

A PROFILE OF RUSSIAN ARMY 1991-97

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DEVRAJ RAKSHIT

**CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN,
CENTRAL ASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI – 110 067.**

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जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI 110067

Centre for Russian, Central Asian &
East European Studies.
School of International Studies

GRAM : JAYENDU
TELEX : JNU IN
TEL. : 6107676/ Extn
6167557/ 2365
FAX : 91-11-6165886
91-11-6868234

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the Dissertation entitled **A Profile of Russian Army 1991-97**, submitted by **Mr. Devraj Rakshit** is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this university. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university and is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROFESSOR SHAMS-UD-DIN
(CHAIRPERSON)

PROFESSOR ZAFAR IMAM,
(SUPERVISOR)

Dedicated to
MY PARENTS

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PREFACE

The study seeks to draw a profile of an important institution of new Russian state under President Yeltsin after Soviet disintegration – the armed forces of Russia, during a well defined period, 1991-97. As an inheritor of once mighty Soviet Army with a proud record of victorious battles and onslaughts, the expectations were that the new Russian Army would quickly recover the damages of Soviet disintegration. However, these hopes were belied in the midst of chaos and instability of the entire socio-economic-political system of new Russian. The new state was in transition, and so was the Armed forces of Russia. Hence, we can do no better as a scholars than to draw only its profile during a crucial period of its existence, 1991-97.

This study comprises mainly in three chapters, followed by conclusions. We begin by examining legacy of Russian Army by focussing attention on the formation and growth of the Soviet Army and this chapter provides necessary historical backdrop of our main study. The next chapter focuses on the military reforms of the Russian Army and the effects it had on the Army. The third chapter deals with the post disintegration state of the Russian Army and the doctrine and strategy of new Russian State. This chapter provides various new strategies and doctrine that Russia would adopt in case of internal and external threats. The final chapter in about the future prospects of Russian Army and the obstacles and hindrances towards its growth.

The study is based on published source materials and relevant academic articles also from Russian journals in translated form.

Here it would not be out of place to mention that I met with an unfortunate accident during the final phase of this study. Although I was paralysed but somehow I managed to complete it on time.

In the course of my research work, I am fortunate to have received guidance and co-operation from various quarters. I felt that it is my moral duty to put on record a few words of acknowledgement here.

I take the opportunity to express my reverence, gratitude and indebtedness my supervisor, Prof. Zafar Imam for his constant help, guidance and encouragement. I felt myself to be benedicted to have a supervisor who enabled me to give concrete shape to an idea which occurred to my mind an year ago. At every stage, his scholarly discourses and valuable suggestions has deepened my knowledge.

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DEVRAJ RAKSHIT

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CHAPTER -1

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF RUSSIAN ARMY**

After Soviet disintegration, Yeltsin's Russia was recognised by the international community as the successor state of the Soviet Union, and as such, it inherited assets of Soviet era. A major such asset was the armed forces. However, like other important institutions of the erstwhile Soviet state, New Russia wanted to mould Soviet army to its needs. but this was not an easy task. With a view to understand this complex task ahead of President Yeltsin, and for drawing a profile of Russian army for our study here objectively, it is logical to critically analyse the historical legacy of Russia's army. In the following pages we propose to take up this exercise.

The Soviet armed forces were created simultaneously with the formation of first socialist state. The Soviet armed forces, in common with the armies of other socialist countries, was radically different. It was claimed to represent a qualitatively different military organisation diametrically opposed in its essence to all previous armies and to all existing bourgeoisie armies. As one of the last generals of Soviet army put it:

The armies of the capitalist states are a tool in the hands of the exploiting classes, which use them to further their interests and to keep the working masses in submission.... the Soviet armed forces were a weapon in the hands of the socialist state and its truly popular power. They expressed the identity of class interests between the workers and peasants, the friendship of peoples, and the moral and political unity of Soviet society, of socialist patriotism and of internationalism their aims and tasks reflected the character of the socialist social state system and the motive forces and advantages of socialism over capitalism¹.

¹ A.A. Grechko., *The Armed Forces of Soviet Union*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1997, pp.5.

The ideological foundation of the Soviet armed force was Marxism - Leninism and by its very nature the Soviet military establishment was designed to be used in the interests of a just and progressive cause. This determined the fundamentally new and genuinely popular social role, meaning and significance of all activities of the Soviet armed forces.

Lenin first formulated the basic principles upon which the Soviet armed forces were to be organised and built . These were contained in his writings, most of which were completed on the eve of October revolution and during foreign intervention and civil war.

The significance of Lenin's principles about the development of armed forces lay in the fact that they were based on an indepth analysis and a generalisation of the working people's experience of revolutionary struggle against their exploiters, of the experience of proletarian revolutions and civil wars, and experience of building socialism. They followed from the objective laws governing Soviet development and revolutionary wars.

Major Leninist principles underlying the development of the Soviet armed forces included the following :

- a) The Communist party's guidance to armed forces.
- b) A class approach to the development of the armed forces.
- c) A unity of the army and the people.
- d) A devotion of proletarian internationalism.
- e) Cadre organisation.
- f) Centralised direction of armed forces.
- g) One man command.
- h) A high sense of military discipline.

- i) The armed forces constant readiness to repel any aggression²

These principles were closely integrated with one another. They embodied the socio-political and organisational basis of Soviet military development and constituted the fundamental premises for its guidance and direction. Hence the quick overview of these basic principles may in order.

A. COMMUNIST PARTY'S GUIDANCE OF ARMED FORCES

Communist Party's guidance of armed forces was the basic principle of Soviet military development Lenin believed that Communist party's guidance was a decisive factor in the might of Red Army and the basis of all victories. Questions of military policy and the guidance of armed forces always received unflagging attention from Lenin and the central committee. The party's and Lenin's dynamic and many sided activities in this area during the foreign intervention and civil war meant that the objective prerequisites and potentialities of victory over the enemy could be translated into reality.

The decisive role of the party in military development was clearly in evidence in its prompt and purposeful solution of all major questions relating to country's defence, to the formation of the Red Army and Navy, their equipment and sons. It was also much to the credit of the communist party that while organising the country's defence and building up the armed forces fighting power,

² Edgar O' Balance, *The Red Army*, Faber and Faber, London, 1970, p.27.

it was able to find out the most efficient structure and flexible forms and methods of political and military leadership to respond to any situation, however complex or difficult.

B. CLASS APPROACH TOWARDS BUILDING UP THE ARMED FORCES

The class principle is used in armies of all countries. But bourgeois military theoreticians tried to mask the class essence of the imperialist armies because it was thoroughly directed against the people's interests. The Socialist military however proclaimed the class principle openly, thereby emphasising the generally popular character of the socialist army and its close links with the people.

The class principle in developing the Soviet armed forces expressed their qualitatively new essence, their new content. This principle was diametrically opposed to the class character of the imperialist armies. While the army in a bourgeois state was used to maintain and consolidate the dominance of the exploiting classes, the Soviet armed forces safeguarded the interests of the entire Soviet people and defended their great socialist gains.

C. UNITY OF ARMY AND PEOPLE

The determining socio-political principles underlying the development of Soviet armed forces included the unity of army and the people. The unity was based on the fact that Soviet was the flesh and blood of masses. There was a close organic and inextricable link between Soviet power and workers, peasants and the people's intelligentsia. The revolutionary character and a close bond linked the

Soviet armed forces with the people who were major reservoirs from which sprang their fighting power and invincibility. The Soviet people loved their army and did everything in their power to continue to heighten its battle worthiness.

The communist party educated the Soviet people in the spirit of constant readiness to defend the socialist Fatherland, it inculcated respect for their armed forces. The officers and men of the Soviet armed forces returned the love and affection of the people. They were boundlessly dedicated to the people and would sacrifice themselves to safeguard the people's interests from imperialist encroachments.

D. LOYALTY TO PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

The fundamental principles which underlined the development of Soviet armed forces included loyalty to proletarian internationalism. From the very first, the Red Army and Navy, in keeping with Lenin's ideas on equality of all nations and nationalities, were formed as a single multi-national military organisation of socialist state. Educating the Armed forces personnel in the spirit of friendship and fraternity among the peoples of USSR and in the spirit of boundless devotion to the Soviet Motherland was a major condition for the monolith strength of Soviet Armed Forces.

On the international scene, the Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism can be seen in the community of social aims and goals, in fraternal cohesion of the socialist countries, in their armies militant alliance and

in their solidarity with the working people throughout the world. In safeguarding the class interests of the working people, the Soviet Armed forces safeguarded the class interests of the working people of the socialist community and standing guard over their peaceful labour together with the armies of fraternal socialist countries, they ensured the inviolability of the borders of the socialist community which is major gain for the international working class. The armies of the socialist community stand vigilant guard over world peace and people's security.

E. CADRE ORGANISATION

The principle of a cadre organisation in the armed forces implied that the functions of defending the socialist gains of the Soviet people could only be performed efficiently by a regular army, well trained and with a high sense of discipline. This principle was substantiated by Lenin during the foreign intervention and civil war, and was developed further at subsequent stages of the Soviet military development.

F. CENTRALISED LEADERSHIP

The principle of centralised leadership sprang from the specific nature of military establishment and tasks fulfilled by the army. In essence it lay in the fact that the commanders were guided by the decisions of the communist party and its central committee and Soviet government and in uniting the efforts of their troops, orienting them towards a steady building up of the country's defence

potential, heightening the army and navy's combat preparedness in peace time and orienting them towards victory in possible war.

G. ONE MAN COMMAND

The principle of one-man command was closely bounded up with the principle of centralism. This important organisational principle underlined the building up of the Soviet armed forces. This principle took some time to be established in Army as well as in Navy. At the time of foreign intervention and civil war, there was a shortage of commanders from among the people, trained adequately both militarily and politically, so the organisation and control of Red Army units were based on equal responsibility of the commander and political commissar. These two were responsible for the combat efficiency of the unit they were in charge of and responsible for the fulfilment of its combat sessions. At the time this form of control was justified. The commissars played an important role in enhancing the combat efficiency of the unit they were in charge of and responsible for the fulfilments of its combat missions. At the time this form of control was justified. The commissars played an important role in enhancing the combat efficiency of the Red Army and Navy.

Lenin while advocating the principle of one man command warned against a narrow and one sided interpretation of this principle. Leadership must not degenerate into a matter of issuing orders and edicts or into high handed administration based on fear which could lead to an abuse of power. Lenin argued that the principle of one man command was the basis of a system of military

leadership, both politically mature and as well as professionally competent.³

H. HIGH SENSE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE

The principle that there must be a high sense of military discipline was one of the most important features of Soviet armed forces. Lenin attached enormous importance to military discipline, seeing it as a major factor in the troops combat efficiency. He maintained that the commanders and commissars maintain a high level of order and organisation in the units in their charge.

Lenin showed the class content of the Soviet military discipline, indicating that it was based on a high level of political awareness among the personnel of the Red Army and Navy. The importance and role of discipline increased. The nature of possible war, the growing complexity of military organisation and the entire military field required a strict and unconditional fulfilment of military regulations and commanders orders, a high degree of organisation and prompt and well coordinated action by individual troops and units.

D) SOVIET ARMED FORCES CONSTANT READINESS TO REPEL AGGRESSION.

The principle of the Soviet armed forces constant readiness to repel aggression and to defend the Soviet people's socialist gains stems from the continued threat of war emanating from the imperialist states. Lenin repeatedly emphasized the exceptionally great role played by this principle and warned the Soviet people and armed forces of the vital need to follow the enemy even more,

³ A.A. Grechko., *Armed Forces of Soviet Union*, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977, p.42.

maintaining a high level of recreational vigilance, so as not be caught off guard. The communist party, in strictly fulfilling Lenin's instructions, did everything necessary to maintain the Soviet army and navy at high level of combat preparedness. Its importance gained immeasurably during the span of the Soviet era.

These were the basic principles underlying the development of Soviet Armed forces. Some of them, in form at least, were similar to the principle underlying the organisation and design of capitalist armies. These included for instance the principles of one man command and centralisation. But this similarity was more apparent than real. The class basis and mechanism of these principles in a bourgeois society could not be more different, they embodied a system of relations inherent in capitalism based on exploitation of man by man. The Leninist principles underlying the formation and the development of the Soviet armed forces convincingly demonstrated their effectiveness during the foreign intervention and civil war. They were later tested in military operations in great patriotic wars. Lenin's ideas on defence of the Socialist fatherland, the principles were underlying the development of the new army have been further refined and elaborated in the successive CPSU congress decisions, plenary meetings of the CPSU central committee and in other party documents, and these principles were used as party's guide to improving and strengthening the country's defences. It was in fact the Leninist principles which led to the formation of Red Army and also its subsequent development.

The decision to work towards a mass centralised 'regular' and professionally trained army began to take shape in the days immediately after signing the BRESLITOVSK PEACE TREATY. However the ideas about military organisation did not survive the early traits of the Soviet state. The Bolsheviks seized power quickly in October 1917, but they had to wage a bitter civil war to consolidate that power throughout the country. They were soon forced by the war, and by the intervention of the leading capitalist powers, to raise an army. In the spring of 1918 Lenin called for an army of one million men, and soon for three million, to defend the young Soviet state.

During the 7th Party congress on 7th March 1918, Lenin exhorted to "Learn the out of war property" and it was probably the first significant indication that change of course was in air. The task of organizing the defence of the country had become top priority since it had been observed that well armed and disciplined foreign armies had been able to impose on the Soviet Republic the extremely hard times of the peace treaty.⁴

The Congress included among its own resolutions a point that spelled out the need to train systematically and comprehensively in military matters and military operations the entire adult population of both sexes. These indications were still very ill defined the following day Lenin spoke again, in vague terms of the future armed force of workers and peasants one least divorced from the people

⁴ Francesco Benvenuti, *Bolsheviks and the Red Army, 1918-1922*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.36.

as something synonymous with the armed workers and peasants Soviets. The traditional concept of the 'militia' was still attractive even though recourse to regular models was not explicitly ruled out. It was in any case clear that the military preparation of numerically changed nuclei was favoured and this in itself seemed a new departure. That this objective was not solemnly and clearly expressed by the authorities at the beginning of March may be accounted for by the fact that the treaty of BRESLITOVSK provided for thorough demobilisation of Russian armed forces, including the detachment that was newly formed by the present government.

In organising the Red Army, Trotsky imposed strict discipline and centralized control, and recruited between 50,000 and 100,000 former imperial officers. He claimed that these steps were necessary to make the Red Army an effective fighting force, but they evoked widespread criticism within the party. The 8th Party congress in March 1919 pronounced the existing organization of the Red Army transitional and declared that it would be transformed into a territorial militia after the civil war, as Bukharin and Preobrazhansky in "The ABC of communism", write in 1919 they argue that the party must convince all proletarian and peasant troops" . That the workers have only become soldiers for a brief space and owing to a temporary need, that the field of production is the natural field of their activities, that work in Red Army must on no account lead to formation of any caste permanently withdrawn from industry and agriculture⁵

With the end of the civil war, there was an intensive debate about the transition to a territorial militia system. Commissions were set up and reports were prepared. However the circumstances did not favour

⁵ N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, p.39.

reorganisation. In 1920 the Bolsheviks tried to take the revolution into Poland on bayonets of the Red Army, but met defeat outside Warsaw. In 1921, they used the Red Army to suppress the peasant insurrection in TAMBO and sailors' mutiny in KRONSTADT. It was clear that, although victorious in civil war, the Bolsheviks still faced enemies abroad and opposition at home. A disciplined standing army under tight central control appeared to be a more reliable instrument for protecting the Bolshevik power than a militia that might be ineffective as a military force and open to hostile political influences.

The debate on the organisation of the army was finally settled by the military reform of 1924-25, which created a mixed system, with the emphasis on standing forces. The territorial militia element was retained for economic reasons rather than on grounds of principle. The Bolsheviks claimed that the Red Army was an Army of a new type, because its function was to defend the proletarian revolution of October 1917. It differed in important respects from the capitalist armies of mid 1920. Its commanders were not drawn predominantly from upper and middle class backgrounds, and it had a system of military commissars – political officers through whom the party sought to exercise control and instil loyalty. But the Red Army was far from embodying pre revolutionary socialist ideas of military organisation. It had been shaped primarily by the Bolsheviks determination to defend their power against enemies at home and abroad.

Lenin remarked that two conditions were necessary for a successful revolution in Russia : a socialist revolution in one or more of the advanced countries, and an alliance between workers and peasants in Russia. However by the end of the civil war both of these conditions were threatened. Europe had not been swept by proletarian revolution, and the failure of the Polish workers to greet the Red Army as liberators in 1920 dealt a further blow to the hope of revolution in the immediate future. Moreover, war communism, with its forced requisitioning of food in the countryside, had the effect of turning the Russian peasants against the Bolsheviks. Lenin repeated the two conditions for the success of socialism in Russia when he introduced the New- Economic Policy at the 10th Party Congress in March 1921. The new policy was designed to secure peasant support by ending state requisitions of food and allowing the market a greater role in the economy. The New economic policy proved rather very successful in bringing disused plants back into production, but it did not provide the basis for further industrialization. A bitter and wide ranging argument broke out in the Party about the correct strategy for industrial development. Military considerations were not decisive in this debate, but they were important. The Bolshevik leaders realized that the economic basis of Soviet military power was even weaker than of Russia in 1914. As the idea of 'Socialism in one country' gained acceptance, the lack of modern armaments grew more worrying. The Soviet state might have had to fight alone against the capitalists powers; and although it might have had the support of revolutionary elements in those countries, it would have had to face a formidable enemy.

In 1929 Stalin defeated his political opponents on both left and right of the party, set his own brutal stamp on Soviet industrialization. He launched the forced collectivization of agriculture, and pushed for an increase in the targets for industrial production. 1929 was also a key year for military policy. In July, the Politburo issued a decree on

The State of Defence of USSR⁶ called for an even faster drive to reequip the Red Army. The targets in the military plan were revised upwards : The Red Army was to have no fewer troops than its probable enemies in the main theatre of war and was to attain superiority in the decisive type of armament-aircraft, artillery and tanks. In the same year (1929) the Red Army adopted new field service regulations. The regulations commission noted "We have every reason to expect that Soviet technological might will increase from year to year and also surpass the bourgeois neighbors in arms and equipment. In 1931 the guidelines for military planning were altered once again. The Soviet union was to have more troops than the enemy in main theatre of war⁶.

The Bolsheviks believed that they needed a strong army because they were likely to face a coalition of powerful capitalist states in future war. They also believed that military power rested upon industrial power, and consequently by giving high priority to creation of modern armaments industry. Tsarist Russia had an intensive arms industry, to which the 1st WORLD WAR had given new impetus. But this was neglected under the New Economic Policy (NEP), and by the late 1920's, the Soviet Union had virtually low artillery and ammunition production, the aircraft industry was the brightest spot in the otherwise gloomy picture. Besides most of Red Army's weapons were of pre-revolutionary or foreign design. During the years for the first five year plan (1928-32) the

⁶ Edgar O' Balance, *The Red Army*, Faber and Faber, London, p.35.

production of arms and equipment rose rapidly. It remained more stable during the second five year plan (1933-37) but rose again after that as the threat of war loomed larger. In the early 1930's foreign weapons were acquired and used as basis for Soviet designs. By 1940 the Soviet union had strong defence industry and military technological base and had gone a long way towards attaining the goal of strategic self sufficiency. There was a sharp rise in the production of basic types of armaments which is represented in the table below.

**ANNUAL AVERAGE PRODUCTION OF BASIC TYPES OF
ARMAMENTS 1930 - 40⁷**

	1930-31	1932-34	1935-37	1938-40
<i>AIRCRAFT</i>	860	2595	3758	8805
<i>BOMBERS</i>	100	252	568	3571
<i>FIGHTERS</i>	120	326	1278	4574
<i>TANKS</i>	740	3371	3134	2672
<i>ARTILLERY PIECES</i>	1911	3778	5028	14,996
<i>RIFLES ('00)</i>	174	256	397	1379

While reequipping the Red Army the Soviet leaders rejected the concept, which was popular with western military theorists at the time, of small highly mechanised forces. They instead sought to marry the mass army of the modern military technology

The Red Army chief of Armament Tukhachevski and a group of officers close to him developed the concept of the "OPERATION

⁷ Julin Cooper, Maureen Perrie and E.A. (ed.), *Soviety History, 1917-1953*, St Martin's Press, London, 1995, p.62.

IN DEPTH" as a way of using modern arms in mobile offensive warfare. The main idea was that modern armaments made it possible to strike the enemy not only in his front line, but simultaneously in the whole depth of his order of battle. The enemy could be prevented from bringing up his reserves and stopping the breakthrough. This new operational concept tried to embody the qualities of manoeuvre and offensive that were said to spring from the class character of Red Army.⁸

Stalin however in 1930 rejected a proposal from TUKHACHEVSKI for expansion of weapons production, on the grounds that it would lead to an end of 'socialist construction' and its replacement with a system of 'RED-MILITARISM' Later however Stalin realised his mistake of turning down the proposal. "Red -militarism' was an apt term for many aspects of Soviet life in the 1930s. The creation of military power was one of the main objectives of the industrialization drive, and military requirement had an important effect on the pattern of industrial development. The Party saw itself as a disciplined army, combating hostile forces in Russian Society. The style of political and economic Leadership was military, the economic system was often called a 'command economy' official languages was sufficed with military wages : problems were "attacked" everyone belonged to one 'camp' or another enemies were 'crushed', the party conducted struggles on various front'. It was said "these is no fortress that Bolsheviks cannot storm".

Finally, the need for security was offered as one of the chief justifications for the Ruthlessness of Soviet rule. In 1936 Stalin declared that socialism was built in Russia and that antagonistic classes no longer existed there, this should

⁸ A.A. Grechko., *The Armed Forces of Soviet Union*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p.32.

in Marxist theory have helped the state to wither away. But in 1939 Stalin justified the strength of Soviet state by reference to capitalist encirclement and the efforts to the capitalist state to undermine Soviet power.

POST WAR DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ARMY :

Let us now turn to the post war development of Soviet Army.

With the end of world war II Stalin was faced with three gigantic problems concerning the Soviet armed forces and these were:

- 1) Demobilization.
- 2) Reorganisation on a peace time basis.
- 3) Enduring that the armed forces remained loyal to the party.⁹

Despite the huge numbers under arms, demobilization did not presented such a difficult problem as might had been expected as there was an urgent need for manpower to reconstruct Russian economy.

The optimum number available for military service had already been passed and by May 1945 for example it had fallen below 11 million. Systematically and quickly this total was reduced to about 5 million by February the following year, and then sank down to about 3 million by May 1948. After this as a result of Stalin's cold war policy, strength again began to rise, reaching another maximum of about 5.7 million in 1955¹⁰.

Stalin was determined to maintain a comparatively large peace time army, composed of very best. The discontented, mediocre and the indifferent were discharged, and only the every able and politically reliable were retained in the services. In the first stage of demobilization the politically suspect were

⁹ John Erickson, Lynn Hansen and William Schneider, *Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment*, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1986, p.36.

¹⁰ Michel Gardner, "The History of Soviet Army". Pall Mall Press, London, 1970, p.59.

discharged in droves. During 1945-46, a major reorganisations was planned on a peace time basis, but it was, however somewhat slow to come into effect, and was not completed by 1949. Stalin retained the position of commissar for defence until 1947, when a Defence Ministry was set up on more conventional lines to control and direct the whole of armed forces. Marshall Bulganin was appointed for the post, and took the title of Minister of defence.

In 1946 the old name of RED ARMY of workers and peasants was changed for the more embracing one of the 'SOVIET ARMY'. The wartime STAVKA was dissolved their former functions. The military council, presided over by the Minister of Defence, consisting of the heads of services and civilian political personalities was responsible for evolving policy decisions. The general staff was responsible for making plans to put these policies into effect. All the various arms and services had their own directorate each with its own staff, the Director of each being at defence Minister.

Soviet Military was divided into 23 military districts, all of which were directly responsible to the defence Ministry. The standing strength of the ground forces was to be 2.6 million The OSOAVAKHIM remained a valuable part time supporting organization, charged with training a reserve of specialists and giving basic military instruction. The ground forces remained predominant, both the air force and the Navy played a secondary supporting role. In 1946 Konev was appointed commander in chief of ground forces and was given the task of pushing the reorganization plan through.

In 1946 the armoured 'corps' was abolished, and in its place appeared 'TANK' and 'MECHANISED' divisions.

The tank division had about 280 tanks, assault guns and armoured fighting vehicles and strength of about 9,000 men, of whom only about 2,000 were motorized infantry. The mechanized division had a strength of about 12,500 of which half were infantry. They consisted of 3 regiments, each of tank and 2 motorized infantry battalions and had about 200 tanks and armoured fighting vehicles.¹¹

Despite the devastated nature of the economy and urgent need to rehabilitate, a fairly large, proportion of industry geared to the needs of armed forces, and large quantities of military material continued to be produced.

Stalin was convinced that the numbers counted, perhaps above anything else, and that more fire power was needed to support them. He advocated increased fire power for the division, defence in depth and completely mobile formations. These were the principles upon which he directed the reorganisation to be based. Independent military thought or views by senior officers and writers were discouraged and even articles written by prominent war leaders for military grounds Slavishly echoed Stalin's dictum and never deviated from it.

Stalin's five Principles of victory were :

1. Security of rear areas through political stability.
2. Morale.

¹¹ John Erickson, Lynn Hansen and William Schneider, *Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment*, West View Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1996, p.46.

3. Numbers of divisions and quality.
4. Man of equipment.
5. Ability and Skill of officers.¹²

The third major problem that Stalin had to contend with was to ensure that the armed forces remained loyal to the party, which of course meant himself. During WORLD WAR II and especially the latter part, a terrific esprit de corps had blossomed within the RED ARMY, which was bursting with pride at its achievements. Soldiers walked with heads held high in confident, not to say taunty manner, their pride in their profession manifest. The political officers and the Stalin eyed all this with distrust.

To boost morale, during the early part of war, military traditions had to be fostered and deferred to, and the political officers had temporarily to take a back seat, but from 1944 onwards when the final outcome could no longer be in serious doubts the far sighted Stalin instructed the ZAMPOLITS, or military deputies, as the political officers eventually became known, gradually to reassert their dominance. Stalin wished that all credit, the honour and glory for winning the struggle against Nazi Germany should go primarily to himself and the party, and not to military commanders. He did not want successful generals and other officers to form discontented cliques. Individual leadership on the battlefield was payed down. In 1946, Stalin had removed the popular ZHUKOV from his position as the commander in chief of ground forces, banishing him to a distant

¹² Michel Garder, *The History of Soviet Army*, Pall Mall Press, London 1970

obscure military district. Zhukov was replaced by Konev who was more self-effacing.

The power and influence of the political officers again rose slowly and eventually the party seized the armed forces in its grips. An intensive educational programme with a heavy political accent was organised for new regular officers. Officers were cross posted from the units in which they had served in action, and war time spirit of comradeship in arms declined. No longer was there a close co-operation amongst themselves, bred under heavy fire and difficulties.


With the strict imposition of party authority on the army, its morale sank and as they came into contact with the west, Soviet occupation forces tended to become disillusioned and discontented, and for the first three years in Eastern Europe and Germany there were spates of insubordination and desertions. Strict, almost brutal discipline was enforced and men of occupational forces were restricted in their movements off duty, never being allowed of barracks alone.

The 1947 constitution was amended and it decreed general military service for all men between the ages of 19 and 49 years, women could only be conscripted for certain tasks. The conscript for the army was required to serve for two years if he was an ordinary soldier, and for three years if he was promoted to be a Non-commissioned officer when his compulsory service ended, the man was posted to the reserve, which was reformed by different category. This new system started functioning smoothly by 1950.¹³



Stalin was obsessed with retaining power and through the MGB (ministry of State Security) continued to remove those he was jealous of, suspected or

¹³ Jonathan R. Adelman and Cristann Lee Gibson (ed.) *Contemporary Soviet Military Affairs: Legacy of World War II*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1986,



8956-7568

disliked. The MGB was under strict control of Stalin and its main activities in the post war years were directed against intellectuals and jews.

However there was a decisive change in the Soviet military doctrine with the launching of the first Sputnik, for this put an end to the invulnerability of the territory of U.S. The post 1957 period was characterised by the absolute advancement of nuclear weapons. The Soviets recognized the importance of surprise and the reality of nuclear war, which led them to begin restructuring the air defence forces and reorganising the ground forces into their modern form. With Zhukov at helm-- as Defense Minister from February 1955 to October 1957, the ground forces were given a leaner and a more mobile look, accompanied by manpower reductions in 1955 advertised by Khrushchev as part of unilateral Soviet move towards disarmament.

On completion of the State treaty with Austria in 1955, the Soviets announced transfer to the reserve of a number of men equal to the troops to be withdrawn from Austria. That number was estimated at 50,000, the equivalent of one to two division. They were moved into Hungary which thereafter became the main base for the Soviet "Southern group of Forces" During 1955-57, 1,840,000 men were released from the armed forces later, Khrushchev revealed that total Soviet strength was 5.7 million before this demobilization, thus disclosing a very substantial mobilization during the Korean war period. Soviet announcement intimated that 63 divisions and independent brigades had been disbanded, though no hint was offered as to the manner in which this effected the order of the battle¹⁴.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

Nuclear weapons thrust drew Soviet attention demanding changes in structure and tactics during 1954-59. Marshall Koniev had again assumed command of the ground forces in 1955, but the master plan for radical change was developed and implemented by Marshal Zhukov himself. The reduction in manpower whatever its political and economic advantages, assisted appreciably in this new rationalization and further modernization.

The Soviet military doctrine during that period lay overemphasis on Nuclear weapons. Naturally only the officers of the ballistic missile forces were satisfied with Khrushchev outlook. Thus Defense Minister Malinovsky spoke up for a co-ordinated development of the various branches of services.

Khrushchev 's insistence on the primacy of ballistic missiles confirmed for western analysts the presumption that the Soviet doctrine at beginning of 1960's was in many respects similar to the American doctrine of MASSIVE RETALIATION, namely that any attack against World Treaty Organisation (WTO) would be answered by the use of all the ICB Ms of USSR. It was an interesting feature of that period that Soviet rocket forces were still underdeveloped. The target precision of ICBMs was low, and their numbers was small too. An interesting development was that the reduction of long distance bombers was stopped during the Khrushchev period. Further research and development programme were initiated, and the first experiments were carried out to set up anti ballistic missile system. The Soviet air defence became suitable

for increasing achievements the opinion emerged that something similar could be developed against American missiles too.

The Soviet union produced nuclear weapons of increasing explosive force Khrushchev spoke once about a 100 megaton nuclear bomb; although most probably no such large bomb was ever produced, a 60 MT was tested in 1961. Such large explosion force has hardly any strategic significance, because it does not cause essentially greater destruction than a 5 or 10 mt. bomb. The situation did not change in the last year of Khrushchev era, the emphasis remaining on nuclear weapons of "mass retaliation" Nevertheless, taking into consideration the numbers of these weapons, the Soviet doctrine devoting that period should rather be called 'Minimal Deterrence'¹⁵

THE BREZHNEV ERA

In September 1964, Khrushchev, in one of his last acts, eliminated the ground forces as an independent command and placed them under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence, in effect leaving them in suspended animation. Three full years lapsed before the ground forces reemerged as an integral command, demonstrating that here was no case of Khrushchevian eccentricity but rather a protracted reappraisal of role and organisation of Soviet Army, all against the background of a thorough examination of Soviet military policy as a whole.

Brezhnev rejected the concept of 'one variant war' – nuclear war and nothing short of it – on the ground that it imposed unacceptable inflexibility on

¹⁵ Albert Seaton and Joan Seaton, *The Soviet Army 1918 to Present*, Bodley Head Ltd, London, 1986, p.86.

Soviet policy and was based on unrealistic assumption that conventional Soviet military means were incapable of attaining Soviet objectives. The "nuclearizing" of the Soviet ground force, when carried to extremes, left them dangerously deficient in all round capabilities. The possibility of the ground forces in a nuclear straitjacket disquieted many senior Soviet commanders but, in fact, Brezhnev had no such intention. Rather he developed for the first time a genuine dual capacity within the ground force.

Brezhnev's policy had for the most part prevailed effectively over the past decade and a half, from the mid 1960's to 1970 and from 1971-72 to 1985. The build-up of the ground forces particularly those deployed forward in Europe, followed the pattern of matching capabilities more precisely to objectives and moved closer to the combined arms concepts.

The Soviet command brought major new systems into the ground forces : Five new battlefield air defence systems, five artillery systems, new infantry combat vehicles and improved battlefield engineering and logistics equipment. The build up assisted appreciably in culminating inadequacies perceived by Soviet command : absence of a genuine dual capability, shortage of mobile air defense for moving columns and of conventional artillery and ammunition stocks, and the lack of infantry on the axes of armoured advance¹⁶

During the post Khrushchev period, the ground forces, as a "theater force" for operations in Europe, accepted a non nuclear phase of operation though it did not envisaged a conventional campaign in toto. The most prominent of these

¹⁶ Ibid, p 87.

changes were strengthening of conventional artillery components in Soviet divisions, widespread introduction of the T-62 main battle tank; introduction of BMP, an infantry combat vehicle; inclusion of a motorized rifle division within the tank army; an increase in the mobility and capability of organic air defense systems; and improvements in logistics in areas of fuel and ammunition.

Gorbachev and The Arm Forces

Gorbachev, shortly after he came to power, emphasised in the 27th CPSU congress that soviet military strategy would be unequivocally defensive. The military objectives as outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress emphasised upon the following:

1. Reduction by the nuclear powers of war – both nuclear and conventional – against each other or against third countries
2. Prevention of arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons' tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on and destruction of chemical weapons and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation.
3. A strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to units of reasonable adequacy"¹⁷

Mikhail Gorbachev outlined the policy of Perestroika which stressed the role of the individual in revitalizing the sluggish economy and ossified party bureaucracy. To restore trust and confidence in the system and to make Soviet citizens responsible for their work, Gorbachev claimed,

¹⁷ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agenc Publishing House, Moscow, 1986.

Corruption should be eradicated, the public should enjoy more freedom and party leadership should respond to public needs. He made it clear that he expected restructuring to be implemented in all Soviet institutions, including the military¹⁸

The Armed Forces Under Perestroika

The USSR's history of experiments with reform suggested that in the past civilian reform leaders relied on military to support their programmes. For their part, military establishment usually approved economic changes when it could anticipate from them the long term growth of its own capabilities.

Conforming with this historical pattern the Soviet military had appreciated the urgency of Gorbachev's economic reforms for development of sophisticated military technologies and weapons systems, but had a hard time understanding the link between enhanced military power and a more open society. Initially officers at different levels of command from Defense Minister down to platoon leaders, resisted the restructuring policy.

There was confusion about ways of implementing Perestroika in the armed forces. The very idea of granting more autonomy to Subordinates ran counter to the core premise of centralised Soviet military system which was rooted in deference to authority and unquestioned obedience to commander. The then defense Minister

Army General Dmitri Yazov admitted :

¹⁸ Natalie A Gross, "Perestroika And Glasnost In Soviet Armed Forces", *Parameters*, September 1998.

Generals, admirals and officers have no profound understanding of restructuring, they have not identified their role and place in it and have not come to understand that they have to start restructuring with themselves. They do not serve as models in enforcing discipline, upgrading professionalism, and ideological tampering of troops¹⁹.

It was only after June 1987, when Gorbachev had reshuffled the Soviet high command following the Cessna aircraft incident in Red-Square that restructuring of armed forces got off the ground. Restructuring the Soviet army meant some decentralisation of decision making to lower levels, reduction of Red tape, freer exchange of views, especially regarding shortcomings in trainings and cadre policies. Initiative and individual suggestions were encouraged, some criticism of command decisions were permitted, and closer interpersonal relations between leaders and those being led were sought. Not unlike Western military experts, under Perestroika reform minded Soviet commanders stressed realistic and flexible training, "accessible leadership", and self-motivated commitment in place of subordination and blind obedience. Traditionally, Soviets regarded the highly centralised senior command authorities which implemented elaborate plan as linchpin of total combat power. Soviet military reformers emphasized smaller combat units, junior leaders and individual combatants as critical elements of success on the ever changing modern battlefield, which is characterised by an accelerated tempo of operations, unforeseen changes in situation, and massive disruptions in command and control systems.

¹⁹ Ibid, p 69.

There was nothing new or surprising about Soviet attention to flexibility and soldiers initiative these discussions had continued in the military press for years. What seemed was is that debate was evolved into an authoritative, doctrinal reappraisal of the rigid centralised military system, which was seen as a potential liability in modern combat.

The Soviets came to recognised the positive relationship between a more accommodating military system in peacetime and a soldier's motivation and initiative on battlefield during war. In re-examining some of their leadership and training concepts the Soviets had responded to western technological and doctrine developments (e.g. high precision weapons, assault breaker Techniques, Air land Battle doctrine and Follow on Forces attack) which would fundamentally change the nature of battlegrounds of the future. Gorbachev's new military establishment favoured Perestroika precisely because it recognised the potential benefit of making the Soviet soldier more effective on the technologically complex modern battlefield²⁰.

Though the Soviet high command may found Perestroika compatible with the army's military technological requirements, Gorbachev's policy had not been easily accepted by military bureaucrats with vested interests in old system. As with civilian bureaucracies, groups of senior officers who owe their careers to the traditional ways obviously felt threatened by a more open military where their performance was subject to greater Scrutiny. The right to criticize command decisions granted to the lower ranks had provoked angry complaints from seasoned officers that Perestroika is eroding the Sacred unity of command. To mitigate the conflict between competing interests within the military, general Yazov had reassured officers that Marxist dialectical approach can reconcile

²⁰ Mary C. Fitzgerald, "The Russian Military's Strategy for "Sixth Generation Warfare", *Orbis*, 38,3, Summer 1994.

subordinates criticism with unity of command. Holding out a carrot to opponents of military Perestroika Yazov had promised his military improved housing and consumer services as part of the military restructuring package. Again, as in the civilian sector, losers in the military restructuring are the older, less technically competent career officers and NCOs who are entrenched in the military bureaucracy and are used to manipulating it for personal gains without having their performance subjected to scrutiny. On the other hand, restructuring was more fully supported by the younger, motivated and technically versatile combat arms officers, many of whom have grown to maturity in fighting army in Afghanistan.

MILITARY GLASNOST

In Russian history, Glasnost in the military, as in civilian society, was designed to occasion and exchange of opinions and ideas which was in best interests of the leadership. In the 19th century Russia under *Nicholas I*, the champions of Glasnost promoted critical debates to correct the failures of bureaucracy and thwart corruption, which thrived among Russian officers of the time. The Grand Duke *Konstantin Nikolaevich*, who sponsored such discussions in the Naval establishment, believed that an artificially induced debate (ISKUSSTUENNAIA GLASNOST) would promote a constructive ferment of opinion about new naval regulations. These debates - held within limits strictly defended by the central Government - contributed to Russian Naval professionalism and made military system of the time more effective.

Russian, GLASNOST in the military unlike its predecessor stood for discussions critical of bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption. During the Glasnost campaign in the military and civilian press, Senior military officers and the Ministry of Defense as an institution had been criticised for inefficiency and misappropriation of funds. The Soviet public had learned, for instance, that its highly revered two star Generals have built private Saunas and Spas at the army's expense, and have made profits on the side by sending cadets to work on local farms. By castigating these activities, Soviet military reformers believed public openness would assist in correcting some of the army's present discipline and morale problems.

Secondly, Glasnost was also used to promote discussions in the military on topics ranging from rewards and punishments to shortcomings and exercises. Commanders were requested to solicit recommendation from junior personnel on issues related to education and training. Colonel General L. Batekhin, the chief of the Political Administration of Air force, public openness should be used to discuss possible improvements in training standards, specially to introduce high standards of combat readiness. A new deemphasis of indoctrination (*Vospitanie*) in favour of training (*Obuchenie*) means that Soviet military can tailor Glasnost to promote Perestroika, that was improve training methodologies and the quality of Soviet military manpower on individual bases, especially within its junior command component.

Thirdly, another aspect of *Glasnost* encouraged grass-root initiative in suggesting improvements in Military hardware and training procedures - changes intended to make the military system more cost effective. It also recognised the role of public debate in facilitating the decision making process, namely, making the military bureaucracy more responsive to suggestions from lower ranks. The soldier was also informed about command decision making - a pre requisite for developing lower rank initiative in peace and wartime.

Glasnost In The Military Press

The Soviet military press, which is clearly more open today than it had been since the 1920's challenged the stereotyped image of Soviet soldier as a communist superman. It discussed the plethora of social problems which the Soviet army shared with many other modern militaries : alcoholism and drug abuse, violence between first and second year draftees, corruption among senior officers, and illegal arms trading in units stationed in Central Asia.

Another aspect of *Glasnost* in the military press had been the new candor in assessing Soviet military performance during world war II. Though criticism of selected topics of Soviet operations (e.g. organisation of the logistic and medical services during the initial period of war) appeared in the military press during the late 1970's to early 1980's, recent discussions have scrutinized Soviet failures during all phases of war.

Soviet military had mixed feelings about *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*. On one hand, it hoped to benefit from Gorbachev's reforms by making the tightly controlled military system more responsive to western technological and doctrinal challenges. On the other hand, these new policies brought into question the legitimacy of the military institution in Soviet society and create tensions between civilian and Military elites. Glasnost jeopardised the vested interests of many senior officers and generates apprehensions about the disruptive effects a more open society may have on the army's morale and political reliability.

Soviet armed forces was the largest in the world in terms of numbers and technology on the eve of its disintegration. In the highly ideological and multiracial society, the Soviet armed forces come nearest to being a 'national' institution. It was for these reasons also that military, political and operational, that the Soviet military system assumed such complexity though the form and structure of Soviet armed forces which existed in the time of disintegration was established at the beginning of the 1960's with the introduction of strategic Missile forces as the premier arm. Behind the formal structure of five arms – Strategic Missile Forces, Ground forces, National air defense forces, Air forces and the Navy – lied a huge and intricate system of command and general support personnel, a military training organization of immense scope, a training organization which included pre-induction military training (extending to schools, factories and collective farms) and a civil defense organization which was highly ramified, as well as a military – administrative (and mobilization) apparatus which maintained a nationwide system of republic, provincial and local

"military commissariats". Separate national republics also had their own military commissar with attendant staff and apparatus. Nor it was possible to discount the very substantial forces maintained by the internal security organs, which cannot be described properly as paramilitary formations. On the contrary, in view of their standard military organization and variegated equipment, including light armor, extending also into the organization of the Border guards, these were an additional source of militarized manpower.

Soviet army on the eve of reform had certain distinguishable characteristics which can be discussed as under :

Compulsory Service

The Soviet military system was based on compulsory service; that is the obligation of each citizen of USSR to undergo a period of military service. Under the 1967 revision to the law on Universal Military service, the length of obligatory military service was set at two years for the Army and Air force, three years for the Navy, the coast guard and Border guard services.

The active strength of the Soviet armed forces at the time of disintegration was around 4,200,000 men, while the reserve strength of the Soviet armed forces was around 5,700,000 (This might be called the immediate reserve, for it comprises men who have served for at least twelve months with the active forces over the past five year period; the total pool of reserve manpower is much greater, probably in the order of twenty million men, half of whom have at least twelve months service with operational units, what is pronounced is the 'over production' of officers, which leads to a high increment of officers with "immediate reserve" status).

The Structure of the Soviet armed forces in terms of conscripts/volunteers is in the order of 65:35 (conscript to volunteer), and the presence of some two million conscripts in the Soviet forces represented about 80-85 percent of the available annual contingent of manpower. In addition, the pre-induction military training program - 140 hours of instruction for youth at school, in factories or in agriculture - meant that the Soviet conscript entered the armed forces which his basic training more or less behind him (drill, knowledge of the military system, rudimentary experience with weapons, signals, military equipments and so on). After the completion of his military service, the Soviet conscript moved to the reserve where he was retained until the age of fifty. Thus from early adolescence to the late middle age, the Soviet citizen was subjected to military obligation, to military training and service : the net result was to pass the entire adult population through the military training process²¹.

Supreme Command

There was also one other feature of Soviet military organization which defies comparison and yet demands some explanation – the 'Supreme command' charged with and committed to the declaration and waging of general war. The Soviet wartime commander-in-chief has not been publicly identified : in the day of the Khrushchev regime, Khrushchev himself assumed the post of "Supreme Commander", but Leonid Brezhnev had not been publicly invested with this responsibility, nor with the formal rank. The most likely explanation was that a small collective group of the Politburo is empowered to act as a "Supreme Command" – possibly five or so members, including Leonid Brezhnev. The problem was also complicated by the fact that the Soviet general staff (unlike

²¹ John Erickson, Soviet – Warsaw Pact Force Levels' USSI Report pp.17.

similar organizations in other military establishments) was essentially a command and operational organisation. In addition there was an alternative wartime command center in the volga military district.

Military Autonomy

In terms of basic military autonomy, the Soviet union was made up of sixteen military districts, which compared more or less to U.S. joint commands. Each military district had its own tactical air components, while the Soviet system also included several "Air Defense Districts". Outside the frontiers of USSR there were four "groups of forces" – East Germany (GSFG), Northern group (Poland), Central group (Czechoslovakia) and Southern group (Hungary). The Soviet Navy also maintained its four Fleet commands : Northern, Baltic, Baltic Sea and Pacific. The overall structure can be represented as under.

THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

FIRST DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTERS

**COMMAND IN CHIEF, WARSAW PACT FORCES CHIEF OF
GENERAL STAFF OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, GENERAL OF
ARMY.**

DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTERS

**HEADS OF THE SERVICES OF ARMED FORCES
STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES
GROUND FORCES**

NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES
AIR FORCES
NAVY.

OTHER DIRECTORATES

CIVIL DEFENCE
REAR SERVICES (LOGISTICS)
INSPECTORATE
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
CONSTRUCTION / QUARTERING.

STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES : COMMAND - ORGANISATION

HIGH COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
1ST DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
DEPUTY C IN CS.
MAIN STAFF CHIEF
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION CHIEF
DEPUTY CINCS (BRANCHES)
LOGISTICS
COMBAT TRAINING
MILITARY EDUCATION INSTITUTION.

GROUND FORCES : COMMAND AND ORGANISATION

HIGH COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
1ST DEPUTY C IN C
DEPUTY C IN C / CHIEF OF MAIN COMBAT TRAINING
DIRECTORATE
DEPUTY CHIEFS

MAIN STAFF CHIEF
POLITICAL DIRECTORATE CHIEF
CHIEFS (ARMS & SERVICES)
AIR DEFENCE TROOPS
AIR BORNE TROOPS
TANK/ARMOURED TROOPS
MISSILE AND ARTILLERY TROOPS
SIGNALS
*ASSISTANT TO C-IN C/CHIEF, MILITARY EDUCATION
INSTITUTE.*

SOVIET AIR FORCES : COMMAND AND ORGANISATION

HIGH COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
1ST DEPUTY C-IN C.
DEPUTY C-IN C.
MAIN STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF
1ST DEPUTY CHIEF
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION CHIEF
1ST DEPUTY CHIEF.
DEPUTY C- IN C. (BRANCHES)
LONE RANGE AVIATION
COMBAT TRAINING
ENGINEERING
LOGISTICS
MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION
MILITARY SCHOOLS.

SOVIET NAVY : COMMAND & ORGANISATION

HIGH COMMAND
COMMANDER - IN- CHIEF
1ST DEPUTY C-INC
DEPUTY C INCS

MAIN NAVAL STAFF

CHIEF
1ST DEPUTY CHIEF
DEPUTY CHIEF.

POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

CHIEF

DEPUTY C INCS (SERVICES)

COMBAT TRAINING
REAR SERVICES
SHIP BUILDING AND WEAPONS

ASSISTANT TO C INC / NAVAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION.

CIVIL DEFENSE : COMMAND AND ORGANISATION

HIGH COMMAND
CHIEF
DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF
1ST DEPUTY CHIEF
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CHIEF.

Source: Erickson, John. Soviet Warsaw Pact Force Levers, USSI Report pp. 36-37.

This chapter has discussed about the formation and the development of Soviet armed forces till its disintegration. The Soviet armed forces which was built and organised upon the Leninist principles since its very beginning became the largest in the world in terms of numbers and technology on the eve of its

disintegration. In the highly ideological and multiracial society, the Soviet armed forces came nearest to becoming a 'national' institution.

However when Gorbachev came to power in 1985 he introduced the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost for the country. In his programme laid a prime importance upon cutting down of troops and also emphasised upon prevention of arms race in outer space and destruction of all chemical and nuclear weapons. Gorbachev was critical of centralised decision making and he stressed upon the decentralisation of decision-making down to lower levels, reduction of bureaucratic management red tape and freer exchange of views.

With the disintegration of the USSR and later with the formation of CIS, the security requirement, changed suddenly. There was now an urgent need for reforms in the military policies and as well as the military structure under new Russia. The following chapter examines this very need for reforms and how these were carried out.

CHAPTER 2

**MILITARY REFORMS AND
THEIR EFFECTS ON
RUSSIAN ARMY**

With the disintegration of the USSR and the formation of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) the security requirement of Russia and CIS has changed dramatically. National security was one of the primary duties of the new government, more so, when threats to national security which can be manifested in the form of local ethnic wars or conflicts and from the unleashing of precision-guided munitions launched from distant and remote locations.

The challenges faced by the Russian Federation (RF) in the field of national security are numerous. Issues of state building, ethnic conflict, residual animosities towards former enemies, deterioration of the armed forces, as well as a multitude of socio-economic factors plague the Russian Federation (RF) and significantly limit its ability to perform its fundamental duties to its citizens²².

However, given the Post- Cold War scenario, reforms in the armed forces were considered top priority. Besides, the unprecedented scale and speed of domestic changes, further highlighted the need for radical military reform. It was not enough to say that Russia had inherited 76 percent of the territory and 60 percent of economic power and population of former USSR. True, most Russians still resided where they always had, shared traditions and a national character developed over many centuries, and had lived most of their adult lives under Soviet rule. But Russian Federation of today differs profoundly from the USSR of 1991 in many ways, notwithstanding standing the size and shape of its territory and borders and size and ethnic composition of its population.

²² Bakich, Spencer, "Military Doctrine Of The Russian Federation, Working Document Or Anachronism?", *Conflict Studies*, London, 301, July-August 1997, p.16

Russia's natural resources and communications network ; economic foundation, including financial and taxation systems; political regime, ideology, and moral values; and constitution and legal system, had all been greatly affected by recent change in politics. Even the State's name, flag, anthem and emblem had changed. These changes illustrate the extent of Russia's transformation - a transformation that was yet to influence the defense establishment to the same degree it did in other aspects of Russian life. This transition was at the core of the unprecedented crisis Russia now faced, and it helped explain the need for radical military reform. Two principal factors will fundamentally affect Russia's defense posture in the post cold war era; new military requirements and the availability of economic and human resources.

NEED FOR MILITARY REFORMS

There were urgent need felt among Russia's policy makers and military experts for reforming the armed forces in the changed circumstances, Political, economic, security factors had led to the debate for Russian armed forces reform and these are analysed here in the following pages.

Military reform consists of a series of political, economic, legal, military, technical and social measures designed to qualitatively transform the armed forces of the Russian Federation, other troops and military formations, military executive agencies, and defence production organizations ; these measures should also provided a sufficient level of national defence, given available resources. The term "military reform" suggested a more comprehensive framework than does, for

example, "reform of the armed forces", dealt mostly with military doctrine and strategy, structure, composition, force levels, combat equipment and training of the armed services of the Ministry of Defense. Military reform includes the comprehensive reorganization of the following : troops and formations, defense industries and war mobilisation assets, recruitment and social welfare systems, the division of power among branches of government dealing with military matters, the system of funding defense and security, and instruments for implementing defense policy, including military build up and use of force.

The general definition of military reform does not, however, offer specific guidelines for implementing reform. In recent years however a broad consensus has developed among a vast majority of Russian politicians on what these guidelines should be. The list includes President Boris Yeltsin, pro-reformist members of Parliament, defence experts, academics, members of mass media and ordinary citizens. The exceptions include both individuals on the liberal extreme (Valeria Nowdvorskaya, Gleb Yakunin and Konstantian Borovoi) and the reactionary right (Vladimir Zhirinovisky, Albert Makashov, Stanislav Terekov and Valentin Varennikov, who have recently been joined by *Lev Rokhlin*, Chairman of State Duma Defense Committee, and former minister of Defense Igor Rodionov)²³.

There were some areas where there appeared to be consensus. First for the near future Russia needed to maintain a defense capability that could address real threats and conceivable contingencies but that would not overburden the national economy. Second, the quantity of military personnel, combat units, weapons, defense sites, and military production facilities was not be sacrificed for higher-quality arms and equipment, housing standard of living, training and combat

²³ Alexei G. Arbatov., "Military Reforms In Russia" Diemmas Obstracles And Prospects", *International Security*, Vol.22, No.4, Spring 1998, p.116.

readiness, efficiency in maintenance and supply, and command and control and information gathering systems. Much more controversial, however, is the need to eventually shift from the current system of conscription to a smaller all-volunteer, professional armed force that is better suited to operate modern weapons and fight new types of wars. In addition, Russia's armed forces must shift from preparing for local and regional conflicts of much shorter duration. Third, area of consensus, also supported by a majority of the political military elite, was the need to rechannel Russia's strategic contingency planning from the global and western European theaters to theaters in the South (i.e. Transcaucasus and central Asia) and Far east. No serious policy-makers or defense planner in Russia today thinks about fighting in the theaters of former operations in central or Western Europe, The middle east, Mongolia or Manchuria, or about implementing support combat missions in, for example, Sub-Saharan Africa, South-east Asia, Indian ocean or the Caribbean.

Finally, there was near universal agreement in according highest priority to Russia's nuclear forces in order to address both the absolute and relative weakening of its conventional capabilities and its new geo-political vulnerability. Although practically nobody (except for a few extreme hardlines) seriously envisions a large scale external threat against Russia in the near future, most politicians, military officials and other defense experts want to retain a viable nuclear arsenal to ensure that such a threat does not materialize. Making nuclear deterrence a priority does not, however, imply a crash missile build up or a hair-trigger employment strategy. Rather, it means developing "inherent enhanced

deterrence". At present, Russia's planned nuclear force levels are lower than U.S. levels, and its sufficiency criteria come close to the concept of a "Finite deterrent" - that is, a capability to survive a preemptive nuclear strike and retaliate against a few dozen economic and military targets.

Despite bitter controversy over *Start II*, arms control retained broad support as an essential element of Russia's security strategy. This was a far cry from the days of former USSR's war fighting / Damage-limitation strategic posture, with its emphasis on first - strike operational planning and its avowed goal of maintaining 'Strategic parity', commonly interpreted as superiority in weapons over all combined opponents.

Need for military reform in Russia, particularly regarding new defense requirements, invariably focus on changes in the external security environment resulting from the collapse of the USSR and the disbanding of the WARSAW PACT alliance. Indeed this profound transformation occurring over less than a decade has forced serious readjustment of Russia's entire defense posture. The end of the cold war has forced Russia into a strikingly different security situation vis - a vis its new frontiers, relations with neighbours, and a host of other foreign policy concerns²⁴.

EXTERNAL THREATS TO RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CHIEF MISSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARMED FORCES

The October 1993 document, Principle Provisions of the Military Doctrine²⁴ of Russian Federation asserts the Russian Federation's (RF) military policy was defensive, and that RF has no aggressive intentions. However, this provision of

²⁴ Anton Surikov "Some Aspects Of Russian Armed Forces Reform", *Economic Security*, London, Autumn 1997, p.46.

the document required further clarification, since the objectives of Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) need to be made more specific. There were three key objectives:

1. The RFAF should be capable of effectively deterring any threat of a nuclear attack on Russia, on the CSR/CIS - 2 states or on the other CIS states that signed the 1992 Tashkent Treaty on collective Security. The community of Sovereign Republics (CSR) consists of Belarus and Russia. The community of Integrated States (CIS-2) is made up of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Russia. The Tashkent Treaty CIS states are Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
2. The RFAF aimed at deterring the threat of large scale conventional attack on Russia or on the CSR/CIS - 2/CIS states by foreign states or coalitions of states. It should also deter the repel foreign military aggression pursuing limited objectives. In both instances, deterrence would be nuclear.
3. The RFAF had the capability to carry out local wars and conduct peacekeeping operations, primarily within the borders of the former USSR. The capability takes into consideration the FSU is regarded as a Zone of vital Russian interests. The FSU zone has 25 million ethnic Russians and 10 million (non Russian) Russian speaking inhabitants. It was important that President Yeltsin, Victor Chernomyrdin and Yevgeny Primakov all defined FSU territory as an area of vital Russian interest²⁵.

There had been local wars on the territory Former Soviet Union (FSU) - in the Chechen Republic and in Tajikistan. Further by performing peacekeeping functions, the RFAF effectively deterred Georgia and Moldova from committing

²⁵ Ibid, p.47.

aggression against *Abkhazia* and *South Ossetia*, and against the *Trans - Dniestrain Moldavian Republic*, respectively.

Another factor was external threat especially from USA and NATO expansion. When the Russian State is weak and its military economic potential is declining, Russia's foreign enemies were becoming increasing bold in their actions. The reasons behind these actions seemed to be both political and military strategic.

Among the political reasons, the following may be mentioned :

1. It was believed that the West, via the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions, was forcing Russia to destroy her national industry and accept a colonial type of economy such an economy would be oriented towards exporting natural resources and a reliance on other countries in the area of food and high technology.
2. It was believed that the west was actively resisting any attempts to integrate the CIS republics, including the process of peaceful and amicable integration between Russia and Belarus, which the Belarussian people supported a national referendum. It was believed that west was attempting to create an atmosphere of political confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. It was also thought that west directly supports Azerbaijan's claim to a significant portion of the Caspian Sea, and that it indirectly supports

the Baltic republics of FSU in their policy of discrimination against ethnic minorities.

3. It was believed that NATO enlargement has the political goals of isolating the Russian Federation and excluding Russia from participation in the resolution of European problems. President Yeltsin stated in 1994 that any NATO enlargement would create a situation of '*Cold Peace*' in Europe.
4. It was believed that the USA's planned scrapping of the ABM treaty after 2003 has the goal of breaking the existing strategic nuclear balance between Russia and USA. If this were to occur, the USA would be able to dictate Russian foreign and domestic policy under the threat of nuclear blackmail.

The military aspects can also be highlighted :

1. The USA has a large nuclear missile potential that could destroy Russia as a state. It was believed this potential was originally created with a view of blackmailing the USSR and was primarily designed to deliver a first nuclear strike. Despite reductions within the framework of the START I treaty, the first strike capability is not going away. Rather, it is being strengthened. This was primarily due to the aforementioned policies of the American Leadership, in particular that of US Congress. The aim was to review the 1972 ABM treaty and to create the preconditions for

developing a strategic ballistic missile defence system (BMD) by 2003 and its subsequent development.

2. The American - led NATO, unlike the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) had not been dissolved. There had been moreover eastward expansion of NATO. Though the western politicians have offered their assurance that NATO no longer considers Russia an enemy. However, since any military block by definition inevitably had an enemy with comparable military potential, it was widely believed the very existence of an alliance demonstrates that the west considers Russia a potential enemy. History shows that military alliances were created and existed either for joint opposition to a military threat on the part of some third state or alliance of states, or to carry out military aggression against some state.

It is obvious that Russia does not currently represent a military threat to NATO members. Thus according to many Russian experts, NATO has an offensive character. Despite all arms and troops reductions under CFE treaty, the alliance's infrastructure was aimed at actions in the eastern direction. Although today NATO's conventional forces lack sufficient potential to conduct a large scale offensive operation against the Russian Federation similar to Hitler's invasion in 1941, this potential could be bolstered in the future and moved closer to Russia's borders. Seen in this light, the plans to enlarge the alliance definitely appear aggressive. Moreover, in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary steps are being taken to build an infrastructure, an airfield network and communications

for use in NATO's interests. One of Hungary's airfields had virtually been turned into an American military base.

3. The experience of the American and NATO operations in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and in former Socialist Federal Republic in Yugoslavia in 1995 - 96 demonstrate that even today the alliance has sufficient capability to carry out military operations with limited objectives in outlining districts of the territory of FSU.

The greatest threat of aggression may come from three possible directions :

First, the northern direction which comes in connection with Norway's decision to expand NATO's military activities in Northern Norway, for example a potential NATO military operation against bases of the Russian Federation's Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula.

Second, there was the northwestern direction, in connection with purported plans to create a 60,000 man Baltic corps composed of military units of Germany, Denmark and Poland. An example would be NATO military intervention in the event of a Russian conflict with Baltic FSU republics.

Third, there was the Southern direction. This threat arises in light of suggestions that the states near the Caspian Sea receive NATO security guarantees similar to those provided to the states of the Persian Gulf. Here the key role is given to NATO - member Turkey²⁶.

Japan an ally of USA can also be considered as a potential enemy of the Russian Federation. Japan lays claim to Russian Federation territory. Today Japan

²⁶ Anton Surikov., "Some Aspects of Russian Armed Forces Reform", *European Security*, Autumn, 1997.

lacks the military capability to attack the Southern Kuril Islands. However Japan has the potentiality and capability to increase its armed forces rapidly.

In addition to the USA and its allies, it was evident that Russia's neighbour, the People's Republic of China (PRC), a large and fast developing state, was also being taken into account in plans for developing the RFAF. Chinese military demonstrates that China was reducing the size of its ground forces. This indicates that China does not plan to invade the Russian Far East in the near future. At the same time, China was increasing its navy, its strike aviation and air defence forces, especially in the south of the country. Further China formed two airforce bridges and one naval infantry bridge. This confirms information from some sources that the Chinese military - political leadership had already decided to invade Taiwan in 2000-2005.

The Russian military experts say that the Russian Federation was implementing its military policy towards China (and other countries) very carefully. This policy takes into account that United States, since it considers China a political enemy, was attempting to create a military confrontation between China and Russia. It was also believed that USA was interested in a military confrontation between the Russian Federation and another US rival, Iran. As an argument in favour of confrontation, the idea of the so called Islamic threat to the FSU was being propagated. However experts say that upon closer scrutiny it became obvious that extremists movements in the FSU, acting under pseudo - Islamic slogans, are generally relying not on Iran, but rather on the Muslim world's pro-western regimes - Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

The main rivals on FSU territory are the forces of aggressive nationalism that are supported by foreign countries and have their own military units; armies, police, other armed units of FSU Baltic republics, illegal Chechen military units, illegal military units of the so called Tajik operation etc. The following four factors give rise to conflicts involving the RFAF on the FSU territory :

1. Ethnic discord and genocide against ethnic minorities. The following conflicts that directly or indirectly involved the Russian Federation Armed Forces (USSR) illustrate this thesis ; Transnistria in 1992 ; The Prigorodny district in North Ossetia at the end of 1992 ; South Ossetia in 1991 - 92; and Abkhazia in 1992 - 93. It appears that the following two factors will lead to ethnic conflict in near future. The first was that the events of 1991 divided the Russian people. The second was that ethnic minorities are discriminated against in all FSU states, except in Belarus and perhaps, Ukraine. This was most apparent in the Baltic FSU republics. It is believed that in the Baltic republics the restructuring of Human rights based on ethnicity has become an official policy and that western institutions, such as European council, had supported the development of such a policy. The Baltic FSU republics are the most probable FSU region for possible new military conflicts involving RFAF.
2. Attempts on the part of nationalist forces to use in order to seize or retain power in various FSU republics. Examples Tajikistan in 1992 - 96,

Lithuania in January 1991, Georgia in the winter of 1991 - 92 and at the end of 1993, Azerbaijan in January 1990 and in the summer of 1993.

3. Claims made on the territory of Russian Federation and illegal attempts to seize resources in the seas and inland reservoirs that belonged to Russia. Russia had so far managed to avoid direct involvement in any such armed conflict. However, this possibility had not been ruled out. A particular case in point is the BAKU regime policy aimed at usurping a part of Caspian Sea. The Caspian is an inland water reservoir whose oil resources belong equally to all the Caspian countries. Another source of conflict was a portion of the Baltic sea that belongs to Russia but was illegally claimed by Lithuania. The regimes in Tallin and Riga also claim certain northwestern territories of Russian Federation.

4. Aspirations on the part of certain forces in FSU to integrate with NATO, primarily in the Baltic FSU republics. It was widely considered that the RFAF should be prepared to use force in order to exert influence on armed nationalist units. The goal would be to halt any practical steps toward the realization of plans to join NATO. In any case, any attempt to bring the FSU Baltic republics into NATO could create a serious international crisis comparable with Caribbean crisis of the 1960's.

Human Resources as a Political Factor for armed forces reform

Apart from material and financial limitations, Russia's shortage of military manpower another compelling reason for the government to consider military

reform. However, it was also one of the most divisive issues in Russian domestic politics. Traditionally manpower, had been an almost unlimited resource in both the Russian and Soviet empires. It defined the historic tradition of building and maintaining large armies. Commanders relied on high levels of manpower much more than on technology or mobility, and on the practice of fighting wars by overwhelming opponents with their large numbers and by being able to absorb much greater losses than their opponents (which was most vividly demonstrated during world war II). For the first time in history, Russia does not have this crucial advantage. In the west, in the east and probably even in the south, Moscow faces potential opponents who have greater military manpower. At the same time NATO will undoubtedly retain its significant overall technological advantage, while China may achieve conventional force superiority in 10 or 15 years. The overall number of young men eligible for conscription (aged eighteen to twenty seven) stands at 1.7 million. Each year approximately 800,000 men in Russia turn eighteen and become eligible for the much dreaded draft. However according to a law entitled

'On military duty and military service', which was adopted in the spring of 1996 and amended during the summer and fall of 1997, however only half of them are actually called to duty, while some are allowed to use exemptions based on health education or family reasons; others are ineligible because they have criminal records; and some simply evade the draft at risk of being imprisoned of the young men actually drafted, only half (about 200,000) join the armed forces, while the rest are sent to other troops and military formations run by fifteen different federal agencies. With a two year term of service, at any given time there are about 400,000 -

500,000 conscripts. Given the military's standard ratio to 1 officer (including non commissioned officers) to every 3 conscripts, that would be enough for a full complement of 600,000 - 700,000 troops. In contrast, the actual strength of the Russian forces is about 1.6 million, of whom 500,000 are draftees; 1,00,000 are contract soldiers; and the remaining 1 million are officers, noncommissioned officers, and cadets at military colleges".²⁷

The ongoing shortage of manpower relative to the overall size of armed forces undercuts combat readiness, and was thus one of Russia's largest military problems. The average shortage in regular units was around 30 percent, but in some services, such as the ground forces, it was as high as 50 percent. The war in Chechnya, among other things, clearly illustrated the detrimental effects these shortages can have especially when combined with inefficiency of hastily assembled units. Further, at this inadequate level of manpower, quality has begun to steadily decrease.

For example, in 1996, 28 percent of draftees had below average intelligence, 40 percent were not physically fit, 25 percent were in ill health or combating chronic illness, only 10 percent had a high school or college education, 20 percent had problems with alcohol or drugs, and 8 percent had criminal records²⁸.

Russia's armed forces personnel dealt it with a variety of other problems, including the widespread abuse of young conscripts by older soldiers. Faced with shortages in both funding and manpower, inadequate housing and training,

²⁷ Charles J. Dick, "The Military Doctrine of Russian Federation", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Essex, Vol.7, No.3, September 1997, p.484.

²⁸ Ibid, p 485.

increasing demands to perform non military duties, and a general lack of morale coupled with less incentive for good performance, the officer corps often control troops through a tacit deal of allowing older soldiers to shrink their responsibilities in exchange for disciplining young soldiers and in effect, training them like an obedient "Slave Labour" force. In addition, several thousands soldiers die each year as a result of accidents or beatings, while others (about 500 per year) commit suicide. Another several thousand defect annually, sometimes with these weapons. This abuse has become systemic in the Russian armed forces.

Traditionally, the peasantry constituted the bulk of Russian and Soviet armed forces, and served willingly in order to acquire an elementary technical education and a chance to move to the city after completion of service with the collapse of Soviet union, however, these incentives have had disappeared. Education, for example, was now compulsory. Thus in the eyes of Russia's youth, being drafted was tantamount to being punished. This new reality, combined with stories of war in Chechnya and fighting elsewhere, miserable living conditions, inadequate food supplies, and the abuse of young soldiers help explain the unprecedented scale of draft evasion. In 1985 only 443 Soviet men evaded or tried to evade the draft, whereas in 1995 - 96 the figure has reached 30,000 per year.

The only way to address these problems was to significantly reduce the overall number of authorized force levels; armed services and units; dramatically improve the standard of living; limit number of draftees for troops other than the armed forces; introduce an alternative civil service; expand contract recruitment;

and curtail the draft until the transition to an all - volunteer service is completed. Exchanging the legal and social protection accorded military personnel was also important, but will only be truly effective after the draft was eliminated.

Instead of tackling the roots of the problem by taking any or all of these steps, however in past years the Ministry of Defense had fought for a tougher draft law, elimination of exemptions, and harsher punishment for draft evasion. It had also sought to limit the number of contract soldiers (presently close to 300,000) and expand the draft, using the argument that a draftee costs five times less than a contract soldier. The Defense Ministry and its allies in the Duma have also worked the law "On alternative Civil Service" since 1994. These actions however have proved ineffective; and in Russia's newly democratic environment they have encountered the growing resistance of civil society and opposition in State Duma. The law on mandatory military service, for example, has become one the most hotly debated topics in Russia, and has the law "On alternative Civil Service". Thus it was not by chance that in May 1996, at the peak of the presidential campaign, Boris Yeltsin signed presidential decree no 723, promising to transform the military into an all volunteer force by the year 2000. Yeltsin's action was clearly a populist gesture, which the military of Defence refused to adopt.

Still manpower shortages in the armed forces remain a matter of great concern, and can be resolved through military reform. Specifically, deep cuts are needed in force levels. Even if those eligible for the draft were recruited only by

the armed forces and the border guards, the Military of Defense would have about 3,00,000 draftees per year. With two year service terms, this would provide 6,00,000 conscripts at any one time, plus some number of high quality contract soldiers. Thus, to have a normal force structure with no shortage of manpower, and including commissioned and non commissioned officers, would translate into an armed force of about 900,000. An armed force of this size would be about 50 percent less expensive to maintain than the present one.

Another option would be to transfer to an all volunteer service, in which case maintaining 800,000 armed forces personnel would cost about the same as maintaining the present 1.6 million. In terms of direct salary, a contract soldier receives five times as much as a draftee. Within a few years, however, contract armed forces would bring considerable savings : they would serve longer terms, and initial training of conscripts would be greatly reduced or eliminated.

An all volunteer force would effectively address the manpower shortage, the military's lack of prestige, the ongoing abuse of conscripts, and problems associated with the quality of military personnel. It would not however, provide savings to enhance the technical quality of the armed forces, support the defense industry and scientific research, or improve the defense infrastructure. In fact maintenance cost would be higher if the wages of contract soldiers were increased to attract a better contingent; if officers' salaries were also raised; and welfare benefits, as well as repairs and technical maintenance - all of which are

badly needed. Some compromise or combination of the two basic options might be the best course for military reform.

In sum, the enormous gap between the present size of the armed forces and available resources creates the main imperative for radical military reform. New external security conditions and defense requirements, however, do not constitute an imperative for radical reform, although they might imply the need for some corrections. Even if the external situation has not changed, Russia's domestic transformation would have necessitated radical military reform. The good news is that Russia's current and projected security environment is also conducive to reform, although some developments - foremost NATO expansion - would complicate matters in the coming decade.

REFORMS : MAIN CONTOUR AND THEIR PROGRESS

Military reforms which was initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev was in virtual passivity. However in 1997 President Yeltsin began taking practical steps towards implementing military reform. Russian military had many contours and was also hindered by a number of obstacles which can be discussed.

1) Reducing Force Levels

One of the toughest issues facing Yeltsin was the gross size of the Russian military establishment. Without a radical reduction of force levels and a concerted effort to salvage what remains of the defense industry, neither will be saved from total collapse within a year or two at most. Moreover reducing the armed forces

had its costs. The Paradox was that for the first few years substantially reducing the armed forces will be more expensive than maintaining them at their present level. For example, according to the laws

On the status of military serviceman" and "on military duty and military service", an officer about to retire is entitled to twenty monthly salaries, housing (if not already provided) and relation expenses. This would mean spending on the order of 80 - 120 million rubles (\$14,000 - 21,000) to retire a single middle rank officer, whereas continued service during the first year would cost two to three times less, depending on a number of other factors. To retire 1,00,000 officers would cost 10 billion rubles (\$ 1.8 bn). However, only 6.3 trillion rubles were allocated in the initial 1997 budget : 1.6 trillion rubles to pay the twenty monthly salaries; 2.1 trillion rubles for housing from within the defense budget, and 2.5 trillion rubles from the section of federal budget on capital investment for housing, a portion of which is allocated for military housing - all of this provided to only 50,000 officers at a cost of 120 million rubles each. In the same year the budget for personnel wages was reduced by nearly 1.2 trillion rubles after personnel cuts were made. Hence a considerable cost (almost equal to all Ministry of Defense civil employee wages - 6.8 trillion rubles in 1997), just 3 percent of armed services actual force strength would be trimmed, with only meager savings accrued to maintenance costs²⁹.

Reducing the officer corps on a much larger scale would readress the distorted ratio of officers to conscripts; permit organization of fewer, yet fully manned, combat - ready units; and in several years render savings from maintenance that could be used for procurement, R&D, construction, training and improving the quality of life of serviceman. In the meantime, however, expenses would be higher. For instance, training 3,00,000 officers over three years would cost 10 - 12 trillion rubles (\$ 2 trillion) in additional appropriation annually,

²⁹ Alexei G. Arbatov., "Military Reforms in Russia: Diemmas Obstracles and Prospects", *International Security*, Vol.22, No.4, Spring 1998, p 36.

including the cost of merging partly manned units and strong surplus weapons and a equipment.

An alternative plan might be to make more radical reductions by reducing the number of officers and conscripts proportionally for example 1,50,000 conscripts for every 50,000 officers. This would not cost significantly more because sending soldiers home is not expensive; and at the same time, force levels would be reduced by 600,000 in three years. This action would not provide substantial personnel savings, however, because maintaining conscripts is relatively inexpensive at 2 million rubles (\$ 300) per private per year. Of course, this would eventually provide savings by reducing the scale of draft, the expense of transporting and training draftees, and the cost of maintaining large numbers of fully and partly manned units. In the first few hours, however, savings would again be smaller than expenditures (which would include the costs of closing units, bases, and defense sites as well as storing and securing weapons and equipments). Also, given distortions in the armed forces' present personnel structure, proportional cuts would exacerbate the problem, eventually leaving the armed forces with too few conscripts and not enough combat ready, fully manned units.

Thus, from a purely financial perspective it would be cheaper to maintain the status quo - a proposition that opponents of reductions have supported for years, and that can not be easily dismissed given the present financial crunch. On the other hand, at current finding levels, Russia's military - industrial complex is teetering on the verge of collapse.

Simply put, if by official estimates the minimal maintenance of the armed forces was funded at an annual level of only 52 percent (and the defence industry at 28 percent) - and there was no reason to hope that this situation will improve the next few years - the armed forces was reduced to bring in line with available resources; the defense industry must be partially converted; and the savings on maintenance must be used for procurement and R & D. Fortunately, the external security environment is conducive to an understanding of this magnitude, despite complications and tensions that could stem from NATO enlargement. No doubt these measures will require substantial upfront investment during the first several years, but Russia's national interests demand it, and there are ways to implement reductions economically.

The Defense Ministry's reform program, already approved by President Yeltsin reduces personnel levels in 1999 to 1.2 million. Reform supporters believe that additional cuts could be made in three stages.

The first stage, until the year 2000 would involve cutting force levels by 6,00,00 (to about 1 million) through the combination of the above two alternatives, so that reduction is deep but not excessively expensive, renders substantial savings through officer retirement, and leaves at least a small number of combat - ready units in conventional forces while assigning the rest to guard stored surplus equipment and weapons. At this stage, the defense conversion program should be revived and R&D centres and programme supported, while

procurement should be kept to a minimum to save industries vital to the military production sector.

During the second stage, until 2003 - 2005 the armed forces should be reduced to 80,000 - 90,000 mostly through retirement, curtailment of the draft, and expansion of contracts. This should level out the ratio of officers to conscripts, provide a large number of fully manned, combat ready units and improve the overall quality of life and training of military personnel.

If by this time the Russian economy improves and budget revenue increase, the armed forces could shift to an all volunteer service. The cost would be the same as for the present armed forces, but additional appropriations would pay with for better training and infrastructure and more procurement and R&D. If on the other hand, the economic situation does not tangibly improve, the armed forces would have to rely on a combined draft/contract system (Drafting about 1,00,000 - 1,50,000 soldiers per year and maintaining about 3,00,000 contracted troops). A force with this composition might have a large proportion of partly manned units and costs 20 - 30 percent less than the present one. The savings could be used to improve overall quality, recognize the defense industry, and increase research in science and engineering.

In the third stage, until the year 2010, the armed forces should transfer fully to a contract/professional system. By this time force reorganization and redeployment should be finalized all forces should be equipped with new weapons and technology produced by a revised defense industry. It must be emphasized,

however than in any radical military reform scenario, additional appropriations will initially be needed to cover the costs of reductions and reorganisation on the order of at least \$1.8 bn per year. This money, however, should not be allocated within the limited and annually sequestered appropriations for "national defense", but rather in a separate, defended article of the federal budget. This way an unnecessary burden would be removed from the defense budget, leaving more room to both fund reorganisation and support the defense industry. In addition, it would reduce the Defense Ministry's opposition to deep cuts and prevent possible sabotage of the reform movement at all levels of the military bureaucracy - something that occurred between 1992 and 1997. These costs would be covered at least partially by a reduction in military expenditures. In addition to trimming waste, corruption and inefficiency, lowering the START III ceilings to 1,300 - 1500 warheads by the year 2007 - 2010 would save Russia trillions of rubles in the implementation of a broad strategic force modernization program - money that could be spent on military reform.

2) Reorganization

Deep cuts, require serious reorganization of the structure, deployment, and command systems of the armed forces. Clearly, Russia cannot afford nor does it needed five armed services, eight military districts, and four fleets. One view was that four armed services would be enough (eliminating air defense and merging its air arms with the air force, and its early warning systems with the strategic rocket forces). A more radical proposal was to eliminate the ground forces as a separate

armed service and subordinate it under the General staff. The military district's command structure could be eliminated altogether. Instead three groups of troops (principally ground, air, and naval forces) could be organized to react quickly to contingencies in the South (department in the North Caucasus), in the east (Transbaikal and Maritime province areas), and in the west - depending on the rate and form of NATO enlargement.

Incidentally, before the decision to expand NATO, force deployment in Russia's western territories was perceived mostly as a basing area for reinforcements : they could now be assigned missions to the south and east. After the Madrid Summit, however, western deployment probably ought to be seen as a strategic in its own right - to deter further NATO expansion and to defend Russia's interests. In response to planned deep reductions in conventional forces, heavier reliance would be placed on a nuclear deterrent, and a smaller force, allocation might be dedicated to the east.

The Defense ministry's official position, and other experts close to the defense leadership support the following plan of the 800,000 members in the armed forces, 200,000 could be allocated to strategic forces and their command, communications and intelligence systems; 150,000 to the Navy; and 250,000 - 300,000 to the ground and rapid deployment forces, plus about on additional 50,000 to central and local staffs, administrative organizations, and military colleges³⁰.

The air force in such a scenario would have a much more prominent role : 1,000 - 1,500 well maintained combat and

³⁰Bakich, Spencer D., "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Working Document or Anachronism?", *Conflict Studies*, London, 301, July-August 1997, p. 88.

transport aircraft with well - trained crews would be sufficient. The ground forces should be confined to preserving the same forward positions with a screening force ; rapid deployment ; and reinforcement capabilities for large - scale, short, intensive warfare, or longer, small - scale operations, for which 15 - 17 heavy divisions would equivalents and 2 - 3 light divisions equivalents would be assigned to protect SSBNs (Northern Fleet) and guard exclusive commercial Zones and Sea communications (Pacific fleet), while the Black Sea and the Baltic fleets would be transformed into flotillas or even Squadrons. In total, 70 - 80 large combat ships, 40 - 50 attack submarines, and 200 - 300 shore based naval aircraft might be adequate for these missions"³¹.

The Strategic forces should remain an uncontested priority of Russia's defense posture. In the wake of NATO expansion and an unclear future for the START II and START III treaties, nuclear deterrence would become Russia's principal tool for providing security in both the west and the east. It would also be the "umbrella" under which it becomes possible to implement radical conventional force reductions and military reform fear.

The strategic rocket forces (and nuclear - technical troops) were the only armed services that had retained high combat readiness, command - and - control system reliability, and nearly fully manned units (including a high proportion of officers and contract soldiers). Russia's strategic forces now account for no more than 10 percent of the defense budget. It will be absolutely necessary to increase their funding by 100 - 150 percent, so that viable land and sea based missile forces can be maintained well into the next century at a level of 3000 - 4000 warheads without that START II treaty and between 2,000 - 2,500 and 1,500 - 2000 warheads within the START II/III framework. Politically and economically,

³¹ Ibid, p 89.

it would be much more preferable to take the START II/III route and save money for rapid and radical military reform. As a matter of first priority, command and control systems should be improved and made more survival and reliable in order to provide for consistent and selective retaliatory capability. Combined with a limited but mobile, flexible and survivable tactical nuclear force, this would form the basis for extended nuclear deterrence vis - a vis superior conventional forces that may be deployed in Russia's Eastern and Western borders.

3) Restructuring Of Security Services :

After the failure of the August 1991 coup attempt, Gorbachev began to dismantle the federal intelligence organs. The KGB, Gorbachev's main power base and the purported leader of the takeover attempt, was the most drastically restructured. Gorbachev first transferred the KGB's border forces to the military of Defense under Yevgeni Shapashnikov, and brought the KGB counter terrorist units *Steptsgruppa A* and *Vympel* as well as a 8000 man Kremlin guard force under presidential control. Since the KGB forces and support personnel in the major cities could have posed a significant security threat to the president, he placed them under army and Kremlin control. Next Gorbachev eliminated the KGB Collegium, the administrative head of the security service which housed most of KGB power base.

However, the KGB's communications services and REZIDENTURA (The complex organisation of intelligence collection and analysis personnel stationed abroad) continued to operate unimpeded, and much of the administrative

However, the KGB's communications services and REZIDENTURA (The complex organisation of intelligence collection and analysis personnel stationed abroad) continued to operate unimpeded, and much of the administrative organization remained unchanged at the federal and republic levels. There remained too the three divisions and one brigade (about 20,000 soldiers) of special - purpose forces (SPETSNAZ), and the thousands of employees in the other administrations and departments that made up the huge organization. Largely untouched, the union ministry of Internal Affairs remained under Gorbachev with over a million personnel spread throughout the republics. Its leader, BORIS PUGO, committed suicide after the attempted coup and was replaced in August 1991 by Victor Barannikov.

Rebuilding the Security Infrastructure

Before his resignation, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated further restructuring of KGB. On 30 September 1991, Gorbachev signed a decree separating the KGB's first chief administration (counterintelligence) from the main organization and created a new intelligence agency. The Inter - republican Security Service (Mezh - respublikanskaia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or MRSB). However, on the same day Gorbachev established the new organisation, Yeltsin subordinated all union KGB assets located in Russian Republic to the Russian Federation.

Bakatin, former chief of Ministry of internal affairs (MUD) under Gorbachev (1988 - 90) was a liberal reformer and true democrat. Gorbachev removed Bakatin from the MUD in December 1990, and replaced him with

former Latvian KGB chief BORIS PUGO owing to Bakatin's reluctance to use force against rioting civilians in the Baltics. During the coup attempt, Yeltsin convinced Gorbhachev to install Bakatin as head of the new MSRB.

Republic KGB's existed much as before and answered to their republic governments. At the federal level, the MRSB was supposed to provide assistance with the assistance and investigation and apprehension of organized criminal elements, terrorists and drug traffickers through its (KGB) seventh and sixth chief administrators. An estimated 39,000 agents remained in the new structure. On 22 August 91, Gorbhachev transferred the KGB's special counter terrorist force (Spetsgruppа А to presidential control along with Kremlin guard force; these units were placed under the USSR main guard administration (*Glaunoe Upravlenie Okhranv*) and used as a presidential guard force.

Established in 1974 under Yuri Andropov, Spetsgruppа 'A' was primarily a counter terrorist force under the control of KGB's seventh administration. Seventh administration chief Aleksei Beschastnov patterned *Spetsgruppа 'A'* after Charles Beckurth's delta force and gave it the same clandestine mission of countering terrorism and effecting hostage rescues.

SECURITY ORGANS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

With the help of Vadim Bakatin (chief MRSB), and Victor Barannikov (chief USSR MUD), Yeltsin initiated his attempt to consolidate the power ministries. Since Gorbhachev had already stripped the KGB of most of its assets,

the Russian President moved to group the remainder of the intelligence and security forces under his control. Yeltsin felt he would be the likely successor to Gorbachev in the event the USSR collapsed or Gorbachev left power. Therefore, he had begun planning for this eventuality after the coup attempt.

As early as September of 1991 Vadim Bakatin had developed a plan to consolidate the forces of MUD and KGB into a single ministry responsible for the security and law enforcement's functions of two organizations. Once established, the security agency would be known as Ministry of Security and internal affairs (MBUD)

The Ministry of Security and Internal affairs (MBUD) Vadim Bakatin and Victor Barannikov both advocated the idea of consolidating the union security and internal ministries with those of RSFSR as early as September of 1991. The intent was to merge the Inter republican security service and union's MUD with the RSFSR federal security service and union's MUD into a joint ministry of security and internal affairs (MBUD). The TSSR would remain intact and handle foreign intelligence functions, namely espionage. An originally envisaged, the ministry would handle all law enforcement and security functions throughout the Russian Republic and work closely with KGB and MUD structures. The ministry was to be subordinate to the President and parliament, with control exercised by the council of ministers who would provide the necessary checks and Balances. Yeltsin approved Bakatin's and Barannikov's proposal. The MBUD was scheduled to be in full operation by early 1992.

On 8th December 1991 twelve signed an agreement to join the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS), forsaking the union. The Communist party of the USSR was officially removed from power as was the Soviet Government. Soon thereafter, the Soviet KGB and MUD ministers were dissolved. The structures which remained naturally dissolved to the President of Russian Republic. On 25 December 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev announced his resignation as a result, control of the federal MSRB, TSSR, and Interior Ministry shifted to the President of Russia. Although he had already planned to absorb the federal structures into the MBUD in January. Yeltsin was able to assume their responsibilities a month early.

In his original announcement, Yeltsin stated that the component security organs would be eliminated in favour of the new structure. In actuality on 19 December 1991 Yeltsin transferred the MRSB and remaining KGB administrations to the Russian Federal Security agency (AFB) and issued a decree to the formation of the MBUD. Although policy formulation and implementation were split between the chairman of council of ministers and newly formed Russian Parliament, it was the Russian President who had the greatest say in how the agency was managed. At this point it become evident that Yeltsin has no intention of eliminating the AFB or its subordinate elements. The AFB remained a powerful intelligence and security asset.

On 24 January 1992 President Yeltsin issued Decree # 42 'On forming the Russian Ministry of Security'. He reestablished the Collegium which Gorbachev

had abolished consisting of eleven numbers at the administrative held of ministry. The new ministry of security of the Russian Federation (MBRF) assumed control over most of the intelligence and security functions of the former KGB. At its head Yeltsin placed Victor Barannikov, former head of USSR MUD, he promoted Victor Erin to head of the Russian Interior Ministry.

NEW SECURITY AGENCIES UNDER YELTSIN

In January of 1992 Russian Khasbulatov created a security unit of combined Omon, Militsia and KGB Spetsnaz personnel to maintain control in and around Moscow, known as the administration for the Protection of Russian Federation's Supreme Bodies of state power, this unit possessed a strength of between 1,500 and 5,000 combat experienced members. Formed with Yeltsin's approval, the unit acted outside the law and performed special missions for Government personnel, especially Khasbulatov, with its main function to serve as a personal reaction force for the Moscow leadership.

HINDRANCES TO MILITARY REFORM

Apart from President Yeltsin's lack of potential will and general disinterest, the main reason for the deadlock on military reform from 1992 - 1997 was the absence of an appropriate mechanism to booster the implementation of reform.

First, and most important, many of the now redundant committees created in recent years to oversee military reform should be eliminated. One

administrative organ should be assigned to implement reform, with parliament, relevant ministries, and independent panels providing input. At present, the Defense Council appears to be the prime candidate to take on this role. To cement the council's legitimacy and power, a deputy prime - minister should be assigned to supervise its work. In addition, the practice under which the ministries of defense and internal affairs, and heads of other so called armed structures, report directly to the president should be revised. These individuals should be subordinate to the prime - minister, which would make coordination of military reform and programs affiliated with the armed structures more easily integrated into budget process. Furthermore, it is imperative that military reform should involve not only the Ministry of Defense but all organs that use military formations.

Other steps include opening up the defense budget and the military reform program to greater public scrutiny. For example, in 1992 - 96 the State Duma approved the Defense budget in only seven principal articles. In the 1997 law 'On Budget classification', the number of articles increased substantially ; and future amendments to this law, which are now being considered, will push the number even higher. The needs to be kept informed as this process unfolds.

Increasing the role of parliament in establishing defense policy and military reform is also crucial. In the past, the Duma made decisions on the defense budget without the slightest idea of how they would affect particular security and reform issues (e.g., strategic deterrence, regional war fighting

capability, and support of key industries and technologies). The Duma further does not have the instruments to control the implementation of the budget, discover violations in a timely fashion, or punish these responsible for violations. These problems should be corrected by making the necessary adjustments to the constitution. Finally, if the president wants military reform to succeed, he should support these initiatives.

The present political composition of the State Duma should not be an argument against its deeper involvement in defense policymaking. After all, the parliament reflects the mood of society as a whole, including its military and defense - industrial sectors. Military reform is doomed without broad public support, which to a large extent is rendered through parliament. Deeper involvement, more information, greater responsibility, constructive engagement, are tough bargaining are all ways to modify the negative positions a substantial number of Duma deputies hold on military reform.

Another measure would be to establish independent audit control over the financial activity of the military of defense and its implementation of the budget. Every amendment, additional alteration of funds, and sequester should be discussed and approved by the Duma with full disclosure regarding the potential consequence for defense and security.

To deal with the problem of delayed payments of military salaries and to enhance control over the Defense Ministry's finances, money for salaries, wages and other maintenance items should be delivered directly through the Federal

Treasury, which has regional branches through Russia. This would break the Ministry of Defense's monopoly on disbursement and help guarantee timely payment. The state Duma budget committee made this proposal in 1996 while negotiating the 1997 budget, but the defense ministry rejected it, and the measure went down in defeat for lack of votes. Apart from parochial interests, some substantial concerns do exist. For example, it could make the armed forces department on regional authorities who can exert huge influence on the federal treasury's regional branches and who can always find other ways to spend the money. This concern, however, should be dealt with through the adoption of laws and policies to govern financial relations between the federal and regional authorities.

Another important but controversial suggestion could be to make the post of minister of defense a civilian position. This is a necessary element for cementing civilian control over the military, but this action should be postponed until a later stage in the reform process. The current crisis is so deep and the reform so painful that it would be unwise at this time to aggravate the situation by putting a civilian in charge of Ministry of Defense. The choice of General of the Army Sergeev seems optimal under the circumstances. Also it will be easier in the future to change the law " On defense", and approve the law "on civilian control and management over the armed forces, "which is currently under Discussion in Duma. For a civilian minister of Defense to be effective, he or she must be given among other things the following : an apparatus for military analysis that is independent from the armed services, cost effectiveness studies and well prepared sensible policy options and programs.

Another important thing is that the functions of the defense minister and General staff should be clearly distinguished. The former should oversee the General defense policy, doctrine and the budget; deal with Government officials, including parliament; manage procurement and R&D programs; and personnel and social welfare issues. The later should handle operational planning and training of forces; oversee military operations and activities in peacetime; and command combat forces in wartime.

The Russian armed forces reforms was thus due to economic, political and military reasons. The armed forces of USSR which was the largest in terms of numbers and they had to restructure due to changing needs and circumstances. The reforms were carried out on various fronts viz., beginning with reduction of nuclear arsenal reducing force levels, reorganisation of structure, deployment and command systems of the armed forces and also restructuring of security services. The reforms which was carried out had to face many hindrances and these are analysed in the last portion of the chapter.

The Russian army as it stood in 1991-92 was in disarray. Plummeting morale of the troops was a primary threat to the security of Russian state. With declining budget and allocation of funds, poor training, and housing facilities the armed forces became a breeding ground for deep disillusionment. Moreover the Russian armed forces lacked modern advanced weapons and technology, indeed the essential hall mark of modernity of armed forces. Other issues that posed problems and divided the armed forces were the rivalries between the elite and non-elites in the military set up and an open competition for funds and missions, among different branches of Army. Moreover decline in combat readiness and the participation of uniformed officers in political fight as in October 1993 made the

situation worse. These were some of the main problems which the Russian army was trying to cope up with at the beginning of 1991.

The next chapter will focus attention on the state of Russian Army during 1991-97 and its doctrine and strategy as they were evolved.

CHAPTER 3

**POST-DISINTEGRATION
STATE OF RUSSIAN ARMY
AND THE EVOLVING
DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY**

The break up of the Soviet Union provides a fascinating field of inquiry to both historians and the security analysts. The disintegration of the largest continental Land Empire in history happened with a suddenness that took the world unaware. Yet, it also came about in a remarkably peaceful manner and with certain continuity amidst revolutionary change. Continuity was demonstrated by the steady move from a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to the emergence of sovereign independent republics in a gradual and steady manner. This was equally applicable to mighty Red Army. It too has been moving with steady speed from a single strategic entity, to the CIS joint Armed Forces (JAF), to almost inevitably, independent armies of the individual republics. All these changes are taking place, atleast so far, with remarkable lack of acrimony and through a process of dialogue and discussion. It was indeed fortunate that this was so far the break up of this mighty force with its enormous nuclear arsenal, if not managed smoothly, could had devastating consequences for the world.

This chapter will discuss about the post disintegration state of Russian army and how Russian military strategists prepare to counter the offensive against the fragile Russian state. It would also discuss about Russian preparedness to counter threats both domestic and international in changed security scenario.

Amongst the changes that had taken place in the erstwhile USSR, next to economy, it was developments in the military that had the most far reaching implications for itself and the world. While economic changes effected the

Republics internally, in the case of defense and security, alteration in what was once the mightiest military machine in the world, would have had more profound impact internationally. What we are witnessing today is the disintegration of the edifice and coming together of constituent parts, each trying to relate to each other, while simultaneously falling apart.

To analyse these developments, it is necessary to examine the evolution of Russian Armed forces from the initial period of formation to CIS JAF, their relationship responsibilities, restructuring and development. This would include the withdrawal of Russian forces from Europe and CIS and the pains of readjustments, and a brief look at the problems of military industrial complex (MIC). Finally, a consideration of the policies and the emerging military doctrine, with their consequent impact on force restructuring.

Evolution of Armed Forces

When on December 21, 1991, at Alma Ata in Kazakhstan, eleven out of the 15 former Soviet republics came together to form the CIS, it was expected that the mighty Soviet army would somehow remain a homogenous and somewhat of a supranational force. This was the perception of the CIS and the one that was articulated by Marshal of aviation, **Yeugeiny Inanovach Shaposhnikov**, the USSR defense minister who later became the chief after February 1992, of what came to be known as CIS JAF.

In June 1992, the tasks that were set forth for the CIS JAF amounted the following :

Ensure reliable centralised command and unified control of the strategic forces on the Independent Republic territories, to improve their structure within the START treaty provisions and to keep them at the necessary levels of functional efficiency.

To react rapidly to prevent local conflicts on the CIS internal borders, and ensure effective infrastructure within the CSCE treaty provisions.

To comprehensively analyses the military political environment and to co-ordinate strategic policies³².

In accordance with the above it was intended that the CIS JAF should control the strategic forces of the union, and in that capacity it was to command the following:

- Strategic rocket forces.
- Air force strategic Nuclear forces.
- Naval strategic Nuclear forces.
- Missile attack early warning systems.
- Strategic Reconnaissance
- Logistic Units.³³

Structurally, the CIS JAF has at its apex the president of those Republics who have signed the treaty on collective security - under it is a council of Defense Ministers, who meet at regular intervals to take major decisions. Each republic is again represented by Deputy chief of Staff level at the JAF high command.

³² Banerje. D., "Military: Current state and evolving strategy", *Strategic Analysis*, New Delhi, 15.12, March 93

³³ Richard F. Starr Moscow's Plans to restore its power". *Orbis*. London. Summer, 1995, p.377.

FORMATION OF RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES

The decision to the formation of Russian Armed forces as independent and separate from the CIS was taken in May, 1992. This was by no means an easy decision. This would be the final step that would have undermined the cohesion of CIS. But a detailed analysis of the political and economic processes, according to vice president **Aleksander Rutskoy**, compelled such action.

The reasons were:

The Conventional Force European (CFE) treaty laid down that forces and weapons that USSR accepted. If the Republics decided to maintain separate armies, Russian as the successor state to the USSR would be left without significant strength or be in violation of the treaty.

The other was the uncertainty of the status of the former union Army and Navy stationed in the Republics. To whom will the men and equipment go ?

Who do these remaining forces actually serve?

These were a major questions that could not be answered without a clear legal framework.³⁴

³⁴ Banerjee.D, "Russian Military current state and evolving strategy", *Strategic Analysis*. New Delhi, March 1993, p.36.

**CFE ceilings of the State of the former Soviet Union according to
TASHKENT DECLARATION³⁵**

Tanks	Acv	Artillery	Attack	Helicopter	Combat Aircraft
<i>Uzbekistan</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>285</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>Armenia</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>285</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>Belarus</i>	<i>1600</i>	<i>2600</i>	<i>1615</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>260</i>
<i>Georgia</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>285</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>Kazakhstan</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Maldova</i>	<i>210</i>	<i>210</i>	<i>250</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>Russia</i>	<i>11,480</i>	<i>11,480</i>	<i>6415</i>	<i>890</i>	<i>3450</i>
<i>Ukrain</i>	<i>5080</i>	<i>5050</i>	<i>4040</i>	<i>330</i>	<i>1090</i>

Restructuring poses fundamental questions regarding share of resources among the various republics. This emerged as major contentions issue to which no solution has yet been found.

However, as per the present assessment the appropriate strength of the Republican armies is given in the table. The actual restructuring of the Russian armed forces poses very fundamental challenges. as this involved reorganisation of the entire force, withdrawal from the erstwhile **Warsaw Pact** countries, relocating and providing them housing in Russia, maintaining forces in **CIS** but at the same time to justify their deployment through mutually agreed laws. Manning was another problem area. It is proposed to examine some of these.

³⁵ Ibid, p 37.

Restructuring of Russian armed forces was planned in the following phases

Phase 1 1992

- Creation of the Russian Federation defense ministry.
- Creating a legal basis for the organisation and functioning.
- Evolving a concept of military organisation.
- Withdrawing troops into Russia under Russian Jurisdiction.
- Establishing a command and control set up of the Russian Federation Armed forces.

Phase 2 1993 - 1994

- Complete the withdrawal of the Russian troops.
- Reduce and reshape the forces and create a military infrastructure within Russia.
- Legislate social safeguards for serviceman and their families, including housing, pay and pension.
- Transition to a mixed system of manning between career and compulsory service personnel.
- Introduction of alternative service.

Phase 3 : BY THE YEAR 2000 A.D.

- Complete withdrawal of troops from other countries.
- Reorganisation of Armed forces.
- Transition to a non district system and creation of territorial commands.
- Recreate military infrastructure for peace time.
- Reduction of strength of Armed forces to 1.5 m.³⁶

Major decisions were taken during a high level conference in June 1992 at the general Staff Military Academy, presided over by vice President Rutokoy and attended by Defence Minister **General P. Grachev**. In particular, priority was to be given, to according **General P. Grachev**, to the following :

³⁶ Spencer D Bakich, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Working Document or Anachronism? *Conflict Studies*, London, 301, July-August 1997, p.8

- Development of strategic arms.
- Space and air defense systems.
- Highly accurate long range weapons.
- Army Aviation.
- Reconnaissance systems.
- Command and control structure.
- Formation of highly mobile troops”³⁷.

In practice however serious difficulties were experienced in all areas. The withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the former Soviet Republics has to be seen in the background of 5,00000 soldiers that were to be reduced in accordance with the announcement made by GORBACHEV in U.N. in Dec. 1988. This number has apparently been accomplished only in 1992 and it had resulted in bringing back, in addition to the personnel 12,000 tanks, 13,000 artillery pieces and 2,000 aircraft including helicopters.

Col. General Boris Gromov Deputy Defense minister claimed that withdrawal of soldiers from outside the CIS had gone according to schedule. In brief these were completed as under:

- From Hungary to Czechoslovakia by 1991.
- From Mangolia by September 1992.
- Over 6000 soldiers were still in Poland to guard the stores and man the garrisons.
- The Brigade from Cuba returned by mid 1993.
- Troops located in Germany returned by end of 1994.”³⁸

³⁷ D. Banerjee, “Russian Military: Current State and Evolving Strategy”, *Strategic Analysis*, New Delhi, March 1993, p.1143.

³⁸ Ibid

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE

Military doctrine is a complex subject which is rooted in the unique military heritage of any state. The term poses major difficulties to the students of military affairs as it means different things to different people. In the west military doctrine refers to written regulations on field tactics, in the USSR and Russia, the term has a much more profound meaning and a far more critical role in the military development. *A.A. Svechin* 'Chto had stated that

Military doctrine is the name given to a viewpoint by which military history is understood and its experience and study are treated.³⁶

Before one proceeds to discuss about Russian military Doctrine it would be fruitful if one can scan the origin and development of Soviet Military doctrine. The discussion of military doctrine in USSR began prior to the revolution in 1917. Tsarist officers began to discuss the need for doctrine as early as the years following the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5). The discussions were however halted by the world war I and after the revolution and end of Russian involvement in the world war (1914-17), the discussions resumed. The first Soviet professional military Journal, *Voennoe Delo* (Military Affairs) contained articles by several former Tsarist officers who discussed the need for a Russian Military Doctrine. The development of Soviet Military doctrine was further elaborated by the seminal work of Vladimir I. Lenin. The work of Lenin basically established the attitude of the proletariat (The people) and the state to war. Lenin based his views

³⁶ Mary E. Glantz, "Origins and Development of Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, London, 7.3 September 1994, p.444.

on Marx and Engels and through his reading of Care Von Clausewitz developed concept of militarized Marxism.

Soviet Military doctrine was not simply established and defined by a Leninist decree. A series of debates that were of paramount importance to the creation of a Soviet military doctrine raged through the early 1920s. The venues for those debates were party congress and conferences and party military journals, and two main conference and party military journals, and two main protagonists were M.V. Frunze and Leon Trotsky. Frunze strongly believed in the need for a unified military doctrine. He further believed that the pre-conditions for the doctrine were created by the proletarian nature of Soviet state, by the proletarian nature of Red Army and by Unique experience of civil war. Frunze also focussed on the relationship between what he described as the military doctrine and the military technical aspect of military doctrine. He stressed that future wars would be fought by huge, multi-million man armies that would necessitate a high level of co-ordination in order to control effectively. This coordination, in Frunze's view, required a unified military doctrine that would be understood equally well at different levels in chain of command.

The main opposition to Frunze's views came from Leon Trotsky. In his article military doctrine or pseudo military doctrinarism Trotsky argues that a unique military doctrine was unnecessary and overlay restrictive. In response to Frunze's assertion that it was imperative for coordination, Trotsky contended that the Red Army already possessed the principle of structure, education and

utilization required for coordination principles that tended to be universal. Trotsky further believed that a restrictive military doctrine was dangerous since the empirical nature of military offices made it harmful to create a “system” of views on the creation and use of armed forces.

The debate ended in 1924 with Trotsky discredited and Frunze’s views accepted. Thus Frunze’s ideas became the basis of the military doctrine of the Soviet armed forces. The Soviets adopted and developed most of his ideas, with few exceptions. One significant change involved the offensive nature of the military doctrine. On the military – political side, Soviet doctrine, largely due to necessity, maintained a defensive character Frunze’s view that the Soviet military doctrine must be offensive was thus restricted to purely military – Technical consideration, the Soviets would act military doctrine upto the collapse of USSR was defined as

A system of views adopted in a state at a given (specific) time on the content goal, and nature of possible future war, on the preparations of the country and the armed forces for it and means of conducting it. The basic propositions of military doctrine are conditions by the socio-political and economic system of the state, the level of development of economy, the means of conducting war, military science as well as geographic situation of the country itself and that of the country of probable opponent.³⁷

However with the collapse of USSR, Russian military scientists have sought to adapt this definition to Russia’s new security requirements in a new, multi-polar, international system during a time of profound natural and

³⁷ Mary E. Glantz. “Origins and Development of Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine”, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, London, 7,3 September 1994, p.446.

geographical change. *General M.A. Gareev*, mindful of difference in western and Russian use of the term, offered the following definition, which underserves these changes:

A system of views, officially accepted at the national level, on defense questions. It does not include all existing military – theoretical idea, which in case of sciences can be both diverse and contradictory. Instead it includes only the fundamental, leading, officially accepted principles of military theory and practical which are mandatory for all government bodies and military personnel.³⁸

The significance of military doctrine was stated in the preface to the November 1993 version. The basic provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation (RF) were part and parcel of the concept of security of the RF and represented a document covering Russia's transitional period - The period of the establishment of statehood, implementation of democratic reform and formation of a new system of International relations. They represented a system of views officially accepted by the state on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on the development of Armed Forces, on the country's preparations to defend itself, on the organisation of actions to ward off threats to the military security of the state, and on the use of Armed Forces and other troops of RF to defend the vital interest of Russia. The vitally important interests of the RF has no way affected the security of other states and shall be ensured within the framework of equitable and mutually advantageous inter-state relation. The implementation of the basic provisions of the military doctrine shall be achieved by means of measures of a political, economic, legal and military doctrine with

³⁸ Mary E. Glantz, "Origins and Development of Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, London, 7,3 September 1994, p.447.

the participation of all the bodies of state, power and administration, as well as public associations and citizens of RF.

The new military document of Russian Federation has been characterised in a number of fashions. Two stand out as particularly insightful. Initially, the military doctrine was described by *Sergei Kortunov* as

The quintessence of military consciousness'. Kortunov further notes, further, that because a clear concept of nationhood has yet to be constructed, similar notions of national security are lacking. The second characterisation was offered by former Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. Grachev claimed that military doctrine of the Russian Federation is in fact a 'militarily constitution'.³⁹

The new military doctrine was the result of two key elements : 'the end of the cold war' and the 'democratic revolution in Russia'. Both factors had influenced international security and stability in the post cold war era in different ways. Both influenced the formulation of Russia's military doctrine. The end of cold war meant that Russian departed from the relatively stable world in which it once existed. The departure ushered forth an era of instability, particularly in the Eurasian region. Armed conflict and local wars, and an increasing threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile delivery means, and conventional weapons, are now prevalent.

As a result, military force remained an attractive device in political disputes between states, primarily those on the periphery of Europe. Despite the illogic of

³⁹ Charles J. Dick, "The Military Doctrine of Russian Federation", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, London, 7,3 September 1994, p.481.

maintaining the old cold war infrastructure, the material basis - weapons and their production base-remained. This infrastructure strives for self-reproduction and had provided a tremendous supply of arms for international market.

Other international factors influenced the military doctrine and military technical policy of Russian Federation. Mobile fire groupings, first strike echelons, and tank concentrations had disappeared from the structures of armed forces. As a result of the changing nature of the potential threats confronting the RF, the employment of air mobility, nuclear deterrence on an operational tactical level, a transition to a corps and brigade structure, an orientation towards resolving tasks tied to peacekeeping operations, a transition to a professional army, an emphasis on military technical policy supported by a highly advanced technology, the development of high precision weapons, the development of space systems (in particular for air space, and ground operations) and a relative decrease in the role of heavy weapons become overriding orientation (or more properly, the ultimate goal) of the armed forces again, this was reflected in the doctrine's assertion that the armed forces were founded of the 'defensive orientation' of Russian military thinking.

Domestic factors also played an integral role in determining the content of the Russian Military doctrine.

Firstly, Russia is undergoing a crisis of statehood. The absence of concrete borders has made definitions of national interests and concepts of national security abstract, at best.

Secondly, Until now there has been no clear characteristic of relations among the CIS countries. Those nations which were once a part of the concept of 'Russia' (particularly Ukraine, Belarus and the northern tier of Kazakhstan) are now foreign nations. Without the formulations of such ties and relations, defining national security will be impossible.

Thirdly, it is important to note that the attack on the parliament building in October of 1993 brought an end to the competition between the legislative and executive branches over the content of the military doctrine. Because of the utilisation of force was successful, Yeltsin was assured to the power to dictate the terms of military doctrine.⁴⁰

POLITICAL BASIS OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE

Armed Conflicts And Use Of The Armed Forces And Other Troops

It was accepted that ideological confrontation was waning and partnership and cooperation were gaining ground. Armaments were being cut back, military to military confidence building was progressing and political, legal and economic action were being undertaken to reduce the risk of war. In these circumstances, the military security of Russian Federation (RF) depended primarily on the following :

- (a) Internally, on the solution of economic, political and social problems and on the successful implementation of ongoing reforms.
- (b) Externally, on relations with the outside world, especially with immediate neighbours and leading world powers.

It followed that the RF :

⁴⁰ Spencer D. Bakich, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Working Document or Anachronism?", *Conflict Studies*, London, 301, July-August, 1997, pp.6.

- (a) Does not regard any state as its enemy. All state whose policies do not conflict with Russian are viewed as partners.
- (b) Regards prevention of armed conflict as the highest goal of military policy.
- (c) Adheres to the principles : of settling international disputes by peaceful means ; of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; of non interference in their internal affairs of the inviolability of state borders.
- (d) Shall not use its armed, and other, forces against any state except in individual or collective self defence if an attack is launched on the RF or its allies.
- (e) Shall contribute to international efforts to prevent wars and armed conflicts and keep or restore the peace.”⁴¹

Policy On Weapons Of Mass Destruction

In connection with the actual process of reform to be carried out various sectors of Red Army, we might mention some important initial measures mainly under international pressure that deeply affected pace and content of actual reform in Russian army. Most of these measures were infact the destruction and reduction of nuclear weapons with US agreement and under its supervision as well bringing all its nuclear warheads back to Russian Territory under exclusive Russian control and command system.

Thereafter attention was focussed on actual reformed vis-à-vis nuclear weapon. Soon a policy consensus emerged that Russian Federation would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state or any signatory to the Non

⁴¹ Charles J. Dick “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, London, 7,3, September 1994, p.483.

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as long as that state did not possess such weaponry.

Two exceptions were made when Nuclear use could be envisaged :

- (a) When a non-nuclear state allied to a nuclear one attacks the RF or its allies.
- (b) When a non-nuclear state joins with or supports an attack on the RF or its allies⁴².

The ultimate aim was of course to eliminate all nuclear weapons. In the meantime, strategic forces should be cut to a minimum consistent with effective deterrence and the maintenance of strategic stability and the NPT should be strengthened and expanded.

As regards other mass-destruction weapons, RF policy was enunciated was

- (a) To implement conventions banning the development production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and the destruction of stocks.
- (b) To prevent the development of new types of mass destruction weapons and to be ready to counteract the development of such weapons.⁴³

ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES AND OTHER TROOPS

Russian Federation would ensure its military security by all the means at its disposal, giving preference to political diplomatic and other peaceful methods.

The Armed forces are necessary for following purposes :

- (a) To defend the Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies and other vital Russian interests.
- (b) To carry out peacekeeping. This may be done under the UN auspices or in accordance with international obligations.

⁴² Ibid, p 336.

⁴³ Glantz, David M, "Continuing Influence of Non-Linear Warfare on Russian Force Structuring" *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Essex, 9,2, June 1996, p 335.

- (c) To cut short armed conflicts or any illegal armed acts on the state border, or the some other state, if warranted by treaty obligations, or within the territory of RF if they threaten vital interests.⁴⁴

SOURCES OF MILITARY DANGER AND THREAT

While the threat of armed aggression against the RF had diminished, it had not disappeared. The main likely causes of conflicts and wars were : The Social political economic, territorial, religious, national-ethnic and other contradictions and the desire of some countries and political forces to resolve these by force of arms. Particularly dangerous are aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance.

The sources of military threat that Russia possesses are both internal and as well as external. The Russian armed forces had to deal with both these threats simultaneously as both continued to threatened security as well as the very existence of Russian state system. The external as well as the internal threats can be focused upon separately.

The following were the principal and existing sources of external military danger:

- a) Territorial claims by other states against Russia and her allies.
- b) Existing and potential areas of local wars and armed conflicts, especially near Russia's borders.
- c) Possible use of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons (including unsanctioned use) possessed by several states.
- d) Proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, delivery means and technologies, together with the desire of

⁴⁴ Ibid, p 336.

some states, organizations and terrorists groups to pursue their military and political goals.

- e) Possible upsets to strategic stability in consequence of violations of arms control/reduction agreements, and the qualitative and quantitative build up of armaments in some countries.
- f) Attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the RF and to destabilize the internal political situation.
- g) Suppression of the rights, freedom and lawful interests of Russian citizens in foreign states.
- h) Attacks on Russian military facilities located in foreign states.
- i) Expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of Russian military security.
- j) International terrorism.⁴⁵

Military danger may be transformed into Military threat to Russia by the following :

- a) A build up of forces along the borders of RF such as to upset the existing balance of forces.
- b) Incursions over the borders of Russia or its allies and the unbashing of border conflicts and armed provocation.
- c) Preparations of military formations/groups to move into the territory of Russia or her allies.
- d) Interference by other states with the functioning of Russian Strategic unleashing weapons, their command and control and the space components.
- e) Deployment of foreign troops into neighbouring states (if not with the consent of the RF in fulfilment of a UN or collective security organization mandate)⁴⁶

The following were the principal sources of internal military threat against which the Armed Forces may be used :

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.337.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p 339.

- a) Armed actions by nationalist, separatist and other organizations aimed at destabilizing the internal situations violating Russia's territorial integrity.
- b) Attempts forcibly to overthrow the constitutional system disrupt the working of state structures.
- c) Attacks on nuclear, chemical and biological or other dangerous installations.
- d) The creations of unlawful armed formations.
- e) The growth of organized crime and large scale smuggling which imperils the citizenry and society.
- f) Attacks on arms stores and factories etc. to acquire weapons.
- g) Unlawful proliferation on the territory of the RF of weapons and explosives which can be used for Sabotage, terrorism and drug trafficking.
- h) The Lack of definition of several structures of the state borders and the uncertain definitions of the Legal status of Russian forces deployed abroad.⁴⁷

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF ENSURING MILITARY SECURITY.

The principle governing security policy were as follows :

- a) Measures to ensure the security of RF must not be at the expense of others security.
- b) Stability must be maintained in regions near the borders of Russia and her allies, as well as in the world as a whole.
- c) The development of armed forces must be consistent with the country's political aims and economic capabilities.
- d) International obligations must be observed.
- e) The international arms trade must be regulated to ensure that Russian and regional security are not endangered, crisis not aggravated or embargoes violated.

⁴⁷ Desmond, Dennis. "Restructuring of Security Services in Post Communist Russia". *Low Intensity Conflict and Low Enforcement*, Washington 4,1, Summer 1995, p 134.

- f) All states whose policies do not harm the RF are regarded as co-operation partners. Priority for co-operative effort will be given to collective defence within the CIS. There will also be regional co-operation with the CSCE and other states and the structures in adjoining regions and global co-operation within UN.
- g) The terms and forms of Russian peace keeping operations will be governed by Russian legislation and international commitments (especially those with the CIS)⁴⁸.

The following methods will be used to ensure military security.

- a) The qualitative standard and combat readiness of the Armed Forces will be maintained at a level guaranteeing the defence of Russia's vital interests.
- b) Bilateral and multilateral agreements will be concluded to exclude the threat or use of force as an instrument of policy and to promote membership of collective security bodies.
- c) Arms control will be pursued. Nuclear disarmament talks must become multilateral and aim at eventual abolition. In the meantime, they must reduce testing to levels which will ensure safety but not allow for perfection of weapons. The NPT regime should be expanded to cover all actual and potential nuclear states.
- d) Mutually advantageous military co-operation will be pursued especially within the CIS and with central and Eastern Europe. The Status of Russian troops and bases on the territory of other states must be established.⁴⁹

MILITARY BASIS OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE

With the danger of world war (both nuclear and conventional) having lessened, local wars and conflicts represented the main threat to peace and

⁴⁸ Chernov, Vladislav, "Significance of Russian Military Doctrine" *Comparative Strategy*, Washington, 13, 2 April-June 1996, pp.162-163.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p 165.

stability. Their likelihood was increasing. In such conflicts, the main task of the Russian Armed Forces was to localize them, prevent them from escalating, and then bring them to a close.

Local wars and conflicts can be characterised by :

- a) The broad range of forces involved, from irregular enemy formations and limited RF contingents (i.e. those deployed in the area in placetime) up to the use on both side of operational–strategic groupings.
- b) Actions on a tactical or operational scale using the entire arsenal of weaponry from small arms to precision systems.⁵⁰

Local wars and conflicts can escalate even into nuclear war. Conventional war may become nuclear if the aggressor tries to disrupt the early warning or command and control of strategic forces or those forces themselves, or if nuclear or chemical installations are attacked. Any use of nuclear weapons by one side, even if limited, may provoke a massive use of such weapons with catastrophic consequences.

A formidable threat was posed by internal armed conflicts endangering the vital interests of RF and which may be exploited by other states to interfere in its domestic affairs.

To prevent war and armed conflicts, the Armed Forces would provide timely intelligence; maintain a strategic second strike capability; keep peacetime general purpose forces at a level capable of defeating local or regional aggression;

⁵⁰ Sergeev, Igor D., "New Russia, A New Military Instrument", *Military Technology*, New York, 23,3, March 1998, p.30.

maintain a mobilization capability and the means of strategic deployment; guard the state border. To fulfil these tasks, the Armed forces will closely co-operate with Border and Interior troops.

Overall command will be exercised by the president, who is the supreme C in C. Responsibility for the state of Armed forces shall be borne by the council of Ministers. Direct command of Armed forces shall be in the hands of Defence Minister.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMED AND OTHER FORCES

In developing the Armed Forces and other troops, it was important to :

- a) Ensure governmental control over the military.
- b) Observe the political right and freedoms of serviceman.
- c) Centralize military leadership and ensure unity of command on a legal basis.
- d) Establish troop strength and structures which correspond to commitments and legislation as well as to the economic situation of the country.
- e) Create a high level of professionalism.
- f) Ensure the possibility of building up the combat power of the forces adequately to match the growth of military danger and create a mobilization capability. The geopolitical and geo strategic situation should always be determinant.
- g) Learn from national and world experience.

Force restructuring of withdrawals into Russia and the creation of groups of forces within the country which are appropriate to their tasks.

A. By 1996 the following was accomplished.

1. The completion of withdrawals into Russia and the creation of groups of forces within the country which are appropriate to their tasks.
2. Reduced the size of the Armed Forces to a determined level. However, Defence Minister GRACHEV had pointed out that the arbitrary pegging of manpower to 1 percent of the population by the Law on Defence into no account of geographical, political or economic factors. Thus the doctrine lays down no end strength for the Armed Forces.
3. Continue the transition to a mixed system of manning (i.e., to a mix of contract soldiers and those drafted for service according to the principle of extraterritoriality)
4. Complete planning for the reorganization of the structure of the Armed forces.

B. The period 1996-2000 would see the completion of the above tasks and the reorganization of Armed Forces. A priority area for development is the creation of mobile forces, the formation of which has already begun on the basis of the airborne forces and other branches.

These are to be capable of rapid deployment to any axis of region where any threat to security may appear.

In the event of war, the Armed Forces must be prepared for rapid regrouping on to threatened directions and for decisive action, both defensive and offensive, regardless of how the war actually started. The methods and means used will be matched to the nature of the enemy's aggression, will be appropriate to the situation, and will ensure the seizure of the initiative and the defeat of aggressor.

Special attention would be given to :

- a) Ensuring the stable functioning of command, control, communication and intelligence.
- b) Isolating the invasion force.
- c) Flexibly combining firepower and manoeuvre actions.
- d) Ensuring close coordination of all services and arms.
- e) Inflicting bubbling strikes on enemy troop and weapon control organs.

MILITARY TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF DOCTRINE

The new doctrine demanded that Russia continued to field world class weaponry creating 'ahead of competitors new generations of armaments and equipment. It was also vital to retain a mass mobilisation capability in both personnel and industrial terms. To these ends, priority must go to the military in the allocation of financial and other resources. Defence conversion should be carried out rationally and it was clear from the context that this means as little as conceivably possible. The consequences of a move to a market economy were mentioned only insofar as it is necessary to minimise their effects on defence R & D and production. Russia has a plethora of clever scientists, designers and

engineers in defence industries. While they are unlikely to overtake the west in fields of weapons development and production, they could probably keep pace in some areas and lag not too far behind in others. This could only be done however at the cost of perpetuating the enormous investment, inefficiency and waste of resources that characterised the USSR and therefore at the cost of economic reform.

The answers to this problem identified by new military doctrine were :

- a. Restoring the former Soviet military economic system through 'mutually advantageous co-production with other CIS countries.
- b. Exporting sufficient arms to earn enough hard currency to sustain Research and Development production for domestic use, finance limited defence conversion and 'ensure the serial protection of personnel employed in defence industries.

This was assuredly a pipe dream. In 1992 Russia hoped to export \$11-12 billion worth of arms. The basis of this calculation were suspect, in fact little more than wishful thinking. The actual figure was nearer \$2.4 billion (compared with the U.S.A's \$8.5 billion). There is no chance of such an improvement as will meet the ambitions goals set for arms exports.

Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov suggested that the promulgation of a new military doctrine was premature.

We still do not know what we are, where we are going and what our ultimate goals are the blue print for the development of the Russian state ... we have to say ; these are our interests, these are

the possible dangers and threats to our interests – and from this you get a blueprint, a doctrine including an economic doctrine, an ecological doctrine, a foreign policy doctrine, a federal doctrine dealing with internal matters, a military doctrine and so on. A doctrine in turn generates strategy. The former is a system of views the latter a line of conduct. In no area has Russia's future direction been decided by a democratically elected body : there is no even a constitution as yet. Worse than that, there is not even a definition of what actually comprises Russia ! For centuries, the state and the empire have been indistinguishable. The collapse of USSR has overnight faced Russians with an identity crisis that has no parallel, certainly not with the slow British and French retreats from empire, for the lands that they were giving up were regarded at home as demonstrably foreign. Why, therefore, has been a transitional military doctrine been rushed into law a mere month or so before Russia is due to hold its first ever democratic parliamentary election ? could it be an attempt to define, to fix in advance that which the military want to see happen so that the hands of future governments are tied ?⁵¹

The Armed forces form, in many ways, a reactionary institution. They had not adjusted well to the changes that have taken place over the last few years, and it might be that they are incapable of making the mental adjustments necessary to live with the world as it is now rather than as it ought to be. This probably explains the 'Alive in wonderland' nature of much of new doctrine. Talk of maintaining combat readiness rings increasingly hollow in a demoralised army with, thanks to the collapse of the conscription system and desertion more officers than actual soldiers, with shortages of every kind and with precious value training being done. Large sections regularly ignore or flout instructions from the centre and are forming local attachments and loyalties. Much of the personnel is

⁵¹ Fitzgerald, Mary C., "Russian Military Strategy for Sixth Generation", *ORBIS*, London, 38,3.

deeply illusioned with the way that Russia and the Army are going. These trends, coupled with an unpreparedness in some quarters to face reality, bode particularly ill for any attempt the army for internal purposes, at least if it cannot, as on 4 October 1993 achieve a short, sharp success. Today's army is a very brittle instrument. Any attempt to field it too vigorously is likely to break it. Civil war is likely to be the outcome.

The psychological limitations may well account for the most disturbing features of the new doctrine. These were :

- a) A growing insistence on the right to ignore the sovereignty now independent former, Soviet Republics and to intervene in FSU where and when it suits Russia's interests. The Army, and perhaps the government and people of Russia, simply do not accept that such states are truly independent.
- b). The assumption, implicit in many elements of the new doctrine, that the Armed Forces continue to spend according to their perception of need rather than what the economy can afford. If the MOD and the defence industries to gather have the political clout to enforce this demand, it will either prolong the economic slump indefinitely, virtually killing off reform, or it will provoke a revolution and probably the disintegration of the Russian Federation. The lesions of the collapse of the USSR simply do not seem to have penetrated the military mind.

Finally, the new military doctrine poses profound and disturbing questions and problems for both the Russian people and for the states of the 'near abroad'. It would also force western governments to think very carefully about their policies towards Russia. Moreover, there are areas in which there is little for leisured reflections on its very implications.

i) Should the west relax the cocom restrictions as they apply to Russia ? given the unabashed aim of the army to acquire world class weaponry, its continued demand for priority in the allocation of resources and its interventionist leanings, some may doubt this.

ii) Is economic aid to Russia undeniably desirable ? Quite apart from the justifiable doubts about the country's ability to spend money wisely to improve the economy, would such aid merely help the military to fund its grandiose schemes ?

iii) Should the west accept the changed circumstances should allow Russia to renegotiate the CFF treaty as regards their forces that can be stationed in the caucasus region ? What signal would this send to an increasingly hawkish military and foreign ministry ?

iv) Should the West support Russia's peacekeeping efforts in the near abroad? should it even accept them tacitly ? should it approve them in some areas and draw a line at others and would such a line be credible anyway? This is the biggest question and it needs an early answer. Whatever that answer may be, it should not be based on the premise, disproved by the new military doctrine, that Russian foreign policy and defence elites have lost their 'imperial itch'.⁵²

⁵² Sergeyev, Igor D., "New Russia, A New Military Instrument", *Military Technology*, New York, 22,3 March 1998, p.32.

RUSSIAN MILITARY STRATEGY

It had been assumed by the western observers that for the foreseeable future, only the United States would have the capability to revolutionize military technology and doctrine. But the Soviet military declared, back in the early 1980s, that a "military - technical revolution" (MTR) was afoot. Today, the Russians argue that precision - guided, non-nuclear, deep strike weapons, and the systems used to integrate them, are revolutionizing all aspects of military art and force structure – and elevating combat capabilities by a million fold Russia's first official military doctrine, approved by President Boris Yeltsin and the security council in November 1993, clearly reflects the ongoing civil - military consensus on the nature and requirements of the MTR. The documents directs that research and development (R & D) efforts focus above all on the development of the new deep strike weapons, information weapons (advanced C³I systems), and electronic warfare (EW) assets.

In the short run - despite the ongoing political crisis and economic chaos - The Russian general Staff continued to devise sophisticated technical and operational counters to the new technologies of Air-Space War. For the long term, they had oriented most of their limited resources toward creating an infrastructure that ensured rapid surge production of technologies as the situation warrants. And for the transitional period in between, they had revived the nuclear war fighting option to cope with a variety of worst-case scenarios. Civilian and military leaders agree that the potential for waging air-space war and competing in the MTR are Russia's main guarantees for preserving great power status.

Russian military scientists, such as *General-Major V. Slipchenko*, lead of the Scientific Research Department of general Staff Academy, warfare has evolved through at least five generations.

The first generation of warfare involved infantry and cavalry without firearms. The second generation saw the development of gunpowder and smooth - bore firearms. Rifled small arms and tube artillery were introduced in the third generation of wars. In the fourth generation, automatic weapons, tanks, military aircraft, signal equipment and powerful new means of transporting weapons were used. The fifth generation of warfare includes of course nuclear weapons. In the impending sixth generation of warfare, a superior military will be able, through advanced data processing and C³I systems, smart weaponry, EW and air defense assets, and space based reconnaissance and weaponry, to destroy discrete targets and inflict military and political defeat on an enemy, all at a low cost in casualties and without occupying enemy territory⁵³.

Sixth generation warfare has already changed the laws of combat and the principles of military science. In past generations, the battlefield was confined to the earth's surface, with the vertical coordinate (primarily air) playing an auxiliary or supporting role. In future wars, the emphasis will be reversed. The main vector of combat will be the vertical or aerospace coordinate, with operations on the ground playing the supporting role.

The destructive properties of various types of weapons despite their diversity, the effect on targets was determined primarily by three basic forms of energy – physical, chemical and biological. The new weapons of war inflict not

⁵³ Mary C. Fitzgerald, "The Russian Military Strategy for 'Sixth Generation 'Warfare'", *Orbis*, London, 38,3, Summer 1994, p.76.

only mechanical (kinetic) destruction but also acoustic, electro magnetic and thermal destruction, they disrupt or destroy personnel, installations, and structures, affect people's mind and behavior; and inflict delayed hereditary, carcinogenic, fatal or environmental damage. Inasmuch as there are properties common inherent to acoustic, electromagnetic and certain other kinds of destruction that are of a radiated (wave) nature, they may all be classified conditionally as "radiated destruction". The Russians term the infliction of such damage, as well as protection against it, "radiated warfare" and already means of radiated destruction - Laser, radio-frequency, accelerator, and infrasonic - are beginning to enter the inventory. The concept of radiated warfare as the Russians see it can be represented in the table.

TABLE - 1

MEANS OF "RADIATED DESTRUCTION"⁵⁴

CASUALTY AND DAMAGE EFFECT (DESTRUCTION)	MEANS OF DESTRUCTION (WEAPONS)	NATURE OF CASUALTY AND DAMAGE EFFECT ON TARGETS
ACOUSTIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INFRASONIC WEAPONS • ACOUSTIC GENERATORS • EXPLOSION GENERATING (FORMING) ACOUSTIC ENERGY • MEANS OF ACOUSTIC (SONAR) SUPPRESSION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL AND DISTURBANCES IN LIVING ORGANISMS AND DEMORALIZATION OR DEATH OF PEOPLE. • SUPPRESSION OF OPERATION OR DISABLING OF ACOUSTIC EQUIPMENT DIVERSION FORM TARGETS OF WEAPONS GUIDED BY ACOUSTIC (SONAR)MEANS
ELECTRO- MAGNETIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LASER AND RADIO FREQUENCY WEAPONS] • NUCLEAR A WEAPONS (ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE) • MEANS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC SUPPRESSION. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DESTRUCTION OF CELL OF LIVING ORGANISMS • STRUCTURAL CHANGES OF EQUIPMENT MATERIALS • CHARRING PARTIAL FUSION OR VAPORIZATION OF SURFACE OF OBJECTS • SUPPRESSION OF OPERATION OR DISABLING OF ELECTRONICS AND OF ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL DEVICES. • EFFECTS ON MINDS, BEHAVIOUR, AND REPRODUCTIVE FUNCTIONS ON HUMANS
RADIATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PARTICLE - BEAM WEAPONS • NUCLEAR WEAPONS (IONIZING) • ELEMENTARY PARTICLE ACCELERATORS. • NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS • RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS • RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IONIZATION, STRUCTURAL CHANGES (DESTRUCTION), OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROCESSES IN ORGANISM MILITARY EQUIPMENT MATERIALS, STRUCTURES AND ENVIRONMENT. • RADIATION SICKNESS • GENETIC CHANGES IN POPULATIONS

⁵⁴Mary C. Fitzgerald, "The Russian Military Strategy for 'Sixth Generation 'Warfare'", *Orbis*, London, 38.3, Summer 1994, p.29

Radiating weapons and equipment for electronic counter-measures (ECM) use one and the same kind of energy, but, depending on their magnitude, they can do anything from suppress the operation of enemy electronics, to irradiate personnel and hardware, to reduce national infrastructure to chaos. Therefore ECM should be considered a type of radiated destruction, and EW a component part of radiated warfare and warfare as a whole.

Reconnaissance, of course, remains a critical element of any battle and not a kind of support, since effective destruction and protection of targets is possible only after timely identification of their composition and coordinates. The unity of reconnaissance and combat is illustrated by the introduction of "reconnaissance - strike" and "reconnaissance - fire complexes" to armed forces. According to Soviet and Russian military scientists, reconnaissance - strike (STRATEGIC) and reconnaissance fire (operational and tactical) complexes consist of a triad of

- (1) Highly effective ground - air and space based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) SYSTEMS;
- (2) Deep strike systems;
- (3) Intelligent command and control systems that ensure the delivery of strikes in real time. The same is true, in Russian theory of MASKIROVKA (cover, concealment and deception). Its means and techniques contribute to protection against destruction and ECM, to increased survivability, and to preservation of the combat effectiveness of

forces. In the sixth generation of warfare, MASKIROVKA will outgrow its role as combat support and become a round the clock duty of personnel, whether in peace or wartime.

THEORY OF COMBAT SYSTEMS

Like the Soviet predecessors Russian experts saw integration as critical - comprehensive integration into unified systems, at the level of divisions and armies, of reconnaissance equipment, weapons, ECM equipment, and equipment for the command and control of forces and weapons. The essence of this integration was to ensure the continuous, co-ordinated collection and processing of informations, and to communicate data instantaneously to EW units. Under such conditions warfare represents a process wherein complex, open, developing, dynamic operational - tactical structures - combat systems - exert a mutual effect on each other. Distinguishing features of the combat system concept include the following :

1. It is an integral formation based on a grouping of army or Navy forces; reconnaissance, target designation, and EW equipment, an automated command and control system; and other support systems. It is created by organizing coordination among them, and it is capable of changing its structure and function depending on situation conditions.
2. The goal of creating combat systems under conditions of implementing a defensive doctrine is to prevent damage inflicted by the enemy on force groupings and installations on friendly territory and on territory of allied countries, force the enemy to give up aggressive plans, and if necessary disrupt the functioning of combat systems.

3. The combat system is hierarchic, each of its components is a complex system performing a particular mission while it represents a component (subsystem) of an even more complex combat system (super system). The combat system is controllable with respect to the supersystem and controlling with respect to its subsystems.⁵⁵

Reconnaissance - strike and reconnaissance fire complexes are an example of the simplest combat systems on a tactical scale. Their capabilities have substantially expanded, owing to the integration of weapons, reconnaissance equipment and automated control systems. In the opinion of 'foreign specialists' integrated attack systems make it possible to destroy a considerable portion of enemy targets even before making contact with the enemy and before committing friendly forces.

Cardinal changes should be expected in the nature of warfare after combat systems of an operational and strategic scale appear on opposing sides. According to 'foreign press reports', basic efforts of U.S. and NATO military Leadership are specifically directed at this. The Russians believe that by the year 2000, and operational system will be able to issue data on an overall number of targets (3,500 – 4000 targets for 1,2000 strike aircraft) at the level of European theaters of military action in one minute. They are also considering a procedure for centralized decision making for engagement of targets by a large number of offensive weapons in short time periods. They confirm the advisability of creating a unified, integrated, combined arms system in which not only

⁵⁵ Glantz, David M., "Continuing Influence of Non-linear Warfare on Russian Force Structuring", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, London, 9,2, June 1996, p.339.

reconnaissance equipment, weapons and EW equipment but also tactical command and control equipment would interface.

A systems - oriented, balanced armed forces development aimed at creating combat systems capable of opposing future enemy systems is a critical parameter of Russian military development at the present time. As a result, the Russian military argues for radical change in its "arms development" concept. Heretofore, Soviet doctrine decreed that creation of means – tanks, aircraft, Submarines, surface ships, radar systems- was the primary object of research, design, testing and evaluation on the assumption that each new model would be more sophisticated than previous ones. Such an approach was called "ascending, straight line arms development". In the sixth generation, the goal not the means, must be the driving force behind research, development, testing and evaluation; and the scarce resources must go to whatever military branch or laboratory promises to develop technology relevant to goal identified.

The first step on the path to a systems oriented, balanced developed of the Russian armed forces was to ensure that any request to develop a new weapon justify itself in terms of a combat systems designed specifically to project enemy systems. Such a revolution in military research and development would clearly increase the effectiveness of Russian military - industrial complex but it would require a wholesale political assault on the vested interest of the entrenched ministries, departments, design bureaus and plants used to regular budgets ascending, straight line development of military technology. A systems oriented

approach, after all, precludes programmes that do not meet modern demands, and would radically alter the method of evaluating priorities in military development.

Any distribution of expenditures among branches of the armed forces would be justified only if it produced corresponding combat systems.

COUNTERING THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY REGIMES (MTR)

Missile Technology Regimes (MTR) poses serious security threat to Russian Armed forces and hence measures had been developed for protecting the armed forces against the new technologies of MTR which consists of the followings:

The possible measures for protecting the armed forces against the new technologies of MTR consists of the following :

Active Warfare

Destruction of platforms, command and control equipment, and weapons elements by SAM complexes (systems); electronic and electro-optical suppression of weapons systems by EW equipment.

Passive Protection

Reduction of one's own radar or optical signature, and of emitted signals; use of diversionary means; mobility. armoring.

Systems Protection

Creation of integrated air defense systems realizing the integration of air defense and EW assets; creation of alert radar field at high, medium, and low attitudes; support of information communication with reconnaissance systems and other branches of the armed forces.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Spencer D. Bakich, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: working Document or Anachronism?" *Conflict Studies*, London, 301, July-August, p.26.

The Russian military experts in addition have suggested specific counters to the tomahawk missile. The arming of NATO surface vessels with Tomahaivk cruise missile able to strike at coastal facilities from long range has posed a critical problem keeping the enemy ships from approaching friendly coastlines to the missile launch time. This can be solved by anew operational anti-ship missile system with a range comparable to that of the tomahawk. Such systems, placed on mobile launchers and maneuvering freely along the coast, should be able to hit surface targets on the approaches to missile launch lines. And they, in combination with other short based missile systems and artillery, will be the foundation of a highly effective system for action against naval targets, making it possible to increase return fire to the extent that enemy vessels approach the coast.

Russian's military scientists have also examined the following specific counters to a variety of systems.

Against Reconnaissance - Strike Complexes

Fighters against airborne elements (reconnaissance and communications relay aircraft); front air operation against ground elements.

Against Stealth

Detection - radar, acoustic, laser sensors (multi positional and multi-frequency radars; over the horizon radars; holographic radars; air - and space- based radars, EM, infrared systems, etc. solid radar field); destruction (SAMs and fighter aircraft S-3000, BUK SAMs and MIG-315, SU-27s and follows)

Against Non Traditional Weapons

Detection and destruction of facilities, strikes by ground and air based radio-technical systems; Jam communications and guidance

systems, troop and equipment protection – fortifications, alrosols etc.

Against EW Systems

Affect Software - for example computer viruses; strikes with beam, super high frequency, and especially, electromagnetic pulse weapons.

Against Rsta Systems

Advanced anti radar missiles, advanced anti-radar drones.

Against Command And Control Systems

Perturbations of environment (Tectonic); system failures (non-lethal weapons); nuclear weapons; advanced conventional munitions; computer viruses⁵⁷.

DEFENSIVE FORCE STRIKE OPERATION

In the late 1992, Russian military scientists began to describe the new Defensive fore- Strike Operation designed to counter the new technologies of the MTR. They noted that by analyzing the development of the armed forces for leading world states and the practice of deploying them in military conflicts, it is possible to forecast variants of the beginning of armed conflict in a future war. The aggressor probably will begin military operations with an offensive air operation aimed at the victim's aviation, air defense, communication and infrastructure. Subsequently, the enemy command will strive to achieve war objectives either by offensive operations by groupings of ground troops with wide use of landing and raiding forces, or without the use of ground grouping, limiting itself to presenting ultimatums with the threat of limited (regional) use of nuclear weapons. Translating GULF WAR scenarios to the Central European theater, the

⁵⁷ Ibid, p 28.

Russians fear that NATO may, by the late 1990s obtain a unique opportunity to achieve the principle goals of war through fire effect without combat by major ground formations.

It is therefore behooves the Russian military to devise means of surviving and repelling the first and subsequent strikes of enemy precision weapons and aircraft. But the insufficient number of airfields for aircraft dispersal and the insufficient number of reinforced concrete shelters for aircraft will complicate the Russian front commander's efforts to defend his installations and command and control. The Solution to this problem lies in carrying out the following measures :

First, redeploy a large portion of strike aircraft from western regions into the interior of the country even in peacetime. This will permit making them unreachable by enemy tactical aircraft and cruise missiles and thereby will sharply improve survivability.

Secondly, leave fighter, ground attack and army aviation in the border zone, dispersing it by using freed up airfields equipped with reliable shelters and aircraft mock-ups. Gulf war experience demonstrates that thousands of mock ups made from synthetic materials coated with metallized paint and supplied with thermal emitters represented dummy targets on Iraqi territory against which coalition aircraft delivered repeated strokes.

Thirdly, disrupt the enemy's tactical air command and control (navigation) systems by jamming or destroying the NATO E-3A AWACS radar early warning and control aircraft.

Operations of attack aviation will have to be concentrated on uncovering and delivering strikes against ground elements of the enemy's tactical air command and control (navigation) system, which may be deployed in advance (several days ahead) near Russian border. Their destruction will hamper enemy strike aircraft in approaching targets, which will substantially reduce the effectiveness of their operations. In addition, in areas where centres of front operational stability are located, it is desirable to distort the radar (television, thermal and so on) map of the terrain by making returns of objects similar to the natural background, concealing reference points, and changing the configuration of bodies of water, river channels and so forth.

Clearly, air defense and EW personnel and equipment will play a critical role in repelling a first massive strike. But, instead of distributing them evenly throughout the defense zone, it is advisable to use them to cover centers of front operational stability strengthening air defense specifically in those areas against which the enemy will strive to deliver strikes by precision weapons and tactical aviation. The air defense and EW grouping must destroy a considerable portion of enemy air weapons and disrupt the air offensive.

NEW R & D PRIORITIES

In a December 1992 interview, Deputy Defense minister KOKOSHIN stressed the critical importance for the future of the results of the research and development effort Kokoshin had noted

Russia attached exceptionally great importance to technological innovations and a search for new ways to create highly effective weapons, a Directorate for Planning orders for advanced R & D of New technologies is being formed within the directorate of the chief of Armaments⁵⁸.

The priority in the area of "Critical Technologies" will play an important role in forming the Ministry of Defense's military technical policy. The Military technical program for the most important technologies developed by the Russian Ministry of Defense was used for the first time in working out the R & D plan for 1992. The basic goals of this program are to develop designs that when implemented permit raising the qualitative level of arms and military equipment and creating preconditions for both the appearance of advanced weapons and assurance of the possibility of using these technologies in the non defense sphere.

Kokoshin notes that Russia has already developed ten fundamental R & D programs that constitute its "critical defense technologies program": micro-electronics; optico-electronics; "artificial intelligence" systems; EW systems; near real time navigational systems; aerodynamic systems; hydrodynamic systems; computer, radar, nuclear technologies; new types of explosives, fuel, gunpowder; production of engines and electrical energy.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Interview with A.A. Kokoshin, "First Deputy Defense Minister Interviewed," *FBIS*, April 19, 1993. *Moscow Television*, April 17, 1993.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*

The preceding pages above surely underlying the fact the despite their economic malaise, the Russians were fixated on competing militarily in the future as they had done in the past, they appear to be doing so in a far more focussed, efficient fashion.

Despite political instability and economic chaos, the Russian General Staff continued its foresighted planning. For the short term, they were devising sophisticated technical and operational counters to the new technologies as in operation demonstrated in 'Desert Storm'. For the long term, they had focussed most of their limited resources on creating an infrastructure that ensures "rapid surge production" of new military technologies as the situation warranted - a dramatic shift away from the quantitative paradigm of the past toward the new, qualitative, "technological deterrence" of the future. For the transitional period by 1997 they had resurrected the concept of limited nuclear war, if only to deter potential enemies during their time of troubles. What comes through clearly is the strong civil military consensus reflecting a continuing, disproportionate emphasis on military power as the basis for Russia's status in the international arena, and a deep determination not to stand aside while other countries forge the military technological revolution that will usher in the "sixth generation" of warfare.

Broadly speaking, the Russian Army was in a state of sharp decline from the glorious past of Soviet Days. By 1997 it was also evident that inspite of all talks of reform for making army of new kind with a new doctrine and strategy, this process appeared to be a long drawn out, beset with many difficulties. In another words, like all other institution of new Russian state, Russian Army was also in transition. When this phase will be nearing to its end, it is indeed difficult to foresee in the year 1997.

CHAPTER-4

CONCLUSION: WITHER RUSSIAN ARMY

We began our study by elaborately discussing the formation and the development of Red army throughout the Soviet era. The Red army during that period was based on centralised command and every Soviet citizen was to join the army once in their lifetime. With its historic victory over Nazi Germany Soviet armed forces was the most cohesive as well as the most disciplined organisation of the world, soon in the seventies poised to challenge US hegemony. The armed forces however in recent years have lost cohesion and discipline.

The disintegration of USSR however changed the international, situation and security scenario, and there was a need felt to reform the armed forces and also to evolve a new doctrine and strategy to the changing times. However, the reforms in the armed forces was not without hindrances and moreover Russian economic condition political instability hampered the process of the reform. Here we may attempt of summarising the whole situation of Russian Army from 1991 to 1997 and its prospects for the future.

The best indicator of stability in a political system is the military. As it is the armed forces which are usually the strongest, most cohesive and the most disciplined organisation in any polity. If they have lost cohesion and discipline, then the outlook for the political system is bleak.

Unfortunately, this is exactly the condition the Russian military finds itself in. Discipline has collapsed, equipment is becoming antiquated, moral has sunk to an all time low, good officers and non commissioned officers are leaving the

services, the country's generals have been politicized and Moscow's ability to ensure the military obedience in a crisis is doubtful.

BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS

The Russian Military is beset with problems. The greatest concern is money. Not only had the military's budget been cut each year over the past decade, but it has rarely received even the funds promised. In 1997 for instance the military received only 56 percent of its budget appropriation. It was given only 43 percent of its budgeted allocation for medical services, 41 percent of currency earmarked for clothing and equivalent, and only 50 percent of what was promised to feed its soldiers. The last shortfall had led to a constant delay in paying officers whose salaries are often to pay enlisted personnel.

The budget crisis has had a cataclysmic impact on the entire military. Because of cutbacks in weapons purchases (only 2 combat aircraft was purchased in 1995 compared with 585 in 1991), by 1998 only 30 percent of all weapons in the Russian inventory could be classified as modern - in NATO countries the number stood at between 60 and 80 percent. If current trends continue by 2005 only 5 to 7 percent of all Russian weaponry will be new and Russia's military will have a third world status. Moscow's worry about weapons does not end with the need for new systems. Existing equipment is also in a desperate need of repair has dropped sharply. In 1989 for example, it was 1.9 candidates per space. In 1993 only 1.35. Recent comments by Russian officers suggest that it has since decreased even further. Moreover by 1996 more than 50 percent of all junior officers had

left the military as soon as their duty was completed in order to enter the business world.⁶⁰

Poor salaries and insecure future, inadequate family quarters and support institutions and declining prestige have all taken their toll.

POLITICIZING THE MILITARY

The army though professing to be outside politics had become politicized itself. The general breakdown in discipline and decline in morale had been accompanied by another major change in the post Soviet Russian military. There had long been a misperception in the west that the Soviet military was highly politicized. Much depended on how one defined the term "politicization". If it referred to the effort of a party state such as the USSR to inculcate a particular point of view in the hearts and minds of its troops, then the Soviet military was highly politicized. Political officers and indoctrination lectures were part of the life of the Soviet leader.

There was however, another type of politicization : the involvement of military officers in politics. In this sense, Western military officers have been much more politicized than Soviet military officers. For example American military officers often enjoy close ties with members of Congress, something that would have been inconceivable in the Soviet Union. Soviet officers were far more isolated in political process.

⁶⁰ Lambeth, Benjamin S., "Russia's Wounded Military", *Foreign Affairs*, New York, 74.2. March-April 1995, p.67

Since the collapse of USSR, Russian military officers have cast off this apolitical stance. Former Soviet (and Russian) generals such as Aleksandr Rustkoi, Boris Geomov, Aleksandr Lebed, and Andrei Nikolayes have become household names among these who follow politics in Moscow; all have taken the political plunge, with varying degrees of success. As far as civil - military relations are concerned; this had increased the possibility that at some point active duty Russian generals may move directly into the political realm. As for the military it had further undermined cohesion as generals have begun to view themselves as political actors and sometimes find themselves on different sides of issues in public.

BREAKDOWN IN DISCIPLINE

There was once "Prussian Style" discipline in the Soviet military. Over the past 10 years, however, discipline had deteriorated to the point where the military prosecutors office has a full time job pursuing those accused of the most serious forms of crime, such as murder. Yuri Demin, the chief military prosecutor, noted

In 1997 that 50 soldiers were shot by fellow serviceman - and this was just those on ground duty who shot each other ! He further reported that by March 1998, another 10 has been killed in similar circumstances. The problem continues to grow. In May 98, another 10 had been killed in similar circumstances. The problem continues to grow. In May, in the far eastern military district , 4 soldiers reportedly shot and killed their commanding officers. In all, during 1997 approximately 521 service people died because they were engaged in criminal activity.⁶¹

⁶¹ Dale R. Herspring, "Russia's Crumbling Military", *Current History*, New York, May 1997, p.96.

Suicides are also a growing concern. In the year 1997, 487 Soldiers, committed suicide 57 more than in the previous year. The Duma reported that between January and April 1998, another 132 committed suicide - while the cause is unclear, most observers agree that poor food and working conditions, frequent delays in wage payments, and the widespread hazing of recruits were the primary factors.

The last is a long - standing problem. Rather than exerting close personal supervision of enlisted personnel, Russian officers have traditionally relied on senior conscripts to keep the junior ones in line. However the senior conscripts have brutalized many of junior conscripts - to a point that a number of them had committed suicide. The army was aware of the problem, but ending it would require major changes in the training and conduct of officers and non commissioned officers. There was little indication that the high command is prepared to make these fundamental changes. Meanwhile it was reported that 50,000 young man evaded the draft in 1997 while more than 12,000 conscripts went away rather than endure the brutality of barracks life.

The quality of those who do answer their draft notices had dropped considerably. In 1997 some 40 percent of new conscripts had not attended school or held a job in the two years before their military service. Further one in twenty had a police records and others were drug addicts, toxic substance abusers, mentally disabled and syphilitics.

Problems are also found at the junior - officer level. Not only are these officers resigning their commissions at an alarming rate, but competition among candidates for officer school (which once was intense) had dropped sharply. In 1989 for example, it was 1.9 candidates per space; in 1993 only 1.35 recent comments by Russian officers suggest that it has since decreased even further. Moreover by 1996 more than 50 percent of all junior officers had left the military as their duty was completed in order to enter the business world. Why should they remain in a military that pays them about \$100 per month for doing a job that requires heavy labor and physical discomforts that go with it. Poor salaries, an insecure future, inadequate family quarters and support institutions, and declining prestige have all taken their toll.

Given the problems facing the military it was not surprising that morale was at an all time low. Many military professionals no longer saw any future in the armed forces. Pavel Felgenhaver, the highly respected Russian commentator on military affairs, had reported

Senior officers have begun to tell journalists openly that Marshal Sergeev is not fit to command the Russian army - public criticism that would have been inconceivable during the Soviet period. Even more troubling from the Kremlin's standpoint are the questions being raised concerning what officers would do if called on to support Moscow internally. A 1995 survey of 600 field - grade Russian officers illuminated doubts about the army's reliability. According to the Survey, "officers were particularly adamant in their opposition to using the military to quell a separatist rebellion in one of the regions of the Russian

Federation. Only 7 percent supported such action. When asked if they would follow Moscow's orders if a Russian republic declared that they probably or definitely would not follow orders.⁶²

The results of the survey confirm defense analysts Felgenhaver's comment in March 1998 that sending the present Russian armed forces into any kind of action would be serious error. Things could get worse than they were in Chechnya - the troops could rebel instantly.

To compound morale matters, the government has increased the income taxes the soldiers must pay. At the same time, military officers whose incomes previously were not taxed must now not only pay this tax but also suffer a reduction in benefits such as free travel and 50 percent discount on housing.

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE IN TRANSITION

Another major problem facing the Russian army in its military doctrine. The new military doctrine of Russia is in transition due to various reasons :

Firstly, still there is yet no conclusive agreement on the military doctrine within the post communist military leaders. This view is evident from both the document and the position that is taken by significant military leaders. The military doctrine is provisional and issued through a decree. The Deputy Defense minister Andrey Kokoshin said that there were long discussions in the Russian

⁶² William E. Odom. "Soviet Military in Transition". *Problems Communism*, May-June, 1990, p.36

Security council and extensive amendments before its adoption. Those who had not been inside the forum have been critical of it. Shaposhnikov was opposed to the adoption of the military doctrine at this stage for general and particular reasons. Generally speaking he said that it is better to determine the national security goals than to determine the military doctrine.

Secondly, the military establishment was divided between radical reformers and radical conservatives. The two trends represented extreme approaches. One trend wanted a complete break from the Soviet policies while the others wished to keep as much continuity as possible. Going again to Kokoshin's position on the military doctrine it seems that the current doctrine is product of the two eras rather than a break with earlier one. About the military doctrine, he said that it is break with the former era in the sense that the Soviets did not have a doctrine and the Russians have one now.

Thirdly, the engulfing atmosphere within and without the Russian state has a bearing on military doctrine. Its immediate contexts are the following :

The Russian military is itself undergoing a period of transition in terms of both political and technical orientation. The old leadership seems to be in the process of being eased out. This was being done dramatically at the top level after the August 1991 coup and after the hesitation of Grachev in 1993 to come to aid of Yeltsin in his fight against the white-house. The return of the soldiers from the East European countries after the CFE and INF treaties and the turmoil in the

Sovereign Republics has made the earlier leadership in these places at lower levels much more uncertain about their past commitments and current dilemmas. The churning in the minds of young commanders is a reflection of the transitory character of Russian State. A weak democratic movement is still at an incipient stage of following a charismatic leadership. The emergence of a civil society in the last decade has not crystallised into a definite consensual political culture. This is necessary since any aspect of state security in its broadest and narrowest terms will require some consensus on the ideological goals before the commanders in the Army and leadership develops a system of teaching.

INEFFICIENCY OF CONTRACT SYSTEM

The system of contract service, introduced in 1993 also leaves much to be desired. The idea was that by 2000 the non - officer component of the army would consist equally of conscripts and professionals unlike conscripts who are exempt from foreign service in times of peace, the new "contract soldiers" would be available to serve outside Russia. They would also provide Sergeants and Technical specialists of which the army is seriously lacking under the conscription system.

However many contract recruits have turned out to have criminal records, or have committed crimes after enlistment of the first 1,00,000 men and women recruited, 20,000 had their contracts terminated in the first eight months in 1994. The high intake of women has proved embarrassing, as they cannot be posted to

fighting units. Contract service exerts a heavy drain on funds if pay is kept in line with inflation⁶³.

Military reform had been widely discussed in Russian military circles, but there has been little effort to make it a reality. The most ambitious and controversial plan is one that was recently being implemented. Designed under Marshal Sergeyev's leadership, the plan divides military reform into two stages.

Under the first stage, which is to be completed by the year 2000, the military is to be reduced to 1.2 million troops. Reaching this level will require the discharge of thousands of soldiers. The maximum number of generals (in both the military and paramilitary units) is also to be cut to 2,300. Funds must be found to pay those who are discharged, since Russian law requires that forcibly discharged soldiers receive a hefty separation allowance.

The reform plan also calls for the abolition of the position of commander in chief of ground forces, one of the most powerful in the Russian army. It will be replaced by a ground forces main Department. The introduction of more mobile forces is called for as well. The plan also combines the air defense and air force into one service. Some 1,25,000 air force personnel were discharged by the end of 1998, and a number of redundant offices and organizations have been combined in an effort to save money.

⁶³ Rakesh Gupta, "Russian Military Doctrine in Transition", *Occasional Paper Series*, IDSA, New Delhi, March 1996, pp.34-35.

Stage two calls for even more ambitious changes. Space forces may be combined with the air force, military academics will undergo major changes both in curriculum and numbers, and there are suggestions that the military will be divided into conventional and strategic nuclear forces. The last change would lead to a blurring of service lines ; opposition by more traditional military and navy officers is already evident.

The proposed changes to the nuclear forces come at a time when Russia is placing primary reliance on nuclear weapons as it restructures its conventional forces. Nuclear weapons are cheaper than conventional systems, and easier to maintain. The danger, however is that by adopting a "Launch on warning" strategy, even greater reliance is placed on Moscow's command - and - control systems as well as its missiles. After all, launch on warning means that as soon as Moscow detects an incoming missile, it has no alternative but to launch its own missiles in response. It does not have time to evaluate the situation and determine if the threat is real.

A BLEAK OUTLOOK

Despite the introduction of reform measures, it was hard to be optimistic about the Russian Military's future. President Boris Yeltsin give the impression that he neither understands nor cares about the state of the armed forces. He seems to tolerate the military and if anything, appears more interested in the country's internal security forces - which are specially trained to deal with domestic conflict.

As for the reform process, it was true that for the first time the country has a plan and was attempting to implement it. The problem was that the military continues to fall apart in the process. As the west knows only too well, downsizing is expensive.

Even if the reforms are fully carried out, it will be a long time before Russia has a military something similar to that under the Soviet Government for various reasons.

The one, the equipment is so old that almost all of it will have to be replaced, a very expensive undertaking.

The other, the hemorrhage of young officers from the military and drop in prestige of military service mean it will be some time before the army is able to attract the high quality people it needs.

The chaos found in the military is indicative of a larger problem : the instability that haunted Russia ever since 1991. This means that Kremlin can only hope that it will not have to call on the military to protect it from internal and external enemies. What is needed is a honeymoon for the next 5 to 10 years, a period of foreign and domestic tranquility in which it can rebuild its shattered armed forces. Unfortunately the country's leaders seem to believe that they can ignore the military until the rest of country recovers. While it would be wrong to rule out such a possibility, the instability that seems to reign through Russia suggests that this will not be the case.

There has been tendency in some circles to ignore the role played by the military in many countries, including Russia. But if the military represents the last barrier against collapse and chaos, then the state of armed forces is critical. For Russia, the situation is not encouraging. The Russian military may not yet have collapsed, but it is not far it. When this phase will be nearing to its end, it is indeed difficult foresee in the near future.

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