

**ISLAMIC PARTIES IN INDONESIAN POLITICS
(1965-1998)**

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled ISLAMIC PARTIES IN INDONESIAN POLITICS (1965-1998) submitted by Gautam Kumar Jha for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy is his own work and has not been submitted so far, in part or full, for any other degree any university.

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Javanese Ramayana Dance
Hanumana carrying Sita (Ramalila)



For

*The martyrs who laid their life for India at
Kargil*

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Chapter I

Introduction

When we analyse a political system where Muslims are in a majority, we find that Islamic religion and Islamic laws are reflected in a very effective manner. In many instances of Muslim-dominated societies, Islamic tenets dominate laws of government and polity besides dictating the norms of the social system. However, Indonesia presents a different picture where secularism has been accepted as a way of life. Thus an important question which draws our attention in this sphere is why this country is not so Islamic in its governance and policy-making despite having a strong majority of Muslims.

Islam has never had the political importance in Indonesia that one would expect from a religion of the majority. It is discernible from the general election in 1955 that the four major Muslim parties received only 43.5 percent of the votes in the country's so far only reasonably free and fair national election. However it always left its tangible evidence as a major political force.

Islam as a political force emerged in the early 1960s: the Masyumi Party¹ demanded Indonesia as a theocratic state had been banned and many of its leaders imprisoned or driven into exile. The less radical Nahdatul Ulama (NU) remained a political force, but one far less threatening to the army and the non-Muslims. Unlike the Masyumi NU was prepared to work with Soekarno and other major Muslim groups.

In 1964 the rising influence of Communist Party became a source of serious concern. The party's work in rural areas, and especially its support for land redistribution, was blamed for drawing support away from Islamic preachers. The rapid popularity of PKI caused an acute frustration among Muslim organizations. The major

¹ In 1943 the Japanese required all existing Islamic organizations to join an umbrella group known by its acronym Masyumi

feed back of this frustration among Islamic groups were the massacre of communists (of PKI) and their relatives in the name of *jihad* during 1965 to 1966 which was one of the worst genocide of the twentieth century.

Although Indonesia is thought of as a secular country, various Islamic organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Masyumi, Parmusi, ICMI, have established strong mass support despite their ideological differences.

The main Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), led by Abdurrahman Wahid says "Using religious politics is a dangerous tendency. Let the government govern and let religious groups take care of their own affairs". Muhammadiyah have on the whole been very accommodative towards the government. The NU is the main traditional organization while the reformist Muhammadiyah represents modernist wing of Indonesian Islam. The differences between the two organizations have narrowed considerably. As noted by Tamara one of the leaders of ICMI, "the modernists and the traditionalists have more similarities than differences".

It is however, very difficult to assess that all these Muslim organizations would unite to support the demand of Indonesia as a theocratic state but if we ponder over the recent political scenario of Indonesian politics, having a conglomeration of 48 parties enrolled, many projections are drawn. More than twelve Muslim parties have participated in the general election on 7 June 1999. It can influence the evolving political norms and the secular framework of the governance in Indonesia.²

The reformist or the modernist Islam widened the divisions within Indonesia's Muslim community. In his study, the *Religion of Java*, Clifford Geertz identified three types of Indonesian Muslims: *abangan*, *santri* and *priayi*. For the *abangan*, religion is a mixture of traditional mystical beliefs, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. Avowedly tolerant and syncretic, *abangan* or nominal Islam remains close to its Javanese roots. *Abangan* is much more close to its own traditions and culture than the Islamic culture and

² See Kompas, Jakarta, 5 February 1999

norms of life. For *Santri*, Islam occupies a much more central place in its worldview. *Santri* is much more concerned with the Islamic doctrine and most especially with the moral and the social interpretations of it. *Santris* see themselves as 'purer' Muslims than *abangans* and take the *abangan*-absorption of non-Islamic traditions as backward and old-fashioned. The *priyais* were Java's aristocratic elite. Originally clustered around the courts of the ancient Javanese kingdom, the *priyai* later formed the nucleus of the colonial bureaucracy. While the educated *priyai* looked down on the animistic features of *abangan* beliefs, their worldviews were more close to *abangan* than to *santri*. Thus *priyai* were more involved in administration while *abangans* and *santris* remained involved in trade and farming.

The arrival of the reformist Islam had another effect. It did not only sharpen the division between *abangan* and *santri*, it also deepened cleavages within the *santri* community itself. A split emerged between the modernists and the more conservative *santri* preachers. The modernists were close to *abangan* 'infidels'. The modernists attacked what they called the meaningless ritual of Koranic chanting and the quibbles of the traditional scholasticism. Thus the differences within the *santri* community increased in course of time. In the early part of the 20th century these doctrinal differences took an organizational shape. Two important Muslim groupings sprang up in 1912: the Muhammadiyah and the Sarekat Islam. The Muhammadiyah was founded by modernist *santris*, particularly from urban areas. Sarekat Islam, while founded by men of similar religious temperament, saw its mission more in economic and political terms as a defense against Chinese economic domination and as a grassroots nationalist movement. The Sarekat Islam soon became more militant and fictionalized and within a decade had ceased to be a powerful movement, although the ideas it represented lingered on. One wing of the Sarekat Islam eventually formed the nucleus of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The Muhammadiyah on the other hand survived and grew in influence.

In 1926 the more conservative *santris* responded to Muhammadiyah by founding a mass organization of their own: the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), meaning the 'Revival of the Religious scholars'. By the early 1990s, the NU claimed a membership of some 30

millions based mostly in the Central and the East Java. The Muhammadiyah's membership is smaller, at about fifteen million, but it is well dispersed in Indonesia. With their own network in schools and training centers, the two are the strongest non-governmental social and educational organizations in Indonesia.

Another Islamic party came into existence in 1943 when the Japanese advised all existing Muslim organizations to join under one umbrella group known as Masyumi. In the constitutional debates of mid-1945, the Masyumi demanded that Islam become the state religion.

At its inception in 1945, the Indonesian Army was comprised largely of soldiers recruited by the Japanese under *Pembela Tanah Air*. (Peta), the Motherland Defence Force. The soldiers came predominantly from *priyai* and *abangan* backgrounds and shared a distrust of *santri* units. These were known as Hizbullah, the Army of Allah, and fought against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949. During the frequent cease-fires, the Hizbullah kept up a guerilla campaign against the Dutch forces. In 1947, a section of the guerillas assumed a new name, *Dar-ul-Islam* (the House of Islam) and established their own armed faction called 'the Indonesian Islamic Army'. This group, later headed by Sekar Madji Kartosuwiryo, refused to submit to control by the regular army and proclaimed a separate Islamic state. Later the *Dar-ul-Islam* insurgency received the support of rebels in Aceh and subsequently found new followers in South Sulawesi and other areas. However, in 1962, Kartosuwiryo was captured and executed. Since then the Islam-based rebellion occurred several times in Aceh and other areas.

Former President Soeharto's strong sponsorship of the Indonesia Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), founded in the late 1990 and headed by the then Minister of Information and Technology, B.J. Habibie, has proved controversial but it highlights, at the same time, the role of religion in Indonesian politics. The formation of this association by Soeharto was to counter other Muslim organizations present in the country, which were basically traditionalists and modernists. The ICMI is comprised of government bureaucrats and 'technologists' who worked at the Agency for Research and

Technology. It also includes a collection of Golkar leaders, university professors, businessmen and cabinet ministers who were encouraged to join the organization as it began to take shape in early 1991. Members of this association primarily advocated pro-government viewpoints.

Many Indonesian Muslims, of course, take their religious faith very seriously. For this group particularly, Islam in Indonesia has been a study in frustration. Shunted aside under Soeharto's authoritarian and nominally secular rule, many Muslims feel that they have been deprived of their rightful place in running the action. This does not make Muslims unique in the New Order- other groups have been denied political influence as well, but the feeling of being dispossessed burns strong. However, this has not diluted their political aspirations, if anything, this appears to be growing.

Radical Islamic parties of Indonesia pose a serious threat to the democratic and secular structure of Indonesian polity. The ongoing intra-party conflicts within the Indonesian Islamic groups seek to maintain a proper check and balance between present democratic and secular nature of Indonesian polity and futuristic theological pursuits.

The growing influence of Islam in Indonesian polity is primarily attributed to the transitional nature of country's political economy as well as primordial nature of Indonesian society, which tends to reflect itself through more traditional and conservative forums. The post liberalization economic crises of Indonesian society might further aggravate the Islamic fundamentalism in the country threatening to dismantle the secular democratic fabric of the Indonesian polity.

Islam and Indonesian State

Among the prominent religions of the world, Islam is perhaps the most comprehensive in its insistence on the appropriateness of direct relationship between

religion and politics. The tenets of classical Islam as enunciated in the *Quran* and *Sunnah* (tradition of Prophet)³ and elaborated by theologians and jurists of early Islam, acknowledged no legitimate distinction between religious and secular activity. Classical Islamic theology and social theory envisaged a society which was thoroughly regulated according to the tenets of *Shar'iah* (divine law).⁴ Politics in particular was encompassed within the overarching authority of religious imperative. Sovereignty belonged to only Allah, while the caliph, the vice-regent of Prophet Muhammad, whose duty was to implement *Shariah*, defend the faith, and dispense justice, exercised spiritual authority. Classical theory possessed both an ideal and a pragmatic view of power. The ideal view posits indissoluble unity of religion and political power within the framework of the caliphate, a relationship in which political power was clearly subordinate to religion.

Power unaccountable to prophetic law was felt to be illegitimate, the theoretical primacy of religion over politics was unquestioned. The political concepts of classical Islam were, however, honored in theory rather than implemented in practice. The influence of the caliphate declined and *shariah* came to be restricted more and to the symbolic and the realm of personal and family law.⁵

Diluted and curtailed almost from its inception, the concept of the ideal Islamic politics stood more as an utopian symbol and religious solidarity than as a pragmatic institutional basis around which to organize the Muslim state. Although the concept failed to bear the resemblance to the political reality developing in the Islamic world with the weakening of the caliphate and the rise of the non-religious authority of the sultans and amirs, its theoretical hold did not diminish. Succeeding classical theorists effected compromises; though they were forced to acknowledge the *de facto* power of non-religious authority, they constructed and elaborate theoretical structure of compromise-cum-expediency while clinging to the ideal concept of an integrated religious power structure.

³ *Sunnah* : All those deeds done by Prophet Muhammad personally whereas *Hadith* refers to verbal injunctions made by him.

⁴ All those tenets of law which found direct reference in the Holy *Quran*.

⁵ Waines David, 'An Introduction to Islam'. Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp 100-101.

The classical pragmatic view acknowledged, though it did not approve of, power unattached to religion. This view combining pragmatism with theological concern, was formulated by *Ibn-e-Khaldun* (perhaps Islam's first social scientist) who, though sincerely committed to Islam and ideal of caliphate, nonetheless recognized the reality of autonomous power. His realistic view of man and balanced view of power impelled him to recognize the will to power and domination as man's principal driving force. The "Power State", as government by authority based on power rather than revelation, he maintained, was natural to man's needs as a rational being. "*Siyasat-e-aqliya*", or government founded on human reason, was less preferable than '*siyasat-e-deeniya*' (government based on *shariah*) but appropriate for certain times and conditions.⁶ Purely political authority was necessary and legitimate if it sought to promote the well being of the populace, even if religious concern were subordinated to the political and social needs of the state. Religion and power no longer formed an indissoluble unity. Other factors were operative as well.

The Period of Islamic Kingdoms

Muslim merchants from Gujarat (India) and Persia began visiting Indonesia in 13th century and established trade links with this country. Along with trade, they propagated Islam among the Indonesian people, particularly among the coastal areas of Java, like Demak. At a later stage they even influenced and converted Hindu kings to Islam, the first being the Sultan of Demak, this Muslim sultan later helped in spreading Islam westwards to Cirebon (near Bandung) and Banten and eastward along the northern coast of Java to the kingdom of Gresik. In the end, he brought the downfall of the powerful kingdom of Majapahit (1293-1520). After the fall of Majapahit, Islam spread further east where the sultanates of Bone and Goa in Sulawesi were established which occupied the area of Ternate and Tidore in Maluku. North of Java, the religion spread to

See also L.E. John, Religion, Politics, And Society, op. cit.p.15

⁶ Khaldun, 1958, vol.1-3

Banjarmasin in Borneo and further west to Sumatra, where the entire area of Palembang, Minagkabau (West Sumatra), Pasai and Perlak was converted.

Meanwhile, descendents of the Majapahit aristocracy, religious scholars, and Hindu Kshatrias retreated through the East Java peninsula of Blambangan to the island of Bali and Lombok. In a later period, however the eastern part of Lombok was converted to Islam, which entered the island from the southern Sulawesi city of Makassar, now named Ujungpandang.

The capital of the West Java kingdom of Pajajaran was Sunda Kelapa (1300AD). It was located in the present capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta. In 1527 Sunda Kelapa was conquered by Falatehan, an Islamic troop commander of the sultanate of Demak. After his conquest the city was renamed Jaya Karta, meaning 'the great city' which is the origin of the present name Jakarta. Falatehan also defeated the Portuguese, who had also tried to seize the city.

Islam under Mataram

During the 17th century one of the Mataram rulers had sought to block the expansion of Islamic influence and on one occasion massacred several thousand *ulemas* who he thought were undermining his regime. The Dutch, too, regarded Islam as a potential challenge to their hold on the archipelago. The emergence of these new Indonesian groups was the basis of an ideological and political renaissance in the early 20th century. From these several millions emerged new programs for secular nationalism, socialism and Islamic revivalism, all of which aspired to an independent and modern form of Indonesian civilization.⁷ Nationalism was the position of the new *Priyai* bureaucrats and intellectuals and it also appealed to Javanese peasants. The communists represented lesser *Priyai*, students, and workers' interest. Islamic reforms spread most

⁷ Alfian, Jogjakarta, 'The Political Behavior of a Muslim Organization under Dutch Colonialism' 1989 pp. 13 to 56.

widely in urban and middle class milieus, and in many villages, especially in the outer islands. Islamic conservatism was the creed of rural *kiyai* or *ulama* and their peasant followers. All these movements, by the command of *Jihad fi sabilillah*, (holy war in the path of Allah) were devoted to Indonesian independence.

Islam in the political prism of Indonesia

Indonesia has the world's largest Muslim population. With 85-90 per cent of the population being at least nominally Muslim, Islam is an important factor to consider when trying to understand Indonesian politics. While considering the role of Islam in Indonesian politics what strikes most is the fact that Islam has penetrated the country peacefully and gradually. Islam has been accepted by different layers of population as it was found to be beneficial not only for the spiritual upliftment but also for material well being. It is fascinating to note that despite being the abode of the largest segment of Muslim population in the world it has evolved a secular polity, fairly accommodative of the sentiments and opinions of the minority non-Muslim segments of its population. Having grown and evolved over the centuries through gradual process of interaction with existing religious beliefs, mores and practices Indonesia has a flavour and complexion strikingly different from that in regions where it entered as a conquering power.

When Islam spread to the Southeast Asian archipelago it was combined with and adjusted to local beliefs. Beginning with the thirteen-century, Arab, Indian and Chinese Muslim traders settled in the Indonesian archipelago and married with the local population. To a large extent they adopted local lifestyles but maintained their religious practices, although these were adjusted to the new context. Indigenous people converted to Islam, according to one argument, because the egalitarian ethos of the new religion was attractive for people suffering under the hierarchical Hindu caste system. Islam appeared in Indonesia mostly as a converting cultural force, not as a conquering political force as in many other countries. Pre-Islamic cultures co-existed peacefully with Islam as

there was nothing egalitarian about Islam in practice, and historical evidences indicate that Islamization was mostly a process induced from above. Although there was no foreign military power imposing Islam, once a local state came under the Islamic bulwark, the religion was sometimes propagated to other areas in the archipelago through warfare.⁸

Nevertheless, the way Islam mixed with other beliefs and co-existed with other religions created culture of tolerance which is still characteristic of many religious relations in contemporary Indonesia. Many Indonesian Muslims, especially in Java are not orthodox. They are syncretists who believe in Allah and the Quran but also in various kinds of spirits. They adhere to pre-Islamic ceremonies and rituals, and stress the inner content instead of the formal aspects of the religion.⁹

The various names by which this unique country has been known from time to time indicate its unique physical features. It is important to bear this aspect in mind as it may well be responsible for the gradualness of the growth of Islam. Its ancient name was Nusantara, which means the "middle islands". The Dutch who held sway it for more than three centuries called it Dutch East Indies. The present name Indonesia is composed by two Greek words Indus and Nesus meaning 'sea and the island' which corresponds to the locally familiar name *Tanah-Air-Kita*.

The Islamic experience in Indonesia produced a diversity of political perception over the past three centuries. Central to such diversity has been the division of Indonesian society along religious-cultural and political lines ranging from the strongly Islamic to the nominally or even non-Islamic.¹⁰ The strongly Islamic-nominally Islamic dichotomy is especially pronounced in Java, where Islamic culture, after its introduction in the sixteenth century, interacted with a highly eclectic Javanese culture comprising of

⁸ Wahid, Abdurrahman (1980) 'Religion, Ideology and Development', Prisma. The Indonesian Indicator, No.20, pp.56-65.

⁹ Cedorroth., Sven (1995) " Survival and Profit in Rural Java, the Case of a East Javanese Village, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monograph Series No.63)

¹⁰ 'Culture and Politics in Indonesia', Edited by Holt C, O'G Aderson Benedict R, and Siegel J.,p 61.

animism, exclusivity and syncretism, in which the Islamic and Indic-influenced civilizations warily interacted with each other- neither being fully able to subjugate or assimilate the other. Many Islamic practices were incorporated into Hindu-Javanese ceremonies and rituals, while much of that was syncretically Javanese found its way into Islamic practice.¹¹ Even now if a Hindu from India will visit Java, he will not be surprised to find his own mythological precepts based on the Ramayana and the Mahabharatha depicted in different forms in general peoples' houses of Java. Fire worshipping can be traced out in Hindu rituals especially during harvest time or any other rituals in Java. Most of the names of Indonesian people often resemble the names of Hindu Gods and goddesses.

Position of Islam during the Dutch rule.

During the colonial period, much of Indonesian Islamic behavior in an institutional sense (especially in Java) was assimilative in nature and accommodative to colonial and traditional court authority. The participation of Islamic officialdom (mosque administrators and judicial officials) in positions subordinate to Dutch and to Javanese aristocratic administrative superiors reflected its acquiescence to non-religious authority. The accommodation of the traditional Islamic bureaucracy to non religious rule was of the order of a 'quid pro quo' in which the legitimacy of non Islamic power was acknowledged in exchange for the retention by the Islamic bureaucracy of various perquisites of official symbols of authority.¹² In contrast to the accommodative style of the religious bureaucracy stood a more autonomous religious figure- the *kiyayi* (well known Islamic teacher or notable who usually headed his own Quranic School). Although the Islamic bureaucracy was perceived as an appendage to Dutch and Javanese aristocratic authority, the *Kiyayi* was perceived by his followers, as well as by colonial

¹¹ 'The Cambridge History of Islam' Edited by Holt P. M. (Et. A. L.), Vol. 2 A, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp 133-134.

See also 'Religion in Southeast Asia' by Fodour's, New York Press, 1984, p102-167.

¹² Piscatory James, 'Islam in the Political Process', Cambridge University Press, 1983, p 225.

authority, as an independent religious and social force. For the '*Kiyayi*'¹³, only religiously grounded power was truly legitimate.

A fair amount of diversity also exists as well within the Indonesian Islam, which is essentially divided between modernism and traditionalist orientations. Islamic modernism, introduced in Indonesia at the end of 19th century, has received social and political expression through the activities of several organizations. During the same period new forms of Islamic religious, social, and political actions were born in major parts of Sumatra, Java, Maluccas and Malaya among Muslim merchants, sensitive both to the pressure of the expanding colonial powers and to the currents of reformist thinking emanating from Meccca and Cairo. Singapore, a melting pot of the Southeast Asian people, became the main center of Islamic reformism and modernism.¹⁴ It harbored a large part of Malay population, immigrants from Minangkabau, Javanese laborers in transit to and from the rubber plantations from Malay, and other Indonesians who passed through the course of their pilgrimage to Mecca. Dutch restrictions on the Haj in Indonesia made British-ruled Singapore a major port for Indonesian pilgrims. Singapore also had significant Arab and Indian Muslim communities. The Arab settlement was especially important. Many Arabs worked in Singapore as brokers arranging the pilgrimage traffic. *Shaikhs* and *Sayyids* from Hadhramaut had high prestige, as they were respected for their religious probity. They formed a commercial elite, owned land and houses, invested in plantations and trade and had control over *batik* (traditional printed garments of Indonesia), tobacco, and spice trades. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, direct contact with Mecca had become more frequent. From Hadramaut Arab

¹³ The tradition of Muslims in Java always address the religious men with the title '*Ulama*' or "*Maulana*" but after the Dutch entered and became power in the realm, the title was changed to '*Kiyayi*', which means the Ulemas activities are confined till the mosques (*ulema dan para maulana kerjanya hanya mengurus mesjid*).

¹⁴ According to Geertz, the. (See his book *Islam Observed*, London, pp56-89.) the " Scripturalist Movement the objective to purify the Islam in Indonesia from its foreign syncretic and mystical elements, and to educate the nominal Muslim in purer Islamic doctrines and practices. According to Nakamura, it is part of ever going process Islamization or Reislamization in Indonesia.

*See manuscript by Mitsuo Nakamura. "The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree". Ph.D. Thesis. Cornell University, 1976.

*See also Noer Deliar, "The Modernists Muslim Movement in Indonesia", 1900-1942, Kuala Lumpur, 1973.

traders arrived to settle in Indonesia and transmitted their fine sense of orthodoxy to the local merchants with whom they dealt. From the other side, two thousand Indonesians were reported departing to Mecca for the Haj pilgrimage in 1860, ten thousand in 1880, and fifty thousand in 1926¹⁵.

Anti-colonial movement

The spread of anti-colonial sentiments can be traced in part to the intensification of the pilgrimage to Mecca¹⁶ when *hajis* (who visited Mecca as pilgrimage) returned to Indonesia with an acute consciousness of the need for Islamic political power, purification, renewal, and even outright assertion against the colonizer. It was common to find *hajis* and their circles of followers constituting the communities within the wider Muslim community through their Puritanism, austerity, and condemnation of '*adat*' (customs and traditions related to Islam). The best example is Haji Muhammad Rifangi, who founded movement of sorts, called Buduuh movement among the rural populace of Pekalongan and Kediri residencies. There was nothing outwardly 'anti-colonial' about this movement, but the members' withdrawal from the collective social and religious life of their villages, and also Rifangi's constant disruption of 'official' rituals in the Kalilsalak mosque, were subversive enough in the eyes of local officials who secured his exile to Maluku.

The activities of itinerant *hajis* prior to uprisings in Banten are illustrative. When Haji Abdul Karim, one of the teachers from the *Kadiriah tarekat*, not only established a *pesantren* in Banten but also became active in promoting Islamic political thinking, as Islamic way of life for all the human beings. He traveled throughout Banten, holding purification rites, *zikir* and processions. In the religious revival that ensued, he came to be regarded as a saintly figure with curative powers, his popularity was growing rapidly among the local *Priyai* officials. He predicted an imminent *jihad*, (fighting for the

*See Islam Observed by Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java and Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, London.

See also Perry Kenneth, Southeast Asia Crossroad of Religions. University of Chicago Press, 1984, p142.

¹⁶ The Crescent and Rising Sun, by J.Bend Harry, the Hague and Bandung 1958 pp.23-44.

survival of Islam as a holy war) the arrival of the *Mahdi* and the "Last Judgement." The Dutch orientalist and Islamologist, Snoeck Hurgronje, comments:

"Every evening a thousands of people for salvation flocked to his residence, to learn the *zikir* from him, they would kiss his hands and ask and how long the *kafir* (non believer of Islam) Government (Dutch Government) would continue.

The earliest reaction to consolidate Dutch rule and decline of the aristocracies came from this milieu. The changing balance of power allowed for the resurgence of *ulama*'s challenges to the authority of the *Priyai* elite. Ever since the consolidation of Mataram in the early 17th century the Javanese aristocracy had been divided into two groups the *Priyai*,¹⁷ conditioned by Javanese values, and those who governed, and the *Kiyai*, who represented Islamic religious faith and community loyalty.

The identification of the *priyai* and their 'official Islam' with the Dutch during the second half of the 19th century exacerbated the tensions between center and peripheries in Java whose history during this period is replete with the accounts of disturbances, illegal gatherings, and uprisings. Some of these were located in the areas, which were haunted by the potent spirits of past kingdoms; such 'illegal' gatherings took place around the graves of the Mangkunegara dynasty on Mount Lawu's slopes. A desire for collective action in this age of colonial economic penetration and political reordering made millennial appeals and messianic figures attractive at the very least, groups of people could seek to withdraw from the colonial order and its economy in order to maintain their self-respect. To Dutch officials, at least, the most serious threat came from the small

¹⁷ See Clifford Geertz, the Religion Of Java, pp.227-252. Literally, the term '*priyai*' refers only to the hereditary aristocracy of Javanese Court. The importance of this group is due to the fact that from the earliest times, traditional Javanese culture had been given its fullest expression in the Urban Centers where the Royal Courts were located (*negara*). The *priyai* culture manifests in the cultivation of a highly refined court etiquette, a very complex art of dance, drama, music, and poetry, and the multi-faceted system of Javanese philosophical mysticism weakened, the *priyai* variant as a souci-cultural and religious system remarkably strong. The *priyai* style of life remains to be the model, or at least the most important model, for the elite class in particular and the entire society in general. See also, 'Social Stratification and Social mobility in Indonesia' by CF. M. A. Jaspan, Jakarta. 1961. p.12

Islamic leaders who wandered about preaching *jihad* and the imminent arrival of a new era.

The only serious challenge to the Dutch consolidation of Sumatra was posed by the Acehnese. Acehnese were wealthy, organized, well armed, and fully determined to remain independent. The Dutch force first invaded Kota Raja (*Banda Aceh*) in 1873 and was consequently driven out. And when Kota Raja was finally defeated the following year, the sultan, and much of the populace fled to the hills to begin a guerrilla war that formally ended only in the early 1990s.¹⁸ In the Aceh war the familiar themes of pan-Islamism, *jihad*, millennial expectations and *ulama* leadership were clearly manifested.

TH-7520
The tenacity of the Acehnese resistance can certainly be attributed to the efforts of the *pesantren*-based *ulama*, the most distinguished among whom was Teungku Cik di Tiro.¹⁹ By the time guerrilla warfare commenced in 1881, he had taken over leadership from the *Hulubalang* or *Uleebalang* and their religious officials. The *ulama* constructed ramparts in the mountains, collected holy war contributions, and even succeeded in reconquering areas that were returned to the *Hulubalang*. What constituted the basis of their popular appeal were the *ulemas*, who counted among them Arabs of Hadhramaut Sayyid descendents, provided the links to the reformist and anti-colonial currents in the Islamic world. Committed to the goal of a revitalized Islamic community, they and their pupils lived in perpetual tension with the chiefs and ordinary villagers, who had other visions of their own. It was the circumstances of war that enabled the obligation, in order to unite them as Muslims. But even then, what appealed most to the guerrilla fighters was not the vision of a heavenly existence. As the *Hikayat Perang Sabil* (epic of the holy war) put it, "The blessings of Allah are unlimited for those who serve, who fight the *perang sabil*". To them he gives a paradise full of light, seventy heavenly princesses. More than can be counted he gives...you will get a new face, a young one...Allah will give you wealth and life". Several wars against the Dutch rule in the nineteenth century

¹⁸ Hasjimy. A., *Bunga Rampai Refolution of Aceh*, Jakarta, 1978, pp. 137-134.

¹⁹ Zuhri. K.H. Saifuddin, *the History of Islamic Resurgence and Development in Indonesia*, Bandung 1979, pp. 579-578



(such as the revolt led by Prince Diponegoro in Java, the Padri and Aceh wars in Sumatra) were Islamic in character as was the first mass movement of Indonesian nationalism. By 1903 the royal family and the *Hulubalang* had been completely subdued. But the guerrilla war continued in the form of attacks of small bands under the guidance or outright leadership of *ulemas*. These muslims as the Acehnese called them were prepared to die a martyr's death rather than submit to the Kafir's regime. It was only in 1913 that the two main centers of resistance were broken and thousands of Acehnese were killed. The Dutch attempted to neutralized further outbreaks by propping up *Hulubalang* as district chiefs, in the same way that they had established collaborative ties with the Javanese *Priyai* chiefs affairs. This, however, merely deepened the divisions, aggravated by the war, within Acehnese society.

Chapter II

Role of Islamic Groups in the Freedom Struggle

When all these regional wars of independence had failed, Indonesian nationalists began thinking of a more organized struggle against colonialism. The much awaited move began with the founding of *Boedi Oetomo*, literally meaning "noble conduct", on 20 May 1908. This organization of Indonesian intellectuals, which was initially set up for educational purpose but turned later into a political organization. It was inspired by Japan's victory over Russia in 1901, which also provided impetus to nationalist movements in many parts of Indonesia. The founder of *Boedi Oetomo* was Dr. Soetomo who was at that time, a student of *STOVIA*, an institution of trained Indonesian medical officers. Dr Soetomo was greatly influenced by Dr. Wahidin Soedirohoesodo and supported by Gunawan and Suradji.

In 1912 was founded the *Sarekat Dagang Islam*, an association of Muslim merchants by Haji Samanhudi and others. Their objective was to stimulate and promote the interest of Indonesian business in the Dutch East Indies. However, in 1912, this organization of middle class businessmen turned into a political party and was renamed *Sarekat Islam* under the leadership of H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, Haji Agoes Salim and others. In 1912, a progressive Muslim organization, *Muhammadiyah*, was established by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta for the purpose of social and economic reforms.

In December of the same year *Partai Indonesia* was founded by Douwes Dekker, later named Setiabudi, with Dr. Tjito Mangunkusumo and K.I. Hajar Dewantoro. The objective of the party was to strive for the complete independence of Indonesia. The Dutch government in 1913 exiled all these three leaders of the party. In May 1914, communism was introduced in the East Indies by the three Dutch nationals; Sneevliete, Baars and Brandsteder.²⁰

²⁰ Indonesia Handbook 1996, Page 24-25

Islamic groups prior to Freedom Struggle were not in a position to emerge as a separate identity. The main hindrance against the emergence of Islamic groups was the unislamic customs that were related to a number of rituals and customs with the two main groups of Islam- *priyai* and *santri*. However, during the first decade of 20th century some organizations emerged as reformist organizations. They started a movement of social and religious reforms in the Muslim society. These movements eventually became a challenge for the Dutch and also to the traditional landlords who were basically supporting the Dutch rule. However all the Muslim organizations were not able to remain united. Sarekat Islam had to face a split in 1923 and leftists were forced out and by late twenties it was challenged by Nahdatul Ulama.²¹ Soon after the ascendance of secular nationalism people like Ahmad Soekarno, Muhammad Hatta and Sultan Syahrir emerged as the leaders of the Indonesian politics. As a result, the leadership shifted from religion based Sarekat to secularists in order to seek support from all sorts of Indonesian communities. This drastic change into a major Muslim group was keenly observed by Agus Salim, a famous literary man who was immensely popular among the general mass. A well-known orator, writer, and journalist, he played a leading role in awakening Muslims especially through his famous journal *Fajrasia*. In the mean time, other leaders of Sarekat Islam left the party and founded *Partai Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Party) in 1938. However, this party could not get popular support and the initiative shifted to nationalist party *Partai Nasional Indonesia* which was led by Soekarno.

The Dutch tried to check the Muslim movement by imposing state control on education for 20 years (1905 to 1925) and in 1940 they banned any kind of political meeting.²² This created a strong reaction among Muslims and as a result the struggle for reform and freedom among them became intense. Muhammadiyah gave priority to moral and educational reform. In 1930 a Muslim party was founded by *pesantren* as *Pesantren Muslim Indonesia* (Pesantren Muslim of Indonesia) campaigned against imperialism and capitalism and called for Indonesian independence. All these Islamic parties came under

²¹ See Sar Desai D. R. " *Southeast Asia. Past and Present*, Third Edition. University of California at Los Angeles, West View Press, Boulder, San Francisco, 1994, P. 159

²² *Ibid*, P. 157

one banner to demand a parliamentary regime which would include a ministry of Islamic affairs and in which two thirds of ministers would be Muslims.

The Japanese occupation (1942-45) gave tremendous encouragement to the Muslims. Japan's immediate policy was to encourage religious groups and repress the political ones. They undermined all the domestic aristocracy and rapidly brought the Muslim movement under control. They used Muslims' sentiments against the Dutch and manipulated teachers and the network of Islamic schools to consolidate their position during the World War II. Thus, they tried to suppress the revived Sarekat Islam as well as various groups of PNI. MIAI- Masyumi a'laa (Great Islamic Council of Indonesia), also known as the Islamic Federation- was used to help the recruitment of a local army and to secure food supplies. Within a year even the MIAI got exasperated. Japanese arrogance requiring all " colonials" to bow towards Tokyo and recognize the divinity of the Japanese emperor was most repugnant to some of the devout MIAI followers, whose religion required bowing in the opposite direction, towards Mecca, and denouncing any divinity in a human being. Further the harsh treatment and brutalities inflicted on the peasant masses alienated the Japanese from the MIAI.²³

In 1943 the Japanese brought together all the existing Muslim organizations into a single federation under the name of Masyumi (*Majlis Sura Muslim Indonesia*). It provided a unique status and confidence to the Muslim groups, which they had not previously enjoyed. This was a good time for *ulemas* who were appointed as judges in Java. *Jamiatul Wasiliysh* was founded in late 30s and had a common interest with Muhammadiyah. In 1939 *Ichwanus Safa* was founded which was basically consisted of Muslim intellectuals and *ulemas* in Medan (Sumatra). This period of Japanese occupation acted as catalyst not only for unity of the Islamic parties but also contributed to the upsurge and consolidation of Indonesian nationalism which had emerged as a reactionary force against the Dutch imperialism.

²³ Sar Desai D. R. "Southeast Asia , Past & Present" Third Edition. University of California at Los Angeles, West View Press, Boulder, San Francisco, M.1994.pp.23-34

Two important Muslim groupings sprang up in 1912: the Muhammadiyah was founded by modernist *santris*, particularly from urban areas. The Sarekat Islam, while founded by men of similar religious temperament, saw its mission more in political and economic terms.

Islam after the Independence

The republic of Indonesia encountered a host of problems during the period 1945-49, some of them stemming from disunity among the nationalist ranks. There were those who scorned any compromise with the groups that had collaborated with the Japanese. The Islamic Masjumi party denounced the Marxist-oriented socialism. The PNI was split into several groups. The greatest challenge to the republic came from the communists, who attempted to overthrow the government by kidnapping members of the cabinet in June 1946. Two years later, another communist revolt took place. Both revolts were effectively suppressed by the republic, which was also fighting the Dutch forces intermittently from late 1945 to 49.

However, after the independence the Muslim party enjoyed strongest influence during the parliamentary phase when they played important role as members of the various coalition governments of that period. They were, however, neither able to consolidate it with political organizational unity nor contribute to stability of the polity. The situation paved way for emergence of authoritarian regimes first under Soekarno and then under President Soeharto. The armed forces have acquired a key position relegating political parties, in particular the Islamic groups, to the background. Neither the regimes nor the army can be described as hostile to Islam but both have been reluctant to make Islam the basis of governance as, they feel, it would disrupt national unity and development.

The unity of Muslim parties represented by Masjumi split after it converted itself into a political party when the NU withdrew support and set itself as a rival to Masjumi. In the elections held to replace the provisional Parliament with an elected one, held in

1955, the secular National Party secured the highest percentage (22.3) of votes, Masjumi stood second with 20.9 per cent and NU third with 18.4 per cent.²⁴

The 'Islamic State' set up as a revolt against Dutch occupation continued its struggle under the new Indonesian government and the leadership for this movement was provided by the Masjumi elements. In late 1956 and early 1957 several regions in Sumatra and Celebes decided to sever links with the central authority in Jakarta following which, in 1958, a rival government called the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) was formed. The revolt was supported by the CIA but it did not succeed. Only the Masjumi was embarrassed and the party split on the question of measures to be taken to deal with the crisis. It also marked the collapse of the parliamentary democracy leading first to the imposition of martial law and then Guided Democracy.

The system rested on two pillars, Ahmed Soekarno himself and the army. Gradually political authority passed into the hands of army and identifiably and whole-hearted Islamic groups got isolated throughout the country. Dominant political elite in Java and in most outer island societies remained basically syncretic in religious orientation. So far as Muslim parties were concerned they denied any essential differences in matters of faith but remained politically divided and mutually competitive. The secular nationalist leaders while paying due respect to symbols of Islam insisted on keeping religion and politics separate.

In 1965-66 the Islamic parties had played important role in crushing the Communists (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) of Indonesian Communist Party for their attempt of coup and hoped to gain legitimate place in the Post-Soekarno "New Order" regime of Soeharto. The latter, however, discouraged Masjumi, the most assertive Islamic party and encouraged its rivals, the NU and PSII, which was more pliable and responsive to secular approach.²⁵

²⁴ Schwarz Adam 'A Nation In Waiting, Indonesia in 1990s', Alwin & Anwin Tty Ltd. National Library of Australia, 1994. P.171

²⁵ Broinowski Alison " The Politics of Isklam in ASEAN countries Macmillon Perss, London, 1990 P.132

Soeharto's policy towards Islam was based largely on the views of the orientalist Islamologists Snouck Hurgronje who was for encouraging religious activities but proscribing the attempts of religious parties to develop a powerful political base. In practice it was similar to the approach of Soekarno who had created fission in Muslim unity by extending patronage to NU, allowing non-political Muhammadiyah and banning Masjumi.

Soeharto caused further damage to Masjumi by making a partial accommodation for the Masjumi. He refused the demand for its rehabilitation, however; he allowed some of its leaders to participate in a new Islamic party formed in 1968. At the same time his military regime was watching closely that Masjumi leaders were not acquiring important position. Therefore, preference was given to Muhammadiyah, which was prepared to cooperate with Soeharto's policy.

The Muslim Parties showed resilience by avoiding head-on clash with government and participated in the elections held under the 'New Order' even though the conduct of the electoral process was heavily weighted in favor of the ruling party Golkar. The vote for these parties never reached more than 44 per cent which Muslim party had achieved in 1955 general election. It remained substantial ranging between 27 to 29 per cent between 1971 and 1982.

Until 1970s the New Order Government under Soeharto adopted overall Islamic strategy aimed at dragging political Islam into open political contest. The Modernist Muslim groups were at first allowed to form a new party, the Partai Muslim Indonesia, but government's efforts to control the selection of leaders at local and national levels made this party a mere shadow of its precursor, the Masjumi. The NU, which had been spared government crackdowns against parties in the past, suffered a major setback in 1972 when it was deprived of its control over the Ministry of Religion.²⁶


²⁶ Hong Lee Oey 'Indonesia After the 1971 Elections' (edited) University of Hull, Oxford university Press, London, Kuala Lumpur, 1974 page.1-4

Once it had consolidated its power the New Order moved to increase bureaucratic leverage over Islam. K. H. Wahid Hasim was replaced with Muhti Ali as head of the Ministry of religion. Ali was both a modernist and a strong accommodationist as far as relations with the state were concerned. However, while limiting the political power of Islam, the military managers were careful not to offend Muslim sensibilities too much. For example, in 1973, army leaders agreed to amend a draft law in marriage in deference to the objections of Muslims that it ignored Islamic laws and courts. This compromise enabled the government to avoid having to defend itself on two fronts at a time when student demonstrations on secular issues led to mob violence in Jakarta in 1974.

In 1979, further relief was provided to the protagonists of Islam, when certain mystical streams of belief, popular among Java's syncretically Muslim majority but anathema to devoutly orthodox Muslims, were not given the status of a major new creed in the Ministry of religion. They were declared mere folkways and assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture. This survey, thus, leads to the conclusion that while there is an Islamic challenge to the Indonesian government, it is not at all threatening. Current developments suggest that the present relationship between the state and religion is unlikely to undergo a drastic change.

Political Islam in Indonesia consists of fundamentalists who believe that violence is necessary to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic State and it is also justified in eliminating un-Islamic elements in the existing state and society. Muslim fundamentalists are generally drawn from the modernists rather than traditionalist stream and see themselves as continuing the struggle pioneered by the Dar-ul-Islam and part of the Masjumi.²⁷

²⁷ Uhlin Anders 'Indonesia and the "Third Wave of democratization" The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World.' pp.28-31, Curzon, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Democracy in Asia Series, 1997 Richmond.



1. A balustrade of Borobudur (the biggest Buddhist temple in the world)



2. Artiste preparing for the mask dance


3. A pair of Javanese dancers posing as Rama and Sita (Hindu God and Goddess)



4. Leather Puppet Show (depiction of the Mahabharata)



The Great Mosque in Jakarta



Chapter III

Islamic Parties and their role in the Government

Islam has never had the political importance that one would expect from a strong majority religion. The four major Muslim parties received only 43.5 per cent of the votes in the country's so far only reasonably free and fair national election in 1955. ²⁸

At that time there were following political parties:

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1. PNI | Indonesian National Party (Nationalism group) |
| 2. UN | Muslim Teacher's Party (Based upon religion) |
| 3. Masyumi | Indonesian Islamic Council Reformist Muslim Party |
| 4. Perti | Islamic Educational Movement, Minor Islamic Political Party (Idem) |
| 5. Parkindo | Indonesia Christian (Protestant) Party (based on Christianity). |
| 6. PKI | Indonesian Communist Party (communist) |
| 7. Partai Katolic | Catholic Party (Catholic) |
| 8. PSI | Indonesia socialist Party (Socialist) |
| 9. IPKI | League of Upholders of Indonesian Freedom (Pancasila Principle) |
| 10. PRN | Partai Rakyat Nasional (National People's Party) |
| 11. Partai Buruh | Labor Party |
| 12. GPPS | Movement to defend Pancasila |
| 13. PRI | Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Party) |
| 14. PPPRI | Police Employees Association of the Republic of Indonesia. |
| 15. Partai Murba | (Marxist Nationalist) |
| 16. Baperki | Consultative Council on Indonesian Citizenship. |
| 17. PIR | Wongsonegoro |
| 18. Gerinda | Indonesian Movement. |

- | | |
|---|---|
| 19. Permai | Persatuan Masyarakat Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) |
| 20. PPD | Dayak Unity Party. |
| 21. PIR Hazairin | Individual Party. |
| 22. PPTI | Tharikhah Unity Party. |
| 23. AKUI | Islamic Victory Force. |
| 24. PRD | Village People's party. |
| 25. PRIM | Party of the People of Free of Indonesia. |
| 26. ACOMA | Younger Generation Communist. |
| 27. R. Soejono Prawirosoedarso and Associates. | |
| 28. Others parties, organizations and Individual candidates | ²⁹ |

They were classified in three categories:

1. Parties orientated to religion.
2. Parties orientated to nationalism.
3. Parties orientated to Marxism.³⁰

Among them only nine political parties and one new mass organization participated in the 1971 General Election. The new party was *Golongan Karya* or Functional Groups usually abbreviated into Golkar³¹ representing people from all classes. The executive of Golkar was in the hands of senior army officers, with Lieutenant-General Sukowati as chairman during the election period.

The parties contesting in the election were:

²⁹ Herbert Feith, "The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia", (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), P. 434-35.

³⁰ Official release from Indonesian Embassy, New Delhi. Novemebr 1996

³¹ Golkar, abbreviation of *Golongan Karya* (functional group). They have a Joint Secretariat (*Sekretaria Bersama*) under the guidance of the Army officers. The functional groups, a provision of the 1945 constitution, came into being after the return to the Constitution of 1945 had been decreed by Soekarno in July 1959. The representatives of professional and regional groups were expected to supplement the party system, the importance which was gradually and systematically reduced.

1. *Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)*, the national party was once associated with former President Soekarno in the colonial period;
2. *Nahdatul Ulama (NU)*, comprising orthodox Islamic scholars with their mass support,³²
3. *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII)*, a small Islamic Party with socialist tendencies which later was divided into two distinct groups.
4. *Perti*, a small orthodox party with basic support in Sumatra;
5. *Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi)*, considered as the successor of the banned Masjumi party;
6. *Partai Katolik*, the official Roman Catholic party of Indonesia;
7. *Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo)*, the party of Indonesian Protestants;
8. *Partai Murba*, usually called 'Trotskyist' because it was ideologically influenced by the late Tan Malaka, a prominent anti-PKI communist; and
9. *Ikatan Penduduk Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)*, the League for Upholding Indonesian Independence, some times associated with veterans of the Indonesian army.

During the election campaign from April to July 1971, these political parties were forbidden to criticize the government's policy and at the same time a series of other prohibitions were introduced which were totally against the democratic norms. The arrest of the prominent leaders of NU and Parmusi for being involved in the activities of the banned PKI gave the opportunity to the Golkar to reap the support of the people. The official result shown below (announced on 8 August 1971, without the nine seats representing West Irian that was still to be contested at that time)

DPR seats

- | | | |
|----|----------------|---|
| 1. | Partai Katolik | 3 |
|----|----------------|---|

³² See Gatra, November 1991

2.	PSII	10
3.	NU	58
4.	Parmusi	24
5.	Golkar	227
6.	Parkindo	7
7.	Murba	--
8.	PNI	20
9.	Perti	2
10.	IPKI	--

351+9 (West Irian Jaya)³³

total 360

The nine seats of West Irian Jaya ultimately went to Golkar.³⁴

In this constitution supreme state power is vested in the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR³⁵ (People's Consultative Assembly). The MPR determines the general orientation of state policy, and elects the President and Vice President for a period of 5 years and he is answerable to the MPR. He has the obligation of implementing MPR's

³³ The Sovereignty of the People rests with the People's Consultative assembly (MPR). Hence, the President is accountable to the MPR. The legislative power is vested in the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR) House of representatives.

The present Constitution of Indonesia is the "Constitution of 1945" (*Undang Undang Dasar 1945*). This constitution was drawn up in August 1945 shortly after the proclamation of Indonesian independence, but was abolished as a result of the Round Table Conference with Dutch held at the Hague at the end of 1949. It was re-promulgated by former President Soekarno on 5 July 1959 and became the political framework of the ensuing regime of Guided Democracy. The 1945 Constitution is still maintained as Guided Democracy. The 1945 Constitution is still maintained under the New Order regime of Soeharto.

³⁴ Kompas, Jakarta, 29 October 1971.

³⁵ The elections were for 425 seats in the People's Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR). This is Indonesia's parliament, the body responsible for making laws. The DPR also contains 75 appointed Armed Forces (Abri) representatives. Abri members do not vote in the election. Indonesia's super-parliament, the People's Deliberative Assembly *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR) consists of the 500 members of the DPR, together with another 500 representatives of regional, party and 'functional group' representatives, who are effectively appointed by the president. This body is Indonesia's supreme law-making institution. It meets briefly once every five years. Its two chief functions are to elect a president and vice-president, and to enact the Broad Outlines of State Policy (*Garis Besar Haluan Negara*, GBHN).

decisions. Thus the position of the President is subordinate to that of the MPR. In the execution of the government policy, power and responsibility are concentrated in the President. In exercising his duty the President is assisted by a Vice- President.³⁶

The surprises of the election results could be seen in the severe setback experienced by the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), that obtained only about 7 per cent of the total votes or 20 seats out of the elected 360 in the new Parliament. In comparison Golkar won 227 seats, or nearly two thirds of the elected seats in the legislative body. The major cause of the defeat of the PNI was that the President Soeharto had given proof of his benevolent attitude towards the restructured Nationalist party, even if for the purpose of balancing the influence of the Islamic parties in the future Parliament.³⁷

Muslim organizations supported the establishment of the New Order and many took an active part in the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI. The Muslim community expected to benefit from its support for the army's seizure of power, but instead the political and social role of Islam was further restricted. The Muslim Masyumi party, banned by Soekarno for alleged involvement in the regional and religious rebellion in the 1950s, was not rehabilitated. In 1973, the existing Muslim parties were forced to merge into a federation, the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP), which became manipulative and controlled the government.

There is a deep-rooted antagonism between the Indonesia army and political Islam. Armed conflicts between Muslims and the army have occurred in many parts of Indonesia, especially in west Java, Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi.

³⁶ Lee Oey Hong (edited by) "Indonesia After 1971 Elections" University of Hull Publications, published by the Oxford University Press, London, Kuala Lumpur, 1974. p.page2-3

³⁷ Sundhaussen, Ulf 91989) " Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with democracy", I Adamantine Press Limited, London.

However, as stressed by Zifridaus³⁸, the major Muslim organizations have never clashed with the army.

The main Muslim organization, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah have on the whole been very accommodative towards the government. The NU is the main traditionalist organization while the reformist or modernist wing of Indonesian Islam is represented by Muhammadiyah. The differences between two organizations have over the time narrowed considerably. As noted by Tamara³⁹, "the modernists and the traditionalists have more similarities than differences" this point is stressed by the fact that the highly reformist and independent-minded Abdurrahman Wahid is head of the NU.

Like many countries Indonesia has experienced Islamic revival. Basically this is a reaction to swift social changes in the country. One explanation is that many Muslims lost their economic and political power under the early New Order as foreign capital destroyed traditional industries (batik, and textile etc). In the 1990s, a Muslim middle class is regaining economic and political influence, a process manifested in the formation of the association of Muslim intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI*).

In the wake of the general Islamic revival, and as a reaction against the conservative accommodating tendency of the established Muslim organizations, a new generation of Muslim activists emerged. These activists played an active role in the student movements of 1974 and 1978, and the campaign against compulsory Pancasila indoctrination. The new Muslim groups have also cooperated with non-Muslim democratic groups.⁴⁰ Unlike the colonial Java of the 19th century, it is the religious teachers and preachers at the base who, being independent from the government, are

³⁸ Zifridaus, Adnan (1990) "Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic (Political) Ideology: No! Islam and the Strategy in Indonesia, Clypton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No.22)

³⁹ Tamara, Nasir (1986) "Indonesia in the Wake of Islam: 1965-1985, Kualalumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies.

⁴⁰ Liem Soei Liong (1988) "Indonesian Muslims and the State: Accommodation or Revolt?" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.10, No.2: 869-896.

becoming the leaders of underground resistance.⁴¹ This is overstating the case, as many Muslim leaders are conservative and do not oppose the regime. Nevertheless, sections of the Muslim community do play an important role in the opposition to the New Order. This is partly explained by the fact that the Muslim community has been less vulnerable to the government's restriction on the political participation and expression through political parties, mass organizations, and the press than other groups relying primarily on such formal political organizations. The Muslim community retained its ideology and traditional structures centered on the mosques and religious schools despite the restrictions imposed on their "modern" organizations⁴²

Major Political Organizations

1. Sarekat Islam

The first organization with mass appeal dealing with broad political and economic issues was the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), founded in 1912. Its focus of activity was economic and, therefore, anti-Chinese. The Islamic appeal of Sarekat Islam provided a common link, a welding force binding the divergent communities together. Some of them had been concerned over the aggressive efforts of the Christian missionaries who had of late stepped up their proselytizing activities. The membership of the Sarekat was principally drawn from the *santri* and the lower *priyayi* classes. Educationally, the members were above the general level of Indonesians, with maximum exposure to the west and hailed mostly from middle class families. Because of the flexible nature of Islam in Indonesia and more especially because of influence of

⁴¹ Wertheim, W.F. (1985) "Bourgeois Current in Religion", in A. Ibrahim Siddique and Y. Hussain (eds) *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. (Excerpt from W.E. Werheim (1959) *Indonesian Society in Transition, A Study of Social Changes, the Hague: W. van Hoeve, 2nd edition.*)

⁴² Crouch, Harold (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. --(1986) "Islam and Politics in Indonesia", in Coral Bell (ed.) *Politics, Diplomacy, and Islam: Four Cases Studies*, Department of International Relations. The Australian National University, Canberra (Canberra Studies in World Affairs No.21)

modernist Islamic doctrine, religion could play a significant role as a vehicle for Indonesian nationalism and the people's social and political aspirations.

The Sarekat was led by the charismatic Unar Sayaid Tjokroaminoto⁴³, known as the "*ratu adil*" (righteous prince) who would lead people to abiding happiness. Peasants flocked in thousands to touch him, kiss his feet, and hear him speak. For two decades, Tjokroaminoto's residence remained the rendezvous of social and political activists. Among them was a young man, named Soekarno, who lived in his house for several years and married his daughter.

The Sarekat Islam's initial objectives were quite modest. They primarily intended to promote among Indonesians, a commercial spirit, and a feeling for the "true religion of Islam." The party was created to enhance the economic activity among the indigenous Muslim population. Many of its preachers learnt about the reformist Islam in Mecca and Cairo and started propagating message to *desa* (Indonesian villages). In a very short time the movement spread through the countryside. The basic objectives of Sarekat Islam were:

1. Introducing the true teachings of Islam,
2. Removing the un-Islamic ways of life and out-dated customs,
3. To promote Islamic brotherhood and Pan-Islamism,
4. To work for the educational progress of the nation,
5. To struggle for the commercial and industrial development,
6. Plan for enhancing the economic condition of the people.

⁴³ Umar Saeed was the founder of the National Freedom Movement and revival of the Islamic way of life in Indonesia. He was born in Madiun, Central Java. After early education in Islamic school, he joined the Dutch Secondary School for modern education. From his early age he hated the religious policies of the Dutch Government. He started anti-Dutch movement in his school days as protest against the inhuman behavior of Dutch teachers and religious fanaticism. Later he became the journalist and joined the party of Haji Saman and became the President of its Youth Wing. He emerged as a new leader of Sarekat Islam and became the flag bearer of Islamic Revolution and Unity. After the foundation of Sarekat Islam he established another institution for political training of the nationalist workers where Islamic history, culture, philosophy and Islamic Theories were taught, and launched a magazine for propagating Islamic message known as *Utusan Hindia*.

These objectives attracted the people and soon there were more than 400.000 adherents. Its activities included protection of Indonesian merchants against the Chinese and defense of Islam against the proselytizing efforts of the missionaries. Its national status was justified by a membership all over Indonesia of approximately two millions by 1919. The heterogeneous nature of the organization soon brought conflict within it over the long-range goal of the party and the methods to achieve them. However, Sarekat members agreed on a number of issues like the need for modernization, self-government, and socialism. The differences were on the acceptable level of radicalism and how rapidly the socialist programs should be adopted. Capitalism was considered "sinful" largely because it was European and Chinese, responsible for Indonesia's miseries. Besides, socialism seemed to suit the Indonesian temperament of group spirit (*gotong royong*), the traditional outlook, favoring mutual cooperation as against Western individualism.

The Dutch government was soon alarmed and it put a lot of restrictions on the various activities of the Sarekat Islam. However, in the third conference in October 1917 the Sarekat Islam demanded to establish a Parliament based on democratic principles and capable of representing the Indonesian people. The national rights were demanded openly and a resolution was passed against imperialist rule. In 1929 Sarekat Islam faced a jolt when a group of communist agents, who were holding prominent posts, deserted the party by the name of *Sarekat Rayaat* and the main part of the party came under the leaderships of Agus Salmi and Abdul Muis. However, in the freedom struggle Sarekat Islam emerged as a mass political movement and the main force of the Indonesian opposition to Dutch rule, but later, within a decade, it broke up over the differences of ideology and political orientation. The rise of the socialist wing polarized the party. In 1923 the movement split as the leftists were forced out and this marked the diminishing point of the Sarekat Islam's popularity among the mass. It lost a majority of its followers and at the same time it also lost its influence over the peasant class followed by challenge from the Nahdatul Ulama⁴⁴

⁴⁴ See, 'Journal of Southeast Asian Studies', by Martin Van Bruinessen, Utrecht University on February 2, 1994, p.419.

Partly in response to the Sarekat's demands the colonial government agreed to introduce some administrative and constitutional reforms. In 1903, Indonesians had been allowed some modest participation in the local and regional councils. Then in 1918, the people's council, or *Volksraad*, was inaugurated. One-half of its members were appointed by the Governor-General in his discretionary authority, while the other half were elected by local councils. The *Volksraad's* powers were advisory: the Governor-General even needed permission from The Hague to accept its advice. No wonder Indonesian nationalists felt completely frustrated with the pace and content of political reforms.

The most radical of the socialist groups within the Sarekat fold was the Indies Social democratic Association (ISDA), founded in 1914 by the future leader of the Dutch Communist Party, Henerik Sneevliet. Its Indonesian leaders included Semaun and Tan Malaka; who insisted that the Sarekat Islam come out openly as a political organization with a radical and revolutionary program for the overthrow of Dutch rule and establishment of a socialist state. After the ideological bifurcation of Sarekat Islam the PKI detested Sarekat's emphasis on religion and preference for evolutionary rather than revolutionary means to attain independence. In 1921, the Sarekat Islam prohibited its members from joining any other political organization. The die was cast. The communists were expelled from the Sarekat Islam.

The PKI and the "Revolution" of 1926

The rift in the Sarekat Islam helped the PKI. Many young members of the Sarekat, impatient but hitherto not Marxist, turned to the PKI as the only radical vehicle for their energies and aspirations. By 1923, the PKI claimed some 50,000 members and a significant control of the trade union movement. It owed its success partly to the Dutch decision in 1921 to balance the budget without hurting Dutch economic interests. Consequently, the government discharged considerable numbers of lower staff and stopped payment of cost-of-living bonuses. Tax level for Indonesians were raised.

Indonesians with an average income of 225 guilders per year now paid ten per cent in taxes while the Dutch paid that percentile only after they reached 9,000 guilders. Understandably, the PKI had a substantial following among urban workers, educated youth without jobs, and middle income persons burdened with taxes. A later survey of 1,000 PKI internees showed a literacy rate of 76.1% compared with the general literacy rate of 5%. Ten per cent of the men had long periods of unemployment despite their diplomas from Dutch native schools.⁴⁵ The PKI successfully exploited the economic frustrations of the western-educated, middle class youth and the urban workers in forging a radical movement in the 1920s.

In 1923, the PKI organized a railroad strike that successfully paralyzed most of the economy activity on the island of Java. Inspired by the success, Semauan, Alimin Prawiridirdjo, Musso, and Tan Malaka amalgamated twenty-two trade unions into a Communist-dominated federation. It soon became the operational channel for the revolutionary aims of the PKI, organizing between 1923 and 1926 numerous strikes, lockouts, and demonstrations. In 1926, the PKI considered the situation ripe for a revolution and for the overthrow of the colonial government. In November 1926, the communists proclaimed a republic and announced that PKI members would be exempted from the payment of taxes. Although the PKI uprisings were spectacular and fairly widespread, they were largely limited to city workers. The call for a revolution was certainly premature and the Dutch government had little difficulty in crushing the movement. The PKI was banned and about 13,000 of its members were arrested and thrown into prisons or exiled for long period to the concentration camps in New Guinea. The PKI suffered so badly that it did not raise its head for the remainder of the Dutch rule.

What were the reasons for the PKI's collapse? Its secession from the Sarekat Islam was suicidal. The PKI's main point of dissension with the Sarekat Islam had been latter's religious bias. Little did the PKI realize that the moderate central leadership of

⁴⁵ Robert Van Niel, "The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite", The Hague, W. Van Hoeve, 1960, pp.223-224.

the Sarekat Islam was closer to the bulk of the religious-minded Indonesians than the atheist communist could ever hope to be. Moreover, the series of labor strikes had led to the arrest and detentions of many prominent PKI leaders, leaving mostly the second-level echelons to lead the abortive revolt of 1926-27.

The PKI revolution could not involve the masses of peasants. Its leadership, coming for the most part from the *priyayi*, had traditionally looked down upon the toiling peasants. Even the lower ranks of the PKI were educated far above the level of an average Indonesian and had a certain aversion towards the inarticulate, untutored peasants. The party's work in the agrarian sector of the society had been negligible, and the communists' refusal to give religion any place in life had only helped to alienate them further from the peasants. Consequently, the PKI's call for a nationwide revolution failed to evoke a sufficient response in the countryside.⁴⁶

The PNI and Soekarno

Meanwhile, the Sarekat Islam avoided overt political activity for fear of repression. Instead, it paid attention to education and economic questions. During the same period, a movement, which began in 1921, encouraged the Taman Siswa (garden of pupils), a school system blending Indonesian and Western cultures. Though their activities were overtly non political the schools fostered a national consciousness and helped to create a cadre of educated youth who would join the nationalist movement in later days. Such a program, aiming at slow progress, did not satisfy many, particularly the young educated Indonesians returning from Holland. Many of them were members of the Leftist Indonesian Union, organized in Holland in 1922. They were joined by Soekarno⁴⁷, a young engineer with a gift for political rhetoric.

⁴⁶ Dorothy Woodman, "the Republic Of Indonesia" New York, Philosophical Library, 1955,p.366.

⁴⁷ Ahmad Soekarno was born in 1901, at a village near Surabaya. His father, a schoolteacher belonging to a poor family had married a Balinese woman of Brahmin caste, who brought up her son according to Hindu customs and culture. Soekarno was admitted to a boarding school founded Umar Saeed who, observing Soekarno's gifted talent, took him under his own supervision and later gave his daughter to him. From beginning Soekarno seemed very ambitious he left Umar Saeed and divorced his daughter and later married

He established the *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* (PNI), the Indonesian Nationalist Party, on 4 June 1927. It soon brought all known communist nationalist elements under the umbrella of a non-cooperation movement in 1928 on lines similar to that adopted by the Indian National Congress. The PNI adopted the red and white flag, Bahasa Indonesia, (the Indonesian language), and the anthem "Indonesia Raya" (Greater Indonesia) as the symbols of national unity.

The Dutch government quickly moved to liquidate the threat that it recognized in the PNI's growing strength. In 1930, Soekarno and other PNI leaders were jailed and the PNI was outlawed. In 1932, Muhammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir returned from their university education in Holland, where Hatta had been the President of the Indonesian Union. On their arrival in Java they found that the PNI was leaderless and split into factions. Along with Soekarno, who was then out of prison, they brought all the splinter groups together into a mass organization called the *Partai Indonesia* (Partindo). In 1933, they were all arrested. None of the three leaders was freed until the advent of the Japanese in 1942. Sjahrir's book written in exile is a sad commentary on the harsh prison conditions to which the leaders were subjected.⁴⁸

In the face of nationalist competition and Dutch policies, the Muslims generated a new wave of political activism, which was to last through the war years until 1955. While Muhammadiyah gave priority to moral and educational reform, the *Persatuan Muslim Indonesia* (PMI), ~~founded in 1930, campaigned against imperialism and capitalism and called for Indonesian independence as an essential condition for both~~ Islamic reform, and economic prosperity. The *Partai Islam Indonesia* (the Indonesian Islamic Party) similarly combined Islamic, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist slogans. Indonesian Muslim parties formulated new demands for a parliamentary regime, which

a wealthy woman. He was very interested in politics and being a hard-liner he was imprisoned in 1933 by Dutch. Later he was released by Japanese in 1942 and since then Soekarno emerged as leader.

⁴⁸ Dr. D. R. Sar Desai, "Southeast Asia" Past and Present" Third Edition. UCLA Western View Press, Boulder, San Francisco. PP, 153-155.

would include a ministry of Islamic affair and in which two-third of ministers would be Muslims.

Muhammadiyah

Muhammadiyah is one of the largest Islamic organizations formed in various parts of Indonesia. It was founded by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 in one of the Sultan's mosques in central Java.⁴⁹ Ahamad Dahlan and his close associates, mainly drawn from his own neighborhood, the Kuman district of Jogjakarta, worked vigorously, giving religious lectures '*pengajian*' for adults and young people, providing religious courses at government schools, setting up their own schools where both secular and '*achirat*' subjects were taught, and establishing orphanages and clinics. The basic patterns of Muhammadiyah and its activities were firmly established by Dahlan himself in his lifetime. The following objectives were agreed upon as the main principles for the party on 18 November 1912:

1. Social and Religious reforms of the Muslim community.
2. To emancipate them of un-islamic beliefs and various tattoos.
3. Presentation of Quranic teachings in such a way that they could help in solving contemporary social problems.
4. To establish an education system based on Islamic principles and expansion of education.
5. To teach modern sciences along with the revival of Islamic sciences and their development.
6. To establish institutions for the purpose of social, religious and educational reform.
7. To protect the rights of women and bring them to the same status as men in terms of education.

⁴⁹ See . Muslim Movement in Modern Indonesia, by Dealern Noor, Kuala Lumpur 1973, and Pre-War History of Muhammadiyah in Particular, by Ibrahim Alfian, Jakarta 1969.

Muhammadiyah laid great emphasis on its ideology. It expressed itself in the fields of beliefs, rituals, education, social welfare activities, and politics. In the mid-1920s Muhammadiyah entered fresh zones when Minagkabau's emissary Hamka⁵⁰ carried it to other parts of the island and even to Borneo and Celebes. The movement for the religious reform eventually became a challenge to the Dutch as well. Between 1918 and 1923 several efforts were made to unite the various *Kaum Muda* (young generation) groups and channeling them into political action and calling for independence both from the feudal rule of local notables and from the imperialistic rule of the Dutch. The Sumatran students groups appealed to petty traders and the small holding peasants and eventually provoked scattered rebellions which were put down by the Dutch in 1926 and early 1927.

Limited and belated as was the political role of reformism in the twentieth century Indonesian political history, its impressive educational and religious achievements had far-reaching social and ultimately also political consequences, not least in some of the outer islands. To some extent Muhammadiyah succeeded in educating a new generation of self-reliant Muslims. It gave birth to a group of youths who were ready to propagate the real Islamic doctrine based Indonesian social system.

In the town outside the control of 'kerajaan' Muhammadiyah built up a still more impressive organization. It penetrated not only a large number of Dutch and Indonesian medium schools and colleges but also important women organizations (*Darma Wanita*) like *Aisyah*, scouts⁵¹ (Hizbul Wathan).

In mid-1930s, a new Islamic party emerged, "*Premi*" (*Persatuan Muslim Indonesia*), Union of Indonesian Muslims'. But it too was disbanded, leaving only Muhammadiyah in the field.

⁵⁰ Amrullah's famous son, the prolific writer and publicist Haji ' Abd al- Mallik (H. Abdullah Malik), known under his nick name Hamka.

⁵¹ Hizbul Wathan- was one of the most important scouting women groups active in different provinces in 1933 with 400 members in ten branches.

**Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectual
(ICMI, *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*)**

Formation of the association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI, *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*) in 1990s was part of the new political strategy of Soeharto to exploit Muslim society. It was a poignant moment in the political and cultural history of the New Order in Indonesia since 1966.⁵² The ICMI emphasized responsibility of Indonesian Muslims for penetration in the politics and thus put Islamic *ummah* in a strong position to develop awareness of objectives and understanding of Islam in all aspects of life.^{53, 54}

The global trend of Islamic movements affects directly and indirectly the Indonesian *ummah*, the community of believers. In recent years, the problem of

⁵² B. Modi Nawaz "Indonesia Under Soeharto: Soeharto and Political System, India, 1987, p. 151-154

See 'ICMI dan Harapan Ummat (ICMI) and Ummah Expectancy'. Edited by Muhammad Abrar, Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Jakarta 1991

⁵⁴ In a modern western language the fundamental distinction between intellect and reason is usually forgotten and the term is used as the equivalent of reason. In Arabic, Persian and other Islamic languages a single term, *al-'aql*, is used to denote both reason and intellect, but the distinction between the two as well as their interrelation and dependence of reason upon intellect is always kept in mind. *Al 'aql* in Arabic is related to the root *a'ql* which means to bind. It is the faculty which binds mind to god, to his origin. By virtue of being endowed with *al a'ql*, man becomes man and shares in the attribution of knowledge, *al ilm*, which ultimately belongs to God alone. The possession of *al a'ql* is of such a crucial nature that the Holy Quran refers repeatedly to the central role of *al a'ql* and of intellect. "(*ta' aqquh or tafaqquh*) in man's religious life in his salvation.⁵⁴ But *al 'aql* is also used as reason, intelligence, keenness of perception, foresight, common sense and many other similar concepts. Moreover, each school of Islamic thought has elaborated in great detail of certain aspects of the meaning of intellect as it pertains to its perspective and inner structure.

As far as the word intuition is concern such terms (*firasah*) have usually been used. These terms imply parting of knowledge which is not simply rational but not opposed to the intellect as the term is understood in its traditional sense. Another set of terms more prevalent in text of philosophy, theology and Sufism are *dhawq*, *Ishraq*, *Mukashafah*, *Basirah*, *Nazar* and *Badiah*. These terms are all related to the direct vision and participation in the knowledge of the truth in contrast to indirect knowledge upon which all ratiocination is based. This contrast is emphasized also in the usage of the term

Al-ilm, *-al huduri*, or inherent knowledge, has opposed to *al-ilm* or *al-husuli* or acquired knowledge, but these terms referred to a deference between intuition as a form of knowledge based upon immediate experience and ratiocination as indirect knowledge based upon mental concepts.

communication is turning to be insignificant day by day, as the globalization is not only occupying the market but the whole society. The events of the other Islamic world can be followed very shortly after the event takes place. Yet, while it is true that the Indonesian Muslims share their fellow Muslims' feelings around the world, it will be misleading to picture the development of Islam in Indonesia solely in the light of current global trend.

The distinct historical background of Islamization process and the characteristic of Indonesian society make any sweeping generalization untenable. The distinct patterns and various sources of Islamization in the archipelago since the fourteenth century have been responsible for the accommodative and receptive character of Islam in the country. Also, the heterogeneous nature of the people necessitates various interpretations in doctrines and practices. Indonesians are also the recipients of many traditions and influences originating from different civilizations prior to and during the process of Islamization. Such cultural traditions as indigenous traditions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and later Christianity have co-existed with Islamic tradition. As consequences, even though Islam is the religion of the majority of Indonesian population, it has sociological and historical characteristics, which in many ways differ from those of Middle Eastern, African and other Asian countries.

It is no longer a surprise that many strands of Islam emerged as a result of doctrinal reflections responding to the existing social, economic and political changes. Religious reform movement in the early 20th century⁵⁵, the current phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia, can be seen as a dynamic response to the challenge of modernization. As a process, which rapidly transforms the existing order of things, it has resulted in a mixed feeling and insecurity among the Islamic leaders. On the one hand, modernization has brought about unprecedented results, which makes it possible for the *ummah* to escape from backwardness and enable the Muslims to perform the religious

⁵⁵ See *Sejarah Pemikiran, Politics, and Society*. Edited by L. Esposito John, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996 p.5

obligations. On the other hand, many leaders see the threat of secularism as one of the by-products of modernity to religious values and tradition.⁵⁶

If we see the chronicles of the modern history of Indonesia, 19th century witnessed Muslim intellectuals and reformers like Ahmad Dahlan, who founded Muhammadiyah School. Hasimal_Asyari founded Syarikat Nahdatul Ulama and Pesantren of Tebuireng in Jombang. H. Saman Hudi and Tjokroamonoto with Sarekat Islamic commerce movement, the leaders of the movement Ahmad Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta founded the New Indonesian republic. The later part of the 20th century again saw Islamic resurgence throughout the young generation of Muslim leaders like Muhammad Nasir who founded the new mode of Islamic da'wa system in Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic da'wa movement), lafran Pane, A. Timur jlani, Ahmad Trisudiro, founded Indonesian Muslim Students Movement Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI*), and in 1991, General H. Muhammad Soeharto and Prof. Dr. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (B. J. Habibie), founded the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (*Ikatan Muslim Cendekiawan Muslim se Indonesia ICMI*) backed by Soeharto with a different mode of Islamic organization.

H. Muhammad Soeharto⁵⁷ and Prof. Habibie belong to a different Muslim background. This was one of the best examples and a call for the people of different background of Islam to come under one umbrella called ICMI. Their basic aim was to mould the ICMI on the ideology of Pancasila, close to Indonesian culture, "modern Muslim" which was a symbol for a high quality of Muslim.

Different approaches have been adopted by the Islamic leaders to respond to such a challenge. Three major trends can be found in this respect: legalistic, cultural, and

⁵⁶ The intellectual efforts to construct an *Islamic Modernization* had roots in the late 19th century. According to Haji Miskin, Haji Sumanik, Haji Piobang. Syaikh Ahmad Khatib. Islamic modernism became the dominant mode of theological thought throughout much of the Muslims of Indonesia by the middle of the 20th Century. It provided a flexible intellectual foundation for the articulation of ideologies such as Islamic socialism, Islamic democracy, and Islamic politics.

⁵⁷ Muslims those who accomplish their Haj pilgrimage are authorized to use title Haji before their names, which is a kind of social status. President Soeharto uses this title "Haji Muhammad " just after he returned from a formal Haj trip with his wife in 1990.

social transformative. Legalistic approach aims at revamping the existing order in society under the blueprint of Islamic legal, ritual and formalistic precepts. Islamic doctrines and laws became the sole arbiter and standard of reference in all practices and affairs in society. Neo-orthodox Muslims have adopted such an approach with different intensity ranging from gradualist, persuasive to radical. The cultural approach is aimed at distilling methods from Islamic teachings which are capable of integrating non-religious sphere (secularist part) to a new totality of Islamic framework of development.⁵⁸ The idea of ICMI's efforts for modernity is to develop parallel institutions like banking, science, enterprises, economy, polity, etc. under Islamic teachings.

The social transformative approach aims at seeking solution to the problems of modernity by avoiding exclusivist attitudes both towards neo-orthodox and non-Muslim aspirations. It advocates accommodationist attitudes and introduces disturbing questions addressed to the central doctrines of the orthodoxy. Therefore, the advocates of third strategy reject legal formalistic interpretations of doctrines, including literal adherence to Quranic perceptions and Prophetic traditions without reformulating fundamentals of religious beliefs, so as to guarantee that those beliefs take into account the empirical dimensions of life.

Leading Muslim intellectuals such as, Prof. Habibie, Dr. Nurcholos Madjid, Dr. Amin Rais, Prof. Qurai'Sahab, Prof. Imaaduddin, Prof. Ali Afie KH Abdurrahman Wahid and others have pursued this strategy of advocating the non-confrontationist understanding of Islam and modernity. It sought dialogues with other groups for reaching mutual understanding on problems faced by the society in general, and encouraging the *ummah* together with others in resolving some fundamental questions related to poverty, illiteracy, abuses of human rights etc.⁵⁹ Thus we can say that the ICMI offers a more adequate approaches that are more beneficial to the modern

⁵⁸ Naisbitt John, *Megatrends Asia: the Eight Asian Megatrends that are Changing the World.*, London, 1996, pp.240-103

⁵⁹ See Gatra, *Otokritik Tahun Keempat, Silaknas ICMI kali ini diwarnai otokrotik. Struktur organisasinya akan diubah. Namun peran Habie tetap akan menonjol.* No.9 Tahun 1, Jakarta, January 14, 1995, p.36

Indonesian society in general which is totally different from the current trends of the Islamic world and is commonly becoming more radical and fundamental.⁶⁰

For the Islamic *ummah*, Aswab Mahsin once said that the establishment of ICMI and the growing influence of Muslim institutions in all parts of Indonesia, have made many people more conscious who were previously embarrassed about their faith because it apparently looked backward and outdated.⁶¹

When the ICMI was established, its founders agreed that it was a non-political organization, and therefore it would not get involved in any political activities or political engineering at any level of government and administration of Indonesia. Habibie said, "ICMI is not a political organization, our main objective is to make a real contribution to the ever-increasing quality of life of the whole Indonesian population, especially the Islamic community"³⁶.

Now eight years after its establishment the fact shows differently as the ICMI led by a powerful Vice –President: 1998 – 2003 (formerly Minister for Research and Technology). Prof. Burhanuddin Jusuf Habibie, not only just involved in religious activities but has also involved in political engineering such as determining who should be appointed in a particular government position and deciding strategic government planning and policies. After a final decision was made President Soeharto and Vice-President Try Soetrisno then inaugurated the organization. They installed Prof. B.J.Habibie in 1990, Minister for Research and Technology, Chairman of "BPPT- *Badan Pengkajian Penerapan Teknologi*" (Agency for Examination and Application of Technology), and Chairman of some 30 government and non-government organizations as its first Chairman up to now.³⁷

⁶⁰ See GATRA. Otokritik Tahun II, Jakarta. December 2, 1995. p.108.

⁶¹ See *TEMPO ICMI sampai Megawati*, No.4 Tahun XXIV, Jakarta, March 26, 1994, p.32

³⁶ Adam Schwarz, "A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s." (Australia Allen & Unwin, 1994), P. 179.

³⁷ Pudjo Soeharso, "ICMI Dalam Wacana Pembangunan Nasional", in *ICMI Dalam Kekuasaan dan Demokrasi*, Ahmad Bahar (ed), (Yogyakarta : PT.Bcna Cendekia Indonesia, 1995), P. 192-194).

The establishment of the ICMI was regarded as extremely controversial as its establishment was seen as a phenomenon of Islamic revivalism in Indonesia and was perceived as reliving the role of Islam in politics.³⁸ The presence of the ICMI in the middle of Indonesian community has attracted attention of many intellectuals who feel that the organization is being given special treatment by the Indonesian government which is seen to accommodate its interests. This creates social jealousies among intellectuals in Indonesia.

Adam Schwarz argued that there were three components in the ICMI's organization composition:

First, a group from BPPT (that is Prof. Habibie's office) plus Golkar's executives, businessmen, and universities' President.

Second, a group of so called Islamic thinkers such as Prof. Emil Salim (President Soehartos' former cabinet minister), DR. Nurcholis Madjid, Soetjipto Wirosardjono, and many others. This group is identified as being concerned very much with the importance of intellectualism of Islam in the ICMI.

Third, those who have wider plan for the ICMI. Third group will plan to make the ICMI a political vehicle for Islamic modernists such as Dr. Amin Rais (chairman of Muhammadiyah organisation), Dr. Bintang Pamungkas (former PPP faction in DPR), Dr. Adi Sasono (at present is ICMI's Secretary General), Prof. Dawan Rahardjo.³⁹

A question being asked very often by many observers and critics is about the factors that makes ICMI so powerful compared to 'other intellectuals' organization like ICHI – *Ikatan Cendekiawan Hindu Indonesia* (Association of Indonesian Hindu Intellectual), PCPP – *Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila* (Association of Pancasila Development Intellectual), PSCMI – *Pethimpunan Sarjana dan Cendekiawan Muda Indonesia* (Association of Scholar and Young Indonesian Intellectuals), and other

³⁹ Adam Achwarz, Op. Cit, P.176 – 177.

small organization.⁴⁰ This question is easily answered by looking at: First, personnel composition of ICMI's organizational structure where quite a number of central government ministers and top bureaucrats as well technocrats have become its top executives that includes chairman of the Indonesian ruling party Golkar, Mr. Harmoko (the chairman of the MPR and DPR), and other cabinet ministers as members. Secondly, most of ICMI's head offices both at central and regional levels are using government building and facilities⁴¹

The above answers, however, are partly responsible in forming public opinion in Indonesia for suggesting ICMI as the new brain trust of the government in the 1990s.⁴² Another important fact is that ICMI has important role in promoting its members to any strategic and top public office positions. The formation of public opinion as mentioned above is without basis if one examines the historical perspective of early establishment of the ICMI. As indicated, that when the ICMI was inaugurated it was attended by the Indonesian President, Vice-President, senior cabinet ministers, and senior General of the Armed Forces. The attendance of such personnel was interpreted, at least by ICMI's executives and also by most of the people, as a blessing by them to ICMI or it could also be viewed by majority of Muslim as a sign of governmental support. The support has become apparent when the ICMI applied to get permission from the Indonesian government to publish a national newspaper 'Republika'. Even President Soeharto himself bought its shares when the newspaper (ICMI) offered its shares to the public.⁴³ Again, support of the Indonesian government was reflected in the establishment of Islamic Bank in Indonesia. This bank is believed to have some strong links with the ICMI.

⁴⁰ Zulfan Heri, "ICMI, Politik dan Demokratisasi". in *ICMI Dalam Negara dan Demokrasi*, Zuli Qodar dan Lalu M. Iqbal Songell (ed). (Yogyakarta : Pustaka Pelajar, 1995), P.199.

⁴¹ Muhammad Thoriq, "Cerita Ringan Tentang ICMI'-wan Muda", in *ICMI Negara dan Demokrasi*, Zuli Qodar and Lalu M. Iqbal Songell(ed), (Yogyakarta : Pustaka Pelajar, 1995), P. 182 – 192.

⁴² Affan Ghafar, "Kesalahpahaman Terhadap ICMI", in *Islam Demokrasi Atas Bawah : Polemik Strategi Perjuangan Umat Model Gus Dur dan Amin Rais*. Arief Affandi (ed), (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996), P. 55.166.

The ICMI framework and planning program for 1991-95 consisted of following features: to provide education and human resource development program in all forms of knowledge for all Indonesian Muslims, to enhance the Islamic educational institutions (*madrasah*) with the knowledge based upon technology and sciences and make *masjid* as a center of social, cultural and Islamic activities.

One thing is very clear Soeharto did not let the ICMI to take a form of a political block but he let it be open for all the muslims from any political party for dialogue, discussion of ideas emerging from different windows of all the Islamic ummahs of Indonesia. This was the main cause for the rapid success of the ICMI. The ICMI tried to accommodate all Indonesian groups and societies. Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) are the largest muslim organizations in Indonesia and they are bound to seek support of all the muslims of the country.⁶²

With the emergence of the new government and the fall of the Soeharto, Indonesia is heading towards a new democratic era in which a number of muslim organizations are emerging and are taking part in the election supposed to take place in June 1999. President Habibie has pledged to bring in comprehensive reforms for which people had clamored in the past. It should not be forgotten that Habibie is one of the founders of the ICMI, an organization he still chairs and has been seen as a staunch supporter of pro-Islamic policies. His earlier vice-presidential office and the current cabinet have a strong ICMI presence; its cadres and local leaders will be having a good time in coming elections.

Justice Party

Six months after its spirited launch at the Al Azhar mosque in south Jakarta, the Justice party is emerging as a force to watch. Across the country, it has attracted hundreds of thousands of devout Muslims in their twenties and thirties who are well

⁶² See GATRA, *Merdeka akan Meramiakan Sukses*, No.4, Tahun 111, Jakarta, December 14, 1996,p.27. &

educated, articulate and eager to promote a fresh political culture. While many other new parties are appealing to old loyalties among the nation's 86% Muslim majority- reviving constituencies and recruiting aging leaders from major Muslim groups such as the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah- the Justice party is striving to overcome such boundaries. That means reversing decades of dependency on well-worn public figures. Although compared to other major political parties like NU, PDI, Justice Party has not received much attention from the international press. The party's 37 -year-old president, Nur Mahmodi Isma'il, is an American-trained food scientist more renowned for his chicken sausage and cheddar cheese than domestic politics.

Most of the followers of the Justice party are college and university students. Their network of the activities by and large starts from campus mosques and Islamic social -welfare foundations. For the most part, these are not the same students embroiled in mass demonstrations against the president Habibie-- the majority of whom remain wary of party politics. Justice party members have tended to keep their heads down, win scholarships and gravitate towards studies in the natural sciences, while deepening their knowledge of Quran. Many party members deepened a mutual affinity on the internet and party leaders meet via religious chatline called the Islamic network or isnet, which started in 1983 as a forum for Indonesian Muslim students studying overseas. The Justice party is now using the Internet to broaden its reach. It has its own Web site (www.keadilan.or.id) and disseminates its take on political issues facing the country through regular e-mail dispatches to its branch offices and others.

While the party strives to develop hi-tech, modern, moderate and professional image, its cadres adhere to a social code that appears conservative to some other Indonesian Muslims. Men and women in the party avoid any physical contact, including handshakes. Smoking is discouraged, but not banned. Female cadres tend to cover themselves with headscarves and long dresses, stopping short of the full-length chador. And proper moral behavior is a prerequisite to rising through party ranks.

While the Justice party leaders insist that they want to build the country in which the rights of ethnic Chinese and religious minorities are fully protected, some ambiguity lingers over the Islamic law (*shariya*). On the question whether Indonesian law should be replaced by Islamic law, the possibility can not be ruled out according to the Justice Party's Jakarta branch chairman Ahmed Heryawan who says " Indonesian law is man made. Islamic law comes from Allah." ⁶³ But according to the president of the party Nur Mahmodi the party may suggest certain changes in Indonesian law during future parliamentary sessions if it procures some seats in the June elections (the general election which supposed to be held on 7th June 1999). But he according to him, the justice party is not seeking to impose full Islamic law, or establish Islamic state. The party is counting on one formidable resource for support: young women. During the Soeharto years, women were marginalised from politics, and generally thrust into ceremonial duties aimed at supporting their husband's careers. Now, the Justice Party seems to be devoting more energy than some of its rivals towards correcting this historical imbalance. Special leadership training courses already in progress, and married women with small children are encouraged to bring babies and toddlers to party activities, if necessary.

⁶³See Asia Week. January 29, 1999, p.22

Chapter IV

General Election 1999

Indonesia held general election to the seven hundred member People's Consultative Assembly on June 7, 1999. The new Assembly will finally choose Indonesia's president, and thus this election is important in many ways. Presumably for the first time, after a gap of three decades, free and fair election to the assembly has been held. This assurance was given by the President B. J. Habibie, who succeeded Gen. Soeharto after his force exist in May 1998 following students demonstrations all over the country demanding an end the dictatorial regime. Since B. J. Habibie is regarded as a protégé of Gen. Soeharto, his assurance that election would be free and fare is viewed by the opposition parties with certain misgivings. Gen. Soeharto assumed power in 1968 in a military coup and imposed authoritarian rule in Indonesia, which lasted for three decades. He relinquished power in May last year leaving Indonesia bankrupt. When Gen. Soeharto was at the helm, the election to the assembly was reduced to a farce. It was packed with Soeharto's protégé. Under the Soeharto dispensation corruption became all pervading. Gen. Soeharto's family members, relatives, and friends made huge fortunes by adopting corrupt means.

The recession that over took Indonesia in 1997 brought to light the corrupt activities of Gen. Soeharto and his men who dominated the entire financial system including banks. It is true that in seventies, Indonesia, witness economic boom. Increased oil exports brought prosperity to the country. Indonesia was described as one if the three Asian tigers, the other two being South Korea and Taiwan. The World Bank and US gave liberal assistance to Indonesia for the simple reason that Gen. Soeharto eliminated the communist threat in Indonesia.⁶⁴ In 50s and 60s, Under the leadership of D.N. Aidit, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) made rapid strides and was on the threshold of power when military struck in 1965. More than half a million communists

⁶⁴ See Schwarz Adam " A Nation in Waiting" Indonesia in the 1990, (Emerging Tiger) Allen & Aunwin, 1994, pp. 49-70

including D. N. Aidit were killed. This was one of the worst political massacres that the world then witnessed.

Gen. Soeharto declared himself as the President in 1968 after forcing the then President Soekarno to stepped down. Dr. Soekarno was the undisputed an outstanding leader of Indonesia who took the country to freedom from Dutch rule in December 1949 after four years of protracted armed struggle. A republic was declared on Aug 17, 1950 with Dr. Soekarno as the president. Indonesia under Soekarno's rule moved closure to the Soviet Union. In fact, Soekarno was an important leader of the non-aligned nations and the US was suspicious of Dr. Soekarno precisely for this reason. At the height of cold war, the US viewed Dr. Soekarno as an ally of the Soviet Union.⁶⁵

But the military take over under Gen. Soeharto brought about a sea change in the situation. Under Soeharto Indonesia emerged as the ally of US. As a result Indonesia received massive bank aid to consolidate the position Gen. Soeharto. The World Bank, which spent \$ 25 billion on the development projects for Indonesia realized rather belatedly that the aid had been siphoned by the corrupt rulers. The IMF also put together rescue deals worth \$120 billion for Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997 for saving currency collapse. Indonesia however, could nor recover from the economy collapse. On the other hand the crisis has deepened. Indonesia's economy has collapsed. There is no way to salvage the ruined economy. It was loot by the then ruling clique headed by Gen. Soeharto. Collapse of fraudulent gold mining venture in Busarest (East Kalimantan) in March 1997 cost investors more than three billion dollar.

More over Indonesia faces many fold problems including ethnic violence. When nation of archipelago was in grief of recession, Indonesians attacked the relatively prosperous Chinese immigrants, many of whom had to flee the country. Some parts of Indonesia witnessed Christian- Muslim riots. East Timor may declare itself independent, while the Hindu Island of Bali is seething with discontent.

⁶⁵ See Schwarz Adam " A Nation in Waiting" Indonesia in the 1990, (Soeharto Takes Charge) pp. 25-47 Allen & Aunwin, 1994.

In February 1999 the Government announced that 48 political parties had passed the team of election screening and were qualified to contest the June 7 general Election. Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid told a media conference in Jakarta the parties have been screened by the independent team comprising 11 respected scholars and activists rather than by the government to ensure a free and fair pole.

" The Habibie government did not interfere once in the whole selection process and the team, whose members are people with integrity, was really independent in making its decision, " he said. The team was disbanded to make way for the establishment of the National election Committee (KPU) which became in charge of further steps of organizing elections.

Among the 48 political parties there are *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Rakyat* United Development Party (PPP), the dominant *Golongan Karya* ruling Golkar Party and the *Partai Demokratik Indonesia* Indonesian Democratic Party, (PDI) which were the only political parties recognized under the New Order regime of Soeharto.

Islamic Parties

The most mainstream Islamic groups can be grouped broadly into three factions:

- * The Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, or ICMI, is not technically a political party but is in power nonetheless. Until last year, President B. J. Habibie headed the organization. Today it forms the core of his government.
- * The second faction is more a network than a single grouping, a loose association of individuals whose most important connection is their former participation in the Islamic Association of University Student, or HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia). HMI graduates hold crucial positions in the bureaucracy, business, and society.
- * The third group is numerically the largest but in pre-election politics perhaps the weakest. It comprises the established mass organization of Muhammadiyah and

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Their combined, claimed membership is about 58 million people, largely middle-to lower class.

Symbols


Parties



01. New Indonesia Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Drs HM Syaiful Anwar
General Secretary: Robkin Emhas



02. Indonesia Christian Nationalist Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Ny CML Sitompul
Tambunan
General Secretary: Raden Didiek s oegito
SH



03. Indonesian National Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Supeni
General Secretary: IM Sunarkha



04. Indonesian Democrats Alliance Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Hmoh Bambang Sulistomo SIP
General Secretary: Drs Harry Ganda Asi

5




Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia
(KAMI)

KU : Drs H Syamsahril SH MM
Didirikan : Tangerang, 29 Agustus 1998
Asas : Al Qur'an dan Hadist

05. Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party
Principle: Al Quran and Hadis Nabi Muhammad SAW
President: Drs H Syamsahril SH MM
General Secretary: Djamhari Maskat

6



Partai Ummat Islam
(PUI)

KU : Prof Dr Dellar Noer
Didirikan : Jakarta, 26 Juni 1998
Asas : Islam

06. Islamic People's Party
Principle: Islam
President: Prof. Dr Dellar Noer
General Secretary: Fahmi Rahman

7



Partai Kebangkitan Umat
(PKU)

KU : KH Yusuf Hasyim
Didirikan : Jakarta, 21 September 1998
Asas : Pancasila dan Aqidah Islam

07. United Believers Awakening Party
Principle: Pancasila and Aqidah Islam
ahlussunnah Wal- Jamaah
President: KH Yusuf Hasyim
General Secretary: Drs. H Asnawi Latief

8




Partai Masyumi Baru

KU : Drs H Ridwan Saidi
Didirikan : Jakarta, 28 Oktober 1995
Asas : Islam

08. New Masyumi Party
General Secretary
Principle: Islam
President: Drs H Ridwan Saidi
General Secretary: H Fairuz Basyar

9












Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(PPP)





KU : Dr H Hamzah Haz
Didirikan : Jakarta, 5 Januari 1973
Asas : Islam

09. United development Party
Principle: Islam

President: Dr H Hamzah Haz
General Secretary: H Alimarawan Hanan SH

<p>10 2</p>  <p>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)</p> <p>K U : H Taufiq R Tjkroaminoto Didirikan : Solo, 16 Oktober 1905 Asas : Dienul Islam</p>	<p>10. Indonesian United Islamic Party Principle: <u>Dienul Islam</u> President: H Taufiq R Tjkroaminoto General Secretary: Ir H Amaruddin Djajasubita</p>
<p>11 41</p>  <p>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI Perjuangan)</p> <p>K U : Megawati Soekarnoputri Didirikan : Jakarta, 10 Januari 1973 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>11. Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle Principle: Pancasila President: Megawati Soekarnoputri General Secretary: Alexander Litaay</p>
<p>12 0</p>  <p>Partai Abul Yatama (PAY)</p> <p>K U : Dr H Rusli Bintang Didirikan : Jakarta, 7 Januari 1999 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>12. Abulyatama Party Principle: Pancasila President: Dr. H Rusli Bintang General Secretary: Drs. Agus Suarman Sudharsa</p>
<p>13 0</p>  <p>Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (PKM)</p> <p>K U : KH Zaini Ahmad Noeh Didirikan : Jakarta, 18 Agustus 1998 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>13. Independent Nationalist Party Principle : Pancasila President: KH Zaini Ahmad Noeh General Secretary: Cornelius D Ronowidjojo</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">14</p>  <p style="text-align: center;">PDKB KASIH DEMI BANGSA Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">K U : Prof Dr Manase Malo Didirikan : Jakarta, 3 Agustus 1998 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>14. Love and the National Democratic Party Principle: Pancasila President: Prof. Dr Manase Malo General Secretary: Seto Harianto</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">15</p>  <p style="text-align: center;">PAN PARTAL AMANAT NASIONAL Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">K U : Prof Dr H Amien Rais Didirikan : Jakarta, 23 Agustus 1998 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>15. National Mandate Party Principle: Pancasila President: Prof. Dr H Amien Rais General Secretary: Drs Faisal Basri MA</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">16</p>  <p style="text-align: center;">Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">K U : Budiman Sudjatmiko Didirikan : Sieman, 15 April 1996 Asas : Sosial demokrasi kerakyatan</p>	<p>16. Democratic People's Party Principle: Social Democracy Ke rakyat President: Budiman sudjatmiko General Secretary: Petrus H Haryanto</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">17</p>  <p style="text-align: center;">PSII - 1905 Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 (PSII 1905)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">K U : Drs H Ohan Sudjana Didirikan : Soto, 16 Oktober 1905 Asas : Dienul Islam</p>	<p>17. Indonesian United Islamic Party 1905 Principle: Dienul Islma President: Drs H Ohan Sudjana General Secretary: Ir Paka chairi</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">18</p>  <p style="text-align: center;">Partai Katolik Demokrat (PKD)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">K U : Drs Marcus Mali Didirikan : Jakarta, 21 Agustus 1998 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>18. Democratic Catholic Party Principle: Pancasila President: Drs mArcus MAli General Secretary: Nirwan -Sembiring</p>

<p>19</p>  <p>PILAR</p> <p>PARTAI PILIHAN RAKYAT</p> <p>Partai Pilihan Rakyat (PILAR)</p> <p>KU : RO Tambunan Didirikan : Jakarta, 16 Juni 1998 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>19. People's Choice Party Principle: Pancasila President: RO Tambunan General Secretary: Fachrudim Hasan</p>
<p>20</p>  <p>PARI</p> <p>Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PARI)</p> <p>KU : Agus Miftach Didirikan : Jakarta, 22 Mei 1998 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>20. Indonesian People's Party (PAN) Principle: Pancasila President: Agus Miftach General Secretary: Michele Poerwanto SH</p>
<p>21</p>  <p>MASYUMI</p> <p>Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi</p> <p>KU : Abdullah Hehamahua MSc Didirikan : Jakarta, 28 Agustus 1998 Asas : Islam</p>	<p>21. Masyumi <u>Islamic</u> Political Party Principle: <u>Islam</u> President: Abdullah Hehamahua MSc General Secretary: Sayuti Rahwarin</p>
<p>22</p>  <p>PBB</p> <p>Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)</p> <p>KU : Prof Dr Yusril Ihza Mahendra SH MSc Didirikan : Jakarta, 17 Juli 1998 Asas : Islam</p>	<p>22. Crescent Star Party Principle: <u>Islam</u> President: Prof. Dr. Yusril Ihza Mahendra SH M . Sc General Secretary: MS Kaban SH MSc</p>
<p>23</p>  <p>PSP</p> <p>Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (PSP)</p> <p>KU : Dr Dedi Hamid SH Didirikan : Jakarta, 7 Februari 1999 Asas : Pancasila</p>	<p>23. All Indonesian-Workers Solidarity Party Principle: Pancasila President: Dr. Dedi Hamid SH General Secretary: Pardjaman BSc</p>

24



Partai Keadilan
(PK)

K U : Dr Ir H Nur Mahmudi Ismail MSc
Didirikan : Jakarta, 20 Juli 1998
Asas : Islam

- 64
24. Justice Party
Principle: Islam
President: Dr Ir H Nur Mahmudi Ismail MSc
General Secretary: Ir H Suswono

25



Partai Nahdlatul Ummat
(PNU)

K U : KH Sjukron Ma'mun
Didirikan : Jakarta, 16 Agustus 1998
Asas : Pancasila & Beraqidah Islam

25. Nahdatul Ummat Party
Principle: Pancasila Dan beraqidah Islam
 mab'da Ahlussunnah Wal- Jamma'ah
President: KH Sjukron Ma'mun
General Secretary: KH Achmad Sjaman

26



Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis
(PNI Front Marhaenis)

K U : H Probosutedjo
Didirikan : Jakarta, 10 Pebruari 1999
Asas : Pancasila

26. Indonesian Nationalist Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: H Probosutedjo
General Secretary: Bambang Suroso

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


Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan
Indonesia (IPKI)

K U : R Soeprapto
Didirikan : Bogor, 20 Mei 1954
Asas : Pancasila

27. Independent Vanguard Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: R Soeprapto
General Secretary: H Rusly Dahlan SH

28



Partai Republik

K U : Drs H Syarifuddin Harahap
Didirikan : Jakarta, 17 Agustus 1998
Asas : Pancasila

28. Republic Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Drs. H Syarifuddin Harahap
General Secretary: Drs HA Yani Wahid

29



Partai Islam Demokrat
(PID)

K U : Drs H Andi Rasyid Djali
Didirikan : Jakarta, 15 Oktober 1998
Asas : Pancasila

30

PARTAI NASIONAL INDONESIA



Partai Nasional Indonesia Massa Marhaen
(PNI Massa Marhaen)

K U : Bachtar Oscha Chaik
Didirikan : Bandung, 4 Juli 1927
Asas : Pancasila


31



Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak
(MURBA)

K U : Hadidjojo Nitmihardjo
Didirikan : Jakarta, 20 Mei 1998
Asas : Pancasila

32



Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
(PDI)

K U : Budi Hardjono SH
Didirikan : Jakarta, 10 Januari 1973
Asas : Pancasila

33



Partai Golkar

K U : Ir Akbar Tandjung
Didirikan : Jakarta, 20 Oktober 1964
Asas : Pancasila

65

- 29. Democratic Islamic Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Drs H Andi Rasyid Djal
General Secretary: Imam Dipowindo


- 30. Indonesian National Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Supeni
General Secretary: IM Sunarkha

- 31. People's Consensus Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Hadidjojo Nitmihardjo
General Secretary: Zulfikar Kamarudin M Sc

- 32. Indonesian Democracy Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Budi Hardjono SH
General Secretary: Buttu R Hutapea

- 33. Functional Group Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Ir akbar Tandjung
General Secretary: Tuswandi

34



Partai Persatuan
(PP)

K U : H Jailani Naro
Didirikan : Jakarta, 3 Januari 1999
Asas : Islam

66

34. United Party
Principle: Islam
President: H Jailani Naro
General Secretary: Drs Mardinsyah

35



PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA
P K B

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
(PKB)

K U : H Mawardi Abdul Djali
Didirikan : Jakarta, 23 Juli 1998
Asas : Pancasila

35. National Awakening Party
Principle: Kelima Sila Dalam Pancasila
President: H Matori Abdul Djali
General Secretary: Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar

36



PARTAI UNI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA

Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia
(PUDI)

K U : Dr Ir H Sri Bintang Pamungkas
Didirikan : Jakarta, 29 Mei 1996
Asas : Demokrasi Religius

36. Indonesian Uni-Development Party
Principle: Religious Democracy
President: Dr Ir H Sri Bintang Pamungkas
General Secretary: Husni Akbar Lubis

37



PARTAI BURUH NASIONAL
PBN

Partai Buruh Nasional
(PBN)

K U : Tohap Simanungkalit
Didirikan : Jakarta, 28 Agustus 1998
Asas : Pancasila

37. National Labor Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Tohap simanungkalit
General Secretary: Robikin Emhas

38




Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong
Royong (MKGR)

K U : Ny Hj Mien Sugandhi
Didirikan : Jakarta, 27 Mei 1998
Asas : Pancasila

38. Deliberation, Work and Cooperation Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Ny Hj Mien Sugandhi
General Secretary: Kristinya Kartika Sh Msi

66



44



P B I

Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia
(PBI)

K U : Nurdin Purnomo
Didirikan : Jakarta, 1 Juni 1998
Asas : Pancasila

- 68
44. Unity in Diversity Party of Indonesia
Principle: Pancasila
President: Nurdin Purnomo
General Secretary: Imam Dipowino

45




Partai Solidarttas Uni Nasional Indonesia
(SUNI)

K U : H. Abu Hasan MA
Didirikan : Jakarta, 27 Juli 1998
Asas : Pancasila

45. National United Solidarity Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: H Abu Hasan MA
General Secretary: Ali Fahmi

46




Partai Nasional Demokrat
(PND)

K U : Edwin Henaan Soekowati
Didirikan : Jakarta, 12 Juni 1998
Asas : Pancasila

46. National Democratic Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: Edwin Henaan Soekowati
General Secretary: Eddy Sjafran

47



P U M I

Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia
(PUMI)

K U : H Anwar Junus SH
Didirikan : Jakarta, 21 Mei 1998
Asas : Pancasila

47. Indonesian Muslim Party
Principle: Islam
President: H Anwar Junus SH
General Secretary: KH Abdillah Muhammad

48



Partai Pekerja Indonesia
(PPI)

K U : H Saleh Said Harahap
Didirikan : Jakarta, 20 Mei 1998
Asas : Pancasila

48. Indonesian Workers Party
Principle: Pancasila
President: H Saleh Said Harahap

General Secretary: H Salam Sumangat⁶⁶

The new prominent parties are:

- *Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI *Perjuangan*)
- *National Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN)
- *Justice Party
- *Justice and the Unity Party (PKP)
- *Indonesian Workers Party (PPI)
- *National Labor Party (PBN)
- *Ummat Nahdatul Party (NU),
- *Democratic People's Party (PRD)
- *Indonesian United Democratic Party (PUDI).

The ambitious candidates for the presidents are:⁶⁷

Candidates	Parties
B.J. Habibie	Golkar
<u>Megawati Soekarnoputri</u>	<u>PDI Perjuangan</u>
<u>M. Amien Rais</u>	<u>PAN</u>
<u>Abdurrahman Wahid</u>	<u>PKB</u>
Wiranto	PID, Partai SPSI, Masyumi Baru, Golkar
Didin Hafiduddin	PK
Nurcholis Madjid	Masyumi Baru,
Deliar Noer	PUI
Budiman Sujatmiko	PRD
Yusril Ihza Mahendra	PBB

⁶⁶ Ministry of External Department of Republic of Indonesia, Pemilu 1999, source: Department of Communication, Embassy of Republic Indonesia, New Delhi.

⁶⁷ See Kompas (Jakarta) 24 June, 1999, The Jakarta Pos, 21 June 1999.

Sri Sultan Hamengkubowono	X	PARI	Golkar
Ali Sadikin		PADI	
Sri Bintang Pamungkas		PUDI	

Latest Election Result (6th July 1999)⁶⁸

No of the Parties	<u>Name of Parties</u>	DPR Central	DPR Province level	DPR District level
1.	Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB)	95,296	94,426	94,391
2.	Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (KRISNA)	144,897	149,678	147,883
3.	Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	222,460	226,274	232,714
4.	Partai Aliansi Demokrat Indonesia (PADI)	39,384	39,153	39,086
5.	Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (KAMI)	173,833	174,094	170,028
6.	Partai Umat Islam (PUI)	137,919	137,564	134,708
7.	Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU)	216,109	215,691	211,944
8.	Partai Masyumi Baru	78,541	76,031	75,290
9.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	6,673,52	6,706,20	6,258,61
		3	0	1
10.	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)	208,422	213,684	217,806
11.	PDI Perjuangan	23,764,6	23,709,1	22,500,6

⁶⁸ Department of Election Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Release, Source: Department of Communication, Embassy of the Republic Indonesia, New Delhi.

		72	06	24
12.	Partai Abul Yatama (PAY)	118,693	119,587	120,396
13.	Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (PKM)	57,854	58,704	57,676
14.	Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB)	167,012	178,219	180,068
15.	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	4,537,59	4,457,77	4,017,49
		1	6	3
16.	Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD)	53,604	55,039	50,546
17.	Partai PSII 1905	83,537	83,810	82,335
18.	Partai Katholik Demokrat (PKD)	65,309	67,956	68,137
19.	Partai Pilihan Rakyat (PILAR)	17,026	17,440	17,264
20.	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PARI)	27,185	27,733	27,515
21.	Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi	242,708	243,926	238,615
22.	Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)	1,108,19	1,110,28	1,046,10
		4	6	2
23.	Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (PSP)	26,762	27,340	26,999
24.	Partai Keadilan	813,589	840,730	716,832
25.	Partai Nahdlatul Umat (PNU)	345,102	347,386	340,632
26.	PNI Front Marhaenis	230,356	231,779	234,356
27.	Partai IPKI	181,351	183,647	181,472
28.	Partai Republik	107,988	113,419	113,915
29.	Partai Islam Demokrat (PID)	32,308	31,989	32,291
30.	PNI Massa Marhaen	225,324	224,436	226,411
31.	Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (MURBA)	33,665	36,013	35,231
32.	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)	253,299	254,539	255,291
33.	Partai Golkar	12,749,3	12,684,8	12,335,8
		04	68	99
34.	Partai Persatuan (PP)	303,030	303,916	283,393
35.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	11,327,8	11,384,2	11,280,4
		10	83	44

36.	Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (PUDI)	77,379	77,742	72,115
37.	Partai Buruh Nasional (PBN)	55,163	55,512	54,497
38.	Partai MKGR	107,496	109,268	109,653
39.	Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR)	208,377	213,041	219,055
40.	Partai Cinta Damai	88,653	89,241	88,111
41.	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP)	575,836	576,509	561,117
42.	Partai SPSI	34,334	34,899	35,311
43.	Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (PNBI)	86,587	87,068	85,600
44.	Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (PBI)	121,002	121,561	101,452
45.	Partai SUNI	125,401	126,032	125,760
46.	Partai Nasional Demokrat (PND)	58,474	59,745	60,689
47.	Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI)	21,854	22,196	21,650
48.	Partai Pekerja Indonesia (PPI)	35,419	34,993	35,165

It is clear from the election result that the vast majority of the people of Indonesia voted for the Soekarno's second daughter Megawati and her PDI -Perjuangan. PDI -P procured more than 36 per cent of the total vote it means its supporters are in millions. By June 22, the ruling party Golkar had overtaken the National Awakening Party (PKB) to be in second place, with over 18% of the half the estimated total vote. Indonesia's complex electoral laws will narrow further the gap between the delegates PDI-P and Golkar can send to the people's consultative Assembly (MPR), which chooses the president in November this year.

Megawati's opponents, both Muslim politicians and Golkar officials, have tried to use the backgrounds of her advisers and aids against her. (Kwik is Buddhist, Syafei a Christian) Muslim figures accuse the PDI-P of opposing too many non-Muslim legislators. According to Akhmad Soleh, a *kyai* (Islamic Preacher) in South Jakarta, a country having 90 per cent Muslim population is supervised by non-Muslim people, in

the parliament. There is no voice of Islam there. His problem is that Megawati is a woman and that her level of religious belief is still in question.⁶⁹

Soeharto, in his reorganization of party politics, had fused secular and Christian parties to form the original PDI, of which Megawati's party is an offshoot. (The United development Party gained all the Muslim-linked parties.) The irony is that these attacks help perpetuate Megawati's status as a quite victim, which only enlarges her appeal to the masses. So her opponents are fighting on a battlefield she has already conquered.

Poll Pact of the Opposition Parties

The promotion of a common political cause of bringing about "reform," though through separate electoral campaigns, was agreed to by three leading Indonesian opposition leaders of the unfolding post-Soeharto era in Jakarta. A mutually-agreed political pact was signed by Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais openly and Ms Megawati Sukarnoputri in private (PDI-P, PKB, PAN). The agreement came into immediate effect on the eve of commencement of the campaign for the planned June 7 parliamentary election.

The deal, in spite of the separate parliamentary poll campaign by Ms. Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party (Struggle) as also Mr. Wahid's National Awakening Party and Mr. Amin Rais's National Mandate Party, is the three might test their relative electoral strengths but would do so as compatible " reforms."

Another aspect of the political understanding among the three is that they will unite more categorically after the prospective parliamentary polls to field a common slate of presidential and vice presidential candidates for the proposed November (1999) poll for the highest position in what will still be a system of the executive presidency. All the three leaders of the new alliance have more or less equal presidential ambitions, with Ms. Megawati being ahead of the other two in the relative rudimentary opinions polls

⁶⁹ Asia Week, July 2, 1999 P.33

conducted in post-Suharto Indonesia so far. It was this aspect that accounted for her perceived reluctance, until the very last possible moment political system.

Given the complexities of an alliance between three ambitious "reformists," the obvious incongruity of their separate electoral campaigns is in pragmatic conformity with the peculiarities of the Indonesian political system. This View in the political circles of Jakarta is based on the reckoning that the totality of the parliamentary seats that might be bagged by these three opposition parties would give their collective presidential candidate, as and when chosen, a clear edge over the incumbent President, Mr. B.J. Habibie of the "Suharto-era vintage" of now-discredited politics, in the paramount stakes for the planned presidential poll in November this year.

Megawati is most popular leader now and if the ruling Golkar is decimated in the election, Megawati is likely to be the presidential candidate. She will have the backing of the opposition party. Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, these three leaders have formed a "common front," not an alliance per se, to try and prevent the Golkar from capitalizing in their competing presidential aspirations during the legislative polls. Given however, Megawati's spectacular political road shows on the campaign trail and earlier public rallies, her party is seen by many Indonesian observers as a clear frontrunner. Her credentials as the leader, who dared raise a voice of dissent at the height of Gen. Soeharto's rule. Not to mention her political lineage as the daughter of the founder of the country's post-colonial dispensation (a formative democracy in some sense), have also given Megawati a dream-run on the campaign circuit so far.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ **United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) PPP:** The PPP began its political journey with the Kabah symbol, only to switch to a less powerful image- a star-at the behest of the Suharto regime. Likewise, the party was forced to relinquish its "basic principles" of Islam after the regime decreed that all parties must be based on the state ideology, Pancasila, which recognizes 5 religions. In a national congress last year, party leaders swiftly agreed to return to Islam as their basic principle. and the Kabah as their symbol. (All parties are still required to support Pancasila as the national ideology, eliminating any move toward an Islamic state.)

The party also elected an NU member, Hamzah, to serve as chairman, an abrupt departure from past year when NU leaders were kept on the sidelines. While the PPP had started out in 1973. As a fusion party of four Muslim constituencies, including NU, the party watched the NU withdraw in frustration in 1984.

However, one of the Indonesia's largest Muslim parties has vowed to block opposition leaders Megawati from becoming the President. The United Development Party will bank on lobbying Muslim legislators, which emerge from the June 7 elections. The Chairman of PPP Mr. Hazah Haz is reluctant to accept Megawati as the President of the country because she is a woman. Though the position of PPP in the election halted on the 4th position procuring the 10 per cent of the total vote it can pose a big threat by as it says it will appeal from the Muslim legislators against Megawati to form the government.

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⁷¹ The Jakarta Pos, Jaakarta, June 21,1999.

Conclusion

Islam as a political force began to be recognised in the late 1970s and early 1980s when its popularity as a source of social, ethical and spiritual power began to resurface the political horizon. A section of people, many of them in uniform, felt that Islamic revolution in Iran and elsewhere were an important development. They began to take interest in the revival of Indonesian interest in Islam. They believed Islamic revivalism would take them on the path of prosperity. For instance, Islamic leaders in Aceh promoted fundamentalist course.

At the national level the tendency of many Indonesians, particularly the young is to find in their religion a stable bedrock of belief in a rapidly changing, modernized world. They appear to be interested neither in the traditional ritual dogma of the conservative *ulama* to the messianic fervour of some modernists who want Indonesia to become a theocracy. Instead, they are looking for ways to make Islam more relevant to life in the modern world.⁷²

The political dynamics is adding to Islam's attractiveness. The enforced acceptance of Pancasila after 1984 brought Islam fully into the fold of New Order politics. By adopting an ideology based partly on religious tolerance, Muslim groups made themselves more attractive to many Indonesians who take or want to take their religion seriously but who were uncomfortable with the perception of Islam as a political rival to the existing government.

More broadly, however, the New Order government's efforts to depoliticise Indonesia have driven many to look to Islam as an alternative political arena. Islam's growing attraction is not just reflected in higher attendance at mosque, Islamic study groups have blossomed on the university campuses and more women students have taken

⁷² See Bill Liddle "Three Indonesian Cases" Allen & Anwin Pty.Ltd., National Library of Australia, 1994, P.11

to wearing the *jilbab* headscarf.⁷³ It is hard to know how far this rising Islamic consciousness has spread in society. Certainly, it has made inroads into the educated elite, the class known as *priyayi*. Some, in fact, have described the changes taking place as the *santri*-fication of the *priyai*. Undoubtedly, the Islamic revival also has extended well into the category of nominal Muslims known as *abangan*, but modernist Muslim claims of a thoroughgoing, *santri*-fication' of *abangan* Indonesian are probably exaggerated.

Islam is no longer seen as the opiate of the uneducated and economically deprived. Professionals and the middle class increasingly are seeing it as a religion, which can provide for their spiritual needs in the context of contemporary society. " There is a new sense of pride in being a Muslim among Indonesian Muslim now. One of my Indonesian friends Irfan Djuman Farid, a mass communication student of Tri Shaksti University ,Jakarta, liked himself to be called by Ivan, now studying in *pesantren* very happily and his parents feel more proud of him than before.

By late 1980s the changing social composition of the Indonesian Muslim community meant late 1980s could no longer ignore it by political leaders. After two decades spent pushing modernists Muslim into the political wilderness, Soeharto suddenly became more responsive. Without relaxing the strict curbs on Muslim political activity — such as letting the United Development Party (PPP) return to its Islamic roots — he began to give ground on other issues dear to Muslims and tried in many ways to burnish his own Muslim credentials. The government relaxed restriction on the use of *jilbab* headscarf at public schools, introduced more Islamic elements into national school curriculum, and gave more authority to Islamic courts. Soeharto is going on Mecca pilgrimage with his family, his eldest daughter Tutu giving speech at public place wearing *jilbab*, started procuring more coverage in the newspapers and the magazines.

⁷³ For a discussion of university-based Islamic study student groups and their views on Islam, see 'Pembaruan', *Tempo*, 3 April 1993, pp.13-21. (in Bahasa Indonesia)

Foundation of Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) by Habibie was the last bet given by Soeharto to win the intellectual class of Muslim. The tumultuous events of the past year have made Islam, more than ever, a farce to be reckoned with in Southeast Asian politics. Yet far from being a rigid, monolithic force, its manifestations in the region are richly varied, and more often characterized by tolerance and nations of social justice than by the quest for an Islamic state. In Indonesia, with the world's largest population, *reformasi* has led to flowering of 30 Islam-inspired parties. It should become clear, after the presidential poll in November, 1999, whether the Islamic factor will enhance democracy and promote positive social change, spur a retreat into identity politics. The stakes are high. By enhancing democracy and promoting social justice, Indonesia's Muslim politicians could influence other Muslims in Asia and alter perceptions of Islam globally.

Now there is a ray of hope that election will throw new leadership who carry the country out of the crisis. The three main opposition parties- Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) led by Megawati, National Awakening Party (PKB) led by Abdurrahman Wahid, and National Mandate Party led Amien Rais-- have entered into an agreement to work unitedly after the election.

However, recent developments in Indonesia appear to have ended almost half a century of military backed rule. Ever since President Soeharto's day-to-day role of the armed forces in politics been declined. However, the role of religion in power politics is gradually increasing, which may not complement the secular framework in due course.

Glossary

Indonesian Terms and Acronyms

Abangan	the nominally Muslim or spiritually syncretic community or orientation in Java.
adat	customary law
akal	intellect, mind, reasoning faculty
aliran	current, flow, trend, stream
Ansor	youth wing of the Nahdud Ulama
Asas tunggal	the requirement that all organization adopt Pancasila at their official ideological foundation.
Aldjam'ijatul Waslijah	a modernist Islamic organization
Baitul mal	Islamic affairs treasure
Biro Peradilan Agama	bureau of religious justice
Bid'ah	heresy, deviation from Islamic orthodoxy
Bhinneka Tunggal Eka	Unity in Diversity (Indonesia's national motto)
jihad	holy war (<i>jihad fi sabilillah</i>)
dukun	magician, healer, seer

Darul Islam	home of Islam, a militant faction striving for theocratic state
dasar negara	the philosophical basis of the state
dwinfungsi	dual function of the military as guardian sovereignty and integrity
fatwa	advisory opinion
Golkar	(Golongan karya) functional group party of Soeharto
haji	pilgrim returned from Mecca
haram	prohibited, forbidden by Islam
hadiths	tradition of Prophet Muhammad
hukum	law
hak	right
hakam	representative of spouse or arbiter in <i>sjiqaq</i> (divorce) cases
hakim	judge
hizbullah	Islamic Organization during the revolution of 1965.

Jakarta Charter	Compromise Preamble to the Constitution of 1945 that would have stipulated that Indonesian Muslims were obliged to carry out draft of the Constitution
kadi	Islamic judge
Kementerian Agama	Ministry of Religion; later deptt. Of Religion
keterbukaan	Political openness, glasnost.
Kyai	Honorofic title for Javanese Islamic notables
kaum tua	older group, progressive, modernists
kraton	palace, court
Konstituante	The Constituent Assembly
Masyumi	Majelis Sjuro Musallimin Indonesia
mubaliq	Islamic Preacher
Muhammadiyah	Modernist Indonesian Islamic Organization, founded in 1912
Musyawah and Mufakat	consultation and consensus
madhab	scholar doctrine of Islamic law

madarsa	Islamic School where Islam is taught in Arabic Language
makrifatullah	highest (mystical) knowledge
muffakat	Concensus
musyawarah	Meeting, conference, discussion, deliberation.
Nasakom	<i>(Nasinalisme, Agama, Komunisme)</i> Nationalism, religion, communism. Political concept in the Soekarno era.
musantra	Archipelago, hence Indonesia
P-4	<i>(Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila)</i> Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila). Pancasila education Courses
Pancasila (<i>Lima Dasar</i>)	The Indonesian state doctrine consisting of five principles. 1) belief in One God, 2) just and civilized humanity, 3) the unity of Indonesia, 4) democracy guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of the deliberation among representatives, and
pesantren	Islamic Boarding school.

Priyayi	administrative upper class of Java.
Santri	orthodox Muslim community or orientation.
SIUPP	<i>(Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers)</i> Press Publication Business Licence. The acronym has also been taken by the organization <i>Solidaritas Indonesia untuk Pembebasan Pers</i> (Indonesian Solidarity for Press Freedom).
Islamic Concepts	
fiqh	Islam jurisprudence
itihad	Independent reasoning for reinterpreting Islamic law in accordance with the changing needs and requirements of Muslim community.
majlis	council, assembly
shura	consultation
sunnah	Actions and saying of the Prophet Muhammad.
taqlid	Imitation; unquestioned acceptance of the opinions of predecessors.
uulama	Islamic scholar
ummah	Community; people; nation.

zakat	Obligatory alms tax which constitute one of the five pillars of Islam.
kafir	infidel, conservatives, modernists (in Islam)
kaum	village religious official (Islamic)
kitabullah	Book of God (Holy Quran)
kramat	holy man, saint
idrihad	striving to attain truth by reasoning (<i>akal</i>)
ilmu	knowledge, science
imam	Islamic religious leader
iman	belief in God (Allah)

List of Organizations

ABRI	(<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i>) Indonesian Armed Forces
AJI	(<i>Aliansi Jurnalis Independen</i>) the Alliance of Independent Journalist
Aldera	(<i>Alliancsi demokrasi Rakyat</i>) alianse for People's democracy

Bina Desa	Indonesian Rural Development Network
CSIS	Centre for Information and Development Studies, a policy-oriented think-tank established in 1971 with the support of key New Order Strategist Ali Moertopo
CIDES	Centre for Information and development Studies, ICMI's academic think-tank
DPR	(<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i>) People's Representative Assembly; National Parliament,
DPR-GR	<i>Gotong Royong</i> : mechanism for developing mutual understanding)
DPA	(<i>Dewan Pertimbangan Agung</i>) Supreme Advisory Council
HMI	(<i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam</i>) Modernist Islamic student Association
IAIN	(<i>Institute Agama Islam Negeri</i>) Government Institute of Islamic Studies at the university level
ICMI	(<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i>) Indonesian Muslim intellectuals' Association
KUA	(<i>Kantor Urusan Agama</i>) Religious Affairs Office
NU	(<i>Nahdatul Ulama</i>) Muslim Scholar Party

MPR	<i>(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat)</i> , 1,000 member of People's consultative Assembly. Meets every five years to elect the president and Vice President
Orba	<i>(Orde baru)</i> New Order, the regime of President Soeharto
Orla	<i>(Orde Lama)</i> Old Order; The Soekarno regime

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