THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS
CULTURAL MODELS OF THE METAPHOR OF HAPPINESS IN TELUGU, HINDI AND ENGLISH

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Certified that this dissertation entitled "THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS:CULTURAL MODELS OF THE METAPHOR OF HAPPINESS IN TELUGU, HINDI AND ENGLISH," submitted by   B.P. Sridevi, Centre of Linguistics and English, School of Languages, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, is an original work and has not been submitted so far in part or full, for any other degree or diploma of any University. This may be placed before the examiners for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

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INTRODUCTION

The following case study of the emotion of happiness in three languages is an attempt at building cultural models in the true tradition of cognitive linguistics. The study starts with an acceptance of cognitive philosophy which has not been delved into due to the obvious constraints of space and scope. It also follows the methodology for the study of emotion as formulated by Lakoff and Kövecses in their study of the emotion of anger. The present study seeks to draw on the rich sources of conventionalized language in the form of metaphors, metonyms, image schemata, similes and idioms which encapsulate generations of folk knowledge. By doing this it tries to present an alternative view to the study of emotion. While the study may not be beyond the frontiers of proof, yet it is presented in the spirit of a human-sized evaluation of emotion backed up by thoroughly researched linguistic data. While the study does not get into the debate of the objectivist philosophy versus that of cognitivist philosophy(which is beyond its scope), it is but obvious that its sympathies lie with a cognitivist interpretation of the world.

The study seeks to break virgin path with respect to two aspects:
1. The description of the structure of the emotion of happiness in the three languages of English, Hindi and Telugu on the basis of linguistic expressions incorporating folk knowledge and

2. a systematic comparision of these three structural models so as to have a broader view of not only culturally constructed knowledge but also cognitively constructed knowledge. By this I mean the manner in which humans as a species cognize emotion. While this is hardly an exhaustive study considering as it does only three languages, yet it does lead to some

interesting conclusions which have been and are being arrived at by various cognitive scholars all over the world with respect to different aspects of human knowledge.

Keesing (in Holland and Quinn eds., 1987:372-3) says, "(cultural models) are frameworks of interpretation... there is room for choice, for alternative constructions, for creativity. ...these models are at once cultural and public, as the historically cumulated knowledge of a people and the embodiments of a language, and cognitive, as paradigms for construing the world." He points out three streams of thought in the study of cognitive linguistics:

1. The first is that of a culturally constructed world. He says, while it is not possible to write a cultural grammar, it is perfectly possible to seek a partial but systematic model of a single target domain.

2. Another stream of thought comes from Lakoff's and Johnson's exploration of how conventional metaphors build on paradigmatic, experientially based models, and

3. Yet another stream comes from the prototype-semantic theory as engineered by Rosch and Berlin and Kay. These models of the cognized world build on prototype relationships in a number of ways.

The present study is a mixture of all these streams. It has combined within it the linguistic and anthropological approaches (both are not mutually exclusive in the field of cognitive studies). It also builds the cultural models on the basis of metaphorical extensions of language. It further examines the nature of prototypy in emotion organization.

Further, it points to the fact that neither the models nor the prototypes are sacred. It is just possible that there are alternative or even contradictory

models, but as Keesing points out (as quoted above), there is room for choice. Another point to be noted, again as Keesing succinctly puts it is that "these models are not *presented* to us in what everyday people say and do in their everyday lives, or in the stuff of metaphoric talk; they are *represented* in fragmentary surface facets. We must infer the more coherent, if unarticulated, models that lie beneath." (in Holland and Quinn eds., 1987:374).

Cognitive linguistics set out to erase the core-periphery distinction. It brought into the limelight topics considered amorphous and vague such as the study of emotion. These topics were studied by the use of tools such as cultural models or folk models or Idealized cognitive models. The terminology has changed and evolved but the devotion to details has remained unchanged. Cultural models were constructed on the basis of metaphors, metonyms and image schemata to show a definite embodiment of so called abstract concepts. This was and is being done on the basis of linguistic data rigorously researched and described. As Lakoff expresses it, "Grand theories don't count for much unless they are substantiated to the minutest details." To borrow a line from Lakoff , it is in that spirit that this study is presented.

1. APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF HAPPINESS

Davitz in his work, The Language of Emotion, formulated the central question as follows : "What does a person mean when he says someone is happy or sad...?"(1969:1)[1]. Kövecses in the book Emotion Concepts poses a similar question, "How do people understand their emotions?"(1990:1). Similarly Wierzbicka in her work Semantic Primitives queries, "What is the meaning of such words such as joy, sorrow, regret, fear, irritation, admiration, jealousy, pity, gratitude, worry?"(1972:57).

To continue the above strain of questioning and to limit the questions to a particular case study - that of the emotion concept of happiness is the objective of this study. What exactly do we mean when we say we are happy? How do we understand it? Is the experience as well as the expression of emotion a universal cognitive experience or is it governed by culture? Does emotion have a concept? If so are these concepts structured and how? Finally can emotion concepts be subjected to linguistic analysis? These are some questions which have been posed time and again and answered in many different ways.

The present study starts with an acceptance of certain lines of reasoning and argumentation. Within this given scenario, one specific problem has been focussed on. The problem is formulated by Kövecses "...mention must be made of another line of research. Here authors are concerned with cross cultural differences and similarities in the use and understanding of emotion terms. The major problem with this kind of research is that the studies fail to provide a systematically arrived at and sufficiently detailed

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[1] As quoted in Kövecses (1990:1).

conceptual model of the emotion under study. Consequently, the comparisons across cultures are to a large extent based on subjective assessments of how a given emotion is conceptualized in the two cultures." (1990:25).

The present study therefore seeks to do the following :

1. To build systematic cultural models of the conceptualization of the emotion of happiness in three languages - Telugu, Hindi and English. These models will be based entirely on linguistic terms used to express happiness. The models of these languages will be compared solely on the basis of the criteria used to build the models, leaving no scope for subjective interpretation.

2. Further, cross cultural studies in the anthropological line have tended to be based on general emotion concepts. This study proposes to account for the interaction between the emotion domain and the system of cultural values by researching a particular emotion concept - that of happiness in great detail. As Lakoff in <u>Women, Fire and Dangerous Things</u> says, "grand theories don't count for much unless they are substantiated down to the minutest details." (Lakoff 1987:379)

3. The study also seeks to analyse the influence of culture on emotion concepts. This case study may help one take a stand on the debate for a universal cognitive experience versus that of pluralistic ways of looking at the world which are totally culture specific. Yet another line of reasoning would be the possible basis for an areal cultural model. Do language families in "proven" linguistic areas influence each other, so that a similar cultural model emerges within an area? The languages of Telugu and Hindi belong to the Indian linguistic area though to two different language

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families - Dravidian and Indo-Aryan. By the comparision of these two models one would like to investigate whether there is a case for a pan Indian model of metaphor of the emotion of happiness. Does a language family build up its own cultural models or is there scope for the transgression of borders?

4. Continuing this stream of reasoning another question follows : Do the three cultural models differ to a great extent from each other? Is the cognitive experience of any culture exclusive to itself or is there a degree of commonality between the conception of emotion in various cultures? This question brings us back to the original one - at one level do humans as a species cognize emotion similarly or does culture influence the cognizance of emotion to such an extent that there is no meeting ground?

The above questions and the answers to them form the mainstay of the following study.

1.1 Program for the study of emotion:

George Lakoff in Women, Fire and Dangerous Things expresses his dissatisfaction with the Objectivist paradigm. He believes that it bases cognition on a "metaphysical account of reality"- one which is composed of "objectively existing entities with properties and relations among them." Pointing out his problems with objectivist philosophy, Lakoff writes, " ...language (is) considered as a human institution, linguistic expressions and their meanings are then taken to be objectively real entities that have an existence independent of their use by any particular person on any given occasion. Thus a distinction is drawn between sentence meaning and speaker meaning... Within objectivist semantics, it is sentence meaning

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which is fixed and defined in terms of its capacity to fit a real or possible world that is of central importance. "Semantics", is then, taken to be a technical term defined independent of "pragmatics" - the study of how sentences are used and what speakers mean by what they say. Pragmatics is taken to be peripheral, and of secondary interest, since it is not concerned with anything having to do with objective reality, but merely with human communication. The objectivist paradigm also induces what is known as the literal-figurative distinction. Figurative expressions are defined as those that do not have meanings that can directly fit the world. If metaphors and metonymies have any meaning at all, they must have some other, related literal meaning." (1987:171)

Arguing the case for a cognitive approach to the study of language, Kövecses(1990) lays out a positive program for the study of emotion concepts. This neatly surveys as well as summarizes the work that has been done and which remains to be done in areas as diverse as linguistics, philosophy, anthropology and psychiatry.

The nine commandments which Kövecses lays down in his basic program are as follows:

1. The study of emotional meaning must be based on both the core and peripheral aspects of meaning. It is only this broadening of focus that can ensure a better fit between emotional meaning and emotional experience.

2. The characterization of emotion concepts should involve uncovering cognitive models or scenarios associated with emotion terms that are human sized and are used for the purposes of everyday life.

3. We should attempt to discover the structure of both the core and the periphery of meaning associated with emotion terms. This structure is likely to be complex.

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4. Peripheral meaning associated with emotion terms should be studied systematically.

5. Since our emotion concepts are organized around prototypes, it should be our goal to identify and describe the paradigmatic or prototypical cases of emotion concepts together with the set of deviations from these prototypes.

6. If we wish to study the interaction between the emotion domain and the system of cultural values, then we should study particular emotion concepts in great detail.

7. The study of emotional meaning must include image schematic knowledge of various kinds.

8. In order for us to come to know an emotion concept in its detailed entirety, we have to examine in addition to the various uses of a single emotion word, the entire range of words and expressions related to the concept in question, including metaphors, metonymies, idioms,[2] and many more.

9. The goal of understanding emotional experience requires us to investigate the linguistic descriptions of the emotions rather than the signals used to express them.(1990:32).

1.2 Tools for the study of emotion:

The study of reality and meaning through schematic models or prototype semantic analysis is often seen as an alternative approach to that of objectivist philosophy. As Mark Johnson states the case in The Body in the Mind, objectivism functions on the following principle :

The world consists of objects that have properties and stand in various relationships independent of human understanding. The world is as it is,

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[2] Idioms are defined as pithy sayings; phrases or usages peculiar to a language which contain within them generations of folk knowledge.

no matter what any person happens to believe about it, and there is one correct God's-eye-view about what the world is really like. In other words, there is a rational structure to reality, independent of the beliefs of any particular people, and correct reason mirrors this rational structure. To describe an objective reality of this sort, we need language that expresses concepts that can map onto the objects, properties and relations in a literal, univocal, context- independent fashion. Johnson questions this received objectivist view of meaning and rationality. Rather, he argues the case for parallel empirical studies that highlight the embodiment of human meaning and understanding which manifests itself over and over, in ways intimately connected to forms of imaginative structuring of experience. The two major imaginative structures that Johnson cites are those of image-schemata and metaphor (1987:x). Other concepts that that are of equal importance are those of folk or cultural models, metonymy, prototypy and emotion concepts.

1.2.1 Cultural model :

Roy D' Andrade defines a cultural model as "a cognitive schema that is intersubjectively shared by a social group. Such models typically consist of a small number of conceptual objects and their relations to each other. Though the number of objects a person can hold in mind is limited, through hierarchical organization, human beings can comprehend a schema containing a very large number of discriminations."(in Holland and Quinn, eds.1987:114). One result of this "inter-subjective sharing" is that interpretations made about the world on the basis of folk models are treated as if they were obvious facts of the world. Thus a great deal of information need not be made explicit. The folk model of the mind

according to Roy D' Andrade is a statement of the common sense understandings that people use in everyday life.

Roger M. Keesing in the paper, "Models Folk and Cultural - Paradigms Regained", writes, "an ideational theory of culture can look at cultural knowledge as distributed within a social system, can take into account the variation between individual's knowledge of the vantage points on the cultural heritage of the people. It can also view cultural knowledge as shaping and constraining but not directly generating social behaviour." (in Holland and Quinn, eds.1987:371).

Cultural models are thus at once cultural and public. Cultural models enumerate the historically accumulated knowledge of a people and the embodiments of a language and cognitive paradigms for construing the world. As Keesing puts it, "folk models comprise the realms of culturally constructed common sense. They serve pragmatic purposes, they explain the tangible, the experiential, the probable. They thus assume a superficial geology of causation, they hold sway in a realm in which exceptions prove rules and contradictions live happily together. They are world proposing, paradigmatic in nature. Such models are not presented to us in what people say and do everyday in their lives - they are represented in fragmentary surface facets. We must infer the more coherent, if unarticulated models that lie beneath."(in Holland and Quinn, eds. 1987:374).

Lakoff labels these coherent, unarticulated models Idealized Cognitive Models. He reiterates the view that
1. The structure of thought is characterized by cognitive models.
2. Categories of mind correspond to elements in those models.

3. Cognitive models can either be scalar, classical, metonymic or radial.

4. In the conceptual system, there are four types of cognitive models : propositional, image schematic, metaphoric and metonymic. While the former two characterize structure, the latter characterize mappings that make use of structural models.

5. Cognitive models are embodied - the embodiment providing a non arbitrary link between cognition and experience. (1987:69).

Relating the concept of a cognitive model to that of the structure of emotion, Kövecses asks the pertinent question: "does the language we use to talk about emotions accurately reflect current beliefs about the emotions?"(1990:39). In view of this question he notes that cognitive models consist of entities and predicates, they are neither minimal or infinitely large, and a great deal of experience is packed into them. It is a further feature of cognitive models that they represent not an "objective", "scientific" conception of a domain but a folk understanding of it. Understandings of this kind have come to be known as folk or cultural models. The experiences that prototypical cognitive models incorporate and embody are culturally defined - i.e. prototypical cognitive models are defined in large part by conventionalized language use. Through language we build up a conceptual universe, which represents "reality" in a simplified and/ or idealized form. The product is a cultural one and not something that we acquire as a result of formal education and/or scientific procedures.(1990:39).

1.2.2 Emotion concepts :

Emotion concepts are looked upon as abstract and devoid of any structure or conceptual meaning. Lakoff is of the contrary view. He says, "in

addition to what we feel, we also impose an understanding on what it is that we feel. When we act on our emotions, we act not only on the basis of feeling but also on the basis of that understanding."(1987:377). Emotions are thus at the same time abstract as well as based in bodily experience as the abundant number of metaphors used to express them will show. Kövecses lays out the following view of emotion -

1. They are fairly complex constructs with a sophisticated structure.

2. They are constituted by a variety of entities and predicates.

3. The combinations of these entities and predicates follow some order.

4. They embody a great deal of experience.

5. They arise in a large part from metaphor.

He further elaborates on the structure of emotion concepts as including the following parts:

1. a system of conceptual metonymies associated with the emotion concept in question.

2. a system of conceptual metaphors associated with the emotion concept in question.

3. a set of concepts linked to the emotion concept in question.

4. a category of cognitive models, one or some of which are prototypical. (Kövecses 1990:40)

Quoting Charles Frake, he says, "The analysis of a culture's terminological systems will not, of course exhaustively reveal the cognitive world of its members, but it will certainly tap a central portion of it. Culturally significant cognitive features must be communicable between persons in one of the standard symbolic systems of the culture. A major share of these features will undoubtedly be codable in a society's most flexible and productive communicative device, its language."(quoted in Kövecses

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1990:42). Kövecses suggests that by studying the detailed internal structure of any item (including emotion), the conceptual features responsible for the differences in the conceptual organizations of members of different cultures will fall out in a natural way. For this it is important to focus on everyday language recognizing the special relevance of metaphors, metonymies, idioms, clichés, sayings, proverbs, collocations, etc. which go on to form what he terms *conventionalized language* - expressions that are worn out and clichéd or even hackneyed.

1.2.3 Metaphor and Metonymy :

Lakoff and Johnson among others have developed a view of language as pervaded by metaphors that are neither creative nor dead but conventional and fundamentally constitutive of our ways of everyday talk - a view of metaphor as experientially based. A metaphor schema establishing a universe of discourse in terms of another universe of discourse in effect defines the kind of paradigm that has been conceptualized as a folk model. By exploring the cultural particularity of a model - embodied in a metaphoric schema, one can go on to show how people live their lives through such metaphoric schema.

Günter Radden says, "conventional metaphors are not just ubiquitous phenomena of language; they are also at the very basis of our thought. Whole domains of experience, not just linguistic expressions, are systematically conceptualized in terms of other domains of experience. These systematic cognitive mappings of one domain of experience, the source domain onto another domain of experience, the target domain, are referred to as conceptual metaphors."(in Martin Pütz, ed.1992:521). Following the first study by Michael Reddy on the conduit metaphor,

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many conceptual and structural metaphors like ARGUMENT IS WAR, orientational metaphors such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS involving image schemata at generic and specific levels have come to be studied. Radden is of the view that to a large extent, metaphorical mappings seem to be systematic in that lower level mappings derive, or inherit features from their higher level mappings.

Searle lays down very precise principles regarding metaphor:

1. Things which are P are by definition R .

2. Things which are P are contingently R.

3. Things which are P are said or believed to be R.

4. Things which are P are not R, nor are they like R things, nor are they believed to be R ; nonetheless it is a fact about our sensibility, whether culturally or naturally determined, that we just do perceive a connection. (quoted in Johnson 1987:73).

Johnson argues for the need to recognize metaphor as one of the central projective operations by which we establish semantic connections. Some kinds of metaphor must be regarded as irreducible, primary cognitive functions by which we create and extend structure in our experience and understanding. "...it is possible for metaphorical projections to play a constitutive role in the structuring of our experience."(1987:73). In the same manner metonymy must be regarded as a general cognitive structure as it is central to categorization. Lakoff considers metonymy as one of the basic characteristics of cognition. He says , "it is extremely common for people to take one well-understood or easy-to-perceive aspect of something and use it to stand either for the thing as a whole or for some other aspect or part of it." (Lakoff 1987:77).

For instance :

One waitress says to another, "The ham sandwich just spilled beer all over himself."

Here, the ham sandwich refers to the person eating the sandwich.

The focus on metaphor articulates closely with an increasingly generalized understanding of prototypy as an organizing principle. A metaphorical schema highlights the similarities between unrelated things in the real world by looking at the forms, patterns and relationships between the source domain and the metaphorized one. "A world thus simplified becomes the world of the prototypical."(Keesing in Holland and Quinn,eds.,1987:386).

Kövecses believes that metaphors and metonymies play a significant role in the way we conceive of emotions. He quotes Jim Averill's study (1974), who shows that psychophysiological symbolism has had a major influence on past and present thinking concerning emotion and bodily change. Kövecses considers that besides regarding metaphors as important ingredients of our folk and scientific conceptions of emotion; it is also important to look at metonymy as an organizing principle. Metaphors and metonymies help differentiate not only between emotional concepts but also the organization of emotion concepts across cultures.

1.2.4 Image Schema:

A related concept is that of the image schema. Johnson defines an image schema as follows: "(It is) a dynamic pattern that functions somewhat like the abstract structure of an image, and thereby connects up a vast range of differing experiences that manifest this same recurring structure." He

believes that "image schemata and their metaphorical extensions constitute much of meaning structure and inferential patterns." (1987:2-4). Radden says that image schemata are "preconceptual schematic structures which derive their meaning from the child's early sensorimotor experience in the spatial world - and - what is more striking remain meaningfully conceptual throughout life." (in Martin Pütz, ed.1992:524). For instance the container schema, the verticality schema, the link schema and so on. When conceptual metaphors are based on image schematic structures, they are called "orientational metaphors"(Lakoff and Johnson 1980:14-21) as these create analogies based on the structure of the spatial world. Thus in emotion talk metaphors based on image schema would be *happiness is high* or *happiness is a liquid in a container* and likewise. Further these image schemata are linked with a number of metaphors and could be used to structure a vast part of human experience.

1.2.5 Prototypy:

Prototype theory functions on the basic principle that members of a category are organized around one central member known as the prototype. This view is contrary to componential analysis which views that the meaning of a lexical item can be represented in terms of a fixed set of necessary and certain conditions. Kövecses details the history of prototype research in emotion theory. (1989:33-34):

Ekman's (1971) research correlated the consistent facial expressions to particular emotions across cultures. Of all emotions, he found "core" emotions like happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and interest correlate universally with facial gestures leading to a prototype-oriented categorization. Alston (1967) lays down six factors by which the concept of emotion can be characterized. This list of typical features brings out the

nature of the emotion. But while some of the features are present in all cases, there is no one feature that is present in all emotions. It is clear from this kind of reasoning that there is no fixed set of necessary conditions that characterizes each and every situation as an emotion. James Russell and his associates (1984) have also utilized prototype theory in the study of emotion. In their research it was shown that the category of emotion concept has a great deal of internal structure and lacks sharp boundaries. Emotions like anger, fear, love, happiness and sadness are viewed as better examples of emotion than awe, respect, calmness and boredom.

Kövecses (1989) also connects prototype theory with the study of emotion concepts. Kövecses studies some "carefully selected emotion concepts" like anger, fear, pride, respect and love to discover their respective prototypes on the basis of the language that we use to talk about them. His methodology is based on "the lexical approach to the structure of concepts : it is a basic assumption of this work that a large part of our conceptual system can be uncovered through a detailed study of most of the lexical expressions that are related to particular concepts - the principle that underlies this assumption is that language, particularly its lexicon, is a reflection of our conceptual system." (Kövecses 1989:41).

The present study also takes a lexical approach to the study of emotion concepts. It seeks to concentrate on the internal organization of a particular emotion concept - that of happiness based on a study of language or lexical items. By doing this it seeks to bring out the differences in the organization of a particular emotion concept across three cultural models - by a fusion of the lexical and anthropological approaches.

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2. THREE MODELS OF HAPPINESS - ENGLISH, HINDI AND TELUGU

Emotions are often considered to be feelings alone, and as such are viewed as being devoid of conceptual content.(Lakoff 1987:380). However as Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) have proved with their pioneering study of anger, emotions have an extremely complex conceptual structure which gives rise to a number of non trivial inferences. Linguistic expressions that are used to convey a particular emotion are not straight from the heart as a manner of speaking, but are well organized into a system of conceptual metaphors and metonymies. The conceptualization of emotion is best presented by the structuring of a multitude of metaphors, metonymies and image schemata into a cultural model - a model which encompasses within it not only the spontaneity of emotion, but also generations of a particular world view of a particular culture and its language.

Quinn and Holland summarize the conceptualization of folk knowledge within a cultural model in the following terms, "...much of the order we perceive in the world is there only because we put it there... Culturally constituted understandings of the social world point up not only the degree to which people impose order on their world but also the degree to which such orderings are shared by the joint participants in this world... a very large proportion of what we know and believe, we derive from these shared models that specify what is in the world and how it works." (in Holland and Quinn, eds.1987:3).

A cultural model according to D'Andrade, "is a cognitive schema that is inter subjectively shared by a social group."(in Holland and Quinn,

eds.1987:112). It answers the question : How are meaning systems organized ? Cultural models are thus presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behaviour in it. These models tell us what one needs to know in order to say or do culturally acceptable things.

A cultural model organizes knowledge in such a manner that the individual need invoke and hold in mind only a small set of criteria - a number not exceeding the limits of short term memory. Secondly, the "nestedness"[1] of cultural models one within the other lends a further, far reaching economy to cultural knowledge. Models of wider applicability may arise in a number of other models, for instance, the conduit metaphor, the container metaphor or the verticality metaphor. Thirdly, cultural models are organized on the basis of metaphors, metonymies, image schemata and prototypy[2] - all of which contribute to economy. These work on the principles of taking presuppositions for granted, mapping one domain onto another, a part standing for the whole and also making use of the notion of the best example or central case.

Quinn and Holland emphasize that the fundamental premise of the structuring of a cultural model is as follows: Cultural understanding is organized into units smaller and simpler in construction and fewer in number than might have been supposed. The prototypical scenarios unfolded in the simplified worlds of cultural models, the nestedness of

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[1] Quinn and Holland, (1987: 3-35), *Culture and Cognition* in Holland and Quinn eds. Cultural Models in Language and Thought; use this term to refer to the interlinking of cultural models. This, they opine points to the fact that cultural knowledge is in sync with the storage capacity of knowledge of the brain.

[2] All these concepts are defined in Chapter 1.

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these presupposed models, one within another, and the applicability of certain of these models to multiple domains, all go far to explain how individuals can learn culture and communicate it to others, so that many come to share the same understandings. (in Holland and Quinn, eds.1987:35).

Most studies on cultural models have emphasized the concept of shared understanding within the boundaries of a particular culture. However, Keesing (1987) and others have also raised the pertinent question of whether it is necessary that this shared understanding need remain within the boundaries of a particular culture. Do like models arise in different cultures? Are cultural models purely particularistic, or is there a possibility of knowledge being organized in a similar manner across cultures? Is folk knowledge influenced totally by the culture within which it arises or are there universals on the basis of which humans encode, organize and understand the world around them?

Further, Lakoff (1987) among others, has put forward the concept of an idealized cognitive model, linking cultural knowledge with the human capacity to think and organize knowledge into a world view. Lakoff looks upon cultural models as the means to shed light on the human brain's cognitive processes. All these speculations are important if one has to answer the question posed elsewhere: How are meaning systems organized ? And this question can be answered only if detailed studies on various aspects of human understanding and conceptualization of knowledge are studied in detail and across various cultures.

The concept of happiness as the three cultural models will show is very much a part of folk knowledge. The interesting point is that the emotion

concept of happiness is structured in a strikingly similar fashion across all three languages. The implications of this will be discussed after the models have been described. The models have been described on the basis of the clustering of metaphors giving rise to a certain pattern of image schemata.

The following cultural models of happiness have been described on the basis of the methodology devised by Lakoff and Kövecses in their case study of anger.[3] The schematization of the language of happiness is done on the basis of metaphors, metonymies, idioms and image schemata. Thus the following study structures the emotion of happiness on the basis of metaphorical and image schematic extensions. The boundaries of emotions not being well defined, the metaphors have been assigned to categories where they fit best. Sometimes, the metaphors may appear in more than one category reflecting the fuzzy boundaries of emotion which is reflected in its language. Thus a metaphor such as *dil me kʰuśi ki lehər dəuɽ gəyi-* 'a wave of happiness ran through my heart' could be categorized as a metaphor of the container schema as well as a natural force metaphor. Further, certain metaphors which do not exclusively describe the emotion of happiness have been included because though they may indicate other emotions, they *do* indicate happiness too., These metaphors with modifications could describe any emotion, for instance, one can *blush* with joy, shame or anger. In much the same manner, though *tears* in isolation could be a physiological reaction to sadness, when modified or specified they could indicate happiness, anger or even shame. This further reaffirms the fuzzy borders between emotions as pointed out by D'Andrade- "in general, feelings do not seem to be well demarcated in the folk model (of

[3] Lakoff and Kövecses (1983). *The Cognitive model of anger inherent in American English.* Berkeley Cognitive Science Report No.10.Berkeley: University of California.(Also appeared in a slightly modified form in Holland and Quinn eds. 1987, Lakoff 1987 and Kövecses 1990).

the mind)." (in Holland and Quinn eds.1987:123). Happiness, in this study is thus interpreted in the broadest sense. Metaphors range from a sense of well being to intense happiness. Laughter has been included whenever it is taken as a manifestation of happiness. The inclusion not only of "specific happiness metaphors" but also metaphors which with modifications could indicate happiness has been done so as to give a richer account of the language of emotion.

2.1 THE CULTURAL MODEL OF HAPPINESS IN ENGLISH

The Verticality schema [4]

Happiness is typically schematized in terms of height as the following metaphors and metonymies indicate. Happiness being a positive emotion, it is featured at the upper end of the vertical scale. The following sentences are thus to be viewed in terms of metaphorical extensions.

Happiness is high

1. He is floating in the air.
2. I am on top of the world.
3. My spirits soared.
4. My feet are not on the ground.
5. I want to hit that high.
6. I was just transported.

Intense happiness is the highest point - Heaven

1. He is in seventh Heaven .
2. It was Paradise.
3. It was the seventh Heaven of delight.

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[4] The principal metaphors and image schemata are discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Happiness causes physical excitement - pictured in terms of verticality

1. He was over the moon.
2. He leapt with joy.
3. I was jumping with joy.

Other related metaphors indicate verticality[5]

1. These are the ups and downs of life.
2. His news lifted my heart up.
3. Just keep your spirits up.
4. Cheer up!

The Container Schema

The container schema is an important tool in the cognitivist's kit. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) opined that our conceptual system imposes a container structure on a variety of things that are not in fact containers. This is because there are certain directly emergent concepts like containers, with a clear structure that can be utilized in understanding concepts that have no such clear concepts.(as quoted in Kövecses:145). Thus events, time, society, states and emotions are cognized as containers.[6] "In the case of emotions, when we are inside the container, we are in the given emotional state" (Kövecses 1990:145) leading to the first metonym:

Happiness is the container

1. I'm in a good mood.
2. He was kept in good spirits.
3. He luxuriated in his happiness.
4. She reveled in her happiness.

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[5] These metaphors are not specific metaphors of happiness. They have been included here on the basis, however, that they do indicate to some extent the emotion of happiness, though it may not be the only emotion or perhaps not even the major emotion being talked about. They also show that the conceptualization of emotion is coherent with concepts outside the emotion domain.

[6] For instance : 1. He is in the race.
                2. We live in society.
                3. I'll be there in five minutes.
                4. I'm in love.

Happiness is the fluid in a container

1. Happiness welled up inside her.
2. She is filled with joy.
3. My cup of joy is filled to the brim.

As happiness gets more intense, the fluid overflows the container

1. My heart overflowed with joy.
2. My joy knew no bounds. (not necessarily fluid)
3. I could not contain my happiness.
4. My joy spilt over.
5. I could not hold back my laughter.

Happiness is situated in various bodily organs

Heart

1. There was a happy feeling in my heart.
2. My heart sings for joy.
3. The news made him light hearted.

Eyes

1. His eyes welled up with happiness.
2. I laughed so much that tears just flowed.

Happiness is of the Natural World

One of the most productive metaphors in the conceptualization of emotions is that of the natural world - it provides a rich source of images which are then targeted onto the domain of emotional experience. The metaphors, however, vary on the basis of the kind of emotion being experienced. For instance, though happiness has a number of natural world metaphors, it is marked by the absence of the *fire* and *aggressive animal behaviour* metaphors which serve to distinguish it from the emotion of anger. Secondly, a number of natural world metaphors encode within them the ecological peculiarities of a region, serving to distinguish them from other cultures,

for instance, the *toddy tree*[7] in Telugu. Even with universals like the sun and the stars, each culture gives varying importance to the natural phenomena.

Happiness is a natural force - rivers, floods, seas and storms

1. She opened the letter with a rush of happiness.
2. Happiness engulfed her.
3. Her intense joy overwhelmed her.
4. She felt a surge of joy within her.
5. She gurgled with laughter.

Happiness is light - the sun, moon and the stars

1. She gave me a sunny smile.
2. She basked in her happy state.
3. It was sunshine all through.
4. His eyes twinkled with merriment.
5. She was positively beaming.

Happiness is green

1. It was roses, roses all the way.
2. Her joy wilted.
3. It was the spring time of my life.

Happiness belongs to the world of animals and birds

1. He roared with pleasure.
2. He grinned like a Cheshire cat.
3. She smacked her lips with pleasure.
4. He bellowed with laughter.

Happiness is Agitation

A state of emotional calm is also a state of physical calm. Emotional disturbance leads to physical disturbance. And the more intense the emotional experience, the more physically disturbed the person becomes. It

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[7] *atani ki tati cettu ekkinanta santosamu* -'he is as happy as though he has climbed the toddy tree.'

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is interesting to note that physical agitation in happiness interlinks with the schema of verticality in a number of metaphors.

Happiness leads to physical disturbance

1. He danced with joy.
2. He did a cartwheel.
3. He leapt with joy.
4. He jumped with joy.

Happiness leads to loss of control over body and mind

1. He rolled with laughter.
2. He was carried off his feet.
3. He just cracked up with laughter.
4. They were intoxicated with pleasure.
5. I was on a high.
6. He was drunk on life.
7. It was a delirious feeling.
8. It was a heady experience.
9. It was a kind of frenzied joy.
10. I couldn't control my laughter.
12. I was dizzy with happiness.

Happiness is Physiological Reaction

In the case of emotions, a number of metaphors indicate the close relationship between the emotional experience and change or reaction in the body. This is probably so because physiological change especially in the face is readily observable with regard to emotions. The metaphors seem to capture this feature. For instance, consider the metaphor, *"his emotions are written all over his face."* Curiously, a number of emotions may account for similar physiological reactions leading to the application of similar metaphors for a number of emotions. For instance, *to flush* with joy, shame or anger.

Change in face and skin and eyes

1. She was all flushed with joy.
2. Her face suffused with joy.
3. His eyes sparkled with joy.
4. There was a twinkle in his eye.
5. His eyes welled up with happiness.

Heart

1. My heart flipped over.

Happiness is a Valuable Object

Most emotions may be conceptualized as objects, but happiness in particular is conceptualized as a precious object. This is probably so because happiness being a positive emotion is of great value to every one and most metaphors target onto happiness, images of other objects held in value by the respective cultures. The value is seen as all the more great because it is scarce, fragile and easily destroyed.

1. He cherished his happiness.
2. She guarded her joy jealously.
3. Her happiness is her greatest treasure.
4. Don't steal my happiness.
5. Joy is for sharing.

2.2 THE CULTURAL MODEL OF HAPPINESS IN HINDI

The Verticality schema

Happiness is high

1. mujʰe ɛsa ləga jɛse mɛ̃ne asman ko cʰu lɪya.
   I-dat. like felt as if I sky to touch had
   I felt as though I had touched the sky.

2. aj kəl uske p̃ao zəmin pər nəhĩ pəɽte.
   today yesterday his feet ground on neg. fall
   Nowadays his feet do not step on the ground.

Intense happiness is the highest point - Heaven

1. vo satve asman pər hɛ.
   He seventh heaven on is
   He is in Seventh Heaven.

2. use ɛsa ləga jɛse use jənnət mil gəyi ho.
   He-dat like felt as though he-dat. paradise find go aux.
   He felt as though he had found Paradise.

Happiness causes physical excitement - measured in terms of verticality

1. uski bat sunkər mɛ̃ ucʰəl pəɽi.
   her talk hear-CP I leapt fell
   I leapt up having heard what she said.

2. mɛ̃ jʰu:m uʈʰi.
   I swayed rise-pst.
   I swayed with happiness.

3. mɛ̃ nac uʈʰi.
   I danced rise-pst.
   I danced (with happiness).

The Container Metaphor

Happiness is a fluid in a container

1. use dekʰ kər mera dil   kʰuši   se   bʰər aya.
   him see-CP my   heart happiness with fill   come-pst.
   Seeing him my heart filled with happiness.

2. uski zindəgi kʰuši se   bʰər gəyi.
   his   life   joy   with fill go-pst.
   His life filled up with happiness.

3. usme kʰuši   ki lehər dəuɽ gəyi.
   he-in happiness of wave ran   go-pst.
   A wave of happiness ran through him.

Happiness is any matter in a container

1. kʰuši   se   mera damən bʰər de.
   happiness with my   fill   do
   Fill my life with happiness.

Happiness is any matter, not necessarily in a container

1. kʰuši bãnʈte   cəlo.
   joy   distributing go
   Distribute your happiness.

2. kʰuši bəʈorna.
   joy   gather-inf.
   To gather happiness.

3. kʰuši   səmeʈna.
   happiness collect-inf.
   To collect happiness.

As happiness gets more intense it overflows the container

1. pãnc sal   bad   veh əpne beʈe ko dekʰkər phu:li nəhĩ səmayi.
   five years after she her   son -obl. see-CP joy   neg. hold
   Seeing her son after five years, she could not contain her happiness.

2. hɔ̃si   ke phəvvare chu:ʈ gəye.
   laughter-obl. fountains   release go-pst.
   Fountains of laughter were released from me.

3. ãkhõ   se   khuši chələk gəyi.
   eyes   from joy   spill   go-pst.
   Happiness spilt from my eyes.

Happiness is situated in various bodily organs

The heart

1. mere dil   me ləɖɖu phu:ʈ gəye.
   my   heart in laddus burst go-pst.
   Laddus(sweets) burst in my heart.

2. veh dil   kholkər hə̃sa.
   he heart open-CP laugh
   He laughed heartily.

3. dil   me khuši ki lehər dəuɽ gəyi.
   heart in joy -obl. wave ran   go-pst.
   A wave of happiness ran through the heart.

4. dil   me khuši ki uməŋg jag   uʈhi.
   heart in joy   -obl surge awoke rise-pst.
   A surge of happiness ran through my heart.

Eyes

1. meri ãkhe khuši se   bhər ayĩ.
   my   eyes joy   with fill come-pst.
   My eyes filled up with tears of joy.

2. uski ãkhõ se   khuši chələk rəhi thi
   his eyes from joy   spill -prog. aux-pst.
   His eyes spilled with happiness.

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Happiness is of the Natural World

Happiness is a natural force - rivers, floods, seas and storms

1. usme kʰuśi ki lehər   dəuɽ gəyi.
   he in joy -obl wave/ripple run go-pst.
   A wave of happiness ran through him.

2. dil   me kʰuśi ki uməŋg jag   uʈʰi.
   heart in joy -obl. surge awake rise-pst.
   A surge of happiness awoke in the heart.

3. həsi   ke pʰəvvare cʰuːʈ gəye.
   laughter-obl. fountains   release go-pst.
   Fountains of laughter were released.

Happiness is light-the sun, moon and the stars

1. uski ãkʰe kʰuśi   se   cəmək uʈʰi.
   his eyes happiness with sparkle rise-pst.
   His eyes lit up with happiness.

2. zindəgi kʰuśi   se   rəśən ho gəyi.
   life   happiness with light   became
   Life lit up with happiness.

3. kismət ka   tara cəmək gəya.
   fortune-poss. star shine   go-pst.
   The star of fortune shone bright.

4. mera cehra kʰuśi   se   cəmək uʈʰa.
   my face happiness with shine   rise-pst.
   My face brightened up with happiness.

Happiness is green

1. həm pər kʰuśi ki bəhar cʰa   gəyi.
   us on joy -obl. spring cover go-pst.
   A spring time of happiness enveloped me.

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2. kʰuʃi   se uska cehra kʰil   uʈʰa.
   happiness with his   face bloom rise-pst.
   His face blossomed with happiness.

3. mera cehra kʰuʃi se   cəmək uʈʰa.
   my   face joy   with shine rise-pst.
   My face lit up with joy.

Happiness belongs to the world of animals and birds

1. mɛ̃ kʰuʃi se   cehək uʈʰi.
   I joy   with chirp rise-pst.
   I chirped with happiness.

2. mɛ̃ kʰil kʰilake hə̃s pəɽi.
   I expressive   laugh fall-pst.
   I laughed like a bird.

Happiness is agitation

Happiness leads to physical disturbance

1. uski bat sunkər   mɛ̃ ucʰəl pəɽi.
   her talk listen-CP I leapt fall-pst.
   I leapt with joy after listening to her.

2. mɛ̃ jʰu:m uʈʰi.
   I sway rise-pst.
   I swayed with happiness.

3. mɛ̃ nac   uʈʰi.
   I dance rise-pst.
   I danced (with happiness).

Happiness leads to loss of control over body and mind

1. hə̃s hə̃s   ke vo loʈpoʈ   ho gəya.
   laugh laugh -CP he expressive became
   He became uncontrollable with laughter.

2. hə̃ste   hə̃ste   jan nikəl gəyi.
   laughing laughing life let out go-pst.
   I died laughing.

3. kʰuši   se   vo həd se   bahər ho gəya .
   happiness with he limit from out   became
   He crossed all limits with happiness.

4. kʰuši se vo divana ho gəya.
   joy   with he mad   became
   He went mad with happiness.

5. vo kʰuši ke mare mər gəyi.
   she joy -obl. kill die go-pst.
   She died of happiness.

6. vo kʰuši se pagəl ho gəyi.
   she joy   with mad   became
   She became mad with happiness.

Happiness is Physiological Reaction

Change in face and skin

1. meri bə̃cʰe kʰil   gəyĩ.
   my lips   bloom go-pst.
   My lips widened.

2. meri to bəttisi   dikʰ gəyi.
   my   thirty-two show go-pst.
   My thirty two (teeth) showed.

Eyes

1. uski ə̃kʰe kʰuši   se   cəmək utʰĩ.
   his eyes   happiness with shine rise-pst.
   His eyes shone with happiness.

2. uski ə̃kʰe kʰuši   se   bʰər ayĩ.
   his eyes happiness with fill   come-pst.
   His eyes filled up with happiness.

Heart

1. mera dil   gəd gəd   hua
   my   heart expressive aux-pst.
   My heart began to beat with happiness.

Happiness is a Valuable Object

1. use   kʰuši ka   kʰəzana mil gəya.
   he-dat. joy -poss. treasure find go-pst.
   He found a treasure of happiness.

2. meri kʰuši   mət   lu:ʈo.
   my   joy   don't steal
   Don't steal my joy.

3. kʰuši b͂aʈna   cahɪye.
   joy   share   should
   One must share one's happiness.

4. usne   sari kʰuši uske   nam kər di.
   he-acc. all joy   he-dat. name do-pst.
   He gave away all his happiness to him.

Happiness is a territory, it is location

1. meri kʰuši ki sima   nəhĩ hɛ.
   my   joy -obl boundary neg. aux-pres.
   There is no limit /boundary to my happiness.

Happiness is Music

1. kʰuši ke dʰol bəjne ləge.
   joy   of drums play start
   The drums of happiness started playing.

2. kʰuši ke tar   jʰən jʰəna uʈʰe.
   joy   of strings expressive rise
   The strings of happiness began to play.

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3. mən ga uʈʰa.
   heart sang rise
   The heart began to sing.

2.3 THE CULTURAL MODEL OF HAPPINESS IN TELUGU

The Verticality Schema

Happiness is high

1. ətənu me:gʰalə lo te:li potunnaɖu.
   he   clouds -in float go-pres.
   He is floating in the clouds.

2. ətənu gali lo te:li potunnaɖu.
   he   wind in float go-pres.
   He is floating on air.

3. ətənu anəndə vihəngəmu əyyi   egiri potunnaɖu
   he   happiness wing   become fly go-pres.
   He is flying away on the wings of happiness.

4. ətəni kallu bhu:mi miida niləpəɖutə levu
   his   legs ground on   stand   neg.
   His feet do not stay on the ground.

5. naku himaləyə pərvətəmu ekkinəntə səntoʃəmu əyyindi.
   I-dat. himalaya mountain climb -as happiness be-aux.
   I felt as happy as though I had climbed the Himalayan mountain.

6. ətəniki taʈi ceʈʈu ekkinəntə səmbʰərəmu.
   He-dat. toddy tree climb-as happiness
   He feels as happy as though he has climbed a toddy tree.

7. ətəniki anɖələmu ekkinəntə səntoʃəmu.
   He-dat. zenith   climb-as happiness
   He feels as happy as though he has reached the zenith.

8. mii ʃubhə vartə vini   naku konɖəntə səntoʃəmu.
   your good news hear-CP I-dat. mountain-like happiness
   I feel a mountain of happiness having heard your good news.

Intense happiness is the highest point-Heaven

1. idi brəhma anəndəmu
   this God   happiness.
   This is the happiness of Gods.

2. kəḍupu ninḍite kəilaŠəmu.
   stomach fill-if   kailash
   If the stomach is full , it is like Heaven (Mt. Kailash, the abode of Lord Shiva).

Happiness causes physical excitement - measured in terms of verticality

1. na maṭa vini   ətənu egiri gentulu vesæḍu.
   my news hear-CP he   jump leaps   put-pst.
   He heard my news and started jumping with joy.

The Container Metaphor

As happiness gets more intense, the liquid overflows the container (this subsumes the liquid in a container metaphor)

1. hridəyəmu səntoŠəmu to   ninḍi pongi porilindi
   heart   happiness   with fill   overflow-pst.
   The heart filled and overflowed with happiness.

2. səntoŠəmu pəṭṭuka leka poyyænu.
   joy   hold   neg. go-pst.
   I could not contain my happiness.

3. nuvvu ceppina maṭa to   na mənəsu pongi   vəccindi.
   you   say-CP news with my heart   overflow come-pst.
   My heart overflowed after having listened to your news.

4. kənḍlu navvu   to   ciṭlincinaḍu.
   eyes   laughter with sprinkle-pst.
   His eyes sprinkled laughter.

When happiness gets too intense , the container bursts

1. poṭṭə cəkkəlu əiyye təṭlu nəvvædu.
   stomach pieces become like laugh-pst.
   He laughed till his stomach broke into various fragments.

Happiness is situated in various bodily organs

The Heart

1. gunḍæ anəndəpu miiṭəlu nokkindi.
   heart happiness-of strings press-pst.
   The heart plucked the strings of happiness.

2. mənəsu vippi nəvvænu.
   heart open laugh-pst.
   I laughed heartily.

Eyes

1. nii· kənḍlulə lo anəndəmu cu:stunnanu.
   your eyes in happiness see-pres-prog.
   I am seeing happiness in your eyes.

2. anəndəmu to asrivulu vəccinayi.
   happiness with tears come-pst. ,
   Tears of happiness came.

Happiness is of the Natural World

Happiness is a natural force-rivers, floods, storms and seas

1. na mənəsu ələ la te:li potunnədi.
   My heart wave like float go-pres-prog.
   My heart is floating like a wave.

2. ide na səntóšə sagərəmu.
   this my happiness sea
   This is the sea of my happiness.

3. sənto˘səmu pongi porilindi.
   happiness   overflow-pst.
   Happiness overflowed (like a river).

4. sənto˘sə   tərəngalə   lo munigi   ettipoyyædu.
   happiness currents   in drown   carry-pst-3Pmas.
   He drowned and was carried away by the currents of happiness.

5. sənto˘sə   sagərəmu   lo koʈʈi   miʈʈadinadu.
   joy   sea   in kick   frolick-pst-3P-mas.
   He frolicked in the sea of happiness.

Happiness is light - the sun, the stars and the moon

1. cəlləni raja   o   cəndəmama.
   cold   king -voc. moon
   The king of coolness and pleasantness-the moon.

2. nuvvu na pəkkənə vunʈe prəti   ratiri   punnəmi   pəguləite vennela.
   you   my side   be-if every night   full moon day   moonlight.
   If you are by my side, every night is like the full moon, the day is also
full of moon   shine.

3. vennelə   lanʈi   nəvvulu.
   moonlight like   laughter
   Laughter as soft and pleasant as the moon.

4. ətəni kəndlu sənto˘səmu to   nək˘sətralə velugutunnayi.
   his   eyes   happiness with stars-like   shine-pres-prog.
   His eyes are shining like the stars.

Happiness is green

1. na   jivitani   vəsəntə ritu.
   my   life-poss. spring   season
   The spring time of my life.

2. u:rənta   sənkranti
   village-full sankranti (harvest festival).
   There is so much happiness, it is as though the whole village is celebrating
the harvest   festival.

3. sirimǝlle puvula nǝvvu.

   jasmine flowers laughter

   Laughter as beatuful or soft as the jasmine.

4. nityǝ kǝlyanǝmu pǝccǝ torǝnǝmu anǝndaniki sǝnketǝmu.

   When everything is blooming and growing around you, it is a sign of happiness.

5. jivitǝmǝnta hǝrivillu.

   life-full   rainbow

   Life is like a rainbow.

6. pu:lǝ panupu sukʰǝm vistundi

   flower bed   joy   gives

   A bed of flowers gives utmost joy.

7. nuvvu ekkǝdǝ vunṭe ǝkkǝḍe   nǝndǝ   vǝnǝmu.

   you where be   there-emph. Krishna's garden

   Where ever you are that place is like the garden Lord Krishna stays in. (It bestows   happiness).

Happiness belongs to the world of animals and birds

1. ame kilǝ kilǝ nǝvvindi.

   she expressive laugh-pst.

   She laughed like a bird.

Happiness is Agitation

Happiness leads to physical disturbance

1. sukʰǝ sǝntoṢǝmu to ˜ vo:lǝlaḍæḍu

   happiness   with sway-pst-3P-mas.

   He swayed with happiness.

2. anǝndǝmu to egiri gentulu vesæḍu

   happiness with jump leap   put-pst-3Pmas.

   He leapt up with joy.

Happiness leads to loss of control over body and mind

1. səntoʃəmu to   ukkiri bikkiri əyyinaɖu
   happiness with expressive became
   He went crazy with happiness.

2. ətəni anəndani ki pəʈʃə pəggalu levu
   his happiness -obl. reins   neg.
   There are no reins on his happiness.

3. səntoʃamu to   picci vaɖu əyyi poyyæɖu.
   happinesss with mad man be go-pst-3Pmas.
   He became a mad man due to his happiness.

4. sukʰə səntoʃəmu to   məttu   lo pəɖɖæɖu.
   happiness   with drunken state in fell-3Pmas.
   He became drunk on happiness.

5. nəvvu   ni apuko lekə poyyæɖu.
   Laughter -obl. stop neg go-pst-3Pmas.
   He could not control his laughter.

Happiness is Physiological Reaction

Change in face and skin

1. səntoʃəmu toʈi murisi potunnaɖu.
   happiness with blush go-pres-3Pmas.
   He is blushing with happiness.

Eyes

1. ətəni kənɖlu səntoʃəmu to   nəkʃətrala velugutunnayi.
   his eyes happiness with stars like shine -pres.prog.
   His eyes are shining like the stars.

2. kənɖlu nəvvu to ciʈlincinaɖu.
   eyes laughter with sprinkle-pst-3Pmas.
   He sprinkled laughter from his eyes.

3. ivi   anəndə asrivulu.
   these joy   tears
   These are tears of joy.

Heart

1. na   mənəsu vuyyaləlu vu:gutunnədi.
   my heart swing   swing-pres.prog.
   My heart is swinging.

2. mənəsu anəndə ɖo:likəlu vu:gisəlaɖutunnədi
   heart joy   swing   swing-play-pre.prog.
   My heart is swinging the swing of joy.

Happiness is a Valuable Object

1. sukhani pəncivvu.
   joy   share-give
   Share your joy.

2. səntoʃəmu ləbʰistundi.
   happiness find/gain.
   You will find happiness.

Happiness is a desirable quality - and vice-versa

1. əndəme   anəndəmu.
   beauty-emph. happiness
   Beauty is happiness.

2. səntoʃəme səgəm bələmu.
   happiness half   strength.
   Happiness is half your strength.

3. anəndəme   məhabʰagyəmu.
   happiness-emph. great fortune
   Happiness is the greatest fortune.

4. səntoʃəmu lekunʈe jivitəmu vyərtʰəmu.
   happiness neg-if life   waste
   Without happiness, life is a waste.

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5. anəndəme jivitə məkərəndəmu.
   happiness life   goal
   Happiness is the ultimate goal of life.

Happiness is a territory, it is location

1. anəndə   lokalu vihərinci vəccædu.
   happiness places stayed come-pst.
   He has traversed the lands of happiness.

2. anəndəpu ənculu ce:rinadu.
   happiness limits reach-pst-3Pmas.
   He has reached the borders of joy.

Happiness is Music

1. aṭa paṭələ   to jivitəmu gədəpæru.
   play songs with life   spend
   They spent their lives in song and dance.

2. viinulu   ·   . vindəinə səngiitəmu.
   Musical instruments playing music   ·
   I felt so happy, it was as though the veenas started playing.

3. gundæ anəndəpu miiṭulu nokkindi.
   heart happy   strings press-pst.
   The heart plucked the strings of happiness.

2.4 THE PRINCIPAL METAPHORS OF HAPPINESS

The cultural models of happiness in English, Hindi and Telugu, elaborated in the foregoing pages show that the emotion of happiness is constructed around a few principal metaphors. The data suggests that a large part of our conceptualization and organization of emotion is based on metaphor. Metaphors are pervasive in emotion talk. Moreover, these metaphors are clustered or structured around a prominent image schema.

Lakoff's and Kövecses' study (1983) showed that the conceptualization of anger was intimately linked with the embodiment of that emotion. That embodiment gave rise to a number of physiological reactions. These physiological reactions in turn were expressed through numerous metaphors which were in turn clustered around an image schema - that of the container, in the case of anger. Anger, thus basically was pictured and expressed as the *heat of a liquid in a container*. The container metaphor is equally pervasive in the expression of various other emotions such as fear, respect, pride, etc.

In happiness, however, the metaphors are not based solely on physiological reactions. Further, the container metaphor is clearly not the most important or most productive. A number of clusters of metaphors giving rise to various image schemata co-occur in the conceptualization of the emotion of happiness.

The basic premises postulated by Lakoff and Kövecses in their study of anger hold good for happiness too. As Kövecses elaborates, "the structure of at least some emotional concepts can be seen as being constituted by four parts:
1. a system of conceptual metonymies
2. a system of conceptual metaphors
3. a set of related concepts and
4. a category of cognitive models."(Kövecses 1990:198)

The emotion concept of happiness too is structured by these four parts. As the above cultural models disclose, happiness operates on the following principal metaphors, metonymies and image schemata.

2.4.1 *I want to hit that high :* The Verticality Schema

Perhaps the most productive image schema giving rise to a number of metaphors for the conceptualization and expression of happiness is the verticality schema. It is an important addition to other principal metaphors enumerated by Kövecses (1990). The verticality schema includes within it a number of metaphors such as *happiness is high, happiness is heaven, happiness is physical excitement* and so on. The verticality schema is most productive in all the three languages under study. It measures happiness in terms of anything high - heaven, mountains, toddy trees to birds - a range of metaphors in all three languages, anything as long as it is perceived to be high. Thus :

i. Telugu : kəɖupu nindite kəilaśəmu
'When the stomach is full, it is like Mt. Kailash.'

ii. Hindi : mujʰe ɛsa ləga jɛse mɛne asmãn ko cʰu liya
'I felt as though I had touched the sky.'

iii. English : I was just transported.

The verticality schema operates particularly productively with the emotion of happiness and as a corollary, with sadness too. Happiness and sadness can be viewed as points along a scale of verticality - a scale which measures a continuum between the extremes of ecstasy and utmost depression. Happiness is located at the upper end of the scale, in tandem with folk notions that anything *high is positive.* Moreover, as we move higher up the scale, the intensity of happiness increases, this too, in keeping with folk notions of *More is Up.* This last notion helps in linking the verticality schema with the container metaphor.

Further, happiness is seen in opposition or relation to another emotion, viz. sadness. This notion of binarity - of viewing and conceptualizing the world in terms of opposition, is an indication of the embodiment of emotion with respect to the verticality schema.[8] The human body is itself based on the notions of symmetry and opposition. Thus, right is always with regard to the left. Similarly *up* is always in relation to *down*. These notions of opposition and relatedness form the basis of the verticality schema which in turn is widely used in the conceptualization of emotion - ultimately pointing back to the embodiment of emotion. Further the notion of opposition is not polar, neither in the body nor in emotion talk. The notion of a continuum seems more productive. Thus happiness and sadness are not amorphous feelings but show a clear embodiment in their conceptualization, in keeping with Johnson's theory of the *body in the mind*. (1987)

While the verticality scale in anger is submerged within the container metaphor, it comes into its own with the emotion of happiness and sadness. Happiness could thus range from a general nice feeling, a feeling of well being to an intense ecstatic joy as one moves up along the continuum. These could well be contrasted with metaphors of sadness for instance :

i. I'm feeling bogged down.
ii. I am depressed.
iii. I'm down in the dumps.

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[8] The notion of binarity and opposition need necessarily not be in relation to the verticality schema only. This may work with the schema of horizontality as the work of Rosch (1978) and Johnson (1987) shows. Happiness thus could be viewed along any plane vertical or horizontal. However the number of metaphors which indicate verticality shows that this schema *is* one of the basic ways by which happiness is schematized in various languages and cultures.

all of which show a descent down the scale. That happiness and sadness are related can also be gathered from metaphors expressing similar physiological reactions. For instance, consider the following metaphors in English :

i. She shed tears of joy.
ii. I'm so happy I could die.
iii. It is so beautiful, I could die.
iv. I laughed so much, tears just flowed.

There seems to be a very thin dividing line between the two emotions. Thus a destruction of happiness could have one descending down the scale into the depths of sadness. This probably accounts for the idiom in Telugu which translates as *"don't laugh too much or you will cry"*, disclosing the value and fragility of happiness. Further metaphors in English which show the relationship between the two emotions are :

i. Her joy died / wilted.
ii. She killed his happiness.
iii. Her smile faded away.

The verticality schema points to the fact *that happiness is positive.* It also shows the irreversible link between *positive* and *up.* As Lakoff and Johnson point out, in the case of a large number of central concepts, the upward orientation corresponds to things that are considered good, while the downward orientation to things that are viewed as bad or less good (as quoted in Kövecses, 1990:186). Kövecses is of the view that even within the emotion domain, the same two classes can be noticed. Thus happiness is conceptualized as *up,* while sadness is *down.* This corresponds to the distinction between positive and negative emotions. Thus the domain of emotions with its conceptualization in terms of negative and positive as also up and down inter links it to a world of knowledge concepts outside as well.(1990:186). This can be seen in the use of related metaphors which

include within them emotion concepts as well. For instance, the English metaphor, *these are the ups and downs of life.*

2.4.2 *dil me ləɖɖu pʰu:ʈ gəye - laddus burst in my heart :* The Container Metaphor

This metaphor is most pervasive in emotion talk. Most writers on the subject are of the view that the container metaphor is by far *the* most productive metaphor in the conceptualization of emotion. Kövecses (1990:158) believes it is so because it is an important way of conceptualizing the human mind and body, and thus has important implications for the theory of personhood. The container schema works with the following metaphors :

i. Emotional states are containers - when a person is in given emotional state, he /she is in a container.

ii. The mind is a container

iii. The body is a container

iv. Emotions are fluids in a container and

v. Emotions are the heat of a liquid in a container.

(i) works very well across all three languages as a look at the cultural models will show. In English, especially, a number of metaphors indicate the cognition of a particular emotion state in the form of a container. Thus:
a. I'm in a good mood.
b. He was kept in good spirits.
c. He luxuriated in his happiness.

(ii) is conspicuous by its absence. In none of the three languages does happiness reside in the mind. The mind in this case is not the ruler of

emotions as Satan says in <u>Paradise Lost</u> - *"the mind in itself can make a Hell out of Heaven or a heaven out of Hell."* [9]

(iii) on the contrary is most productive in expressions of happiness. Happiness is situated in various bodily organs, especially the heart and the eyes. Consider the following sentences :

i. English: My heart sings for joy.

ii. Hindi: veh dil kʰolkər həsã .
    'He laughed heartily.'

iii. Telugu: gunɖæ anəndəpu miiʈulu nokkindi.
    'The heart plucked the strings of joy.'

The eyes of course are the windows to the heart or in other words to emotion and they express happiness too :

i. English: His eyes welled up with tears of joy.

ii. Hindi: uski ãkhe kʰuši se bhər aye.
    'His eyes filled up with joy.'

iii. Telugu: anəndəmu to asrivulu vəccinayi.
    'Tears of happiness came.'

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[9] Milton, John <u>Paradise Lost Book 1.</u>

While (iv) and (v) are most pervasive in emotion talk, they are not quite so productive in the expression of happiness. They take up limited space in the cultural models of all three languages. Further, these two metaphors have interesting variations. While in most emotion language, the *heat of a liquid* metaphor is most pervasive, it is marked by its absence in the expression of happiness. The *liquid in a container metaphor*, however has a number of metaphors clustering around it. It does not, however combine with the metaphor of *heat*, which had given birth to a very structured and well conceptualized model of anger. In happiness the container metaphor is structured as follows :

a. Happiness is a liquid in a container.

b. As happiness gets more intense, the liquid overflows the container.

c. When happiness gets too intense, the container bursts.

As noted above, the intensity of happiness does not occur in combination with the heat metaphor. Rather, here the amount - the quantity of happiness increases causing it to overflow the container which can no longer hold it. Thus, literally as well as metaphorically, " *I could not contain my happiness.* "

The container metaphor throws up further images of happiness. Happiness need not necessarily be the *liquid* in a container, it could be any unspecified matter. Consider the following metaphors:

a. Hindi: kʰuŜi se mera damən bʰər de.
    'Fill my life with happiness.'

b. Telugu: səntoŜəmu paʈʈukə lekə poyyænu.
    'I could not hold my happiness.'

c. English: My joy knew no bounds.

The above metaphors are not necessarily liquid. And it follows from their non-liquid state, that further images of containment of a liquid in a container such as the emotion overflowing or the container bursting will not follow. This is most evident from the metaphors in Hindi.

The container metaphor has important implications for the emotion prototype. Kövecses, concentrates on the images of *liquid* and *heat* in relation to the container metaphor. The container metaphor in happiness is not entirely based on liquid and there seems to be a complete absence of heat. This distinguishes happiness from emotions like anger which are almost entirely based on the above said images. Thus the following conclusions may be drawn :

1. The happiness model is structured on the basis of the container metaphor to a limited extent.

2. The body is seen as a container of happiness.

3. The mind is *not* seen as a container for happiness.[10]

4. The substance in the container is not necessarily liquid and

5. The container metaphor does not co-occur with *heat*.

2.4.3 *jivitəmənta hərivillu - life is a rainbow* : The Natural World

This is the third principal metaphor of happiness and one of the most productive. This includes metaphors such as *happiness is a natural force -* rivers, floods, seas and storms.

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[10] This may not be clearly true of Hindi where the word *mən* which is a container of emotions does not refer solely to the heart. It is best translated as a combination of the heart and the mind. Interestingly, in Korean, too the mind is situated in the heart.

The natural force emotion as Kövecses (1990:162-3) mentions has four main implications:

1. Emotions are forces and thus there is a lack of personal control over these emotions. The individual is passive and is swept away by his/her emotions over which no control is possible.

2. The metaphor also suggests that these emotions are of high intensity. Thus they combine with the *more is up* metaphor.

3. Moreover, beyond a certain point, the increase in the intensity of emotion leads to an inability to function normally. It leads to a further set of metaphors which indicate a loss of control over the mind and body.

4. Lastly, emotional experiences are episodic or relatively short-lived -"they are like whirlwinds; they come in surges; they sweep over us and then subside..."(Kövecses 1990:163).

Emotion as a natural force metaphor is abundant in all three languages ranging from water, waves to fountains, seas, etc. as the data shows in all the three cultural models.

Another variation of the natural world metaphor is - *happiness is light - the sun, moon and the stars*. This metaphor is also quite productive in structuring the emotion of happiness. A clear cultural differentiation can be seen between the three languages. Thus while the English cultural model revolves mainly around the metaphors of the sun, the Hindi cultural model includes expressions using the imagery of the sun and the stars. The Telugu cultural model includes metaphors which compare happiness to the moon and the stars. It includes the rainbow too in one instance.

Yet another variant is that of *the happiness is green* metaphor. This includes metaphors which supplant the domain of the living plant world on to an

emotional state or experience. Thus the world of plants and flowers and greenery is yet another manner of structuring, conceptualizing and expressing happiness.

The last variant of the natural world is that of happiness belonging to *the world of animals and birds*. While the metaphors in the Indian languages are few and far between (they relate mainly to the birds), the English cultural model provides a vast array of animal and bird metaphors - from lions, to bulls, to cats.

2.4.4 *He was drunk on life :* Happiness is Physical Agitation

The next principal metaphor is central to most emotions. It results from physical as well as physiological reactions of the body to the experience of emotion. Thus, happiness is also expressed as part of the *happiness is agitation* metaphor. The metaphor takes into account the following premises:

a. The self when in a state of emotional equilibrium is also in a state of physical equilibrium. Thus emotional calm is physical calm.

b. When the self is in an emotional state, the self is also in a state of physical disturbance. Thus emotional disturbance is physical disturbance.

c. A great deal of intensity of emotion leads to excessive physical disturbance. Emotion could thus engender within it a loss of control over both body and mind.

All these premises are applicable to emotions in general. They are applicable to happiness too in all the three languages studied. Kövecses(1990:167) quotes Young (1943) on the subject of physiological reactions : "an emotion is an acute disturbance or upset of the individual

which is revealed in behaviour and in conscious experience, as well as through widespread changes in the functioning of the viscera, and which is initiated by forces within a psychological situation."

The physical agitation metaphor is another of those all pervasive metaphors which occurs within other central metaphors or is at least inter linked with them. Thus it brings together the container, the natural force, physiology and the verticality metaphors. All these metaphors involve physical or bodily agitation to a certain degree.

2.4.5 *She was all flushed with joy :* Happiness is Physiological Reaction

As a corollary to the above, the metaphor *happiness is physiological reaction* follows. This includes reactions in the skin/face, heart and eyes. This again links up with the container metaphor which looks at happiness as residing within certain bodily organs viz., within the heart and the eyes. Physiological reactions are similar to the natural force metaphor in that they are "happenings" not "actions". The individual is passive, he has no control over his reactions. As Kövecses says, "bodily change, especially visceral and expressive reactions provide a rich source of metaphors and metonymies such as *sweaty palms* for fear; *broken heart* for grief and so on. They, however, are expressed only when the emotional experience is intense."(1990:174). Crying or tears are one of the most important ways of expressing emotion as these are purely physiological reactions. Thus even with happiness expressions such as these occur:

a. English: His eyes welled up with joy.

b. Hindi: ãkhõ se kʰuši cʰələk gəyi.
   Happiness spilt over from his eyes.

c. Telugu: kəndlu nəvvu to ciṭlincinadu.
   His eyes sprinkled happiness.

Other metaphors include changes or reactions in the heart and the face. This seems to justify the general metaphorical expression - " *his emotions are written all over his face*".

2.4.6 *He treasured his happiness:* Happiness is a Valuable Object

This is present in all the three languages of English, Hindi and Telugu. This is applicable to happiness for the obvious reason that happiness is a positive emotion, it has great value and always carries with it the fear that it is short lived and may be destroyed. It is this fragile, momentary nature of happiness which makes it much valued and cherished, giving rise to idioms in certain Indian languages such as, *don't laugh too much or you will cry.*

It is jealously guarded over and nurtured lest it be destroyed and sink down the vertical scale into the depths of sadness and despondency. It also leads to the altruistic notion that since it is in short supply (which accounts for its value), it must be shared among people. This is a notion prevalent in all the three cultural models.

2.4.7 *Three minor metaphors : Happiness is a desirable quality, it is territory and it is music*

In Telugu, happiness is seen as a desirable quality. Further, desirable qualities are also seen as happiness. Qualities such as strength, beauty and others are viewed as desirable qualities ultimately leading to bliss.

The territory metaphor occurs both in Hindi and Telugu, where happiness is depicted as a place, a location, best expressed by the Telugu metaphor *"anəndə lokalu" or the lands of happiness.*

Happiness is music occurs both in the Telugu and Hindi cultural models, where happiness is equated with song and dance, with sweet music and with musical instruments. A number of poetic metaphors are constructed in English around this image but in Telugu and Hindi it seems to be part of folk knowledge.

2.5 THE INTER-LINKING OF METAPHORS

From the foregoing account of metaphors, it is clear that the principal metaphors used in the structuring of happiness are interlinked. This inter twining of metaphors is yet another manifestation of the organization of human knowledge in the most economical manner possible. This grouping of schema within schema organizes knowledge in such a manner that the knowledge of a few metaphors will help in understanding a particular cultural model as these major metaphors occur one within the other. This is referred to as "nestedness" by Quinn and Holland - "the nestedness of cultural models one within another lends a further, far reaching economy to cultural knowledge. This hierarchical structure in which models of wide applicability recur as elements of models in many domains of experience has implications for long term memory as well. These general purpose models considerably reduce the total amount of cultural knowledge to be mastered." (in Holland and Quinn eds. 1987:34).

Thus even in talk about emotion, not only are the principal metaphors that are to be mastered limited in number, furthermore, they are nested within one another. For instance, within the container metaphor in anger, there is a clear subsuming of the verticality schema - as the intensity of anger

increases, the heat of the liquid within the container too rises along the verticality scale.

As D'Andrade puts it, "one consequence of the hierarchical structure of schemata is that certain cultural models have a wide range of application as parts of other models ...to have a real understanding of a culture one must know at least those models widely incorporated into other models."(in Holland and Quinn 1987:112-3). In emotion the interlinking can be seen in two broad patterns:

1. nestedness of one schema within the other and

2. the applicability of certain metaphoric schema to a large number of emotions, for instance, the container schema .

Analyzing the latter category first, it is clear that the principal metaphors used in the language of happiness are also the principal metaphors used in the language of most other emotions, though their degree of use or disuse may vary from one to the other. Thus the metaphors of the container, verticality, natural world, physical and physiological reactions occur in most other emotions such as fear, anger, respect, pride, love and so on. To elaborate, consider the following expressions of the container metaphor :

1. Anger : He was filled with a burning rage .

2. Pride : Her heart swelled with pride.

3. Love : You fill up my senses.

4. Fear   : The sight filled her with fear.

5. Sadness : I feel so empty.

6. Happiness: She could not contain her joy.

The container metaphor is thus all pervading in the expression of emotion. So are most other principal metaphors. The interlinking of these metaphors

one with the other makes a distinction between the different emotions experienced. For instance, though the container metaphor is used in structuring both happiness and anger, the images it gives rise to are vastly different. In anger, the combination with heat gives a totally different twist to the container metaphor. In happiness it is the *container + quantity* metaphors which lead to most images of happiness. It is this combination of metaphors that serves to distinguish one emotion from another to a great degree.

In happiness the nestedness of various image schemata is evident. For instance the following combinations are evident :

1. The container + verticality - *Happiness welled up inside her.*

2. The natural world + container- *She felt a surge of joy within her.*

3. Physical agitation + verticality - *He leapt with joy.*

4. Physiological reaction + container - *My heart flipped over.*

5. Container + music- 'gundæ anəndəpu miiṭulu nokkindi
               'The heart plucked the strings of happiness.'

The following conclusions may probably be drawn about the intertwining of metaphorical images:

1. It could lead to economy of knowledge that is to be stored in the mind so as to fit into the needs of short term memory as suggested by D'Andrade and Quinn and Holland.

 2. It could set patterns for the types of combinations as well as the use of individual metaphors which structure emotion.

3. It could help distinguish one emotion from another and finally

 4. It makes clear the structuring of the cognitive model of a particular culture so that one knows what exactly to look for in order to understand a particular culture, in order to have an insider's view.

What distinguishes one emotion from another is not only the principal metaphors that are used, or the combinations of these metaphors, but also conversely to an extent, the absence of certain metaphors to organize and express a particular emotion. For instance, it would be ridiculous to express anger evoking the image of flowers, because flowers typically represent something pleasant, soft, fragrant which anger definitely is not.

In much the same manner, happiness is marked by the absence or near absence of certain principal metaphors and image schemata such as :
1. Emotion as heat
2. Emotion as fire
3. Emotion as an aggressive animal and
4. Emotion as opponent.

The last especially marks happiness as a very different emotion from anger, fear or sadness because in happiness, there is no attempt or at best a half hearted attempt at battling the emotion. Only in some cases do metaphors such as:
1. I was trying to hide my amusement or
2. I could not hold back my laughter

occur. These, however, are not examples of an outright battling of happiness, rather a fight against the manifestation of happiness. And in some cases, happiness does not enter the picture at all. The absence of the opponent metaphor in happiness has important implications for the prototype theory of emotion.[11]

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[11] This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

To sum up, the principal metaphors, their clustering to form image schemata, the presence or absence of metaphors and the various permutations and combinations they occur in, all combine to create the cognitive model of a particular emotion. They help to distinguish one emotion from another due to the varying degree of importance they may have in the structuring of different emotions. But in the structuring of a particular emotion across cultures or languages, they remain remarkably similar.

2.6 IS THE STRUCTURE OF EMOTION LOCAL OR UNIVERSAL?

Kay (in Holland and Quinn eds.,1987) observes that cultural models are not to be thought of as presenting a coherent ontology, a globally consistent whole, in the way that the expert's theory is designed to be. Cultural models are better thought of in Kay's view, as resources or tools, to be used when suitable and set aside when not.

"An ideational theory of culture, according to Keesing, "can look at cultural knowledge as distributed within a social system, can take into account the variation between an individual's knowledge of the vantage points on the cultural heritage of the people. It can also view cultural knowledge as shaping and constraining but not directly generating social behaviour."(in Holland and Quinn eds.,1987:371). Cultural models are thus at once cultural and public- they are placed in the multisided paradigms of "how what we know articulates with the social worlds we create together and which dialectically create us and what we know." Cultural models enumerate the historically accumulated knowledge of a people and the embodiments of a language and cognize the paradigms for construing the world.

A growing volume of research on the various aspects of folk knowledge has, however highlighted the fact that a cultural model need not be strictly cultural (in the sense of being restricted to or applicable to only a particular culture). A number of cognitive models across various cultures have been found to share some essential features, prompting questions on the working of the human mind especially in the organization of knowledge.

D'Andrade's research on the folk model of the mind delineated the organization of thoughts, beliefs, feelings and desires into a folk model,- the American-European model He finds overall, " the model used in Ifaluk[12] and the Western model seem to have similar frameworks . Thoughts, feelings and desires are distinguished. Feelings (for instance) are considered a response to experience, not under self control, and also have the power to move the person toward action."(in Holland and Quinn eds.,1987:144). There are however, significant differences too - the situation of the feelings in the gut rather than the heart being one of them.

Logically D'Andrade believes, one might believe that the Ifalukan materials are not in the least translatable into the Western world. If these models are models of private experience (internal states and processes), how are they matched to any one else's private experience, even if the experience is highly similar ? That is because D'Andrade concludes that neither model is merely a model of private experience - both models use similar, external, public definitions of internal states : thus thinking is like

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[12] The Ifalukan model is the folk model of a small community studied by Catherine Lutz. Ifaluk is a small atoll, located in the Western Caroline Islands of Micronesia. The findings of this study are published as a paper titled: *Goals, events and understanding in Ifaluk emotion theory.* In Holland and Quinn eds., <u>Cultural models in language and thought</u> 1987: pp.290-310. D'Andrade describes this as a "non-Western folk model of the mind."

speech and speech is public. This, in his view accounts for the similarities between the two cultural models and the translatability of one into the other. What then accounts for their differences ? D'Andrade says, "it seems likely that some part of (the) folk model cannot be explained by variation in current social or ecological factors. Parts of most folk models are legacies from the past, and the information needed to discover whatever causes once operated to create these models is often not obtainable."(in Holland and Quinn eds.,1987:146)

Keesing makes similar observations. He says, "in many realms - folk conceptualizations of emotions, time, mental processes and so on are turning out to be more similar than might have been expected. The differences are more shadings of value and emphasis than unique conceptualizations."(in Holland and Quinn eds., 1987:374). Keesing goes on to say, "folk models comprise the realms of culturally constructed common sense. They serve pragmatic purposes, they explain the tangible, the experiential, the probable. They thus assume a superficial geology of causation : they hold sway in a realm in which exceptions prove rules and contradictions live happily together. They are world proposing, paradigmatic in nature. Such models are not presented to us in what everyday people say and do in their lives - they are represented in fragmentary surface facets. We must infer the more coherent if unarticulated models that lie beneath."(in Holland and Quinn eds., 1987:374).

It is the search for these coherent, unarticulated models, that Kövecses (1990) emphasizes. He proposes that by minute, close study of particular emotions across languages, one can discover the process of

conceptualization that goes into the organization of an emotion concept. He elaborates :

1. The characterization of emotion concepts should involve uncovering cognitive models (or scenarios) associated with emotion terms *that are human sized and are used for the purposes of everyday life.*

2. If we wish to account for the interaction between the emotion domain and the system of cultural values, then we should study *particular emotion concepts in great detail.*

3. In order for us to come to know an emotion concept in its detailed entirety, we have to examine, in addition to the various uses of a single emotion word, *the entire range of words and expressions related to the concept in question, including metaphors, metonymies, idioms and many more.*

Kövecses believes that the above methodology based on "conventionalized language" would be an important standard of comparision. He says, "...emotional concepts as analyzed here on the basis of the English language can be analyzed in similar ways in other languages. The comparision would no doubt be instructive.... these investigations might be used to the benefit of both the relevant expert theories and a more profound understanding of the way we see ourselves as functioning emotionally or otherwise."(1990:215)

Using Kövecses' methodology, with a few modifications (especially in the definition of a prototype), the following study presents the findings of the conceptualization of happiness through the study of conventionalized linguistic expressions of three languages.

The three languages in the study were carefully chosen on the basis of the language families they belong to. Telugu belongs to the Dravidian group of

languages, Hindi to the Indo Aryan and English to the Indo European family of languages. But all the three languages are spoken in varying degrees in India. Telugu is spoken in the South Indian state of Andhra Pradesh by about fifty four million people that is 8.2% of the total population, while Hindi is spread over a number of states in North India including Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan among others by a population of around two hundred and sixty four million accounting for 39.94% of the total population.[13] Hindi is thus, the language used by a majority of the people in the country with Telugu being the second most spoken tongue, together accounting for about fifty percent of the total population of India. Besides, Hindi has been recognized by the Government of India as the national official language and has been promoted all over the country. English is spoken not as a foreign tongue but as a second language by a minority of the population.

The data for all the three languages has been drawn from a mixed bag of books, thesauruses, audio visual media and informants. The analysis of the data presents arguments for either of the three possibilities:
1. The cognition of emotion in universalistic terms
2. The cognition of emotion in purely culturalistic terms and
3. The possibility of give and take between languages in the cognition of emotion leading to an areal model.

2.6.1 A universal schematization of happiness

From the foregoing models, it is clear that the conceptualization of happiness is strikingly similar in all the three languages. Metaphors and metonyms are abundant in the schematization of emotion in all the three

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[13] Census of India, 1981.

languages. Further, schematization of happiness is structured on the basis of similar principal metaphors and image schemata. This makes possible the complete translatability of one model into the other as they are all based on the principal metaphors of verticality, container, natural world, physical agitation and physiological reactions. In addition to this, each cultural model may have further image schema such as territory (as in the Telugu model), but their importance does not over ride the metaphors which are common to all the languages. For instance, though there are a few metaphors evoking the image of territory, in Telugu, the verticality and natural world metaphors are certainly more productive. In other words, the Telugu cultural model does not revolve around territory.

Further, happiness is typically located in the body in all the three languages, especially in the heart and eyes, physical agitation is typically measured in terms of verticality as is expressed by the terms *up* in English and *uʈʰ* in Hindi; happiness is typically at the upper end of the verticality scale; it is a positive emotion; it is valuable; it may lead to loss of control over body and mind and so on. The cultural models throw up so many points of similarity - sometimes even individual metaphors are mirror images of each other. Even when different images are evoked, schematization remains similar. The container metaphor *is* present in all three languages though it may give rise to images as vastly different as cups, fountains or even *laddus*.

The absence of certain metaphors also points to a universal kind of conceptualization of happiness. Heat, fire, aggressive animals, opponent metaphors are uniformly missing in all the three languages. Moreover, happiness is viewed in terms of binarity and opposition to sadness in all three languages. There is a thin dividing line between both the emotions.

The cultural models thus suggest that though there may be differences of degree and emphasis, the essential conceptualization of happiness is strikingly similar in all three cultural models. One could perhaps speculate that this is so due to the embodiment of emotion in all the cultures. Another reason could be the universal nature of emotion itself which is more human oriented than culture oriented. This could possibly account for the similar schematization of emotion, cultures not withstanding.

2.6.2 Culturally defined schematization of happiness

Though the models disclose an "almost universal" conceptualization, there are plenty of differences which are language specific. To begin with, English is a metaphor rich (in the grammar book sense of the term) language, while the Indian languages make more use of similes and idioms. Further though the metaphors fall into the same broad categories in all the three languages, as expected at the level of individual metaphors, they are extremely local and particularistic. For instance, though happiness is schematized as vertical in all three languages, the individual metaphors evoke images of the sky, paradise, toddy trees and even birds. Even the natural world metaphors are local, ranging from the moon in Telugu, the sun in English and gardens in Hindi. Even when the same image is evoked, the associations are different. For instance, the heaven metaphor is used in all three languages, but in Telugu, the image of heaven has religious associations. The individual metaphors have obviously been invoked on the basis of ecological and social milieu particular to each culture and its language and these are in turn reflected by the metaphors.

Further, though happiness is universal, different things lead to happiness in different cultures as exemplified by the Telugu metaphor : kaḍupu ninḍite kailasəmu - 'when the stomach is full it is like Paradise.

The image schemata occur in varying degrees of importance in the three languages. Some metaphor clusters are more productive in a particular language for instance, the container metaphor in English, the greenery metaphor in Hindi and the music metaphor in Telugu. The container metaphor in Telugu and Hindi is not as productive as it is in English. Further, Telugu is marked by the territory and desirable quality metaphors, which are not present in either of the other two models . This makes the model distinct from the other two models, but again, it is as Keesing says, only a matter of emphasis. The models do not throw up any surprises - it is predictable that the individual metaphors will have large amounts of local colour, though the schematization may be the same.

2.6.3 An areal schematization of happiness

Is there a case for an areal model ? A linguistic area has been defined by Emeneau as "an area which includes languages belonging to more than one family but showing traits in common which are found not to belong to other members of (at least) one of the families."(1956:16). Telugu and Hindi belong to the Indian linguistic area. Both share a number of linguistic features - phonologically, morphologically, syntactically and semantically. Is it possible for languages of a linguistic area to share cognitive features too? A linguistic area is a result of diffusion of linguistic features. Is it possible for cognitive features to be diffused too? As Shapiro and Schiffman put it, "languages in close proximity invariably influence each other in some way: lexical and phonological borrowings frequently occur;

stress patterns may be altered; entire systematic constructions may be adopted or morphological distinctions may be added, lost or changed. Yet these phenomena, resulting from the proximity of language varieties, are precisely those that are characteristically disregarded when the "cores" of speech forms are compared."(1981:116).

The cultural models of happiness of Telugu and Hindi, however, give a very faint indication of an Indian areal model. The picture is quite confusing because the conceptualization of emotion is almost common to all the three languages. The commonality of the conceptualization between both the languages may thus not be an areal feature, rather it seems universal to most languages. There are however, some clear areal features which can be distinguished on the basis of the above data.[14] These are as follows:

1. Besides sharing the conceptualization of happiness on the basis of most of the principal metaphors mentioned above (which cannot be classified as areal features since they are shared by English too), both languages share the *happiness as music* metaphor and to a lesser degree *happiness as territory* metaphor which are absent in the English cultural model.

2. Both languages are marked by an absence of the happiness metaphor as evoked by animal sounds. Instead, most happiness images in this category are those of birds.

3. Both languages are also marked by the relative unimportance of the container metaphor. Further, in Telugu and Hindi the container metaphor does not necessarily evoke images of a liquid.

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[14] The conclusions here have been hypothesized on the basis of the data of the two major languages spoken in India. A larger survey including other Indian languages may prove or disprove these conclusions.

4. While in English, the container schema yields a large number of metaphors, in both Telugu and Hindi, the natural world metaphors are most numerous evoking images of mountains, seas, storms and greenery such as flowers and gardens.

The areal features seem few and far between and it is possible only to speculate whether the features are truly areal or possibly universal.

The cultural models thus seem to indicate that local differences not withstanding, the emotion of happiness is conceptualized in a similar manner across a number of languages at least in terms of a broad paradigm. Keesing puts into words the essential question towards which studies of this kind are geared: "to what extent are conventional metaphors and the schemas they express constitutive of our experience? Do various schemas of time, emotion, causality reflect contrasting modes of subjective experience of thought and perception or of simply different conventions for talking about the world, as creatures with our human brains and sensory equipment and bodies experience it ?"(in Holland and Quinn eds.,1987:386).

How is it possible that the conceptualization of happiness is similar and differences are at the most shadings of value and emphasis rather than unique conceptualizations. Keesing answers that there are possibly universals of experience by which he means "the experiential nature of consciousness, the way members of our species experience and perceive the operation of the mind/brain. It tells us not about the nature of human heads but how it feels to live inside them".(in Holland and Quinn, eds.,:374).

3. THE PROTOTYPE OF HAPPINESS

3.1 Emotion is a matter of more or less

Not all emotions are clear central cases of the category emotion. There is no checklist of features which one can tick off, fulfilling which, a particular state could be termed emotion. Even with regard to a particular emotion, the actual emotion felt by a person could also be a matter of more or less. To illustrate, one may feel angry but one may not feel angry enough to perform an act of retribution which is prototypical of the emotion of anger as outlined by Lakoff and Kövecses in their prototype of anger. (Kövecses,1990:68). Similarly with regard to the super ordinate category of emotion, all emotions are not prototypical. While some emotions may fulfill all the conditions of a prototype, some may not fit the frame entirely. For instance, the Kövecses' prototype of emotion throws up anger as the central case or prototypical emotion while fear and respect are seen as the not so central cases.

What exactly does a prototype of emotion (in both the generic and specific senses) mean? What purpose does a prototype of either emotion as a super ordinate category or of emotion as in a particular emotion serve?

A prototype scenario of emotion would indicate that emotion and the language used to express it would not fall into the realm of the amorphous or indefinable. The prototype scenario is based on structural and conceptual metaphors, metonymies, image schemata and cognitive models. It thus shows us that emotions in both the specific and generic sense of the term are capable of having conceptual content on the basis of

which they are structured. Though the boundaries are not clearly defined and emotions are necessarily fuzzy in nature, cognitive linguists have argued that it is possible to construct a prototype since emotions and the language used to express them are based in the body. This bodily basis of emotion gives rise to a definite though complex structure as indicated by the linguistic medium of metaphors, idioms and image schemata which matches closely with people's perceptions of their bodies and minds - giving birth to a folk model. As Lakoff says , " in addition to what we feel, we also impose an understanding on what it is that we feel. When we act on our emotions, we act not only on the basis of feeling but also on the basis of that understanding." (1987:377). Thus a prototype scenario of emotion indicates that:

1. Emotions are structured on the basis of conceptual content.

2. They are structured on the basis of metaphors, metonymies, image schemata and cognitive models.

3. Both emotions and the language used to express them are based in the body.

The conceptualization of the emotion of happiness is thus mostly structured on the basis of the verticality, container, natural world and physiology schemata. What is significant here is that the prototype scenario for happiness in all the three languages of English, Hindi and Telugu is similar. Lakoff and Kövecses (1990:50-68) had predicted in their case study of anger that the prototype of anger was possibly applicable to a vast number of cultural models across various cultures and languages. The present cross cultural study of happiness confirms the earlier prediction with regard to at least three languages embodied in their particular cultural models. The happiness prototype leads to certain interesting implications relating to human cognition with regard to

emotion. Happiness is seen as a positive emotion in most cultures, linking thus with the verticality schema which places happiness at the upper end of the verticality scale indicating that *positive* or *good* is *up*. It also follows that where as anger is schematized mainly on the basis of the container schema, happiness is structured to a large extent on the verticality schema. It is thus possible to predict that across a large number of cultures, happiness will be viewed on the basis of the verticality schema, with happiness always at the upper end - it will indeed be a rare culture where *happiness is down*.

These basic schemata are important because most people use them across a large number of cultures. This is so, Johnson argues, because they are based in the body and thus common to the human species. D' Andrade points out, " certain cultural models have a wide range of application as parts of other models- the verticality, container, etc. are part of emotion structure or cultural models. To have a real understanding of a culture, one must know at least those models widely incorporated into others."(1987:113).

It would be reasonable to say as the following analysis of the emotion of happiness further reinforces that certain image schemata are almost universal - especially those which are emotion related as they are all based within the body. These image schemata are incorporated into the way we perceive the world and the language we use to describe the world. This is what Johnson calls "the body in the mind."(1987). Emotion, it follows is not an intangible concept but is firmly rooted within the body.

3.2 Two prototypes of emotion

Roy D' Andrade classifies feelings and emotions as a part of the folk model of the mind.

1. Emotions are described as :

2. having a cause inside or outside the mind

3. taking simple and propositional objects

4. self is usually the object

5. usually not controllable

6. mass noun and

7. possible to have many emotions at once.(in Holland and Quinn,eds.,1987: 117).

D'Andrade while attempting to create a folk model of the mind of American-English makes the following conclusions: feelings and emotions are often treated in the folk model as reactions to the world mediated by one's understanding of the world. Further, "feelings do not seem to be clearly demarcated in the folk model."(in Holland and Quinn,eds.,1987:123). Boundaries are extremely fuzzy between particular emotions. Moreover, desires are seen as having an emotional component, but not always. He asks, "feelings generally give rise to desires, but does every feeling give rise to a desire? Can one feel sad or happy or angry without it leading to any identifiable desire? However, we do expect that there will be a relation between the kinds of feelings a person has and the kinds of desires these feelings engender."(in Holland and Quinn,eds., 1987:122). The connection between feelings and desires, he observes is not tight. This he reasons may be due to the fact that the means-ends relations are located in different worlds. The causal structure, in the relation

between feelings and desires, is moreover, the mind of the individual - one can only guess how the person will react when experiencing a certain emotion. This last observation is important for emotion theory as it points out that firstly no prototype is water tight . Secondly, it brings to light that there is a certain defined area of acting, reacting or emoting - and this is why it is possible to guess.

D'Andrade's prototype of the mind looks upon the mind both as a container and a processor. The Kövecses' prototype of emotion relies heavily on the container schema. Kövecses says that the container schema has important implications as it matches with the folk theory of personhood. Kövecses' justifies his reliance on the container schema as the major basis for the prototype of emotion as:

1. it applies to a large number of emotions and

2. it is a single, conceptual metaphor which can give considerable structure to the diffuse and vague notion of emotion.

In the English language, he points out that the two metaphors which are largely pervasive in talk about emotion are both related to the container schema:

1. Emotions are fluids in a container ("less interesting in the sense that it produces fewer metaphorical consequences")

2. Emotions are the heat of a fluid in a container (which is more widely used) (1990:146).

It is necessary to reproduce the prototype of emotion as developed by Kövecses here :

0. **State of emotional calm**

S (Self) is calm and cool.

1. **Cause**

Something happens to S.

The event is external to S.

The event disturbs S.

The event exerts a strong and sudden impact on S.

Emotion comes into existence.

S is passive with regard to the coming into existence of emotion.

2. **Emotion exists**

Emotion is an entity separate from the self.

Emotion exists independently from the self.

S is disturbed.

E (Emotion) involves a desire which forces S to perform an action (X).

X can satisfy E's desire.

S knows that X is dangerous and /or unacceptable to do (both for himself and others).

E manifests itself for S primarily in terms of physical sensations (inside the body).

S experiences certain physiological responses : agitation, increased heart rate, body temperature and respiration, and change of skin colour on face.

S exhibits certain behavioral responses : crying, emotional expressive behavior, and energetic behavior .

E is intense ; it is near the limit that S can control.

3. Attempt at control

S knows that he is under obligation not to perform X required by E .

S applies counterforce to prevent X from happening.

S has to spend a great deal of energy to try to counteract the force, that is, emotion.

S is non rational.

E's (the force's) intensity quickly increases beyond the point that can counteract.

The force becomes much greater than the counterforce.

4. Loss of control

S is unable to function normally : S cannot perceive the world as it is, is unable to breathe normally, and engages in extremely agitated behavior.

S is irrational.

S ceases to resist the force affecting him.

E forces S to perform X.

5. Action

S performs X.

S is not responsible for performing X since he only obeys a force larger than himself.

E is now appeased and S ceases to be emotional.

E ceases to exist.

0. Emotional calmness

S is calm again.

Kövecses believes that it is not only possible but also necessary to create a prototype of emotion both at a basic level as well as a superordinate level : "... the metaphors and metonymies do seem to converge on cognitive models that can in turn be conceived as prototypes for the emotion in question. The same applies to the concept of emotion in general. The metaphors and metonymies will enable us to propose a language-based cognitive prototype for the category of emotion as well. Furthermore in the light of this prototype it will be possible to see the details of why certain emotions are considered as very good examples of the category, others as not so good, and still others as poor examples."(1990:182).

Kövecses bases his prototype of emotion on two categories of metaphors - the first one is the container metaphor which he believes is the most productive. The second consists of a motley of metaphors which include emotions as natural forces, fire, inanimate objects, living organisms, agitation, physical disturbance, physiological change and so on. The second category of emotions are reflected in the prototype reproduced above, but it is clear from the same prototype that for Kövecses, it is clearly the container metaphor that reigns supreme in our conceptualization of emotion. And at the level of particular emotions it would follow that anger stands out as the best example of the emotion prototype.

Kövecses' prototype of emotion is based on the study of conceptual metaphors relating to the emotions of anger, fear, pride, respect and romantic love. The general prototype of emotion (as a super ordinate category) has important distinctions from the prototype of specific emotions.

The most important of these according to Kövecses are :

1. **Specificity** : certain aspects of the prototype are specific to a particular emotion especially the causal and the action structures and cannot be made specific at the superordinate level.

2. **Additional information** : the prototypes associated with specific emotions typically contain additional information in comparision to the emotional prototype.

As Kövecses states, "in general, it is typical of basic level prototypes to be more specific and to contain more information than superordinate-level prototypes." But, Kövecses says, "the prototype of emotion seems to contain a core that is shared by several particular emotions. This core has to do with the workings of the force used in the conceptualization of emotion in general and the effect of the force on the self (*especially how the force causes the self to perform certain actions.*) Depending on the extent to which particular emotions share this core they will be considered as more or less prototypical emotions . If it is the case that the emotion that comes closest to this core is anger, then anger is perhaps the most prototypical emotion ." (1990:187).

3.3 Is happiness prototypical or non prototypical?

In the 'Kövecsesian' scheme of things, that anger is the most prototypical or central example of emotion should not surprise any body for two reasons:
anger ranks high in all prototypicality judgements and
it is on everybody's list of basic emotions.

Where exactly does happiness fit in the Kövecses' prototype?

Happiness would seem to be a pretty non prototypical emotion according to Kövecses. It would be viewed as a non central case of emotion and would be considered one of the poorer examples of emotion. This is so because the core of emotion as prescribed by Kövecses which includes the working of the force and "especially how the force causes the self to perform actions" is very significantly different in happiness to say the least. Stages 3, 4 and 5 do not exist in happiness and even if they do they do not conform to the prototype in the manner as say, anger does. To make things clearer a possible prototype of happiness is delineated below:

0. State of emotional calm

S is calm and cool.

1. Cause

A causal event triggers off the emotion of happiness .

The cause could be external.

The cause could be internal .

There need not be a cause at all - happiness could just be a state of well being.

Emotion exists

Happiness could exist at differing degrees of intensity which can hypothetically be measured on a verticality scale.

Happiness causes physical as well as physiological effects in S.

2. Attempt at control

There is no serious attempt at controlling happiness.

Even if in a minority of cases there is an attempt at control, for instance trying to hide a smile, this is not due a grappling with the force of emotion (X) which causes S to perform some action which he shouldn't be.

3. Loss of control

Loss of control is a possibility but this does not arise as a corollary to 3 as in the Kövecses' prototype.

4.Action

No action is taken in happiness to restore S to a state of equilibrium.

0. Happiness decreases with time and not due to action taken - leading to a state of **emotional calmness.**

From the above it is clear that happiness does not seem to conform to the prototype of emotion. Granted that according to Kövecses, a prototype of a particular emotion is more specific and does contain additional information which cannot be specified at the super ordinate level; happiness does fall into the category of a non prototypical emotion as it differs with the prototype with regard to the core of the prototype. From the above prototype of happiness it is clear that happiness differs in the following aspects:

Happiness need not necessarily have an overt cause. Further, happiness does not lead to craving or a desire for action. Even if this desire exists it is positive, it is expressive - it is not done to bring the self back to a state

of equilibrium. In the same manner there is no serious attempt to control the force of desire component. Subsequently, loss of control does not arise due to an attempt at control. Rather it could just be an explosion of well being. Further no action follows to restore the state of calmness in the self. As a corollary happiness does not cease to exist after an action has been performed, rather the intensity fades away with time.

The above observations are certainly different from Kövecses' prototype of emotion . He states, "...the emotion is something we try to control, we fail to control it and this leads to some action ...What is more interesting, however, is that the emotion has a desire component which forces S to perform an action he is not supposed to perform. Thus S attempts to control E. But when E gets too intense, S will be unable to resist E. S loses control and performs the action that was required by E." (1990:184). This may not be entirely true of happiness. Though there is a desire for action in happiness, it is not necessarily an action which the Self should not be performing. Thus happiness does not involve a Freudian grappling of the Id, Ego and Super Ego. Moreover, the desire and emotion components have a two way relation in happiness. While an experience of happiness may lead to the desire for action (not necessarily detrimental and not for returning S to a state of equilibrium), the fulfillment of a certain desire may also lead to the emotion of happiness.

One reason as to why happiness emerges as a non prototypical case of emotion is quoted by Kövecses himself though he doesn't pursue it. He quotes Lakoff and Johnson who observe that in our folk model, emotion has less value than rationality because the former leads to a loss of control. The upward orientation is reserved for all things good while the downward orientation is the preserve of things that are bad or less

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good.(as quoted in Kövecses 1990:186). Within the emotion domain the same two classes can be observed. Some emotions are conceptualized as *up* (happiness is thus a positive emotion), while others like anger and sadness are *down*. *"Thus although the larger category of emotion is viewed as downward oriented, specific emotions may be thought of as having an upward orientation..."*(1990:186).

3.4 Are prototypes sacred?

The prototype of emotion delineated by Kövecses largely corresponds to the category of negative emotions. That is probably why romantic love is also not a central case according to the prototype. But is it enough to consider happiness as a non prototypical case of emotion and leave it at that? It would be a little uncomfortable to do that because happiness like anger is a basic emotion. Like anger, it too is on the list of everybody's basic emotions. It is then very surprising that it turns out to be so non conformist. There is, then, a need to re-examine and reconsider the parameters of the prototype of emotion.

Kövecses' work on the concept of emotion highlights the important fact that emotions are structured. He investigates the structure of emotion with the concept of prototypy. This in itself leads to some very interesting and enlightening conclusions :

1. Emotions are structured.
2. Emotions are based in the body.
3. At a general level, emotions are structured similarly though the specificities may vary.
4. The structure of emotion could possibly be similar across a number of languages.

However, certain problems arise in the prototype due to Kövecses' over emphasis on the container metaphor. He considers the container metaphor as the most productive because -

i. It applies to a large number of metaphors.

ii. It is a conceptual metaphor which can give considerable structure to the diffuse and vague notion of emotion.

iii. The container metaphor pervades our thinking about personhood .

iv. It is the metaphor we evoke to make sense of a large number of emotional experiences. It is mainly evoked in two forms:

a. emotion is a fluid in a container and

b. emotion is a hot fluid in a container.

3.5 Happiness is high

While it is true that the container metaphor is one of the most important ways of schematizing emotion, it should be noted that it does not work very well with the emotion of happiness. Though the container schema is productive in describing happiness, what emerges as the central schema is easily the verticality schema.

For instance, consider the following sentences in English :

1. He is in seventh Heaven.

2. I am on top of the world .

3. My spirits soared.

4. I want to hit that high.

All the above sentences are excellent indicators of the verticality schema. Further, they are not subsumed within the container metaphor as in the

metonym for anger, where anger is the *rise of the liquid in a container* due to an increase in heat. Kövecses does not consider this metaphor, probably because his study does not include the twin emotions of happiness and sadness.

The verticality schema is used to good effect by Eleanor Rosch in her pioneering work *Principles of Categorization* (1978) where she says, things are classified by humans on the basis of the horizontal and vertical schemata. Mark Johnson (1987) too, considers the verticality schema as one of the basic metaphors which help in conceptualizing the world. This argument can be stretched to include emotion too. As the present study of happiness shows the verticality schema is the most productive metaphor across all three languages each belonging to a different language family and culture.

Happiness in binary opposition to sadness can be pictured on a hypothetical scale where happiness is high and sadness is low. This corresponds to Johnson's and Lakoff's observations that in the folk model of language anything that is valued or positive is always up. It is possible to predict that this will be the case in a number of languages and folk models. Secondly the verticality metaphor also indicates that we conceptualize emotion not in strictly binary terms, but rather in a continuum with the ends being polar. However one particular emotion is seen in relation to another and thus the notion of opposition and relativity is central to our understanding of emotion. Though this study does not include within its canvas the superordinate category of emotion, it is possible to hypothesize that most emotions function in oppositions and relatedness - like happiness and sadness, love and hatred, pride and shame and so on. The scalar value of verticality thus shows that emotions

are a matter of more or less. It also shows that certain emotions are more closely related than others. Towards the extremes these emotions are opposites. But at another level there is a very thin line separating the two. Consider happiness and sadness: they even have the same physiological reactions: *She wept tears of joy/ She wept tears of sorrow*. Or the sentence, *"Don't laugh too much or you will cry."*

The container metaphor is important. A lot has been written on the subject because it has important implications for the theory of personhood. In the study of emotion, the mind as well as the body are seen as containers for a variety of emotions and states of being. It is true that the container metaphor has helped in imposing a structure on the amorphous nature of emotion, but it is equally important to consider other image schemata as well otherwise the study of emotion is bound to be incomplete or worse still, lopsided.

As described above the verticality metaphor gives rise to further suggestions :
1. Emotions are seen in terms of opposition and relatedness
2. Emotions move along a scale of up and down . This "scalarness" is useful not only for looking at the merging of one emotion into another, which accounts for the overlapping of so much of emotion language; but also at looking at the varying intensity of a particular emotion.(Lakoff and Kövecses study the intensity of anger, but the verticality scale is included within the container schema - as the rise of the heat of a liquid in a container).

The verticality schema further, is not alien to the human body. Johnson (1987) considers it a part of the bodily basis of imagination and

reasoning. It is possible to contend that the verticality schema in combination with the notion of binary opposition is based in the human body giving rise to a number of conceptualizations. The body in itself provides the basis for the notions of *up* and *down, left* and *right*. What is important is that these notions move along a continuum - there is always the notion of relativity. Thus the notions of verticality and of binarity has as much a bodily basis as the notion of containment. It is not alien, it is not superimposed, it is just another image schema used to express and explain emotions. This study does not seek to establish the supremacy of one image schema over the other, rather it strives for the recognition of other image schemata which might be useful in structuring emotion.

3.6 Anger is anger and happiness is happiness and never the twain shall meet?

What then are the effects of different metaphors, metonymies and image schemata on the development of a prototype? The emotion of anger is obviously the best example of a prototype based on the container schema. In such a prototype scenario, however, happiness becomes a non central case of emotion. Conversely, a prototype which includes the verticality metaphor may throw up the emotion of happiness as the best example of emotion. Is it then possible to reconcile the combination of various metaphors and image schemata? The present study does not include an analysis of the super ordinate category of emotion. However it seems fruitless to consider any emotion as a prototypical case unless the parameters of the concept of emotion are well defined - a tough task considering the plethora ways of conceptualizing emotion. Further, though folk models are supposed to be pluralistic, studies have pointed out the existence of certain universals and thus arises the possibility of comparison without positivistic evaluation. However in the case of

emotion, the prototype of the superordinate category of emotion perforce seems to be imposing some rather strict parameters. While the prototype scenario of particular emotions is fruitful in the sense that it is comparable across cultures, and thus gives an insight into the conceptualization of a particular emotion, the prototype of emotion will have to be extremely general. If the parameters are tight, then they may also be constraining which defeats the whole purpose of a prototype. This will be similar to an objectivist superimposition of man made categories. A world of pluralistic models, is better to contend with than to superimpose an artificial paradigm. That would be going against all that cultural models stand for.

4. Conclusion

The study started with the posing of two questions:

1. Does the concept of emotion as typified by happiness have a structure?

2. Do these structures differ from one language to another?

The study has been an endeavour to answer these questions with the help of the cultural models of happiness in the three languages of English, Hindi and Telugu. The conclusions presented here in summary form can only be a repetition of what has been described in the earlier chapters. As is evident from the study, the answer to the first question is undeniably a positive one, while the latter throws open an area of debate.

The present study reaches a similar conclusion as the earlier cognitive studies on the subject of the structure of emotion have reached :

1. Emotion is undeniably structured.

2. It has a complex structure.

3. This structure is constructed on the basis of metaphors, metonymies and image schemata all of which have conceptual content.

4. Emotion cannot be relegated to the realm of the abstract and amorphous as its structure is revealed by a deeper understanding of the creative use of language which has important implications for the subject of human cognition.

5. A linguistic approach to the study of emotion is most useful as it reveals the conceptualization of emotion through the study of conventional talk.

6. The structure of emotion is best revealed by the study of particular emotion concepts in detail.

7. The interlinking of metaphors leads to the distinction of one emotion concept from the other.

8. The structure of emotion can be best studied on the basis of cognitive models which include a number of prototypical and non prototypical cases.

9. It is useful to construct a prototype for a particular emotion but not for the concept of general emotion as this can only be very abstract.

10. It must be noted that there is no one prototypical cognitive model of any emotion. As Lakoff says, "the point is that there is no single unified cognitive model... instead there is a category of cognitive models with a prototypical model in the center. This suggests that it is a mistake to try to find a single cognitive model for all instances of a concept." (1987:405).

With regard to the concept of happiness in particular, the study reveals that as quoted above, it would be a mistake to consider the above models as the exclusive cognitive models of happiness. There could be a number of alternative and even contradictory models, but as Lakoff says, they will always bear family resemblances to each other.(1987:405).

1. The study has highlighted the fact that happiness is structured on the basis of metaphors, metonymies and image schemata.

2. It suggests that these have a bodily basis. Thus the concept of happiness is embodied which gives rise to the myriad images reflected in its conceptualization.

3. Happiness is conceptualized on the basis of six principal metaphors- the most productive of which are the verticality, container and natural world schemata.

4. The verticality schema is to happiness as container is to anger, it is a central metaphor which is perhaps most prototypical of happiness.

5. It also reveals that emotions are closely related. They may be viewed as pairs in terms of binarity and opposition which link up with the image schema used in conceptualizing them.

With regard to the second question, the study concludes that the conceptualization of happiness in all the three languages is remarkably similar. This may imply that since the concept of emotion is perceived as having a bodily basis, the differences in conceptualization may be more a matter of shading and emphasis. But, this will have to be proved by a larger survey of languages and the cultures they represent. At the level of individual metaphors, the languages show typical cultural features which point to the social and ecological influences of those particular cultures. The cultural models are thus an insight into the workings of the mind of a particular culture. They give rich and fine details of the working of a culture - its values, what is dear, what is abhorrent, - all of which are incorporated into the language of that society - which is an embodiment of its folk knowledge. As Wierzbicka says, language undoubtedly reflects culture, "although it is not always easy to determine which aspects of the culture reflected in agiven language pertain to the present and which to the past;possibly a remote past."(1986:368)

A study of the above type by its very nature and limited scope cannot make any strong generalizations. While it is possible to trace the structure of the particular emotion concept in question on the basis of its component parts, it is quite impossible to generalize on the cognition of emotion as a general category. Further, the delineation of cultural models is possible; but to theorize on the nature of cultural or human cognition of emotion would lead to the opening of a virtual Pandora's box. But these issues are outside the scope of the study. The research in this study was

aimed at using a cognitive methodology - termed the lexical approach by Kövecses to study a particular concept of emotion in great detail. The study also aimed at comparing the cognitive models of three languages to draw up conclusions on the nature of the cognition of happiness with respect to the three languages studied. While it is impossible to give proven conclusions and generalizations, yet it is possible to make intelligent guesses and hypotheses which may be proved or disproved by later studies on the subject. Again as Wierzbcika says, " the dangers of subjectivism and arbitrariness involved in a search for such correlations are no doubt real enough. But to abandon the search because of these dangers is, to my mind, analogous to saying, as Bloomfield did, that linguistics should stay clear of meaning because all attempts to study meaning are fraught with dangers of subjectivism and arbitrariness. As I see it, the important thing to do is to sharpen our analytical tools and to develop safeguards for the study of the dangerous areas."(1986:368). A larger survey of the concept of happiness is definitely required which may lead to interesting comparisons. This work contributes to that larger survey by studying in three languages the concept of a particular emotion - that of happiness.

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