. The new state's foreign policy was a matter of some debate and argument, but the energies of the principal actors – F.W.de Klerk and Nelson Mandela were absorbed in trying to maintain

their partnership through the vicissitudes of negotiation, although both made effective use of over seas visits to extol their particular interpretations of what future new South Africa had to offers its people and a range of external constituencies with an economic and political interest of the final outcome.

Following the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected South African President on 10<sup>th</sup> May 1994, the Republic has continued with the process of re entry into the international fold begun after 2 February 1990. The external milieu in which South Africa now has its foreign policy objectives has changed profoundly. A radical ideologically driven foreign policy was prevented by the necessity of adaptation to the new post-cold war world environment, a change which took place almost in tendon with South Africa's domestic transformation and implied a for more complex external environment. However, the new government did bright about important philosophical shifts and many changes in emphasis and priorities: the old regime was philosophically right-wing oriented, uncompromisingly pro-western, critical to the point of being hostile to the Third World and its causes, and sceptical about universal liberal ideals such as human rights and gender issues. The shift in policy implied that priority would now be given to the African continent and in particular Southern Africa, to the southern hemisphere, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), and to universal moral and humanitarian issues.

This chapter sets out to examine the determining factors which are driving force to the post-apartheid South African foreign policy. In doing so, an overview of the present South African foreign policy will be provided, and a general assessment made as to the present characteristics of South African foreign policy. Finally, an assessment will be made to the future prospects of South African foreign policy

### **Determining Factors of South African Foreign Policy**

South Africa's foreign policy must be determined by the inherent characteristics of the country and by nature of its relations with the international community. Factors which are influencing the nature of foreign policy will be aspects such as abilities, needs, interests, strengths, weakness, population, economy and aspirations. Against the above background a number of key elements must be considered:-

- South Africa is a medium-sized country as far as population and landmass are concerned. The republic covers a total area of 1,219,080 sq. km (470, 689 sq. miles) and has common borders with Namibia on the northwest, with Botswana on the north and with Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland on the north-east. Lesotho is entirely surrounded by South African territory, lying within the eastern part of the republic<sup>1</sup>. As far as population is concerned, according to the preliminary results of the October 1998 census, the total population was 40,58

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<sup>1</sup> Europa, *South of the Sub-Saharan Africa Year Book*, 2000. p. 972.

million people<sup>2</sup>. The chief characteristic of South Africa's population and the one that dominates its society is the great racial, linguistic and cultural heterogeneity of its people, with Africans (76.1%), Asians (2.6%), Europeans (12.8%) and mixed-race (8.5%) citizens making up the population.

The country's economy, although large by African standards, is in the medium category.

South Africa is a medium military power with limited resources at its disposal for use in the international arena.

Although South Africa's foreign debt is low by world standards, the country's own development needs are such that South Africa could not become a substantial donor of development assistance.

The nature of the country's infrastructure, the level of education and training and the relative importance of various sectors of the economy.

As a country with considerable First World abilities but substantial remaining development needs, South Africa's economy is that of a country in transition and developing foreign economic relations, government and private sector must take cognizance of this state.

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Government of South Africa, *South Africa Yearbook; 1999*, p. 48.

- South Africa's international relations are politically non-aligned and multifaceted and leave ample room for the blocks, groupings or traditional formations whether the Commonwealth, the OAU, the ASEAN, the NAM, or the European Union.
- South Africa's present philosophy on international relations has evolved over time and there are no compelling reasons for the country's foreign policy to be ideologically inspired. Its population composition dictates that the country should have an open mind on sensitive issues such as religion, race, nationality, historical developments, etc.
- As an African country, South Africa's future and, therefore, its foreign policy must inevitably be linked to events on the continent. An African focus within the wider global context is essential.
- South Africa occupies a pre-eminent position in Africa, in terms of military economically and political importance<sup>3</sup>.
- South Africa's strategic importance is due to the large deposits of precious minerals scattered about in Southern Africa which have attracted people from all over the world. Southern Africa produces about 50 per cent of the world's output of gold and

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<sup>3</sup> Gavin Cawthra, *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defence, Development and Security in Transition*, London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 122.

substantial amount of diamonds, uranium, asbestos, copper and other precious minerals<sup>4</sup>.

- The Indian and the Pacific Oceans have always been of paramount importance to South Africa. They represent the lifeline of communication and contact with the outside world<sup>5</sup>.

In the light of above determining factors, the South Africa's new democratic government has articulated a dramatically different foreign policy vision than the previous National Party government by emphasizing support for human rights, internationalism, a commitment to promote regional growth and co-operation, and adherence to international convention on nuclear and conventional weapons. South Africa's leaders believe that this sea change will promote their domestic goals of democracy, nation building, reconstruction and development. As Nelson Mandela said in foreign Affairs before his election as president in April 1994, "The African National Congress (ANC) believes that the charting of a new foreign policy for South Africa is a key element in the creation of a peaceful and prosperous country"<sup>6</sup>. Nelson Mandela is correct in this assessment-South Africa's foreign and domestic policy remains deeply intertwined. I will focus on four elements of the new foreign policy: Overall goals and prospectives instrumental beliefs about the best way

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<sup>4</sup> D. Benerjee, "South Africa- The security and strategic dimension", *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 4, pp. 162-163.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>6</sup> Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's future foreign policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5, (November / December 1993) p. 86.

to accomplish foreign policy goals; the new government's understanding of South Africa's international role; and its understanding of the nature of the outside world.

The earlier documents before the ANC took over the reins of government, indicated a high level of idealism and a desire to break with the isolation and bellicosity of the past. At the same time, there was a recognition that South Africa's challenges were mainly domestic and internal and that 'foreign policy will be primarily shaped by the nature of its domestic policies and objectives directed at serving the needs and interest of our people<sup>7</sup>. Reflecting the sonorous calls of the Freedom charter, earlier statements of putative ANC foreign policy invoked concepts of 'democracy, peace, stability, development and mutually beneficial relations... as well as Pan-African solidarity', and the ANC declared that it would:

contribute to the democratization of international political and economic relations, and so help secure a global context within which a democratic South Africa will be able to coexist peacefully and to cooperate on a democratic basis with its neighbors and further afield<sup>8</sup>.

However, later declarations were less ambitious and more focused. One of the clearest exposition of planned foreign policy came from Nelson Mandela. He declared that the 'pillars' of the new South Africa's foreign policy would rest on: a core commitment to human

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<sup>7</sup> ANC, *Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, Johannesburg: African National Congress, 1992, p. 77

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.



rights and democracy; respect for international law; a commitment to peace and effective arms-control regimes; an emphasis on 'the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa' and regional and international economic co-operation. He further committed the new government to support the UN's 'commitment to general and complete disarmament under effective control', to the reform of the UN and to collective non-militaristic approaches to security in the Southern African region<sup>9</sup>.

These ideas were very closely reflected in the earliest detailed public exposition of the ANC-led government's foreign policy, a document adopted by the ANC's Working Group on International Affairs in March 1994, which in particular argued for a peace-based, development oriented approach to regional cooperation in which South Africa should explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions<sup>10</sup>. The group also directed its attention towards the reform of the diplomatic service.

However, early indications were that such idealist approaches would be tempered by the demands of realpolitick and despite the ANC's declared policies, its overwhelming priority would be to secure foreign trade and investment in order to bolster the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). In practice, this would mean that the government would do only the minimum to protect the interests of

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<sup>9</sup> Nelson Mandela, op.cit. p. 86-97.

<sup>10</sup> ANC Working Group, *Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa*, Johannesburg: ANC, March 1994.

Africa and to champion the Third World lest it upset relations with its principal trading partners, the EC and USA. However, the central objectives of South Africa's foreign economic policy will have to be the attraction of foreign savings<sup>11</sup>.

South African foreign policy regarding how consistent and substantial support for universal liberal ideals and human rights has actually been and the broad concerns seem to be that, although the rhetoric is still there, actual practice has shown that the new South African government may be influenced quite substantially by old friendships on the one hand and pragmatism on the other. The pragmatism has probably been brought on by economic imperatives as well as some other disappointing failures in foreign policy.

In implementing its foreign policy the new South African government moved rapidly to end its international isolation. In May 1994, South Africa was admitted to the OAU and joined the NAM on May 31, 1994. In June 1994 South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth after 33 years, and, after nearly two decades, rejoined the United Nations on June 23, 1994. In addition, during his visit to a United Nations in October 1994, Nelson Mandela signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<sup>12</sup>. On the other side, the Government of

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<sup>11</sup> Greg Mills, "Waiting for the fig leaf to drop?" In Greg Mills and et.al., (eds.), *South Africa in the Global Economy*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> Neta C. Crawford, "South Africa's new foreign and military policy: Opportunities and constraints", *Africa Today*, Vol. 42, (1995), No. 1-2, p. 98.

National Unity (GNU) pursued a fairly conservative foreign policy in its first two years, there was some indication that it was determined to carve out a sphere of relative independence, perhaps most evident in an ill considered attempt to isolate Nigeria and its attitude to Cuba. Such a posture naturally put strain on South African relations with the US, as did South Africa's insistence on maintaining friendly relations with Iran, a significant trading partner.

“Since its founding election in April 1994, South Africa has acquired many new friends”, declared President Nelson Mandela to a Cuban solidarity conference in November 1994. “This does not mean that it will forget those, like Cuba, who stood by South Africa's people at their time of greatest need. South Africa intends not to weaken but to strengthen its bonds with Cuba”.<sup>13</sup>

There had been some interest within South African security circles in Indian or Atlantic Ocean alliances. The idea of an alliance with selected South American countries in a South Atlantic bloc, and also of an alliance with Australia and New Zealand, was proposed to the JMCC (Joint Military Co-Ordinating Council) in the lead-up to the Government of National Unity. Given the Vast distance between South Africa and Australia, and the fact that Australia's security interests lie to the north in South East and East Asia, this would seem an unlikely course of action. Perhaps it was motivated by a perceived need to contain India, as an ‘Indian threat’ was a recurrent theme in SADF (South African Defence Force) thinking. Given India's historical

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<sup>13</sup> Richard Calland, “Time to lay the myth of the Cuba monster to rest”, *Star*, 10.1.94, In Gawin Cawthra, op.cit. p. 126.

support for the ANC and its concerns over Pakistan and China, conflict with India seems an unlikely scenario, while it is difficult to envisage why Australia and New Zealand should see any economic or geostrategic advantage in a formal alliance with south Africa. Nevertheless, South Africa's major ports are on the Indian Ocean seaboard and its enjoys extensive maritime trade with the Far East<sup>14</sup>. The republic will be bound to take steps to secure its interest in the Indian Ocean region, and this is likely to be done multilaterally<sup>15</sup>.

### **South Africa's International and Regional Foreign Policy Context**

South Africa's foreign policy has, since 1994, been a matter of intense public debate. High profile and controversial dealings with Libya, Iran, and Syria have posed the question: to what extent and for what purpose is the ruling ANC willing to endanger its international trade and investment links by encouraging close ties with so called 'pariah' states, even if they were its old allies and friends? Also, the seemingly haphazard manner in which decision were made, such as Pretoria's decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to the People Republic of China (PRC) in 1996, and misguided stand on Kashmir issue in 1998, has given rise to concern about the nature of the policy process and role of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Parliament in an environment where the President's superstar status

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<sup>14</sup> R.R. Subramanian, "South Africa's strategic significance in the Indian Ocean", *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No.1, 1992.

<sup>15</sup> ANC, *Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa*, Johannesburg: ANC, March 1994.

and personal style have overshadowed all else. Additionally, the ANC came to power in April 1994 and later in June 1999 committed, or so it seemed, to placing human rights before any other priority in its foreign policy. As Nelson Mandela put it then, 'Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy'<sup>16</sup>. Yet for many this promise has been disregarded in the face of external pressure.

Following the ANC's accession to power in April 1994, the new government set about defining South African foreign policy through a wide consultative process. A **South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document** which laid down the basic principles in the light of international, continental and, increasingly important, Southern African regional trends was distributed in 1996. These principles are:

- A commitment to the promotion of human rights;
- A commitment to the promotion of democracy;
- A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;
- A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;
- A commitment to the interest of Africa in World Affairs; and

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<sup>16</sup> Nelson Mandela, op.cit. p. 88.

- A commitment to economic development through regional and international co-operation is an independent world<sup>17</sup>.

These principles serve to provide a general orientation of foreign policy, but do not offer a clear guideline or directive as to what South Africa's policy goals, objectives, plans or strategies are. Yet the discussion document lays great stress on multilateralism and the growth in the importance of some multilateral organisations such as the European Union, which has become almost a 'supra-state' and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which will play a major role in regulating trade between contracting states. The document stresses the growth in the importance of multilateral bodies to which South Africa belongs and also senses possibilities for diplomacy within them because of the changed global environment from a bipolar to a multiplier world<sup>18</sup>. However, with regard to Africa the South African government has been more specific. With the continent, the Southern African development community (SADC) has assumed the highest priority; while further afield, the need to operate through the OAU and to develop common positions in harmony with African and other developing nation groupings has taken precedence.

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<sup>17</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs, *South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document*, Government of South Africa, June 1996, See, Section 3.4.

<sup>18</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, *South African Foreign Policy: Principles-Options-Dilemmas*, New Delhi: Africa Publications, 1997, p. 74.

Pretoria has declared that its primary foreign policy ambition is to secure the conditions necessary for an African Renaissance through the establishment of genuine and stable democracies in Africa, from which systems of governance will flourish<sup>19</sup>. In this, African themselves will have to take responsibility for solving their own problems. As South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki put it in September 1998:

'The New African world which the African Renaissance seeks to build is one of democracy, peace and stability, sustainable development and better life for the people, non-racism and non-sexism, equality among the nations and a just and democratic system of international governance. None of this will come about of its own. In as much as we liberated ourselves from colonialism through struggle, so will it be that the African Renaissance will be victorious only as a result of a protracted struggle that we ourselves must wage. Yesterday is a foreign country tomorrow belongs to us.'<sup>20</sup>.

This will require, however, more than just the outlining of a process whereby the African Renaissance will be achieved. Policy steps rather than guidelines to a process of definition of such a renaissance are required to give structure and strategic direction to this objective. In practice, at least four tracks are currently evident in South Africa's foreign policy. First, Pretoria is seen as pursuing the national interest about all else, at time countering criticism arising out of South Africa's arms trade or its close links with the pariah states) on the

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<sup>19</sup> Thabo Mbeki, Exerpts from an address at the "African Renaissance Conference": Johannesburg September 28, 1998, In *Partnership' 99 South Africa and India*, Published by the South African High commission, New Delhi, p. 35.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

grounds of past links or the need for economic growth in South Africa. Clearly the states that South Africa is most likely to interact with outside Africa, are those which have considerable interests (trade, cultural and investment) in the continent.

In this regard, at times there has been a blurring of distinction between the 'national' and 'party political' interest. Certainly, the ANC has unashamedly sought funds from a variety of foreign governments for its party coffers. The blurring of party government lines has been illustrated by the alleged use of official visits to raise funds for the ANC, fuelled by President Mandela's steadfast refusal to answer parliamentary questions on this subject. Some idea of the extent of the ANC's foreign dealing was disclosed by Mandela in April, 1999, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd had donated US \$ 10 Million to the ANC, as had Shaikh Said bin Sultan al- Nahayan of the United Arab Emirates. Fahd had earlier given US \$50 million to the ANC in 1990. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia had donated US \$ 50 million, while President Suharto of Indonesia had given US \$ 60 million<sup>21</sup>. This may have created an expectation on the part of foreign donors vis—vis the ANC, the ANC does not appear to have felt any obligation in return.

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<sup>21</sup> Greg Mills, "South Africa foreign policy after Mandela" In Greg Mills, (ed.), *South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1999/2000*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999.



Second, Pretoria outwardly displays concern over human rights and democratization elsewhere, such as over the East Timorese issue in its relations with Indonesia, President Mandela's strong outburst against the government of General Sani Abacha in Nigeria at the 1995 commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Auckland, its attempts to mediate a solution to the problems in Africa, and even in the recent delegation sent to assist in the Northern Ireland peace process.

Third, while the South African government is sensitive to criticism that it lacks a coherent foreign policy and objectives, it maintains that it has been playing a global role. Thus the DFA points to the success of its multilateral interventions, such as in helping to bring about an indefinite extension to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, in reforming UN; in breaking the logjam in the Conference for Disarmament over new membership and giving it a mandate different from a bipolar maximalist stance; and in helping to create an African Nuclear free Zone (NFA) in 1996 through the Pelindaba Treaty in 1996.

A fourth track may be seen in Pretoria's attempts to redress the foreign policy imbalances of the past, which partly explains the shift in its relations with the middle East and with Cuba. This explains, in part, South Africa's relationships with the so-called pariah states.

The apparent unwillingness to focus excessively on human rights has been a source of some frustration, in particular, to those who were supportive of the ANC's new approach to foreign relations. However, if there is one area where radicals and realists agree on the direction and focus of South Africa's foreign policy, it is that South Africa has a critical role to play in the regional hinterland. Here there is a neat coincidence of sentiment and interest<sup>22</sup>. There are, however, doubts about how this may be given substance, how institutionalization should follow common interests, and how Pretoria should prioritize its foreign policy aims and objectives, and set an enduring and systematic way of achieving these, particularly in the post-Mandela era.

The need for South Africa to order its regional foreign policy has given emphasis recently by Africa's apparent economic and political revival. The great political and economic opening that has occurred in South Africa has been followed by similar experiences elsewhere on the continent. The dramatic new opportunities present in this changing relationship have been seized upon by South Africans.

South African business has taken full advantage of the end of both apartheid and Africa's Cold War xenophobia against foreign involvement. South Africa's exports to SADC (R 26.6 billion) have

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<sup>22</sup> See Jack Spence, "The debate over South Africa's foreign policy", *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No.1, Summer, 1996, p. 124.

marginally outstripped those to European Union (R 26.4 billion)<sup>23</sup>. Exports to Africa comprise, more over, mainly value-added goods, and have recorded significant annual increases. The SADC figure was up by 30 percent over the previous year. Current South African-Southern African trade levels are heavily skewed in the Republic's favour, however, with South Africa importing just 5 percent of the value of its exports from SADC members in 1995.

The extent of this deepening and widening of ties has been replicated in the banking, mining, retail and insurance sectors as well. This involvement has been made possible by political and economic change throughout the continent, and has been partly facilitated through privatization campaigns. In this, of course, South Africa possesses the competitive advantage of geographic location, wide network of rail, road and air traffic, rich in mineral resources, World class infrastructure, and knowledge of conditions in Africa, including work contexts, business opportunities and cultural sensitivities which may effect the success of economics initiatives.

In contrast, the South African government must be or certainly should be reflecting deep and hard about its Africa policy. A proactive role for South Africa in Africa presents no easy task, given to sensitivities that exist concerning South Africa's dominant status on the continent and, paradoxically, its own lack of resources and

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<sup>23</sup> South African Yearbook of International Affairs (SAIIA), 1999/2000, pp. 4447.8 calculated from the *Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics*, South African Commissioner for Customs and Excise.

capacity in the face of an international demand that the country should play the more incisive African part. President Mandela's government had been under pressure since its inception to play a more active role in pushing Africa towards democracy, stability and prosperity. But a number of interventions by the President Mandela himself in African crises during 1997, culminating in his very high-profile effort to broker a political settlement to the conflict in the former Zaire aboard the South African naval vessel SAS Outeniqua, raised considerable doubts about Pretoria's ability to influence events on the African continent. They have also raised doubts about the formulation and conduct Pretoria's Africa policy.

The President Nelson Mandela's attempts at the African diplomacy and conflict mediation must all be counted as failures rather than successes. These include the efforts to effect democracy in Nigeria and reconciliation in Angola; to persuade Zambian President Fredrick Chiluba to allow his predecessor Kenneth Kananda to participate in the elections in November 1996; and to nudge Swazi King Mswati III to introduce democratic reforms speedily. To these must be added the problems associated with the expansion of the SADC membership, together with those difficult that arose, particularly at summit level, within the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC's security wing) regarding its role and structure.

Mindful of such problems, South Africa must ask itself how it should engage with the continent so as to bring about the 'African

Renaissance' heralded by newly elected president Thabo Mbeki. Yet, Africa's mixed fortunes are clearly a priority issue for South African and regional policy, as it seeks to make Africa the centerpiece of its foreign policy. The first is to help to remove impediments to economic growth in Africa; the second is to provide an environment that underpins that growth<sup>24</sup>.

Future Prospects of South African Foreign Policy:- Nelson Mandela stepped down as South Africa's first democratically elected leader after the June 1999 general elections and paved the way for Thabo Mbeki. The conclusion of Mandela's epoch-making presidency is a useful time to take stock of the challenges and achievements of South Africa's foreign policy, and to assess what future role the Republic could play.

It has not been easy as expected to capitalise on the goodwill following from the end of apartheid. Many in the new government appeared to underestimate the challenge of moving from a liberation movement to a government; and of the rules of arithmetic and geography that apply to normal states. The end of apartheid gave South Africa – and President Mandela in particular – a certain moral stature in the international community, but this has not translated into either preferential trade conditions to the extent expected, or alleviated the constraints of operating as a middle – ranking state.

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<sup>24</sup> Greg Mills, "South African foreign policy in review", In Greg Mills (ed.), *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1998/9*, Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, August, 1998, p. 11.

The difficulties in South Africa's trade negotiations with the European Union (EU) are a case in point. Initially the government felt that South Africa deserved preferential access to the EU's markets via the Zome Convention<sup>25</sup>. The Free Trade and Development Agreement was finally secured in March 1999, over three years after the EU's mandate was produced. In the course of these negotiations, South Africa attempted to shift the blame for the delay on to the EU, citing its lack of generosity. Ironically, the delay in negotiating was partly due to a lack in South African negotiating resources, which ultimately provided the necessary space to develop these individual and collective skills.

It should be noted, however, that South Africa has had some foreign policy success. The country status as the sole unilaterally disarmed nuclear-weapons states has given it a special place in the arms control and disarmament community. Its contribution to crafting an indefinite, conditional extension to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York in May 1995 has been completed by positive actions, and conditions for a global landmine ban, and in chairing the Prepcom (Preparatory Committee) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Some Progress has also been made since South Africa assumed the chairmanship of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1996 in adopting a more assertive policy towards the subcontinent, particularly in areas of human

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<sup>25</sup> Jack Spence, "South Africa's foreign policy: Current realities, future options", In Paul B. Rich (ed.), *Reaction and Renewal in South Africa*, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 232.

rights, democratization, trade integration and the fight against corruption.

Since the beginning of the democratic process to transform South Africa, Pretoria has become one of the busiest diplomatic capitals in the world. By March 1999, diplomatic relations had been established with 164 countries and more than 70 international agencies. Over the past five years, South Africa has been visited by 73 heads of state or government, while the President of the South Africa undertook 83 State visits outside the country<sup>26</sup>. South Africa is obliged to prioritise representation abroad and make savings. The foreign ministry's budget is slated to be cut by almost one-quarter in real terms between 1998 and 2001, yet there is a need to open new missions in key locations – such as Shanghai, Jamaica, Vietnams, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Cost cutting will inevitably require a clear categorisation and description of the functions of overseas assignments.

This bilateral focus will have to be balanced against the stated objective that South Africa will continue to exercise a strong voice in the multilateral arenas, particularly over the issues of human rights and disarmament, and at a functional level, UN reform. However, South Africa's position regarding the restructuring of the UN Security Council still remains unclear. It is uncertain whether South Africa will or will not make itself available for a permanent African seat, and how

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<sup>26</sup> *South Africa Yearbook, 1999*, Government of South Africa, p. 180.

it could use its diplomatic resources to break the current impasse in the UN on this question. Its relations with a newly-democratic Nigeria could cool if Pretoria pushes its own candidacy for a sole African seat, given that Nigeria has long regarded on African UN seat as its own.

South Africa faces a number of immediate foreign policy challenges in the run-up to the new millenium. These include the finalizing of the details of the much delayed Free Trade and Development Agreement with the EU, and the conclusion of the terms and process leading towards the establishment of a SADC Free Trade Area.

Ongoing problems of security and stability on the African continent illustrate the need for the foreign ministry and security forces to work well together-as they failed to do over the ill-planned peace-enforcement mission by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) into the Kingdom of Lesotho in September, 1998<sup>27</sup>. In the light of the ongoing failure to secure a peaceful settlement to the civil wars in Congo and Angola, and with the prospect of social unrest in Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe, there has been an urgent need for the harmonious development of conflict resolution and peace support institutions within the Southern African region -a-region which is increasingly seen as an 'arc of cricis'. Without progress in this area, the continent will not be able to move from an agenda of conflict to one of development.

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<sup>27</sup> *South Africa Yearbook, 1999*, Government of South Africa, p. 261.



In this regard, the South African Cabinet and Parliament approved the white paper on South African participation in International Peace Missions in November 1998<sup>28</sup>. It should be viewed in the context of an international shift from peacekeeping deployment in Africa in the immediate post Cold War period to a post-Somalia nation of self-help. The focus on subregional peace capabilities was also apparent in the hosting, in April 1999, by the SANDF of 'Exercise Blue Crane'<sup>29</sup>. The largest peace exercise ever held in Africa.

It should also be noted, in terms of defence-foreign affairs relations, that the future will have to bring a closer working relationship in the area of defence procurement, given that defence is a tool of foreign policy and should be designed around the nation's external defence requirements and not principally on domestic economic needs or policing requirements. On the policy front, in January 1999, the Department of Foreign Affairs released a policy document, entitled Transformation Process, Strategic Planning and Core Business of the DFA, which argues for a higher profile and more assertive action by the foreign service in both wealth creation and security. The former is to be achieved through inter alia, a co-ordinate approach to globalisation, the enhancement of South Africa's image abroad, and the vigorous pursuit of trade and investment; the latter through the promotion of compliance with international law, and active engagement in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 261.

Reflecting President Thabo Mbeki's concept of a South African foreign policy built on two legs – one each in the developing and developed worlds-and underlying the creation of wealth and security, is an appeal for South Africa to promote democratization and human rights. Today the foreign service is intent on linking foreign policy with domestic needs and values, with the aim of restructuring its bureaucracy around defined goals.

South African foreign policy in the future will have to continue its focus on Africa, balancing this with strong relations with the Group 8 countries and key notion of the south. This spread of interests may be seen in President Mbeki's notion of a country which 'walks on two legs': one foot in the North, where a sound relationship will give the means to pursue a relationship with Africa and the South, and also provide the investment and trading opportunities crucial to the success of South Africa's transformation' and the other foot in the South, displaying solidarity with developing nations and assisting South Africa, too, in meeting its domestic goals.

However, there are widespread beliefs that, in the future, South Africa will no longer enjoy the honeymoon afforded by the Mandela years. As South Africa increasingly becomes just another country in a continent that accounts for around two per cent of world economic production, Pretoria will have to play to its current strengths rather than its anti-apartheid history. It will have to focus on its regional role and, critically, the pluses in its domestic set-up-the non-belligerent

and healthy nature of its democracy, a highly – developed financial and economic infrastructure, and a favourable and secure policy environment. The kind of government and society that emerges in the post-Mandela period will be the key determinant of the extent, character and success of the Republic's foreign policy.

## **Chapter - III**

# **IMPACTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON INDIA**

### **Introduction**

The association between South Africa and India has a long if somewhat chequered history. It must be recalled that India was in vanguard of the anti-apartheid movement against South Africa when Mahatma Gandhi started his Satyagraha campaign on South African soil. Infact, Gandhi was born in India but his political birth took place in South Africa. The political interaction between India and South Africa started after Jawaharlal Nehru met Josiah Gumede, then President of the ANC at the International Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in 1927. The two leaders worked to ensure that India and South Africa became partners in the struggle for freedom and justice. In 1946 India was the first country to sever its relationship with South Africa, by introducing an official boycott and withdrew its High Commission. Up to that time India was an important trading partner of South Africa, accounting for five percent of India's total trade. The break in trade relations meant considerable sacrifice by India, especially as it was an emergent independent nation.

India abhorred the policy of racial discrimination as institutionalised by the government of South Africa so as to subjugate the Black majority population politically and economically for the benefit of the White minority. India was strongly of opinion that the policy was repugnant to the conscience of mankind, that it violated the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. India utilised every forum against racial discrimination, be it UN, the Commonwealth or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). India supported the anti-apartheid struggle, often in the teeth of opposition from some of the world's major powers. Over the fifty years India has provided considerable moral and material aid to the anti-apartheid movement. Diplomatic relations were restored during the visit to India of then South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, on November 22, 1993<sup>1</sup>. The Indian High Commission was opened in Pretoria in May, 1994, coinciding with the inauguration of then President Nelson Mandela's multi-racial government.

### **Common Outlook of India and South Africa**

India and South Africa share many common features. The freedom movements of the two countries – with populations of varied origins, speaking many languages and professing many faiths – have set an example of unity in diversity. They are both multiparty

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<sup>1</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report, 1993-94, p. 46.

republics confronting problems of high levels of poverty and unemployment, high population growth rates, limitation on resources to provide health care, education, and social benefits as well as the capacity to address their infrastructure shortcomings. They are both in similar dominant political and economic positions in their regions. South Africa accounts for approximately 80 percent of the combined Southern African Development Community (SADC), Gross National Product (GNP), and India for a similar proportion of the GNP in South Africa.

India and South Africa share a number of similar views in terms of their global perceptions, vis-a-vis the United Nations (UN), both sides agree on the need for reform, including the UN Security Council, in a manner reflective of current global political and economic realities. Both sides recognise the importance of revitalising the agenda of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), so that it could more effectively articulate the interests of developing countries. Following the re-entry of the South Africa into international community in 1994, India and South Africa became partners in issues concerning the India Ocean Rim initiative. The concept of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC) became a reality in Mauritius on March 6<sup>th</sup> 1997<sup>2</sup>. The presence of a large Indian Community in South Africa has led to a strengthening of both cultural and business ties between the two nations.

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<sup>2</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, *South African Foreign Policy: Principles-Options-Dilemmas*, New Delhi: Africa Publications, 1997, p.171.

India and South Africa nations which rely heavily on ocean transportation for the accumulation of wealth. Both have established highly professional navies and share a common interest in the Indian Ocean Rim. It is therefore understandable that this has led to the emergence of a co-operative relationship with a view to further mutual development.

In their position as key countries in their respective regions both understand their responsibilities. With the globalisation of the world economy, they face a formidable task for taking up the responsibilities for the implementation of economic reforms and reconciling the social consequences, which invariably accompany a programme of economic liberalisation.

Both India and South Africa are middle-sized economic powers in terms of technological capabilities, and have sizeable industrial and tertiary sectors. Both are in search of a new collaborative network and have much to contribute to each other's advantage.

In the light of above characteristics between South Africa and India, I will focus my research on two major factors through which South African Foreign Policy have tremendous impact on India. These factors are: (1) Bilateral cooperation and, (2) Multilateral cooperation. Now, I will briefly focus my study on these two factors.

## 1) **Bilateral Cooperation**

The bilateral relationship between India and South Africa is unique- it is one forged by the bonds of history and consolidated by a deep commitment to shared values and ideals. The two nations have much in common-a prominent regional presence dictated by geographical and historical circumstances, diversity in terms of people, cultures and languages and above all, a commitment to recognise the fundamental worth and potential of every human being, Ahimsa in India, Ubuntu in South Africa.. Bilateral cooperation between South Africa and India have been given further impetus by the establishment of a Joint Commission between India and South Africa in July 1995<sup>3</sup>, which culminated in the signing of the Red Fort Declaration on a “Strategic Partnership” on March 28, 1997<sup>4</sup>. The visit of the then Indian Prime Minister I.K.Gujral to South Africa in 5-10 October 1997, during the fiftieth anniversary year of India’s independence served to recall the historic bonds between the people of South Africa and India, their shared struggles of past years and aspirations for the future<sup>5</sup>. The visit also served to flesh out the concept of a “Strategic Partnership” between India and South Africa. The strategic partnership between South Africa and India has been reaffirmed with the successful conclusion of the third session of the Bilateral Joint Commission held in Pretoria on 4 and 5 December

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<sup>3</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1995-96*, p. 52.

<sup>4</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1997-98*, p. 60.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.



1998<sup>6</sup>. South Africa-India bilateral cooperation have, however, also made massive strides in non-governmental areas over the past few years. Both countries have witnessed the exchange of high level trade and business delegations, cultural groups, sports teams and a myriad of other activities aimed at fostering closer relations between the people of both countries on all fronts. There are various areas in bilateral cooperation between India and South Africa through which South African foreign policy have shown pragmatic approach. I would like to explain the four of bilateral cooperation. These areas are – a) Strategic and Defence Cooperation; b) Economic and Commercial Co-operation – Trade and Investment; c) Science and Technological Cooperation; and, d) Cultural Co-operation.

#### **a) Strategic and Defence Cooperation**

The basis of bilateral relationship between India and South Africa is the strategic partnership, encapsulated in the principles of the Red Fort Declaration which was signed by the then South African President Nelson Mandela and Indian Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda on 28 March 1997<sup>7</sup>. The idea of strategic partnership was first floated by the then South Africa Deputy President Thabo Mbeki during his official visit to India in December 1996. In his speech at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, Thabo Mbeki described Indo- South African relations as:

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<sup>6</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1998-99*, p. 50.

<sup>7</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1997-98*, p. 60.

“a friendship which regards with disdain the many physical miles which lie between our two nations. Indeed, the uninterrupted wash of the waves of the Indian Ocean between the two shores, signifies the endurance of this closeness and friendship”<sup>8</sup>.

Apart from affirming historical links through Mahatma Gandhi, the Deceleration, inter alia, also affirms a common commitment to the following principles:

- Working together for economic development and social justice;
- Co-operating in the mutual quest for universal human freedom and equality among nations;
- Co-ordinated efforts to make the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC) an instrument of substantive economic partnership towards the development of a regional identity;
- South Africa and India agreed to mutually consult on matters relating to regional and global security and to support each other’s efforts to promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation in their respective regions;
- Economic co-operation between India and South Africa to promote mutual economic development;

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<sup>8</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, *op.cit.*, p. 159.

- Combined efforts in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the UN, NAM et al to ensure a more equitable dispensation for developing countries in the face of globalisation;
- South Africa and India share a belief in the need for UN reforms, in particular for an expanded Security Council; and
- A shared belief in the vitality and crucial importance of the Non-Aligned Movement<sup>9</sup>.

Similar principles also inform the concept of the African Renaissance, crucial to the agenda of the South African leadership. This belief that Africa can move beyond negative stereotypes of wars, famine, corruption and mal-administration, is prominently espoused by South African President Thabo Mbeki.

In the defence co-operation, there is considerable potential for co-operation between India and South Africa in defence research and production. Because of sanctions, South Africa had pursued the path of self-reliance and developed First World Capabilities in certain niche areas, which may have major gaps in their defence technologies that could be filled by India.

Between December 3-12, 1994, two Indian Naval ships, the INS Gomati and INS Khukri, made the first-ever visit of Indian Naval ships to South Africa. They were received with extraordinary enthusiasm by

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<sup>9</sup> See, Document on *Red Fort Declaration between South Africa and India, 28 March, 1997*, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

the South African Naval authorities, which expressed great happiness at this opportunity to interact with their Indian counterparts. Subsequently, a South African Naval vessel, the SAS Drakensburg visited India in March, 1995<sup>10</sup>.

In February, 1996, Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, Chief of the Indian Navy, visited South Africa as the guest of his South African counterpart. This had been preceded by the visit of a 16-member team from the National Defence College of India led by the Commandant, Vice Admiral Pasricha to South Africa in June-July, 1995. These visits have ensured that there is an active dialogue between the defence forces of the two countries.

The Chief of Staff of Indian Air Force, Air Chief Marshal S.K.Sareen, paid a week-long visit beginning in February 9, 1997 to explore prospects of mutually beneficial co-operation between the two air defence establishments. During the second meeting of India- South Africa Joint Commission held in New Delhi in December 1996 an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence equipment was signed between the two countries<sup>11</sup>. There has been a regular exchange of high level visits from both sides. All three-Service Chiefs of Indian Armed Forces have visited South Africa since 1994. In October, 1999, 26 South African Companies successfully participated

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<sup>10</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, op.cit., p. 163.

<sup>11</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1996-97*, p. 52.

in Def Expo' 99, held at Pragati Maidan in New Delhi. The South African Defence Minister Mosiuao P.G.Lekota, paid a very successful visit to India to attend Def Expo' 99. The Chief of SANDF General S. Nyanda paid an official visit to India in February, 2000<sup>12</sup>.

The first meeting of the South Africa-India Defence Committee at the level of Defence Secretaries was convened in Pretoria in August 1998. Defence co-operation has registered significant progress and will soon extend into the areas of research and development and co-development of systems. A draft agreement on Defence co-operation is under review. Co-operation is also being pursued in the fields of exchange of personnel and in training. India was a key participant in "Operation Blue Crane" in South Africa, as its contribution to the development of the peacekeeping capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). India provided an aircraft to transport troops from Tanzania Namibia, and Zambia and ship to participate in joint naval exercises of the coast of Durban, with the French and South African navies<sup>13</sup>.

South Africa and India are on course to sign a comprehensive defence agreement, and to promote joint training, joint research, joint production, and transfer of technology. On the export side, South Africa's defence exports to India have increased rapidly since 1994,

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<sup>12</sup> See, *Report of High Commission of India*, (Pretoria: South Africa), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> *Partnership' 99, South Africa and India*, The South African High Commission, New Delhi, pp. 17-18.

particularly after the conclusion of MoU on Defence Equipment in December 1996<sup>14</sup>. South African exports since 1994 have crossed US \$ 200 million. In 1997, India's share of total South African exports was nearly 50 percent with a total of over US \$ 100 million. The figure dropped to US \$ 2.2 million for 1997. The figure for 1999 is US \$ 31.6 million out of total South African exports of US \$ 168.1 million<sup>15</sup>. A number of sizeable contracts are in advance stages of negotiations.

There is, however, a growing realisation on both sides that the bilateral defence co-operation should transcend a mere buyer-seller relationship and should encompass other dimensions such as joint research and development, joint production, joint ventures and co-operation of systems.

#### **b) Economic and Commercial Co-operation-Trade and Investment**

Since its lifting trade sanctions against South Africa in October 1993, India has entered into a formal Trade Agreement with South Africa. This agreement signed on 22<sup>nd</sup> August 1994, lay a foundation for the promotion of trade opportunities between the two countries. The India- South Africa Joint Commission was established in January 1995 and has since held three meetings in Pretoria (1995), New Delhi (December, 1996) and Pretoria (December, 1998). The fourth meeting of the Joint Commission is expected to take place in the second half of

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<sup>14</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1996-97*, p. 52.

<sup>15</sup> See, *Report of High Commission of India*, (Pretoria: South Africa), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p.4.

year 2000. In recognition of the burgeoning economic relationship within the strategic partnership between the two countries, it has been decided to upgrade the level of the Joint Commission to that of foreign ministers<sup>16</sup>. On the three occasions of Joint Commission meetings, number of issues were discussed, not the least being trade and trade development. On the occasion of a visit of the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki to India in December 1996, a bilateral Agreement on Double Taxation Avoidance was signed.

On the occasion of State visit to South Africa by then the Indian Prime Minister I.K.Gujral, in October, 1997, further impetus was given to the strengthening of multidimensional, political, developmental, economic, Commercial, defence and cultural ties in a common endeavor to build a more just and equitable world. The Indo-South Africa commercial Alliance (ISACA) was launched during the Prime Minister I.K.Gujral's visit in 1997. ISACA met on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1998, in South Africa, envisages the participation of the private sector along with the governments of both countries in promotion of bilateral trade and investment. ISACA hold discussion on the following seven sectors of co-operation: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, Engineering and Equipment, Information Technology, Mining, Housing and Infrastructure, Food Processing and Transportation<sup>17</sup>. ISACA agreed on the need for a more structured approach to engagement, on the

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Partnership '99, South Africa and India*, The South African High Commission, New Delhi, p. 19.

need for sectoral MoUs to be initiated to identify projects for co-operation, and the need to conduct studies to identify complementarities and the need to conduct studies to identify complementarities and synergies for the formation of joint ventures.

India and South Africa on March 11, 1997 signed an agreement in Johannesburg to resolve through arbitration the disputes on investment and trade between the two countries. The Indian Council of Arbitration and the Association of Arbitration of South Africa signed the agreement. The agreement binds business communities from the two countries to include a clause on institutional arbitration in their contracts. The arbitration would take place at the home country of the respondents<sup>18</sup>. Early in January, 2000, three senior South African Cabinet Members visited India to attend the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) Partnership Summit. They were Essop Pahad, Minister in the office of the President, A.M. Omar, Minister of Transport, and A. Erwin, Minister of Trade and Industry. They all held highly successful meetings with their counterparts. South African Minister of Trade and Industry A. Erwin and Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry Murasoli Maran, reconfirmed common ground between India and South Africa on issues pertaining to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

<sup>19</sup> *Partnership, 2000*, The South African High Commission, New Delhi, p.13.



As far as trade co-operation is concerned, after the hiatus of sanctions, India's exports to South Africa constituted a mere one per cent of India's trade. Now bilateral trade between India and South Africa increased tenfold over the last five years, with India now being the eleventh largest investor in South Africa after the 1994 elections<sup>20</sup>.

The following excellent trade figures speak for themselves:

Year: →	1995	1996	1997	1998
South Africa Exports to India	754,723,200	1,040,069,000	1,571,650,000	1,638,229,000
South Africa Imports from India	793,460,700	1,148,949,000	1,349,258,000	1,625,693,000
Total Trade	1,548,183,900	2,189,018,000	2,920,908,000	3,263,922,000

*Source: South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (Note-These figures are in South African Rand, US \$ 1 = R6.30 approx.)*

These exports are concentrated in a narrow range of commodities-base metals, steel, chemicals, minerals products, coal, with low value added and a relatively low labour content. Diamonds and gold are exported to India through third countries. South Africa offers an attractive destination for India's chemicals, machinery and equipment, fibre and yarn, textiles and apparel. Opportunities for increased importations by South Africa from India could lie

<sup>20</sup> *Partnership '99, op.cit., p.19.*

predominantly in pharmaceuticals, sulphur, drugs, vitamins, textiles and garments, fibre and yarn, dyestuffs.

With the change in the political and economic climate and resumption of diplomatic and economic relations South Africa has the potential to once again become a significant trading partner of India. Besides manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, South Africa is a large importer of several items of Indian traditional exports – similarly South African exports have a ready market in India. Several large Indian companies have established offices in South Africa. These include computer technology. The Indian companies like the United Breweries (UB) Group has an invest of US \$ 27 million in beer and tourism projects in South Africa. Shriram Industrial Enterprise Ltd. invested US \$ 7 million in a car air conditioner manufacturing unit near Durban. TATAs have plans of assembling their vehicles and are exploring other investment projects in South Africa particularly in mining. For marketing of TATA trucks the group has entered into a joint venture agreement with DORBYL of South Africa<sup>21</sup>.

While India's trade position with South Africa might rank relatively low, the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) gives it a high ranking of 6 in terms of its Trade Potential Index (TPI), which is described by DTI as, "a simple framework to determine relative market potential and pinpoint overall trends as far as South

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<sup>21</sup> See, *Report of High Commission India*, (Pretoria: South Africa), Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, p.3.

Africa's recent export performance". India achieved the ranking by gaining 40 out of a possible 50 points for its position as a "medium share, high growth and high share, medium growth market." The second element in the index weighting was potential for manufactured exports. In this category, India came up with a 9 out of possible 10, something that should greatly stimulate South African interests, in the Indian Ocean Rim initiative<sup>22</sup>.

As the investment prospects concerned, South African Government has identified a number of key sectors for economic development. These include employment generating sectors such as small-scale and cottage industries based on the utilisation of local raw materials, infrastructure development including construction and housing, general health, hotel and tourism, mining, textiles, drugs and pharmaceuticals and engineering goods. India has considerable expertise and experience in all these sectors. India's expertise in terms of setting up joint ventures as well as providing consultancy services in various fields of economic activities would find a ready market in South Africa.

The following areas has identified by Humphrey khoza, President of the South African Chamber of Business, which specially offer scope for Indian investment in South Africa<sup>23</sup>--

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<sup>22</sup> *Partnership '98, India and South Africa*, the South African High Commission, New Delhi, p. 28.

<sup>23</sup> Humphrey Khoza, "India's expertise can find a ready market in South Africa", *Partnership '98, India and South Africa*, op.cit, p.28.

- (i) The setting up of small and medium scale units in the field of drugs and pharmaceuticals, agro-processing, textiles, leather and components for heavy and light industries including electrical and automotive industries.
- (ii) The processing of various forest products for example, timber and local forest products.
- (iii) Service sectors with an emphasis on tourism, health care, computer software and the institutions to provide education.
- (iv) Investment and technology transfer from South Africa.
- (v) South Africa is placing an enormous priority on the delivery of houses and other infrastructure. Indian consultants and enterprises are assisting the South African Government in this regard, by constructing houses for the poor.

### **c) Science and Technological Co-operation**

Co-operation with South Africa in the area of Science and Technology was initiated with the visit of three member delegation in August, 1995 led by Mrs. Magofe Leokana of International Relations and Market Development. The visiting team had a mission to identify institutions and organisations in India for economical co-operation and transfer of technology from India to South Africa. Because of similarity with Indian climate, wide variations in temperature, the interest was focused for collaboration in broad areas of biotechnology

such as aquaculture, biological diversity, biofertilisers, plant molecular biology, plant tissue culture and medical biotechnology. It was also suggested that India should assist South Africa in setting up of a biological diversity ex-situ conservation facility. During the Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral visit in South Africa in 1997, a Programme of Co-operation in the field of Science and Technology was also agreed upon indicating possibilities of co-operation in the fields of frontier sciences, particularly in bio-technology, microelectronics, information sciences and renewable energy sources<sup>24</sup>.

Information Technology (IT) is one specific area in which there is huge scope for expansion in terms of co-operation between Indian and South African companies. India has largest IT professionals in the world. South Africa is the 20<sup>th</sup> largest market for information technology products and services worldwide and the 18<sup>th</sup> largest in terms of Internet usage<sup>25</sup>. South Africa is an emerging consumer market for IT products and services. South Africa is very strong in providing software and technology for mining industry. So, both countries can assist each other in this field.

#### **d) Cultural Co-operation**

South Africa and India have shared a bond for decades and this relationship is not limited only to political ties but extends to cultural

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<sup>24</sup> Jerry Matsila, "South Africa and India: Strategic Partnership for the New Millennium", *Partnership '98*, op.cit., p.11

<sup>25</sup> Refiloge G. Moloi, "South African foreign economic strategy", *Partnership '99*, op.cit., p. 49.

ties as well. After years of unavoidable distancing, visits by Indian art and culture personalities are now gaining momentum. The declaration by India on 23 October 1992 that cultural relations between South Africa and India should be entered into can be interpreted as the first step towards the formalisation of relations between the two countries. On 30 May 1993, the Indian Cultural Centre in Johannesburg began functioning. The South African mission in New Delhi was opened on 22 November 1993 as the culmination of an agreement establishing full diplomatic relations<sup>26</sup>. The cultural objectives of India in South Africa is to build bridges with all segments of South African population, and, in particular, reach out to the Black majority with which contact has been the most slender<sup>27</sup>. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations has established two cultural centres which function within the administrative set up of the Consulates General in Johannesburg and Durban respectively. These aim at serving as centres for Indo- South African cultural and academic dialogue and partnership. This dialogue began in September, 1995 with the launch of the South African Gandhi, a compilation of Gandhi's works during his 21-year stay in South Africa, by Sonia Gandhi in the presence of the South African President Nelson Mandela. Another major manifestation of this partnership has been the jointly financed Indo-South African production of full-length feature film, *'The making of the*

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<sup>26</sup> India severed its diplomatic relations in 1954 on account of the apartheid policy pursued by the government of South Africa. See, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1993-94*, p. 46.

<sup>27</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, *op.cit.*, p.166.

*Mahatma'* directed by Shyam Benegal. The distinguished South African Scholar and activist Fatima Meer were the initiator of both enterprises.

South Africa also has tried to make use of every opportunity to showcase South African culture to India. During the past six years this has taken the form of various cultural troupes such as Ahimsa Ubuntu, Tribanghi Dance Theatre, etc., traveled to India. Various South African musical bands performed in India, exhibitions of South African children's art, and South African High Commission in New Delhi facilitated various visit to South Africa. For example, in February 1999, a group of pupils from Springdales School, New Delhi paid a very successful visit to South Africa. The highlight of the visit was the meeting with Nelson Mandela, which the pupils will surely cherish for years to come.

## **2) Multilateral Co-operation**

India and South Africa both nations are respected members of many regional and international organisations. Breaking the international isolation, South African Government joined the Non-Aligned Movement in May 1994, Commonwealth in June 1994, and, after nearly two decades, rejoined the United Nations. In addition, during his visit to the UN in October 1994, [Former] President Nelson Mandela signed the Universal Declaration of Human rights<sup>28</sup>. During

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<sup>28</sup> Neta C. Crawford, "South Africa's new foreign and military policy: Opportunities and constraints", *Africa Today*, Vol. 42, (1995) No. 1-2, p. 98.

the last few years South Africa has played a major role and has become a significant player on the world stage. Highlights during 1998-99 included the hosting of the 12<sup>th</sup> NAM Heads of State Summit, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) Summit, CHOGM Business forum, the Chairing of the UN Commission on Human Rights, leadership of the SADC and UNCTAD, its role in the conclusion of a UN Declaration on Human Rights, its continued pressure for disarmament and its participation in different international organisation including World Trade Organisation (WTO). Constructive intervention made by two countries (India and South Africa) in key multilateral foras such as Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation, the NAM, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations. I would like to explain and analyze the role of South Africa in her co-operation with India on key multilateral foras and its impact on India. In this section my study will focus on multilateral foras like the IOR-ARC, the NAM, and the UN, where South African foreign policy, to some extent, has a different outlook with India.

**a) India-South Africa on Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC)**

India and South Africa were key players in the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI) from its inception, and even before, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, is on record as having discussed the commonality of the peoples of the region. South Africa has a pure and sound Indian Ocean entity, During his visit to India in November 1993, Foreign Minister of South Africa, Roelf "Pik" Botha,



then mooted the idea of Indian Ocean Rim as an area of mutual importance to both South Africa and India, suggesting thereby the need for economic co-operation among the IOR countries<sup>29</sup>.

In January 1995, during his first state visit to India, then President Nelson Mandela put forward a proposal to form an Indian Ocean “trading alliance” and it was enthusiastically received. He expressed the opinion that growing business ties between South Africa and India could help shape what he termed as a “trading bloc among Indian Ocean nations”<sup>30</sup>. The concept of an IOR community became a reality on 6 March, 1997, when fourteen countries signed the Charter of Indian Ocean Rim for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)<sup>31</sup>. It was decided that further meetings would be hosted on rotational basis and that a pilot mechanism would be established in Mauritius to co-ordinate the implementation of policy decision and to service administrative requirements. The importance gained by the IOR-ARC is borne out by the fact that seven more countries, namely, Iran, Bangladesh, France, Egypt, Seychelles, Thailand and Pakistan have shown interest in becoming members of the new grouping.

The IOR-ARC Charter confirms the innovative tripartite approach of the initiative, which accepts input from government, business and academia. South Africa finds this to be of great value

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<sup>29</sup> R.Pik. Botha, “Changing South Africa and the World”, *Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, Proceeding No.2, 1994*, p. 14.

<sup>30</sup> *The Hindu* (Madras), 30 January, 1995.

<sup>31</sup> The current members are Australia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Yemen. See, Hari Sharan Chhabra, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

because it stimulates co-operation between government and civil society.

As the significance of the IOR-ARC might be represented most immediately in terms of South-South Co-operation, the IOR-ARC initiative is consonant with the aims of both India and South Africa, with regard to relations with the developing world and with their immediate neighbours. India and South Africa are hoping to give new dimension to South-South Co-operation by bringing the economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America closer. Both countries are committed to their respective sub-regions.

India, with large human resources and a growing economy, is an important member of the IOR-ARC. Total trade between South Africa and India increased over five-fold from 1994-1995 and doubled again in the period 1995-97 to US \$ 634.76 million and dramatically increased in 1998-99 to US \$ 1732.63 million<sup>32</sup>. However, the balance of trade is in favour of South Africa.

On the question of including the security dimension within the IOR-ARC, both states were in general agreement that it should be omitted, in order not to jeopardise co-operation in the economic sphere. The regional formation is intended to promote the collective self-reliance of Indian Ocean states through joint actions by its

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<sup>32</sup> *Ubuntu*, The South African High Commission, New Delhi (India), Vol.4, No.1, p. 10.

members. The regional forum hopes to accelerate the goals of multilateral trade liberalisation, while promoting the exchange of information and communication among members.

The possible formation of an economic bloc will increase intra-regional investment. Both countries are looking for potential markets in which to invest. By creating an exclusive organisation of IOR states, India and South Africa hope to receive some kind of preferential access to the markets of these states, for both trade and investment purposes.

The main difference between South Africa and India on the IOR-ARC is on the membership issue. South Africa is in favour of increasing membership quickly, either for economic or political reasons. India is against this. India prefers a gradual, phased approach, which appears to be more logical, but needs to be made more transparent, hopefully through a set of membership criteria.

The importance of IOR-ARC and the role that South Africa and India can play in it. First, the IOR community while promoting trade will have promote Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment on a reciprocal basis within the region. Second, the IOR would control the majority of the energy resources and a significant percentage of the raw materials resources of the planet. And third, the IOR will command the world's busiest and most lucrative shipping routes.

**b) India- South Africa on Non-Aligned Movement**

Since South Africa is to chair the NAM from 1998 for three years, India and South Africa, said in the Red Fort Declaration that the NAM continued to remain an instrument of preserving “independence of thought and autonomy of action” of its members. “India and South Africa, therefore, resolve to work for NAM’s increasing effectiveness in the promotion of political and socio-economic justice and disarmament”.<sup>33</sup>

South Africa and India participated in various NAM meetings after 1994, including the Cartagena Heads of Government and / or State Summit of 1995, and the New Delhi Ministerial Summit of 1997, Cartagena Ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Co-ordinating Bureau, in May, 1998, and XII NAM Summit at Durban in South Africa in September, 1998.

South Africa’s tenure as Chairing the NAM came at a critical historical juncture, at the onset of a new millennium marked by twin rubrics of globalisation and post modernity. These have come to signify particular challenges, identified at the New Delhi Ministerial Conference in April 1997, involve crucial issues such as the reform of the United Nations, in particular the restructuring of the United

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<sup>33</sup> See, Document on *Red Fort Declaration on A Strategic Partnership between South Africa and India*, on 28 March 1997, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

Nations Security Council (UNSC), nuclear and conventional disarmament, economic and social development, with particular reference to poverty eradication and environmental conservation, and the further development of the NAM as an institution<sup>34</sup>.

India and South Africa participated actively in the XII<sup>th</sup> Summit of the NAM, countries in Durban in September 1998. As a founder member of NAM, India urged the continued commitment of NAM to its basic principals. The Durban Summit endorsed NAM'S traditional emphasis on nuclear disarmament, peace and development<sup>35</sup>. It also reinforced the international community's determination to combat terrorism in all its forms with suggestions for concrete action.

The Ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Co-ordinating Bureau, held in Cartagena, May 18-20, 1998 took place in the aftermath of India's nuclear tests in May 1998. Despite efforts by some member States to criticise India's decision, the final document made no reference to India's nuclear tests<sup>36</sup>. However, South African President Nelson Mandela expressed its "concern" to both the Government's of India and Pakistan following the nuclear tests conducted in the two countries, when he visited Pakistan in May 1999<sup>37</sup>. During the meeting India successfully contributed in reiterating traditional NAM positions on nuclear disarmament,

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<sup>34</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, "India-South Africa pact to bolster NAM", *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), 12 May, 1997.

<sup>35</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1998-99*, p. X.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>37</sup> *South Africa year book, 1999*, Government of India, p. 187.

including the call for the elimination of nuclear weapons within specified time frame. India made a proposal for the Durban Summit to call for a special session of the UN General Assembly on Africa.

On the issue of disarmament, Indian position was underlined by its Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee during the NAM Durban Summit that disarmament continued to be a cornerstone of India's foreign policy and that India had undertaken several initiatives to establish a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. Explaining India's nuclear tests in the context of a unique geo-political environment where India's security was threatened by overt and covert nuclearisation of its neighbourhood, he urged the established nuclear states to join NAM in negotiating a nuclear weapon convention. However, South Africa's position with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, is based upon a principled, independent perspective on these issues, and is not, and has never been directed toward any specific country. And yet, there have been some differences of approach between South Africa and India on these issues, South Africa believes that relationship with India is larger than its individual position on any single issue<sup>38</sup>.

When President Nelson Mandela commented on the Kashmir issue and about the tensions in South Africa during the Durban Summit, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee dismissed his apprehensions over heightened tensions in South Asia. The Indian

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<sup>38</sup> *Ubuntu*, The South Africa High Commission, New Delhi (India), Vol.3, No.3. p. 4.

Prime Minister reiterated that differences would be resolved peacefully through bilateral negotiations and that there was no place for any “third party involvement” in the process, howsoever well intentioned. He categorically stated that J&K were an integral part of India and that the real problem in the region was that of cross-border terrorism. He called for concerted international efforts in the form of an international conference to discuss and agree on measures to combat and defeat the menace of terrorism through collective action<sup>39</sup>.

However, President Mandela’s reference to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir in his speech to the NAM Summit at Durban was clarified by the South African High Commission, New Delhi. According to the High Commission, the reference was made in the context of global security and a number of other references to various situations of conflict across the world, and reflected a spirit of humanitarian concern over various context in which loss of human life is being incurred. According to the clarification, President Mandela did not call for third party intervention on this matter, nor did he intend placing it on the NAM agenda or calling for a resolution on the matter. The High Commission says, South Africa still believes that the “Shimla Accord” is the appropriate framework towards peaceful resolution of the issue<sup>40</sup>. Besides of this conflict, India and South Africa has been co-operating each other on several concerned issues at NAM fora like disarmament, UN reforms particular with UNSC

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<sup>39</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1998-99*, p. 86.

<sup>40</sup> *Ubuntu*, The South Africa High Commission, New Delhi (India), Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 4.

expansion, to promote world peace, crusade against terrorism and humanitarian issues, etc.

**c) India and South Africa on Commonwealth**

India, the largest member of the Commonwealth, is represented in all its important controlling bodies of the Secretariat and organisation. India and South Africa, both are important members in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) met for the first time in South Africa in Durban, from November 12 to 15, 1999<sup>41</sup>. South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth after an absence of 33 years. Immediate advantage for South Africa included the facilitation of trade with and travel to other member countries, as well as participation in the biennial CHOGM and other Commonwealth meetings.

The discussions at the November 1999 CHOGM, held in Durban, focused on the challenge of people-centered development in an increasingly dependent world. In this regard, India and South Africa are of the opinion that in order to ensure that the Commonwealth continues to be responsive and dynamic as a movement in the next century, it will be necessary to incorporate the idea of people centered development, whereby the objective of policy is achieving sustained human development, where there will be an improvement in the well being and quality of life for all.

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<sup>41</sup> *Frontline*, Vol.16, No.25, November 27-December 10, 1999, p. 57.



**d) India - South Africa on United Nations (UN)**

India and South Africa have co-ordinated with each other at the UN on several issues like, disarmament, human rights, democratisation of the UN Security Council. Speaking at the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration of the UN, the President Mandela joined other developing countries in calling for the democratisation of the UN Security Council. South Africa, along with India, is also a member of the group of 16 countries which have signed a declaration for strengthening and democratisation of the UN System.<sup>42</sup> As part of "Strategic Partnership" South Africa and India convinced that the UN structures need to be more representative of the concerns and diversities of the developing world, both nations have belief in the need for UN reforms South Africa and India agreed upon to campaign for the need for an equitable balance in the composition of an expanded Security Council to provide a constructive voice to the aspirations of the developing countries. Both nations believes that piecemeal and discriminatory approaches to such expansion will be inconsistent with the objectives of that world body<sup>43</sup>. India and South Africa also continued their efforts to generate support in the international community for making use of the opportunity created by the end of Cold War, for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and

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<sup>42</sup> Hari Sharan Chhabra, *op.cit.*, p.165.

<sup>43</sup> See, Clause, 10, Document of *Red Fort Declaration on a Strategic Partnership between South Africa and India*, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

moving towards a nuclear weapon free world. In doing so, South Africa was the first country ever to have given up nuclear weapons<sup>44</sup>.

In keeping with their commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and to strengthening the role of the UN in a multi-polar world, India and South Africa participated constructively in all areas of UN Security Council, development-related issues, terrorism, and disarmament. Both countries also took part in the deliberations of the UN on human rights and environment, which have acquired increasing prominence in the global agenda.

The UN continued to grapple during the period with critical choices for its reform and revitalisation. The withholding of assessed financial contributions by some countries and unilateral selective actions, including use of military force, to seek to resolve global problems requiring co-operation and consultation for their effective resolution, constituted a major impediment to the strengthening of the multilateral system based on the UN. All this underlined the importance of a purposeful effort by both countries for an equitable expansion and restructuring of the UN Security Council, to make it more reflective of the realities of today's world, in particular through the inclusion of developing countries as new "permanent members". There is broad recognition, that under any objective criteria, India is well qualified for permanent membership of such a restructured and

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<sup>44</sup> R.Pik. Botha, "Changing South Africa and the World", *Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies*, Proceedings No. 2, 1994, pp. 12-13.

expanded Security Council. As the Indian Prime Minister, in his address to the 53<sup>rd</sup> UN General Assembly on September 24, 1998, called for the Security Council to be made more representative, reflecting the interests of the developing world. He further reiterated that India was qualified, had the ability, and was prepared to accept the responsibilities of permanent membership<sup>45</sup>.

South Africa and India now recall with satisfaction the healthy growth in their bilateral relationship in the political, economic, defence, scientific, technological and cultural spheres, constituting a firm basis for the launch of a concrete and mutually beneficial programme of co-operation in the new millennium. India recognise South Africa's geo-strategic location as a transshipment point between Asia, Africa and Latin America in the development of South-South relations. South Africa and India, with their liberalised economy, concerned at the uneven impact of globalisation on developing economies. South Africa and India are convinced that the success and sustainability of the globalisation process depends upon its ability to bring equal benefits to developing countries. Now South Africa and India agree to consult and collaborate with one another in multilateral foras such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation and to make full use of their partnership within the Non-Aligned Movement and Commonwealth to articulate this concern. Both countries are co-ordinating their efforts in their mutual endeavour to

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<sup>45</sup> Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1998-99*, p.72.

capture the new opportunities for South-South Co-operation and to helping to build capacities among the Least Developed Countries.

Despite of good bilateral relations, however, there are some differences between the two countries. These include the question of disarmament, and conflicting approaches to certain issues under negotiation within the WTO, including labour standards and whether interference in another country's domestic affairs over human rights abuses is justified. However, this should not stand in the way of a successful relationship or "strategic partnership".

## **Chapter – IV**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

For symbolic and political reasons, the South African foreign policy continuum, which existed since autonomy from British rule, had to come to an end with the accession of the ANC – dominated Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1994. The old apartheid regime's foreign policy and culture had to make way for political legitimacy defined by the ANC's vastly different political philosophy, external experience, constituency, and priorities. The overall goal of South African foreign policy before GNU, was the preservation of a white controlled state, although the means employed to maintain white power and identity changed as the challenges increased. That aim shaped and dominated domestic and foreign policy as South Africa fought to ensure the security, status and legitimacy of the state within the international community.

The post-Second World War challenge produced a change of government and the introduction of apartheid; the shootings at Sharpeville (1960) and their aftermath saw a surge in apartheid activity and a substantial increase in military strength; Soweto and the regional challenge of the 1970s set off the labour and constitutional changes and an increased military role in foreign policy making. From the 1960s South Africa became increasingly isolated as she was forced out of many

international organisations, starting with the Commonwealth. Despite the hostility, South Africa clung to UN membership because this confirmed its international legitimacy and sovereign status while to withdraw might create the opportunity for the recognition of a black government in exile. However, the criticism persisted, and South Africa had no diplomatic friends. The Western states continued to support her UN membership (on the principle of universal membership) but they too were persistent, if less militant, critics. Wherever South Africa turned, its activities were brightened by its internal racial policies. It clung to hopes that the international climate would change, or that attention would move elsewhere, or that its policies would succeed in transforming the situation.

South Africa's response to its changing regional setting was mixed, with weary resignation to Marxist State in Mozambique, attempts to foster a moderate government in Rhodesia, but armed intervention in Angola. Soon South Africa faced major internal problems inspired in part by the regional upheaval. In 1976 black youths rose in defiance of apartheid: first in Soweto and then across the country. The government's harsh response, with the shooting of youths and the killing of Steve Biko, the Black Consciousness leader, intensified opposition and the sense of crisis. Again, predictions of the imminent overthrow of the state were rife. Even the Prime Minister, John Vorster, spoke of prospects too ghastly to contemplate. On the international front the presence of Cuban troops in

Angola signalled the entry of global conflict into the region, raising further problems. Military action in Angola failed and led to a humiliating retreat after the entry of Cuban troops and the withdrawal of US support, while after Soweto and Steve Biko's death, the West demonstrated its opposition by supporting a UN mandatory arms ban against South Africa. At the same time the ANC staged a revival; mobilising international opposition, launching a sabotage campaign inside South Africa, and recruiting young blacks fleeing the country.

The South Africa government response to the crisis was fivefold: firstly, to unify whites in defence of the state; secondly, intensify security arrangements; thirdly, to exploit its economic strength; fourthly, to push ahead with apartheid; and lastly, to join a white regional security bloc. Surrounded by challenges the government vacillated at first but when it recovered its nerve it responded with characteristic vigour; repressing opposition, strengthening the security forces, pushing ahead with apartheid by granting independence to Bantustans, and reducing its international dependence (for example, by expanding the arms industry). South Africa also recognised that repression had its limits and started a process of reform in two sensitive areas: the constitution and labour relations. The process led eventually to a new constitution – with an executive President and a tricameral parliament of coloured, Indian and white chambers. The constitution was opposed by most Africans, who saw their exclusion as confirmation of their lack of rights.

A radical ideologically driven foreign policy was prevented by the necessity of adoption to the new post-Cold War world environment, a change which took place almost in tandem with South Africa's domestic transformation and implied a far more complex external environment. However the new government did bring about important philosophical shifts and many changes in emphasis and priorities: the old regime was philosophically right-wing oriented, uncompromisingly pro-Western, critical to the point of being hostile to the Third World and its causes and sceptical about universal liberal ideals such as human rights and gender issues.

The shift in policy implied that New South Africa's priority now be given to the African continent and in particular Southern Africa, to the southern hemisphere, the Non-Aligned Movement, and to universal moral and humanitarian issues. This had a substantial impact on the frequency and nature of contacts between South African leaders and their counterparts in the areas of priority, and on South African involvement in international organisations, conferences and agreements. South African foreign policy regarding how consistent and substantial support for universal liberal ideals and human rights has actually been and the broad consensus seems to be that, although the rhetoric is still there, actual practice has shown that the new South African government may be influenced quite substantially by old friendships on the one hand and pragmatism on the other.



The pragmatism has probably been brought on by economic imperatives as well as some rather disappointing failures in foreign policy. A case in point is Nigeria where President Nelson Mandela's strong stance and attempt to get support for strong action against the Nigerian regime after the hanging of the political dissidents, came to nothing and turned into a loss of face. There is no room here to go into the debate, the merits of the broad consensus mentioned or the question what South Africa should be doing with regard to its "human rights foreign policy". The important issue here is how South African foreign policy, such as it is, has shaped her diplomacy. As it will become clear below, policy implementation have in some cases been mutually influential.

Foreign policy issue areas, in which the new South Africa has made special efforts and has had some considerable success, have included non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons, including land-mines. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa's policy of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control forms an integral part of its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection. The primary goal of this policy is to reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced technologies in the nuclear, chemical and conventional arms fields and in implementing

it high priority is given to nuclear, chemical, biological, missile delivery systems non-proliferation as well as working towards a ban on anti-personnel landmines.

South Africa is generally accepted by countries from the NAM as well as the developing world, especially the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), as a leader in the field. South Africa is seen as having the standing and the capacity to promote dialogue and interaction between the developed world on the one hand, while on the other, address the concerns of the developing world that they do not acquire the technology they need for their development. The South African government, therefore, supports all bilateral and multilateral initiatives to prevent the proliferation and development of such weapons on the one hand and to promote total disarmament of these weapons on the other.

South Africa's strong stance in the area of disarmament and arms control has not meant that it ceased to function as an arms trader, as has been mentioned it merely implied that it would act as a "responsible arms trader". The sale of arms is, therefore, supposed to take place according to a fixed set of criteria. However, the application of these criteria and the resulting decisions about whom to sell to, may not necessarily correspond with what others, notably the US, would want to see happen. This has resulted in some diplomatic difficulties for South

Africa, as in the case of the leaking of information of the possible sale of arms to Syria and the resultant tension in relations with the US.

As far as the impact of the shift in foreign policy on bilateral relations was concerned, it was more a question of adding than changing. The old South Africa was very isolated and even ties with the Western countries were restricted. Immediately after the 1990 F. W. de Klerk speech, which heralded real political change in South Africa and started the country on the road to regaining respectability in the international community, existing ties were beginning to be restored to normal and some new ties (such as with Eastern Europe, due to changes there) were being forged. After 1994, the new government did not bring about changes in a zero-sum fashion. Relations with the West were not downgraded, in fact in some ways these relations have been raised to a higher plateau than previously. However, many new ties were forged, including the cementing of relations with countries formerly known for their animosity toward South Africa and including some so-called pariah states. Most African States (including the "pariah" Libya), India, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Mexico and Cuba, are examples of the new addition. This Universal foreign policy made necessary a vast extension of South African diplomatic communications. However, resource and other constraints (such as the lack of sufficiently trained and experienced personnel) and special circumstances in individual cases, resulted in some difficulties. In addition, relations with the "pariahs" have put a

strain on South Africa's relations with the US, necessitating some diplomatic maneuvering.

The much debated and analysed love-hate triangle among South Africa, the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan is another interesting foreign policy and diplomatic case study. It took the new South African government quite some time to finally make a decision on the issue prior to the political change in South African diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level had been maintained with Taiwan and this was retained after 1994. On 1 January 1998, South Africa established full diplomatic relations with the PRC. At the same time, official ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan), which is not recognised by the PRC as an independent state, were severed. However, South Africa and Taiwan continue with trade, scientific, cultural and other relations, and Taiwanese investors in South Africa continue to enjoy full protection under South African law, and all other benefits extended to foreign investors.

The domestic faces of South African foreign policy also reflect a diverse set of goals and strategies. Apartheid in South Africa privileged a strategy of internal extraction in which national economic development was subordinated to the needs of a national security state. With the transition to democracy, the traditional nexus between state security and economic accumulation has been swept away, some residue of the past

remains. While the traditional definition of security has been fundamentally altered, the right connection between military resources and the national interest has not been completely removed. More specifically, the issue of transparency in such sensitive areas of decision-making as arms sales remains highly political.

As far as the South African foreign policy towards India is concerned, the cooperation between South Africa and India in various realms dates back to centuries. India and South Africa have been close allies in the struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination. As founder member of the IOR-ARC, both countries can consolidate a new arrangement of regional cooperation in the North Western sector of the Indian Ocean. With respect to regional cooperation both sides have taken note of emerging opportunities in the Southern African region in the wake of the growth and consolidation of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). South Africa's leadership role in the economic development of the region renders it a valuable partner in India's efforts to develop mutually beneficial cooperative links with the countries of the Southern African region.

India and South Africa share a number of similar views in terms of global perceptions. In the United Nations, both sides agree on the need for reform, including the UN Security Council, in a manner reflective of current global political and economic realities. Both sides recognise the

importance of revitalising the agenda of the NAM, so that it could more effectively articulate the interests of developing countries. India and South Africa could give new orientation to the NAM by bringing on its agenda subjects of contemporary relevance like sustainable development, gender issues, environment management and human rights.

Having said this, one has to acknowledge that the strategic and security concerns of South Africa and India are bound to differ because of their respective geographic locations and differing security environment. India conducted its nuclear tests in May, 1998 and then South Africa reiterated its deep concern on Indian nuclear tests because they do not contribute to promoting world peace and security. South Africa believes that security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation. However, India commitment to nuclear disarmament remains undiluted. India is favoring a time-bound programme to abolish all nuclear weapons.

Despite of areas of disarray like disarmament, human rights, India and South Africa stand to face the new challenges in the millenium. Both are united by a shared past and by the frontiers of a common ocean. Both Countries take pride in being democracies. At the same time, in the modern competitive world, both India and South Africa have to seriously build a rapidly growing super structure of cooperation on the foundations of deep and abiding commonalities. Both countries have

declared themselves to be strategic partners. South Africa is the only country with whom India has sanctified such a communion is the testimony to the uniqueness of ties. India and South Africa have much to gain and offer each other in a plethora of areas. Both countries learn from each other's experiences and competitive advantage for making their berth in the global economy of today. South-South Cooperation offers an alternative approach to development and both countries can become a model of South-South Cooperation for others to emulate.

Keeping in mind that South Africa's foreign policy future role in world politics in the medium to long term will be conditioned by its success at local and regional levels. Within sub-Saharan Africa and its southern Atlantic and the Indian Ocean it will obviously be a substantial and probably decisive presence. If it assumes special responsibilities at this subsystemic level, it could well aspire to a leadership role in South-South relations, and perhaps an intercessionary position in North-South encounters. In the new global order, countries like South Africa can play an effective role in promoting peace and cooperation in the company of like-minded countries, such as India with which it is proclaiming "strategic partnership".

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