CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE SUCCESSION CRISIS IN THE PRC

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE SUCCESSION CRISIS IN THE PRC", submitted by SONIKA GUPTA, is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of the this university and is her own work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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For
Dad, Mom
&
Chander

Acknowledgments

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INTRODUCTION

China has been labelled totalitarian, in part, because of the predominance of the notion of a paramount leader whose rule is largely unchallenged, and his theories and actions eulogized. This has perpetuated the personality cult in Chinese polity, leading to a political history of succession crisis in China. A cursory glance at the recent history of China and of the Chinese Communist Party, reveals phases of intense political infighting, factionalism, and a prevailing uncertainty regarding political succession.

Scholars have adopted competing methodological approaches to explain political behaviour in China. These can broadly be classified into the psychoanalytical, political-institutional and the political culture approaches. A psychoanalytical approach aimed at explaining the subjugation of an entire nation to the will of a strong and powerful leader was used in the early 1970's by scholars like Erik Erikson. Robert Jay Lifton's specific work on Mao[1] based on Eriksonian assumptions, was an attempt to explain the role of the leader in China. The problem, however, with the psychoanalytical approach was that it viewed the issue

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1. Robert Jay Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality, Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969).

weak institutional framework. The question why certain political cultures supported concentrations of power and revered them in the form of the paramount leader, and even after clear evidence of their politically harmful implications sought to replace one paramount leader with another was never asked. Significantly, how was a broad political and cultural consensus created in support of this? To find answers to these questions it was necessary to look beyond personality and institutions to the political culture of China.

The political culture approach contextualized the problem allowing for deeper insights into the determinants of political behaviour. A systematic concern with political culture has its heritage in Enlightenment and 19th century sociology. It came to the fore in political science with the post-World War II behaviour revolution in political science applied to new states whose formal institutions were similar to western models.[3] Political culture was defined by Almond and Bingham Powell as "the set of attitudes, beliefs and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time."[4]

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3. Peter Moody Jr., "Trends in the Study of Chinese Political Culture", *C.Q.* Nos.139-149, 1994 p.25.

4. Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics, Systems, Process, Polity*, (Boston, 1978) p.25.

Based on the political culture approach scholars like Richard Solomon and Lucian Pye authored landmark works on China. They provided newer insights into Chinese polity by tracing the roots of Chinese political behaviour in traditional Chinese culture. Some scholars like Andrew Walder argued that post-1949 Chinese political culture and political behaviour were an outcome of the new revolutionary institutions introduced by the communist leadership. This argument posed two problems. Firstly concepts like political culture and political behaviour cannot be understood in the light of a "communist culture" divorced from its cultural landscape. Secondly, post-1949 political behaviour and political culture could not be studied in isolation from their history. They were a part of an ongoing process of cultural and political interaction where the continuities of tradition mutated the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy into a sinified version of Marxism.

Robert Tucker, in advocating a political culture approach to studying communist politics stated, "although it brings with it an elaborate ideology, a new institutional setup, a host of characteristic new practices, the communist movement could not be thought of it seems, as simply imposing a ready-made ˹communist culture" upon a receptive (or non-receptive) populace. Rather the new culture, or new political culture is something that emerges in and through

the transformative process over a period of years, something moreover in which the new cultural ingredients that communism brings with it as a movement blend with elements of pre-existing national cultural ethos".[5]

Both Solomon and Pye concentrated on existing continuity of tradition as an important determinant in post-1949 Chinese political culture. In other words, they shared the tradition - modernization paradigm. In their individual works Solomon and Lucian Pye located the determinants of political behaviour in tradition and focused on the traditional Chinese notions of deference, hierarchy authority, and leadership.

Richard Solomon in *Mao's Revolution and Chinese Political Culture* investigated the tension between new communist international setup, geared to modernization or to achieving socialist goals and the endurance of old social attitudes and political habits or methods of the Chinese who embody the legacy of China's past. According to Solomon there was a notable degree of ambivalence towards authority in the attitudes of those reared in the Chinese tradition; a paradoxical combination of the desire for a strong leader, yet a concomitant resentment against the demands of this powerful

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5.   Bruce Dickson, p.105.

authority on the individual.[6] Solomon explored the reasons

for this ambivalence to arrive at the conclusion that endur-

ing Confucian traditions laid stress on deference to those

in authority, filial piety, etc., in an era of class-strug-

gle advocated by the Marxist leadership. This ambivalence

was best exemplified in Chinese politics throughout the

Cultural Revolution.

Lucian Pye identified the reason for the endurance of

these traditional norms and practices despite an atmosphere

of revolutionary fervor and an emphasis on "communist cul-

ture". According to Pye these traditional norms and prac-

tices concerning authority, deference etc. survived because

the family, not communist institutions, form the basic unit

of socialization in China. And the Chinese family is still

steeped in tradition. In politics, questions of authority

obviously predominate, and the Chinese for generations have

stressed filial piety as the basis of superior-subordinate

relations. This attitude translated into political beha-

viour led to a concentration of power and a reverence to-

wards those in authority.

The political culture approach adequately answered the

first question i.e. why is there a concentration of politi-

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6.   Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and Chinese Political
     Culture*, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
     1971) p.2.

cal power in China, despite the revolutionary objective of decentralizing authority. The political culture approach, however, stops short of exploring and answering how this concentration of political power is created and legitimized. This latter query can be answered with greater satisfaction by the culture theory approach. Scholars like Clifford Geertz and Raymond Williams deviated from the political culture approach to put forward the basic tenets of culture theory resting on the assumption that culture is politics. The culture theory approach differed from the work of Almond and Easton in that it placed not politics, but culture at the centre of any investigation. Geertz and Williams extrapolated culture from traditional categories of sociology to arrive at the basic tenets of a cohesive culture theory. They placed hitherto marginalized sociological ideas like art, language, communication etc. at the heart of their treatise. This was an attempt to rework not only the field of culture but to put new questions to, and look at new evidence in, the general work of the social sciences.[7]

The concept of culture which Geertz espouses is essentially a semiotic one. According to Geertz man is an animal suspended in his own webs of significance. Geertz defines culture to be those webs and the analysis of it to be,

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7.   Raymond Williams, *Culture*, (Glasgow: Fontana Books, 1981) p.10.

therefore, not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.[8]

Similarly Raymond Williams defines culture as a signifying system through which necessarily (though among other means) a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored.[9] Closed ideological systems like China, more than others, need to be interpreted contextually and the culture theory approach lends itself well to this task. To understand a culture's power structures it is necessary to understand and contextually interpret the way in which language, rhetoric, and ways of communication create dominant communities that protect or challenge established power structures. Only then one can provide an adequate second level interpretation of various phenomena like personality cults, political instability, mass movements etc. Using the culture theory approach thus illuminates the way in which culture operates as politics and is power in China.

Chinese politics has strong ideological underpinnings. Ideology in China is not merely an ivory tower phenomenon defining political operations, but has a larger function within the broader cultural context. According to Mu Fu-

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8. Clifford Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1973) p.5.

9. Raymond Williams, n.7, p.13.

sheng, "Communist ideology offered a solution to ethical and aesthetic problems, an ontology, a theory of history, universal formula or `law' of thought, the Dialectics, very much like the old Chinese formula of Yin and Yang".[10]

This broad application of ideology in China is best understood in the light of the role of ideology in China, politically and culturally. In the West, the separation of the Church and the State resulted in a separation of the concept of morality from politics. Morality became an altered concept, prescribing not specifically correct political behaviour, but correct religious behaviour. In politics Machiavelli's *The Prince" epitomized the amoral rules by which rulers could retain political power.

In China, morality and politics have been inseparable since Confucian times.[11] Moreover, morality and authority are inseparable in that a ruler's legitimacy was based on his adherence to a moral order. In contemporary China too, for example, the Communist regime not only dictates laws in the public sphere, it also seeks to "legislate" the private morality of the people.[12] The Three Antis or the Five Antis

10. Mu Fu-Sheng, *The Wilting of a Hundred Flowers*, (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1962) p.117.

11. James Chieh Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970) p.106.

12. Ibid., p.106.

campaign, and the Cultural Revolution are examples of this.

According to James Chieh Hsiung, the content of China's ideology may change but its functions do not. Ideology furnishes Chinese society with a set of basic moral values by which individuals and community as a whole judge all thought and behaviour. This all-pervasive function of ideology does not set politics apart as just one aspect of Chinese culture but allows politics to permeate every aspect of social life. In other words politics is located at the heart of culture.

Hayden White, in laying down ground rules for using culture theory or cultural criticism notes that all genuine cultural discourse embodies a movement "to and fro" between (a) received encodations of experience and the clutter of phenomena which refuse incorporation into conventinalized notions of "reality", "truth" or "possibility" and (b) between alternative ways of encoding this reality. Thus discourse is quintessentially a mediative process. It is both interpretive and pre-interpretive. It is about the nature of the interpretation itself as much as it is about the subject matter of the interpretation. Thus the approach opens up the possibility of reading texts differently as well as expanding traditional archives to include works not hitherto considered `political'. Therefore it is possible

to establish linkages between traditionally separate socio-
logical categories as `politics' and `culture' and `politi-
cal culture'. This exercise in turn gives us a contextually
grounded, culturally interpretive and holistic explanation
for the phenomenon of succession crisis in China. This
approach does more than provide an explanation for the
crisis, it interprets the explanation as well. Thus, the
culture theory approach, supplemented by the insights pro-
vided by the political culture approach, gives us a sound
methodological framework within which the succession crisis
in China may be adequately examined. A significant aspect
of leadership in China, as elsewhere, is the existence and
function of `Charisma'.

Max Weber's formulation of charisma offers some in-
sights into the personality cult of the leader and is useful
in interpreting/analyzing the crisis of succession to char-
ismatic leaders like Mao Zedong. Weber grounds his formula-
tion of charismatic leadership in the social conditions
existing within a specific cultural context. Weber defines
charisma as a "certain quality of an individual by virtue of
which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed
with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically
exceptional qualities. These are such as are not accessible
to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin
or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual

concerned is treated as a leader."[13]

According to E.A. Shils, charisma attaches itself to those "individuals or institutions which appear to address the problems related to the dominant concerns within a society."[14] In case of pre-1949 China these two concerns may be identified as (a) the question of national integration and (b) the empowerment of the peasantry. Mao as a nationalist guerilla fighter and revolutionary peasant leader addressed both these concerns. Mao's dual role during the revolution formed a strong base for his subsequent position as paramount leader and idealogue in Chinese politics. Concentration of political power in Mao and a handful of his disciples and the problems of succession to Mao may be explained partly as a consequence of the dominance of the charismatic principle in Chinese politics. However, this Weberian principle cannot be extended beyond Mao to interpret the succession to subsequent Chinese leaders. Mao's successors did not aspire to be successors to Mao's charisma but on the other hand, initiated a critique of Mao's policies. Deng Xiaoping initiated a process of rationalization in Chinese politics, sought to institutionalize and decentralize authority and ruled out the creation

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13. Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, *Scholarship and partisanship, Essays on Max Weber*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) p.174.

14. Ibid., p.171.

of personality cults of the leader. Yet Deng epitomized the concentration of political power and commanded obedience which was earlier attributed to Mao. This paradox may be examined in the framework of the need to create legitimacy for existing and a seemingly inevitable concentration of political power in China.

Underlying the enquiry of charisma is the basic question, i.e, what are Chinese notions of authority and leadership and where do they derive from? The strong Imperial tradition in China and its underlying notions of authority have been interpreted differently by various scholars. For the purpose of this study we may categorize them as (a) despotic and (b) others.

Marx, in dealing with the need for social revolution in the non-European world considered the concept of Oriental despotism as being the cornerstone of the Asiatic model of state, society, and of production. According to Marx, Indian and Chinese villages were based on property held in common and the prime necessity of an economical and common use of water required the interference of a strong political power in providing public works. These two features, according to Marx, were the mainstay of Oriental despotism.[15]

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15. ShLomo Avineri (ed.), *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*, (New York: Double Day Inc., 1968) p.7.

Marx further argued, that the Asiatic model of society based as it was on Oriental despotism, was static, unchanging and non-dialectical. Hence, change in such a society depended on external influences. In this context Marx envisaged the role of a revolutionary catalyst for Wester Imperialism in Asiatic societies. In his article on "The Future Results of British Rule in India", he wrote, "England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive and one regenerative - the annihilation of the old Asiatic society and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia."[16] For Marx, then Asiatic societies were incapable of initiating a process of social change and thus their traditional economic and political structures based on Oriental Despotism were self-perpetuating unless challenged by Western influence of colonialism.

The same assumption underlies John Fairbank's interpretation of China's modern history. Fairbank's approach, which represents a significant majority of the views of the China watchers in the US, takes root in Marxian interpretation of Asiatic history as static. This `Harvard-School' sponsored `impact-response' approach adopted by Fairbank and others like Reischauer and Craig[17] argues that

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16. Ibid., p.125.

17. Philip Huang, *Modern China*, Vol.17, No.3, July 1991 pp.299-341.

qualitative change in China came with the advent of Western

Imperialism on western influences of `modernization'. Each

Asian country responded to this `modernizing' influence

differently and developed accordingly. Comparison between

Japan (a `successful' society) and China (an `unsuccessful'

one) is cited as an example of this phenomenon. Further,

the obstacles to independent development in Asia were not

related to either American actions or the international

system that the US promotes. Rather they were seen largely

as the result of enormous difficulties involved in adapting

the traditional societies of Asia to a world culture founded

upon science and technology, modern means of organization,

and rational standards of efficient government procedure.[18]

Karl Wittfogel, while rejecting Marx's Eurocentric

approach and the unilinear idea of development, discoursed

expansively on the theme of Oriental despotism. Moreover,

Marxists postulate the traditional Western division between

man and nature whereas Wittfogel favours `environmental

determinism".[19] In other words Marx's emphasis is on eco-

nomic relations while Wittfogel stresses environmental basis

of human interraction. According to Wittfogel, hydraulic

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18. James Peck, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 1969, p.50.

19. Andrew L. March, *The Idea of China. Myth and Theory in Geographic Thought* (London, Vancouver: David & Charles, 1974) p.71.

society was the foundation of Oriental Despotism in China. Wittfogel's 'hydraulic society' was differentiated from Marx's pre-dominantly geographic definition of 'Asiatic society' in the following way:

"I suggest that family based on large scale water-works be designated hydraulic farming and that it be differentiated from hydro-agriculture (small-scale irrigation farming). I also suggest that a government managing such an agriculture be designated a 'hydraulic government' and a society dominated by it a 'hydraulic society'."[20]

According to Wittfogel the hydraulic society was not confined to China. Similar societies emerged early in India, Persia, Central Asia, and many parts of Southeast Asia, and in Java, Bali and ancient Hawaii.[21]

Marx laid stress on feudal society as a necessary evolutionary stage of development to communism in his teleological scheme of historical development. More specifically within feudal society Marx emphasized the private ownership of land as the basis for development of capitalist institutions, both in the social and economic sphere. According to

20. Karl Wittfogel, "Chinese Society: An Historical Survey", *Journal of Asian Studies*, No.16, 1956-57 pp.343-64.

21. Karl Wittfogel, "The Marxist View of China", Part I & II, *CQ*, July-December 1960 p.160.

Marx the absence of private ownership of land and the inter-
ference of a centralized authority (in providing public
works) are the two main factors that hindered the growth of
civil societey and consequently formed the basis for endur-
ing despotism in China. Wittfogel, on the other hand,
presented a case for an environmental need in China for a
strong centralizing authority in providing for extensive
public works. This entailed the recruitment of a large
bureaucracy and in Wittfogel's opinion the presence of this
large and powerful bureaucracy was responsible for absence
of development of a civil society in China. The Marxist
view of China as an Asiatic feudal society was adopted and
reinforced in late nineteenth century and 20th century by
many Marxists like Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lenin and Stalin.
The CCP, since the early 1920's, looking towards the Soviet
Union for guidance incorporated this view substantially in
its own ideological interpretation of Chinese history. This
was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, to legitimize the
adoption of Marxism-Leninism as its official ideological
doctrine, CCP needed to find a place for China's essentially
peasant revolution in Marx's dialectical concept of history.
According to Wittfogel, though the Chinese communists faced
problems in reinterpreting China's imperial economy as
feudal, fortunately for them, the feudal interpretation of
China crystallized slowly; and this gave their leaders time

to adjust to the "feudal" legend.[22]

Secondly, China in the late 1940's and early 1950's followed the Soviet Union as the only existing model of a revolutionary state both in its policies and its programmes in the ideological, political and economic spheres. Such doctrinal engineering, according to Wittfogel, was an emulation of a similar exercise undertaken by Lenin in paving the way for an interpretation of China and other Eastern countries as feudal pre-revolutionary states.

However, according to Wittfogel except for a temporary regression to a regulated land system, which lasted from 5th century to 8th century A.D., China perpetuated itself as a complex hydraulic society throughout its imperial period, i.e., roughly speaking for almost 2,000 years. This debate between the Marxist view of China and Wittfogel's argument of China as a hydraulic society must be viewed in the context of the Chinese political tradition. Feudal society is characterized by a contractual relationship between the ruler and his subordinates or the nobility as in England. The hydraulic society, on the other hand, is characterized by the unconditional obedience of the ruled to the autocratic ruler. For Wittfogel the contractual relationship between the ruler and his fief-holding vassals never flour-

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22. Ibid., p.380.

ished in China. The land given to them was not assigned
fiefs but as official salary. Further, Otto Franke points
out that the contractual relationship between a sovereign
and his vassals was a European tradition that had no roots
in the Chinese concept of state.[23] Wittfogel thus rejects
the Marxist view of China, despite it being incorporated
into CCP ideology. He goes on to explain that the Chinese
autocratic traditions rose out of the hydraulic state's
function of establishing centralized control of agriculture
and, in the absence of a civil society, became stronger with
each succeeding dynasty in China.

This centralized authority of the despotic ruler was
perpetuated through the classical type non-progressive and
static oriental society. The traditional Chinese bureaucra-
cy was the main factor in perpetuating a despotic order in
China. According to Wittfogel maximum authority was vested
and wielded in bureaucratic landlordism. This bureaucracy
differed from the Weberian formulation of a "serving" 'or
"controlled" bureaucracy. Wittfogel calls the Chinese
bureaucracy a "ruling" bureaucracy. Weber defines the
political context of bureaucracy as one in which it wields
institutionalized power in a multi-centred societey such as
England. Opposed to this Wittfogel speaks of bureaucratic
despotism in a one-centred complex hydraulic society. The

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23. Cited in Karl Wittfogel, n.19, p.347.

difference is that of the differing evolutionary process and to some extent of different sociological roots of the two types of bureaucracies.

Weber's formulation of "bureaucratization" serves to desginate a pattern of social change 'which can be traced to the royal households of medieval Europe, to the eventual employment of university-trained jurists as administrators, to the civilian transformation of military controllers on England and in the United in the 19th century.[24] In such liberal-democratic setups the bureaucracy though powerful did not become the only privileged class. The feudal land-owning class wielded a much greater economic power.

On the other hand, Chinese landowning gentry was a part of the ruling bureaucracy of a single centred society in which officials were organized only as officials. It was not a feudal gentry whose members necessarily held land, but a 'bureaucratic gentry' whose members usually held land, but necessarily were connected with holding of government of-fice.[25] Obviously under such circumstances the amount of power invested in the bureaucracy was definitely much more than in a controlled bureaucracy. Consequently the amount of power and the way in which it was wielded by the bureauc-

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24. Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, 1971, p.133.
25. Karl Wittgofel, n.20, p.355.

racy in a hydraulic society like China differed considerably from a feudal society. Wittfogel thus qualifies China's despotic tradition as `bureaucratic despotism'.

This "bureaucratic despotism" and the autocratic tradition were buttressed by the teachings of Confucius in Wittfogel's opinion. He points out that Confucius viewed the good family as the cornerstone of the good society. And Confucian good family was characterized by strictly defined hierarchical relation between father and son, husband and wife and brothers. The father-son relationship indicates the political implications of family authority: a son who obeyed the father was ready to obey the state.[26]

Wittfogel traces the continuation of this despotic authority to the PRC as does Zhengyuan Fu. They however differ in one significant way. Fu adopting the political culture approach says that Chinese political culture sustains a social system in which society is subordinated to the state. According to Fu the omnipresence and super-ordination of the state vis-a-vis the society is a major distinctive feature of the state.[27] Fu argues that the Communist Revolution simply replaced the Imperial autocracy

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26. Ibid., p.350.

27. Zhengyuan Fu, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol.XXIV, no.3, September 1991 pp.259-279.

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with the Communist autocracy. Wittfogel argues that the Imperial order though despotic was not omnipresent. The despotic regime while exerting total political power was unable to control the everyday life of the individual. But the ruling class of the Communist state exerts power through a ubiquitous state apparatus. And since the rulers exert total power through a government that is different from Oriental despotism and controls virtually all the economic and social activities of the population, one is confronted with a genuinely totalitarian apparatus of society.[28]

Both Fu and Wittfogel support their arguments by citing examples of individual features of Chinese politics and society. Fu cites similarities of personality cults of the Emperor and Mao and compares the range of state power in pre and post-1949 China. Wittfogel too compares the range of state power to derive at a different conclusion. Both however agree that the autocratic tradition of Imperial China survived a Communist Revolution because the Chinese Communist Party it itself is no harbinger of revolution but aims at the establishment of a totalitarian regime in China.

The Oriental view of Asian and specifically Chinese society as static and needing Western `modernizing' influence was criticized by many scholars. Edward Said in formu-

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28. Wittfogel, n.19, p.362.

lating an alternative approach to the Oriental approach said
that the "Orient" is a creation of the West. He defines
Orientalism in the following way.

"Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the
corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing
with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of
it, describing it, by teaching it, setling it, ruling over
it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating,
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."[29]

The analysis of knowledge/power in the work of Michel
Foucault provides the basis of Said's study of Orientalism
as a discourse of difference in which the apparently neutral
occident/orient contrast is an expression of power relation-
ships. The society from which comparisons are to be made
has a privileged possession of a set of essential features -
rationality, progress democratic institutions, economic
development - in terms of which other societies are
deficient and backward. These features account for the
particular character of Western society and explain the
defects of alternative social formations.[30] Thus the West
is also seen as providing a `modernizing' and `rationaliz-

29. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books,
    1979) p.3.

30. Bryan Turner, *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, London:
    Allen & Unwin, 1978 p.22.

ing' influence for the `backward' and `non-rational' Asian societies.

Similar criticism of Fairbank's approach to China and its politics is made by James Peck. According to Peck, China watchers in the US seek to provide a justification of the role of the US in the post-World War II East Asia by utilizing a theory of modernization to counter theories of American Imperialism.[31]

Bryan Turner sums up the Orientalist sketch of Asiatic society in the following way. The Orientalist view of Asiatic society can be encapsulated in the notion that the social structure of the Oriental world was characterized by the absence of a civil society, that is, by the absence of a network of institutions mediating between the individual and the state it was this absence which created conditions for Oriental despotism in which the individual was permanently exposed to the arbitrary rule of the despot.[32]

The despotic view of Chinese Society while presupposing China to be a static society also completely disregarded the liberal tradition, which though shortlived, cannot be ignored. Intellectuals like Hu Shih (1891-1962) Chen Tu-

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31. James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China-Watchers", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, October 1969 p.41.

32. Bryan Turner, 1994, p.23.

hsiu (1880-1942) and Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao (1873-1929) were major liberal thinkers in China. These thinkers could be identified as a "small band of western educated scholars, educators, publicists, and professional men reflecting certain of the characteristics of Enlightenment".[33] Though they rejected the erstwhile social and political order based on strict Confucian precepts, their attempt was more at revitalizing Chinese culture by introducing Wetern liberal ideas of individual liberty, representative government etc. into Chinese politics, than at a total rejection of Chinese history.

The May Fourth movement was the "rallying point" of the liberals in China. It is an important landmark in the history of Chinese liberalism and a very visible outcome of liberal aspirations of the Chinese youth. It also brought to the fore the presence of participatory politics in China. The May Fourth movement left significant traces in subsequent Chinese politics especially in the later mass or youth movements. Therefore, the liberal tradition, though shortlived, left its impact on Chinese politics and an interpretation of Chinese political behaviour by solely stressing on the autocratic tradition would not be comprehensive.

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33. Jerome Grieder, *Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970) p.314.

Opposed to the despotic view of authority is the Confucian view of authority. While the despotic view of Chinese society holds that the absence of civil society gave the ruler wide-ranging, almost ubiquitous power, the Confucian view holds that the ruler's power is bestowed by a `mandate of heaven' which the ruler must earn and sustain. Karl Wittfogel stresses the authoritarian principle underlying the Confucian principle of filial piety, i.e., a son who obeyed his father was well prepared to obey his government. However in doing so he misses out on the greater importance of an `evaluation of all relationship by an ethical stand-ard' under the Confucian principle.[34]

This ethical evaluation prescribes certain codes of conduct in any hierarchical relationship. In accordance with this code each person must fulfill the obligations of his/her assigned role in the social and political order. A son must behave like a son and fulfil his obligations to-wards his parents and a father must behave like a father and fulfil his duties towards his children. Similarly, a ruler is a ruler only as long as he rules in accordance with a moral order. A king who acts as a tyrant loses the name of the king and becomes an outlaw and a usurper.[35]

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34. Moody, 1977, p.27.

35. Ibid., p.29.

According to Confucian principles the king rules within an elaborate cosmological scheme, to the end of the welfare of his subjects. "Heaven gives birth to people. They are good but cannot fulfil their potential. Therefore, a king is established, that they may be good, this is heaven's intention.... The ancients who invented writing drew three lines and connected them in the middle, calling the word "Wang" [王]. The three lines are heaven, earth and man. The line through the middle links them together, who if not a king could link together, heaven, earth and man?"[36]

This glorification of the ruler must be understood through an understanding of the Confucian project. Confucius was concerned primarily with providing order to the chaotic political situation that prevailed in China during his lifetime. China was divided into a number of small feudal states which were constantly bickering or making war upon each other or upon the barbarian tribes that pressed the Chinese people from all sides. The kings of the central court of the Chou (Zhou) dynasty who had given peace and stability to the nation, were weak and ineffective before the might of the feudal lords.[37]

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36. This cosmological theory was elaborated by the Han Scholar, Tung Chung-shu, Moody 1977, p.31.

37. William Theodore de Bary, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1960) p.18.

According to the Confucian school, society was in disarray because ethical standards had deteriorated and people were not living up to their highest ideals. All would be improved if each person would work more conscientiously to fulfill his role in society. The ideal state of affairs that once existed could be restored by using moral persuasion towards correct behaviour.[38]

The first step towards good government and the realization of a harmonious society was for each person to know his role and perform it well, according to a strict interpretation of that role. Confucianism identified five key role relationships - between ruler and subject, neighbour and neighbour, father and son, husband and wife and brother and brother.[39] All these relationships were supposed to be hierarchical, with the ruler at the very apex.

In the Confucian formulation, the ideal ruler was pictured as a holy or saintly ruler, responsible to heaven for the welfare of his earthly charges. By practising noble qualities with which he had been specially endowed he was capable of influencing their behaviour, and leading them to the practice of charitable and just conduct. If he failed in these endeavours, he would be warned of his imperfections by

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38. Lucian Pye, *China: An Introduction*, (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1984) p.35.

39. Pye, 1984, p.41.

Heaven, that would plague his government with natural disasters and rob his people of prosperity they should expect. Confucian thought made it quite clear that the duty of the sovereign, or of Son of Heaven, lay in ordering his government for the benefit of his subjects and not for the realization of his own personal ambitions. On the other hand the main task of the majority of the subjects was the production of crops from the land which they tilled and in return for the blessings of the ordered government they were duty bound to obey the commands of their sovereign.[40]

Thus the Chinese ruler was not responsible to the subjects or the people but to `heaven' and mainly gained legitimacy of his power in sustaining that `mandate of heaven' by ruling in accordance with a moral order. Confucius envisaged a harmonious society and a united Chinese Europe under such enlightened benevolent and moral ruler.

Other than the Confucian formulation of a sage king two more schools of thought came up in China. These were Legalism and Daoism. The Fa Jia or legalist school believed in the establishment of a uniform legal code throughout the Chinese Empire. They argued that the problems of the society could be solved if the ruler would establish clear and unambiguous laws and strictly enforce them. When people saw

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40. Ibid., p.77.

that violation of laws would be dealt with severely, they would quickly and quite naturally change their behaviour, thus ensuring a tranquil and orderly society. The laws could be arbitrary; indeed there was an advantage in making laws arbitrary, for people would constantly be reminded that power ultimately rested with the state and not with personal notions of what was just and reasonable.[41]

The Legalist school thus favoured a system of laws as punitive code to keep people from disrupting harmony in society. Confucianism on the other hand believed in the innate good of human beings and viewed training and education to channel that goodness as far superior ways of ensuring a virtuous and harmonious society. Confucius's teachings about `overnment by personal virtue' in the following statement could seem to sum up the essence of both legalism and Confucianism.

"Lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties, and the people will try to keep out of jail, but will have no sense of shame. Lead the people by virtue and restrain them by rules of decorum, and the people will have a sense of shame, and moreover will become good".[42] Thus, Chinese did not perceive in legalism a set of natural rights

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41. Ibid., p.35.

42. de Bary, 1960, p.19.

in the Western sense, but only viewed laws as a punitive measure.

Daoism rejected the Confucian view of a virtuous and moral order. The Daoists viewed everything in the world as relative. While Confucianism dealt with man in a public and social realm, Daoism was devoted to a perpetuation of the individual self. It concerned itself with the `ultimate questions' - the origin and meaning of life, the nature of the universe - and culminated in the mystic union of the individual with `Dao", which may be translated as the `Way". Most followers of Daoism belonged to the elite landed class who could afford to indulge in mystical Daoists rites, the aim of which usually was to prolong life.

The Daoists viewed the human body as a micro-cosmos with its various parts resembling various corresponding objects in the sky such as the sun, moon, planets etc. Now the universe is giant mechanism that automatically produces its effects. Or in other words everything is preordained and nature should not be tampered with since it requires no external direction. Thus the Daoist ethic may be summed up in the word "non-action".[43] Whereas the Confucians pictured the ideal gentleman as constantly active in promoting gener-

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43. McNeil and Sedlar (eds.), *Classical China*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970) p.181.

al welfare, Daoists thought of him as doing nothing.[44]

While both Legalism and Daoism were popular in China, for a while Confucianism, however, became the official philosophy of the Chinese Emperors as well as the dominant intellectual system in China. Accepted by the ordinary people for its application to everyday human concerns and its insistence that government exists for the common welfare, revered by the educated classes for its stress on advancement through merit and its inherent conservation combined with a reputation for benevolence, Confucianism remained the dominant intellectual system of China well into the twentieth century.[45]

The Confucian precept of the "Mandate of Heaven" as a legitimizing basis came under criticism, especially from the Western perspective. John Fairbank called it a `political invention' to help despotic rulers perpetuate their power. The mandate of heaven as a legitimate basis for exercising political authority becomes significant when one compares legitimacy in the Western and Chinese contexts.

Max Weber's definition of legitimate authority and legitimacy connote the validity of the authority of all ruling powers, profane and religious, political and apoliti-

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44. Ibid. .

45. Ibid., p.6.

cal, over their affiliated or subordinate groups in a given society or community. It is this basis that justifies the right to exercise power of governance.[46]

According to Dolf Sternberger, "the foundation of such governmental power as is exercized both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right".[47]

According to Reinhard Bendix, "legitimation achieves which power alone cannot do for it establishes the belief in the rightness of rule which, as long as it endures, precludes massive challenges."[48]

In the Western-liberal sense, this legitimacy is manifest in the doctrine of popular sovereignty which establishes a reciprocal contractual relationship between the government and the governed. The doctrine of popular sovereignty bestows upon the government or the ruler, a legal sanction to rule.

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46. Hans H. Gerta and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, cited in Hok-lam Chan, 1984, p.3.

47. Dolf Strenberger, "Legitimacy", *International Encyclopaedia of Social Science 9*, cited in Hok-lam Chan, 1984, p.3.

48. Bendix, *Kings or People*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, pp.16-17, cited in Hok-lam Chan, 1984, p.10.

Legitimacy is defined differently in the Chinese context. The Chinese developed a concept parallel to the Western notion of Legitimacy much earlier than the West, they had also formulated a set a political theories for legitimating rulers and dynasties as far as second century B.C.[49]

Unlike Western civilizations, China has had a homogenous monarchical order backed by a bureaucratic government since before the Christian era. The basic features of government of the Zhou state, the golden era of classical China, were based on a combination of Confucian, some Daoist and Legalist ideologies and a complex feudal and bureaucratic government. And these features of government of the Zhou state continued with little or few cosmetic changes over the centuries in China.

The Confucian monarch was restrained in exercise of his authority by an ethical evaluation of it, and the prescribed need for sharing power with his supporters and administwrators. Further Confucian ideology by emphasizing a hierarchical scale of authority and role definition for all members of society towards communal good, as the primary source of rule and order. This system was obviously not devoid of imperfections but it remained a highly effective form of

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49. Hok-lam Chan, 1984, p.ix.

government, surviving both internal uprisings and conquests, until the revolution in early twentieth century. In fact, it had a record of longevity and reputation unsurpassed in any other civilization.[50]

Hok-lam Chan traces the origin of legimating principles in China to the Classical age in China. He says:

> The Chinese terminology and definition are quite different from those of the West, but they have some common ground. The Chinese approximation of the Western concept of legitimacy, in the sense of the ruler's mandate and the recognition of his right by the governed is known as *Cheng-t'ung*.
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> In their original form the characters Cheng and t'ung had a broad meaning in Chinese etymology and political thought. *Cheng* means `correct, proper, rectified, upright, legitimate or orthodox; *t'ung* connotes `system, sequence, filiation, tradition, succession, or unification'. These two characters even in their separate forms carried explicit moral and political overtones and inspired the development of more elaborate criteria concerning legitimate rulership in later times.[51]

A brief survey of Chinese history brings to light the relationship between the religious factor and the legitimating basis of temporal authority. During the Shang dynasty in ancient China, the worship of numerous deities of heaven and of ancestors was closely linked with providing legitimacy to the ruler, since their blessings were essential to

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50. Ibid., p.20.

51. Ibid., p.28.

legitimize the temporal authority. Hence the Shang king's emphasis on nature and ancestor worship provided the basis for their legitimacy.

According to Chan, more elaborate theories of legitimacy, later crystallized under the rubric of *Cheng t'ung* were derived from two sources of political thought in China. The first was the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven developed during the early Zhou state with the inception of the feudal system. The second was the ideal of benevolent rule by sage kings assisted by the cultured elite, which was based on Confucian principles. These classical traditions fused and gave form to *Cheng-t'ung* to provide the firm basis of legitimacy in ancient and imperial China. Many of these traditions survived till the 19th century and formed components of legitimacy sought by and given to the Communist Party in China.

CHAPTER I

DISCOURSES OF AUTHORITY
AND LEADERSHIP IN CHINA

In any broad discussion of political culture, both in
liberal and socialist polities, there are specific and
dominant aspects that relate to succession crises. These
are the discourses that create and legitimize notions of
authority and leadership. In China and within the Chinese
Communist Party, in particular, dominant discourses of
authority and leadership and their discursive development
within the framework of Chinese political culture are clear-
ly discernible.

Political culture as an analytical concept is helpful
in bringing human motivation more sharply into account in a
cross-cultural analyses of behaviour.[1] In other words, an
inquiry into political culture of a society, to seek deter-
minants of political behaviour, provides a culturally rele-
vant area of investigation. Thus it is possible to adopt a
culturally contextual view of authority and leadership in
China instead of doing an ideologically hidebound analysis
of the official ideology of the Chinese Communist Party.

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1. Richard Wilson, "Reconciling Universalism and Relativ-
    ism in Political Culture", *Journal of Asian Studies*,
    50, no.1, February 1991, pp.53-66.

Discourses of leadership and authority may be sought in
`non-political' texts as well and determinants of political
behaviour may be found in `non-political' spheres of life.
This chapter shall deal with locating the specific concepts
of authority and leadership within the Confucian, Marxist
and Maoist discourses in China.

If any one word was to be chosen to characterize the
Chinese way of life for the last two thousand years, the
word would be "Confucian".[2] The political culture of China
is deeply permeated with Confucian thought and an analysis
of it throws light on many aspects of authority in China.
Confucius's sayings and teachings, especially on government
and filiality, contain his references to authority in socie-
ty.

Confucius prescribed moral order as the basis of a
stable and prosperous society. The preservation of the
moral order was the highest goal of social and political
action. The king or the ruler was the living representation
of a moral order. The king was also the highest representa-
tion of moral order. Further, the king derived his right to
rule from his capacity to preserve the Confucian moral
order. According to Confucius, "If the ruler himself is

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2.   Wm. Theodore de Bary (ed.), *Sources of Chinese Tradi-
     tion* (New York and London: Columbia University Press,
     1960) p.15.

upright, all will go well even though he does not give orders. But if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders, they will not be obeyed."[3] Morality and authority, then, are enmeshed in Confucian thought, and in fact, only moral authority is genuine and enduring. According to Confucius, "he who rules by moral force is like the pole-star, which remains in its place while all the lesser stars do homage to it."[4]

The Confucian moral order is based on hierarchical organization of society. Or in other words, the Confucian moral order is a hierarchical one. Relationships between family members as well as those among the ruler and the ruled are clearly defined. The hierarchical order contributes to the preservation of the moral order, in that each person in society has a role to perform. Confucius says, "Let the prince be prince, the minister be minister, the father father and the son son".[5] Two dominant characteristics of this hierarchical society are filial piety and loyalty to the ruler. The virtue of filial piety may be considered as one of the cornerstones of Chinese way of life even today. Confucius stressed filial piety as a contribut-

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3. Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938) p.173.

4. Ibid., p.88.

5. Wm. Theodore de Bary (ed.) 1960, p.33.

ing factor in good government. In his words, "Be filial, only be filial and friendly towards your brothers, and you will be contributing to government."[6]

In Confucian thought therefore morality and authority are interlinked to legitimize the basis of leadership. Thus the ruler's responsibility is to preserve the prescribed moral order and he wields his authority by ruling in accordance with it. In short, Confucius locates authority in the ruler, who is at the apex of a hierarchical organization of society and the nature of this authority is moral.

Richard Solomon in exploring the cultural and ideological underpinning of the Confucian precepts of authority, makes a distinction between the Western and Chinese notions of social interaction.

The Western model of society is based upon individualism which holds self-actualization of the individual as the highest motivation for social and political action. On the other hand, Chinese society considers the promotion of communal good and social harmony as the highest motive for individual action. "The American cultural perspective, places strong emphasis on the importance of the individual in society, on personal responsibility and on self-realization. The Chinese emphasis on social inter-

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6. Arthur Waley, 1938, p.93.

relatedness, on the basic importance of group life, and on submission of the individual to collective interests, stands out as a fundamental cultural difference".[7]

This primary emphasis on communal interest over individual interests is manifest in the cyclic theory of life[8] and is evident in fostering the idea of social interrelatedness from an early age. According to the Confucian life pattern, the son reciprocates the nuturance he receives in his childhood by nurturing his parents in their dependency of old age. This cyclic life pattern reinforces the idea of an interdependent society and fosters a culture of dependency in China, which is carried beyond the family. It is reflected in the general attitude to authority and the submission to it.

Social interdependence is based on role division which is hierarchical i.e. it is the place of the father as head of the family to make important decisions and it is the place of a son, in keeping with the principle of filial piety, to obey the father. Richard Solomon establishes the formation of enduring patterns of behaviour towards authori-

7. Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p.2.

8. Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (Massachussetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunns Hain Inc., 1981) p.21.

ty in childhood by an analysis of child-rearing practices of typical Chinese families over the centuries. The child's primary understanding of hierarchy comes from patterns of privilege and punishment in the family. These patterns of authority and responsibility fostered in a child in the family are later reflected in the adult political behaviour.

The social dependency of individuals is encouraged and fostered towards the greater aim of a harmonious social order. In doing so adults take decisions for the child because children (or any younger person for that matter) are not competent to develop independent opinions; they "don't understand", and lack sufficient experience and hence should rely on adults for guidance. Thus the child should only obey his elders and not question their decisions. The communication pattern which a Chinese child learns is therefore non-reciprocal. A strong sense of social status and authority thus develops around interpersonal communications, of whom may speak first, who must listen, or who is left speechless.[9]

This dependence of the youth on the older generation for decision-making and articulation is coupled with the social dependence of an individual on society generally. For example, in punishing children, parents and teachers

9.   Solomon, 1971, p.49.

invoke the solidarity of the group (i.e. family or class-mates) to shame an erring individual into submsision, thus raising his/her anxieties about not fitting into group life properly.[10] This group pressure results in fostering an attitude of obedience to authority and conformity to social norms.

Solomon traces the life of an individual from infancy to adulthood to provide evidence of the crystallization of childhood deference to authority as a life long behavioural norm. This authority is invested in superior subordinate relationships even in the family. Each family member has a social role to perform, and these roles are interrelated in rank order. For example, there are no `brothers' in the family, only *ko-ko* and *ti-ti*, elder and younger brothers, and their relations are shaped by the pattern of father-son interrelations.[11]

Solomon qualifies this authoritative hierarchical pattern as one imbued with an inherent sense of responsibility and benevolence. As the child is taught that he/she must obey the father, the child also learns that in return for submission to filial authority, the father or older brother should be kind and generous.

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10. Ibid., p.53.

11. Ibid., p.54.

According to Solomon, a cultural rationale for encouraging social dependence and an hierarchical structure of authority in China was "a pervasive concern with social disorganization, and interpersonal conflict (which) gave enduring meaning to the authoritative institutions of Chinese society and an individual's early-life experiences with family authority prepared him for commitment to these social institutions as adults."[12]

The Chinese value "harmony above conflict" and believe that if all in society fulfil their assigned roles morally, there shall be reigning peace. Thus it is moral and desirable for younger people or subordinates to obey their superiors, because firstly, the superiors have greater wisdom and secondly, it is their place to lead or to decide for others. This attitude towards authority translates into deference for higher officials and a dependency on their "greater wisdom". The legitimation of political authority in this sense rests upon people's belief that they are dependent on it and shall be secure under it.

However, this deference to authority is by no means absolute or total. It has other underlying tensions inherent in this non-reciprocal form of communication. According to Lucian Pye, the repression of aggression has been a

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12. Ibid., p.105.

central theme in Chinese culture, in contrast with Western civilization, where the central concern has been the suppression of sexuality.[13] Hostile emotions and `disruptive' behaviour are sought to be suppressed as early as possible. According to Solomon in the Confucian family tradition there is no behaviour which is more likely to invoke swift punishment than a child's quarrelling or fighting with siblings or neighbourhood peers.[14] Pye establishes a direct link between repression of aggression or impermissibility of hostility and the paradoxical psychological need among Chinese to look for security in authoritative relationships. According to Pye "in Chinese culture the notion of power is directly related to a search for personal security. The Chinese seek the protection of power, which in turn depends upon reliable personal relationships in which the strong appreciate the need to protect each other".[15]

According to Pye, since a filial son was never to disobey his father or to talk back to him, the hostility that he may feel simmered as resentment, but was not allowed to be expressed. This resentment became stronger if filiality was not reciprocated with justice and care. Thus many a

13.   Pye, 1981, p.137.

14.   Solomon, 1971, p.67.

15.   Pye, 1981, p.138.

times the parental harshness which was seen as necessary to the rearing of filial children but produced in a maturing son a strong sense of ambivalence to authority, a desire to be nurtured and protected by it, yet anxiety about proximity to it. The authority figure in Confucian households i.e. the father, was not accessible to the children, rendering him fearful and above human failing and reproach.

Thus the traditional Chinese order was characterized by (a) fostering a dependency on hierarchical authority versus self assertion, (b) social harmony and peace versus hostility and aggression and (c) self versus the group or the community.[16] It was a remarkably enduring social and political system providing a strong basis for moral authority in preserving a harmonious social order.

The Communist Revolution, theoretically, made a metamophoric break with China's past. The Communists wanted to establish a political institutional order based upon Marxism-Leninism which would revamp Chinese politics and society.

A textual study of the Communist Manifesto[17] reveals the Marxian notions of authority and leadership. The Marx-

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16. Solomon, 1971, p.79.

17. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol.6* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976).

ian concept of authority was essentially political, based upon the seizure of state power, towards the end of a class-less society. Marx defined authority in terms of political power and locates it in the ruling class in each successive stage of historical development. Further, every stage of historical development was characterized by class-struggle. According to Marx and Engels, "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle... oppressor and oppressed, stood in a constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in revolutionary re-constitution of society at large or in the common ruin of all contending classes".[18]

Each stage of historical development is represented by more advanced relations of production than its preceding one. However, even as society progresses from primitive communism to slavery to feudalism to capitalism the existence of two contending classes endures. Or, there is a "progress" in the relations of production and mode of production, but not in the class-nature of society. As long as two classes, related differently to the mode of production, as owners and non-owners exist, the exploitative nature of societey exists. And the state which is the symbol of supreme authority in society too becomes exploitative in

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18.   Ibid., p.483.

nature. Marx says of bourgeois state that the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.[19] The state then serves as the tool of the ruling class to perpetuate its power.

After the Industrial Revolution, two new classes came into being - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The class-struggle between these two classes, according to Marx was historically inevitable and had a predestined outcome. The workers would triumph over the capitalists to establish a classless society. However, the downfall of capitalism would not take place automatically. It depended on the organization, consciousness and revolution activity of the working class.[20]

Marx entrusted the leadership of the Communist movement to the Communist Party, while positing the maximum revolutionary potential in the proletariat. The proletariat's capacity for revolution was based on its unique position in the relations of production in the bourgeois society. Marx argued that as the essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class was the formation and augmentation of capital, similarly the condition for

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19. Ibid., p.486.

20. Alex Callinicos, *The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx* (London: Bookmarks, 1984), p.140.

capital was wage-labour. Wage-labour rested exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry whose involuntary promoter was the bourgeoisie, replaced the isolation of the labourers due to competition, by their combination due to association. Thus the bourgeoisie produced above all, ts own grave diggers".[21]

The middle class created by capitalism, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie do struggle against the capitalists but to perpetuate their own position i.e. to preserve the status-quo, and in that are reactionary. Neither do they have the coherence of a "class" as the proletariat does. Nor can the peasantry be considered as the motive force in a socialist revolution as it does not have the required revolutionary potential. In his own words:

> ...the small holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Then mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse.... Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient, it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small-holding, a peasant and his family alongside them another small-holding, another peasant, another family. A few score of these make up a village and a few score of villages make up a department. Insofar as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes put them in a hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there

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21. Communist Manifesto, p.496.

is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class.[22]

However, when led by another class, the peasants can become a national force. And the peasants find their natural ally and leader in the urban proletariat whose task is the overthrow of the bourgeois order.[23] The proletariat becomes aware of its revolutionary role in its daily struggle against the capitalist. The trade union strikes that aim at improving the living and working conditions of the proletariat pave the way for the "banding together" of the workers to form a class. But Marx terms these struggles as economic in nature. The class struggle of the working clas can succeed only if it is transformed from an economic into political struggle, that is, into the struggle of "class against class" in which workers become aware of their historic interests and seek to wrest political power from the capitalists. Marx, of course, believed that the economic class struggle of the proletariat had an inherent tendency to become political.[24]

Marx emphasised the need to organize and provide leadership to the revolutionary proletariat, if it had to effec-

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22. *Collected Works*, Vol.II, p.187.

23. Ibid., p.191.

24. Callinicos, p.149.

tively struggle against the entrenched power of the bourgeoisie. And the Communist Party was to provide that leadership. According to Marx the Communist Party serves not only as the most effective organization and provides theoretical articulation of the workers interests but is, in fact, indispensable in guiding a workers revolution. Marx and Engels say that "the Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties. They have no interest separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movements.... In various stages of development which the struggle of any working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole".[25]

The Communist Party has not only the best interest of the workers at heart in establishing a classless society, it is also the most capable organization for doing so. According to Marx, the Communists are the "most advanced and resolute section" of the working class parties of every country since they exhort all others to be revolutionary, and they also have the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general

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25. *Collected Works*, Vol.6, p.497.

results of the proletarian movement.[26]

After the Communist revolution led by the Communist Party and brought about by the workers' power, the Communist Party's role is reinterpreted in the post-revolution context. Now the Party must provide political organization of power or the state based on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Marx qualifies the dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary stage in the transition from a bourgeois to a class society. Abolition of private property cannot be achieved at a single stroke. It is a gradual process aimed at maximizing productivity to lay the material basis for social ownership of means of production. Thus this stage has to be characterized by a dictatorship of the proletariat which is led by the Communist Party as the vanguard of the revolution.

Marx stipulates that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a transitional stage, which must culminate in a classless society. The Communist Party must work towards its own extinction to achieve the greater objective of establishing a classless society. This is in consonance with the Marxist view of any state" as exploitative and hence undesirable. Marx, therefore, delinks authority and leadership at a particular stage in history. The state

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26. Ibid., p.497.

which is the symbol of authority and the concrete manifesta-
tion of the leadership of the Communist Party, withers away,
creating a space for independent social interaction.

Marxism-Leninism being the official ideology of the
Chinese state also provides a basic foundation for the
Maoist discourse on leadership.

The Maoist discourse on authority and leadership de-
rives from Marxism-Leninism and is sinified to suit Chinese
conditions; i.e., it reconciles the western ideology of
Marxism precribing a workers' revolution in industrially
developed societies to an Asian predominantly agrarian
Chinese society. For example, in defining the characteris-
tics of China's revolutionary war Mao stresses the need to
make a concrete analysis of concrete conditions in keeping
with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.[27] According to Mao the
experience and theoretical output of the Russian revolution
was invaluable to Communist parties across the world but
that did not mean a mechanical application of it to all
conditions Hence theory must be made practical by applica-
tion to China's real conditions. The evolving of a guerilla
technique of warfare for China is one such example of this
exercise.

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27. *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung*, p.92.

The Maoist concept of power was revolutionary in nature. Mao's aim was to revolutionize social relationships in their entirety. Political, economic and social relations of the past had to be destroyed to establish a new society along Marxist lines. Further even after the establishment of a new state, revlution had to go on.

Unlike Marx, Mao posited the maximum revolutionary potential in the peasantry. However, the peasantry needed to be educated, organized and led by the Communist Party. According to Mao, the Communist Party was the expression of the interests of all people i.e., the Party was the expression of the will of society and not of a political entity, the nation. Thus the CCP was the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people and without this core the cause of socialism could not be victorious.[28] Thus in Maoist China, power was located in the CCP and it was concretely manifested in the dictatorship of the Proletariat led by the CCP. Here unlike Marx, Mao enmeshed leadership with authority/power to lay the foundation of a monolithic party structure in China.

Further, the Communist Party in a Communist state is not merely an organized expression of revolutionary interest, it is the Party which leads and controls the state.

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28. *Selected Works* of Mao Tse Tung, Vol.V, p.447.

According to Mao the CCP or any Communist party differed from bourgeois political parties (although both strive to capture state power) in that a Communist Party works towards its own extinction. Mao exhorted the Chinese Communists to hasten their extinction so that the goal of a classless, stateless society is achieved.[29] Since the Communist Party has no vested interest in entrenching its power, it is therefore the honest and true leader of the exploited people. According to Mao the Communists must play a vanguard role in every sphere[30] because it is only under the leadership of the CCP that the goal of socialism may be achieved.

However, Mao did not specify any time frame for the withering away of the Party and the socialist state. Instead he emphasized the socialist reconstruction of society and the role of "continuous revolution" in achieving it. significantly the "continuous revolution" is to be carried out under the leadership of the CCP which would handle the contradictions in society. Contrary to the Soviet Union where "all exploiting classes had been eliminated",[31] in China, Mao stressed the presence of counter-revolutionaries,

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29. Ibid., p.297.

30. *Selected Works*, Vol.II, p.197.

31. Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p.110.

petty bourgeoisie and the big landlords in society even after the Communist Revolution.[32] Hence it is the task of the CCP to provide leadership in weeding out these contradictions by carrying on a "continuous revolution" which eventually translated into a continuous leadership of the CCP in China. Further Mao clearly defined the leading role to be played by the CCP in various spheres of politics and society.

According to Mao the peasantry was the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution, the natural and the most reliable ally of the proletariat and main contingent of China's revolutionary forces.[33] However, the peasantry needed to be educated in the revolutionary gospel of Maxism-Leninism and this task Mao entrusted to the Communist Party. "The Communist Party is great, glorious and correct and this is the aspect which must be affirmed at all levels."[34] This unshakable faith in the leadership of the CCP is evident in many of Mao'a directives and speeches. This was the basis for the vanguard role that the party was to play in the revolution, constantly educating peasants, workers, cadres in the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

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32. "On Contradiction", *Selected Works*, Vol.I, pp.311-346.

33. *Selected Works*, Vol.II, p.324.

34. *Selected Works*, Vol.V, p.47.

Within the CCP, Mao presecribed a hierarchical struc-
ture with a stress on collectively and individually remain-
ing true to Marxism-Leninism. In a report made to the Sixth
Plenary session to the Sixth Central Committee, Mao clearly
laid down the following organization principles to be fol-
lowed in the CCP: (a) the individual is subordinate to the
organization, (b) the minority is subordinate to the majori-
ty, (c) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level
and (d) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central
Committee.[35] Further in an inner-party circular Mao stress-
es the apex position of the Central Committee within the
hierarchical structure of the Party. In Mao's words, "the
consolidation and building of the Party should proceed under
the strict control of the Central Committee and its bureaus,
and organizations at lower levels must in no case act as
they please.[36]

Along with this prescription of "democratic centralism,
Mao also interpreted democracy in the Communist context.
According to Mao democracy did not necessarily entail adop-
tion of bourgeois parliamentary system and imitation of
western concepts as "parliamentary democracy", "freedom of
the press" and "freedom of speech". Mao defined democracy
as a method, and the character and function of this method

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35. *Selected Works*, Vol.II, p.204.

36. *Selected Works*, Vol.V, p.47.

depended on whom it was to be applied and for what purpose. In Mao's words, "what we favor is great democracy under the leadership of the proletariat".[37]

After firmly establishing the unchallenged political leadership of the CCP Mao elaborated on the leadership of the Party in every sphere of life including culture. Here `culture' is meant as defined by Raymond Williams as the informing spirit of a whole way of life, manifest specifically in cultural activities - a language, styles of art, kinds of intellectual work, etc.[38]

Mao identified three kinds of dominant authority to which peasants in traditional China were subject. These were (a) the political authority of the state system at local, provincial and national levels, (b) the clan authority, ranging from the central ancestral temple and its branch temples down to the head of the household and (c) the supernatural or the religious authority, ranging from the King of Hell down to the town and village gods, from the Emperor of Heaven down to various gods and spirits belonging to the celestial world. These authorities were the embodiment of the whole patriarchal-feudal system and ideology and

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37. Ibid., p.343.

38. Raymond Williams, *Culture*, (Glasgow:Fontana Books, 1981) p.11.

were reflected in the culture created by this setup.[39] This is in consonance with Marxism which had as its starting point that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, it is their social being that determines their consciousness".[40] And art and culture are a part of this consciousness. Mao made significant additions to Marxism-Leninism in the sphere of culture generally and this was closely connected to his understanding of the role the CCP in revolutionizing culture and creating strategies of persuasion in establishing a communist society.

According to Mao, the superstructure, of which culture forms an important part, plays an initiating role in transforming the base. Engels too emphasized that, though the base, that is the economic factor, played the most significant role in determining the course of history, it was by no means the only factor. The superstructure also exercizes its influence upon the course of historical struggles and in many cases determines their form in particular.[41] Mao elaborating on this argument highlighted the role of super-

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39. *Selected Works*, Vol.I, p.44.

40. Marx, "Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", FLP, Peking, 1976, p.3, cited in Avakian Bob, *Mao Tse Tung's Immortal Contributions*, (Chicago: RCP Publications, 1979), p.200.

41. Ibid., p.203.

structure as the "initiating force". In Mao's words, when superstructure (politics, culture etc.) obstructed the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive."[42]

Mao aimed at the development of proletarian culture and its use in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and carrying forward the revolution under this dictatorship. And for this he laid out the basic orientation even before nationwide political power had been established and the socialist stage of production entered. Mao's "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" (May 1992)[43] was one important document in laying down the party's line on art and culture.

Mao intended art and literature to serve specific purposes in carrying forward the revolution. According to Mao art should expose the anti-nationals, bourgeoisie and the bourgeois influences among the peope. On the other hand art must extol the revolution and the workers and peasants working towards it. Art and literature must address the broader section of the masses comprising the workers, soldiers and peasants and not merely the elite, as was done under bourgeois society. And to address the workers, sol-

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42. *Selected Works*, Vol.I, p.336.
43. *Selected Works*, Vol.3, p.72.

diers and peasants, it was necessary to know them. In fact, the primary task of the writers and artists was to understand people and know them well. Finally it was fine for writers and artists to study literary and artistic creations, but the science of Marxism-Leninism must be studied by all revolutionaries, writers and artists not excepted, because only then they may produce literature and art which was rich in content and correct in orientation.[44] Hence, Mao privileged culture by placing it at the heart of politics and also used it as a persuasive strategm to legitimize the authority of the CCP.

This Maoist prescription of the "correct line" in art and culture was a part of the larger objective to prescribe morality in political and non-political spheres, to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and to carry forward the revolution. China's many mass movements such as the Hundred Flowers, the Anti-Rightist campaign and specifically the Cultural Revolution were exercises in redefining political and public morality i.e., socially and politically acceptable behaviour in keeping with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The emphasis in these movements on exposing revisionists, capitalist-roaders and counter-revolutionaries was an attempt to reinforce the concept of a

44.   Ibid., pp.69-97.

public morality, based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as essential for a successful revolution.

Thus Maoist prescriptions of morality bear many similarities to the Confucian precepts of moral authority. In Confucian times the authority of the ruler derived from his adherence to the moral order prescribed by Confucian thought. The ruler lost legitimacy if he transgressed or violated the moral order. Under the CCP, Maoist prescriptions of morality were based on a strict adherence to basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The Party derived its legitimacy from being the highest form of the organized expresion of the will of `the people'. However, the Party was not infallible and Mao constantly warned against revisionism and bourgeois influences even among the Party's higher level. The Cultural Revolution is the classic example of the Party losing legitimacy because it did not adhere any longer to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy as perceived by Mao. Senor party leaders such as Liu Shao-qi who had earlier been anointed as Mao's successor was denigrated as China's biggest capitalist-roader and Mao circumvented the party machine to appeal directly to the "revolutionary" Red-guards.

This similarity between the Confucian and Maoist concepts of legitimacy is no accident or coincidence. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, political behaviour is not a mere reflection of discourse and vice-versa.

This relationship between ideology and political behaviour needs to be examined in the tradition-modernity paradigm to arrive at an interactive interpretation of political behaviour exhibiting certain enduring dimensions of Chinese political tradition.

CHAPTER II

THE TRADITION - MODERNITY DEBATE

The founding of the People's Republic in China in 1949, based on the guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism, heralded a break from China's traditional past. The CCP proclaimed the PRC as a worker's and peasant's state under the a dictatorship of the proletariat. The objective of the CCP was to make a clear break with China's traditional past by, (a) ending all exploitative economic and social relations that existed in pre-1949 China and (b) by 'modernizing' China and propeling it towards the path of economic development.

Modernization is generally understood as a process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies.[1] Modernity has also been referred to as the development of a secular and rational outlook.[2] Modernization thus defined, is heavily biased in favour of Westernization of the non-Western world. The aspiration of traditional, non-western states to modernize may thus be identified to a large extent, with an aspiration towards westernization. Further, most theories of modernization arising out of the west, do present westernization as the end towards which traditional societies must strive.

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1   David Lerner, "Modernization: Social Aspects." Cited in Rajendra Pandey ed., *Modernization and Social Change*, (New Delhi: Criterion Publisher, 1988) p.67.

2   Anisuzzaman and Anour Abder - Malek (eds.) *Culture and Thought*, (United Nations University: MacMillan Press, 1983).

The Chinese, however, have assiduously made a distinction between westernization and modernization. The Chinese have traditionally regarded China as the middle kingdom, "*Zhongguo*" ruled by the "son of Heaven", as culturally and morally superior to the rest of the 'barbarian' world. However, a series of humiliating defeats since the Opium war, at the hands of Western powers forced the Chinese to acknowledge the technological superiority of the West. To cope with the military and mercantile assault from the West, the Chinese adopted a policy of selective adaptation of western ways. According to Lucian Pye, the Chinese leaders at the end of the 19th century firmly believed that it would be possible to preserve their ancient Confucian traditions, in spite of the acknowledged military superiority of the West, by merely taking over western science and "technology".[3] Thus the Chinese chose to adopt or learn western "skills" while keeping western culture and values at bay. Pye identifies the differentiation, between "skill" and "values" and "technology" and "culture" as a constant feature of transitional societies.[4] After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chose to follow the same path of "modernizing" China without "Westernizing" it.

The communist view of modernity derives from Marxism - the guiding principle of the Chinese state. Marxism is inherently modern, in that it advocates a total break with the economic relationships, social structure, political institutions and culture of the past.

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3   Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development*, (New Delhi, Amerind Publishing Co., 1966) p.96.

4   Lucian Pye, 1966. p.96.

According to Marx, the history of all mankind has been the history of class struggle. In this struggle the oppressor and the oppressed are related differently to the mode of production. The exploitative economic relations in all pre-revolutionary societies shall cease to exist in a communist society, thus fundamentally altering the class nature of society. In Marx's words, "the commune ... therefore ... serves as a lever for uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class-rule."[5]

Further, Marx advocated the uprooting of the political machinery of the bourgeois state including its governmental bureaucracy, its police and army and its judicial & prison system. Marx and Engels noted in the Communist Manifesto that, "one thing especially was proved by the (Paris) commune, viz., that the working class simply cannot lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes." Hence the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat must proceed under a modern state apparatus.

In stressing the dialectical relationship between the base and superstructure Marx pointed out that the "ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class".[6] Literature and art were considered by Marx as important components of the superstructure. He considered that changes in the base could be affected by changes in the superstructure and vice-versa. The ruling class with its dominant position was

5   *Selected Works*, Vol.2, p.220.

6   *Manifesto of the Communist Party* p.57.

able to suppress the ideas of the oppressed class. Therefore, only when the oppressed class overthrows the existing political power can its ideas become dominant in society.[7]

In doing so, Marx differentiated between the earlier bourgeois revolutions and the communist revolution. For Marx, "the social revolution of the nineteenth century [i.e., the proletarian revolution] cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future.... Earlier revolutions required recollections of past world history in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. In order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead."[8]

Thus Marxism advocates a clean break from the past, economically, politically, socially and culturally to establish a new society imbued with a new ideology and consisting of modern institutions in all spheres of human organization and endeavour.

The PRC based on Marxism-Leninism, expressed the aspiration for modern society thus defined. The CCP broke away form China's feudal and semi-colonial past to established a socialist state based upon commong ownership of the means of production. Private property was done away with and within a decade of its inception, China underwent agricultural co-operativization. In the political sphere, the fragmented

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7   Bob Avakian, *Mao Tse tung's Immortal Contributions*, (Chicago: RCP, 1979) p.202.

8   Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, p.18.

Chinese nation partly under Republican rules, partly under foreign rule and under the last vestige of imperial Chinese rule, was united into the People's Republic of China. the bureaucracy and organizations of pre-1949 years were done away with, to be repalced by CCP organizations in politics, economy, education etc. The ideological basis of the new state was provided by Marxism-Leninism and Mao exhorted the people to launch a "continous revolution" to root out all vestiges of past practices and to aspire for a socialist reconstruction of China.

According to Samuel Huntington, political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, the differentiation of structures, and the expansion of political participation.[9] The liberal-democratic definition of political modernization is in direct contrast to the aim of a stateless society, pursued by a communist state where the dictatorship of the proletariat is only a "transitional stage" in the process of achieving the "withering away of the state". Therefore, for a communist state like China to aspire to political modernization in the liberal-democratic sense was not the intention of the CCP. However, survey of Chinese politics and the role of the CCP since 1949 amply bears out the fact that the stated objective of classlessness and statelessness is undermined in reality by the presence of social disparities and a progressively strong and visible state.

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9   Samuel P. Huntungton, *Political order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1966) p.93.

Further, the movement towards a 'modern' path is offset by elements of traditional Chinese culture in communist China. The most important among these are traditional attitudes towards authority. However, before assessing the role of traditional elements in Chinese politics it is necessary to ask the following question. What is responsible for the seeming paradox of the endurance of traditional attitudes in a communist society based an Marxism, which is inherently modern? This may be answered either by treating the Chinese condition as an anomaly or by not considering tradition and modernity as dichotomous. In the first case, as Zhengyuan Fu does, the autocratic political tradition in China may be highlighted, and, the CCP discredited as a substitute for the Imperial Chinese government. Fu traces similarities between the Imperial government and the CCP's style of working, cult of the Emperor and of Mao etc to establish his argument. The authority of the CCP, according to Fu, derives from the continuation of traditional autocratic power structures in post-1949 China.

However, this approach only explores a narrow co-relation between tradition and authority in China. The struggle of the PRC as a developing nation to modernize is completely ignored.

A more insightful explanation of the problem may be attempted by viewing China as a developing country and exploring the dynamic relationship between tradition and modernity against such a background.

In response to the unilinear vision of progress which viewed tradition as useless and relegated it to the "historical

trash heap",[10] many scholars have explored positively the dynamic relationship between tradition and modernity. According to Sussane Rudolph and Llyod Rudolph, "the assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictory rests on a misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, and a misunderstanding of modernity as it is found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them".[11]

Speaking specifically about the preoccupation about a tradition modernity dichotomy in transitional societies, Rudolph and Rudolph clarify that paracommunities, associations combining traditional and modern features, are not merely a transitional phenomena but a persistent feature of modernity. Further, to assume the presence of this dichotomy in a transitional society results in an analytical gap between tradition and modernity.[12]

Rudolph and Rudolph trace the presence of traditional forces such as local history, ethnicity, race and religious community in influencing political behavior even in modern" societies like America. They cite organizational literature which reveals the trends in modern corporations towards economic relations which assume aspects of traditional patron-client relationships undermining a strict dichotomy between tradition and modernity.

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10   Sussane Rudolph and Llyod Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Develpment in India*, (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1967) cited in Pandey, p.189.

11   Ibid, p.141.

12   Ibid.

The comparative method of analysis has been a major contributer to an understanding of tradition and modernity as contrasting concepts. According to Rudolph and Rudolph the strongest impulse for comparative work has come from those familiar with Western comparative politics and political sociology, and has consequently been influenced by categories of analysis and historical possibilities fashioned in their own contexts, and are hence ethnocentric.

For Reinhard Bendix the intellectual tradition arising from a contrast of tradition and modernity has a basic common tendency expressed in the following four developmental assumptions (a) societies are natural system (b) in society there is a presence of independent variables which, if altered initially, will cause changes in related, but dependent variables in the process of transition from one type to the other (c) this transition is one of declining tradition and rising modernity and (d) social change consists of a process that is internal to society changing.[13]

According to Bendix actual societies do not fit these patterns. Other scholars such as Bernstein have criticized the ethnocentricity implied by using the present western societies as the only destination of modernization and have objected to the tradition-modernity dichotomy as being an inadequate concept both as a descriptive and as a conceptual device. Another prominent theorist Andre Gunder Frank has also criticized the tradition-modernity dichotomy as an explanation

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13   Anisuzzaman and Anour Abdel Malek, 1983, p.4.

for the backwardness of underdeveloped, traditional areas of the world.[14]

Hence, it would allow for a more comprehensive approach to analyse the dynamic relationship between tradition and modernity in China, rather than isolate different aspects of Chinese political behaviour and political culture as 'traditional thus undesirable, or 'modern and thus desirable'. As Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph note, "there may be certain persistent requirements of the human condition that tradition, as it is expressed in the past of particular nations can and does satisfy".[15]

Carl.J.Friedrich deals with authority in a tradition-modernity paradigm to argue the tradition possesses a vital function in the body politic of a country as it provides the basis of much communication and effective integrative argument.[16] According to Friedrich, genuine authority may be derived both from traditional and modern social structures. A dichotomous relationship between tradition and modernity, condemns authority derived form tradition as non-rational, which in turn implies a dichotomous relationship between modernity and authority. Hence authority based upon tradition is categorized as totalitarian and not "legitimate".

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14   Ibid, p.5.

15   Cited in Pandey, p.140.

16   Carl. J. Freidrich, *Tradition and Authority*, (London: Pall Mall, 1972) p.14.

Friedrich negate the difference between tradition and authority on the one hand, and reason as found in the Enlightenment tradition on the other. In Friedrich's words, "neither authority nor tradition is unrelated to reason and reasoning,..........and tradition is often the very basis of reasoning and rational argument."[17] During the Enlightenment, authority was linked to religion and thus based upon unreasoning superstition, as to royal absolutism and thus based upon despotism. Thus the function of authority in society was percieved as "weilding of power" rather than providing authoritative social and political structures.

Friedrich disagress with this definition of authority and differentiates between "power" and "authority" to establish that authority rests upon the ability to issue communication capable of reasoned elaboration, which may in turn be linked to tradition. According to Friedrich, to assume that authority is "force rightfully and justly applied" is to confuse authority and legitimacy. There may be authority without legitimacy as in the case of Stalin whose actions were highly authoritative but lacked legitimacy Friedrich defines authority as the capacity of adding wisdom to will, reason to force and want, that is the capacity to offer convincing reasons for authoritative action. Or the capacity for reasoned elaboration as opposed to use of force. This reasoned elaboration rests on a knowledge of values shared and traditions hallowed, to whatever the people wish to do. For example, Gandhi possesed authority because he combined

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17   Ibid, p.13.

dominant social concerns in India with the national struggle for independence.

Further the genesis of authority is the outcome of changes in values, and the collapse of their authority results from disappearance. The person in an authoritative position must integrate the prevalent values in society, define goals based upon them and be capable of offering convincing reasons for pursuing these goals. A shift in basic values and belief patterns leads to an authority crisis because authority ceases to be based upon shared values and a shared understanding of importance of values. Friedrich clarifies this by quoting examples of loss of authority by leaders like French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer. According to Friedrich, "Their authority underwent a rapid decline when it became clear their reasoning no longer meshed with the value preferences of a part of their following.[18] In France, de Gaulle failed to assimilate European concerns in french agricultural policy and in Germany Adenauer neglected domestic concerns in his preoccupation with foreign policy. Both faced political ouster after successful stints as political leaders.

Thus, in Freidrich's analysis true or genuine authority demands a capacity for reasoned elaboration and is based upon shared knowledge and recognition of communally prevalent values. This is in contrast to an understanding of authority based or formalistic ethics of command. Authority as viewed in

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18 . Ibid, p.61.

the Chinese tradition served an integrative purpose. It provided a moral order in society and politics. This moral order was based upon the communally accepted value of authority and this authority carried a moral connotation. Both Confucius and Mao possessed the requisite capacity for reasoned elaboration of this communally accepted value. Persuasion, and not mere use of force, was used both by Confucius and Mao to command genuine authority within their own constituencies. This is evident both in the Confucian and Maoist discourses on authority.

Hence authority was not viewed as regressive or merely repressive because in large part it derived from tradition. It was viewed as necessary to create and preserve a moral order. Lucian Pye elaborates on the communally accepted value of authority in China and identifies the specific political tradition arising out of it in China. Lucian Pye identifies six different types of crises that modernizing societies may face. These are (a) The identity crisis (b) the legitimacy crisis (c) the penetration crisis (d) the participation crisis (e) integration crisis and (f) the distribution crisis.[19] In China's case, however, Pye identified the authority crisis as the most important. According to Pye, the authority crisis occupies the place in China that an identity crisis occupies in other modernizing societies.[20] Pye traces the genesis of this "authority crisis" in China by listing dominant characteristics

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19   Pye, 1966. p.63.

20   Lucian Pye, *The Authority Crisis in Chinese Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) p.12.

of politics and exploring their relationship with political modernization.

Pye's first observation about Chinese politics in that it has an extraordinary reliance upon ideology. He qualifies this observation by tracing a continuity of this trend from Confucian to Marxist times. Therefore, any study of Chinese politics begins with the study of the formal doctrines that enshrine the common ideology of the moment. Further this ideology has always carried a moral connotation, a virtue. In Confucian times it was the virtue of filial piety and in Maoist times it is the virtue of a revolutionary outlook. Ideology forms the basis of law, which prescribes correct political orientation as correct behaviour. An example of this is the Criminal law in China. The 1st article of Chinese Criminal law clearly provides, "the guide of Criminal Law of PRC is Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought"[21]

Secondly, Pye emphasizes the strong hierarchical quality in traditional and modern Chinese politics. According to Pye Chinese politics has been monolithic in structure, with a strong tendency to rank everyone either as superiors or "inferiors"[22] Any kind of fragmentation is disturbing and an immediate need to establish order and thus create a monolithic authority is evident in Chinese politics. Pye argues that the question for the Chinese has not been, "Do we want a

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21   Cited in *Chinese Law and Government*. Summer XIII/2, 1980. p.7.

22   Pye, 1967, p.15.

hierarchy?" but rather, "Does the hierarchy we have measure up to what it is supposed to be?"[23] At the same time Pye points out that submission to such authority is not without problems. However, open aggression or open defiance of authority is not encouraged in China hence there may be a great deal of resentment brewing within a tightly controlled order. The handling of dissent in Maoist and post-Mao China bears ample evidence of the importance of the elementin Chinese politics.

Pye further establishes by an analyses of China's foreign relations that in Chinese politics, the expectation seems to be that authority should be monopolistic, diffuse and capable of handling a wide range of matters without interference. And as a matter of fact, in China the authority of the Emperor was total; the authority of the Mandarin was total, and the authority of father was total; each within its own realm.[24]

Pye explains this analysis of the basic characteristic of Chinese politics by linking it to a perceived need for order in Chinese society. According to Pye, the breakdown of the traditional system really meant the breakdown of authority in China. In Pye's words, "the revolt of the Chinese in the 1920's and the sprit of the Chinese renaissance was not are of seeking cooperation from fathers but rather of striving to recreate stronger fathers - a search for strong father images who can provide a sense of authority for the people."[25] This need for

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23   Ibid.

24   Ibid.

25   Ibid, p.17.

establishing order is based on a fear of anarchic situations
which China has witn8essed with regularity since ancient times.
In fact, Confucius too was concerned primarily with providing
a moral order to society. This order can be brought about by an
hierarchical arrangement of relationships through which each
level of social and political organization may function in
accordance with established patterns of interaction.

Pye summarizes the dominant aspects of the Chinese
political tradition in (a) an obsessive concern with ideology,
(b) a tendency to maintain hierarchy in all political
structures, (c) a feeling that authority should be monopolistic
and (d) an uneasiness with the concept of equals. These
enduring characteristics seem to be directly related to a
search for orderliness in human relationships, a fear of
confusion, a distrusting of ambiguity and uncertainty.[26]

Francis L.K. Hsu provides a comprehensive analysis of the
social context of these characteristics. Hsu bases his
arguments upon a structure-content paradigm. According to Hsu
"structure is an organization of dyads. Each class of dyads has
a pattern of interaction peculiar to itself...these different
patterns of interaction are called attributes... content is an
organization of attributes".[27]

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26   Ibid, p.19.

27   Francis. L.K. Hsu, "Chinese kinship and Chinese Behaviour
      in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.) *China's Heritage and
      the Communist Political System* Vol.I (Chicago: Univ of
      Chicago Press 1968) p.581.

Hsu argues that content can differ where structure is the same, or contents may be similar where structures are different. Further structure and content may also existed separately. Structure may existed without content and content may operate in the absence of a corresponding structure. It is the latter that Hsu considers more important in explaining the endurance of traditional influences in Chinese behaviour.[28]

Hsu identifies kinship as the basic organizational principle in traditional China which also permeated all other social and political spheres. In Hsu's view the main objective of the communist authorities has been to transform Chinese society from its kinship foundation to a political (non-kinship) one.[29] To achieve this objective structural changes in kinship organization are not enough. What is required is a break with the ways of thinking and interacting rooted in kinship or in the "context".

Hsu identifies the father-son dyad as the most dominant in Chinese kinship system. The main attributes of the father-dominated Chinese kinship content are (a) continuity (b) inclusiveness (c) authority and (d) asexuality. Only the first three concern us for the purpose of this study. According to Hsu the Chinese individual is less likely to discard a kinship principle since one of the attributes of the Chinese kinship system is continuity. A Chinese will be reluctant to severe

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28   For a detailed discussion see Francis Hsu, "Structure, Content and Process," *American Anthropologist*, 61, 1959. pp.790-805.

29   Hsu, 1968. p.583.

ties with parents. This continuity of relationship within the kinship group leads to the attribute of inclusiveness i.e. the longer the vertical ties last, the more inclusive the horizontal ties become. In other words, inclusiveness also tends to be a function of continuity and is a form of continuity itself.[30] If continuity is maintained in large extended families, then inclusiveness obviously is fostered. The attribute of authority in the Chinese system demands obedience not only to parents but to elders and to any one in a position of authority. According to Hsu, thus, authority in China is based on tradition and is more genuine than brute force and more enduring than charismatic authority.

According to Hsu Chinese kinship affects Chinese behaviour beyond kinship organization. In Chinese kinship system there is the desire to seek authority in all interpersonal relations outside of kin. In fact, Chinese scholars and officials and others have always made use of actual kinship ties or teacher-pupil ties whenever these could be traced. In the absence of such actual ties, they would not hesitate to initiate psuedo-kinship or psuedo-teacher-pupil ties through which the seeker of influence always took the part of the inferior. In other words, Chinese have always tried to establish hierarchical patron-client relations, as they exist in kinship groups, in non-kinship interractions as well.

This tendency to establish hierarchy in interpersonal relations coupled with a fostering of an attitude of deference

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30   Ibid, p.585.

towards authority as Richard Solomon highlights, contributes in a major way to the emergence of a social and political elite in China. It also leads to an increasing centralization of power in this elite because traditional attitudes towards authority demanded a monolithic and monopolistic structure of authority.

Though the communist regime in China attempted to replace kinship content with political content, it did not aim at completely uprooting the kinship system from Chinese society. In fact many aspects of kinship and tradition were used in the CCP to consolidate the power of the top leaders. For example, the attribute of continuity in traditional times seems to be present in CCP's political organisation as well. For example conventionally in communist China, older leaders have kept command, regardless of their age. This seems highly consonant with the attributes of continuity and especially with that of authority. In practical terms, this means that those who had authority tend to continue holding it, so long as they seem to be able to deal effectively with all or at least the most urgent problems. According to Hsu this was the substance of the age - old Chinese concept of Mandate of Heaven.[31]

Secondly the attribute of authority in traditional China resulted in a hierarchical arrangement of all interpersonal relations. This in turn fostered a patron-client relationship which provided the basis of cult of the superior authority at all levels. This has manifested itself in a broader way in the cult of the Emperor in traditional China, and a cult of Mao in

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31   Ibid, p.605.

Marxist China. These factors contributed to a strengthening of the centralization of power and consequently of elite rule. Simultaneously, these factors also undermine the process of succession based upon organizational principles. The attribute of continuity undermines the need for formulation of a second-level elite to replace existing power configurations.

Further, the attribute of authority hinders or rather forbids initiation of any kind of challenge to existing authority in a bid to engage in a debate upon succession, whether based upon policy considerations or on personality.

The Cultural Revolution in China was an exercise in overhauling the ideological orientation of the Chinese people which included a break with many customs and habits of the past. "A great revolutionary rebellion must be launched against the old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits and all things opposed to the thought of Mao Tse-tung".[32]

Since the retreat of the GLF, Mao was dissatisfied over the direction which the CCP seemed to be heading towards. Following the Sino-Soviet split, Mao discredited the CPSU as 'revisionist' and sought to remove all traces of revisionism from the CCP. Thus the cultural Revolution had as its dual objective (a) to ideologically reorient the CCP towards a revolutionary path in keeping with the principle of 'permanent revolution' and (b) to reeducate the masses in Marxism and help

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32   Red Guards of Peking July 1966, cited in Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of Californai Press, 1971) p.405.

them break with past practices that ran contrary to the revolutionary theme.

Many American scholars such as Philip Bridgham have viewed the Cultural Revolution merely as a power struggle. They offer strong argument in favour of the view that the Cultural Revolution was Mao's attempt to regain a hold over Chinese politics, which seemed to have loosened in the early 1960's.

Though the elements of a power struggle, specifically a succession struggle, are very much evident in the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution, to disregard the cultural-ideological underpinnings of the Cultural Revolution would lead to an incomplete analysis of it. The power struggle, implicit and evident in the cultural revolution, itself was drawn from ideological differences and moreover was acted out in a cultural context. Therefore to delink it from the larger issues of the Cultural Revolution would result in an analytical gap between the context and objectives of the cultural revolution.

Certain dominant themes emerge in a study of the Cultural Revolution. Firstly, the Cultural Revolution advocated a break with the revisionist past in culture and politics. However, along with this denigration of past practices, the presence of certain traditional themes cannot be denied.

According to Solomon, "the manner in which Mao came to reassert his authority during the 1960's reflects the enduring confucian concept of the 'power of the word'". It was through

his writing, the *Little Red Book of Quatations from Chairman Mao*, and emulation of model students of his "thought" that the Party Chairman sought to sustain the influence over the course of the Chinese Revolution". Both Confucius and Mao weilded rhetoric as an effective tool in a radical reorganization of society. In the case of Mao, his early writing on Art and Letters[33] are further proof of his use of the 'power of the word' to revolutionize society- though this tool may be the result of a Confucian tradition.

The beginning of the cultural revolution is traced to Mao prompting a critique of a play. Beijing's deputy mayor Wu Han had written a play called *Hai Jui Dismissed From Office* based on an event in the Ming Dynasty. This was in fact a thinly disguised commentary on Mao's purge of Peng Dehuai in 1959. Mao directed the Cultural Revolution Group to criticize the play which consisted of many references to Mao's rigid ideological stand. For example, in one scene Hai Jui asks the Emperor,

"In earlier times you did quite a few good things, but how about now? Your mind is deluded, and you are too dogmatic and prejudiced. You think you are always right and refuse criticism. Your faults are too numerous. The whole country has been dissatisfied with you for a long time and the inner and outer ministers and officers all know it".[34]

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33   "Talks on Art and Literature at the Yenan Forum." *Seleted Works*. vol. III (Beijing: Foreign Langauages Press, 1975) pp.69-99.

34   Cited in Dick Wilson, *Mao, The People's Emperor*, (London: Hutchinson 1979) p.389.

In an atmosphere of extreme caution and an ingrained sense of deference, open criticism or open debate not being possible, such veiled written criticism was practised. Mao too responded, not by physically removing the threat to his authority, but by initiating a critique of the opposing view. Another reason underlying Mao's approach was to test the waters and gauge the extent of 'revisionism' in the upper Party ranks before initiating as open attack on revisionism.

In fact the "power of the word" finds manifestation in many events of the cultural Revolution. Mao's sanction of big-character posters for the Red Guards as an instrument of criticism and Lin Biao's compilation of the Little Red Book are two important examples of it. Therefore this traditional practice of using rhetoric to awaken consciousness towards social change has been an enduring practice in Chinese politics used by any Chinese leader of significance. Confucius' Analects are replete with stories, fables and teachings preaching moral order. Similarly Mao employed rhetoric and the written word to serve the purpose of the revolution, which placed him at the heart of culture in Chinese politics.

Secondly, the cult of Mao during the Cultural Revolution has been likened to the cult of the Emperor during the traditional age in China. The deification of Mao Zedong reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution. Emperor worship practised in China for centuries saw a modern revival in the cult of Mao. In an interview with Edgar Snow in 1965 Mao said that though Lin Biao's promotion of the cult of the leader was

in excess, however, a personality cult was needed to stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao party bureaucracy. Further Mao explained that it was hard for the people to overcome the habit of 3,000 years of emperor worshipping tradition.[35] Thus as the Emperor was referred to as the 'Son of Heaven', Mao was referred to as the 'Red Sun'. Slogans such as 'May Chairman Mao Live a Ten Thousand Years" were echoes of similar idolatry slogans about the Emperor in traditional China. Millions of Red Guards assembling in square in the fall of 1966 to recieve Mao's benediction was an example of the glorification of Mao to almost divine status.

Lin Biao and the Red Guards were the most vocal supporters of Chairman Mao as the 'Great Helmsman' etc. Lin Biao's Little Red Book became the Bible for the young Red Guards and adherence to Mao's writings acquired fanatical dimensions.

Opposed to these traditional elements the opposition to tradition was also a dominant them in the Cultural Revolution. In an interview to Andre Malraux in 1965 Mao said, "thought, culture, custom must be born of struggle, and struggle must continue for as long as there is still a danger of a return to the past". From this statement it is evident that Mao considered the presence of past culture and habits as regressive. to make a break with the regressive past, Mao chose to privilege the youth of China. The young in China, traditionally were bound by a subordination to the authority of

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35   Dick Wilson, 1977. p 100.

the elders. The entire socialization of the child focused upon fostering an attitude of submission and deference to authority. This was inevitably accompanied by the unexpressed resentment on the part of the youth. However, to express this bitterness or to give vent to it was traditionally considered disruptive. Thus as Solomon puts it, the young were taught to "eat bitterness" in favour of the greater goal of preserving order.

Mao harnessed the resentment towards authority among the youth to create "revolutionary disorder" which was to serve the greater objective of reorienting Chinese society. Mao sought to 'liberate' aggressive emotions in the service of political ends or in other words emotional manipulation and political education constituted complementary dimensions of the Maoist approach to mass mobilization.[36]

The Red Guards were exhorted by Mao to revolutionize society by statements like "to rebel is justified". Mao thus provided the Red Guards with a voice and a moral right to possess that voice by condemning the Party as revisionist and condemning Liu Shao-qi as 'China's Khrushchev".

The Cultural Revolution, was Mao's intensive attempt to stress the Marxist ideological basis of the revolution and to privilege those with authority who adhered to the correct ideological line. According to Solomon, Mao sought, "to father

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36   Solomon, 1971. p.514.

a new generation of student revolutionaries and bring them into a place of influence within China's political life".[37]

The use of disorder wreaked by the Red Guards against authority by Mao and the deification of Mao by the Red Guard, bear evidence to the fact that amidst the crusade to break with the past practices, the paradox of Mao as paternalistic authority emerged very clearly during the Cultural Revolution. Thus adherence to the search of paternalistic authority finds evidence in Red Guard slogans of the Cultural Revolution. One such slogan was 'When Chairman Mao Waves His Hand, I Move Forward' Another example is of one Red Guard shouting to his father, "I am not your son anymore. I belong to Chairman Mao".[38] The Red Guards, though urged to smash the authority of the Party, teachers, and of parents, were not asking for a diffusion of authority in society. In fact their major task was to "protect Chairman Mao" and to die for his ideals.'[39] Thus the Maoist campaign to weed out revisionists and to break with past practices or "the olds" combined to result in a break down of authority structures in China. Mao's authority, however, became more entrenched and acquired significant concentration. The Cultural Revolution was yet another example of the Chinese people "rebelling but not revolting". The Red Guards rebelled against the traditional authority structures especially of the family and Party but did not revolt against the Communist

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37   Solomon, 1971. p.11.

38   Chihua Wen, *The Red Mirror, Children of China's Cultural Revolution*, (Oxford, Westview Press, 1995) p.60.

39   Ibid.

system or the Maoist ideology that formed the basis of their society before the Cultural Revolution

Moreover, the use of disorder through Red Guards by Mao, and the deification of Mao by Red Guards, bear evidence to the fact that amidst the crusade to break with the past practices, the paradox of Mao as a paternal authority emerged clearly during the Cultural Revolution. Further the Gang of Four's attempts at legitimizing its authority by publicly pledging personal allegiance to Mao, and Hua Guofeng's subsequent attempts to keep Mao's cult alive for the same purpose, were results of a crisis of legitimacy to which paternalistic authority inevitably led.

CHAPTER III

MODERNIZATION, WESTERNIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN POST-MAO CHINA

Samuel Huntington notes that to cope successfully with modernization, a political system must (among other things) be able to successfully assimilate into the system the new social forces (and groups) produced by modernization. These emergent groups demand participation in the political processes. The political system may either provide for this participation in ways that harmonise with the system or run risk of alienating these groups from the system and produce overt and covert civil strife and secession.[1] Post-Mao Chinese politics reflect the tension between modernization and political control in China.

Deng Xiaoping's strategy for modernizing China was a revival of the early 19th century Chinese strategy of selective adaptation of western military technology to repel imperialist attacks on China. While technology may be imported from the West, the underlying spirit in society would be Chinese. Deng's Four Cardinal Principles were the manifestations of this strategy. China's modernization was

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1. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968).

to be achieved within the Four Cardinal Principles that entailed (1) keeping to the socialist road, (2) upholding the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, (3) upholding the leadership of the Communist Party and (4) upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.[2] Dengist strategy seems to have the Confucian prescription of first enriching people and later educating them.[3] Deng, unlike Mao, believed that economic prosperity would provide the basis of a socialist system.

Dengist strategy advocated a separation of spheres of politics and economy and sought to insulate politics from the liberalizing influences in economy. Within economy too Deng followed a **One** state-two-systems strategy, introducing reforms in chosen urban and rural sectors and coastal areas. However, political reforms too were initiated. Deng sought to institutionalize and rationalize authority within the CCP by ruling out cults of the leader and introducing a system of recruitment, training and retirement of party cadre. Though political reforms were introduced, they did not borrow from the West as the economic reforms did. The leadership of the CCP was not challenged and the Marxist

2.   Wm. Theodore de Bary (ed.), *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1960) p.35.

3.   *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p.172.

basis of society was reiterated. In short, Deng's intention was to harness the advantages of western technology while keeping the socialist basis of China intact.

The early 1980s saw an atmosphere of great intellectual freedom in China. Economic liberalization loosened strict political control of the party, in every sphere of life. In such an atmosphere demands for political reforms surfaced in the Chinese media. Chinese scholars stressed the complementary relationship between economic development and political reform. Accoding to pro-reform scholars such as Tan Jian and Wang Huning, socialist reconstruction would only be realised by full political participation of all Chinese people.[4] As the years progressed, demands for political reform clearly stated political democratization as the desired goal in China.

Rather than introducing fundamental systemic changes such as separation of powers, regular elections, system of checks and balances etc., the CCP leaders stressed accommodation of radical ideas within established Marxist doctrine.[5] The Marxist-Leninist basis rather than a civil

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4. Cited in Benedict Stavis, "Reform of China's Political System", *Chinese Law and Government*, Summer XX/2, 1987, p.7.

5. Terrell Carver and Li Jun, "Marxism and Reforms" in Gerald Segal and David Goodman (eds.), *China at Forty Midlife Crisis?* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

rights basis, of China's criminal law is an example of this exercise. The first article of China's Criminal Law clearly provides that the guide of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China is Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.[6]

However, the demand for democratization existed even within discussion of Marxist doctrines in China. One such example is an article by the Chinese scholar Shen Yue who established civil rights as `class-neutral' in opposition to Mao for whom civil rights were a part of bourgeois democracy and therefore "bourgeois right". Shen Yue argued that in Marx's commentary on rights. German term `Burgerliche Gesellschaft' has been mistranslated into Chinese as `bourgeois night', when it actually meant rights of the townspeople. Shen argued for the universality of civil rights by noting that since "townspeople's rights" are available to both classes, i.e., the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, civil rights are also neutral.[7]

More blatant demands for Westernization and adoption of liberal democracy were made by radicals such as Fang Lizhi,

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6. Cited in *Chinese Law and Government*, Summer XIII/2, 1980, p.9.

7. Cited in Shu-Yun Ma, "The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society", *CQ*, 137, 1994, pp.180-94.

Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang.[8] Radical demands for liberal-

democratic reforms in China, undermined the authority of the

CCP. They threatened CCP's authority structures built up

over the years. At a deeper level, they threatened the

moral value of authority in providing a stable order in

Chinese society. The demands for democratization were

perceived by Party conservatives as an offshoot of Westerni-

zation as opposed to modernization as evinced in Deng's

strategy of selective adaptation of technology. Moreover,

the demands of a "bourgeois democracy" ran counter to the

centralized hierarchical organization of the CCP. Though

Deng Xiaoping opposed mass movements and personality cults,

introducing democratization was not on his agenda. Even

Zhao Ziyang, the most ardent supporter of political reforms

equated democracy with chaos.[9]

After 1949 the CCP had devoted more than three decades

to evolving and strengthening a party and state apparatus

that would sustain a socialist system in an increasingly

capitalist world. This strong centralized leadership pro-

vided the stability that was a prerequisite for socialist

reconstruction. Even traditionally, a strong centralized

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8.   Lawrence R. Sullivan, "Assault on the Reforms. Conser-
     vative Criticism of Political and Economic Liberaliza-
     tion in China", *CQ*, 114, June 1988, p.198.

9.   Stuart Schram, "China after the 13th Congress", *CQ*,
     114, June 1988, p.187.

authority like the monarch had provided a stable political and moral order in China. An undermining of the centralized authority had resulted in chaos such as war lordism in China. Thus China's top leaders repeatedly tempered their expressed desire for modernization and reform with a deep concern for maintaining political order and stability and an even deeper hostility to "westernization".[10]

Charting a middle course between conflicting demands for radical democratization or absolute political control, the neo-authoritarian debate emerged in the late 1980s in China. Highly placed intellectuals debated the theory of neo-authoritarianism, a doctrine new to China, which reflected the policy prescriptions of pre-revolutionary Chinese leaders and Third World strongmen. Neo-authoritarianism was discussed as an alternative to implementation of liberal democracy in China.[11] Liberal reformers such as Su Shaozhi noted that, "What China needed was a *strong* liberal leader."[12]

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10. Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen" in Roderick Macfarquahar (ed.), *Politics of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.341.

11. Barry Sautman, "Sirens of the Strongman, Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory", *CQ*, 129, March 1992, p.72.

12. Lawrence Sullivan, "Leadership and Authority in the CCP" in Segal and Goodman (eds.), *China at Forty* (Oxford: OUP, 1989), p.62.

Neo-authoritarian debate attempted to synthesize polit-
ical stability with high rates of econmic growth and with
the evidently expanding demand for an equitable political
system. In other words it was an attempt to chart out
China's political future as a socialist country committed to
economic liberalization. It prescribed the combination of a
centralized political authority, liberal in principle, and
committed to a programme of increasing marketization of
China. Neo-authoritarianism provided a rationale for Deng's
reform policies without attacking the structure of authority
and leadership in Deng's China.

After the smashing of the Gang of Four and the death of
Mao Zedong, Chinese leaders regrouped to decide upon China's
and political direction. The emergent themes in the late
1970's were those of providing "stability and prosperity" to
China. Deng Xiaoping emerged as a strong supporter of
reform in China and redefined national goals. China was to
strive for Four Modernizations in agriculture, industry,
national defence and science and technology while upholding
the Four Cardinal Principles especially Marxist-Leninism and
Mao Zedong thought as the basis of the Chinese state. Deng
condemned his predecessor Hua Guofeng's "two whatevers"
policy as "it did not represent Maoism-Leninism and Mao
Zedong thought".[13] Hua's "two whatevers" was summed up in

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13. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, p.196.

his following statement, "We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave". However, Deng also criticized Lin Biao's for promoting the cult of Mao through the Little Red Book and instead advocated seeking truth from facts and integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of Chinese Revolution.[14] Thus Deng attempted to free Chinese politics of the retrogressive and evidently destructive influences of the concentration of political power in one person. In advocating a greater participation in decision-making, Deng sought to lay the foundations of pragmatic policy formulation in China.

The economic experiment of the Great Leap Forward and the nation-wide disruption wreaked by the Cultural Revolution had affected the Chinese economy adversely. Deng's primary concern was to modernize the Chinese economy and to lay the material foundations for building a socialist society. Opposed to Mao's view of a "continuous revolution" to achieve a socialist reconstruction of China, Deng sought to build a "civilization which was both materially developed and socialist in spirit",[15] through stability and unity.

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14. Ibid., p.196.

15. Roderick Macfarquahar, *The Politics of China, 1949-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.xi.

During the Dengist era the slogans in Communist China changed from "to serve the people" to "to get rich is glorious". This was the embodiment of the CCP's decision to eschew class struggle and focus on economic development as its primary goal. A number of economic reforms were initiated under Deng's "Open Door Policy" both in rural and urban sectors. The opening up of the economy in China was meant primarily and solely to serve in modernizing and enriching the economy, and not as a restoration of bourgeois ideology in China. This was evident by the emphasis laid on the Four Cardinal Principles throughout the Dengist era. Thus the decade of 1980;s in China saw significant economic growth coupled with the ideological camplaigns against ˆBourgeois-Liberalization" and ˆSpiritual Pollution". During these campaigns economic reforms were not tampered with.

This tension between an open economy and controlled politics was acted out both in Chinese society as well as in elite politics within the CCP. The major areas of conflict were institutional changes within the Party and relaxing of the Party's control on freedom of speech and expression. These were, at the fundamental level, differences in charting out a viable course for economic liberalization in a society based on Marxism-Leninism. According to Richard Baum, beneath the surface of these debates lay the potent

issue of chaos versus stability. The Chinese leaders did not desire a repeat of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, their most recent expression of "democracy", and thus viewed democracy, or large-scale mass participation, with suspicion. Even Zhao Ziyang, the most ardent supporter of political reform in China, stipulated political stability and control as a pre-condition for greater reform. According to Zhao, "We shall never again allow the kind of `great democracy' (meaning the Cultural Revolution) that undermines state law and social stability."[16] It is notable that Zhao Ziyang made this statement while calling for more inner-party democracy in China.

This tension between political rationalization and the need to maintain authority was reflected in the *fang-shou* cycle. Richard Baum provides a comprehensive account of the *fang-shou* cycle in Chinese politics. This stemmed from the tension in the CCP regarding China's ideological and economic direction. *Fang* meant "letting go" and *shou* meant "tightening up". The ambivalence among the top ranks of the CCP concerning reforms resulted in each phase of political reform being followed up by a drive to regain and reimpose control. According to Baum, Deng Xiaoping personally embodied all the complex antinomies of *fang* and *shou*.

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16. Cited in Stuart Schram, "China after the 13th Congress", *CQ*, 114, June 1988, p.181.

Deng believed that China could have both "market compe-
tition and a monistic political order", "socio-economic
modernity", and a "socialist spiritual civilization"; a
"vigorous creative intelligentsia and a high degree of ideo-
logical conformity".[17] The most concrete examples of Deng's
ambivalent attitude towards political reform are the desig-
nation of moderates Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.as his suc-
cessors. Both, however, ran foul of the conservative ele-
ments in the party and suffered political ouster. And Deng
Xiaoping withdrew his support from both the leaders on
ground of their soft stands in combatting bourgeois influ-
ences in society.

Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CCP, was a moder-
ate liberal who attempted to create an atmosphere of free
speech in China and advocated a soft stand concerning the
student demonstrations of 1987. Since 1981, Hu Yaobang
sought to blunt conservative criticism of various liberal
debates arising among the Chinese intellectuals. In 1982-83
a vigorous academic debate unfolded in Beijing contending
that "alienation" could exist under a communist system and
advocating a policy of socialist humanism based upon a
socialist legality. Initially the Party did not react
strongly. However, when some intellectuals questioned the

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17. Richard Baum, "Road to Tiananan" in Roderick Macfarqua-
har (ed.), *Politics of China*, p.342.

political authority of the CCP, the conservatives in the Party represented by Deng Liqun struck back. Thus the campaign to combat "spiritual pollution" was launched. Hu Yaobang with Zhao Ziyang's support managed to restrict the campaign. Deng Xiaoping too, fearing disruption of hard won economic reform, indicated support for Hu's position, and the spiritual pollution campaign was brought to an end. This was the phase when economics was in command in China. However, the "blooming and contending" of this period invited a conservative backlash expressing concerns for preserving the doctrinal integrity of Marxism in an increasingly revisionist China. Denigration of Marxism by senior party members such as Su Shaozhi, a leading theoretician, appeared in the Chinese press. In one article Su said, "There are no Marxist quotations for what we are doing now."[18] Such statements were viewed as a challenge to the Marxist basis of Chinese society coupled with rising demand for political reform was the increasing corruption and crime in Chinese society.

Under pressure from the conservative led by Chen Yun and Peng Zhen Deng Xiaoping conceded and the attack on bourgeois liberalization was launched in China. The campaign, which was intended to criticize the corruption ram-

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18. Su Shaozhi, *Democratization and Reform* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1988.

pant in China and especially among senior CCP cadres, quickly broadened to target the liberal elements in the mass media. The lead role yet again was played by Deng Liqun. However, yet again owing to the threat of upsetting the economic applecart, and scaring away foreign investors the movement was confined only within the CCP. Student demonstrations that broke out during 1985-86 throughout China were an indication of the disenchantment of the students and intellectuals alike on the scope of reforms in China. Intellectuals such as astrophysicist Fang Lizhi made a demand for complete westernization. On 18 November 1986 at Tongji University, Fang said, "I am here to tell you that the socialist movement from Marx and Lenin to Stalin and Mao Zedong, has been a failure.... I think complete Westernization is the only way to modernize."[19]

There was an immediate conservative criticism of such pronouncements and this time Deng Xiaoping himself headed the conservative opinion. Deng also openly threatened use of power to quell the demonstrations. Though the crisis went into remission Hu Yaobang, as a supporter of free speech and greater democratic reforms, was scapegoated. Hu was criticized for resisting the Party's efforts to combat spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization. Thus

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19. MacFarquahar, 1993, p.394.

contributing to an upsurge in liberal demands for 'total westernization', culminating in the student turmoil of December 1986.[20] Deng Xiaoping relieved Hu Yaobang of his official titles and yet again retracted reforms in the political sector in the face of a threat to stability in China.

In the case of Zhao Ziyang the similar tension between democratization and control played itself out this time with more disastrous consequences. The 1989 Tiananmen incident was the culmination of this contradiction in Chinese society.

During the 13th Party Congress in 1987 Zhao Ziyang presented his reform blueprint for structural changes within the CCP. This was a measure to institutionalize reform and to free it from being subservient to periodic misgivings of the conservatives within the Party. The 13th Congress started out with the retirement of many of the Old Guard with Deng Xiaoping heading the list. The others were Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, Wang Zhen, Xi Zhongxun, Yu Quili, Yang Dezhi, and Fang Yi. Zhao Ziyang formally assumed the title of General Secretary of the Party. Other leaders in the Politburo were Yang Shangkun, Wan Li, Yao Yilin, Jiang Zemin and unexpectedly Hu Yaobang.

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20. Ibid., p.400.

Notably Deng Liqun was not included. The composition of the new Politburo standing committee was thus more reform-oriented than less. Significantly, for the first time appointments to Party positions were based on an election. Deng Liqun's marginalization was a result of this new electoral procedure whereby ten more nominees were in the fray over and above the number of seats.

Zhao Ziyang's structural reforms had a strong 'economics first' leaning and he identified economic development as the "central task" of the present era. Zhao Ziyang came up with two economic 'whatevers' of his own. "Whatever is conducive to the growth (of productive forces) is in keeping with the fundamental interests of the people and is therefore needed by socialism and allowed to exist." And secondly, "Whatever is detrimental to this growth goes against scientific socialism and is therefore not allowed to exist."[21] A comparison of Zhao Ziyang's 'whatevers" with earlier 'whatevers" of Hua Guofeng amply bears out Zhao Ziyang's commitment to economic and political reform as well as the new direction decided upon by the CCP after Mao for China's development. Though after the Congress Zhao Ziyang combined the two whatevers of his formulation into one single complex whatever, thereby avoiding comparison with

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21. *Beijing Review*, 9-15 November 1987, pp.i-xxviii.

two whatevers promulgated by Hua Guofeng.[22]

Linking politics and economy Zhao called political reform an "urgent matter" without which economic reform would inevitably fail. He made suggestons for separating Party's functions from that of the government, a suggestion made earlier by Deng Xiaoping himself. According to Baum Zhao Ziyang also called for fundamental changes in China's Leninist-Stalinist personnel system, the *nomenklatura*, and replacement by a civil service system of recruitment and evaluation of cadres. In Baum's words, "Although campaigns to eliminate excessive bureaucratism had been frequent occurrences in China under both Mao and Deng, never before had a top Chinese leader called for such broad sweeping civil service reform. If implemented, Zhao's proposal could have spelled the end of CCP's traditional monopoly of control over government's personal staffing and review procedures".[23]

Further Zhao attempted to accommodate differing opinions in a bid to initiate pluralism in Chinese politics by saying that "different groups of people may have different interests and views and they too need opportunities and

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22. Baum in MacFarquahar, ed., *Politics in China*, p.411.
23. Ibid.

channels for exchange of ideas".[24]

However, while arguing for more democratic procedures within the Party, Zhao Ziyang rejected the idea of `bourgeois" or Western-liberal concepts of democracy with a multi-party system, separation of powers and freedom of political expression as antithetical to Chinese needs. Further by equating Cultural Revolution with a "great democracy", Zhao Ziyang made a case for neo-authoritarianism in China to provide stability to the country. Thus the structural reforms suggested by Zhao had a neo-authoritarian orientation.

Immediately after the Congres, Zhao Ziyang attempted to consolidate his position by a few significantly symbolic events to encourage an atmosphere of pragmatism in China. For example, `Red Flag' (*Hongqi*), the repository of conservative opinion in the Central Committee was renamed `Seeking Truth' (*Qiushi*). After the PRC's 40th anniversary celebration in 1989, it was also decided to remove posters of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin traditionally put up at Tiananmen Square. Even two statues of Mao Zedong were dismantled. China's intellectuals welcomed this renewed atmosphere of greater tolerance and endorsed Zhao Zhiyang's structural reforms.

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24. *Beijing Review*, 9-16 November 1987, p.xix.

However, in the years from 1987 to 1989, reform-generated changes in the economy resulted in widespread discontent throughout China. The issue of price decontrol of food stuffs in the face of a crisis of inflation, generated panic-buying among the urban residents time and again. Coupled with this the breaking of iron rice bowl, i.e., scrapping of guaranteed employment in many sectors led to discontent among the workers as well. The urban population suffering from rising inflation reacted sharply to the privileged lifestyle of party cadres and their children and corruption among the Party leaders and bureaucracy was criticized openly in the mass media. It was revealed in the summer of 1988, that between 1983-87, the CCP had expelled more than 150,000 members, mostly for corruption.

In such an atmosphere the credibility of the CCP, built up over decades and based upon a record of selfless revolutionary spirit, declined rapidly. The students were among the most pessimistic and vocal critics of the CCP.

Against this background, China's Party leaders met in Beidaihe for their annual summer meeting. During this meeting Zhao Ziyang put toward his strategy for radical decentralization of both economy and political authority. However, Deng Xiaoping and the other conservative leaders blamed the urban malaise on fast pace of liberalization and

backed Li Peng's plan for economic stabilization. Yet again Zhao Ziyang like Hu Yaobang lost out on Deng Xiaoping's support over retraction of reforms in China.

Party conservatives led by Chen Yun criticized Zhao Ziyang for permeating the Chinese society with bourgeois ideology. According to Chen Yun, under Zhao Ziyang, "almost all ideological proletarian bridgeheads have been occupied by bourgeois ideologies."[25] The conservatives decided to counterattack the proliferation of liberal ideas in the mass media.

Meanwhile the death of Hu Yaobang became the rallying occasion for liberal opinion throughout urban China. Universities throughout the country held demonstration in support of Hu Yaobang's attempts to liberalize Chinese politics, which gradually widened to include the larger issues of corruption and political democracy in China. Gradually the participation in the movement increased from just students to workers, intellectuals and urban residents. The movement from January 1989 until June witnessed many ups and downs and matters came to a head in early June when the Military Affairs Commission of the Party decided to launch a military crackdown on the movement. Zhao Ziyang's earlier attempts in May to try a softer approach and his final

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25. Cited in Baum, MacFarquahar, ed., *Politics of China*, p.432.

appeal on 19 May to stall imposition of martial law in Beijing was rejected, and Zhao Ziyang's political career was over.

Zhao Ziyang was dismissed from the Politburo Standing Committee membership on 24 May. He was bitterly criticized by Deng Xiaoping as well as the top leadership of the CCP, for trying to split the party into two competing factions. Conservative PLA leader Yang Shangkun compared the behaviour of "Zhao-inspired" Beijing students with the anarchist behaviour of the Gang of Four inspired Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Chen Yun accused Zhao of trying to form a treacherous "anti-party clique".[26]

The brief survey of the political careers of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, both designated successors to Deng Xiaoping and later suffering a fall from grace, bear out the following patterns in post-Mao politics in China.

Within the broad debate on China's future political and economic direction the concerns of chaos versus stability dominate. Deng Xiaoping's commitment to economic modernization of China was not to be achieved at the cost of political stability. Traditionally in China social order and harmony have been viewed as the highest motivation for

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26. Ibid., p.454.

political action, and democracy or mass participation emerging from below is viewed as disruptive. This may be narrowly understood as an authoritarian justification for perpetuating the power of the CCP in post-1949 China, or understood in terms of the moral value of authority in Chinese society. Even committed reformers like Zhao Ziyang believed in a step-by-step liberalization under the leadership of the Party. The post-Mao commitment to reforms has not wavered with Deng Xiaoping or successive leaders like Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin. What has given rise to most bitter dispute among the leadership has been the pace of these reforms. And this dispute is based directly upon the difering views of leaders concerning the amount of "chaos" permissible in the "primary stage of socialism".

Secondly, the dichotomous opinions of the Old Guard and the newer leadership is an arena of conflict. The Central Advisory Commission (CAC) formed after the 12th Party Congress had been a repository of conservative opinion in the CCP. Ironically the CAC was the result of Deng Xiaoping's attempt at phasing out old leaders and introducing newer liberal leaders into the party. The CAC was also a classic example of continuity in Chinese society. The *fang-shou* cycle in post-Mao politics amply bears out the dilemma of the Chinese leadership concerning the direction of the

country. The spiritual pollution campaign, the anti-bour-geois-liberalization campaign, the crackdown on the Democra-cy Wall and 1989 democracy movement were all example of the reasertion of conservative opinion in response to "chaos" or "turmoil" in Chinese society. However, increasingly after the early 1990's, the sway of conservative opinion on Chi-nese policies began to wane. Even during the height of conservative criticism such as the anti-bourgeois-liberalization campaign or the spiritual pollution campaign, effort of the moderates to contain a regression to pre-reform politics was evident. The reassertation of the conservative opinion did not mean an undermining of economic reform. The politics-in-command group has gradually lost its tremendous hold on Chinese policy making and after the 14th party Congress the CAC itself was disbanded.

These patterns are the basis of the debate on neo-authoritarianism that emerged in China concerning national goals and direction in the late 1980s. The debate which emerged in Chinese journals on the mainland, continued through exiled intellectuals and students after the Tianan-men incident of 1989. According to Barry Sautman, the underlying theory of the debate was classically conservative and in its organizational principle reflected Zhao Ziyang's

views.[27] The neo-authoritarianism debate in China consisted essentially of two opposing views on the relationship between poitical development and economic liberalization. According to the right-wing view, China could not liberalize its economy while continuing with an authoritarian Communist political system. The economimc development of Four Little Dragons of the East, Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore and South Korea could not be used as a reference point for China's economic development because of right-wing base of these authoritarian regimes. Many scholars such as Ding Xueliang, Hu Ping, Rong Jian expressed their view in favour of this argument, which was also in consonance with the argument of Samuel Huntington. According to Huntington if China were to continue its bid for economic development under an authoritarian regime, then a right-wing military-backed regime would be more likely to achieve this objective rather than a Leninist dictatorship.[28]

According to Ding Xueliang, the June 4th "massacre" proved that if there was to be continued emphasis on the high degree of centralization of authority on the premise of the Communist party's holding power, then economic liberali-

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27. Barry Sautman, "Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory", *CQ*, 129, March 1992, p.72.

28. Samuel Hutington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968.

zation in China would be in danger of being strangled.[29]   He
gives the example of Zhao Ziyang to support his argument by
contending that though Zhao himself was for an neo-
authoritarian model, his fell victim to a high level of
centralization while opposing a military solution to the
1989 demonstrations.

According to Ding the following three preconditions
were necessary for socio-economic success under a neo-
authoritarian model.   These are: (a) structural division
between politics and the economy and the de-ideologizaton of
economic policies; (b) depoliticization and professionaliza-
tion of the civilian bureaucracy and (c) the independence of
the professional activities of the intelligensia.[30]   These
conditions were present in the East Asian model but not in
China.

Hu Ping carries Ding Xueliang's argument further by
stressing the inevitability of economic future under the
Communist regime in China.   He makes the case for a non-
communist dictatorship which he calls a "lesser evil" com-
pared to the Communist regime because the former would be
more "democratic" than the latter and at least preserve a

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29.   Ding Xueliang, "The East Asian Model and the New Au-
thoritarianism", *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*,
p.8.

30.   Ibid.

"minimal democracy". According to Rong Jian the East Asian model cannot be applied to China because China lacks a private ownership system, a free market economy, and a middle class, which were are the bases for the economic growth of The Four Little Dragons.[31] Rong Jian makes the point that as China transformed its "natural economy" into a commodity economy, it needed first to create a relative centralization of power and then make a transition from centralized to democratic politic. Even Su Shaozhi, the radical supporter of reform expressed the view that China needed a strong liberal leader.[32]

In contrast Zhang Shu put forward the view that economic liberalism under an autocratic system was the most likely to succeed in China in its quest for development. According to Zhang Shu, "After the June 4 incident, because the Chinese Communist regime has not made the error of abolishing the two-tier system of property rights, or suspending reform and the open-door reform (or glasnost) line, it is possible in the short and intermediate run, the Chinese Communists may maintain their regime. At the same time, the possibility is growing that the Chinese Communist regime would take to the road of economic liberalism under an autocratic

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31. Stanley Rosen and Gary Zou, *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, Winter/Summer Vol.23 No.2-3 1990-91 p.3.

32. Cited in Barry Sautman, "Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory", *CQ*, 129, March 1997, p.73.

regime."[33]

This autocratic regime may be located in strong localities with a weak centre or vice-versa. In any case economic development is unlikely to endanger the autocratic regime. This is Zhang's main point of departure from other theorists like Ding Xueliang and Hu Ping. Zhang argues that the experiences of various countries in East Asia have proven that it is indeed possible to separate political control from economic control. Further, the fruits of economic liberalization would reaffirm the people's faith in the existing regime, firmly entrenching its political power.[34]

As mentioned earlier, Barry Sautman, then rightly points out the presence of classically conservative elements in the neo-authoritarian debate. Barring a few outright rejections of the authority of the CCP, the dominant theme in the neo-authoritarian debate in China seems to be the continued presence of a strong leadership committed to reforms. On the "tough government" and "soft economy" model as Chen Yizi, the Director of State Council's Institute for

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33. Zhang Shu, "The Two-Tier System of Property Rights and the Transitional Situation in China, The Development in China of Economic Liberalism under an Autocratic Regime", *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, Winter/Summer. Vol.23 No.2-3. 1990-91 p.65.

34. Ibid.

Restructuring defined it.[35]

This conservative element is also detected in the most
radical protest demonstration in China - i.e. in the 1989
democracy movement. Towards the beginning of the movement,
Beijing students Autonomous Federation called upon students
to stage "patriotic" mass protests in support of the "so-
cialist order" and in opposition to "bureaucracy, corruption
and special privilege".[36] Further, the demand of the stu-
dents that their movement be recognized as "patriotic" and
"democratic" was repeated oft and again during the move-
ments. This was a paradoxical seeking of approval from the
very authority against whom the movement was directed. This
is an example of "rebellion but not revolt". Chalmers
Johnson has made this point about peasant rebellions in
China and Lucian Pye has located it within China's political
tradition.

Not only in the demands of the students but in the
handling of the situation by the CCP leaders, certain tradi-
tional elements were detectable. According to Robin Munro
in *The Nation*, it was not particularly surprising that the
non-students were the first to be arrrested during the
crackdown. He explicates the situation by calling upon

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35. Cited in Barry Sautman, p.77.

36. MacFarquahar, p.441.

strong paternalistic element in China's political tradition.
According to Munro, China's political tradition confers an
unusual degree of paternalistic tolerance upon students,
rendering them immune to harsh punishment.[37]

These tendencies bear out Richard Solomon's basic argu-
ment about the presence of ambivalence towards authority in
China.[38] This ambivalence exists at all levels in Chinese
society and politics. Thus in an atmosphere of tension
between `fang' and `shou', thus ambivalence is expressed in
dissent which is classically conservative in its approach.

The neoauthoritarian system in China, places succession
at a crucial position in politics. Since 1979, legitimacy
of the CCP has increasingly become linked to its ability to
deliver goods in a transitional society. Consequently,
succession too has increasingly become linked to policy
formulation and change. In other words it has become inter-
linked with successful policy implementation. And this
success has to be two-fold. Firstly, the economic liberali-
zation must deliver fruits to its constituency and secondly
this economic liberalization must take place within accepted
boundaries of relaxation of political control. Leaders like

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37. Cited in Ibid., p.455.

38. Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese
    Political Culture*, (Berkeley: University of California
    Press, 1971).

Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang were seen to be failures on the second front, whereas Li Peng, successfully combined Deng's Xiaoping's commitment to reforms with a well-defined code of political conduct and expression.

Thus succession still remains an internal party issue, but it no longer remains a personal issue, confined only to the ʻwill of the paramount leaderʻ as in Maoist politics.

CONCLUSION

Succession in China cannot be interpreted merely as a political issue. It is based on an entire framework of social and cultural factors that create legitimizing discourses of authority and leadership in China. Chinese political tradition forms a strong continuum in post-1949 politics as well, creating an arena for interaction of Communist and Confucian precepts. Tradition and revolution created a political structure that evolved into a `modernizing' framework, i.e., Marxist in basis but bearing elements of Chinese tradition as well

The impetus for this modernization of Chinese society came from within its own culture. Contrary to the Marxist belief of Asiatic society as mired in "rural idiocy" and incapable of dialectical change, Mao emerged as the harbinger of peasant-based revolution in China. Both Marx and Wittfogel stressed the need for external, or more precisely Western Imperialist, influence to modernize Chinese society. Marx, in particular, emphasized the essential link between an industrial proletariat and revolution. Mao not only emerged from within Chinese culture, he engineered a peasant revolution, not envisaged by Marx, along Marxist line. Moreover, Mao emphasised culture as a legitimizing and

persuasive strategy, thus placing Chinese culture in a privileged position.

The Marxian argument, carried forward by scholars like Karl Wittfogel and John Fairbank, of China as a non-dialectical society, rests upon the "Orientalist" view of China. The concept of "Orientalism" has been discredited by scholars like Edward Said. On the other hand, the culturally contextual and interpretive investigations suggested by Raymond Williams provide the basis for an insightful study of succession in China. Thus sucession crises in China can be interpreted within a framework of political culture within which newer categories of analyses could be introduced.

The political tradition of China, termed as despotic by Marx and Wittfogel, may be contextually interpreted as a tradition of moral authority in China. The Marxian view of Chinese political authority as despotic, disregarded the moral basis of autocratic authority in China. While the despotic view of authority bases the monarch's power on an absence of civil society, in China the Confucian view of authority held that the monarch's authority was bestowed by a "mandate of heaven". The Confucian monarchy was supposed to earn and sustain that "mandate of heaven" by ruling in accordance with a moral order. Hence an amoral ruler would lose legitimacy in Chinese society whereas in the Western

context morality and political power were not linked. In fact a ruler could even use amoral Machiavellian tactics to perpetuate power. The ideal Chinese ruler was pictured by Confucius as the sage king responsible for not merely providing a political organization but a moral order in society. Thus the Chinese definition of legitimacy differs radically from the Western one, which views the relationship between the ruler and the ruled as a contractual one. In China, this relationship is benevolent and paternalistic. The paternalistic basis of legitimacy is sustained by notions of filial piety and loyalty to the ruler and justified by the value of the attribute of moral authority in society.

The differences in the Western and Chinese definitions of authority and legitimacy are borne out by comparing Marxist and Chinese notions of power. Marx located power in the political organization of the state, or in Marxian discourses, the nature of power was political. The capture of political power by a new class such as the bourgeoisie, was a significant event in the evolution of history. However, since the state was merely a tool to perpetuate the power of the ruling class, it was inherently exploitative in nature. The state was the concrete manifestation of the presence of class-struggle in society. Hence, the Marxian utopia was to strive for a classless, stateless society. The Communist Party, after smashing the bourgeois basis of

society, was to strive for a withering away of the state and implicitly of its own self. In this way, Marx delinked authority from leadership in a Communist state at a particular stage in history.

Unlike Marx, Mao saw the continuing importance of the leadership of the Communist Party. Mao located power inthe revolutionary role of the CCP. The Communist Party was the only party capable of leading a revolution of the workers and peasants. In fact the CCP was the core of the leadership of the whole Chinese people and without this core the cause of socialism could not be victorious. Mao did not stress withering away of the state; instead he emphasized the need for a "continuous revolution" to constantly guard against counter-revolutionary elements in society. Mao expanded the vanguard role of the Communist Party to establish a ubiquitous party apparatus in China. Thus Mao established not only the need for a penetrative Party apparatus, but also provided the Party with the moral right to wield power. This was, in many ways, a reflection of the Confucian notion of authority.

The Confucian moral order was the basis for a stable and prosperous society in imperial China. The monarch embodied this moral order, was the highest representation of it and also its protector. Similarly the CCP, by weeding

out counter-revolutionaries and constantly re-educating people provided stability in society. Like the moral prescriptions of the Confucian monarch, the CCP also sought to legislate morality through thought-reform and various ideological campaign like the Three-Antis, Anti-Rightist campaign etc. in Maoist time and Spiritual Pollution and Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization campaign in Dengist China.

The Confucian moral order was a hierarchical one. Relationship within family members, as well as those between the ruler and the ruled were clearly defined. Similarly the CCP had a hierarchical organization with each level of the hierarchy subordinate to the one above. Further, the basic aim of the Confucian state and the Communist Party state was essentially the same i.e., the promotion of communal good in accordance with a prescribed moral order. This was in contrast to the Western concept of state, which was based upon maximizing the privileges of the individuals.

Under a communal system, social interrelatedness is stressed and social dependency fostered. This emphasis on the community over the group is evident both in Confucian and Maoist discourses on authority. Further, in both the scenarios, legitimacy is derived from the value of moral authority in society. In Confucian China this moral authority was embodied in a moral social order providing stability and in Maoist China, it was embodied in the CCP's vanguard

role for a continuous revolution in China. Thus, Maoist China embodied elements of Confucian tradition as well as a `modern' institutional framework along Marxist lines.

In terms of political succession the presence of both traditional and modern elements implied a paradox. The method of choosing a successor had elements of tradition in it, while the succesors aspired to inherit the revolutionary mantle of Mao. In other words, succession within the CCP was decided by Mao as the supreme authority and the successor derived legitimacy from his commitment to revolutionary ideals of Mao. An open and institutionalized struggle for power was absent, owing to the traditional notions of deference embodied in the Chinese political tradition.

The reason for this continuation of traditional elements may be sought in a non-dichotomous relationship between tradition and modernity. Modernization, defined in terms of westernization of traditional societies, discredits tradition as regressive. It also implies a non-rational basis for traditional authority. Scholars such as Sussane and Lloyd Rudolph rescued tradition from the "historical trash heap" to establish a dynamic relationship between tradition and modernity. They suggest the presence of para-communities, associations combining traditional and modern elements in *all* societies. Hence it is possible to trace

elements of Chinese political tradition in an inherently modern Marxist system, without discrediting the CCP's authority in China as a mere continuation of Imperial rule. Instead, the dynamic relationship between tradition and modernity is the basis for explaining the revolutionary yet personalized state system in China.

Lucian Pye identified the dominant aspect of Chinese political tradition, and Francis Hsu placed them in the Chinese social context. According to Pye, the Chinese have an obsessive concern with ideology, a tendency to maintain hierarchy in political structures, a feeling that authority should be monopolistic and an uneasiness with the concept of "equals". According to Hsu, kinship forms the basic organizational principle in China. It permeates all social and political relations. Further kinship operates even in the absence of kinship groups through psuedo-kinship relationships. In Chinese society, the attributes of authority and continuity are the main reasons for the formation of these psuedo-kinship ties in the Communist state. In the Chinese kinship system, there is a desire to seek authority in all interpersonal relations i.e., a desire to rank everyone as superior or subordinate.

The tendency to establish a hierarchy in interpersonal relations, coupled with the need to foster an attitude of deference to authority, has given rise to a social and

political elite in China. the CCP's internal politics in particular, and Chinese political behaviour in general, strongly reflect this tendency. Further the attribute of continuity strengthens the concentration of power in the upper ranks of the CCP. Older leaders, who usually represent the conservative opinion within the party, continue to hold sway over polity-formulation owing to their continuous position in government and Party posts.

Though the Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao to break with all past practices and revolutionize Chinese society, evidence suggests that during the course of the Cultural Revolution many traditional elements in politics were atually strengthened. The cult of Mao peaked along the lines of the cult of the Emperor. Moreover, the paternalistic nature of Mao's authority was fully revealed. Even as the Red Guards revolted against all manifestations of authority in society and politics, they did not challenge the authority of Mao as a supreme leader. Once again, the paradox of a paternalistic process of deciding a revolutionary successor to Mao was evident. Mao's chosen successors, Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng rose to the highest political office as a personal choice of Mao and hence had to eulogize Mao to gain legitimacy as leaders. Mao's charisma, and not any rational political choice, formed the basis of succession in Maoist China.

Deng Xiaoping initiated an ideological change, not an ideology break as is widely believed, in China. Deng stressed the significance of building a materialist basis for socialist society. Deng did not abandon ideology but sought to reformulate it. Ideological work in China was made subservient to exigencies of economic development and technological modernization. Hence, the socialist basis of society remained intact while harnessing the advantages of a liberalizing economy.

However, Dengist strategy gave rise to many contradictions in Chinese society and succession was directly linked to these contradictions. In the Dengist era, succession was played out in a broader arena, where there was an assimilation of the conflicting opinions of different groups in a modernizing society. The conflicting demands of political control and economic liberalization had to be accommodated in the succession debates. Leaders who could reconcile these two contradictory demands, such as Li Peng, emerged as the most credible candidates. The political structure they espoused was a neo-authoritarian one. Hence political control was not relinquished but relaxed, and the commitment to economic reforms maintained. But the socialist basis of society was emphasized time and again and liberal democracy rejected as bourgeolis and as anti-thetical to Chinese

needs.

Unlike in the Maoist era, succession no longer remained a personal choice of the supreme leader but became more policy-based. However, succession in China still remains an internal institutional matter of the CCP, not inviting popular participation and hence retaining a strong hint of political intrigue owing to the opacity of the procedure of choosing a successor.

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