

**FOREIGN POLICY OF INDONESIA DURING
GUIDED DEMOCRACY**

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION : A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1950

Indonesia is situated on the trade route between China on the one hand and India, West Asia and Europe on the other. Thus, it has long been the centre of trading empires and the recipient of a diversity of cultural and linguistic influences from outside. The world's largest and most scattered archipelago, Indonesia has been struggling hard with geography to maintain itself as a unit. Easy traversability of these seas has ensured a continuity of cultural contact and interchange between peoples of different islands. Heavy rain characterises almost the whole of its area, and much of it covered by tropical forests. Because of ~~its~~^{young} and active volcanoes, they created and continue to create greater soil fertility which in turn helps to develop intensive agricultures. And the abundance of important raw materials like oil, rubber, tin etc. added to the significance of Indonesia.

Indonesia since its independence in 1949 had been rocked with political instability till the proclamation of the 'guided democracy' by President Sukarno in 1959 and thereby making the cabinet responsible to himself and no more to parliament. So also the foreign policy of Indonesia was vacillating without any definite perspective. Indonesia's

strategic location and socio-political make up have an important bearing on its outlook on the world. Inevitably a country's foreign policy is shaped by innumerable factors of both objective and subjective nature, its national interests as conceived at a given point of time, geo-political configuration, natural resources, economic constraints etc. In the case of Indonesia, to start with, nationalism was the pivotal force that enabled Indonesia to fight unitedly with remarkable vitality in order to achieve independence from the Dutch colonialism.

Foreign Policy under various Cabinets

The first government to be formed after independence was by Mohammad Hatta (December 1949 to August 1950). Hatta cabinet wanted to concentrate much on internal problems rather than on foreign affairs. So, foreign policy was low on the cabinet's scale of priorities. It sent ambassadors to all major western countries and uncommitted governments, but maintained no diplomatic relations with any Communist state. In Asia its closest relations were with India.

The second cabinet under the leadership of Matsir (September 1950 to March 1951), like its predecessor, was more inclined to evade foreign policy issues than to seek them. It was rather strongly pro-western in its cold-war orientation. It supported the policies of the United States in Korea and rest of the Far East. But it was bound by the

already well established terms of consensus on independent foreign policy. Indonesia had been admitted to the United Nations organization on 27 September 1950 as a result of Indian and Australian sponsorship. It abstained during the voting at the United Nations for United States resolution condemning China as aggressor in Korea.

Then came the Sukiman cabinet (April 1951-February 1952). It adopted a kind of committed pro-American policy. It placed a number of restrictions on the activities of the Chinese Embassy and its operations. It did not allow China to open new Consulates in other towns. It focussed its attention on relations with America. It was here that there arose two controversies which led to its fall.

(1) Japanese Peace Treaty

Initially it was not clear that the Indonesian Government would send representatives to the US proposed "Japanese Peace Treaty Conference" at San Francisco to sign the treaty. But the Sukiman cabinet decided on 24 August 1951 to send Foreign Minister Subandoro. It faced a strong criticism and sometimes hostility from Press and parliamentarians mainly because the Treaty was purely an American product which would go against the basic principle of independent foreign policy. Signing the Treaty meant aligning with western bloc. Though the cabinet tried to

testify that the treaty would be advantageous, it met with severe opposition. But finally Sukiman group survived when it won on a 17 to 14 vote. The PNI decided that although the party would continue to oppose ratification it would not support any parliamentary move for an early debate on the treaty.¹

(2) Issue of Mutual Security Aid

It was second major controversy in the foreign policy and the Sukiman cabinet was obliged to step down. This controversy stemmed from the Foreign Ministry's acceptance of the United States aid on the terms of Mutual Security Act of 1951. When it became public after one month, it met with lot of criticism. The signing of Mutual Security Aid agreement seemed to strike at the very roots of the independent foreign policy.² This affair ultimately led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Subandjo and finally to the fall of the cabinet.

Silopo cabinet (April 1952- June 1953) showed certain changes in the foreign policy attitude. It opposed Indonesia-Netherlands union and initiated preliminary negotiations on the matter of bilateral relations with Soviet Union.

1 Keith-Herbert, Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (New York, 1962), pp. 190-97.

2 Hatta, Mohamad, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, vol. 31, April 1953.

Foreign policy marked a great change under the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (July 1953- July 1955). The foreign policy was almost passive though the previous cabinets claimed that they were following an independent and active policy. When Ali formed his cabinet there was militant anti- feeling among the Third World countries which naturally enabled Indonesia, to aspire for a position of leadership within the anti-colonialist movement. It was Ali Sastroamidjojo who first posed to hold an international conference of developing countries in Indonesia in order to diffuse the situation of Asian Cold War which arose in the wake of Vietnam, Korea etc. Jawaharlal Nehru also agreed for the proposal when Ali Sastroamidjojo visited New Delhi in September 1954. Meanwhile the Ali cabinet had been active in improving the relations with China.

The Bandung Conference in April 1955 was certainly the Ali cabinet's big triumph which improved the image of Indonesia. Indonesia gained two specific diplomatic victories in the course of the conference. Firstly, Indonesia signed the 'Dual Nationality Agreement' with China regarding the Chinese residing in Indonesia, and secondly, Indonesia got affirmative support for its claim on West Irian in the final communique. Thus, foreign policy during the Ali Sastroamidjojo was "vigorous" and "effective".³

3 Faith, Herbert, n. 1, pp. 394-7.

The Surawidjia Harakat cabinet (August 1955-March 1956) from the beginning of its term of office, pursued an active foreign policy and one aimed at re-establishing fairly close relations with the Western world. It started negotiations with the Netherlands and it was able to persuade the Dutch to concede important modifications in the terms of the Round Table Conference Agreement of 1949. This cabinet decided to abrogate the Netherlands-Indonesian union.

The second Ali cabinet which came to power after the general elections in 1956 was a coalition cabinet of which the Masjumi party and the Indonesian Nationalist party formed the backbone. In the field of foreign policy it failed to make a tangible contribution toward projecting role of Indonesia in world diplomacy. However, during this period President Sukarno initiated his world-wide tours, especially to the USA, the USSR and China were very significant. After the official revelation of President Sukarno's "concealment", and consequent deterioration of relations between regions and the central government there was no way out for Ali cabinet but to resign on 10 March 1957. President Sukarno as a last act declared Martial Law throughout Indonesia. The Karya Cabinet thus came to power in succession of Ali cabinet. Sukarno, declaring that as president of Republic of Indonesia empowered to appoint the cabinet, appointed Karya cabinet. Djanda Kartawidjaja was made first minister who later became the Prime Minister

and Subandrio, Foreign Affairs Minister. In the field of foreign policy priority was given to solve West Irian question. Sukarno began to play an active role in the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy affairs. He started his policy of antagonism to western bloc and a rapprochement with Communist countries.⁴ Sukarno gave his first open diatribe in his Independence Day Address on 17 August 1958.⁵ Indonesian-United States relations also became strained, for it was strongly believed in Jakarta that America helped the (PRRI) Persekutuan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/ rebels in the regions.

During the two years in which the Karya Cabinet was in power under Premier Djuwanda there had been little foreign policy activity except vigorous campaign for West Irian and the consequent deterioration of Indonesian relations with United States and other Western countries. The whole attention of the administration was focussed on the implementation of the guided democracy. This was the period of growing Russian influence in Indonesia in the matters of foreign and economic aid. But, Karya Cabinet succeeded in concluding the long-awaited agreement on war reparations with Japan and thus normalizing the Japanese-Indonesian diplomatic relations.⁶

4 Ido Anak Agung Nda Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesia Foreign Policy, 1945-1965 (The Hague, 1973), pp. 243-51.

5 See Sukarno, A Year of Challenge, Independence Day Address, 17 August 1958, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta, 1958).

6 Agung, n. 4, p. 266. Also see Guy Kahn, The Asian African Conference, Bandung, April 1955 (New York, 1956).

Basic Principles of Indonesian Foreign Policy

As far as the basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy are concerned, representing Indonesia Sutan Sjahrir gave a speech on the eve of the "Asian Relations Conference" in New Delhi, which took place from 23 March to 2 April 1947. It was, in fact, the first foreign policy statement of the Republic of Indonesia before an international conference. To sum up, Sjahrir appealed to the Asian nations, united by their common interest, to seek friendship with other countries, so that the idea of one world might be realised. This could be achieved only by peaceful coexistence and the efforts of all nations to preserve peace by strengthening bonds which exist between the various races and nations of the world.⁷ From this statement can be drawn the first indications of the basic principles of Indonesian foreign policy, which later formulated in a more positive form, was to be known as non-alignment and positive search for peace.

Indonesia gave its own interpretation and understanding, that is, not merely maintaining neutral posture, but to pursue an independent and active foreign policy which in turn would be conducive for the settlement of disputes through negotiations and peaceful means and finally for the promotion of world peace at large. } in his address to the

⁷ Agung, n. 4, p. 25.

plenary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 September 1953, Dr Sunario, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, reiterated the above stand that Indonesia's independent policy was not a policy of 'passive neutrality' or 'neutral passivity', but an active policy to reduce tension in the world politics and to help promote peace and friendship.⁸ Stressing the role and responsibility of the nations like Indonesia, Egypt, Burma etc., he maintained that these countries could make a significant contribution to the cause of the world peace at the same time safeguarding the interests and ideals of the Afro-Asian group without siding with any bloc. "In this respect Indonesia holds an advantage as position. For not only is Indonesia able, because of her geographical position, to pursue her independent policy vis-a-vis the two blocs -- Soviet Union and United States -- but other factors such as geopolitics, racial, religious and cultural affinity with other Asian-African countries makes this co-operation on the most sound basis possible and acceptable."⁹

(Thus Indonesia's motivations were to maintain an

8 Sunario, "Address to the Plenary Session of the Eighth General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 September 1954", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta, 1955), p. 8.

9 Sunario, "Address before Opening Session of the Asian Conference for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia on 9 March 1954", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta, 1955), p. 17.

active and independent, not merely neutral foreign policy, taking no sides in the cold war, but to develop and complete the independence and sovereignty more effectively, and also discharge its responsibilities in terms of the basic principles of the United Nations.)

(The second basic principle of the Indonesia's foreign policy was peaceful co-existence. Sunario time and again emphasized the indispensability of peaceful co-existence of all nations and peoples. According to him co-existence was not a negativetern implying passive acquiescence to the policies practiced by others, but it means a positive effort to recognise their own way of life so long as this does not impinge upon the rights of others.) And in the period of strong ideological cleavages in the international politics, the only way out was to accept the notion of peaceful co-existence in order to make any economic and social progress. (This belief was in full agreement with Indonesian philosophy of life as embodied in the state ideology, the "Pantja-Sila" or Five Principles.¹⁰)

(The third basic principle of Indonesia's foreign policy is nationalism.) As already pointed out, according to Indonesian policy-makers, nationalism (meant something

¹⁰ Sunario, "Address to the Plenary Session of the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations on 30 September 1954", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta, 1955), pp. 26-28.

different from what was postulated by the Western writers. In the West nationalism developed as an aggressive force, seeking national economic advantage and expansion. Nationalism is singular force in Indonesia which regulates its international activity.)

Guided Democracy

(The initiation of Guided Democracy definitely marks an epoch in the recent history of Indonesia, for this era experienced great upheavals politically. Though numerous causal factors were responsible for the adoption of guided democracy it was doubtlessly because of political instability and economic laxity. It may sound dubious to consider the critics of Sukarno with enough insight whose claim goes that it was sheer propensity for power Sukarno wanted to go for the guided democracy. But certainly Sukarno wanted to go any way to find the way out for political equilibrium and economic advancement. So, he thought guided democracy would be the better way to overcome these inhibitions.)

(Firstly, the strained relations between the centre and the regions of Indonesia created chaos in the political atmosphere.)In spite of Indonesia's large earnings in terms of foreign exchange (nearly 70 per cent) from exports of the goods of the outer islands, the national resources were used mainly for the development of Java, and the other regions were

considerably ignored. Consequently 'regional councils' were formed with sympathies from Masjumi Party, which was a direct challenge to the Central Government. These strains between centre and regions further ramified into severe strains in the cabinet. Masjumi party came out of the government which eventually led Ali Sastroamidjojo to resign in March 1957. A new cabinet was formed under Djuanda which almost remained under the control of Sukarno. All the efforts on the part of the new cabinet to satisfy the demands of the regions were in vain. The demand with an ultimatum for the immediate resignation of the new Cabinet was turned down by the cabinet. This aggravated the tension further. And so the formation of a "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia" (Permintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia - PRRI) was proclaimed on 5 February 1958. The PRRI rebels were well armed with modern weapons and it was strongly believed that the United States had supplied them with arms. The rebellion was suppressed within a few months. This enabled the army to enhance its influence further in the politics of Indonesia.

Secondly, the economy was in shambles and the 1953-57 period was characterized by recession with rate of production at a stand still. By and large the cabinets till the proclamation of the Guided Democracy had fewer strong commitments and in general they were all less intensely concerned with maximization of production, fiscal stability

and administrative rationalisation. In fact these cabinets had no distinctive set of policies for solving problems in the economy and being concerned more with power both for themselves as cabinets and their parties. In almost all fields the economy was slackening. Because of social change and partly because of growing population the domestic demand grew rapidly but the government could not cope with the growing demands.¹¹

Thirdly, the years after 1953 also saw further growth in the influence of forces which could either initiate an abandonment of constitutional democracy or provoke others to do the same in order to forestall them. Thus, the army grew more independent of civilian leadership in those years and more determined to play an open active political role itself. One important factor contributing to this determination was the rising power of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The signs that the officers were growing important with the existing order stimulated President Sukarno to prepare himself to participate in effecting a change.¹²

At this stage of political and economic crises Sukarno had to resort to some kind of action in order to bring the situation under control. This was the reason why

11 Faith, Herbert, n. 1, pp. 557-70.

12 Ibid., p. 577.

Sukarno propounded his idea of "Guided Democracy", to consolidate his own position of supremacy and promiscuously suppressing the forces opposing this notion. It is also true that he had to act as a balancer to maintain the equilibrium of power between the forces trying to overcome each other. As the army slowly started picking up the momentum of strengthening its own position, Sukarno had to go for some alternate power to combat and curb it if necessary. So, the only option left out was to chose the PKI which had considerable mass following.

The idea of guided democracy was quite justified by the various pronouncements and observations both by the officialdom and Sukarno as well. "Excesses mounted until the democratic principle was caricatured in an ultra-party system, an economic sphere in which the rich grew richer and the poor grew poorer, and a situation in which continuation of the National Revolution was being opposed by reaction from both within and without the country. It was in an effort to correct this situation that President Sukarno advanced a series of ideas from the latter half of 1956."¹³

The principles of guided democracy were rapidly and vigorously applied in 1959 and 1960. It was proposed that the

¹³ Basic Documents about the Idea of Guided Democracy,
(Jakarta: Department of Information, 1960), p. 18.

provisional constitution of 1950 should be replaced by the revolutionary constitution of 1945. The 1945 Constitution provided for a strong presidency as the principal focus of governmental power. This idea of guided democracy met with an opposition from two political parties of Indonesia, Nasjumi and the PSI. The parties failed to comply with the order to sign the declaration of full ideological support to the government. Their defiance led to their liquidation in August 1960. This was the beginning of Sukarno's anti-Western policy.¹⁴

¹⁴ Flouvier, Jan H., A Study in Indonesian Politics: a Confrontation (London, 1965), pp. 54-56.

CHAPTER II

INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND ANTI-COLONIALISM : THE STRUGGLE FOR BEST IDEAL

With the initiation of Guided Democracy, Sukarno made his attack vociferous against colonialism and imperialism, which constituted the focal point of Indonesia's national and international policies. Though Indonesian elite group and army showed signs of resentment over the policies of Sukarno, he was able to muster enough support to pursue his newly invented policy, that is, the guided democracy. It is evident by the various pronouncements, observations, remarks of Sukarno that he identified himself with socialistic thinking in attacking colonialism and imperialism which were responsible for economic stagnation and backwardness.

The early sixties was obsessed with the power politics of the developed nations and it was at its peak trying to bring as many countries as possible under their sway. This period also marked two Super Powers fighting each other, though they were not involved physically, one for communism and the other for containment of communism. It was true that there was a kind of struggle among the leading personalities of the Third World also to identify themselves as leaders and their policies as guiding factors for the developing countries. There was definitely a crisis of identity amongst the leaders

of the Third World like Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nasser of Egypt etc. And, among these, Sukarno took a radical attitude of criticizing the Western countries for their corruptive policies of colonialism and imperialism, whereas Nehru was less radical. Despite Nehru's staunch opposition to colonialism he pleaded for mutual friendship and close relations with all the countries, but at the same time maintaining unity among the Third World nations in general and the newly liberated states in particular.

Sukarno, with the growing influence of the army, was rather compelled to take certain steps to consolidate his own position and to ensure his future. Because of the importance, the army got after successfully suppressing the PRRI rebellion against the central government in Djakarta and its considerable interference in the civilian affairs, Sukarno badly sought some other force which could combat army and help secure his supremacy. The choice was the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) which was ready to support the policies of Sukarno. But it is true that necessarily a leader has to frame the internal as well as the external policies in accordance with the demands and sentiments of the people to get along.

Whatever may be the reason for his new approach, we find Sukarno as the supreme authority of Indonesia during the guided democracy period and as such had a free hand to mould the foreign policy of Indonesia. We also see the formulation

of the foreign policy on the basis of an ideology. The remarkable feature of the new doctrine was that Sukarno tried to manifest the national problem to the structural changes that were reshaping in the then prevalent international system.

Sukarno advanced a new theory in the place of big power conflict what was to be known as the Confrontation between the "New Emerging Forces" (NEFOs) and the "Old Established Order Forces" (OLEFOs). The significance of this contest was that in place of imperialism communism dichotomy, he advanced a new bipolar line of demarcation centred on problems of colonialism and imperialism. The principles upon which President Sukarno sought to base Indonesian strength were in his own sense 'radical'.¹ To sum up, it was the principle of a struggle between the newly emerging forces and the old established forces. Essentially it was a conflict theory of international relations which would be a determining phenomenon of the world society, a conflict between the 'New' and 'Old'. "The New Emerging Forces, according to Sukarno, are the nations of Afro-Asia, the socialist countries, more recently Latin America and the progressive elements of the capitalist countries".² This differentiation of the countries between the new emerging

1 G. Modolahi, The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy (Cornell, 1963), p. ii.

2 Ibid., p. iii.

forces and the old established order is very important with which we can foresee the pattern of shaping of foreign policy by Sukarno in the course of time.

Though the traces of Sukarno's attack on colonialism and imperialism go back to 1958,³ it was more vociferous only during the guided democracy period when he started a militant campaign for West Irian. These trends were apparent in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960, although at that time he did not clearly distinguish himself from the "Third Force" advocates of non-alignment. He spoke as a representative of the Third World thereby accepting the idea of a tripartite world division, but at the same time he insisted that colonialism and imperialism, not co-existence and disarmament, were the main problems in international relations.⁴ With the proclamation of his new doctrine, the guided democracy, Sukarno gave a new turn to Indonesian foreign affairs. His contention was that neo-colonialism and imperialism were the main hindrances for the economic prosperity of the Third World countries. This was the reason why Sukarno started his

3 See Sukarno's Address on Independence Day, 17 August 1958 (Jakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1959).

4 Sukarno, Address to the General Assembly, United Nations, 30 September 1960 (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1960).

bitter attack on Western countries branding them as breeders of colonialism and imperialism. "There are tensions and sources of potential conflict in many places if you look closer you will find that almost without exception, imperialism and colonialism is one of their manifestations....Conflict of colonialism and imperialism and forcible divisions of nations is at the root of almost all international problems and threatening evil in this world. Until these evils of a hated past are ended there can be no rest or peace in this world. Imperialism - and the struggle to maintain it - is the greatest evil of our world. The brothers of Asia and Africa know the scourges of imperialism. They have suffered it and know its dangers."⁵

We can see this kind of bitter remarks against colonialism and imperialism in the subsequent speeches of Sukarno at various international forums. He went to the extent of denouncing their peaceful co-existence as not feasible because of the intricacies of colonialism and imperialism. Here, he identified himself with the communists saying that "these old forces play on the fears of their own people, play on their own ignorance of the stark realities of colonialism, play on their suspicion. These Africans, these Asians, these Latin Americans are a bunch of

5 Ibid.

"communists", they say of non-aligned countries of the world.⁶ Thus he criticized colonialism and imperialism as the enemies of peaceful coexistence.


The Struggle for West Irian

The Round Table Conference in the Hague, in December 1949, may be said to mark the formal beginning of the West Irian dispute. At the conclusion of the Round Table Conference though Indonesia officially received its independence from the Dutch, it was maintained with a stipulation that West Irian question would be settled through negotiations. Article II of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty agreed to at this conference excluded the West New Guinea from Indonesia. It, however, provided that its political status "shall be decided by negotiations within a year. Dutch and Indonesia in the meanwhile agreed that the status quo of the territory could be maintained".⁷ The sovereignty charter did not explicitly use the term sovereignty in describing continued control by the Dutch of the area.⁸ The two countries had

6 Sukarno, "Address to Belgrade Summit of Non-alignment and Anti-Colonialism", 1 September 1961, as quoted in Nodelski, George, in The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy (Canberra: Australian National University, 1965), p. 26.

7 Justus Van der Kroef, "The West New Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications", Crisis, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 1963, p. 121.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 121.



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their own views: Indonesia thought that West Irian would simply become a part of Indonesia and only transfer of power should have to be negotiated, whereas the Dutch interpreted it to mean that negotiations would settle whether West Irian would become a part of Indonesia or some other arrangements would be made for it.⁹ "As a matter of fact, the Netherlands had no intention to withdraw from West Irian. It tried to retain its control over the area as long as possible and thus contributing to the growth of Communism and intense anti-Western feeling in Indonesia".¹⁰

Sukarno tried to insert the West Irian problem into the general framework of his concept of struggle against the OLDEFOs. With the advent of guided democracy liberation of West Irian became a matter of great moment to Sukarno. Secondly, with his assumption of a direct role in the government it became something of a test of his leadership capacity. He might also have anticipated a more prominent role both for his country and for himself, for he felt that Indonesia being the fifth largest nation it should have due place in the international political affairs. Rex Martinor cites many a reason for Sukarno's new posture. "There were a number of reasons for this: Sukarno's desire to demonstrate

9 P. Bhattacharjee, Southeast Asian Politics: Malaysia and Indonesia (Calcutta, 1975), pp. 194-95.

10 Ibid., p. 151.

the historic importance of national revolution he had led; his belief that Indonesia could win the respect and prestige to which it was entitled only by bringing its distinctive new point to bear upon world affairs; the personal satisfaction it gave him to cut a figure on the international stage; his realisation that this area of politics peculiarly suited his style and talents; lead to concentrate on enemy targets and goals external to the state in order to divert the attention from internal failings."¹¹

Circumstances also helped Sukarno to steer toward a radical anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance in the world politics. He got the most readily available support from the socialist countries. Soviet Union fully supported the Indonesian cause of West Irian both inside the United Nations and outside it. When Khrushchev visited Indonesia in 1960, he assured Sukarno that Russia would render all kinds of help to fight against colonialism and imperialism. Sukarno was also able to get the support of the most militant Afro-Asian states. During the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries in April 1955, Indonesia got its resolution passed for her claim over West Irian. The Western countries were naturally cool to the Indonesian claims partly because of Sukarno's direct attack on the Western states. Sukarno

¹¹ Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno Ideology and Politics, 1949-1962 (Ithaca, 1974), p. 177.

said that because of imperialism and its armed forces in West Irian the situation was dangerous and explosive. He blamed the Netherlands for its adamant attitude and thus making Indonesia to stiffen its attitude. "West Irian is a colonial sword poised over Indonesia. It points at our hearts, but also threatens world peace".¹²

Here mention may be made regarding the role of the PKI during the West Irian crisis. Both Sukarno and the PKI shared the view that the struggle against colonialism and imperialism constituted the central objective of Indonesian policies in the nationalist crusade. Sukarno's formulation of this objective, in terms of massive confrontation between the New Emerging Forces and the old Established Forces in the world became the official doctrine encompassing the nationalist tendency. PKI was content to rally behind this concept during the West Irian phase. "The West Irian issue played its part too in preparing and consolidating the alliance between the PKI and the radical nationalist elite. From this time onward throughout the constitutional democracy period, the PKI acted as a staunch supporter of Sukarno in all his major initiatives regarding West Irian and other foreign policy issues."¹³

As Hotzenacker's rightly points out, one must always bear in mind the essential feature of Indonesian nationalism

12 Sukarno, n. 6, p. 36.

13 Hotzenacker, n. 11, pp. 175-7.

and its innate intricacies and its development as a coherent bond to unite the people of Indonesia. "The first important factor that must be considered when one attempts to understand the importance of West Irian in the Indonesian politics is the character of Indonesian nationalism. The whole struggle of the nationalist movement before the Second World War was based on the concept of unity and indivisibility of Indonesia....Both during the colonial period and at the time of negotiations on the transfer of sovereignty, the Dutch constantly emphasized the separatist tendencies among Indonesian people, and failed to appreciate the basic character of unity of the Indonesian nationalism".¹⁴ And the second important point here is that the struggle for West Irian does not represent a consciously chosen policy employed by the Indonesian government to arouse the passions of masses artificially in order to divert the attention from domestic problems.¹⁵ "The inordinate amount of attention accorded to the West Irian problem in Indonesian politics arises instead from spontaneous popular sentiments and political dynamics of a transitional society. On the whole, the leaders have highly ambivalent feelings on the issue."¹⁶

14 L. Hetschackers, "The Western New Guinea Problem", Pacific Affairs, June 1951, p. 136.

15 Leijphart, Arned, "The Indonesian Image of West Irian", Asian Survey, July 1961, vol. 1, no. 3.

16 Ibid.

✓ It is undoubtedly true that there had been complete popular unanimity on the basic demand that West New Guinea be returned to Indonesia. It connotes the strength of Indonesian nationalism in the identification of nationalistic sentiments. Secondly, Indonesians had their own doubts about the danger of a possible reversal of success achieved by the revolution if the Dutch continued to stay in West Irian. Thirdly, West Irian was strategically important to Indonesia, though it was considered to be backward with little or no output helpful to Indonesia. Moreover West Irian was still under the control of the Dutch with its troops present there.

Indonesia's haste in offering a decision on West Irian appears to be due to four main reasons. First, if the Dutch plan of creating an independent West Irian state succeeds, world public opinion and the Afro-Asian nations would definitely not approve an attack on an independent country. Secondly, though all the Indonesians were convinced of the justice of their claims, the moderates had felt that there were more urgent tasks than chasing sovereignty over it.¹⁷ Thirdly, there was a possibility, according to the Dutch and Australian calculations, that if the people of West Irian were free as a self-governing state, that they would likely join the Papuans on the eastern side (East

17 R. Leslie Palmer, Indonesia and the Dutch (London, 1962), p. 131.

18 Ibid., pp. 130-32.

Irian) which was under the suzerainty of Australia. Fourthly, the Australians opposed outrightly the claim of Indonesia for West Irian, for it was dangerous to the security of Australia. Their contention was that Indonesian control over West New Guinea might lead to the usurpation of East New Guinea which was vital to the defence of Australia. Even in the United Nations Australia supported the Netherlands.¹⁹ It may be argued that if West Irian is vital to the defence of Australia, it is much more important to a relatively underdeveloped and weaker countries like Indonesia.

During the period 1950-1953 the attempts made to resolve the West Irian issue ended with no success. After Ali Sastroamidjojo came to power in 1953 as Prime Minister, he tried to get popular backing for West Irian claim and even the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung in April 1955 had supported the position of Indonesia in the West Irian case. On the formation of the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (March 1956- March 1957), Indonesia withdrew from the Dutch-Indonesia Union unilaterally. A resolution supporting Indonesia in the United Nations in November 1957 failed to get the requisite two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. The failure in the United Nations was followed by seizure of the Dutch properties and eviction of Dutch nationals from Indonesia. The Dutch Government began to reinforce its

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 124-5.

military strength in West Irian.

Since 1958 the Dutch gradually started losing its support for what they considered to be their right to rule over West Irian. Indonesia secured the sympathies of the Afro-Asian and socialist countries. The Western countries did not openly desert the Netherlands but this issue definitely annoyed them a lot. America in particular was annoyed at the growing influence of the PKI in Indonesian politics and the close relations of Indonesia with the Communist countries. Fearful of being manoeuvred into one position overtly, America assumed the position of non-committal attitude.²⁰ In the Netherlands itself doubts were raised about the wisdom of the Netherlands policy which had led to the liquidation of all its business interests in Indonesia.²¹

On 17 August 1960 Indonesia severed its diplomatic relations with the Dutch. This issue began to pass from the realm of agitation to that of hostile action in late 1960 when small parties of Indonesian infiltrators landed in West Irian. Although it had little military effect, it marked a new stage in the conflict. Meanwhile, in 1960 the Dutch had been strengthening their military position in West Irian and

20 Jan M. Pluvier, A Study of Indonesian Politics I Confrontations (London, 1965), p. 60.

21 Ibid., p. 60.

hastening moves towards Papuan self-government which was nothing but escalation of the gravity of the situation. General Nasution went to America in October 1960 and America was reluctant to enter into an arms deal with Indonesia. Thereupon in December 1960 he went to Moscow and successfully concluded a loan agreement for the purchase of arms.²² This showed that the army leaders were definitely preferring United States for an arms deal to the Soviet Union. As a result of arms deal a huge quantity of arms started flowing into Indonesia. This deal provided for training of Indonesians in the Soviet Union. The Russian presence in Indonesia created a situation favourable for the PKI.²³ This implied a Soviet challenge to the United States. America started to have second thoughts over its policies toward Indonesia. So, gradually it started relinquishing its prior position of neutrality towards Indonesian claims. Hence, we find a drift in America's policy toward the end of 1961.²⁴

In the Belgrade Conference on non-aligned countries in 1961, Sukarno had made clear that his position had changed decisively from that of neutralists,²⁵ which in fact reflected

22 Guy J. Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow", Asian Survey, vol. 1, no. 1, March 1961.

23 Ibid.

24 Guy J. Pauker, "The Soviet Challenges in Indonesia", Foreign Affairs, vol. 40, no. 4, July 1962, pp. 620-26.

25 See Sukarno's Address to the Belgrade Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, 1 September 1961, Department of Information (Djakarta, 1961).

in intervening year when Indonesia moved a few steps closer to the use of force against the Dutch in West Irian. And it had entered into closer military and political relations with the Soviet Union. Sukarno continuing his attack on the Western countries made it clear that colonialism-imperialism, and not cold war issues - was the crux of international politics. But on this occasion he made an explicit attack on neutralism.

A change had taken place at the White House, with John F. Kennedy assuming the Presidency in January 1961. The new President showed more concern about the importance of Indonesia in the American policy calculations. The President regarded Indonesia as one of the potentially significant nations of Asia and was anxious to slow up its drift towards Communist bloc, for he knew that Sukarno was already turning to Moscow to get military equipment necessary for invasion.²⁶

For the Dutch the West Irian issue had simply become a prestige issue though it was considered to be a backward area full of swamps and impenetrable high lands, and the tribal people with little knowledge of modern civilization. Despite the seriousness of the situation the Dutch Foreign Minister, R. Luns, was not to be convinced so easily.

26 Arthur M. Jr. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days in John F. Kennedy in the White House (Darton, 1965), p. 464.

Represented a proposal to the United Nations in 1961 to replace the Dutch rule with some kind of international trusteeship. The resolution of the Western countries which was sympathetic to the Netherlands was not approved. The Indonesian resolution was not accepted either. After the seizure of the Dutch enterprises, the elimination of the Dutch nationals from Indonesia the severing of diplomatic and other relations with Netherlands and forcing of Japan to cancel the visit of a Dutch warship to Tokyo, there was not much left to be done short of embarking upon military action.

In the following days the situation became explosive. In December 1961 Sukarno issued the Triple Command (TRIKORA) to prevent the formation of state of Papua, to hoist the Red and White flag of Indonesia in West Irian and finally to remain prepared for general mobilization. In the Independence Day Address of 1962 Sukarno said that "Irian Barat" (West Irian) would be liberated from the Dutch colonial rule before the cock's crow on 1 January 1963.²⁷ Early in 1962 detachments of Indonesian troops landed in New Guinea. It was not clear whether this resort to open armed hostility was meant to put pressure on the Dutch or on United States. Realizing that Indonesia

²⁷ Sukarno, "Address on the Independence Day of the Republic of Indonesia", 17 August 1962, Department of Information (Djakarta, 1962).

constituted major factor in world policies compared to Holland, the United States started to mediate in the dispute as also at the same time pressing the Dutch, who were still trying to play for time, into accepting terms.²⁸ The outbreak of war was prevented by the timely intervention of President Kennedy. In February 1962 Robert Kennedy, United States Attorney General, came to Djakarta and had long discussions with Sukarno and others. He then went to the Hague and advised them to solve the West Irian problem peacefully. President Kennedy asked the Dutch to prepare for peaceful negotiations. The Dutch Government was rather forced to start negotiations in Washington on the basis of a proposal drawn by Ellsworth Bunker who as a representative of the United Nations Secretary General presided over the meeting. The talks ultimately led to the signing of an agreement on 19 August 1962,²⁹ and the twelve-year dispute came to an end. Though Soviet Union was opposed to the United States intervention, Sukarno did not succumb to the pressure. This was Sukarno's strategy - to bring about the defeat of the enemy through negotiations under the threat of an imminent military invasion.³⁰

28 Fluvier, n. 18.

29 Bruce Grant, ed., Indonesia (Melbourn, 1966), p. 172.

30 Brackman C. Arnold, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York, 1963), p. 293.

CHAPTER III

CONFRONTATION WITH MALAYSIA

Confrontation (or konfrontasi as widely known in Indonesian terminology) with Malaysia during the period of 1962-1965 is indeed a milestone in the recent history of Indonesia with wide ranging and far-reaching implications, both political and social. The international political activities had certainly had their impact on the developments in the South East Asian nations. It was a period of bitter ideological conflicts and power politics. At this juncture the birth or formation of a new country would certainly have its repercussions. And it ended in konfrontasi between these two countries. Probably both Indonesia and Malaysia were the victims in the game of international politics; and, hence, we cannot simply single out the issue of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia from the arena of world politics. That is why one should always bear in mind the practical purposes for which Malaysia was created; and the motivations of Indonesian reaction to it.

Before probing into various causal factors of confrontation inevitably the historical background and the cultural and ethnic affinities between these two countries be taken into consideration. Historically speaking, there

are many unifying factors of religion, language and geography. The Western part of the Indonesian archipelago and the Malaysian peninsula have for at least 1500 years been an important cultural and economic communications centre for Eastern Asia. The affinity is also based on the ethnic groups in the area, the Malays, the Atjenesse, Javanese, Suidanese, Minangkabao and Bukinese belong to the so-called Poutero-Malay racial group and have psychological and cultural traits in common. Religion is also a unifying factor. Malaysia and Indonesia are the only Islamic countries in the Southeast and East Asia. In addition there is the typical Southeast Asian pattern of present wet rice cultivation which provides a common cultural humus on which the regional "civilization" form a "brilliant" "variegated offering".¹

Secondly, the colonial rule in these two countries. The most important divergencies in the histories and cultures of the Nephilindo (Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia) countries are certainly to be attributed to the divergent type of colonial rule to which they were subjected. And the most serious difference between contemporary Malaya and Indonesia stem from the haphazard predatoriness of Dutch and British imperialism. In the development of Indonesia and

¹ For details see, D.G.E. Hall, History of Southeast Asia (London, 1967).

Malaya during the colonial period two kinds of important distinctions must be made: (a) a general contrast between Dutch and British colonialism, and (b) a narrower comparison between different types of Dutch rule.² After the end of Japanese rule in 1945 while Indonesia started its struggle for independence against the Dutch, Malaya continued as a protectorate state of Britain. After a protracted struggle Indonesia got its independence on 27 December 1949, while Malaya's independence was granted on 31 August 1957. The basic difference between the struggles of independence between these two countries was that Indonesia pursued a militant struggle against the Dutch, while the latter never pursued a militant path.

Before exploring the actual implications of the confrontation it would be useful to have a retrospective glimpse of the happenings in that region to understand the things better. Simultaneously with the initiation of guided democracy in 1959, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism became the basic determinants of the Indonesia's foreign policy. With this background Indonesia launched the struggle for West Irian. By August 1962 internal security was largely restored and the Dutch had agreed to relinquish West Irian. Probably, this was the reason why Indonesia

² Robert Curtis, "Malaysia and Indonesia", New Left Review no. 26, November-December 1964, pp. 8-9.

remained indifferent initially when Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman of Malaya for the first time proposed the formation of a new Federation of Malaysia in May 1961; for Indonesia was already preoccupied with West Irian affair and did not want to antagonise any outside power, particularly its neighbours.

Initial Relations with Malaysia

By the end of 1962 Indonesia maintained cordial relations with Malaya, when Malaya became independent (31 August 1957). Subandrio, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, attended the 'Merdeka' (independence) festivities and expressed the hope that the two countries would maintain close relations because of their ethnic, cultural and religious attachments.³ In November 1958 a delegation of eight members led by the Deputy Premier of Malaya - Tengku Abdul Razak, went on a goodwill mission to Indonesia. This was followed by a visit of Indonesian First Minister, Djusendo, to Kuala Lumpur in April 1959, when the two countries signed a "Treaty of Friendship".⁴

During the West Irian struggle though Indonesia preoccupied the support of Malaya, Malaya did not share the anti-colonial feelings of Indonesia. Malayan delegation

3 Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue", Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 3, March 1965, pp. 139-40.

4 Richard Allen, Malaysia: A Prospect and Retrospect (Kuala Lumpur, 1968), p. 132.

even abstained from voting when the West Irian issue was raised in the United Nations.⁵ Also the attitude of Malaya during the rebellion of outer islands in 1958-1962 (FRRI) was revealing to Indonesia. The rebel leaders found refuge in Malaya; and Indonesia's request for the extradition was turned down by Malaya. Secondly, during the rebellion Malaya continued her trade with regions under rebel control.⁶ In spite of these small differences the two countries maintained fairly good relations. Though the relations between these countries were not friendly, there was no symptom of positive hostility. But the situation changed after the West Irian issue was resolved and when Malaysia plan was pushed forward vigorously. Sukarno had some reasons to consider the proposed scheme of Malaysia as a neo-colonial project. These were Malay's foreign policy, the Defence Agreement and the cordial relations with its former colonial power, the achievement of independence without struggle etc.

As far as Indonesia's attitude toward the formation of Malaysia was concerned, in the initial stages Indonesia was indifferent to the proposal of Malaysia Federation and it seemed it was inclined to support it. It is evident from the remarks of Indonesian leaders at

5 Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy (Sydney, 1968), pp. 53-54.

6 Ibid., pp. 54-55.

various points of time. In a statement before the 16th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 November 1961. Subandrio, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, said: "It should be noted that Indonesians are very closely related to the people of Malaya and Philippines. However, from the Indonesian side, I assure you that there have never been any territorial claims whatsoever towards Malaya nor Philippines."⁷ In reply to a question by the United States Ambassador H.F. Jones, the First Minister of Indonesia, Djuanda said: "Of course, we would rather have an independent nation on our northern border instead of a colony."⁸ Subandrio also declared before the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 that Indonesia did not have any ill-feeling toward the formation of Malaysia. "Although North Borneo was ethnologically and geographically closer to Indonesia than to Malaya, we still hold Malaya that we have no objections for such a merger based upon the will for freedom of the people's concerned."⁹

But Indonesia soon changed its attitude toward Malaysia especially after the restoration of West Irian. On 17 September 1962 Subandrio told the press in Singapore

7 Agung Ido Anak Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy - 1945-1962 (The Hague, 1973), p. 456.

8 Howard Jalfrees Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York, 1971), p. 266.

9 Peter Boyce, n. 5, Chapter V, Document 9, p. 67.

that since Malaysia and Indonesia have a common frontier, he had to take stock of the situation, and in fact, the formation of Malaysia was a matter of great concern for his country. The establishment of an American base on the Malaysian territory of North Borneo would, he said, certainly force Indonesia to arrange for a Soviet base in our part of Borneo.¹⁰

Cause of Confrontation

There are many a reason which prompted the creation of Malaysia Federation and many more reasons for Indonesia's opposition to it. As already stated, because of Indonesia's preoccupation with West Irian issue its initial reaction was neither positive nor negative toward Malaysia. But when the West Irian issue came to an end Indonesia confidently started opposing the proposal of Malaysia. Before analysing the objective conditions of confrontation necessarily one should try to find the subjective motivations behind this confrontation. Secondly, it is also necessary to bear in mind the then prevailing international situation.

(1) Primarily, it was a British idea about the formation of Malaysia. It was a time when Communist activities in South East Asian countries were at their acme. While on the one side Vietnam war was going on, the PKI grew

¹⁰ P. Datta-Charjee, Southeast Asian Politics & Malaysia and Indonesia (Calcutta, 1975), p. 156.

rapidly, and was in a position to influence the policies of the Government. The PKI had close links with the Malayan Communist Party which was too spreading rapidly. So, it was high time for Britain to make some kind of arrangements to reduce or to suppress the influence of Communists. Hence we see PKI immediately reacted to the Malaysia proposal. The PKI understood from the beginning that Malaysia would become a bulwark against communism and as early as December 1961, it adopted a resolution denouncing Malaysia directly.¹¹

(2) Foreign Policy Ideology:

With the onset of guided democracy, Sukarno had already given a definite shape to the foreign policy of Indonesia, a militant anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist policy based on the contradictions of New Emerging Forces and Old Established Order. Therefore the confrontation of Indonesia with Malaysia can be considered a milestone in Indonesian political development. It had far reaching consequences for the political situation within Indonesia, and at the same time it gave a concrete form to Indonesia's foreign policy. Even after the acquisition of West Irian Sukarno confirmed and continued his foreign policy of militant anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.¹² When Malaysia was actually inaugurated on 16 September 1963,

11 Boyce, n. 5, Chapter V, Document 6, pp. 63-69.

12 Agung, n. 7, pp. 445-6.

Sukarno declared his "Banjeng" (crush) Malaysia policy. Indonesian explanation for this policy was that Malaysia scheme was at first formulated against the background of the decolonisation of the British empire in South East Asia. Indonesia initially supported because it thought it would solve the problem of Chinese. But, "gradually it was found that this scheme was going to be imposed on the people against their will instead of representing the anti-colonial urge which eventually resulted in the Brunei revolt".¹³ At the time of PRRI rebellion, the United States extended its tacit support and the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, made some statements in favour of the rebels, and called the Seventh Fleet in the straits of Malacca. And if this armada movement was coincidental with the Malaysia crisis, then still it was incontrovertible that the United States and Britain had persuaded other Western states to halt all but minimal flow of aid to Indonesia in an effort to force Indonesia to alter its position on Malaysia.¹⁴

(3) The question of Indonesian security was also very important. Indonesia had long been pursuing an anti-

13 Extract from "A Survey of the Controversial Problem of Establishment of Federation of Malaysia", issued by the Indonesian Embassy in London, February 1964, in Gullick, Malaysia and its Neighbours (London, 1967), p. 107.

14 Donald Hindulus, "Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia: The Search for Motives", Asian Survey, vol. 4, no. 6, June 1964.

West policy. This was more vociferous during West Irian crisis. Indonesians did not fear Malaysia's power as such, but were, however, apprehensive of the continuation of the British presence there. They were particularly disturbed by the defence arrangements, whereby Britain retained authority over the Singapore base and could use it not only for the defence of Malaysia but also for the defence of the whole Southeast Asia. This was considered by Indonesia as a threat to her security.¹⁵ This distrust started during the F.M.I. rebellion when Tengku Abdul Rahman Government gave covert moral and material support to the rebels in Sumatra and seriously considered the idea that this island might join a Greater Malaya.¹⁶ Robert Curtis points out that the Indonesia-Malaysia crisis had deep roots in a long complex relationship between these two countries, and it was not simply a capricious aggression of Indonesia but this antagonism had a solid historical, political and economic foundations. Secondly, the Indonesian attitude toward Malaysia was not purely a personal whim of Sukarno's, but it reflected the pressures from almost every section, whether right or left, of the political spectrum in Djakarta. Britain had its own plans of military pressure on Indonesia. This stood as a lesson and as a warning to Britain, because Indonesia would become certainly anti-West, still vigorously.¹⁷

more

15 A. Ling, n. 7, pp. 450-60.

16 G. H. F. Kahan, "Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, vol. 37, no. 3, Fall 1964, pp. 293-6.

17 Curtis, n. 2, pp. 20-23.

(4) As far as the army was concerned, the response was not as prompt as the PNI's to the proposal of Malaysia. But army also opposed for various reasons. Primarily it was afraid of the spread of communism. Though army's prestige was highlighted with the West-Irian issue, it now faced a serious political and psychological crisis. Sukarno's revocation of martial law hampered the significance and legal basis for the army's predominance. Though to some extent the army could play a conspicuous role, the restoration of West Irian without any armed belligerency offered the army no active role to play, and allowed the detested parties to reassert their claims to political predominance. The army feared that the balance of power could be disturbed with this step, and hence, had no other way but to support the confrontation policy very readily.¹⁹ Secondly, the question of Chinese residing outside China. "On the first place the basic reason for the establishment of Malaysia - and an important reason for Indonesia's and Philippines' opposition to it - is fear of political potential what is by far the world's largest concentration of overseas Chinese who outnumber even the Malays themselves. The approach taken to this problem both by London and Kuala Lumpur has been based on the assumption that a substantial majority of the Chinese can be induced to develop a principal loyalty to Malaysia rather

¹⁹ Curtis, n. 2, pp. 21-23.

to China."¹⁹ Indonesian army on the other hand doubted such kind of possibility of assimilation. Indonesian military officials, including General Nasution, have frequently indicated in private conversations with Westerners that they fear Malaysia for another reason, namely, that Malaysia will not be able to contain its Chinese population and will fall ultimately into the hands of China which in turn might help MFI to capture power in Indonesia.²⁰ The same view was expressed by Hatta and others.²¹

The army had two reasons to support the confrontation policy. Firstly, to check the infiltration of Communist influence in Malaya, Singapore etc. because of Chinese population in these regions and secondly, the army's calculation that militant posture of confrontation permits it to play a major national role and could justify it in restricting the budget cuts Suharno had been contemplating (about two thirds cut) to focus on economic development.²² Curiously the situation was such that the three principal forces of Indonesia opposed the formation of Malaysia for three different reasons. Suharno's opposition flowed from conviction that in the framework of his newly invented ideology of conflict between the MLFOs and OLDEFOS,

19 Kohin, n. 16, p. 254.

20 Hindulus, n. 16.

21 See Mohammed Hatta, n. 3, and Agung, n. 7, p. 467.

22 Kohin, n. 16, pp. 250-61.

Malaysia was but a manifestation of neo-colonialism. PKI leaders viewed Malaysian politics "as the expression of class struggle in which the feudal Malay and the elite Chinese leaders will proserve, and to advance their interests by pro-capitalist, pro-Western and therefore anti-Communist politics."²³ Finally, the army viewed the Malaysian politics from an ethnic point of view, presupposing that Chinese might over-power the indigenous population and ultimately extend their allegiance to Peking.²⁴

(6) Some writers hold the view that the main reason for confrontation was that Indonesia had territorial ambitions, and expansionist motivations in order to realize the old concept of "Greater Indonesia".²⁵ In that case Malaysia with its pro-West policies would definitely become a grave threat to Indonesia. After the restoration of West Irian, Indonesia directed its attention to resist the formation of Malaysia. Certainly, a country's national power is determined by various factors but more important are territory, population, national resources, strategic location etc. Malaysia was created with the object of promoting the interests of pro-Western countries. If Malaysia were divided Indonesia would get every chance to influence at least some islands. But there was no single clear evidence

²³ Hindulus, n. 14.

²⁴ Kahin, n. 16, pp. 258-61.

²⁵ Ibid., and Hindulus, n. 14.

to corroborate this view point. "There is, however, no clear evidence to suggest that Indonesian foreign policy was actually shaped by the expansionist urge of Indonesian nationalism. In view of this, the assumption that the confrontation was a result of the Indonesian attempt to realize the dream of Greater Indonesia appears to be far fetched. The confrontation must be explained against the general anti-colonial trend of Indonesian foreign policy. Whatever might be its objective and significance, Indonesia's charge of neo-colonialism against Malaysia had some basis and Indonesia was committed to anti-colonial policy."²⁶ Though Hatta was a staunch anti-*ukarnito*, he also emphasized the view that Indonesia had no territorial claims whatsoever beyond the area of Netherlands Indies.²⁷

(7) It was also thought that *ukarno* started his 'konfrontasi' in order to divert the attention of the people from the internal failures and problems. Indonesia had very serious economic problems during and after the West Irian affairs. Because of its anti-Western policy it used to get very minimal aid from the West. Hence *Suharno* proposed a two-third cut from the military budget. Even if *Suharno* wanted he could not have diverted the attention of the people for ever under the pretext of confrontations. Secondly, the

26 Bhattacharjee, n. 19, p. 167.

27 Hatta, n. 3, pp. 139-40.

internal law and order situation was overwhelmingly restored by the end of post-war crisis than ever since 1949. So, it was not the basic reason to start a confrontation policy, but it was the spirit of nationalism based on a specific ideology.

(8) One more reason, probably very important, for the policy of confrontation on the part of Indonesia was that it never had been consulted fully and seriously regarding the formation of Malaysia, which shared a common border with it and Indonesia being the biggest power in South East Asia. The initiator of the Malaysian scheme, Tunju Abdul Rahman, ruled out the possibility of a broad-based Malaysia comprising Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and other islands for practical reasons immediately after the Malay independence in 1957.²⁹ But he later on propounded the idea after being inspired by the British. Though this idea was informed to Indonesia, it was not fully consulted and well informed. Suharno in particular and Indonesians in general developed a deep-rooted belief that because of their country's rice and armed power Indonesia should have been given due weightage. Secondly, the Indonesian leadership had a belief that Malaysia itself was a 'semi-independent feudalistic anachronism' unrepresentative of the Malay people. They tended to assume that if an ex-colonial country had won its freedom without

²⁹ Agung, n. 7, p. 447.

recourse to revolution, its independence must be spurious. They saw Malay ruling elite as feudalistic, maintained in power by the British as instruments of indirect rule, and still propped up by a largely British officered army and police.²⁹

(9) Finally, to understand the Indonesian perspective more fully one must recognize the following key elements in it. "(1) a strong feeling that the present boundaries of Indonesia are colonially determined and that the 'Malaysia deal' reinforces this. (2) The historical memory and legend of a Java-based 'Greater Malay Empire' in Southeast Asia. (3) An image of the Malaysian government as a cynical alliance of feudal aristocracy and Chinese bourgeoisie. (4) A natural desire for revenge on Malaysian Government when it regards as having, on at least two occasions, actively conspired against Indonesia's interests. (5) A belief held especially in army circles, that only Indonesian control over North Borneo and Malaya will keep Chinese power in Southeast Asia to a minimum. (6) The determination to remove Western Power and influence, especially in its neo-colonialist form, from Southeast Asia. (7) A definite fear of encirclement."³⁰

29 Kahin, n. 16, p. 261. See also Curtis, n. 2, and Hinduluc, n. 14.

30 Curtis, n. 2, pp. 23-24.

Formation of Malaysia

As far as the formation of Malaysia was concerned, it is important to understand how the attitudes of the parties to Malaysia dispute developed. The Federation of Malaysia was the logical result of a consistent, gradually evolved policy of Britain. When in May 1961 Tengku Abdul Rahman first proposed such a federation, most of the prominent leaders of the two Borneo territories, as well as the top British civil servants stationed there, were opposed to merger. But they had little choice when Britain insisted on carrying out the plan.³¹

It is significant that though the British members of Cobbold Commission³² argued for a transitional period of 3 to 7 years, the two Malaysians on the Commission insisted the formation of federation within twelve months to avoid the external intrusion and escalation of friction. For British merging of Singapore and Malaya became a pressing need, than anything else. Probably Britain feared that because of Chinese predominance and active communist activities in Singapore it appeared it might at any time go communist, which in turn would be detrimental even to Malaya and other islands. Until mid-1961 Tengku Abdul Rahman was unwilling to the merger of Singapore to risk upsetting the delicate

31 Rahin, n. 16, pp. 256-8.

32 The Cobbold consisted of 4 members, two from British side and two from Malayan side.

ethnic political balance within Malaya by adding to it predominantly Chinese population of Singapore (44 per cent Chinese against 42 per cent Malays). But Tengku Abdul Rahman was persuaded that Chinese would be in minority in population and in political representation and power if Sarawak and North Borneo along with Singapore were federated with Malaya.⁵³

Indonesia's Confrontation

Though Indonesia started opposing the formation of Malaysia since the mid-1962, it took an abrupt twist with Brunei revolt led by Sheik A.H. Azahari in December. Indonesia fully supported this revolt. In Brunei the Sultanate had some reservations about the formation of Malaysia. Azahari, who had good influence amongst the people, succeeded in forming 'Parti Bahjat'. It also took a strong anti-Malaysian stance. It pleaded for complete independence of Brunei. Azahari in the end of 1962 launched a rebellion in Brunei. This insurgency had far reaching consequences for the future prospects of Malaysia, for it triggered the support of Indonesia which culminated in the confrontation policy. Though Indonesia expressed its initial disagreement, only after the Brunei insurrection its confrontation policy against Malaysia became open. Gradually Indonesian confrontation became more militant. Indonesia supported

⁵³ Kohin, n. 16, pp. 256-8.

Aschari and the formation of the unitary state of North Kalimantan (composing of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo) which he proclaimed.

Before the revolt Indonesia had never really had much to say against British control over North Borneo. Only when it was to be joined in Malaysia did the protests begin. "As long as North Borneo remained a British colony its future continued to be problematical. Since 'direct' colonialism was everywhere becoming a thing of the past, the situation in North Borneo is neither permanent nor strong. But when the project of Malaysia was brought forward, the time for a definite solution appeared to have come. The territorial boundaries of British North Borneo which had been established by the various European imperialist expansions were now called into urgent action."³⁴ According to President Sukarno Malaysia was an attempt to save rubber, tin and oil for the imperialists. Indonesia supported the insurgents because they were fighting for independence against British neo-colonialism. If the Malaysia plan was pushed forward Indonesia would have no choice but to face it with political and economic confrontation.³⁵

The confrontation, in Indonesian sense, included everything short of direct armed conflict. This meant

³⁴ Curtis, n. 2, pp. 22-23.

³⁵ Richard Allen, Malaysia: A Prospect and Retrospect (Kuala Lumpur, 1953), p. 167.

boycotting Malaysia for international forums and conferences that were being held in Indonesia, snapping all diplomatic ties, suspending all economic activities with Malaysia etc. Indonesia went even to the extent of training guerrillas to fight against Malaysia. President Macapagal of the Philippines took the initiative in order to break the stalemate. On his initiative President Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman met in Tokyo on 31 May 1963. A joint statement issued after the Conference referred to the treaty of friendship concluded between Malaya and Indonesia in 1959 and expressed the hope that they would be able to solve all their present problems peacefully and restore the friendship of the past. The Foreign Ministers' conference which was held in Manila from 7 to 11 June adopted an important document known as 'Manila Accord' in the form of recommendations to the Heads of the Government of Indonesia, Malaya and Philippines.³⁶ It accepted Macapagal's proposal for a loose confederation between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, which was called "Nephilindo". Secondly, it was agreed that Indonesia and the Philippines would welcome the formation of Malaysia if it was ascertained by an independent and impartial authority such as Secretary General of the United Nations, or his representative, that the people of Sarawak and Sabah actually wanted to join the federation. The three foreign ministers also

³⁶ For details see Doyce, n. 9, Chapter V, Document No. 8.

recommended that a summit meeting of the heads of the three governments should be held by the end of July.³⁷

The Manila Summit meeting was held from 30 July to 5 August 1963. But before this summit took place, a conference in London had already decided that Malaysia would come into being on 31 August 1963. The London Conference was held at the initiative of the British Government which was anxious to complete its plan and wanted to avoid interference from Indonesia and the Philippines in this matter. The final agreement signed on 9 July 1963, provided for the transfer of British sovereignty in Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah to Malaysia on 31 August 1963. The decision of the Conference infuriated President Sufarno, who considered the final announcement of the date of inauguration of Malaysia, a violation of the Manila Accord. According to the agreement reached in Manila Malaysia would be formed only after the wishes of the people of Sarawak and Sabah were ascertained by the United Nations. Sufarno attended the summit on President Macapagal's persuasion. The summit accepted the Manila Accord and it was stated that the United Nations Secretary General or his representative should ascertain the wishes of the people of the territories concerned prior to the establishment of Malaysia.

37 Bhattacharjee, n. 10, p. 167-8.

The United Nations team, under Nicholmore arrived in Sarawak on 16 August, though Indonesian and Philippine representatives did not arrive before 1 September. The report of the United Nations mission was in favour of the formation of Malaysia and it was announced by the Secretary General on 14 September that a disccable majority of the people of Sabah and Sarawak wanted to join Malaysia. But before this announcement was made, Tunku Abdul Rahman announced on 29 August that Malaysia would be inaugurated on 16 September 1963. President Sukarno became furious. According to him, it was a clear violation of Manila spirit as it was prejudging the United Nations report. The then Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant also recounted this announcement.³⁰

Malaysia was proclaimed on 16 September 1963 as per schedule. Indonesia had already announced on 19 September that she would not recognise Malaysia and her Ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, General G.P.H. Djajikusumo, was recalled. On the day of Malaysia's inauguration, the British and Malaysian embassies in Djakarta were attacked and destroyed. At the same time Indonesian Embassy at Kuala Lumpur was also attacked. On 17 September 1963 Tunku Abdul Rahman severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia. General Nasution openly stated that Indonesia

³⁰ Ibid., p. 171.

would prepare guerrillas for liberation of North Kalimantan
 Britain, Australia and New Zealand made preparations to
 defend Malaysia.

The Malaysian Government declared emergency in
 the country and referred the matter to the United Nations
 Security Council on 3 April 1964. A Norwegian draft
 resolution deploring the aggression of Indonesia was vetoed
 by the Soviet Union. At the initiative of the United States
 President Johnson, a tripartite ministerial meeting
 (Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) was convened at
 Bangkok in February and March. Though Sukarno agreed for
 a ceasefire with a demilitarized zone of twenty miles on
 each side of the Borneo border, he insisted that his
 struggle against Malaysia would continue.³⁹ But after two
 meetings talks broke down in early March 1964. Again due
 to the initiative of President Macapagal a second tripar-
 tite meeting was arranged in Tokyo in June 1964 which also
 ended in vain. The only outcome of this summit was the
 acceptance of President Macapagal's proposal that the dispute
 would be referred to an Asian-African Conciliation Commission,
 consisting of one member chosen each by Indonesia, Malaysia
 and the Philippines; and a fourth to be chosen unanimously
 by the three so appointed. The talks failed because of
 Malaysia's insistence on the withdrawal of guerrillas from

³⁹ Nichol Laifer, "Anglo-American Differences Over
 Malaysia", The World Today, April 1964.

its territories. Sukarno, however, refused until a final political settlement was reached. The failure of the Tokyo summit was followed by an intensification of guerrilla operations by Indonesia.

The konfrontasi, however, came to an abrupt end by a sudden dramatic development within Indonesia with the coup incident on 30 September 1968. Thus, marking an end to the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation which was resolved afterwards.

CHAPTER IV

INDONESIA AND THE MAJOR POWERS

In the assessment of Indonesian foreign policy, it is necessary to take into consideration the roles of major powers like the United States, the Soviet Union and China in Southeast Asia, in general, and Indonesia in particular, for Indonesia is the fifth largest country of the world and its role at that particular point of time. Secondly, its strategic position and various developments in Southeast Asia prompted the Super Powers and China to show keen interest on this country. The major power rivalry was partly competition for influence and partly ideological conflict. As regards China, its role became increasingly evident only after West Irian crisis arose between Indonesia and the Netherlands and the Sino-Soviet schism. The ideological differences of the two socialist giants affected the role of the PKI which played, in turn, a major role in shaping the policies of Indonesia.

Indonesia and the Super Powers

The Indonesian struggle for independence, especially after the Second World War, was largely influenced by the attitudes of the two Super Powers toward it. In the initial stages, particularly during the period of Amir Sjarifuddin's

Prime Ministership (July 1947 to January 1948), the Soviet Union gave full support to the freedom struggle of Indonesia. But after the formation of new government under Mohammad Hatta as Prime Minister in January 1948 and particularly after the suppression of Communist revolt in Madiun (East Java) in September 1948 by the Hatta Government, the Soviet attitude towards Indonesia changed considerably.¹ On the other hand the United States' support to Indonesian cause became almost unconditional though it was lukewarm in the beginning.² /

Among the major powers, United States was the first country to recognize Indonesia as an independent country, after the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in December 1949. The Soviet Union delayed recognition until 29 January 1950.) Mohammad Hatta, the first Prime Minister of independent Indonesia, with his pro-Western foreign policy orientation sent Ambassadors to all major Western countries. He even negotiated an unpublished agreement to receive military aid from the United States.³ The post-Stalin foreign policy of the Soviet Union brought about an improvement in the Soviet-Indonesian relations. It witnessed the

1 For detailed account see Herbert Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (New York, 1962), and V. Chatterjee, South-east Asian Politics - Malaya and Indonesia (Calcutta, 1976).

2 Ibid.

3 Feith, n. 1.

opening of Soviet Embassy in Indonesia during the first cabinet of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in 1954.

As it has been elucidated earlier, the Indonesian leaders had repeatedly affirmed their faith in an independent and active foreign policy. (Although the foreign policy of Indonesia was not very effective till the proclamation of the Guided Democracy, we see many an instance of the various cabinets taking either pro-Western or pro-Communist sides. Writing in an article contributed to Foreign Affairs Journal, Hatta emphasized that Indonesia played no favourites between the two Super Powers but followed its own path of independent and active foreign policy.⁴)

Guided Democracy marked a great change in the foreign policy outlook of Indonesia. Virtually controlling all reins of power, President Sukarno decided to mend the fences with the Communist Powers. The PFI also started influencing Sukarno who was badly in need of its support to subsist in his position in Indonesian politics. When Sukarno took up the West Irian issue he pursued a militant foreign policy and went to the extent of confronting the Dutch and other Western countries. (As far as the Indonesia's relations with America were concerned, according to Weinstein, Indonesians saw America differently from other colonial powers. Primarily their colonial rule over the Philippines was comparatively far less repressive than that of

4. Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesian Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, vol. 31, no. 3, April 1953, pp. 445-6.

Dutch or British.⁵ But in the course of the decade and half from the end of revolution to the fall of Sukarno in 1966, American goodwill toward Indonesia continued to erode. This was especially influenced by three American actions: efforts to draw Indonesia into alignment with the West in the early fifties, support of anti-Djakarta rebellions in 1958, and failure to back Indonesia's claim to West Irian until 1962.⁶)

Long before the West Irian crisis actually took a serious turn, Sukarno had started his bitter criticism of the Western countries. In his Independence Day Address on 17 August 1958, Sukarno openly criticized America and other Western countries.⁷ The two-year period of the Kardja cabinet led by Djuwanda was marked by growing Russian influence in Indonesia in the field of foreign policy.⁸ By the time the Guided Democracy was initiated, Sukarno started his vociferous attack on colonialism and imperialism. For various reasons (which are discussed earlier) Sukarno started a militant policy to get West Irian from the Dutch. (During the Indonesian struggle for West-Irian, the Soviet Union readily offered its support for Indonesian claim while the

5 Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Sovereignty (New York, 1976), pp. 66-67.

6 Ibid., p. 70.

7 Sukarno, A Year of Challenge - Independence Day Address on 17 August 1958 (Djakarta, Department of Information 1963).

8 See Coith, n. 3, pp. 593-5.

United States showed a non-committal attitude. The US policies of neutrality came under a bitter criticism by the Indonesian leadership. The vacillating and the ambiguous policy of the United States Government vis-a-vis the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West Irian had hampered the growth of relations between these two countries. The United States, of course, had its own reasons for its cool attitude on the West Irian issue. Firstly, the Netherlands was a partner in the NATO.⁹ Secondly, Indonesia started developing close relations with the Communist bloc. Russia, and later China, extended their fullfledged support to the Indonesian claim on West Irian.)

During the West Irian crisis, John Allen, the then United States Ambassador to Indonesia, in the early sixties, proposed to plan for resolving the West Irian issue. But US Administration was indifferent and continued its passive neutrality. In the State Department of Washington, the influence of the so-called European-minded wing of 'Foggy Bottom' was too strong to allow the cancellation of a new approach in the American policy. The United States thought that a diplomatic initiative of the US Government which would frustrate the Dutch interests in West Irian might well antagonise this NATO ally and thus

⁹ Agung, Ido / Ach Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-65 (Cino Nugro, 1973), p. 267.

endanger the Atlantic community itself.¹⁰ Another reason for reluctance of the US to change its position with regard to West Irian was the growing opposition over the nature of Indonesia's non-alignment. In the opinion of the United States Indonesia was pro-left because of its close relations with the Soviet Union and China, and because of the growing influence of the PKI on governmental policies.¹¹

On the other hand, because of the Soviet Union's outright support to Indonesia on the West Irian issue and its unreserved support to Indonesian position in the United Nations paved the way for closer relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. The friendship grew further with the visit of Premier Khrushchev to Indonesia in 1960. Internally the PKI started extending its influence. Sukarno also sought the support of the PKI to implement his policies. The Soviet Union's manifold increase of aid to Indonesia in all fields, particularly the supply of arms, further subserved to consolidate its relations with Indonesia. The Haratican mission and its outcome, marked a decisive shift in policy, which Sukarno had been urging and the army resisting for some time. Definitely the army leadership tried to restrict the Communist influence and to have good relations with the

10 Allison, "United States Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The Limits of Policy", in Allison Henderson, ed., Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 196-8.

11 Ibid., p. 70.

West. During the PRRI rebellions (of 1953), when the United States policy favoured the regionalist cause, they had been obliged to take up Soviet offers of military aid.¹²

When the struggle for West Irian was further intensified Indonesia badly needed outside help of armaments to fight the Dutch. General Nasution went to Washington in October 1960 and America was unwilling for an arms deal with Indonesia. Thereupon in December 1960 he went to Moscow and successfully concluded a loan agreement for the purchase of arms. As a result a huge quantity of arms started flowing into Indonesia. This also provided for the training of the Indonesian military personnel in the Soviet Union. All these developments created a situation most favourable to the PRRI.¹³ By this it is obvious that the army leaders preferred America to the Soviet Union for an arms deal, and thus, showed the tendencies of their consistent pro-Western attitude.

The Soviet Union's growing influence was not slow to have its effect on American policy. John F. Kennedy who became President in January 1961 showed concern about the importance of Indonesia in the American policy calculations. Kennedy was anxious because of Indonesia's drift to Moscow.¹⁴

12 Guy J. Parker, "Nasution's Mission to Moscow", Asian Survey, vol. 1, no. 1, March 1961.

13 Ibid.

14 Arthur H. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), p. 464.

The timely intervention of President Kennedy in the mid-1962 prevented the outbreak of war. The American pressures made the Dutch to accept the negotiations and finally to sign an agreement on West Irian.¹⁵ Of course, the Soviet Union was opposed to such a kind of agreement.¹⁶

During the 'konfrontasi' period the US-Indonesian relations further deteriorated. As it was a British design for the formation of Malaysia to curb the communist infiltration, the United States had to support that plan. The report submitted by the Humphry Commission, which was appointed immediately after the West Irian issue to streamline the possibilities of economic aid to Indonesia, was shelved under the pretext that the political situation was not stable.¹⁷ The US-Indonesian relations reached their lowest point after the publication of the Tengku Abdul Rahman-Johnson statement in 1963 in which the US Government unequivocally committed itself to support Malaysia in its stand against Indonesia. These developments further aggravated the anti-American feelings in Indonesia. And these followed fierce demonstrations against the American Government in Djakarta, damage to the US Government

¹⁵ Bruce Grant, ed., Indonesia (Holbeurn, 1964), p. 172.

¹⁶ Erickson C. Arnold, Indonesian Communism - A History (New York, 1965), p. 293.

¹⁷ Agung, n. 9, pp. 398-9.

property, closure of American Library in Indonesia, etc.¹⁸

In spite of military threats and guerrilla raids, Sukarno always responded favourably to the prospect of a negotiated settlement which gave an opportunity to the United States to interfere diplomatically in the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation. In January 1964, the US took initiative in the matter and the US Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, went to Tokyo, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Djakarta and also to London in an attempt to bring the dispute to conference table. President Johnson had earlier sent a note to President Sukarno that Indonesian attitude towards Malaysia was the main obstacle to the friendly relations between the United States and Indonesia.¹⁹

The confrontation policy of Indonesia put Soviet diplomacy in a different position. Though the Soviet Union unilaterally supported Indonesia for its claim over West Irian, it was half-hearted during the period of confrontation. Soviet Union supported Indonesia because Malaysia was the creation of the British plan to prevent the spread of Communist influence in the region. The Soviet authorities, however, feared that the collapse of Malaysia would enable the influence of China in Southeast Asia. Secondly, it was not prepared to retard the process of 'detente'

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 400.

¹⁹ Sanktcharjee, n. 1, p. 173.

with the United States. But, at the same time it could not afford to remain indifferent to Indonesia, for this would make Indonesia to depend completely on China.²⁰ These factors made the Soviet Union to extend its grudging support to Indonesia. The Soviet policy was severely criticized by PKI. Indonesia joined with China in opposing India's proposal for Soviet's participation in the proposed second Afro-Asian Conference. Alarmed by these developments the USSR sent Nikoyan to Djakarta in June 1964. Nikoyan assured Soviet's help and support to Indonesia in its confrontation against Malaysia, and promised supply of arms. This was soon followed by Sukarno's visit to Moscow in October 1964 where he signed a new military aid agreement with the Soviet Union.²¹

Indonesia and China

Before analysing the development of relations between China and Indonesia in the post West Irian crisis, it is necessary to assess the role played by the PKI in the light of ideological differences between the Soviet Union and China. Since the initiation of the Guided Democracy, Sukarno, in general, pursued an anti-Western policy.

20 See Nadia Borbach, "The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and Malaysian Disputes", Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 11, November 1965, pp. 563-9.

21 Bhattacharjee, n. 1, pp. 136-7.

Secondly, in order to carry out his theory of continuing the confrontation, first during the West Irian and later during the formation of Malaysia, President Sukarno had to depend more on the Soviet Union, which the PKI very much desired.²² With the ideological schism between China and the Soviet Union, the PKI decided to identify itself with the Communist Party of China. And this difference between China and the Soviet Union and the attitude of the PKI had a definite bearing on the politics and policies of Indonesia internally as well as externally.)

(China's relations with Indonesia had always been marked by a period of tremendous strain interrelated with the most cordial and close relations, ever since the two countries first decided to exchange ambassador and diplomatic relations. Because of China's close relations with the PKI Indonesian Government was averse to the various activities of the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia. The China-Indonesia relations improved considerably after the first Ali Sastroamidjogo's cabinet was formed.²³)

(In the initial stages of the Guided Democracy period the relations between China and Indonesia were strained quite a bit when in 1960, the Indonesian Government seized the Chinese rural business activities in

22 Douglas Hyde, Confrontation in the East (London, 1966), p. 120.

23 Leo Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1973).

Indonesia and indirectly forced the expulsion of many Chinese from Indonesia. This brought the diplomatic dialogue between these two countries "to a level somewhat below friendship".²⁴ But, Sino-Indonesian relations started growing rapidly since the middle of 1962.) "The appointment for the first time in 7 years, of an Indonesian-born Chinese to an Indonesian Cabinet in early 1963, and shortly before, lifting of the May 1960 ban on papers and periodicals published in Chinese, served to confirm the development of a new working partnership between Peking and Jakarta which is of signal importance to developments in Asia and beyond."²⁵ (The principal factor to bring Indonesia and China closer was Malaysia issue. China outrightly condemned the formation of Malaysia as a neo-colonialist plot of imperialists. China fully supported the Indonesian stand.)
 Liu Shao-chi declared during his visit to Indonesia in April 1963: "Indonesia's just stand of opposing neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia and supporting the revolutionary struggle of the people of North Kalimantan constitutes a serious blow to the colonialists, 'old and new' and with it Indonesia has become an important force opposing imperialism and colonialism in Southeast Asia."²⁶

24 Carl Taylor, "Indonesian View of China", Asian Survey, vol. 3, no. 3, March 1963, p. 109.

25 Justus Vender Broek, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", Orbis, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, pp. 333-4.

26 Reking Review, 9 April 1963, p. 9.

Another major factor leading to Sino-Indonesian close relationship was the covert nonetheless real identification of the PKI with Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the initial stages the PKI did not show very keen interest and refrained from siding openly with either of the disputants, and continued to describe the dispute as a family quarrel. But the pronouncements made later on denouncing the Soviet Union clearly indicate that the PKI was falling in line with Peking.²⁷ If this was one aspect, the other one was that both countries seemed to share a common political temper, a mixture of revolutionary nationalism and Marxist-Leninist philosophy. It was at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Neshi Tanganyika, early in February 1963 that the new Chinese-Indonesian alliance for the first time clearly showed itself. And Indonesia's new role as Peking's "front man" was revealed still more evidently during the "Come of the New Emerging Forces" (CONEFO) held in Jakarta in November 1963, which Peking supported and in which it took active part.

"A very significant manifestation of the alignment of Indonesia with China was the sudden dramatic visit of President Sukarno to Shanghai in November 1964, to confer with Chou En-lai concerning the synchronization of foreign

²⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 23, pp. 333-6.

policies of their two countries against imperialist and colonialist countries.²⁸ The negotiations which began in Shanghai were continued in Jakarta when China's Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, arrived there on 27 November 1964 for long discussions with Sukarno and Subandrio. A joint statement issued on 3 December 1964, "revealed the harmony of the Sino-Indonesian political views with a candor that far exceeded anything found in previous diplomatic statements of either country".²⁹

When in January 1965, President Sukarno announced Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in protest against the election of Malaysia to the Security Council, it was China which first supported Sukarno's decision enthusiastically. Sukarno announced that those nations which had been injured and attacked had all become powerful, making a reference to China. A joint statement issued in the names of the Chinese and Indonesian governments on 23 January 1965, declared that "no peaceful co-existence is possible between the new emerging forces and the old established forces".³⁰

As a result of this policy it was not surprising that President Sukarno declared in his Independence Day

28 Agung, n. 9, p. 436.

29 Ibid., p. 435.

30 Ibid., n. 22, pp. 122-3.

Address on 17 August 1965, the existence of a strong Djakarta-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis³⁰, uniting the five countries in one purpose to struggle against the old established forces or order of colonialism and imperialism and to destroy Western imperialist influence in Asia.³⁰

³⁰ See Sukarno, "Independence Day Address on August 17, 1965", Department of Information (Jakarta, 1965).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

(Foreign policy of a country is moulded, shaped and reflected by three factors. One is the kind of leadership that rules the country; secondly, the internal or domestic political developments, and thirdly, the political system that is being pursued in that country. Inevitably all these factors are interlinked and should be taken into consideration to estimate the foreign policy of a country. After the Second World War one more important factor that developed, and which has become a fundamental principle for foreign policy making, is the ideology. And, of course, ideology is followed by national interest of a country at a given point of time. All these factors are seen in the foreign policy development of Indonesia.) The applicability of all these factors is more appropriate to a Third World country. Because most of the Third World countries were colonies almost up to the end of fifties and beginning of sixties when they suddenly emerged as independent countries they were in a flux between rampant backwardness and underdevelopment internally and ideological flare-up (of Communism and anti-Communism) between the two blocs of socialist and capitalist countries, ending in the Cold War. Though most of the colonial regimes

were put to an end, exploitation in the form of neo-colonialism started vigorously which made certain Third world countries to react sharply and to take radical postures. This was applicable to Indonesia too. For instance, Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Sukarno of Indonesia openly showed their penchant for socialist patterns. Also, it is necessary to bear in mind that despite those leaders advocacy for socialist policies in the strict ideological sense, they were never admitted themselves as Communists, nor to those policies.

(As far as Indonesia was concerned, during the Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) when Sukarno assumed full powers for himself his first intention was to consolidate his own position. There was tremendous amount of political instability due to various reasons and importantly, Indonesia was lacking definite political perspective. And, its strategic location enabled the Super Powers to show keen interest on this country. However, the political instability and partly the incapacity of the various cabinets to solve the various problems failed to protect the country as a stable and integrated country. Secondly, the economic stability, which determines the political stability of any system, was lacking.

The initiation of the guided democracy marked an epoch in the recent Indonesian history. It does not appear to be correct to say that Sukarno went for guided democracy

basically with a propensity to grab power. But, it was more of political instability and slackening economy which gave handle to Sukarno to assume full powers and he virtually controlled everything. There were strained relations between the centre and the regions and subsequent rebellion (PRRI), and the whole economy was in shambles with recession and the rate of production at a stand still. At the same time army was asserting its power and was determined to play a more active political role in the Indonesian politics. But, Sukarno started his vociferous attack on colonialism and imperialism only after the initiation of the guided democracy. Among all the Third World leaders Sukarno pursued a radical attitude with his scathing on the Western countries as neo-colonialist and imperialist countries. And, only during the guided democracy period the relations between the socialist countries and Indonesia started growing rapidly. That way Sukarno, firstly to ascertain his own position and secondly to curb the growth of growing army influence, had to extend active support to the PKI. At this juncture Sukarno advanced a new theory of conflict between New Emerging Forces and the Old Established Forces, which, according to him, would only end up with the victory of the former. / Though Indonesia was part of the non-aligned countries, Sukarno clearly did not distinguish himself from the Third Force advocates

of the nonalignment. Though he spoke as a representative of the Third World, he advocated for an inevitable conflict of new Third World countries (along with socialist states) and old western world.

Then came the West Irian problem during which not only Sukarno moved closer to the socialist countries, he could muster the support of the people in general and rally the masses under a politically stable system. West Irian became a testing point for Sukarno's strength. At this point the PKI applied all its strategies to consolidate itself. The PKI apart from sharing the views of Sukarno in regard to the threat of colonialism and imperialism actively supported Sukarno in the West Irian issue. During this period the US tried its best for the betterment of relations between Indonesia and the United States. The United States went to the extent of compelling the Netherlands to concede to the demands of Indonesia, for it (US) basically feared the growing strength of the PKI internally and closer relations between Indonesia and the socialist countries externally. During the West Irian crisis Sukarno not only became very popular but had complete backing of the people too.

The 'konfrontasi' with Malaysia during 1962-65 period became a milestone with far reaching consequences. Though the formation of Malaysia had deeper roots in the

arena of international politics, essentially it would have been Indonesia which could be affected if at all there arose any conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia. Moreover, it was a threat to the Indonesian dominating position in Southeast Asia region. Indonesia had its own reasons to oppose the formation of Malaysia. Basically, Indonesians were of the opinion that Indonesia was superior to any other country in Southeast Asia because of its area, population and their heroic fight against the Dutch imperialism. Whereas Malaya's independence was given without much effort. And secondly, the formation of Malaysia Federation was a plan of the British and not the Malays and other people concerned. Also, after the West Irian crisis Indonesia asserted itself successfully restoring the internal security. Sukarno's radical attitude was further increased against the West and thus facilitating closer relations with socialist countries, especially China. As the PKI was the main supporter of Sukarno for his internal and external policies as well it could be able to influence Sukarno a lot. With the deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and China because of some ideological differences, the PKI declared its allegiance to Chinese Communist party despite its earlier non-committal attitude. The PKI even went to the extent of accusing the Russians as revisionists. This development inside the PKI enabled China to come closer to

Indonesia. Despite the Soviet Union's opposition to the formation of Malaysia, it was not closer to Indonesia after the West Irian crisis unlike China. The United States extended its blanket support to Malaysia proposal because primarily it was a British plan to contain Communism in Southeast Asia. Army opposed Malaysia plan for various different reasons. Firstly, army feared that the overwhelming Chinese population might prefer to communism; and secondly, by opposing Malaysia proposal it can demand more budget allocations and play a predominant role in the Indonesian politics. Thus, curiously all the three forces of Indonesia, Sukarno, the PKI and the army, opposed Malaysia formation for three entirely different reasons. Also, it sounds unconvincing to say that Sukarno wanted to divert the attention of the people from internal problems for even if Sukarno wanted he could not have done it under the pretext of confrontations. On the other hand the spirit of the nationalism was the main factor to galvanize the Indonesians. Moreover, it was based on an ideology, ideology of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. These factors were basically responsible to start a policy of confrontations. Here, it is also necessary to understand the sentiments of the Indonesian people. Firstly, with regard to West Irian people wanted that West Irian should become a part of Indonesia because of geographic and racial affinity.

Secondly, as far as the formation of Malaysia was concerned, Indonesians feared that they might lose the predominant role which Indonesia had to play.

Finally, despite Sukarno's perseverance to rally the people under his philosophy he could not tackle the basic economic problems of the people. This laxity eventually culminated in frustration among the people. Of course, everything took an abrupt turn with 1965 coup incident which made Sukarno just helpless and army ruling on its own. Externally the socialist countries received a setback while the West became happy over the later incidents.

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