

# **Soviet Union and The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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TO MY PARENTS



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DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled "Soviet Union and the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" submitted by Mr. Ashutosh Mishra in partial fulfilment of the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in Jawaharlal Nehru University, is a product of the student's own work, carried out by him under my supervision and guidance.

It is hereby certified that this work has not been presented for the award of any other degree or diploma by any university in or outside India and may be forwarded to the examiners for evaluation.

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## PREFACE

Nuclear weapons discovery is easily one of the foremost events of the 20th century. However, this discovery and the accession to nuclear weapon status by a few states of the world led to fears of their being developed by other states. The potential for disaster of the nuclear weapons being what it is, it was feared by responsible and militarily and industrially significant states, that their dissemination to other States which lack socio-economic stability might increase the threat to mankind's survival.

Thus developed the thinking among states to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union as leader of one bloc of states and a superpower has been an advocate of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Commensurate with its industrial and military capability the Soviet Union cooperated with the Western bloc led by the United States and helped in the evolution of a nuclear non-proliferation regime. This has been outlined in the first chapter of this study.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union wished to check proliferation, but what possible motives drove it to become such an ardent supporter of nuclear non-proliferation have been discussed in the second chapter of the present work.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), has been

considered the foremost instrument to check the spread of nuclear weapons to states not possessing them. The development of Soviet-American consensus that led to the conclusion of the NPT has been discussed in the third Chapter of this dissertation.


The existence of a small club of nuclear weapon states and the remaining non-nuclear weapon states, led to the emergence of two approaches to the solving of the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation. The two groups of states hold differing views of the rights and obligations accruing as a result of adherence to the NPT.

A perusal of the functioning of the treaty provisions is undertaken in the last chapter and concluding remarks made as suggestions to strengthen the Treaty as means of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

My interest in this topic was generated as a result of a paper I presented in my course entitled "International System, Arms Race and Disarmament". At this stage, I wish to record my deep gratitude to my supervisor Prof. T.T.Poulose who not only helped to give shape to this idea, but has also been a constant source of encouragement and critical suggestion during the various stages of research. I gratefully acknowledge the typing assistance rendered by

Mr. K. Muralidharan. Of joy and moral support has been the regular correspondence I had with my siblings Amla, Aparna and Aradhna.

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ASHUTOSH MISHRA

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CHAPTER - 1

BUILDING A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION  
REGIME: AN OVERVIEW

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## CHAPTER - 1

### BUILDING A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: AN OVERVIEW

Nuclear proliferation raises some fundamental normative issues which cannot be erased by any amount of theorizing. To arrest the spread of nuclear weapons would be to perpetuate an international status quo in which some societies are denied political and strategic assets that other societies which are quite certainly no more deserving, are entitled to have. Yet, to condone nuclear proliferation in the interest of reducing the inegalitarian nature of international system would be to abdicate responsibility for minimizing the risk of nuclear conflict.

The inherent inequity of the non-proliferation norm is compounded by the fact that non-nuclear weapon states are not only deprived but in fact penalized for their deprivations. As states manage to accumulate nuclear technology, deprivation becomes voluntary abstention and the legitimacy of the behavioural norm assumes increased significance.

As long as states with nuclear weapons insist on unrestricted access to and unsafeguarded use of nuclear technology, the imposition of restrictions on others is seen as discriminatory and therefore inequitable. Thus, the

tighter the technical arrangements to check proliferation, the less legitimate appears the behavioural norm in the non-proliferation treaty - the foremost measure in the evolution of a nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The United Nations has played a very major role in the efforts to bring about non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This phenomenon is technically referred to as horizontal nuclear proliferation. However, the other aspect of this - vertical nuclear proliferation - has been generally ignored in debates.

In the United Nations General Assembly and other UN disarmament negotiating forums, several proposals and counter-proposals were discussed by the member nations of the United Nations, belonging to the American bloc, the Soviet bloc and the Third World comprising of neutral and non-aligned countries.

The three major instruments agreed upon by the United Nations to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons are (1) The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) treaties.

The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the atomic era. On November

15, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada proposed the establishment of a UN Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes". The Baruch plan of 1946, offered by the United States, sought to forestall nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control.

But the early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament failed. The Soviet Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and the People's Republic of China in 1964, became nuclear weapon states. Increasingly, it was being apparent that the assumptions about the scarcity of nuclear material and the difficulty of mastering nuclear technology were inaccurate.

Other developments and prospects further underscored the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early 1960s the search for peaceful uses of nuclear energy had brought advances in the technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of electricity. By 1966, such reactors were operating or under construction in five countries. Nuclear reactors produce power, as a by-product plutonium - a fissionable material which can be chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

If the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes were not prevented by an international system of safeguards and if a growing number of countries came to possess nuclear arsenals, the risks of nuclear war as a result of accident, unauthorized use, or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase. The possession of nuclear weapons by many countries would add a grave new dimension of threat to world security.

A succession of initiatives by both nuclear and non-nuclear powers sought to check proliferation. Indeed the effort to achieve a test ban - culminating in the treaty of 1963 - had as one of its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

However, much before that in August 1957, the Western powers (Canada, France, UK and USA) submitted a package of measures, in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which included a commitment "not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons", except for self defence.

Although the Soviet Union opposed proliferation it claimed that this western formula would allow an aggressor to judge his own actions and to use nuclear weapons "under

cover of the alleged right of self defence". It sought to couple a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons to other states with a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries.

The establishment of the IAEA was the first concrete step in evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The main objective of this regime was the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The IAEA safeguards system lays down some of the basic norms and rules governing civilian nuclear technology transactions as well as technical assistance provided by the IAEA itself.

The realization within the international community that a wider proliferation of nuclear weapons would pose a threat to world security has led to the development of a non-proliferation regime, that encompasses myriad rules and institutions, both national and international. Among these the IAEA, just referred to, with its elaborate systems of nuclear safeguards fulfils an essential practical role. The pivotal place, however, belongs to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), concluded in 1968, with a view to preventing the addition of new nuclear weapon powers to the five, then in existence.

The NPT, in force since 1970, has attracted a record number of adherents for an arms control agreement. These

include three nuclear weapon powers - the UK, the USA and the USSR - as well as almost all highly developed industrialized and militarily significant non-nuclear weapon states. France, a nuclear weapon power which has not acceded to the NPT, has proclaimed a policy of behaving exactly like a state party to it and of strengthening safeguards on nuclear equipment, material and technology. China, the fifth state to become a nuclear weapon power, which at first expressed strong opposition to the Treaty gave solemn assurances that it would not help other states to obtain nuclear weapons.

In 1961, the General Assembly unanimously approved an Irish resolution calling on all states particularly the nuclear powers to conclude an international agreement to refrain from transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover the general disarmament plans which had been submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States during the period 1960-62, included provisions banning the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The United States, on January 21, 1964 outlined a programme to halt the nuclear arms race in a message from

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1. See The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (New York), p.263.

President Johnson to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). This programme, unlike the 1957 proposals was not a package. It included a non-dissemination and non acquisition proposal-based on the Irish resolution - and safeguards on international transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, combined with acceptance by major nuclear powers that their peaceful nuclear activities undergo increasingly "the same inspection they recommend for other states".<sup>2</sup>

An issue that was to be the major stumbling block for the next three years was the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) then under discussion by the United States and its NATO allies. The Soviet Union strongly objected to this plan and maintained that no agreement could be reached on non-proliferation so long as the United States held open the possibility of such nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO. These would constitute proliferation, the Soviet Union contended and were devices for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to or control of nuclear weapons.

On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty to the ENDC. This draft would oblige the nuclear weapons powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any country not

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2. See US.ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1964 (Publication No.27, October 1964) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.7-9.

possessing them. Non nuclear nations would undertake to facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.<sup>3</sup>

A Soviet draft treaty was submitted to the General Assembly on September 24. The Soviet Union declared that the greatest danger of proliferation was posed by the MLF and the alternative British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). The Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons "directly or indirectly through third states or groups of states not possessing nuclear weapons". It would also bar nuclear powers from transferring "nuclear weapons or control over them or their emplacement or use" to military units of non-nuclear allies, even if these were placed under joint command. The draft included no safeguards provisions.<sup>4</sup>

In March 1966 the United States tabled amendments to its draft treaty in the ENDC, seeking to clarify and emphasize the western view that collective defence arrangements would not violate the principle of non-proliferation. The US representative stressed that the United States would not relinquish its veto over the use of

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3. See US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1965 (Pub. No.34, December 1966) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1966), pp.347-349.

4. Ibid., pp.443-446.



U.S. weapons. The Soviet Union objected that the amendment did not prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons through such alliance arrangements as MLF, the ANF, or units placed under joint command. The U.S. retention of a veto, the Soviet representative argued, did not provide security against dissemination.

Despite strong disagreement on the issue of collective defence arrangements, it was apparent that both sides recognised the desirability of an agreement on non-proliferation. Moreover, the interest of non-nuclear powers was increasingly manifest. It was shown in 1964 at the African Summit Conference at Cairo in July 1964. It was also evident in the Second Non-Aligned Conference held at the same venue in October 1964. It was also evident from a series of resolutions in the General Assembly urging that non-proliferation receive priority attention.

In May 1966, the US Senate unanimously passed a resolution sponsored by Senator Pastore of Rhode Island and 55 other Senators commending efforts to reach a non-proliferation agreement and supporting continued efforts.<sup>5</sup>

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5. For Senate Resolution, see US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1966 (Pub. No.43, September 1967) (Pub. No.43, September 1967) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1967), pp.306-307.

In the fall of 1966 the Soviet and U.S. co-chairman of the ENDC began private talks and by the end of the year they had reached tentative agreement on the basic non-transfer and non-acquisition provisions of a treaty, as well as on a number of other aspects.

On August 24, 1967, the Soviet Union and the United States were able to submit separate but identical texts of a draft treaty to the ENDC.<sup>6</sup>

Other ENDC members proposed numerous amendments largely reflecting the concerns of the non-nuclear states. In response to these, the drafts underwent several revisions and the co-chairman tabled a joint draft on March 11, 1968.<sup>7</sup>

With additional revisions, the joint draft was submitted to the General Assembly where it was extensively debated. Further suggestions for strengthening the treaty were made, and in the light of these the Soviet Union and the United States submitted a new revised version - the seventh - to the First Committee of the General Assembly on May 31st.<sup>8</sup>

The General Assembly on June 12 approved a resolution commending the text and requesting the depository governments

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6. See US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1967 (Pub No. 46, July 1968) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 338-341.

7. See US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1968 (Pub. No. 52, September 1969) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office 1969), pp. 162-166.

8. Ibid., pp. 404-409.

to open it for signature.<sup>9</sup>

France abstained in the General Assembly vote stating that while France would not sign the treaty, it "would behave in the future in this field exactly as the states adhering to the treaty".

In the course of these extended negotiations the concerns of the non-nuclear powers centred particularly on three main issues:

Safeguards:

There was general agreement that the treaty should include provisions designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use. Two problems were involved in this. One was the problem of reconciling Soviet insistence that all nuclear parties accept IAEA safeguards with the desire of the non-nuclear members of EURATOM (Belgium, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) to preserve their regional system.

To meet this concern, the final draft provided that non-nuclear parties could negotiate safeguards agreements

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9. Ibid., pp. 431-32.

with the IAEA either individually or together with other states.

The other problem was to satisfy the widespread concern among non-nuclear states that IAEA safeguards might place them at a commercial and industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear energy for peaceful use, since the nuclear powers would not be required to accept safeguards.

To help allay these misgivings, the United States offered, on December 2, 1967, to permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards, when such safeguards were applied under the NPT in all nuclear facilities in the United States, excluding only those with "direct national security significance". The United Kingdom announced that it would take similar action. France in 1981, United States in 1980 have now agreements with IAEA and the Soviet Union in June 1982 announced its readiness to put some of its nuclear installations under IAEA.

Balanced Obligations:

Throughout the negotiations most non nuclear states held that their renunciation of nuclear weapons should be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to make progress on the measures of comprehensive disarmament. General provisions were attached to the treaty affirming the intentions of the parties to negotiate in good faith to achieve a cessation of

the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.

Further, to meet objections about possible discriminatory effects, the treaty stipulated that parties were to participate in and have fullest access to materials and information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The treaty also provided that any potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be made available to non-nuclear weapons parties on a non-discriminatory basis.

Security Assurances:

Non nuclear weapons states sought guarantees that renunciation of nuclear arms would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. But, it was argued, the security interests of the various states, and groups of states, were not identical, an effort to frame provisions within the treaty that would meet this diversity of requirements - for unforeseeable future contingencies - would create inordinate complexities.

To resolve the issue the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted in the ENDC, on March

7, 1968, a tripartite proposal that security assurances take the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution, supported by declarations of the three powers. The resolution noting the security concerns of the states wishing to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would recognize that nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression, created a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially its permanent members.

Following submission of the treaty itself to the General Assembly, the tripartite resolution was submitted to the Security Council. In a formal declaration the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom asserted their intention to seek immediate Security Council actions to provide assistance to any non nuclear - weapon state party to the treaty that was the object of nuclear aggression or threats.

France abstained from voting on the Security Council resolution. The French representative said that France did not intend its abstention to be an obstacle to the adoption of the tripartite proposal, but that France did not believe the nations would receive adequate security guarantees without nuclear disarmament.

Although there is wide international acceptance to NPT today, yet it is a fragile document. Perhaps to a greater

extent than other arms control agreements, it depends for its durability on universal or quasi-universal adherence which is still to be achieved.

At least half a dozen countries with significant nuclear activities remain outside the treaty, they operate or are building plants capable of making nuclear weapon usable material which are not covered by the non-proliferation regime.

Some of these countries who have played a leading role in the non-aligned movement have claimed the right to conduct nuclear explosions for 'peaceful' purposes. Moreover, all of them can provide themselves with a reasonably effective nuclear delivery capability.

On these grounds they are considered as future members of the "nuclear club" and are referred to as "threshold countries".

If nuclear weapon proliferation among non-parties to the NPT takes place, it may lead to withdrawal from the treaty by certain parties. The treaty allows this on the basis of a claim that the "supreme" interests of the withdrawing party have been jeopardized.

The treaty is unique in the sense that it prohibits the acquisition by an overwhelming majority of states of the most destructive weapons yet invented, while tolerating the retention of the same weapons by a few.

However, the position of the non nuclear weapon parties has always been to consider the NPT not as an end in itself, but as a transitional measure aimed at facilitating nuclear disarmament.

Unlike many other arms control agreements the NPT is not of a permanent duration. In 1995, 25 years after its entry into force, a conference is to be convened to determine its future. The parties will then decide whether the treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional period or periods of time.



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CHAPTER - 2

THE SOVIET STAND ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

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## CHAPTER - 2

### THE SOVIET STAND ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Though the Soviet Union had a rather late blooming interest in stabilising the East-West strategic arms race, its concern over the threat of nuclear weapons dispersion has been a consistently articulated theme of its disarmament policy.

In particular, during the sixties, the rhetorical tone of the Soviet pronouncements on the subject of nuclear proliferation has frequently bordered on the apocalyptic. A prominent Soviet analyst described typically, the question of nuclear proliferation as "one of the most burning problems of our day".<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union's persistent efforts to see the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) accepted and implemented, their eager endorsement of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, their implacable opposition to various NATO nuclear sharing arrangements such as the aborted Multilateral Force (MLF) and the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), and their continued diplomatic pursuit of regional nuclear free zones

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1. G. Gerasimov, "Accidental War", International Affairs (Moscow), December 1966, p.38.

throughout the world, have all helped to indicate the special interest which the Soviet Union has in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

An interesting question that may now arise is relating to the Soviet rationale for pursuing a non-proliferation policy. The question may be stated thus:

Are the Soviets truly concerned about the dangers and instabilities that might result due to multi-nuclear world or is it just that they wish to merely preserve the international nuclear duopoly held by the Soviets themselves and the United States of America.

The Soviet Union has normally stated its views on proliferation problem which contain three recurring themes:

- a) that nuclear proliferation would be a virulent process.
- b) that proliferation is undesirable since it provokes further proliferation
- c) that if there is further proliferation, it will lead to dangerous consequences for continued international stability and security.

The Soviet Union has been a crusader against any non nuclear-weapon state acquiring nuclear weapons. Sometimes

this attitude has been observed at the highest level of Soviet political elite.

The anti-proliferation argument of the Soviet Union - that nuclear weapons spread cannot be divided into various stages of acceptability - has not been quite categorically asserted. However, the inclination of the Soviet Union to consider the nuclear weapons proliferation problem in terms of a vaguely defined "Nth power" problem implies a distinct reluctance on their part to consider that there may be unique variants of nuclear diffusion, which may be inspired by unique local conditions, and might have unique dimensions as regards their respective threat potential in the international arena and their propensity to invite proliferation elsewhere.

An example of this Soviet tendency to "universalize" the proliferation challenge was evident in an official Soviet statement which was issued in 1963. It aimed at justifying the Soviet withdrawal of the nuclear weapons assistance to the Chinese:

"It would be naive to say the least, to think that it is possible to conduct one policy in the West and another in the East to fight with one hand against the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons, against the spreading

of nuclear weapons throughout the world, and to supply these weapons to China on the other hand".<sup>2</sup>

"It is axiomatic," one observer insisted, "that any increase in the number of nuclear powers would greatly aggravate international tensions and increase the possibility of these monstrous mass destruction weapons being brought into play".<sup>3</sup>

The possibility of a catalytic war which could somehow drag the superpowers inexorably into a nuclear collusion has worried the Soviet Union. In such an event the super-powers would be dragged into a nuclear conflict against both their will and their interests.

Thus, the Soviet Union has consistently taken a public position on the proliferation issue and has forcefully driven home the disruptive potential that nuclear dispersion might introduce into the international system. It has in consequence, tried to bolster the argument for non-proliferation as an imperative precondition for a stable international balance of power.


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2. Soviet Government statement to CPR, August 21, 1963 Cited in Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p.474.

3. "An Important Aspect of Disarmament", International Affairs (Moscow), January 1967, p.61.

Thus apart from the natural psychological and chauvinistic disinclination of the Soviet Union to share the prerogatives of nuclear status with other states, their opposition to nuclear weapons proliferation is attributable to a number of pragmatic considerations.

These involve the most basic policy and security interests of the Soviet Union.



The Soviets concern is that any further nuclear weapons spread might eventually add "Nth Power" threats to the physical security of the Soviet territory.

The Soviet Union tends to believe that nuclear weapons proliferation would undermine the stability of the then prevailing United States - Soviet Union nuclear dominance over the international arena by introducing smaller nuclear weapon-states, led by leaders of questionable responsibility and rationality.

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Hence, the Soviet Union feels that local use of nuclear weapons in regional crisis might generate enormous escalatory pressures which might threaten to embroil the two superpowers in an unwanted nuclear confrontation.

However, the Soviets had by the mid sixties fully come to realise that "the secret of manufacturing nuclear

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weapons has virtually ceased to be a secret",<sup>4</sup> and that it was perfectly within the capability of a number of lesser states to develop nuclear forces sufficient to threaten the security of even the most powerful nations.

The belief held by the Soviet Union that, it was a relatively stable, bipolar, mutual deterrence arrangement between the superpowers, that provided the most reliable framework for maintaining international security and keeping down the risks of nuclear war gave rise to the anxiety that the Soviets experienced regarding a multi-nuclear world that might slip out of control and raise the explosive potential of the international system.

In particular, ever since the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership took office, the Soviet Union appeared increasingly confident in the "manageability" of the international balance of power. This was reassured in great measure as a result of the remarkable improvements in their nuclear missile strength which the Soviet Union had carried out and hence they had placed a high premium on the preservation of the status quo.

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4. V. Shestov, "Major Success For the Cause of Peace", International Affairs (Moscow), August 1968, p.4.

Hence the Soviet argument comes that any further proliferation of nuclear weapons would alter the status quo and introduce new imponderables.

The study of the 1958 Quemoy crisis will provide an interesting example of the Soviet concerns outlined above.

During 1957, the Soviet Union had been engaged in a significant nuclear weapons technical aid programme to China, and had often spoken of the "fraternal comradeship" which purportedly nurtured their relationship.

In 1957, ostensibly under the impact of the success of Sputnik and by Khrushchev's boasts of Soviet Union's nuclear missile superiority over the western powers, Mao-Tse-Tung adopted a policy of intractable militancy towards the United States.

This militancy finally culminated into Communist China's attempt to wrest the offshore island of Quemoy from Taiwan in the summer of 1958. China sought the Soviet Union's nuclear support in this endeavour.

The Soviet Union was alerted by the enormous explosiveness of the situation and undoubtedly was stirred by China's display of callous indifference to the prospects



of further escalation of the conflict. Thus its response was that of being shocked.<sup>5</sup>

The Soviet Union refused to grant the Chinese the public commitment of nuclear support until it had become apparent to everyone that the crisis was subsiding.

However, in a broader perspective, the Soviet Union got awakened to the ominous prospect that in some future crisis, in which China possessed its own nuclear weapons, the ultimate outcome might not be so simple and that the Soviet Union might be dragged into a catalytic nuclear confrontation with the United States because of some irresponsible behaviour on the part of its erstwhile allies.

Hence, keeping in view, the restrained relations that developed between the Soviet Union and China, the Soviets quickly truncated their nuclear aid programme to China as well.<sup>6</sup>

A perusal of all of the Soviet Union's disarmament efforts ever since the Taiwan Straits crisis, including its proposals for nuclear free zones in Asia, its endorsement of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and its pursuit of the NPT,

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5. See Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966).
  6. John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behaviour in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958", ORBIS, Spring 1962.

would show a clear cut Soviet intention both to contain and to isolate China's nuclear weapons programme and to sacrifice the interests of Sino-Soviet "fraternal comradeship" to the larger imperatives of international stability and security.<sup>7</sup>

In fact the Soviets had got a feeling of the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons during the Taiwan episode and had found it possible to control only because the Chinese had then lacked the possession of nuclear weapons. In future, such easy management of a similar crisis in which the main protagonists fought with nuclear weapons would not be possible, the Soviets realised.

This experience of the Taiwan Straits crisis marked a significant watershed not only in the erosion of the Sino-Soviet relationship but also in the evolution of the Soviet opposition to nuclear proliferation.

During the years 1957-1958, the Chinese government under Mao-Tse-Tung moved away from the Bandung spirit to a more belligerent stance, at the same time, Khrushchev's regime was expressing increasing dedication to peaceful

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7. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens Jr. and Franklin J.C. Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interest in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p.130.

coexistence as the main line of Soviet foreign policy.

In this context, a Soviet-United States agreement to ban nuclear tests could be viewed with greatest concern by the Chinese.

From China's perspective, a Soviet decision to sign any major agreement with the United States suggested that the Soviet Union was turning Westward, away from alliance with China.

Strategically, a Soviet accord with the West would tend to confirm the Soviet unwillingness to support China's external policies.

Specifically speaking, a nuclear test ban treaty could threaten China's security at several levels. At the very least it could bring a halt to Soviet aid to China's nuclear programme and create some legal or moral restraint upon China's future capacity to test nuclear weapons.

A test ban might well have led to a Soviet-United States non-proliferation agreement and could have foreclosed China's entry into the nuclear club. Also a Soviet-United States understanding could lead to joint measures to eliminate China's incipient nuclear plant.

Thus the Soviet interest in any nuclear test ban treaty tended to undermine Sino-Soviet relations.

Until the end of 1953 there was apparently no serious effort on the part of Soviet Union to the export of nuclear technology or expertise. In December 1953, however, President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations prompted the Soviet Union to consider the political benefits to be derived from active worldwide promotion of atomic energy. As a result, a Soviet campaign to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy abroad was launched in 1954.

The States of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China were the main recipients of Soviet nuclear exports.

By far the most extensive and significant nuclear assistance provided by the USSR in the mid- 1950s was to the People's Republic of China. Between 1955 and 1958 the Soviet Union delivered a 6.5 MW heavy water reactor. In the "First Five Year Plan for Foreign Aid", the Soviets were to assist in the development of thirty nine atomic centres in China.

The Soviet Union failed to apply safe-guards to any of these nuclear facilities exported to China, perhaps as they felt confident that they would be able to control the nuclear programme of their allies.

Khrushchev was faced with the fact that the Chinese were determined to go ahead with the development of nuclear weapons whether or not they received extensive Soviet assistance. It was a choice for the Soviets between a Chinese nuclear programme carried out in defiance of, or at least without the aid of the Soviet Union, or a nuclear programme carried out in cooperation with the Russians.

In the latter case Soviet technicians would be involved in the Chinese programme giving the Soviet Union considerable information about what the Chinese were doing, and some degree of control over the evolution of the Chinese nuclear weapons programme.

Thus, only in 1958, after China declared publicly that it intended to produce its own nuclear weapons, the Soviets realised as to what they had done and tried to persuade China not to go nuclear.

Unsuccessful in their efforts to dissuade the Chinese from going nuclear, the Soviet Union withdrew its nuclear advisors and technicians from China in August 1960 as relations between them deteriorated.

This termination of Soviet nuclear assistance to China marks a major shift in Soviet nuclear cooperation efforts away from reliance on political as opposed to technical controls.

An overriding imperative of Soviet foreign policy has been the prevention of West German resurgence as a significant military challenge. This objective has been a vital factor behind the Soviet views on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a consequence, its relentless search of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The Soviet opposition to West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons appears to be based upon at least two reasons.

The first was the apprehension that possession of nuclear weapons by West Germany would further inflame its presumed desire to recapture territories lost to the Soviet bloc after World War II, thereby laying an intolerable threat directly at the Soviet Union's doorstep which the Soviet Union would somehow be forced to remove.

The second reason appears to be the concern of the Soviet Union that a nuclear armed West Germany might emerge as the defacto leader of a United Europe or of some form of European confederation, which would then not only challenge the physical security of the Soviet Union but present a significant and destabilising military counterpoise to the then Soviet-United States nuclear duopoly.<sup>8</sup>

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8. "Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties" in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, editors, Soviet Politics since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice Hall, 1968), p.160.

In the Irish era of 1958-61 when the concept of non proliferation was being evolved the Soviet Union expressed its fears of a German drive for nuclear weapons. West Germany was described as a "a breeding place for militarism and revanchism".

This fear escalated as the MLF proposal came to be discussed more seriously. The attacks by the Soviet Union on the MLF proposal continued even as developments showed that this scheme was being abandoned and less ambitious proposals were being discussed.

However these latter attacks had actually originated from the United States nonproliferation treaty drafts which left the possibility open for such schemes.

In the arguments in the ENDC and the Disarmament Commission during the period 1963 to 1965 the Soviet Union took the stand that the MLF would mean the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in particular, the access to these weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany as a step towards possessing its own nuclear weapons.

It was feared by the Soviet Union that Germany's access to nuclear weapons would encourage **its** desire to alter the situation which took shape in post World War II

Europe, and to pursue their territorial claims against the German Democratic Republic.<sup>9</sup>

The history of the two World Wars was repeatedly invoked to warn against too much confidence in future German behaviour by the Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup>

The Soviet Union was very doubtful of the validity of the American retention of its veto on the use of force. The Soviet Union felt that Germany having obtained at first a somewhat restricted access to nuclear weapons in the MLF, would try, to secure the abolition of most of the restrictions one by one, just as it had secured the abolition of most of the restrictions laid down for West Germany in the Paris agreement of 1954 in the sphere of conventional armaments.<sup>11</sup>

The scheme was finally found incompatible with the disarmament efforts and the establishment of denuclearized zones.

The Soviet Union and its allies in a communique issued by the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization meeting in Warsaw on January 19-20, 1965, threatened that if MLF plans were

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9. DOC.ENDC/84, 17 April 1963, P.2.  
10. ENDC/PV.195, 2 July 1964, P.24.  
11. Ibid., pp. 9, 10 and 13.



implemented, they "would be forced to carry out the necessary defence measures in order to ensure their security".

History was the driving force for Soviet opposition not only as far as the recent experiences with Germany in both World Wars I & II but also as far as Russian history itself which was dominated by constant fear of foreign intervention.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, fears of escalation and accidental war as a result of a Multilateral Force were a reflection of the Soviet Union's mounting appreciation of the dangers inherent in a general nuclear war.

However, the MLF was defended by the United States as a non-proliferation measure. By offering an alternative to national nuclear weapons programmes it would increase incentives and improve chances of the limitation of national nuclear weapon producing centres.<sup>13</sup>

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12. See Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), Chapter II, PP.10-19

13. ENDC/PV.195, 2 July 1964, P.37

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CHAPTER - 3

THE SOVIET-US CONSENSUS ON NUCLEAR NON-  
PROLIFERATION

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## CHAPTER - 3

### THE SOVIET - US CONSENSUS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

It was in response to Irish endeavours in the United Nations in the years 1958-61 that a concept of nuclear non-proliferation was laid down in a United Nations General Assembly resolution. This concept served as a guide to successive steps within and outside the United Nations with the intention of arresting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

After the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission came to be established, the concern about nuclear proliferation was clearly to be seen. Both, the Soviet Union and the United States expressed similar concern in the meetings of the Disarmament Commission.

The United Nations General Assembly began to pay particular attention to the issue of nuclear proliferation with the Irish draft resolution presented to the General Assembly in 1958.

The Soviet delegation voted in favour of the Irish draft resolution but did not comment at all on any of the

proposals. However, by that time the Soviet Union had not taken any firm declaratory position against proliferation. As early as 1952, however, and especially since 1958, the Soviet Union began to show a decided interest in the establishment of various atom free zones. They also pushed strongly for a nuclear test ban. But during this period, the Soviet Union displayed ambivalence towards the proliferation issue and tended to conceptualize the question of proliferation mainly in terms of Sino-Soviet relationship.

The Western alliance wasn't, however, happy with the Irish proposal and the non-proliferation resolution of 1958 was like a kind of psychological barrier to the type of nuclear arrangements which the USA was negotiating with its NATO allies.

It was being done in response to the successful launching by the Soviet Union of the "Sputnik" on 4th October 1957, and the subsequent emplacement of Soviet missiles aimed at Europe, which had shaken the confidence of United States and its allies in the effectiveness of the American deterrent system.

On October 29, 1959, Ireland raised the question of nuclear proliferation in the General Assembly of the United Nations at its fourteenth session.

The Irish draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 1959, as the first substantive resolution on nuclear proliferation problem. This resolution was supported by the United States.

The United States however felt that it had overreacted to Sputnik and that it was capable of coping with the Soviet missile threat bereft of its allies' help. It had also felt that its atoms for peace approach to halting spread of nuclear weapons was an ineffective one and had in fact helped countries to at least develop a threshold nuclear capability.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union did not support this Irish draft resolution because the draft did not prohibit states from having nuclear weapons outside their own territory, outlawing such weapons, destroying their stockpiles, or eliminating foreign bases. For the Soviet Union, those problems had to be resolved if the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was to be prevented at all.

It may be inferred that the Soviet Union never wanted the USA to place its nuclear weapons on European soil under

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1. William B. Bader, The United States and Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus 1968), p.40.

its control.

Also, since the Soviet Union had under the 1957 Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation agreement given significant nuclear weapons technical aid to Chinese, therefore it could not come out pushing a policy of nuclear non-proliferation so strongly.

On 13th February, 1960, France joined the nuclear club till then consisting of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. A permanent agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons became a definite choice.

Hence an Irish resolution cosponsored by Ghana, Japan, Mexico and Morocco in the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations appealed to the non-nuclear states to declare their intention neither to make nor acquire nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon powers were called upon to refrain from relinquishing control over nuclear weapons as well as transmitting the information for their manufacture.

The Soviet Union supported this draft resolution while the United States abstained from voting but reiterated that its national policy was not to encourage proliferation.

On 17th November 1961, Ireland moved yet another draft resolution and brought its revised version on November 26, 1961, wherein it reiterated the arguments it had made earlier on the need to have an agreement on the effective steps to prevent proliferation.

This resolution was referred to in disarmament negotiations as the Irish resolution. Both the Soviet Union and the United States supported the Irish resolution.

The Soviet and American draft treaties on General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), contained certain provisions in the first stage of the disarmament process regarding the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.

The United States plan to provide much closer participation in the nuclear defence of NATO to its allies by providing Federal Republic of Germany a finger in the nuclear trigger were strongly criticized by the Soviet Union and its allies. The concept of Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) came under heavy attack by the Soviet Union which feared that this would lead Federal Republic to go nuclear in the long run.

During this period the defunct Ten Nation Disarmament Committee was replaced by Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC). Its most distinguishing feature was that

it had eight non-aligned (neutral) states as its members. However, France which was designated a member of the ENDC abstained from all the meetings, the first of which took place on 14th March 1962.

The discussions over the problem of dissemination of nuclear weapons started in the General Assembly of the UN and in the ENDC since 1963. In July 1964, at Cairo meeting of heads of States and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), it was declared that they were ready to agree to an international treaty not to manufacture or acquire control over atomic weapons.

On 10th October 1964 in Cairo itself, another declaration was issued by the Second Nonaligned Conference, which stated that the nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states must check proliferation of nuclear weapons by adopting suitable methods.

The Disarmament Commission undertook a full length discussion of the question of nuclear proliferation and instructed the ENDC on 15th June, 1965, by eighty three votes to one with eight abstentions to give priority to the nuclear non-proliferation issue.

The non-aligned group working in the ENDC was actively involved in reaching conclusion on an NPT. The main concerns



of the non-aligned were, however,

**The** sovereign right of nation states to conduct research and benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The right of nation states to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions.

The responsibility of nuclear weapon powers to bring an end to arms race and disarm themselves, as well as assure the non-nuclear weapon states of their security against nuclear blackmail which had foresaken nuclear weapons.

The Soviet position about the objectives of the proposed treaty can be seen from the Soviet declaration:

"The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not provide for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their manufacture by the nuclear-weapon countries, although it is a step towards that objective. Therefore according to the sense of the Non-proliferation Treaty there arises no questions of control over the activities of the nuclear powers in the atomic field. It is quite reasonable that the states possessing nuclear weapons and the states not possessing such weapons in concluding a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons should assume obligations of a different nature".<sup>2</sup>

The non-aligned states developed an identity of interests while participating in the ENDC debates and introduced an eight power draft resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly on the 19th November, 1965, reflecting their views about a non-proliferation treaty. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 23rd November 1965, as resolution 2028 (XX). This laid down the five principles on the basis of which the NPT drafts of USSR and the USA were to be examined.

The evolution of a joint strategy in the approach of the Soviet Union and the United States is discernible with regard to nuclear proliferation problem, ever since the United States agreed to meet the Soviet demand on the MLF.

Now both the superpowers began to respond to the criticisms of the non-aligned members of the ENDC, in unison.

On the question of security guarantees, the Soviet Union declared "its willingness to include in the draft treaty, a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

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2. ENDC/PV.377, 22 March 1968, Para 13.

against non-nuclear states parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territories".

The USA, on the other hand offered assistance to those non nuclear-weapon states willing to forego their nuclear option against "threats of nuclear blackmail" but without providing a specific provision in the NPT. It also stood for restrictions on PNEs but was of the view that nuclear weapon states must offer their services to non-nuclear weapon states in need of PNE services, however, the nuclear devices would be under control and custody of the nuclear weapon state rendering such assistance.

It shall now be relevant to trace the evolution of the Soviet-American consensus on the nuclear proliferation problem as manifested in their negotiation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, in some detail.

In March 1962, the Soviet Union submitted a "Draft Treaty on General and complete Disarmament" (GCD), which provided among other measures an article on prevention of further spread of nuclear weapons. It read as follows:

"The States Parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information

necessary for their production to states not possessing such weapons. The States Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other states into their territories."<sup>3</sup>

On 18th April 1962, the United States too submitted to the ENDC an "outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a peaceful world, "which provided, among other measures, a paragraph on non-transfer of nuclear weapons:-

"The parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

- a) Any Party to the treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures a nuclear weapon would:
  - i) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapon to a State which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
  - ii) Not assist any such state in manufacturing any

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3. See The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970, (New York), pp.400-401.

nuclear weapons.

- b) Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:
- i) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire control over any nuclear weapons;
  - ii) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture any nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

Regarding the question of non-dissemination presented by the Soviet Union to the Committee of the whole, the Soviet representative Zorin hurled accusations against Federal Republic of Germany on the ground that it was driving towards access to nuclear weapons, especially through NATO plans for establishing an integrated European nuclear force. He proposed an agreement between the nuclear weapon states not to deliver nuclear weapons, control over them or the information relating to their manufacture to non-nuclear-weapon states.<sup>5</sup>

The US representative, Ambassador Dean, setting aside Soviet accusations highlighted the Federal Republic of Germany's undertaking given in 1954, not to manufacture any nuclear-weapons on its territory. He asserted that the United States and the United Kingdom retained full control

4. Ibid., p.419.

5. ENDC/C.1/PV.9, 19 July 1962, pp.11-17.

over nuclear weapons located on German territory.<sup>6</sup>

President Kennedy in a message to the ENDC said that the United States would continue to seek an agreement on non-proliferation.<sup>7</sup>

There was no specific resolution in the UN General Assembly in 1962 and 1963. In 1963 discussions continued on non-proliferation at the ENDC. The Test Ban Treaty was also concluded in 1963, signed on 5th August, 1963, in Moscow and came into force on 10th October, 1963.

The Soviet Union submitted a memorandum and the United States sent a message to ENDC in January 1964. Both the superpowers favoured an agreement on non-proliferation based on the "Irish Resolution". The basic difference between the two, during this period, remained the vexed question of MLF.

The Chinese detonation of a nuclear device on 16th October 1964 in the atmosphere brought the non-proliferation issue as the centrepiece of disarmament negotiations.

The Disarmament Commission whose membership included all members of the United Nations met upon a request by the

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6. Ibid., pp.20-22.

7. ENDC/144, 16 July, 1962.

Soviet Union from 21st April to 16th June, 1965, and a resolution was adopted at the end which demanded that the proliferation issue be discussed as a special priority by the ENDC for the early conclusion of a treaty to halt further proliferation.

A very active round of negotiations began at the ENDC when it met on 27th July 1965.

The first draft treaty by the United States was presented to the ENDC on 17th August 1965. It reflected the prevailing American position on the MLF and also had the backing of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Union at the 20th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations submitted its first NPT draft attached to its request to include "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" on its agenda on 24th September, 1965.

The American draft had its first two articles devoted to obligations, the third to a loose obligation on inspection and the fourth defining the term "nuclear state". The remaining three articles contained the final clauses including a withdrawal clause.<sup>8</sup>

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8. See US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1965 (Pub. No.34, December 1966) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office 1966), pp.347-349.

The Soviet treaty contained seven articles first three of which contained the main obligations that foreclosed the possibility for creation of MLF. It also didn't have an article on inspection. The remaining articles contained the final clauses including a withdrawal clause.<sup>9</sup>

At the end of the debate, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 2028 (XX) on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and requested, for the first time since 1961, the ENDC, to submit to the Assembly at an early date a report on the NPT. The resolution called for the negotiation of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of the following five main principles:

- a) The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.
- b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers.
- c) the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and more particularly, nuclear disarmament.

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9. Ibid., pp.443-446.



- d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty.
  
- e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their territories.<sup>10</sup>

These principles were not just the outcome of one session of the General Assembly. In fact they were rooted in the Irish era of 1958-1961 and the four years that followed, especially in the ENDC and the Disarmament Commission debates.

The United States on 21st March, 1966, introduced a set of amendments to the ENDC which were brought to allay Soviet suspicions that a NATO MLEF could use nuclear weapons without the agreement of the United States.

However, the Soviet position remained unchanged as it stood still opposed to any variety of nuclear sharing within NATO, allowing the Federal Republic of Germany any access to nuclear weapons.

While negotiations went on in the light of the five

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10. Ibid., pp.533-534.

principles in the ENDC in 1966 a development of direct consequence to NPT, took place in the United States.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings on February 23rd and March 1 and 7 to discuss a Senate draft resolution submitted by Senator Pastore, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee to the Senate on 18th January 1966 and referred to the Committee for its consideration. The resolution read:

"Resolved that the Senate commends the President's serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supports the principle of additional efforts by the President which are appropriate and necessary in the interest of peace and for the solution of nuclear proliferation problems".

Senator Pastore who was not satisfied with the non-committal phrasing of Art.III of the first American draft treaty on inspection recommended a new language for Art.III which later served as a basis for the formulation of the final text of the Article. On 17th May, 1966, the Senate approved the "Pastore Resolution" without any dissenting vote being cast.

The co-Chairman of ENDC - the Soviet Union and the United States began a series of bilateral talks. In

September 1966, the United States President met the West German Chancellor and in October 1966, the United States President met Mr. Gromyko in Washington, during which the American reservations aimed at according some nuclear sharing device in NATO was withdrawn since it was an obstacle to negotiating a non-proliferation treaty.

After the Washington meetings, the ENDC co-Chairman held bilateral discussions the New York during the session of the General Assembly. This led to a wide measure of agreement, on central articles of a non-proliferation treaty, between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The ENDC reconvened on 21st February, 1967. This time the old intricate problem of MLF was over but a new problem, namely that of the degree of inspection which must be accepted on civil nuclear programmes to ensure that they were not directed to military purposes, arose.

There were two safeguards systems in operation internationally, the first was established by IAEA in Vienna and the other was EURATOM. The Europeans didn't want the IAEA safeguards to be applied on them as that would have made EURATOM redundant and would almost certainly have led to a negative impact on efforts towards European unity. Therefore, the United States took the position that both the systems may be permitted to continue.

The Soviet Union had demanded that all non-nuclear weapon States signatory to the treaty should submit their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA inspection. They believed that the EURATOM safeguards amounted to merely self-inspection.

Besides the problem relating to inspection, the two protagonists of the treaty had to reconcile the views of the non nuclear-weapon states. These included the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, security assurance to the non-nuclear weapon states which had renounced their right to acquire nuclear weapons and the measures of nuclear disarmament which were to be undertaken by the nuclear weapon states.

The Soviet Union and the United States submitted two identical drafts to the ENDC on 24th August, 1967. The draft contained a preamble and eight articles including an article III on inspection which was left blank.<sup>11</sup>

The discussions in the ENDC were more specific and less general as the delegations had a definite text agreed to by Soviet and American delegations to deal with. As the 22nd Session of the U.N. General Assembly was coming to be

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11. See US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1967 (Pub.No.46, July 1968) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.338-341.

adjourned, the ENDC decided to prepare and submit an interim status report.<sup>12</sup>

The General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the ENDC to submit to it a full report on NPT negotiations by 15th March, 1968. It also recommended setting of an early date after 15th March, 1968, for the resumption of the 22nd session of the Assembly to consider the full report.<sup>13</sup>

On 18th January 1968, the ENDC reconvened. By then the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed on a definite Article III on inspection. The consultations on Article III came up with a formula presented by the United States to the Soviet Union on 2nd November 1967, but these consultations broke down in an inconclusive manner.

In Geneva, three days before opening of ENDC talks, the Soviet and American delegations met and in that meeting the Soviet Union indicated that it was prepared to accept the language of the 2nd November formula presented by the United States.

The Soviet approval of Article III was communicated to

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12. Ibid., pp.622-623.

13. Ibid., pp.732-733.

the United States representative on 18th January 1968.

Two identical texts of a draft NPT were introduced to the ENDC on January 18, 1968. The draft had a preamble and eleven articles. The preamble was slightly shorter than the 24th August, draft as some of its paragraphs were developed into articles.<sup>14</sup>

The ENDC had a very busy and active session of the Conference on NPT. For the first time questions were addressed in abundance to the co-Chairman, who provided extensive answers and interpretations of treaty provisions. Informed consultations took place over Article III which was submitted for the first time to the Conference.

The 18th January text did not mention security assurances and several proposals came before the ENDC. On March 7, 1968, the three nuclear-weapon states particularly in the Conference submitted to it a draft Security Council resolution on this subject. These States stated that their Government would make declarations of intention closely connected with the resolution.<sup>15</sup>

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14. See US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1968, (Pub.No. 52, September 1969) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969), pp.1-6.
15. See ENDC/PV.375, 7 March 1968, pp.5-6 (USA), pp.8-10 (USSR), and p.10 (UK).

For the first time in the history of ENDC negotiations a joint draft treaty was presented on 11 March, 1968 which incorporated some of the suggested amendments and proposals made since the introduction of the 18 January draft treaty. A new preambular paragraph on discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, modification of Article VI to denote the urgency of measures regarding the stopping of the arms race, and Article VII was modified to allow for periodic review conferences.<sup>16</sup>

The changes brought in the draft of 11th March 1968 were very small taking into account the great number of proposals and amendments sought, mainly by the non-aligned states members of the ENDC. But both the Soviet Union and the United States refused to give in when it came to Articles I, II and III.

These Articles were framed after intense negotiations and any modification in any one of them would have upset the extremely delicate balance between States' interests. A full report of the Conference by the two co-Chairman was submitted to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

On May 1, 1968, the Soviet Union & the United States along with eighteen other states submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly endorsing the 11 March text.<sup>17</sup>

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16. Op.cit., pp.162-166.

17. Ibid., p.271.

On May 3, 1968, a revised draft was submitted with nine more co-sponsors.

On 28th May, 1968, after further deliberations, the last revised version was introduced by the sponsors of the treaty, the Soviets and the Americans. Here, the preamble was changed and added to. Other changes were made in the operative part the most significant of which was that the Assembly would commend the NPT rather than simply endorse it.

The 11 March draft treaty was also revised on 31st May. The preamble was slightly changed and added to and Article 4 modified to meet the needs of the developing countries. The names of the depository governments: The Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom was inserted in Article IX. The treaty was to come into force when the instruments of ratification had been deposited by these three states and 40 other countries.<sup>18</sup>

On 12th June, 1968, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the Security Council, their draft resolution of 7th March 1968 on security assurances. The Council met between 17th and 19th June, 1968 where deliberations were made by the three countries in conjunction with their draft resolution. On 19th June,

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18. Ibid., pp.404-409.



the draft was adopted by the Council without change. Five members abstained whereas the remaining ten voted in favour of resolution.<sup>19</sup>

The treaty was opened for signature on 1 July 1968. The Soviet Union and the United States deposited their instruments of ratification on 5th March, 1970 thus completing the process of ratification on 5th March, 1970, thus completing the process of ratification by the three nuclear weapon parties to the treaty.

On the same day instruments of ratification were deposited by more than forty states that were required. By 5th March 1970 almost one hundred countries had already signed the Treaty.

The Soviet Union's armed intervention in Czechoslovakia led to a delay in the Treaty's signature by the United States and European nations such as Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Thus, the negotiation of the NPT was a long and arduous process. At the beginning of the negotiations the process was slow and cautious. General discussions or bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States was much in evidence at this stage.

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19. Ibid., p.444.

The Disarmament Commission meeting of 1965, marks the end of this phase which may be said to have begun since the "Irish resolution", and the starting of an active phase with the introduction of the first draft treaties on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Thereafter, bilateral and multilateral negotiations and discussions of the problem continued in various fora. However one finds the ENDC at the centre of all these negotiations.

The problems encountered were related to East-West relations as well as nuclear and non nuclear weapon states as also between allies and also between the committed nations such as the non-aligned.

The Soviet Union and the United States acted in unison and favoured a treaty text rather than unilateral undertakings such as the non-acquisition declaration suggested by Italy.

The consensus built up between the two main protagonists of the NPT, the Soviet Union and the United States, and the perseverance with which they pursued their common drive for urgent conclusion of a Treaty led to its final attainment.

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CONCLUSION

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## CONCLUSION

The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons has been a favourite theme of the Soviet Union's arms control policy for a long time. One can discern its concrete manifestation in Soviet Union's endorsement of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America in 1967, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty of 1986, and since 1958, in the stringent nuclear export policy of the Soviet Union.

Although, one may explain away, much of Moscow's non-proliferation rhetoric and elements of its non-proliferation behaviour, in terms of narrow self interest, namely, the preventions of access to nuclear weapons by traditional adversaries, the range and the consistency of its proliferation efforts, as well as certain specific actions, indicate that the leadership of the Soviet Union appreciates the dangers posed by the diffusion of nuclear weapons.

The basic premise underlying Soviet non-proliferation appears to be that Soviet military and political interests are best served if the spread of nuclear weapons to other states is prevented.<sup>1</sup>

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1. See William Potter, "Nuclear Export Policy: A Soviet American Comparison", in Charles Kegley and Pat McGowan, eds., Foreign Policy: USA/USSR, Sage Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publication, 1982), pp.291-313.

This perspective appears to have been shaped first and foremost by the fear that nuclear weapons might be obtained by states hostile to the Soviet Union, has remained remarkably constant for over three decades.<sup>2</sup>

The thinking of the Soviet Union about the policy toward nuclear exports, however, underwent major changes since the Soviet Union first acquired a nuclear weapons capability in 1949.

Until the end of 1953, no serious attention appears to have been given in the Soviet Union to the export of nuclear technology or expertise. In December 1953, however, President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations prompted Soviet decision makers to consider the international political benefits to be derived from active worldwide promotion of atomic energy.

As a result, a Soviet campaign to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy abroad was launched in 1954.<sup>3</sup>

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2. See Joseph Noguee, "Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Policy: Dilemmas and Contradictions", *ORBIS* (Winter, 1982), pp.751-69.

See also Benjamin Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy", in Roman Kalcowicz et al., The Soviet Union and Arms Control (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp.70-115.

3. See Harold Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), pp.90-101.

The Soviet Union began to export not only nuclear power information and technical experts, but also research reactors. The states of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China were the first recipients of Soviet nuclear exports.<sup>4</sup>

However, by far the most extensive and significant nuclear assistance provided by the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s was to the People's Republic of China. Between the period 1955 to 1958, the Soviet Union delivered a 6.5 Megawatt heavy water research reactor, and announced the first five year plan for foreign aid, which provided for the development of thirty nine atomic centres within China, and most likely, delivered (or at least assisted the assembly of), a gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant at Lanchow.<sup>5</sup>

It is significant that the Soviet Union failed to apply safeguards to any of these nuclear exports, perhaps because they were confident that they would be able to control the nuclear programme of their allies.

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4. See Gloria Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy: Domestic and International Policies (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1979), pp.3-5.

5. Arnold Kramish, "The great Chinese Bomb Puzzle - A solution", Fortune (June 1966), pp.246-48.

Soviet laxness may also have been due to a failure to appreciate fully the ease with which these exports could be used for military purposes.

This may explain the Soviet failure to insist on safeguards on nuclear exports during this period even to countries outside the Soviet bloc, for example to Egypt.<sup>6</sup>

The lack of Soviet attention in the mid-1950s to the issue of nuclear safeguards reflects the possibility of absence at that time of a coherent and consistent non-proliferation strategy.

However, it was precisely at the time when the allied decision to encourage the rearming of Germany raised the issue of non-proliferation in Moscow, to one of first importance, the Soviet Union proceeded with its efforts to provide the Chinese with substantial nuclear assistance.

It was only in 1958, after China indicated publicly that it intended to produce its own nuclear weapons, did the Soviet Union come to realise the danger of proliferation which it had hitherto thought, existed in the West, in fact existed in the south, and was acute, primarily because of its own

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6. George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p.36. Also Gloria Duffy, "Soviet Nuclear Exports", International Security (Summer, 1978), pp.84-85.

nuclear largesse.

Once this situation was understood by the Soviet Union, it suspended its nuclear aid to China and began efforts to persuade the Chinese that nuclear non proliferation in general and Chinese nuclear abstinence in particular were in the best interests of the People's Republic of China.

After being unsuccessful in their efforts at persuading the Chinese, the Soviet Union withdrew its nuclear advisors and technicians from China in August 1960.

This termination of Soviet nuclear assistance to China has been considered as a major shift in Soviet nuclear export policy, away from reliance on political (as opposed to technical) controls.

Gloria Duffy has noted, "the ease with which the Chinese transformed the Soviet nuclear aid into a weapons programme seemingly was taken by the Soviets as an ill presentiment of the way Soviet nuclear exports might be manipulated in the future by other recipient countries."<sup>7</sup>

After that, the Soviet Union retrenched noticeably in its nuclear exports since 1958. The promise by Soviet Union to Hungary of a 100 Megawatt reactor was, for example

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7. Duffy, "Soviet Nuclear Exports", International Security, (Summer 1975), p.86.



not fulfilled, nor was the pledge to assist Czechoslovakia in bringing into operation its natural uranium (and high plutonium producing) power plant.

The Soviet Union also adopted the policy of restricting nuclear reactor exports to the more proliferation resistant light water reactors, and most significantly, instituted a serious system of safeguards - well in advance of any considerable safeguards adopted by other nuclear suppliers.<sup>8</sup>

It insisted that all recipients of its nuclear reactors obtain the nuclear fuel for their operations from the Soviet Union and must return the spent fuel rods to the USSR. In addition to that, the East European states were prevented from developing their own Uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities.

The efforts made by the Soviet Union to impose more stringent controls on nuclear exports after 1958, coincided with the rise of nuclear non-proliferation in the hierarchy of Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives. This fact was reflected in the negotiations undertaken by the USSR with the United States and the United Kingdom over a nuclear test ban treaty.<sup>9</sup>

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8. See Gloria Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy, p.7.

9. Christor Johnson, Soviet Bargaining Behaviour: The Nuclear Test Ban Case (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). See also Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

Following the successful conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the foreign policy efforts of the Soviet Union in the nuclear field were directed primarily at preventing West German acquisition of nuclear weapons.<sup>10</sup>

The major vehicle for promoting this policy was the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which after extensive negotiations was opened for signature in July 1968.

As far as the Federal Republic of Germany was concerned, the Soviet Union was worried about nuclear diffusion primarily in the context of the American sponsored multilateral force (MLF).<sup>11</sup>

The Soviet Union who sometimes appeared to be irrationally afraid of a potentially resurgent German military threat denounced the MLF primarily on the grounds that it represented a first step towards the nuclear arming of Germany and that such a first step would inevitably lead to further movement in the same direction.

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10. Gerhard Wettig, "Soviet Policy on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966-1968", *ORBIS* (Winter 1969), pp.1058-84.

11. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.43, No.1, (October, 1964), pp.126-134.

It is probably correct to say as most Western observers of Soviet nuclear policy have argued that Soviet concern over proliferation problem diminished significantly after West Germany signed the NPT. Certainly there was a significant decline in the perceived urgency and magnitude of the proliferation threat expressed in Soviet Union's non-proliferation pronouncements.

This change in the public posture may have corresponded to private assessments among the Soviet foreign policy elite concerning the nature of the non-proliferation threat.

However, a decline in the priority of non-proliferation as a Soviet foreign policy objective should not be mistaken to mean abandonment of the objective itself or a necessary divergence between declaratory policy and actual behaviour.

In fact if we focus on the behaviour of the Soviet Union rather than its rhetoric we can observe a subtle shift in Soviet policy in the mid-1970s in the direction of more pragmatism and cooperation in the area of non-proliferation. This change entailed movement away from the post 1958 approach which had been characterized by the notion that "there would be no proliferation problem if all countries follow the policy of the USSR and each take care of its own."<sup>12</sup>

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12. V.S. Emelianov cited by Duffy, Soviet Nuclear Energy, p.12.

The involvement of the Soviet Union in the Nuclear Exporters Committee (the so called Zangger Committee), the London Suppliers' Group, the NPT Review Conferences of 1975, 1980 and 1985, and the INFCE, for example, reveals the increasing Soviet recognition of the complexity of proliferation problems and the utility of coordinated multinational action.<sup>13</sup>

In these and other international forums, the Soviet Union and the United States have often worked closely together to tighten export controls and to gain greater adherence to the NPT.<sup>14</sup>

At the London Suppliers' Group meetings, for example, the Soviet Union used to regularly align itself with the Supplier States who were proponents of strict nuclear export controls, a group that usually would include the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.

Moreover as George Quester has noted, "at the meetings of the IAEA, or in the NPT Review Conferences, or at the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly on the proliferation topic, it apparently has been typical for Soviet delegations to compare strategy and tactics very closely with the United States, indeed sometimes (where the

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13. A. Mikhailov, "Effective Control Over Nuclear Exports", International Affairs (Moscow) (June, 1982), pp.19-25.

14. See Potter, "US-Soviet Cooperation For Non-Proliferation" The Washington Quarterly (Winter, 1985), pp.141-54.

Soviet delegation had not the time to make its own assessment) even letting the American delegation decide how some other nations' proposal should be responded to.<sup>15</sup>

Probably the most unusual example of Soviet cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation measures occurred in the summer of 1977, when the Soviet Union shared intelligence information with the United States which indicated the possibility that South Africa had constructed a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert.

The Soviet Union also respected the American requests for behaviour in the United Nations that would not jeopardize a United States initiative to gain the adherence to NPT and international safeguards by the Union of South Africa.

This is particularly significant as an indicator of Soviet Union's genuine interest in non-proliferation because it had occurred behind the scenes and had not afforded the Soviet Union, the opportunity to exploit its non-proliferation vigilance or anti-South African stance for propaganda purposes - something which it had done during the Kalahari Desert episode.

Today, the Soviet Union has emerged as a global supplier of nuclear technology and services. Soviet agreements for

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15. George Quester, Politics, p.23.

nuclear cooperation are in force with over two dozen countries, many of which are outside the Soviet bloc of socialist countries.

The nuclear assistance provided by the Soviet Union has in most instances been clearly consistent with its public commitments to stringent export controls and non-proliferation. Examples are - sale of power reactors to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland and the provision of Uranium enrichment services to Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland.

Restraint in the area of nuclear exports is also evident in the support which the Soviet Union has rendered to the United States efforts in the Zangger Committee to gain acceptance of more precise definitions of the items affected by the nuclear suppliers' "trigger list".

Also indicative of fairly high level of Soviet support for strengthening the non proliferation regime is the agreement of the Soviet Union with the IAEA in February, 1985, to place some of its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection system.

One additional sign of continued Soviet interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is the resumption

in late 1982, after a hiatus of four years, of high level consultations on non-proliferation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

However these steps taken by the Soviet Union with cooperation and in conjunction with the USA to develop a non-proliferation regime have not been taken kindly by most other states. France and China are not parties to the NPT and the remaining non-nuclear weapon, third world states consider the treaty as discriminatory.

From the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation, the principle of non-dissemination has been established. The principle of safeguards by IAEA has been accepted as an effective way of inspection and verification to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, the principle of denuclearization and non nuclearization has been accepted as an essential part of the non-proliferation strategy to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

These aforesaid norms have succeeded in preventing the widespread nuclear proliferation to the satisfaction of the members of the nuclear club but they have not established a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime to the satisfaction of the majority of the United Nations members, mainly the underdeveloped world.

Though, the nuclear weapon states have under pressure from the non-nuclear weapon parties to NPT, have accepted safeguards on some of their peaceful nuclear installations or on those which are not directly related to national security.<sup>16</sup>

Hitherto the safeguards system remains discriminatory and not universal.

Likewise, the hope that the production of fissionable material would cease and an agreement would be reached, has failed to materialize. Also, the principle of destruction of nuclear devices and their conversion to peaceful uses, again remains a pious hope.<sup>17</sup>

Article VI of the NPT, which represents a counterweight to the obligations assumed by the non-nuclear weapon states has not been realised at all. Horizontal proliferation has not only been exaggerated but vertical proliferation has been accelerated to dangerous proportions due to an uncontrolled arms race.

The comprehensive test ban treaty remains an idle dream,

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16. ENDC/165, January 27, 1966.

17. ENDC/172, March 8, 1966.



whereas, the conclusion of the INF Treaty comes after more than fifteen years of the coming into effect of the NPT. Thus, the process of pursuing negotiations "in good faith" is alarmingly slow. The START negotiations are still going on at a snails pace.

In fact since the First Review Conference onwards, one can discern two distinct approaches to the non-proliferation question by the nuclear haves and the nuclear have nots.

Though the Conference could adopt a declaration yet there were some issues whose resolution was demanded by the non-nuclear weapon states.

These included a demand to put an end to underground nuclear tests and that there must be a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. The nuclear weapon states must pledge themselves not to use or threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon parties to the treaty. The nuclear weapon states must take steps towards substantive aid to the developing states in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and they must contribute to the creation of an international regime for conducting peaceful nuclear experiments. The nuclear weapon states were also to undertake to respect all nuclear weapon free zones.

The nuclear weapon states on the other hand concentrated upon the technical issues and "rejected out of hand, and

in almost brutal fashion all of the proposals of the Group of seventy seven."<sup>18</sup>

At the second NPT Review conference in 1980 sufficient consensus could not be developed to issue a declaration. This was mainly due to disagreement over provisions dealing with disarmament dwelt under Article VI of the NPT.

The major powers refused to accede to demands put forward by majority of participants that concrete commitments be taken to halt the arms race, nor did they agree to step up the pace of their ongoing negotiations or set up procedures for new ones. Though all states wanted full-scope safeguards to be applied to non-parties to NPT but disagreement arose on whether such safeguards be required as a condition of receiving supplies.

Views converged on, that international cooperation likely to contribute to development of nuclear weapon capability by non NPT parties be avoided, that safeguards procedures needed continuous improvements to deal with increasing amount of nuclear material and more complex facilities, that convention on physical protection of nuclear material should be acceded to by all states; More assistance be provided to less developed non-nuclear weapon parties in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

18. William Epstein, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Failure of the Review Conference," Survival , November-December 1975, p.267.

Conditions of nuclear supplies be more fully discussed between supplier and recipient states and IAEA efforts towards the establishment of a scheme for international plutonium storage and the management of spent fuel should continue.

The issues that are contended by the developing non-nuclear states may now be enumerated.

The norms, rules, procedures and institutions constituting the existing non-proliferation regime are regarded by non-nuclear weapon states as instruments of technological domination.

They feel that this regime is discriminatory exploitative and hierarchical and legitimises the dichotomy of nuclear haves and the nuclear havenots.

The developing nations in contrast to the nuclear weapon states, do not foresee the possibility of any widespread horizontal proliferation.

As a consequence, they have all along resented the imputation that they might subvert the civilian nuclear technology to acquiring nuclear bombs.

The non-nuclear weapon states have been adversely affected by the nuclear energy policy of the nuclear weapon states which is that of 'over consumption and waste' of valuable fossil energy instead of sharing it more equitably. They are appalled at the callous indifference displayed by nuclear weapon states towards the energy requirements of the underdeveloped non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT.

The non-nuclear weapon states have all along regarded as an imposition, restrictions other than those which are provided under the IAEA Statute and the NPT.

Hence the non-nuclear weapon states believe that the present non-proliferation regime is a partial non-proliferation regime. A universal non-proliferation regime which would be able to reconcile the energy requirements of the developing nations and non-proliferation goals of the nuclear weapon states, can be created by having a radical look at the issues and as a solution revise the norms and rules of the regime so as to make it appear equitable.

In this direction, rethinking is called for with regard to the norms, rules and institutions which non-nuclear weapon states consider as detrimental to their economic development.

This can be done by revising the NPT in order to comply with the requirement of the UN Resolution 2028 (XX) of

November 1965.

Article III should be revised in order to make NPT safeguards applicable to nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states alike.

Addition of a provision covering vertical proliferation since Article VI has not been of sufficient help, which make it obligatory for the nuclear weapon states to halt arms race and vertical proliferation and to reduce their existing arsenals within a fixed period.

The security guarantee to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to NPT need to be strengthened as the UN Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968 is redundant and amounts to a mere reaffirmation of duty by UN members to assist a state which has been attacked, irrespective of the type of weapons employed.

These changes would affect the promotional activities of the IAEA, the export policy of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) and the U.S. Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978.

The building of a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime on an equitable basis be accomplished if the superpowers take bold initiatives in the field of arms control.

The treaty should be concluded on strategic offensive arms between the superpowers. Arms control negotiations for the reduction of short range nuclear weapons (TNF) should be pursued in all earnestness. Steps should also be taken by the superpowers to conclude a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Also, the signature and ratification of peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) is called for by all states.

These measures in the field of arms control would create an atmosphere in which the nuclear non-proliferation regime would appear credible to all those concerned. This can, however, only be brought about by genuine interest and efforts of the super powers - the Soviet Union and the United States with cooperation from the remaining three nuclear weapon states.

This then would create a nuclear world order based on justice and equity for all, in which all discriminations and special privileges will crumble, and the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would effectively be tackled.

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APPENDIX - 1

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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APPENDIX I

TREATY ON THE NON PROLIFERATION  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

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Source: UN Doc. A/Res/2373 (XXIX)



Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and

to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence

of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

#### Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

#### Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly,

or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

### Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence

within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180 day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

#### Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organisations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy

for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

#### Article V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

## Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

## Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

## Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.



2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository

Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

#### Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.
3. The Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice

of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

#### Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

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