

PARTY SYSTEM AND INSTABILITY IN NAGALAND

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C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled "PARTY SYSTEM AND INSTABILITY IN NAGALAND" submitted by Miss. SEYIEVINO LIEGISE in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

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TO MY PARENTS

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Party System in India

India has neither a single party system that smacks of a totalitarian model nor a bi-party system as it prevails in a country like Great Britain. Here operates a multi-party system. But the exceedingly great number of political parties (over 50 in number) makes it appear that the Indian party system is basically different from the multi-party system as is obtained in a Western country like Italy or France. The factual scene is that though generally many political parties fight for political power only few enjoy and share the fruits of power. So far in India, it is one party alone - the Congress - that has an India - wide effective network by virtue of which it has managed to remain in power.

The scene in Nagaland too is more or less the same when it comes to the domination of political power. Though the number of political parties are not as many as found at the national level there are always several namesake political parties which vie, generally alongside two main contenders, for political power at every elections. But the fact is that the fruits of political power has been achieved and enjoyed by only two political parties (viz, the Naga Nationalist Organisation (NNO) turned Congress (I) and the original United Democratic Front (UDF) under different names all along since the advent of statehood.

Furthermore, the Indian Party System is characterised by frequent fragmentation and polarisation. It may also be found that some parties lost their distinct individuality by sinking themselves into the fold of the ruling party or parties, or they happily accepted the position of behaving like an adjunct of the great party for no other reason than to share the dividends of power shed by the single dominant organisation of the country. This fact of the Indian stasiological system contributes very much to the pluralisation of the character of the dominant party. There is plurality within the dominant party which makes it more representatives, provides flexibility and sustains internal competition. At the same time, it is prepared to absorb groups and movements from outside the party and prevent other parties from gaining strength.

As the nature of the party system in Nagaland is rather fickle and its organisational set up loose, its characterization by frequent fragmentation and resultant polarisation is nothing unfamiliar. Most of the political parties (eg. Congress Regional Nagaland, Joint Regional Legislative Party, United Legislative Front, Naga National Party and United Legislative Party) and its names revolves and moves around just a handful of political leaders almost always from major advanced tribes. Inter - mingling of political parties for immediate political gains resulting

generally from defection was a common factor until the early 1980s. Thus during a short span of time, since achieving statehood, many political parties came and went, several by sinking themselves into the fold of the ruling parties. Only since 1982 the pluralisation of the character of the dominant party (viz., Congress (I) in Nagaland) surfaced.

The Indian party system is a peculiar variety of the multi-party system that ascribes to it the title of a single dominant party system. Moreover, this system should be described as popular or democratic in the sense that the ruling party, though it outdistances all others and thereby proves that it is far more stronger than all else, cannot assume the position of a dictatorial or 'hyperdominant' party.

The single dominant party exhibiting the hold of the Congress should not be treated as a permanent feature of the Indian stasiological system. The electorate may take a critical view of its performance and then show its preference for some viable alternative as happened in 1977 when the Janata replaced the Congress (I). It impels all other parties to live in a state of dilemma. Sometimes they try to come together so as to offer an effective opposition to the Congress; sometimes they run in different directions

when it tries to dismantle their effort of unity by disrupting favours in an open or clandestine manner. It is for these reasons that the single dominant party system of India may be said to be basically different from a similar system prevailing in other countries of the world like Japan.

The party system in India is a one Party Dominant or the Congress System. The stable, effective and democratic government which India has enjoyed for years can be attributed to the Congress in adapting itself to the task of governing. According to Kamalapati Tripathi "the unity of the country and its integrity can be protected only by the Congress (I). The people think so too, that the Congress is the only national party and has been ever since its inception". Veerbhadra Singh states that "the Congress is the only binding force in the Country".¹

The Indian National Congress is the oldest democratic party in the world. It had its beginning way back in 1885. It had inherited the legacy of the leadership of the freedom movement. Before independence the Congress was an organisation and after independence it became a political

1. Chand, A., Congress Party and New Challenges, Delhi, U.D.H., Publishers, 1985, pp. XIX-XX.

party. It was fortunate to secure the charismatic leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru who was a national hero. But more importantly, the Congress had held regional and sectional interests together and its programmes were moderate and applicable to the various demands of the people.

Asked about the Congress Party's vitality and capacity for renewal, Rajiv Gandhi attributed to it among other factors the party's understanding the need to fuse unity and diversity. It knows how to accommodate regional personality within broad national unity, he added. Another reason for its vitality, he said was the lesson instilled into partymen that they should represent all the people of India and the teachings by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi that the party's basic objective was service of the people and not power.²

The ideology that the Congress adopted was never an extreme one. It espouses secularism and socialism in policy and thought process. Non-alignment, global peace and new international economic order are their foreign policies. The Congress has been the most powerful and organised political force to champion the cause of the third world countries on the international forum. India is made possible to face both internal and external challenges.

2. Ibid., p. CXXIII.

The strength of the Congress lay chiefly in its programmes that reconciled rural and urban interests, agricultural and industrial interests, cottage industries and heavy industries the traditional and modern, it performed the essential function of obtaining consensus and integration. The Congress does not belong to any group of people, it belongs to all. It moved from the leadership of the small intellectual class at the top and make appeal to the masses of the poor peasantry who forms the majority of the population.

The opposition, on the other hand could not build themselves up for the Congress party allow all groups and interest within its policies and programmes, infact it included the opposition within itself. Although it is a one party dominant system the Congress always espoused the democratic and secular ideals and leave no scope for opposition to build up. As such in absence of a competing political force the Congress retained power.

The Congress is also stable because it is a highly structured party. It has its organisational unit at the district, the state, and the national level. The party has its conference every year which includes members of the Congress Committee both at the state and district levels. The conference elects the President for a term of two years

and selects the All India Congress Committee. The real power is organised by the Congress Working Committee (CWC) called the High Command, consisting of twenty members out of which thirteen are appointed by the Congress President. The Congress President is usually selected by the Prime Minister if the Congress is in power. The Prime Minister can even assumed presidency as Nehru did in the early 50's and Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi did in the 80's.

The Congress leadership has shown remarkable continuity. Nehru was the prominent leader from 1948 until his death in 1964 and unchallenged between 1951 and 1962, Lal Bahadur Shastri was Prime Minister from 1964 until his sudden death in 1966,³ after which Mrs. Indira Gandhi became the dominant figure in the party till her assassination in October 1984, although there were some temporarily successful challenges to her leadership during the 1977-80 period when the Congress was out of office. In fact her role became so overwhelming that the party was officially and universally labelled Congress (I) for Indira Congress to distinguish it from the various off shoots of the old Congress.⁴

3. Ibid., p. LXXXXV.

4. Ibid., p. LXXXXIV.

Rajiv Gandhi became the next Prime Minister after the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Though circumstances were more responsible for his taking up the cloak of political power he was able to become a leader with genuine national stature. In some ways he was able to rejuvenate the declining popularity of the Party (Congress I). The Congress (I) has enjoyed the dominant position, the national scope and the range of support which characterised the undivided Congress. The present Prime Minister Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao has the difficult task to reorganise the party in the wake of the passing over of party leadership to a non-Nehru family member for the first time. Up to the present stage we can say he's handling the various problems and development in a satisfying manner.

Since independence the Congress was continuously in power at the Centre except for a brief period of 3 years (1977-80) when the Jan^ata Party was in power, and again in 1989 when the National Front formed the government for a brief period. The Janata party however, could not face the challenge from within while undergoing a process of party building and party consolidation.

In the 1980 Lok Sabha election, the Congress came back to power at the Centre with a thumping 2/3 majority and the process was repeated in June assembly election. The new

political trend once again showed the way to the Congress dominance system in the country.

Political stability in India despite the strain and stress involved in the development process is its "early institutionalization" India has been fortunate in the length and continuity of its process of institutionalization. A long colonial rule during which the broad lines of its territorial and administrative structures were laid, a family long nationalistic movement when its goals were articulated and a broad consensus on them achieved, and the unhampered rule of the Congress Party over two decades when the structures and procedures adopted by the Constitution were allowed to penetrate and strike roots have all consolidated the institutional framework of democracy.⁵

Contrary to what has been the common scene at the national level where one party dominant system is found, it is not easy to establish the political nature of the party system in the state of Nagaland. Besides the unique diversity when compared with the nation as a whole there are other factors such as tribalism, lack of political consciousness etc, which can disrupt or corrode the position of any political party from domination for a long period of

5. Kothari, R., Politics in India, New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 1990, pp.148-49.

time. Seen from past experiences, instead of one dominant party, there is always the likelihood of a straight fight for power between two dominant parties which will evolved from time to time.

Firstly, the fact of ideological orientation is missing in most of the major parties. Not the principle but personalities have their determining influence. Lack of ideological orientation and major political parties revolving around certain personalities than principles has been the state of political affairs in Nagaland since the formation of the state. The political parties found in Nagaland are almost always ideologically neutral organisations, more concerned with their attitude towards personalities than with a clear cut commitment to some particular type of social and economic philosophy.

Secondly, the Congress Party has remained so dominant nationally that India is often taken as the model of uni-party state. What is surprising is that this party has been in power ever since the attainment of independence without assuming any ideological character. It includes in its ranks from pure rightists to pure leftists all pulling the organisation in their own directions. What has, however, been keeping it like a viable entity is its flexible character with a left of the Centre orientation as given by Nehru.

The question of any political party emerging as a dominant one so as to present a uni-party nature look is impossible in Nagaland. Most of the political parties are divided or formed on tribal lines but at the same time their flexible character accommodates individual factors/interests.

Thirdly, there are some regional parties with a communal orientation, which pose a potential threat to liberal democracy, secularism, and nationalism. Perhaps the biggest weakness of the Indian party system is the absence of commitment to discipline. Power and pelf are the seeming goals of leaders rather than ideology and principles.

In case of Nagaland the concept of secessionism or formation of a separate independent state is often floated by certain political parties to serve their narrow and immediate ends. The communal concept does not have a footing in Naga politics and hence in the political parties. Otherwise, the common features found in the Indian party system, such as, absence of commitment to discipline, floor crossing, defections, lack of ideologies, etc., infest the political parties and the party system in Nagaland.

Instability - Its Meaning

Instability in a political sense can be regarded as a phenomena where the right state of affairs is disturbed

often resulting to negative changes. It can be taken as the unpredictable and the unreliable state in the life of a political party or that of a government - it is an experience when the political future of any government or political party is very bleak.

The instability of the political parties is nothing unusual or unique. It has become a world wide phenomena particularly in the developing countries and has become an indispensable part of politics.

In a parliamentary democracy people normally described the government as stable if it enjoys the support of the majority in the lower house of the legislature. The laws, regulations and executive orders framed by this government are considered to be authoritative because the government has been installed in office by virtue of a political mandate, usually obtained in an election. The government is stable as long as the mandate lasts, which normally extends for a constitutionally stipulated period.⁶ The stability of the parties and party systems depends on their strength. A strong party with high levels of institutionalization and

6. Mitra, K.S., Governmental Instability in Indian States, Delhi Ajanta Publications, 1984, p.2.

mass support contributes for a more stable and developed political system.⁷

The instability that prevail in many of the developing countries are attributed to the establishment of a new political system which demand the participation of new social forces at various levels. In a developing society which is characterised by tribalism, leadership crisis, lack of literacy etc., the party face the problem of tribal and personal conflict. The success and failure of parties and party system depend on the fact that of how they tackle these problems. But there maybe times when parties may not successfully face these problems. As a result there is instability and disintegration in the political system. Nagaland, being a tribal state, faces the complexities of unstable politics. Tribalism coupled with leadership crisis often creates factions among the politicians in the state affecting the stability of government. The year between 1979 and 1982 saw several changes in leadership pattern all formed on the basis of tribal lines. None of the governments formed then (1979-82) could survive for long and proved to be a stepping stone for the advent of the Congress (I) to power.

7. Puspa, Asthana, Party System in India, New Delhi, Criterion Publication, 1988, p.11.

Dr. Kishalay Banerjee also states that the pattern of party system varies from state to state as it is largely shaped by the socio-economic milieu of a particular society. The emergence and functioning of the political parties are, therefore, determined by the structure of the society in which they operate and origin. The deep cleavages owing to the cultural and ethnic diversities have often divided the society and the forces of tribalism, traditionalism, regionalism and the like have powerfully manifested in giving rise to fragmentation and proliferation of parties in the developing countries.⁸

Puspa Asthana holds that in modernising countries where the parties and party system are not so developed, inter party movement of individuals and groups are highly prevalent. Leaders at local level join the party which wins the elections whereas in the national level leaders shift - from one party to another in terms of their own electoral and political process.⁹ In Nagaland in the early stage it was a politics of who could exploit or take advantage of the sentiments of the Naga people. But since 1982 to win an

8. Dr. Banerjee K., Regional Political Parties in India, Delhi, B.R., Publishing Coporation, 1984, p.X.

9. Puspa, Asthana, (1988), Op.Cit., p.12.

election the party in power at the centre had an edge over the other.

The work of Dr. Kashyap "Politics of Defection" need special attention with regard to political instability. He made a ^{thorough} study about defections in India with special reference to Rajasthan, Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, Utter Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. He hold that defection has become a part of Indian politics. However, this is nothing unusual and should be viewed in a realistic manner. He examine that defection by a few members could win the party's majority and turn it into a minority.¹⁰ Many of the party legislators defected not to join another organised party but to form a separate pressure group or party defectors with a view to seize or share power.¹¹

The best case in Nagaland can be cited on the political development in 1979 which saw the downfall of the UDF Ministry headed by Mr Vizol Angami. A span of two years saw the forming and ousting of three subsequent government/ministries due to defection and counter defection.

10. Dr. Kashyap, S.C., The Politics of Defection, Delhi, National Publishing House, 1969, p.4.

11. Ibid., p.9.

The existence of a large number of independent legislators further accelerated the pace of defection dynamics in the states. Many of these were elected as independents had deserted on being denied party tickets. Thus not being 'independents' on any principles, they are prepared to trade and offer their vote to the highest bidder. It would be seen that the largest number of the defectors to various political parties were contributed by independents. It was perhaps natural that under conditions of general instability and marginal majority governments, independent legislators should be in a position to tilt the balance and often play a decisive role in toppling the existing governments and installing new ones.

The 1982 general elections in Nagaland saw independents capturing as much as 20% of the total seats (12 out of 60) and further contributed to the unstable state of politics. It became obvious in 1987 elections when many of the disgruntled candidates did more harm than good to the ruling party (Congress (I)) which ultimately resulted in the ouster of the government.

B.S. Pradeep Kumar, stresses on the factionalism of the political parties in India. He states that intra-party factionalism is the bane of all or nearly all political parties and groups. In other words, party system and intra

party factionalism as well as defections exist in political culture of several countries in general and in developing countries in particular. In India too, no political party is beyond the pull of factions. In fact factionalism is a true feature of the Indian political scene, more so at the state level.¹² Leaders have misused power and party has become a means for personal gains.

Factionalism is a prominent feature with the present day political parties in Nagaland. Misuse and abuse of political power to achieve corrupt and personal gains has become common with all political leaders and persons in authority in the state.

K. Santhana in his work "Political Parties and Indian Democracy" opines that the main defects of the so called national political parties are that they are neither democratic, nor feudal, nor loyal and disciplined. The strength and influence decline as one proceeds from top to the bottom. It is the top most executive which is called the 'High Command' that really dominates the party. Where the party is in power the High Command nominates the Chief Minister in a state, decides about his cabinet colleagues

12. Kumar, Pradeep, B.S., Regional Political Parties in India, New Delhi, Ess Ess Publications, 1988, p.173.

and treats the entire state ministry as a subordinate agency. The state branches can be dissolved by the High Command and have ad-hoc Committees substituted for them.¹³

The loose organisational set up of political parties in Nagaland is such that no strict sense of discipline among the party members is maintained. The concept of the party high command is not respected really and the same trend of hypocrisy found at the national level is also found in the state.

Political instability which has been a recurrent feature in India became restless with the Chinese aggression in 1962, the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964, the Pakistani invasion of 1965 and the sudden death of Lal Bahadur Sastri in 1966. In the economic sphere also these years have seen many dismal failure, widespread distress and discontentment, large drought, sharp decline in exports and the forced devaluation of the rupee.

S.K. Mitra in his book entitled, 'Governmental Instability in Indian States', states that governmental instability became quite pronounce in the mid-sixties reaching its peak between the fourth and fifth general

13. Santhana, K., Political Parties and Indian Democracy Delhi, Research Publication in Social Sciences, 1972, p.1.

elections. After that it started declining but did not disappear altogether. Instability was on the increase when the emergency was declared.

Indian politics of the fifties and the early sixties was characterised by a consensus based on the national programme of democratic, socialism, planning, secularism and non-alignment. However, the consensus was increasingly disturbed by growing radicalism in the country in the early sixties, manifested in non-congressism first propounded by Ram Monohar Lohia. The process reached a climax in the fourth general election when coalition of opposition parties many of whom were ideologically apart from one another drastically reduced the strength of the Congress Party in the states. But having come to power the coalitions crumbled when their ideological differences could not be reconciled.

The sequence of unstable coalition building came to an end when a new leftleaning consensus emerged out of the fifth general elections. This however was short lived since radical expectations have come to characterised the electorate.¹⁴

While it is difficult to really establish any one cogent pattern in the post 1967 political defections it may

14. Mitra, K.S., (1978), Op.Cit., pp.56-57.

be noted that their sources have more often been situational and motivational rather than ideological and structural.

From the above views and opinions we gather several reasons which attributed for instability in politics such as factionalism, defection, lack of discipline, absence of any one dominant/strong political party etc.

Factionalism can be regarded as one of the most prominent feature of political instability. Any political party having factions among its ranks loses the integrity and collective responsibility - in other words the 'we' feeling among its members is missing. Factions can develop due to vested interests among the members of a party, on tribal or caste lines, crisis in leadership etc. Factionalism always creates an atmosphere of political instability as there is tendency to defect or stall the party policies.

Defection as a factor causing instability is closely connected with factionalism. This has become so problematic at times that the very political stability of the states concerned becomes uncertain. Defections have been the products of various socio-political complexes under which we operate and have to be accepted as a hard sociological reality. Defection generally takes place on grounds of vested interests of certain sections/groups or on grounds of personal gains.

Lack of ideological orientation and polarization among the parties further exhibit the growth of defection. It cannot be denied that legislators defected because of political power, money, status or denial of the same - but the ease with which they left one party to join the other made it obvious that they did not take any party ideology seriously which result in the fall of governments.

Lack of proper organisational set ups among some parties can be responsible for political instabilities. Lack of discipline amongst the party members have resulted in defections and party splits.

Besides, the government's failure to fulfill the aspirations of different peoples can give rise to feelings of regionalism or even ideas of secessionism. When a section of people or a region feels neglected their resultant hurt actions can destabilised the functioning of any government.

The Problem

The political history of Nagaland since the gaining of Indian independence has been a turbulent one. The year 1947 earmarked the active insurgency period which lasted for decades with important political developments in between, such as the inauguration of statehood for Nagaland in 1963, and the Shillong Peace Accord of 1975. Many governments

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under different political leaders of different political parties had come to power since 1964, yet none could survive (except one term, Hokishé's 1969-74) the full term of office. The nature of political developments of the period was such that it did not favour a stable political system. First, it was the problem of insurgency which proved a hindrance for any political party to provide a stable government, even when elected to power. Then comes other problems such as defection, factionalism, lack of ideology etc., which had made deep inroads to destabilised the political set up since the 1980s onwards.

The party system in Nagaland is neither that of one party dominant system nor that of multi-party system in the real sense. But political instability which exist in any political system, has been marring the state politics since the beginning of its evolution. Party politics has been characterised by faction, dissension and confusion. Governments changed frequently enough, accompanied by party disunity, organisational chaos and the shifting of personal loyalties.

The Party system in Nagaland is rather a loose organisation. Party alignments are too general and unstable with hardly any identification with party ideology or programmes. Legislators have not hesitated to shift their

loyalties from one leader to another opposition leader and vice versa with the result that new governments have been formed and toppled in quick succession. Three Congress Chief Ministers (S.C. Jamir, K.L. Chisi and Hokishe Sema) came in quick succession in between 1987 and 1990 exposing the unstable nature of political system in Nagaland.

The instability of the Party system in Nagaland has been known for a long time but so far no research work has fully examined it. The aim of this research is therefore an attempt to understand and analyse the political parties and its developments in Nagaland with special emphasis on the instability factor.

In order to study the politics and the party system of a state it is inevitable to take into account the nature of the society and the traditional polity of that particular state. The Naga society though an egalitarian one, is composed of many different tribes. This complex nature of the society, time and again surfaced proving as an important factor contributing to the political instability in the state.

At the deep bottom of the society, the Nagas are largely rivals for power and money derived from the narrowness of tribal politics and politicisation as it is overlaid to include almost every segment of interest of each

individual and tribe. Such a thing is clearly visible in election in which scattered series of local contests in the various places, each of which bring forth its own conflicting issues and organisations as well as personality based on personal circles of friends, clients, influences and parties against their own democracy which emphasizes on the merits of the peoples interest only.¹⁵ This often leads to unstable government.

Collective responsibility or decision found among the different respective tribal units more often than not contributes to the unstable scene of state politics.

Political parties and party politics is the next part under study. Since the inception of statehood the party system in Nagaland has always been more or less the struggle for political power between two prominent political parties. Initially, the state witnessed the struggle between the Naga National Organisation (NNO) and the United democratic Front (UDF) each vying for political supremacy. Then since 1982, the state political scene has been a battle between the Congress (I) and the erstwhile NNDP, which has now changed its name into the NPC. This phase of

15. Yonuo, Asoso, The Rising Nagas, Delhi, Manas Publications, 1974, pp.397-98.

my study will thus cover the evolution of political parties and its policies and the developments which occurred in the party politics of the state.

The leadership issue of any political party has always formed a vital part of any political system. The integrity of any political party and, for that matter the stability of the government depended much on a strong and consensus leadership. In Nagaland the leadership issue is more a tribal factor than the personal integrity of an individual. Here the question of 'dominant tribe' comes into the scene and thus the acceptance of a party under any one particular leader depended much on to which tribe he or she belongs.

The above factor leads to the question of ministry making/formation and the stability of the government. Political ideals like collective responsibility among the members of a ministry does not hold much ground. Though defections and floor-crossing has been stopped by a recently enacted law (Anti defection bill 1984) the toppling game has been still very much in existence denying a party from the rule of a legitimate authority.

The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that an analysis is needed to understand problems and recommend remedial measures. The Naga society and its polity, the changes that occurred during the period under study will be

taken into account. The evolution of party system and political parties, and the crisis faced by the leaders and ministries will also be examined as to how they attribute to political instability in the state. Insurgency a major cause of instability, throughout the period under study will be discussed thoroughly. The period under focus is from 1963 to 1989 but a little of the years preceding 1963 has been discussed so was with the period following 1989 infact up till now.

Chapterisation

Chapter I: The introduction includes a brief account of the party system in India. A review of literature about instability is made and its relevance in Nagaland.

Chapter II: Naga society and polity is discussed, including the historical perspective and changes that occurred during the time under study.

Chapter III: The chapter dealt with the evolution of Naga politics and insurgency movement. It also examine the causes of instability and political turbulence experienced by the people during the period.

Chapter IV: Discusses the formation of different Ministries under different leaders and parties. It assesses the successes and failures of each Ministry.

Chapter V: This chapter discusses the prominent political personalities of Nagaland and their ups and downs in the state political scene.

Chapter VI: It concludes with a brief summary of all the chapters. The factor responsible for political instability is analysed and suggestions are attempted to remedy the lacunae.

Chapter II

**HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE TRADITIONAL
NAGA SOCIETY AND POLITY**

On December 1st, 1963, Nagaland became the sixteenth state of the Indian Union despite the shadows of guerillas with Kohima, an insignificant district headquarter township of Assam as the state capital. It was not Shilu and company who had won statehood for the Naga tribes, it was a small group of guerillas who had wrested it from a mighty nation.

Nagaland situated in the north eastern hills of India, is bounded in the West by Assam, on the east by Burma, on the north by Arunachal Pradesh, and on the south by Manipur. The geographic and climatical conditions under which the Nagas lived for centuries isolated them from the outside world.

The Nagas belong to the Mongoloid group of people and linguistically to the Tibeto- Burma family. There are about sixteen major tribes speaking different dialects which more than often proves to be an obstacle in Naga solidarity. The different Naga tribes present different system of administration. The entire Nagaland is divided into tribal areas and each tribe lives in its own village. Basically they are agriculturists who practised terrace and jhum cultivation. The chief crops grown were rice, millet, maize, chilli and soyabeans. These farmers were also craftsmen who made ornaments and handicrafts such as wooden plates, spoons, beds, benches, cups, earthern pots, baskets and mats

etc. Thus all their daily needs were produced accordingly during their free time. Clothes used by them were woven by women for family needs.

Nagas have a rich tradition and ancient culture. They love beauty and colour, dance, music and rhythm. There are quite a number of festivals celebrated during the year among which cultivation, harvest and prestigious feast are important. The cultivation festival marks the end of sowing and growing of all seeds and paddy of a year and propitiation of crops god for good harvest, whereas the harvest festival celebrated at the end of the year marks the commencement of the new year. These two festivals last for 5 or 10 days.¹

The most important festival is the 'feast of merit', for a man to have a social status does not only means possessing wealth, but by sharing it with the community. This kind of feast is defined by customs and a man spends large quantities of food stuff and rice beer but in return he also receives gifts from friends and relatives. He is entitled to wear clothes and ornaments of honour. The people also wear colourful dresses to decorate themselves, during the festival. Nagas are also known for their ancient

1. Yonuo Asoso (1974), Op.Cit., pp.31-32.

practice of head hunting. By taking the head from another village and bringing it to one's village was believed to have add strength and prosperity into the aggressor's village.

Family plays an important role in the social and political life of the Nagas. The Naga women have almost the same rights and duties as men. However, men is the head of the family, who by virtue of his seniority expect traditional respect from his family and is in turn responsible for his family, and slowly from family headship man rise up to the position of his clan head and village head.

The system of inheritance is passed on to the male members of the family although movable property such as paddy, clothes and ornament are given to girls in their marriage.

The Morung or dormitory are for unmarried young men where he learns the cultural and traditional norms and values. It was an educational centre for learning discipline, art, stories, songs, diplomacy and ceremonious living. These are aspects of political socialization which train the young men to take up responsibility in the village organisation. These recruited young men form the village guard and warriors. In some villages there are morungs for

girls also. The young boys and girls enter the morung at the age of seven or eight years.

Village Organisation

A Naga village is further divided into clans or khel and each clan has its own head. Every Naga is very loyal and attach to his clan, in all its political, social or economic spheres. According to Dr. Verrier Elwin "The basic interest of every Naga is his family, the clan, the khel (part of a village) and the village. This is what he regards as his culture, which must not be interfered with. He is passionately attached to his land, his system of land tenure, the arrangements for the government of his village, the organisation of cultivation, the administration of tribal justice through the village and the tribal courts"²

Among the Angami Nagas the concept of clan is very prominent and the laws made by it are respected by all. Although the village may be regarded as the unit of the political and religious sides of Angami life, the real unit of the social side is the clan. So distinct is the clan from the village that it forms almost a village in itself, often

2. Ramunny, Murkot, The World of Nagas, New Delhi, Northern Book Centre, 1988, p.6.

fortified within the village inside its own boundaries and not unfrequently at variance almost mounting to war with other clans in the same village.³ Every clan has the right to hold its meeting where matters relating to intra clan disputes are settled, but if the disputes could not be settled with the clans concerned they are further decided by the Village Council.

The village which constitute the political institution of the traditional Naga society was basically concerned with decision making, law enforcement and dispute settlement, thus an orderly and disciplined society is maintained through customary laws and village elders exercising strong control. No tribe encroaches the land area of another tribe, nor will anyone tribe sell his land to another tribe. Most of the village live independently but sometimes the weaker village sought the protection of a stronger village and in return pays tribute to the dominant.

The system of administration varies from tribe to tribe. The Konyaks, Semas, Chang and Maos have hereditary chiefs. The Konyak kings (Ahng) are powerful chiefs whose word is law. The Aos have a council of elders representing the clans which exercises a limited authority. The Angamis,

3. Hutton, J.H., The Angami Nagas, London, Oxford University Press, 1921, p.109.

Rengmas and the Lothas are very democratic in choosing their elders.

They are nominally governed by the two kings or chieftains of their respective villages chosen for their bravery in war, skillful diplomacy, richness in the form of cattle and land or power of oratory in contrast to the hereditary system in which the office of king passes to the eldest son on the death of his father or to the youngest one or if the king dies issueless, to the nearest descendant. Thus in almost all the Naga village - states in principle except Aos, there are modest hereditary kings or elected chieftains assisted by a council of elders elected by the clans from amongst the most respected, experienced and enlightened persons or an oligarchy of old and influential men known as gaonburas or village headmen since the British era.⁴

The administration of the village, therefore, depends on the village council headed by elected elders or hereditary chief. The chief however can be deposed off by a decision taken by the village council if he violates the Naga customs. The members of the village council come together and take all the important measures by a show of hands in the open ground or in a hall of justice which is

4. Yonuo, Asoso (1974), Op.Cit., p.15.

found in case of some tribes. Their decisions on certain matters becomes law binding.⁵ The king or chieftain deals with a foreigner directly. Whenever any stranger comes to the Naga village, he is first of all conducted to visit the king at his residence. He inquires the object of his visit and if it is for a purpose of great importance like a message sent by the stranger's village to have good relation or of obtaining redress of wrongs committed by the villagers he is detained and showed great hospitality till the village council assembles, discusses the matter and gives its final decision. Then the stranger is allowed to go on his way through which he comes.⁶

The village council decides civil and criminal disputes and also has the power to declare war or peace. The traditional laws thus binds the family, clan, village and the tribes.

The village council also serve as tribal courts which are based on customary and tribal laws and necessary action are taken against anyone violating such laws, the final verdict is given by the chief and it is for the person concerned to either accept it or leave the community.

5. Ibid., p.17.

6. Ibid., p.16.

Thus the Nagas being isolated for centuries developed their own system of administration and lead a contended life in their own villages.

The history of Naga relations with the Ahoms throughout the six hundred years of Ahom rule in Assam was a blend of both co-operation and hostility. The first contact with the Nagas was violent. The Nagas resisted the advance of the Ahoms into Assam through their land and there were fierce fighting in many places.⁷ Sukapa is reported to have killed the Nagas mercilessly. Clashes between the Ahoms and the Nagas of Patkoi were frequent where the Ahoms claim the Nagas as their subjects while the Nagas in response offer stiff resistance.

The troubles with Nagas, who lived on the low hills of Tirap close to the plains of Sibsagar and Lakhimpur districts, were due to economic reasons. Ahoms had to fight the Nagas to get exclusive possession of salt wells. It was with great reluctance that the Nagas agreed to share the salt wells with the Ahoms. But they still occasionally raided the people near the salt mines. Ahoms in return dispatched punitive expeditions. The salt mines were in Naga territory and the Ahoms needed them. This was another reason

7. Ramunny Murkot, (1988), Op.Cit., p.10.

for continued hostility between the Ahom rulers and the Naga people of that area.⁸

However, there are some Naga tribes who had close friendship with the Ahom rulers who helps them and allotted them revenue free lands (Naga Khats) which are supervised by Assamese agents (Naga Katakis). The Nagas in return give presents to the Ahom rulers and avoid raids into the plain. But apart from the Ahoms and the Manipuris with whom they had frequent clashes, the Naga remained secluded for centuries from the rest of the world.

The British in Nagaland

With the conclusion of the Anglo Burmese War and the influence of the British in Assam the whole of Naga Hills also came under the British dominance. This was resented by the Nagas who always value their independence and they stood up against the intruders. Many of the Nagas lost their lives fighting against the British who had superior arms and ammunition. The British overcame the opposition but the Nagas gave them a world of troubles, so the British decided to follow a policy of non-interference in Naga affairs. It was only in 1866 the first Naga Hills District was established at Samaguting as the headquarter. This mark the beginning of the British administration in Naga hills.

8. Ibid., p.11.

Colonial Administration

To facilitate the administration, the government appointed the village headmen known as Gaonburas, who were given the responsibility of collecting annual house tax, to decide civil and criminal disputes according to their customary laws and tradition and also to maintain law and order in their village. These Gaonburas function under the protection of the British and are to abide by the policy of the government, they are also presented with red blanket which signify their important role in the administration. This way the British had an indirect control over the village administration which was accepted by the Nagas. Besides there were a number of dobashis or interpreters appointed by the government from different clans who are men of wisdom to aid the Deputy Commission and sub-divisional officers while deciding district disputes. The dobashis translate tribal dialects to either Assamese or Manipuri or sometimes English. While the role of the district officer was to tour the villages, receive the collection of revenue from the Gaonburas, settle disputes between tribes which could not be settle by the native courts, study their ways of living and gave an account to the Government of India for an effective working of the administration.

This system of administration promotes co-operation between the Nagas and the British. The Gaonburas who were

also paid as administrative employees acted as a link between the villages and the British administration and all government actions to the tribes were taken through them. The people as such do not feel much of a foreign dominion.

All this while Nagas remain untouched by Hinduism or Muslim of the plains or Buddhism of Burma, although they believe in the supreme creator and arbiter of mankind. The reason for this isolation could be attributed to the geographical and climatical condition of Nagaland. It was only with the advent of christian missionaries that the Nagas gave up the idea of living in isolation for which they have been suffering for centuries and slowly accepted the civilization of the world.

Impact of Christianity

Christianity in Nagaland brought about a drastic change in the traditional life of the Nagas. The christian missionaries won the hearts of the tribal people by preaching the love of Christ and sharing their hard life. Once the missionary won the confidence of the Nagas and his credibility established his advice was welcome and his instructions were accepted.⁹

9. Ibid., p.18.

The christian missionaries along with the British administrators took a leading part in bringing an end to the evil practices among the Nagas by teaching them as to how to live together in peace, love and tolerance with one another as good neighbours. Generally it can also be said that the christainity was an inward machinery which brought modernization, western ways of life, education, the renaissance of the Nagaism and unity among Nagas. Not only that christianity brought about the social reforms also.¹⁰

With the acceptance of christinity, tribal laws and customs no longer play a significant role as before. The new converts had to give up all rites and customs which are contrary to christinaity. The 'feast of merit' was stopped because christians are not allowed to eat the flesh of animals which are being sacrificed to the spirits.

The morung system was thought to be associated with heathenism and was replaced by the chapel where hymns, prayer meetings and other christian activities were performed.

The village headmen who were converted could no longer continue as the headman because he cannot serve the interests of the non-christians, thus, the village council started to decline.

10. Yonuo, Asoso, (1974), Op.Cit., p.120.

The spread of christianity helped cessation of war to a large extent. The chief no longer wage war against the neighbouring village but decided to live in peace and harmony with all the villages. The cropping of the hair of the unmarried girls was not in practice any more, and the popular drink of the Nagas, the rice beer, was replaced by tea.

The christian missionaries also established a number of schools which brought about a considerable change in the living standard of the people and the general outlook widened. The educated Nagas were also the converts and they took up the responsibility of spreading the gospel and educating the Nagas, as a result many of the ancients soon became christians.

The contribution to music made by the missionaries is also considerable. They brought to Nagaland a number of western musical instruments and songs and introduced new musical modes and forms. In other words, the missionaries brought about numerous changes in fundamental constitution of Naga thought and action and improved their lot by translating of the christian hymns and other literary works into Naga languages and distributing the Biblical and other literature, by introducing the Roman script in absence of their own, by preaching gospel and church history, political, economic, social and historical ideas of the west

and by establishing schools, hospitals and churches in order to make the life of the Nagas more orderly, more civilised, more comfortable and more cultured.¹¹ Thus the various activities of the christian missionaries became very effective in reforming the Naga society. The Nagas had given up all evil practices and learnt to live a civilised life.

The influence of western culture had contributed a lot towards the Nagas way of living but at the same time it has its draw backs also. Not everybody accepted Christianity, there are some people who stick to their ancient practice and beliefs.

The spread of Christianity gave rise to conflicts between christians and ancients living in the same village, because the new converts no longer take part in traditional customs and rites, this created a lot of social problems in the Naga hills.

With the advent of christianity the bright side of village life, the great annual feasts, the dancing and singing, the happy community life in the morung and last but not the least the gay parties round pots of sparkling rice-beer have for him disappeared. No longer does the ambition to entertain his friends and neighbour at elaborate feasts

11. Ibid., p.121.

to gain the right to the wearing of magnificent ornaments and to rise to prominence in the council of village elders, show of its colour and entertainments has become monotonous.¹²

Besides the Naga art of wood carving is in danger of extinction. The beautiful carvings which are found in the morung and on the houses of the donor of 'Feast of Merit' were the main works of the craftsmen, but with the disappearance of morung and the ban on Feasts of Merits, there is neither incentive nor scope for the Naga sculptor.¹³

Thus with the influence of western culture and the spread of Christianity Nagas had lost much of its rich culture and traditions.

Growth of Political Consciousness

When the British came to Nagaland the whole of Naga hills were brought under a common administration for the first time, and the dominion of an alien rule aroused political consciousness in them. Besides when the Ist World War broke out thousands of Nagas were send to France to fight for the British.

12. Furer Haimendorf, F.C., Return to the Naked Nagas, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1976, pp.54-55.

13. Ibid., p.55.

The indirect influence of World War I was tremendous. The Nagas who went to France brought back horrified accounts as to how the great civilised nations fought for their ends and interests while Nagas were condemned as barbarous for their head hunting wars. Second, the intercourse among the different Nagas of different tribes in France, far from their homes fostered mutual love, service and a sense of political unity which manifested itself in their verbal resolution that on return to their land they would work for friendship and unity among themselves and give up their nasty weaknesses like head hunting and village feud. It was this spirit which spearheaded an upsurge of the Naga rationalist movement.¹⁴

The outbreak of the World War II into the Naga hills further accelerates the growth of nationalism. The Nagas had experienced the use of modern science and technology, and had seen a modern warfare. The improvement in the means of communication had link them with other parts of India and Burma, making them realise that they were also part of a larger world. The spread of western civilizations taught them the rise and fall of nation states and the spirit of nationalism which inspired them to unite and fight for their freedom. Thus from the beginning of the century when India

14. Yonuo, Asoso, (1974), Op.Cit., pp.125-126.

was struggling for independence, the Nagas were trying to preserve their identity.

The traditional village administration slowly paved the way for a wider political system and this began to modernised with the gaining of India 's independence.

The adoption of universal adult franchise promoted popular participation in administration replacing the village council. Unwritten laws were no longer valid, all laws and regulations were carried out according to the provision of the constitution. The new administrative system does not recognise the traditional administration any more.

The morung system which was the centre of education where young boys and girls learn the social norms and values to participate in the village administration is no longer practised. Educational institutions have been set up and almost all young boys and girls go to schools and colleges, to learn to develop good taste, thoughts, speech, moral and spiritual values, leisure and privilege who will grow up to take part in the administration of the state.

The Naga Hills, primarily a tradition ridden and backward state, has now witnessed the emergence, development and the working of party system in the state politics bringing in a lot of changes.

Chapter III

EMERGENCE OF NAGA POLITICS AND INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

During the World War I Nagas who went to France as Labour Corps came back with new ideas and a sense of belonging. As early as 1918, the educated Nagas organised themselves into the "Naga Club". They were preparing themselves politically in the event of India gaining her independence from the British - a happening they then visualised as being imminent. Thus their chief concern was the political future of their homeland after the exit of the British. The 'Naga Club' was still in its infancy then, but the pattern of the future had already been installed in their minds.¹

In the post World War II, when the issue of granting independence of India came up, the problem of the future status of the Naga Hills district was raised by some of the Naga leaders who had organised themselves for a political identity as the (NNC) Naga National Council. But the desire of the Indian leaders was to keep the Naga Hills district as integral part of India. Since then negotiations continued between the Naga leaders and the Government of India but they could not arrive at any agreement with the extremist Nagas who persist for an independent Nagaland, while a section of the nationalist, agreed to work within the Indian Union and achieved Statehood.

1. Horam, M., Naga Insurgency, Cosmo Publication, New Delhi, 1974, p.37.

The Naga Club

Political evolution of Nagaland can trace its history to the formation of the 'Naga Club' in 1918 in Kohima and Mokokchung. The purpose of the Club was to foster the welfare and social aspirations of the Nagas, under official patronage and to form a representative body bringing together all the Nagas. The meetings discussed social and administrative problems, it "sought to solve the problem of the Naga people with the British through talks and consultations across the table."² Its members consists of government officials and village elders from few Naga tribes. "Apart from their political activities, this Club also ran co-operative stores in Mokokchung and Kohima".³ The Naga Club stressed to the Simon Commission that the Nagas be left alone to determine their fate when the latter visited the Naga Hills in 1929. The memorandum reads -

"We the undersigned Nagas of the Naga Club at Kohima, have heard with great regret that our hills were included within the Reformed Scheme of India without our knowledge, but as the administration of our hills continued to be in the hands of the British Officers we did not consider it

2. Sema, Hokishe, Emergence of Nagaland, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1986, p.80.

3. Ibid.

necessary to raise any protest in the past. Now, we learn that you have come to India as representatives to the British Government to inquire into the system of working of Government and the growth of education. We pray that the British Government will continue to safeguard our rights against all encroachment from other people who are more advanced than us by withdrawing our country from the Reformed Scheme and placing it directly under its own protection. If the British Government, however, want to throw us away, we pray that we should not be thrust to the mercy of the people who could never have conquered us themselves, and to whom we are never subjected, but to leave us alone to determine ourselves as in ancient times."⁴

Naga National Council

Likewise, the Naga National Council (NNC), initially known as the Naga Hills District Tribal Council, came into being after the World War II. It aimed at improving the political and economic conditions of the Nagas through constitutional means, the main objective of which was to unify the Nagas on modern lines. According to Elwin, "Its original political objective was to achieve local autonomy for the hills within the Province of Assam and to train the

4. Horam, M., (1974), Op.Cit., pp.38-39.

people for self-government. It encouraged the Tribal Councils already set up by individual tribes and started others to administer their own local affairs and consider possible reforms. It also published a small newspaper, the 'Naga Nation', for a few years".⁵

The NNC ultimately emerged for the next few years as the only organisation in Naga Hills claiming to be voicing the opinion of the majority of the people. It received official patronage and all educated Nagas who were mostly government servants, were its members .⁶ It did not indulge in any political activity until the latter half of 1946 when T. Aliba Imti and T. Sakhrie became president and secretary of the Naga National Council (NNC) respectively. This Council submitted a four point memorandum to the Cabinet Mission on 19 June 1946 as follows:

1. This Naga National Council stands for the solidarity of all the Naga tribes including those in the unadministered areas.
2. This Council strongly protest against the grouping of Assam with Bengal.

5. Verrier, Elwin, Nagaland, Shillong, 1961, p.51.

6. Ramunny, Murkot, (1988), Op.Cit., p.31. The leaders of the NNC were T. Sakhrie, Jasokie Angami, Aliba Imti, T.N. Angami etc. It has also been discussed in chapter V.

3. The Naga Hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous Assam in a free India, with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interest of the Nagas.
4. The Naga tribes should have a separate electorate.

But a rift in the NNC soon became imminent over the issue of complete independence (Angami extremists led by Phizo) and autonomy within the Indian Union (the group comprising other tribal leaders).

In the early part of 1947 the Naga leaders sent a memorandum to the last British Governor-General (Lord Mountbatten), demanding that India act as the guardian power over Nagaland for a period of ten years after which the Nagas be left to decide their political future. The memorandum included the following terms:

1. The Interim Government of the Naga people will be a government by the Naga people over all the people of Nagaland, having full power in respect of legislation, executive and judiciary.
2. Nagaland belongs to the Naga people and will be inalienable.

3. The Interim Government of the Naga people will have full powers in the matter of raising and expenditure of revenue, an annual subvention to cover the deficit being given by the Guardian Power.
4. For defence and for aiding Civil Power in case of emergency a force considered necessary by the NNC will be maintained in Nagaland by the Guardian Power. That force will be responsible to the Guardian Power.

The Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly rejected this demand. The 'Nine Point Agreement' between Sir Akbar Hydari and the NNC soon followed but ultimately failed to serve its purpose due to the controversy which arose out of the different interpretation of clause ninth by both the parties which reads -

"9 period of Agreement: The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of the Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure the due observance of this Agreement; at the end of this period the Naga Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at".⁷

7. Ibid., p.370.

Sir Akbar Hydari and Pt. Nehru who had accepted the Agreement obviously intended that at the end of ten years the Nagas would be free to suggest, if they so desired, change in the administrative pattern to suit their special character and to ensure a greater measure of autonomy within the Indian Constitution which was still to be framed. The Constitution was to formalise the Naga demands in this agreement and they would, therefore, themselves decide whether they would, join the plain district of Assam or other adjoining areas, such as Manipur, or would like to have a separate state within the Indian Union. Some of the extremist Nagas led by A.Z. Phizo, however interpreted the ninth article in their own way. According to them this article meant that they would have the liberty to demand complete separation from India after the expiry of ten years.⁸ The agreement of the provision was thus put to vote and was approved by slight majority vote, despite protest ending the negotiations.

Provision in the Indian Constitution

The provision in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution partially met the Naga demands to manage their affairs which concerned them.

8. Singh, Chandrika, Political Evolution of Nagaland, New Delhi, Lancers Publication, 1981, pp.39-40.

The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution enumerated in detail the administrative set up of all the hill districts of Assam. The schedule was divided into two parts. While Part A dealt with the excluded areas of the hill districts of Assam such as United Khasi - Jaintia hills, the Lushai hills, and the Naga hills, Part B dealt with the North Eastern Frontier including Balipara Frontier Tract, Tirap Frontier Track, Aore Hill District and the Naga Tribal Area.⁹ The Constitution made the hill districts, which were placed under Part A, autonomous with District Councils for their respective areas comprising not more than twenty four members.¹⁰ The hill districts were made autonomous with a view to protecting the culture, religion and economic interest of the hill people. The composition of the District Council was based on democratic principles. Three fourths of the members of the District Council were to be elected on the basis of adult franchise.¹¹

The tribal areas which had been placed under Part B of the Sixth Schedule were declared autonomous regions and separate Regional Councils were constituted for them. The members of the Regional Councils were also elected on the democratic

9. Constitution of India, Sixth Schedule, Paragraph, 20(3), pp.136-137.

10. Ibid., Paragraph, 2(1), p.128.

11. Ibid.

principles. The Governor was empowered to make rules for the Constitution of the District Councils and the Regional Councils in consultation with the existing Tribal Councils or other representative Tribal Organisations within the autonomous districts or regions concerned.¹²

The District Councils or Regional Councils were granted power to make rules for the composition of subordinate local councils or boards, the appointment of officers and staff of the District Council and Regional Councils, the procedure of conduct of business in the District and Regional Councils, and the terms and conditions for election of District and Regional Councils and qualification of their members.¹³ Further these Councils were given the authority to regulate agriculture, the allotment of occupation of land other than reserved forests, the use of any canal or water course for agricultural purposes and the establishment of village or town committees or councils and their powers.¹⁴ They were also given the power to manage affairs concerning elections of the civil chiefs or village headmen for the welfare of the people and the growth of the hill areas, the District and Regional Councils were given enormous powers in matters

12. Ibid., Para, 2(6), p.129.

13. Ibid., Para, 2(7), a,b,c,d,e,f,g and (4)(i), (11), pp.123-130.

14. Ibid., Para, 3, p.130.

such as inheritance of property, marriage laws and social customs, maintenance of trade and education, construction of roads and bridges, hospitals, dispensaries, markets, cattle pounds etc. The Councils were empowered to impose and collect taxes and to make necessary expenditure.¹⁵

The autonomous hill districts were given representation in the state legislature of Assam where some of the hill representatives were appointed as Ministers and Deputy Ministers for the affairs of the hill people in the Assam government. Though the autonomous districts were given representation in the Assam government, the legislature of Assam had no power to interfere in the local affairs of these autonomous districts or regions. The Sixth Schedule provided that no Act of State legislature in respect of the tribal affairs should apply to any autonomous districts unless the District Council so direct.¹⁶

Thus the provision in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution had provided the tribal areas of Assam autonomy to manage their local affairs. But for their supervision, control and direction of the District and Regional Councils, the Governor of Assam was given some discretionary powers.

15. Ibid., Para, 6(a), p.131.

16. Ibid., Para, 12(a), p.133.

It was provided that the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any act of the Parliament or of the legislature of the State shall not apply to an autonomous district or shall apply to such district, or any part thereof subject to such exception or modification as he may specify in the notification.¹⁷ The Governor was entrusted with authority to appoint a Commission at any time to examine and report on any matter specified by him relating to the administration of the autonomous district and autonomous regions.¹⁸ Further the Governor was empowered to annul and suspend an Act or resolution of the District Council or Regional Council, if, in the opinion of the Governor, such an act would endanger the safety of India.¹⁹ The Governor had power to dissolved the District Councils and the Regional Council on the report of the commission appointed by him. He might direct for fresh election for the reconstruction of the councils or he might take the administration of the area under the authority of such councils himself or place the administration of such area under the Commission appointed by him for a period not exceeding twelve months.²⁰

17. Ibid., (b), p.134.

18. Ibid., Para 14, p.134.

19. Ibid., Para, 15(1), p.134.

20. Ibid., Para, 16(a) (b), p.135.

In a way the Nagas demand in cultural, religious and economic matters were met. The Nagas were given the District Council and Regional Council and representation in the Government of Assam. This indicates that the Nagas were given autonomy in matters of local administration. The Naga Hills area was however, kept within the Indian Union. The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution had expected that the creation of the District Council and the Regional Council would give the Nagas a sense of participation in the administration and they would gradually come within the mainstream of India.

These expectations of the Indian leaders, however, was not based on a realistic assessment of the situation obtaining in Nagaland at that time. The Nagas, far from being satisfied with the provision of the Indian Constitution, became all the more irritated and dissatisfied. The Nagas had been demanding a government of their own, of course, within the Indian Union for the time being but contrary to their expectations they were tagged with Assam which they consistently opposed. They felt that they had been betrayed.²¹ Even the provision of the Hydari Agreement which had provided some form of an Interim Government for the Naga Hills area also could not be made

21. Assam Tribune, Guwahati, 23th June 1948.

available to them. The extremist Nagas had all along advocated for an independent Naga state. The moderates were however, prepared to co-operate with the Indian Government had the Constitution provided them a separate government of their own within the Indian Union as stated in the Hydari Agreement. But now they felt that they had been let down by the Government of India. The dissatisfaction of the moderates provided an opportunity to the extremists to create an anti-Indian feeling throughout the Naga Hills.²² This led to the boycott of the elections of the District Council of the Naga Hills district and the General Election of 1952.

Post-Independence Period

The beginning of the 1950s saw the extremist group becoming more and more active. In September, 1952, Phizo went underground to prepare a draft memorandum to the UNO which he planned to take with him to the UN headquarters via Burma and Pakistan. He secretly left Naga Hills in December, 1952, but was intercepted by the Burmese police in January in 1953. He had with him several NNC documents, including his memorandum to the UNO. On his release from Burma, Phizo returned to Naga Hills in June, 1953, but continued to remain underground and direct the activities of the NNC in

22. The Naga Khabar, Vol.5, No.7, Nov. 1948, pp.3-8.

Naga Hills and secretly extended it to the Tuensang Frontier Division mainly through Thungti Chang, an important Chang tribe leader and an ex-serviceman, who later became the Chief of the Underground Naga Home Guard.²³

Thus the NNC activities slowly showed distinct signs of spreading and saw more and more Nagas moving underground and in march 1956 they formed the Naga Federal Government of Nagaland ushering in a phase of violence. They hoisted their flag at Phensinyu village in the Rengma area. They had drawn up a constitution under which there was to be a "Parliament" of 100 tatars (Members of Parliament) and a Kedaghe (President) with a Cabinet of 15 Kilonsers (ministers). In addition they went on to appoint themselves Governors of various tribal areas, Magistrates, Deputy Commissioners and junior officials, duplicating the official set up of the new administration in India. The Naga Home Guards went on to form their 'army' adopting the designation, uniforms and badges of ranks used in the Indian Army.

By 1956 the hostile Nagas who had gone underground had built up a guerilla force of about 3000 men and intensified their campaign of terrorism.²⁴ The bond of kinship being

23. Ramunny, Murkot, (1988), Op.Cit., pp.60-61.

24. Gundevia, Y.D., War and Peace in Nagaland, Dehra Dun, Palit and Palit, 1975, p.69.

strong among the Naga society, "the villagers co-operated with them and provided them with rice, money and other essential supplies without which they could not have thrived the way they did".²⁵

As a result, the Government of India was forced to resort to calling in the Army to deal with the hostile menace. Strict instructions, however were laid down that the army was to function solely in aid of civil power, use minimum force and provide maximum protection to the peaceful villages. Despite the fact that these instructions operated to the advantage of the hostile bands, who could easily collect intelligence about the movements of the troops, attack them at the time and place of their choosing and when hard pressed, lose themselves amongst the villagers, they were never relaxed.

As the sufferings of the villagers at the hands of the hostile activities increased, the futility of the campaign of violence came more and more to be recognised by the bulk of the Nagas. Some of the hostile leaders who had from beginning been opposed to the violent methods adopted by Phizo and his gangs resigned from the NNC in 1955. They were Shri T. Sakhrie, Shri J.B. Jasokie and Shri T.N. Angami.

25. Sema, Hokishe, (1986), Op.Cit., p.93.

Meetings of the Naga Peoples Convention (NPC)

The liberal leaders, condemning the grim violence practiced by Phizo, sought to bring the conflict to an early end and to achieve a satisfactory solution through peaceful negotiations. Early in 1957 the Baptist Church also came out with a condemnation of violence and an appeal to the Christian Nagas to work for peace. As a result of these efforts an All Tribes Naga People's Convention held three meetings one at Kohima in August 1957, another at Ungma in May 1958, and the third at Mokokchung in October 1959. These meetings, were well attended and the delegates represented all the Naga tribes.²⁶

The first meeting was held in August 1957 at Kohima. In the meeting over 2200 people were present. The main resolution passed were the demands for (i) a satisfactory political settlement and solution of the Naga problem within the Union of India and (ii) the constitution of a single administrative unit of the Naga Hills district of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency, under the Ministry of External Affairs.

The second meeting was held at Ungma in May 1958. This meeting went a step further and appointed a Liason

26. Gundevia Y.D., (1975), Op.Cit., pp.69-70.

Committee. This committee was given the agenda of trying to contact the underground Nagas and to win over their support for the Naga People's Convention. This move though very laudatory in their intentions, failed to achieve any success. The underground Nagas insisted that the only basis of any negotiation was the recognition of the 'Naga Federal Government' and the acceptance of their demand for 'independence'. The Convention leaders, having reached an impasse with the underground Nagas, decided to go ahead with the appointment of a Drafting Committee, which would then formulate their demands.²⁷

At the third meeting of the N.P.C. at Mokokchung in October in 1959, which was attended by over 3,000 tribal representatives, the Naga People's Convention prepared a Sixteen Point Memorandum for the constitution of a separate state within the Indian Union, to be known as Nagaland, again directly under the Ministry of External Affairs, with a Governor, an Administrative Secretariat, a Council of Ministers and a Legislative Assembly. There was every expectation that all this would take the wind out of the hostile's sails.

The Sixteen Point Agreement that was brought about in July 1960, provided for a transitional period before the

27. Sema, Hokishe, (1986), Op.Cit., p.94.

formation of the State of Nagaland, during which an Interim Body with elected representatives from the various tribes could assist and advise the Governor in administration. The promulgation of the Nagaland (Transitional Provision) Regulation, 1961, gave effect to this agreement, and the Interim Body was duly inaugurated in Kohima on February 18, 1961.

The Interim Body functioned effectively for two years but the raids from the jungles by the "Federal Government of Nagaland" continued unabated.²⁸

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28. Gundevia, Y.D., (1975), Op.Cit., pp.71-72. The Federal Government of Nagaland as mention earlier was formed in 1956. The declaration of the Federal Government included "Nagaland will maintain permanent military neutrality. There will be no standing army. For the maintenance of law and order in the country, there will be a department of Home Guards headed by a Chief to function in the dual capacity of police and patriot soldiers. Each Naga village is a republic in its right. Each Naga family or tribe occupies its own distinct region and shall continue as before to exercise full authority over its own affairs including land, community organisations, social and religions practices and customs. Men and women who have completed 22 years of age, will have equal rights for voting. There will be equal wages for equal work irrespective of Sex" (Leaflet, typed). It also has a network of intelligence system. "Small intelligence cell of varying strength with agents, look outs and mail drops, positioned in and around the villages and along the roads" (Anand K.V. Conflict in Nagaland, Delhi, Chanakya Publications, 1980, p.105) which operated efficiently and was able to infiltrate the official agencies. While the female members were assigned tasks of nursing, cooking and stictching.

Emergence of Nagaland

On December 1st 1963 the State of Nagaland was inaugurated by the late President, Dr. S. Radha Krishnan, with thousands of Nagas in their colourful traditional dresses attending the function. A five member caretaker Ministry, headed by Shilu Ao, was administered the oath of office and secrecy by the Governor, Vishnu Sahay, wishing a bright future for the 'brave people' of Nagaland.²⁹

The Chief Minister welcomed the President and thanked the Central Government for the immense help it had extended in building up a new State. He hoped that the development of Nagaland, rehabilitation of the uprooted families and reconstruction of the villages destroyed during the disturbances would be looked into. He emphasised the importance of the political settlement reached between the - Naga People's Convention, led by late Dr. Imkongliba Ao and the Government of India. He said that the main task now would be to build up a strong and progressive state "Today is a day of rejoicing and it also marks the day to redeem our pledge".

The Constitution of India as now amended, once again provided various safeguards in regards to the religious and

29. Ibid., p.73.

social practices of the Nagas, their customary laws and procedures, the administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to the customary laws and ownership of land and its resources. Due to the comparative backwardness of the Tuensang district the Constitution provided for its administration by the Governor for the first ten years from the formation of the state. During this period no Act of the Nagaland Legislature was to apply to Tuensang unless the Governor, on the recommendation of the Regional Council, so directed by public notification. The Governor could also make Regulations to repeal or amend, if necessary, any Act of Parliament or any other law which might be against the interest and well being of that district.³⁰

Elections in Nagaland

After the inauguration of the State, the election machinery which was set up in 1962 started to work in full operations, and very soon announced the dates of election to the new Nagaland Assembly. The two political parties which contested the elections were the Nagaland Nationalist Organisation and the Democratic Front.³¹

30. Ibid., p.73.

31. More information about election and political parties has been discussed in the next chapter (IV).

The NNO won the election, some of the important candidates were elected unopposed namely Shilu Ao, Hokishe Sema, Chiten Jamir and T. Kikon.

The anger and fury of the underground now turned against the State Government. The President of the Naga People's Convention was assassinated. They went after the Chief Minister, his colleagues and the Naga officers of the State administration. The Naga Federal Government stepped up its activities of ambushing, recruiting conscripts, firing at running trains and Indian Army convoys and attacks on military post multiplied, they refused to accept any measures taken by the moderate group in collaboration by the Government of India.

The hostile Nagas had the moral support and material assistance from China and Pakistan. Pakistan also gave them military training and financial assistance. After the Sino-Indian war in 1962, many hostile Nagas went to China to receive military training and arms and ammunition to create disturbances in Nagaland.³² China not only encouraged the hostile Nagas but also supplied them light machine guns, stenguns, rifles, medium machine guns, rocket launchers and other weapons in large quantity.³³

32. Lok Sabha Debates - Third Series, Vol. XXXIX, No.19, March 15, 1965, p.4203 and pp.2969-70

33. Vol. XII, No.8, (1965), pp.1306-1307.

Thus the hostile Nagas aided and assisted by China and Pakistan stepped up their rebel activities in 1964 in order to show that the solution of the Naga problem lay not in the creation of Nagaland but in meeting the demands of the underground Nagas. The hostile activities of the underground Nagas not only disturbed the communication system but the economic development of the area also could not be pursued vigorously. The normal life in the Naga villages were also very disturbed.³⁴ The situation in Nagaland was troubled and abnormal. The restoration of peace and order in Nagaland was an urgent necessity because the rebel Nagas were not reconciled of the creation of the State of Nagaland within the Indian Union. They still harped on their old demand for independence.³⁵ It was at this juncture, early 1964, the church leaders took the initiative and formed the Peace Mission consisting of Jayaprakash Narayan, B.P. Chaliha and Rev Michael Scott. The Peace Mission succeeded in bringing about a cease-fire which came into effect on 6 September 1964.³⁶

After the cease-fire a series of talk was held between government delegation and the underground delegation but the

34. Vol. XI, No.21, (1964), pp.5523-5524.

35. The Statesmen, New Delhi, 4th Oct. 1968.

36. Sarin, Vik, India's North East in Flames, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1982, p.100.

political problem remained unresolved. The cease-fire continued even after the failure of the peace talk.

The Unstable Nature of the Party System in Nagaland

In order to get a clear idea/picture about the instability of the party system we need to examine the development and nature of the political parties in Nagaland. Nagaland's integration with the rest of the country was inevitably slow the consequence of which was that some of the parochial parties came to dominate, such as the Congress Regional Nagaland, Joint Regional Legislative Party, United Legislative Front, Joint Legislative Party, Naga National Party and United Legislative Party.³⁷ Factionalism and personal influence and intense ethnic consciousness are but natural consequences of the insular politics. The earliest political parties in Nagaland (NNO and UDF) confined themselves to limited objectives (nationalising and seceding respectively) and did not open to new ideas to structure its respective parties. However these factors have become so common in Nagaland that ever since the formation of the state in 1963, except for once, no government was able to complete its term of 5 years. Most of the parochial parties in Nagaland have been ephemeral. Hence these small

37. Details of the political parties and the tenure of different ministries have been discussed in chapter IV.

ethnocentric parties among the Nagas appeared during the elections and disappeared thereafter.

The emergence of the Naga National Council heralded the upcoming of the middle class intellectuals who in their turn contributed to the formation and development of party system and political parties in Nagaland. Since the constitution of the State in 1963, Assembly elections were held in 1963, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1987 and 1989.³⁸ The first two elections were won by the Naga Nationalist organisation (NNO), the third and the fourth by the United Democratic Front (UDF). The Congress (I) formed the government for the first time in 1982 but failed to hold its ground thus giving way to the Naga Peoples Council (NPC) formed from the remnants of the erstwhile Naga National Democratic Party (NNDP). But this party (NPC) also could not last long and President's rule was imposed in Nagaland (April '92).

Despite Nagaland's contribution to the politics of the North East region, party system in Nagaland has been very unstable. Since 1974, no matter which political party came to power none could hold its ground to provide a stable government eg., the UDF ministry under Vizol after winning the election in 1974 could not retain power for long due to

38. Election figures have been given in the next chapter (IV).

defection (7 M.L.A.s) and it fell in 1975. Jasokie Angami of the NNO was invited to form the government but soon fell due to defection again after which President's rule was imposed in Nagaland since both the parties claimed majority. Defections and counter defections became the order of the time on various reasons, thus contributing to the already emerging nature of unstable party system in the state.

Regionalism and the continuing problem of insurgency is another cause of instability. A significant projection of insurgency in Nagaland is what may be called 'underground baiting'. The bond of kinship being strong in tribal societies and the sufferings of the underground activists having been immense there is considerable popular sympathy for the sufferers in the state.

The UDF had a greater sympathy for the underground activists. Though it has never publicly supported secession it has advocated a greater understanding for the Naga cause and talks with the exiled secessionist leader Angami Zapu Phizo (now dead). The Front's sympathy for the underground cause was apparent from its condemnation of the army operation (while the NNO thought that the operation was generally necessary, though its excesses were deplorable), constant pleading for a political solution of the Naga problem through negotiations with the Naga National Council (NPC) in the past. The identification of the Front with the

underground and the NNO with the Central Government was so close that in popular parlance the NNO was described as 'pro India' and the UDF as pro-underground.

Thus while the NNO was in office (1964-74), it was constantly criticised by the UDF for its betrayal of the underground brethren. The UDF having come to office in 1974, had to establish its equation with the Central Government's firm anti-secessionist stand and was exposed to the same charge.

The NNO on the other hand emphasised that the Naga problem 'needed to be solved politically'. In one respect, however, the two parties hardly differ. Both of them have developed a stake in peace, so much so that both co-operated with the leaders of the Baptist Church of Nagaland, the most significant non-political organisation in Naga politics to bring about the Shillong Accord on 11 November 1975. The insurgency was so strong that time and again it tilted the scale of power in favour of one political party or the other.

Socio-Economic Context of Nagaland

The greatest difficulty standing in the way of Naga solidarity and affects political stability is tribal particularism and inter-tribal rivalry. This has been one of the main sources of tension and instability posing

challenges to the leadership. The inter-tribal conflict between the different tribes for centuries has been exploited to their own selfish ends by the politicians today. Several tribal lobbies appeared at different times which usually always affect the stability of any government formed in the state. This infighting among the tribes has been aggravated by the political unrest obtaining in the Naga areas for a long time. The tribal rivalry has touched all the main aspects of life, political, economic and social. Collective solidarity of party members stands behind tribal interests and hence the political stability of any particular government depends much on the backing of the tribal factor.³⁹

Another major obstacle to the Naga solidarity, and hence political stability, is the diversity of Naga dialects, there being as many dialects as there are tribes and there are even sub-dialects varying from village to village. This factor more than often aggravates factionalism among the tribes. Also the age old rivals in Christiandom, Roman Catholics and Protestants have brought their rivalry into the Naga society as well. The schism which rend the Church and affect the harmony of the Naga world with serious consequences.

39. Tribal rivalry have also been discussed in chapter IV and V.

The above, being some of the important factors responsible for the unstable nature of party system in Nagaland, it would be proper if one goes into details to find out which factors were responsible for instability in the course of political development at a particular stage. The period from 1964-1974 appeared stable, at least politically as the Naga National Organisation Party (NNO) could finish its two full terms after winning the first democratic election based on adult franchise in January 1964. It is true that the stability of the government during these years was not put on a serious test but the seeds of dissension and factionalism within the party was to raised its head and wrecked the party from within. Tribal particularism developed and took deep roots right from the beginning even though the bitterness of inter-tribal rivalry was yet to be experienced in its true sense. The insurgency factor also geared up during the years taking advantage of the cease-fire (1964).⁴⁰

40. The Suspension of Operation Agreement was signed by both the parties (i.e., the Indian Army and the Naga insurgents) on August 15, 1964, which was officially christened "Cease fire" and which came into force with effect from September 6, 1964. According to which the Security forces will not undertake:
(a) jungle operation, (b) raiding of camps of the Underground, (c) patrolling beyond one thousand yards of security posts, (d) searching of villages, (e) aerial action, (f) arrests and (g) imposition of labour by way of punishment.

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Thus we may conclude that much of post 1947 Nagaland, was taken up by insurgency which is one of the oldest movements in India. The nature of political process showed that the granting of statehood was not the final solution to the Naga problem. The view of the Indian Government was to come to an understanding with the Naga leaders by providing maximum autonomy within the framework of the Indian Constitution. But the Naga Federal Government refused to accept anything short of independence, hence the insurgency problem remained unresolved, which continued to be an important issue for the different political parties.

It has been noted that at the initial stage the Naga National Council has enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the people, but slowly the attitude of the people changed following the brutal killings of some of the leaders like T. Sakhrie and Dr. Imkongliba Ao and the futility of the demand due to economic backwardness and the

Cont....

The Underground Nagas also agreed that during this period they will refrain from:
(a) sniping and ambushing, (b) imposition of fines, (c) kidnapping and recruiting, (d) sabotage activities, (e) raiding and firing on security posts, towns and administrative centres and (f) moving with arms or in uniform in towns, villages and administrative centre, wherever there are security posts and approaching within one thousand yards of security posts.
Cease fire Day observed all over Nagaland and other places where Nagas lived. Horam M., (1988), Op.Cit., p.108.

need for protection. Thus the NNC came to be divided politically, as some of the leaders decided to work within the Constitution of India while the extremists demand complete independence.

According to Asoso Yonuo, "In any case, Naga identity needs time and leadership and management to give it greater cohesion, strength, maturity and unity till the present parochialism, tribalism and jealousy and friction among themselves for small gain, still plaguing and preventing them from unity in the common goal, hold good".⁴¹

The insurgency had as its objective the unrealistic aim to secede from the Indian Union. It resulted in achieving nothing beyond what would have been achieved by peaceful and rational methods, namely, the grant of Statehood to Nagaland. But it caused in the process, great misery to its people and set back, by many years, its economic development and most importantly contributed to the unstable nature of party system in the state political scene in the years to come.

One reason why counter insurgency operations have not yielded the desired result is that the National Socialist Council of Nagaland which is the guiding centre of insurgency has its headquarters in the Somrah tract of North

41. Yonuo, Asoso, (1974), Op.Cit., p.374.

Burma, beyond the reach of the Indian forces. Besides the difficult terrain poses a major hurdle.

Another reason is the lack of co-ordination between the various intelligence agencies and security forces. The State Government too is playing around the peaceful settlement of the Naga problem. There is also lack of co-operation between the State Governments of the region, which often differs in their approach and will to tackle insurgency and the strained relations between the Assam and Nagaland Governments over the long standing border dispute, have further hampered co-operation in anti-insurgency operations. So has the growing political instability in the region, marked by frequent changes in State governments.

Thus the problems which stood in the way of stability have to be dealt with carefully and stepped up recommendations and developmental activities for peace and stability in the State politics.

Chapter IV

PARTIES AND GOVERNMENT MAKING

Political Parties

The state of Nagaland has witnessed the birth of a good many number of political parties of varying natures. Some such political parties were regional in character and as such were opposed to national parties, while some others were pro-national in character. One interesting thing of note is that the life span of any one political party is rather short. However, it is always the remnants which always gives birth to another political party.

Regional Parties: Several regional Parties had made their appearance in the state political scene from time to time. Some of such prominent parties are discussed below.

Democratic Party: During the formation of the State of Nagaland, there were two political parties namely, the Naga Nationalist Party and the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party was formed by Shri Kevichusa, a retired I.A.S. Officer. The Democratic Party had the support of the major tribes like the Angami, Chakhesang and Ao who were in favour for the Naga cause i.e. independence. While it was strongly opposed by some political leaders like Hokishe Sema, who felt, that it was too early for the Nagas to fight elections on the basis of political parties in the face of tribal divisions and the underground problems. "The system of Tribal Representative was doing well and it could have

continued till the underground problem was solved. At the same time the formation of the Democratic Front was a tactical move calculated to keep the doors open for Phizo's (the underground leader) return if they won the elections, they wanted to create a situation which would determine the successful functioning of the administration".¹

The comprehensive propaganda of the Democratic Front during the 1964 election was the demand for the independence of Nagaland and the involvement of Phizo in Naga affairs.

United Front of Nagaland (UFN): In 1968, a new political party called the United Front of Nagaland was floated in with Shri Kevichusa as its President. The objective of the newly formed party was to bring a powerful political solution of the Naga problem and to unite the Nagas on the principles of justice and equality. They promised a clean and efficient administration and gave high priority to development and agriculture and resolved to remove economic disparity. They promised to prevent infiltration of any foreign elements or influence affecting the social and cultural life of Nagas. On the other hand the underground too, in October 1968 formed a new party called the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland by representatives

1. Sema, Hokishe, (1986), Op.Cit., p.103.

of nine tribes splitting away from the Federal Government. This underground Revolutionary Government was to play a very important role in Nagaland's march to peace and in the history of Nagaland in the next few years. The question was whether the government of India should have encouraged the Revolutionary Government and discussed with them a settlement. Most of the leaders who had conducted the negotiations earlier were with the Revolutionary Government, they had openly given up violence, and were soon to declare that they would work within the Indian Union. But it took sometime for the Government of India to deal with them. This split in the underground cadre did not affect the stability of the government much for while the underground 'Revolutionary Government' remained in doldrums (static) their followers started leaving them.

United Democratic Front (UDF): The year 1974 State General Election saw the emergence of a new party called the United Democratic Front (UDF) formed from the erstwhile United Front of Nagaland (UFN) and the break away group of the NNO led by T.N. Angami. The Angami tribe was a strong supporter of this party because of the insurgency movement.

In 1977, the UDF after winning the General Lok Sabha Election was in power but soon the Chief Minister had to expel four members of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly

because of infighting and factionalism within the party. This was followed by the resignation of three more M.L.As, as they had lost faith in the government. The four expelled members formed the UDF (Progressive) and was joined by the other three members who resigned. They were supported by the Lotha and Ao tribes.

Naga National Democratic Party (NNDP): The Naga National Democratic Party, another regional party was formed in May 1980, comprising of the Naga National Party, a partner in the Jamir Ministry (1980) and the opposition party, the United Democratic Front. This party was mainly supported by the Angami tribe with the two leaders, Mr. Vizol and Mr. Jasokie joining hands to form the government.

The NNDP pledged to restore the morale confidence and political stability as well as to maintain peaceful atmosphere in the state. The NNDP Government strived for economic self reliance based on agriculture and rural development, also to unite the state's different sections and factions.

Congress Regional Nagaland (CRN): The Congress Regional Nagaland was led by Mr. K.L. Chisi with 12 other members who had split away from the Congress Party under the leadership of Mr. Hokishe Sema in 1988, due to non-performance of the

State Government and misuse of the State exchequer under the Sema leadership. They merged with the opposition NNDP.

Joint Regional Legislative Party (JRLP): The Joint Regional Legislative Party was formed under the leadership of Mr. Vamuzo in August 1988 who was then the leader of the opposition in the State Assembly. The Party had been formed with the support of the 13 M.L.As who resigned from the ruling Congress (I) (1988) of Nagaland, they joined hands with the opposition NNDP which has a strength of 18 M.L.As. But before the JRLP could achieve anything President rule was imposed in Nagaland. The Party was represented with members from different tribes with the hope of forming a government.

Naga People's Council (NPC): The Naga People's Council was formed in 1988 under the leadership of Mr. Vamuzo. This party had mainly the support of the regional minded tribes, the Angamis and the Chakhesang tribes. The leadership was shifted to Mr. K.L. Chisi in 1990 for a brief period as Mr. Vamuzo had lost the assembly election in 1989. The objective of the NPC was to work for the Naga cause - to solve the problem of insurgency and to protect and defend the people of Nagaland from a national party like the Congress (I).

United Legislative Front (ULF): The United Legislative Front came into being in 1990 when the Congress (I) legislators withdrew their support from the Jamir Ministry and defected to form a government with the NPC. To find a political solution of the problem of insurgency for a lasting peace in the State and a clean government was in priority. It has representatives from different tribes but it lasted only for few weeks.

Joint Legislative Party (JLP): The Joint Legislative Party was a coalition of 24 Congress (I) M.L.As and the break away group of the NPC (17) headed by Mr. Vamuzo formed in 1990. It has members mostly from the tribes of Chakhsang, Lotha and Ao all of whom including the Chief Minister joined hands for position and money.

The party promised a stable and efficient government and pledged to work towards arriving at a broad framework of unity and consensus through which to resolve problems, including the long standing Naga political problem.

While there are Regional Parties there are also parties which support National Parties like the Congress (I).

Naga Nationalist Organisation (NNO): When the election dates were announced for the first time in 1964 and the Democratic Party had entered the fray, the opposition had no alternative but to form a counter political organisation

known as the Naga Nationalist Organisation (NNO) led by P. Shilu Ao. The constitution of the NNO was drafted on the lines of the constitution of the "All India National Congress". The NNO pledged for peace and economic progress of the people (the NNO later on merged with the Congress (I)). The NNO was then supported mainly by the Sema and Ao tribes, but after two years with the change in leadership, some members from the Angami and Chakhesang tribes joined in.

During the 1969 election, the NNO besides other promises assured the people that it would make sincere efforts for integrating all the Nagas inhabited areas. By then the NNO has been represented by liberals from different tribes to work within the Constitution of India.

In 1974 election, the NNO laid emphasis on the rehabilitation of the rebels who surrendered. It also promised to provide increase employment opportunities to the youth of Nagaland. It continues to be represented by different tribes but mainly supported by the Sema and Ao tribes.

The Congress (I): The Congress (I) for the first time was formed in Nagaland in 1980. The Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee (I) was formed at a meeting held at

Dimapur in March 1980 with Mr. R.C. Chiten Jamir as its President. The Congress leaders in Nagaland elected Mr. T.A. Ngullie and Sao Chang as the leader and deputy leader respectively of the legislature wing of the newly formed Nagaland Congress (I). The members belong to the Ao, Lotha and Chang tribes.

The meeting requested all sections of the people to join the Congress (I) to strengthen hands in implementing the 20 Point Programme and the political measures evolved for the tribal Christians and the weaker sections of the people.

Naga National Party (NNP): Meanwhile a new party, the Naga National Party was formed on 2 April (1980) headed by Mr. Jasokie, leader of opposition in the Assembly. Mr. Jasokie said NNP had been formed in view of the changed political situation in the state.

The aim and objective of the new party would be among others "to strive for greater Nagaland, economic self reliance and establishment of a government based on the Naga pattern of society.²

Mr. Jasokie said his party had committed itself to work closely with the ruling Congress (I) in the Centre and that

2. Times of India, Kohima, 31st March 1980.

the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi had been apprised the reasons behind the formation of the new party.

United Legislative Party (ULP): The United Legislative Party, another party formed in 1980 with the combination of the Congress (I), the UDF (Progressive) and the NNP, was headed by Mr. S.C. Jamir former Deputy Chief Minister in the Vizol Ministry in 1977. Mr. Yashpal Kapoor Congress (I) M.P. who came to Kohima on the eve of the Rajya Sabha election (1980) said "with the formation of the ULP, the process of political polarisation has begun ushering in prospects of peace, stability and economic development in the State.³ The ULP has the support of three leaders belonging to three different tribes, Mr. Jamir (Ao tribe) Mr. J.B. Jasokie (Angami tribe) and Mr. T.A. Ngullie (Lotha tribe) who had come together for power and pelf.

During the 1982 poll, Mrs. Gandhi who visited the State, pointed out that a National Party in power in the State would act in unison with the Centre for the greater progress and development, particularly of an undeveloped Hill State like Nagaland.

Since its inception the Congress has been supported mainly by the Ao, Sema and Lotha tribes although there were members

3. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Kohima, 31st March 1980.

from other tribes. The Angamis and the Chakhesang usually favours Regional Parties which are closer for the Naga cause.

The Congress (I) manifesto during the 1987 election reads - "The Nagaland Pradesh Congress (I) maintains that the underground Nagas are an inalienable part of Naga community and it shall explore all possible avenues for the solution of outstanding problems of Nagaland through peaceful means. Efforts will continue to bring the small number of misguided elements back to a life of peace, so that they can live as normal law abiding citizens".⁴ The Congress (I) manifesto also include to end insurgency through dialogue and to solve the boundary dispute with Assam, and to maintain peace and order at all cost.

In the 1989 election the Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi on his two day campaign appealed to the voter that the Congress (I) ensured peace and stability necessary for all round development. The Prime Minister also promised to create an Upper Legislative Chamber in Nagaland if the Congress (I) was voted to power. This creation of an Upper House will give professionals among the Nagas greater

4. Speeches of Hokishe Sema, Chief Minister, Nagaland, Directorate of Information and Public Relation, Govt. of Nagaland, Vol. p.21.

opportunities for participation in the development of the State.

The Congress (I) expressed willingness to sit across the table to solve the insurgency problem within the constitutional framework. He also said that the Centre would take step to resolve the border issue.

The NNO from the beginning was close to the Congress having full conviction in Congress ethics, culture and policies while the UDF was for the Naga cause i.e. independence, this was the ideology behind the two political parties. But later on particularly in the 80s politics was devoid of any ideology and political parties were formed for the sake of power and pelf. Defections, counter defections and factionalism became the order of day leading to unstable government, each ministry had an average of 2 years tenure except once during Hokishe's tenure 1969-1974 which had its full term of five years.

Government During Different Periods

Interim Body (1961-63): As provided in the Sixteen Point Agreement July 1960 an Interim Body was set up with representatives from different tribes who would assist and advise the Governor in administration for a transitional period before the formation of the State of Nagaland. This

Body was supported by liberals and Congress (I) supporters mostly belonging to the Ao and Sema tribes. The Interim Body successfully completed its term for two years.

Second Ministry (NNO) 25.1.64-13.8.66: The first democratic election based on adult franchise was held from Jan. 16 to 20th, 1964. The Naga National Organisation (NNO) and United Democratic Party, Nagaland, contested the election. Forty seats were filled up by direct election and six seats were elected indirectly from the Tuensang Regional Council, Seventy three candidates contested for the 40 seats. The NNO won 34 seats (including the 6 members from Tuensang and 2 independents) while the UDP won 12 seats. Fourteen candidates were returned unopposed.

A seven member Council of Minister headed by Shri P. Shilu Ao was sworn in by the Governor, Shri Vishu Sahay on January 1964. But on December 8th, the same year, all the elected members from the United Democratic Party resigned en-mass. They demanded that the Nagaland State Legislative Assembly should be dissolved and Phizo should be consulted for a political solution of the Naga problem. By-elections to these seats were held in the summer of 1965 and the NNO Party captured all the contested seats, baring one which went to an independent candidate. Thus, the first Nagaland Legislative Assembly became a one party house. The Naga

National Council, the third political party in Nagaland during the time-boycotted the election of 1964.

The underground people continued their violent activities during all these times. In fact they had issued threats to the party candidates during the election and created a disturbing atmosphere. This created awareness among the Church leaders and a Peace Mission was formed to bring an understanding or to act as a mediator between the underground and the Indian Government. It brought about a cease-fire agreement between the two parties (Sept. 4th 1964) but inspite of all their earnest efforts the problem was not solved.

Shilu Ao's ministry, however, could not continue for a long time. In August 1966, he was forced to resign from the Chief Ministership as the ruling Naga Nationalist Party passed a no-confidence motion against him over the issue of shifting the capital from Kohima to an alternative site near Mokokchung. This ushered in the seed of instability in the party system of the state politics. Henceforth, tribal lobbies and personality clashes were often witnessed in the political developments. The shifting of the capital was in the true sense a political propaganda, there has been internal differences and dissatisfaction in the ruling party since most of the elected candidates wanted to be Cabinet

Ministers. Besides differences over the issue of Chief Ministership came up, this factor became a major cause of instability of governments even in the later years. The Angami lobby prevailed over the others and subsequently a new ministry headed by the late Shri T.N. Angami assumed office in August 1966.

Third Ministry (NNO) 14.8.66-15.2.69: The Angami ministry which had a rather short tenure (3 years) changed the whole complexion of political developments of the newly formed State. It initiated several schemes for the all round development of the Naga people. It also continued its efforts to bring the underground Nagas into the mainstream of the country. But the underground Nagas did not respond favourably to the call of the Nagaland Government. The efforts of the Peace Mission also failed to convince them of the futility of their demand of a sovereign and independent Nagaland. Thus while T.N. Angami's ministry succeeded in winning the confidence of the Naga people in general and in undertaking some development works, it failed to establish lasting peace in Nagaland because of the uncompromising attitude of the underground Nagas.

Nagaland remained free from involving security forces during these years (upto 1969), but the underground Nagas continued to strengthen and consolidate their

administration. Fines were levied and threats were imposed, if anyone co-operated with the government. There was massive recruitment to the 'Naga Army' of the underground Federal Government in all the areas. This resurgence of the underground Nagas was made possible to a large extent by the political situation of the time being faced by the country. The country was then facing some sort of a political crisis as a result of the Chinese aggression of 1962 and the subsequent war with Pakistan in 1965. Added to these political developments was the Cease-Fire Agreement between the underground Nagas and the Indian security forces that made the Union Government to stop all military operations in the state and also withdrew most of its security forces. Taking advantage of the situation the underground Nagas threatened the stability of the state administration. Another cause of instability was whenever a decision is to be reached the undergrounds wanted to consult their leader Phizo in London, which upset the state ministries (NNO). Their view was that if the underground representatives visited London they would lower the morale of their followers/party men and boost up hostile morale and there would be propaganda that the outside world would intervene.⁵ The executive expressed dissatisfaction over the progress in the peace talks and criticized the underground for taking

5. Ramunny, Murkot, (1988), Op.Cit., p.280.

advantage of the suspension of operation and sending men to China for military training. The executive resolved that Phizo as a British citizen should not be allowed to participate in the Peace talks, unless he chose to renounce British citizenship.

Such a stand did not help the ruling Party as by then Phizo had acquired enough fame and Naga sympathy, in fact regarded as a true Naga patriot.

In such a scenario, the Nagaland Legislative met in Sept. 1967 and recorded its regret to solve the political problem, the underground moving to China was a threat to democracy, political freedom and liberty, the Naga way of life and the Church.

Fourth Ministry (NNO) 16.2.69-25.2.74: The outcome of the Second State General Election (1969) also went in favour of the NNO. The NNO including the 12 seats from Tuensang and 8 independents won 42 seats while the UFN won 10 seats. The total number of seats was 52. The NNO formed the government under the Chief Ministership of Shri Hokishe Sema. The change in the leadership (from T.N. Angami to Hokishe Sema) can be attributed to inter rivalry between the tribes, then particularly between the Aos and the Angamis. The Aos managed to push T.N. Angami out probably to avenge the humiliation meted out to Shilu Ao not so long ago.

The Sema ministry though it could survive its full term of five years experienced a period of political turbulence. The underground Nagas continued their fight for independence and many political murderers were committed on those underground who did not agree with the extremists. The ruling party became concerned with the violent activities and by July 1969, advocated lifting suspension of operations in the affected areas, as one of the measures to combat it. The Sema tenure also saw the gradual decline in the popularity of the NNO Party. This was evidenced by the defeat of the NNO candidate Mr. S.C. Jamir by the UFN candidate Mr. Kevichusa Angami during the Lok Sabha election. The main cause of the defeat according to observers were, the complacency of the NNO, who thought they would have a walk over, and the active support of the underground to the UFN candidate. The UFN also had to be in turn faithful to the underground for the support given during the election (by the armed threat it posed to the villages). Thus we see that the insurgency factor had moved in even within the inside of a political party.

The subsequent developments saw the birth of defection which became a major cause of instability in the years to come. The aftermath of the Lok Sabha elections stressed members from both sides of the House attacking individual ministers as well as the administration for inefficiency and

maladministration. Dissension was also noticed within the party with the Chief Minister and others charging each other. Slowly the attitude of the pro-underground UNF and the anti-Chief Minister group in the NNO came closer. The attempt of the splinter group in the NNO was to capture the party and the leadership. The result of the election made some of the NNO members look inward to its organisational weakness and defects. The UNF on the other hand, took full advantage of their victory and tried to spread their influence fully supported by the underground. Such a situation in the long run contributed to the unstable nature of the party system in the state.

A serious political problem arose in the ruling Naga National Organisation in Oct. 1971, when a group of legislators led by T.N. Angami had pressed for associating the Naga National Council (NNC) in the peace talk with the government.⁶ Here the insurgency factor nearly brought down the NNO government from power. Hokishe was of the view that the NNC did not represent all the underground Nagas. There were other groups also such as the Revolutionary Government of Thangdi Chang. Hokishe Sema believed that if negotiations were to be conducted with only one section of the rebels, the others would continue to pose the problem.

6. Singh Chandrika, (1981), Op.Cit., p.183.

This difference of opinion reached such a point that the Chief Minister asked three of his Ministers (T.N. Angami, Akum Imlong and Weprenyi Kapfo) to resign. However, the resignation of these leaders did not lead to a fall of government, and it continued to be stable and had its full term of 5 years. This incident however exposes the differences within the ruling NNC party to which the opposition took full advantage to exploit it.

By 1972, in the wake of the victory of Bangladesh War, Shri Hokishe Sema was appealing to the underground to realise that Nagas have been externally linked with India and had already won the freedom of action and autonomy for which the underground were fighting. On the other hand the underground affirmed that the Federal Government which stood the test of time would not be affected by changes in the world affairs, and claimed that 1972 would be an epoch-making year in the history of Nagaland. Such a declaration on the part of Hokishe Sema had a very bitter consequence which ultimately led to the exit of the NNO party from power in the state in the 1974 general election - the party never really recovered.

The period saw the underground Sema leadership broke off from the Angami and the former were alleged to have stood in the way of Phizo's return and taking over the

threads of discussion with the Central Union Government. The rivalry between the Angami and the Sema underground brought its ripples among the overground also and some of the Angami members of Legislative Assembly found themselves ranging against the Sema Chief Minister. Thus by the end of 1973 the insurgency factor along with inter-tribal rivalry and internal dissensions among party members saw the end of the heydays of the NNO party. On the other hand the developments during the years preceding 1974 favoured the UFN party that ultimately saw it capturing of political power in the ensuing general election. Thus though the period between 1964 and 1974 did not experience acute political instability in a true sense, it saw the seeds of instability been sowed which soon started germinating.

During the 1974 State general elections the insurgency factor played a vital role in tilting the scale of power. From the beginning it was an unequal fight for the NNO leaders could not go into the villages particularly in Angami, Chakhesang and lower Sema areas without escorts. This indicate the political instability of the time in the State. Moreover, the underground Nagas led out their fury through violence prior to the holding of election to destabililise the political situation killing 15 state policemen in North Angami area, and killed a Deputy Commissioner and Asstt. Commissioner in lower Sema area.

Fifth Ministry (UDF) 26.2.74-9.3.75: The outcome of the 1974 Assembly election saw individual Assembly members running after personal gains at the cost of political stability. The Tuensang Regional Council was for the first time included in direct election after the expiry of ten years under the Governor's administration. The UDF emerged as the largest party (25 out of 60) but fell short of majority to form the government. The NNO won 23 seats. The number of seats won by the independent candidates (12) was considerable and held the key for both the NNO and the UDF to come to power. But most of the independent candidates were willing to support a party only if given a Cabinet rank. The UDF floated its willingness to give out all the portfolios except the Chief Ministership and succeeded in forming the ministry with the help of seven independent candidates. But it found itself in deep trouble on assuming office due to its earlier commitments. The UDF election manifesto had openly declared matters which were beyond implementation. The verbal propaganda in the interiors was that they remove the army, release the political prisoners and bring the underground to talk with the Government of India unconditionally. The ministry found it difficult to implement all the promises that they had made to the electorate.

However the government released a number of prisoners after summing trial and with token fines giving the impression that the UDF government would keep up their promises of release of all prisoners who were convicted for acts committed in the insurgency movement. This stop only after the Governor's warning that he would use his special powers under the Constitution for the maintenance of law ⁿ and order. The Cheif Minister Vizol Angami, fully agreed with the Governor and issued orders against those who were encouraging recruitment and abetting the underground movement. Some of his colleagues were closely in touch with the underground, and thus the Council of Ministers, along with the ruling party members of the Legislative Assembly were slowly finding themselves in different groups destabilising the position of the ministry.

The complexity of the composition of the Vizol ministry was also responsible for the instability and the early downfall of the ministry. There was Vizol who wanted to bring peace by reconciliation and bring back Phizo from London, get something more than Statehood for his people. There were some who were pro-underground. There were the old NNO members who had been enticed to join UDF. There were nationalist, there were what one would call NNO minded but for personal gain had walked over. Then there were the independents who did not share the policies of the pro-

underground or pro-Phizo (eg the UDF). They had come in for Cabinet ministership and particular portfolios. With such a mixed crowd Vizol could not hold the party together for long and his ministry fell, 10 months after assuming office. The immediate cause was resignation and defection of Tokheho Sema and his faction from the party. The dissatisfaction of the underground Nagas with the UDF performance and the infighting within the party were the main causes of Vizol's downfall.

Sixth Ministry (NNO) 10.3.75-21.3.75: Jasokie Angami of the NNO was then invited to form the ministry by the Governor but he found it extremely difficult to get a compact ministry as there was scramble for ministership as well as important portfolios. The defectors as well as some dissatisfied party members tried to make the best use of this difficult situation. Jasokie's ministry was short lived as he found it hard to satisfy all of them. Defections became the order of the day and under the then existing situation it was not possible to convene the Assembly for free discussion. In most cases defections took place not on any ideological difference but due to personal or factional rivalry and for personal gains by individual members. Jasokie's ministry fell when the budget could not be passed before March 31st 1975, and the Speaker could not guarantee

whether the Assembly would be able to meet before that time. All political activities were put to rest finally when the State Assembly was dissolved and President's rule was imposed in Nagaland.

The state under President's rule at least saw some stability and break-throughs in the political arena. Administrative efforts were taken to negotiate with the undergrounds and saw the gradual change in the underground groups. Serious efforts were put in by the Liason Committee (consisting of Zopianga and Ramunny) to give up the fight of independence. The negotiations and efforts of the period resulted into the signing of the controversial Shillong Accord between the representatives of the Indian Government and some leaders of the under ground Nagas. But the Accord did not really served its purpose of solving the Naga problem as not all factions of the underground Nagas agreed to the terms and provisions of the Accord. In fact some of them had even denounced the Accord all together (i.e. Phizo).

Seventh Ministry (UDF) 22.11.77-17.4.80: The General Lok Sabha Election of 1977 and the coming of the Janata Party to power at the Centre had some important bearings in the political developments of Nagaland. The UDF won 35 seats, while the NNO won 15 seats, 9 seats were captured by

the independents and one went in favour of NCN. Thus the UDF with the largest number of seats was voted to power. So in a way it could create a congenial atmosphere for a dialogue to solve the Naga problem. But the meeting between Prime Minister Shri Morarji Desai and Shri A.Z. Phizo could not achieve anything positive. In contrast the Janata regime showed a harsher attitude towards the underground Nagas than the Congress. Besides it has tightened up its purse and considerably reduced the inflow of money to the State. This had done great harm to the UDF under Vizol again, who was already facing intra rivalry in the ruling UDF.

By then the intra rivalry in the ruling UDF had surfaced, the Chief Minister removed the Deputy Chief Minister Mr. S.C. Jamir on charges of corruption. The rift widened when four members of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly belonging to the ruling UDF had been expelled from the party on a charge of 'deliberate and serious breach of the party discipline'. The expelled members included the former Deputy Speaker, Mr. Rainbow Ezung. The members were against the unanimous decision of the party by setting up Mr. Khymo Lotha as official candidate in place of Mr. Aliba Imti, the UDF President, for the Rajya seat from Nagaland.

The ruling UDF further weakened with the resignation of three more M.L.As from the party on the eve of the biennial

election to the Rajya Sabha. These were Mr. Kariba, Mr. Wati and Mr. Nukla who hold that the people of Nagaland had lost their faith in the government, because of the infighting and factionalism in the UDF and with a hope to ensure a stable, effective, and clean administration, had decided to withdraw the support from the government and joined the four others who had been expelled for setting up a rebel candidate for the Rajya Sabha. They formed the UDF (Progressive). The result of the Rajya Sabha election went in favour of the ruling UDF candidate, Aliba Imti.

Amidst claims and denials about resignations the UDF central executive requested Mr. Vizol to recommend the Governor for immediate dissolution of the Assembly and a mid term poll. The Party vice President Mr. Y. Zhümomi, in a letter to the Chief Minister said that a sharp lesson should be taught to all defectors and the only way to do this was to force them to face their respective electorates by having the Assembly dissolved and calling for a mid term poll.

While Mr. R.C. Chiten Jamir, President of the Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee (I) claimed that the combined opposition group in the State Legislature Assembly was in a position to form an alternative government in the State. Mr. Jamir said that the UDF had been reduced to a minority in

the State Assembly following the resignation of the several ministers and M.L.As of the Party. He said the Governor should immediately ask the leader of the opposition group to form the government.

The Chief Minister however maintained that he still enjoy majority in the House, that none of the legislators resigned. At least four of the legislators whose names figured in the list denied in a signed joined statement of having resigned from the party.⁷

While another new regional political party, Naga National Party was formed with Mr. J.B. Jasokie, leader of the opposition in the Assembly as the convener. And very soon, the Naga National Party and the Congress (I) together with the UDF (Progressive) Party formed the United Legislative Party (ULP).

Nagaland was then in a grip of political crisis following claims and counter claims of majority in the state Assembly by both the ruling UDF and the newly formed opposition ULP. Under such circumstances the Governor Mr. L.P. Singh directed Nagaland Chief Minister Mr. Vizol to summon the Assembly and have a trial of strength to determine his majority. A similar message was conveyed to

7. National Herald, Kohima, 31st March 1980.

the opposition leader Mr. S.C. Jamir. Meanwhile, Mr. Horangse Sangtam, a legislator of the then ruling UDF in Nagaland resigned from the party and joined the ULP.

The Chief Minister Mr. Vizol being away to attend the Chief-Ministers conference at Delhi a number of opposition members began to canvass with support of central leaders. Mr. T.A. Ngullie who was the leader of the Congress (I) in the Nagaland Assembly said that the ULP had 31 strong membership as against 28 of the UDF.

Though Mr. Vizol got the assurance from the Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi, that the Centre would do nothing to destabilise his government, he suspects some central inspiration for the destabilisation moves in Kohima. There was no denying that the trouble started much before the Congress (I) came to power in New Delhi. The first indication of this came in Sept. (1979) when the Chief Minister ousted the Deputy Chief Minister Mr. S.C. Jamir from the Cabinet for misuse of power and mismanagement of financial affairs. That there was much more to it became evident two months later when another Cabinet colleague Mr. R. Rengma was also sacked for corrupted practices. If all these damaged the public image of the ministry, it also showed the Chief Minister's hold over the legislators in the party had weakened. Confirmation of this came towards the

end of March (1980) when as many as four ministers of state resigned from the party along with six other legislators. All of them had joined the ULP, boosting its strength from 16 to 31. But whether the Vizol government wins or loses the Assembly, the prospect of political stability in the state was not rated high. For the ULP was but a coalition of disparate parties put together with the sole aim of gaining power. Once the ministerial ambitions of the large number of defectors in it were thwarted, their shifting loyalties may well spell the doom of the coalition arrangement. The ULP had also to contend with the personal rivalries and tribal animosities of the leaders of its three constituents, whose record in the past does not inspire much hope of their pulling together once the immediate aim of dislodging the government is achieved.

With all these ills, insurgency was beginning to rear its head after nearly two decades of peace and stability.

Eight Ministry (ULP) 18.4.80-4.6.80: Instability which had marked the Vizol Ministry came to an end on 18th April (1980) morning when the Chief Minister resigned and a three member coalition ministry (ULP) headed by Mr. S.C. Jamir was sworn in. The 2 1/2 year old Mr. Vizol Ministry bowed out of office without facing a trial of strength in the Assembly.

The others who took office as Cabinet Ministers besides Mr. Jamir were T.A. Ngullif and Dr. Setu Liegise.

However, given the constant personal feuds among the Nagaland Legislators belonging to all parties which often accentuated by tribal rivalries did indeed became quite a task for Mr. Jamir to stay on until the Assembly elections.

Amidst all these confusion, there had been a heartening development in the Nagaland underground movement. A new Maoist group of extremists led by T. Muivah and Issac Swu, had rested control from the moderate faction of the NNC. As a fall out of the wide spread purges and extermination that had taken place in the rebel headquarter across the border in Burma, several leaders of the Phizo faction had come overground, including Phizo's son Kevitzalezo, who surrendered along with five others. This division in the ranks of the underground offers a rare chance to win over the misguided elements and consolidate the gains of peace so that insurgency dies down for want of any takers among the youth. But this calls for a stable administration that is not obliged to warring pressure groups and desparate parties to keep itself in power and enjoys, besides a measure of popular support. Whether the Jamir ministry could give a better account of itself in this respect than the previous one, the manner of its birth does not warrant much optimism.

Similar loss of credibility by the administration in the neighbouring States and Union Territories of the region accounts partly for infectious spread of students' agitation on the foreign national issue from Assam to Manipur, Meghalaya and then Arunachal Pradesh. Overshadowing it all was the growing linkage between the insurgency movements in the north eastern region with the Muivah faction of the Naga rebels trying to form a broad based liberation front cashing it on the legitimate grievances and tribal fears of the people. While the economic factors that breed these secessionist sentiments must be removed urgently, the political and security aspects of the problem must come in for immediate and clean scrutiny.

But very soon, the 15 day old ULP in Nagaland headed by Mr. S.C. Jamir became unstable with the formation of a regional party - Naga National Democratic Party (NNDP). The UDF and the NNDP had together claimed a majority of 39 in a house of 60, creating a lot of confusion to the ruling ULP.

In a joint statement, signed by Mr. J.B. Jasokie, leader of the NNP and four former UDF ministers said that in view of the unstable political conditions prevailing in the State and also considering the larger interest of the people of Nagaland the NNP and the UDF had decided to realign themselves into a single regional - NNDP.

Thus the Jamir ministry after 23 days was reduced to a minority of 24 with the withdrawal of the support of seven MLAs and the formation of a new regional party (NNDP) claiming majority.

Meanwhile all the constituents of the ruling ULP have merged, with the Congress (i.e., the UDF (P) and split up-faction of the NNP).

Thus the four political parties have been reduced to two. The strength of the Congress (I) was 25 and the NNDP 34 in a house of 60.

Ninth Ministry (NNDP) 5.6.80-16.11.82: A 16 member NNDP ministry headed by Mr. J.B. Jasokie assumed office following the resignation of the Jamir ministry on 6th April (1980). This was the second time Mr. Jasokie was heading the ministry in Nagaland. He was the Chief Minister for a brief spell of 10 days in 1975 when he led the NNO. Shri Jasokie who was on his way to attend the funeral of Sanjay Gandhi said that in the death of Sanjay Gandhi 'we have lost a rising star of India and dynamic leader of a new generation. His death is a big loss to the country'.⁸

Meanwhile there were reports of trouble across the Indo-Burma border between underground Nagas and Khiamungan

8. Assam Tribune, 6th June 1980.

tribes. The underground problem remained unsolved.

Mr. Jasokie was able to hold the ministry until the next general election in November 1982.

The beginning of the 1980's presented an altogether different political scenario. Political stability of any government which came to power was tested occasionally but not threatened by numerous forces (e.g. insurgency) as before. It was the decline of the regional political parties and the emergence of the Congress (I) as the main contender to political power in Nagaland. Since its appearance in 1975 the Congress (I) had made considerable progress/breakthrough in the state in a short time. With the Congress entering the political race a new trend developed which changed the nature of the state politics. Violence or threats from the underground personnels to attain political ends was now overshadowed by the money factor. Horse-trading in the political circles became the order of the day leading to defections almost always in favour of the Congress party due to its superiority regarding party organisation and its working. The party High Command issue of the Congress also helped in keeping the party together, a factor which other parties faced as a major problem.

Regionalism or nationalism was the choice before the people of Nagaland for the fifth Assembly poll in Nagaland.

This was the major slogan in the campaign by the two contenders. The NNDP, a regional party contested all the 60 seats for a second term against the Congress (I), an all India party in power at the Centre. A host of independents were also in the fray.

The outcome of the electorate returned an equal number of candidates of the two main contending parties - 24 each. This engendered horse trading with both the NNDP, that was in office, and the Congress (I) bidding for support of the remaining 12 independents in a House of 60. With support from the Centre the Congress (I) assumed power with the help of eight independents all of whom were rewarded as ministers. However, the stability of the government does not seem so bright, with the Congress Party not enjoying absolute majority by itself. The Congress (I) had a taste of it in 1980 when its ministry lasted just for 48 days. And the NNDP ministry, which succeeded it with a two thirds majority ended by losing nearly a dozen MLAs to the Congress (I). Defections and toppling of ministry have been a regular feature since the State was formed.

Tenth Ministry (Congress I) 17.11.82-28.10.86: Mr. S.C. Jamir was sworn in as Nagaland Chief Minister by the Governor, Mr. S.M.H. Burney. Mr. Jamir who had withstood the storm within the Congress (I) Legislature Party was however

soon in dire straits. A silent but effective revolt was carried against him by the dissident members of the party who for all external purposes presented the very picture of unity. Ever since Mr. Jamir became the Chief Minister by outmanoeuvring his rivals, he has been holding the reins firmly and by a clever combination of tact and manipulating politics he had ensured that the Congress (I) was well seated in power notwithstanding its failure to win a conclusive majority in the polls. It was the manner in which the independents were drawn into the fold that strengthened his hands, and he has so far given a fairly stable administration to a state that is both sensitive and strategically important in the north eastern region. The Naga National Democratic Party which was the main opposition group in the 60 member Assembly had been unable to dislodge Mr. Jamir and had been keeping a low profile. The underground movement which at one time was eating into vitals of the state had been contained and infact, the rebel National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was then functioning from Manipur for lack of support in its home state. Mr. Jamir, who had been closely watching the movements of the extremists had made serious efforts to establish contacts with them with a view to finding a political solution to the problem of insurgency.

However, the decision to extend the area declared to be a disturbed belt in Nagaland along the Burmese border from 5 km. to 20 km. brought the students and the Government into open conflict. The 12 hours bandh organised by the Naga Students Federation (NSF) to protest against the decision turned violent and in the police firing that took place two students were killed. This was the signal for unrest within the party and to mark their protest, six Ministers including T.A. Ngullie, who was holding the finance portfolio and was stated to be the leader of the dissidents submitted their resignation.

Thus Mr. Jamir (CM) was under severe attack by opposition parties and the Naga Students' Federation. Many other questions relating even to the 1975 Shillong Accord were raised following the information that the Centre was contemplating on introducing a Bill in Parliament reducing the number of seats in the State Assembly reserved for the tribal people.

Mr. Jamir had also come out strongly against the proposed Bill but the students however, think that Mr. Jamir had not opposed the proposed Bill strongly enough.

Mr. S.C. Jamir came under a cloud when the NNDP leader Mr. Vamuzo brought the liquor license scandal involving his younger brother and a cousin to the notice of the Prime

Minister, who were given exclusive rights to manufacture and sell liquor in the State and allowed them to deprive the exchequer of Rs. 1 crore annually by way of non-payment of royalty and the license fee. The step also violated a 1965 resolution of the AICC which prohibited the relatives of the party leaders from holding liquor license.

This case of favouratism, coupled with glaring signs of administrative paralysis, left the Centre with no option but to ask Mr. S.C. Jamir to resign.

Eleven Ministry (Congress I) 29.10.86-21.11.87:
Following the resignation of Mr. S.C. Jamir, Mr. Hokishe Sema was installed as the Chief Minister of Nagaland. Mr. Sema legalised his entry into the Assembly from the Rajya Sabha by winning the April by-election to the Dimapur I constituency, defeating his NNDP rival Mr. Charlie Kevichusa.

With all the problems left behind by the former Chief Minister Mr. S.C. Jamir, the new Chief Minister Mr. Hokishe Sema has a difficult task ahead. The delayed swearing-in of the new Chief Minister and his first lot of 16 Cabinet colleagues had been because of the tough bargaining for ministerial portfolios that preceded the installation of the Sema team.

But in the immediate context his task has been rendered somewhat easier by the support promised by the powerful Naga Students' Federation and the main opposition group, the NNDP. It was the concerted campaign of these two organisations that aided the efforts of Congress (I) dissidents led by Mr. Ngullie to dethrown Jamir.⁹

The new Chief Minister of Nagaland persuaded the Centre to concede at least two major Naga demands. In promptly accepting of Mr. Sema's request to reduce the military controlled zone along the border with Burma and to postpone introduction of a Bill seeking to decrease the number of reserved seats in the State Assembly, New Delhi obviously hoped to strengthen the Chief Minister's position within his party as well as outside since the internal threat was probably stronger than any danger from the opposition. The problem of posting non Nagas civil servants in the state which was another cause of Mr. Jamir's downfall, was resolved by Mr. Hokishe Sema, persuading the students to believe that the induction of IPS officers would be in the State's interest.

Mr. Hokishe who became the Chief Minister in October 1986 continued till the next Assembly election in November 1987.

9. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 5th Nov. 1986.

Nagaland was once again all set for the Sixth Assembly Election. While the Congress (I) and the NNDP were contesting all the 60 seats, the Naga People's Party had fielded in 32 constituencies. Sixty independent candidates and two from the BJP were also in the fray.

The outcome of the election swept the Congress back to power in Nagaland securing absolute majority in the 60 member State Assembly. The opposition NNDP was way behind with 18 seats. Independents claimed 7 seats while one result went in favour of the NPP. The B.J.P. was yet to open its account. The Congress (I) victory proved to be a personal triumph for the Chief Minister Mr. Hokishe Sema, who resigned as Governor of Himachal Pradesh to re-enter State politics in order to rejuvenate the party.

^v
Twelfth Ministry (Congress I) 22.11.87 - 6.8.88 :
Mr. Hokishe Sema was unanimously re-elected leader of the Congress (I) Legislature Party of the 60 member Nagaland Legislative Assembly. This was Mr. Sema's third term as Nagaland Chief Minister. For the first time, independent MLAs did not have a role in the ministry making process. However three elected independents - Mr. Vihepu Yeptho, son-in-law of Mr. Hokishe Sema, Mr. John Lotha and Mr. I. Chuba have pledged their support to the Congress (I) government.¹⁰

10. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 23rd Nov. 1987.

Thus a 20 member, two tier Congress (I) Ministry, was installed in Nagaland on 22 Nov. (1987).

The choice of Mr. Hokishe Sema as Chief Minister was a foregone conclusion but almost every legislator exerted pressure for being inducted into the Council of Ministers. Mr. Sema attempted to please a substantial section of his party legislators and no less than 20 of them were inducted as ministers. It was the largest ever ministry in the history of Nagaland. But the infighting did not end. The President of the Nagaland Pradesh Congress (I), Mr. R.C. Chiten Jamir declined to join the ministry until he was appointed as Deputy Chief Minister.¹¹

Mr. Sema declared publicly that there would be no Deputy Chief Minister in his government but this did not quiten Mr. Jamir. He was able to convince the High Command of the need for a Deputy Chief Minister, thus the Chief Minister was forced to appoint Mr. Jamir as Deputy Chief Minister.

The former Chief Minister Mr. S.C. Jamir was asked to resign for corruption and mal-administration and was replaced by Mr. Hokishe Sema for a clean and efficient administration but this time Mr. Hokishe did not prove any

11. Indian Express, New Delhi, 4th Jan. 1988.

better, and very soon allegations against him (i.e. CM) were made by the opposition leaders, for maladministration, rampant corruption and misappropriation of funds by the government of Mr. Sema.

Mr. Vamuzo, leader of the opposition in the Nagaland Assembly and leader of the NNDP, who has met several top Congress (I) leaders to acquaint them with the State affairs in the State under the Congress (I) government submitted a chargesheet to the Prime Minister, containing serious allegations of corruption against the Chief Minister Mr. Hokishe Sema.

The complaint said, 'The Chief Minister of the State instead of protecting the property of the government and public has connived with a private party in grabbing government land for his own interest and benefit'. Mr. Vamuzo submitted with the complaint a full album of photographs showing the plot of land and the dismantled thatched roofing house.¹² This has done great harm to the party and the Congress (I) under Mr. Hokishe Sema again could not remain in power.

Soon, the eight month old Congress (I) ministry in Nagaland was reduced to a minority following the resignation

12. Statesmen, New Delhi, 3rd May 1988.

of 13 party legislators. The legislators resigned as they were not happy with Sema's leadership. Besides four of the seven independents in the assembly also withdraw their support to the Sema Ministry and the Congress strength in the 60 member House had gone down to 21. Nagaland opposition leader Vamuzo demanded that Mr. Sema must step down from the Chief Ministership in the best tradion^{ti} of parliamentary democracy.

The dissident group headed by Mr. K.L. Chisi declared the formation of a new party - Congress Regional Nagaland.

Mr. Vamuzo, former Finance Minister in the NNDP government with Mr. J.B. Jasokie as Chief Minister then leader of the opposition was raring to form a government. His NNDP, has 17 MLAs in the legislature. Mr. Vamuzo had the support of Mr. Huska Sumi who constitute the one M.L.A. of the NPP. Four independent MLAs were then, also expected to throw in their lot with Mr. Vamuzo in the ensuing bid to turn the tables on Mr. Sema's government.

Thus the governments in Nagaland had become very unstable with the practice of defections and factions and personal rivalries.

The legislators who had resigned from the primary membership then, met the Speaker and requested him to

recognise the new legislature party and allot separate seat in the Assembly with immediate effect. In a statement, the legislators said that they have resigned because the style and functioning of the Congress under the leadership of Mr. Hokishe Sema was not acceptable to the people of Nagaland.

The people's condition has worsened and the entire administrative set up and law enforcement agencies have become completely demoralised due to the whimsical interference and misdirections by the Chief Minister and some of his close colleagues.¹³

Meanwhile a new political party in Nagaland called the Joint Regional Legislative Party, under the leadership of Mr. Vamuzo, has stated its claim to form a new government in the state.

Congress (I) circles were highly concerned with the sudden development in Nagaland which they feel will adversely affect the party's position in the region at a time when Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh were getting ready for Assembly polls. The AICC I's trouble sooter for the north east, Mr. Rajesh Pilot and the party General Secretary incharge of the region, Mr. Oscar Fernandes had come to Kohima to resolve the problem with the Meghalaya Chief

13. Times of India, Kohima, 1st Aug. 1988.

Minister, Mr. P.A. Sangma but the problem remained unresolved.

Even though the Congress had given up all hopes of retaining its ministry in Nagaland, the delay in invitation to the newly formed J.R.L.P. leader to form an alternative government further deepened the political instability. Finally the eight month old Nagaland Assembly was dissolved on 7 August (1988) and the state was put under President rule, following the instability sparked off by the resignation by 13 Congress MLAs.

The Governor's report while recommending imposition of President rule said that a situation has arisen in which government could not be carried on according to the relevant constitutional provision.¹⁴

The opposition leader, Mr. Vamuzo described the Centre's decision as the rape of democracy. He expressed shock that the Centre could have imposed President rule when the J.R.L.P. had a clear majority of 35 members in the Assembly.¹⁵

The proclamation placing Nagaland under President rule was reported to have thrown Parliament in turmoil with more

14. Times of India, New Delhi, 8th Aug. 1988.

15. Telegraph, Calcutta, 8th Aug. 1988.

than an hour long uproar in the Rajya Sabha and an indignant walk out by angry opposition members in both the Houses.

The then Governor in his first speech after imposition of the President rule, assured the Nagas that he would take full initiative for an early solution of their problem. But apparently he achieved nothing except his frequent calls that the Centre was ready to open a dialogue with the NSCN outfit within the constitutional development.¹⁶

The Congress (I) government led by the veteran Mr. Sema came to power in 1987 with a pre-poll commitment for a lasting solution of the Naga political problem. While efforts were on to bring the guerrilla leaders to the negotiating table, the Hokishe Sema government was reduced to a minority and subsequently President rule was imposed.

Nothing better demonstrated the Congress (I)'s desperate desire for success in the Nagaland Poll than the shabby manner in which it treated the outgoing Chief Minister, Mr. Hokishe Sema and recalled his arch rival Mr. S.C. Jamir, to lead the party once again. Considering the circumstances in which Mr. Jamir was forced to quit office in October, 1986, with his opponents given full freedom to voice charges of corruption and mal-administrations and to

16. Patriot, New Delhi, 19th Feb. 1988.

accuse him of having secret links with the Naga insurgents. But all such misendeavours had been forgiven, presumably because the party High Command had realised that there was no one else who could help the Congress (I) at least to put up a good fight.

Mr. Jamir's task was to try and repair the damage but the verdict on his endeavour was to be given by the people and not by the Centre's nominee in Raj Bhawan.

Mr. Jamir who had led the faction ridden Congress (I)'s victory in Nagaland was unammiously elected leader of the Legislature Party.

Thirteen Ministry (Congress I) 25.1.89-15.5.90: The Congress (I) romping in with absolute majority in the 1989 election with 36 seats in the 60 members House formed the government. The opposition NPC won 24 seats, while the NPP and the independents did not get a single seat. The Congress (I) promises a stable government in the State that had seen a series of political upheavals.

But ever since Mr. Jamir became the Chief Minister he had to face trouble from within the party which for all purposes looked like a cohesive unit. There were quite a few who did not like his reentry into State politics, for the circumstances under which he was removed from the top post

years ago were still fresh in the memory of the Congress in Kohima. Since Mr. Sema did not enter the Assembly, Mr. Jamir really did not have a real rival to upset him straight away and it took nearly 16 months for the dissidents to achieve the objective.

The Congress (I) ministry led by Mr. S.C. Jamir was the thirteen in Nagaland but it collapsed due to defection.

Since the NPC leader, Mr. Vamuzo had lost in the last election the Legislature Party leader was Mr. K.L. Chisi, a former Congress (I) MLA who had brought down the government of Mr. Hokishe Sema.

Fourteen Ministry (ULF) 15.5.90 - -.6.90: Mr. Chisi was sworn in as Chief Minister. Mr. Jamir criticised the Governor's action in dismissing his government without giving him an opportunity to prove the majority in the Assembly.

The new two tier ministry of the ULF comprising 36 legislators belonging to the NPP (Nagaland Peoples Party) and the Congress (R) legislature party, was the first non Congress government to come to power in the border state in a decade. The Governor directed Mr. Chisi to prove his majority in the Assembly within 30 days.

Mr. Rajesh Pilot and Mr. S.S. Ahluwalia (MP) as Congress observers described the Governor's action as 'authoritarian and undemocratic' which violated all precedences.

The fall of the Congress government was to be expected, because smaller states are particularly susceptible to political changes at the Centre. Thus after the National Front Government came to power the Congress was ousted in both adjoining states, viz., Manipur and Meghalaya.

Meanwhile an era in Naga politics ended with the death of Phizo in London after 33 years of exile. Phizo will be remembered as the architect of Naga nationalism.

Fifteen Ministry (JLP) -.6.90 - --.92: In a dramatic developments before the governor invited the ULF to form the government, the speaker T.N. Ngullie, disqualified 10 of the 12 Congressmen under the anti-defection Act. The other two had been expelled by the Congress (I) before they defected.

While Mr. Chisi was away in Delhi, 17 NPC legislators withdrew their support to his ministry on June 13 (1990), elected Mr. Vamuzo as their leader and joined hands with 24 Congress (I) legislators to stake claim to forming the government. This was not only a bolt from the blue for Mr.

Chisi, but also for all Nagaland watchers since Mr. Vamuzo had been a strong critic of the Congress (I) throughout his political career and none could believe that he would join hands with his opponents for Chief Ministership.¹⁷

It would however, be unrealistic to assume that the Vamuzo ministry was going to be stable until the next general election to the Nagaland Assembly till the end of its term. For one thing the understanding between Shri Vamuzo and Shri Jamir who were bitter political opponents to each other in Nagaland politics looks like bedfellows and for another, politics in the State, was in effect, fluid with little chance of a stable government, a fact manifest in three ministries one after another within the span of 18 months. It all depends on the smooth relationship between Shri Vamuzo and Shri S.C. Jamir and both will have to work in full co-operation. In the meanwhile the NPC executive has expelled Shri Vamuzo from the party and also urged the NPC members in the coalition not to join the new ministry, but the NPC's (Chisi's group) appeal did not have any effect. New to ministerial office but a veteran political Chief Minister Vamuzo's leadership in the government will be a test in the management of Nagaland affairs, at any rate.

17. Statesmen, Guwahati, 11th July 1990.

The manner in which the government led by Mr. K.L. Chisi was brought down in Nagaland within one month of his assuming office as Chief Minister had shown once again that defection have become a way of life in the state.

The installation of a new non-Congress (I) coalition government in Nagaland after dramatic defections came in for sharp criticism from the Congress (I) benches in both Houses of Parliament.

While a major escalation of the insurgency in the region seems likely in the near future, the warning signals emanate not only from the failure of the Asom Gana Parishad government to control the growing violence by the ULF of Asom (ULFA) demanding an independent Assam, the activities of the NSCN demanding an independent Nagaland, and the militant Bodos demanding a separate state of Bodoland within India but from the growing co-ordination of the activities of the various insurgent groups in the region under the aegis of the NSCN which was set up by the Naga rebels who disowned the 1975 Accord with the Government of India.

Political fortunes fluctuated again as the six month old coalition of the Naga People's Council (NPC) and the Congress (I) broke on Dec. 3. Angered by what he thought was a Congress attempt to undermine him, Chief minister Vamuzo dropped two Congress (I) members on grounds of misconduct,

public health engineering minister T.N. Ngullie and rural development minister Hokheto Sema. The next day the remaining 10 Congress (I) ministers resigned en bloc.

But Mr. Vamuzo remained unfazed by the break in coalition and the apprehensions of some, that Nagaland might come under President rule as had Assam. He went ahead and inducted 12 new ministers from the NPC which has a total strength of 35 in the 60 member Assembly.

The trouble began with the Chandra Shekhar government banning the NSCN of Nagaland along with the ULFA in Assam - and with the resignation of Deputy Chief Minister I.K. Sema,. Vamuzo accused the Congress (I) of trying to break the government and expressed the suspicion that it was behind the outlawing of the NSCN, of course, former Chief Minister and State Congress (I) leader Mr. S.C. Jamir adamantly denied the charges.

The banning of the NSCN seems to have disturbed the uneasy political equilibrium in the state.¹⁸ The Nagaland Chief Minister therefore urged the Centre to lift the ban on the outlawed NSCN and help restore a congenial atmosphere through negotiated settlement.

18. India Today, New Delhi, 31st Dec. 1990.

The Congress (I) with support from the Centre seems to be quite successful in engineering defections. But then, Chief Minister Vamuzo put up a splendid fight, however the situations seemed to be going out of control. There were reports of fresh spate of defections.

The only possible way to restore a government enjoying the people's mandate was to held fresh elections Vamuzo therefore recommended to Governor M.M. Thomas that the Assembly be dissolved. This was accepted and Thomas asked the Chief Minister to continue in a caretaker capacity. Vamuzo promised fresh polls in six months.¹⁹

However, this was not favoured by the CM's Cabinet who were not consulted; the C.M. by now had lost the confidence of the people and now in a minority does not have the right to be the caretaker.

The Governor's action was also criticised by the Centre, and within few days the Union impose President rule in Nagaland (2 April 1992).

The long-gestating plan to topple Vamuzo's government was brought to a conclusion just as the C.M. was making a serious effort to end the 40 year old insurgency problem.

19. Rapas Ray, Frontline, 24th April 1992, p.28.

There were four major rebel outfits in Nagaland at present - two factions of the Naga National Council (NNC) led by Adino (daughter of the late A.Z. Phizo, founder of the NNC) and Khodao, and two factions of the NSCN (NSCN which was formed in 1975 by NNC dissidents led by T. Muviah and S.S. Khaplang). Vamuzo had enticed the help of the Church, which holds an almost complete sway over Naga society, in order to bring a team representing all the four outfits to the negotiating table²⁰, but unfortunately his government collapsed before he could achieve anything.

Thus throughout its political evolution Nagaland has been experiencing political instability in one form or the other, and the different ministries could not complete its full term of five years. As it has been noted above the insurgency factor has always been an important issue in the Naga politics influencing the policies and ideologies of the different political parties in the state. In fact the underground movement factor has always been a major point in contributing to the popularity of any political party in the state. No serious candidate can afford to criticise or even reflect the issues pertaining to the insurgency in the State. In fact most of them flaunt their links with either the NSCN of Nagaland or the rival federal group headed by

20. Ibid.

Mr. Phizo. It is common knowledge that the insurgency groups enjoy the sympathy from the vast majority of the people in the border State.

Besides the problem of ;factionalism, defections etc. remain strong factors of instability. Political parties in Nagaland are offshoots of ever changing party loyalties, while the game of floor crossing created chaotic conditions. Horse trading has become acute in Nagaland politics particularly in the 80s. The display of money power is reaching an alarming level. There have been instances of almost the entire break away group finding berths in the ministry. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the political stability of the State has been at stake. The rules of democracy is absent. Political instability in the State also provided fertile grounds for growth of insurgency.

Another feature of the politics of the north east region is the firm hold of the regional parties and in Nagaland too the Naga Peoples Council an essentially local outfit, continues to enjoy significant popular support. It is also known that those who talk of the merger of the regional parties were not reconciled to the fact that the Congress (I) should rule Nagaland. While the Congress (I) all along benefited by using money power to engineer

majorities in the State irrespective of what the people want. Joining with the Congress later proved to be a marriage of convenience for the sake of power and pelf.

The absence of a one party dominant system also is responsible for the unstable nature to a large extent. The loosely organised structure of ideology and programmes of the political parties also contributes its share to the instability of the party system in the State. It was noticed that party ideology or its programmes hardly had any influence on the electorate's choice to favour a certain political party. In contrast personal benefits, bonds of kinship, and personal influence of political leaders over the public proves more important to achieve political power which does not always favour a strong stable government. Ideological factor can be felt with parties like the NNO and the UDF at earlier stages. But gradually political parties came to be formed more on the line of tribal factor, which evolved not out of ideological differences but on leadership issue, hence contributing to the unstable entirety of the party system in the state politics.

On the whole the nature of political instability found in Nagaland has become chronic, in its character and needs a deeper look and study in order to understand it properly and then recommend steps to bring about stability in the political system of Nagaland.

ELECTION RESULTS

**FINAL PARTY POSITION
ON MINISTRY FORMATION**

1964	NNO	-	26	NNO	-	34	
	UDP	-	12		UDP	-	12
	IND	-	2				----
							46
			----				----
			40				
	TUENSANG		6				

	TOTAL		46				

1969	NNO	-	22	NNO	-	43	
	UFN	-	10		UFN	-	9
	IND	-	8				----
							52
			----				----
			40				
	TUENSANG	-	12				

	TOTAL	-	52				

1974	NNO	-	23	NNO	-	25	
	UDF	-	25		UDF	-	35
	IND	-	12				----
							60
			----				----
			60				

1977	NNO	-	15	NNO	-	15	
	UDF	-	35		UDF	-	39
	IND	-	9		IND	-	5
	NCN	-	1		NCN	-	1
			----				----
			60			60	
			----			----	
1982	CONG (I)	-	24	CONG (I)	-	36	
	NNDP	-	24		NNDP	-	23
	IND	-	12		INP	-	1
			----				----
		TOTAL			60		
			----			----	

Contd/...

1987	CONG (I)	-	34	CONG (I)	-	34
	NNDP	-	18	NNDP	-	18
	IND	-	7	IND	-	7
	NPP	-	1	NPP	-	1
	BJP	-	0			
			----			----
	TOTAL		60			60
			----			----
1989	CONG (I)	-	36	CONG (I)	-	36
	NPC	-	24	NPC	-	24
	NPP	-	0			----
	IND	-	0			60

	TOTAL		60			
			----			----

Chapter V

LEADERSHIP ISSUE IN NAGALAND

The problem of leadership in present day political parties has been one of the new dimensions of the political systems. Like power the issue of leadership has been an age long-concern of political theory as it constitutes an important characteristic of modern political processes. The pressing needs of rapid social change, under the pressure of modern forces, have brought about transformation in the social structure with alterations in the old values and attitudes as well. These structural and functional changes in the political systems gave rise to the need for an increased direction and decision by government and political leadership. Hence the question of political leadership and its related issues has been of immense value in modern times.

The concepts of leadership and authority in political parties are a complex phenomena. These concepts forms a closely related system and acts like the steering wheels of the political parties. Differences in styles or kinds of leadership may arise under different situations, different communities and in different periods.

In India the nature and pattern of political leadership have undergone remarkable changes in the post independence era. The rural areas of the country particularly, has passed through a period of transition where the new social and

economic forces have geared up the large-scale development plans. The traditional leadership in India has undergone changes under the impact of modernising processes in the post independence years, and subsequently new patterns of leadership have emerged on the political scene. Thus, in recent times, the criterion for political leadership has gradually shifted from 'ascriptive to achievement standards' as men have ceased to be accepted as leaders mainly because of hereditary status and have begun to make their impact through their own talents.¹

Types of Leadership

Before going into the leadership and its related issues found in Nagaland an attempt has been made here to briefly examine the different types of leadership. Such an attempt will help one to understand better the issues and its relevance in the political systems in Nagaland. Hugh Tinker has classified political leadership into three kinds, viz., (i) traditional, (ii) traditional-modern, and (iii) modern. Traditional leaders are those who claim their legitimacy of tradition enjoying prescriptive rights over the tradition loving people. In this case a leader ascends to the position not on the basis of his achievement or worth, but solely on

1. Banerjee, Kishalay, (1984), Op.Cit., p.282.

the basis of traditional values. It is most universal and even primitive and might come from within a group or without.² The examples of such leaders are to be found in history - kings, chiefs etc. But traditional leadership has changed in form and function and it has acquired some modern elements as a result of political socialisation processes.

As for traditional modern, the leadership issue has often depended upon the success of ascriptive leadership in taking over an achievement role under the new dispensation. In this context, can be included the introduction of community projects, land reforms, decentralised local administration and adult franchise all of which aimed at the reconstruction of rural society. Thus there develops a system where these leaders supplement their inherited prestige by an acquired expertise. In this way the traditional modern leaders are able to preserve their old aloofness and at the same time come in close contact with the masses by exercising their acquired influence.

Finally, the modern political leadership emerges from within the group. It is an internal development made possible by modern social forces. With the communication and secularization processes being more widened and better

2. Thinker, Hugh, Ballot Box and Bayonet People and Government in Emergent Asian Countries, (Allied, New Delhi), 1964, p.64.

organised, the traditional and local groups, such as, castes, tribes or regions which till lately used to play a very restricted role in their own spheres have now emerged as important elements of the Indian national politics.

By making use of new political techniques and exhibiting all the qualities of skills and political manipulation these leaders come to occupy important positions and from there aspire to ascend to the state leadership and again to higher national level leadership.³ It has come to light that 'modern political leaders' derive their power and influence as much from the traditional affiliations of the old groups (though not in its purely classical sense) as from promoting responsible participation and reinforcing cooperative interpersonal relations within the group. Thus modern leadership suggests the need for special skills, personality, resources and knowledge of dynamics of leadership on the part of the leader. The new leadership facilitates communication within the group, makes for better morale, increases members' satisfaction, promotes greater productivity and helps the growth to move towards its goals.⁴

At the national level, 'the post Gandhian era' saw the proliferation of politicians at different levels as a wider avenue was opened up for display of leadership competence

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

resulting from the greater participation of the people in the political processes. It has also brought into broad focus the placing together of the centrifugal and the centripetal forces. As a result a new politico-administrative style of leadership emerged with the disappearance of the classical style with an accent on intellectualism and for sacrifice. In such an atmosphere the states as units of the Indian federation became important centres of political power where the regional parties that successfully contended with the Congress (I) Party and other all India parties brought about significant changes not only in the party system but also in the leadership pattern as well. The political scenario and the leadership issues too, in Nagaland, has undergone tremendous changes, particularly after the attainment of statehood in 1963.

Leadership Pattern in Nagaland

Traditional Leadership: The ancient method of administration was based on the system of Chiefs, where Naga villages were ruled by hereditary or elected chiefs. As already discussed in the II chapter, the Village Chiefs or headmen in Naga villages are outstanding figures.

The Chief was a judge, administrator, and commander rolled into one and indeed it was imperative that he be a warrior more than anything else. However the King or Chief is bound

by traditions and his leadership is accepted so long as he acts in accordance with popular traditional customs, norms, and values.

As it has been noted that traditionally the Chief was the supreme authority, but slowly with the introduction of more representative organisations, the traditional authority of the chiefs has been curbed. New changes have been brought about by the system of vote, thus, giving way to modern political administration.

Traditional-Modern Leadership: The traditional modern leadership in Nagaland emerged with the formation of the Naga National Council. When World War II was over, Mr. Pawsey, the then Deputy Commission of Naga Hills; formed an institution called 'Naga Hills District Tribal Council' in 1945, the main objective of which was to unify the Nagas on modern lines⁵, to foster the welfare and social aspiration of the Nagas. But the conference of the Naga Hills District Council (NHDTTC) held at Wokha on Feb. 2, 1946, changed the Council into Naga National Council (NNC). It had 29 members representing various tribes on the principle of proportional representation in its inception.⁶ Thus for the first time

5. Horam, M., (1974), Op.Cit., p.41.

6. Alemchiba, M., A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland, Naga Institute of Culture Kohima, 1970, p.165.

the Nagas were represented under one political organisation. The leaders of the NNC were an educated group such as T. Sakhrie, Jasokie, T.N Angami, Aliba Imti etc.

The NNC became more manifestly assertive for Naga identity. However, the primary aim of the NNC was to achieve the solidarity of all the Nagas and to work for their political social and economic advancement.⁷

Initially, the NNC was built up by the village and tribal councils from below, but with its formation, the organisational infra-structure of it was further strengthened from the top level. Every Naga family was expected to contribute towards the maintenance of the council on voluntary basis. Contribution ranged anything from a pumpkin to handful of paddy or from one rupee to hundred and even more. Cows and mithuns were often contributed by one or another well-to-do family. Office bearers were paid if there was money. Every tribal council gave strong emphasis on village unit and it helped to bring the Nagas into a strongly united people even when no mass communication such as newspaper and radio was there.⁸ Thus the NNC made everybody have a sense of participation. Later

7. The Case of the Nagas, O'King Naga National Council, 1964, pp.21-22.

8. Ibid.

on a monthly journal called "Naga Nation" was published as the organ of the NNC. The Constitution of the NNC was drafted on the lines of modern political system⁹, and the council worked according to the constituted system and decision on a majority by voting.

The very nature of the Naga National Council which demanded for the Nagas an independent state placed their leadership in such a position whereby certain amount of voluntary sacrifice of the leader's personal career, properties and even family life are called for. Opportunities for the leaders to pursue power or personal ambition at the expense of other fellow-men has not set in yet, subsequently alienating those persons who had accepted a political career from the sources or chances of amassing wealth. It was ideological differences which wrecked the NNC from within, ultimately led to the decline of the charismatic leadership and popularity of Angami Zapu Phizo (A.Z. Phizo). This paved the way for the emergence of new leaders on the political scene under the moderate ideology.

The pendulum and the cloak of power was gradually shifted from the NNC politics to the state politics after 1963. This phase of Naga politics had witnessed an almost entirely different pattern of leadership. The influence of

9. For details of the Constitution see Horam, M., (1974), Op.Cit., pp.61-64.

the NNC on the state politics was now just a dim shadow of its old self as the new leaders were mostly drawn from the NNC moderate group. Such a tendency was the outcome of the weakening in the underground leadership. It practically created a confused situation among the rank and file of the leaders of the time being caught at a transitory phase of political developments. The resultant outcome was that there was a wide gap in the expectations from, and the fulfillment of the expectations by the leaders. Such a state of affairs gave in to the emergence of new leaders on the political scene which diverted itself greatly from earlier traditions.

Modern Political Leadership: The post-state formation period quickly ushered the induction of tribal elites into the state political scene. It also opened a new political stage to those who perceived politics in terms of vocation in order to achieve political power and elevating personal status. Naga politics and leadership based on the cause of the NNC diminished, and the politics of party system and elections, the benefits and gains of political office, and the chances of improving one's socio-economic status emerged prominently and attracted most of the new political career-oriented leaders. In the new atmosphere the politics and ideology of the more extreme followers of the NNC were even condemned. Some of the new leaders even, went to the extent of denouncing Phizo and the NNC altogether so as to gain

recognition from among the central leaders, who view the NNC movement as purely a secessionist one led by a misguided and self-centered section of the Nagas. Few among such leaders succeeded to achieve part of their political ambition when being imposed on the state legislature as Chief ministers. But their success ranges from moderates to near disastrous reception as most such leaders lacked the backing of a strong political lobby from the state legislature parties. Such instances too contributed to the leadership issue and its related problem in the state of Nagaland.

During the nearly three decades of its existence now, the state of Nagaland had undergone tremendous experiences of political instability due much to the lack of strong and competent leadership bases. Thus, since the formation of the state, in 1963, the state had over a dozen governments with an average of about two years each while some only as short as few days, and not less than a dozen political parties were formed during the same time span. The party system in Nagaland has thus undergone an intensive phase of merging and splitting particularly during the last seventeen to eighteen years. This trend of political developments has culminated into organisational disintegration without an effective political force. This disintegration is primarily a consequence of internal schism among the leaders and

groups rather than external forces. Leaders like S.C. Jamir, J.B. Jasokie, T.N. Angami etc. all tended to be very uncertain in their political behaviour, each espousing his own kind of political resurgence for the bed-ridden political crisis in the state, each indulging in the sentiment-exploiting game with a view to woo their tribal support so characteristic of Naga politicians and each willing to compromise with the others when situations tend to get out of control. The resultant feature was that, over a period of time the political leaders, no matter to which party they originally belonged, had all renounced, defected or being expelled from the party, each time leaving it a little weaker by taking with them their apparent loyal supporters.

Political instability has become a common phenomenon in Nagaland. Incidentally, leadership integrity and sincerity has become rare qualities aggravating the overall political situation and damaging the image of the state party system. Institutionalisation of political parties has virtually broken down. The state is caught in a quicksand of large scale corruption both at the official and non-official levels, leading to the stagnation and arrest of socio-economic developments. The party system thus exist not in an organised and collective form but lingers loosely at the whims of personal characters of political leaders who could

unscrupulously play their cards well in the disintegrated and degenerated system. In the process of this political journey, the masses ignorant as they are, are alienated from the very political system as they are from the high echelons of the Naga society. Such a trend could prove fatalistic if not checked and might create a situation where things are beyond the redeemable stage.

The underground leadership are experiencing a situation no better than the problems being faced by the overground ones. In fact, things have gone from bad to worse for the former group. The emergence of tribal leadership with its subsequent political evils can largely be attributed to Phizo's stiff policy of eliminating the moderate leaders and his stubbornness to give in to a compromise of anything short from his original demand i.e., an independent sovereign state of Nagaland. Everyone has dreams, which he or she aspires to fulfill, so must be Angami Zapu Phizo and his staunch followers. But Phizo failed or maybe refused to, compromise with the practical reality or the changes in notion of time and tide. His death in recent years did not bury his legacy in totality but has left his followers in turbulent waters to fend for themselves and to try to look for new leadership from amongst themselves. The incidents that followed his death, such as the NNC split into the

Adino Phizo group and the Khodao group has further weakened the influence of the Phizoites over the Nagas. Also, yet in Phizo's refusal to condemn the Shillong Accord (1975), a more active and militant anti Phizo faction emerged (NSCN) which too has again split into Issac-Muviah camp and Khaplang camp. The conflict in ideologies were the main causes which led to the crisis in the underground leadership. But of late, the dissensions and conflicts are even given tribal colours. Only time will tell whether it is just a mere play to disunite the underground leaders or, that actually they are heading for a final parting on tribal lines.

Leadership Issue

With the already discussed part of this chapter as the background certain issues will be analysed so as to understand the problem, the nature and the extent of leadership issues/crisis that were been faced and has become a common feature of party system in Nagaland. The questions, that can be included in analysing the discussion will cover a vast range of issues, such as, (i) the extent of ideology and socio-economic factors in determining the crisis of Naga leadership; (ii) the extent of individual personalities and personal conflicts and its impact/effect in influencing the crisis; (iii) the anomaly and gravity of the crisis in the

political system; (iv) the extent of the effect of the crisis on the perpetual instability of government in the state; (iv) the convergences and differentiations in the leadership pattern of the underground and the state politics, and finally; (vi) if a higher level of peoples participation and involvement in the political processes will provide an effective leadership. An effective discussion on the above questions will give searching analysis of the leadership issue and its related factors responsible for crisis and its subsequent effect on the instability of the political system. It will also help in understanding the nature of the issues so as to suggest measures accordingly.

The extent of ideology and socio-economic factors in determining the crisis of Naga leadership is a major one, its effects been immensely felt in the very political system of Nagaland. To begin with the ideology factor was not an acutely felt one when legislative political system began with the formation of the State of Nagaland. In fact statehood was granted as a measure to counter the already progressive underground movement which had engulfed practically the whole of Naga inhabited areas. Also to a certain extent the granting of statehood was welcomed by certain sections of the Naga society who are already weary of insurgency, which was affecting their normal day to day

life. Likewise, the majority of the rising educated Nagas were beginning to favour a political settlement for the Nagas within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Thus it was only a question of political shrewdness for the central ruling party leaders to take advantage of the situation to put the leadership cloak on the shoulders of certain leaders whom, the centre felt, would fit best for the national interest.

The appointment of Mr. Shilu Ao and other members to the Interim Government was a clear indication of favouring members who has pro-nationalist stands. All the members of the Interim Government can be considered as moderates who favoured a settlement of the Naga problem within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Such a beginning sowed the seeds of pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist leadership in Nagaland legislative politics. The first ministry (1964-69) under the Naga National Organisation did not have much ideological impact regarding the leadership issue. Leadership clash did occur within the party but was on the grounds of personality clashes and inter-tribal rivalry factors. It was a fact that Shilu Ao's ouster was caused by T.N. Angami's diplomatic exploitation of the underground movement. At the same time this cannot be solely held responsible for the former's downfall.

The ideological factor pertaining to leadership issue and clashes could be said to have been felt only in the next election in 1969. The two contesting political parties, i.e., the NNO and the UDF, were branded and floated as pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist parties. In other words, the NNO was floated as pro-Indian and anti Naga, while the UDF was considered the Naga party which would carve out a sovereign independent State of Nagaland from the Indian sub-continent. But even under such adverse situation the NNO managed to scrap through under the leadership of Hokishe Sema. Mr. Hokishe Sema, though a pro-nationalist to the extreme, was able to complete his full term as Chief Minister (1969-74) much due to then inter-tribal rivalry for political leadership between the Aos and the Angamis . He did not get much trouble which threatens his leadership from within the rank of his ministry as often as the case in the later years of politics in Nagaland.

The ideological factor along with the socio-economic ones can be witnessed only in the subsequent ministries. Leadership issue has been a grave problem affecting the political stability of the state. To come to power and then to maintain their positions different leaders had taken to different strategies to meet their ends. Within the very

ranks of the "so-called" nationalists¹⁰, ideological differences proped up in the manner of extremity and moderates. The so called anti-nationalists also did not lag behind. In all, such developments within the political system had added gravity to the unstable political situation in Nagaland.

Different Party Leaders

The topic under discussion can be appreciated in a proper manner only if we have an idea of the main leaders who has steered the political system in Nagaland since its attainment of statehood.

The NNO Leaders: The prominent NNO leaders include Mr. Shilu Ao, Mr. Hokishe Sema, Mr. T.N. Angami and Mr. Jasokie Angami. Mr. Shilu Ao became the first Chief Minister of Nagaland when appointed as leader of the partyless Interim Government and the subsequent victory of the NNO party at the 1964 election. He was faced with the first hurdle in 1966 and he couldn't overcome it. The situation developed was such, that, Shilu Ao was forced to resign from the Chief-Ministership as his own ruling party (NNO) passed a no-confidence motion against him over the issue of shifting

10. The term 'so called' is employed as all political parties however pro or anti nationalist are working under the political set ups of the Indian Constitution.

the capital from Kohima to an alternative site near Mokokchung. This incident ushered in the seeds of instability and saw the development of tribal lobbies and personality clashes in future. The immediate aftermath saw the victory of the Angami lobby and the formation of the subsequent T.N. Angami ministry which lasted till the elections of 1969. While the ministry under the leadership of T.N. Angami succeeded in winning the confidence of the Naga people in general and in undertaking some development works, it failed to establish lasting peace in Nagaland, because of the uncompromising attitude of the underground Nagas. Thus he became the victim of the roaring force of the time, i.e., the underground movement. Though the N.N.O. won the election in 1969 T.N. Angami could not retain the leadership of the party. He was replaced by Hokishe Sema.

The change in the leadership from T.N. Angami to Hokishe Sema can be attributed to the inter-rivalry between the tribes, then particularly acute between the Aos and the Angamis. The Aos managed to push T.N. Angami out probably to avenge the humiliation meted out to Shilu Ao not so long ago. Hokishe Sema's victory, however, was not so much due to personal popularity as the fact that in a state where tribal rivalry was emerging strongly, he was perhaps the most acceptable leader. But very soon he too became the victims

of the Angami-Sema rivalry which ultimately saw the eclipse of the NNO party in 1976.

The Semas were allegedly held responsible for blocking Phizo's return to start a dialogue with the Central Government. This attitude of the Angamis saw its tribesmen legislators adopting an anti-Sema stand and did the greatest harm to the NNO party under Hokishe Sema's leadership. However, it was the insurgency factor coupled with the inter-tribal rivalry and internal dissensions that saw the waning of the influence of the Semas. Thus all legislators are supported by the leaders or members of the tribe to which he belong, without which he could not survive for long.

The rise of leaders such as Mr. S.C. Jamir and J.B. Jasokie, to a certain extent, can be attributed to ideological factor within the ranks of the so called nationalists. The situation favoured them many a times when placed against the like of Hokishe Sema and Chiten Jamir who are considered staunch Congressmen. On the other hand S.C. Jamir and J.B. Jasokie has moderate attitude towards the underground movement and better rapport with them.

Mr. Jasokie was a leader whose personal integrity has been very high. He has led the nationalist forces from 1956 onwards. In 1953-54 he was the publicity officer of the Naga

National Council of Phizo. But the youthful educated leaders under him soon realised that Phizo was diverting the political movement to insurgency and soon left the movement.

Mr. T. Sakhrrie, one of the most brilliant young leaders and colleague of Mr. Jasokie, paid the price with his life. Mr. Jasokie narrowly escaped. Since then he has been an important target of Phizo's followers, while, he continued to lead the nationalist forces through the NNO. When in 1974 the NNO decided to merge in the Congress, Mr. Jasokie had advised caution, but the Semas and Tuensang tribes along with some Aos and Lothas would not turn back. To them there was no halfway house to nationalism and national integration. Thus Jasokie paid the price for maintaining a half hearted and indecisive stand.

On the whole, the failure on the part of the major backward tribes, particularly the tribes inhabiting the Mon and Tuensang districts, to evolve a clear cut policy in supporting a particular political party added to the gravity of leadership clash in the state. The members from these two districts constitutes a considerable strength in the 60 member State Legislative Assembly, whose support is vital for any leader or party to be in power. It is often found that the members from these districts did not attach much importance to the ideology based politics but moved enmass

from one party to another party for political positions and personal benefits. They are responsible for the rise of Hokishe Sema in 1969 and S.C. Jamir in 1982, which saw the decline of T.N. Angami and J.B. Jasokie, respectively. As for Hokishe Sema's initial downfall in the 1974 election, many observers feel that his close relation with the Congress did not wash well with the proud Nagas who saw Sema's compromises with the Central Government as a sign of weakness.

U.D.F. Leaders: The moving spirits behind the UDF party were Shri Kevichusa, Shri Vizol, Shri Vamuzo, Shri Surhouzelie and Mrs. Rano Shaiza. With the NNO forming the government in 1964, the UDF forms the opposition with Shri Kevichusa as its President. The leaders hold that "they would not be a party to any deadlock that may arise at any stage as a result of the insistence by the Nagaland State Government for its inclusion in the peace talks. They said that their party would continue to act only as a bridge between the two contending parties, India and Naga Federal Government."¹¹

11. Ramunny, Murkot, (1988), Op.Cit., p.183.

On 4th April 1964 Rev Michael Scott and Shri B.P. Chaliha¹² came to Kohima and held a meeting and Shri Kevichusa was invited to address the meeting. He made a strong plea to "start all over again". By this he meant that the State Assembly be dissolved and the State Government be done away with. His argument was that the government was composed of government officials and unless the opposition group was associated in the task of reconstruction, no permanent solution was possible. He went on to argue that the first task was to establish peace and then to seek political solution.¹³ The leaders believed that the Nagas could themselves solve their problems if they get together, that the talks between the Nagas and the Government of India would be an exercise in futility without first exploring a common meeting ground among all the Nagas.

At a meeting held on 28 May 1966 in Kohima, Shri Kevichusa said, "The Peace Mission had brought cheer and hope to the people of Nagaland". He reminded the audience about the circumstances under which Chaliha left the Peace Mission. Chaliha said, "How can I work for peace with people who cannot stop their fellow people from committing the most

12. Shri Rev Michael Scott and Shri B.P. Chaliha were members of the Peace Mission which was set up to act as a mediator between the Indian Government and the Naga insurgents to solve the political problem.

13. Sema, Hokishe, (1986), Op.cit., p.108.

dastardly acts of violence"? He reminded them of the bomb explosions that had killed many innocent lives. Fortunately it (the culprits) was discovered Kevichusa after narrating all the various incidents, said how he wished that no Naga had any hand in these inhuman acts. He added that "in face of these disclosures, what is the task before every Naga leader?" I agree that those who say that there can be no peace, if it is a fact that Nagas do not hold human lives as sacred".¹⁴

During the nation-wide mid term poll in September 1971, Shri Kevichusa from the UDF contested for the single Lok Sabha seat in the state against Jamir of the NNO. The former was a retired I.A.S. Officer and without exaggeration, one of the best loved and revered public figures among the Nagas. His candidature was hailed by many as they saw in him a spokesman for the Naga cause and felt that here at last was a man who could hasten the solution of the Naga problem. Some newspapers played up his sympathies towards the boys in the jungles and opined that such a man in New Delhi could do what the earlier soft-peddalling representatives had failed to achieve. The official support, on the other hand, was naturally, behind Jamir. Both the parties went in for

14. Ramunny, Murkot, (1988), Op.cit., p.241.

feverish political activities not witnessed in the State before. Although both the candidates were popular men, Kevichusa was declared elected. The UDF was at least on its way back from political wilderness.¹⁵

Meanwhile it saw the decline of the NNO Party under the leadership of Mr. Sema and paved the way for the Angami resurgence under the leadership of Mr. Vizol heading the UDF ministry in 1974. At the same time it proved to be a preparatory stage for the Aos to mount the stride of leadership in the near future.

Mrs. Rano Shaiza's (who was elected as the Party President) "main theme was that the UDF would give a clean administration, quick development and final negotiated settlement of the political problem. She mentioned the two irreconcilable positions - one of the Government, and the other as she called it of the Federal Nagas'. The Federal Nagas were unwilling to join the Union of India and the Government of India was not in a position to concede the claims of the 'Federalists'. She appealed to "my brave brothers and sisters (the underground) to prepare themselves to face the challenges of a new approach that recognise their services towards building what is called today 'Nagaland'. She also declared that for this sacred task, there were

15. Horam, M., (1974), Op.cit, p.159.

people willing to go to the remotest end of the world regardless of personal risks to do what is just and right (she meant the underground proceeding to China). She had declared that her party had recommended to the Government of India the release of political prisoners.¹⁶

However, it was not possible for their party in power to implement all the promises that they had made to the electorate. This had done great harm to the Vizol ministry which could not last long. As far as the UDF leaders were concerned, the solution of the problem lay in (a) Army operations being reduced completely and army posts being removed, (b) release of prisoners, (c) Non-imposition of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act after 31st August, 1974. But they could not promise anything in return.¹⁷ As such sensible leaders of UDF like Kevichusa, who was reported to have been very annoyed and said that something will have to be done to stop recruitment and collection of fines.

Mr. Vizol Angami has himself to be blamed for his own downfall for often adopting the policy of liberal reception and policy of appeasement. In fact he was popular among his

16. Ramunny, Murkot, (1988), Op.cit., pp. 315-16.

17. Ibid., p.318.

tribesmen even before attaining political power. Besides, he managed to build a good rapport with the major backward tribes of the Mon and Tuensang districts by his developmental works and plans at the initial stage of heading the UDF ministry. But his policy of liberal reception and appeasement encouraged revolts within the rank of his own partymen which gradually but surely saw to his phasing out from the political scene of Nagaland. The decline of the popularity of Vizol Angami saw the meteoric rise of the doyen of Naga politics, Mr. S.C. Jamir, to power.

At present the UDF is under the leadership of Mr. Vamuzo as the Naga People's Council. The Party leader Mr. Vamuzo was in the 1989 poll defeated in his home constituency, Chazouba. Had he been elected, he would have been the obvious choice for the leadership of the NPC which ultimately went to Mr. Chisi. Mr. Vamuzo was thus a disappointed man. So Mr. Jamir thought the best way of organising defection in the NPC was to make use of the Mr. Vamuzo and he succeeded in his efforts.

Mr. Vamuzo could not have had a better deal than when the post of Chief Minister was presented to him on a platter. Thus Mr. Vamuzo became Chief Minister by default, propped up by Mr. S.C. Jamir who had his own reason to

settle scores against Mr. K.L. Chisi, largely responsible for the downfall of the Congress Ministry.

But the six month old Vamuzo led government came to an end when the ruling NPC members resigned from the party and offered support to the Congress (I) until finally the assembly was dissolved and President's rule was imposed in Nagaland.

Congress (I) Leaders: The Congress (I) leadership has been revolving between the two main leaders - Mr. Hokishe Sema and Mr. S.C. Jamir.

Mr. Hokishe Sema is the only Naga Chief Minister to have completed his five year term. His relations with the Centre are excellent particularly because of his role in persuading his tribesmen, the Semas, who are his supporters to surrender and compromise with the Indian Government.

When the insurgency problem erupted in Nagaland, Mr. Sema was the assistant commissioner of the district¹⁸ and therefore, a natural choice for membership in the interim council formed in 1961 under the 16 point Agreement giving the Nagas their own state. Thus began Hokishe Sema's political life. He was appointed finance minister, a

18. Nagaland then was a district of Assam.

portfolio he continued to hold after the First Assembly Election in the State in 1964. In 1969, he became Chief Minister and managed to steer the state through some troubled times with a remarkable degree to political stability. This direct approach coupled with a readiness to work within the Constitution of India kept his relation with the Centre close and during his tenure the Central Government readily financed several developmental projects. In 1972, he survived the most serious attempt on his life by the Naga insurgents. He was on his way back to Kohima with his teenage daughter when his car was ambushed, but Mr. Sema escaped, his daughter sustained a severe thigh injury, she limps to this day.

Despite the stable and, according to reports, honest government he headed, Sema's party lost in the 1974 elections, which according to observers was because the Nagas were not in favour to work within the Indian Constitution. However the opposition (UDF) did not last long and in 1975, the State was put under President's rule. In 1976, Sema's party (NNO) formally merged with the Congress. The next year, Sema lost his assembly seat in the anti-Congress wave that swept the country. He then transferred his attention to the Centre and became the Chairman of the Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Governor of Himachal Pradesh and finally, member of the

Rajya Sabha. Through the various ups and downs in his political career, Mr. Sema has remained steadfastly loyal to the Congress and can claim for himself the distinction of being one of the few Naga politicians who has not changed his party.

Meanwhile it saw the rise of Mr. S.C. Jamir to power. Mr. Jamir was one who has changed loyalty twice. He had administrative experience at the Centre as also in the State. He was Joint Secretary of the Naga Peoples Convention and one of those instrumental in bringing the Naga State into being. A law graduate of Allahabad University he (supposedly) had no connection with the underground set up at any time. In 1961 when the interim body was elected by the traditional method, Mr. Jamir was recommended and nominated as Member of Parliament. He served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister Nehru. In the next election, he was elected unopposed to the Lok Sabha and became Deputy Minister of Agriculture and later of Railways.

Mr. Jamir felt he was led down by the ruling party, NNO, when badly defeated by the opposition U.D.F. candidate Mr. Kevichusa Angami in the 1971 election. He left the NNO and in the 1974 and 1977 elections he won on the UDF ticket and was Deputy Chief Minister. He parted company with the Chief Minister, Mr. Vizol Angami and his party in 1980 after

he was ousted on charges of 'financial mismanagement'. This act of Mr. Vizol Angami can be considered as a political blunder as he failed to realise the emerging political realities with the passing of time. He took the decision and action too late and henceforth the AOs under the leadership of Mr. Jamir were able to build a strong lobby to determine the fate of Naga politics uptill now.

Mr. Jamir joined the Congress (I) and became Chief Minister after toppling the Vizol Ministry though he in turn was toppled by Mr. Jasokie, who had himself shifted from the Congress (I) to join his erstwhile opponents of the UDF to form a new regional party of NNDP.

The pattern of leadership in Nagaland saw new changes after the Fifth General Election of 1982. The state politics then became more of circumstantial politics than any other factor. Money power and central interference in the State politics became more profound and changed the nature of politics. The Fifth General Election to the Nagaland Assembly indicated certain trends and raised the hopes and aspirations of the people, particularly the youth. Defections and toppling of ministries have been a regular feature since the State was formed. Independents have in many cases played a key role in ministry 'making' as well as 'breaking'. The danger to all ministries formed since 1982

became all the more apparent. The tendency to make all the independent candidates as ministers became a regular practice thus wrecking all chances of establishing a stable government under competent leaders.

The defeat of some prominent leaders, both from the opposition and the Congress (I), paved an easier road for Mr. Jamir in 1982 to assume the cloak of political leadership. Rano Shaiza's ignominious defeat was a victory for new ideas and new hopes for the Nagas, breaking away from the past as she was considered a staunch overground supporter of the underground movement. Mr. Vizol's defeat was another striking blow to those who still had a lingering admiration for Phizo and had links with the past. So was Mr. Charlie's defeat another pointer to the dying embers of Phizo's flames. The defeat of Mr. Chiten Jamir (Congress (I)) was a great blow to the party. It must have been a relief to Mr. Jamir as Mr. Chiten Jamir (President Nagaland Pradesh Congress (I) Committee) would have been a serious contender for the Chief Ministership. Mr. S.C. Jamir only had to content with Mr. T.A. Ngullie the No. 2 in the Cabinet, who would be breathing down his shoulder all the time.

The question of what does the future hold for Nagaland then stood prominently before Mr. Jamir. The question of revival of insurgency did not arise. Both the opposition and

the Congress Party had promised a 'final solution of the Naga political problem'. It was hoped the Congress (I) led by Mr. S.C. Jamir would not try to persuade Delhi to have talks with Phizo as that would be setting the clock back, and reviving old loyalties. The new Chief Minister had enough on hand. He had to provide a clean administration in the region. Money, liberally sanctioned by the Centre had to be spent on economic and educational development of the people in the interior, particularly border areas. His team was mainly old wine in new bottles, including himself.

Whether defections would plague the Jamir ministry remained to be seen then. He had enough experience to deal with defections but to hold the various tribes together and to satisfy individual interests was not an easy task. Belonging to the national ruling party at the Centre has its advantages. But to the self seeking politician, nothing matters but his own interests.

The political instability and leadership issue under Mr. S.C. Jamir came under 'circumstantial politics' and he failed to wriggle out of it. His tenure saw dissident activities within the State Congress (I) reached an all time high, ultimately leading to his replacement in November 1986. It was not clear whether Mr. S.C. Jamir's surprise decision to quit, announced after his meeting with the Prime

Minister in Delhi, had been prompted by the list of charges levelled by the NNDP leader Vamuzo or the faction war in the Congress (I). Probably, it was a combination of the two which made the Centre realised the cost of propping him up at a time when the resurgence in the activities of the underground extremists called for a more acceptable leader in Kohima. The charges were serious enough coupled with the paralysis that had gripped the administration, with the Chief Minister's group and the rival faction led by the then Finance Minister T.A. Ngullie checkmating each other's moves. Another important factor which hastened the exit of Mr. Jamir was the spread of the belief among the people that he was increasingly following the Centre's dictates.

Mr. Hokishe Sema replaced Mr. S.C. Jamir in November '86 and was re-elected in November '87 for the third term as the Chief Minister. The choice of Mr. Sema was a foregone conclusion but almost every legislator exerted pressure for being inducted into the council of ministers. He attempted to please a substantial section of his party but the infighting did not end. During his long tenure outside the state, Mr. Sema had been out of touch with party affairs in Nagaland. In fact, one of the main complaints of the dissident Congressmen during his tenure as Chief Minister was that he kept himself largely aloof from organisational matters and was inaccessible to most of his party men.

Another major charge against Mr. Sema was that he showed undue favours to his own Sema tribesmen in matters ranging from representation in the Ministry to job appointments and allotment of contracts.¹⁹ Besides, when Mr. Hokishe Sema replaced Mr. Jamir in November 1987, he dropped most of the Jamir loyalists from his Cabinet who were not happy with Sema's leadership. And after eight months of its inception the Congress (I) ministry in Nagaland was reduced to a minority.

The Congress (I) High Command once again took the decision to replace Mr. Sema. This was because he failed to hold the party together even after having an absolute majority in the Assembly (34 out of 60). Mr. Jamir's candidature was favoured taking into consideration his ability to survive even under adverse situations. He managed to form a Congress (I) led ministry in 1982 with 24 Congress (I) M.L.A.s and 12 independents and the ministry survived till 1987.

Mr. Jamir's return as the leader of the Congress (I) in the assembly election replacing Mr. Hokishe Sema was mainly on the expectation that he would induce the 13 rebel Congressmen who backed out from the party to come back to

19. Deccan Herald, Bangalore, 1 Jan, 1989.

the fold. Those rebel Congressman have since joined the opposition Nagaland People's Council, and has been a major factor because most if not all of them proved strong candidates no matter on which ticket they contest. For like most other North-Eastern states in Nagaland too personality and personal influence matter more than party loyalty and ideology. Moreover, many of the defectors were from remote constituencies where strong opponents capable of defeating them were difficult to obtain. In a 60 member house, 13 was a decisive number. If they were persuaded to come back, it would imply appeasement. Mr. S.C. Jamir, whose younger brother Mr. Imtimeren Jamir, was one of the defectors, was confident that he can bring back most of them, hence the favour shown to him by the Congress leaders. But if for any reason none of the rebels or only a few can be won over then, Mr. Sema would be the obvious choice. For then the Congress would have more of his supporters.

Mr. S.C. Jamir believed to have had a hand in the July 31 (1988) defection that ultimately toppled the Sema government, became the Chief Minister was not free from trouble either which for all purpose looked like a cohesive unit. Besides the N.P.C., which had a membership of 24 in the Nagaland Assembly, was an associate member of the National Front. Not surprisingly it became especially active after the Front assumed power at the Centre. Its leaders

submitted a memorandum to the Centre against the Congress Government headed by Mr. S.C. Jamir alleging large scale corruption and embezzlement of funds. Faced with the threat of a Central inquiry and a challenge from within his party, Mr. Jamir, whose talent for manipulating legislators has served the Congress well in the past, sought to placate the dissidents by expanding his cabinet.²⁰ But he was clearly upstaged by the dissidents led by Mr. K.L. Chisi to form a government with the opposition NPC.

But within a month Mr. Chisi's government was toppled by Mr. Vamuzo at the instigation of Mr. S.C. Jamir, after which he (Mr. Jamir) worked for Vamuzo's ouster to grab the Chief Ministership. Finally President's rule was imposed in Nagaland.

Mr. Jamir, as things stand today in the sensitive State, is the most skilled practitioner of power politics. Mr. Jamir had held the post of Chief Minister on three different occasions and survived several charges. Not even Mr. Hokishe Sema who had the distinction of being the only Chief Minister so far to complete a full five year term was a match for him. Mr. Sema was brought to Nagaland by the Central leadership and it was left to Mr. Jamir to dislodge

20. Times of India, Kohima, 16 May, 1990.

him when the first opportunity presented itself and again it was Mr. Jamir unmindful of his unceremonious exit who has staged a successful coup to oust Mr. Chisi.

Thus we may conclude that on the whole, all the Naga political leaders, no matter to which political party they belonged, are responsible for creating and aggravating the leadership clash in the State. Everyone of them failed to come out with clear cut ideologies/policies to attract or influence the politically conscious educated few. Infact many of them are not even aware of political norms which otherwise a political leader should be aware of. Hence such a situation creates and adds gravity to political instability in the state.

Another point to be taken into account while discussing the leadership issue is the anomaly and gravity of the problem in the political system. This is so because many of the political leaders are themselves not devoted to the party they belong. Leaders are known for their fickle political loyalties. This compulsive desire for office being what it is, regional leaders often succumb to blandishments held out by the national parties. Besides the socio-economic factors also further aggravates the instability of the leadership issue as well as ministries.

A voter often does not vote for a particular party due to the party's ideologies/policies but on personal grounds. This nature of the society does not prove conducive for a stable government under a stable leader.

The extent to which individual personalities and personal conflicts contributed to leadership clash is a considerable one. In fact individual blunders and personnel rivalries are the root causes of leadership clash. Thus the leadership issue and political instability have to be understood mainly in terms of personal rivalries and tribalism. A political leader can keep his place for long only with the backing of the tribe he belongs to.

It is also widely believed that politicians of all hues to some extent are keeping insurgent groups largely alive to strengthen their own bargaining power vis-a-vis the Centre.

It is to be taken into discussion also as to what extent the effect of the leadership clash had on the perpetual instability of government in the state. It is a well known fact that leadership clash had caused the downfall of many governments since the formation of the state in 1963. The same issue saw to the demise of several political parties. The perpetual instability of governments in the state since the late 1970's can be assigned more to the leadership clash than any other reason.

The leadership clash between the Angamis and the Aos saw the downfall of the UDF ministry in the late 1970's. Likewise the instability that crept in within the Congress since the mid 1980's is also due to the same issue of leadership clash arising out of different factors (e.g. factors like tribalism, personal factors etc.). Also the convergences and differentiations in the leadership pattern of the underground and the state politics had contributed to the unstable trend of governments in Nagaland.

To sum up the chapter, we can say that the growth of conflict from policy orientations develops personal rivalries among the political leaders. Such a thing tends to destabilise political leadership in the state. It is only fair on our part to question whether a higher level of people's participation and involvement in the political processes will provide an effective leadership.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

A political system and its development is best analysed, by the nature of its political parties as well as by circumstantial factors which contributes to its success or failure. Our analysis of the political parties in Nagaland reveals certain prominent features which have affected the political development and political stability in the state.

India is a multi-party democracy, with Congress as the dominant party, especially in the initial decades. The Congress, because of the legacy of the freedom movement, the effective leadership of Nehru, the nation wide organisation and the flexibility of its policies, was in a position to retain control over the country for two full decades since independence. This situation underwent a radical change. In the Fourth General Election of 1967 the Congress lost the traditional two third majority in the Lok Sabha. Further in the wake of split in Congress in 1969 the position of the party was further weakened, Mrs. Gandhi's government was reduced to minority and obliged to seek the support of Communist Party of India (CPI) and certain other independent members to keep itself in power. Thus for the first time the opposition parties in the Lok Sabha posed a formidable challenge to the position of the Congress.

In 1977, the Congress not only lost the Lok Sabha Election, but it also lost its majority in the States where elections were held in June 1977. The historic Congress Party, for the first time, had the bitter taste of defeat, and was reduced to the stature of an opposition. After a lapse of about 3 years, Congress (I) came back to power at the centre with a thumping majority, until again in 1989 when the National Front formed the government for a short time the main trend in the Congress Policy has been towards a welfare state with strong socialist flavour.

Whereas India has been experiencing a one party dominant system, Nagaland has been having more or less a two party system, throughout its electoral history, based on the issue of nationalism and regionalism. At the very first general election to the Nagaland Assembly the state has the Naga Nationalist Organisation (NNO) party led by the late Shilu Ao and the Democratic Party led by Kevichusa Angami based on the above mentioned issues.

The NNO from the beginning was close to the Congress Party having full conviction in Congress ethics, culture and policies and was thus dubbed as a national party. The regional Naga Democratic Party on the other hand, was considered as standing for the Naga cause, with the main objective of bringing the Naga rebels and the centre to the

negotiating table, and also having reserved the option to dissolve itself if and when it considered its task accomplished. The NNO has experienced both political success and failures and ultimately merged with the Congress, with some of its earliest members as the stalwarts of the present day Congress (I) in the state. The Naga Democratic Party too has its ups and downs, but its remnants still forms the bulk of the opposition party in the state. Thus we can safely say that the state of Nagaland has experienced even dramatic political developments and undergone changes but the nature of its party system has remained a two party system all the while.

Political instability which has become a feature in Indian politics is marked by factionalism, fragmentation, defection and dissidence both at the National and State level.

Nature of the Traditional Naga Society and Polity

For centuries the Nagas lived in isolation, not only from the rest of the world but the Naga tribes themselves were isolated from each other. Thus they developed their own system of administration. The village was the highest political unit, governed by the village council headed by an elected or hereditary chief. The traditional Naga political institution was mainly concerned with decision-making, law

enforcement and dispute settlement. It was only under the colonial rule that the Nagas were brought under an administrative unit for the first time. But the British administered the Naga Hills loosely following a policy of non-interference. Hence the Nagas remained unknown to the world despite the fact that they were also under the colonial rule. A turning point in the Naga way of life, came with the advent of Christianity in Nagaland.

Christianity brought hope, love, and meaning into their lives. They also brought the beneficial notions of hygiene, education, medicine and especially helped in the removal of superstition within a short period of time. Even in more advanced places such changes would normally take a much longer time. But the missionaries in their zeal to reform declared all accompanying feasting, drinking and dancing to be evil as well. Thus the entire culture of the Nagas with its rich tradition of song and dances died down. With this the colour and gaiety departed from Naga life.

The Nagas became aware of the changes taking place. They realised that their interest and outlook should go beyond the limits of the village. The impact of the World War I and II later on gave rise to the spirit of nationalism.

Emergence of Naga Politics and Birth of the Insurgency Movement

The first organisation ever to be formed in Nagaland was the 'Naga Club' which was founded in 1918, in Kohima and Mokokchung. The leaders of the Naga Club could see that India would eventually gain independence from British rule so they were concerned about what would happen to the Naga Hills politically. In 1929 when the Simon Commission visited Kohima, they represented that Naga Hills should be excluded from the proposed reforms and kept under direct administration to save them from being overwhelmed by the plain people.

Similarly, the Naga National Council was formed in 1946, with a view to improve the political and economic conditions of the Nagas. But with the achievement of India's independence in 1947, the Nagas found themselves under the control of a national government which they had no part in creating and with which they had no ethnic or historic affinity.¹

"The Nagas contention is that they are not Indians and that Nagaland is not part of India, and that since the British were the only people, who conquered them, they

1. Ramasubban, Radhika, Eastern Anthropologist, Vol.31, No.4, 1978.

should have been allowed to revert to their earliest independent status when the British left India. They see themselves not only ethnically different from the mass of the Indian people, but more important, as having experienced a totally different history which provides no commonalty with the rest of India and therefore renders their inclusion into the Indian Union, an artificial and forced one".² As a result of this the 'Nine Point Agreement' was reached between the Indian Government and the NNC in June 1947. But later on a controversy arose over the 'Ninth Point' in the agreement between the Indian Government and the extremist group of the NNC.

With the formulation of the sixth schedule in the Indian Constitution, provisions were made to safeguard the interest of the Hill areas of Assam. Nagaland was given Regional and District Council. However this was rejected by the Naga leaders and they boycotted the elections of the District Council of the Naga Hills district and the general election of 1952.

The extremist started moving underground in the early 1950s and formed the Naga Federal Government in 1956. As hostile activities increased an appeal for peace was made by the moderate and church leaders. The Naga People's

2. Ibid.

Convention thus held three meetings, which finally led to the formation of the State of Nagaland in 1963. The hostile Nagas then turned against the state government. It was during this time that the Peace Mission was formed which brought about a cease fire on September 6, 1964. But the political problem remained unresolved.

Government Making and Political Instability in the State

Political parties in Nagaland are more or less based on the issues of nationalism or regionalism. Many governments came to power as a result of favouring regionalism to nationalism. The UDF, branded as a party with regional interests, was favoured by both the underground and overground Nagas from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s. The success of the party was not much due to its programmes and ideologies but mainly due to its regional orientation. The Congress (I) had to trace its genesis to the erstwhile NNO stalwarts so far as Nagaland is concerned. The NNO had its taste of power right from the time when Nagaland was granted statehood in 1963. It survived till 1974 and got itself merged with the Congress (I) after the Shillong Accord. Since 1982 the Congress (I) party has been enjoying more luck than its counter part, the Naga Peoples Council (NPC).

It has been found that certain factors (e.g. defection, insurgency, leadership issue etc.) are affecting the success

as well as the failures of political parties in government making. Such factors eventually affect political stability in the state. The decline of the NNO party since the early 1970s was the result of ushering in of underground elements in the electoral politics of the state.

Leadership Issue

Leadership issue as a factor affects the political development and political stability in Nagaland. It is found, in modern times, that the problem of leadership and its related issues have been one of the new dimensions of the political system much due to the structural and functional changes. The traditional leadership in India has undergone changes under the impact of modernising processes in the post-independence years, and subsequently new patterns of leadership have emerged on the political scene. The modern leadership suggests the need for special skills, personality, resources and knowledge of dynamics of leadership on the part of the leader.

The post Gandhian era saw the proliferation of politicians at different levels and the placing together of the centrifugal and the centripetal forces. In the like manner the political scenerio and the leadership issues in Nagaland has undergone tremendous changes, particularly after the attainment of statehood in 1963. The introduction

of more representative organisations and the changes brought about by the system of vote has practically wrecked the traditional Naga leadership under chiefs and gave way to modern political administration.

Initially A.Z. Phizo was accepted as an outright leader of the Nagas. His popularity was much due to his sharp capability to mobilize the masses. His decline came about with the induction of educated Naga elites into the then Naga politics. Also Phizo's extreme views (to secede a Naga state from India) led to loss of many of his initial supporters. Other Naga political leaders are found to move away from the original Naga politics as propounded by Phizo. Some prominent NNO leaders include Mr. Shilu Ao, Mr. T.N. Angami, Mr. Hokishe Sema and Mr. Jasokie Angami. The advocates of regional politics include the veteran Mr. Vizol Angami, Mr. Kevichusa Angami, Mrs. Rano Shaiza, Mr. Vamuzo and Mr. Shurhozelie Angami. The Congress (I) leadership has been revolving between the two main leaders - Mr. Hokishe Sema and Mr. S.C. Jamir. It was among these leaders that the politics of the state has been swinging around.

However, leadership integrity and sincerity has become rare qualities among the Naga leaders aggravating the overall political situation and damaging the image of the state party system. The present scenerio calls for a

revamping of the political leaders so as to check further degeneration.

Political Instability: The most prominent findings in the present study is the political instability which has characterised the nature of politics in Nagaland. Till date, since Nagaland attained statehood on December 1, 1963, the political instability feature has been prominent amounting from defections, toppling of governments and intra-party feuds. Such instability has been both the cause and effect of frequent coalition governments since the state's first Assembly elections in 1964.

Certain reasons were found to be responsible for the unstable nature of political system in the state.

Inter-Tribe Rivalries: The rivalries between the tribes has caused the fall of many governments and has affected the stability of the political system in the state.

The Shilu Ao ministry which was formed after the first general election in 1964 could not last long due to internal differences and tribal rivalries then particularly between the Angami and the Ao tribesmen. The Angami lobby prevailed over the others and managed to make the late Shri T.N. Angami as the Chief Minister of the state in August 1966 which lasted till 1969.

In 1980 the fall of the 15 day old U.L.P. in Nagaland headed by S.C. Jamir was because he tried to distribute the loaves and fishes to the members mainly belonging to his own Ao Clan. Also the fall of Jamir's ministry in 1986 was the case of showing favouritism to his tribesmen while the interest of other tribes were ignored. Similarly Hokishe Sema's ministry in 1988 could not survive as he was accused of grabbing government land for the benefit of himself and his tribe.

The rivalry factor was felt even in the underground movement. The Angamis, the Aos and the Semas who played the major role in the beginning of Naga insurgency have opted for sedate regional politics. The period following the Bangladesh War saw the underground Sema leadership breaking off from the Angamis and the former were alleged to have stood in the way of A.Z. Phizo's return and taking over the threads of discussion with the Central Union Government. The rivalry between the Angami and the Sema undergrounds brought its ripples among the overgrounds of both the tribes. Thus the inter-tribal rivalries coupled with the insurgency factor and internal dissensions among party members saw the end of the heydays of the NNO Party in the State.

Defection: It has also been found that defections had contributed immensely to the political instability in the

state. In most cases defections in Nagaland took place not on any ideological differences but due to the personal or factional rivalry and for personal gains by individual members. Defections has been quite common in the state after 1974 and became a major threat to political stability in the state since 1980.

Central Interference: Politics in Nagaland has oscillated between the mainstream and regional poles. But what is remarkable is the fact that whether it is the Congress or the regional party that is ruling in Nagaland, the leadership tends to depend entirely on New Delhi's generosity to solve even the smallest of problems.

In 1977, the UDF in power could not last long when the Janata Party at the Centre showed a harsher attitude than the Congress. But with the coming back of the Congress to power at the Centre, the Congress High Command favoured the U.L.P. of Mr. S.C. Jamir which influenced the ushering in of the Congress (I) era in Nagaland politics. Again it was at the dictates of the party High Command that Mr. Jamir stepped down in 1986 to give way to Mr. Hokishe Sema. In the like manner central dependency or central dictatorship had affected the state politics of Nagaland quite often.

Regionalism: Regionalism along with the continuing problem of insurgency plays an important role in Naga

politics. It has been found that political parties tried to extol issues relating to regional interests, such as issues like secession from the mainstream. This along with insurgency has been a major cause of instability.

Similarity of Programmes: Another cause of instability has been the similarity of programmes among various parties. All parties more or less promise clean administration, and to solve the Naga political problems. Such circumstances confused the electorate and facilitates floor crossing. It made personality more important than principles. Besides the similarity in programmes, the parties sometimes do not live up to their promises.

Thus we can say, that the image reflected by the present political scene of the state, in all its aspects, is not very encouraging. To bring about a new scene in the political set up is the top most priority. However, the task of redressing the on going political scene is an enormous one and efforts are essential to create a model political system.

To start with, the political arena of the state is packed with undeserving and corrupted but powerful and influential men. In spite of the formidable front they present, the society, as a whole, must confront them if we are to have better leaders.

Some Suggestions

Political instability is caused by the political development and situations of the concerned time. Also the behaviour of individual members of political parties often bring about instability to the political arena. Political instability has been a very prominent feature which has characterised the nature of politics in Nagaland. Certain reasons were found to be responsible for the unstable nature of political system in the state, such as that of inter-tribal rivalries, defections, central interference etc. Some remedial measures for solving this political malady is given below.

Solution to the Naga Political Problem: The Naga political problem has been one of the major factors contributing to the political movement which more often than not affects the stability of the political system in Nagaland. It is a fact that many leaders taking advantage of this factor often tried to achieve even their selfish goals. Several governments came to power and several government were brought down as a result of this factor. The outcome of such political activities is often seen in the chaos and unstable political scene. So bringing about a permanent solution to the Naga political problem, involving all factions of the underground people, will do much good to bring about a more stable political system in the state.

Checking of Defections: The concept of 'defection' in the political arena can be regarded as one of the most important factors which brings about political instability. Political defections are often induced by force or by temptation of money or office. Political defection has become a regular phenomena in Nagaland. It has brought down several ministries (e.g. the Vizol Ministry of 1977, the Jamir Ministry of 1980 etc.) and created political instability all the while. So if defections can be carefully checked then it can do a lot of good to improve the political stability in the state.

Some suggestions to safeguard against unprincipled defections are:

- (i) evolving a code of conduct by the political parties themselves and strict adherence to the codes.
- (ii) right choice of candidates with integrity, sincerity and loyalty to party principles so as not to get tempted by immediate personal gains.
- (iii) mobilisation of public opinion to build popular pressure against defectors.
- (iv) educating the leaders as well as the masses so as to understand clearly one's duties and rights.

- (v) limiting the size of ministries and disqualifying the defectors for a certain period of time as these are considered to constitute some of the more effective disincentives to the frequent defection and counter defections.
- (vi) fixed ministerial term so as to check the monopolising trend by a few politicians leaving the many frustrated and without a remedy unless they indulge in defection and topple the ministry

Improve Relations between the Tribes: It is a must on the part of all the Naga tribes to develop and maintain better and cordial relations among them. In the past the inter-rivalries between the tribes has caused the fall of many governments, and has affected the stability of the political system in the state. Shilu Ao was the first victim of the Ao-Angami rivalry. The repercussion of inter-tribal rivalries are often grave adding more to the political instability. So it will be to the best interest of all the tribesmen of Nagaland to build up better relations and rapports.

Checking of Central Interference: Often the central authority of the Union Government adds more confusion to the state's unstable political character. The appointment or removal of leaders by the central authority often tend to

create a sense of insecurity in the minds of the former making them disloyal to the party. Hence this sense of central dependency should be removed.

Peoples Participation: So far politics in Nagaland has been the domain of the elites. The commoners including a number of educated people are not much conscious politically. A higher level^{of} people's participation and involvement in the political processes will provide effective leadership to a certain extent and contribute to the stabilisation of the political system. This can be done by educating and building up strong public opinion through maintaining pressure groups and other press medias and communications.

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