RUSSIA'S ROLE IN CIS

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

BHAGAT SINGH

CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY NEW DELHI 110067 1998



जवाहरलाल नेहरु विश्वविद्यालय JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY NEW DELHI - 110067

CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN
AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

21st JULY, 1998

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "RUSSIA'S ROLE IN C.I.S" submitted by BHAGAT SINGH in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy of this University, is his bonafide work and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any degree of this University or of any other University to the best of my knowledge.

(PROF. DEVENDRA KAŬSHIK)

(PROF. NIRMALA JOSHI)

SUPERVISOR

CHAIR PERSON

GRAM: JAYENU TEL.: 6107676, 6167557 TELEX: 031-73167 JNU IN FAX: 91-011-6165886

CONTENTS

PREFACE	
CHAPTER I1-	13
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE	
SOVIET UNION, AND THE	
FORM VI ION OF THE CIS.	
CHAPTER II14-	28
RUSSIA AND THE CIS IN THE	
INITIAL PERIOD: "FROM CHVILIZED	
DIVORCE" TO REALISATION OF	
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION.	
CHAPTER III29-	47
ASCENDANCY OF INTEGRATIONIST	
TREND IN CIS: RUSSIA'S RELUCTANT	
ACQUIESCENCE.	
CHAPTER IV48-	-64
RUSSIAN ACTIVISIM IN THE CIS AND	
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF	
INTEGRATION: IN LIEU OF A	. '
CONCLUSION.	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	. 7 7

PREFACE

It is an irony of history that Russia which had created the mighty U.S.S.R. in the wake of its socialist revolution in 1917 was mainly responsible for its destruction in December 1991. Infact the seed of destrucation of the Soviet Union was sown on 12th June 1990 when Russia declared its so called independence, But by a quirk of destiny the Russia of yeltsin is again on the centrestage of historical movement for creation of a new Eurasian state through a closer intergation of the CIS.

The present study is an attempt to analise and explain the role of Russia in transforming the CIS in to a more effective inter-state organization. The work deals with the various stages in Russia's role in this process of evolution of a new supranational state on the ruins of the former soviet union.

The study is based on primary source material consisting of documents of the various CIS Summit. The treaties and agreement signed by the CIS members state

as well as speeches and public statemens of the CIS leaders. This study is also made use of an extensive secondary source material contened in the Russian and western periodicals and press.

supervisor *Prof. DEVENDRA KAUSHIK* for his valuable guidance which as mend a lot of for completing this studyt, I also thank the librarian staff of J.N.U. Library for their genrous assitance and cooperation in collection material used for preparing this dissecrtation

Last, but not the least, I am greatful to my parents, friends and my siblings who have always been kind and helpful to me.

BHAGAT SINGH

New Delhi 14/7/98

TO MY PARENTS

CHAPTER I

THE DISINTE GRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FORMATION OF THE CIS

The great Soviet state ceased to exist a few days before it Seventieth Anniversary the Soviet federal structure began to fall apart in 1987 when a sharp conflict arose between The Republic Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-kara backh autonomous region.

Lithuania was the first republic to declare its

Sovereign status, in March 1990 followed by the two
other baltic republics. president Gorbachov efforts formed
a new federal structure fail to analist support of the
Republican leaders who had become more powerful

than the Union leadership.

The Republican leaders were suspicious of any move to form a new federation in which the federal govt would enjoy greater power.

That the originally Well-Conceived Soviet federation.

Which degenerated into unitary states as a result of stalin dictatorship,

was in desperate need reform is Universally expected. Yet it is doubtful that the kind of reform needed was not possible to be achived by legal and constitutional Means and by taking the people in to confidence.

It is often argue that the dissolution of Soviet Union and its replacement by the CIS was a political necessity and that it was the lesson envall. Such an a arguement however tends to ignore the responsibility of power-hungry

politicians like Gorbachov, Kravechuk and Yeltsin for the disintergration of the Soviet Union.

The abortive coup of August 1991 is also became for hastening the collapse of Soviet Union. With or without the coup Yeltsin to was determined to end duality of power in the Kremlin. He started and unseemly struggle to grap Union enterprises and ministries.

President Gorbachov tried to cling to powers at any cost regardless of the interest of great Soviet states. He hopped to cut-manoeuver Yeltsin through the Novologaravo process by enlisting the support, of other Republic. The Ukrainian referendum on december 1991 came in handy as an Alibi to dissolve the Soviet union by passing out the popular mandate of the referendum of march 1991 and the constitution and the law. The August Union treaty which could not be signed on account of the abortive

failed august 1991 coup a new structure governence was created which provided for a role of the republican leaders in the running of Union government?

The state Council of the Union was headed by the president by union and conceted of the supreme Soviet leader republics. It also created a new Union supreme Soveit.

A New inter-republic union economic committee was constituted the guide structural changes in the economy of the country. After protracted negotiations the republics accepted the draft of the treaty of union of sovereign states (USS) as a confederal political set up. However this draft treaty remained unsigned because of opposition from the legislature of the republics.

Gorbachov's efforts in this direction were frustrated

and Belorussia. After the meeting of December 1991 in belovezh near minsk decided to dissolve the U.S.S.R and formed a common-wealth in its place instead of a proposed confederation.

The central Asian republics expressed their annoyance at being leftout by the slav leadership from their minsk initiative. In a meeting in Alma Kazakhastan on December 21,1991 leaders of eleven Soviet republics signed a commonwealth agreement that guarnteed their separate soveriegnty they agreed to Yeltsin proposal that Russia should take over the security council in the United Nation held by the Soviet union.

President Gorbachov was left no option but to transfer his power to president of Yeltsin Russia by constitutionaly dissolving the Soviet union. On Dec. 25, 1991. Gorbachov

had wanted to restructed the political and economic system.

by adopting the policy of openness and democratization

but his policy failed to motivate Soviet citizen. His efforts

to democratise the country unleased the democratic forces

that brought about the disintegration of the Soviet union.

Thus Soviet union was illegally and unconstitutionaly replace by the CIS the union of treaty 1992 the established the U.S.S.R. contened no provision for its repudiation by any single republics or group of republics. A Republic could secede a republic from the union, following the relevent constitutional provision, namely, by holding a referendum and fullfilling the conditioned prescribe by the law adopted 3 aprial on 1990 for the settlement the question relating to the secssion of a republic. In Russia the heighest representative of the republic, the congress of peoples because which amended the and confirmed the Russian

the C.I.S. the congress did not recognise the ratification of Belovezh and Almata agreement by the supreme Soviet of the Russia. Ratification of these agreement by the parliament of other republics did not legitimise the CIS as their constitution affirming has lof Russia. Were not amended.

The creation of the CIS is at best explained it not justified by the contradiction between political necessity and the law.

There was little hope left for the establishment of a reformed union in the form either a soft or even a loose confederation. "It was thus imperative for the republics" writes Devendra Kaushik, to reach compromise in the form of the CIS, avoiding both a much-feared centre and uncontrolled disintegration of the post-Soviet

space a la Yugoslvia.1

On December 30, 1991 the members states of the CIS agreed on a permanent joint command. Over the former Soviet nuclear warheads but to fail to preserve a command of the unified conventional forces. They also reached an agreement on a principle of common tariff and transportation systems. On agreement to reach to reconstituted, the existing state television and radio monopoly as a common wealth broad casting network.

A seperate council of priminister was also created.

The three slavic state decided to go in price liberalisation resulting in a steep price rise.

If one were to spell out the single strongest factor accelerating the demise of the Soviet Union, the likely

^{1.} Devendra Kaushik, <u>"The CIS: A Balance Sheet" in Ajay Patniak (Ed.)</u>
common wealth Independent State problems and prospects P, 34 (New Delhi)
1995.

Yeltsin. A fierce power strugle was going on between Yeltsin and Gorbachov.

In this power struggle Yeltsain did not hesitate to exploit the factor of Russian nationalism. Yeltsin used the desire of the Ukranian president for independence as a pretext to break the Soviet union and coaxed a reluctant Belorussian president Shuskveich to fall in line with him at Belovelzh. It would however unfair to solely blame Yeltsin or Gorbachov or both of them for the disintegration of the Soviet union.

Officourse there were objective factors behind the collapse of the Soviet experiment of a federal state. The wide powers conceded to the national republics comprising the U.S.S.R. where more than counter balanced by the unifying role of a centralized communist party, which held

force of and ideology professing, proletarian internationalism over tylic year this cementing force was showing signs of cracking up under the weight of numerous contradictions. In this sphere of economic inter-ethnic relations. The mature leadership could have found a satisfactory solution through a reformed federal selter. But certainly Gorbachov and Yeltsin did not belong to the category of real statesmen Gorbachov started thinking of reforming the existing federel setup rather late.

Infact when he initiated his moves towrds a new union treaty, the Soviet economy was already on a downward course which further stocked thefire of interethnic dissession and conflicts.

When the C.I.S. was born on 21 December 1991 of the fomer Soviet republics only Georgia and three Baltic

states decline to become its member. The C.I.S is not a successor institution of the former U.S.S.R.

It is not a subject of international law. Most CIS agreements are not legally beinding. They remain declarations of intent and only a few of them require ratification by the parliament of mamber state. The CIS has no capital minds is designated as the seat of coordinating body.

Altogether the CIS agreements provide for roughly thirty coordinating bodies of varying spheres. Apart from the councils of heads of state and government and the already mentioned work groups, there are the council of defence ministers, the council for collective security, the supreme command of the Joint armed forces, a custom union institution, an inter-state bank, the council of foreign Ministers and iner-state council and committees for space travel, air traffic, the environment, science and technology

standardisation, methology, statistics, rail traffic electroenergetics the health system, and the like. Irrespective of this host of Joint activities, the goals formulated in the constituent agreement the coordination of foreign-policy and cooperation in the development of a common economic area and of all European and Eurasion markets, in the field of custom, transport and communication, with respect to environmental protection, migration policy and the fight against organised crime are not being effectively fostered, only a few of the coordinating bodies function properly. And this only applies to fields such as transport, in which of coordination would lead to the collapse of entire branches CIS the states.

The MINSK agreement extended by the Almata agreement speaks of a commitment to building tevel democratic law govern, develop relation mutual recognition

and respect for state sovereignty, the inalienable right to self determination, the Principles of equality and non interference, repuliation of use of force of any form corecion, relations of friendship, good neighbourleness, and mutually

rights of people, The, new entities of open for accession by all member states of U.S.S.R and also by other state that share the aim and principles of said agreement.

Thus was launched the CIS which included eleven former Soviet republics. Only three Baltic republics and Georgia did not choosed to join it.

CHAPTER II

RUSSIA AND THE CIS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD: "FROM CIVILIZED DIVORCE" TO REALISATION OF THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION.

When the C.I.S emerged on the ruins of the U.S.S.R there was little clarity about the shape and direction of its future evolution. It was mainly viewed as an agency supervising what was described by many as the, "Civilized Divorce" among the members of the former Soviet union. In the beginning it remained they foccupied with the problems of minimising the economic disruption and eliminating threats to internal and external security of the newly independent republics. The structural model for the CIS which toward the largest support was the European

EC were at best superficial. If there were still obstacle to Europeon union unity the obstacle in the ways of creating a true functural true C.I.S were to prove much greater unlike the EC which was composed of well-established nations, in most cases the C.I.S was made up of nations which had little experience of the C.I.S along the lines of the EC it was first necessary that the newly independent nation states consolidated there states soveriegnty before agree to deligate a part of it to be exercised by the supra-national entity -- The CIS.

As stated in the new preceding chapter it was the secession of Russia from the Soviet union and recognition by it or the independence of the Baltic states which sealed the fate of the U.S.S.R and establishment of the C.I.S in its place. But even in the CIS dominance of Russia Remained a reality if in the past Russia and

true in the relation to the CIS. (The CIS failed to establish its own authority because non of the members states had the funds or personnel, to setup CIS administration.

All were thus obliged to depend on Russians experts.)

As MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT as rightly observed, "Russian filled most of the secondary and teritary level position on the CIS Working groups that meet four weeks before the formal meetings between commonwealth presidents, defence ministers, and other officials, giving Russia essential control of agendas, venues and other procedural details".

The Stand-Off between the parliaments of the C.I.S republics which were still dominated by the communists and the presidence who had broken with the communist party resulted in a distorted functioning of the CIS The

^{1.} Martha Brill Olcott "Russia's Place in the CIS" (Current History) 92 (576)
Oct. 93 P. 315

presidents of the republics often acted for reasons considerations which contributed Domestic political weakening of the CIS structures. The parliaments of the republics mostly ignored the CIS resolutions. Thus Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan asserted in Aprial 1992 had adopted that CIS 270 measures that were his country and to its soveriegn not unacceptable to applicable to it. The CIS meetings were reduced to mere formal forums which were expanded by the presidents of member states to lose their own image rather than to finding solutions for common problems.

The first year of the existence of the CIS was marked by a sharp fall in production in the republics ranging from 15 to 40 percent. The rate of interesting inflation varied from 1500 to 2600 percent resulting in mass impoverishment. The inter-and intra-republic and interethnic conflicts in the CIS in Moldova, Nagorno-kara-bakh

northern Caucasia. Abkhazia and Tazikistan, assumed enlarging presumption resulting in the death of scores of thousands of people and displacement of hundered of thousands. The CIS as an institution hardly played any role in islamic bloodshed in these areas. Off course Russia along with Uzbekistan did play an active role in restoring an easy place in Tazikistan, but in doing so it operated outside the CIS mandate. The Russian dominated C.I.S was not viewed favourbly for bringing about a settlement of the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh

Never the less the CIS sought to address a number of serious issues. It successfully tackled the problem of succession of the military and particularly Soviet nuclear arsenal which was spread among Russia, Ukraine, Belarusa and Kazakhastan. A CIS strategic military command was established under marshal Shapshonikeo and a process elaborated for ensuring control of nuclear weapon which

was to remain in Russians hand. Subsequently Russia show direct control over the CIS strategic military command. While the officer corps and the equipment of the bulk of the army were shared out among the CIS members.

The transition however has not been without some problems, Ukraine which post-poned signing of the START-I until it was promised proper compensation for becoming a new nuclear state. The problem of owner ship black sea fleet also remain unresloved for a long time. Kazakhastan also raised some obstacles which were solved by extending security guarantees by the nuclear powers.

On the whole Russia acquited itself well in discharging its obligations as a leading member of the common wealth. It subsidise the CIS member state to the tune of \$17 billion dollar through artificially low fuel prices and

unprofitable credits.2 Russia did not show any expansionist ambition by raising border issue with the CIS neghbours confining it self to insistence on cultural autonomy of the Russian are living outside Russia. It may be noted that 25 million Russians are living out side Russia. Influx of Russian refugees in to Russia could only create more economic difficulties and lead to political turmoil at home. As such Russia provide large economic assitance to states like Tazikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhastan. In the case of Kazakhastan, Tazikistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Russian aid has been the tune 45 to 70 per-cent of the G.N.P.

The relative success of the CIS in technically problem?

a common economic and security space has be to viewed

^{2.} Ajay Patnaik (Ed.)

[&]quot;The CIS A Balance Sheet" Commonwealth Independent States Problems and Prospects (New Delhi) 1995 P. Xvii

in the background of strong psychological odds. There are strong though in the CIS states which view the CIS obstacle in the way of achieving the complete independence of various states in the post Soviet period. They see in the move to form a grasian supra-state a varient of the old idea of the Russian nationalist on the other hand fear the CIS might result in the sacrifice of Russia political and economic interest for the sake of preserving the post Soviet commonspace. Nationalist in the Mon-Russian states view the attend to the strengthen to the CIS with suspicion comparing to it position of Russian hegemony.

74-7341

the year 1992 following (the introduction of liberal economic reform in Russia resulted in the emergence of two broad trend. The firstwas to dismantle the common economic space and the rouble zone : it manifested itself in the

abolition of inter-state committee, which had been established prior to formed the CIS, as well as other common financial organs. The union bank and other such integrating economic structure. It was a contradiction with the orginal aims of the CIS. This trend towards disintegration of the common economic space was given a stimulus by liberal economic reform actively persuade under the leader ship of gaider, this resulted in the end of the common rouble zone. Although Ukraine had, had a poor system dual roubles and coupns for more than a year, the first real break came when Kyrgzystan introduced its som followed som by Turkmenistan Kazakhastan and Tazakistan and Uzbekistan.

The second trend demolished was manifested in the advocacy by president Nazarbayev of Kazakhastan, who made a number proposals to strengthen the intergration process in the CIS by its Conversion into a Eurasian Union.

At the various summits 1992 Nazarbayev continued to make

such please. At the BISHKEK SUMMITS he suggested a programmer five point of this were adopted, such key question, as the creation of inter-government bank, The drawing for a common charter of CIS and established a coordinating economic council were deffered confined at the MINSK summit, which has finally held in January 1993.

The first year of the existence of the CIS witnessed the organization as torn between the opposite processes of integration and disintegration in a way the disintegration trend seem to be more powerful. No sooner than the declaration were signed, differences in interpetation began to arise. The Izvestia Commented on this situation

"The Presidents are Compelled to prolonged the life of their year - old offspring primarly by interest own

^{3.} Ajay Patnaik (Ed.)

[&]quot;The CIS A Balance Sheet" Common Wealth Independent States, Problems and Prospects Konark Publication (New Delhi) P. 36,

a tightrope | between the their state. These interest i walk fear of reriving a Centre with Russia Playing the role Elder Brother of \"ELDER BROTHER" and the burning need for a single economic space. The former is noticeably tipping the scales, Judging from the fact that not one of the records signed earlier there are more than two hundred of them is being implemented in any practical way, The Existence of the CIS is being maintained by artificial respiration. There is no other turn for the process mutual assurances, protocal hand sakes, and diplomatic smiles that the leaders of CIS Countries have been exchanging of at their summits so far without result.4

Another important Russian daily also struck a pessimistic note.

It called the observation of president Nazarbayev

^{4.} Izvestia, 21 January 1993.

of Kazakhastan about the formation a strong integrative nucleus in the CIS as some what exaggerated. The Paper Wrought " rather we are still with slow but steady decomposition of this integrative neucleus".

There were several reasons for the economic crisis in the CIS such as structural changes, lack of demand fall in investment and worsening social political condition but the main reason was the severance of economic ties between the Commonwealth States after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. President Nazarbayev attributed 85 percent of the slump in production in his Republic to the rupture of economic ties with ther CIS States.

The over all situation did not favour the intigrative

^{5.} Nezavasmaya Gazeta, 26 January 1993.

^{6.} Cited By Jaya Shekar In His Article "The CIS Economic Reintigration Or Disintigration" (Ed.) Ajay Patnaik Commonwealth Independent State Problems

And Prospects (New Delhi) 1995 P. Ix

of Turkmenistan and Ukraine favoured bilateralisation of relations among the CIS members. The restore the old economic linkages drove the member state increasing to bilateralized their economic relation such bilateral efforts undermined the incentives to create a common economic space)

These pepressing economic Results during the year 1992 made the CIS Leaders realise at the beginning of 1993 that only pooling their efforts could they expect to avert disaster. However the failure of the CIS to achieve what had many expected it did not signify that it was quite meaningless. The Pre-emption of dangerous Conflicts on matters related to division of Union assets. Through the played by the Commonwealth even in its weak form in sustaining economic links could be viewed as one of its somewhat important achievement.

By the end of 1992 the power elite in the Republics had Consolidated its position. The republics had gained control of material resources on their territories. The New States had acquired real assessment of their potentialities in the External Political and economic fields. They now understood better their respective roles and their strength vis - a vis one another and Russia. The early euphoria was disappearing as the ideologies of national sovereignty made room for pragmatic economists at the top level of the elite.

Russia which had played a crucial role in the disintegration of the Soviet union continued to be at the centre stage of the CIS The suspicion of Russia, the "elder brother" continue to obstruct the development of forces of integration in the CIS. On its part Russia also contirbuted to weakening of the integrative processes through its desire to keep a distance from the less developed

CIS members belonging to the periphery in the interest of its speedy transition to a market economy. The pursuit such a course of policy destroyed whatever was left of a common economic space in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet union. The failure of the liberal economic reforms in Russia leading to a dismal economic situation in the country, necessitated a reconsideration of this course, in favour of a policy of restoring the economic linkages between the CIS members.

CHAPTER III

ASCENDANCY OF INTEGRATIONIST TREND IN THE CIS: RUSSIA'S RELUCTANT ACQUIESCENCE

As stated in the previous Chapter Russia's proclamation of its state sovereignty (than with in the USSR) on 12 June 1990 spurred on this path other Soviet Republics. It opened up the floodgates of disintegration. The CIS was born not as another state or a super-state. It was not a legal entity is international law. It had only an agreement not had a constitution as its foundation. The CIS had only coordinative structure and no unifying bodies. This was made clear by president Kravichuk right on the eve of the Ala-Ata summit in December 1991

when he declared that the decision of coordinative structures could only be advisory and not, binding any way. President Yeltsin had earlier endorsed the Ukrainian stand when he stated that the CIS was "not a state or a subject of international relation and does not to be recognised by foreign state. It is a commonwealth with small c not a capital C. However Ukraine was satisfied with this even statement and explicitly that it reserved the right 1 only to suspend but also ceas its participation in the agreement or individual clause.3 But the continuation of inter-republican bodies rather than mere co-ordinating called for during an extending period of ones was

^{1.} TASS MOSCOW coated in BIS, Soviet Union Daily Report 23 December 1991;

^{2.} Komsomolskya Pravada, (Moscow), 18 Dec., 1991;

^{3.} Statement by Ukranian Parliament on the Eve of ALM-ATA summit 20 Dec. 1991 FBIS; P. 37 Soviet Union Daily Report, 23 Dec., 1991;

Transition in matters such as the Soviet Union space programme, implementation of arms control currency and debt management etc. Than there of managing the former Soviet armed the question forces. Thus a major dilemma arose between and Ukraine in the first place. Whereas Russia beginning to realise the need for closer co-operation between the republics. Ukraine in contrast continued to insist that it would not be averse to ceasing co-operation with the commonwealth in whole or in part should it consider that its interests so require. In C.I.S. agreements provided for roughly thirty Coordinative bodies in different spheres, apart from the council head of State and Government and the Council of Defence Ministers, Council for Collective Security. The supreme command of joint Armed forces/ Q customs institutions and an Inter-State-Bank. The council for

foreign ministers, and interstate council and committee for space travel. Air traffic, environment, science and technology, standardisation, metrology, statistics, traffic electrical energy the health system etc. respective of these the goals formulated in the agreement. The co-ordination of foreign policy and co-operation in the development of common economic area and all European and Eurasian markets, in the fields of and customs, transport in the communication were not be effectively promoted, merely a few of the coordinative bodies functionally properly. The year 1992 witness even a fall of the members of C.I.S. with Azerbaijan associate and Moldova confining themselves to uself membership. some time it appeared that as it Turkmenistan also and Ukraine would | be following in sooting of their toot step.

The CIS was however saved with the help of

mechanism that allowed every state to opt out of participation in agreement if it considered topposed to its interests without obstructing the consensus and consensus dependent decisions of others. Thus only a few CIS documents have been signed by all member states. The treaty on collective security was signed only by six of the eleven member state in taskent on 15 May 1992. The agreement on the appointment of Economic Court of CIS (6 July 1992) only bears the signature of eight states.

The mechanism of selective participation in CIS agreement resulted in the emergence of several groups of member states Russia and the central Asian states of Kazakhastan Kyrzystan, Uzbekistan, Tazikstan, were strong champion of an expended role of the CIS, They

^{4.} Anderei Zagorski, "Development in the CIS Challanges for Russia" (Aussen Politic) 44 (2) January 1993 P. 146;

signed almost all agreements. In this group President Nazarbayev of Kazakhastan made a proposal during the Moscow summit on 6 July 1992 to appoint Supreme Economic Council of the CIS. These five states also favoured extension of close co-operation towards political military alliance. Other CIS states dissociated themselves from a closer integration of the community. This group included Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Moladova. These countries opposed the of joint cordinating institutions and adoption of a supra-national binding on CIS states. still remains a constituent opponent creation of supra-national a permanent structure Ukraine had not fully opted out of co-operation the CIS. It can not efford to otherwise because its close economic ties with Russian and other member Ukraine's attitude is based on states.

namely, rejection of Russiak dominant role and itself image of a European country not as a part of the Eurasian region the long term goal of Kiev is to pullout the CIS.

Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian republic which wants to keep a distance from the confining itself to participation in as, few agreements as possible. Turkmenistan has evaded any participation in institutionalisation of the CIS. A personality cult of Neyajev is emerging in Turkistan where the leadership favour political or economic Turkmenishis wunta to stay away from all collective projects which might necessitate for reform. The aguntry virtually no industry and has little dependence on the industrial centre of Russia. It also banks byon hopes of export oil and gas which it has in abundance. Both Ukraine and Turkmenistan have shown preference for developing relation with Russia and other CIS states on a bilateral basis.

Azerbaijan too did not actively participate in the CIS. The victory of the popular front led by Elchibei in July 1992 wide the gap in the CIS. The Regotiations on the CIS statute showed that Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova did not support the institutionalisation of the CIS. Ukraine and Turkmenistan refused to sign any text providing for resecuting body. They agreed to participate in the Moscow meeting of foreign ministers on the statute held in November 1992, only as observers Moldova though it signed the draft November 1992 subsequently declared would not sign the CIS statute at the next meeting scheduled for June in Minsk.

Belorus adopted a middle position while generally Stayed participating in most CIS agreements, it straightaway from any involvement in military political alliances.

The two trend manifested in the development of CIS created a number of challenges for Russia. Its initial hope that the abolition of centralised Soviet authority exercises by the Soviet Union would guarantee emergence of a genuine community among the the successor, states was not realised. The lack of convergent the Central Asiam Mates interest between the European's and CIS countries and wide spread concern about Russia's domination hindered forging of the new links among the former Soviet the Republics. Russia which in the beginning had itself some reservations about promoting integration of the CIS it implementation of lest obstructed reform in Russia started increasingly setting its sight economic inter-dependence in an effort together the former Soviet space. Its interest in CIS integration increased against the background the

failure of the reforms. Which made the task of restoring the old economic linkages a more urgent one. Moscow reluctantly adhered to a willingness to expect a CIS characterised by varying speeds or integration. While leaving integration of the CIS to the members state interests in it Russia took recourse to bilateralisation its relation with the CIS states not much interested in multilateral co-operation with In the CIS framework. Even with in the CIS countries it concise itself a multilevel co-operation. The MINSK summit of CIS which was finally held after two postponement in last week of January 1993 was a watershed event. the was attend by Azerbaijan and Moldova observers only. Only nine states attended it as members out of which seven favoured the adoption of the charter summit itself. The representative Turkmenistan and Ukraine did not agree on the draft of the charter. But they signed along with other seven republics the declaration signifying their continued membership of the CIS which they stated should be strengthened and perfected.

The CIS member has one reservation or another regardiess inclusion of the section of collective security and joint control of the international borders. Uzbekistan did not favour the section to the relating to the establishment of commission on human rights. Ukraine presented a draft of economic charter. Russia failed to reach understanding with Kazakhastan Ukraine which had nuclear weapons on their territories. These republics were keen on preserving same kind of control over the strategic nuclear weapons on their territory. Belarus had no differences with Russia over nuclear weapons being held under the Jurisdiction of the Russian federation.

The Moscow summit of CIS in May 1993 struck a note of optimism about the prospects of strengthening the CIS. It was followed by a meeting of Heads of Government of Republics of Belorus, Russia and Ukraine July 1993. The results of these two meetings however showed only a slow movement towards a closer integration of CIS. President Yeltsin claimed that the Moscow summits decision to form an economic alliance was a "breakthrough" in its life. He the CIS claimed that the view treating the CIS as a kind of "Civilized divorce" had no popular support in a single CIS state.

The Moscow summit highlighted integration in the sphere of economy as the strategic course of the CIS.

It took the long awaited steps to establish a

^{5 &}lt;u>SUMMARY OF WORLD BROAD CAST</u>, SU/1690 C2/1, 17 May 1993;

co-ordinating and consultative committee of CIS executive secretary and the CIS institution permanent representatives. I am korotch eyeni confirmed as executive secretary the co-ordination consultative committee were envisaged under the common wealth charter. As the standing and executive co-ordinating body of the commonwealth, it to be responsible for implementing the decision the Council of heads of states and the Heads of government was to drawn up and coordinate proposal for co-operation in all fields. It was be headed by a chairman elected for six months be followed by a regular rotation of deputy heads of government on this post. The CIS economic court was to be headed by the Justice minister of Belarus. It was decided at the Moscow summit to prepare twenty five document during the year 1993 that were to form the basis of new relations in the CIS as oppose to

of Ukraine which laid emphasis the approach Union president Yeltsin suggested economic comprehensive approach. He emphasised that economic union was impossible to achieve without close interaction in other fields as well. Addressing the Moscow summit of the CIS president Yeltsin said, "It is a matter also of collective security system and the co-ordination of the instance on key political and economic problems and on issues of defending human rights and liberaties."6 The participant in the Moscow summit adopted a declaration reiterating their determination to proceed along the deep integration and to create a market for the free movement of goods, capital\$ and services. They also considered it\$ necessary speed a creation of interstate bank. It was planed

SUMMARY OF WORLD BROAD CAST, SU/1690 C2/1, 17 May 1993;

to draw up I July1993 the relevant document to take practical steps to create a Economic Union.

However no practical steps had been token to forge an economic Union even by the time the of government of the Republic Belarus. Russia Ukraine issued a statement on 10th July 1993 at the conclusion of their meetings in Minsk. The statement did not gone beyond "expressing the firm intention of participating the development and implementation of the treaty an economic the creation of union within framework of the CIS."8 The three heads of government simply identified the scope of economic integration which called for immediate measures. It was cover of sphere of production, investment, foreign trade, Financial credit, currency and social relation. They did

^{7.} ibid C2/3;

^{8.} ibid SU/1739, C2/1, 13 July, 1993;

agree upon any concrete measures to usher in this economic integration at the level of the CIS or even at the level of the three Republics. Instead of creating a common market or established a custom union the statement of heads the statement of heads of the three CIS republics at Minsk simply affirmed that "the government to agree make it their priority to remove tariff and non-tariff restrictions in trade and economic relations between the three states set-up a customs union and also to form a common market of commodities, services and capital, on the basis of a single policy in the field of price marking, and investments and in harmonising the system."9

It was apparent that the CIS leaders paid just lip-sympathy to the goal of economic integration on account of the growing pressure of the people. At

^{9.} ibid;

of the need to restore inter-republics economic links and order to overcome the current economic crisis. Yet at the action level the CIS leaders did not reveal essence of urgency while harping the need of economic integration Ukraine's president Kravchuk appealed to the G-7 leader for a help of \$1.5 billion for establishing hryvna the new currency to be introduced in Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan issued its own national currency som and opted out Rouble zone. Turkmenia followed suit.

The deputy premier of the Turkmenistan alleged on 15 May 1993 hat the documents of Moscow summit violated the princitples and the assigned of the Almata declaration. The Moldovan president M Snegur gave vent to his reservations about the idea of an economic

^{10.} ibid, SU/1690, C2/7, 17 May, 1992;

union. He favoured the idea of an economic community in its place. Proceedent Krvachuk of Ukraine also said at a press conference in Moscow held soon after the summit that his Republic would favour a formula which would not require a state "to give up its statehood and soveriegnty." Thus only Belarus Kazakhastan and Russia were redier than most to participate in their economic union.

The different pace of economic reforms in the CIS Republic created a situation which was not suitable for a advance in an economic union. Under the stress of conflicting economic interest a common Rouble zone could not preserve itself and Kazakhastan, Uzbekistan and even Tazikestan were compelled to out of it. Never the less despite these practical difficulties the realisation

^{11. &}lt;u>ibid;</u>

^{12. &}lt;u>ibid;</u>

isolated efforts was growing. A modest success had been achieved in the direction of integration through the creation of interstate institutions such as the interparliamentary assembly, the co-ordinating committee and economic court. The CIS in the ineffective form in which it was born had out lived itself. The question now was at what pace the various CIS member states were willing to move in the direction of integration.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIAN ACTIVISM IN THE CIS AND THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF INTEGRATION: IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

If the year of 1993 witnessed Russia's reluctant conversion in to, a key - state supporting the goal of integration of the CIS, the following years have seen a steady escalation of Russian activism in the CIS. Several factors have been responsible for this kussian soviet stand on the CIS. The failure of the economic reforms to take off brought about a change in Moscow's perception of the CIS state as "poor cousin" obstructing Russia's march to prosperity and democracy through a market economy. The growing popular opposition to president Yeltsin's "Shock Therapy" reforms as manifested in the increasing

representation of the opposition in the Russian Juma after the December 1993 and December 1995 elections forced Yeltsin to dilute his atlanticism in favour of Russian Eurasianism in pursuit of national interests. It may be recollected that in the December election to the DUMA the ready to pro-radical reform parties polled about only 21 percent votes as against 29 percent vote pole by the communist party and its allies opposed to the "Shock Therapy". The opposition did better during the year 1995 election duma to the DUMA. Together with their allies the communists gained a near majority in the duma - two hundred hundred eleven deputies in a house of four Lfifty. As president Yeltsin said in a speech duma Feb to the see that most of the ex-1994 the competition to Soviet state came out independent has visibily showed.

^{1.} Rossickaya Gazeta, 25 Feb., 1994,

Martha Brill Olcott rightly observed : "centripetal forces have begun to assert themselves, and a general sentiments prevails in the post sonnet expanse that some sort of reintegration especially in the economics of various republics is not only necessary but desirable."²

But the question still unresolved is the mechanism achieve it. The CIS has never had the to enforce its decisions and policies adopted by its various committees. President NazarbayeV observed March 1994 that out of 270 document adopted the CIS is as few as only forty had been ratified by one member state and the highest number ratified The number of Unratified by a CIS member was 150 documents reached 200 by early 1995. The proposal Kazakhastan president Nazarbayev to create

Martha Brill Olcott

2. ALARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, "Sovereignty and the near Abroad,"

OK#18 Summer 1995 P. 153;

Euro-Asian union found no supporters among the big
CIS countries. Even the one supranational body that
Russia has supported actively, the Interstate Economic
Committee (IEC) has been slow to take shape.

The emphasis in the regulation of the relations among the Republic has largely remained on bilateral agreements.

Largely arisen from the varying needs for state sovereignty for different Republics. There is Tazikistan, a state that has received sovereignty notwithstanding its government inability to ensure the fulfilment of its people needs for security or social welfare. Two thirds of its national budget on foreign assistance. Ukraine is just the opposite example It aspires to become a major central European states in the long term perspective. But it is reconciled to a short term

co-operation with Russia as a necessary condition for its survival. In addition to Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are other CIS states which want to preserve their sovereignty even though their desires are co-operative with Russia during the short and medium terms.

Besides Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan that would like to see their sovereignty preserved Kazakhastan, Kyrgygstan, Belarus and Tazakkistan which seem nervous about the burden of their independence and fears the possibility of losing it, would be content to become "quasi sovereignty". By guarantee of their security from a warsaw type pacture? CIS, Kazakhastan has an economy that was inextricably inter-twined with that of Russia at the time of breakup. The severance of economic ties with Russia has caused great suffering to a large numbers of Russians

employed in factories in Kazakhastan. In these ties which nazarbayer considers vital preserve stability of his republic (the for the discontented Russian community is feared to champion the cause of merger with Russia), The Kazakhastan president has with a proposal for transformation of come out CIS confederation ofcalled into states the Eurasianunion. The members of the Euro-Asian Union Purrender surrounded a part of their sovereignty to would authority charged with development of supra-national a common economic policy as well as common defence. But Moscow rejects any proposal that would equal say to other members in conducting defence or economy. Ukraine, Turkmenistan the unrealistie Uzbekistan have all declared they EAU Unexpectable Kyrg‡yjstan another and only •of one region or Georgia have supported it The failure of the

to materialise has pushed Kazakhastan towards greater accommodation of Russia's interests the Republic on a bilateral basis. In late 1994 and early 1995 Kazakhastan handed over natural gas filled in Karachagansk to Russia and gave it concession for Caspian sea oil and gas development. Kazakhastan also gave Russia ownership care of his Industries. However beginning with 1996 Kazakhastan has been trying to Salance blame Russia's economic presence with the presence of other foreign countries. It has granted major oil concession to the United States of America and China and sold a large number of industries in North Western Kazakhastan to foreign investors from the countries of late president NazarbayeV has also abandoned in favour of closer integration with his stand an interview to the Nezavasimaya Gazeta In on the 5th Anniversary of the CIS Nazarbayer blamed Russia for having missed the chance to play the key role of nucleus in the renewal of the process of reintegration.

for custom Αn agreement union among Kazakhastan Russia and Belarus signed in January 1993 also seems to have run in to difficulties. Thus with the passage of time belarus Kyrgyzystan and Tazakistan have been left as the only states interested in having integration Russia dominated CIS. particularly warmed up towards reintegration with Russia after the election Aleksander Lukashenko in July 1994 as president of the Republic. In April Lukashenko finally succeeded in achieving the union Belarus with Russia. Moscow tried to postponed pretext or another. Its objections to the Union were mainly based on the different levels of economic reforms in two countries. Yeltsin reluctantly

agreed to a formal Union on account of the mounting pressure of the public opinion in Russia and the Arising threat eastward expansion of the NATO. A Monetary by Lukashenko has Union desired materialised. For the present the Union of the two countries is confined to the establishment of interstate bodies. The Supreme Council of Union and its executing committee. A joint parliamentary assembly has also been set-up. Work is progressing on consolidated of legal basis of the Union between the belarus and Russia. The two countries in beginning 1998 have started going over the single standard in their social policy and achieve a common citizenship. It is plant to level up pensions to war and labour veterans, disable persons low income families. In their meeting on 7 March 1998 president Yeltsin and president K. Lukashenko pleaded for more attention to workout and implement

a joint programme of synchronising economic reforms. They called for a package of measures to creat more favourable facilities for the priority of development of trade, unhampered movement of commodities, services, capital and workforce. The presidents in this statement pointed out to the necessity of achieving a higher level of economic integration through conducting a single monetary and fiscal with a prospects of concluding a currency union. The union of belarus and is having a budget formed from deduction from custom dues of Russia and Belarus.3 This year five trillion old roubles were gear marked in the joint budget to be spent on setting up joint projects and relief to Chernobyl victims.4

The Union of Belarus and Russia which is still

^{3.} News from Russia, (New Delhi) Volume VI, No. 11, 14th March 1997 P. 9;

^{4.} ibid, Jan., 1998;

in its infancy have caused several CIS members states of anxiety anxiety feeling threatened by reintegration process and apprehensive of losing their independence in the face V. stosation of the of prospects for the USSR, CIS states like Ukraine Uzbekistan started accusing Russia of seeking topressurise CIS member into closer integration by forging a bilateral union with Belarus and four way customs union with belarus, Kazakhastan and Kyrgygstan president Karmov of Uzbekistan observed, "there has been attempt form the union of two, and the union of four and then to pool all the rest in by the year Drob But I will say again such attempts have no prospects.⁵

There was an atmosphere of despondency on the eve of the CIS summit held in Chisinau in October 1997. The common Wealth peace keeping efforts suffered another set back as plans to create a committee to

^{5.} THE HINDU MADRAS (25 Oct., 1997)

deal with regional conflicts fell apart amidst disagreements among presidents who declined to discuss the setting The conflict control committee. Committee proposal to give to the, lorder direct control over the peacekeeping operations did not find support from the other members who wanted to it remain consultative organ. The CIS summit held in Moscow 29th April 1998 re-elected president Yeltsin Chairman of the council of commonwealth Independent states till year 2000 A.D. It appointed business Tycoon Bori's Berizavasky as executive secretary of Commonwealth & Endependent states. The summit decided to postpone the issue to reforming the CIS for discussion at the inter state forum to be held in July 1998. Although president Nazarbayev's proposal for reforming the CIS have been postponed for discussion until July, The meeting of the interstate council of Russia, Kazakhastan

CIS summit is reported to have been highly productive one of the decision taken up to speed up joint work an the creation of a single economic space. Tajikistan also decided to join the integrationary four of which has now turn into the five state. The five states partly to the agreement on customs union decided to take a unified stand in negotiation to join the world trade

The success of the integrationary four has also prompted Uzbekistan to mend fences with Russia. During his visit 6 May 1998 the president Moscow on of Uzbekislan -of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov agreed to step-up economic co-operation with and political Russia including combating Islamic fundamentalism. in agreement was signed between the heads of states for co-operation in setting up joint production, maintenance

^{6.} News from Russia, First May 1998 Vol. VII, No. 18, P. 15;

and modernisation of in of IL - 76 and IL - 78 air craft. Summing up the above developments it may be noted that the situation in regard to the future evolution of the CIS remains marked with uncertainty. If the union of Belarus and Russia and the integrative now turned five are some what positive and optimistic trend, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova remain a group of CIS states which can not decide which way to go. Another alarming aspect of the situation is the emergence of a "CIS-II" Consisting of smaller sub units of the CIS republics, like the Trans - Dniester republic, the Gagauz republic, South Ossteria, Abkhazia, Crimea, and Karabakh There has announcement from Moldova that signed treaty of friendship with South Osstia Trans -Abkhasia Dniester and Adbhazia. The situation has become more

^{7.} News from Russia, Vol. I, No. I, May 8, 1998 P. 12;

^{8.} MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, op. cit., P. 365;

complex on account of Russia's contradictionly attitude towards its security interest and continued its decision in this sphere. Russia's policy makers are divided in several factions. One faction led by General Ivashov secretary of CIS Council of defence ministers is of the view that Russia must use CIS structures under Russian control to defend the entire former soviet space (It not clear whether this includes Baltic state also) In a new variation of a Warsaw pact. This view is opposed by Andranic Migra Nian who feels that Russia should abandon more hundred fifty years than five of old attempt of the Russian empire and subsequently of Soviet Union, to integrate central Asia into a single space and concentrate instead of making the region zone, while seeking | find buffer Belarus, the North Caucasus and Kazakhastan to itself

^{9.} Nezavisinaaya Gazeta, 17 May. 1994;

with a series of regional defence agreements. 10 Another faction favours establishment of a two-tiered relationship, first among 'oil four" of Russia, Kyrgygstan, Kazakhastan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and then secondary less importantly consuming states. 11 All factions appear to agree on defence of the former USSR and the protection of 25 million Russians residing outside the Russia, 4.

Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhastan, Moldova and Azerbaijan have also often changed their stand on co-operation with the CIS though it is true that Ukraine and Turkmenistan have consistently opposed the integrationist trend. The president of belarus, A. Lukashenko was very right when he made the following observation in St. Petersburg while addressing an economic forum

^{10.} ibid, 12 Jan., 1994;

^{11.} ibid, 3 June, 1994;

of the CIS countries in 17 June, The commonwealth turned in to of independent states flabby has amorphous, entity in which each member further its own aims at the expanse of others, must admit that now the CIS is a semblance of an organisation rather than a reality". A politically stable vibrant Russia alone can serve as and economically the neucleus of a strong CIS functioning effectively as a new interstate organisation. The present day weak and disorganised Russia is hardly capable of providing the kind of leadership needs to transform the in to an effective inter - state organization, urgently required to pullout the vast Eurasian territory from the cess pool of anarchy and economic decline and stagnation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCE

Document: CIS Summit at Moscow, 29th April,

1998.

Document: Agreement of CIS on the armed forces

and border troops, 1 January 1992,

Text of : agreement signed between CIS on the

armed forces and border troops, December,

1992.

Document: Minsk Summit in January 1993.

Statement: Tass Moscow, FBIS, and soviet union

daily report 23 December 1991

Statements: IZVESTIA Comment on CIS, 21 January

1993,

Statement: in Rossickaya Gazeta 25 February, 1994

Statements: Nezavasamaya Gazeta, 26 January 1993.

Agreement : CIS agreements on status of strategic

forces. (Link) March 1992 P.P. 27-32

Document

: CIS summit at chisinau, 24th October 1997,

Statement

: News Agency "Interfax : "Ibid", January 1998,

News from Russia, 1 May 1998 Vol, VIII, (New Delhi) No. 18, P-15

News from Russia (New Delhi) Vol, VI No. 11, 14 March 1997, P-9

Statement

: Ukrainian parliament on the eve Alm Ata summit 20 December 1991 FBIS Soviet Union Daily report 23 December, 1991, P- 37.

Statement

: <u>Komsomolskya Pravada</u>, (Moscow) 18 December 1991

Summary of world broad cast, Su/1690, C2 /1, 17 May 1993
'Ibid,' C2/3,
'Ibid', 3 June, 1994

SECONDARY SOURCE

Books

Bremmer and taras (ed),

Nation and Politics in the soviet Successor state (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993)

Patnaik, Ajay (ed.),

Common Wealth of Independent states: Problems and prospects:

(New Delhi : Konark Publisher 1995)

Kumar rupesinghe (ed),

Ethnicity and conflict in a post - communist world "
St. Martin's press Inc, (Newyork), 1992

Robert C, tucker (ed.)

<u>Political Culture and leadership in Soviet Russia</u>
"Wheatsheaf books Ltd. Publisher, John spiers Susex 1990

Jonathan c. Valdez (ed.),

"Internationalism and the ideology of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe"

Cambridge University Press (London) 1993.

Gorbachev (Mikhail s) Towards a better world, Hutchinsion, (London), 1987

CARTER (stephen K.) (ed).

Russian Nationalism : Yesterday,
today and tomorrow

Billington (James H.) <u>Russia transformed</u>: Breakthrough to hope. The free press, (Newyork), 1991.

Lapidos (G.W) and Zaslavsky (V)

from union to common wealth nationalism and separatism
in the Soviet Republics Cambridge Univ., press (Cambridge),
1992

Khilnani (Niranjan M.) <u>Emergence of New Russia</u>. Anmol Publishers, (New Delhi), 1992.

SHEVARDNADGE (Eduard) <u>The future belongs to freedom</u>. The free press (Newyork), 1991

Hough (J) and Fainsod (M), (ed).

How Soviet Union is governed Spring (D.W) ed, <u>The impact of Gorbachev</u>, 1985-90.

Printer Publisher, (London) 1991

MANDEL (Earnest) Beyond perestroika: The future of Gorbacheve's USSR verso. (London) 1991.

Journals / Articles :

Malcolm, nail, the new russian foreign policy", world today. February 1994.

Lougn, John, Riding the tiger: Russia's New security imperative, <u>Strategic digest</u> Vol. 2, 1994

Imam Zafar, "How and Why the Soviet union disintegrated"

<u>International studies</u>,

Vol, 29 (4), 1992.

Gleason, Greagory, " The federal formula and the collapse of the U.S.S.R," <u>Pulius</u>,

(Texas, winter 1992, Vol, 22, No. 1)

Brahm heinz, "The disintegration Soviet Union and Europe" Aussen Politik (Vol., 43, No. 1 1992)

Dallin, Alexander, "causes of the collapse of the U.S.SR."

<u>Post Soviet affairs</u>

(Silver spring, Vol. 8, No. 4 1992)

Zagorski (Andrei) "Developments in the CIS challenges for Russia," Aussen Politik 44 (2): 1993.

Snyder (Jack) "Nationalism and the crises of the post Soviet state" <u>Survival.</u> 35(1): spring 1993.

Abrahm S. Becker, Russia and Economic Integration in the CIS, "Survival," Winter 96 Vol, 38, No, 4, P.P. 117-36

Myalo, What is the place of Russians in Russian, CIS?.

"The current digest", Vol. XLV, No. 17 1993.

<u>Jayasekar</u> "The CIS Economic Reintegration or Disintegration" (ed) Ajay Patnaik,

<u>Common wealth Independent states Problems and Prospect</u> (New Delhi) P. ix. 1995

Martha Brill Olcott

Russia's Place in the CIS (Current History) 92 (576) October 93 P. 315.

The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, "Turkmenian Children, Women Are Starving' P.1 Latvia. Estonia: "Some oppose Independence", Vol. XL II (20), June 20, 1990 P. 4

Uzbeks", Vol XL II (23), July II, 1990, P. 31.

The Current digest of the post - soviet press 'Tashkent summit signals CIS Realignment', P. 1, 'What future for embattled Tajikistan.?

P.P. 5-6, Vol XLIV (19), June 10, 1992, PP 19-20.

Kupchen, C.A; "The promise of collective Security", International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995.

"The Current digest of the post-Soviet press "should be consulted on the Russian peacekeeping forces and their responses", Vol. XL VIII (21), June 19, 1996 P.P. 22-33.

Cusack, Thomas R. and Stoll, Richard J., "Collective security and state survival in the interstate system", International studies

Quarterly, 38 (1), March, 1994, P.P. 33-60

Rakesh Gupta: Commonwealth of independent states initiated

(Link) 34 (21) : 5 January 1992 P.P. 4-7

Chenoy (Anuradha M) Commonwealth of independent states: easy come easy go (Link)., 34 (21); 5 January 92, P.P. 8-9

Gidadhuble (RG). 'Problems of former Soviet block (world focus) 13 (2); February 92, P.P. 17-21

Martha Brill Olcott.

"Soveriegnty and the 'near abroad" ORBIS Summer P. 353 1995

Moscow, August 1991: The coup that failed, (mainstream). 30 (44), 22 August, 92 P.P. 24-27

Huan (Guocam), New relationship with the former Soviet union. (Current history) 91 (566); Sep 92 P.P. 253-56

Mandelbum (Michel) Coup de grace : The end of the Soviet union (Foreign affairs), 71 (1) 1992 P.P. 164 -83

Mehrotra (O.N) CIS Military in the labyrinth (strategic analysis) 15 (3): June 92, P.P. 209 - 22 (Isn-4661)

<u>Puskov (Alexei)</u> Commonwealth of independent states : still alive though not Kicking (NATO Review) 40 (3); June 92 P.P. 13-17

Randhir Singh: Collapse in Soviet union: the impact # mainstream # 35 (34); 2 August 97; P.P. 15-24

<u>Kiri Chenko</u>. V Status and problems of economic relations among CIS Countries # problems of economic transition # 39 (3); July 96; P.P. 19-31

Mehrotra, (ON) Taliban raises anxiety in the CIS (# strategic analysis #) 19 (12); March 97; P.P. 1675-87

Komarov, V. Investment activity in countries of the Commonwealth (Problems of economic transition) 40 (5): September, 97 P.P. 83-91

Maefarlane, S. Neil, "on the front lines in he near abroad: the CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's civil wars" (Third World Quarterly) 18 (3); 1997 P.P. 509-25.