THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AGREEMENT : ITS IMPLICATIONS

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that this Dissertation entitled "The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement : Its Implications" submitted by Miss Sathyavathi. G. in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for the award of any other degree of this or any other university. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend this dissertation to be placed before the Examiners for evaluation.

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THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AGREEMENT : ITS IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"I have become Death, Destroyer of the World"

- Robert Oppenheimer witnessing the first Atomic test at Alamogardo, New Mexico, 1945

No other decision in the history of the Atlantic alliance has been so deeply affected by politics as the NATO's 'Dual-Track' decision to deploy Intermediate Range Nuclear forces in Western Europe. In West European countries, where the anti-nuclear movement was particularly strong - Great Britain, West Germany and Netherlands - the question of INF deployment became embroiled in political issues that had little or nothing to do with Military Doctrine. Anti-nuclear sentiment awakened by Pershing IIs and cruise missiles evolved into a huge protest movement, that encompassed a broad range of social issues from ecology to women's rights.

The role of American nuclear weapons in the defence of Western Europe has been a subject of debate almost since the inception of NATO alliance itself. The post-World War II developments, the disintegration of wartime partnership with Soviet Union, and Stalin's post-war moves, which

culminated in cold war, made clear to the Americans that even an organization like the UN could not be a reliable guarantor of world security.

In the wake of these circumstances, the nations of the West on both sides of the Atlantic were drawn together by the need for mutual defence against Soviet expansionism, which resulted in the formation of NATO alliance in 1949. The United States with its clear nuclear monopoly, pledged to provide security to Western Europe under the policy of 'Extended Deterrence'.[1]

Thus the ultimate result of the cold war was the construction of two pillars, namely, NATO and Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization formed in 1955 - a kind of East European rival to NATO.

The strategic impetus behind the nuclearization of NATO forces came from momentary fears of Soviet attack. Following the Korean invasion, Soviet conventional force superiority which could not be matched by the recovering economies of Western Europe and subsequent failure of allies to meet the ambitious Lisbon conventional force goals (1952) which was intended to meet the specified military requirement for a 'Forward Defense of NATO's Central Front'. Thus the US began to deploy its tactical nuclear weapons in mid-50s -

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1 The concept of 'Extended Deterrence' envisaged the extension of the US military umbrella to cover its allies. It was a way of coupling the United States with Western Europe.

basically gravity bombs for fighter bombers, warheads for short-range missiles, nuclear artillery shells and demolition mines. The Soviet response was a long march to nuclear parity, deploying a fleet of about 200 medium range nuclear bombers at Soviet bases within a range of Western Europe. Starting in 1958, the Soviet Union began to deploy SS-4S and SS-5S, single warhead medium-range nuclear typed ballistic missiles targeted at Western Europe.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, due to their range which varies between 500 and 5,000 km, are confined to the European theatre. Again depending on their range they can be short-range, medium and long range. Deployment of these weapons by the Americans is seen by West Europeans as a way of coupling the United States with Western Europe.

The Deployment of 'Thor' and 'Jupiter'[2] Intermediate-range missiles in early 60s on European soil, in the wake of Soviet innovation in technology reassured West Europeans about their security which was however thwarted by the then American President Kennedy who withdrew these missiles as a result of the Cuban missile crisis (1962). Soon the

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2 By 1959, 6 Thors were deployed in the United Kingdom and 45 Jupiters in Italy and Turkey.

administration, to console its allies, proposed the MLF project[3] which had a slow death.

It was only four years later that the Robert McNamara, the energetic US Secretary of Defense, persuaded the reluctant continental allies to accept a new strategy of 'Flexible Response'[4] which represented a compromise between the European and US viewpoints.

During late 70s, modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons seemed inevitable for NATO planners, as a result of emergence of a new element in the East-West balance - Soviet SS20, a mobile IRBM - which had no American counterpart.

Along with SS20 and SALT II proposals, to quote Chancellor Schmidt, "impaired the security of the West".

Since 1973, the United States and its West European allies had been drifting apart due to the following reasons :

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3 MLF or the Multilateral Force Project was an American plan that envisaged deployment of a mixed nationality NATO fleet of 25 surface vessels manned by crew and commanded by officers from a number of member states. The ship would be equipped with the polaries missile and the US would have Veto over the missiles. France rejected the idea because it violated the cherished principles of an independent French deterrent. Britain rejected it too. The plan died a slow painful death.

4 The Flexible Response Strategy, under which NATO is still operating, provides that in the event of overwhelming Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, the US will, among other possible responses, consider initiating use of nuclear weapons.

(1) The natural tendency of the older Great Powers in Europe to reclaim some freedom from the tutelage of the United States;

(2) The 'Factor of uncertainty' about the US after the Vietnam debacle.

Moreover, the policies of the Carter administration, the Neutron Bomb fiasco and a bitter relationship between President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt contributed more to the contention and fear about US decoupling from its allies.

Soviet intentions in Europe have been remarkably consistent to preserve the East European gains while striving for greater influence in Western Europe.

Though the deployment of SS20 missile was justified by the Soviets as one of their routine 'modernization' programme to replace ageing SS4 and SS5s, one can come to the conclusion that the Soviets who began to realize that the fruits of detente would not flourish autonomously and seeing US demands in SALT process, wanted to pressurize the European and the Americans. The precise instrument for intimidation was the SS20.

An assessment of December 1979 Double Track Decision of the NATO Council in the wake of introduction of SS20 missile to the actual deployment of missiles in 1983,

the zero-zero proposal and events leading to the negotiation and signing of the INF Treaty, with special reference to peace movements and their impact on decision-making process is the content of Chapters II and III.

Though the zero-option was seen by the Americans as a logical response to persistent West European pressure, the motive was far behind this. It was a sound decision because it would be difficult to argue that US had not exhausted all remedies in an effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union prior to actual deployment.

Yet the sweeping scope of Soviet moves both in Arms Control generally and specially in INF itself i.e. the willingness on Moscow's part to agree finally to a zero-zero approach though was undoubtedly related elsewhere to the Soviet interest to remove western systems targeted against the Soviet Union itself and to take important step towards a long-held goal of denuclearized Europe. The credit, however, on Soviet thinking goes to General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, who set a precedent for future negotiations, thus discarding the traditional Soviet moves.

Thus the Soviet return to the negotiating table in 1985, followed by Summit meetings, where greater flexibility in Soviet Arms Control methods was seen, can be attributed to Soviet 'new thinking' under the patronage of Gorbachev, who in order to redress the Soviet stagnating economy, brought

sweeping changes in the form of 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika'.

In his Prague speech in April 1987 Gorbachev explicitly acknowledged the existence of "a certain asymmetry in the armed forces of the two sides in Europe due to historical, geographic and other factors" and advocated redressing the imbalance existing in some of the elements, not through a build-up of the trailing party but through the build down by one that has broken away.

While all these aspects are discussed in Chapters II and III in detail, Chapter IV focusses on the terms of the Treaty, its significance and implications for the NATO alliance. Though the Treaty is a move from arms control to disarmament and thus facilitates the START negotiations it has major shortcomings; firstly, it aims to destroy only launchers and not warheads. Secondly, it does not prohibit any other country from developing, deploying and even using these INF systems. Thus, it is restricted to just being a bilateral treaty and has no effect globally. Neither does it manage to draw France and Britain into the process of reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Finally, the Treaty leaves unaffected the short-range nuclear system capabilities that could be launched from or reach targets in the West German territory. While the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had strived, in keeping with

its principle of non-singularity, to avoid becoming the sole locus of deployment of the INF system, it was left in the post-Treaty environment in a peculiarly singular position with respect to short-range systems. The range limitation set forth in the agreement assumed that the Netherlands, the United Kingdom as well as the other INF deployment countries except West Germany would be exempted from their direct involvement in post-INF debate comparable to what would confront the FRG. However, upon FRG would fall by far the greatest part of the burden of deploying short-range nuclear forces on its territory together with the distinction of being the principal point of detonation for Soviet nuclear systems that could be launched against NATO European targets.

The INF Treaty has brought into sharp focus many issues for the West Europeans who feel that their security is being jeopardized. German defence has always been a concern to NATO planners. It was on German soil that NATO and Warsaw pact faced each other.

Thus many approaches came into being in the post-INF era, as far as the security aspect of NATO was concerned. The German Greens believe that withdrawal of the two German states from their respective military alliances, the dissolution of NATO and of the Warsaw pact, the withdrawal of US and Soviet forces to their homelands and a position of obligatory neutrality for all states of Europe would

greatly increase security in Europe while others believe that a tilt towards 'Defensive approach' or non-offensive defense is ideal for Europe.

Though the treaty sets precedent to conclude future nuclear agreements, it has also raised many arms control issues for Europe. In the concluding Chapter V, the alternative security debate for Europe and various concepts are discussed. The move towards conventional Arms reduction which has been quite promising (in the form of Cafe Talks) along with changes taking place in Eastern Europe is discussed. As the future is very uncertain, one can only predict that as the struggle continues in Eastern Europe (basically nationalistic revolution) that a community of Europe can be foreseen, independent of Super Power influence politically and militarily, though the interdependence will continue economically.

While this dissertation was in progress, unforeseen changes took place in Eastern Europe and thus created an element of uncertainty as far as Europe was concerned. German unification was seen as the best alternative which however leaves many issues unsettled. The discussion of these issues were added to the conclusion of this dissertation.

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CHAPTER II

THE INF CONTROVERSY

Introduction to INF Weapon Systems

The fate of nations and civilizations has often been determined by a differential in the technology of warfare. Europe in the period of its expansion from the 15th century through the 19th century carried its power on the vehicle of a technology of warfare.

However, the twentieth century witnessed major innovations in technology and thus the rise of nuclear weapons as symbol of power. The possession of these weapons by the Americans to deter Soviet attack in the wake of the cold war, justified by the Deterrence Doctrine, also envisaged the deployment of these weapons on the European soil under the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence.

Though the US relied on its 'central' or 'strategic' arsenal for this purpose, much more importance was given to theatre nuclear forces due to their range. Theatre nuclear forces, later known as intermediate range nuclear forces whose range varies from 500-5000 km, but less than that of strategic forces, sometimes categorized as short, medium and long-range forces, came into focus in the late 50s, when the US deployed its Thor and Jupiter missiles in Britain, Italy and Turkey.

During the late 70s, the West Europeans were of the opinion that a gap favouring the USSR already existed in the level of conventional forces and feared that another gap had developed higher up at the level of INF and thus having a upperhand on the INF 'rung' in the so-called 'Ladder of Escalation Dominance'.

Doubts about Carter's policy where the focus was on the two extremes of the Deterrence Spectrum, Strategic and Conventional in the shape of ongoing SALT process and long-term defence programme for NATO, President's inaugural address of January 1977 calling for complete nuclear disarmament led many West Germans to fear that the Administration wished to shift NATO strategy away from Nuclear Deterrence to Conventional Deterrence.

American refusal to give information on the cruise missile to the West German and British government and bitter personal relationship between Carter and Chancellor Schmidt, and Carter's attempt to derail DM 12 billion civilian nuclear power deal that the FRG had signed with Brazil in 1975, Carter's Human Rights Policy, Neutron Bomb's Fiasco of 77-78 contributed to growing European fear of 'Decoupling'.

However, NATO planners agreed that the new element SS20 IRBM which had no American counterpart had undercut the credibility of the American strategy of defence to Europe.

Description of SS20

The history of the most controversial SS20 can be traced back to the SALT-II negotiations. The comprehensive proposal issued by the Americans contained the issue of two Soviet rockets namely SS-16 and SS-20 which were to be deployed. SS16 was unique among the new generation of Soviet ICBMs, in that it was propelled by solid fuel and had a proficient junior partner SS20, which could be deployed in the mobile mode at first and second stage could carry MIRV warheads.

In an international crisis there was a possibility of converting IRBM launchers into Mobile ICBMs. To reduce this danger of 'Breakout' was SALT-II's aim. SS20 is fuelled by solid propellant and has a range of 5000 km and yield is said to be about 150 kt and carries three MIRV warheads. The CEP of the SS20 is about 500 meters and said to replace SS4 and SS5 Soviet MRBM. SS20 can be deployed in mobile mode on trucks which are harder to find, hard to hit the targets of retaliation.

It is said that from its bases in the Soviet Union, SS20 can hit targets throughout Asia, Middle East, North Africa and the Far East. The 150 kt yield moderate accuracy of SS20 makes it suitable for striking vertically any target within its range. Along with this fear of SS20, much annoyance was caused to the West European as a result of Neutron Bomb Fiasco.

Neutron Bomb Controversy

Enhanced radiation warheads - better known as Neutron Bombs[1] - are low yield variants of the Hydrogen Bomb. Envisaged as a means of blunting Soviet conventional superiority, the Neutron Bomb's intended production caused a storm in FRG.

Egon Bahr of the SPD described it as a 'Perversion of Human Thought' on account of its ability to kill people. To quote him:

> feeling and conscience rebel against it.... Is mankind turning mad?.... Our scale of values is being turned upside down. The object now is the preservation of a matter; mankind has become a secondary consideration ...the neutron bomb symbolizes the perversion of thinking.... 2

A massive Soviet propaganda campaign helped to fan popular opposition to the bomb. Yet Chancellor Schmidt was able to rally opinion within the governing coalition and SPD into its favour, only to be undercut by Carter's subsequent decision to defer production of the weapon components indefinitely.

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1 Neutron warheads (proposed for Lance missiles) though produce blast, heat and radiation like fission warhead, the effect is in the form of an instaneous burst of nuclear radiation-neutron. It is this emphasis radiation which had aroused most of the emotional resistence of the West Europeans. It has been described as a weapon that primarily destroys human beings rather than inert physical objects. It is called ERW because of its military anti-personnel effect.

2 Gregory Flynn, ed., The Internal Fabric of Western Security (London, 1981), pp. 84-87.

The ultimate defeat of the Neutron Bomb and Schmidt's annoyance over-repeated US assertions that strategic forces gave adequate coverage of targets in the USSR made him go public with his concern in his Alastair Buchan memorial lecture in London on 28 October 1977.

To quote Schmidt: "SALT neutralizes strategic nuclear capabilities..., we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that (SALT) does not neglect the components of NATO's Deterrent Strategy..., we must maintain the balance of the full range of Deterrence Strategy."[3] Despite the subsequent impression given, Schmidt did not in that speech call for deployment of any weapon. Rather, he concentrated on describing the implementation of strategic parity implying that this necessitated creation of 'Euro-Strategic Balance'. The political solution suggested late in 1978 was to deploy some cruise and pII missiles. At the first meeting of NATO's High Level group, West German and British officials urged support for an 'evolutionary upward adjustment' in Long range intermediate range nuclear forces.

Description of Cruise and Pershing Missile

Cruise Missile: Cruise missile are not rockets; they are in fact, old weapons dating back in principle to the German

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3 "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture", 28 October 1977, Survival, January-July 1978, pp. 3-4.

V-1 or 'Buzz Bombs' of World War II. This missile is a small relatively inexpensive, jet-powered, slow, low flying drone. Soon after the war the USA and the USSR took up the cruise missile,[4] and produced a variety of types - surface-to-surface, surface-to-air and air-to-surface for both short-range tactical and long-range strategic purposes.

More recently, a number of technological advances have encouraged cruise missile development. A low flying drone can shreak under enemy's radar. It can also deliver a thermonuclear warhead with almost pinpoint accuracy. It can be launched from air, land or sea. ALCMs, however, are more vulnerable to interception. SLCMs and GLCMs can be scattered. GLCMs, since they are small and mobile, can be dispersed to evade enemy targets. SLCMs can be fired from submarines which are hard for the other side to track.

Due to the availability of technology, very small, but accurate missile guidance systems are developed. For example, the McDonnell Douglas Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) system, which weighs only 37 kg, can guide a cruise missile to its target with a CEP of 40 meters or less.[5] TERCOM used a computer carried by the cruise missile wheel is scanned with a radar altimeter, with a pre-programmed flight

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4 Frank Barnaby, Futurewar ; Armed Conflict in the Next Decades (London, 1984), pp. 56-71.

5 Ibid., p. 59.





58

This is how terrain contour matching, usually abbreviated to TERCOM, works. Above, on nearing the end of its flight path near enemy territory, the cruise missile sinks to as low as 20 meters over sea, 50 meters over hills and 100 meters over mountains. Below, the missile computer compares the radio-grid information with which it has been programmed with the readings of the on-board altimeter. If there are differences, it can redirect itself to the planned trajectory, with a terminal accuracy or CEP of 40 meters or less.
(Source: Science Digest, Feb. 1977.)

path, which is fed into the missile's computer before its launch. Deviations from the planned flight are corrected automatically from the very accurate maps that have become available using satellite mapping techniques, the position of targets and contours of flight paths can be obtained with unprecedented accuracy. Targets could not be located accurately enough from earlier maps to make effective use of this sort of missile-guidance system - even if it had existed. (Refer Figure Nos. 1 and 2).

The most important characteristic of these missiles is that the ratio of the payload (the bomb) to the physical weight of missiles themselves is relatively very high - typically about 15% compared with a fraction of 1 per cent for a typical ballistic missiles.

Normally a cruise missile flies at subsonic speed at very low altitudes, a couple of hundred meters above rough terrain and a few tons of meters up if the ground below is smooth.

The missile also has a very small radar cross-section which means that it is difficult to detect and destroy. By the time radars have spotted the missile, plotted its trajectory and instructed a surface-to-air missile to intercept it, a cruise missile has probably passed out of range. The effective detection and destruction of cruise missiles, particularly if launched in large numbers, involves

look-down radars operating with long-range interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. Apart from their high accuracy and relative invulnerability, another factor in the popularity of cruise missile is that they are quite cheap.

Tomahawk Cruise Missle: Tomahawk Cruise Missile can be air sea, or ground-launched with ranges either tactical (ground 560 km) or strategic (2,500 km). Tomahawk GLCMS are more accurate, reliable and mobile. Four Tomahawks could be carried in a cannister called an armoured box launcher on a semi-trailer towed by truck or tractor. The whole machine could remeble camouflaged around the countryside and forests or it could be loaded aboard a military transport plane and moved rapidly to some other part of the country or continent.

Pershing I (PI) and Pershing II (PII)

Pershing I: Pershing I is a medium range missile with a range of 840 kms and 108 launchers were deployed in 1962.

Pershing II: Pershing II is a considerable improvement on Pershing I. In addition to more than twice the range, it would have a 'terminally guided' re-entry vehicle.

Pershing II was to require less support equipment and personnel than Pershing I and could be readied for firing quickly. Pershing II was billed as the ultimate

'theatre' weapon, creating and bolstering regional deterrence, but not posing a strategic threat to the USSR. It also had the cosmetic advantage of being distinguished in designation from PI only by a Roman numeral.

After the first high level group meetings, Carter at the Four Power Summit in Gudeloupe in 1979 was able to tell Schmidt that the US supported the new long range intermediate range nuclear force deployments. Gudeloupe proved to be the start of a year of intrusive intra-alliance discussion. In terms of the weapon options available i.e. sea-based or land-based, it was decided to opt for the most controversial and visible types of systems - Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II (PIIs).

In political military terms, the case for these systems lay in the fact that land-based intermediate range weapons have a greater deterrent value because they are visibly deployed in the country to whose protection deterrence should contribute. By deploying these weapons in Western Europe, the US could demonstrate the coupling of its security with that of Europe.

Evolution of Double-Track Decision

The imperative to have to prepare to deploy and at the same time to negotiate was, however, spelled out by then the French President Valery Giscard d'Estang at an informal meeting at Gundeloupe.

While the US rejected the motion advanced by the Norwegian government that the LRINF deployment be reviewed after two years in the light of arms control progress, Schimdt, however, at the Berlin Convention explained that it would be theoretically possible for Arms Control achievements to obviate the necessity for deployment. As a result of Schmidt's growing problem within the SPD, the US acceded to his request and thus the pattern was set for NATO's Dual track decisions,[6] and NATO settling for deploying 462 GLCMs and 109 PIIs i.e. in total 572 missiles.

The idea of joining deployment with Arms Control initiative was seen as a way of recoupling the US with Western Europe in both diplomacy and detente. The final Integrated Decision Document, containing HLG and SCG reports together emerged publicly on 12 December 1979 at Brussels in the form of a communique - Dual Track-Decision.[7]

The alliance committed itself to proceed with the New American missiles along one track while the US pursued reduction in Soviet missiles along the other. It was further stated that the Arms control track should not be expected to overtake the deployment track entirely.

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6 Special Report, INF, Brassey's 1989, p. 11.

7 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits : The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 38.

The most important military reason for the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, according to Voigt[8] was to reestablish the capacity for controlled nuclear escalation.

According to Lawrence Freedman[9] the main impetus to deploy new US missiles came from Europe rather than from the US. Carter's withdrawal of the Neutron Bomb led him to press hard with INF in an effort to demonstrate that NATO in general and the US in particular could still take important nuclear decisions.

To quote Z. Brzeznski, the then Defense Secretary,

> We felt we were responding to the European desire in shaping, but were also very conscious of the fact that the Europeans were ambivalent. As a result one track of NATO decision was designed to satisfy those Europeans who felt that their insecurity ought to be reduced by some offsetting deployment, giving the West a range to match the Soviets...other track was designed to satisfy those European what felt that it was important to match any security effort by the Nuclear Arms Control Initiative. 10

The DTD in the first instance represented a consensus at the intergovernmental level. The debate that unfolded thereafter took place within member countries

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8 Andrew J. Pierre, ed., Nuclear Weapons in Europe (New York, 1984), p. 98.

9 Lawrence Freedman, "The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence", Adelphi Papers 236 (London, IISS), vol. 23, spring 1989, pp. 18-31.

10 Talbott, n. 7, p. 31.

between domestic constituents and their governments rather than at the official inter-governmental level between members. How DTD was actually to be implemented depended on the ability of member states to minimize the effects of domestic opposition.

To an extent, the NATO European allies of the US claimed and received a participatory role in the formulation of policy leading to the DTD of December 1979. NATO-European governments played a direct part in alliance decision-making on the INF issue at a time where the people in the respective deployment countries themselves were taking an unprecedented interest in security issue.

Although there was trans-Atlantic friction during Carter's final year in office, for example, over Afghanistan and Poland, the difference between European and American emphasis on the DTD became more apparent after the election of President Reagan. All West European governments urged the new administration to adopt greater flexibility in negotiating tactics. Thus Schmidt was instrumental in ensuring that the US came out in favouring zero-zero solution in November 1981.

Zero Option

When the party leaders of NATO countries had endorsed Double track decision, later they found that their policy being repudiated by a leadership representing a

decided shift to the left.

When the Reagan Administration was wrestling for various options in Washington, it was Schmidt's concept of the zero solution which came into sharp focus.[11] The idea of zero solution was that the removal of all the offending weapons on the Soviet side would make the American deployment unnecessary.

After a long bureaucratic struggle between the Department of State and Defense and the Pentagon, the Chief INF negotiator Paul Nitze endorsed 'zero only' as against 'zero plus' solution which was unveiled by Reagan at the National Club on 18 November 1981.

According to Reagan, "the US said that it is prepared to cancel its deployment of PIIs and GLCMs if the Soviet will dismantle their SS20s, SS4s and SS5.[12] Further, as stated by Richard Perle, "many Europeans were calling for zero solution, so why not give it to them. Then when it failed, they would be party to the failure, just as they had been party to what public saw as the folly of the December 1979 decision".[13] The zero-zero option for the US represented a logical response to persistent pressure from NATO-European allies and especially from the mounting opposition to US

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11 Ibid., p. 56.

12 Ibid., p. 79.

13 Ibid., p. 57.

arms control policy that was increasingly evident in deployment countries, especially the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Hence the option was seen to fulfill the needs of the alliance.

Moreover, the aged Soviet leadership then headed by Leonid Brezhnev, could be expected to reject such an approach to arms control. For Moscow had a long history of unwillingness to dismantle weapon systems under circumstances in which its opponent had not yet deployed or in which it appeared that such action could be delayed or could be prevented altogether. It was a sound solution because it would be difficult to argue that the US had not exhausted all remedies in an effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union prior to actual deployment. Moreover, if the prospect that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept zero-zero was remote, then this approach would allow the US in fact to reconcile the need for a consensus based on deployment decision with whatever nuclear modernization needs could be satisfied by the installation of the INF system. As long as the Soviet Union continued to reject zero-zero solution, Moscow would furnish the US with necessary bases for moving toward INF deployment.

Only a week after Reagan's announcement of the zero option, Brezhnev went public with the Soviet proposal for a bilateral freeze on INF in Europe along with unilateral

reduction of a certain portion of Soviet INF in European USSR, west of the Urals. He presented his own zero option, the ultimate aim being the elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe.

However, the change from the Double Track Decision to the acceptance of zero-zero solution was seen as being quite paradoxical in the context of Western Europe. The growing anti-nuclear protest movement under the aegis of which 350,000 people signed the Krefeld Appeals during Reagan's visit to Bonn in 1982 had tremendous impact on the decision-making process of the NATO countries.

Rise of Peace Movements

Humankind for centuries has dwelled upon the question of war, peace and order and in this quest has witnessed rise of many movements and organizations. The peace movement is not a new phenomenon as far as Europe is concerned. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto (refer Appendix) issued in 1955 was a major landmark.

Viewing the protest movement over the last 20 years, Taylor and Pritchard found striking parallels between the activities of the movement during 1958-65 and the 1983 movement. The use of mass protest movement was due to the linking of three issues that had previously only been considered separately. The peace campaign which was activated by the decision of 12 December 1979, evolved into

a huge protest movement that encompassed a beard range of social issues from ecology to women's rights. The irony was that while the government or member countries unequivocally supported the DTD/that the allies were not consulted properly before such an informal decision was taken. /the public felt Pressure from opposition parties of member countries and fear of war on European soil by the public, made these governments vulnerable. However the DTD brought into light deepening differences of opinion within the European allies. At the simplest level, the European peace movements have expressed a rising consciousness among the West Europeans about Super Power domination. The anti-nuclear protest movement began in Western Europe during the period of 1977-78 and came into its own with a public victory in Netherlands over the Neutraon-Bomb issue. The Interchurch Peace Council of Netherlands was amazed to find itself able to collect more than a million signatures--almost 10 per cent Dutch population.

These movements were led largely by ideologically committed militant self-righteous cadres. They were supported by Church groups, Women's groups, Labour organizations, Environmentalists, Peace societies, Political parties, Scientific groups, Business people, University professors, Journalists, Writers, Physicians, Students, Civil servants

and other respectable elements from a wide spectrum in terms of their socio-economic background.

Causes and Impact of Peace Movements

One can broadly identify the causes for these protest movements as - fear of expanding Soviet military power base, rise of a particular brand of nationalism, revival of socialist pacifism, sense of powerlessness due to the dominance of super powers, rising tide against military defence and the economic problems of West European countries.

The increasing costs of modernization of sophisticated technology have undoubtedly placed a burden upon Western economies. Military expenditures no doubt contribute to employment, increase GNP and promote technological growth. But they also contribute to inflation and deficits. In all West European economies, these factors have led to a sharp debate over the issue of Guns vs Butter.[14]

The ideological milieu from which these anti-nuclear and anti-American sentiments spring is deeply rooted in Western philosophical tradition. The German historian Karl Dietrich-Brah perceives the peace movement as a classic case of acculturation - a difficult cultural adaptation to technological change. These movements, according to E.P.

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14 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Fatzgraff, Jr., ed., INF Controversy : Lessons for NATO Modernization and Transatlantic Relations, Special Report (Washington, D.C.: Pergaman Brassey's, 1989),

Thompson, were "neither pro-Soviet nor manipulated by the world peace council". But the Reagan administration branded these movements as pro-Soviet, sponsored by the World Peace Council.

According to some experts, these movements, however vocal and well-orchestrated, failed due to their inability to stop the deployment of Pershings and Ground launched cruise missiles on the European soil. As far as the potential of European peace movements for influencing NATO's policies as well as the future of the alliance is concerned, there can be no uniform assessment since their strength varied from country to country. If the European protest movement can be characterized as socio-psychological in its basic dimension, its manifestation in West European countries must be assessed with reference to each nation's attitude, values and historical conditions.

For instance, in the Netherlands, where neutrality has been an acknowledged tradition, anti-nuclear activists focussed their attention on nuclear issues, believing that such weapons represented the ultimate form of immorality. What the Dutch sought was the denuclearization of Holland and the withdrawal of Netherlands from all nuclear tasks of NATO.

The movement in Iceland was older than most of the new generation of European peace movements. There has been a movement against NATO bases ever since NATO bullied Iceland

into granting these during the Korean War. What gives a new urgency to the Icelandic campaign during the 1980s was the very success of these movements. For, if Cruise and Pershing IIs were refused on European territory then it was possible that more and more missiles would be thrown into the sea..

The movement in Italy developed as the decision was taken to deploy Cruise missiles on the Sicilian coast. In early 1980s, Cosimo, where the base was sited, became the controversial issue in Italian politics.

The essential component of these new social movements was their anti-modernistic tendency. They rejected the traditional progress and growth-oriented conception of politics and wanted to replace it with an alternative potential concept linked to human needs. Two features distinguished the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany: (i) It was the peace movement of a divided country and (ii) it had very close connection with the past in which the mobilisation of the German state lend to the massacres of World War II.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the INF issues became embroiled in domestic political squabbles over what constituted a proper foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. All the political parties had as 'peace policies' in their agenda. Green party, for instance, developed a 3-year plan for resisting the deployment and supported the 'Krefeld Appeal' which declared the prevention of NATO's

nuclear rearmament as the central concern of the peace movement. The conflict within the party became severe when the Green party members questioned the entire relationship between the East and the West bloc and revived the Rapacki plan for a nuclear free zone in Europe stretching from Poland to Portugal.

In Great Britain, along with the defeat of the Labour Party in 1979 elections, came the formation of unilateral disarmament groups-notably the CND groups. At their meeting in Brighton, the party voted to make an 'unambiguous commitment to unilateral disarmament', and to declare total rejection of deployment of Cruise missiles in Britain, though the party had supported the DTD when in power. The CND upsurge of early 1980s affected many who were not labour activists. The CND membership grew rapidly from 3,000 to 9,000 members and at the end of 1980 to 20,000. In November 1985, it claimed to have 1,00,000 members. Though their anti-American posture and 'No Cruise, No SS20' slogan had attracted many, yet the post-Falkland environment made it very difficult for any one to advocate reduction in armaments. The concerns of CND being purely nationalistic, a transnational campaign was thus organized by E.P. Thompson in the form of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END). The END group blamed both the blocs for the Cold War, saw the removal of Cruise missiles as the first step in the breaking down of the artificial barrier between East and West.

Though these movements failed to prevent INF deployment, they demonstrated a remarkable organisational and political capability which influenced the nuclear decision process.

Achievements of the Protest Movements

The first and the greatest achievement of these movements was that they have raised public awareness of nuclear issues across international boundaries, ideologies, cultures and creeds. Thus the CND symbol became recognizable in the Red Square, Moscow, as well as in the Time Square in New York. These movements via the mass media precipitated a fundamental political debate. Previously, nuclear weapons were matters to be discussed by experts, but today governments can no longer claim immunity from public debate on defence issues.

The peace movements were able to activate the very best in humanitarian and liberal thought which united people across political and social divisions. They also led to a prolonged spate of mass protests which took democracy to the streets, bypassing the usual political structures. They led to a whole new style of politics which sought to involve the individual in a collective way. They took Gandhian ideas of 'passive disobedience' and adapted them to Western culture.

The most important achievement has been the rise of Women's movement. The courage of women protesting at

Greenham Common in Britain airbase has been commented all over the world.

Thus these peace movements were instrumental and had profound impact on the political process, including public opinion and governmental decision-making process to a certain extent and thus contributed to speed up the negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear forces even though they failed to stop the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in 1983.

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CHAPTER III

NEGOTIATING THE INF TREATY

INF Negotiations : 1981-1983

Though it was believed that negotiation would take place in the framework of SALT III, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only left SALT II unratified but also undermined the hopes for SALT III. Yet Chancellor Schmidt's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1980 resulted in obtaining arrangements to conduct separate US-Soviet talks on INF.

Preliminary exchanges began in 1980 between the US and the USSR in the last months of the Carter Administration. The US presented a basic criterion for an INF agreement drawn from the principles which had been approved by NATO in connection with its 1979 decision. This encounter, however, raised many issues, which are as follows:

I. Which Soviet and US Systems should be Included? From the outset, US position was to limit the negotiations to land-based INF systems of both sides and to postpone the consideration of aircraft and sea-based missiles due to the different types deployed.

While the Soviets wanted to include aircrafts, and also all US fighter bombers, not only of INF range F-IIIs

but also short-range F-4s, carrier-based A-6s and A-7s, the Soviet side included only INF bombers-Badger, Blinder and omitted fighter bombers of short range. While US data included all short range Soviet fighter-bombers and its own F-IIIs and F-4s, in its missile count, the US included not only Soviet SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s, but also SS-12s and SS-22s.

II. Geographic Coverage: Due to SS-20s mobility, the United States wanted to include INF missiles in the whole of the Soviet Union, Europe and Asia, including Soviet nuclear weapons directed at Japan and China in the talks, while the Soviets wanted to include only these systems deployed in Europe west of Urals.

III. Third Country Forces: The Soviet Union insisted on including British and French nuclear forces. Soviets negotiators insisted on 'equal security'. For the USSR this meant equality between total Soviet INF and total number of INF weapons of all countries that could be used against the Soviet Union in Europe. American negotiators refused to codify it and insisted that Britain and France were sovereign countries. Moreover French weapons were not assigned to NATO and the real purpose of British forces was to deter Soviet attack on Britain itself.

IV. Verification: The US stressed the need for full verification, given the mobility and reload capability of SS-20s,

while the Soviets were for National Technical Means and felt it was rather premature to deal with verification unless an agreement was reached.

When President Reagan assumed office in January 1981, NATO governments pressurized the new administration to resume INF negotiations. Talks were resumed at the end of November 1981, where Reagan originally proposed the 'zero option' as being the US position on the issue. Though NATO had only endorsed the 'zero option' with misgivings it was foreseen that NATO would have to relinquish its decision to deploy new US INF missiles if the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate all its existing INF missiles (SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s) wherever stationed, in both European and Asian regions. In its draft treaty at Geneva 1982, the US proposed, in addition, a freeze on the short-range Soviet SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles and aircrafts.

In his reaction to Reagan's option, General Secretary Brezhnev went public with the Soviet proposal for a "bilateral freeze on INF missiles in Europe". He offered a unilateral reduction of a 'certain portion' of Soviet INF in European USSR, West of the Urals and presented his own zero option, the ultimate aim being the elimination of all nuclear weapons only from Europe. Further, at Geneva, the Soviets proposed in

their draft treaty a staged reduction of INF including some aircrafts of both countries, to 600 delivery systems on each side in the first phase, and 300 in the second phase. In May 1982, they publicly proclaimed a freeze on Soviet INF levels reaching Western Europe.

Taken together, the US and Soviet positions excluded the most logical potential compromises on the INF issue. Part of US ambiguity was due to the bureaucratic struggle within the Administration. Even while formulating the 'zero solution', the point of contention between Richard Perle and Richard Burt was, should it be 'zero only' or 'zero plus' option. While Perle was the co-Chairman alongwith Burt of the interagency group charged with preparing for INF talks, Burt was from the State Department. As far as the scope of the zero proposal was concerned, the Administration was again divided on what to count on the Soviet side. While the State Department endorsed a narrower view and hence included SS-20 alone, the Defense Department wanted to include other missiles too. In a series of informal discussions in June and July 1982, American INF negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart Yuli Kvitsinsky worked out what became known as the "walk in the woods" compromise.[2]

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2 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits : The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 117.

The compromise would have permitted the US to deploy 75 Cruise missile launchers, each with four single warhead missiles, while the Soviets would reduce their INF forces deployed in sites capable of reaching Europe to 75 SS-20s with 3 warheads each. While Soviet INF forces in Asia would be frozen, the US would not deploy any Pershing IIs. No account of French or British forces was taken in this interim agreement. However, this package generated a reaction in Washington on the key issue of cancellation of Pershing IIs.

Reagan was negative and said: "US would be relying on slow flyers" to meet the challenge of Soviet 'fast flyers'. He asked, "was it equitable...was it militarily prudent to counter fast flyers with slow flyers (Cruise missiles)? I am puzzled about Chief's view and concerned about the potential precedental impact on 'START'."[3]

While Nitze felt that as Pershing II was a ballistic missile much feared by Soviets, it was the principal source of leverage for the US in the negotiations. However, his 'package deal' was unacceptable to the administration. The 'walk in the woods' episode remained as mysterious as it was controversial. The principal mystery concerns what had actually happened on the Soviet side which hypothetically endorsed the package deal.

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3 Ibid., p. 158.

In the period remaining before the collapse of INF talks in November 1983 (the deadline for deployment), the Soviets made one concession after another in an effort to block any US deployment of INF missiles. The governments of European NATO countries--where the public under the impact of Soviet criticism had come to consider the original US zero-option, position as inequitable and non-negotiable--now pressurized the Reagan administration to adopt a less extreme negotiating position.

In March 1983, Reagan publicly offered the Soviets a second possible outcome in addition to the zero option. Under the new proposal the US would limit its Pershing and GLCM deployments in Europe to a specific number of warheads (between 50 and 450), provided that the Soviet Union reduced the total INF warheads on a global basis to the same level. However, the British and French forces were excluded in this interim solution.

While Brezhnev's death had no impact on negotiations, in May 1983, General Secretary Andropov publicly announced Soviet willingness to limit Soviet INF warheads in Europe to the level of British and French warheads. No mention was made about destroying withdrawn Soviet missiles and missiles deployed in Asia. The British and French governments were quick to discuss Andropov's offer. As NATO's 1983 deadline for beginning deployment of US INF missiles moved, the Soviets appeared to offer still more concessions to prevent this

outcome. In October 1983, Andropov offered to freeze Soviet INF in Asia and to reduce INF forces in Europe to about 140 SS-20 launchers each with 3 warheads.

However, the Soviet act of shooting down a Korean Airliner which had strayed into Soviet air space, had a negative impact globally about Soviet intentions.

In Geneva, Soviet negotiator Kvitsinsky offered to go down to about 120 SS-20s in Europe in return for zero deployment. The British and French forces were included in the US-Soviet talks on START. Given this, the Soviets had shown considerable flexibility. An agreement on this basis meant 50 per cent cut in Soviet INF warheads arrived at Europe from their level when the INF talks began in 1980.

Entering their final stage, INF talks had become largely a matter of which bloc would make the last offer before the negotiations collapsed and thus to be in a better position to blame the other for collapse and this was followed by unprecedented acrimony between Nitze and Kvitsinsky. The last day of negotiation was 23 November 1983. The next day Bundestag confirmed the Pershing-II deployment and the same day the first of nine PIIs reached a US unit in the southern FRG. Soviet negotiators walked out from INF, START and MBFR talks. "Everything is finished", said Kvitsinsky bitterly.

Reasons for the Breakdown

According to Jonathan Dean, most US officials were unwilling to accept any outcome that did not entail some US INF deployment. The Soviet Union rejected even a minimal US deployment. When talks broke down the issue ceased to be a question of East-West balance and the question was raised whether NATO governments, especially the FRG and UK, had sufficient strength to carry out deployment despite public protests.

In response to the beginning of NATO deployment, the Soviet Union announced counter measures, which included deployment of SS-12 missiles forward from the USSR into GDR and Czechoslovakia and for the West European countries this meant unnecessarily an increased deployment. According to Dean "everyone lost from the events of late 1983" and NATO lost consensus on defence issues.

The walk out from arms control talks was disastrous for the Soviet Union. The public could not understand why the Soviets, the most consistent proponents of arms control and disarmament were sulking while the conservative President of the United States similingly proclaimed his willingness to negotiate further. At this stage, though many believe that it was Reagan's Star Wary programme that brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table in 1985, it was however the negative consequences for the Soviets for their stand on 1983 withdrawal from the negotiations. And the deployment itself

began to change Soviet perceptions dramatically which made them come back to the negotiating table.

INF Negotiations : 1984-85

The year 1984 is remembered for the complete collapse of US-Soviet arms control dialogue, while the year 1985 is likely to go down as the year in which the bilateral dialogue was revived and each side introduced new proposals in virtually every arms control negotiation. However, the issue that threatened most to divide the alliance in 1985 was the Strategic Defence Initiative.

The unexpected 'Star War' speech by President Reagan in March 1983 set a central new element in East-West relations, following the INF deployment struggle. There had been no alliance consultation or even notification before the Star Wars initiative, though the speech included explicit reference to the protection of Europe. Reagan's speech was initially interpreted by the European NATO allies who feared 'decoupling', as a purely tactical move--primarily aimed at disarming the anti-nuclear rhetoric of the American Catholic Bishops, who were to meet in April 1983. The Strategic Defence Initiative left NATO Europe more divided than the INF dispute. At least five European countries--France, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Greece--rejected any official participation while Great Britain, FRG and Italy moved towards a policy of conditional support.

Both the INF controversy and the SDI debate demonstrated that the alliance consensus on defence readiness and detente adopted in 1967 (Harmel Report) was disappearing. However, the SDI was seen by many as a move to extract concession from the Soviets, i.e. to use it as a 'bargaining chip' in the negotiations.

Resumption of INF Talks : 1985-1987

The Reagan Administration's foreign policy review suggested a more flexible attitude towards the Soviet Union. The emergence of a new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, brought increased optimism about prospects for an improvement in relations and for a summit meeting between the Soviet and US leaders in 1985. An invitation to a summit meeting with Reagan was delivered by Vice-President George Bush, at Moscow following the funeral of President Chernenko.

The Soviets, who renewed their interest in negotiations soon after the 1984 elections in the United States insisted on "new INF negotiations to be combined with negotiations on strategic systems and defense space systems under the umbrella of 'Nuclear and Space Talks'."

The January 1985 Gromyko-Shultz communique led to the resumption of Geneva Talks. Shortly after Gorbachev's

assumption of leadership, the Soviet Union declared a six month freeze on Soviet missiles deployed in Europe. Clearly motivated by the approaching summit meeting, in early October 1985 the Soviet Union presented new reduction proposals for strategic and INF delivery systems. On INF, the Soviets proposed as a first step, a moratorium on further deployment of Soviet and US INF missiles in Europe. In the next stage, all Pershing II missiles were to be withdrawn and GLCMs were to be held to their approximate level at the time of the proposal. The Soviet Union was to reduce the number of its SS-20 warheads to the level of the combined total of US, British and French warheads. There was to be a freeze on missiles of 1000 km range and below. Withdrawn Soviet missiles were to be destroyed and the number of missiles deployed in Asia were to be frozen.

The important aspect of the Soviet initiative was the fact that it was clearly and formally based on Soviet acceptance that any US-Soviet agreement on INF would have to be based on some INF deployment. The second innovative aspect of the proposal was omission of aircrafts from the first stage. In early November 1985, the United States made new proposal which included (i) equal ceiling of 140 launchers for both countries in Europe; (ii) 170 Soviet SS-20s in Asia were to be reduced by the same proportion as those in Europe (about 50%); and (iii) no account of British and French systems was to be included and finally no concessions were given to the Soviets.

Geneva Summit - November 19-21, 1985

At Geneva the private meetings whose apparent importance led to the coining of the expression "Fireside summit" had by prior agreement resolved not to release any information to the public.[5] It was agreed that the pace of negotiations should be accelerated and early progress should be made in areas where there was common ground such as the 50 per cent cuts in overall level of armaments and the possibility of an interim INF agreement.

Gorbachev described the summit as a 'watershed' which had created the possibility of moving forward and according to Reagan "the meeting provided a fresh start for US-Soviet relations". The two leaders agreed on a communique calling for early progress towards "an interim agreement on INF in Europe". Gorbachev's moves made it clear that the Soviets were willing to agree to a separate INF agreement.

In his January 1986 proposal Gorbachev suggested a programme for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000. This offfer included in the first stage (i) the United States and the Soviet Union were to eliminate completely their INF systems in Europe and also reduce their inter-continental forces, (ii) the United States was required to make a commitment not to supply strategic

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5 Keesing's Record of World Events (Harlow, Longman Group), vol. 33, p. 34972.

or INF missiles to other countries; (iii) Britain and France were to commit themselves not to increase their strategic and medium range weapons. In the second stage, other nuclear powers would join in the reduction of forces, while the United States and the Soviet Union would move further towards elimination of their INF weapons and would freeze their tactical nuclear weapons with a range of below 1000 km.

The significance of these new Soviet proposals was that the Soviet Union had now formally dropped its requirement that British and French nuclear weapons had to be included in the US total of INF systems and thus was prepared for a separate agreement on INF. However, in March 1986, the United States presented in Geneva the INF verification proposals on which the administration was working.

At the Reykjavik summit[6] in October 1986 Gorbachev linked progress on INF to American willingness to make concessions on SDI. Soviet spokesmen justified this retreat from an earlier Soviet position on the grounds that an INF deal now was but one element of an inter-related package of measures that had to be accepted or not at all. Since President Reagan refused to accept any constraints on the development of strategic defences, this linkage was a recipe for stalemate: thus it was Reagan's SDI that had caused a dramatic breakdown of the talks at Reykjavik.

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6 Ibid., p. 34973.

In President Reagan's assessment "the significance of the meeting at Reykjavik is not that we did not sign agreements at the end. The significance is that we got as close as we did. The progress that we made would have been inconceivable just few months ago." He further said:

> The US side had been prepared to offer what may have been the most sweeping and important arms reduction proposals in the history of the world involving an important concession on delaying SDI deployment for a decade, coupled with a 10 year plan for eliminating all Soviet and American ballistic missiles. But that was not good enough for Mr Gorbachev, he wanted us to accept even tighter limits on SDI than the ABM treaty now requires. 7

Three months later it became clear to Moscow that there was little prospect of the US offering any major concessions on SDI and in February 1987, Gorbachev agreed to consider INF separately from the rest of his comprehensive arms control package. President Reagan responded enthusiastically and instructed his negotiating team in Geneva to present a draft treaty. Western Europe's response was more guarded, as it began to appear that the so-called 'zero option' was becoming a reality.

The Soviets were ready to sign an agreement without delay to eliminate Soviet and US INFs in Europe over 5 years, while retaining the global limits of 100 warheads envisaged at Reykjavik, while the US proposal included short-range

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7 Ibid., p. 34974.

missiles too. It was part of the American position that Soviet missiles such as the SS-23s and SS-12s should be frozen at current levels, but again it was suggested that extra restrictions should be introduced.

The immediate Soviet response was to propose separate negotiations on SRINF, but on 15 April, at a meeting in Moscow with Secretary of State, George Shultz, Gorbachev surprised the West by proposing that the short-range systems should also be reduced to zero. While presenting this proposal at Geneva, the Soviets insisted on inclusion of Pershing Is deployed in FRG, while the US contention was that they belonged to a third country. In August 1987, this issue was resolved by a pledge by Chancellor Kohl who was under considerable pressure to destroy Pershing Is (75 already deployed ones) after the US and the USSR had implemented the INF agreement.

Once Bonn had acceded to the Soviet demands to abandon its Pershing I in the interest of a second zero, West German views on the way ahead for nuclear arms control became fragmented. The United Kingdom and France strongly advocated that no further theatre nuclear weapons beyond the INF should be removed until something had been done about conventional forces. In a fresh offer, Gorbachev claimed that he was ready to accept 'Global Double Zero Option((LRINF + SRINF) throughout the world. This offer was not to be linked to US withdrawal of nuclear weapon in Korea and

other countries. The INF issue had thus been disentangled from many other issues at this stage.

As far as verification was concerned, the US significantly scaled down its demands in respect of a verification regime. It dropped the proposal for 'suspect site', challenge inspection anywhere in the United States or the Soviet Union, thereby reducing the number of sites that would come under inspection.

An agreement in principle on an INF treaty was announced on 18 September 1987, at the conclusion of three days talks in Washington between US and Soviet officials.

On the occasion of Shultz's visit to Moscow on 22 October, Gorbachev unexpectedly reintroduced the question of SDI and refused to set the date for a summit without further movement on this issue. However, on his visit to Washington Edvard Shevardnadze the Soviet Foreign Minister agreed on a date for the Summit.

Washington Summit - December 1987

Though an agreement in principle on the elimination of INF systems had been announced on 18 September 1987, subsequent difficulties with aspects of the agreement had necessitated further meetings between Shultz and Shevardnadze in Moscow (22-23 October), Washington (29-30 October) and Geneva (23-24 November).

During the December 1987 Summit, public attention focused almost entirely on the INF agreement, but surprising progress was also made in START. While the possibility of signing a START agreement in 1988 was raised, the obstacles to achieving a complete detailed, well-crafted and unambiguous treaty remained formidable and could perhaps have delayed formal signing of a full agreement until 1989.[8]

On 8 December, the two leaders signed an agreement providing for the elimination of long-range and short-range intermediate range nuclear forces. Reagan further described the summit meeting as a 'clear success' and said: "we have proven that adversaries, even with the most basic philosophical differences can talk candidly and respectfully with one another and with perseverance and common good."

The INF Treaty, although affecting less than 4 per cent of the nuclear arsenals, represents the first ever agreement to eliminate a whole category of offensive nuclear weapons and was regarded by both sides as a prelude to further agreements covering long-range (strategic) nuclear weapons and other aspects of military balance.

The agreement which requires the United States to dismantle and destroy a total of 283 deployed and non-deployed launchers and 867 missiles, and the Soviets to

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8 Ibid., p. 35601.

destroy a total of 851 launchers and 1,836 missiles by the end of 1991, envisages intrusive verification measures, so as to ensure that there can be no attempt to reactivate the weapons.

To implement the treaty, further ratification by the Senate and Supreme Soviet was envisaged. However, the ratified treaty was presented at Moscow summit (29 May-21 June 1988). Before concluding this Chapter, the most important aspect to be discussed is, the Soviet come-back to the negotiating table in 1985. Several factors contributed to it.

On the western side, after the collapse of SALT II, the newly elected US Administration played an important role in resuming negotiations. The vehement opposition of large segments of West European opinion to missile deployment and Soviet walk out created a negative atmosphere towards the Soviets by public opinion at large.

At this time there was a desire for positive change in East-West relations. One key factor was the deployment itself, which may have influenced the Soviet decision to pay for it.

Yet the sweeping scope of Soviet moves both in arms control and generally INF itself i.e. the willingness on Moscow's part to agree to a zero-zero approach (though it was undoubtedly related elsewhere to the Soviet interest to remove western systems targeted against the Soviet Union

itself) and thus taking an important step toward a long-held goal of denuclearized NATO. However, the credit for the Soviet approach goes to Mikhail Gorbachev, who set a precedent for future arms control negotiations by discarding the traditional Soviet moves. Showing his interest in genuine global disarmament, on 15 January 1986, he set forth a plan to achieve this aim by the end of the century.

Soviet 'New Thinking'

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev has embarked on a radical reassessment of its problems and consequently of internal and foreign policy issues. His domestic policy being very clear -- to halt and eventually reverse the decline and stagnation of the Soviet economy which threatens a dramatic retrenchment in the USSR's global position. The deepening multi-dimensional crises of the Soviet system also have political, social, ideological and cultural sources.

At the same time, Moscow confronts a systematic crisis of historic proportions. So deep has this crisis been, that the Soviet leadership has apparently been led to the extreme exigency of overhauling certain public themes of communist ideology.

From the early days of the Soviet regime, the Soviet Communist Party has counted on forced economic development often at great human cost to create an infrastructure capable of supporting its quest for military power and influence around the globe.

During the late 1980s, the United States was in a position of strength as it negotiated INF. Its defence build up was increasing and its economy was recovering strongly. Reagan was elected for the second term. The Soviets during this time were relatively weak, not militarily, but politically and economically. At this time, Gorbachev was attempting to resuscitate the Soviet economy and consolidate his power base, for which he needed breathing space in relations with the United States. Soviet economic growth had slowed to under 2 per cent and consumer growth was declining as consumer expectations were rising. Meanwhile, military spending was absorbing roughly 15-17 per cent of Soviet GNP. Thus there was a move towards Soviet 'New Thinking' to redress all the weaknesses in domestic and foreign policy fields.

There was consequently a shift in Soviet negotiating style in arms control talks. Gorbachev led his military establishment and bureaucracy to reverse long-held positions, to accept virtually all of NATO's cardinal requirements for INF treaty, thus making his reforms accepted internationally. This international acclaim for his Glasnost and Perestroika, was seen to influence internal policies of the Soviet Union. Certainly, thus, there was a greater subtlety in methods, increased flexibility in negotiations and an appeal to Western people by trying to create a new peaceful image of USSR. Thus the Soviets accepted the intrusive inspection as well as CSBM under the Stockholm agreement.

Gorbachev has succeeded in making arms control the number one issue on the international agenda. For his active and high-profile pursuit of disarmament, the campaign by which Gorbachev aimed at regaining the initiative in East-West negotiations, first concentrated on nuclear systems. An important landmark being his proposal on 15 January 1986, calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The thrust at further delegitimising nuclear arms reached its climax at the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986. Subsequently, the Soviet leadership responded to concerns in West Europe about denuclearization in the light of Soviet conventional superiority. Gorbachev in his Prague speech in April 1987 explicitly acknowledged the existence of 'a certain asymmetry' in the armed forces of the two sides in Europe due to historical-geographic factors.

Finally there is a strong desire to believe that the Cold War is over for good and that East-West bloc could be demilitarized at the centre of confrontation i.e. Europe. There are concerns however that the new phase of detente might again prove to be the prelude to another period of confrontation -- this time with the USSR perhaps having been modernized with western support.

But for the West, much uncertainity remains about prospects of Gorbachev's reforms. Is the economy abandoning planning procedures and bureaucracies and without real democracy and Human Rights guarantee? Awareness of the

fact that the 'new thinking' is not only a policy orientation but also a policy instrument and the euphoric expectation that Gorbachev's personality and public relations campaign have created in Western societies suggest a caution approach in evaluating his motives and interests and the prospects they offer.

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CHAPTER IV

THE INF TREATY - VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Verification and Compliance

On 8 December 1987, as the Central act of the Washington Summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gerbachev, the two leaders signed an agreement providing for the elimination of long-range and short-range Intermediate-range nuclear forces. The agreement is in four parts - a 19-page Treaty document, 21 pages on monitoring compliance and a 73-page memorandum of understanding describing the exact numbers and location of the systems covered by the agreement.

The treaty as such contains 17 articles and two protocols. The protocol on elimination specifies the way in which INF missiles will be destroyed, while the protocol on inspection contains agreed procedures for verifying the treaty. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) contains the data base for the treaty.

Significance of the Data

The MOU contains an unparalleled amount of details on the number, character and location of weapon systems to be eliminated under the agreement. Indeed, the

data are unprecedented, because all previous arms control agreements between the US and the USSR relied on US-supplied data only; this time, both sides have provided the relevant data and have pledged to do so again in the case of START.

The contents of the MOU raise two main issues. One, involving data and the other concerning their implications. The data themselves contain a number of surprises, not only about Soviet systems but also about US deployments. In general, the numbers of missiles and in some cases launchers to be eliminated on both sides are significantly larger than previously published.

Table I shows the types and numbers of launchers and missiles to be eliminated under the treaty. It also reveals interesting specific information about three US and six Soviet systems slated for destruction.

The treaty proper provides for the elimination of all US and Soviet missiles with a range 500-5000 km, but not over 5,500 km. "Elimination means destruction of existing missiles including their front section, but minus their nuclear warheads and guidance systems, which are retained by the deploying countries; further there exists prohibition of production or flight testing of any INF missiles or stage or launchers of these missiles for third parties." Destruction of missiles, launchers and associated

Table I

Summary of Data on the MOU

	Launchers			Missiles		
	Deployed	Non-Deployed	Type Total	Deployed	Non-Deployed	Type Total
United States						
LRINF						
Pershing II	115	51	166	120	127	247
GLCM	99	17	116	309	133	442
Sub-total	214	68	282	429	260	689
SRINF						
Pershing I	-	1	1	-	178	178
Total	214	69	283	429	438	867
Soviet Union						
LRINF						
SS20	405	118	523	405	245	650
SS4	79	6	85	65	105	170
SS5	-	-	-	-	6	6
SSC-X-4	-	6	6	-	84	84
Sub-total	484	130	614	470	440	910
SRINF						
SS12	115	20	135	220	506	726
SS13	82	20	102	167	33	200
Sub-total	197	40	237	387	539	926
Total	681	170	851	857	979	1,836

Source: Strategic Survey - 1987-1988 (London: IISS), p. 32.

equipment for missiles of ranges between 1000 and 5,500 km must take place within 3 years and that of missiles in the 500-1000 km range within 18 months. Within the first six months, each party may destroy up to 100 missiles in the 1,000-5,500 km range.

It also contains agreed procedures for destruction of missile launchers, launch pad shelters, eight different types of existing missiles will be destroyed under the treaty - for the US, P II, BGM-10 SG GLCM and P1, while on the Soviet side, SS20, SS4, SS5, SS12 and SS23.

Further, two missiles which were tested but not deployed are to be eliminated i.e. US PIB of which none now exists and the Soviet SSC-X-4, GLCM of which 84 undeployed missiles will be destroyed. Counting the SSC-X-4s, the USSR will destroy 1,836 missiles and the US 867 - a ratio of more than 2: 1.[1]

To further communication, Art. XIII(2) of the treaty provides for the use of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres to enable a continuous exchange of data and to provide and receive required notification. Although the treaty does not envisage elimination of any warheads, these would be returned to stockpiles or recycled in the United States and the Soviet Union. But the treaty rules out the right to produce,

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1 Backgrounder, January 1988.

flight test or launch any INF missile. However, there is no restriction on R&D.

Further, Art. XVI provides for unlimited duration of the treaty, subject to amendments and ratification in accordance with constitutional procedures of each party.

Verification Procedures

The final set of concessions needed to conclude the 1987 INF treaty involved 'verification'. Although both countries will continue to rely on NTM as the principal method of monitoring the agreement, a number of unprecedented provisions for on-site inspections (Art. XI(i)) were established for the first time in the history of arms control agreements.

In order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the treaty, a special Verification Commission was established [Art. XIII (i)].

Thus the treaty establishes totally new procedures for on-site inspection of missile production plants, operating bases and support facilities. It designates 84 locations for inspection on the Soviet side, including 7 in Eastern Europe and 34 locations, including 12 in Western Europe for the United States. Each country will carry out several different types of inspections during a 3-year elimination period (some for 10 years thereafter) which are as follows:

(1) Baseline Inspection

Baseline inspection will take place within 90 days of Treaty's entry into force to verify the starting counts for missile and launcher destruction, which are located in Belgium, FRG, Italy, Netherlands, UK, GDR, Czechoslovakia, US and USSR.

(2) Close-out Inspection

To confirm the elimination of the missiles and launchers.

(3) Elimination Inspection

US and USSR have an obligation to observe the destruction of missiles and launchers at elimination facilities.

(4) Short-notice Inspection

For 13 years, after the treaty enters into force, the parties are entitled to conduct SNI as agreed facilities.

(5) Continuous Portal Monitoring

The Soviet Union has agreed that the US can establish a continuous portal monitoring system at a missile facility Votsisk. In return the US has agreed to allow the Soviets to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at the former P II missile facility - Hercules plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah.

In order to conduct the periodic inspection of missile bases and support facilities to verify the elimination, the inspectors, in teams of 10 to 30, may carry out on 16-hour notice, up to 20 inspections per year in the first three years of the agreement, 15 per year during the next five years and 10 per year in the remaining five years. The US officials will accompany Soviet inspectors for the entire time of inspection in their country just as Soviets would do. But Soviet inspectors at the Hercules plant in Utah and US inspectors of the missile facility at Votsisk will not be under constant escort.

Inspectors can bring linear measurement devices, such as tape measures, cameras, portable weighing devices, radiation detection devices and other equipment as specified by the parties to assist them in conducting inspection. Inspectors further have diplomatic immunity.

An additional verification measure requires the USSR to facilitate surveillance of the long-range SS-25 mobile missile not covered by the treaty and is similar to SS-20s until a strategic reduction agreement comes into effect. The USSR will be required at US request to open the roofs of shelters covering SS-25 missile launchers up to six times a year and keep them open for a 12-hour period.

Revelations

The Mou, discussed earlier, revealed that more Pershing II missiles and launchers had been deployed in West Germany (see Table 1), than previously announced - indeed more than those permitted under the decision of December 1979 (572 LRINF). The actual PII deployment consisted of 115 launchers and 120 missiles, both figures exceeding the 108 missiles and launchers announced earlier. Seven of the launchers were designated as 'spares' and deployed at the Neuulm main operating base (MOB), as were twelve of the 120 missiles. In addition to the missiles deployed in West Germany, a further twelve were in store at a facility in Wielerbach.

A second interesting revelation about P-II was the relatively large number of missiles and launchers stored in the United States. The Mou contained little data on GLCM deployment that had not previously been known. In the United Kingdom, the Molesworth air base had received 6 launchers and 18 missiles - a fact officially revealed only when the agreement had been signed. In addition, although at no base in Western Europe were more GLCM deployed then planned under the December 1979 NATO decision, the number of GLCM launchers, at some bases did exceed the planned totals.

The most important of the Soviet-supplied

figures reveal -

(i) the 'deactivation' of a number of LRINF launchers and missiles;

(ii) the large number of GLCMs 'tested but not deployed'; and

(iii) a surprisingly large number of SRINF both deployed and in storage.

One of the surprising disclosures was that the Soviet Union had deployed 405 SS20 missiles and launchers, 36 fewer than recorded in most public sources. The relevation of this 'short fall' raised a number of questions in the Netherlands.

Secondly, it was revealed that the Soviet Union had a large number of non-deployed SS-20 launchers (118) to support the 405 on active sites. An additional item revealed by the MOU data affects the assertion by some western analysts, including the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that the SS20 had a 'reload' capability. The MOU indicates that the Soviet Union deployed an identical number of missiles and launchers, at its SS20 MOB, each base having 9 missiles and launchers. Moreover, all the non-deployed launchers kept in storage were similarly accompanied by an equal number of missiles. Perhaps the biggest surprise in the data on Soviet LRINF was the large number of SS-X-4 GLCM (84 with 6 launchers) that the Soviet Union

disclosed were already in place at Jelgava in Latvia.

Finally, one can say that the data have a number of important implications for verification. The first is the importance of the data. The fact that the Soviet Union was willing to provide precise data on the number, characteristics and location of all its missiles and launchers covered by the agreement is of itself an important aid to the verification process. Moreover, the data in the MOU will provide a very precise verification standard by which to judge future Soviet and US compliance.

Another issue raised by the MOU data is what they tell us about the verification of future arms control agreements. To the extent that future nuclear arms-control agreements. To the extent that future nuclear arms-control agreements will reduce launchers rather than eliminate them, the on-site inspection requirements for ensuring effective verification will probably need to be more intrusive than those in the INF agreement and cannot be confined to declared locations alone. If launchers - whether mobile or fixed - may be used to fire more than one missile then it becomes critical for effective verification to know the precise number of missiles remaining in existence after an arms control agreement has been implemented. This is particularly true regarding major reductions, because both the incentive for cheating and its significance will

presumably increase as force levels are reduced. In those areas of future arms control agreements where launchers will be reduced but not eliminated, a more intrusive verification regime will therefore become necessary.

Reactions to the Treaty

The United States-Soviet agreement has sparked off a wide-ranging debate over its potential impact on NATO's strategy and even the future of the alliance itself.

While some see it as a first arms control agreement in a decade, others fear that it represents a move towards 'denuclearization of Europe'. These contradictory assessments stem from differing perceptions of a number of factors, including the role of Pershing II and GLCM in the Alliance strategy of flexible response and extended deterrence.

According to Secretary of State, George Shultz, "the INF treaty strengthens US and allied security. INF experience offers important lessons on how to proceed as one confronts with challenges and security".[2]

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2 Congressional Digest, vol. 67, April 1988, p. 98.

The most vehement critic of the treaty, however, was former US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. To quote him: "The treaty affects the essence of NATO, its ability to deter war. It weakens rather than strengthen deterrence against war....I would object to the INF treaty even if the warheads were to be destroyed...highest importance."[3]

General Bernard, W. Rogers (former NATO, Supreme allied Commander of Europe), was also critical of the INF Treaty. In his view, he puts NATO on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe, a long time stated objective of the Soviet Union. He further feels that denuclearization would make western Europe safe for conventional war or more likely subject to intimidation, coercion and eventual neutralization from the threat of aggression by the Warsaw Pact's forces.

To quote Nixon and Kissinger, "the agreement could create the most profound crisis of the NATO alliance in its 40 year history".[4] According to Kissinger, the agreement continues a process whereby successive American administrations have for three decades abandoned European leaders who staked their political position on American proposals for the nuclear defense of Europe.

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3 Ibid., p. 99.

4 Ibid., p. 113.

This agreement, in his view is favoured not because it is going to save vast amount of money or solve the problems of US-Soviet relations. It is favoured because it would solve the specific problem that NATO set out to solve when it made its famous 'Two-Track Decision' in 1979, where it decided that either it must offset the SS20s with Western deployment or obtain an agreement to get rid of SS-20s. Thus the agreement comes close to getting rid of SS-20s and it is important the way it sets precedent to conclude future nuclear arms control agreement.

Many supporters of the agreement in the US and Europe argue that its implementation is a modest benefit to the alliance which will not seriously disrupt NATO's treaty.

The decision to accept a second 'zero' for ballistic missiles with ranges of 500-1000 km, is also seen by this group as a net gain for NATO. Elimination of this category of weapons will have little impact on NATO's strategy. They observe that even without counting the independent British and French nuclear arsenals, NATO still retains 4,000 theatre weapons in Europe, including systems (such as the F-IIIA) which are capable of striking the USSR. There are also 400 SLBM warheads assigned to the Supreme allied commander of Europe for planning purposes. They further note that the agreement does not prevent the alliance from bolstering its nuclear component with

additional air-breathing systems in order to maintain the credibility of its 'Flexible Response' strategy. Further, supporters of the Treaty assert that continued availability of a range of theatre nuclear systems plus the presence of 325,000 US troops in Europe, is an ample proof that European security is in no danger of becoming decoupled from that of the United States.

On the other hand, there are those, particularly among defence experts and among conservative political leaders in the United States and Europe, who feel that the original point of deploying PII and GLCM - to assume the coupling of US and European security - was only indirectly related to the SS-20s deployments. Consequently, the elimination of SS-20s does not reduce the need to field in Europe US nuclear systems that are land-based to assure visibility and have sufficient range to strike the USSR. Those who take this view are equally concerned that the second 'zero' institutes a pattern of nuclear negotiation which will lead to a third 'zero' (range less than 500 km) and ultimately complete denuclearization of Europe.

On the military level, critics feel that elimination of LRINF deprives NATO of an irreplacable element of flexible response. This pessimistic view and concern is greatest in West Germany and France. West Germany has always been ambivalent towards NATO's nuclear strategy. For a country

in the front line of the East-West confrontation, nuclear weapons have served as an important security guarantee. Now the longer-range systems eliminated, many West Germans see NATO as increasingly dependent on short-range weapons which would explode on either side of the inter-German border. The epigram "shorter the range, the deader the German' testifies to the apprehension of some West German that the rest of NATO would escape the brunt of nuclear war and thus it is an evasion of the principle of equal security to all members.

Critics believe that an inevitable consequence of these developments is a gradual unravelling of NATO's strategy. Gripped by their dilemma, West Germans will be driven to push for negotiations to eliminate shorter-range nuclear systems. The US will then be increasingly reluctant to maintain its troops in Europe without the protection of tactical weapons. Finally, stripped of the twin assurance of US troops and US nuclear guarantee, Germany will turn to the East to assure security and NATO will collapse. These viewpoints seem exaggerated in its optimism and pessimism over NATO resilience. Moreover, it is not clear which way NATO will go, for this depends on a number of issues that are still unresolved.

The first major issue which concerns NATO is the future role of nuclear weapons. The continued viability of the nuclear component of NATO's strategy will depend on how NATO leaders respond to the INF agreement itself.

Compensation for the removal of the INF systems and modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons both remain problems for NATO. Any plan to compensate for eliminated systems - for example by substituting one submarine launched cruise missile for each Ground launched cruise missile is likely to provoke a countervailing Soviet response. It might endanger political disillusionment in the minds of European people who have been led to believe that the INF agreement makes a real reduction of nuclear threat.

The modernization of shorter-range system poses similar problems, because it is a difficult political issue since they smack more of 'war fighting' than deterrence. Thus there exists uncertainty within NATO on what role nuclear forces would play if deterrence were to fail in the wake of the INF agreement.

The second major issue concerns the role of the US and its European allies within NATO, especially in relation to nuclear weapons, because NATO feels that it is in a grip of recurrent agony over strength of US commitment to the alliance. The problems of burden-sharing, foreign policy issues, US strategic thinking and trade issues have exacerbated.

Significance of the Treaty

The real value of the treaty, though not military (only approximately 4% reduction of nuclear weapons is to be achieved) is definitely political. Destruction of category

of weapon would eliminate conflict in Europe. Although both the alliances have many other systems of adequate range, which could deliver nuclear weapons on targets in NATO or Warsaw Pact areas, these systems are either dispersed, more distant or less vulnerable than the INFs.

The Treaty thus promotes crisis stability along with the destruction of SS-23 missile, the only weapon of this range which has the accuracy to deliver conventional or chemical warheads against NATO air fields, command posts and anti-aircraft installations. Conclusion of the INF agreement has already seen considerable progress towards a US-Soviet agreement on strategic nuclear arms reduction procedure which are taken over to conclude START.

Further, it has increased Western hopes for similar Soviet flexibility in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals force negotiation which will probably get underway. The entire course of the INF episode from 1979 to 1987 has already had highly important and probably enduring effects on the relationship between the United States and European NATO members in the defence field. Though the treaty represents a fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy, one must not over look two facts viz. (1) the treaty as such has major shortcomings, and (2) there are still vastly more arms control questions to be solved than are already settled.

The INF treaty, however, has brought into sharp focus the conventional area of arms control and development of new doctrines of deterrence. It is just a bilateral agreement and does not, however, prohibit any other country from developing and deploying them. Neither does it manage to draw France and UK into the process of reducing their nuclear arsenals.

For NATO the most positive aspect of the treaty has been the Soviet willingness to make asymmetrical reduction. But in future balanced agreements would be particularly difficult to negotiate given the many asymmetries between NATO and WTO inherent in geographical and historical conditions, which has shaped different security needs. To quote Anders Boserup, an exponent of the concept of Alternative Defense, "Arms control negotiation, with their typical fixation on numbers and on the effort to bring similarly organized forces into better balance and their success only perpetuates the problem."

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CHAPTER V

EUROPE AFTER THE INF TREATY

There exists an element of uncertainty in the minds of defence analysts about Western Europe's security in the post-INF era. No term appears too dramatic for commentators to portray NATO's INF dilemmas: the alliance is seen at the cross-road, some believe it to be on the verge of disintegration. Ironically, the prevailing unease was born out of success. It is the aftermath of the Treaty signed in Washington on 8 December 1987, that seems to have thrown the Western alliance into disarray.

Though the treaty was to accommodate West European fears about Soviet SS-20 and thus the Soviet upper hand is the so-called (INFRUNG', it sparked off a debate pertaining to security issues. This was clear on NATO's 40th anniversary where the mood in the West was characterized by -

(1) Public perception of considerably reduced military threat to Western Europe.

(2) Diverging assessments of Soviet foreign policy ranging from high hopes of military self-constraint to profound scepticisms that 'new thinking' may just represent new tactics to achieve hegemonic aims.

(3) New doubts about the US security guarantee for Western Europe and reliability of 'extended deterrence'.

Overall, there was a widespread sense of need for a fundamental review of NATO's basic strategy in order to revalidate it or revise, if it is necessary. Though the treaty was seen primarily as a major political achievement, the most significant contribution of the treaty may not be the nuclear arms it eliminates but the new phase of concern and action on conventional arms it stimulates. Further, it initiated the development of many proposals to unilaterally structure Western defence in new ways and on a non-offensive basis.

The debate about the INF agreement, anxieties about the 'slippery slope' of further nuclear arms reductions, budgetary constraints, demographic trends and perestroika, have combined to put political impetus behind the pursuit of conventional arms control in Europe which has taken shape in many discussion forums. Apart from this, the INF treaty has brought into sharp focus the implications of modernization of short-range nuclear forces, which has been an ongoing debate.

The central security problem in Europe being that of 'German Defense', NATO's strategy in central Europe, apart from 'flexible Response', has been that of 'forward defence' - along the German border with the aim of holding the Warsaw Pact's attack as forward as possible. The end

of the dispute over INF did not, however, end the public concern over this issue.

It becomes clear from this Treaty that Arms control is basically a political process, where strong personal leadership at the highest level is needed. Public opinion has also given a powerful new impetus to arms control agreements and policy makers must reckon with it.

Along with its intrusive verification procedures and asymmetrical reduction, the treaty has set precedents to conclude future agreements, for instance, START treaty where 50 per cent of reduction in strategic forces as opposed to just limitation is envisaged. START treaty as such is important for several reasons which is discussed in the chapter along with the other concepts. So let us discuss the various concepts and developmented mentioned above.

The Concept of Alternative Defense and its Models

According to Michael Randle[1] Alternative Defense is the term used to designate defense plans in which nuclear states, such as the UK, France or alliances such as NATO would rely on conventional or non-violent social resistance, as an alternative to depending on nuclear weapons or in which non-nuclear states would move to an

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1 Michael Randle, "Alternative Defense", World Encyclopedia of Peace (Pergamon, 1986), p. 11.

unambiguously defensive or non-violent strategy.[2]

The argument that a country or alliance could aim to establish a viable system of defensive deterrence rests on the traditional insight of military strategists, since Clausewitz that "Defense enjoys certain inherent advantages over offense".

Proponents of the Alternative Defense accept NATO's forward strategy as desirable. But they have focused on a more fundamental issue - how NATO forces are organized for forward defense, rather than on how many forces should be deployed. Anders Boserup and John Galthung attack the basic concept of NATO's defence that peace and stability are promoted by a balance of force between NATO and Warsaw Pact. They argue that efforts to achieve a balance of forces always leads to instability rather than stability.

These proposals are more relevant to the defence of FRG. The idea has been to rearrange conventional forces so that they can defend but not attack. Various plans put forth suggest that nations can restructure weapons, personnel and strategy to ensure their own military security without posing a threat to other nations.

The following Table 2 enumerates the proposals for alternative defence strategies:

A menu of European defense plans

This summary of the nonoffensive defense plans described in this issue of the *Bulletin* shows that they are not parallel. Some emphasize changes in grand strategy and doctrine, while others would revamp tactical (smaller-scale) military operations. Some call for unilateral changes, others are bilateral; some call for reductions, others do not. Despite these differences, most of the proposals are compatible.

The Afheldt plan

West German defense analyst Horst Afheldt would restructure NATO forces unilaterally. His defensive configuration has four elements:

- *Light infantry commandos* equipped with modern antitank weapons would break the initial thrust of an attack.
- An *artillery network* would back up the commandos.
- A *communications network* would tie it all together.
- At first, NATO *armored forces* would be redeployed behind these networks, but tanks would gradually be eliminated as the command and rocket networks are expanded.

The SAS plan

The Study Group on Alternative Security Planning (SAS), headed by Lutz Unterseher, outlines a military plan that also calls for unilateral changes, but it is closer than other alternative schemes to current NATO deployments:

- A static "web" of *light infantry*, much like Afheldt's, forms the forward defense, to wear down an attack.
- *Armored formations* ("spiders") would use their mobility to aid the static network when it is in trouble, driving back the attackers that break through the web. The mobility of these forces would be limited so they could not be used for deep attacks or counterattacks in enemy territory.

Elements of the SAS plan, which is supported by the West German Social Democratic party, have found favor in NATO circles.

The East-West arms control proposal

Albrecht von Muller and Andrzej Karkoszka present a proposal that arose from the Pugwash working group on conventional weapons. It puts nonoffensive defense ideas into negotiating form.

- *Weapons cuts* would reduce major categories of weapons to 90 percent of the current levels of the inferior side.
- *Force density limits* would reduce the possibility of offensive operations.
- *Mobility limits* would be imposed by reducing ammunition stockpiles and mobility equipment.

The Soviet plan

The Soviets have called for broad discussions of NATO and Warsaw Pact doctrines and concepts. They emphasize military balance and mutual reductions in weapons where NATO has an advantage as well as in armored forces, where the Warsaw Pact maintains numerical superiority. Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov proposes several phases in the transition to nonoffensive defense.

- *Comprehensive data exchanges* would be bolstered by on-site inspections.
- *Weapons would be reduced* in categories where imbalances exist.
- Next, *troop withdrawals* would reduce each side's forces by 500,000.
- Finally, *forces would be restructured* so they are incapable of offensive operations.

The Jaruzelski plan

The plan put forward in July 1987 by Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski is the most comprehensive of the Eastern bloc proposals but does not include specific goals for reductions.

- *Nuclear weapons* remaining in Europe would be gradually reduced.
- *Conventional weapons* would be gradually reduced, beginning with "those of the strongest power and precision of destruction, which allow for a surprise attack."
- *Military doctrines* would evolve along strictly defensive lines.
- *Verification* and *confidence- and security-building measures* would be multiplied and strengthened.

Other plans

Not covered in this section but often discussed along with other alternative defense proposals are the following:

Hannig's firewall. West German analyst Norbert Hannig has proposed developing an uninhabited border along the border between East and West Germany which could be saturated with fire from missiles and rockets of various ranges. Behind the "firewall" would be antitank units equipped with precision-guided missiles. If the attackers broke through or if airborne forces landed behind the lines, the rockets could also be turned around and fired against them.

Wide-area territorial defense is the concept of former Bundeswehr Maj. Gen. Jochen Loser. Loser envisions a frontier defense zone 80–100 kilometers deep in which barriers and blocking units channel attacking tank forces toward concentrations of fire. Andreas von Bülow, a Social Democratic deputy in the Bundestag, has devised a similar plan.

Civilian-based defense is based on the theories of American sociologist Gene Sharp, who advocates training civilian leaders in the techniques of nonviolent resistance. The idea is to deny a conqueror the benefits of conquest. Wilhelm Nolte, a Bundeswehr officer, incorporates the idea in his nonoffensive defense [illegible], in which cities would contain no military installations. Instead, urban populations would engage in passive resistance.

Sources: Jonathan Dean, "Alternative Defense: Answer to NATO's Central Front Problems?" *International Affairs*, Winter 87-88, pp. 61-80; Stephen Langlois, "Nonprovocative and Civilian-based Defenses," in Joseph S. Nye et al., eds., *Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 93-109.

A situation where there exists ample forces for defence and inadequate forces for attack is called 'Mutual Defensive Sufficiency' or 'Reasonable Sufficiency'. A major political advantage of a defensive yet credible military posture is that it would greatly reduce the likelihood of mutual escalation such as when modernization by one side is seen as a new threat that must be responded to by the other or when a weapon developed as a 'bargaining chip' in arms control negotiations becomes a permanent addition to the arsenal of one or both sides.

According to many defense analysts, NATO military commanders would not be prepared unilaterally to give up or curtail their means of dealing with possible Soviet breakthrough in spite of recent Soviet proposals for unilateral reductions.

Conventional Deterrence

Though propagated by many in the wake of INF Treaty, the conventional deterrence has its own limitations. Modernization of conventional weapons using emerging technology and their development of various concepts like deep strike capability to counter the Warsaw Pact's attack are seen to be very cost-effective and much depends on the timely availability of forces.

Conventional Arms Control in Europe

The INF treaty's most significant contribution, as pointed out earlier, may not be nuclear arms it eliminates, but the new phase of concern and action on conventional arms its stimulates.

Since the early 1970s, two competing approaches to arms control involving conventional military forces in Europe have vied for public attention:

(1) One approach centres around Vienna, where NATO and Warsaw Pact negotiators have been engaged since 1973 in 'Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction' (MBFR Talks). Its objective is to reduce the number of military forces currently existing in Europe.

(2) The second approach to conventional arms control in Europe culiminated in September 1986, in the document of the Stockholm Conference on 'Confidence and Security building measures' (CSBMS). It focusses on regulating the activities of military forces.

Figure 3 shows the different European Negotiation Forums.



Figure 3 .. European negotiation forums

The MBFR negotiations, which for the last 15 years had a tendency to maintain active duty air and ground force personnel strength in central Europe than to reduce them, closed down on 3 February 1989. However, 16 NATO and 7 Warsaw Pact countries approved a document establishing a new negotiation forum for reducing conventional arms in Europe. The talks officially called negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE), will focus on the reduction of both conventional armaments and personnel and will cover Europe from the Atlantic to Urals.

There has been some progress in these talks and a treaty is expected to be ready by the end of 1990. Much depends upon Soviet 'New Thinking' and the response by the Bush Administration. A climax of the Soviet conventional arms control campaigns to date was Gorbachev's address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 7 December 1988, announcing unilateral reductions in Soviet forces overall.

The aim to bring 'Conventional Stability' in Europe has been superseded by a disruptive row in NATO over the fate of short-range nuclear weapons and on the other by a virulent Soviet campaign to block NATO's plan to modernize such weapons replacing the aging Lance with a new weapon having a range of 450 km.

To conclude, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in late 1989 and its consequence on Soviet

military power, and the question of reunification of Germany, have transformed the European scene. Such transformation could not have been foreseen even at the beginning of 1989. The prospect of an early reunification of Germany has raised certain questions:

(i) Would this lead eventually to the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact or should these alliances have a political role in the future?

(ii) Should a reunited Germany become a member of NATO or should it be a part of both the alliances?

(iii) What would be the future of 'Extended Deterrence' and what role does the United States play in this scenario? To quote Michael Mandelbaum, "the United States most important task for the last forty years has been its commitment to Europe and now a revolution has taken place there and US has to find a new position."[2]

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2 Mary H. Cooper, "A Primer on German Reunification", Editorial Research Reports (Pub. by Congressional Quarterly), vol. 2, no. 19, December 1989, p. 174.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Evolution of INF Negotiations

1963—The United States signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater.

1967—North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developed its strategy of "flexible response." The U.S. signed the Treaty on Principles Governing activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The Treaty prohibited military installations on the moon or placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth.

1968—NATO issued a Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions at a Reykjavik, Iceland. The United States signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

1969—Strategic Arms Limitation talks began between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

1971—The United States and Soviet Union signed an "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War."

1972—The U.S. and U.S.S.R. ratified the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, restricting both sides to two deployment sites. That same year, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. In essence, the Interim Agreement froze the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) launchers then operational or under construction for five years, during which time negotiations were to proceed on a more comprehensive agreement.

1973—President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev jointly announced negotiations on mutual reduction of European forces and armaments.

1974—The U.S. signed the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The United States and Soviet Union also agreed to a ABM Protocol reducing systems to one site each.

1975—NATO offered to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads in exchange for certain Warsaw Pact tank reductions.

1976—The Warsaw Pact placed its troop strength at 987,000. NATO officials reported the figure was well below its estimate. U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. The Treaty governed all nuclear explosions at locations outside weapons test sites specified under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

1977—The "deep cut" proposal by President James E. Carter, making significant missile reductions, was rejected by the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. began deployment of the SS-20, having three independently-targetable warheads.

1978—NATO and the Warsaw Pact exchanged detailed data on forces.

1979—The U.S.S.R. announced it would unilaterally withdraw 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from the German Democratic Republic. The proposal was intended to dissuade NATO from deploying the PERSHING II intermediate-range nuclear missiles. President Carter signed the SALT II Treaty with the Soviet Union. The Treaty remains to be ratified by the Senate.

The United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military and of Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was signed by the United States and 33 other nations. That same year, NATO adopted the "dual-track" decision calling for 464 ground-launched cruise missiles to be deployed four to a launcher. Plans also went ahead for the deployment of 108 PERSHING IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, each on separate launchers. As part of the "second track," the U.S. would attempt to negotiate the lowest possible level on United States-Soviet Union INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) missiles.

1980—The U.S.S.R. announced plans to dismantle half of its 64 ABM launchers around Moscow. No indication was provided in the announcement whether the Soviet Union intended to modernize the remaining 32 launchers to house new missiles, or planned to abolish them altogether.

1981—The Defense Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that the U.S.S.R. out-produces the United States by three-to-one in tanks, fighter planes, short-range ballistic missiles, and SLBMs. In November, President Reagan announced his "zero outcome" proposal pertain-

ing to intermediate-range weapons.

1982—The U.S. tabled a draft INF Treaty in February. The Soviet Union tabled its version in May. A new version was presented in Vienna by the Warsaw Pact, accommodating several NATO demands. Accepted in principle was the establishment of posts around the reduction areas to monitor troop movements. The United States and Soviet Union began the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) at Geneva.

1983—In a new proposal, the Warsaw Pact accepted in principle NATO's demands for on-site inspections in the reduction areas. In March, President Reagan consulted with NATO allies and Japan on his "zero outcome" proposal. In May, the U.S. tabled a draft treaty embodying the President's proposal.

In October, NATO representatives met at Montebello, Canada. A draft treaty was submitted by the Soviet Union to the U.N. General Assembly calling for the elimination of existing anti-satellite systems, new systems, and attacks on satellites in earth-orbit.

In November, the United States proposed a global ceiling of 420 deployed INF missile warheads. The U.S.S.R. walked out of the INF talks on November 23. By the end of the year, the U.S. began initial deployment of PERSHING II missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy and the United Kingdom.

1984—The FRG proposed to set aside NATO's data disagreement with the Warsaw Pact, until after a first-stage U.S.-U.S.S.R. cut had been made. The West German proposal was reportedly rejected by the National Security Council. On April 19, NATO offered to ease initial data requirements. In exchange, the Warsaw Pact was to provide substantial assurances on verification.

1985—The Soviet Union returned to the INF talks at Geneva in March. In an effort to get reduction talks moving again, NATO dropped its preconditions to resolve the data dispute. A unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was announced by General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. The moratorium was to extend until March 1986. In November, President Reagan proposed a new interim agreement for equal global limits. That same month, the President met with the General Secretary at Geneva.

1986—President Reagan proposed the phased elimination of INF missiles by 1989. The U.S.S.R. rejected the proposal. A new draft treaty was presented by the Warsaw Pact in Vienna. The draft accommodated a few NATO positions, but also backed away from several previous concessions. On April 18, General Secretary Gorbachev called for substantial troop, aircraft, and nuclear systems reductions.

Meeting in Budapest on June 11, the Warsaw Pact announced a new comprehensive approach to reducing nuclear and conventional arms in Europe based on the Secretary General's initiative. The Budapest Appeal proposed substantial Warsaw Pact and NATO troop reductions "from the Atlantic to the Urals," to be accompanied by similar reductions in air forces, nuclear weapons, and other armaments.

On July 25, President Reagan wrote General Secretary Gorbachev making clear his preference for a zero outcome treaty, but proposed an interim agreement to facilitate progress. NATO responded to the Budapest Appeal on December 11 in Brussels, declaring its readiness to open new negotiations on reducing conventional forces. President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in October, at Reykjavik, Iceland. The U.S.S.R. modified its insistence that an agreement on space and defense weapons precede any INF agreement.

1987—In April, the Soviet Union tabled a draft treaty incorporating the Reykjavik principles. On May 8, Poland announced a new gradual disengagement and reduction proposal for nuclear arms and conventional weapons in Central Europe. Poland also called on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to develop strictly defensive military doctrines. That same month, the Warsaw Pact proposed direct military concepts and doctrines consultations based on the Polish proposal. Intelligence sources reported the U.S.S.R. had 405 SS-20s deployed with 1,215 warheads.

On December 8, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

1988—The Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Intelligence committees began hearings in January on the INF Treaty. On March 21, the Select Intelligence Committee reported its findings on U.S. ability to monitor and verify Soviet compliance with the treaty. Excerpts from the report follow:

"The committee believes that by a combination of National Technical Means (NTM) and on-site inspection, the intelligence community will be able to monitor the drawdown and elimination of declared Soviet missiles launchers and associated equipment with great certainty. The committee notes that the on-site inspections established by the treaty are applicable only to facilities declared by the Soviets in the Memorandum of Understanding. Therefore, the burden of detecting banned activities at undeclared sites, where they are most likely to occur, will fall on NTM of verification.

Appendix B

Soviet Union-United States Summit in Washington, DC

Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles. December 8, 1987

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

ARTICLE II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles,

means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

ARTICLE III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

(i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

ARTICLE VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar

to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

ARTICLE VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

ARTICLE VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraph 1 and 3 of this Article.

ARTICLE IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this

Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:
  (i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;
  (ii) the elimination site;
  (iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and
  (iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:
  (i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;
  (ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;
  (iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and
  (iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:
  (i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and
  (ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:
  (i) the number of missiles or launchers;
  (ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;
  (iii) the mode of transport; and
  (iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be

considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

ARTICLE XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at

which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

ARTICLE XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

ARTICLE XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

Ronald Reagan

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Gorbachev

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

I. Items of Missile Systems Subject to Elimination

The specific items for each type of missile system to be eliminated are:

1. For the United States of America:

Pershing II: missile, launcher and launch pad shelter;

BGM-109G: missile, launch canister and launcher;

Pershing IA: missile and launcher; and

Pershing IB: missile.

2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

SS-20: missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle and fixed structure for a launcher;

SS-4: missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand and propellant tanks;

SS-5: missile;

SSC-X-4: missile, launch canister and launcher;

SS-12: missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle; and

SS-23: missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle.

3. For both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers shall be subject to elimination.

4. For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination.

5. For both Parties, all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles shall be subject to elimination.

II. Procedures for Elimination at Elimination Facilities

1. In order to ensure the reliable determination of the type and number of missiles, missile stages, front sections, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, indicated in Section I of this Protocol, being eliminated at elimination facilities, and to preclude the possibility of restoration of such items for purposes inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall fulfill the requirements below.

2. The conduct of the elimination procedures for the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with Article XI of the of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the name and coordinates of the elimination facility at which the on-site inspection may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

3. Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed.

4. Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance

with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The initiation of the elimination of the items of missile systems subject to this Section shall be considered to be the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section.

6. Immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the Party receiving the pertinent notification required by paragraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters.

7. A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that such missile stages are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed.

8. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, except those for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, along with the type and number of items of missile systems for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party. The elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

9. The Parties agree that all United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their associated reentry vehicles shall be eliminated within an agreed overall period of elimination. It is further agreed that all such missiles shall, in fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section.

10. The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph:

For the Pershing II:

Missile:

(a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the BGM-109G:

Missile:

(a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;

(b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister: launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IA:

Missile:

(a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IB:

Missile:

(a) missile stage shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

For the SS-20:

Missile:

(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition of the missile in its launch canister or by burning missile stages;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister: launch canister shall be destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile, or shall be destroyed separately by explosion, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

(a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;

(c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS–4:

Missile:
(a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;
(b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(d) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Stand: launch stand components shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Erector:
(a) jib, missile erector leveling supports and missile erector mechanism shall be cut off missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints; and
(b) jib and missile erector leveling supports shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Transporter Vehicle: mounting components for a missile and for a missile's erector mechanism as well as supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher shall be cut off transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the SS–5:

Missile:
(a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;
(b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the SSC–X–4:

Missile:
(a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;
(b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and
(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister: launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:
(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;
(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;
(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(f) the launcher chassis shall be severed at a location determined by measuring no more than 0.70 meters rearward from the rear axle.

For the SS–12:

Missile:
(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning missile stages;
(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:
(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;
(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;
(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:
(a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
(b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;
(c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS–23:

Missile:
(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning the missile stage;
(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:
(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher body;
(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(c) missile launch support equipment shall be removed from launcher body;
(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher body;
(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(f) each environmental cover of the launcher body shall be removed and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
(g) a portion of the launcher body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:
(a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;
(b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle body;
(c) all components of mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(d) control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;
(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle body and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the transporter vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

11. The specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows:

Training Missile and Training Missile Stage: training missile and training missile stage shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launch Canister: training launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launcher: training launcher chassis shall be cut at the same location designated in paragraph 10 of this Section for launcher of the same type of missile.

III. Elimination of Missiles by Means of Launching

1. Elimination of missiles by means of launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. Immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched.

2. All missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a ballistic missile interceptor.

3. Missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched one at a time, and no less than six hours shall elapse between such launches.

4. Such launches shall involve ignition of all missile stages. Neither Party shall transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by means of launching except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

5. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party.

6. A missile shall be considered to be eliminated by means of launching after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and upon notification required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

IV. Procedures for Elimination In Situ

1. Support Structures

(a) Support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) The initiation of the elimination of support structures shall be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 1(d) of this Section.

(c) The elimination of support structures shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(d) The specific elimination procedures for support structures shall be as follows:

(i) the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;

(ii) the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion;

(iii) the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty; and

(iv) upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures shall be considered to have been completed.

2. Propellant Tanks for SS-4 Missiles Fixed and transportable propellant tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be removed from launch sites.

3. Training Missiles, Training Missile Stages, Training Launch Canisters and Training Launchers

(a) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers not eliminated at elimination facilities shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers being eliminated *in situ* shall be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of this Protocol.

(c) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers.

(d) The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 3(c) of this Section may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

(e) Elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon the completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of this Section.

V. Other Types of Elimination

1. Loss or Accidental Destruction

(a) If an item listed in Section I of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a result of an accident, the possessing Party shall notify the other Party within 48 hours, as required in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, that the item has been eliminated.

(b) Such notification shall include the type of the eliminated item, its approximate or assumed location and the circumstances related to the loss or accidental destruction.

(c) In such a case, the other Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of the specific point at which the accident occurred to provide confidence that the item has been eliminated.

2. Static Display

(a) The Parties shall have the right to eliminate missiles, launch canisters and launchers, as well as training missiles, training launch canisters and training launchers, listed in Section I of this Protocol by placing them on static display. Each Party shall be limited to a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters and 15 launchers on such static display.

(b) Prior to being placed on static display, a missile, launch canister or launcher shall be rendered unusable for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant shall be removed and erector-launcher mechanisms shall be rendered inoperative.

(c) The Party possessing a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher that is to be eliminated by placing it on static display shall provide the other Party with the place-name and coordinates of the location at which such a missile, launch canister or launcher is to be on static display, as well as the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 2(d) of this Section, may take place.

(d) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection of such a missile, launch canister or launcher within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in paragraph 2(c) of this Section.

(e) Elimination of a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher, by placing it on static display shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty

remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.

Done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

Ronald Reagan

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Gorbachev

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

I. Definitions

For the purposes of this Protocol, the Treaty, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Protocol on Elimination:

1. The term "inspected Party" means the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection as provided for by Article XI of the Treaty.

2. The term "inspecting Party" means the Party to the Treaty carrying out an inspection.

3. The term "inspector" means an individual designated by one of the Parties to carry out inspections and included on that Party's list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

4. The term "inspection team" means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection.

5. The term "inspection site" means an area, location or facility at which an inspection is carried out.

6. The term "period of inspection" means the period of time from arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on any pre- and post-inspection procedures.

7. The term "point of entry" means: Washington, D.C., or San Francisco, California, the United States of America; Brussels (National Airport), The Kingdom of Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase), The Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino), The Republic of Italy; Schiphol, The Kingdom of the Netherlands; RAF Greenham Common, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Moscow, or Irkutsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Schkeuditz Airport, the German Democratic Republic; and International Airport Ruzyne, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

8. The term "in-country period" means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until its departure from the country through the point of entry.

9. The term "in-country escort" means individuals specified by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as necessary throughout the in-country period.

10. The term "aircrew member" means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

II. General Obligations

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate inspection by the other Party pursuant to this Protocol.

2. Each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other Party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the basing countries to the effect that the basing countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, on their territories.

III. Pre-Inspection Requirements

1. Inspections to ensure verification of compliance by the Parties with the obligations assumed under the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section.

2. No later than one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party: a list of its proposed aircrew members; a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty; and a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. None of these lists shall contain at any time more than 200 individuals.

3. Each Party shall review the lists of inspectors and aircrew members proposed by the other Party. With respect to an individual included on the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, if such an individual is unacceptable to the Party reviewing the list, that Party shall, within 20 days, so inform the Party providing the list, and the individual shall be deemed not accepted and shall be deleted from the list. With respect to an individual on the list of proposed aircrew members or the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party, within 20 days after the receipt of such lists, shall inform the other Party of its agreement to the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed. Inspectors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party.

4. Each Party shall have the right to amend its lists of inspectors and aircrew members. New inspectors and aircrew members shall be designated in the same manner as set forth in paragraph 3 of this Section with respect to the initial lists.

5. Within 30 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or of subsequent changes thereto, the Party receiving such information shall provide, or shall ensure the provision of, such visas and other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each inspector or aircrew member may enter and remain in the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located throughout the in-country period for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and documents shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months.

6. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded, throughout the in-country period, privileges and immunities in the country of the inspection site as set forth in the Annex to this Protocol.

7. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. In the event the inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member of the other Party has violated the conditions governing inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, or has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspected Party making such a determination shall so notify the inspecting Party, which shall immediately strike the individual from the lists of inspectors or the list of aircrew members. If, at that time, the individual is on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspecting Party shall immediately remove that individual from the country.

8. Within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall inform the other Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for airplanes of the Party transporting inspectors and equipment nec-

essary for inspection into and out of the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the designated point of entry shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon by the Parties as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.

IV. Notifications

1. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection shall be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The receipt of this notification shall be acknowledged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers by the inspected Party within one hour of its receipt.

(a) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include:
(i) the point of entry;
(ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
(iii) the date and time when the specification of the inspection site will be provided; and
(iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

(b) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include:
(i) the point of entry;
(ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
(iii) the site to be inspected and the type of inspection; and
(iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

2. The date and time of the specification of the inspection site as notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of this Section shall fall within the following time intervals:

(a) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry; and

(b) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 48 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry.

3. The inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with a flight plan, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, for its flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required."

4. No less than three hours prior to the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place, the inspected Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

5. Either Party may change the point or points of entry to the territories of the countries within which its deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities are located, by giving notice of such change to the other Party. A change in a point of entry shall become effective five months after receipt of such notification by the other Party.

V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. The in-country escort and a diplomatic aircrew escort accredited to the Government of either the inspected Party or the basing country in which the inspection site is located shall meet the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry as soon as the airplane of the inspecting Party lands. The number of aircrew members for each airplane shall not exceed ten. The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew, their baggage, and equipment and supplies necessary for inspection, into the country in which the inspection site is located. A diplomatic aircrew escort shall have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In the case of an inspection taking place on the territory of a basing country, the in-country escort may include representatives of that basing country.

2. An inspector shall be considered to have assumed his duties upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties when he has left the territory of the inspected Party or basing country.

3. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all customs duties.

4. Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party brings into the country in which an inspection site is located shall be subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought into that country. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country where the inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within tamper-proof containers within a secure facility. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system requiring the presence of both Parties to gain access to the equipment and supplies.

5. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of the inspected Party, including meals, services, lodging, work space, transportation and medical care shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

6. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for the airplane of the inspecting Party at the point of entry. The inspecting Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing.

7. For inspections conducted on the territory of the Parties, the inspection team shall enter at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is closest to the inspection site. In the case of inspections carried out in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of Section IV of this Protocol, inform the inspected Party at the point of entry through the in-country escort of the type of inspection and the inspection site, by placename and geographic coordinates.

VI. General Rules for Conducting Inspections

1. Inspectors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

2. Inspectors shall not disclose information received during inspections except with the express permission of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignment as inspectors has ended.

3. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with ongoing activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or taking actions affecting its safe operation.

4. Inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified by the in-

specting Party under paragraph 1(b) of Section IV or paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol.

5. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as considered necessary by the inspected Party throughout the in-country period. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort.

6. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken solely as a leisure activity.

7. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located within the territory of the country where the inspection is taking place using the telephone communications provided by the inspected Party.

8. At the inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort.

9. The inspection team may bring onto the inspection site such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, as well as linear measurement devices; cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties. The characteristics and method of use of the equipment listed above, shall also be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may use any of the equipment listed above, except for cameras, which shall be for use only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements shall be made by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall take photographs of the inspected facilities using the inspecting Party's camera systems which are capable of producing duplicate, instant development photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one copy of every photograph.

10. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection by the inspection team.

11. Measurements recorded during inspections shall be certified by the signature of a member of the inspection team and a member of the in-country escort when they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report.

12. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarifications as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph the object or building as requested by the inspecting Party for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and a copy of any photographs taken shall be included in the inspection report.

13. In carrying out their activities, inspectors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including those for the protection of controlled environments within a facility and for personal safety. Individual protective clothing and equipment shall be provided by the inspected Party, as necessary.

14. For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection procedures, including briefings and safety-related activities, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures. The period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours, except for inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of inspection may be extended, by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol, shall begin immediately upon completion of the inspection and shall be completed at the inspection site within four hours.

15. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of that Article, which shall include no more than 20 inspectors and an inspection team conducting inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of that Article, which shall include no more than 30 inspectors. At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and deputy team leader. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each. There shall be no more than one inspection team at an inspection site at any one time.

16. Except in the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities and shall then leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using its own airplane. In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it shall either:

(a) notify the inspected Party of its intent upon return to the point of entry; or

(b) notify the inspected Party of the type of inspection and the inspection site upon completion of the post-inspection procedures. In this case it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to ensure that the inspection team reaches the next inspection site without unjustified delay. The inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and route involved in such travel.

With respect to subparagraph (a), the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VII of this Protocol shall apply.

VII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Within one hour after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team arrives at the inspection site. During the period that pre-inspection movement restrictions are in effect, missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be removed from the inspection site.

2. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site so that the inspection team arrives at the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol.

3. In the event that an inspection is conducted in a basing country, the aircrew of the inspected Party may include representatives of the basing country.

4. Neither Party shall conduct more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, or more than 10 inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time.

5. The boundaries of the inspection site at the facility to be inspected shall be the boundaries of that facility set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support

structures and support equipment at the site that are subject to the Treaty and provide the inspection team leader with a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of these missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the inspection site.

7. Subject to the procedures of paragraphs 8 through 14 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding for the missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party.

8. A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher. A container that the inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile subject to the Treaty, and which is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a container to confirm that it cannot contain more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14 of this Section, a container that is sufficiently large to contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that the inspected party declares not to contain a missile or stage of such a missile subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by means of weighing or visual observation of the interior of the container, as necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact, contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

9. A structure or container that is not sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or container to confirm that it is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

10. Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, but which is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspection team not to be accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall not be subject to further inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection.

11. The inspection team shall be permitted to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and station inspectors at the exits of the site for the duration of the inspection.

12. The inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle capable of carrying missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty at any time during the course of an inspection and no such vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the course of the inspection until inspected at site exits by the inspection team.

13. Prior to inspection of a building within the inspection site, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits of the building that are large enough to permit passage of any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the time that the building is being inspected, no vehicle or object capable of containing any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be permitted to leave the building until inspected.

14. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected object which is equal to or larger than the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. This may be accomplished by partial removal of the shroud or environmental protection cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies the inspection team by its demonstration that the object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection of that object. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

VIII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Inspections of the process of elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.

(a) Upon arrival at the elimination facility, inspectors shall be provided with a schedule of elimination activities.

(b) Inspectors shall check the data which are specified in the notification provided by the inspected Party regarding the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated against the number and type of such items which are at the elimination facility prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures.

(c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the execution of the specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If any deviations from the agreed elimination procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance with the above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination.

(d) During the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspectors shall have the right to ascertain by visual observation that a missile prepared for launch is a missile of the type subject to elimination. The inspectors shall also be allowed to observe such a missile from a safe location specified by the inspected Party until the completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches for the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transport and route for the transportation of inspectors between inspection sites.

2. Inspections of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

IX. Inspection Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line and one road which shall be within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest

stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall exit only through this portal.

2. For the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty shall be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs.

3. There shall not be more than two other exits from the inspection site. Such exits shall be monitored by appropriate sensors. The perimeter of and exits from the inspection site may be monitored as provided for by paragraph 11 Section VII of this Protocol.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to establish continuous monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section and appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair and replacement of monitoring systems.

5. The inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following:

(a) all necessary utilities for the construction and operation of the monitoring systems, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating and sewage;

(b) basic construction materials including concrete and lumber;

(c) the site preparation necessary to accommodate the installation of continuously operating systems for monitoring the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, appropriate sensors for other exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and the center for collecting data obtained during inspections. Such preparation may include ground excavation, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations and utility connections;

(d) transportation for necessary installation tools, materials and equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site; and

(e) a minimum of two telephone lines and, as necessary, high frequency radio equipment capable of allowing direct communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party in the country in which the site is located.

6. Outside the perimeter of the inspection site, the inspecting Party shall have the right to:

(a) build no more than three buildings with a total floor space of not more than 150 square meters for a data center and inspection team headquarters, and one additional building with floor space not to exceed 500 square meters for the storage of supplies and equipment;

(b) install systems to monitor the exits to include weight sensors, vehicle sensors, surveillance systems and vehicle dimensional measuring equipment;

(c) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section equipment for measuring the length and diameter of missile stages contained inside of launch canisters or shipping containers;

(d) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this section non-damaging image producing equipment for imaging the contents of launch canisters or shipping containers declared to contain missiles or missile stages as provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section;

(e) install a primary and back-up power source; and

(f) use, as necessary, data authentication devices.

7. During the installation or operation of the monitoring systems, the inspecting Party shall not deny the inspected Party access to any existing structures or security systems. The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to such structures without consent of the inspected Party. If the Parties agree that such structures are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation.

8. The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict the access of the inspection team to such equipment.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use its own two-way systems of radio communication between inspectors patrolling the perimeter and the data collection center. Such systems shall conform to power and frequency restrictions established on the territory of the inspected Party.

10. Aircraft shall not be permitted to land within the perimeter of the monitored site except for emergencies at the site and with prior notification to the inspection team.

11. Any shipment exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section which is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be declared by the inspected Party to the inspection team before the shipment arrives at the portal. The declaration shall state whether such a shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party.

12. The inspection team shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including railcars, exiting the site to ascertain whether it is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party. These measurements shall be performed so as to minimize the delay of vehicles exiting the site. Vehicles that are either not large enough or not heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall not be subject to further inspection.

13. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party but that are declared not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

(a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles.

(b) If the inspecting Party can determine by visual observation or dimensional measurement that, inside a particular vehicle, there are no containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, then that vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded objects are not and do not contain intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of such GLBMs of the inspected Party.

14. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

(a) The inspecting Party shall preserve the integrity of the inspected missile or stage of a missile.

(b) Measuring equipment shall be placed only outside of the launch canister or shipping container; all measurements shall be made by the inspecting Party using the equipment provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section. Such measurements shall be observed and certified by the in-country escort.

(c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage and to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage; it shall have the right to view such missiles or missile stages contained in launch canisters or shipping containers eight times per calendar year. The in-country escort shall be present during all phases of such viewing. During such interior viewing:

(i) the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container shall be opened;

(ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be removed from its launch canister or shipping container; and

(iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the missile shall be measured in accordance with the methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

(d) The inspecting Party shall also have the right to inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside the vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 13 of this Section.

X. Cancellation of Inspection

An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that prevents an inspection team performing an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, or delay, then the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

XI. Inspection Report

1. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection procedures, and no later than two hours after the inspection has been completed, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report in both the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers and items of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and any measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures, as well as the inspection site diagram provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be attached to this report.

2. For inspection activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days after the end of each month, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report both in the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party that left the inspection site through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include any measurements of launch canisters or shipping containers contained in these vehicles recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party, under the provisions of paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a launch canister or shipping container declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also include the measurements of the length and diameter of missile stages obtained during the inspection and recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures shall be attached to this report.

3. The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report.

4. The Parties shall, when possible, resolve ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by one of the members of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.

Done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

Ronald Reagan

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Gorbachev

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

ANNEX

PROVISIONS ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors and aircrew members referred to in Section III of this Protocol shall be accorded the privileges and immunities contained in this Annex. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the entire in-country period in the country in which an inspection site is located, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or aircrew member.

1. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. The living quarters and office premises occupied by an inspector carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

3. The papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft of the inspection team shall be inviolable.

4. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction of an inspector or an aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be express.

5. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

6. Inspectors and aircrew members of a Party shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the other Party or a basing country in which an inspection site is located, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

7. An inspector or aircrew member shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party or that of the basing countries.

8. If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

Note: As printed above, the treaty, protocols, and annex follow the White House press release.

Soviet Union-United States Summit in Washington, DC

Address to the American and Soviet People. December 8, 1987

Well, thank you, and thank you all very much, and I think that maybe I got out the wrong set of notes here. Still, I do say thank you very much.

General Secretary Gorbachev and distinguished guests, my fellow Americans and citizens of the Soviet Union, the American philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson, once wrote that there is properly no history, only biography. He meant by this that it is not enough to talk about history as simply forces and factors. History is utimately a record of human will, human spirit, human aspirations of Earth's men and women, each with the precious soul and free will that the Lord bestows.

Today I, for the United States, and the General Secretary, for the Soviet Union, have signed the first agreement ever to eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. We have made history. And yet many so-called wise men once predicted that this agreement would be impossible to achieve—too many forces and factors stood against it. Well, still we persevered. We kept at it. And I hope the General Secretary will forgive me if I reveal that in some of the bleakest times, when it did truly seem that an agreement would prove impossible, I bucked myself up with the words of a great Russian, Leo Tolstoy, who wrote: "The strongest of all warriors are those two—time and patience."

In the next few days, we will discuss further arms reductions and other issues, and again it will take time and patience to reach agreements. But as we begin these talks, let us remember that genuine international confidence and security are inconceivable without open societies with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish, and the right to travel. So, yes, we will address human rights and regional conflicts, for surely the salvation of all mankind lies only in making everything the concern of all. With time, patience, and willpower, I believe we will resolve these issues. We must if we're to achieve a true, secure, and enduring peace.

As different as our systems are, there is a great bond that draws the American and Soviet peoples together. It is the common dream of peace. More than 40 years ago we fought in a great war as allies. On the day that news of the enemy's surrender reached Moscow, crowds gathered in front of the American Embassy. There they cheered the friendship of a nation that had opened a second front and sent food, munitions, and trucks to the Soviet peoples as they displayed awesome courage and will in turning the invader back. A young American diplomat later told of a Soviet soldier in the crowds who shouted over and over, "Now it is time to live."

Too often in the decades since then the soldier's dream—a time to live—has been put off, at least as far as it concerned genuine peace between our two countries. Yet we Americans have never stopped praying for peace. In every part of the world we want this to be a time to live.

Only those who don't know us believe that America is a materialistic land. But the true America is not supermarkets filled with meats, milk, and goods of all descriptions. It is not highways filled with cars. No, true America is a land of faith and family. You can find it in our churches, synagogues, and mosques—in our homes and schools. As one of our great writers put it: America is a willingness of the heart—the universal, human heart—for Americans come from every part of Earth, including the Soviet Union. We want a peace that fulfills the dream of all peoples to raise their families in freedom and safety. And I believe that if both of our countries have courage and the patience, we will build such a peace.

In the next 2 months, people throughout the world will take part in two great festivals of faith: Hanukkah and Christmas. One is a celebration of freedom, the other of peace on Earth, good will toward men. My great hope is that the biographies of our times will record that we had the will to make this the right season for this summit.

Thank you, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 2:10 p.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House. His remarks were translated into Russian by an interpreter. The address was broadcast live on television.

At the conclusion of the broadcast, the President and the General Secretary met with U.S. and Soviet officials to discuss arms reduction and bilateral issues.

Soviet Union-United States Summit in Washington, DC

Toasts at the State Dinner for General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. December 8, 1987

The President. Mr. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, honored guests: In our public statements and in our meetings together, Mr. General Secretary, we've always paid each other the compliment of candor. So, let us continue to do so. By now, Mr. General Secretary, you may have concluded that while we have fundamental disagreements about how human communities should govern themselves, it's possible, all the same, for us to work together.

As we complete the first full day of this historic meeting, let us look back together at the developments of the past 2 years and the significance of what is taking place. For we find ourselves involved in a dramatic march of events that has captured the attention of our two peoples and the entire world.

Since you and I first met in Geneva in November 1985, Mr. General Secretary, our two countries have moved toward a new period in the history of our relations. The highlight of your visit is the signing of the first U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement in nearly a decade—the first ever to mandate actual reductions in our arsenals of nuclear weapons. We're making significant progress in other important areas of arms reduction, and have the opportunity, with mutual commitment and hard work, to achieve much more in the coming months.

But our relationship—the United States and the Soviet Union—is not founded just on arms control but reaches across a broad spectrum of issues. A relationship that addresses the basic problems of self-determination in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights. There are differences here, but ones that require frankness and candor. In bilateral matters, we also need hard and honest debate.

A century-and-a-half ago, the brilliant French observer, de Tocqueville, foresaw that our two countries would be the major countries of the world. History, geography, the blessings of resources, and the hard work of our peoples have made it so. And between us, there has also been a profound competition of political and economic philosophy, making us the protagonists in a drama with the greatest importance for the future of all mankind. Man's most fundamental beliefs about the relationship of the citizen to the state and of man to his creator lie at the core of the competition between our two countries. History has indeed endowed our relationship with a profound meaning.

Certainly we will not settle those issues this week. But the tasks before us require a full awareness of those issues and of a responsibility that is binding on us both. I speak of a responsibility we dare not compromise or shirk. I speak of the responsibility to settle our differences in peace.

Already, by virtue of hard work and hard bargaining, we've accomplished much, and our negotiators deserve great credit. But we cannot afford to rest. There is more work to be done, and time and history are marching on.

So, I offer a toast, a commitment on behalf of the American people of seriousness, goodwill, and hope for the future. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev: To your health. *Za vashe zdorovye.*

The General Secretary. I take power into my hands now, while the President is busy. [*Laughter*] Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. Reagan, ladies and gentlemen, comrades: Last summer it took a daring American girl by the name of Lynn Cox a mere 2 hours to swim the distance separating our two countries. On television we saw how sincere and cordial the meeting was between our people and the Americans when she stepped onto the Soviet shore. By her courage she showed how close to each other our two peoples live.

Without minimizing the great political and ideological distances between us, we want to seek and find avenues of rapprochement in areas where this is of vital importance for our two countries and for all humankind. That is precisely what we are here for.

In my 1986 New Year's Eve address on American television, I spoke of our hopes for a better future. By that time, Mr. President, you and I had already had 2 days of face-to-face talks in Geneva. This enabled me to tell Americans in my New Year address that the winter of our discontent may one day come to an end. Today, following Reykjavik and the extensive preparatory work that has made our meeting in Washington possible, it can be said that the winter is on the wane.

A boundless world stretches far and wide beyond the walls of this house. And you and I, if you will, are accountable to it and to the peoples of our two countries, to our allies and friends and to all our contemporaries. The Russian word, *perestroika*, can be applied to the process now underway all over the world of rethinking the realities of a nuclear and space age. It must now be clear to all that the problems of today's world will not be solved through old approaches.

The goal we are setting today is to build a nuclear-free world. The road leading to it is difficult and thorny, but with new thinking it is attainable. As you can see, here, too, changes are necessary—changes in the minds and changes in actions.

The great age of geographical discoveries amounted to more than one caravel or one newly found continent. Our journey toward a nuclear-free world cannot amount to reaching one or two islands named INF and shorter range INF. It is my hope that we shall promptly move further ahead toward the goal of reducing and then eliminating strategic offensive arms which make up the main and decisive portion of the nuclear arsenal.

As the clock of life brings us closer and closer to the 21st century, we are duty bound to remember that each one of us, within the limits of our capability and ability, personifies the link between the transient and the eternal. As our famous poet Afanasiy Fet, said, "Although man is not eternal, what is human is eternal." It is in the name of eternal humanity that we have today performed our momentous deed.

And my first salute is to that event. It will be cherished by our two peoples. So, I address these words of congratulation to the Soviet and American people whose will is embodied in the agreement. I want to emphasize that this is the fruit of the efforts not only of us both but also of our allies and representatives of all countries and all public movements whose effort and contribution rightfully make them parties to this historic event.

It would be fair today to pay tribute to the efforts of those who were directly involved in preparing the treaty. May I wish good health to you, Mr. President, and to Mrs. Reagan; happiness and well-being to all those present here tonight; peace and prosperity to the peoples of our two countries.

Note: The President spoke at 9:34 p.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House. The President spoke in English, and the General Secretary spoke in Russian. Their remarks were translated by interpreters.

Supreme Court of the United States

Statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations on the American Bar Association's Rating of Anthony M. Kennedy. December 8, 1987

Today the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary unanimously voted to give Judge Anthony M. Kennedy its highest rating of fitness for a Supreme Court Justice—a rating of "well qualified."

The President is very gratified by the ABA's announcement and believes that after concluding its hearings the Senate will agree with the assessment of the American Bar Association that Judge Kennedy possesses the highest qualifications to be a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

According to the ABA, this rating is "reserved for those who meet the highest standard of professional competence, judicial temperament and integrity. The person in this category must be among the best available for appointment to the Supreme Court." The ABA's decision followed a detailed examination of Judge Kennedy's professional qualifications, his writings, and his decisions on the bench, as well as extensive interviews with persons familiar with his record.

Soviet Union-United States Relations

Excerpts From an Interview With Conservative Columnists. December 9, 1987

Q. What reassurance can you offer to our conservative friends that this INF treaty is in the national interest and in their interest?

The President. Well, it is. And I know that most of the things we hear is that they believe that somehow by this INF agreement we have changed the balance of power in Europe, and that the Soviets, who do have, admittedly, a conventional superiority, have been given an advantage. But that isn't so. There are still hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons left in Europe—the tactical battlefield weapons. And those are the weapons that do equalize that imbalance in conventional weapons.

Now, before you would go into any treaty about those tactical battlefield weapons, that would have to follow parity in the conventional weapons because if we eliminated and they eliminated the tactical battlefield weapons they automatically would end up with a great superiority if it was reduced to conventional weapons. And in this instance, I feel they're so wrong because they are giving up four times as many warheads as we have to give up. In our Pershings and cruise missiles, we didn't have anywhere near the number of warheads, and their intermediate-range missiles were not targeted on military targets. They covered all the way to London.

Q. Sir, can I ask you how did you feel this morning when you woke up? Is this the happiest day of your life? [*Laughter*]

The President. Well, I felt good. I think that yesterday was quite a day. After years of debate and discussion and walking away from things without settlement, I thought it was quite a day.

Q. Does this mean that you expect the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan soon and stop supporting the Sandinistas soon in Nicaragua?

The President. They have—he has expressed and is—in fact, not just to me but publicly, that they want to get out of Afghanistan. And I can't go beyond that, other than that saying that the people we have working on all of these things are working on that particular question right now, as to when and how.

Q. How did you like Raisa Gorbachev?

The President. Oh, well, she seems very pleasant, and we just had a little moment here. Maybe I shouldn't give this away, but I will. His schedule was very busy today, and our meeting ran over here in the Oval Office. And I kept—finally, as I told him, I said, I've been told that I'm to take him over to the Diplomatic Entrance there to meet his wife who was with Nancy, and then so they could go on with their schedule. And then when we got there, we found out that Nancy and Raisa were having coffee together, and they were late. [*Laughter*] So, when we stood down there in the Dip Room waiting for them to come down, I suggested something to him, and we both did it—that when finally they came around and through the door, he and I were both looking at our watches. [*Laughter*] We got a laugh.

Note: The interview began at 2 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. Participants in the interview included Philip Geyelin, Georgie Ann Geyer, R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., and Joseph B. Wattenberg.

As printed above, the excerpts follow the White House press release.

Soviet Union-United States Summit in Washington, DC

Toast at a Dinner Hosted by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. December 9, 1987

Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Ambassador and Mrs. Dubinin, and ladies and gentlemen: We're coming to the end of the second full day of your visit to our land. It's been an eventful 2 days. But now that you've seen our Nation's Capital, Mr. General Secretary, I only wish you could have a chance to meet the people who normally work and do business here. Unfortunately, they're all in Iowa and New Hampshire—*[laughter]*—campaigning for my job.

As everyone in the United States knows, I have a weakness for anecdotes. So, if I may, I'd like to begin with a story I was so moved by recently that I mentioned it in my address to the people of the Soviet Union. It's an account of one of our diplomats, a young man then, stationed in our Embassy in Moscow during World War II. He was there when news of victory, V-E Day reached that city, and he said Red Square erupted in a spontaneous demonstration of thankfulness and joy.

Our Embassy's chancery was just across from the Kremlin, and many of the Americans stationed there in those days were still in uniform. When they walked outside to join in the celebration, the crowd spotted them, lifted them onto their shoulders, and carried them on to Red Square. But the young diplomat said he was even more moved by the words of one Red Army major standing near him in the crowd, words filled with new found hope: "Now it's time to live," he said.

Well, Mr. General Secretary, we've accomplished much so far in this summit—a pathbreaking agreement that for the first time will eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. But I'm convinced that history will ultimately judge this summit and its participants not on missile count but on how far we moved together to the fulfillment of that soldier's hopes.

We have prided ourselves, Mr. General Secretary, on our realism, that we've come to this summit without illusions, with no attempts to gloss over the deep differences that divide us, differences that reach to the core values upon which our political systems are based. But we said, even so, we can make progress; even so, we can find areas of agreement and cooperation.

But perhaps in this Christmas season, we should look at an even deeper and more enduring realism. It is a reality that precedes states and governments, that precedes and surpasses the temporary realities of ideology and politics. It is the reality that binds each of us as individual souls, the bond that united Soviets and Americans in exultation and thanksgiving on that day of peace, 42 years ago.

General Secretary Gorbachev, you've declared that in your own country there is a need for greater *glasnost*, or openness, and the world watches expectantly and with great hopes to see this promise fulfilled. For in talking of openness and promising truth, you've called on the deepest hungers of the human heart, hungers shared by all, whether they be Soviet or American or the citizens of any nation on Earth.

Thomas Jefferson, one of our nation's great founders and philosophers, once said, "The God who gave us life, gave us liberty as well." He meant that we're born to freedom and that the need for liberty is as basic as the need for food. And he, as the great revolutionary he was, also knew that lasting peace would only come when individual souls have the freedom they crave. What better time than in this Christmas and Hanukkah season, a season of spirit you recently spoke to, Mr. General Secretary, when you noted the millennium of Christianity in your land and spoke of the hopes of your people for a better life in a world of peace. These are hopes shared by the people of every nation, hopes for an end to war; hopes, especially in this season, for the right to worship according to the dictates of the conscience.

There's an old Russian saying: "Every man is the blacksmith of his own happiness." And like all folk sayings, it contains a profound understanding of the human condition. We can, with our free will, shape our future. We can make it what that Soviet soldier saw in his vision of a better world, a vision of peace and freedom.

In memory of that day in Red Square when Soviet citizens carried American soldiers on their shoulders, in memory of that day when the Red Army embraced a new world of hope, I raise my glass. Mr. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, thank you. And Ambassador and Mrs. Dubinin, thank you for your hospitality this evening. And for my last attempt at Russian: *Za vashe zdorovye [To your health].*

Note: The President spoke at 7:40 p.m at the Soviet Embassy.

Earlier, the President and the General Secretary met privately and then with U.S. and Soviet officials in the Oval Office at the White House to discuss regional issues and arms reduction.

Soviet Union-United States Summit in Washington, DC

Joint Statement. December 10, 1987

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on December 7–10, 1987.

Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last two years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stabil-

ity and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive cooperation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I. ARMS CONTROL

The INF Treaty

The two leaders signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This treaty is historic both for its objective—the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms—and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The Delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: PEACEKEEPER (MX): 10, MINUTEMAN III: 3, MINUTEMAN II: 1, TRIDENT I: 8, TRIDENT II: 8, POSEIDON: 10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17: 4, SS-19: 6, SS-18: 10, SS-24: 10, SS-25: 1, SS-11: 1, SS-13: 1, SS-N-6: 1, SS-N-8: 1, SS-N-17: 1, SS-N-18: 7, SS-N-20: 10 and SS-N-23: 4. Procedures will be developed that enable verfication of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

(d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

(e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will

be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Other Arms Control Issues

The President and the General Secretary reviewed a broad range of other issues concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that enhance security and stability.

Nuclear Testing

The two leaders welcomed the opening on November 9, 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on September 17, 1987, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR:

> The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the U.S.-USSR Treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts' visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test site. The terms of reference for the Experiment are set forth in the statement issued on December 9, 1987, by the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders noted the value of these agreements for developing more effective measures to verify compliance with the provisions of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their last meeting of additional parties to the Treaty, and confirmed their intent to make, together with other states, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.

The President and the General Secretary expressed support for international cooperation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further strengthened IAEA safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders welcomed the signing on September 15, 1987, in Washington of the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

Chemical Weapons

The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. The United States and Soviet Union are in favor of greater openness and intensified confidence-building with respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They agreed to continue periodic discussions by experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

Conventional Forces

The President and the General Secretary discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favor of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, so that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures. They also noted that the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability, and spoke in favor of continuing and consolidating this process. The President and the General Secretary agreed to instruct their appropriate representatives to intensify efforts to achieve solutions to outstanding issues.

They also discussed the Vienna (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations.

Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the Middle East, Cambodia, southern Africa, Central America and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS

The President and the General Secretary reviewed in detail the state of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening

bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

Bilateral Negotiations

Having reviewed the state of ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: commercial maritime issues; fishing; marine search and rescue; radio navigational systems; the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary; and cooperation in the field of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet Air Transport Agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the New York-Moscow route by Pan American Airways and Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet World Ocean Agreement.

People-to-People Contacts and Exchanges

The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the U.S.-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement in the areas of education, science, culture and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with plans to celebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of the first Exchanges Agreement in January 1988.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the initiative they launched at their 1985 meeting in Geneva—a process which has involved tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet citizens over the past two years. The leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment further to expand such contacts, including among the young.

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

With reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to cooperate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the U.S.-Soviet Environmental Protection Agreement and the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary supported further cooperation among scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the U.S. and the USSR to cooperate with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy towards establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further cooperation in this area.

The President and the General Secretary agreed to develop bilateral cooperation in combatting international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective cooperation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.

The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Canada.

Trade

The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations.

Diplomatic Missions

Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their respective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of Embassies and Consulates General constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V. FURTHER MEETINGS

The President and the General Secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The President accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.

Appendix C

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto

In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction, and to discuss a resolution in the spirit of the appended draft.

We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt. The world is full of conflicts; and, overshadowing all minor conflicts, the titanic struggle between Communism and anti-Communism.

Almost everybody who is politically conscious has strong feelings about one or more of these issues; but we want you, if you can, to set aside such feelings and consider yourselves only as members of a biological species which has had a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can desire.

We shall try to say no single word which should appeal to one group rather than another. All, equally, are in peril, and, if the peril is understood, there is hope that they may collectively avert it.

We have to learn to think in a new way. We have to learn to ask ourselves, not what steps can be taken to give military victory to whatever group we prefer, for there are no longer such steps; the question we have to ask ourselves is: what steps can be taken to prevent a military contest of which the issue must be disastrous to all parties?

The general public, and even many men in position of authority, have not realized what would be involved in a war with nuclear bombs. The general public still thinks in terms of obliteration of cities. It is understood that the new bombs are more powerful than the old, and that, while one A-bomb could obliterate Hiroshima, one H-bomb could obliterate the largest cities, such as London, New York and Moscow.

No doubt in an H-bomb war great cities would be obliterated. But this is one of the minor disasters that would have to be faced. If everybody in London, New York and Moscow were exterminated, the world might, in the course of a few centuries, recover from the blow. But we know, especially since the Bikini test, that nuclear bombs can gradually spread destruction over a very much wider area than had been supposed.

It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can now be manufactured which will be 2,500 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radioactive particles into the upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or rain. It was this dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish.

No one knows how widely such lethal radioactive particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might quite possibly put an end to the human race. It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death—sudden only for a minority but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. What they do say is that these results are possible, and no one can be sure that they will not be realized. We have not yet found that the views of experts on this question depend in any degree upon their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as our researches have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert's knowledge. We have found that the men who know most are the most gloomy.

Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: shall we put an end to the human race, or shall mankind renounce war? People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war.

The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything else is that the term "mankind" feels vague and abstract. People scarcely realize in imagination that the danger is to themselves and their children and their grandchildren, and not only to a dimly apprehended humanity. They can scarcely bring themselves to grasp that they, individually, and those whom they love are in imminent danger of perishing agonizingly. And so they hope that perhaps war may be allowed to continue provided modern weapons are prohibited.

This hope is illusory. Whatever agreements not to use H-bombs had been reached in time of peace, they would no longer be considered binding in time of war, and both sides would set to work to manufacture H-bombs as soon as war broke out, for, if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side that manufactured them would inevitably be victorious.

Although an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments would not afford an ultimate solution, it would serve certain important purposes. First: any agreement between East and West is to the good insofar as it tends to diminish tension. Second: the abolition of thermo-nuclear weapons, if each side believed that the other had carried it out sincerely, would lessen the fear of a sudden attack in the style of Pearl Harbour, which at present keeps both sides in a state of nervous apprehension. We should, therefore, welcome such an agreement, though only as a first step.

Most of us are not neutral in feeling, but as human beings, we have to remember that, if the issues between East and West are to be decided in any manner that can give any possible satisfaction to anybody, whether Communist or anti-Communist, whether Asian or European or American, whether White or Black, then these issues must not be decided by war. We should wish this to be understood, both in the East and in the West.

There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.

Resolution

We invite this Congress, and through it the scientists of the world and the general public, to subscribe to the following resolution:

> In view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will certainly be employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued existence of mankind, we urge the Governments of the world to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purpose cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them.

Professor Max Born (Professor of Theoretical Physics at Berlin, Frankfurt, and Göttingen, and of Natural Philosophy, Edinburgh; Nobel Prize in physics)
Professor P.W. Bridgman (Professor of Physics, Harvard University; Nobel Prize in physics)
Professor Albert Einstein
Professor L. Infeld (Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Warsaw)
Professor J. F. Joliot-Curie (Professor of Physics at the College de France; Nobel Prize in chemistry)
Professor H. J. Muller (Professor of Zoology at the University of Indiana; Nobel Prize in physiology and medicine)
Professor Linus Pauling (Professor of Chemistry, California Institute of Technology; Nobel Prize in chemistry)
Professor J. Rotblat (Professor of Physics, University of London, Medical College of St. Bartholomew's Hospital)
Bertrand Russell
Professor Hideki Yukawa (Professor of Theoretical Physics, Kyoto University, Nobel Prize in physics)
(Rotblat 1972)

This statement, which became known as the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, was subsequently endorsed by thousands of scientists from many countries. It became the credo of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. The Pugwash Movement (see *Pugwash Movement*), which is the direct outcome of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, carries out its activities in the spirit of the Manifesto to this day.

Thus, a quarter of a century after Einstein's death, the ideals for which he strove throughout his life are being cherished, promoted, and gradually implemented by an ever-increasing number of scientists.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALCM	:	Air launched cruise missile
CEP	:	Circular error probable
DTD	:	Double Track Decision
GLCM	:	Ground launched cruise missile
HLG	:	High level group
INF	:	Intermediate range nuclear force
LRINF	:	Long range intermediate range nuclear force
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM	:	National Technical means
SCG	:	Special consultative group
SLCM	:	Sea launched cruise missile
SRINF	:	Short Range Intermediate Range Nuclear Force
START	:	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TERCOM	:	Terrain counter matching

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