

SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT, 1956-64

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "**Soviet-Chinese Ideological Conflict, 1956-64**" submitted by **RAJEEV RANJAN**, Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies, School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067, India, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, is his own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.


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DEDICATED TO

MY PARENTS

***“ Without your Expectations of
me I would have been nowhere”***

PREFACE

Before the World War II Soviet Union was the only socialist country in the world with an exception to Mongolia, as a result of which it wielded full revolutionary authority throughout the World Communist Movement. However, the post world war period brought dramatic changes in the world as a result of Soviet victory over fascism. The defeat of fascist Germany was immediately followed by emergence of powerful socialist bloc in the Eastern Europe which provided Soviet Union an undisputed ideological power in the World Communist affairs. The victory of Chinese revolution in 1949, though initially strengthened Soviet position during Stalin era, but it began to develop crack during Post-Stalin period, particularly after the conclusion of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956.

The main purpose of this study is to analyse the origin of the ideological conflict and its developments between Soviet Union and China which influenced not only their relations but it also put a far-reaching impact on the world affairs.

The study is intended to examine Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict particularly during Khrushchev period, 1956-64. This period was marked by many epoch-making land marks in both the countries. This period began with the historic 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, followed by two

international conferences of the World Communist Parties held in 1957 and 1960 respectively, for China it was the period of historic 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and adoption of a different path of socialism in the name of great leap forward followed by better Anti-Soviet line and a worse inner party struggle. Finally the period ends with the overthrow of Khrushchev from Soviet power in 1964.

In this context the study has been organised in 6 chapters. The first chapter introducing the subject.

The second chapter deals with the historical background of Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict.

The third chapter, examines the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet-Chinese ideological Conflict 1956.

The fourth chapter deals with the Soviet-Chinese ideological Conflict and the international Conferences of the World Communist Parties, 1957-1960.

The fifth chapter deals with the Soviet-Chinese ideological Conflict and its impact on the World Communist Movement, 1960-1964.

The sixth and the last chapter is Conclusion.

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RAJEEV RANJAN

CONTENTS

	Page No.	
Preface		
Acknowledgement		
CHAPTER I	INTRODUCTION	1-13
CHAPTER II	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT	14-29
CHAPTER III	TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT, 1956	30-55
CHAPTER IV	SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES, 1957-1960	56-75
CHAPTER V	SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1960-1964	76-99
CHAPTER VI	CONCLUSION	100-105
BIBLIOGRAPHY		106-124

**CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION**

The study of Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict has been one of the most important subjects in the modern history of the world. The period of the subject under study i.e., 1956-64 specially proved to be a turning point in Soviet-Chinese relation. This is the period in which the whole world observed how the two bosom friends turned against each other as most difficult enemies, never seen before in the history. This particular phenomenon makes this study more interesting. In this regard, it is also significant point to note that, the Soviet Union has been a country of largest territory while the China has been inhabited by the largest population of the world. This factor seemed to be a deadly combination for the purpose of expanding and consolidating the revolutionary ideology, i.e., Marxism-Leninism. However, it was destined not to be so in future. Though, we have discussed this issue in detail in further chapters, yet it is necessary to pointout certain facts regarding the study of this subject.

The idea of revolution based on Marxism-Leninism spread in China particularly after the October revolution, in 1917. At the outset of the October revolution, a large number of workers from different Asian countries were employed in Russia. The Chinese workers farmed a bit chunk of them. This is how these Asian workers, initially took the idea of Bolshevik revolution in their respective countries. At the same time most of these countries were reeling under the colonial

yokes of different European powers. This is how, the anti-colonial movement became very strong particularly after October revolution. Though the China was not directly occupied by the colonial power. Its domestic rulers were performing the same kind of role as the colonizers did. Therefore, the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ideology became very strong in China. The birth of the Communist Party of China in 1921 was itself a product of October revolution. During Post-October revolutionary period many communist parties in the world were directly formed with the help of the COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL (COMINTERN) established by Lenin in 1919. The formation of new communist parties in different countries was the most important agenda of COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL since its very beginning. Different Bolshevik leaders were deputed for this work. Many leaders were also deputed to formulate ideology for newly established communist parties. In this regard it is interesting to note that the famous Indian revolutionary M.N. Roy was sent to China by the Bolsheviks to provide ideological direction to Communist Party of the China. Thus the Comintern became deeply involved in Chinese Communist affairs. The intimacy between the Bolshevik's and the Chinese Communist Party can be traced from the fact that one of its most important party congress, i.e., Sixth Congress, was held in Moscow in 1928. It is a historical record that the congress of a communist party like China was held in the country of Bolshevik's. The famous Chinese Communist leader Wong-Ming was in constant touch with the COMINTERN and Bolshevik leaders. This is how Wong-Ming

became the backbone of ideological co-operation between Bolshevik's and the Chinese Communist Party. Later on over Sovietization of the Chinese policies turned into anti-Sovietism in China.

Before analysing the ideological conflict between Soviet Union and China, it is necessary for us to know about the term "ideology" in international politics. 'Ideology' can be defined as a set of principles or system of belief that characterises any group, government or the entire nation. The set of ideas concerning economic, social and political values and goals posit 'action programmes' for attaining these goals. In the context of international relation, 'ideology' which prior to 1914 was the concern of only those persons professionally engaged in it, now plays pirated role in the formulation of international as well as national principles of a country. It is in light of this semantic context of the term 'ideology', i.e., a meaning which is context bound in International Relation that we must examine the 'ideological' confrontations between China and Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet rivalry was not accidental in the world-history but culmination of a long-lasting ideological dispute between the two. It is true that Soviet Union had extended full support to the Chinese Revolution but her relation with China before that was not a cordial one and both the nations were suspicious towards each other. The study of Sino-Soviet conflict is of great importance

because it influenced not only the 'Soviet-bloc' but almost every facet of international life.

Immediately after People's Republic of China had been proclaimed, both countries made every effort to promote Sino-Soviet friendship. The Soviet Union attached great importance not only to material content of its international assistance to the Chinese people, but also to the creation of strong international law for Sino-Soviet relation. To this end, the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China was signed on February 14, 1950. The Soviet Union also granted the credit of 300 million dollar to China. In 1953 when China adopted its first five year plan, the Soviet Union granted all the possible aid and assistance for successful transformation to a socialist society. In addition the Soviet Union sent scientists and technicians to China, for the modernization of the country.

However, these years of mutual trust and friendship could not last long and some minor differences began to arise between the Soviet Union and China since 1956 when 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) adopted entirely new policies different from Stalin era. In fact, 20th Congress of CPSU was a landmark in the development of Soviet-Chinese relation which gradually intensified a struggle between two lines - the Marxist internationalist i.e.,

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Maoist on one hand, and, the Petty bourgeois - nationalist on the other. By the end of 1950's great power chauvinistic forces entered the Chinese political arena which aggravated the problem. And a sharp difference between the two arose on the question of war and peace and peaceful transition of countries to socialism.

Before the World War II the Soviet Union was the only socialist country in the world with an exception to Mongolia, as a result of which it wielded full revolutionary authority throughout the world communist movement. However, the post world war period brought dramatic changes in the world as a result of Soviet victory over fascism. The defeat of fascist Germany was immediately followed by emergence of powerful socialist bloc in the Eastern Europe which provided the Soviet Union an undisputed ideological power in 'world-communist' affairs. All the communist parties of the world looked towards the Soviet Union for all kinds of helps, guidelines and encouragement to pursue their revolutionary goals. However, the victory of Chinese revolution in 1949, though initially strengthened Soviet position during the Stalin era, began to develop crack during post-Stalin period, particularly after the conclusion of 20th congress of the communist party of Soviet Union in 1956. The theoretical differences mainly emerged out of 'ideological' interpretation of world revolutionary processes. The strong Soviet commitment to stick to the peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition between two opposite system (Socialist and Capitalist) and peaceful transition from Capitalism to

Socialism caused tremendous ideological upheavals in between Soviet and Chinese parties that led to a major split in the World Communist Movement.

However, if we analyse the diachronic development of the Sino-Soviet ideological differences, it will appear that the seeds of disagreement had been sown long before the Chinese revolution. Wong-Ming, the famous communist leader and Chinese representative in the Communist International, who always followed Soviet line before the revolution, was never liked by the Maoist faction within the communist party of China. Some of the starting facts have been revealed now, according to which even before the beginning of the world war II Mao-Tse-Tung had suggested for an United front of Soviet Union and Hitlerite's Germany against the allied countries. The ideological differences had also emerged on the question of revolutionary path in China. Mao-Tse-Tung always considered Soviet Union and its communist leaders including Lenin as 'typical' European who according to him, were not well versed in Asian affairs, and therefore, 'outsiders' to the oriental problems of Socialistic Movements.

Not only this, those Chinese cadres who were given a Marxist training in Moscow party school before the Chinese revolution were also not liked by Mao-Tse-Tung, which is obvious from his utterances on several occasions when he dubbed them as "Moscow Group", a term that designates an alienation effect. Mao-Tse-

Tung always took offensive attitude towards Soviet dictates before the revolution, which is clearly revealed in P.P. Vladimirov's secret diary. It may be recalled that P.P. Vladimirov' as the representative of Soviet communist party lived in the underground headquarters of communist party of China in Yen-an province during the World War II.

However, during the early years of post-revolutionary China, Soviet Union could enjoy its strong position while dealing with China. It became evident when Chinese forces went to fight against the US forces in Korea under direct suggestion of Stalin in the early 50's. As mentioned earlier, differences between the two countries emerged basically after the 20th congress of the communist party of Soviet Union (CPSU), which were so acute that the Soviet Union had to call the first International meeting of the World Communist and Workers Parties in 1957 and after a short gap of three years it was again convened in Moscow. The third such meeting was called a decade later in 1969 in Moscow. All these three international meetings of the world communist parties broadly supported the Soviet position in the international communist movement, as the 'centre' of the such movements. Albanian communist party was an exception to this, which supported the Chinese communist party's position.

During this period the Chinese communist party openly called for the split in

the World Communist Movement. Following all these developments in the World Communist Movement, one could see a major power struggle going on within the Chinese communist party itself. 'Pro-Mao' and 'anti-Mao' groups within the communist party of China were fighting each other for their survival. Having strong influence in the Chinese army, Mao Tse-Tung ultimately became victorious over the rival faction led by so-called 'Chinese Khrushchev' the Li-Shao-Chi the then president of China. The Maoist victory within the communist party of China was reflected thoroughly during the so-called cultural revolution in China which was launched in mid 60's and continued till the death of Mao-Tse-Tung in the mid 70's. The in-built conflictual situations within the communist party of China were also reflected in the world communist movement, and, many communist parties particularly in the Third World Countries got split over the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict. The communist party of India became one of the worse victims of such ideological battle and the biggest ever split took place in the party in 1964. Many new communist parties or groups were formed in so many countries on the Maoist line, too.

Though khrushchev was the main target of ideological offensive from the Chinese side, it became sharper even after he was removed from the power in 1964. Thus we see that the ideological conflict between these two countries during the period of our study left behind a dangerous legacy which continued to influence

were not consistent with one another or with its global policies and aims Soviet policy towards China had reflected its traditional anxieties over border security as well as long-standing economic and strategic ambitions in China. For a time, Stalin seriously underestimated the speed and scope of the communist victory in China, the Soviets only belatedly became aware of the role of communist China might play in world communism and of the potential significance of China in the post world war II strategic balance. Behind the Sino-Soviet split lie several decades of contradictory Soviet policies. The Soviet combined more or less conventional power politics with assistance and encouragement to such mutually hostile elements as various revolutionaries and the established anti-revolutionary governments in Peking (until 1927), Nanking and during world war II, Chungking.

Following Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict not only the Marxist ideology was divided but also the foreign policies of different countries had to go under thorough change, particularly the Western countries led by the United States of America got new opportunity to counter Soviet influence in the world Communist Movement through different cooperation with China. The Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict also forced China itself to get rid of its isolationist policies in the foreign affairs in 70's. It proved to be a serious threat to the Soviet interest in the world affairs, as a result of which anti-Sovietism became the backbone of the foreign policies of many countries including China. This ideological conflict

ultimately became the biggest hurdle for an unified world communist movement.

**CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE
IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT**

Before going through the process of thorough analysis of the Soviet-Chinese conflict, it is necessary to find out its roots in the historical perspective. Initially, after the victory of the October Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin enjoyed very intimate relations with the Chinese communists even before the formation of the Communist Party of China itself. In this context, it is a remarkable point to note that most of the communist parties of the world were formed under the direct influence of the Bolshevik Revolution. In fact, it was this revolution which fomented anti-capitalist and anti-colonial fire throughout the world in which Asia proved to be a centrifugal force, particularly China became a decisive factor in spreading the Bolsheviks' ideology in the East. Like many other newly born communist parties, the Communist Party of China formed in 1921 proved to be a baby of October Revolution. Hence, the cordial and intimate relations between Soviet and Chinese Communists became a natural phenomenon which contributed immensely to the victory of Chinese Revolution in 1949. An other most important factor, the Soviet support against Japanese invasion of China before the revolution laid the solid background of Soviet-Chinese relations. After many years of struggle by the Chinese people, favourable international situation and a constant support received from Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed on October 1, 1949. The Chinese revolution occupied an important place in world history due to many reasons. First of all it dealt a crushing blow against position of imperialism in Asia and also changed the balance of power in the world arena in

favour of socialism. It is in this context that Soviet-Chinese relations after 1949, became an important factor in the study of international relations.¹ These relations were of utmost importance because of their ideological and geographical proximity. The study of Soviet-Chinese relations during this period becomes very important because it has influenced almost every facet of international life not to speak of only the Soviet bloc.

The formation of People's Republic of China paved the way for a new phase in the development of Soviet-Chinese relation. The People's Republic of China found a close loyal ally in the Soviet Union to overcome its economic and technical backwardness in a hostile environment. It was also a necessity of time for China to have good and cordial relation with the Soviet Union in its formative years. Thus Mao's policy of learning to one side became a corner-stone of China's foreign policy. According to Mao-Tse-Tung: "The Chinese people must either incline to the side of imperialism It is impossible to sit on the fence, there is no third road, neutrality is merely camouflage, a third road does not exist ... Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union".²

Thus both the Chinese and the Soviets made every effort, from the very

¹ Vladimir Petrov (ed.), "Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970", (London, Indiana University Press, 1975), pp. 64.

² Mao Ze-dong "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", Selected Works, 1949, Vol. 4, p. 404

inception of People's Republic of China to strengthen their friendship. The Soviet Union was the first state to grant recognition to and establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China immediately after its proclamation. To further strengthen their friendship Mao-Tse-Tung stayed eight weeks in Moscow and a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was signed on February 14, 1950. The treaty embodied the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state interdependence, national sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs and was a model for a new type of state relationship inherent between brotherly socialist countries. Regarding the treaty Mao said: "The signing of treaty of friendship, Alliance and mutual assistance between China and the Soviet Union not only was of tremendous help in building the new China, it was a strong guarantee in the struggle against aggression and for the preservation of peace and security in the far east and throughout the world".³

The treaty provided that the Soviet government would transfer to the government of the People's Republic of China all its rights in connection with the Joint Administration of the Chinese Chang-chun railroad together with all railroad property before 1952 and would do so without compensation. Soviet government also agreed to withdraw the Soviet troops from Joint naval base at Port Arthur. All

³ Jen Min Jihpao, "People's Daily", February 14, 1951.

base installation were to be transferred to the government of People's Republic of China.⁴

The Soviet government also agreed to grant the government of People's Republic of China a credit of 300 million American dollars. This credit was intended to reconstruct all important branches of the Chinese economy. The deliveries from Soviet Union to China equal to the total credit were to include equipments and materials for electric station, metallurgical and machine building plants, coal mines, rail and road transportation and for other branches of the Chinese economy. Not only this, the Soviet government also sent scientists and technician to China to build the Chinese economy. Thus the assistance given were of immense help for the Chinese people as those years were very difficult year for the Chinese.

The disinterested assistance provided by the Soviet Union and the success attained by the Chinese enabled them to launch their first five year plan in 1953 for gradual transformation of Chinese society to a socialist society. During the planning period, the Soviet Union extended all possible helps including credit for setting up rubber plant and other industries, sent scientists and technicians etc. for the success of planning. In September 1953 Moscow agreed to contribute for the construction of more industrial plants. During the visit of Soviet leaders Bulganin

⁴ Vladimir Petrov, 1975, N. 1, p. 65.

and Nikita Khrushchev agreed to give an additional credit valued at \$ 130 million as aid, deliver \$ 100 million in supplies and equipment over and above the previously pledged aid. Soviet technological experts and scientists also contributed to Chinese economic development. The trade between the Soviet Union and PRC also increased significantly during this period and by the end of 1959 the Chinese foreign trade had grown from a pre-liberation 5 per cent to 50 per cent and Soviet exports to China equalled Soviet exports to the rest of the third world.⁵

During 1953-55 the Soviet Union and PRC came close in international arena and jointly supported many foreign policy actions. As a result of active participation of People's Republic of China (PRC) with the Soviet Union, the PRC gained universal recognition. However, we cannot conclude from above discussion that all the help provided by the Soviet government to People's Republic of China were completely disinterested. It was also in the interest of Soviet Union to support the People's Republic of China because PRC was able to supply the Soviet Union with valuable raw materials and other goods needed to develop the economy.

The nationalist in the Chinese Communist Party, from very beginning were against the Chinese policy of accepting the Soviet Union as their leader, but the internationalist in the part understood it very well that cooperation with the Soviet

⁵ Vladimir Petrov, n. 1, p. 94.

Union on the basis of equality and mutual assistance was the high road to overcoming China's economic and cultural backwardness and to transforming the country into a great socialist industrial power as quickly as possible. Consequently Maoist suppressed temporarily the hegemonistic and anti-Soviet ideas of the nationalist.

However those years of mutual trust and friendship could not last long and contrary to the expectation generated in the wake of cordial relation in the initial stages, Sino-Soviet relation did not travel on a smooth track in the successive years. An analysis of Sino-Soviet relation shows that upto 1955 an atmosphere of greater friendship and cooperation developed between the two countries. It was during 1956 that some differences between the people's Republic of China and the Soviet Union came out publicly after the conclusion of 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 and 8th Congress of Chinese Communist Party in September 1956. Yet their relation up to 1959 can be said to be good one. The Soviets were of the view that great power chauvinistic forces entered the Chinese political arena and began playing an increasingly notable role in shaping its domestic and foreign policies.⁶ These forces in time completely dominated the leadership of the party and the country and suppressed the internationalist tendencies in the Communist Party of China.

⁶ Washington Post, November 1, 1978.

The causes of conflict in Sino-Soviet relation have been discussed far and wide since 1959. Like any other inter-state issue, the conflict had all types of disagreement that characterise disputes between allies such as claims over territory, disagreement over issues of aid and trade or lack of agreement over specific policy issues that result from differences in each party's national interests. Soviet-Chinese relation in late 50's had become the central and dominating feature in the world history. It had considerably influenced the external policies of both China and the Soviet Union. Analysts expressed their views during those years that the story of past 30 years which had been the east-west had now become the East-East conflict between the Soviet Union and China for next twenty years.⁷

We have so far analysed the development of comprehensive economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and military co-operation between the Soviet Union and China and have also started a discussion on Soviet-Chinese conflict. But before starting the analysis of causes which resulted in complete breakdown of relationship between these two countries in post liberation period, it is necessary to have a glimpse over the history of China and ideas of Communist Party of China during its formative years.

The formation of views of the Chinese Communist Party took place under

⁷ Mark Mancall, "China at the Centre-300 Years of Foreign Policy". (New York, 1984), pp. 380-81.

extraordinarily complex conditions. The Communist Party of China was born in a semi colonial semi-feudal country. It was extremely backward from the point of view of economics, sociology, politics and culture.⁸ It is clear from the fact that about ninety per cent population of the country was peasant and there were only 2.5 to 3 million industrial workers in China in 1949 and industries contributed 17 per cent of the gross output of the country. Similarly both socially and politically the Chinese society was backward.

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"The centuries of feudalism in China under conditions which were isolated from the rest of the world and relatively high level of Chinese culture as compared with the culture of her neighbours, who often were no more than vassals, acclimated the Chinese to considering their country, institutions and culture as something exceptional of "heavenly" Its large population, its comparatively high level of civilization, its isolation from other countries, all served to create the illusion that China was the centre of the universe. For centuries the ruling clique instilled this notion into the consciousness of the Chinese people. The contradiction between these notions and the real situations in a country which, in modern times, had been transformed into a semi-colonial territory led to extreme intensification of national sentiments, and gave rise to the attempt to restore its former grandeur,

⁸ Vladimir Petrov, N. 1, p. 109.

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whatever the cost".⁹ These were the conditions which prevailed before the formation of Communist Party of China.

The victory of great October revolution in Russia had a tremendous effect on China which showed the Chinese people the way to liberation. It also spread the Marxist-Leninist doctrine in China which was unknown to Chinese prior to 1917. As a result Marxist circles were formed in the country with the assistance from communist international which made the basis of formation of Communist Party of China (CCP) in 1921.

The CCP had some organizational defects. The workers which were the very basis of Communist Party could not form the basis of the CCP. As a resolution entitled "Immediate organizational tasks of Communist Party of China" of the CCP in November 1927 pointed out that: "One of the basic organizational short comings of the communist party of China is that virtually all the most active leaders of our party are neither workers nor even poor peasants, rather are representative of petty bourgeois intelligentsia. The Communist Party of China began to take shape as a political movement and as a party at a time when the Chinese proletariat had not yet constituted itself as a class, and when the class movement of the workers and peasants was still in its embryonic stage..... The mass influx of workers and

⁹ Ibid., pp. 109-110.

poorest peasants in to the party began comparatively late and as a result of the development of revolutionary class movement of workers. Consequently, the leadership role in the Communist Party of China has been retained by those who had come from petty bourgeois strata".¹⁰

Thus inside the party two different lines of thought began to develop - one was the Marxist internationalist of which ideas were based on the ideas of great October revolution and another was the nationalist - the petty bourgeois, with its own ideological concept. The struggle between these two lines inside the Communist Party of China was more evident after 1927.¹¹

Another tragedy for the Communist Party of China was that in 1935 most of the old party cadres were physically destroyed and anything resembling real organization in the cities had been crushed. As a result the nationalists in the CCP remained in the mainstream of revolutionary struggle. They gradually developed anti-Soviet tendencies in the CCP, although they were taking full support of the Soviet Union in their struggle against imperialism. Thus they were playing a dual role.

¹⁰ O. Vladimirov and V. Ryazantsev, "Stranitsy Politicheskoy Biografii Mao-Tse-Tung", (Moscow 1969), pp. 15-16. [page from the political biography of Mao-Tse-Tung, hereinafter referred to as Mao-Tse-Tung].

¹¹ Vladimir Petrov, N. 1, p. 115.

During rectification campaign in 1940 anti-Soviet tendencies in the Communist Party of China developed further. Mao's supporters rejected the applicability of the teachings of Lenin to the conditions of the Chinese revolution. As Wong Ming wrote about the campaign "In his preparation for and in the course of it Mao-Tse-Tung repeatedly said that by carrying out this campaign, he wanted to achieve three goals: (1) replace Leninism with Mao-Tse-Tungism (2) write the history of Communist Party of China as the history of Mao-Tse-Tung (3) raise the personality of Mao-Tse-Tung above the central committee and above the entire party".¹²

Thus it is clear from the above discussion that anti-Soviet tendencies inside the Chinese Communist Party always remained during pre-liberation period. However, the Soviet Union provided full support in the Chinese war for liberation. The Soviet took more interest in China because the victory of socialist China could alter the balance of power in the world in favour of the communist state. They were also looking in China the vast raw materials and a big market. The Chinese, on the other hand had to rebuild their country which could not be materialised without active support from the Soviet Union, as the USA and other capitalist countries looked at China with suspicion. Therefore both countries tried to maintain cordial relations built by them during 1950's and they maintained it during Stalin's era. The

¹² Wong Ming, *O. Sobytiyakh Vkitaye (On events in China)* (Moscow, 1969), pp. 37-38.

problem began after the death of Stalin and with the conclusion of 20th Party Congress of the CPSU.

This does not mean that Mao did not have his difficulties with Stalin. It took Mao two months while on a visit to Moscow to get from Stalin a treaty of friendship and alliance Stalin's suspicion of a possible Chinese Titoism was aggravated by the Chinese action of supporting North Korea from total defeat.¹³ The death of Stalin removed from scene, the senior leader to whom all communists were beholden. It was also clear that Soviet successors, whoever they could not speak with the same unquestionable authority that Stalin held. And as a result Mao regarded himself as senior to Stalin's successor in the world communist movement. Therefore he did not regard Khrushchev as the leader of world communist movement.

Thus, with Khrushchev coming to power, Soviet-Chinese relation took a different turn. Khrushchev attacked on the cult of personality and his policy of de-stalinization alarmed Mao and his colleagues who subsequently opposed "Khrushchev Oriented World Communism". The policy of peaceful co-existence and peaceful transition to socialism was not acceptable to Mao, who termed it as revisionist view of Marxism-Leninism which was a major threat to communist purity. At the same time Mao adopted new economic policy in which special emphasis was

¹³ David Floyd: "Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of Sino-Soviet Conflict", (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 68.

laid on agriculture rather than industries which contributed to further deterioration in the Soviet-Chinese relation.¹⁴

The change made by the leadership of Communist Party of China of the Leninist principles was seen by the Soviet Union as a direct consequence of the anti-Soviet tendencies in China and her departure from the path of socialism. There were several other factors such as border issues, personality cult, conflicting national interests which escalated the already existing tensions between both the countries.

Two new elements were introduced in Soviet Policy during the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union in 1956. Khrushchev denied the importance of Stalin in his speech which was made by him in the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and launched a new process which was known as "de-stalinization". The second element was Khrushchev's stress upon peaceful co-existence, according to him, which was the fundamental principle of Soviet Foreign Policy and the road of transition to socialism. In the Chinese view Khrushchev's speech seemed to deny many aspects of Marxist-Leninist thought. Chinese considered these as dangerous attempts to distort the Marxist-Leninist principles. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

¹⁴ Vladimir Petrov, N. 1, pp. 84-85.

was the first step along the road of revisionism taken by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.¹⁵

In the history of world communist movement, it was the Twentieth Congress of CPSU, which turned the whole scenario. It sowed the roots of polycentrism and bi-centrism in the communist bloc. Khrushchev denied Stalin's adventurism in foreign policy. He attacked Stalin pointing out his errors-that dominating attitude and one man decision of Stalin which threatened the Soviet Union's peaceful relations with the other countries. Khrushchev's static support for peaceful co-existence, forced him to remark: "When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition between the two systems - the capitalist and socialist system - this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved through armed interference by socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries. We believe that countries with differing social systems can do more than exist side by side. It is necessary to proceed further, to improve relations, strengthen confidence between countries and cooperate".¹⁶

The relative element of the Soviet-Chinese relations are not too easy to determine. However, the Chinese objections stressed upon the question of Stalin

¹⁵ G.F. Headson, R. Lawenthal and Macfarthav, 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute, Documented and Analysed', (London, 1961), pp. 42-43.

¹⁶ Gittings, John (ed.) "Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute" (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 60. n. 10, p. 68.

and other doctrinal issues, which emerged in the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin was further brought back to former position by Khrushchev in January 1957 in a speech which he made at the Chinese embassy. He said: "The enemies of communism have deliberately invented the word "stalinist" and are trying to make it sound abusive. For all of us, Stalin's name is inseparable from Marxism - Leninism."¹⁷

Tremendous importance of ideological and political questions raised by the Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders feared that it might weaken the unity of communist bloc and may affect the world wide struggle against capitalism. Moreover, the sweeping attack against Stalin's "cult of personality" raised the questions that Mao-Tse-Tung must have felt his importance and primacy within China. In ideological terms, we can say that Chinese were disturbed by Khrushchev's stress on the non-requirement of war, the possibility of a non-violent transition to socialism and the idea of peaceful co-existence as basic determinants of Soviet foreign policy. These ideological stands, which brought by Khrushchev were not in agreement with many angles of the model for revolution by Mao-Tse-Tung. Soviet Union also implied a willingness to make their relations better with capitalist countries and China felt that this step of Soviet Union would weaken its position with the United States.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 69.

So this is the historical background of Soviet-Chinese ideological conflicts. It shows how Soviet Union and China made their good bilateral relations step by step and how these relations later deteriorated.

It is clear after this study that the ideological conflict between Soviet Union and China had emanated long before the Chinese revolution, which could not flare-up earlier because Chinese Communist Party was still fighting for the victory of revolution. Other thing is that after Chinese revolution Soviet leader Stalin proved to be a cementing force in the world communist movement due to which the ideological conflicts remained completely silent till his death. But after Stalin's death the immediate root cause of the ideological conflict emerged following the decisions taken at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was the first congress held in 1956 without Stalin.

**CHAPTER III
TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL
CONFLICT, 1956**

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 was the first Congress to be held after the victory of Chinese revolution in 1949. This particular fact is of great importance, while, dealing with the ideological conflict between the two communist giants. During this period, the death of Stalin in 1953 may be interpreted as an important blow to the intimate Soviet-Chinese relations; however, Soviet-Chinese relations continued to be deep prior to the commencement of the 20th Congress in 1956. Since the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not hold any Congress after Chinese revolution till the death of Stalin, no new ideology regarding World Communist Movement could be evolved. Therefore, no question regarding ideological conflict could arise before the 20th Congress. However, an ideological debate was bound to emerge after this congress as it brought fundamental changes in the Communist ideology opposed to Stalin's policy.¹

Between 1949 and 1956 the People's Republic of China received from the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries everything needed to develop domestic industry, science and engineering, and was given the opportunity to sell its traditional exports in the markets of those countries. The United States of America and its allies had tried to organise an economic blockade against China, but they could not be able to do so because Soviet Union wanted to increase the authority

¹ Vladimir Petrov: "Soviet-Chinese Relations 1945-70" (London, Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 77.

of the young republic against those imperialistic powers.

The First Five Year Plan for development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China was adopted in 1953. In this transition period the main objective of the Communist Party's line was to transform socialist property into the means of production as the economic base of the state and social system in the China. The main objective during the transition period was to effect the socialist industrialization of the country, and a socialist transformation in agriculture, in cottage industry and in private capitalist industry and trade. It was said that all these tasks would take approximately 15 years.

Soviet Union also helped China to draft its constitution, which was officially published on June 15, 1954, by a number of observations. Soviet Union was a dependable guarantor and defender of China in its struggle to implement socialist principles of foreign policy. After these mutual co-operation the Communist Party of China passed a resolution in its 8th National Congress in 1956 and thanked Soviet Union for their assistance. It stated: "The developments over the past years show that the great alliance between China and the Soviet Union is a major bulwark of peace in the Far East and the rest of the world. The Soviet Union has rendered our country immense assistance in socialist constructions extensive assistance has also be rendered by the People's Democracies of Europe and Asia. The Chinese

people will never forget this comradely assistance of fraternal countries China's unity and friendship with the great Soviet Union and other socialist countries, founded on common aims and mutual assistance, are eternal and unbreakable. The further consolidation and strengthening of this friendship and unity are our highest internationalist duty and the foundation of our country's foreign policy".²

The Soviet Union gave full support and assistance to China for their development, but there was a anti-Soviet tendencies in Communist Party of China had much before the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Wong-Ming recalls how Mao-Tse-Tung artificially split the party into two camps, the "dogmatic" and the "empirical". He included all communist who had studied in the Soviet Union, those who were engaged in ideological and political work, as well as those who by their social origins belonged to the intelligentsia in the so-called "Pro-Soviet, Dogmatic Group".³ Mass retaliation against those, who did not support Mao-Tse-Tung took the form of the "Campaign to expose spies" which began in March 1943. At the conclusion of the treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual assistance, the leadership displayed definite distrust and suspicion in relations with the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders were dissatisfied with the fact that

² 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Moscow, 1956, p. 63 (in Russian) cited in B. Ponomarev, A Gromyko and V. Khvostov's "History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-70" (Moscow, Progress Publications, 1974), p. 415.

³ Wong-Ming, p. 39, cited in N. 1, p. 118.

the Soviet Union had extended a credit of "only" 300 million dollars.⁴ All these aspects were viewed by Moscow as temporary deviations at that time. But in the light of these, the roots for ideological conflict between Soviet Union and China was started.

By 1953, Mao-Tse-Tung started to eliminate all those who did not support his anti-Soviet line. Mao-Tse-

Tung attacked Wong-Ming, Kao-Kang, P'eng Teh-huai, Chang Wen-t'ien and others, because Mao felt that they were main obstacles in establishment of his petty bourgeois, Chauvinistic course. Documents indicate that one of the major "crimes" of the Chinese leaders were their friendly feelings toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Later it was known as the struggle between the internationalist Marxist-Leninists and the Maoists.⁵

Here one point is very essential, which should be added, that these anti-Soviet tendencies were not open, it was in hidden form. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held from February 14 to February 25 in Moscow. Mikoyan said that it was the most important Party

⁴ Ibid., p. 125.

⁵ Ibid., p. 126.

Congress since the death of Lenin. Khrushchev took his important place after Stalin's death. Earlier the Soviet policy regarding everything was moving around Stalin. When the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU held in 1956 the Stalin's thought and policy felt again throughout the congress. It was also felt throughout Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the first serious disagreements between Soviet Union and China arose over the theories on revolution and relation with the capitalist world that Khrushchev propounded to the delegates.⁶

In Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Khrushchev made two speeches, first one on 14th February and the second was on 25th February, which was a secret speech. The criticism of Stalin came in the second secret speech.

Khrushchev in his first speech, as Secretary of the Party, attacked the cult of the personality but he did not take Stalin's name directly. Khrushchev declared that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was based on the Leninist principles of Peaceful Co-existence. It was the major factor for increasing strength of the socialist camp. Khrushchev also said that war was not unavoidable, a revolution can achieve its goal by non-violent means and thus there were several alternative ways of reaching socialism.

⁶ Fred Halliday, "Russia, China and the West" (Middlesex, Penguins Publications, 1965), p. 52.

Mikoyan spoke after Khrushchev's first speech and he attacked Stalin directly. He attacked Stalin for making ill-informed and dogmatic assertions about economic collapse in the West. Mikoyan also criticized the official party history, the "Short Course on the History of the All Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)", which had been produced in 1938 by Stalin and contained many distortions and slanders against former communists, he called for the rehabilitation of those slandered in it and for the re-writing of party history.⁷

The 20th Congress marks some remarkable shifts in the political understanding of the Soviet leaders. This Congress can be treated as a watershed between dogmatic and progressive understanding of the socialist ideology. To start with one of Khrushchev's proposition was the principle of peaceful co-existence. Nevertheless, it was not a new proposition offered by Khrushchev. Even Lenin believed it as an important component of foreign policy. This principle strongly criticised the inevitability of war. A socialist state could co-exist with other social systems and more, so the Soviet Union because it had sufficient natural resources and markets within its own territorial limits. People could not be plunged into war for the benefit of Kulaks. Khrushchev brought to the surface the basic contradiction in the foreign policy of Soviet Union. "The Soviet leaders works for peaceful co-existence between the two systems. At the same time they declare that they are

⁷ Ibid., p. 53.

fighting for communism, and say that communism is found to win in all countries. Now if the Soviet Union is fighting for communism, how can these be any peaceful co-existence with it?"⁸ He believed that it was a bourgeois propaganda that confused ideological struggle with the question of relations between states. Communist victory over other social systems would not come out of armed aggression but due to the inherent advantages that socialist mode of production had over other systems. This kind of peaceful co-existence has mustered wider appeal for communism in many states like India, Burma etc. This principle however, was exposed to vociferous criticism 'a principle based on expediency' or as 'a revisionist principle'. In the 20th Congress it was also asserted that it is not necessary that the transition from Capitalism to Socialism would always be along the lines of Soviet experience. "All nations will arrive at socialism - this is inevitable, but not all will do so in exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own in one or another form of democracy, one or another variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, one or another rate at which socialist transformations will be effected in various aspect of social life".⁹ In the name of historical materialism if the possibility of variety of ways to achieve the goal of socialism was contradicted, it is theoretically and practically an error.

⁸ N.S. Khrushchev: "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Party Congress", (New Delhi, Roxy Press, 1956), p. 38.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

Historically experience had shown a variety of ways to construct a socialist society that differed from Soviet experience. These were people's democracies such as Poland, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia and the other European Peoples Democracies on the one hand. On the other hand there was Chinese People's Republic whose economy, prior to the victory of the revolution, was exceeding backward, semi-feudal and semi-colonial in character. Still China was undergoing a gradual transformation into a component of socialist economy.

The peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism was further possible because the present situation offered the working class in a number of capitalist countries a real opportunity to unite the overwhelming majority of people, under its leadership to secure transfer of basic means of production into the hands of the people. The working class including peasantry would unite to defeat the reactionary force opposed to the popular interest to capture stable majority in parliament.

Thus the 20th Congress stressed the need for peaceful co-existence of various systems of social organisation. The assertion of "Communist aggression" was "a crusade against peace, democracy and socialism".¹⁰ . Soviet leaders also stressed on peaceful competition between two opposite system (Socialist and

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 38.

Capitalist). The strong Soviet Commitment to stick to the peaceful co-existence, Peaceful competition between two opposite system (Socialist and Capitalist) and peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism caused tremendous ideological upheavls between Soviet and Chinese Parties tht led to a major split in the World Communist Movement.

With Khrushchev coming to power, Soviet-China relations which till then had a smooth run took a different turn. Although Mao and Khrushchev got on well for some time, it could not last long. Certain internal and external policies of Khrushchev infuriated Mao and sparked of the Sino-Soviet scheme. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and peaceful co-existence' alarmed Mao and his colleagues who subsequently opposed "Khrushchevism-oriented world communism" deprecating it as a `revisionist view of Marxism-Leninism'. In the same way, Mao's new economic policies contributed to a further deterioration inthe Soviet-China relation.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU introduced two new elements into the Soviet Policy. The February 24-25 speech made by Khrushchev downgraded the importance of Stalin which launched the process known as de-stalinization. The other aspects were Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful co-existence as the fundamental principle of foreign policy and the parliamentary road as a viable

means of transition to socialism. In Chinese view, Khrushchev's speech seemed to imply a negation of many aspects of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. They considered these as a serious distortion of the Marxist-Leninist principles. To them: "The twentieth Congress of CPSU was the first step along the road of revisionism taken by the leadership of the CPSU".¹¹

The 20th Party Congress was a turning point in the history of the communist movement in the world. It showed the seeds of polycentrism or bicentrism in the communist monolith. Khrushchev debunked Stalin's adventurism in foreign policy. He denigrated Stalin pointing out his errors - that Stalin dominating attitude and one-man decisions threatened the Soviet Union's peaceful relations with other countries causing great complications. Khrushchev's unflinching support for peaceful co-existence induced him to remark: "When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition between the two systems - the capitalist and socialist system - this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved through armed interference by socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries. We believe that countries with differing social systems can do more than exist side by side. It is necessary to proceed further, to improve relations, strengthen confidence between countries and cooperate".¹²

¹¹ F. Headson, R. Lawenthal and Macfarthehav, The Sino-Soviet dispute Documented and Analysed, (London 1961), pp. 42-43.

¹² Gittings, John (ed.) "Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute", (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 68

The relative merits of the Soviet and Chinese version are not easy to determine. However, the Chinese objections to the 20th Congress were more pronounced over the question of Stalin than over the doctrinal issues. Probably because of the Chinese criticism, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Stalin was further 'rehabilitated' by Khrushchev in January 1957 in a speech made at the Chinese Embassy. He said "The enemies of communism have deliberately invented the word "Stalinist" and are trying to make it sound abusive. For all of us, ... Stalin's name is inseparable from Marxism-Leninism."¹³

The Khrushchev speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU had raised ideological and political questions of tremendous importance. China's leaders feared that it might threaten the legitimacy of communist regimes and parties everywhere, weaken the unity of the communist bloc and affect the world wide struggle against the capitalist world adversely. Moreover, the sweeping attack against Stalin's "cult of personality" inevitably raised questions that Mao must have felt, might threaten his primacy within China. In ideological terms, the Chinese were disturbed by Khrushchev's stress on the non inevitability of war, the possibility of a non-violent transition to socialism and the idea of peaceful co-existence as basic principles underlying Soviet policy. These also implied a willingness to compromise with the capitalist nations, and Beijing felt that this would weaken its position in its

¹³ Ibid., p. 69.

confrontation with the United States, particularly over Taiwan.

However, after a gap of several months after the 20th Congress, China traced its disagreements with Soviet Union to these statements by Khrushchev on foreign affairs and cleared its own position. China said that revolution could not get its goals without violence and this was the real Marxist-Leninist policy. So China alleged Soviet Union that of overlooking Marxist-Leninist policy. despite China's opposition to new Soviet line, its supremacy was recognised in both the international conferences held in 1957 and 1960 respectively. Although Soviets increasingly inclined to abjure any claim to Soviet leadership were seeking to get the support of other parties for policies, which were most convenient to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the issue was primarily screen for the broader question, which party shall formulate the general line for World Communism? They simply declared that the CPSU had automatically forfeited the position of "Head", only because of its revisionism in the international communist movement.

Several factors emerged after the 20th Congress of the CPSU which sharpened the ideological conflict between Soviet Union and China, for example revisionism or Dogmatism, war or peace, peaceful transition to socialism, Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the class struggle, third country issue, differences over Nuclear co-operation, Taiwan strait crisis, Cuban Missile crisis, conflict, Sino-

Soviet borderdispute and Partial Test Ban Treaty.

As for as revisionism is concerned the Chinese argued that it was the major threat to Communist Purity, for what they identified it publicly first with Tito and from 1963 on, openly with the Soviet leadership. After an initial anti-revisionist spurt in 1957-58, the Soviets maintained that both revisionism and dogmatism were a threat to Marxism-Leninism, but after 1963 the emphasis was given on dogmatism as the basic threat and for that the Soviets claimed the Chinese leaders as its exponents.¹⁴

On the question of war or peace led the Soviets to conclude that peaceful expansion of communism is possible. Since war by the imperialist could be deterred. Though the war was no longer inevitable, while the appearance of highly destructive nuclear weapons made its avoidance desirable. The Chinese argued that the alleged military superiority of "Socialism" made a more forceful policy of practical and that the "imperialist" could be forced to resign. If they did not war would spell the doom of "imperialism" even if a half of humanity perished.¹⁵

Soviet Union argued that peaceful transition to socialism was possible, and the more advanced western states power could be attained by Communists by

¹⁴ Z.K. Brzezinski: "The Soviet Block: Unity and Conflict", (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 399

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

following the Parliamentary road. The Chinese took it as Bernsteinian revisionism and a betrayal of the Leninist revolutionary tradition.¹⁶

Soviet Union argued that the class struggle had been completed victoriously, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat had been transformed into a state of all the people. This had permitted a relaxation in some of necessary policies of Historical stage. The Chinese rejected this as sheer sophistry, designed to mark the lush growth of bourgeois elements inside the Soviet Union. Which were the danger on the Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the class struggle.

Third country issue was also very much related to the Soviet-China conflict in late 50's. The Chinese intervention in European bloc was made possible due to political developments in the East European countries of Poland and Hungary. It was the first time when the Chinese involved themselves directly in East European affairs and gave their views on major ideological and political issues of communist world. These actions of China indicates the Chinese new thought that Beijing no longer accepted Moscow's authority to define the correct line on critical issues of communist regime or parties. During the Hungarian and Polish crisis Chinese criticized Soviet perceptions and sought for full equality between socialist countries

¹⁶ Vladimir Petrov, "Soviet-Chinese Relations 1945-1970", (Indiana University Press, London 1975), p. 18.

and non-intervention in internal affairs. During this crisis China made its reputation as the champion of the underdogs. Mao-Tse-Tung during his talks with the first Secretary of the Polish workers party, is reported to have urged the poles to follow absolutely the search for an autonomous internal policy and develop their own social system as Yugoslavia had done.¹⁷ By this China tried to encourage polycentrism in the world communist movement which meant, China was bent on refusing to accept Soviet Union as the leader of World revolution.

In this background, the first international meeting of the Communist Parties took place in 1957. In this meeting major reassessment of communist bloc policy took place. The struggle for peace, economic development of the bloc, relations among Communist Parties were discussed in this meeting. Strongly Mao-Tse-Tung who led the Chinese delegation to this meetings, spoke on November 14, and supported Soviet leadership of the bloc strongly and said: "In the same way as every small party organization we must have a leader".¹⁸

During his speech Mao congratulated the CPSU on having drawn the necessary conclusions from the experience, which it had derived from its mistakes

¹⁷ Gittings, John (ed.) "Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute" (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 73, cited in the report by Ebert on the Moscow Meeting, News Deutschland, November, 30, 1951.

¹⁸ A. Doak, Barnet, "China and Mao's Power in East Asia", Peoples Daily November 12, 1958 (Brooking Institution), p. 33.

since the death of Stalin. However, in this conference differences in strategic attitudes became evident. Soviet Union brought a relatively cautious strategy towards the non-communist world.

A source of disagreement was the domestic policy, which was followed by China. Developmental issues had been a matter of debate in China. When the "great leap forward" and commune programme, were introduced in 1958, Mao had clearly rejected the Soviet model. Through this policy a radicalism increased in internal policy and grown militancy in foreign policy. On the other hand, during the same period the trends in Soviet Union were toward a less revolutionary domestic policy which put pressure on Khrushchev to pursue a co-existence policy towards the West.

During 1958 and 1959, the differences between the two communist countries emerged on many issues. Chinese saw the Khrushchev's new policy toward the United States with suspicion. Khrushchev's efforts to promote co-existence or detente with the USA was cleared with his US visit in 1959. The Chinese were then convinced that Soviet-American detente would compromise important Chinese interests in Taiwan and elsewhere. The recovery of Taiwan was the one of the highest priority of China ever since 1949. For some time they had been watching the strengthening of relationship between Taiwan and Washington. So Chinese

were in fear. Chinese suspected that Khrushchev was trying to signal both Washington and Beijing that in his view Taiwan was not an issue of high priority and should be laid aside, at least for the present.¹⁹

Limited Co-operation between the two countries in the nuclear field had begun in the mid fifties; when Soviet Union aided the Chinese in building their first nuclear reactor. Later the Chinese claimed that they were promised by Soviet Union to give China a 'sample' bomb and technical data, which was required to build nuclear weapons. Moscow, however, clarified that they were disturbed by Mao's statement in Moscow conference and blamed China for a nuclear war. After then in 1959 China blamed Soviet Union for the tore up of 1957 nuclear agreement. This nuclear issue was responsible for the open rift between them. Soviet Union wanted China to be dependent on Moscow for nuclear technology, and China blamed Soviet Union for their unwillingness to back China over an important issue. After this China planned to develop its own nuclear capability. On the other hand Soviet Union argued that around this time Khrushchev had decided that primacy must be given to arms control including efforts to prevent proliferation and that it was, therefore, logical to end nuclear assistance to China. It appears that, to Moscow a nuclear China especially under Mao's leadership, might be more of a liability than an asset and hence it was not in the Soviet interests to help the

¹⁹ Gittings, N. 17, p. 85.

emergence of such China.

The Taiwan affair was another important incident in which the Soviet - China differences became apparent. On July 23, 1958, at the conclusion of an extraordinary session of the Chinese Central Committee's Military Affairs Committee, Chinese propaganda revived the call for liberation of Taiwan. For some time the Chinese leaders had been observing with concern the strengthening of ties between the United States and Taiwan. They were now fearful of the Soviet policy of Co-existence which they thought would reduce the probability of recovering Taiwan. In fact, as already mentioned, the Chinese suspected that Khrushchev was trying to signal both Washington and Beijing that in his view Taiwan was not a very serious issue. According to the Chinese, during the peak of crisis when the US threat of attacking China was very much in the news, the Soviet Union while promising moral and material aid to China in case of aggression against her, had avoided any explicit commitment or reference to the provisions of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. According to the Chinese view, whatever offer of support to China came from Soviet Union only after the crisis ceased to exist. In fact, the Taiwan crisis had the

effect of classifying the Soviet attitude towards independent military initiatives by

China, it revealed that Soviet support for China would be operative only within narrowly defined limits.²⁰

Although it represented a diplomatic defeat for Beijing, it also strengthened the arguments of Chinese leaders who advocated the policy of economic and military self-reliance for China.²¹

The late 1950s also witnessed radical changes in Chinese economic policies which also were a source of tension between Soviet Union and China. In the summer of 1958, the 'three banners' were proclaimed as the guidelines for China's progress toward socialism, which established a theoretical base on the doctrine of permanent revolution, the 'Great Leap Forward', which called for rapid industrial progress, and the 'peoples commune movement' which applied the great leap to agricultural policy. The 'Great Leap Forward' movement to some extent reflected a mood of discontent and impatience with the pace of development so far achieved by moral and psychological incentives, where material incentives had failed.²²

The 'Great Leap Forward' movement was important in the context of

²⁰ John R. Thomas "Soviet Behaviour in the Quemoy Crisis", 1958, Orbis Spring 1962.

²¹ Gittings, John (ed.), N. 17, pp. 99-100.

²² Willim Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, (London, 1964), p. 234.

deteriorating Soviet-Chinese relations. It showed dissatisfaction with both the Soviet economic model and with the Soviet aid as a solution to China's spiralling needs. The Chinese expressed unwillingness to associate with the Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) plan for economic integration and declined to conclude a long term Soviet-China trade agreement preferring to trade on an annual basis. During this period Soviet Union's resources were fully occupied with both domestic economic expansion and with increased aid towards third world countries. Between 1955 and 1962, India, for instance, was granted Soviet loans totalling US \$ 800 million which was more than what China had received in the two grants of 1950 and 1954.²³

Faced with growing differences in their relations China published on April 16, 1960 a bitter polemical article in the party's main theoretical journal 'Red Flag'. It was a

sweeping ideological condemnation of the Soviet Union for abandoning Leninist principles and basic communist values. The article entitle 'Long Live Leninism'

²³ Barnett, N. 18, cited in Red Flag, no. 8, April 16, 1960.

referred to Soviet leaders simply as "modern revisionists".²⁴

The long standing disputes between the two countries reached its Zenith in August 1960 when the Soviet Union decided to withdraw from China its technical experts working in different areas. The withdrawal of the Soviet experts had far-reaching repercussion in the trade relations between the two countries. It was only after the withdrawal of experts that the bilateral trade had started decreasing. In the earlier years though political differences had existed the trade was not affected seriously.

Expressing dissatisfaction over the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw experts, the CCP Central Committee wrote: "In spite of our objections you turned your backs on the principle guiding international relations and unscrupulously tore up 343 contracts concerning experts and scrapped 257 projects of technical and scientific cooperation all within a short span of one month."²⁵

With the Soviet Union-China relations further deteriorating, the Moscow conference of Communist Parties in 1960 provided a forum for other fraternal

²⁴ Gittings, Letter of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, 29 February, 1964, p. 139.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 140.

Communist Parties to join the dispute. The issues discussed during the meeting were the questions of war and peace, peaceful transition, national liberation movements, revisionism and dogmatism. However the most important issue in the conference was that of 'fractionalism' in the communist parties and Soviet Union wanted to have a ban on the fractional activities. It also attempted to assert the principle that major decisions of fraternal parties taken collectively should be on all communist parties.²⁶ But China objected to this proposal and saw it as an attempt to prevent them from publishing their views in the international communist movement, and to interdict the expression of minority view point.

It was in the Moscow conference that the differences between Soviet Union and Albania became apparent when the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha accused Khrushchev of economic reprisal against albania. Hoxha's speech gave formal expression to the irreconcilable split between the Soviet Union and Albania which became public at the 22nd congress of the CPSU in October 1961.²⁷ But China refused to tow the Soviet line. Thus, while in 1961, the Soviet Union and some East European countries imposed economic sanctions upon Albania, in February and April 1961. China signed agreements on economic aid and loan to Tirana. Albania

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 154-55.

²⁷ The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to Party Organisation and all Communist of Soviet Union, Pravda, 14th July 1963, cited in Gittings, N. 17, pp. 181-83.

thus became yet another symbol of Sino-Soviet conflict. The 22nd congress of the CPSU led to a resumption of indirect Soviet-China polemics with bitter attacks respectively on Albania and Yugoslavia.

The conflict between Soviet Union and China was continued throughout 1962. Many other fraternal Communist Parties had tried for the relaxation of tensions, but they were not succeeded. The situation got a new low during Cuban missile crisis and Sino-Indian border conflict. Though Beijing had earlier supported the decision to place missiles in Cuba, later they changed the stand and denounced the decision as "adventurism" and the subsequent decision to remove them as a 'capitulationsim'.²⁸

Yet while the Cuban missile crisis lasted, Beijing backed the Soviet Union, since the said action led to a superpower confrontation and helped to slow down the process of detente.²⁹ But after this Chinese leadership attacked Khrushchev for his 'capitulationism' and American pressure, which was on Khrushchev. This step of Beijing increased the differences.

Sino-Indian borders conflicts was an other factor which influence of Soviet-

²⁸ Ramachandran, K.N. & Ghosh, S.K.: "Power and Ideology, Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Overview", (New Delhi, 1971), p. 109.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 109-110.

Chinese relation. The situation began to deteriorate when borders clashes become very frequent in 1959. India's relation with Soviet Union was highly cordial during that periods. Soviet Union called upon both-India and China to resolve the disputes. China took it as left out in the hours of crisis by the Soviet Union.

The relations between India and China deteriorated and borders dispute had reached in a complex position. China was expecting that the Soviet Union would back the Chinese territorial claims. Moscow, however adopted a neutral stand in the conflict between "its non-aligned friend India and the socialist ally China". The refusal of the Soviet leadership to support communist China's borders conflict with India was viewed in Beijing as an "outright betrayal of the obligation of the proletarian internationalism."³⁰ During this period the relations between Soviet Union and China got a new low. The Soviet Union and its allies in the communist world criticized Beijing's action as 'adventurist' and expressed open dissatisfaction with China's policy towards India.³¹ China's territorial dispute with India turned in a war between them in 1962, and Soviet Union opposed this 'adventurist' step of China. Soviet neutrality incensed Chinese leaders who accused Moscow of taking the side of a capitalist country led by a 'reactionary elite' against a fraternal socialist

³⁰ V.P. Dutt, "China's Foreign Policy 1969-62", (Bombay 1964), p. 138.

³¹ Pravada, 5 November 1962, cited in Alfred D. Low, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polmics", (Rutherford, N.J. Fairleigh, 1976), p. 70.

state.³²

On the other hand borders dispute between Soviet Union and China also increased the tension between the two. In 1964 the two sides met in Beijing to discuss the borders and territorial problems. But these talks were not successful and had been called off. `China stated that they were ready to accept the existing borders as a basis of negotiations, but they added that Moscow should admit that all the old treaties' were `unequal' and invalid. But Soviet Union did not agree and stated that all old treaties were still valid and that only minor adjustments should be discussed.

During 1962-63, Soviet-Chinese conflict entered in a new level. In fact it reached a `point of no return'. Soviet Union signed the partial Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 due to which Soviet-Chinese relation reached the lowest bottom. China openly criticized the Soviet step of signing this treaty. In a government statement, which was released on 31st July 1963, it said: "This is a treaty signed by three nuclear powers. By this treaty they attempted to consolidate their nuclear monopoly and bind the hands of all the peace loving countries subjected to the nuclear threat... Thus the interest of the Soviet people have been sold-out, the interest of peace loving people of the world have been sold out... this is by no means a victory

³² Beijing Review, 31st July and 2nd August 1963, pp. 7-8.

to the policy of peaceful co-existence. It is capitulation of US imperialism".³³ Partial Test Ban Treaty increased further ideological conflicts which continued till the fall of Khrushchev. The attack against the Soviet Union thus became a major thrust of China's policy framework in 1964, when both the countries reached a point of no return. In this background the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict can be easily traced and analysed.

³³ Peoples Daily, (editorial), Vol. 7, 13 November 1964, p. 16., cited in Ramachandran & Ghosh, N. 28, p. 118.

**CHAPTER IV
SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL
CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES OF THE WORLD
COMMUNIST PARTIES, 1957-1960**

After that 20th Congress of the CPSU held from February 14 to February 25, 1956, both countries confronted on Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, which became the central point of serious conflict between the two countries. China considered Stalin's ideology still relevant to its society.

Disagreements between China and Soviet Union existed prior to 20th congress of the CPSU. At the conference of trade unions of the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean held in December 1949 in Peking, China claimed to occupy the leading position in the Asian revolutionary movement. They asserted that situations in Asian and Pacific countries were quite similar to the situation in China prior to 1949, and that revolutionaries should therefore be guided in their actions under the leadership and experience of Peking.¹ Stalin took a decisive stand against this line. The People's Republic of China still was an economically backward country needing much assistance from socialist states in order to strengthen its defensive capability to develop its economy, thus the Maoist, were not too openly venturesome.² But after the death of Stalin, Mao wanted to "take over" the leadership of the communist movement throughout the world. So this was the beginning of conflicts between Soviet Union and China. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU these conflicts emerged openly as ideological conflicts and

¹ Vladimir Petrov (ed.), "Soviet-Chinese Relations 1945-70", (London, Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

China began to oppose Soviet Union in many fronts.

From the beginning, the struggle had been fundamentally a dispute over authority: since 1956, over the authority to define (and redefine) the proper relationships between the CPSU and other bloc communist parties; since 1957, over the authority of fixed unified policy lines for the bloc and the international communist movement.³ But after the 20th congress of the CPSU, which was held in 1956, the Chinese challenge to Soviet Union emerged openly. It is important to know that the CCP had already had important policy disagreement with Stalin before, during and after its advent to power in 1949. The point, however, is that not until Stalin's death did the Chinese party dare to make such conflicts the occasion for challenging the authority and prerogatives of the CPSU - and eventually denying them altogether.⁴ It so happened that the first new policy divergence of importance following Stalin's death arose with the 20th congress and the positions it took regarding the Stalin cult and the possibility of "Peaceful Transitions" to socialism. Confronted once again, as it had been in the past, with Soviet decisions of policy with which it strongly disagreed the Chinese Communist Party leadership now for the first time felt itself in a position to press for their modification and in doing so,

³ Harry Gelman: "The Conflict: A Survey", Problems of Communism, Washington, No. 2, March-April, Vol. XIII, 1964, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

to contest the paramount authority of the Soviet party.⁵

Chinese Communist Party in a major statement on the conflict referred back to its April 1956 announcement "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and had criticized the resolutions of the 20th congress of the CPSU.⁶ By criticising this congress conclusion Mao wanted to defend his own position in Chinese Communist Party. Mao started to define how Stalin's "mistakes" had occurred and how they could be prevented in future. Stalin's serious mistake reflected contradictions between the individual and the collective in a socialist society. Their thinking was if the leader's of communist parties and socialist states exercised sufficient way then these mistakes could be minimized.

These series of thinkings by China representing first of all Chinese efforts to correct the errors of the CPSU and provide guidance for all those who had looked towards Moscow for direction, an immediate and wide impression in the international communist movement.⁷ For example, such a usually loyal CPSU supporter as the late Ajoy Ghosh, then Secretary General of Indian Communist Party, told the fourth Communist Party of India's Congress that the Chinese

⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

⁶ Yin Ch'ing-yao: "Some Views of Peiping-Moscow Relations", Issues and Studies, March, 1976, p. 17.

⁷ Harry Gelman, N. 3, p. 4.

statement was the most satisfactory one he had seen on the question and urged all Indian Communists to study it. Moreover, the Chinese disclosed in September, 1963 that they had followed up the April 1956 announcement with a series of private protests conveyed by Mao, Liu-Shao-Chi and Chou-En-Lai in their talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow and Peking. In these talks Chinese stated that the Stalin's policy and line of action were correct when Stalin was in power and Soviet leadership had fail to analyse the whole techniques of Stalin, which was the most serious thing in Chinese view.

After this allegation China intervened directly in Moscow's relations with its East European socialist countries before and during the crisis of 1956. In the statements and press reports China clearly indicated that China had given its full support and co-operation to Hungraian Communists' demands for their greater autonomy from Moscow.⁸ The Chinese had charged in their more recent statements on the dispute that the Soviet Union "Committed the error of great power chauvinism ... by moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Hungrarian comrades by armed force."⁹ The Chinese Communist Party had then stepped in to warn Moscow aainst using force. At the same time, the Chinese claimed that it were they who pressurised the CPSU for abandoning an altogether different sort

⁸ A.Z. Rubinstein (ed.): "The Forign Policy of the Soviet Union", (New York, Random House, 1960), p. 259

⁹ Z.K. Brzezinski: "The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict", (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967), p. 230

of "grave error" in the handling of the Hungarian revolt. The Peking statement says: "At the critical moment when the Hungarian counter revolutionaries had occupied Budapest, it (the CPSU) intended for a time to adopt a policy of capitulation and to abandon socialist Hungary to counter revolution We insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counter revolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of Hungary".¹⁰

Sensing a possible serious ideological conflict emerging from the conclusion of 20th Congress of the CPSU, Soviet Union called an International Conference of the World Communist Parties for the purpose of justifying its ideological position. Thus the conference of the World Communist Parties took place in Moscow from November 14 to 16, 1957. In this conference every country which was influenced by communism and communist movement lodged their appearance. These countries were: representative of the Albanian Party of Labour, the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party, Unity Party of Germany, the Communist Party of China, The Korean Party of Labour, the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, the Polish United Workers Party, the Rumanian Worker's Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia discussed their relations, current problems of the international

¹⁰ Harry Gelman, N. 3, pp. 4-5.

situation and the struggle for peace and socialism.¹¹ In course of the discussion the meeting also touched upon general problems of the International Communist Movement. In drafting the Declaration the participants in the meeting consulted with representatives of the fraternal parties in the capitalist countries. The fraternal parties not present at this meeting will assess and themselves decide what action they should take on the considerations expressed in the Declaration.¹² The first declaration was transition from capitalism to socialism which was begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia.¹³ According to this declaration: "In our epoch, world development is determined by the course and results of the competition between two diametrically opposed social systems. In the past forty years socialism has demonstrated that it is a much higher social system than capitalism. It has insured development of the productive forces at a rate unprecedented and impossible for capitalism, and the raising of the material and cultural levels of the working people. The communist and workers parties taking part in the meeting declare that the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of the two systems, which has been further developed and brought upto date in the decisions of the 20th congress of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, is the sound basis of the foreign policy of the socialist countries and the dependable pillar of

¹¹ Basic Documents of the Moscow Meeting of Communist & Worker's Parties, 1957-1960-1969, (New Delhi, Communist Party Publication, No. 31, December 1972), p. 1.

¹² Ibid., p. 1.

¹³ More on Great Debate: Selected Writings on Problems of Marxism-Leninism Today, (New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1964). p. 223.

peace and friendship among the peoples. The idea of peaceful coexistence coincides with the five principles advanced jointly by Peoples' Republic of China and India and with the Programme adopted by the Bandung Conference of African-Asian countries. Peace and peaceful coexistence have now become the demands of the broad masses in all countries".¹⁴

The declaration further stated: "The meeting also considers that in the present situation the strengthening of the unity and fraternal co-operation of the socialist countries, the communist and worker's parties and the solidarity of the international working class, national liberation and democratic movements acquire special significance. In the bedrock of the relations between the countries of the world socialist system and all the Communist and Worker's Parties lie in the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the principles of proletarian internationalism which have been tested by life".¹⁵

This meeting also considers that the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union and progress in socialist construction in the People's Democracies find deep sympathy among the working class and the working people of all countries. The idea of socialism is winning additional millions of people. In these conditions the

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 224.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 228.

imperialist bourgeoisie attaches increasing importance to the ideological moulding of the masses, it misrepresents socialism and smears Marxism-Leninism, misleads and confuses the masses. It is a prime task to intensify Marxist-Leninist education of the masses, combat bourgeois ideology, expose the lies and slanderous fabrications of imperialist propaganda against socialism and the communist movement and widely propagate in simple and convincing fashion the ideas of socialism, peace and friendship among nations.¹⁶

The fourth point of this declaration stated that the communist and worker's parties are faced with great historic tasks. The carrying out of these tasks necessitates closer unity not only of the communist and worker's parties but of the entire working class, necessitates cementing the alliance of the working class and peasantry, rallying the working people and progressive mankind, the freedom and peace-loving forces of the world. The defence of peace is the most important world-wide task of the day. The Communist and worker's parties in all countries stand for joint action on the broadest possible scale with all forces favouring peace and opposed to war.¹⁷

After exchanging views, the participants in the meeting arrived at the

¹⁶ Basic documents of the Moscow Meeting's of Communist and Worker's Parties, 1957-60-69, N 11, p. 8

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

conclusion that in present conditions it is expedient, besides bilateral meetings of leading personnel and exchange of information to hold as the need arises, more representative conferences of communist and worker's parties to discuss current problems, share experience, study each other's views and attitudes and concert action in the joint struggle for the common goals - peace, democracy and socialism.¹⁸

Mao himself attended this conference as chief spokesman for the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese tried to renew overall communist policy with a perceptible shift in direction. Whereas in 1956 Peking had stressed autonomy and spoke violently against "great power dictatorship", its representatives now talked about unity and deference to the leading role of the Soviet Union. Mao publicly spoke at Moscow University on November 17, 1956 "the socialist camp must have a head and this head is the Soviet Union", and that "the communist parties of all countries must have a head and this head is the CPSU". Behind this changed version the responsible reason was a treaty which was signed by the Soviet Union and China after a month providing for Soviet assistance to China in the area of "New technology for national defense". Chinese now advocated for a special status for CPSU. In 1963 Moscow and Peking published differing versions of portions of Mao's conference speech dealing with this point, but both versions indicated that

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

the Chinese leader had sought to impress upon the delegates that nuclear war was neither so likely, nor its consequences - if it came - so unacceptable, as to justify communist hesitancy to adopt a more militant international policy.

Mao publicly proclaiming the Soviet Union and CPSU to be the "center" and "head" of world communism, he met personally with Soviet leaders and so the Chinese claimed "where necessary and appropriate waged struggle against them in order to help them correct their errors". According to errors Mao said that the CPSU's draft of the passage in the conference resolution related to the modes of acquiring power. Chinese objections about this draft was absence of word non-peaceful transition [to power] mentioning only peaceful transition and stressed the "parliamentary road". This Chinese objections embodied in a joint CPSU-CCP draft declaration and which was later attached in the published conference resolution. The CCP also claimed that they succeeded to get other facilities and concessions from the CPSU at the 1957 meeting. Notably, Peking asserts that its representatives secured additions to the conference resolution embodying the notions that US imperialism is the center of world reaction and the sworn enemy of the people, and that "if imperialism should unleash a world war, it would doom itself to destruction".¹⁹

¹⁹ Fred Halliday(ed.), "Russia, China and the West", (Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 217.

But in 1959 Sino-Soviet struggle emerged again with various new national interest on several fronts. The three most important issues of conflict, which emerged at that time were: Military relationship between the Soviet Union and China; the question of Soviet intervention during Taiwan straits crisis; new radical economic programme of Peking and other claims which were attached with them on the military issues China claimed that in October 1957. Soviet Union committed to help China to get atomic weapons capability. This appears doubtful, however, particularly in view of the campaign launched by the CCP in the summer of 1958 against Chinese military leaders charged with over stressing the importance of both atomic weapons and out side aid. The same Chinese statement further alleges that in 1958 "the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control", and that these demands were "firmly rejected by the Chinese government". It is conceivable that the demands were linked by the Soviets to the question of atomic assistance to China, and that they were advanced by Khrushchev when he visited Peking in early August, at which time Soviet military assistance was reportedly discussed in the context of China's requirements for the impending Taiwan straits venture.²⁰ [Moscow took slow and deliberate step in the Taiwan straits crisis because they did not want to feel any nuclear conflict with United States]. So the Soviet Union did not support the action which was taken by the Chinese. This interpretation would appear to derive support from the Chinese

²⁰ Raymond, L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 349, September, 1963, p. 89.

claim made last September (denied by Moscow) that Khrushchev, in his talks with Mao at Peking in October 1959, sought to remove Taiwan as "an incendiary factor in the international situation" by hinting that Peking ought to accept a "two Chinas" solution.²¹

A new area of friction emerged in 1958 when China adopted communes programme and economic "Great Leap Forward". It was a major change in Chinese domestic policy and Soviet Union took this change as a dangerous Chinese challenge to its leadership of the communist world. But the Chinese leaders tried to present their "totally unsound and harmful policy ... as an objective law" and "as a prescription or recipe for other countries". According to a official statement Khrushchev personally opposed these "innovations" in his talks with Mao in early 1958.²² After this Soviet Union started to ignore communes publicly. Soviet Union stated that the achievement of full communism required a level of production which Soviet Union had closer than China.

The year 1959 brought again a set of conflicts, between the Soviet Union and China. The main areas of tension were: border conflict between China and India and Soviet moves towards United States with an easing of tensions. Moscow

²¹ Harry Gelman, N. 3, p. 6.

²² Ibid., p. 7.

pursued their strategy of "Peaceful co-existence" towards the west with serious motive. This move was signalled by Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's visit to United States in January and after 21st CPSU congress. 21st CPSU declared that the war between capitalist and socialist states might be avoided while capitalism still remained. Khrushchev's visit to United States and meeting with President Eisenhower made this Soviet step easy. It was the first time after world war II, when Soviet Union tried to make a better relation with United States.

All this was naturally curse of God to Peking, which considered the United States as a main and important obstacle to its ambition in Asia and made every possible effort to stop this US hegemony by giving full communist revolutionary pressure, because it was essential for Chinese national interest. In October 1959 Mao first showed an intention to size are lead the World Communist Movement. Liu Shao-Cao-Ch'i and Teng Hsiao-P'ing Vaguely postulated that socialist revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries and regions should follow the Chinese Communist Path towards communism.²³ This widened the difference between the two countries.

Other Soviet action during this period created many new Chinese grievances. Speaking publicly on July 18, 1959 at Poznan, Poland, Khrushchev -

²³ Yao Menghsuah, "The Outlook for Peiping-Moscow Relations", Issues and Studies, January 1977, p. 42.

without referring to China by name - recalled the failure of the Soviet experiment with communes during the period of "war communism" and remarked that those who had wished to set them up "had a poor understanding of what communism is and how it is to be built."²⁴ Chinese took this statement as a direct intervention in the internal affairs of China. Another reason for suspicion that the Soviets tried to intervene more directly by encouraging Chinese Defense Minister Marshal P'eng Te-huai, during his visit to Eastern Europe in the spring of 1959, to oppose Maoist policies, and P'eng did so in Lushan meeting and that this was responsible for his dismissal shortly thereafter in September 1959.²⁵

Meanwhile Soviet Union ignored Chinese appeal for atomic weapons and a sample of an atomic bomb. And finally rejected Chinese appeal in June 1959. This was the end of Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1957 which provides "new technology for national defense".

Other main element of conflict between them was China's border conflict with non-socialist, bourgeois India. Soviet Union refused to support this Chinese stand. In Chinese view this was the refusal of the theory of "Proletarian internationalism". Regarding this Soviet government on October 9, 1958 issued a public statement

²⁴ Ibid., p. 43.

²⁵ David A. Charles, "The dismissal of Marshal P'eng Te-huai", The China Quarterly (London), October-December 1961, p. 68.

taking a neutral stand towards the conflict - this the Chinese have since claimed, in spite of frantic last-minute efforts by themselves to dissuade Moscow from such action. Not only did Moscow refuse to heed this appeal but it later accused the Chinese of having deliberately timed their military action against India so as embarrass to Khrushchev on the eve of his trip to the United States.²⁶

Khrushchev' visited Peking at the end of August 1958. Chinese put their grievances to him but Khrushchev did not supported. He warned China for their border conflicts with not only India, but also for the entire international situation. Khrushchev suggested to Mao the desirability of accepting a two-Chinas solution of Taiwan problem.

After this Chinese feeled that the Soviet Union is not serious about the treaty of assistance to China, then many indirect but unmistakable incident of Khrushchev's policies published in the leading organs of the CCP was the contention that the peaceful co-existence line as applied by the Soviet party was eroding the militancy of revolutionaries throughout the world.²⁷ Chinese elaborated their objections to the arguments that the advent of nuclear weapons were necessary for peace. Because they believed that if great powers directly involved

²⁶ V.P. Dutt: "China's Foreign Policy 1959-62" (Bombay 1964), p. 138.

²⁷ Fred Halliday, N. 19, p. 218.

in local struggles then the world war will on our door and if that revolutionary armed struggles should not be so seriously cultivated as to create a danger of nuclear conflict. Soon after the CCP campaign began, it was necessary for Soviet Union to defend its policies against the Chinese criticisms. It was measurably weakened as a result of the Soviet decision to publicly exploit the U-2 incident of May 1, whereas previous overflights had been ignored.²⁸ This decision set in motion a train of events which apparently led the Soviet leadership to conclude, after anguished debate, that it would be politically harmful, in view of the Chinese offensive, to allow the summit conference with the western leaders at Paris. Soviet interest was also involved in this U-2 incident. Mao was urgently invited to come to Moscow but Mao refused. It was disclosed by Soviet Party on May 12, 1960 four day before the Paris meeting.²⁹ So if we want to say about this period as a technical word then we should say this was the period of "war of words".

Representatives of the Communist and Worker's Parties discussed urgent problems of the international situation and the further struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism at this meeting.

This meeting shown unity of views among the participants on the issues

²⁸ Allen Dulles, "The Craft of Intelligence" (New York, Harper & Row), 1963, p. 169.

²⁹ CPSU Central Committee letter to the Chinese Communist Party, March 30, 1963, Published in Pravda, April 3, 1963.

which were discussed. The Communist and Worker's Parties were unanimously reaffirmed their allegiance to the Declaration and peace Manifesto adopted in 1957. These programme documents of creative Marxism-Leninism determined the fundamental positions of the international communist movement on the more important issues of that time and contributed in great measure towards uniting the efforts of the communist and worker's parties in the struggle to achieve common goals. They remains the banner and guide to action for the whole of the international communist movement.³⁰

The course of events had demonstrated the correctness of the analysis of the international situation and the outlook for world development as given in the declaration and peace manifesto, and the great scientific force and effective role of creative Marxism-Leninism.³¹ Briefly, the second International Meeting of representatives of Communist and Worker's Parties, in November 1960 discussed in detail about the major problems of world development, and adopted a statement and an appeal to the peoples of the world. The meeting gave a scientific definition of the nature of that times, stressed that the world socialist system was decisive factor in the development of human society. The Meetings statements formulated the conclusion that the development of the general crisis of capitalism had entered

³⁰ Basic Documents of the Moscow Meeting of Communist & Worker's Parties, 1957-1960-1969, N. 11, p. 17.

³¹ Ibid., p. 17.

a new stage. This meeting gave a comprehensive analysis of the principle strategical lines in the struggle waged by the World Communist Movement for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism.³² In October 1960 there was another serious ideological conflict emerged between the Soviet Union and China. This was based on the preparation of a draft declaration which was for submission to the scheduled November conference of communist parties. This conflict was only on the drafts text, but not on certain key issues. In connection with this meeting, the Chinese claimed in September 1960 that Khrushchev, upon returning from the United Nations session in New York, "even scrapped agreements that had already been reached on some questions" suggesting that some of the CPSU leaders were more willing than Khrushchev to make concessions to the Chinese for the sake of unity.

When the meeting of communist party convened, Peking charged the Soviet Union by stating that the Soviet Union was showing hegemony by distributing a new sixty thousand word CPSU "letter" in which they attacking the Chinese Communist Party and Albanian Party. This serious attack by the CCP, was not seen in the past. According to Chinese, in this conference's debate CPSU again attacked China and tried to pressurise them. At last an indistinct document was tabled and

³² V.V. Zagladin, "The World Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics" (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 60.

signed. In this document, there were many issues on which the two countries were in a position of contradiction. CPSU succeeded in getting more of its points in this documents but CPSU could not succeeded to criticize Chinese Albanian "factional activities" in this document and they also failed to endorsement of the Soviet thesis that "Peaceful co-existence was the "general line" of the foreign policy. Chinese saw this failure of Soviet Union as a "historical significance" because it "changed the previous highly abnormal situation in which not even the slightest criticism of the errors of the CPSU leadership was tolerated and its word was final.

After the signature of conference declaration neither Moscow nor Peking regarded the compromise as anything but a temporary makeshift, nor did either intend to abandon the struggle.

After this conference Khrushchev renewed his policy and attacked on the Chinese position on Albania, which was the weakest point of China. The Albanians, who were the blind supporter of China and they supported China in Bucharest and Moscow conference, were now subjected to an extension of the Soviet economic pressures. Soviet Union withdraw their technicians and the complete termination of Soviet economic aid to Albania in April 1961. After this Soviet Union withdraw their naval units from vlore in May 1961. An bitter exchange of message between Moscow and Tirana, CPSU wrote a violent letter to Albanian

party in August 1961. China knows that this pressure on Albania was aimed to them. Then China countered Soviet Union, by taking economic and technical aid by their East European allies to replace those withdrawn by Moscow. China again requested Soviet Union to improve their relations with Albanian on the eve of 22nd congress of the CPSU in October.³³

In this chapter we saw the up and downs of the Soviet-Chinese relations. By this study it is clear that China and Soviet Union, both were tried to get leadership of the communist countries. By 1960's China emerged as a communist power and Soviet Union was not in a position to ignore Chinese influence. So Soviet Union started to create economic and technical problems to pressurise China because Soviet Union knew that China was not strong economically yet. So this was the main reasons for their ideological conflicts in 1960's.

³³ Harry Gelman, N. 3, p. 7.

**CHAPTER V
SOVIET-CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL
CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE WORLD COMMUNIST
MOVEMENT, 1960-1964**

After 20th Congress of the CPSU, for about five years there had been intense discussions and debates throughout the world regarding the possible consequences of the decisions of the said congress to be felt in the World Communist Movement. However after the second international congress of the World Communist Parties held in 1960 these discussions and debates were converted into open split in different Communist Parties of the world. This process continued for over one and half decade during 1960s and 1970s. The World Communist Movement was openly divided between Soviet and Chinese lines. Mao-Tse-Tung of China became the symbol of anti-Sovietism. In early 1960s China came forward with open slogans calling the World Communist Parties to turn against Soviet Union or Khrushchevite revisionism. Some of the major Communist Parties of the world particularly in Asia like India and Indonesia became the worse victim of Maoist line. These Communist Parties had to face split within split due to which the World Communist Movements suffered very badly. Chou Yang, Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in a report to the Committee of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Science said: "Revolutionary people and parties everywhere are more and more placing their hopes on the genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties, including the Communist Party of China, and the genuine Marxist-Leninist groups and individuals whose thinking increasingly represents the banner of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, the banner of world revolution ... where

there is revisionism, these will be Marxism-Leninism fighting against it; and where the expulsion of Marxist-Leninist from the party and other measures are taken to create splits, new and outstanding Marxists - Leninists and strong revolutionary parties are bound to emerge".¹ Chou Yang tried to explain the Chinese view in terms of the Marxist dialectic and Mao's doctrine of contradictions. It was more important angle than theoretical importance. While conflicting national interests may lie at the bottom of the Sino-Soviet quarrel,² the ideological differences not only make it much more difficult to settle that conflict: they also involve, necessarily, the extension of the struggle to the whole world movement. Communism is more than a political system; it is a doctrine with absolute claims and global pretensions. For that reason, Soviet Union and China must affirm the right to speak for and to the entire international movement.

This struggle has been waged within individual parties, at inter-party meetings and international and regional organizations at every level and in every field of activity.³ The Chinese played a "three-continents strategy" to challenge Soviet leadership of the world communist movement. This Chinese strategy concentrated itself in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin

¹ Kevom Devlin, "Boing rfrom within Problems of Communism (Washington), March-April 1964, No. 2, Vol. XIII, p. 27.

² Ibid., p. 27.

³ Zbigniew, K. Brzezihski: "The Soviet bloc: Unity and Conflict", (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967), p. 380.

America. Chinese cleverly exploited the anger of the "have-nots" against the "haves" of the non-whites against the whites. Ideologically it signalled that the main contradiction was not that between socialism and capitalism, but between the national liberation movement and imperialism. The Chinese moved during 1963 toward the creation of separate rival Afro-Asian bodies, from which the Russian could be excluded on racial grounds.⁴ For setting up a new 'Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, a conference was held in Djakarta in which Soviet delegates restricted to observer status and were refused membership in the new body, by Chinese request and aggressiveness. A Peking branch of the world federation of scientific workers was established, and it was announced that the new "Peking Center" was planning a symposium of Asian, African and Latin African scientists in August 1964. When a delegate of African students visited China on October 3, 1964, Chinese announced that a "three-continents" student organization will be constituted on the line of Chinese rival Prague-based international union of students. Another Djakarta meeting at the end of October, 1964 prepared for an 'Afro-Asian Workers' conference to be held in Indonesian capital by the early 1964". This step was opposed by the Soviet and Indian communists.

The Sino-Soviet struggle was not a question of continental or tri-continental. It was world-wide struggle. It was a struggle not for the control of front organization

⁴ J.E. Vidal "Les disignists Chinois Organisent la scission", L'Humanite, October 5, 1963.

but for the allegiance of individual communist parties or of factions within those parties. A Kommunist editorial put the Soviet view rightly: "The people in Peking are obviously trying to knock together an international bloc out of such factional groups and coteries, mostly consisting of people who were expelled from communist parties - all sorts of unprincipled and corrupt elements".⁵ It is clear that the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict was world-wide. From America to Australia, Norway to Nepal, and from San Marino to Sydney, the observer can trace the outlines of the conflict.

The pattern of factionalism varies from country to country. In many cases Sino-Soviet conflict has had a catalytic effect. A brief consideration of a number of "case-histories" will give some idea of this world-wide ideological ferment and the forms it has taken in various countries.

Latin America's geographical position and its revolutionary potential was very good and important for factionalism. As one observer put it: "Today the communist movement of Latin America is deeply split between the castroite advocates of violence and the old guard leaders, who stand for a policy of collaboration and infiltration. In some countries the communist movement is on the brink of an open

⁵ Kommunist, Moscow, No. 15, 1963, cited in N. 1, p. 24.

rift, and in others this rift has already occurred".⁶ It will be wrong if we say that the factional conflicts in Latin America was due to Sino-Soviet conflict. It was due to the emergence of castroism as a third potential force. Castoism was an posture rather than a doctrine, with due respect to the theoretical implications of Guevara's La Guerra de Guerrillas;⁷ as compared with Maoism and its ideological infrastructure, it can perhaps be best described as revolutionary voluntarism. It was expressed in organizations like the Venezuelan Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN) or the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). It was a mixture of communists, Trotskyites, left-wing malcontents and assorted revolutionaries. There was direct and considerable Chinese influence in some areas,⁸ but generally it was the struggle between castoism Vs. old Guard.

When we talk about Latin American factional conflict in the context of Sino-Soviet conflicts, Brazilian Communist party's struggle should not left out.

Brazilian Communist Party, which was pro-Soviet, had been faced the pro-Chinese challenge of a rival Communist Party of Brazil in 1962. Both parties confusingly, going under the initials PCB. The breakaway party claimed not only

⁶ Ernst Halperin "Castroism - Challenge to the Latin American Communists, Problems of Communism, Washington, September-October, 1963, Vol. XIV, No. 2, p. 11ff.

⁷ Ibid., p. 11ff.

⁸ Ritorniamo a Lenin, No. 6, Rome, September 30, 1963. cited in Kevin Devlin, N. 1, p. 29.

the honesty to revolutionary principles but institutional genuineness. This was an important question for communists, and anti-revisionist factions in some other countries (notably Belgium and Ceylon), which had adopted the Brazilian technique of the "extraordinary congress". This insistence on genuineness was strengthened by the fact that the secessionists were able to take over the title "Communist Party of Brazil", which the official leadership of Luis Carlos Prestes exchanged for that of "Brazilian Communist Party" in August 1961. For good measures they were also able (like the Belgian rebels) to revive the name of a famous party paper for their fortnightly organ, A classe Operaria, in still opposition to the Prestes Party's Weekly Novos Rumos.⁹

After 20th Congress of the CPSU, a revisionist, "Peaceful Way" tendency strengthened in PCB and some other Latin American Parties. It gained power in 1957, when secretary general Prestes gave it his full support. Four anti-revisionist militants were expelled from the Central Committee in August 1957 and in March 1958 a policy declaration laid down the line of parliamentary struggle and left-wing alliances - "a repudiation of the militant tradition of the party".¹⁰

⁹ Kevin Devlin: N. 1, p. 29.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 30.

The increasingly relentless factional struggle reached a final stage at the party's fifth congress in 1960. This was seen by an organizational fight in which the rebels had some little chance against the party machine. The minority of anti-revisionists elected as congress delegates were outvoted, later, after the break, they were to someup bilaterally: "The Fifth Congress attained the real purpose for which it was convened the expulsion of 12 full members of the Central Committee out of a total of 25 and of several alternate members."¹¹

The rebels claimed that after these "machinations" the congress "did not reflect the will of the party". This charge strengthened when the Prestes leadership decided in August 1961 to change the party's name. It gave the anti-revisionists a chance to represent the change as the creation of a "new party that would no longer be governed by the principles of Marxism-Leninism". When their demand for a party congress to vote on the change was rejected the way was open for secession in the name of legitimacy. In the leadership of Joao Amazonas, Mauricio and Pedro Pomar, they convened their own "Extraordinary National Congress" at Sao Paolo in February 1962. The claim to continuity and legitimacy was of central importance - so that the final resolution to "reorganize the party" was explicitly based on by-laws adopted at the revisionist Fifth Congress. But in fact they were forming a new party, with its own revolutionary program. From then on, as their organ *A Classe*

¹¹ Resolution of the central Committee, Communist Party of Brazil, July 27, 1963, in reply to the CPSU's open letter of July 14: *A Classe Operaria*, (Rio de Janeiro) August 1-15, 1963.

Operarsia put it a year later: "We have two conceptions, two political orientations and two parties which now confront each other within the [national] Communist Movement. On the one hand, we have the Communist Party of Brazil, which is faithful to the best traditions of the working class, to Marxism-Leninism, and to proletarian internationalism, and the other hand we have the Brazilian Communist Party which has renounced revolutionary ideas, Preaches reformism and serves the interests of the dominant classes".¹²

In the context of number it was an ill-matched rivalry. The rebels claimed that its membership reached several thousands in the first year of their new party's life, while its parent party - PCB had about 30-35 thousand members.

On the other hand the anti-revisionists gained an important victory on January 29th when NCNA reported from Lima that the fourth national conference of the Peruvian Communist Party, convened by the majority of the Central Committee members and representatives from 13 out of 17 regional committees, had reversed the party's Pro-Soviet line. The Secretary General, Raul Acosta Salas, and eight other revisionist leaders were expelled from the party, "because of their betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, their political degeneration, their misuse of party funds, their recourse to splitism [by] creating parallel organizations in a truly

¹² Ibid., p. 3.

sectarian and divisive manner".¹³

Revisionist theories of Tito and his followers was condemned by a resolution, which was passed in this conference on 18-19 January. Anti-revisionist laid emphasis on the correct stand of the Chinese Communist Party in the ideological controversy with the revisionists. The new First Secretary of the Central Committee, Saturnino Parades, announced that the party would "oppose the degenerate revisionist group which had been expelled.

This was the trend and story of the split in the communist parties in the Latin American countries. This split was due to Sino-Soviet ideological conflicts. This conflict laid down the splits in that communist parties in Latin America.

The situation in India, is more confused than any country in Asia, like Ceylon, has also been the subject of more analytical attention.¹⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru was the man among the persons in the world who had foreseen the Sino-Soviet conflict long before it came to the surface towards the end of the fifties. The conflict between the two giants had burst into the open, its full impact was not felt in India largely

¹³ Kevin, Devlin, N. 1, p. 30.

¹⁴ Gelman, Harry, "Indian Communism in Turmoil", Problems of Communism, Washington, May-June 1963 and "The Indian CP between Moscow and Peking", Problems of Communism, November-December 1963, p. 70.

because the country was then absorbed in its own problems with China.¹⁵ By September 1963, the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict had reached "the point of no return and was heading for a showdown".¹⁶ Less than nine month later, in July 1964 the Indian communist movement faced its first major split when a breakaway faction of the CPI organised itself into a parallel party. Many scholars of Indian communism told that this split in the Indian communist movement were not merely or incidently subsequent to the Sino-Soviet split but were a direct cause of the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict. Indian leaders of Communist Party also agreed that the Soviet and the Chinese ideological positions influenced the developments leading to the splits in Indian Communist Movement.

There are some remarkable parallels between the early phase of the Communist Parties of India and China. The two parties were established in the 1920's under the comintern guidance and followed Zigzag courses with shifts in the comintern line. Both had begun by claiming to be parties of the proletariat, and adopted Bolshevik revolution as their model. The application of this model ended in disastrous results for both the parties.¹⁷ There is an equally remarkable contrast between the two: The CPC learnt its lessons from the disaster of late 1920's,

¹⁵ Malhotra, Inder, "Indian Left", World Focus, New Delhi, 1982, May, p. 23.

¹⁶ Mohan Ram: "Indian Communism: Split Within a Split", (Delhi, 1969), p. 159.

¹⁷ Singh, S.P.: "Political Dimension of India-USSR relations", (New Delhi, Allied Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1987), pp.68-69.

stopped following comintern line blindly and developed its own strategy and tactics; they learnt little from disasters of 1930's and 1940's, made few strategic or factual innovations specific to Indian conditions and passed from one ideological crisis to the other.¹⁸ Looking for advice from abroad all over again, P.C. Joshi, the former general secretary of the party, but at that time he was suspended and stands on the door of expulsion, wrote in 1950 a "Letter to the foreign comrades" in great desperation.¹⁹ Underlining that no serious self-criticism was expected from within the party, he pleaded: "..... Therefore, brothers, it is you from abroad who have to act and act quickly International communism must intervene we will accept our mistakes, when are authoritatively point out to us".²⁰

The most appropriate starting point for discussing the parting of ways between the Indian comrades of the two brands is perhaps the year 1957. In this year the still undivided CPI passed its famous resolution at Amritsar Committing itself to the "Parliamentary road to socialism". This resolution was passed unanimously, but the reality was different.

After the outbreak of the Tibetan crisis and the Chinese accusation of Indian

¹⁸ V.V. Zagladin: "The World Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics", (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 379.

¹⁹ P.C. Joshi "Letters to Foreign Comrades", views (Calcutta May 1950), pp. 2-3.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

borders town of Kalimpong being used as a base by the rebels, the aforementioned pattern emerged clearly in the CPI. In May 1959, Ajoy Ghosh expressed his happiness about Nehru's rejection of "Imperialist" attempts to change his foreign policy.²¹ The Secretariat, however, endorsed the Chinese allegation about Kalimpong.²² A couple of months later the central executive committee was even more sharply critical of Nehru's role which it thought was not consistent with the principles of Panchsheel.²³

When the border clash occurred at Longju in August 1959, Ajoy Ghosh was away in Moscow. The secretariat issued a statement on August 30, which conceded the Chinese position that Sino-Indian borders were not clearly defined.²⁴ The Central executive committee in September stated its conviction that "Socialist China can never commit aggression".²⁵ National Council resolution on the other hand, in the aftermath of Kongka clashes in October, said that the area south of MacMohan line was part of India and that Indian government had taken correct stand on the western sector of Sino-Indian boundary. It also endorsed Nehru's

²¹ Ajoy Ghosh, "India-China Friendship-Repair the Damage", New age, (Indian Communist Party Weekly), New Delhi, 10 May 1959.

²² "The India-China border dispute and the Communist Party of India, Secretariat of the Communist Party of India" (New Delhi, 1963), pp. 1-2.

²³ Ibid., pp. 5-7.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

foreign policy in general.²⁶

But the right group was not satisfied with even this version of council resolution. This was an important cause for split. After the split the leftists charged the rightist group of revolting against the resolution.²⁷ The Maharashtra Unit had openly refused to endorse the National Councils resolution demanding its amendment or total rejection.²⁸ The Pro-Chinese faction established a party in West Bengal, under the guidance of the Central Secretariat. This challenge was made through a "Democratic Convention" which a secretariat spokesman has denounced as "a permanent body set up in Bengal with the deliberate object of splitting the party".²⁹

The Pro-Chinese faction has, however, been weakened when an anti-revisionist leader Jyoti Basu wrote a letter and strongly criticised China and in November he expressed "Satisfaction over the decision of the National Council".³⁰ The party Chairman S.A. Dange had a majority of more than two-to-one at the

²⁶ "On India-China Relations", Resolution adopted by the National Council of the CPI, 11-15 November, 1959.

²⁷ EMS Namboodiripad: "Fight Against Revisionism" (Trivandrum, 1965), p. 6.

²⁸ Link, December, 6, 1959.

²⁹ Press Statement by M.N. Govindan Nair, New Age, (Indian (Communist Party Weekly), New Delhi, Nov. 3, 1963.

³⁰ New Age, November 17, 1963.

National Council in October, and was able to pass. An anti-Chinese leader A.K. Gopalan refused this and supported to get a vote of "Public Censure".

At a conference of the World Communist Parties at Bucharest in 1960 which was between China and Soviet Union was completed. No wonder then that the polemics between the Pro-Beijing 'left' in the CPI and the Pro-Moscow 'right' became both more persistent and more abrasive after that date. The identification between the 'left' CPI and China and the 'right' CPI and Russia was also unmistakable. So much so that serious commentators on Indian Communist Affairs nicknamed the two factions as 'Rucos' and 'Chicos'.³¹

It is necessary to interrupt the narrative to make the point that it will be wrong and unfair to believe that the CPI(M) broke away from the parent party at Chinese dictates or that it started taking a pro-Chinese position only as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. Similarly, the CPI's pro-Moscow stance did not make it then - any more than it does today - a stooge or a docile satellite of the Soviet Union, just as the Sino-Soviet split was inevitable so was the division between the two factions of the Indian communists.³²

³¹ Malhotra, Inder, "Indian Left", World Focus, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 23-24.

³² Ibid., p.24.

Around the time of independence Moscow had been the source of inspiration for Indian communists and the Chinese revolution, the attraction of the Maoist revolutionary model was much the greater to them. Mao's remarkable ability to mobilise the peasantry was particularly dazzling to the Indian communists functioning in an agrarian milieu. After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev and Bulganin perceived the value of India's non-alignment to the Soviet union and embarked on a policy of befriending the rightist leaders of the CPI in their belief that they should seek power by collaborating with the ruling party, but it can not be said that the basic policy was dictated to them by Moscow. The reality was that what suited the Soviet Union's foreign policy was useful also to the rightist section of the Indian communists for its own purpose.³³ Similarly the Indian communist leaders found that their future was to oppose the national government and exploiting regional grievances against the centre. In this way they found Chinese ideological and foreign policy formulations both handy and welcome. There was a similarity between China and the 'leftist' faction of the CPI later to turn itself into CPI(M), was coincidence of interests. Interestingly, two decades later, the CPI(M) has tempered its anti-Sovietism, but it remains a regional party. CPI(M) has never been a stooge of China nor the CPI that of Russia, each of these two parties has nonetheless supported and echoed its mentor faithfully, indeed slavishly, adding to popular

³³ Ibid., p. 24.

misgivings about the extra territorial loyalties of communists of all brands.³⁴ On this ground of ideological differences at last in December 1964, Indian Communist Party crackdown countrywide. The two factions emerged CPI and CPI(M). This split was due to Sino-Soviet ideological conflict and their interference in Indian communist movement. Both tried to control with its own interests. So, this type of split was not a surprise.

There was a clear-cut factional struggle in Ceylon as that in Brazil or Belgium, and given special interest by the involvement of the Trotskyite LSSP [Lanka Sama Samaj Party]. This party was the only one which supported Soviet Position, rather than Chinese position and opposed the official line of the Fourth International,³⁵ and it is the only one in formal alliance with communists. In August 1963, the country's three Marxist parties - the Communists (CCP), the LSSP and the Small MEP (an offshoot of the LSSP) publicly abandoned their dreams of a revolutionary take-over by joining together in the United Left Front, pledged to seek power by peaceful parliamentary means as a "third force" alternative to the left-wing Freedom Party and the right wing United National Party.

CCP and LSSP both challenged this policy. The communist rebellion was

³⁴ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁵ Kevin Devlin, N. 1, p. 36.

led by the politburo members and one of the founders of the CCP, Nagalingan Sanmugathasan; Nagalingan was also Secretary-General of the 150,000 strong communist controlled Ceylon Trade Union Federation (CTUF). Sanmugathasan visited Peking on May 29, where he and the secretary of the All China Federation of Trade Unions signed a joint statement expressing the Chinese line on International affairs, just before two months before the signing of the United Left Front agreement. After this he started to organize anti-Soviet rallies and appealing particularly to trade unionists and students.³⁶

After this stand of Sanmugathasan, the party leadership was led to declare its pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese stand more strongly. It was done by a resolution of Central Committee on September 26. The party leadership then took measures against the dissidents. Sanmugathasan published pamphlets on "Chinese propaganda materials" and started to distribute. Two editors of party periodicals, including P. Kumarasiri, a politburo member, were dismissed - and given new jobs on CTUF papers by sanmugathasan. On October 27, Sanmugathasan expelled by Central Committee and absent Kumarasiri was suspended from the party. Sanmugathasan condemned this step of the party and said that the party leadership is betraying Marxism-Leninism, and he announced that his faction would work for a "new and more dynamic revolutionary leadership". More than 100 anti-revisionist

* [Link](#), Weekly, New Delhi, July 28, 1963.

held a "national conference" on November 17th at which they decided to convene the Seventh CPC Congress; and this seventh CPC congress should have been held by December 1962. In a 12 point indictment of the party leaders the rebels added that their demand for a congress had been improperly rejected, although backed by a majority of district committees and supported in writing by "more than half the membership". This "Seventh Congress" was held on January 19-21, and made the split final and formal. Some 400 delegates "rejected" the revisionist policies of the CCP leadership and elected a "new" central committee to replace it. So it was necessary for the pro-Soviet leadership to expel eight more members from the Central Committee and given show-cause notice to others.

Sanmugathan's main strength was CTUF labour federation and he used it for preparing for the 16th CTUF Congress on December 19th to 21st. Only a quarter of the 800 delegates supported the pro-Soviet president, M.G. Mendis. President Mendis delivered a presidential speech and attacked Sanmugathan. After his speech Mendis walked out with his followers, leaving the rest to pass anti-revisionist resolutions and elect a new pro-Chinese leadership.³⁷ The next day of the anti-revisionist meeting, the pro-Soviet leader Mendis held a rival meeting, attended by CPC Secretary-General Keuneman, at which 236 delegates, who had "withdrawn in disgust" from the "CTUF sessions organized by the Sanmugathan

³⁷ New Age, Indian Communist Party Weekly, New Delhi, January, 12, 1964.

Clique", resolved to hold "a real workers conference" in February - presumable to maintain the factions claim to represent the CTUF.³⁸ The Communist Youth League had already split into two sections in November; so it is clear that the split in CPC was due to Sino-Soviet conflict.

The impact of Sino-Soviet relations on South East Asia has to be seen in the background of the fact that this region has been the classic area of great power conflict for about four hundred years. Before World War II Southeast Asia was a part of British Colonial power.³⁹ China and Soviet Union had great interest in this region. Both wanted to absorb the geographical facility of this region in favour of their interest. China used it for aggressive push on India, Burma, Laos and a Vietnam with Thailand. The political influence of the international communist movement led by the Soviet Union has been felt in this region since the twenties, when Moscow was the capital of International Communism. Particularly influenced were Vietnam and Indonesia. Their Communist movements were anti-colonial movement and their attachment to the Soviet Union was with the objective of getting rid of the French and Dutch Yokes. The elderly communist leaders of these countries like Ho Chi Minh and Semaun had spent time in Moscow with the objective of getting Soviet help in this anti-colonial struggles.⁴⁰ Due to its

³⁸ Kevin, Devlin, n.1, p. 37.

³⁹ Vishal Singh: "Southeast Asia: The Threat from China" World Focus, New Delhi, 1982, p. 19.

geographical situation, it was found that it was the battle ground for the Soviet Union and China on the basis of ideology. The impact of this ideological battle on this region was deep. Burma Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaya were affected.

The situation in Malaya was very peculiar. Here the communist movement was largely confined to the Chinese, who constitute a major immigrant community, when the Soviet Union still commanded the loyalty of communists, in 1948, all over Southeast Asia, communist revolts broke out in this region. This British, who were the then rulers, supported that communist insurgency. But after the reconstitution of Malaysia, this insurgency was continued. The most important element for this continued revolt was Chinese phenomenon. So it is clear that the Soviet-Chinese conflict brought a deep impact on this region.⁴¹

The communist movement in Burma was divided between pro-China and pro-Moscow wings. The pro-Chinese Burmese Communist Party (BCP) was well entrenched in the northeast, east of Salween river and makes forays to the west of it.⁴²

⁴⁰ Bhabani Sengupta: The USSR in Asia: In Interperceptional Study of Soviet Asian Relations" (New Delhi, Young Asia Publications, 1980), pp. 280-81.

⁴¹ Singh V., N.39, p. 19.

⁴² Leszek Buszynski: "Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia" (London, Cromm Helm, 1986), pp. 18-19.

In Thailand, the communist party of Thailand (CPT) blessed by Beijing continues to harass the Bangkok government irrespective of Beijing's protestations of friendship with that country.

The Indonesia Communist Movement initially took a compromising stand on the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict, which irrupted in the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The Indonesian Communist Movement leaders laid special stress in their speeches and writings on the need for collective leadership and internal party democracy. "Aidit, the leader of the Indonesian Communist Movement, explained to the Central Committee that the problems of the cult of the individual was largely one for parties in power and that it was of little importance for parties as yet seeking power".⁴³ The Indonesian Communist like the CPSU did not Jettison Stalin, but continue to praise his achievements, condemning only his serious error of later life.⁴⁴ Domestically, at this juncture of time the Indonesian Communist Movement was making effort to strengthen its base through its various programmes. It was not revolutionary in its approach rather following peaceful road to our as that of Soviet Union. In order to drive the peasants in its fold it was following a Chinese path.

⁴³ Politburo Report to the 4th Central Committee Plesrum, Harian Rakjat, August 1, 1956.

⁴⁴ Henolley Donald, "The Indonesian Communist and the CPSU 22nd Congress", Asian Survey, Vol. II, N. 1, March 1962, p. 21.

Aidit analysis of the international situation in his 1954 report appears, on the basis of terminology and emphasis adopted, to have followed Soviet rather than Chinese sources, and despite the greater nationalist bias of his report to the 6th Congress in 1959, he was still differing to Soviet views.⁴⁵ Till 1961 the image of Soviet Union as the major centre of World Communism remained substantially intact but some sort of disagreement had taken place between CPSU and PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). The image of Soviet Union intact, due to its role during 1959-61 in which Russian aid prepared Indonesian for the campaign to liberate West Irian from the Dutch colonialist. Soviet policy also tried to cement the nationalist alliance between the PKI and Sukarno. Thus Sukarno under his guided democracy created a *nasakom* structure in which the nationalist, the religious and the communists were united together in the functioning of the government.

With the advent of the 22 Congress of the CPSU in 1961, the ideological conflict between Soviet Union and China became more aggressive. The issue of Albanian Communist Party became a bone of contention between the two communist disputants (USSR-China). In this dispute where Soviet Union went so far took all explicitly for the overthrow of Albanian party leaders Hoxha and Shehu.⁴⁶ At the 22nd CPSU, the six men delegation headed by Party Chairman

⁴⁵ Mortimer, Rex, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-65*, (Ithaca and London Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 331.

⁴⁶ Harry Gelman: The Conflict: A Survey *Problems of Communism*, Washington, No. 2, March-April, Vol. XIII, 1964, p. 10.

Aidit, refused to join in the attacks on the Albanian Workers Party.

The Communist Movement of Indonesia also became critical about the Soviet Policy for its role in providing military aid to the arm force, which was then considered as anti-communist. It therefore began to shift a position from neutrality in Sino-Soviet dispute to a pro-Chinese stance, drawing Sukarno along in the process. Thus the Indonesian Communist Movement aligned itself into the axis of Sukarno domestically, and Peking internationally. The consequence of which was reflected in the Indonesian political scenario, when the communists of Indonesia conspired a coup d'etal against the army Generals with the portage of Peking Sukarno and other military rivalries, in October 1965. As a result the Communist Movement in Indonesia was ^{decimated} _c and cowed in the New order of Suharto. Thus the Communist Movement of Indonesia became a static phenomenon with the PKI being declared illegal and thus disbanded after the abortive coup.

Thus the period (1960-1964) under study in this chapter proved to be a fertile ground for the split in the World Communist Movement as a result of organized anti-Soviet position taken by China. During this period the Communist Party in Soviet Union had to face two typical problems, one arising from anti-Sovietism of China and the other from the Weakening position of Khrushchev at home itself. As it is obvious from the fact that Khrushchev was unceremoniously

removed from the power in 1964 and was replaced by newly Brezhnev. Brezhnev did try to improve Soviet position throughout the world. However he failed to unify the International Communist Movement.

**CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION**

As it is obvious from preceding chapters of this study that the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict had been one of the most ferocious crisis in the history of both the countries. This ideological conflict turned into a full fledged enmity and war which remained not only between the two countries but also its impact could be seen on the entire World Communist Movement. It divided almost every Communist Party of the world on ideological lines. Most of the communist parties were dubbed either as pro China and anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet and anti-China respectively. Such an ideological division was never seen in the history before. This ideological division proved to be not only costly but also fatal for the existence of the entire International Communist Movement. This division also put that the human being could not be united on the basis of any political ideology.

However, before the ideological conflict between the two countries had taken shape, it is interesting to know that the same ideology was promoted in China by the Bolshevik's themselves who later on became the victim of their own efforts. Like most of the communist parties of the world, the communist party of China had emerged with the help of Bolshevik's in 1921. Initially, the newly set up Chinese Communist Party had to look forward for all kinds of help from the Bolshevik's. In this regard it is also a well known fact that the Soviet Russia was the only newly born state in the world, better still it adopted a joint policy to promote Marxist ideology throughout the world. When it planned to accomplish this great job,

strangely it was completely surrounded by the hostile and bitter anti-communist enemies from every corner of the world. In the absence of the complete diplomatic ties, the Bolshevik's were dangerously isolated in the international affairs. In this regard, the Communist International (Comintern) established on March 4, 1919 by a group of International Communist leaders led by Lenin, played a heroic role for the Bolshevik's with the help of comintern, the Bolshevik's succeeded in organising and establishing many communist parties in all the continents. Many Asian Communist leaders got universal fame due to their activities in the Communist International. For example, M.N. Roy of India, Wong-Ming of China, Akhund Sultanzadeh of Iran and Mustafa Subhi of Turki became leading light of the Asian Communist Movement. The Bolshevik's positively exploited the services of these leaders in promoting their ideology in this part of the world. Interestingly these Asian leaders barring Mustafa Subhi, later on became the centre of ideological conflict in their own countries. So far as Chinese Communist Parties concern the seed of ideological discontent began to emerge during the hey-day of Comintern itself. Wong-Ming, the Chinese representative in the Comintern became a controversial figure within his own party. During 1930's he was considered as a Soviet agent by the Maoist faction within the Communist Party of China inspite of the fact that the party enjoyed very intimate relations with the comintern as well as Bolshevik's. The intimacy between the Bolshevik's and the Chinese Communist Party can be traced from the fact that one of its most important party congress i.e.

Sixth Congress was held in Moscow in 1928. It is a historical record that the congress of a communist party like China was held in the country of Bolshevik's. The historical events also show that the Bolshevik's tried to control the direction of the World Communist Movement through the mechanism of the comintern. Even at the outset of the dying moments of the comintern Bolshevik's were keeping close watch on day-to-day development in the headquarters of the Communist Party of China, during 1942-43. For the first time this phenomenon was revealed by the famous diary of P.P. Vladimirov, who served as Soviet representative in the underground headquarters of the Communist Party of China in Yen-an province during the world war years. P.P. Vladimirov has given day-to-day account of the activities of the different Chinese communist leaders living in the underground headquarters of the party. Vladimirov has also given very important clues to the history of ideological conflicts between Soviet Union and China even years before Chinese revolution in 1949. His diary discloses, how the Chinese Communist Party was divided between pro and anti-Moscow groups before the revolution. The facts reveals that on many occasions pro-Moscow party cadres and leaders were expelled and victimised by Mao's faction in the party.

However, due to Soviets' enormous ideological and material helps that led to the victory of revolution in China. The ideological conflicts remained silent for over half a decade after the Chinese revolution, but soon after the conclusion of the

20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union those silent ideological conflicts became extremely volatile.

We have already discussed in different chapters the nature and scope of the ideological conflicts between the two communist giants. Therefore, it will be improper to repeat those facts in detail, however, it is necessary to mention certain points for the quick understanding of this study. After going through the detail analysis of the subject under study, we reached the conclusions as follows:

1. The ideological conflict between Soviet Union and China had emanated long before the Chinese revolution, which could not flare-up earlier because Chinese Communist Party was still fighting for the victory of revolution.
2. After the Chinese revolution Soviet leader Stalin proved to be a cementing force in the World Communist Movement due to which the ideological conflicts remained completely silent till his death.
3. The immediate root cause of the ideological conflict emerged following the discussions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, which was the first Congress held in 1956 without Stalin.

4. The ideological conflicts aggravated between the two communist countries due to anti-personality cult policy of Khrushchev which was not liked by Chinese leaders as Stalin was still a hero for them.
5. To great extent the inner party struggle between pro and anti Mao faction was also a cause for ideological conflict between the two countries which was used by Mao-Tse-Tung to calm down his own ideological enemies within the Communist Party of China.
6. The ideological conflict between the two countries led to the emergence of polycentrism in the World Communist Movement due to which different ideological guiding centres were borned and lastly,
7. Interestingly an unexpected third ideological front was opened by major communist parties of the Western Europe in mid 1970's in the form of 'Euro-Communism'. For the first time, this term became very popular after the publication of the book titled "Euro-Communism" written by Santiago Carrillo the General Secretary of the Spanish & Communist Party.

The 'Euro-Communists' claimed that neither they believed in Soviet camp nor the Chinese. Initially Euro-Communism became very popular, however, in some major countries like France, Italy portugal including spain itself, the

Communist Parties were badly defeated in different general elections and their strength in parliaments was reduced to less than a half of the seats they held earlier without 'Euro-Communism'. Ultimately 'Euro-Communism' automatically ceased to exist. In totality if we look behind the past and the present, it will appear that different varieties of the above ideological conflicts ultimately led to the disintegration of the World Communist Movement including the Soviet Union itself.

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