

**NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DAYTON PEACE PROCESS**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

KOUSHIK MUKHERJEE

**CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY,
NEW DELHI - 110067**

1999



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067

Centre for Studies in Diplomacy,
International Law and Economics.
School of International Studies.

21 July 1999

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled: "NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DAYTON PEACE PROCESS", submitted by **KOUSHIK MUKHERJEE** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University and this is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. PUSHPESH PANT

CHAIRPERSON

V.K.H. JAMBHOLKAR

SUPERVISOR

*Dedicated to
Bapi & Maa
For their love, faith and confidence*

CONTENTS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
<i>Preface</i>	i - ii
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	iii - iv
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1 - 30
CHAPTER 2 BOSNIAN CONFLICT AND THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS PRIOR TO THE DAYTON ACCORD	31 - 63
CHAPTER 3 DAYTON PEACE ACCORD AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION: AN ANALYSIS	64 - 111
CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION	112 - 119
BIBLIOGRAPHY	120 - 140
APPENDIX	141 - 147
MAPS	148 - 149

PERFACE

Conflict Resolution is a key concept in understanding global conflicts, its mediation and the outcome. The ethnic strife in former Yugoslavia has posed many questions for the general belief of so called peace and prosperity in Europe. This conflict has managed to evade all solutions and has kept on raging since years. A check was put on this conflict with the signing of the American mediated Dayton Accord. This work will try to analyse in stages, if the means used in resolving this conflict, take a page out of the Conflict Resolution concept and if so has it been successful. This work has tried to achieve this by looking at various activities and the efforts put into resolving this conflict by the warring parties, various regional and international organisations and countries like USA, the success or failure of their outcomes and the reasons for the success or failures.

This study has also tried to analyse if third party involvement has proved helpful in resolving the conflict. and to see if the Accord has brought about an escalation or de-escalation in violence. This study has tried to look in to the Accord and analyse its success or failure from its implementation point of view and to assess what other changes are necessary for a better outcome.

The first chapter acts as an introduction to the conflict and provides a short history of the area to have a better understanding of the conflict. It looks into the conflict resolution theory, the various warring parties, involved and their desires, the mediating parties, and tries to provide an overview of their mediation efforts through the years.

The second chapter carries out a detailed follow up of the negotiations from the time the conflict flared to its culmination just short of the signing of the Dayton Accord. It has tried to do this by looking at the negotiations through the years and the key proposals and counter-proposals by the various parties. It has tried to show the progress of negotiations using the various proposals of the mediating parties and their resultant.

The third chapter deals with the negotiations immediately prior to and leading to the Dayton Accord, the negotiations during the Accord and an indepth analysis of the Implementation of the Dayton Accord and its outcomes, clause by clause. This chapter finally ends by giving a general analysis of the entire Accord and the points on which the mediating parties failed to come up to the mark.

The concluding chapter tries to provide a broad view of the pit falls to be avoided during future negotiations and the various tenets to be taken into consideration before embarking on such a task.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In writing this dissertation, my esteemed Supervisor V.K.H. JAMBHOLKAR has been a source of constant and steady guidance. His help has proved invaluable without which this work would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank Prof. PUSPESH PANT the Chairperson, and Dr. VIMALAK RAO who have been lavish with their support and encouragement.

I would like to express my sincerest thanks and gratitude to my parents for their love and affection and for patiently indulging my fancies.

I also wish to thank my brothers and sister, Sonna, Tumpa and Jhumadi who have borne with me and extended their unflinching support over the years.

I would like to give a special thanks to Soni for her love and understanding, for standing by me and for always being there as an inspiration.

*Thanks are due to the library Staffs of Jawaharlal Nehru University,
Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis and American Centre Library, New
Delhi for their assistance.*

*I would also like to thank my friends, D.D. Bhai, Raju da, Bobby
Bhai, Bibhuti, Kabby, Girija, Ravi and Dillip Bhai and all others for their
help and excellent company.*

*Finally I would like to thank Birender, Manoj and Pushkar who went
beyond the call of duty in typing and word processing and needless to say any
errors or short comings are entirely my own.*

New Delhi
21 July 1999

Koushik Mukherjee
KOUSHIK MUKHERJEE

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The sudden rise of conflict situations all over the globe has made it necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the process of conflict resolution and negotiation. Conflicts in Europe during the 1990's have attracted more attention from diplomats and researchers than the ones in other parts of the world. If we are to understand the violent breakdown of a European country at the end of the twentieth century, when state frameworks in this continent at least seemed generally secure, we must go beyond simple explanations. The need for an approach which brings out the intricacy and many-sidedness of the political, social and economic dynamics of the situation is palpable. In this situation comes in the concept of Conflict Resolution and its use in resolving the conflict. To understand this crisis and to have a comprehensive picture of the process of mediation efforts carried out to resolve the crisis we need to have an idea of the concept of Conflict Resolution.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY

Any attempt to 'map' the field(s) of conflict and conflict resolution becomes more than an intellectual exercise as one contemplates conflict where the parties seem more intent on continuing and escalating their violence and destruction than in taking advantage of efforts by various third parties.¹

¹ Dennis, J.D. Sandole, and Hugo Vander Merwe (ed.), *Conflict Resolution theory and practice: Integration and Application* (Manchester). Manchester University Press, 1993. p.3.

Conflict Resolution is a recent concept. It is still not part of any consensual understanding. Indeed, the terms disputes and conflict are used interchangeably, as are settlement and resolution. Disputes involve negotiable interests, while 'conflicts' are concerned with issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised. Accordingly 'settlement' refers to negotiated or arbitrated outcomes of conflict situation that must satisfy the inherent needs of all.² The procedures to be used for conflict resolution then are:

- a) First there must be a careful analysis of parties and issues.
- b) Second it is necessary to bring those two or more parties whose relationships are most affected into a facilitated interactive situation in which relationships are analyzed in depth. Other parties and issues are dealt with in due course in the same way. At this stage no proposals are entertained, nor is there any bargaining or negotiation. When there is an agreed definition of the problem and a full assessment of the costs of existing policies based on a knowledge of responses to the denial of human needs, there can be exploration of positive options.³

Before we move into the conflict resolution process we need to look into the structure of the conflict, processes of conflict, influences on conflict behaviour and the broader contexts for conflict.

Ibid., p.55.

Ibid., p.59.

Structure of the Conflict

The structure of conflict refers to the sources of differences among individuals or groups. Three sources or types of conflict have been of importance, interests, understanding and ideology or beliefs. A conflict of interest is a discrepancy in preferred outcomes to self and other and is often manifest in a competition for tangible resources or rewards. The extreme case of conflict is when one sides gains are directly proportional to another's losses, referred to as zero-sum outcomes. The opposite is when the gains are equal for both, referred to as positive-sum outcomes. Most situations can, however be depicted to lie between these extremes where there are elements of both competition and cooperation, referred to as mixed motive. Larger the potential discrepancy in outcomes, the more the conflict is viewed as being intense or competitive and the more difficult it is to resolve through bargaining.⁴

Disagreements between self and others over the best way to accomplish a shared goal is a conflict of understanding or of alternative cognition. Unlike conflicts of interests, the parties agree on the goal or desire the same outcome. Rather than arguing over who should 'get more', the parties argue about how both can 'get more'. The question of interest is how to produce the cognitive change needed to reach agreements.

⁴ Ibid., pp.25-26.

There is little doubt that contrasting ideological perspectives are unresolvable through bargaining. What needs to be understood is the way that difference in ideology interact with interests and understanding in the process of conflict resolution. Conflict of interest linked to differences in ideology are more difficult to resolve than conflicts that do not derive from contrasting ideological orientations and the more polarized the parties in ideological orientation, the more difficult it is to resolve a related conflict of interest. Of interest then, is the question of how to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. One strategy is to 'delink' the ideologies or values from the interests. Another is to explore the differences in values or ideologies in pre-negotiation workshop sessions.⁵ Ideological differences add a competitive dimension to conflicts caused by differences of understanding and the conflict is more difficult to resolve than when the differences were only matters of understanding.

Process of Conflict

The two processes which are of primary importance in conflicts are those of bargaining and debate. The bargaining process is constructed in terms of concession making. The process of debate emphasizes the role of verbal behaviour and persuasion in negotiation. A bargainer's concession strategy is one of several influences on the others concessions; it interacts with such variables as time

⁵ Ibid., p.28.

pressures, the initial offer, perceived relative defensibility of positions, perceived similarly between bargaining opponents, and the pressure of being a representative. But responding to another's moves is unlikely to be automatic as in tit-for-tat. It is a more complex process involving expectations, evaluations and adjustments.

The debate aspects of negotiation are captured by content-analysis codings of the 'give-and-take' exchanges. Content analysis is used to evaluate techniques designed to increase understanding of the others positions in order to produce better outcomes. Another avenue is to use the content-analysis techniques to distinguish between problem-solving and competitive behaviours that occur during the debate, gauging the impact of these behaviours on the outcome, and identifying aspects in the situation that influence the frequency of the one or the other type of rhetoric.

Influences on conflict

By 'influences on conflict' it is meant to distinguish between persons, role and situational variables. The person variable comes into play in (a) situations where negotiators can choose between alternative strategies each leading to the same outcome and (b) situations where certain strategies are particularly salient. Person variables are likely to have less impact on conflict behaviour in the latter situations.

An important concept is the boundary role conflict, which refers to the competing demands made by one's own and other parties as well as the demands

on negotiators made by multiple constituencies and opponents as these align and realign in the context of shifting coalitions in multilateral conferences. Concession making is easier in private but is harder to sell to the constituents.

In situation influences there are many aspects which have their effect on negotiating. Pre-negotiating experience or the way the negotiators prepare for a negotiation has been seen to influence the process and the outcomes. These processes have been conceived as 'workshops' for resolving conflicts without formal negotiations. Communication opportunities or the physical arrangement of parties during negotiation has been seen to contribute to the intensity of the conflict. Separating opponents fosters competitiveness detrimental to achieving outcomes. The use of tactics like commitment casuistry (creating the perception of benefits for the other who has offered a concession), saving face and manipulating concession rates have their effect on the outcomes. Another crucial factor is the offering of incentives to the parties to reach a negotiated outcome. Time pressures or deadlines show powerful end effects - a rush to agreement. They present negotiators with a decision dilemma so that they must choose between getting an agreement or settling for an alternative. Multilateral negotiations are complex, requiring careful monitoring for tracking progress. Similarly, Multi-layered delegations require monitoring as disagreements occur both within and between delegations.

The Context for conflict

By 'context' it means both broad systemic influences and to more immediate interventions in conflict by third parties. Systemic influences are the domestic, regional and international politics surrounding a negotiation. The resolution of conflicts in complex settings turns on the relationship between structures (types of regional systems) and behaviours (soft or hard bargaining) from a competitive style to a cooperative orientation. Third party intervention ranges from traditional mediation or arbitration to problem-solving workshops. This then is the broad outline which would be adopted to analyse the Yugoslav crisis leading to the Dayton accord and to see if it provided the desired outcomes.

THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

The conflict in former Yugoslavia has its roots in the recent, not the distant past. Yugoslavia was constituted in the aftermath of World War-I as a multinational state with six republics - Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These republics were held together as a single entity by Communist rule in the post second world war period and with the collapse of Communism, dissolved the glue that held these republics together. To understand the causes of its disintegration we need to go back to the root of its formation and follow its genesis. The Balkan states have been described as the

"powderkeg"⁶ of Eastern Europe, because of their history, their geographical location and linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural differences. The population consists mainly of Serbs, the Croats the Slovenes, the Macedonians, the Montenegrins and the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Throughout centuries of war and political disruption, all of these groups have sought to maintain separate characters and identities. Most Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians are Orthodox Christians, the Slovenes and Croats are Roman Catholics and the Muslims follow the Islamic religion.

Former Yugoslavia cannot be understood outside the context of a complex approach, 'indeed it cannot be simplified without being distorted out of all recognition'. Only if painstakingly delineated in its historical, cultural, social-anthropological, political and social dynamics, can the narrative take on the forcefulness required to come to grips with the questions which present themselves; not just the why of the disintegration, but the how and especially the why of the extreme violence.⁷

At the outset, it should be stressed that the absence of any meaningful, democratic political culture, of a civil society, of representative political

⁶ *The Bosnian Conflict: US Involvement in the Balkans* (Washington). Congressional Digest, vol.75, February 1996, p.33.

⁷ D.A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (ed.), *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth* (New York). Addison Wesley Longman Publishing, 1996, p.9.

institutions, of democracy, combined with a legacy of 'surreal', unaccountable, instrumental and manipulative Communist politics, in which citizens were intentionally kept away from decision-making processes provided the worst possible basis for democratic transition. The only 'political' expression of a broader sort under the old system was collective and communitarian, in the first place through the Communist Party and as that shell became increasingly void and meaningless and the search for renewed legitimation more and more urgent, through nationalist ideology. Against the background of power struggle among the governing elites for the political, social and economic inheritance of Communist Yugoslavia, the challenge of peaceful, pluralist and democratic transformation proved to be a task beyond the reach of men and women who had come to power mainly through the negative selection patterns of obedience and loyalty to the party hierarchy. Their shared dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia and the distribution of power within it found no rational political expression. It succeeded only in generating a violent, belligerent competition for territories and new boundaries, in which the people in whose names these changes were being advocated suffered enormously.⁸

⁸ Ibid., pp.9-10.

THE WORLD WARS

In 1911, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro formed the Balkan league to try to free Macedonia. This was followed by the first Balkan war, in which the Turks were defeated and left with only a small area of land around Constantinople. In 1913, the Peace of London gave Bulgaria the largest share of the disputed territory, leading to the second Balkan war. The Treaty of Bucharest, in 1913, divided Macedonia among Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria.

In June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was assassinated in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb. This resulted in a declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary and marked the beginning of World War-I. Turkey and Bulgaria joined the central powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary, while Montenegro, Greece and Romania fought with Serbia on the side of the Allies (France, Great Britain, Russia Italy and the United States).

After the war, the break-up of Austria-Hungary made possible the creation of a new Balkan state. In 1918, the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established. In 1929, it was renamed the kingdom of Yugoslavia (meaning South Slavs), and a royal dictatorship was established under king Alexander. The unpopularity of this regime led to an anti Serbian movement among many Croats and other minorities, culminating in Alexander's assassination in 1934. The country continued as a coalition of mutually hostile ethnic groups until 1941 when Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany, Italy and Hungary. The Germans installed

a regime in Croatia under Ante-Pavelic, head of the movement that assassinated king Alexander.

TITO'S GOVERNMENT

A short backgrounder from the time of Tito would make the picture clearer to understand the breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Tito led a small band of Communists and organised a resistance movement to overthrow the Pavelic regime with its violent terrorism against the Serbs and the Muslims. In 1945 Yugoslavia was liberated and the monarchy replaced by the FRY (a federation of the six republics with Tito as President) Though the Serbs remained the dominant population, Tito himself was half Croat and half Slovene. During its initial years Tito modeled his government on the lines of the Soviet Union. Then in 1948 Tito broke with the Soviets and charted his own course, developing relations with the west in course of time.

By the mid-1970s, Yugoslavia had become a highly decentralised Federation in which the constituent republics dominated the central govt. Regional leaderships carefully protected the interests of their territorial constituencies at the expense of other regions and the Federation. The regional leaders shared a common interest in preserving the Communist political order that shielded them from responsibility and popular accountability but little else. For the vast majority of the population, distinct ethnic or national identities continued to command emotional loyalties and

provided the most powerful bases for political mobilisation. The ethnically defined territorial structures of the Yugoslav system reinforced the political strength of ethnic identities and intensified political divisions in the leadership. In this situation only the army remained a unified, all-Yugoslav organisation.⁹

The last straw in the alienation of the ethnic identities happened at the height of the purge in Croatia that President Tito had ordered at the end of 1971, and which formed part of a larger all-Yugoslav crackdown on "liberals" and "technocrats". The purge was particularly harsh in Croatia in the wake of which thousands of Croatians were expelled from the party and lost their posts, with only a few matching losses among the Serb supporters of the "Croatian Spring". Anti-Serbian feeling in Croatia was further fueled by the fact that the deeply unpopular and insecure leaders Tito had installed in Croatia after his crackdown were obliged to rely heavily on the "faithful" Serbian party cadres in the implementation of their repressive policies.¹⁰

One of the most negative long-term effects of Tito's purge was the deepening of mistrust between the majority Croat population and the Serb minority, which destroyed the possibility of reviving the pre-1941 anti-Belgrade

⁹ Steven L. Burg, *Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart*, Current History, vol.92, no.577, November 1993, p.357.

¹⁰ Christopher Cviic, *Croatia's Violent Birth*, Current History, vol.92, no.577, November 1993, p.373.

alliance between Croats and Serbs.¹¹

All this was very well as long as there was the strong presence of Tito's leadership to guide the country, but this same experiment proved detrimental and counter-productive when after Tito's death there was a resurgence in the old hatreds.

However, what little could have been salvaged was not to be so since the decade following Tito's death in 1980 brought economic decline and a resurgence in Serbo-Croat hostilities. The leadership that followed was unable to hold the Federation together and the constitution that required a rotating Presidency, found it extremely hard to reconcile Serbian demands for hegemony with Croatia's and Slovenia's desire for autonomy.¹² This led to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the present round of clashes.

THE INITIAL YEARS

Bosnia's war was the third and the most destructive stage in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Since 1991, the situation has radically altered, particularly since the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and its immediate effect upon the west. In the

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Timothy M. Frye. *Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transition from Non-democratic Rule*. *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.45, no.2, Winter 1992, p.169.

spring of 1990, democratic elections following the collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe brought nationalist and independence-minded governments to power in the western-most republics of Slovenia and Croatia as well as in Serbia. In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. This set off a brief conflict between the Slovenes and the Yugoslav army and a protracted crisis in Croatia between the newly independent government in Croatia and the Serbian minority in Croatia ("Krajina Serbs"), supported by the Yugoslav army. As the war in Croatia continued through late 1991, mobilisation for the conflict in Bosnia had already begin. Serb leaders in Bosnia had very vocally declared their intention to remain within the Yugoslav Federation or seek separation from Bosnia. Serb "autonomous areas", were established in the fall, and a plebiscite was held in Serb areas to demonstrate Serbian opposition to Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia. By early January 1992, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had also begun transferring Bosnian Serbs in the JNA (Yugoslav Army) back to Bosnia in anticipation of hostilities. Meanwhile, Bosnia's President, Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslim led party of Democratic Action (SDA), grew increasingly committed to Bosnian independence. The successful secession of Slovenia and Croatia, recognised by the international community in January 1992, left Bosnia with little choice, remain in a much smaller Yugoslavia which would be overwhelmingly dominated by Serbia and by implication, by its own large Serb minority, or leave the Yugoslav Federation, a prospect that Bosnian Serbs worried

would leave them analogously dominated by Bosnia's Muslim plurality.¹³ In January 1992, while some mediation efforts were on, the European Community after considerable internal debate decided to recognise Croatia and Slovenia's independence. They deferred action on recognising Bosnia-Herzegovina pending a referendum to determine public support for independence. In March 1992, voters in Bosnia overwhelmingly approved independence in a vote boycotted by Bosnian Serbs.

In the event, Bosnia was recognised as an independent state by the European Community in April of 1992, one month after barricades were first raised in Sarajevo city streets, two days after President Izetbegovic ordered a general mobilization of Bosnia's territorial defense forces, and one day after Serb paramilitary forces besieged Sarajevo's police academy and the JNA seized its airport. In short recognition by the EC occurred just as the country was being plunged into war.¹⁴ At same time to compound matters the US also granted recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia and all three were subsequently admitted to the UN in May 1992. Almost immediately the Bosnian Serbs, backed by Serbian controlled Yugoslav army, began forcible resistance to

¹³ Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Making Peace in Bosnia Work*, Cornell International Law Journal, vol.30, 1997, p.790.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp.790-791.

Bosnia's independence. By the end of spring 1992, Bosnian Serbs having significant military superiority, especially in heavy weapons, achieved control over more than 60% of Bosnia's territory.¹⁵ Progressively over the next few years the fighting escalated with many United Nations sanctions being imposed on the warring parties, prominent being the economic sanctions on Serbia. In February 1993, President Clinton at the beginning of his administration named the first US special envoy to the UN-EU joint negotiations, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew. In May 1993, US efforts helped gain parties agreement to the Vance-Owen plan, but the Bosnian Serbs subsequently renounced the accord. The process continued in 1994, and with UN-EU efforts at mediation bogged down the United States decided to undertake more active involvement, seeking to back diplomacy with the threat of NATO air power in protecting safe areas and UN peace-keepers. In March 1994, the US special envoy Ambassador Charles Redman, and other US officials concluded negotiations between Bosnia Muslims and Croats which resulted in a ceasefire, the formation of a bi-communal federation, and improved relations with neighbouring Croatia. This helped the US in further negotiation over the next year and served as the basis for the Dayton Accord.¹⁶

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Bosnia Fact Sheet: Chronology of the Balkan Conflict*. Bureau of Public Affairs, 6 December 1995. (Internet Source)

¹⁶ Ibid.

PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND WHAT THEY DESIRE

The bone of contention in the region has been the presence of Multiple ethnic identities within a single territorial area, primarily composed of Serbs, Croats and Bosnians (Muslims). The initial clash was between the Serbs and the Croats which by late 1993 turned out to be between the victims of Serbian aggression i.e. the Croats and the Muslims. The demands and objectives of the warring parties had remained more or less unchanged right till the signing of the Dayton Accord, and have been summarized below:

1. The Muslims desired a democratic, united, centralised Bosnia-Herzegovina state, which they would dominate through their numerical weight and their faster growth. They also desired that all refugees and displaced persons be allowed to return to their homes and that war criminals be punished.
2. The Serbs wanted no part of any common state with the Muslims and Croats. It was not quite agreed among them whether this implied a completely independent state or one merged with Serbia or Yugoslavia. However, Republika Srpska must have a fully connected territory and be ethnically pure, which meant none of the expelled Muslims and Croats would be allowed to return. The Serbs did not recognise international war crimes prosecution and largely denied guilt for any war crimes.
3. The Croatians were never quite clear. Ostensibly they agreed to a single state; though one that was weak and highly decentralised into three largely

ethnically pure entities. In the long run they probably had the same solution in mind as the Serbs with the Croatian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be either independent (as Herzeg-Bosna) or merged into the republic of Croatia.¹⁷

The anomaly that arises here is that the Serb and Croat communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina both view themselves as "Bosnians", however the government in Sarajevo prefers to call them Serbs and Croats because of their ties to the governments in Zagreb and Belgrade. One way to classify the different parties would be by their allegiances to specific individuals as shown in Table 1.

Table: 1¹⁸

Cultural Group	Party/Faction	Capital/ Headquarters	Army/Forces
Serbs	Yugoslavs	Belgrade	YA
	Bosnian Serbs	Pale	VRS
	Krajina Serbs	Knin	VSK
Croats	Croats	Zagreb	HV
	Bosnian Croat	Mostar	HVO
Muslims	Bosnian Muslim	Sarajevo	HIH
	Abdic Party	Velika Kladusa	PDWB

¹⁷ Paul C. Szasz, *The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement*, Cornell International Law Journal, vol.30, 1997, p.762.

¹⁸ Barbara-Ekwall Uebelhart, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, United Nations Publication, 1996.

In all this the world community had been following a set of aims, expressed at the 1992 London conference; peace, a single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether centralised or federated or almost completely disassociated, no change in Bosnia-Herzegovina's external boundaries, return of refugees and prosecution of war criminals. These aims largely overlapped with those of the Muslims, except that the latter fought for a centralized, majority ruled state, while the world community was willing to settle for some arrangements that would be at least marginally acceptable to the Serbs and Croats even if the resulting structure would consequently be terminally weak and considerably undemocratic.¹⁹

PARTIES INVOLVED IN MEDIATION AND THEIR POLICIES

The United Nations:

The process of negotiation was essentially begun in 1991 by the UN when it started sending in troops for a peace keeping mission and for humanitarian aid. At the end of 1991 UN envoy Cyrus Vance negotiated an end to the fighting in Croatia. In the initial phases of the conflict there was no major involvement by any outside party to mitigate the conflict, only the United Nations (UN) was supplying humanitarian aid. Then to curb the fighting among the warring factions the UN imposed economic sanctions on Serbia in 1992. The UN peace operation in Croatia

¹⁹ Paul C. Szasz, refer Footnote no.17.

and Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the largest and most complete operation ever undertaken by the United Nations. The UN set up an international task force the UNPROFOR to maintain peace. UNPROFOR also tried to mitigate the conflict through negotiated arrangements between the parties, it played an essential role in the implementing of these agreements and in confidence building. Based on these agreements, the UN was called to carry out disarmament and management of arms within certain areas or along ceasefire lines. UNPROFOR's most difficult mission on the ground was to ensure the protection of the civilian population and to deter attacks on certain protected or safe areas.²⁰

The United States of America:


During the era of bipolarity, US policy towards Eastern Europe and the Balkans fell within the frame work of the Cold War. The US acknowledged that the latter two regions were historically within the area of Russian influence, thereby placing them on the periphery of US interests. This view held that the US and USSR sat atop the heads of respective camps and organised the globe into a series of alliances. These alliances were able to 'create an atmosphere of mutual deterrence in relation to vital interests. From this a strategic balance was achieved'. Bipolarity, therefore, did produce an identifiable enemy. This notion collapsed with the disintegration of USSR and the policy had to be reformulated

²⁰ Barbara-Ekwall Uebelhart, refer Footnote no.18, p.4.

quickly to understand the Balkan conflict. The initial US policy towards the Balkan crisis was that of reluctance to be involved in the crisis. This was also helped by the European community's opposition to its involvement in the conflict. The Bush administration's policy on Yugoslavia was constrained by the reservation that it should not cause Gorbachev any additional foreign policy problems. As the conflict in Yugoslavia involved ethnic independence efforts of the kind which were also looming in the Soviet Union a recognition of any national minority rights in the Balkans was out of the question for Washington. Up until the beginning of 1992, the Bush administration took the view that Yugoslavia must retain its single-state status. A second factor for the reluctance of the Bush administration to become involved in the Balkan conflict was the fact that neither the Croats striving for independence under President Franjo Tudjman, whose personal ideas on minority policy in the USA revived memories of the Ustasha regime during the second World War, nor the Serbs, led by President Slobodan Milosevic, who wanted to preserve the state of Yugoslavia and who were viewed as expansionistic, could count on sympathy in the USA".²¹ This stance was made possible, among other things, by the fact that the member states of the European Community (EC), which were negotiating at the time on more extensive political and economic integration, were interested in taking a leading role in the settlement of the conflict in the

²¹ Dusko Doder, *Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds*, Foreign Policy, vol.91, 1993, p.18.
Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, Foreign Affairs, no.74, 1995, p.4.

TH-8006



Balkans. Should European efforts in this context be successful, the USA would be able to stay out of an unpopular conflict. Should the European Community fail - which in the State departments opinion was more likely, it would open the eyes of western Europe to the need for a continued leading role for America in Europe.

The Clinton administration's policy did not quite follow its election rhetoric. It unveiled a "six point action plan" in February 1993. Secretary of State Warren Christopher promised to keep the United States "actively engaged" in search for a solution by: appointing a special envoy to the negotiations (the United States appointed its own negotiator Reginald Bartholomew for the Vance-Owen negotiations who was briefed by Clinton to contribute towards a solution to the conflict favourable to the Muslim side), telling all parties that "the only way to end the conflict is through negotiations". As part of its new policy on Bosnia, the Clinton administration began to airlift supplies to the besieged Bosnian civilian population. It led the United Nations to impose an arms embargo on Serbia and in April 1993 Clinton announced that the United States should assume leadership in the international policy on Bosnia, but that it should not go it alone. It initiated the "lift and strike" option but which was later rejected on pressure from Congress. The Clinton administration rejected proposals to lift unilaterally the arms embargo as politically and financially unacceptable, since this would lead to conflicts with Britain and France. After 1994 the administration took on a more aggressive posture. This change came about after former President Jimmy Carter

made a pre-Christmas trip to the region at the invitation of the President of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic. Carter whose mission benefitted from the winter lull in fighting in Bosnia, was able to arrange a four month ceasefire.²² This shows that the United States policy evolved from neutrality via insistence on the objectives of the so-called liberal interventionism to *real politik* approach in Dayton that brought about the final compromise.

Russia:

Although the initial Russian policy towards the former Yugoslavia was related to political developments inside Russia and the former Soviet Republics, it was also the result of the unsuccessful international policy initiated in 1991 by the United States and Western European governments. Russian policy towards the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had generally followed in tandem the policies of western Europe and the United States. If the leaders of these countries had correctly diagnosed the nature of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and acted energetically to stop Serbia's war of aggression against its neighbours, Russia might have followed suit.²³ At the time the United States, France, Britain and several other European countries were formulating the basic policies of the

²² Lenard J. Cohen, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State*, Current History, vol.95, no.559, March 1996, p.104.

²³ Alan F. Fogelquist, *Russia, Bosnia and the Near Abroad*, Paper presented at the International Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina organised by Bilkent University and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 19 April 1995, p.1.

international community towards former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union was in its death throes and was too absorbed in internal power struggles to play a significant role in international policy formulation towards former Yugoslavia. In the first months after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Russian government of Boris Yeltsin supported West European and American sponsored proposals for resolving the Yugoslav conflict. On 27th April 1992 Russia extended diplomatic recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina and then on, officially supported the territorial integrity of the country something which Serbian President Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb allies refused to do.²⁴

The Russian policy towards Bosnia started showing some change from the second half of 1993. In December of 1992 at a Stockholm meeting of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Andrei Kozyrev, Russian foreign minister hinted at some changes that were to take place in Russia's foreign policy. He demanded that sanctions against Serbia/Yugoslavia be lifted and accused the NATO countries of interfering in the internal affairs of Bosnia and former Yugoslavia. He stated that "Great Russia" would support the present Serbian government. Sometime later he returned to say that these statements were from a list of demands made by members of the moderate opposition and did not reflect his country's policy. In reality the views stated by Kozyrev earlier on in

²⁴ Ibid., p.2.

the meeting reflected the actual practice of Russian military and diplomatic policy of that time and is close to what has actually become Russia's official geo-political doctrine.²⁵

The Russian government officially supported the Vance-Owen plan of January 1993 but simultaneously called for the United Nations to reduce the economic and diplomatic sanctions against Serbia as an incentive to induce the Serbs to accept the plan. Russia desperately sought to block the United States proposal to use air power against Serbian forces in Bosnia. On 12th April 1993, the Russians persuaded the Clinton administration to postpone a proposal to tighten sanctions against Serbia in order not to create embarrassing conditions for Boris Yeltsin in his effort to win a referendum on 25th April 1993. The Geneva peace talks of August 1993 came up with the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. the Russian government officially supported the Owen-Stoltenberg proposal since its introduction in August 1993, but repeatedly opposed efforts to use military force either to impose the plan on Serbia or to stop renewed Serbian offensives against Bosnian cities.

Germany and the European Community (EC):

The time of disintegration of Yugoslavia saw the European Community busy with preparations for the Maastricht Summit. The first phase of the international

²⁵ Ibid., p.4.

mediation efforts saw Germany in combination with the European Community taking interest to find a political solution to the ongoing crisis. From early on in the crisis, Bonn recognised the inherent dangers of a flare-up in Yugoslavia.²⁶ German policies towards the Yugoslav crisis were inconsistent, veering between activism and impotence. Her interest was important as about half of Germany's substantial Yugoslav investments were in Croatia and Slovenia. When by the end of the June 1991 the multi-ethnic state finally broke up, many Germans felt disappointed in view of the confused and ineffective attempts of the European Community handle the crisis. By the autumn of 1991, the failure of the European Community to bring about a peace arrangement revealed disagreement over whether or not to recognise the former Yugoslav republics Croatia and Slovenia. Kohl's Euro-policy had already met with strong opposition in the German media in late 1991 when the conflict over the European Community's Yugoslav policy was coming to a head and Bonn jumped the diplomatic gun and accorded recognition to Slovenia and Croatia. This was in many ways a direct result of Kohl's surrender at Maastricht.²⁷ Contrary to what is claimed, Bonn had little interest in handling the Yugoslav crisis within any other international frame work

²⁶ Hanns W. Maull, *Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis*, Survival, vol.37, no.4, Winter 1995-96, p.99.

²⁷ Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (ed.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict* (New York), St. Martins Press Inc., 1996, p.54.

than the EC. At the meeting of the European Community ministers on 6th October 1991 it was argued that a political solution should be sought in the perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith and involving all parties. However there were different opinions about the handling of the war of dissolution and the question of recognition. While most of the European Community shared that Yugoslavia could be maintained, only the Germans argued that the federation had already disintegrated. Despite rather strong opposition within the European Community, Bonn believed that the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis, ensuing from recognition, would deter the Yugoslav army from expanding the conflict.²⁸ The Germans even in 1993 were hesitant to send in air support, fearing criticism from their countrymen. They have always followed a policy of containing the crisis and not allow it to flare up. On the other hand the European Community efforts to keep Yugoslavia together, although belated and hesitant, were flawed. The United States had been pushing for a European initiative from late 1990, but by June 1991, the European Community still had no clear plan of action.²⁹ There was no flexibility in its position, policy was dictated by considerations that had

²⁸ Ibid., p.60.

²⁹ John Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, Adelphi Paper 270 (London), Brassey's for the IISS, 1992.

little to do with Yugoslavia and the community had few levers to exert pressure on the protagonists and implement its strategy. The model of European integration was ill suited to the different socio-political situation in Yugoslavia yet Germany still followed the European Community approach which suited its policy preferences for multilateralism and European integration. Bonn was trying to strengthen the Western European Union (WEU), the OSCE and NATO to secure peaceful change. But it was with regard to Yugoslavia that, at Germany's insistence the CSCE meeting in June 1991 established a new political crisis mechanism. Germany was always looking to the multilateral institutions like CSCE to negotiate and impose solutions but when it did not work out then the matter of recognition was put up to the European Commission which after prolonged debate passed it, but with reservations against Croatia but by then Germany had granted recognition and so the other members followed suit. All through the Vance-Owen and then the Owen-Stoltenberg plan this mismatch continued till the formation of the 'Contact Group' formed by United States, Russia, France, UK and Germany, which made some changes to the Owen-Stoltenberg plan but yet they all failed and when the European Community's inability to solve the crisis became evident, the emphasis shifted to NATO as the only institution able to mandate and implement economic and military sanctions.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO):

The NATO stepped in to take over where the European Community had let off. The Atlantic alliance chose not to identify itself as a regional organisation under the United Nations Charter, thereby excluding any Soviet infringement in NATO's security matters.³⁰ As the importance of NATO's classical collective defence task diminished, the Western Alliance had to adapt from deterring a clearly defined threat to coping with what emerged to be an unpredictable and unstable security environment that required new thinking in terms of analyses, responses and missions. Peace-keeping became important since 1992 because of the general policy debates on NATO's future tasks and the implications of the war in former Yugoslavia for the alliance. All through 1992 there was controversy on its peace-keeping missions with France in opposition. By the end of the year a consensus was reached and NATO took on the task of peace-keeping. One of the characteristics of NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia has been pragmatism, whose potential could be used for peace keeping operations. It operated side by side with United Nations and by 1993 was enforcing non-fly zones, contributing personnel and equipment in the FRY. Though United Nation Security Council Resolutions referred to NATO acting in 'support of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the performance of its mandate',

³⁰ Dick A Leurdijk, *Before and After Dayton: The United Nation and NATO in the former Yugoslavia*, *Third World Quarterly*, vol.18, no.3, p.457.

NATO had made it clear that, it is not a 'sub-contractor of the United Nations and has its own credibility to be concerned about.'³¹ As the NATO involvement and operations progressed, it became more settled. In beginning 1994 NATO shotdown four Serbian aircraft showing thereby its intention of using military force if necessary. Through the years NATO took on nearly all the tasks of peace-keeping, even providing air support for crucial UNPROFOR missions, since the UNPROFOR personnel were ill equipped and so more prone to hostage taking and being used as human shields. By the end of the conflict in winter 1995 NATO was involved in nearly all operations in Bosnia and even the implementation of the Dayton peace Accord was entrusted to NATO and IFOR, the task force set up under NATO auspices.

³¹ Shashi, Tharoor. *United Nations Peace-keeping in Europe*. Survival, vol.37, no.2, Summer 1995, p.125.

CHAPTER 2

BOSNIAN CONFLICT AND THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS PRIOR TO THE DAYTON ACCORD

The crisis in the former Yugoslavia, which has developed into the most serious current security problem in Europe has brought to light an old syndrome in thinking, according to which the term 'Balkans' carries extremely negative connotations when speaking of international security and stability and of behaviour in inter-state and inter-communal relations. There is an impression that the whole region is inevitably doomed to long-term instability and conflict. This however belittles the significant efforts and indeed sacrifices being made by the majority of states in the Balkans to find a solution to the crisis.¹

Furthermore, the reintroduction of the term 'Balkanization' and the attempts to reanimate it indicates, according to some analysts, an unwillingness to assume an adequate political and practical responsibility for stopping the Yugoslav conflict.² In such a situation the case of the former Yugoslavia, and the shortcomings it has pointed out in the international community's capacity to act, confirms that the West, most urgently devise effective means for translating into concrete action its intention to play a role in dealing with the new phenomenon that

¹ Boyko Noev, *More Optimism for the Balkans*, NATO Review, vol.41, no.2, April 1993, p.10.

² Ibid., p.10.

are marring the international scene.³ The challenge to peace in the former Yugoslavia especially in Bosnia, has presented not only a human tragedy, but also a barrier to the achievement of a stable and secure Europe.⁴ In this scenario the world community tried to initiate some efforts at mediation to quell the Yugoslav conflict in its initial stages.

IMPORTANT STAGES IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ROAD TO DAYTON

The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and other nations, acting separately, and in groups, have attempted to resolve the Balkan conflict through negotiations since it began in 1991.⁵

In the Spring of 1990, the democratic elections following the collapse of the Communist System in Eastern Europe brought nationalist and independence minded governments to power in the western-most Republics of Slovenia and Croatia as well as in Serbia.⁶ In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their

³ Salvo Ando, *Preparing the Ground for an Alliance Peace-keeping Role*, NATO Review, vol.41, no.2, April 1993, p.6.

⁴ www.nando.net/newsroom/nt/1019yugo.33.html

⁵ US Department of State, *Bosnia Fact Sheet: The Road to the Dayton Peace Agreement*, Bureau of Public Affairs, 6 December 1995.
www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/balkansfact.html

⁶ US Department of State, *Bosnia Fact Sheet: Chronology of the Balkan Conflict*, Bureau of Public Affairs, 6 December 1995, p.1.
www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/balkan_conflict_chron.html

independence. This set off a brief conflict between Slovenes and the Yugoslav army and a protracted crisis in Croatia between the newly independent government in Croatia and the Serbian minority in Croatia ("Krajina Serbs") supported by the Yugoslav military. By the end of 1991, the Krajina Serbs had gained control of nearly one-third of the country. September 1991 saw the imposition of an UN sponsored arms embargo on all of the former Yugoslavia.⁷

The UN Secretary General initiated mediation efforts under former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which resulted in a cease-fire agreement in Croatia in early 1992 and deployment of first UN troops in winter 1992. 1992 also saw the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. There was wide spread clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Yugoslav army backed Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. In April, the EU recognised Croatia and they got admission to the UN in May. Continued Serb aggression led to economic sanctions on Serbia and the sending of UN peace keepers to Bosnia on a humanitarian mission, and the imposition of a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia, in October 1992.⁸ In October 1992, European Union mediator Lord David Owen and UN mediator and former US Secretary of state Cyrus Vance proposed a draft constitution organising Bosnia into

⁷ Ibid., p.2.

⁸ Ibid., p.2.

a decentralized federation, known as the "Vance-Owen" plan. In February 1993 President Clinton, at the beginning of his administration, named the US special envoy to UN-EU joint negotiations, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew. In May 1993 US efforts helped gain the parties agreement to the Vance-Owen plan, but the Bosnian Serbs subsequently renounced the accord. In early 1994 with UN-EU efforts bogged down, the United States decided to undertake more active involvement, seeking to back diplomacy with the threat of NATO air-power in protecting safe areas and UN peace-keepers. 1994 also saw the formation of a bi-communal federation, and the improving of relations between Bosnia and Croatia.⁹ Later in the spring of 1994, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and Germany established a five-nation Contact Group, with the goal of brokering a settlement between the federation and Bosnian Serbs. In July 1994, the Contact Group put forward a proposed map presenting a 51/49 percent territorial compromise between the federation and the Bosnian Serbs, which was accepted by all the parties except the Bosnian Serbs. Serbia also announced the withdrawing of support to the Bosnian Serbs, allowing a UN-EU monitoring of the border closure. In 1995 two safe areas - Srebrenica and Zepa were over-run by the Bosnian Serbs. In July and August the areas taken by the Krajina Serbs were again reoccupied by the Croat forces. This situation continued till finally the negotiations

⁹ Refer Footnote no.5.

for the Dayton Accord were initiated.¹⁰

INTERNATIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BY AND PRIOR TO UNITED NATIONS (UN) INTERVENTION

The initial attempts at conciliation centered on the primarily political effort to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia following 1990. The international community hoped that negotiations leading to a revision of the constitutional structures and balance between the central government and the republics would allow Yugoslavia to remain intact. The fear of ethnic conflict over borders and minority rights following a disintegration of the country was widespread. The mediating efforts of the European Community (EC) were accompanied by economic incentives to keep the federation together. This approach was shared by the United States. Some days before Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, US Secretary of state James Baker announced in Belgrade, his country's support for "democratization, protection of human rights, territorial integrity and privatization of the unity of Yugoslavia". This was a clear signal that western countries were opposed to independence for Yugoslavia. It was also an indication to the JNA, the only federal structure still functioning, that it would be responsible for maintaining the unity of the Federation".¹¹

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Barbara-Ekwall Uebelhart, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, United Nations Publication (New York), 1996, pp.18-19.

The outbreak of fighting after Slovenia and Croatia's declarations of independence and the pictures of devastation and human suffering changed international public opinion. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became involved by virtue of a newly adopted crisis "emergency" mechanism. However, hampered by the requirement of consensus decisions, the CSCE soon diminished as a locus of efforts to resolve the crisis and European Community started to play an active role. The intervention of three successive EC troika missions at the foreign ministers level resulted in an agreement in Brioni on 7th July 1991. This agreement established a ceasefire, a three-month moratorium on implementing the declarations of independence, and a commitment to begin political negotiations within the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY), chaired by Lord Carrington.¹²

After it had become clear that the European Community's mediation efforts could not solve the escalating, Yugoslav crisis, the issue was put on the agenda of the Security Council on 25th September 1991 at the initiative of Belgium, France and Great Britain. Since then, the Security Council has, on a number of occasions considered various aspects of the Yugoslav crisis and has made corresponding decisions based on chapter VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. UN Secretary Generals' Perez de Cuellar and Boutros-Boutros Ghali were actively involved in

¹² Ibid., p.19.

the preparation of sessions of the Security Council and the implementation of its decisions relating to the conflict. To a lesser extent, the case of Yugoslavia has also been dealt with by the UN General Assembly, in particular when admitting new states emerging from the former Yugoslavia to membership in the world organization and when deciding to bar the participation of representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) both in its work and in the activities of several other agencies and bodies of the United Nations.¹³

Initially the UN Secretariat was reluctant to support UN involvement in the conflict. After the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar rejected UN intervention in what was perceived to be a country's internal matter, and voted that Slovenia was not a member of the UN. But with the continued failure of EC led efforts, attention increasingly focussed on the UN as an alternative forum. The UN became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on 25th September 1991, when the Security Council concluded that the development of the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security and adopted Resolution 713 invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council decided "that all states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to

¹³ Ibid., p.20.

Yugoslavia". The resolution invited the Secretary-General to offer his assistance in consultation with the government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the peace efforts, namely the EC and the CSCE.¹⁴

Former US Secretary of State Cyrus, Vance was appointed Secretary-General's personal envoy for Yugoslavia and, serving as UN mediator for the conflict, he negotiated a series of short-lived cease-fires. On 23rd November 1991, Vance convened a meeting in Geneva which was attended by President Milosevic of the FRY, President Tudjman of Croatia, the Secretary of State for National Defense of Yugoslavia, and Lord Carrington, then chairman of the European community's conference on Yugoslavia. During the meeting, the Yugoslav parties agreed on an immediate cease-fire and on a number of other issues, and requested the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation.

Based on this understanding, the Security Council, in Resolution 721 of 27th November 1991, agreed in principle to send a UN peace-keeping force to the war-torn region once fighting truly stopped and all parties fully complied with the cease-fire agreement signed in Geneva on 23rd November 1991. Subsequently negotiations focussed on the implementation of the Geneva agreement and the general principles for a UN peace-keeping operation on 11th December 1991, the Secretary-General presented a report to the Security Council outlining a plan,

¹⁴ Ibid., p.20.

contingent on a cease-fire for a peace-keeping force in Croatia. The Security Council endorsed this plan, also known as the Vance plan, in Resolution 724 of 15th December 1991. While recognizing that the conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still did not exist, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary General's offer to send to Yugoslavia a small group of personnel to prepare for possible deployment of a peace-keeping operation. It also decided to set up a committee to ensure that the general and complete embargo imposed by Resolution 713 was effectively applied. On 15th February 1992, notwithstanding the fact that certain political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the Vance plan, the Secretary General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force. He stressed that "the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping operation will fail because of lack of cooperation from the parties is less grievous than the danger that delay in its despatch will lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia". Resolution 743 of 21st February 1992 endorsed the Secretary General's recommendation and, finally, authorised an initial deployment of troops. In a departure from normal procedure, it provided an initial mandate for one year instead of the usual six months, to give both Serbs and Croats in Croatia greater assurance that their interests would be protected. Resolution 743, while voting that the government of Yugoslavia had requested a peace-keeping force, left the legal basis of the UNPROFOR deployment vague and did not make explicit

reference to Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter. UNPROFOR's purpose was to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, and the implementation of the Vance plan was in no way intended to prejudge the terms of a political settlement.¹⁵

NEGOTIATIONS FROM 1992-1995: AN OVERVIEW

The high point in the negotiations in January and February of 1992 was the agreement reached over the Vance peace plan. The assembly of Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina declared in Sarajevo the Republic of Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Federal unit of Yugoslavia. The EC ministerial council abolished economic sanctions against Montenegro due to "contribution to creation of necessary conditions for continuation of the conference on Yugoslavia". The EC announced that its member states have decided to "begin the process of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia" (not of Macedonia due to opposition by Greece) and on the same day these two republics were recognised by Austria, Belgium, Great Britain and Vatican and subsequently all other EC members.¹⁶ The early part of the year saw the holding of referendum on independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the population of Serbian nationality refused to participate. The Plenary

¹⁵ Ibid., p.22.

¹⁶ Suc.org/politics/chronology/chron92.html.

session of the conference on Yugoslavia was held in Brussels, participated by five Presidents of the Yugoslav republics and Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovarovia. An agreement was reached on continuous work of three conferences groups - for institutional issues, for rights of Minorities and for economic issues. The fifth round of negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina was concluded on 17th March 1992. The participants - leaders of three national parties, PDA, SDP and CDU - signed a declaration on principles of new constitutional order for Bosnia-Herzegovina (known as the Cuttilero plan). According to this document Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain within the present borders as a single state with three constituent units based on the national principle. At the end of March the sixth round of negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina was held in Brussels. Representatives of all three national parties proposed separate "corrections" in already adopted declaration of principles of new constitutional order of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The maps of the constituent units were to be based on national, economic and geographic principles, but also on historic, religious, cultural, educational and transport and communication criteria.¹⁷

As the conflict escalated there was a lot of activity in the international arena on the Yugoslav crisis. In the beginning of April the 11th Plenary session of the conference on Yugoslav held in Brussels discussed possibilities for renewal of

¹⁷ Ibid.

economic relations and the question of secession. The Ministerial Council of the EC also decided to recognise Bosnia within its existing boundaries and to lift economic sanctions against the Republic of Serbia, i.e. "to expand to the Republic of Serbia the benefit of positive measures".¹⁸ The round of negotiations led by Jose Cuttilero with the three warring factions also proved useless. Contradicting the EC stand the US named the Serbian leadership as the aggressor in the conflict which managed to create more animosity between the E.C. and the U.S. The CSCE to preserve some semblance of its importance tried to condemn the activities of the warring parties to no avail. The Chariman of the Conference on Yugoslavia Lord Carrington warned presidents Tudjman and Milosevic that Croatia and Serbia would face strict international sanctions if they continued to interfere in the internal matters of Bosnia-Herzegovina. May saw the representatives of the various warring parties signing an agreement providing for a ceasefire. Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban agreed to a truce under EC control.¹⁹ The Bosnian president Aliza Izetbegovic asked the Secretary General Boutros Ghali for presence of UN troops on the ground, but was refused because of the lack of peace initiatives by the factions, instead the UN imposed an oil embargo on Serbia on the 20th of May 1992. The CSCE which had been organised to settle international differences in

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.7.

Europe, prevaricated having no real teeth, just diplomatic and economic influence. The US pressurized the CSCE into evicting the FRY from its membership but all the while the US was not keen on taking leadership on the issue.²⁰ The President of Yugoslavia in retaliation to the Security Council resolution 757 shot off a letter to the Secretary General conveying that the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro was unfair and unjust and tantamount to harrasment of a country which had no hand in the present crisis and this would only help in exacerbating the conflict.²¹

A new government in Bosnia in June saw Jure Pelivan become the Prime Minister and with two Serbs in the Bosnian presidency. Coming under pressure from international opinion President Milosevic pushed Karadzic to a ceasefire. After this change in the scenario the UN troops which had quit in May returned to Sarajevo. Though there was a calm, but it was more of an uneasy stand-off. The situation was compounded by the UN Secretary General's hesitation to move troops to take control of strategic locations. This led to the inevitable end-result of the collapse of the ceasefire.²² There was also anxiety and disappointment in Washington about how the Europeans, meaning the CSCE and EC were handling

²⁰ Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia 1992-94* (New York) St. Martins Press Inc., 1995, p.52.

²¹ Refer Footnote no.16

²² Edgar O'Ballance, refer Footnote no.20, pp.55-56.

the Bosnian crisis. President Bush seemed to have no positive views on how to solve the problem himself, preferring the Europeans to do it for him, but trying to keep himself superficially involved so as to take credit if any success was achieved. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to the US President, told a conference on 22nd June 1992 that if a military option was used in Bosnia it would embroil Albania, Bulgaria and Greece. In contradiction Bush ordered the NATO Supreme Commander in Europe to move his fleet closer to the Adriatic which raised hackles with Boutros-Boutros Ghali.²³ This brings to light the prevarication by the parties involved in mediation.

Meanwhile the talks between the Chairman of the EC peace Conference on Yugoslavia Lord Carrington and President Milosevic and Tudjman and Haris Silajdic of Bosnia fell through. The EC summit meeting in Portugal on 26th June was equally vague and indecisive about what should be done to stop the fighting in Bosnia. For the first time the EC declared it would not exclude the use of military means, if taken by the UN, being loath to change its opinion of Milosevic as the villain. It did not occur to the EC that it was the author of much of the Bosnian misfortune, as Bosnia, having failed to meet EC primary requirements for Sovereign independence, one of which was internal stability, was still accorded recognition. The French President Mitterand's initiative to provide a few hours of

²³ Ibid., pp.58-59.

reprieve to war torn Sarajevo and supply humanitarian aid infuriated his EC colleagues thereby breaking the fragile facade of EC unity.²⁴

The UN Security Council adopted the Resolution No. 762 requiring that the government of Croatia should withdraw its army to the positions they had taken before the offensive on 21 June 1992 and cease all hostile military activities in the zones protected by the UN or areas in their vicinity. The units of the Yugoslav National Army that were left over, the Serb forces of territorial defense in Croatia and others concerned were required to strictly observe the commitments they had taken in accordance with the UN Peace Plan. Establishment of a joint commission was suggested which would resolve all issues at dispute in the so-called pink zones. It was reaffirmed that implementation of the UN Peace Plan had not for its purpose to prejudice conditions for a political settlement.²⁵

The Summit meet of the G-7 in July adopted the same pleading stance with the warring parties to respect the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was required that all warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina should resume their negotiations and that they should not jeopardize humanitarian efforts. In case these efforts gave no results a conviction was expressed that the UN Security Council would consider

²⁴ Ibid., pp.61-62.

²⁵ Refer Footnote no.16.

all other measures, "not excluding military means too".²⁶

In mid July leaders of the three warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina Radovan Karadzic, Haris Silajdzic and Mate Boban negotiated and signed in London the agreement on cease-fire throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was to come into effect on 19 July. In Zagreb Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic signed the agreement on friendship. It was accepted that the basis of the future state system of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be "the principle of full equality of the three constitutive nations" while "the constitutional and political system would be based on constitutive units". In the headquarters of the United Nations in New York Presidents Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic signed an annex to the pact between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina made in July 1992 on joint defense of their borders. As provided by the annex "a joint committee was to be set up for coordination of defense efforts until the aggression was stopped" and a joint request was submitted to the Security Council for lifting of the arms embargo in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In September 1992, the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance and David Owen negotiated in Belgrade with President of FRY Dobrica Cosic and it was agreed that the Cosic-Tudjman talks should begin to discuss state issues between FR Yugoslavia and Croatia. Under the auspices and

²⁶ Ibid.

in the presence of Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance and David Owen, Cosic and Tadjman met in Geneva. After intense negotiations they signed the joint Declaration, 1. confirming the obligations that had been taken at the London Conference on inviolability of the existing borders, except the alterations which could be made only by peaceful means; 2. reaching agreement to take more decisive actions in cooperation with the UN peace keeping forces in enabling repatriation of displaced persons to their homes; 3. reaching agreement that the Army of Yugoslavia should leave Prevlaka by 20 October 1992 which was in accordance with the Vance plan and security of the area should be ensured by its demilitarization and placing of observers there; 4. reaching agreement on establishment of mixed inter- state committees for all open issue; 5. committing themselves to making maximum efforts with the aim of achieving a just and peaceful settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 6. condemning all actions concerning "the ethnic cleansing"; 7. welcoming the arrival of international observers.²⁷

The Vance-Owen Plan

In the beginning of 1993 with the new found confidence of the previous year Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance presented a new proposal for Bosnia-Herzegovina, including:

²⁷ Ibid.

- the reorganization of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces, according to a detailed map which was provided;
- the establishment of five major corridors between the provinces to allow the safe passage of humanitarian aid and civilians;
- constitutional principles for the republic with large measure of autonomy for the provinces within a decentralized states;
- cease-fire and demilitarization arrangements.

Through January the United Nations Security Council called on Croatia to withdraw its forces behind the original cease-fire line, while also demanding that the Serb authorities in Krajina return heavy weapons which had been seized from United Nations depots²⁸.

In the beginning of February the United States administration offered to become "actively and directly engaged" in peace efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and clarified its policy on former Yugoslavia with a series of proposals. Reginald Bartholomew, then the United States ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, was appointed as the United States special envoy to the international peace talks on former Yugoslavia, which were transferred from Geneva to New York. The administration expressed serious reservations about certain aspects of the Geneva peace plan drafted in January which, it maintained, rewarded ethnic

²⁸ www.its.caltech.edu/~bosnia/doc/weudoc.html

cleansing. The United States administration proposed certain changes among other things, that:

- any peace plan had to be accepted by all parties rather than imposed;
- sanctions should be tightened against Serbia, which had to be dissuaded from spreading the war to Kosovo or Macedonia;
- the no-fly zone over Bosnia had to be enforced by a Security Council resolution;
- if there were a "viable" agreement on Bosnia, the United States would join with "the United Nations, NATO and others" to enforce it, if necessary by Military force²⁹.

After a lull for a couple of months the flurry of activity again started, and in April the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 820, tightening the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. European governments with their troops involved in United Nations operations on the ground were opposed to moves to ease the arms embargo, and EC Foreign Ministers took the view that lifting the arms embargo might escalate and prolong the conflict. Only Germany supported lifting the arms ban. The British government stated that limited air strikes on Serb supply and communication lines would remain as the "least worst" option, and EC ministers agreed to double the number of EC

²⁹ Ibid.

sanctions monitors.

Towards the end of April, going back on its past move the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the proposed territorial arrangements in the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia, which had been endorsed by Bosnian Croats and Muslims but Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs was brought under intense pressure and forced to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan.

Continuing the efforts the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and Spain established in Washington a "joint action plan". The "joint action plan", rejecting the military option, planned the creation of six security zones (Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa) in order to protect the Muslim civilian population and the deployment of international observers at the frontier between Serbia and Bosnia in order to control Serbia's support to the Bosnian Serbs.

Within the framework of the Geneva meeting on Bosnia, Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman came to an agreement on the principle of the partition of Bosnia into "three constituent nations" (Serb, Croat and Muslim) in the framework of a federal or confederal state in June. This proposal somewhat in contradiction to the Vance-Owen plan sounded its death knell.

The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan

Again in August with the replacement of Cyrus Vance by Thorvald Stoltenberg there was put forward a new plan for the partition of Bosnia -

Herzegovina into three Republics to the warring factions. This plan seemed to consolidate Serbian gains in that, 52% of the territory was allocated to the Serbs, 30% to the Muslims and 18% to the Croats. A special status was proposed for Sarajevo and Mostar - which were to be administered under United Nations and EC mandate for two years. This was, backed by the Bosnian Serbs, but opposed by President Izetbegovic of Bosnia while the Bosnian Croats said they would accept it if the Serb and Muslim factions also went along with it. Negotiations after a stand still again resumed in Geneva between Muslims, Serbs and Croats; yet even after pressure by the international community the new Owen/Stoltenberg plan was accepted unconditionally only by the Serbs.

By imposing impossibly rigid conditions for acceptance - restitution by the breakaway Serbs of part of the territory gained over the preceding years the Bosnian Parliament managed to effectively reject the Owen/Stoltenberg peace plan. Towards the end of the year, in November the ministers of foreign affairs of the European union member countries in their meeting in Luxembourg agreed to offer Serbia "gradual suspension" of the sanctions in exchange for territorial concessions that the Bosnian Serbs would grant to the Muslims in Bosnia - Herzegovina as well as for the agreement on Krajina, or the "modus vivendi" status for the territories in Croatia controlled by the UNPROFOR. Complete lifting of the sanctions were to be determined by "some further arrangements".

Taking a cue from this the new peace negotiations on resolving the conflict in Bosnia - Herzegovina commenced in Geneva. Apart from the Presidents Slobodan Milosevic, Momir Bulatovic and Franjo Tujman and the representatives of the three warring parties in Bosnia - Herzegovina Radovan karadzic, Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic, Co-Chairmen of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, the conference was participated by the commanders of the UNPROFOR Generals Cot and Burckmond, American and Russian special envoys Charles Redman and Vitaly Churkin, respectively, President of the UNHCR Sadako Ogatta, President of the International Committee of Red Cross Cornelio Somaruga, all ministers of foreign affairs of the 12 EU members, and others³⁰. This restarted after a small break in December and finally an agreement was reached to give 33% of territory to the Bosnians.

Post Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and the Contact Group Proposal

In the winter of 1993-94, the fighting on the ground was primarily dominated by hostilities between the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims in Central Bosnia, which illustrated the new found vigour and military organization of a growing and increasingly better - armed Muslim force. Similarly on 28th February 1994 international military involvement in the Bosnian crisis took a new twist with the enforcement of the no-fly zone with the use of NATO military

³⁰ Ibid.

aircraft to attack and destroy four Serbian warplanes. This not only illustrated the increasingly antagonistic stance of the outside world to the Serbian position, but it also put into question the role of the UN operation in the region³¹.

At the same time the United States brokered a conciliation between Croatia, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslim government which led to a confederal arrangement between these parties. The Bosnian Serbs were thus now faced with a united front in negotiations, which was given added strength by the recommendations made by Congress to Clinton to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government. By this time, however, the Serbs had taken most of the territory they wanted in Bosnia, and had no interest in pursuing further large-scale offensive deployments³².

Nevertheless, in July 1994, yet another peace plan was announced by the Contact Group comprising Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. Agreed by the group in July 1994 this plan would have divided Bosnia into mini-ethnic states while keeping the facade of a unitary Bosnian state; it was backed by an explicit threat by the Contact Group that if the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the latest variant of the plan by 20th July, 1994 the arms embargo against

³¹ James Mayall (ed.), *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (Cambridge). Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.85.

³² Ibid.

the Bosnian would be lifted and further sanctions would be imposed on Serbia itself³³. The plan envisaged:

1. Bosnia would remain a single state;
2. That state would consist of the Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity;
3. These two entities would be linked via mutually-agreed constitutional principles, which would also spell out relationships with Serbia and Croatia proper.

In July 1994, the Contact Group put forward a proposed map presenting a 51/49 percent territorial compromise between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian Governments all accepted the proposal, but the Bosnian, Serbs repeatedly rejected it. However, all of its key principles were accepted as the basis for negotiations at the November 1995 proximity peace talks in Dayton³⁴.

In the meanwhile the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic started putting pressure on the Serbs to withdraw their forces. He also went ahead and implemented a blockade on the Bosnian Serbs and stopped the supply of arms to the Bosnian Serbs. In return Milosevic, who was increasingly affraid that the Bosnian Serb leader had larger ambitions to replace him as leader of a Greater

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Refer Footnote no.5.

Serbia, bargained for the loosening of the international sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro which was producing increasing political and economic strains³⁵.

For their part the western Europeans were now quite willing to partition Bosnia, if it meant an end to the fighting. But the United States remained adamant that no partition that was the result of the use of armed force could be condoned. Nevertheless in the deal the United States went as far as to concede that the constituent units of a confederal Bosnia might secede at a future date. In return the United States extracted from the Europeans the concession that the arms embargo would be lifted if the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan. The US acceptance of the possibility of partitioning of Bosnia was the biggest shift in American policy since Bush first had to deal with this issue in early 1991.

The first Serb response was neither to accept nor to reject the plan: they demonstrated yet again their skills in diplomatic procrastination. On 20th July 1994, Radovan Karadzic rejected the possibility of a 51-49 per cent territorial spilt; demanded guarantees for the Serbian corridors joining Serbia proper with the Krajina; demanded access to the Adriatic Sea; and, most importantly, stressed that any acceptance of the plan must include provision for future review of the plan with the right of secession for the two constituent ethnic states. Karadzic also stressed that this was not an outright rejection of the plan but rather part and

³⁵ James Mayall (ed.), refer Footnote no.31, p.85.

parcel of an ongoing negotiating process in which the Serbs were asking for certain points of clarification and certain guarantees.

By December 1994, it seemed that all the parties to the dispute and the international mediators had accepted that Bosnia would be divided, sooner or later, in one form or another, formally or informally. But, as with all the plans for the resolution of the conflict since 1992, the maps proved to be the insurmountable obstacle³⁶.

In late 1994, new fighting erupted between the Bosnian Government, anti-government Muslims in Bihac (supported by Krajina Serbs), and Bosnian Serbs. NATO responded by expanding the range for air strikes into Serb-controlled Croatia. In December 1994, with the help of former President Jimmy Carter, the sides agreed to a four month cessation of hostilities. When the period expired, fighting resumed, and in May 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces renewed attacks on Sarajevo and began threatening Srebrenica.³⁷

THE ROAD TO DAYTON

The truce, which took effect 1 January 1995, was doomed from the start. Both sides were war weary and saw the truce as an opportunity to rest and regroup

³⁶ Ibid., pp.86-87

³⁷ www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bostalo.html

their forces for the spring offensives which were to come. Indeed, the truce was in jeopardy of falling apart by the end of January.³⁸

In an attempt to take advantage of the ceasefire, however, the US began the first of its policy reversals for the new year. US Special Envoy Charles Thomas travelled to Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital, to try and get Karadzic to accept the Contact Group plan. Within days, the US presented an autonomy plan for Croatian Serbs in the Krajina. The latter proposal included political autonomy for Serbs in central and southern Croatia while the oil-rich eastern and north-eastern territories they held would inevitably be reintegrated by Croatia. Both missions represented a policy in which the United State went from the 'get tough' stance of NATO air strikes and marginalizing the Serbs to more conciliatory posture. More degrading for the West, perhaps, was that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, once demonized as the instigator and mastermind behind all the conflict, was now seen by the west as the moderate, the key to ending conflict. It should have been no surprise to the US that neither Karadzic, nor Milan Martić, leader of the Krajina Serbs, would accept their proposal³⁹.

³⁸ Gazman Xhudo. *Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans* (New York). St. Martins Press Inc., 1996. p.128.

³⁹ Ibid., pp.138-189.

With failure apparent, and America's patience wearing thin, Washington now reverted to once more isolating the Bosnia Serbs, and hoping that Milosevic would formally recognize Bosnia's and Croatia's pre-war borders in return for a removal of crippling sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia. This, the US believed, would effectively ostracize the warring Serbs and make them realize that their patron had abandoned them. Milosevic, however, continued to toy with the West by asking for unconditional sanction removal without the ability to reimpose them. Some officials questioned his sincerity and whether or not, he indeed had cut ties with fellow Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. UN observers had even claimed that Belgrade was still supplying Bosnian Serbs with materials via helicopter flights originating in Serbia. As to the tenuous ceasefire, warfare in Bihac, and sporadic sniper fire in Sarajevo, undermined the truce's validity.⁴⁰

By mid-February, Washington received another jolt when Croatian President Franjo Tudjman indicated that he would expel all 12,000 UN peace-keepers separating Croatia and rebel Serb state of Krajina (in which Serbs controlled 27 percent of Croat territory), placed there to serve as a buffer between a possible renewal of the Serbo-Croat war. The US and Germany, on good terms with Tudjman, began a desperate series of measures aimed at keeping the UN mission intact. Tudjman, perhaps playing off of Western fears that removal would lead

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 139-140.

to widespread conflict, or genuinely believing that UN troops would perpetuate the divide of Croatian territory (a 'Cyprus' scenario), effectively managed to blackmail the West. To counter this the UN Resolution 981 established the United Nations Confidence and Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). With a scaled-down version of the original peace-keeping force, now down to less than half and only 1000 troops left to monitor the border, coupled with \$35m in reconstruction aid, Zagreb was able to ineffectualize the UN mission even further. More damaging, however, was that Tudjman's diplomatic wrangling radicalized the Serbs. At the outset of his decision to expel the UN troops, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs understood that his reasons were, in effect, to separate the two forces. Immediately following Tudjman's threat, a joint Defence Council in Banja Luka, aimed at mutual defence between Croatian and Bosnian Serbs was established. The moves were seen in the west as proof that Knin and Pale were seeking a link-up of their territories into a Western Serb state and eventual federal or confederal quasi-Greater Serb republic⁴¹.

With spring approaching, all sides rested and re-equipped, and with a weaker UN troop presence in Croatia, the stage was set for a new round of fighting and offensive. These came in succession. By the end of March, the Bosnian Government Corps launched a two-pronged attack in central and northern

⁴¹ Ibid., p.140.

Bosnia near Mt Vlasic, which surrounds Travnik. Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, an extremely vocal critic of the West, claimed the offensive was necessary to open supply routes since diplomatic efforts had failed. This should have signalled to the Contact Group that the UN mission was no longer viable and that the eastern safe havens were in jeopardy. Indeed, Karadzic threatened to attack the east following the move by the Corps. Milan Martić also warned of attacks against Croatian forces and against Bosnian government troops defending Bihac. The Contact Group, rather than heed these explicit warnings, chose to accept the status quo, and instead launched into vain attempts to renew the Carter ceasefire agreement which expired on 30 April.

Following the lead of the Bosnian government forces, Zagreb began, by early April, to move its troops into Slavonia, and looked poised for an attack to regain lost land during the 1991 war. The US still did not seek a strengthening of UN troops in the eastern safe havens, as it perhaps should have. The French, for all their talk of the end need for a tougher military stance through the summer of 1995, were, by this time, calling instead for an international conference on the Balkans to settle disputes, as was Germany. The continued uncertainty in Western capitals only served to increase Serb confidence⁴².

In late July, President Clinton decided that the changes on the ground and

⁴² Ibid., p. 141.

the new resolve displayed by NATO provided the basis for an all-out diplomatic effort to end the conflict. In early August, he sent his National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, to present a U.S. peace initiative to NATO allies and the Russians. In mid-August, U.S. negotiators, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, began intensive shuttle diplomacy with the parties to the conflict. In late August, a Bosnian Serb Shell killed 37 people in a Sarajevo market. This proved to be the last straw and NATO and the UN issued a joint ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs:

1. Stop Shelling Sarajevo.
2. Stop offensive action against the remaining safe areas.
3. Withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.
4. Allow road and air access to Sarajevo.

On August 30th, after the Bosnian Serbs refused, NATO began heavy and continuous air strikes against the Bosnian Serb military. The Bosnian Serbs then complied with the NATO demands.⁴³

By September 1995, despite efforts by US negotiator Richard Holbrooke to get all sides to the bargaining table, the carrot-and-stick approach remained evident as NATO stepped up its bombing campaign against Serb targets while the Russians were now openly voicing their displeasure. Still, with regards to the latter, the

⁴³ Refer Footnote no.5.

Duma, in an overwhelming 258 to 2 vote, demanded that President Yeltsin fire Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev for incompetence over Bosnia, cut ties with NATO's PfP, and formally demand the UN Security Council to end air strikes all indications of the nationalist sentiment taking hold in Moscow. Withdrawing their heavy artillery from the 12 1/2 mile exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo gave the Serbs a stay in air strikes and an opportunity for a renewed effort by Holbrooke to get all three parties to the negotiating table.⁴⁴

By the end of September 1995, a lull in the fighting allowed for the Foreign Minister of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia to meet in New York and discuss a tentative peace plan. With what was aptly labelled *Bulldozer diplomacy* the US used threats, cajoling, and an entire diplomatic repertoire to get all three sides to sign a collective agreement to create a 'memorandum of peace', not yet a legal document, but an agreement to meet for formal peace talks.⁴⁵

At meetings sponsored by the Contact Group in Geneva (September 8, 1995) and New York (September 26, 1995), the Foreign Minister of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (now also representing the Bosnian Serbs) agreed to basic principles for a settlement in Bosnia:

1. The preservation of Bosnia as a single state;

⁴⁴ Gazmen Xhudo. refer Footnote no.38. pp.144-145.

⁴⁵ Ibid.. p.145.

2. An equitable division of territory between the Muslim/Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity based on the Contact Group's 51/49 formula;
3. Constitutional structures;
4. Free and fair elections;
5. Respect for human rights.

In early October, the United States helped broker a cease-fire. Continuing this process the United States and the other Contact Group countries convened the parties to Dayton, Ohio to begin "proximity peace talks" on November 1st and on November 21st, the parties initialled the Dayton Peace Agreement.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Refer Footnote no.5.

CHAPTER 3

DAYTON PEACE ACCORD AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION: AN ANALYSIS

The post-Cold War conflict in the Balkans has been described by some commentators as a civil war, by others as an irredentist conflict and by still others as a war of secession. The tragedy of the Balkans is that the conflict has been all these and more. Since the end of the cold war, the Balkans have witnessed war between as well as within nations and states. The conflict is the result of a combination of a particularly virulent form of nationalism, the clash of religions, and the absence of institutions for the effective functioning of a civic society. The product of developments both deeply rooted in history and as immediate as television news reports, the Balkan conflict is an illustration of the kinds of conflict likely to confront the international community in the years ahead. It has demonstrated the difficulty the world has had in responding to such conflicts.

The challenge has not been just to end the fighting but to do so in such a way that the long-term result is stability and peace rather than fear of further fighting, retaliation and revenge.¹

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE

Before we go into the negotiations leading upto the Accord we should look into the pressure tactics used by the US to bring out a compromise between the

¹ Michael Moodie, *The Balkan Tragedy*, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol.54, September 1995, p.102.

warring parties. The change in the US stand from initial indifference to complete involvement, some would say overbearing presence resulted from two counts, one because of the shooting down of NATO aircraft by the Serbs and two the more important to maintain its image of big brother and peace-broker. Extending that it was also concerned with the secondary interest in the Balkans of a 'spill-over' effect of the Yugoslav war on to pro-US states and may be even their West European allies.² Towards this end the US used the pressure of bombing Serb positions within Bosnia even when the Serbian President Milosevic had assured the Americans of compliance to American demands by the Bosnian Serbs.

These harsh steps taken by the US may be said to be because of the mood of the people on the ground regarding the peace efforts which were summed up by Bosnian President Izetbegovic when he assessed the western efforts as "a mixture of incapability, hesitation and ill will which would discredit the UN, ruin NATO and demoralise nations".³

The statement by US National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake summed up the American position well when he said that "America cannot afford to ignore conflicts in Europe" and that conflicts as the Yugoslavia one "presents a clear

² Gazmen Xhudo, *Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans*, (New York), St. Martins Press Inc., 1996, p.121.

³ Ibid., p.97.

challenge to NATO's credibility and to our vision of a post-cold war Europe".⁴

The pushing and prodding by the US had started months before the peace talks at Dayton got under way. In August it had put forward a new proposal making some changes to the Contact Group plan, and then again in September it brought the warring parties to Geneva to agree on a set of principles for settlement of the Bosnian crisis. Then finally the Chief Architect Richard Holbrooke negotiated the ceasefire agreement in October.⁵

Holbrooke on this instance went to the talks with an absolute no-nonsense, take it or leave it approach, stating in no uncertain terms that this was the last chance with the warring parties to come to the table and forge a compromise or face all out NATO airstrikes. Allthrough this till the end of September NATO aircraft were carrying out airstrikes against Serb positions virtually forcing them to comply with Holbrooke to avoid further damage. After this Holbrooke who was a man with knowledge about the crisis and who was accepted by all the parties started his intense *shuttle diplomacy* to bring all the parties on board. The impression that he gave was that of a man personally involved in trying to solve the crisis. Towards this end the US helped him by providing what ever he asked for, be it the spectre of economic sanctions and oil blockade against the Serbs,

⁴ Ibid., p.107.

⁵ Congressional Digest. *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: US and International Response*. Feb. 1996. p.36.

continued bombing of Bosnian Serb positions to not allowing membership and providing aid to the parties involved. To the Bosnians the US gave a juicy carrot in the form of an 'open city policy' which essentially meant that the US would take up the development of an entire city if the city conformed to certain norms and avoided clashes. The Bosnians and Croats were promised easy loans and aid by the IMF and World Bank with US backing and at the same time squeezing the Serbs to fall back, which obviously had the desired result of Serb compliance to American demands.

Even during the negotiations at Dayton Holbrooke pursued the same policy. He made a basic decision to ignore the Bosnian Serbs and deal only with the Serbian President, Milosevic. Past negotiators, including the European Union envoy Carl Bildt and former President Jimmy Carter, had negotiated directly with the Serbs in Pale, the self-styled Bosnian Serb capital, without success. By spring 1995, American negotiators began to coalesce around what the lead negotiator, the late Robert Frasure, called the Milosevic strategy. Washington would bypass the Bosnian Serbs and pressure Milosevic to deliver an agreement. Frasure had noted the way that Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb leaders, had capitalised on their own disagreements to scuttle earlier initiatives, like a 1994 Contact Group plan. Holbrooke concluded that to reach an agreement both the Serbian factions had to be forced together.⁶

⁶ Warren Bass, *The Triage of Dayton*, Foreign Affairs, vol.77, no.5, September-October 1998, p.101.

The key would be the type of linkage that was a hall mark of Henry Kissinger – tying relief from the economic sanctions that Milosevic so hated to cooperation from his Bosnian Serb friends. Although Milosevic stridently deployed what is described as a "clean hands" gambit – denying any knowledge of or influence over Bosnian Serb misdeeds – the Americans decided to expose his pretensions and tie any agreement to Milosevic. Milosevic delivered, forcing the Bosnian Serbs to surrender virtually all their negotiating rights. The Milosevic strategy held throughout the Dayton process. US negotiations met only twice with Karadzic and Mladic, both times in Belgrade with Milosevic as the principal interlocutor. At Dayton itself, where almost 100 negotiators came together the Bosnian Serb members of Milosevic's delegation were completely ignored. For the Americans they were invisible; for Milosevic, they were to know only what he chose to tell them about what he had negotiated on their behalf. Indeed, only minutes before the signing ceremony, Milosevic told the Bosnian Serbs that he had given up the Serb demand for Sarajevo. Expansion into Bosnia's capital was the sine qua non for the Bosnian Serbs, and at the sight of the Dayton map they stormed out of Dayton in an impotent fury without signing anything, but within a week an unruffled Milosevic had them on board.⁷

Ibid., pp.101-102.

The Milosevic strategy was one key to America's Balkan diplomacy. Another was the creation of the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in March 1994 as the other main constituent part of Bosnia alongside Republika Srpska. Bosnia's Muslims and Croats fought fiercely in 1993, but Washington turned their cease-fire into real cooperation realising well that this was the only way to control the Serbs. Rather than trying to broker a three-way settlement (or by including the Bosnian Serbs, a four-way pact), the United States tried to deal with only two parties: the Federation and Milosevic. The Federation proved essential in the negotiations. Military cooperation yielded results when Serb forces in western Bosnia were routed during August and September 1995, helping set up the Dayton chessboard.⁸

Holbrooke's team knew full well that even an "equip and train" program to boost a joint Muslim-Croat armed force would not erase serious doubts about the Federation's long- or medium-term viability so he cleverly cemented a formal tie before the federation showed signs of strain.⁹

The Clinton administration used this also to further its own needs. It used Bosnia, for instance, to help advance NATO expansion by bringing Russia into the Implementation Force (IFOR) Defense Secretary William Perry and Deputy

⁸ Ibid., p.103.

⁹ Ibid.

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott deftly negotiated placing Russian troops under direct US command, even while the top US general was also the NATO commander. This gave the administration the spectacle of Russian soldiers under NATO orders to point to as evidence that NATO expansion need not be anti-Russian. This helped the US in two ways one by providing smooth eastward expansion for NATO and also in curbing the crisis.

NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE DAYTON ACCORD

The international mediation in the Bosnian crisis was not neutral and free from the aims and interests which were not of immediate concern to the parties to the conflict. However, very early on the warring parties in Bosnia perceived the importance of the support of the influential international circles and very carefully harmonized their policies with the current moves of foreign factors. This is particularly true of the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo which, from the very beginning of the war, based their strategy on the attempts to involve NATO and the USA in the war against the Bosnian Serbs. In this context, the final stage of the international mediation dominated by the United States is also characteristic.¹⁰ The final phase of the American diplomatic initiative began in spring 1995. Several important developments converged to weaken the position of the Bosnian Serb

¹⁰ Predrag Simic, *The end of the war*, Review of International Affairs, vol.47, 15 December 1995, p.5.

leaders.¹¹ In hind sight it appears that the Clinton administration succeeded in its policy of pressure against the Bosnian Serbs. Considerable credit in the execution of the American plan must go to Richard Holbrooke, the aggressive and determined diplomat entrusted by President Clinton to induce a Bosnian peace settlement.¹² Thanks to the great investments, illegal deliveries of weapons and training provided by retired military officers of the US armed forces, the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia gradually emerged as a regional military power demonstrating its strength first by taking the strategically important town of Kupres in South-western Bosnia and shortly after that, by military operations in western Slovenia (UNPA sector west), Bosnian Grahovo and Glamoc and, finally, by taking the largest part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. During the last and the largest offensive, the Croatian armed forces, in cooperation with the Bosnian government forces, penetrated deeply into western Bosnia, which resulted first in the exodus of about 160,000 Serbs from the Krajina and, later on, in the exodus of about 200,000 Serbs from Western Bosnia, representing the largest single act of "ethnic cleansing" during the civil war in the former SFR of Yugoslavia. In the final stage, at the end of August and the beginning of September, NATO airforce

¹¹ Lenard J. Cohen, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile Peace in a segmented state*, Current History, vol.95, no.559, March 1996, p.104.

¹² Ibid., p.104.

and navy took part, on a massive scale, in the attacks against the Bosnian Serbs, bombing the targets in the entire territory of the Republika Srpska for fifteen days, despite the fact that the Bosnian Serb leadership had accepted, already at the ministerial meeting in Geneva, the main demands of the United States, thus opening the road to peace negotiations in Dayton.¹³ May and June marked a turning point. At that time the Bosnian Serbs, in an attempt to prevent the attacks of NATO planes, took several hundreds of hostages from among the members of UNPROFOR, entered Zepa and Srebrenica and shot down a US plane in Bosnian airspace. This provoked strong reaction among the general public in the United States and was exploited by the Republicans who succeeded in mobilizing a two-third Majority in both houses of Congress that voted against the Administration policy in Bosnia, thus getting the White House into an extremely difficult position and threatening President Clinton's prospects in the coming presidential elections. In such a situation the administration decided to take action, which was helped by a change in the balance of forces following the Croatian and Muslim military operations in the Krajina and Western Bosnia.¹⁴

In response to the fall of the safe areas, President Clinton insisted that NATO and the UN make good on their commitment to protect the remaining safe

¹³ Predrag Simic, refer Footnote no.10, p.3.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.5.

areas. The allies agreed to US insistence on NATO decisiveness at the London conference on July 21st 1995, and threatened broad-based air strikes if the safe areas were attacked again. In late July, president Clinton decided that the changes on the ground and the new resolve displayed by NATO provided the basis for an all-out diplomatic effort to end the conflict. In early August, he sent his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, to present a US peace initiative to the NATO allies and the Russians. In mid August, US negotiators led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, began intensive *shuttle diplomacy* with the parties to the conflict. In late August, a Bosnian Serb shell killed 37 people in a Sarajevo market. The NATO and the UN issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to stop shelling Sarajevo. On August 30th, after the Bosnian Serbs refused, NATO began heavy and continuous air strikes against the Bosnian Serb military, following which the Bosnian Serbs were forced to comply with the NATO demands.¹⁵ Following this a ceasefire was declared coming into effect from October 1995. With the cease-fire in effect from early October 1995, the stage was set for formal peace talks at the US military base in Dayton, Ohio. More importantly, President Clinton realised that he would have to commit US ground forces and convince both Congress and the American public that they would be necessary if peace were to take hold. Throughout the remainder of October 1995, the UN

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Bosnia Fact Sheet: The Road to Dayton*, Bureau of Public Affairs, 13 November 1995.

began a pull-out of its troops in Bosnia as in the US the Clinton Administration began to battle those opposed to deployment. President Clinton, although at first wanting Congressional approval, made it known that he, as commander-in-chief, would dispatch troops at his prerogative, without Congress approval if necessary. Despite delays, threats to break the cease-fire, military posturing by Croatia and after the fact, a US house of representatives vote of 315 to 103 on a resolution against sending troops, peace talks at Dayton proceeded.¹⁶ After 21 days of hard negotiation, the three parties agreed to a peace plan, which was signed on 21st November 1995. The Dayton accord provided for two recognised political entities within Bosnia separated into three military zones and enforced by 60,000 NATO troops (IFOR-International Force)

DIPLOMACY LEADING TOWARDS THE PEACE AGREEMENT

During the three week peace talks at the US Wright Patterson Air Force base at Dayton (Ohio), an agreement was reached ending the war in Bosnia and establishing grounds for a peace process to bring lasting political solution for the former Yugoslav Republic and stability to the entire region, as well. Apart from the changes that took place on the Bosnian front at the end of summer 1995, two factors were crucial to the outcome of these peace talks: the formation of an

¹⁶ Gazmen Khudo. refer Footnote no.2. p.145.

International Contact Group in April 1994 to coordinate the policies of the five big powers in the Balkan crisis, and the turn in the US administration policy towards a *real politik* approach to the crisis.¹⁷ Two major problems which had disrupted all the previous peace plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina and had infused the tenacity of the warring parties, were thereby removed, making way for international mediation. Actually the Dayton peace agreement is based on principles that had been in circulation from the beginning of 1993, first in the so-called "Kinkel-Juppe initiative" (the division of the territory of Bosnia according to a 51%:49% formula and lifting the sanctions against FRY in return for its cooperating in implementing the peace plan).¹⁸

Present along with delegations from the Contact Group countries, the EU and the UN, were the Presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. The Serbian delegation included representatives of Republika Srpska (but not Karadzic and Mladic, already having been declared war criminals), while the Bosnian Croats

¹⁷ Predrag Simic, *The Bosnian End Game*, Review of International Affairs, vol. 47, no. 1048, 15 September 1996, p.6.

¹⁸ The initiative of the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel and the French Foreign Minister at that time Alain Juppe, for resolving the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was formally accepted by the European Union that 1993 Autumn in Luxembourg. It had been the subject of comprehensive negotiations among the conflicting parties aboard the British aircraft carrier, The Invincible. Another plan for the Muslim-Croat federation was also initiated in November 1993, these two plans being incorporated in the Owen-Stoltenberg plan which was later rejected. These two proposals were later taken on by the Americans in their diplomatic initiative.

worked along side representatives from Bosnia and the Croatian government. The conference was a *tour de force* of American diplomacy. The major Balkan players had already accepted the broad terms of a peace agreement before arriving at Dayton, but many details remained contentious.¹⁹

The negotiations at Dayton were marked by three distinct phases. The first, eight-day phase, focussed on strengthening ties between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims in order to present the Serbs with a united front. Building on considerable ground work, the initial stage went smoothly. An agreement was reached for a remodelled Muslim-Croat Federation that included the reunification of the divided city of Mostar. Three days were then devoted to resolving the Croat-Serb dispute over eastern Slavonia. This resulted in an agreement between Milosevic and Tudjman (which was not announced until after the conclusion of the Dayton negotiations) that Belgian and Russian troops would patrol Eastern Slavonia for a one-year "transitional phase" under the direction of a civilian authority. The last period of negotiations dealt with the vexing territorial and political issues that had prevented a peace settlement over the previous years. This stage also focussed on bringing pressure on the Bosnian Muslims - who had been steadily improving their position on the battle field - to accept peace.

¹⁹ Lenard J. Cohen, refer Footnote no.11, p.107.

During the 21 days at Dayton the subtle move of negotiations can be seen by the way the Serbian President was treated as compared to the self-style Vice-President of the Bosnian Serbs Nikola Koljevic, while Milosevic got a presidential limousine, Koljevic was treated like any other ordinary member of the negotiating team.²⁰

The Americans were clear about what they wanted right from the first. On the 3rd day of the peace talks the warring parties were given a draft proposal of the agreement. To get the parties to agree they pressurised them to bring Karadzic to book for war crimes.²¹ This helped to bring Milosevic around and to quell the criticism that Milosevic was being equated with the other two Presidents. Holbrooke was referred to as the "dictator" by Milosevic. He tried every shade of bullying diplomacy to bridge the differences. He harassed and cajoled, wined and dined them, all to get their consent. To add to this after two weeks of negotiations without any positive result was the presence of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defense Secretary William J. Perry, and General George A. Joulwan the commander of NATO forces in Europe, which was to convey a sense of power and purpose.²²

²⁰ The New York Times. 1st November 1995. p.1.

²¹ Refer Footnote no.20. 3 November 1995. p.1.

²² Roger Cohen. refer Footnote no.20. 18 November 1995. p.5.

Towards the end the warring parties were given one last 'take it or leave it' chance and even President Clinton was showing his interest in attending the negotiations just to hasten the process and it was finally managed at the last moment. Realising its importance to the success of negotiations, the Bosnian government asked the US for logistic aid and arms supplies. America said that it could try and push for lifting of the arms embargo, but only if the Bosnians signed on the dotted line. The Bosnians relented and finally after much wrangling the agreement was initialled.

The full agreement, initialled on November 21st and signed in Paris on December 14th, is a complex international agreement, both by the number of documents it contains, as well as by the number of questions regulated under its terms and the signatory parties undertaking the obligation of its execution. The agreement comprises the following documents: (a) the General framework agreement, (b) Annexes to the agreement which are actually separate agreements on the individual issues of the peace agreement (12 of them) (c) appendices of the Annexes (3 in number), (d) separate bilateral agreements (2 in number) (e) Supporting multilateral letters of agreement in the form of commitments (22 of them), and (f) the agreement on initialing of the General Framework Agreement.²³ The Dayton Agreement comprises a total of 41 signed documents

²³ Predrag Simic. refer Footnote No.10. p.6.

of commitment, 15 multi-party agreements, 4 two-party agreements, and 22 individual documents of commitment (statement and letters of commitment which had been exchanged). There were three categories of participants involved in the Agreement: States, sub-state entities, and international organisations (universal and regional, governmental and non-governmental).

The Dayton Agreement codified a series of compromises among the adversaries that left each of the parties partially dissatisfied. Serbia's Milosevic appeared to be the most willing to offer concessions. Of course, he was not trading his own territory, but that of the Bosnian Serbs. Concentrated solely on having the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro lifted, Milosevic served as an invaluable partner to Holbrooke in overcoming stumbling blocs. The Croatian President also proved helpful, may be because he had arrived still fresh from the victories on the battlefield. Thus when it seemed that the talks might fail because of territorial considerations Tudjman decided to give up the territory recently seized in Bosnia.

The provisions of the constitution accepted under the Dayton Agreement²⁴ (refer appendix) ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina shall continue to be a single state within its internally recognised boundaries, divided into two entities (Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska) with a tri-party presidency (comprising

²⁴ For details of General Framework Agreement, refer internet site. (www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html)

a Muslim, Croatian and Serbian representative), a ministerial council and a two-house central Parliament. The central government will be responsible for immigration matters, foreign affairs, foreign trade, customs, monetary matters, communications and airtraffic control with other state functions, including defence and internal security belonging to the entities. Elections for the entities as well as central Presidency were to take place within six months of the signing of the agreement with OSCE supervision.²⁵ Territorially, Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into two, the Muslim-Croat federation with 49% of territory and Serb controlled Republika Srpska with 51%. Sarajevo remaining undivided. The signatories undertook to resolve the territorial dispute over the corridor in Northern Bosnia through international arbitration. The Goradze enclave was to be linked to the Federation by an overland corridor, with the constitution providing freedom of movement between the two entities.

Regarding the military implementation there was to be an Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO command of about 60,000 troops, deployed for a one year period to supervise separation of the forces in the conflict. The agreement also foresaw the lifting of sanctions in phases. The control of armaments in Bosnia was to be in the ratio of 5:2:2, with a 2:1 ratio between the Federation and the

²⁵ The head of the OSCE mission entrusted to supervise the elections. US Ambassador Robert Frowick, decided that general elections were to take place on 14th September 1996, which were on schedule.

Republika Srpska.

The Dayton Peace Agreement was locked at the moment a military balance was attained on the battlefields in Bosnia-herzegovina by NATO's intervention against the Serb Republic and the military support of the West to the Croats and Muslims, and when all three sides were militarily and economically thoroughly exhausted after four and a half years of war.

IMPLEMENTING OF THE DAYTON ACCORD, ITS OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS

As 1995 drew to a close, there were certainly mixed feeling about what had been achieved at the peace conference. For many observers, the accord reached at Dayton appeared to be a patchwork of compromises that would prove unworkable. It is often stated, incorrectly, that the Dayton Accord stopped the fighting in Bosnia. What it did, with the aid of 60,000 US and coalition troops, was freeze in place as uneasy cease-fire and prevent a resumption of hostilities.²⁶ But after years of carnage and atrocities and a series of failed peace proposals, the agreement represented an enormous step foreword. Moreover, the letter and spirit of the plan involved an extensive commitment by the international community to rebuild Bosnia and attempt to transcend its deep divisions. Beyond the provisions for establishing an atmosphere of security through the presence of the IFOR, non-

²⁶ Charles G. Boyd, *Making Bosnia Work*, Foreign Affairs, January-February 1998, vol.77, no.1, p.43.

military international assistance will take many forms, including aid, investment, supervision of free elections, police training and human rights enforcement. Dayton represented not the vindication of the liberal ideals with which Bill Clinton excoriated George Bush on the 1992 campaign trail - firm action to halt genocide, bringing war criminals to justice, tolerance, multi-ethnic nation-states, liberal nationalism, and the use of international and European institutions but rather a version of the chilly *real politik* that kept the Bush administration out of Bosnia. The deal that the administration helped cut edged ominously close to partition, writing an epitaph for Bosnia as a Multi-ethnic state and ceding much of its territory to the Bosnian Serbs. Many of Dayton's better provisions, especially the prosecution of war criminals and the return of refugees remain largely unimplemented.²⁷ The fuller our picture of Dayton becomes, the clearer it is that the Dayton process - its accomplishment notwithstanding - is less a how - to manual for peacemakers than a cautionary tale.²⁸

The checkered career of Dayton has shown that the military arrangements have worked most successfully. NATO regained its credibility, acquired a new lease on life, and a new deployment of 31,000 troops called SFOR (Stabilization Force) for eighteen months till June 1998 to stabilize the gains of its predecessor

²⁷ Warren Bass, refer Footnote no.6, p.96.

²⁸ Ibid, p.97.

IFOR.²⁹ On December 20, 1996, the 55,000 person IFOR handed over command to SFOR of 31,000 troops under United States army General William Crouch. It had plans to downsize after 12 months to a much smaller Deterrence force (DFOR) which is still in abeyance.³⁰ During the year 1996 the IFOR was to carry out functions of separating the warring parties, patrol the territorial borders and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and help the OSCE in conducting free and fair elections which were held in September 1996 and which passed off peacefully. The military aspects of the accord were able to be implemented successfully party because of a robust SFOR demands and getting compliance from all parties on matters for which it was responsible, but also because the coalitions mission of separating the antagonists reflected the desires of the antagonists themselves.³¹

Regarding the elections held in September 1996 and the next two years later under OSCE auspices, what they have attempted to achieve has been integrate the population and provide a democratic set up of governance to assuage the fear of the people, but what it has managed to achieve has been to entrench further the nationalist parties and their leaders (many of whom like Karadzic and Mladic have been declared war criminals). This has happened because of the ethnic basis of the

²⁹ Susan L. Woodward, *Bosnia*, Brookings Review, vol.15, Issue 2, Spring 1997, p.29

³⁰ Susan L. Woodward, "Bosnia After Dayton: Year two", *Current History*, vol.96, no.608, March 1997, p.97.

³¹ Charles G. Boyd, refer Footnote no.26, p.44.

population which has remained behind after the ethnic cleansing and so having areas of relative ethnic homogeneity. The big powers intended the elections to work towards bringing in leaders who were more keen towards development but this aim was thwarted mostly because the refugees had not returned to their past homes or were unwilling to do so. A contribution to this can be put at the steps of IFOR. During 1996 the U.S. led NATO IFOR stabilized the October 1995 cease-fire separated the warring factions and established the IEBL thereby successfully implementing the narrow military aspects of Annex IA of Dayton. But IFOR did not promote the freedom of movement necessary to implement Annex 7, which provides for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. With a few notable exceptions, NATO troops discouraged - or even blocked - the return of refugees to communities where they would form a minority. Thus IFOR troops often appeared to condone the policy of ethnic cleansing that was the principal war aim of Milosevic, Tudjman, and their Bosnian proxies.³² Dayton mandated the OSCE to oversee the Bosnian election. Because the US pressed the OSCE office in Sarajevo to report only good news and to certify - in obvious contradiction of the situation on the ground - that conditions for the September elections were acceptable, OSCE was dubbed "The organisation to secure Clinton's election". But hijacking the OSCE did neither the US nor the OSCE any good, and it certainly

³² Jane, M.O. Sharp. *Bosnia: Begin Again*. The Bulletin of the Atomic scientist" March-April 1997, p.18.

did not further the peace process.³³ The elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina held on 14th September 1996 are important from a number of aspects:

- implementation of the Dayton Agreement, in particular its so-called civilian part,
- inauguration of the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, consequently, establishment of the new state organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- establishment of a new post war balance of political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in its entities.

Furthermore, the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina are of singular political importance to the USA and the FR of Yugoslavia:

- For Washington, as incontestable proof by President Clinton that the Dayton Agreement, the brainchild of his administration, has been carried out in practice in the greatest measure and that the promise of the return of American soldiers within IFOR to their homes by the end of the year would be kept.
- For Belgrade, as an event that will automatically result in the fulfillment, on the basis of the Security Council decision, of the obligation from Dayton to lift the Sanctions against the FR of Yugoslavia completely.

³³ Ibid., p.19.

Finally, the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina are also important in a broader European and International context as evidence that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, in its epicenter for a number of years, has actually come to an end and that important prerequisites for the stabilization of the situation in this part of the world have been created.³⁴ The three leading nationalist parties won the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such an outcome was expected as something inevitable, but not desirable. Inevitable, because those parties, headed by their charismatic leaders, winners of the 1996 elections, fought the war precisely in order to realise the national goals of the three ethnic communities making up Bosnia and Herzegovina, therefore it could and indeed was to be expected that they would get their support. Undesirable, because it can hardly be expected that the leading nationalist parties and their leaders would easily give up the motives that had involved them in war, and rid themselves of hatred separating them by the abyss of enmity.³⁵

Looking at the situation from hindsight it can be seen that the hurried approach to get over the elections which were the linchpin of civilian implementation did not prove too successful, since, though all went according to the framework set by the

³⁴ Ranko Petkovic, *Elections and the Sanctions*, Review of International Affairs, vol.47, no.1049-50, 15 October- 15 November 1996, p.6.

³⁵ Ibid., p.6.

Agreement but they did not subdue the differences that existed among the communities on the ground and instead of making the implementation of the provisions easier it made them harder.

Another significant issue of contention that has had its bearing on the Dayton Accord has been the repatriation and reintegration of refugees. This issue also has its effect on the civilian implementation of the Accord. This has faced certain problems because resettlement of minorities in rural Bosnia is resisted about equally by the majority groups in the three respective sectors, although muslim cities such as Sarajevo and Tuzla, secure in their dominance, are less resistant to minority settlers. There seems to be a clear consensus that the hatred generated by the war must fade before any real mixing of the groups can take place without resistance. Even refugees who return to majority areas are unwelcome, branded as cowards who fled in time of danger. Those who received compensation for their return are resented for that reason as well. Only a small fraction of the anticipated refugee returns are likely to have returned. Those who go back to live as minorities in another ethnic groups area are heavily outnumbered by those who have fled Dayton's freshly drawn boundaries, which left them as new minorities. In short, there are now at least 70,000 fewer people living in ethnically mixed areas than when the accord was signed. Finally, many now living abroad are happy to continue doing so, and host nations such as Germany

have come under pressure not to force their return.³⁶

Muslims are widely believed to be carrying out a long range resettlement plan that would return muslim majorities to such key locales as Brcko, Doboje, Sanski Most, and the strategic heights at Gajevi. That fear only serves to intensify the resistance to refugee return, therefore, any large scale resettlement of minorities will have to be forced. This is a labour task for SFOR, and not without increased risk. Force levels probably cannot be reduced if this mission is continued or expanded, and success would be doubtful after the troops eventual departure.³⁷

This situation has been no different from the preceding year. There was a lot of pressure on the refugees to repatriate, by Germany, by far the worst hit by the refugee exodus. The German pressure that year to send more than 30,000 refugees home, let alone pressure on the more than 500,000 scattered elsewhere was resisted. The Bosniac leadership insisted all through the year on the right of displaced persons and especially returning refugees to return to the homes from which they were expelled--villages and towns where they are still not welcome. In Republika Srpska, particularly, Serbs fear losing control of territory if Muslims return in large numbers, but Bosnian Muslims are no more welcome in Croat

³⁶ Charles G. Boyd, refer Footnote no.26, p.48.

³⁷ Ibid.

majority towns, despite their federation alliance.³⁸

In addition to pressing their demands for justice, the Sarajevo leadership has intensified its move for the return of refugees, as they began military operations at retaking territory in strategic parts of the Serb republic. The ultimate goal was to extend Bosniac control upto the northern and eastern borders of the country in place of the Serbs. These military operations proved a major headache for the IFOR/SFOR, at the same time the military's insistence that conflicts over resettlement are an internal security matter - a task for local and international police that is not in IFOR/SFOR's mandate - provoked criticism while it did little to prevent them from being drawn in when there were clashes. All three communities - Bosniacs, Serbs, Croats - resisted the return to their local communities of people who were not their "own" thereby delaying over and over by local crises the goal of building common institutions, multiethnic cooperation and reintegration so that the international forces can depart.³⁹

The refugee return issue has been raised up again and again, even going to the extent of their being a set of recommendations framed in November 1996 to get the Dayton peace process back on track. Some of the recommendations which hold true even today are enunciated below:

³⁸ Susan L. Woodward, refer Footnote no.29, p.31.

³⁹ Ibid.

Repatriation and reintegration were ostensibly corner stones of the DPA (Dayton Peace Accord). Guaranteed in the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex 4 of the DPA) as well as annex 7 of the DPA, the return of refugees to their homes was already supposed to be underway by the 14th September elections. In the event, however, it was not. To date about 220,000 Bosnians have returned to their homes out of more than 2.5 million, almost all to municipalities in which they belong to the majority nationality. Yet at the same time, a further 90,000 belonging to minority communities have been forced out of their homes. The parties to the DPA are refusing to comply with their commitments and consequently the UN High Commissioner for refugees, the international agency charged with organising repatriation, has been unable to start the process.⁴⁰

An alarming trend which has become especially acute lately is the systematic destruction of now vacant homes owned by displaced minorities.

1. ICG recommends that the international community focus its initial repatriation efforts on the estimated 300,000 Serb refugees from Croatia currently living in the FR of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska. For it is likely to be easier to get the process moving in Croatia, than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because Croatia is generally more susceptible to international pressure. Moreover, an initiative which concentrates on the plight of Serb refugees should boost the Serb

⁴⁰ Recommendations to get the Dayton Peace Process Back on Track. 13 November 1996 (downloaded from the Internet).

communities confidence in the international community and generate momentum for repatriation within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. One of the greatest obstacles to reintegration is the lack of telephone communication between the Federation and Republika Srpska. The High Representative should make this issue a priority, link its swift resolution to economic aid and champion it as part of an aggressive public information campaign.⁴¹

3. The introduction of a neutral system of vehicle registration would conceal a car's municipality of origin and boost freedom of movement by reducing the fear factor for Bosnians travelling outside areas in which they belong to the majority community.

4. The commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees was established by the DPA to effectuate the right of displaced persons to have their property restored to them or else receive compensation. It has been slow to begin operations, however, because of a funding shortage. The international community must provide it with adequate financial support, lest the promises of the DPA prove no more than illusory.⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

The Dayton accord has a clause dealing with the trial of war criminals. This is an issue which gives rise to strong objections in the entities because most of the war criminals are the leaders of their respective parties and also of their communities. Towards the end of punishing of war criminals the international community formed the ICTY in 1994, but the functioning of this tribunal faced many hurdles in completing its task. There is strong agreement in the international community that those indicted for war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia by the International Tribunal at The Hague should be brought to justice there.⁴³ The ICTY's mandate is "to prosecute individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia from January of 1991". By mid-october 1997 seventy four public indictments and an unknown number of secret ones had been handed down, but only nineteen suspects had been taken into custody. The ICTY established under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter authorizes the use of force to arrest suspects. The western delegates at Dayton, however, demonstrated little enthusiasm for specifying arrest procedures. The agreement stipulates that indicted war criminals may not hold public office or run for election, but Contact Group delegates rejected proposals from the Bosnian delegation for tough arrest procedures and for detailed vetting of police and military personnel to weed out indictees. As a result, several police

⁴³ Charles G. Boyd, refer Footnote no.26, p.49.

forces remained under the control of indicted war criminals for two years after Dayton.

With the absence of any pressure from Dayton neither the local parties nor the NATO-led implementation forces felt obliged to make arrests or to otherwise cooperate with the ICTY.⁴⁴ Republika Srpska has the largest number of indictees including Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic, but the Republika Srpska is the most hostile to the ICTY. Biljana Plavsic who succeeded Karadzic as president in 1996 has been particularly obstructionist, claiming inter-alia that the Serb entity bans extradition, and has also told the UN that the indictments are no more valid since the war is over. The Croats have a similar record, if slightly better. They are also unwilling to cooperate and what little they did, was after threats to block a World Bank loan.⁴⁵ The IFOR/SFOR has not been of any great help in the matter. Having not made a single arrest for the first eighteen months after Dayton, NATO appeared to offer virtual immunity to war criminals. ICTY prosecutors and human rights groups urged NATO to make arrests from January 1996; but without leadership on the issue from Washington, none of the sixteen NATO governments was willing to put their regular troops at risk.

⁴⁴ Jane M.O. Sharp, *Dayton Report Card*, International Security, Vol.22, No.3, Winter, 1997-98, p.120.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.120-121.

Despite unambiguous legal obligations for all UN member governments to arrest indicted war criminals, NATO commanders in Bosnia were issued guidelines to arrest only indicted criminals whom they encountered, but not to engage in manhunts. However, even when IFOR troops encountered the most prominent indictees, they still made no arrests. Increasingly frustrated by the lack of cooperation from both the local parties and western governments, ICTY prosecutors held several weeks of public hearings on the Karadzic and Mladic indictments during the spring and summer of 1996; their hope was to embarrass NATO governments into ordering arrests.⁴⁶ These public hearings may have had some influence, because in early July 1996 the United States, France and Germany were reported to be close to agreement on the need to arrest Karadzic, not least to have him out of the way before the September elections, as requested by Robert Frowick who was in charge of the OSCE election oversight project. Britain vetoed the idea, however, at an emergency Contact Group meeting in London on July 11. The Clinton administration then recalled Richard Holbrooke from Wall Street to ask Milosevic to use his influence to get Karadzic to leave the country - essentially an offer of safe haven instead of arrest. Milosevic, however, was only able to persuade Karadzic to transfer the presidency of Republika Srpska to Plavsic, which is hardly an improvement, as she was one of the most enthusiastic

⁴⁶ Jane M.O. Sharp. refer Footnote no.44. p.121.

ethnic cleansers in Karadzic's inner circle during the war and one of the most vociferously anti-Muslim fanatics in the Bosnian Serb leadership. Moreover, Karadzic remained secretary-general of the Serbian Democratic Party and continued to wield power in Pale, thus highlighting the impotence of the western guarantors of the Dayton accords.⁴⁷

In September 1996 Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone complained that the ICTY had been "failed by the politicians who have been responsible for a highly inappropriate and pusillanimous policy in relation to arrests. Karadzic's continued flaunting of power over the next twelve months and the Serb authorities' refusal to hand him over to the ICTY were increasingly embarrassing to the Clinton administration and the other NATO powers - none of whom had the stomach for an arrest that might draw blood. Public pressure on NATO increased in late June after UNTAES troops helped an ICTY team arrest Slavko Drakmanovic in Vukovar. Immediately afterward, ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour, while heaping praise on UNTAES denounced the SFOR as an "exercise in self-defeat".⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.122.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.122-123.

A GENERAL ANALYSIS

The Dayton Accord has thrown up many facets to the positive and negative sides of the agreement. The general lacunae with the agreement can be understood by the way the chief architect of the Agreement Richard Holbrooke looks at it. The west, he warned "could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the battlefield. He says that when the United States at last took the lead in Bosnia, the reason was not some abruptly discovered moral or strategic imperative. It was failure repeated and devastating failure - combined with the bleak prospect of fulfillment of Clinton's promise to send American troops to extract the UN peace keeping force that finally put the administration's back against the wall."⁴⁹ Holbrooke says he now sees several flaws in Dayton. The agreement left two opposing armies - that of the Muslim-Croat federation, which controls 51% of Bosnia's territory and that of the Bosnian Serbs; who hold the remaining 49% - in a single country. It allowed Karadzic's Serbs to keep the name "Republika Srpska" for their portion, a name synonymous with countless atrocities. It initially set an unrealistic timetable for NATO withdrawal leaving "the impression among the parties, and especially the Serbs, that they might be able to outwait the enforcing powers". It created a police force far too weak, a NATO mission too

⁴⁹ Roger Cohen, *After the vultures*, Foreign Affairs, vol.77, no.3, May-June 1998, pp.107-108.

circumscribed by the caution of its first commander and an authority too diffused among powers including NATO, the United Nations, the UN High Commissioner for refugees, the office of the High Representative and others.⁵⁰

Nonetheless, the achievements of Dayton are enormous and hope is not entirely extinguished. If Bosnia has a chance, it has Holbrooke to thank among American officials because he has cared from the outset. President Clinton has at least dropped the deadlines for the NATO force's presence in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, Holbrook's man on the shuttle, has become the supreme commander of a reinvigorated and now cohesive NATO that has taken a stronger stance in Bosnia, some war criminals, mostly minor figures have been arrested, Karadzic is increasingly marginalised, a new spirit of cooperation with Dayton's provisions has taken hold in wide swathes of Serb held Bosnia with the election in January 1998 of Milorad Dodic as prime Minister of Republika Srpska, and an economic revival has begun in some parts of the country.⁵¹

The Federal minister for Foreign Affairs of FR of Yugoslavia Zivadin Jovanovic says, great strides have been made in the implementation of the Dayton/Paris agreement. Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been reinforced, the process of recovery and reconstruction has advanced, the second elections took

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.111.

⁵¹ Ibid.

place successfully this time with a mandate of regular duration. However, a long road and great efforts still lie ahead. This applies to many fields - political, legal, humanitarian, economic. The process of renewal and the creation of appropriate infrastructural and economic conditions are of vital importance for the development and participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the integration process in Europe. Especially, a lot still has to be done to secure genuine conditions for the voluntary and safe return of refugees. The year 1998 which had been proclaimed to be the year of the return of refugees unfortunately did not bring about the expected results. As Jovanovic expresses "it obliges all of us to manifest greater readiness and invest additional efforts so that all refugees are enabled freedom of choice as to where they are going to live, without any administrative or other artificial obstacles".⁵² "As far as Brcko is concerned, I should wish to point out the necessity of making an arbitration decision on the Inter Entity Boundary Line, which will be in accordance with the provisions of the Dayton/Paris Accord on the guarantee of the unity of the territory of Republika Srpska. Considering that the compactness of the territory of the Republika Srpska is one of the fundamental starting point in the realisation of the Dayton Agreement, the FR of Yugoslavia is convinced that the arbitration commission will take into account that Brcko is part

⁵² Zivadin Jovanovic, *Firm commitment of FR of Yugoslavia to consistent implementation of the Dayton Agreement*, Review of International Affairs, vol.50, no.76, 15 January 1999, p.1.

of the single territory of Republika Srpska".⁵³

WHERE THE MEDIATING PARTIES FAILED

The first requirement that war should be declared by a competent authority is usually interpreted within the tradition to mean a government of a state, reflecting the fact that it regards the wielding of military force as the monopoly of governments, not individuals. More recently, it has been argued that the use of military force for interventions needs to be authorised by the United Nations. UN sanction would certainly constitute competent authority - it is thus a sufficient condition.⁵⁴

The second requirement - that military interventions should be undertaken only as a last resort - reflects the fact that the application of military force, even in a limited mode, can have harmful, even lethal, consequences. It is, therefore, clearly appropriate that other ways of achieving the objective should also have been considered. It does not, however, follow that the use of military force in a limited mode (for example to assist a humanitarian, food distribution operation) should never be undertaken in preference to other measures, since the latter can

⁵³ Ibid., p.2.

⁵⁴ Roger Williamson, (ed.), *Some Corner of a Foreign Field: Intervention and World Order* (New York). St. Martins Press Inc., 1998, p.167.

sometimes, as illustrated by economic sanctions, pose a greater threat to human life than limited military force. Indeed, it is arguable that economic sanctions have tended to be imposed by the international community too readily on the grounds that they are an easy low-cost option. This may be true of selective, carefully-targeted sanctions such as an arms embargo, although even the latter can, as its application to the former Yugoslavia has shown, have unintended consequences favouring one belligerent against another.⁵⁵

The third and crucial condition of the just war theory is that there should be a just cause for the use of force. The case of former Yugoslavia does not seem to have satisfied this criteria.⁵⁶

The most fundamental faultline in the UN's mediation mission to Bosnia originated in its sponsoring coalition within the UN. The states in this grouping brought widely diverging interests in Bosnia to each meeting coupled with a timidity about getting too closely involved with the war. The sources of these member-states motivations are complex. At one level, the states in the Bosnia grouping were motivated by their own interests, as impacted on by the war, and considerations like relative gains and duties and obligations within alliances. Eager to test their new security independence after the Cold War, the EU states originally

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.167-168.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.168.

claimed the response to the crisis was the 'hour of Europe'. Acquiescing to a new stridency in German foreign policy, the members of the EU recognized the sovereignty of the seceding Yugoslav republics, eventually carrying the US and the UN reluctantly with them, and to some extent hastening the onset of hostilities. Seeing its attempts at conflict resolution fail, the EU called for UN involvement in October 1991. The Europeans in the Security Council, headed by Britain and France in the Permanent Five, thereafter formed the core of the sponsoring coalition of UN mediation efforts. From this genesis, Britain and France, in order to gain significant concessions within the EU, and to retain influence within NATO, struggled to maintain their supremacy in setting UN policy on Bosnia. Most of the UN's mediation and peace-keeping initiatives were instigated by these two states. Their perception of the Bosnian conflict as a civil war to be contained and resolved informed early UN decisions on Bosnia and, as embodied by the large European contingents among the UNPROFOR II peacekeeping force, this perception was to remain the basis of official UN policy.⁵⁷

After initially acceding to European dominance in responding to the Yugoslav wars as a way of retreating from its 'global policeman' role, the US became involved with the activation of a UN response. Much of the disunity in the sponsoring coalition on Bosnia stemmed from disagreements between the US and

⁵⁷ Michael Wesley, *Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars* (New York). St.Martin's Press Inc., p.33.

the European coalition partners. The American position on Bosnia was determined by a different perception of the conflict, which saw the war in Bosnia as an international conflict, in which the sovereignty of a UN member-state was threatened by external intervention.

As the crisis unfolded, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, ineptitude, inefficiency, and shortsightedness destroyed US credibility. This in turn produced futility among the policy-makers which tends to highlight the problem with US foreign policy. The outset of crisis in the former Yugoslavia has unfortunately coincided with the process of democratization throughout the Balkans. Failure to distinguish and, more importantly, to understand the link between these two events will do more than reflect failed US policy. It will result in the inability of the region to produce healthy democracies in an area that sits between two regions vital to US interests, Western Europe and the Middle East.⁵⁸

Initially the US contemplated military intervention on behalf of the Bosnian government, but thereafter acceded to the European position of containment, relief, and negotiations, in the interests of retaining unity with Western Europe. This accession was neither consistent nor gracious, combining domestic attacks on the pusillanimity of the Europeans, with official attempts to challenge the European-formulated UN response in Bosnia. The US declined to contribute peacekeeping

⁵⁸ Gazmen Xhudo. refer Footnote no.2. p.90.

forces to Bosnia, a fact that became a source of acrimony with the Western Europeans as the US began to advocate its policy of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government and shifting the military balance in its favour using surgical airstrikes. The American 'lift and strike' proposal was to become a symbol of the divisions within the Bosnia coalition, being advocated by the US but opposed by the Europeans, whose peacekeepers in Bosnia would have come under attack during the resulting escalation in the war. The Europeans, particularly the French, showed their annoyance at American reluctance to pressure the Bosnian government to accept various peace plans advocated by the UN. The dissenting American position led to splits between the European coalition partners; Britain and France expressed their irritation when German Chancellor Kohl advocated lifting the embargo on the Bosnian government at a private EU dinner on 21 June 1993 after correspondence with US President Clinton.⁵⁹ The misdiagnosis of the conflict by the UN inevitably led it to prescribe an inappropriate response. The mediators had been deprived of all flexibility to find a solution to the conflict by the sponsoring coalition's strict instructions.⁶⁰

This characteristic attitude of the US to go along with the views of its European counterparts reflected its uncertain nature on this issue. US

⁵⁹ Michael Wesley, refer Footnote no.57, p.34.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.39.

administration had much different policy proposals on the table than their allies had. However, the difference in value they placed on their policy preference as compared with alternatives was probably not very significant during much of the crisis. With the economic and strategic stakes for the United States quite low in Bosnia, the benefits of collaboration on policies such as "lift and strike" were not much greater than the benefits of collaboration on compromise policies. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the US administration feared alliance discord and valued alliance greatly.⁶¹

As the conflict in Yugoslavia broke out, the US, rather than act through the very institution it sought to perpetuate and modify, deferred to the Europeans in handling the crisis. The latter's ineptitude in creating a solution through its champion, the EU, has shown that US presence in Europe is not only desirable, but necessary. The US, however, has so far done very little itself. By deferring foreign policy to the various departments in Washington, Clinton has entrusted the vestiges of foreign policy power to people who have issued vague and contradictory statements. This has made the administration seem timid and uncertain. The fear of engagement within the foreign policy arena has made those at the State Department tentative in their approach to most foreign dilemmas. The result being a superpower backpedalling or, at best, standing still at a time it

⁶¹ Paul A. Papayoanou, *Intra-Alliance Bargaining and US Bosnia Policy*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.41, no.1, February 1997, p.103.

should be moving forward. Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, went one step further when, following the fall of Serbrenica in July 1995, he claimed that it is not "unwarranted to say that we [the US] have acted cowardly".⁶²

Sabre-rattling by NATO in Bosnia demonstrates the way in which the US has painted itself into a corner over Bosnia. Peace proposals coupled with threats of airstrikes and the US perhaps openly siding with the Bosnian Muslims do not discount that the administration's policy towards Bosnia was, for quite some time, in a 'holding pattern'. Even the immediate outbreak of peace, however, will not address the primary issues in the region, security and stability.⁶³

By sticking with an outdated framework for analysis, however, the US hinders the multiplicity of options in the foreign policy domain. Worse, it hinders its own ability in formulating a policy since the fundamental base for any policy is itself obsolete.⁶⁴

Moreover, the nostalgia and rigid application of Cold War diplomacy cannot provide solutions to the security concerns of today. Efforts to apply some universal principles of conflict resolution fail when they simply do not provide realistic

⁶² Gazmen Xhudo, refer Footnote no.2, p.91.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.132.

proposals for such concerns.⁶⁵

US policy in the Balkans, especially since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, highlights this flaw. Two fatal early mistakes led to failure in grasping the situation at hand. First, the US hung onto the notion that the territorial integrity of 'Yugoslavia' must be maintained even after it became apparent that such a concept had ceased to exist. By sending then Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade in 1991, the US hoped to convey its express desire that it would not accept the dissolution of the federal Yugoslav state into its constituent parts. This hope of keeping Yugoslavia intact confused US wishes of keeping stability in the area with the realities of the situation. It may have also given Serbia an excuse to justify aggression against the breakaway republics by believing the US would back 'federal efforts to preserve federal integrity'.⁶⁶ By sanctioning the break-up of Yugoslavia, the US would also have sanctioned a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the region, for which it was not prepared. Clinging to these outdated Cold War notions of stability doomed the US to muddled policy in the region—something it has yet to adjust.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.99.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.132.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp.132-133.

The second failure came after the conflict began. Assumptions that the war still held the character of a 'civil conflict', even after recognition of the republics, forced two consequences which may likely limit US influence in the region for some time to come. First, the US and the West held false beliefs that the violence in the Balkans is endemic to the region. Indeed, the aggressors in most cases hoped that the US and the West would feel this way, as if to warn them that: warfare is part of our primitive, non-Western culture.⁶⁸

For the US, the Clinton administration has stated that institutions such as NATO would allow the US the flexibility it required in the area and perhaps further its regional relation. By readapting its role, the US believed NATO could meet the new security environment of Europe. What it has failed to understand, however, is that the environment, *per se*, is not new, although the circumstances may be.⁶⁹

The decision by NATO foreign ministers to allow a UN veto over air strikes following the July 1995 attacks on Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Bihac did more than give Serbs the green light for further attacks. It served to cripple the NATO alliance by making it subservient to the UN. And now, with the Dayton Accords in effect, the UN High Representative in Bosnia, the final

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.133.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

civilian authority can call upon IFOR/SFOR to enforce any particular of Dayton. Although IFOR/SFOR is not as restricted in its rules of military engagement as UNPROFOR was, it appears that the UN still seeks to hold some influence over NATO decisions in Bosnia. NATO military commanders have trained and are much more capable than UN civilian personnel to make the kind of hard military choices required to protect UN forces on the ground. Placing them under UN civilian command both constrained their ability to operate effectively, and undermined their credibility at a time when Europe's security threats continue to grow.⁷⁰

Despite the facade of Contact Group consensus, fashioning a long-term policy approach towards the region will likely still present the US with problems. Much of this potential difficulty came, however, in rallying popular support for a tougher response, specifically, the use of American ground troops in any role which may require their presence. Fashioning a foreign policy response to address ethno-nationalist conflicts within Europe would require, however, both the political will, and the ability to implement such policy.⁷¹

By the autumn of 1995, despite the much longed for ceasefire, the situation for the Bosnian government forces was worse on the ground not in relation to the

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.112.

⁷¹ Ibid., p.113.

Bosnian Serbs but to the Croatian influence on the ground in Bihac but after the NATO air attacks on the Bosnian Serbs, the Croats were able to extend the territory they controlled way beyond that envisaged in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the EU Action Plan or the Contact Group Plan. The Croats did so not just at the expense of the Bosnian Serbs but more importantly at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims given the justice of their territorial claim as the largest group. If the Croats continue to control over half of the 51 percent territory laid down in Dayton for the Federation, there will be a real risk of renewed Croat-Muslim fighting. The crucial factor over the early years of the Dayton settlement was how well the Croats and Muslims would work together in the Federation. Sadly, they have not come together sufficiently in many areas. Instead of Mostar becoming an integrated Croat-Muslim city during EU administration, it stubbornly remains a divided city. This was more damaging to Dayton than the flight of Bosnian Serbs from Sarajevo. Now three years after Dayton, Bosnia is still painfully spilt into three ethnically-based portions, a fact exemplified by the results of the second Bosnian-wide elections in September 1998.⁷²

Only if NATO is ready to remain for a long period is there a good chance that a unified country will slowly emerge. Perhaps like the UN in Cyprus, NATO will remain far longer than envisaged but if the ethnic divisions are not to become

⁷² David Owen. *Five Wars in the Former Yugoslavia: 1991-98* (Abudhabi). The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research. 1998. p.20.

permanent, it will require a sizeable pro-active force on the ground in effect imposing the Dayton Accords, not the status quo orientated force holding the parties apart as has been the case in Cyprus. Also, the EU will have to make it very clear to Croatia that there can be no question of progress in joining the EU until the Federation in Bosnia is working as an integrated unit.⁷³

What we have learnt in the 1990s from the former Yugoslavia is that if the US is to assert leadership in the post-Cold War world they have to bear the military consequences of their political decisions, as they did in the Cold War period. The lesson is that US leadership under the authority of the UN Charter from the start until the agreed objectives are fully reached is the best option. If the US does not want to lead then it must support others in a leadership role; whether it is the EU or any other regional grouping. In this way, the Bush Administration line to leave the former Yugoslavia largely to the EC and the UN and to let them make the unpalatable compromises necessary for an early settlement but to back them as they got on with it, unhampered by political equivocation, is a lesser alternative. The Clinton Administration, however, did not find the self-confidence or self-discipline to accept a limited role and chose the rhetoric of leadership for two and a half years until they faced the harsh realities. Until August 1995, the US in the former Yugoslavia could neither advocate a settlement nor abdicate from a

⁷³ Ibid., pp.20-21.

settlement. They could not forego the appearance of exerting power, but they were not ready to accept the political compromises nor the military responsibilities that go with the exercise of power.⁷⁴

An absolute lesson which we must learn is that quite apart from the morality of stopping deaths, woundings and hardship, wars with associated ethnic cleansing must not await a perfect solution. In ethnic wars, realities are created on the ground that are very much harder to reverse later. The five wars in the former Yugoslavia from 1991, with the fifth still continuing in Kosovo in 1998, will leave a massive legacy of ethnic hatred and religious fervor in the Balkans which will haunt future generations. The prolongation of war in the name of containment is most likely to be a worse solution than an earlier compromise even if not a just solution.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp.21-22.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.23.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

As it is evident from the study, the rise of ethnic conflicts in the post-cold war era has brought a new twist to the International Security paradigm. The belief that the end of the cold war would bring peace to the International Community has come to naught. Instead there has been a more *real politik* approach to the solving of ethnic conflict. The conflict in Yugoslavia has thrown up a lot of problems which have been unique, in the sense that it has not followed the clear cut principles of war or external aggression but rather a case of internal strife which have meant the complete overhauling of the notion of resolving conflict. The use of clear cut principles of Conflict Resolution do not hold much water in this scenario.

The involvement of the various international and regional organizations like the UN the NATO and the OSCE has shown that they have been inept in solving the crisis. Though after a long drawn out period they have been able to bring about a cessation of hostilities but they have not been able to unite the warring parties. In the initial phases after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 the E.U. with its new found independence was very keen in resolving the Yugoslav crisis which it referred to as an internal matter. The problem that arose here is that there was a multiplicity of opinion among the E.U. countries and the way the crisis was to be handled. This created a fluctuating stand among the member countries which allowed the warring parties to go by the notion that the E.U. was not keen in

resolving the crisis. The support of the Germans for Croatia and likewise by the Russians for Serbia led to a clash among the member countries and instead of coming up with a concrete proposal for peace they fuelled the war. The E.U. put up many a proposals like the Vance-Owen plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan and the Kinkel-Juppe initiative formulated aboard the British aircraft carrier 'The Invincible'. But all these plans failed because of the unwillingness of the parties to push the deal through.

Likewise the case with the UN was that of a misdiagnoses of the conflict. This led to an imposition of sanctions which was aimed at bringing hardship on the population in the entities and thereby pressurizing them to stop the conflict but what it did instead was to make them more resilient and negate all peace initiatives. Whatever proposals the UN put forward did not have much teeth and so were ineffective in the face of opposition. The sending of UNPROFOR troops for providing humanitarian aid and to separate the warring parties proved ineffective. The situation took a turn for the worse when the Serbians took hostages from among the UNPROFOR troops to stop NATO attacks. This showed the strong inadequacy of the UNPROFOR troops who were supposed to bring peace but who in actual practice were even unable to defend themselves.

The case with NATO followed somewhat the same lines. NATO was heavily dependent on US involvement in the crisis to carry out its functions, which had by far the largest share in the ground forces contingent and in air support. Till

the situation did not reach the brink NATO was happy to let the UN do all the work. The change in the mood came about only after the US involvement in the crisis. The US stand in the early stages of the conflict was to look at the situation from a cold war perspective and applying solutions according to the same which seemed futile in the face of such intense hatred among the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosnians who were trying to cull a space for themselves and carrying out ethnic cleansing. What antagonised the parties further was the partial attitude of the US Administration towards the Muslims and declaring the Serbs as the pariah. This happened because the US was keen to keep out any Islamic involvement in Europe, through the means of supply of arms by Iran to the Bosnian muslims. The 'lift and strike' policy which was put forward by the US entrenched the feeling of partiality in the minds of the Serbs. This move was also opposed by the Europeans who had troops on the ground and were unwilling to risk their lives and so this proposal was shot down. The US did not push this policy further preferring to maintain ties with its allies rather than oppose them on an issue where they had no important stakes. The Balkan crisis was a war in Europe's backyard and so not of any significance to the US. The change in the US stand came about only after strong domestic pressure on the Clinton administration by the Republican Congress to get involved in the crisis. The sights of carnage and the change to a *real politik* approach helped the US to have a better grasp of the situation and push for NATO reprisals against the Serbs. The ultimatum was given when the Serbs shot down

an American aircraft in Bosnian airspace. This provoked strong retaliation by NATO which set the stage for negotiations and the agreement being signed at Dayton.

The negotiations at Dayton saw a fair share of armtwisting and *bulldozer diplomacy* by its Chief architect Richard Holbrooke. It was pursued unrelentlessly because of two reasons:

1. The US image having taken a heavy beating, the administration was keen to redeem itself in the eyes of its European allies as the big brother and,
2. To prove that it was still necessary for the continuance of NATO which was criticised by many to be reminiscent of the cold war and so to be dismantled.

On both counts the US was successful, a peace accord was signed and implemented. But its implementation had many pitfalls. Primary among them being the unrealistic timing of elections, of providing ground support by IFOR/SFOR which was later done away by President Clinton in 1998. The issue of economic revival also was contentious. Grants and aid amounting to about 98% of the total was given to the Bosniacs and only the rest 2% to the Serbs. This created more stronger differences among the warring parties who were still trying to carve out a homogenous entity. Even the Muslim-Croat federation had the same problems. The elections which were supposed to bring about democracy only managed to legally install the convicted war criminals in the high offices. The repatriation of

refugees and the apprehending of war criminals was seriously hampered by a diverse command structure with decision making being passed around. Many a times the IFOR/SFOR troops knowingly dissuaded the minorities to return to their past homes, fearing a fresh outbreak of violence. In the end what finally remained was a fractured and uneasy calm.

To understand this uneasy peace we need to go into the dynamics of the peace process which imposed this peace in Bosnia. The Clinton administration by the time it reached Dayton was in a hurry to redeem its own standing in the eyes of the world and also end the protracted conflict which had lately become an eyesore in the west. To do that the base point with which Richard Holbrooke and his team of negotiators started off with was that it was impossible to mediate among a multiplicity of view points, so first they impressed on the warring parties to forming two camps and then once a set of broad areas were demarcated guiding the parties towards a solution which the Americans thought were fit, not taking into account the actual demands by the opposing parties. The administration managed to do this by using sometimes subtle and at other times not so subtle means to gain the parties consent. It was as if Holbrooke had all the tools of diplomacy from force and threat to the giving of incentives at his disposal. Whenever necessary the parties were literally brow beaten into submitting to the American demands, else the spectre of bombing always hung over them like Damocles Sword. At other times, the favour of aid and trade was used to get the

Bosnians and Serbs on board, and granting special status, providing international monetary assistance etc. were all to be seen in reaching at an agreement. The 'Carrot and Stick' policy worked well here and finally American diplomacy triumphed with the agreement being signed.

But the inherent problems were not solved, only suppressed and not long afterwards they started to break free of the restraint. The ominous rumble started with all the parties unwilling to adhere to some clause or the other and finally Serbia still in an expansionist mood turned to the Albanians in Kosovo. In such a situation Serbia to increase its territorial gains turned its eyes on the Albanians in Kosovo and as the present situation shows there has been the renewal of ethnic violence among the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The Serbs maintain that Kosovo is an integral part of the territory of Serbia and the attack on the Albanians is an internal matter to quell insurgency in these areas. The US has been vehement to oppose this stand and has carried out relentless bombing of Serb positions through NATO resulting in heavy casualties. As in the previous crisis there have been strong differences among the different quarters. As of the time of this study the Chinese embassy in Sarajevo had been bombed by NATO warplanes. This has led to a stand-off between the US and China, with the US claiming it to be a mistake of intelligence reports and China claiming it to be purposeful and hinting that such a situation was likely to fuel a new arms race.

In such a situation what needs to be done is to make a clear analysis on the ground and reinvigorate the implementation of the Dayton Accord to bring about lasting peace. The important tenets that need to be looked into are :

Peace without justice will be an increasingly fragile peace. Thus, if the western powers are as serious about moving beyond *de facto* partition toward a single integrated multiethnic Bosnia as their rhetoric suggests, they must correct the structural problems in the Dayton agreement and adhere more strictly to fundamental principles of international law. The first task is to reverse the policy of destabilizing short-term exit strategies and recognize the reality that postwar reconstruction is a long-term process. Success requires an appropriate commitment of political, economic, and military resources, including a broader NATO mandate to create safe conditions for repatriation. Second, action must replace rhetoric with respect to support for the ICTY and the need to arrest indicted war criminals. Third, NATO must replace the current repressive and corrupt police forces with police trained in law enforcement and public service. Finally, the donor community must appoint a credible High Representative who can exert effective economic leverage on the local parties and has the authority to call on NATO troops to enforce compliance with the Dayton agreement.

Bosnia will need an international military presence for several more years. The most credible, confidence-building post-SFOR deterrent to new fighting will be another US-led NATO combined joint task force. Rebuilding war-torn societies

takes much longer than the schedule envisaged in Dayton. With or without US troops on the ground, NATO should deploy a combined joint task force for at least five more years to give peace a chance. A European-task force would stretch the capabilities of the European powers, but is materially possible if the political will can be mustered.

The main impediments to the prevention and resolution of the wars in former Yugoslavia in 1991-95 was the reluctance of the western democracies to use force. The overview of the Dayton process has tried to demonstrate that the tendency to appease rather than punish the aggressors still drove western policy in trying to consolidate the peace in Bosnia during 1996 and 1997. Overcoming the grim legacy of western appeasement and indifference in Bosnia will not be easy, but the western democracies cannot afford to fail there if they want a stable Europe.

The critical factor will be U.S. leadership, as it was in ending the war in 1995. If the interest remains episodic, however, it is by no means certain that the Europeans will muster the political will to act without the United States. Only if and when the EU becomes a political Union joining hands with the US and other international bodies can such conflicts be deterred and controlled but till then it will remain the junior partner in the western alliance and the United States must call the shots in Bosnia as else where.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Text of the General Framework Agreement

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html

US Policy towards Bosnia: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress Second Session, 23 April 1996.

US Department of State, *Remarks and a Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Signing of the Agreement Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Wright - Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, 10 November 1995. www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bossec3.html

Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Robert S. Gelbard, Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, Washington D.C., 6 May 1998. www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980506_gelbard_strc.html

U.S. Department of State, *Bosnia, Proximity Peace Talks: Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke*, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Washington D.C., 30 October 1995.

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/boshol.html

Statement by President Clinton on the Bosnia Peace Agreement, The White House, Washington D.C., 21 November 1995.

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosclin2.html

The Bosnian Conflict, US Involvement in the Balkans, Congressional Digest (Washington D.C.), February 1996, p.33.

Balkans Profile, Evolution of the Current Conflict, Congressional Digest (Washington D.C.), February 1996, pp.34-35.

The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, US and International Response, Congressional Digest (Washington D.C.), February, 1996, pp. 36-39 and 64.

President Clinton's Address, US Role in Bosnian Peacekeeping, Congressional Digest (Washington D.C.), February, 1996, p.40-41.

Agreed Measure to Implement Peace in Bosnia, Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade), Vol.47, No.1048, 15 September 1996, p.15-18.

Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade), Vol.47, No.1048, 15 September, 1996, pp.13-14.

Cohen in Confirmation Hearing, Vows Timely Bosnia Pullout, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Washington D.C.), Vol.55, No.4, 25 January 1997, pp.247-248.

Statement by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, on the talks with the Croation Foreign Minister Dr. Mate Granic, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol.47, No.1051, 15 December 1996.

ALBRIGHT, Madeline.K *Finding the path to Lasting Peace in Bosnia*, US Department of State Dispatch (Washington D.C.), Vol.8, No.4 May 1997, pp.1-6.

US Department of State, *Testimony on Bosnia by Secretary of State Warren Christopher before The House Committee on International Relations* (Washington D.C.), 30 November 1995.

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosctest.html

US Department of State, *Bosnia Fact Sheet: The Road to the Dayton Peace Agreement*, Bureau of Public Affairs, 6 December 1995.

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/balkansfact.html

US Department of State, *Summary of US Government Policy on Bosnia*, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Washington, D.C., 16 July 1998. (Internet Source)

US Department of State, *Implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement: The Importance of Civilian Implementation*, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Washington D.C., 28 May 1997.

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosnia_civilians.html

US Department of State, *American leadership and the New Europe: Implementing the Dayton Accords*, Remarks by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott to the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., 14 December 1995.

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bostalo.html

US Department of State, *Intervention by Secretary of State, Warren Christopher At The Meeting of NATO Foreign And Defense Ministers on Bosnia as prepared for Delivery in Brussels, Belgium, 5 December 1995.* (Internet Source)

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

AKHAVAN, Payam *Yugoslavia: The Former and Future*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).

ARBATOV, Alexei, Abram Chayes, Antonia.H Chayes and Lara Olsen (ed.) *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

AZAR, Edward.E *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990).

AZAR, Edward.E and John W. Burton (ed.), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, (Sussex: Wheat-sheaf, 1986).

BENNET, Christopher *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, (New York: Random House Publishers, 1995).

BERCOVITCH, Jacob and Richard Jackson *International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and their Management 1995-1995*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997).

BLANK, Stephen.J (ed.) *Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem From Hell Strategic Studies Institute, PA*, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1995).

BODANSKY, Yossef *Offensive in the Balkans*, (Alexandria: ISSI, 1995).

BOLGER, Daniel.P *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's*, (Presidio: Novato, CA, 1995).

BROWN, Sheryl. J and Kimber M. Schraub, (ed.) *Resolving Third World Conflict, Challenges for a New Era*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992).

- BROWN, Michael.E (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).
- BROWNE, Edward M.A *Future for Peace Keeping*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1998).
- CHAYES, Abram and Antonia. H Chayes (ed.) *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organisation*, Brookings Occasional Papers, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996).
- COHEN, Lenard.J *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, (Boulder, Colorado: West View Press, 1995).
- CORTRIGHT, David (ed.) *The Price of Peace Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*, (New York: Rawman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997).
- CRANNA, Michael (ed.) *True cost of Conflict*, (London: Earth Scan Publishers, 1994).
- CRNOBRNJA, Mihjailo *The Yugoslav Drama*, (Montreal: Brookings Institution, 1994).
- DANCHEV, Alex and Thomas HALVERSON (ed.) *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996).
- DURCH, William.J (ed.) *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990's*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
- DYKER, D.A and I. VEJVODA (ed.) *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth*, (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Inc., 1996).
- ENGLEFIELD, Grey *Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia: Re-emerging Boundaries*, (England: International Boundaries Research University Press, 1992).
- FISHER, Roger, Elizabeth Kopelman and Andrea. K. Schneider *Beyond Machevelli, Tools for Coping with Conflict*, (London: Harvard University Press, 1994).

- FREEDMAN, Lawrence (ed.) *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).
- GHALI, Boutros.B *An Agenda for Peace*, (New York: UN Publication, 1995).
- GOW, James *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslavia Crisis*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992).
- HOGLUND, Bengt *Concepts of Conflict*, (Sweden: Deptt. of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1970).
- HULSMAN, John.C *A Paradigm for the New World Order: A Schools of Thought Analysis of American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York: St. Martin's press Inc., 1997).
- HUPCHICK, Dennis.P *Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1995).
- JAKOBSEN, Peter. Viggo *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1998).
- JENTLESON, Bruce.W *Preventive Diplomacy and Ethnic Conflict: Possible, Difficult, Necessary*, Policy Paper 27, (California: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1996).
- JOHNSEN, William.T *Pandora's Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and its Implications*, Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army war college, 1994).
- KAUFMANN, John *Effective Negotiation: Case Studies in Conference Diplomacy*, (Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989).
- KOLODZIEJ, Edward.A and Roger E. Kanet, (ed.) *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
- KRIESBERG, Louis *International Conflict Resolution: The US - USSR, and Middle East Cases*. (New Haven: The University Press, 1992).

- LUKIC, Reno *Wars of South Slavic Succession: Yugoslavia 1991-1993*, (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1993).
- MAGAS, Branka, *Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the breakup 1980-92*, (London: Verso Publishers, 1993).
- MARK, Almond *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans*, (London: Mandarin Publishers, 1994).
- MAYALL, James (ed.) *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- New Conflicts in Europe: Prevention and Resolution Current Decisions Report No.10*, (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, July 1992).
- O'BALLANCE, Edgar *Civil War in Bosnia: 1992-94*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1995).
- OWEN, David *Balkan Odessey*, (New York: Harcourt Brance and Company, 1994).
- _____ *Five Wars in the Former Yugoslavia 1991-98*, (Abudhabi: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1998).
- PETRIE, John.N (ed.) *Essays on Strategy*, (Washington D.C.: NDV Press 1994).
- RUBIN, Barnnet.R (ed.) *Towards Comprehensive Peace in South-East Europe: Conflict Prevention in the South Balkans*, Report of the South Balkans working Group of the Council on Foreign Relations, Centre For Preventive Action, (New York: Twentieth century Fund Press, 1996).
- RUPESINGHE, Kumar (ed.) *Conflict Transformation*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1995).
- RUPESINGHE, Kumar and Michiko Kuroda, (ed.) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1992).

- SANDOLE, Dennis J.D and Hugo Vander Merwe (ed.) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).
- SANDOLE, Dennis J.D and Ingrid Sandole (ed.) *Conflict Management and Problem Solving, Interpersonal to International Application*, (London: Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1987).
- SHELLENBERG, James.A *Conflict Resolution, Theory Research and Practice*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
- SIMONS, Geoff *The United Nations: A Chronology of Conflict*, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994).
- TERRY, A.J *The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Historical Inevitability or Failure of Western Policy*, (UK: Seaford House Papers, 1993).
- THAKUR, Ramesh and Carlyle A. Thayer *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990's*, (Colorado: Westview press Inc., 1995).
- UEBELHART, Ekwall-Barbara *Managing Arms in Peace Process: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996).
- VOCKOVIC, Gojko. *Ethnic Cleavages and Conflict: The Sources of National Cohesion and Disintegration*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 1997).
- WESLEY, Michael *Casualties of the New World Order: The Cause of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars*, (New York: St. Martins Press Inc., 1997).
- WILLIAMSON, Roger (ed.) *Some Corner of a Foreign Field: Intervention and World Order*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1998).
- WOODWARD, Susan.L *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
- World in Conflict 1994-95*, Jane's Intelligence Review, (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1995).

XHUDO, Gazmen *Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans: A US Foreign Policy Perspective*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996).

ZAMETICA, John *Yugoslav Conflict*, (London: Brassey's, 1992).

ZARTMAN, I. William and Maureen, R. Burman *Practical Negotiator*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

Articles

AHMAD, Sheila.Z *UN's Role in the Bosnian Crisis: A Critique*, **Pakistan Horizon** (Karachi), vol.51, no.2; April 1988; pp.83-92.

AKASHI, Yasushi *Searching for the Solution of Crisis in ex-Yugoslavia*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1035-36; 15 August -15 September 95; pp.12 and 21-23.

ALBRIGHT, Madeline.K *Normalising Bosnia*, **Encounter** (London), vol.1, no.4; July-Aug. 1998; pp.102-115.

ANDO, Salvo *Preparing the Ground for an Alliance Peacekeeping Role*, **NATO Review** (Brussels), vol.41, no.2; April 1993; pp.4-9

ANNAN, Kofi.A *UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO*, **NATO Review** (Brussels), vol.41, no.5; October 1993; pp.3-6

ASHTON, Barry *Making Peace Agreements Work: United Nations Experience in the Former Yugoslavia*, **Cornell International Law Journal** (Nebraska), vol.30: 1997; pp.769-788.

ATYIAS, Nimet.B *Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, **The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science** (Philadelphia), vol.542; November 1995; pp.185-201

ATKESON, Edward.B *Bosnia Update*, **Army** (Arlington), vol.46, no.9; September 1996; pp.16-26.

- BASS, Warren *The Triage of Dayton*, **Foreign Affairs** (New York), vol.77, no.5; September/October 1998; pp.95-108
- BERKOWITZ, Bruce.D *Rules of Engagement for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia*, **Orbis** (Philadelphia), vol.38, no.4; Fall 1994; pp.635-646
- BICHOLLS, D.V *Bosnia: UN and NATO*, **RUSI Journal** (London), vol.141, no.1; February 1996; pp.31-36.
- BILDT, Carl *Implementing the Civilian tasks of the Bosnian Peace Agreement*, **NATO Review** (Brussels), vol.44, no.5; September 1996; pp.3-6.
- BILDT, Carl *Prospects for Bosnia*, **RUSI Journal** (London), vol.141, no.5; October 1996; pp.1-5.
- Bosnia lessons learned*, **Military Review** (Kansas), vol.77, no.4; July-August 1997; pp.62-91.
- BOYD, Charles.G *Making Bosnia Work*, **Foreign Affairs** (New York), vol.77, no.1; January/February 1998; pp.42-55.
- _____ *Making peace with the guilty: The truth about Bosnia*, **Foreign Affairs** (New York), vol.74, no.5; September/October 1995; pp.22-38.
- BUDANSKY, Stephen *Bosnia: too little, too late*, **US News and World Report** (Washington D.C.), vol.14, no.19; May 17, 1993; pp.22-35.
- BUGAJSKI, Janus *Policy Forum: Bosnia- After the troops leave*, **Washington Quarterly** (Washington D.C.), vol.19, no.3; Summer 96; pp.61-86.
- BUNCE, Valery *The Elusive Peace in the Former Yugoslavia*, **Cornell International Law Journal** (Nebraska), vol.28, no.3; Symposium 1995; pp.709-718.
- BURG, Steven. L *Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart*, **Current History** (Philadelphia), vol.92, no.577; November 1993; p.357.
- CALIC, Marie-Janine *Bosnia-Herzegovina after Dayton: Opportunities and risks for peace*, **Aussen Politik** (Hamburg), vol.47, no.2; 1996; p.127-35.

- CHOSSUDOVSKY, Michel *Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonizing Bosnia, Capital and Class* (London), vol.62; 1997; pp.1-12.
- COHEN, Lenard. J *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile peace in a Segmented State, Current History* (Philadelphia), vol.99, no.599, March 1996; pp.103-12.
- _____ *Whose Bosnia?: The politics of nation building, Current History* (Philadelphia), vol.97, no.619; March 1998; pp.103-112.
- COHEN, Roger *After the Vultures, Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol.77, no.3; May/June 1998; pp.106-111.
- COUSENS, Elizabeth. M *Making peace in Bosnia Work, Cornell International Law Journal* (Nebraska), vol.30, 1997, pp.789-818.
- CVIIC, Christopher *Croatia's Violent Birth, Current History* (Philadelphia), vol.92, no.577; November 1993; p.373.
- _____ *Running Late: But is Dayton still on Track, World Today* (London), vol.52, no.6; pp.144-46.
- CZYREK, Josef *The Balkan Kettle, Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1038; 15 November 95; pp.5-8.
- DAALDER, Iva.H *Bosnia after SFOR: Options for continued US engagement, Survival* (Oxford). vol.39, no.4, Winter 1997-98; pp.5-18.
- DODER, Dusko *Yugoslavia: New War old hatreds, Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colorado), vol.91; Summer 1993; pp.3-23.
- DRUCKMAN, Daniel and Christopher Mitchell *Flexibility in Negotiation and Mediation, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia), vol.542; November 1995, pp.10-23
- ELLINGWOOD, Susan *The Dayton Game, The New Republic* (Washington D.C.), 14-21 July 1997; pp.16-17.
- EYAL, Jonathan *Ten Commandments to Cleanse the guilt in Bosnia, World Today* (London), vol.52, no.2; December 1996; pp.380-383.

- FOGELQUIST, Alan. F *Russia Bosnia and the Near Abroad*, Paper presented at the International Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina organised by Bilkent University and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 19 April 1995; p.1.
- FRANCKE, Klaus *Importance of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1056; 15 May 1997; pp.19-20.
- FRYE, Timothy. M *Ethnicity Sovereignty and Transition from Non-democratic Rule, Journal of International Affairs* (New York), vol.45, no.2; Winter 1992; p.169.
- GALBRAITH, Peter. W *Washington, Erdut and Dayton: Negotiating and Implementing Peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cornell International Law Journal* (Nebraska), vol.30, no.3; 1997; pp.643-83.
- GLITMAN, Maynard *US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a flawed approach, Survival* (Oxford), vol.38, no.4; Winter 1996-97; pp.66-83.
- GRAHAM, John *Black past Grey Future, International Journal* (Toronto), Spring 1998, pp.204-220.
- HAGLUND, David.G *Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths, and Policy Dilemmas, International Journal* (Toronto), vol.50; Autumn 1995; pp.651-674.
- HAKSAR, A.N.D *Bosnia: Background and Prospects, World Affairs* (New Delhi), vol.3, no.1; June 1994; pp.58-68.
- HAMZIK, Pavol *Peace in the Balkans of Fundamental Importance, Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1053-54; 15 February-15 March 1997; pp.1-3.
- HANSEN, Annika.S *Political Legitimacy, Confidence-Building and the Dayton Peace Agreement, International Peacekeeping* (London), vol.4, no.2; Summer 1997; pp.74-90.
- HOPPE, Hans-Joachim *Russia's Balkan Policy, Aussen Politik* (Hamburg), vol.49; Third Quarter 1998; pp.40-47.

- HUNTER, Greg *Bosnian Serbs left isolated as Dayton continues to drift*, **Jane's Intelligence Review** (Surrey), vol.9, no.9; September 1997; pp.396-400.
- HUQ, Ramjul *Bosnian Crisis: Failure of International diplomacy*, **Journal of International Relations** (Dhaka), vol.1, no.2; January-June 1994; pp.103-154.
- JOVANOVIC, Zivadin *Firm Commitment of FR of Yugoslavia to consistent Implementation of the Dayton Agreement*", **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.50, no.1076; 15 January 1999; pp.1-2.
- KARTHA, Tara *Rest of the World and Erstwhile Yugoslavia*, **Strategic Analysis** (New Delhi), vol.16, no.10; January 1993.
- KATZ, Mark.N *Superpower Conflict Resolution: Lessons for the Future*, **The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science** (Philadelphia), vol.518; November 1991; pp.177-187.
- KING, Charles *World Waits for Signals from Bosnia*, **World Today** (London), vol.52, no.2; February 1996; pp.32-34.
- KOSLAWSKI, Gerd *Bosnia: Failure of the Institutions and of the Balance of Power in Europe*, **Aussen Politik** (Hamburg), vol.41, no.4; 1996; pp.359-367.
- KRSLJANIN, Vladimir *Who in the Balkans Defends the European Peace*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.45, no.1022; 1994; pp.6-7.
- KUMAR, Radha *The Troubled History of Partition*, **Foreign Affairs** (New York), vol.76, no.1; January/February 1997; pp.22-35.
- LAKIC, Zoran *The Balkans, Peace and Cooperation*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47; no.1051; 15 December 1996; pp.19-22.
- LEURDIJK, Dick.A *Before and After Dayton: The UN and NATO in the former Yugoslavia*, **Third World Quarterly** (Cambridge), vol.18, no.3; 1997; pp.457-470.
- _____ *The UN and NATO in Former Yugoslavia*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46; no.1037; 15 December 1995; pp.1-6.

- LINHONG, Zhang *Adjustments in US Policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and their Impact*, **International Strategic Studies** (Beijing), no.2; June 1999; pp.36-42.
- LOWENSTEIN, L.F. *Peace-making without power is pathetic! (The dilemma in Bosnia)*, **International Journal of Group Tensions** (New York), vol.25, no.4; Winter 1995; pp.289-98.
- LUTOVAC, Zoran *Options for Solution of the Problem of Kosovo*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1056; 15 May 1997; pp.10-14.
- MacINNIS, John.A. *The Rules of Engagement for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Former Yugoslavia: A Response*, **Orbis** (Philadelphia), vol.39, no.1; Winter 1995; pp.97-99.
- MAJESKI, Stephen. J and Shane Fricks *Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations*, **Journal of Conflict Resolution** (London), vol.39, no.4; December 1995; p.622-45.
- MARKOVIC, Brana *Yugoslav Crisis-Causes And Consequences*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1034; 15 July 1995; pp.21-23.
- MAULL, Hanns. W. *Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis*, **Survival** (Oxford), vol.37, no.4; Winter 1995-96; p.99.
- McCAUSLAND, Jeffery.D. *Arms Control and the Dayton Accords*, **European Security** (London), vol.6, no.2; Summer 1997; pp.18-27.
- MEHROTRA, O.N. *International Security and Ethnic Crisis*, **Strategic Analysis** (New Delhi), vol.23, no.2; May 1999.
- MILINKOVIC, Branislav *FR Yugoslavia and OSCE: Inertia of a Suspension*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1056; 15 May 1997; pp.14-18.
- MITCHELL, C.R. *Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and Resolution*, **The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science** (Philadelphia), vol.518; November 1991; pp.23-38.

- MOODIE, Michael *The Balkan Tragedy*, **The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science** (Philadelphia), vol.541; September 1995; pp.101-115
- MOROZOV, Andrey *American Demands in the Balkans*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1061; 15 October 1997; pp.21-26.
- MUGHISUDDIN, Oya.A *Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis: The role and Involvement of Foreign Powers and International Agencies in the Conflict*, **Iranian Journal of International Affairs** (Tehran), vol.7, no.2; Summer 1995; pp.288-318.
- NEVILLE-JONES, Pauline *Dayton, IFOR and alliance relations in Bosnia*, **Survival** (Oxford), vol.38, no.4; Winter 1996-97; pp.45-65.
- NOEV, Boyko *More Optimism for the Balkans*, **NATO Review** (Brussels), vol.41, no.2; April 1993; pp.10-14.
- O'SHEA, Brendan *Bosnia's Muslim/Croat Federation: A step in the Right Direction or Another Recipe for Disaster*, **Studies in Conflict and Terrorism** (Washington D.C.), vol.19, no.4; 1996; pp.403-411.
- OBRADOVIC, Konstantin *Are we truly nearing the end of the war?*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1035-36; 15 August-15 September 1995; pp.9-11.
- _____ *Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina?*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1045; 15 June 96; pp.6-11.
- _____ *Z-4 Plan: Contents and Achievements*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1028-31; 15 April 1995; pp.6-9.
- OGATA, Sadako *UNHCR in Bosnia: An uphill struggle, 11 months after Dayton*, **NATO Review** (Brussels), vol.44, no.6; November 1996; pp.17-19.
- PAPAYOANOU, Paul.A *Intra-Alliance Bargaining and US, Bosnia Policy*, **Journal of Conflict Resolution** (London), vol.41, no.1; February 1997; pp.91-116.
- Peace in Bosnia: The Balkan end-game*, **Economist** (London), vol.338, no.7949; January 20 1996; pp.19-23.

PETKOVIC, Ranko *New Initiatives for Cooperation and Security in the Balkans*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1051; 15 December 1996; p.11-16.

_____ *New Peace Initiatives*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1035-36; 15 August-15 September 1995; pp. 6-9.

_____ *The Balkan Political map after Cold War and Yugoslav Crisis*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1044; 15 May 1996; pp.1-4.

_____ *Yugoslavia and NATO*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1060; 15 September 97; pp.11-13.

_____ *Russia's role in the Yugoslav Crisis*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.45; no.1026-27; October 1994; pp.1-5.

_____ *Russia and USA in Yugoslav Crisis*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.45, no.1022; June 1994, pp.13-14.

_____ *Elections and the Sanctions: Implementation of the Dayton Agreement*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1049-50; 15 October - 15 November 1996; pp.6-8.

PHIPPARD, Helen. Leigh *Contact Group on and in Bosnia: an exercise in conflict mediation*, **International Journal** (Toronto), vol.53, no.2; Spring 1998; pp.306-324.

QADER, M.A *United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: Evaluation of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, **BISS Journal** (Dhaka), vol.14, no.2; April 1993; pp.209-228.

RACIC, Obrad *The United Nations Charter and Internal Conflicts*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1043; 15 April 1996; pp.3-6.

RADIVOSEVIC, Zoran *Yugoslav Crisis and United Nations Decisions*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1028-31; 15 April 1995; pp.4-6.

- RAMET, Sabrina.P *Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, **Current History** (Philadelphia), vol.93, no.586; November 1994; pp.380-385.
- RIPLEY, Tim *Bosnian Serbs so far sticking to Dayton*, **Jane's Intelligence Review** (Surrey), vol.8, no.11; November 1996; pp.501-503.
- ROBERTS, Ivor *Bosnia: A British Perspective*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1032; 15 April 1995; pp.19-22.
- ROSE, H.M *Year in Bosnia: What was achieved*, **Studies in Conflict and Terrorism** (Washington D.C.), vol.19, no.3; July-September 1996; pp.221-228.
- ROSENGARTEN, Ulrich *The Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia*, **Aussen Politik** (Hamburg), vol.49; Third Quarter, 1998; pp.32-39.
- SATTAR, Noman and Louise Liu *UN role in Bosnia: Mandate, Means, and impartiality in peace-keeping*, **Strategic Studies** (Islamabad), Vol.18, no.4; Summer 1996; pp.48-72..
- SCHEAR, James.A *Bosnia's Post-Dayton traumas*, **Foreign Policy** (Boulder, Colorado), vol.104; Fall 1996; pp.86-100.
- SHARP, Jane M.O *Bosnia: Begin Again*, **The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists** (Chicago), March/April, 1997; pp.17-19.
- _____ *Dayton Report Card*, **International Security** (Cambridge), vol.22, no.3; Winter 1997/98; pp.101-137.
- SHULTZ Jr. Richard.H *State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis*, **The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science** (Philadelphia), vol.541; September 1995; pp.75-88
- SILVERBERG, David *Threading through the Bosnian Bog: Where others failed, can Americans succeed ?* **Armed Forces Journal** (McLean, VA), vol.133, no.3; October 95; pp.24-50.
- SIMIC, Predrag *Yugoslavia in the Peace Process*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1034; 15 July 1995; pp.10-11.

- _____ *Conflict Management Versus Conflict Solution: the case of Yugoslavia*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.45, no.1026-27; October 1994; pp.5-10;
- _____ *Bosnia - Two Years after Dayton*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1060; 15 September 1997; pp.5-10.
- _____ *The Bosnian Endgame*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1048; 15 September, 1996; pp.3-12.
- _____ *The End of the War*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1039-40; 15 December 95 - 15 January 1996; pp.3-6.
- SMITH, Leighton *IFOR: Half-way through the Mandate*, **RUSI Journal** (London), vol.141, no.4; August 96; pp.13-17.
- SMITH, Leighton.W *Pillars of Peace in Bosnia*, **NATO Review** (Brussels), vol.44, no.4; July 1996; p.11-16.
- SOLANA, Javier *NATO's Role in Bosnia*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1043; 15 April 1996; pp.1-3.
- STAMBUK, Vladimir *The Balkans – A European Region of Stability and Cooperation*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.46, no.1034; 15 July, 1995; pp.24-28.
- STOJANOVIC, Radoslav *The Balkans and International Security*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1039-40; 15 December 1995 - 15 January 1996; pp.27-30.
- _____ *Croatian-Serbian Conflict and War in Yugoslavia*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1049-50; 15 October - 15 November 1996; pp.8-11.
- STOJKOVIC, Momir *Hindrances to the Peace Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.45, no.1022; June 1994; pp.1-4.
- SZASZ, Paul. C *Protection of human rights through the Dayton/Paris peace agreement on Bosnia*, **American Journal of International Law** (Lancaster), vol.90, no.2; April 1996; pp.3-6.

- _____ *The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement*, **Cornell International Law Journal** (Nebraska), vol.30; 1996; pp.759-768.
- _____ *Peacekeeping in Operation: A Conflict Study of Bosnia*, **Cornell International Law Journal** (Nebraska), vol.28, no.3; Symposium 1995; pp.685-699.
- TAFT, William.H *The NATO role in Europe and the US role in NATO*, **NATO Review** (Brussels), vol.40, no.4; August 1992; pp.14-19.
- THAROOR, Shashi *United Nations Peace-keeping in Europe*, **Survival** (Oxford), vol.37, no.2; Summer 1995; p.125.
- Towns of Trouble*, **Economist** (London), vol.342, no.8005; 22 February 1997; p.62.
- VARADY, Tibor *The Predicament of Peacekeeping in Bosnia*, **Cornell International Law Journal** (Nebraska), vol.28, no.3; Symposium 1995; pp.701-707.
- VEREMIS, Thanos *Avoiding Another Balkan War: Strategy on Conflict Prevention in Kosovo*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.48, no.1053-54; 15 February-15 March 1997; pp.5-8.
- VOORHOEVE, Joris *Bosnia and European Security: The Interests at Stake*, **RUSI Journal** (London), vol.141, no.3; June 1996; pp.1-4.
- VUCKOVIC, Slobodan *Measures for the Solution of the Yugoslav Crisis*, **Review of International Affairs** (Belgrade), vol.47, no.1039-40; 15 December 1995 - 15 January 1996; pp.30-32.
- VULLIAMY, Ed *Bosnia: the crime of appeasement*, **International Affairs** (Moscow), vol.74, no.1; January 1998; pp.73-92.
- WESTON, Charles *American Foreign Policy Under Clinton*, **Aussen Politik** (Hamburg), vol.45, no.2; 1994; pp.226-235.
- WILHELM, Tom *With the Russian Bridge in Bosnia: Military Teamwork and the Success of IFOR*, **European Security** (London), vol.6, no.2; Summer 1997; pp.47-52.

WOODWARD, Susan.L *Bosnia After Dayton: Year Two*, **Current History** (Philadelphia), vol.96; no.608; March 1997; pp.97-103.

_____ *Bosnia*, **Brookings Review** (Washington D.C.), vol.15, no.2; Spring 1997; pp.29-31.

WRIGHT, Joanne *European Security-Post Bosnia*, **European Security** (London), vol.6, no.2; Summer 1997; pp.1-17.

ZARTMAN, I. William *Conflict And Resolution: Contest, Cost and Change*, **The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science** (Philadelphia), vol.518; November 1991; pp.11-22.

News Papers and Periodicals

Facts on File (New York)

The Guardian Weekly (Washington D.C.)

The New York Times (New York)

The Times (London)

INTERNET SOURCES

<http://www.unige.ch/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytoncompl.html>

[http://207/2571.25/world/9609/08/bosnia.borders/](http://207.2571.25/world/9609/08/bosnia.borders/)

secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999/ps990128.html

suc.suc.org/politics/chronology/chron_92.html

suc.suc.org/politics/chronology/chron_93.html

www.cnn.com/world/bosnia/index.html

www.eurasianews.com/bilklast.html

www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol1/yugo.html

www.foreignrelations.org/studies/transcripts/yugo5.html

www.house.gov/csce/oscert.html

www.int.com/int/today/wed/fpage/assess.html

www.intl.crisis-group.org/projects/bosni...its/bh10xrep.htm

www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/bosnia/reports/xx17_sep.htm

www.its.caltech.edu/~bosnia/doc/weudoc.html

www.its.caltech.edu/~bosnia/doc/history.html

www.itscaltech.edu/~bosnia/doc/genevasep8.html

www.lib.unich.edu/libhome/documents.center/cmfi.html

www.mac.doc.gov/eebic/balkan/dayton/road.html

www.micds.pvt.kiz.mo.us/academic/history/globissu/bosnguid/disinteg/disinteg.html

www.ohr.int/speeches/s960217a.htm

www.pitt.edu/~rcss/R-papers/brenner/brenner1.html

www.security-policy.org/96abs.html

www.security-policy.org/papers/1992/92-D102.html

www.security-policy.org/balkans.html

www.stanford.edu/group/sage/agreement/html

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/balkansfact.html

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosseca.html

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bossec4.html

www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/98...ard_bosnia.html

www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosnia_peace_agreements.html

www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/bosnia/balkan_conflict_chron.html

www.state.gov.www/regions/eur/bosnia/index.html

www.usembassy.hr/speech_remarks/981112.htm

APPENDIX

GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agree to fully respect the sovereign equality of one another and to settle disputes by peaceful means;

The FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other and agree to discuss further aspects of their mutual recognition;

The parties agree to fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made in the various annexes, and they obligate themselves to respect human rights and the rights of refugees and displaced persons; and

The parties agree to cooperate fully with all entities, including those authorized by the United Nations Security Council, in implementing the peace settlement and investigating and prosecuting war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

Annex 1-A: Military Aspects

- * The cease-fire that began with the agreement of October 5, 1995, will continue;
- * Foreign combatant forces currently in Bosnia are to be withdrawn within 30 days;
- * The parties must complete withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation of approximately 4 km within an agreed period. Special provisions relate to Sarajevo and Gorazde;
- * As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed period and to demobilize forces which cannot be accommodated in those areas;
- * The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military implementation force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN;
- * The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting tasks. The

IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection;

- * A Joint Military Commission is established, to be chaired by the IFOR Commander. Persons under indictment by the international war crimes tribunal cannot participate;
- * Information on mines, military personnel, weaponry, and other items must be provided to the Joint Military Commission within agreed periods; and
- * All combatants and civilians must be released and transferred without delay in accordance with a plan to be developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Annex 1-B: Regional Stabilization

- * Representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia, and the Bosnian Serb Republic must begin negotiations within 7 days, under Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) auspices, with the objective of agreeing on confidence-building measures within 45 days. These could include, for example, restrictions on military deployments and exercises, notification of military activities, and exchange of data;
- * The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia, and the Bosnian Serb Republic, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, agree not to import arms for 90 days and not to import any heavy weapons, heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters for 180 days or until an arms control agreement takes effect;
- * All five parties must begin negotiations within 30 days, under OSCE auspices, to agree on numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters;
- * If the parties fail to establish limits on these categories within 180 days, the agreement provides for specified limits to come into force for the parties; and

- * The OSCE will organize and conduct negotiations to establish a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia.

Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary

- * An inter-entity boundary line between the Federation of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic is agreed to;
- * Sarajevo will be reunified within the Federation of Bosnia and will be open to all people of the country;
- * Gorazde will remain secure and accessible, linked to the Federation of Bosnia by a land corridor; and
- * The status of Brcko will be determined by arbitration within one year.

Annex 3: Elections

- * Free and fair, internationally supervised elections will be conducted within six to nine months for the presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia, and the National Assembly and presidency of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and, if feasible, for local offices;
- * Refugees and persons displaced by the conflict will have the right to vote (including by absentee ballot) in their original place of residence if they choose to do so;
- * The parties must create conditions in which free and fair elections can be held by protecting the right to vote in secret and ensuring freedom of expression and the press;
- * The OSCE is requested to supervise the preparation and conduct of these elections; and
- * All citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older listed on the 1991 Bosnian census are eligible to vote.

Annex 4: Constitution

- * A new constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will be known as "Bosnia and Herzegovina," will be adopted upon signature at Paris;
- * Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as a sovereign state within its present internationally-recognized borders. It will consist of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic;
- * The constitution provides for the protection of human rights and the free movement of people, goods, capital and services throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- * The central government will have a presidency, a two chamber legislature, and a constitutional court. Direct elections will be held for the presidency and one of the legislative chambers;
- * There will be a central bank and monetary system, and the central government will also have responsibilities for foreign policy, law enforcement, air traffic control, communications and other areas to be agreed;
- * Military coordination will take place through a committee including members of the presidency;
- * No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the international tribunal, and no person who is under indictment by the tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Annex 5: Arbitration

- * The Federation of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to enter into reciprocal commitments to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them, and they agree to design and implement a system of arbitration.

Annex 6: Human Rights

- * The agreement guarantees internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons within Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- * A Commission on Human Rights, composed of a human rights ombudsman and a human rights chamber (court), is established;
- * The ombudsman is authorized to investigate human rights violations, issue findings, and bring and participate in proceedings before the human rights chamber;
- * The human rights chamber is authorized to hear and decide human rights claims and to issue binding decisions; and
- * The parties agree to grant UN human rights agencies, the OSCE, the international tribunal and other organizations full access to monitor the human rights situation.

Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons

- * The agreement grants refugees and displaced persons the right to return home safely and either regain lost property or obtain just compensation;
- * A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will decide on return of real property or compensation, with the authority to issue final decisions;
- * All persons are granted the right to move freely throughout the country, without harassment or discrimination; and
- * The parties commit to cooperate with the ICRC in finding all missing persons.

Annex 8: Commission to Preserve National Monuments

- * A Commission to Preserve National Monuments is established;
- * The commission is authorized to receive and act upon petitions to designate as national monuments movable or immovable property of great importance to a group of people with a common cultural, historic, religious, or ethnic heritage; and

- * When property is designated as a national monument, the entities will make every effort to take appropriate legal, technical, financial and other measures to protect and conserve the national monument and refrain from taking deliberate actions which might damage it.

Annex 9: Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations

- * A Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation is established to organize and operate transportation facilities, such as roads, railways, and ports; and
- * A Commission on Public Corporations is created to examine establishing other Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations to operate joint public facilities such as utilities and postal service facilities.

Annex 10: Civilian Implementation

- * The parties request that a high representative be designated, consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to coordinate and facilitate civilian aspects of the peace settlement, such as humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction, protection of human rights, and the holding of free elections;
- * The high representative will chair a Joint Civilian Commission comprised of senior political representatives of the parties, the IFOR Commander, and representatives of civilian organizations; and
- * The high representative has no authority over the IFOR.

Annex 11: International Police Task Force

- * The UN is requested to establish a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out various tasks, including training and advising local law enforcement personnel, as well as monitoring and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities;
- * The IPTF will be headed by a commissioner appointed by the UN Secretary General; and
- * IPTF personnel must report any credible information on human rights violations to the Human Rights Commission, the International Tribunal or other appropriate organizations.

Agreement on Initialing the General Framework Agreement

- * In this agreement, which was signed at Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agree that the negotiations have been completed. They and the Entities they represent commit themselves to sign the General Framework Agreement and its annexes in Paris.

- * They also agree that the initialing of the General Framework Agreement and its Annexes in Dayton expresses their consent to be bound by these agreements.



