

**RUSSIA AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANISATION: RUSSIAN SECURITY PERCEPTION**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the award of
the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

HERKAN NEADAN TOPPO

**CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN
AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067**

2000



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

Centre for Russian, Central Asian &
East European Studies,
School of International Studies

(Federation)


GRAM : JAYENU
TELEX : JNU IN
TEL. : 6107676/ Extn.
6167557/ 2365
FAX : 91-11-6165886
91-11-6868234

Dated 21 July, 2000


CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "RUSSIA AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION: RUSSIAN SECURITY PERCEPTION" submitted by HERKAN NEADAN TOPPO, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of this university, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. To the best of our knowledge, this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Professor Shams-ud-Din

(CHAIRPERSON)


Professor Nirmala M. Joshi

(SUPERVISOR)

TO MY BELOVED SISTER LATE SANTOSHI TOPPO

Contents

	Pages
Preface	i-ii
Chapter I	
Introduction	1-10
Chapter II	
Historical Development of Russian Security	
Perception	11-21
Chapter III	
Russian Response Towards NATO Expansion	22-54
Chapter IV	
NATO's New Doctrine and its Implications for	
Russian Security	55-74
Chapter V	
Conclusion	75-78
Select Bibliography	79-90

Preface

This study is the part of the inquiry to understand and explain the Russian security perception with regard to the NATO expansion under the aegis of new political world order. The main focus of this study is to explain the relationship between politics and military strategy and an assessment of the threat of the Russian security and the nature of future war. It also seeks to analyse the general Russian perception of the world, including the existing system of international relationship – the roots of major conflicts and contradiction in them.

No words can express the deep debt of gratitude I owe to my supervisor Professor Nirmala M. Joshi her wide experience, unrivalled knowledge on international relations with regard to Russia, Central Asia and East European studies, stimulating discussions and unstinting moral support helped me immensely in completing this work in time.


I thankfully recall Rev. Batuel Ekka and Dr. Sona Jharia Minz for acquaintance at this hour of accomplishment. I have indeed no words to express my indebtedness to them for they have been a great source of support throughout my stay in J.N.U.

I am greatly indebted to the faculty members of the Centre for Russian, Central Asia and East European Studies who provided me with valuable insight and suggestions to formulate my arguments.

I am beholden to JNU Christian Fellowship brothers and sisters whose constant prayer, support and fellowship has kept me cool and cheerful amidst all my onerous academic activities.

I have no words to express my heartfelt gratitude to my friends for their constant encouragement, support and valuable assistance at all times. I specially thank for the service rendered by the library staff of JNU, Teen Murti and Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis.

Last but not the least, I am elated to pay my thankful appreciation to Limaakum Jamir for his impeccable execution of this work.


Herkan Neadan Toppo

Chapter I

Introduction

Present day Russian Federation stretches from the Baltic Sea in the West to the Pacific in the East, the Arctic Ocean in the North to the boundaries of China, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus in the South. This huge land mass of Russia lies partly in Europe and largely in Asia. It is natural that the security concerns of this land mass are different in nature and enormous. In fact many observers of the Russian foreign policy feel that its policy is mainly a policy of ensuring its security. Often Russian concern for its security has verged on fear psychosis. Throughout its history it was primarily the security concerns that made the rules of Moscovy expand in diverse directions. Even after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the beginning of Soviet era the security question did not get settled. The ideological divide added a sharper edge to the security question. It may be added that Russia's present day boundaries, as well as in the past, are man-made boundaries. Natural barriers do not provide a dividing line. This fact has compounded Russian security question.

During the Soviet period the security question was a top-most priority as in the past. Lenin's idea of peaceful co-existence and Stalin's enunciation of Collective Security were steps in the direction of solving the vexed issue of security concerns. With the end of the Second World War in 1945, the cold war began and this heightened Soviet security concerns. To use Churchill's famous

phrase “an iron curtain has descended over Europe”. One of the highlights of the cold war was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) in 1950. NATO was specifically created to contain communism so as to check its further advance into the heart of Europe. NATO was primarily a military organisation with developed structures over the years.

NATO definitely posed a threat to Russia. On its South-Western flank. The member countries of NATO were well developed industrialised countries of the West. They possessed the latest weaponry and with the backing of the United States of America easily were superior to the Soviet Union and its East bloc allies. Hence the nature of threat to its South-West flank was basically in conventional countries that separated the Soviet Union from a Europe that was part of NATO. The Soviet response was to launch the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) in 1955.

With the end of the Cold War by Mikhail Gorbachev in the eighties and the subsequent disbandment of WTO it seemed that the nature of Soviet security concern would undergo a basic change. This hope was further strengthened when in 1991 the Soviet Union broke-up and communism collapsed. The Cold War had finally ended, and the ideological divide which had also disappeared raised hopes for the newly emerged Russian Federation that its concern emanating from South-Western direction were over once and for all.

It is in this historical context the Russian security perception should be studied vis-à-vis the NATO. The evolution of the system of international relations has not resulted in the world's "bipolar configuration" being replaced by either a super power 'condominium' dominated by Russia and the United States or some kind of "global context" of major world powers, i.e. the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Substantial progress is evident in the roles played by major world institutions like the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) though when compared to other world bodies in the past, their influence on world politics has grown quite significantly.¹

Attempting to take advantage of the current state of international relations, NATO appears to be desperately trying to prolong its existence even though the Cold War has ended and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, its principal adversary, has disintegrated. The alliance is now clearly attempting to gain control over the processes under way in areas of vital interest to Russia and its allies. The enlargement of NATO runs counter to the idea of an all European security system. The fact that the western European Union that is both NATO's partners and rival has gradually begun to expand its influence all across Europe. Since the end of the bipolar confrontation France, Germany, Italy and a number of other nations have been preserving their international standing and even increasing their influence.

¹ Kokoshin, Andrei A. "Soviet Strategic Thoughts 1917-91". The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London England. 1998. P. 198

The United States of America and its military allies made various attempts and agreed on a mechanism of consultation between NATO and Russia before taking the decision on expansion. In fact it was difficult for the West to convince Russia about the need for NATO expansion amidst the profound changes brought about in the nature of relations between Russia and its western neighbours as well as the USA. Though President Boris Yeltsin of Russia agreed to allow the expansion of NATO, Russia has never missed an opportunity to express its disapproval on the expansion of NATO because it undermines Russia's national security.

Vladimir Ibler, describes the security of states as a “sum of factual circumstances and conditions the general situations of a state which offers and guarantees its safety from external dangers liable to threaten its vital interests, its territorial integrity and its very survival.”² In his monograph entitled, ‘The concept of security in international relations, Vojin Dimitrijevic sees security in general as being an absence of threats to fundamental values, and state security, sets out as the basic values of states and nations their survival, territorial integrity, political independence, quality of life and the so-called “vital” or “national interests”’.³

² ibler, Vladimir, A Dictionary of International Public law zagreb: Informer 1972, p. 273 as quoted in Ljubivoje Acimovic, “Problem of Security and cooperation in Europe: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, USA 1981, P. 57.

³ Dimitrijevic, vojcin, *The Concept of Security in International relation* (Belgrade) as quoted in ibid.

Post cold war Russia has simultaneously pursued three ambitions and partially conflicting geo-strategic interests First, preserving and consolidating the territorial shape of the Russian Federation as it emerged in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Second, achieving some degree of reintegration of the former Soviet republics with Moscow as the natural leader around which the whole process of structuring the post-Soviet 'space' would gravitate. And third, finding a place for the 'New Russia' as a Great Power in the post cold war international system.⁴

On the other hand, a careful study of politicians' statements (Central and East Europe) reveal a different reason, even if Russia were peaceful, democratic state the smaller countries between Germany and Russia would still insist on their final departure from the zone of "Zwischeneuropa", while for more than two centuries they have been the objects of external powers, decisions and agreements. Although it was made impossible in 1945 (by Yalta), they now want to join the countries of western Europe, as members with equal rights and obligations in the Euro-Atlantic community. If, however, despite their hard work progress on the path to the transformation of their political and economic systems, they would eventually be admitted to the European Union. The quest for NATO membership motivated and justified politically. The assessment of the countries of Central and East Europe that of NATO's eastern enlargement essentially means the "export of political stability." Moreover, closer

⁴ Grundzinski, Premyslaw and Ham, Peter Van, "A Critical Approach to European Security Identity and Institutions" Pinter London, New York, 1999. P. 108

neighbourhood with an alliance of stabilized democracies would also correspond in their view to the intrinsic interests of Russia's democrats in a congenial environment for their country's development.

Initially when NATO was formed its aims were; the first was that its charter prohibited the use of the alliances armed forces outside the boundaries of its zone of responsibility, unless the aim was to repel aggression against one of its member states. The second was that an alliance of democratic states, by definition not only could not carry out aggressive actions. It could even undertake large scale offensive operations. This amounted to a kind of moral credo for the alliance, and its members believed in it sincerely. The collapse of communism, and the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the Soviet military machine made the whole world rejoice, but for NATO the joy was mixed. That magnificent and well-oiled machine, a source of considerable benefit to its member nations, had now lost its reason for existence. This was especially worrisome to the Americans. It turned out that in the absence of military confrontation in an institutionalized form, the Americans new and enormous economic and military might did not translate into political clout. The absolute economic-even military-might of the US was growing, but its clout was fading.

A search began for a new mission for the alliance. In the early 1990's a new slogan was trotted out, 'venture outside the zone of responsibility or die'. The hunt was on for terrorists and ayatollahs, but no real and credible enemy

outside the zone was found. Then another slogan was tried, “enlarge or die”. NATO began its process of expansion stabilising a new division of Europe and showing mistrust. Most recently, NATO decided to prove its viability once more by launching the Yugoslav adventure – having finally found an artificial enemy to expand against. This move leaves the dying to be done others, namely the Yugoslavs, Serbs and Kosovos alike, now NATO has to ‘win’ at all costs in order to prove its own viability.

The alliance is transforming into a strange breed of organisms that, in order to sustain itself, has to sustain an external threat. In the process NATO has also trampled upon its own moral credo. It has launched a large scale, aggressive and offensive war. The Russia-NATO agreement, the expansion of the alliance has contributed to a feeling that NATO can do as it pleases with impunity. NATO is not Russia’s enemy but it could become its enemy unless it doesn’t arrogate to itself the role of a world gendarme.

The formal initiative for NATO’s present political strategy, the alliance strategic concept came at July-1990-London-Summit of heads of state and government. Although there was much optimism and talk about “a new world order” following the “European revolution” of 1989, the preparation of the new strategy took place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. The fundamental changes taking place in central and Eastern Europe – the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the independence of the Baltic states, the collapse of Yugoslavia

and the unsuccessful coup in Moscow had profound impact on the development of the document which was approved at NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991.

The alliance strategic concept recognized the new strategic environment, describing the risks of Allied security as "multifaceted in nature which makes them hard to predict and assess".⁵ In addition to bringing its strategy into line with reality, new political strategy also could help to clarify NATO's transformation in the eyes of the Russian Federation, thus making the accession of its former allies more palatable. NATO has the process of reviewing its 1991 strategic concept which prevents an excellent opportunity to clearly articulate to the public its new missions as they have evolved.⁶ The Russian reaction to NATO's possible eastward expansion must be put into perspective to be properly understood and assessed.

Keeping this as a historical background the present study examines the intricate issues concerning the Russia's security and its territorial integrity in the emerging new world political order. An earnest attempt has also been made to probe into various historical questions relating to the logical development of Russian security perception.

⁵ NATO Review, No.2, Summer, 1998, Vol.46.

⁶ Jan Peterson. "NATO's Next Strategic Concept", NATO Review, Summer, 1998, Vol.46, No.2. p.14.

The source of material on which this work is based on are admittedly just the tip of the iceberg of Russia's attitude, thinking and response to challenge. According to many Russian analyst, only large quantities of the materials spanning several decades produce a rather explicit and detailed picture of the Russia's actual political military strategy. Considering the international political volatile situation it may not be proper to pass any value-judgement with regard to development of Russian security perception and subsequent NATO's expansion however it must be borne that Russia since being a nuclear state its security and territorial integrity should be ensured through proper global order failing which it would become a nightmare to the international peace and harmony among the nation.

This work covers three themes:

1. The relationship between politics and military strategy.
2. An assessment of the threats to the Russian security, the nature of future war.
3. The relationship between offence and defense in Russian military strategy.

In my second chapter entitled "Historical background of Russian security perception" an attempt has been made to traced the development of military "alliances and counter alliances" and its repercussions since Second World War. In the third chapter titled "Russian Response towards NATO's Expansion: A Challenge". I have surveyed the development right after the fall of the Soviet Union and the NATO's Strategic Alliance Concepts and its policy towards expansion of NATO through 'Partnership

for Peace' that focus on security issue of Russia in the last decade of the millennium.

Fourth and final chapter titled "NATO's new doctrine and its implications for Russian Security" mainly evaluates the development of NATO's expansion towards the Russian border through mutual cooperation and implication of NATO's new strategic concept on Russian security. These are the main contending issues that have received due attention. In the concluding chapter an assessment of the above mentioned issues has been presented.

Chapter II

Historical Development of Russian Security Perception

Given the Russian Federation's excessive concern for its security, for which history bears an eloquent testimony, it was natural for it to be apprehensive about the North Atlantic Treaty Organisations (NATO) future plans. Russia had expected that with the end of the ideological rivalry, it would be welcomed into the Western fold as a 'natural ally'. There were no longer any systematic divide. By 1994 President Yeltsin talked of a "Cold Peace" implying that the idea of a natural ally had fallen by the wayside. Competition would still be the hallmark of East-West relations. NATO symbolised this emerging competition.

In Russian view expansion implied that it was still perceived as an opponent instead of partner by the West. Russian objectives remained suspect in the eyes of the West. NATO's further expansion implied that it was taking steps which in Russian perception were aimed at it. By its intention to admit Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic into its fold, the attempt was to encircle Russia's south-western periphery. It is viewed as a potential threat to Russia. Russia's first Foreign Minister Mr. A. Kozyrev gradually abandoned his pro-western stance in favour of a more assertive and Russia-centred foreign policy. In this chapter an attempt is made, however, to examine the historical background of Russia's security issues and problems.

Origin and Development of Russian Security Perception:

Historically the international political competition has developed into a security perception in the Soviet Union. The view that the conflict has resulted from a mutual ideological antagonism between the two rival blocs, implying that the conflict was more or less inevitable and posed threat to Soviet security. Between 1945 and 1948, Soviet Union drew into its sphere of influence states of Eastern Europe, as communist governments came to power in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. By 1945, much of Europe lay in ruins; it no longer dominated the world, and seemed about to be engulfed by the tide of communism spreading from Russia. In this situation many felt that the continent could only be rebuilt and defended by a common military and political effort, moving towards a united Western Europe. Churchill's famous statement that an iron curtain has descended over Europe exemplified this.

The Berlin blockade ended in May 1949, but by then two separate administrations had already been set up in divided Berlin, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had been signed in 1949, and the United States was shortly to pass its Mutual Assistance Defense Bill. In 1949, the European Council was created in the west, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the east, as efforts to organise the two parts of Europe into blocs continued.¹ NATO's Secretary General Lord Ismay said that the

¹ Acimovic Ljubivoje, 'Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe', Sijthoff and Noordhoff USA, 1981, p.12.

purpose of NATO was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down' in Europe.

Predictably, Stalin took it as a challenge and tension remained high between the two blocs that had come into existence. In 1955, the Warsaw Pact came in as a response to the formation of NATO. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) or Warsaw Pact explicitly states that it was formed as a response to the so-called Paris agreement of 23 October 1954 by nine western powers on 14 May 1955. The Warsaw Pact was signed between Russia and her allies states shortly after West Germany was admitted to NATO. The pact was a mutual defence agreement, which the West took as a gesture against German membership of NATO.

WTO

The preamble of the Warsaw Treaty states that its ultimate is to create a system of collective security in Europe based on the participation of all European states, irrespective of their social; and political structure. The seven signatory states claimed that the Paris Agreements had created a new situation, 'the necessary step to safeguard their security and to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe'. The formation of an East-bloc multilateral political military alliance within the ideological east-west confrontation. The allies provided both a defensive buffer and an offensive launching platform for the Soviet Union. The pact, as a whole, enjoyed the advantages of centralized control from the Soviet Union.

After Stalin's death Nikita Khrushchev the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had formulated Soviet thinking on foreign policy and ushered in the concept of 'Peaceful Co-existence'. This concept held that war between the Soviet Union and the capitalist powers was not inevitable, the growing strength of the anti-war forces and the third world would prevent it. It differed from Lenin's cohabitation and Stalin's popular front tactics in that it was seen as a long-term policy. It signaled the Soviet desire for better and closer relationships with the Capitalist world. in all fields, except in ideology. There was a technological gap between the two power blocs and the Soviet Union wanted to close it by importing technology. In fact it was the advent of nuclear weapons, which made war seem no longer inevitable.

The concept of Peaceful Co-existence continued when Leonid Brezhnev became the General Secretary in 1964. Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the 1970's, the two super powers began to cooperate more closely with each other. Détente offered Soviet government the prospects of solving some of its economic problems by importing foreign technology. However, superpower rivalry made Western allies reluctant to export technology with any possible military value. Besides, the cordiality of détente vanished in the early 1980s. The new cold war began in 1979 with the Soviet decision to invade military in Afghanistan in 1979.

Amidst the growing détente and easing of tensions, nevertheless arms race

continued between the two blocs. For the Soviet Union, the most threatening development in international relations was the acceleration of the arms race. This continued despite the continuous negotiations towards arms limitations throughout this period. The share of Gross National Product devoted to defence was probably at least twice as high in the USSR in the 1970s than in the USA. Soviet GNP was just over half that of the USA in the same period. Technological backwardness also raised the cost of defence. Despite the sophistication of some Soviet military equipment, on the whole, its weaponry was less advanced and more costly than that of the West in the opinion of some specialist.

The Soviet Union continued its effort to strengthen its strategic posture through expansion of its strategic delivery forces and improvement of its strategic defences with the exception of the Soviet programme for deployment of ballistic missile defences, which was halted by the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of May 1972, the Soviet Union's unilateral strategic programmes have not been greatly affected to date by the various agreements reached in SALT, including the outline Vladivostok Accord of November 1974.² This has been the case essentially because the boundary limits legislated thus far in the SALT era have room for Soviet planners to carry out the successive strategic programmes which they evidently have regarded as necessary to provide a

² William E. Griffith, ed., The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Détente, Leeington Books, Toronto, 1976.

prudent hedge against future uncertainty.³ These are main features of the strategic programmes undertaken by the Soviet Union and some of the strategic issues raised by them down to the time of the Vladivostok transaction.⁴

Soviet bloc forces enjoy a quantitative advantage in most categories of conventional military power in Europe, as well as being geographically favoured by a deep rear and interior lines of communication in contrast to NATO's lack of room for deployment in depth and lines of communication that stretch overseas to the United States.⁵ In the military technical sphere, there have been on the NATO side qualitative leaps in anti-tank weapons and precision-guided air-delivered weapons of various kinds, while on the Warsaw Pact side improvements in armoured striking power have been accompanied by creation of a tougher ground anti-aircraft environment. The new weapons trends might seem to go a considerable way towards reducing the conventional offensive advantages of the tank-heavy Warsaw Pact forces, the dense anti-aircraft threat against NATO tactical aircraft.⁶

The Soviet Union has indicated that it is prepared to negotiate a new pattern of European collective that might eventually involve "the simultaneous dissolution of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty as a first step,

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ William E. Griffith, pp.181.

⁶ Ibid.

the abolition of their military organisations”.⁷

The Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries in respect to strategic nuclear weapons and the total numerical strength of the armed forces in 1979, the Central Committee of the CPSU emphasized in the report to the congress: “we have not sought and do not now seek military superiority over the other side. That is not our policy. But neither will we permit the building up of any such superiority over us. Attempts of that kind and talking to us from a position of strength are absolutely futile.”⁸ At a conference of the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers’ committee held in Berlin on 5th and 6th December 1979, participants stressed the great importance of the signing of the SALT II-treaty for furthering détente.

On 6 October 1979, Leonid Brezhnev said in reply to the accusation made by NATO against the USSR that it had allegedly upset the military balance in Europe by deploying new medium range missiles there, “As chairman of the USSR Defence Council, I declare in all certainty in the last ten years the number of medium range nuclear missile carriers in the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single rocket or by a single plane”.⁹

Leonid Brezhnev came up with a constructive peace initiative to NATO

⁷ Sh. Sanakoyer, “Peace in Europe and the Confrontation of the two Systems”, International Affairs, No. 11, November 1972, p.7.

⁸ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communists Party of the Soviet Union, p.40 as quoted in Nikolai, Lebedev. “The USSR in World Politics” Progress Publishers Moscow, 1980, p.259.

member countries: “we are prepared to reduce the number of medium range nuclear weapons in the western part of the Soviet Union compared with the present level but only western Europe will not have additional medium range nuclear weapons stationed in it.”¹⁰ Thus, from Stalin to Brezhnev we find that NATO was perceived as the main threat by the Soviet Union. The Nature of this threat was primarily conventional in military terms. Despite, periods of co-operation and détente the Cold War the ideological antagonism remained central in East-West relations.

Gorbachev’s New Thinking:

The new thinking in foreign policy, encouraged by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze was basically an examination of the cost-effectiveness of Soviet involvements and commitments.¹¹ This culminated the complete replacement of the imperial and ideological paradigm. The theme of new thinking had been articulated, that the ideas of an interdependent world and global problems which characterise the new political thinking. According to Karen Dawisha, ‘Gorbachev realized that the Europeanization of the Soviet Union could not proceed without the de-Sovietization of Eastern Europe’.¹² Gorbachev’s maneuvers in the policy are viewed as successes more in the West than in the

⁹ Kommunist, No.15, 1979, p.8.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Pick, Otto, “The Demise of the Warsaw Pact”, NATO Review, No.2, April 1991, Vol.39.

¹² Dawisha, K. Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform – the Great Challenge, (2nd edn.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. p.199.

Soviet Union. Renee de Nevers talks about 'the catalytic role played by Gorbachev's New Thinking'.¹³

Robert Legvold has observed important changes in the policy of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe in the beginning of 1989.¹⁴ Within less than a month of assuming office, Gorbachev declared in April 1985 an immediate six month freeze on the deployment of missile in Europe, to expire in November 1985 only if the NATO deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles was not withdrawn likewise.

In July 1985, Gorbachev expressed support for a global 'zero option' on the elimination of intermediate nuclear force from Asia and Europe. This finally resulted in the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty to eliminate land based weapons falling in this category. In March 1988, Gorbachev proposed a freeze on the level of Naval forces in the Mediterranean. He announced a peace plan under which the USSR would stop using its naval bases in CamRann bay in exchange for US agreement to eliminate its bases in the Philippines. In December 1988 he announced in the UN a unilateral decision to reduce Soviet conventional forces including withdraw of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe, the agreement to on-site inspection of military facilities at the Stockholm CSCE conference in 1986, the scrapping of the Soviet

INF
Treaty

¹³ de Nevers, R. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The End of an Era. Adelphie Papers, 249, March. 1990.

¹⁴ Legvold, R. "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, 1989. 68:82-98.

Union intermediate range nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1987 Washington Treaty, and it resulted finally in the dismantling of preponderance in Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Gorbachev also gave East-European allies a free hand. Gorbachev's new thinking policy was seen as being contrary to the state interests. Such a reaction reflected offended great-state ambitions, traditional fears in the sphere of national security, undermined ideological dogmas and deep-rooted civilisational prejudices against the West. Another important component of the policy was the re-establishment of friendly relations with the former republics. The demarcates welcomed the disintegration of the USSR, not only because it paved the way for Gorbachev's removal from the presidential post in a legal way.

Piontkowsky mentions the influence of the various opposition movements in Eastern Europe on the opposition groups within the Soviet Union: 'In the early stages of 'Perestroika', many in the Soviet Union dreamt that there might come about some movement in Eastern Europe like Solidarnosc had been briefly in Poland in 1980 or like the Prague Spring in 1968; if such developments occurred, it would greatly influence our own chances. This would push the USSR very strongly towards a democratic solution and that might precipitate things, the current Russian revolution is related to the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe. It was related in two ways: as 'cause' and as effect.¹⁵ Piontkowsky points to a great paradox that 'the same Gorbachevian government

¹⁵ Piontkowsky, A.A. "The Russian Sphinx: Hope and Despair", in G. Prins (ed.) Spring in Winter, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990. pp.164-5.

simultaneously lifted the threat of armed intervention from eastern Europe, thus permitting spring to flower in the winter of 1989, yet refused to accept the logic and moral imperative of liberalisation at home'.¹⁶

The end of East-West confrontation has given rise to the idea that NATO
which was founded to counter Soviet threat might have been discontinued but
NATO leaders approved a new "strategic concept" that embraces for the first
time, "military mission in volatile regions" beyond their borders and also
decided to intensify the aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia. As for Russia's
official security perception Yugoslavia crisis could lead to a grave disaster'.
But, by pushing de facto military expansion through NATO's agreement, the west hits the most delicate of Russia's nerves. NATO seems to strengthen
Russia's neighbours only in order to weaken Russia.

TH8749

DISS

355.0310918210947

T629 Ru



TH8749

'N9



Chapter III

Russian Response to NATO Expansion: A New Challenge

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has radically changed the security landscape in Europe and has transformed the international system and when a new Russian state emerged, there was much optimism in Russia and in the West that the collapse of Soviet power, the demise of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the end of the cold war would lead to a more tranquil world, one in which Moscow would cease to be a threatening adversary and would instead become a cooperative member of the international community.¹ Russia stands apart from the West because of its geographic position, its aspirations for great power and the outlook of influential elites.² The formal initiative for North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) political strategy, the Alliance strategic concept, came in July 1990 at London Summit. The Alliance Strategic concept recognized the new strategic environment, describing the risks to allied security as "multifaceted in nature, which makes them hard to predict and assess".³

¹ Marantz, Paul, "Neither Adversaries nor Partners, Russia and the West Search for a New Relationship", International Journal, XLIX, Autumn 1994, p.725.

² Mac Farlane, S. Neil. "Russia the West and European Security", Survival, 35, Autumn 1993, pp.4-18; Neil Malcolm, "The New Russian Foreign Policy", World Today, February 1994, pp.28-32.

³ Wijk, Rob de, "Towards a New Political Strategy for NATO", NATO Review, No.2, Summer 1998, Vol.46, p.14.

The reaction in Russia to the possible expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe has been very different. President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev were rather vague about Russia's attitude towards NATO during 1992 and 1993. However, by late 1993, Russian opposition to NATO's expansion plan was loud and clear. Privately and publicly, the Russian government firmly opposed the extension of the NATO membership to the state of Eastern Europe.

According to Sergei Karaganov, a reputed analyst of Russia in the first half of 1992, Russian perception was based on the assumption that Russia had no potential enemies. Hence, the idea of constructing a new world order in collaboration with Western countries, in particular the USA, was actively pursued. A further step on the path to a definition of a Russian sphere of interests in the post-Soviet context to the near abroad provoked concern, especially outside Russia's borders.

A study on Eastward expansion produced by the intelligence service of the Russian Federation States that the transformation of NATO and the expansion of the Alliance should not be expected to occur synchronously. The danger to Russian interests lies here, because it reduces the chances of definitely overcoming the divisions in which NATO's area of operation is extended right upto the borders of the Russian Federation. Kozyrev in December 1992 in Stockholm denounced Western interference in the territory of all former Soviet Republic and stated that the territory of the former Soviet Union cannot be

considered a zone in which Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe norms are wholly applicable. At the NATO Summit in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994, alliance heads of state and government broke partial silence on a fundamental issue to enlarge the Atlantic Alliance once again by admitting the new democracies of Central Europe formerly member states of the Warsaw Pact. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.⁴

Russian opposition to NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe – its old area of influence accurately reflects the complex nature of Russia's present relations with the West. Russia had its own distinctive interests and perspectives which set it apart from the West and prevent it from fully sharing the West sense of common identity and purpose.⁵

Former communist states, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have been pleading for rapid admission into NATO. Fearful of instability and potential aggression emanating from the east, they want the security guarantees that would accompany membership. NATO membership would also signify the full acceptance of these nations by the West. It would strengthen the case for their eventual membership in the European Union, and it would be popular

⁴ NATO Review, 42:1, February 1994.

⁵ Marantz, Paul. *op.cit.*, p.743.

domestically, paying significant political dividends to the politicians who were able to bring this about.⁶

Russia's Fear of Isolation:

Despite occasional half-threat by Russian politicians to the effect that their country could apply for membership to NATO – no other members of the CIS have followed the example of the Central and East European countries. Meanwhile within Russia two distinct schools of thought emerged around 1992-93; Pro-West or Atlanticists and the Eurasianists. In their thinking about foreign policy issues and problems relating to NATO were rather prominent. One of the more important semi-official attack on the Atlanticist orientation and the new thinking had been launched by the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP) in its 'theses' on a Strategy For Russia. Proponents of this view felt that their appraisal 'was prompted by the concern, the CFDP members felt over the fact that the leadership of the country lacked any coherent understandings of apprehension about a lopsided pro-western orientation. This created a danger of Russia distancing itself, becoming suspicious of the outside world and displaying arrogance of force'. But any new isolation of Russia would be far more unwelcome than the one faced by the USSR, and since conflicts of interests between Russia and the major western countries are 'minor', there are 'no' profound reasons for relations to

⁶ Ibid.

become more strained, almost universal international isolation of the Soviet Union.

To counter possible isolation Russia proposed to upgrade the CSCE into a new collective security organization – a northern hemisphere community. The fact that it was not accepted by the west is perceived in Russia as a deliberate decision to leave Russia outside security related coordination structures in Europe so that it has no opportunity to present and defend its point of view, so that Russia is always presented with a *fait accompli* leaving it only the choice between acceptance and rejection.

A characteristic feature of Russia's relations with the CIS countries was a two-track approach in which the framework for military co-operation were persuaded more or less independently. Military cooperation within the CIS started to breakdown very soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1992 Russian policy switched from keeping nuclear weapons as a collective shield to turning them into Russia's own deterrent. Similar attempts to preserve the Soviet armed forces under a different guise were unproductive, and they were divided amongst the various states. The CIS was saved by the emergence of a separate structure in May 1992 – the Tashkent Treaty Organization (TTO).⁷ On 15 May 1992 in Tashkent, a treaty on collective

⁷ Grundzinski, Przemyslaw and Ham, Peter Van., "A Critical Approach to European Security Identity and Institutions", Pinter London. New York, 1999, p. 137

security was concluded by Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but it has not been ratified by all the participating countries. In July 6, 1992, at the Sixth Summit of CIS heads in Moscow, the establishment of peace keeping force was agreed.

The Threat of Eastward Expansion:

Russia's military doctrine was enunciated in 1993. The document analysed in detail the threats posed to the security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. A feature of the military doctrine of November 1993 was its classification of the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation as one of the threats to Russian security. It had been a matter of fact that Russia preferred to regard its new partners in the west from a distance had become clear during the latter half of 1993, from its reactions to Poland's turn towards the west, although on his visit to Warsaw on August 25, 1993, President Yeltsin had formally assured President Walsesa that Poland could set about securing NATO membership without thereby coming into conflict with the interests of Russia'. This was soon contradicted by Foreign Minister Kozyrev and other Russian politicians. It is assumption that Russia could agree to an eastward expansion of the Atlantic Alliance only on two conditions if the Alliance admitted the Russian Federation as well, and if at the same time, it changed its function from that of a defensive alliance to that of a system of collective security. A study on eastward expansion produced by the Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation States that the transformation of

NATO and the expansion of the alliance should not be expected to occur synchronously.

In Russia, the possibility that NATO's eastern boundary may eventually be on the border of its heartland was seen as a potential threat. NATO already has military superiority over Russia, with new members drawn from Central and East Europe closer to the borders of Russia. The early national security policy recognized this situation. This very first unpublished version of the new military doctrine (March-April 1992) listed NATO as a source of military threat because it was militarily strong and located close to Russia. In a subsequent and more comprehensive document on Russia's national security policy, NATO was classified as a challenge – meaning that it did not have plans to hurt Russia's interests but was potentially capable of doing just that. A memorandum to Yeltsin by the then first Deputy Foreign Minister, Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev, pointed out the 'threat from a potential Baltic to Black Sea' coalition of east and central European states and Ukraine aligned with NATO.

The 'Near Abroad' Sphere of Interests:

When it was becoming clear that NATO was likely to expand eastward, Russia began a vigorous attempt to woo back the countries of the commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). These countries on its periphery were considered as a belt of stability and security for Russia. Russian security interests lay in seeing that these countries were not attracted towards the West and NATO in

particular. In accordance with its interests in April 1993, President Yeltsin signed the document entitled 'the conceptualization of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation'. This represented a further step on the path to a definition of a Russian sphere of interest in the post-Soviet context. In it, all actions that might jeopardize the process of integration of the CIS were classified as threats. The document describes Russia as the guarantor of stability in internal CIS relations. The step from this to the new Russian military doctrine, partly unveiled in November 1993, was not a great one. The attention which that document devoted to the 'near abroad' provoked concern, especially outside Russia's borders.⁸

However, the linking of the use of Russian 'peace keeping forces' to the maintenance of spheres of influence had already been justified by Foreign Minister Kozyrev on the grounds that Russia might lose positions which it had built up over centuries. In view of the prospects of Russia's losing its influence to its rivals, or indeed to potential enemies, in a region where it had traditionally geopolitical interests, other countries may have to seek or approve Russia's taking whatever action it deemed necessary in its own 'backyard'. However, the new military doctrine did not show trace of hegemonial claims against the states of the erstwhile WTO, nor are such claims voiced by members of the Russian government. But because the situation even in regard

⁸ Lepinwell, John W.R. "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad'", *Survival*, 36/3 Autumn, 1994.

to the Baltic states – the only former Soviet republics which are not members of the CIS – is altogether different, the change in foreign policy has caused concern, especially in Poland.

Although Russia formally acknowledged the principles of respect for territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders in relation to the members of the CIS, its claim to influence in these countries has become more than evident. Thus the Chairman of Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, V.Lukin, interprets good neighbourly relations with the 'near abroad' as 'a clear system of reciprocal obligations between the large state and its smaller neighbours, whereby the latter obtain security guarantees in exchange for acknowledgement of the special interests and influence of their 'big neighbour'.

Bilateral treaties providing for a continuing Russian military presence are in force with almost all CIS members – a fact that is of particular significance in relation to the trouble-spots of Tadjikistan and Transcaucasia. In 1992, some CIS states concluded agreements on the use of peace keeping forces. At the CIS Summit in February 1995, however, there was as yet no agreement on the proposal, advocated in particular by Russia, to set up a system of joint control and surveillance of the CIS's external borders.

Russia was keen that its claim to be virtually the sole guarantor of security and stability in the erstwhile Soviet region should receive the blessing of the CSCE.

As a result the Alliance, the Council of Ministers of the CSCE, meeting in Rome at the beginning of December 1993, showed itself more or less willing for Russia, using 'peace keeping forces', to intervene de facto on its own in former Soviet Republics.

Strategy for Russia – A Response:

As mentioned already a group of analyst and specialist representing a school of thought had come into existence on the question of Russian foreign policy. Since they represented a sizeable opinion in Russia, we shall consider their views especially on NATO and its eastward expansion. The complete departure from Soviet conduct in international affairs and the ambition to forge 'a strategic partnership', both economically and militarily with the United States was emphasized by President Yeltsin. In his address to the United Nations at the beginning of 1992, he stated that Russia regarded the Western countries as 'allies'. Such perceptions found some practical expression in an agreement reached at the June 1992 Russian-American Summit in Washington 'to work together along with the allies and other interested states to develop a concept for a global protection attack. The policy changes was particularly evident in Russia's approach to the newly independent countries of the region – the 'near abroad' in current Russian parlance and in the assertion of 'special rights' in that area. The more assertive stance in the 'near abroad' has intimately been connected with the issue of military bases; part of the settlement of the conflict in Georgia in November 1993 was the legislation of the presence of 20,000

Russian troops at three major bases in Georgia, with no date set for their withdrawal. Russia also gained the right to use the Black Sea naval base of Poti. In April 1994, President Yeltsin approved a Russian defence ministry plan to create military bases in other CIS countries and Latvia 'for the security of those states and for the testing of new weaponry and military bases by the alleged need to protect the rights of the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation.

The law on defence adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet in February 1993 ordered the military to cut the overall strength of the armed forces by nearly half to 1.5 million. However, in December 1993, Defence Minister Grachev announced that the figure decreed by the now defunct parliament was far too low and that Russia needed a force totalling 2.1 million officers and men. Yeltsin had raised soldiers salaries and pensions, exempted them from income tax, paid high-profile visits to military bases and scaled back plan for converting factories from defence to civilian production.

The Russian military repositioned forces returning from central and eastern Europe along the country's northern and southern flanks. The redevelopment at present exceeds ceilings scheduled to take effect in 1995 under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. An overall strategic concept to re-establish greater military power at Russia's flanks Georgia and Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Russia had made more stringent attempts at maintaining its military- industrial research, design and production capacity by increasing arms exports. Advocates of a return to 'great power' policies have claimed that the military-industrial complex, despite all the evident disruptions was the only sector of the economy. In a shift that may have negative strategic implications for Russia itself, Moscow has stepped up shipments of substantial amounts of military high technology to China, including missile guidance systems, S-300 surface to air missiles and SU-27 fighters.

In 1993 and early 1994, as part and parcel of the shift away from Atlanticism, the Russian government revised its attitude towards NATO. In November 1993, a widely publicised Foreign Intelligence Service characterized NATO as the biggest military grouping in the world that possesses an enormous offensive potential'. It called the alliance an organization wedded 'to the stereotypes of bloc thinking. It also charged that NATO wanted to remain a defensive alliance rather than embark on the 'creation of a mechanism for the support of international security'. The intelligence services preference was clear of a system of collective security that would somehow range between NATO on the one hand and the CSCE and the United Nations on the other.⁹

⁹ ITAR-TASS, 5 January, 1994.

The authors of the study were emphatic in their opposition to membership of NATO for Central and East European countries. Furthermore, President 'Yeltsin's press spokesman reacting to Lithuania's official request for membership of NATO, even warned that the expansion of NATO into areas in 'direct proximity to the Russian borders would lead to a 'military political destabilization in the region'', and in respect of its possible participation in the Partnership of Peace (PFP), Russia's stance was characterized by indecisiveness and ambiguity, and replete with contradictory statements.¹⁰

The crux of the matter was that Russia wanted a 'special status' in any security arrangement in Europe that would reflect its 'position in world and European affairs' and its military might and nuclear status. It was only in response to political pressure exerted by the opposition, notably by vociferous hard-line factions in the Congress of People's Deputies, that a draft document, 'concerning the Basic Points of the concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation', was submitted to and discussed by the parliamentary foreign affairs committee in February 1992. The draft document was amended and resubmitted without major changes and with detailed explanatory notes, to the committee in April. It was approved in October 1992 and published in early 1993. In competition with the Foreign Ministry, the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy a group of influential political leaders, administrators,

¹⁰ Lloyd, John, "Russian Government in State of Disarray", Financial Times, 8 April, 1994.

diplomats, military officers and foreign policy experts, established upon Karaganov's initiative – in August 1992 issued a foreign policy concept of its own, entitled '*Strategy for Russia*'. This effort in turn was superseded by an even more authoritative document than that of the foreign ministry or the CFDP – the 'Basic Principles' of a Foreign Policy concept of the Russian Federation agreed upon by all the major institutions directly involved in Russian Foreign policy-making, including the foreign ministry for foreign economic relations, and on defence and security. Yury Skokov, the then Secretary of the Defence council, had over-all responsibility for drafting the document.

There are several noteworthy features that distinguish the defence council's document (and also the CFDP's '*Strategy for Russia*') from the foreign ministry's concept. First, the document displayed a greater sense of self-confidence. It claimed that Russia despite the crisis which it is experiencing, remains one of the great powers because of its potential as well as its influence on the course of world events. Second, it enumerated among the developments that would threaten Russia's vital interests 'infringement of the 'integrity of the Russian Federation' obstruction of integration processes in the CLS', violation of human rights and freedoms'; and military conflicts in neighbouring countries'. Third, it reversed the relative priorities accorded to the United States and Europe, focussing less on the American orientation and more on

Europe, advocating close cooperation with western Europe and pointing the desirability of re-establishing Russian influence in central and eastern Europe.

Finally, the document declared Russia's relationship with the countries of the former Soviet Union to be of crucial importance, on the grounds that Russia itself could not develop normally if the post-Soviet geopolitical house were not put in order. The document also advocated the further development of a 'peace creating mechanism in the framework of a new integration with the participation of Russia and on the basis of a mandate by the UN or the CSCE'.

President Yeltsin declared that 'Policy considerations in relation to other CIS countries would have priority'. Foreign Minister Kozyrev also reiterated that but the only ideology the foreign ministry should follow is the defence of Russia's interests and Russia's security. The record of Russia's foreign policy even in the period from the second half of 1992 was mixed. Russia did indeed in several instances act unilaterally, apply military-political pressures and intervention as if its has a *droit de regard* in the former Soviet Union, but even in that period, the overall character of Russia's external policies was not one of restoration of empire with abandonment of cooperation with the west. To turn to specific policy issues, Russia has played a largely successful role in preventing the proliferation of the Soviet Union's huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. After the disintegration of the USSR, Moscow declared itself

responsible for the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy. By July 1992, it had completed the transfer of all tactical nuclear weapons without a single accident.

In January 1994 Russia was one of the signatories to the Trilateral Agreement, providing for the transfer of Ukraine strategic warheads to Russia, thereby opening the way to the ratification and implementation of the severe cuts in strategic nuclear weapons pursuant to the START II agreement. As for Russia request for a revision of the treaty limits for equipment at the flanks, there is undeniable instability in the Caucasus, both north and south of the Russian border. In the north, the Kaliningrad region was gaining in importance now. However, the CFE flank limits included equipment in both the north Causasus and Leningrad military districts, thereby constraining possible Russian redeployments in both geographical areas.

Notwithstanding all the right wing ranting and raving about the pernicious 'role of NATO, the official opposition to membership of the Visegrad countries in the Atlantic Alliance and the declared preference for all-European institutions such as the CSCE, the Russian government entered a formal partnership with NATO in June 1994, acceding to the partnership for peace programme. The appointment of deputy foreign minister Vitaly Churkin as liaison official lend weight to the idea that Russia is intent on cooperating with NATO in a constructive spirit rather than attempting to play. "Russia", Foreign Minister Kozyrev said in Brussels, "stands by its choice of principle – the carrying out

of national and state interests – through cooperation rather than confrontation”.¹¹

The defence ministry and the Duma Committee for Defence had supported defence allocations amounting to 55 trillion roubles – a sum testifying to significant self restraint by the armed forces lobby since, allowing for inflation, this would have amounted to the same level of defence expenditures as in 1993. Yeltsin, Chernomydin and the Federation Council had supported this figure. The spending authority ultimately approved by the Duma, however, was only 40.6 trillion roubles. Equally important for an assessment of trends concentrating the likely use of military power for foreign policy purposes is the fact that, whereas the share of operating costs in the total budget in the period from 1989 to 1994 more than doubled. The share of procurement was cut in half (From 42.2% to 20.8%) and that of research and development by more than two-thirds (From 19.8% to 6%). Such trends bode ill for an effective modernization of the Russian armed forces.

Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov firmly stated Russia’s principled position on the problem: “NATO expansion eastward is unacceptable to Russia”. The Russian Federation Minister of Defence set forth his vision of the ‘sore spots’ that the future expansion of NATO threatens to create. First, the military

¹¹ Daniel Williams, “Russia Signs on with NATO in Peace Alliance”, International Herald Tribune, 23 June, 1994.

strategic equilibrium in Europe would be upset as a result of the de facto undermining of a number of international accords in the field of arms limitations. If new states were to join NATO, this would strengthen NATO's ground, air and naval forces, the basic indices of their combat potential would grow by 15% to 20%. **Second**, Igor Rodionov noted, even if one takes into account the revision of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe, the ratio of armed forces and armaments on the continent certainly will not be in Russia's favour. For all practical purposes, the zone of reduced concentration of armed forces and armaments – the “buffer zone” that has formed along the line of contact between NATO and Russia and has served the risk that armed conflicts will breakout.

Third, the deployment of other countries' armed forces in the new territories would objectively make it possible to deploy tactical nuclear weapons there too and prepare them for combat use. The Russian Minister of Defence pointed out that at that point of time Russia was just beginning to withdraw its troops from the countries of Eastern Europe.

Russia regards the aforementioned risk factor and the possible threat to its national interests and its security as a challenge from the West. So, it would be forced to take the necessary measures to meet this challenge. The measures Russia might take in responses.

Russia's Attitude to the Partnership Programme and the US Shift Towards Eastward Enlargement:

From the foregoing it was clear that Russia was unanimously opposed to the eastward expansion of NATO as it posed a threat to its security interests. The differences among Russians were on the degree of this threat and how to meet this challenge. In the following section we briefly survey the structures of NATO and Russian attitude to them.

Soviet Union which came to play a super power role in just after the II World WAR had to face unexpected developments in the late 1980s. The fast changing international political changes and the dismal performance of communist regime as an alternative system made Russia vulnerable. All of a sudden Russians political and military alliances began to collapse like a house of cards.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact created a security vacuum in central Europe. The disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in a thinly defended zone between Russia which was still powerful. The problem was compounded by the fact that the countries in the zone were now without military allies. The difficulty is that they seemed to have no clue to the kind of security policy they needed – a policy politically feasible, military credible and financially sustainable". But the developments in Russia particularly in Chechnya have drawn NATO's attention on the situation there. In the view of NATO's

member states integration of the states of former Soviet Union into North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) would ensure the “European architecture of security”. Accordingly, the European states fear a “security vacuum in the intermediate zone” between Russia and NATO. They feel abandoned in the approaches to NATO together with countries from which a threat to their stability could enhance.

At the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Lisbon Summit 1992, Russia worked against NATO eastward expansion and Moscow also urged revised Conventional Forces in Europe Pact. Russian diplomacy considered one of its main tasks to be preventing the meetings document from unconditionally approving an increase in the number of members of the North Atlantic Alliance through the admission of Central and East European countries and on the other hand trying to continue moving in the direction of transforming the OSCE into a full fledged all European organisation with its own legal base.

With respect to the latter goal, Russia received some support from France which agreed that it was necessary for the Lisbon meeting to issue a mandate for the drafting of a character of all European security. Great Britain and the US, were opposed to this position from the outset. But the Federal Republics of Germany held the view that the creation of a legal base for the OSCE would benefit the organisations activity.

Viktor Chernomyrdin former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation reaffirmed Russia's viewpoint concerning the plans for NATO expansion. He said: "we have clearly stated and continue to state our firm opposition to the plans to move the North Atlantic Alliance and its military infrastructure closer to our territory".¹²

The Russian Prime Minister agreed that Russia does not have the right to veto expansion of the alliance. At the same time, no one has the right to prevent Russia from defending its national interests.

During a meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers in December 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev delivered a speech couched in aggressive language and asserting Russia's right to maintain its sphere of influence in Europe, later explaining that it was intended to demonstrate how policy could change should a nationalist regime come to power in the Kremlin. President Yeltsin subsequently began to speak of Russia's security responsibilities throughout the whole former Soviet Union while Moscow indicated that it would prefer to have UN or CSCE sanction for any peacekeeping operation which it decided to undertake, it was clear that it did not regard this as a precondition for action during a visit to Seoul in November 1992, the Russian President repeatedly

¹² Chernomyrdin Viktor speaking at the Lisbon Summit Meeting as reported by Mikhail Karpov in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol. XLVII, NO. 49 (1996.)

declared that Russia was turning its attention to Asia and Pacific. One western author complained of the striking absence of any interest in European affairs on the part of the top of the Russian foreign policy hierarchy.

Later Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov reiterated Russia's opposition to NATO's eastward expansion and its right to take counter measures in the event of such an expansion. NATO's assurances of special relations with Russia would be judged by the organisations' readiness to consider Russia's proposals for modifying the CFE treaty. The readiness of the NATO members to take into account Russian concern at the talks on adjusting the CFE treaty these are the channels through which Russia and other members can agree on the most reliable material guarantees for mutual security in Europe. This is the measure of the seriousness of NATO's proposal on building special relations with Russia.

If Russia had succeeded in reaching an agreement on issue of modernizing the CFE treaty, Russian concerns about the possibility of the advancement of the NATO military infrastructure would have been dispelled.

The prospect of NATO expansion to the east is undoubtedly unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security. It was pointed out that NATO's eastward expansion would create threat of a new spirit in the continent which could be extremely dangerous given the preservation in

Europe of mobile strike grouping of troops and nuclear weapons and also the inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace.” In fact Russia wanted to develop multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace and security at the global level through the United Nations and at the regional level through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to Russia, NATO is not an organization that takes decisions objectively on the ways of maintenance of peace and security in a conflict situation.

Moreover, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and in the post-Cold War period, it was widely felt that NATO has lost its *raison d'être*. In the course of a highly productive summit at Washington on June 16-17, 1992. President Bush and Yeltsin concluded agreements on Most Favoured Nation Trade status and a major extension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) concluded at Moscow in July 1991. Under the START-II accord, each nation would be limited to 3,000-3500 long range weapons (Down from 11,000-12,000 on the eve of START-II), while all land based multiple warhead missile would be banned. In November 1992 the Supreme Soviet ratified the 1991 START I accord with the United States, although an exchange of ratification documents was deferred until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreement had been reached on the disposition of nuclear arms in their possession as a result of the USSR's demise. (Under a protocol to START I signed in Lisbon in May 1992, the three

ex-Soviet Republics had agreed that Russia should be the sole nuclear power in the CIS). By late 1993 Belarus and Kazakhstan had completed these procedures, with Ukraine acceding to the NPT in December 1994, after having guaranteed in return for surrendering its nuclear arsenal under an agreement signed at Moscow on January 14, 1994, between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton and Ukraine President Kravchuk.

The rapid transformation of Russia's external relations was highlighted on June 22, 1994 when Russia acceded in principle to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program for former Soviet-bloc and neutral European states and on June 24, 1994, Kozyrev eventually signed a new partnership and cooperation agreement with the European Union. President Yeltsin attended part of the G-7 Summit at Naples, Italy, with the confirmation that Russia would be a full participant in the "political" sessions of future summits and on May 31, 1995, Russia signed two detailed PFP agreements with NATO, but Russia continued to oppose to any eastward expansion of alliance.

The 'Partnership for Peace' started out simply as a diplomatic device but was taken in hand by the NATO authorities to become more than initially intended, that is a " vehicle for enlargement".

The Partnership for Peace proposal was designed to increase direct military contacts between the east and the west, thus making the central and east

European states feel more secure without alienating Russia by direct NATO expansion. PFP was in fact touted as a precursor to membership. The alliance Partnership for Peace initiative and the outcome to the current debate on the organisation's future enlargement are intended to help overcome old division Europe. Yet some segments of opinion in Russia fear that it will lead to the country's isolation, a view that was robustly refuted by NATO's Secretary-General Willy Claes when he emphasized that Russia was too big a country to be isolated by others, it could only isolate by itself.

The creation of the PFP was a western manoeuvre. The Central & East European Countries concerned about the promise of the partnership to prepare candidate for future membership. The Polish Minister of Defence Piotr Kolodziejczyk drew on the proclamation of the partnership to further the country's interests in NATO membership: " We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East" Poland undertook the partnership as "the best route towards its goal to full integration in the alliance".¹³

The Russian leadership was keen on building bridges between Russia and the West, especially the USA, for not only securing economic cooperation with the West but also to conclude nuclear arms control agreements. While the

¹³ Piotr Kolodziejczyk, 'Poland – A Future NATO Ally'. NATO Review, 42, No.5, 1994, 21 April, 1999.

economic relations began to improve haltingly, US President George Bush and President Yeltsin signed the treaty on further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, popularly known as START-II, in Moscow on January 3, 1993. It was the most sweeping nuclear arms reduction treaty in history but is yet to be ratified by the Russian Parliament (the National Duma) which is dominated by communists and nationalists who are against START-II because it undermines Russian security interests.

While the Russians were generally suspicious of the ulterior designs of the US, fearing that they would be against Russian national interests, the ruling Russian leadership was leaning towards the US. In such political scene, when in January 1994, the PFP framework document was published and the Partnership for Peace was actually launched, the anti-NATO campaign began to intensify in Russia. The PFP was the first step in the direction of the expansion of NATO.

The PFP was the first step in the direction of the expansion of NATO. Though Russia was reluctant to join the PFP it was persuaded to do so. Now 44 countries (including NATO) are members of the PFP. They include all the former Republics, all the former members of the Warsaw Pact, only two former Yugoslav Republics, Slovenia and Macedonia and Albania, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. In other words, the US led NATO can conduct military exercise with not only European countries but with the former central Asian

Republics of the Soviet Union also. No doubt, the Russian leadership was unhappy with such an arrangement but it became a reality and Moscow could not check it because all those who joined the PFP were sovereign, independent countries. Apparently, Moscow considered that such a development was not favourable to its own eminent position in the region and it would help the former Soviet Republics to move closer to the US. It may also be considered as a set back to the Russian led collective security arrangement with a majority of the former Soviet Republics.

Once the PFP was formalised, the issue of NATO expansion was raised by the US. The immediate reaction of Russia on the issue of NATO expansion was hostile but the Russian leadership could not oppose the proposal with conviction perhaps because of the economic and military weakness of the country and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower. Moreover, there was a lack of consensus on the issue within the government as was evident from various statements made by the Russian leaders. The Russian Security Council Chief, Ivan Rybkin, said that Russia become a member of NATO. The Russian Defence Minister, General Pavel Grachev, warned that counter measures would be taken if NATO expanded too quickly. Almost at the same time, the pro-west Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, cautioned against the danger of the rush to expand NATO by bringing in former communist countries of eastern Europe. But a few days later, on May 31, 1995, he signed two cooperation agreement with NATO which he had refused to sign

earlier in December 1994, pending classification of plans to expand NATO, though he maintained that Russia still opposed eastward expansion by the alliance.¹⁴ President Yeltsin himself was also not consistent in his opposition to the enlargement of NATO. The PFP initiative has altered the very character of the NATO alliance. In certain quarters it was believed that Russia was led into a “trap” to endorse the NATO expansion. In fact, Russian leaders sent mixed signals to the west about their opposition to the expansion of NATO eastward. Russia maintained that the expanded NATO would pose a threat to its national security and it vigorously opposed to deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet allies, yet it would not oppose the enlargement of the alliance if the expansion was done slowly and no nuclear weapons were deployed on the territory of the new members of NATO. Taking a cue from the vacillating position of the Russian leaders on the issue of NATO, Chancellor Kohl during his visit to Moscow in February 1996, reportedly expressed his endorsement on postponing the issue for a long time and avoid talking about it at the moment.¹⁵ However, the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, insisted that since NATO had made a commitment to take new members, it would not keep the new democracies waiting for ever and on the other, he declared that any decision on the enlargement would be deferred until after the Russian Presidential elections scheduled for June.¹⁶ That was indeed a clever

¹⁴ See Kessing's Record of World Events, Vol.42, Reference Supplement, 1996, pp. R210 and R150.

¹⁵ Ibid. Vol.42, No.2, February 1996, p.40960.

¹⁶ Kessing's Record of World Events, No.3, March 1996, p.41026, see also p.41016.

move taken by the US.

In the meantime, Russia announced on April 2, 1996, that Russia and Belarus would form a community of Sovereign Republics (CSR).¹⁷ Apparently Moscow wanted to convey a message to the west that there was a move on unity amongst some of the former Soviet Republics and that a strong grouping of countries would emerge to challenge the expanded NATO. The West viewed it merely as a declaration in response to the move against the expansion of NATO and felt that such a grouping would not enhance in anyway the military capability of Russia. At the same time, Russia's threat to terminate arms control agreements and deploy nuclear weapons on new sites failed to dampen the west determination to expand NATO eastward.

On the heels of the announcement of the signing of the Union Treaty between Russia and Belarus, President Yeltsin along with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, announced a new "strategic partnership between the two countries, spanning economic and security ties and intended to last into the 21st century". The Presidents joint communiqué included an implied complaint against the USA and the West in general that "hegemonism, power politics and repeated impositions of pressures on other countries have continued to occur". Yeltsin offered his unequivocal support for China's claims on Taiwan and Tibet. In response, China not only recognised Russia's position over Chechnya but also

described as “impermissible” the eastern expansion of NATO. It may be recalled that previously China had left NATO issues to the parties involved. At the same time, Jiang backed Russia’s wish to admission to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) body.¹⁸

The West was neither disturbed by the move of Russia to bring the former Soviet Republics together nor intimidated by growing Sino-Russian strategic cooperation.

Paris - Founding

The main hurdle in the process of NATO expansion was removed when in Paris on May 27, 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of the 16 NATO countries signed the Founding Act, on mutual relations, cooperation and security. This paved the way for NATO to celebrate its 50th anniversary with the induction of three new members- Hungary, Poland and Czech republic in April 1999, as was unanimously decided by the leaders of NATO in their summit meeting held on July 7-8, 1997 in Madrid.

On the other hand, it must be emphasised that on December 17, 1997, the Russian President approved the text of the national security blueprint of the Russian federation. The Founding Act spoke of the beginning of “a fundamentally new relationship” between Russia and NATO based on a strong

¹⁷ Ibid., No.4, April 1996, p.41062.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.41617.

stable and enduring partnership “developed on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency”. The founding act provided for the establishment of a Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council to discuss issues of common security interests, such as terrorism, nuclear safety and conventional military doctrine and peace keeping operations. It was to be chaired jointly by the NATO-Secretary General, and a Russian representative of one of the NATO members states. The Council was empowered to take decision with which both sides agreed, but it was prohibited from restricting the freedom of action of either side. A US government briefing paper emphasized that while Russia would work closely with NATO, the Act made clear that Russia had no veto over NATO decisions and that NATO retained the right to do so. NATO confirmed that it had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy” nuclear weapons and to establish nuclear sites on the territory of new members. It also assured Russia that it would not station permanently “substantial” numbers of conventional forces “in agreed regions of Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe”. Russia had previously demanded many more assurances, including guarantee that NATO would never deploy or install nuclear weapons, foreign forces or military infrastructure on the territory of any new member state.

imp

The US made clear that it would like to restrict new entrants to three (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), arguing that the process of expansion should not weaken the Alliance. US Secretary of State, Madeliene Albright, said that

admissions should be restricted to “those new democracies that have cleared the highest hurdles of reform and demonstrates that they can meet the full obligations of membership. However, several member states-believed to include Canada, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Supported proposals to include Slovenia and Romania amongst those countries invited to join NATO.

Henry Kissinger argued, immediately after the signing ceremony of the NATO-Russia Foundation Act in Paris in May 1997: The so called founding Act seeks to reconcile Russia by diluting the Atlantic Alliance into a UN style system of collective security.¹⁹

The Madrid NATO Summit in July 1997 was the beginning of the end of the divisions created at Yalta. While Russia, continues to look suspiciously at NATO’s eastward expansion, Romania Slovakia and Slovenia are impatiently knocking at the doors of NATO for an early entry and the Baltic countries and Bulgaria are queuing up close behind. In order to allay Russian fears about the intentions behind NATO’s eastward role, a joint NATO’s eastward roll, a joint NATO-Russian council was created in 1997 to enable Russia to scrutinize, but not veto, NATO policy. NATO has also undertaken to desist from deploying nuclear weapons and combat units on the territory of its three new members states. Moscow has said that a ‘red line’ would be crossed if “Ukraine was to

¹⁹ As quoted in Jack Mendelsohn, ‘The NATO-Russian Founding Act’, Arms Control Today, May 1997, p.20.

join the alliance”.²⁰ Fears of NATO creeping close to Russian frontiers make the Russian leaders even more apprehensive because, simultaneously dissent continues to brew within the 12 CIS – the loose grouping of the former Soviet Republics. The tangible negative fall out of NATO’s eastward expansion had been that Russia was forced to reverse its “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons and to modernize its nuclear forces. Also, the Russian Duma is now extremely reluctant to ratify the START II Treaty.

The framework of NATO-Russia cooperation established by the Founding Act is a compromise solution, it is a reasonable quid pro quo which takes into account Russia’s real and even apparent strategic concerns without sacrificing the principle aim of strengthening European security. The clear prospects of NATO enlargement for April 1999 has made Russian policy towards Central Europe even more ambivalent.

From the above developments it was clear that NATO was determined to play a role in international politics, a role that went beyond its original aims when NATO came into existence. The structure of NATO were indeed expanding. Russian security concerns were sought to be met by NATO, only as long as it did not conflict with its new aims.

In the next chapter we shall discuss NATO’s new doctrine and its implications for Russian security.

²⁰ Russia Resigned to NATO membership for Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic”, Times of India, March 12, 1999.

Chapter IV

NATO's New Doctrine and its Implications for Russian Security

In an unprecedented move the heads of states or government of the 16 members countries of NATO, meeting in Madrid, Spain on 8-9 July 1997 invited three member of the former communists Warsaw Pact to join the alliance. NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join NATO as full members in April 1999. The announcement was described by Solana as a 'defining moment' in the organization's 48 year history.¹ Declaring that an "opendoor" would be kept available to future members, Solana specially named Slovenia, Romania and the three Baltic states as strong candidates for the future membership. France and other Mediterranean members had supported proposal for Romania and Slovenia to be included in the first wave of expansion, however they had been opposed by USA and UK. French President Jacques Chirac declared himself 'relatively satisfied with the compromise, but stated that France would continue to press for the 'rebalancing' of responsibilities "both in the military structure and in the political decision-making process of NATO.

Despite signing the Foundation Act in May 1997 which had paved the way for NATO's eastward expansion, Russia denounced the membership invitations to

¹ Keesings Record of World Events News Digest for July 1997, Vol.43, No.7/8, p.41756.

its three former Warsaw Pact allies. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov stated that “we still consider expansion the biggest mistake in Europe since the end of the World War II”.² On July 9, 1997, NATO signed a security pact with Ukraine giving the former Soviet Republic the right to call for consultation with NATO if it felt threatened. President Clinton visited Romania on July 1997 in an attempt to dissipate disappointment in the country over its first wave and said in Bucharest that the door is open”.

Eager to join NATO, the Central European states were not in a position to impose conditions on the alliance.³ Genna Tarasov, an official spokesman for the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, considered the policy of expanding the alliance to be wrong, the decision made in Madrid did not square with the task of creating a single security space in the Euro-Atlantic region, a space within which equal security for all states would be guaranteed.

NATO expansion will do more to create new problems than it will to solve existing ones. The terms on which the East European ‘troika’ are admitted to NATO are not yet known and, to a large extent, the states from Eastern Europe will themselves pay for membership in the military bloc, both literally and figuratively. As President Bill Clinton had said, NATO membership will not be

² Ibid., p.41757.

³ Mercedes, Margarita Balmaceda, “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: the Role of Central Europe in Ukraine Security”. East European Quarterly, XXXII, No.3, Fall, 1998, p.338.

a free gift for the East European countries.

NATO wants whole world to play by its rules. On April 24, 1999, the participants in the North Atlantic Summit Alliances (50th Summit), adopted its New Strategic Concept. Under the 1991 concept in effect up until now, NATO armed forces could not be used for purposes other than self-defence. Henceforth, the bloc did not rule out the possibility of conducting military operations outside its border in order to prevent regional and ethnic conflicts and to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

After heated discussion, a clause stating that the UN Security Council bears primary responsibility for international peace and that NATO should seek its approval whenever possible was ultimately included in the final text at the insistence of France. However, the alliance had no intention of giving anyone veto power over its security interests and reserves the right to act its own if approval cannot be obtained. Even though, the final wording proved somewhat milder than what the US had originally proposed, Jacques Chirac considered the mention of the "Euro-Atlantic Area" as NATO's zone of responsibility to be a personal diplomatic victory, it was obvious that the Washington meeting marked the end of the Yalta and Potsdam era. Veto power was the cornerstone of the entire previous international system which guaranteed its stability.

A special reception was held for CIS leaders at NATO's Washington meeting.

Against the backdrop of Russia's boycott of the anniversary celebration, indicating that Russia's influence in the former Soviet Union countries was dissipating.

On the US President's initiative, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, for the first time, met simultaneously with the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, thereby registering the US, growing interests in the region, which the U.S. proclaimed to be its sphere of American interests also. The Americans held a separate meeting with the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the settlement of the Karabakh problem.

The apotheosis of the overseas "CIS Summit" was a meeting of five presidents at the Uzbek Embassy in Washington on April 24, 1999. The leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova signed a declaration on transforming the association known as GUUAM, into G8+5 group. The space extending from Chisinau in Moldova to Tashkent in Uzbekistan was linked by the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), which sought to recreate the silk route. It appears that the stated objectives of the new Eurasia Five was political.

The leaders of the G8+5 group held a special meeting within the framework of the NATO summit. The meeting formalised the admission to the organization of Uzbekistan, which until then had had observer status in it. The

Presidents of these five countries agreed to coordinate their positions on security issues in the post-Soviet space and on resolving various conflicts. As a result, the Ukraine President, at a meeting of Euro-Atlantic cooperation council, supported Edvard Shevardnadze's proposal that a peace enforcement operation be conducted in Abkhazia.

In addition, it was emphasized once again that the five states take a common position on the issue of flank limits on conventional weapons in Europe. Consequently, GUUAM is being transformed from a consultative forum on regional economic cooperation into a political organization that will henceforth deal with issues of military security as well.

Russia took notice of the fact that the GUUAM declaration made no mention at all of the CIS, while it did express its desire for integration into processes of European and Euro-Atlantic co-operation. These attempts by GUUAM countries to chart an independent course in foreign policy was not likely to be appreciated by Russia. This was so especially because such moves had a bearing on Russian security interests. Sergei Karaganov Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy said that Russia will be forced to make adjustments in its foreign policy and military doctrine and to drastically reassess its relations with certain CIS states that have in effect made a choice in favour of NATO. One of the most Western-oriented politicians in Moscow, Gregory Yavlinski, argued in February 1996, during the Moscow visit of US

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, that “the only people in Russia who favour NATO expansion are the generals who want to see a return of the cold war”.⁴ This again illustrates how deep the feeling of suspicion and humiliation runs in Russia’s strategic circles vis-à-vis NATO enlargement.⁵

NATO’s Eastward Expansion:

Russian opposition to NATO’s expansion is by now well known. Russian reaction was getting strident gradually. Anatoly Chubias, head of staff to President Boris Yeltsin, and an influential leader then called on NATO to head the Russian government misgivings over the issue. Chubias warned that “NATO enlargement would inevitably lead to a new dividing line across the whole of Europe. It would be the biggest policy mistake made in western policy for 50 years”.⁶ He said that the enlargement of NATO would leave Russia as the West only conceivable external enemy, thereby changing the “whole political landscape” and forcing Russia to rethink its own external policy.⁷ He said that enlargement would only be tolerable to Russia, if a binding friendship treaty were to be signed.⁸ Such a treaty should prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of former Warsaw Pact countries,

⁴ Wall Street Journal, Europe, 21-22 February, 1997.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Kessing’s Record of World Events News Digest for February, Vol.43, No.2, 1997, p.41521.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

and ban the construction of NATO bases in those countries.⁹ He had also suggested that it would have to be ready for signature before the NATO summit in July 1997 and be subsequently ratified by the legislatures of all existing member states.¹⁰

On February 18-21, 1997, US Secretary of State, Medeliene Albright met with Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, in Moscow and sought to assuage Russian misgivings by proposing to limit NATO's military potential and its forces close to the Russian border.¹¹ She also put forward proposals for a joint NATO-Russian brigade for peacekeeping and crisis management missions. Albright later said that "important progress", had been made on the question of a NATO-Russian charter, but added that "complex questions" needed to be resolved.¹² Primakov's assessment, however, was that "we are still negatively disposed".¹³

Sergei Karaganov warned against NATO expansion plans for it meant a potential new Yalta arrangement.

Russia's agreement to enter into talks with NATO should be assessed as a

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

common victory. Reports from Moscow only irritated and confused NATO officials. At the same time they felt that the aggression was coming from the people who are not very influential and that the situation inside the Kremlin was changing in the face of very simple but irreversible circumstances. In fact, only in a nightmare could the Moscow 'doctrinaires' ever have dreamed that the Polish Sejm would some day be in a position to ratify a treaty between Russia and NATO. Yet a non-constructive, hardline on Moscow's part would lead in the end to its having a 'legally binding' document, it would have to be ratified by the parliaments of all the members-countries, including the newly chosen ones. From all indications, the last straw was the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit meeting in 1997, in Lisbon, at which Russia maintained a perimeter defence together with its only ally – Belarus. After Lisbon, it was obvious that Russia's agreement or disagreement with NATO expansion eastward was its internal affairs. US President Bill Clinton and his opposition to NATO's further expansion was obvious. As mentioned already in the earlier chapter on March 21, 1997, President Clinton and President Yeltsin unveiled a deal under which Russia agreed to sign a document defining its relationship with NATO. A joint statement declared that the "NATO-Russian relationship should provide for consultation, coordination, and to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, joint decision making and action on security issues of common concern". Russia won a pledge that nuclear weapons would not be stationed in new member states, although President Yeltsin dropped the demand that the document

should be legally binding. Instead it was agreed that the document would be “an enduring commitment at the highest political level”.¹⁴

Russia was promised an enhanced role in the G-7 group of industrialised countries, and it was agreed that the forthcoming G-7 summit would be called the “the summit of the eight”. President Clinton agreed to support Russia’s applications for membership of the Paris Club of creditors countries in 1997 and the WTO in 1998,

The new members were expected to accept all NATO obligations, to act in the spirit of consensus within the Alliance, commit themselves to the rules of democracy, respect for international law and rights of ethnic minorities, civilian control over the armed forces and the resources to commit to the joint defence of Allied territory. Future NATO members must particularly prove themselves willing and be able to cooperate fully within the Alliance machinery which is based upon consensus decision making and a shared political and military commitment. Since, the signing of the protocols of accessions to NATO in December 1997, the three candidate countries have been closely involved in the North Atlantic Council deliberations and would be able to demonstrate their readiness to join the European security community.

The Helsinki American-Russian Summit of March 1997 prepared much of the

¹⁴ Ibid.

ground work for the eventual compromise embodied in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO's opening up for three new members would bring the membership up from 16 to 19 and draw a new boundary in Europe which some are already calling the "golden curtain" opposed the former "iron curtain" which had divided the countries during cold war.

Admission of New Members:

Former Warsaw Pact members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were formally admitted to NATO on March 12, 1999, in a ceremony at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, USA. The site was significant in that it was the location of the speech delivered by US President Harry Truman at the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949, and, for accession of Spain in 1982. A statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry deplored the advance of NATO's borders towards Russian territory, saying that the expansion worked against trust and stability in international relations.

Collective defence remains the core purpose of NATO enlargement and is a part of a broader strategy of projecting stability and working together with partners to build an united and free Europe. The ongoing enlargement process strengthens the Alliance and enhances the security and stability of the Euro-

Atlantic region.¹⁵ The three new members will not be the last.¹⁶ Those nations that have expressed an interest in becoming NATO members will remain under active consideration for future membership. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic locations, each being considered on its own merits.¹⁷ All states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.¹⁸ Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security of all Allies.¹⁹

NATO's New Strategic Concept:

On the final day of the Fiftieth Anniversary Summit of NATO's Alliance at Washington on April,23-25 1999; Heads of State and Government of the Alliance approved the new "Strategic Concept" that embraces, for the first time, 'military missions in volatile regions' beyond their borders.²⁰ NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, termed the new 'strategic concept' as a road map to navigate the security challenges of the next millennium. President Bill Clinton reaffirmed the readiness to address regional and ethnic conflicts

¹⁵ NATO Review – Documentation, Summer, 1999. P.D.1.

¹⁶ Ibid., P.D3.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

beyond the territory of NATO members. The new strategic concept also states that members can act against 'out of area problem that threaten the security and stability of Europe'.²¹ At the Summit meeting they also decided to intensify the ariel bombardment of Yugoslavia, and to enforce an oil embargo. NATO's Naval fleet would forcibly search ships on the Adriatic sea carrying fuel to Serbain ports. While NATO's leaders have publicly gone along with their US host at the summit, particularly in view of the need for public solidarity in the face of the crisis in Kosovo, European diplomats, especially those from France and Germany, have for some time been expressing concern about what they label a US tendency to push too hard for NATO to become involved in the missions outside continental Europe. Many Eastern diplomats have been "insisting that there be an identifiable link to NATO's own security before any such ('out of area') mission can be launched."²² Its threat to impose a naval "oil and economic blockade" on Yugoslavia and to launch a ground offensive, is violative of several international laws and treaties and also of the NATO charter itself. The cost of intervention is reported to have exceeded the US \$ 100 billion mark, without achieving tangible progress in resolving the ethnic Albanian crisis in Kosovo province.

²⁰ Quoted in Wade Boese, "NATO Unveils 'Strategic Concept' at 50th Anniversary Summit", Arms Control Today, Vol.29, No.3, April/May, 1999, p.40.

²¹ Ramesh Chandran, "NATO Widens Scope for Intervention", Times of India, April 26, 1999.

²² Colin Clark, "As Summit Looms, Allies Grapple with Role, Spending", Defence News, April 12, 1999.

The NATO intervention has also forced Russia to “strengthen its defences, revise its military doctrines and rethink its ties with Western countries if NATO launches a ground war against Yugoslavia”. Russia has also vowed to defy the NATO oil embargo. The possibilities of a NATO-Russia stand off are inherent in these developments.

NATO’s strategic concept aims to make the alliance larger and military more capable and flexible. The “new NATO” has refashioned its basic structures. It now looks at crisis response operations, peace enforcement and “humanitarian” intervention. Territorial defence and preparing for a coalition war no longer primary. With the disappearance of the main threat upon which it was based, the traditional mission of collective defence had to be revised or the alliance would wither away.

The new focus has made NATO step outside its traditional area. Bosnia and Kosovo are two examples. Self-defence no longer seems to be the issues for NATO. Through NATO’s strategic concept, the U.S. indeed has recognised the need for a European defence identity but within NATO. NATO believes it has the power to influence the design of a European defence identity so that its interests are not unduly affected.

Implications of a New Strategic Concept on Russian Security:

The air strikes against Yugoslavia and the oil embargo on it have placed

Russian ties with its traditional ally under strain. Russian policy towards Yugoslavia has been the subject of debate within the Duma as well as outside it. Over the bombardment of Yugoslavia, the Russian State Duma and Federation Council have considered the state of Russia's Armed forces on several occasions. The condition of the country's nuclear technical complex was discussed at a special Security Council session on April 27, 1999. The lower house of Parliament has adopted a special resolution asking the Russian President to call a meeting of the Security Council in order to reconsider certain provisions of the country's military doctrine, analyze the progress of military reforms and settle the federal budgets debts to the armed forces. The cabinet of ministers has been asked to set funding for national defence in the 2000 budget at no less than 3.5% of gross domestic product. Deputies were drafting a law that would provide additional funding for the armed forces. In light of projected inflation, a total of at least 10 billion Rubles would be spent on defense needs. The money would be used primarily to procure weapons and military equipment and to fund research and development. All this change has been largely prompted by the changed strategic concept of the NATO approved last year.

Despite the problems involved in funding and supplying the troops, the military districts and fleets have organized and are conducting military maneuvers on a scale unprecedented in post-Soviet history. They involve not only army and navy staff formations and units but also other forces wielding structures as well as

the armed forces of other Commonwealth countries.

Russia's military and military-technical cooperation with Belarus and Armenia is developing. Steps taken to strengthen air defence forces in the Transcaucasus have bolstered Russia's position in that region. It is significant that Armenia is demanding no payment for the stationing of Russian troops there. Russian and Armenian units are carrying out combat training in close coordination and using common training facilities.

Russia's defensive alliance with Minsk is also being reinforced, as evidenced by the numerous treaties and agreements that have been signed, and that set forth the two Slavic countries joint steps to establish a single defence space.

During a visit to Belarus by Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, plans were made to establish a unified regional group of forces on the territory of the two states and to work out command and control principles for the group, as well as procedures for the planning, stockpiling maintenance and use of operational supplies for it. The groups make up was not disclosed but it is known that the group will be stationed in the Moscow Military District and at military garrisons in the Republic of Belarus. It was decided that the Moscow Military district and the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus will henceforth hold exercises simultaneously with the two countries staffs and forces working in close co-operation. The two countries' air defence forces will

also synchronize their exercises. These exercises will involve not only Belarus and Russia but also Armenia, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan.

Military ties between Russia and Ukraine have also been stepped up. Kuzmuk and Russian Defence Minister officials have discussed issues pertaining to broader military and military-technical cooperation in light of the situation in the Balkans. It is in this light that we should view cooperation between the Russian Black Sea fleet and Ukrainian Navy; both stationed at Sevastopol. They organized and conducted their round of military maneuvers on land and at sea on April 19-28, 1999. Although the exercises were not held under a common scenario, the fleets worked together and jointly rehearsed certain missions relating to collective defence and combat and logistical support for military operations.

It appears that CIS countries are learning certain lessons from the Balkan crisis and are beginning to pool efforts to augment their defence potential. NATO's aggressive policies have demonstrated the need to accelerate the creation of a Union of state of Belarus and Russia. It is often interpreted that in Yugoslavia, NATO is fighting not only against the Serbs, but against the entire Slavic and the orthodox world. Many observers feel that the US, which initiated the air strikes against Yugoslavia and backs the Albanian separatists, has interests in weakening Europe; creating a so-called Muslim "arc of instability", eliminating European markets, and undermining the strength of the all-European currency.

The current situation demands that Russia take forceful, determined steps-that it provide immediate military assistance to Yugoslavia and create a union of the three Slavic states as soon as possible. Only in such a union can states safeguard their own security and ensure stability in Europe.²³ All the twist and turns of the Kosovo crisis left the Russian and NATO members with a deep distrust of each other, a distrust that will be manifested at every step.

NATO air strikes against the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia at the end of March 1999 had come as a shock to many in Russia. The use of force without the express sanction of a United Nations Security Council resolution, devalued not only the Russian veto right but also the former superpower's actual international weight.

The Impact of Kosovo Crisis:

Kosovo, a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had an increase of Western sympathy and support for ethnic Albanians and hostility towards the leadership of Yugoslavia, which reached a climax on March 24, 1999 with NATO's launch of airstrikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The airstrikes were terminated 11 weeks later, after intense diplomatic activity on the part of leading NATO members and Russia.

The adoption of NATO's new strategic concept at the Washington Summit a

²³ The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No.15, 1999.

month later, and the alliances stated willingness to intervene anywhere in Europe to uphold stability and human rights raised dark suspicions about where NATO might strike next, perhaps even closer to Russia's borders. Such suspicions were only strengthened when, while Russia declined the invitation to attend the Washington Summit, the leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (G8+5) chose to attend and decided to use the US capital as the venue for a meeting among themselves.

Former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydin's diplomacy, which helped end the crisis, was never popular among the Russian elites. Desperate for a say in a final settlement for Kosovo, the Russian military made a surprise dash for Pristina's airport with 200 of its paratroopers, who were based in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of SFOR (Stabilization Force). This intended show of strength, however, ultimately exposed the Russian military's weakness.

By the end of 1999, Russia-NATO relations had not fully recovered from the blow dealt by Kosovo. The world partnership was no longer mentioned, cooperation and dialogue were still limited to the two ongoing peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, stabilisation force (SFOR) and keeping force (KFOR). Interaction between Russian and NATO peacekeepers in both cases was generally good, but that is not enough to built the momentum needed to

restore a full relationship.²⁴

The international implications of the Kosovo crisis are that a prolongation of the NATO's presence in Kosovo may affect NATO-Russia relations. Hence, a restructuring of the international order is required.

Russia views the NATO's strategic expansion in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe as a confrontation act.²⁵ In Kosovo, NATO has, under the supervision of the US, effectively bypassed the United Nations Security Council two permanent council members. Russia and China had been vociferously criticizing NATO's proposal to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav leadership was forced to regard Chernomyrdin's statement as Moscow's official position and, after agonizing reflection, advised the parliament to approve the proposed peace plan. ✓

The plan coordinated with the American military experts specified tasks that the Yugoslav People's Army units would perform. The strength of the Yugoslav forces allowed to remain was to be determined by each sector commander on the basis of the actual situation in his zone of responsibility.

Russia's firm initial stance gave the world community hope that the aggression

²⁴ Trenin, Dmitri. "Russia-NATO Relations: Time of Pick up the Pieces", NATO Review, Spring- Summer, 2000, Vol.48, p.19.

²⁵ Frontline, 26 March, 1999, p.51.

would be decisively rebuffed. The damage to Russia's international reputation is calculable. Appeasing the aggressor is a sure way to spur it to launch other predatory wars. There can be no doubt that Russia could possibly be the next target of NATO's policies. Russia will also lose the last vestiges of its status as a significant player both in international relations, including the 'near abroad' and on the territory of the Russian Federation itself. Consequently, it is clear to all realistic analysts and politicians that the US must be stopped in Yugoslavia not out of love for Milosovic and the communists, and not even love for the Serbs and Yugoslavia but because this is in Russia's own self-interest, since after a successful operation in Yugoslavia the US and NATO "will wipe their feet on Russia".²⁶

Thus, we find that in the events that unfolded in Europe Russian role was basically reactive. It either had to back NATO's policies or remain on the sidelines. Russia's initial backing for NATO has gradually given way to hostility. This is understandable since NATO's expansion has left Russia with a sense of vulnerability while Russia will have to improve its economy and overcome its deficiencies till then, Russian military strength will have to be given priority and augmented. Meanwhile Russia will have to augment its political and diplomatic tools so that NATO remains a friendly and a co-operative organization as far as Russia is concerned.

²⁶ Migranyan, Andranik, "What Russian Authorities Irresponsibility in the Foreign Policy Realm will lead to". *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, April 28, 1990, p.1 as translated in the *Current Digest Post Soviet Press*, Vol.51, No.20 (1999), p.12.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

The focus of the present study is to understand and analyse Russian security concerns and its response to NATO's eastward expansion. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 led many analysts and scholars to believe that the Security scenario in Europe would undergo a fundamental change. The Russian leadership believed that with the disappearance of the ideological divide, they would be accepted as natural partners by the west. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had not been disbanded its objectives and aims would hence forward focus not on military security matters but on political goals. This firm belief gradually gave way as the NATO showed its inclination not only to be dissolved but to be expanded. NATO ministers of Foreign affairs adopted the strategy of Partnership for Peace (PFP) with countries of the former eastern bloc and other CSCE participating states prior to extending membership states.

Many in Russia perceived that the PFP was regarded as constituting a first step in the expansion of a hostile military alliance right up to Russia door step. There was also concern in Russia that the PFP could be conceived as a counter weight to Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It would encourage the

post communist states on Russia borders to look westward rather than eastward for their security. Despite these apprehensions NATO and Russia concluded a founding Act in May 1997, Inaugurating a NATO-Russia permanent Joint council with the agreement that NATO would militarily forestall any Russian to interfere in NATO decisions about third countries. However, it was agreed to consult and co-operate with each other and even undertake common action potentially leading to a strategic partnership. The alliances' original effort to reach out to Russia was deeply influenced by the need to provide assurance that NATO enlargement was not directed against it, without giving Moscow a say in NATO's decision- "a voice but not a veto".

In Russia, however the perceptions of the leaders of the political parties and the majority of the popularly elected state Duma Deputies were hostile to, NATO's inclusion of former Warsaw pact countries into their fold and were certainly against the admission of former Soviet Republics. The opposition to NATO's further expansion had the support of all sections of society - media, military, Parliamentarians etc. But the difference among them lies in the nature of Russian response to this development . Military approach was whether Russia should deal with the development in a similar military fashion or handle it at the political level. Given Russia's economic situation the response had to be political in nature, at least for the present. Nevertheless, the Russian Government has firmly opposed

the extension of NATO in every possible manner. In Russia, the possibility that NATO's eastern boundary was seen as a potential and at times as real threat.

The prospects through NATO's new strategic doctrine adopted at the Washington Summit of NATO leaders in April 1999 has recognised the need for a European defence identity but within NATO. In the process of isolating Russia. NATO believes it has the power to influence the design of a European defence identity so that its interests are not currently affected. Using smaller European allies despite excluding them from the decision making loop during their campaign against Yugoslavia. It is obvious that the Washington meeting marks the end of the Yalta and Potsdam era at the expense of United Nation (UN). The UN is its current from essentially becomes irrelevant.

On the eve of NATO's Fiftieth anniversary by admitting Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic into its fold, the attempt was to encircle Russia's South-Western Periphery. In Russian perception. Russia feels isolated in Europe and its security concerns are causing anxiety. Peace and Security in Europe will depend not on NATO's expansion or on marginalising it in European affairs but on a friendly and cooperative Russia. Its constructive engagement is fundamental to the emerging new European security order especially Russian views on current security issues such as Bosnia, Kosovo and future problematic issues in Europe.

While Russia economy presently is in a weak condition, nevertheless Russia has the potential to emerge as power in its own right.. Russia is a nuclear, militarily powerful country and has abundant rich raw materials. However, for the present Russian Security interest vis-a-vis NATO will continue to cause anxiety to Russian decision makers. The recent declaration of Russian and China signed during President Putin's visit against America's National Missile Defense system (NMDS) amply evinces President Putin's desire to find out solution to meet Russia's security needs. In the world of accelerated economic activities propelled by information technology and multinational capital whether Putin's astute diplomacy would yield the desired results or not. Only the future can tell us.

Select Bibliography

1. Primary Sources:

President Boris Yeltsin's yearly statement of the Union address to the Nation as translated in the current Digest of the post Soviet Press.

Statements and speeches of Russian leaders and official release as reported in the Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, Summary of World Broadcast and Foreign Broadcasting and Information Service.

Statement of Victor Chernomyrdin in Lisbon Summit meeting as reported by Mikhail Karpov in the Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press. Vol. XLVIII. No. 49, 1996

Important speeches and Declarations of Russian leaders and government on Foreign Policy during 1997-99.

Statement by UN secretary-general Kofi Anan on NATO, Brussels, 28 January, 1999.

Statement by the NATO secretary-general on Exercise Determined Falcon", 13 June 1998.

Statement by the NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana on the ACTIOD, 30 October 1998.

Statement made by the NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana the 50th Anniversary Summit of NATO's Alliance at Washington on April 23-25, 1999.

NATO Review - (Documentation on Washington Summit) Summer, 1999, Vol. 47, No. 2.

2. Secondary Sources:

A. Books

Banks, Arthur S. and Muller Thomas C. "Political Handbook of the World: 1998" CSA Publications Binghamton University, New York, 1998, pp.768-769.

Bowker, Mikes. Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. Dartmouth Publishing Company, England, USA, 1997.

Bredow, Wilfred Von., Jager, Thomas; and Kummel, Gerhard., ed. European Security, MacMillan Press Ltd., Hampshire, London, 1997.

Brundyn, Yitzhak, M. "Reinventing Russia", Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, 1998.

Chafter, Glenn; Spritas, Michael and Frankel Benjamin eds. "The Origins of National Interests", Frank CASS, London, 1999, p.198-234.

Dawisha, A.I., and Dawisha, K., (eds.) "The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia", Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

Dawisha, K. and Parrott, B., Russia and the States of Eurasia: The Politics of upheaval, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Dick, Charles. The Military Doctrine of the Russia Federation. (Cambridge, UK: Royal Military College, Spandhurst Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1993).

Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Fourth Edition, Europa Publications Limited, United Kingdom, 1998.

Faringdon, Hugh., Strategic Geography: NATO the Warsaw Pact and the Super Power. Routledge, London, 1989.

Feld, Werner J., & Wildgen, John. NATO and the Atlantic Defence Perceptions and Illusions. Praeger, New York, 1982.

- Galeotti, Mark. "Age of Anxiety: Security and Politics in Soviet and Post Soviet Russia", Longman London, 1995.
- Gormley, Dennis M. "Double Zero and Soviet Military Strategy Implications for Western Security", Jones Publishing Company Ltd., UK, 1988.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail. S. "A Time For Peace" Richyardon and Steirman, New York 1985.
- Grundzinski, Przemyslaw and Ham, Peter Van, "A Critical Approach to European Security Identity and Institutions", Pinter, London, New York, 1999.
- Henderson, Sir Nicholas, The Birth of NATO, Weidenfield and Nicolson London, 1982.
- Jones, Christopher D., "Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact", Praeger Publishers, New York, USA, 1981.
- Kanet, Roger E. & Alexandra V. Kozhemiakin. eds. "Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation", Macmillan, London, 1997.
- Kokoshin, Andrei A; "Soviet Strategic thoughts 1917-1991," The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London England
- Kuzio, Taras, "Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence", Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1994.
- Lebedev, Nikolai, "The USSR in World Politics", Progress Publishers Moscow, 1980.
- Ljubiroje Acimovic, "Problem of Security and cooperation in Europe" Sijthoff and Noordhoff, USA, 1981.
- Lucas, Michael R. The Western Alliance after INF Lynne Reinner Publishers, Boulder & London, 1990.
- Maciccolm, Neil, Russia and Europe: The End of confrontation? Binter Publishers, London, New York for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994.

- Malcolm, Neil, Soviet Policy Perspective on Western Europe.. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Routledge, London, 1989.
- Meyer, Berthold. NATO Enlargement: Path to Unity or to a New Division of Europe. Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt (RPRIF Report), No.38, June 1995.
- Moreton, Edwina and Segal, Gerald, eds., "Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe", George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., London (UK), 1984.
- Morrison, James W., NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Alignments National Defence University Me Nair Paper 40, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), Washington D.C.
- Mouritzen, Hans, ed., Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects For Europe's Baltic Rim, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., England, 1998.
- Neumann, Iver B., 'Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations', Routledge, London, 1996.
- Nogee, Joseph L. and Mitchell, R. Judson. "Russian Politics: The Struggle for a New Order", Allyn and Bacon, London, 1997.
- Orenstein, Harold Str. Evolution of Soviet Operational Art. 1927-1991, in 2 Vols. Harol S. Orienstein, London. Frank Cass, 995.
- Perrot, Michel de, European Security: Nuclear or Conventional Defence, Pergamom Press Ltd. Headington Hill Hall, Oxford England, 1984.
- Pridhan, Geoffrey and Vanhanen, Tatu eds., "Democratization in Eastern Europe Domestic and International Perspective", Routledge, New York, London, 1994.
- Sharpe, M.E., The OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, England, 1996.
- Solomon, Gerald B. The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997, The Washington Papers/174, CSIS, Prager, New York, 1998.
- The Europa World Yearbook 1999. Europa Publications Limited, (UK) 1999.

The Europa World Yearbook. 2000, Europa Publications Limited, (UK) 2000.

Valder Jonathan C., "Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

Zakaria, Fareed, ed., "The New Shape of World Politics", Foreign Affairs, New York, 1997.

B. Articles

Atlantic Treaty Association 40th General Assembly. NATO on Track for the 21st Century, Conference Report.

"October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues", Pravda, November 3, 1987, as cited in Thomas, Cynkin, "Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe", Survival, Vol.30, No.5, July/August 1988, pp.310-331.

Adomeit, Hannes, "Russia as a great power in World Affairs: Images and Reality", International Affairs, vol. 7 1, no. 1 (1 995).

Ahmad, Eqbal, "Why NATO has Failed", Frontline, May 7, 1999.

Balmaceda, Margarita Mercedes, "Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: The Role of Central Europe in Ukraine Security", East European Quarterly, XXXII, No.3, Fall, 1998, pp.335-357.

Baranovsky, Vladimir, " Post-Soviet Conflict heritage and risks" SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (Oxford: OUP 1993) pp. 131-158.

Black, J.L., "Russia and NATO Expansion Eastward", International Journal, Vol. LIV, no.2, Spring 1999.

Blackburn Robin, "Kosovo: The War of NATO Expansion" New Left Review, 235m 1999 (May-June).

Borawski, John, "Partnership for Peace and beyond", International Affairs, Vol.7, no.2, April 1995

Calleo, David, "NATO Enlargement as a problem for Security in Europe" New Left Review, 234, March-April, 1994.

- Caplan, Richard, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo" International Affairs, 74:4, 1998.
- Cherian, John, "Kosovo on the Edge", Frontline, January 29, 1999.
- _____. "Standing up to NATO", Frontline, June 18, 1999.
- Chittaranjan, Kalpana, "Abolish Nuclear Weapons and NATO's New Strategic Concept", Strategic Analysis, December 1999, Vol.XXIII, No.9, pp.1561-1575.
- _____, "Start II: Stalemated over NATO plans", Strategic Analysis, April 1997, pp. 166-170.
- Cooper, Julian. "The Military Expenditure of the USSR and the Russian Federation, 1987-97" SIPRI Yearbook 1998, pp.243-259.
- Cornish, Paul, "European Security: The End of Architecture and the new NATO", International Affairs, vol.72, no.4, October 1996.
- Deger, Saadet, "World Military Expenditure", 1990, pp. 160-176.
- Ferm, Ragnhild. "Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements", SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: OUP 1996) pp. 769-786.
- Fierke, K.M., "Dialogues of Maneuver and Entangled" NATO, Russia and the CEECS" Millinium: Journal of International Studies, 1999, ISSN 0305-8298, Vol.28, No.1, pp.27-52.
- Gowan, Peter, "NATO powers and the Balkan tragedy", New Left Review, 234, March-April, 1994.
- Grachev Andrei "Give NATO an Enemy" New Times, February 1999; 52-54
- Griffiths, Franklyn, "From situations of Weakness: Foreign Policy of the New Russia", International Journal, Vol.XLIX, no.4, Autumn 1994.
- Griffiths, Stephen Ewan. "The Implementation of the INF Treaty". SIPRI Yearbook 1990(Oxford: OUP 1990) pp. 443-458.
- Haglund, David G., "Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths and Policy dilemmas", International Journal, Autumn, 1995.

- Haksar, A.N.D., "Kosovo Crisis: Prospects and Retrospect", Aakrosh, July, Vol.2, No.4, pp.23-30.
- Hogland, Jim and Dichl, Jackson., "Warsaw Pact Makes a New Arms Offer", International Herald Tribune, 12 November, 1987.
- Hoppe, HJans-Jaochim, "Russia's Balkan Policy", Aussen Politik, 1198
- Howard, Michael. "The Gorbachev Challenge and the Defence of the West", Survival, Vol.30, No.6, November/December 1988, pp.483-492.
- Jain, Rajendra K., "European Security after the Cold War" Vol.31, no.4, Sage Publication, New Delhi, 1994.
- Judah, Tim, "Kosovo's Road to War", Survival, Vol.41, No.2, Summer, 1999
- Kalyanaraman, S. "NATO in the Balkan Tangle" World Focus 20 (3), March 1999, 18-21.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet, "The New World Order: An Appraisal-I", Strategic Analysis, June 1999, Vol.XIII, No.3, pp.345-370.
- _____. Kanwal, Gurmeet, "The New World Order: An Appraisal-II", Strategic Analysis, July 1999, Vol. XXIII, No.4, pp.531-562.
- Kissinger., Henry A., "A Plan for Europe", Newsweek, June 19, 1990.
- _____. "Towards a Trans-European Commonwealth of Free Nation", International Herald Tribune, March 8, 1990.
- _____. "Be realistic about Russia" Washington Post, 25 January, 1994
- Kozyrev, Andrei V. "Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe", NATO Review, August 1994, Vo.42, No.4, pp.3-6.
- _____. "The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance", NATO Review, February, 1993, Vol.41, No.1, pp.3-6.

Laan, Luc van der, "NATO-Russia Cooperation in Air Defence", NATO Review, Spring, 1999, Vol.27, No.1.

Lachowski, Zelzislaw, "Foreign Military presence in the OSCE Area", SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: OUP 1996) pp. 745-752.

_____. Conventional Arms Control and Security Cooperation in Europe. SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: OUP 1996) ,pp. 709-739.

Lansford, Tom, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security after the Cold War", The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.22, No.1, March, 1999.

Marantz, Paul, "Neither Adversaries nor Partners: Russia and the west Search for a New Relationship", International Journal, Vol.XLIX, Autumn 1994.

McCausland, Jeffrey D. Conventional Arms Control and European Security. Adelphi Paper, 301, pp.3-64.

Mike, Jackson. "KFOR: The Inside Story". Rusi Journal London (UK), Vol.145, No.1, Feb 13-18.

Muller, Derek, Perovic Jeronim and Wenger Andreas, "The New Approach to Russian Security in the Context of the Program for Change", Aussen Politik, 1/98.

NATO's New Strategic Concept, Mainstream, July 17, 1999, pp.11-15.

Nelson, "NATO: Use only in Moderation", Review of International Affairs, 47(1039-40) 1996, pp. 32-36.

Okamura, Minoru, "Welfare Effects of Disarmament on the United States Under NATO and the Warsaw Pact", Review of Economics and Statistics, 78 (2), May 1996, pp.277-295.

Pande, Savita, "Scope for Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central and Eastern Europe", Strategic Analysis, October 1998, Vol.XXII, No.7, pp.963-974.

Peel, Quentine, "Gorbachev Plans Sweeping Unilateral Arms Reduction", Financial Times, December 8, 1988.

- Peterson, Jan, "NATO's Next Strategic Concept", NATO Review, Summer 1998, Vol.46, No.2, pp.18-21.
- Pick, Otto, "The Demise of the Warsaw Pact" NATO Review, April, 1991, Vol.39, No.2, pp.12-16.
- Political Handbook Year 1998, pp.764-776.
- Pravda, Alex, "Russia and European Security: The Delicate Balance", NATO Review, May 1995, pp.19-24.
- Primakov, Yevgeny, "Global Scene: European Security and NATO expansion: the Russian Perspective" Mainstream, May 17, 1997, pp. 23-26.
- Retfield, Adam Daniels, "Europe the Transition to Inclusive Security", SIPRI Yearbook 1988, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.141-184.
- Rodionov, Colonel General Igor, "Russia and NATO: After Bergen" Moscow News, October 3-9, 1996.
- Rohald D. Asmus, "Washington is Right to prepare expansion of NATO" International Herald Tribune, December 30, 1994.
- _____. "Building a New NATO", Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3.
- Rossengarten, Ulrich, "The Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", Aussenpolitik 1/98, pp. 32-39.
- Roychoudhury, Rajyasi, "NATO's Eastward Expansion an Institutional Challenge", Strategic Analysis, April 1995, pp.73-89.
- Royen, Christoph, "Ten Questions concerning Russia's Opposition to NATO's enlargement," Perspective, 6/7, 1996, pp. 47-49.
- Rudolf, Peter, "The USA and NATO Enlargement", Aussen Politik, IV/96.
- Ruehl Lothar, "European Security and NATO's Eastward Expansion", Aussen Politik, Vol.44, No.2, 1994.
- Ruhle, Michael, "Taking Another look at NATO's Role in European Security", NATO Review, Vol.46, No.4, 1998.

- Russia and NATO: Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, Published in Neravisimaya Gazeta, June 21, 1995 in FBIS Central Eurasia, June 23, 1995.
- Selikow, Philip, "NATO Expansion Was not Ruled Out", International Herald Tribune, July 6, 1995.
- Simon, Jeffery, "Does Eastern Europe belong in NATO", Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1993.
- Singh, Vanita, "NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia: The Test of Western Credibility", Mainstream, 37 (22), 22 May, 1999, 15-23.
- Sokov, Nikolai, "A New Cold War? Reflections of a Russian Diplomat" International Journal, Vol. XLIX, Autumn, 1994.
- Solana, Javier., "The Washington Summit: NATO Steps Boldly into the 21st Century", NATO Review, Spring, 1999, Vol.47, No.1, pp.3-6.
- Solomon, Congressman Gerald B., "Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO Enlargement", Orbis, Spring, 1997, p. 220.
- Tolbott, Strobe. "Why NATO should grow", New York Review of Books, 10 August, 1995, pp. 27-30.
- Tertrais Bruno. Nuclear Policies in Europe. Adelphi Paper, 327, pp.35-54.
- Udoenko, Hennadiy, "European Stability and NATO Enlargement Ukraine Perspectives", NATO Review, 43 (16), pp.15-28.
- Velichkin, Alexander, "NATO as Seen through the Eyes of the Russian Press", NATO Review, March 1993, Vol.43, No.2, pp.20-23.
- Venturoni, Admiral Guido, "The Washington Summit Initiatives: Giving NATO the "Tools" to do its Jobs in the Next Century", NATO Review, Autumn, 1999, Vol.47, No.3, pp.8-11.
- Wayhe Wichard, "NATO focus new challenge", Aussen Politik, Vol.44, No.2.
- Weller, Marc "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo", International Affairs, Vol.75, No.2, April 1999.

Wetting, Gerhard, "NATO, Russia and European Security After the Cold war", Aussen Politik, 1198.

Wijik, Rob de, "Towards a New Political Strategy for NATO", NATO Review, Summer, 1998, Vol.46, No.2, pp.14-18.

Williams, David and Smith, R. Jeffrey, "NATO Inching Towards East", International Herald Tribune.

Yost, David, S. The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, Adelphi Paper, 326, 1999, pp.13-34.

C. JOURNALS

Aakrosh (New Delhi).

Australian Journal of International Affairs (Australia).

Contemporary International Relations (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, China.)

Current History. (A Journal of contemporary World Affairs). Philadelphia.

Economic and Political Weekly. (Mumbai India)

Frontline (Chennai, India).

International Affairs (USA)

International Security (MIT Press, Cambridge.)

International Studies (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

International Studies Reviews (USA).

Janis Defence Weekly (UK)

Journal of International Affairs (Columbia University) New York.

Mainstream (New Delhi).

New Times (News Times Journalist), Moscow Monthly Digest of Russian Weekly.

Review of International Studies (Cambridge University Press, New York).

Russian Post-Soviet Geography

Rusi Journal (Journal of the Royal United Institute for Defence Studies, London, UK.)

Strategic Analysis (New Delhi)

The week (Tokyo.)

The Economist (London.)

World Affairs (Switzerland.)

D. Newspapers & Newsletters

Arms Control Today (A Publication of the Arms Control Association, Washington, D.C. published monthly).

Current Digest Post-Soviet Press (Ohio).

Defence News Springfield, (USA).

Foreign Report (Published by Jam's Information Group, UK).

International Herald Tribune (Paris)

New York Times (New York.)

Newsletter from Russia (Moscow)

Summary of World Broadcast (USSR)

The Guardian (London)

The Hindu (New Delhi)

The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

The Times (London)

The World Today (London). The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London.)