

The Kashmir Valley in International Relations

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

RAHUL NEEL MANI

**Centre for International Politics,
Organisation and Disarmament,
School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110 067
India
1996**



**School of International Studies
Centre for International Politics,
Organisation and Disarmament**

19 July, 1996

Certificate

Certified that the dissertation entitled "**The Kashmir Valley in International Relations**", submitted by **Mr. Rahul Neel Mani** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University, is his original work.

This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Chairperson

PROFESSOR SURJIT MANSINGH

Chairperson

**Centre for International Politics,
Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110 067**

Supervisor

Sushil Kumar

Acknowledgments

Without cooperation and assistance, even a perfect scholar cannot accomplish a given task. All those who offer or render their help, need a word of acknowledgment.

The credit of the successful completion of the work goes to my generous, compassionate and tender-hearted Supervisor **Shri. Sushil Kumar**. From the selection of the problem upto the end of this thesis, his magnificent, knowledgeable and conspicuous guidance helped me all the way to come out with flying colours. I, really, feel short of words to show my gratitude to his grandeur and graciousness. Above all, his scholarly interaction and knowledge of useful facts helped me building a great courage in myself. At last I would also like to thank him for his kind hearted forgiveness on my errors and carelessness.

I also wish to thank the staff members of JNU and Teen Murti (Nehru Memorial) Libraries for their kind support. Without which I would have lost the way.

My last thanks giving message is for the Department of Education, Government of Rajasthan, who assisted me financially in pursuing the research, without which it would be a dream that might have never come true.

Finally, I wish to regard the esteemed and graceful parents who are the soul of my inspiration.


19/7/96
Rahul Neel Mani

Contents

Chapter No.	Title	Page Nos.
	<i>Introductory Note</i>	1-5
One	<i>The Kashmir Valley: Land and the People</i>	6-39
Two	<i>Islamic Transnationalism and Non Muslim Minorities in Kashmir Valley: Plight of Kashmiri Pandits and Gujjars</i>	40-63
Three	<i>Muslim Elite Dominance: An Ethnic Perspective</i>	64-79
Four	<i>Conflict Escalation: The Impact of Pakistan - US and China Axis</i>	80-99
Five	<i>Conclusion</i>	100-114
	<i>Appendices</i>	115-131
	<i>Select Bibliography</i>	132-143

Introductory note

Political organization in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is often contested between the majorities and minorities. Different forms of political decentralization take concrete shape in the specific conditions of different societies but in none of these societies is the problem resolved for a long time and political tension between the groups defining themselves as majorities and minorities, continues. The problem gets compounded by the changing nature of International Relations specially the foreign policy objectives of the hostile neighbouring states and there sponsorship of minority demands. On closer examination it appears that the very concept of the problem in terms of majorities and minorities is not in correspondence with the demographic reality on the ground. A majority in one place is often a minority in another place and so a contest between these two ultimately leads to ethnic and religious forms of political organization which is oppressive to local minorities.

A networking of ethnic and religious groups with-people and governments outside the national borders considerably limits the possibility of peaceful settlement of the issues. Once we accept this framework of analysis and analyse the problem in India then it becomes clear that the national regional and local demographic pictures do not match with one another.

In the proposed study, an attempt is made to focus on the Kashmir Valley and see how the demographic structure in a region especially like the

valley situated in a border area generates a political dynamics of conflict, disintegration within India and complicates the relations with neighbouring Pakistan, the Islamic states and the U.S.

Kashmir, that has been compared with paradise, Switzerland and Greece and claimed even more than that, by Sir Francis Younghusband is really one of the most beautiful places on the Earth.

To Abul Fazl, Kashmir is so enchanting as to be fittingly called a garden of perpetual spring surrounding a citadel terraced to the skies, and deservedly appropriate to be either the delight of the worldling or the retired abode of the recluse. The **first chapter** of this work reveals the beauty and glory of Kashmir. The Hills, the Valley, the great Watersheds, and cool desert of Ladakh all have been compactly fitted in the opening chapter of this dissertation. A detailed description of Jammu and Kashmir gives the idea of its topography and demography. Alongwith the religions and ethnic classes, this chapter also throws some light on the valuable tradition of 'Kashmiriyat'. The quality of kashmiris their basic instinct of assimilation and secular tendencies have found a great place. The population graph gives the knowledge about various religious and ethnic communities.

With the assessment of population and after a detailed study of their behavioural and cultural ethos, the second part of the same chapter discusses, how Kashmiri Muslims despite being in majority, suffers from a 'minority complex'.

In regions ethnically distinct from the central ruling elite class, tension often takes place and takes shape of a minority complex and subsequently a separatist nationalism. That's what has happened in the Valley. This part of the opening chapter tells, (why the Muslims of Kashmir feel alienated and neglected and how it subsequently turns into a minority complex) The inherent disqualifications of Islam, which adds fuel to the fire are also responsible for the deterioration of the Kashmiri as well as Indian Muslims. (The poverty, uneducatedness, economic backwardness and socially deprived character of the Muslim masses of the Valley also gives them complexes.)

As stated earlier that the problem gets more vigorous by the changing nature of International Relations especially the foreign policy objectives of hostile neighbouring countries and their sponsorship of minority demands. The **second chapter** deals with the transnational emergence of Islam, pan-Islamism and the effect of world-wide, Muslim unity on the question of Kashmiri separatist movement.

↓The sponsorship of demands of Muslim minority in India by the hostile neighbouring states has further ruined the condition. As stated earlier that a majority at one place surely has to be a minority at the other places. So is the condition in India and Pakistan. The Hindus, who constitute a majority in a India, are in minority in Pakistan and the Muslims who are in majority in Arab nations, West Asia and Pakistan are of course a minority in India and even China. Hindus in Pakistan have never planned a secessionist movement but

Muslims of Kashmir Valley are fully indulged in anti-Indian activities for freedom. This is due to the external support and Pan-Islamic appeals. Due to this negative impact of transnational Islam, the non-Muslim or non-Elite Muslim minorities are the greatest losers and sufferers. The Kashmiri Pandits, Buddhists and Sikhs face conditions of genocide and mass exodus from the Valley. Even the Shia Muslims and Gujjar Muslims are also suffering the elite dominance.)✓

Jammu and Kashmir, since the days of Indian independence, have been under the governance of either feudal classes or the elite class. There never emerged a bourgeoisie among the Muslims in India. The **third chapter** is a detailed study of the Muslim elite dominance in the Kashmir Valley and its ethnic impact upon the masses of the state. The comparatively small ethno-religious group of Sunni Muslim elite which emerged as the ruling class, reigned throughout the ages. This ruling elite has exploited the masses for the fulfillment of its own interests. This chapter tells, why the Kashmiri elite Muslims have played a role in spreading the communal and subversive feelings.

The **fourth chapter** bears its origin from the much coveted Sino-Pak and U.S. axis and the escalation of the conflict. More and more external support to Pakistan proves hazardous to the Kashmir Valley. China has proximity with Kashmir through Xinjiang province and it has proximity with Pakistan through the arms supply and technological transfer. China has an

important say in this regional issue because it is a recipient of some territory of Kashmir, illegally given by Pakistan. This chapter also deals with the U.S. role in the Kashmir. President Bill Clinton's approach to compare Kashmir situation with the former Yugoslavia and Somalia and his active correspondence with some of the militant groups based in the U.S., shows the U.S.'s indirect support to the secessionist movement of Kashmir. U.S still does not accept the Instrument of Accession signed in favour of India. The U.S. assistance packages to Pakistan and arms sales worth billions of dollars also gives room for suspicion. Pakistan's active involvement in spreading terrorism in Kashmir Valley, its mischievous efforts to gather international support on the Kashmir dispute also finds place in the same chapter.

The concluding chapter is an overall assessment of the previous chapters. (Suggestions are made in favour of inter-community dialogue and adherence to a multi-cultural model. This problem should be solved, as suggested, with the mutual dialogue between various confronting parties without interference of any outside party.)

The study has been supported by the exhaustive consultation of wide spread study material consisting of both primary and secondary resources. At the end of this dissertation mention has been made of a rich **Select Bibliography**.

Chapter - I

The Kashmir Valley: Land and The People

"In Kashmir's garden, in the heaven of Kashmir, was my body formed: Hijaz the Holy gave my heart, Its life-beats, and shiraz its song".

-Sir Mohammad Iqbal

The praises of Kashmir cannot be contained within the lingual spheres. Kashmir, verily an emerald of verdure enclosed in a radiant amphitheater of virgin snow, is such a beautiful country, blest with fertile soil, glorious climate, grand mountains five following sewers and magical flora and fauna, once to be seen by every human race.

Sir Francis Young husband¹ writes: "It has the same blue sky and brilliant sunshine as in Switzarland and in Greece, but its purple hills are on a far grander scale, and if it has no sea, it has lake and river, and the still more impressive snowy mountains. Kashmir seems much the more likely to impress by its natural beauty".

Kashmir is undoubtedly one of the most beautiful places on the Earth. Mankind have felt that its natural grandeur is unsurpassed. It is a unique beauty with hundreds of faces and innumerable aspects, ever changing, sometimes smiling sometimes full of sadness and deep in sorrows.

1. Francis Young husband, *Kashmir*, 1909, p.133.

Its luminosity reveals the glory to us, a multicoloured tapestry spread on a grand part of Indian soil. As Dr. Karan Singh says, "Like some supremely beautiful woman, whose beauty is almost impersonal and above human desire, such was Kashmir in all its feminine beauty of river and valley and lake and graceful trees"².

Kashmir, a deep projection into the Asian heartland is a component of India. The very identity of Kashmir is its name. An obsession in itself. Volumes and volumes have been written in praise of the beautiful landscape of Kashmir but every volume remains incomplete as Kashmir changes every minute, every hour and every day. A totally different entity of Indian Union, calm peaceful and very standstill is Kashmir. A land of great people, a privileged spot apparently endowed by nature with all that she has to give.

To Abul Fazi³ "Kashmir is so enchanting as to be fittingly called a garden of perpetual spring surrounding a citadel terraced to the skies, and deservedly appropriate to be either the delight of the worldling or the retired abode of the recluse".

All the above written literature presents a vivid description of Kashmir, what we claim as a land of explorers, zoologists and travellers. A skeptical and gracefully charming paradise on earth. It is difficult to imagine anything more wonderful than the profusion of various colourful things in Kashmir.

2. Francis Brunel; 'Kashmir'; Calcutta; 1978. p.3.

3. Fazi Abul; 'Ain-i-Akbari' English translation by Col. Calcutta, 1891, Vol.II; p.348.

The Land and People

Jammu and Kashmir, more popularly known as 'Kashmir' constitutes the northern tip of the Indian Land. The state lies between 32° 17° to 36° 58° North and 73° 26° to 80° 30° East. Jammu and Kashmir, one of the largest states of Indian Union, covers an area of 2,22,236 sq.km. including 78,114 sq.km. under the controversial occupation of Pakistan - 5,130 sq.km pleasantly gifted (without any legal mode) by Pakistan to China and 37,555 sq.km illegally occupied by China.

The Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir (as on 31st December, 1948) was 1,38, 124 sq.km. But tragically another major change was done due to the realignment of the border. The cease-fire line was renamed as the Line of Actual Control (LOAC) following the Shimla Agreement on July 31, 1972. With the effective date of Shimla Agreement the Indian occupied J & K was cut short to 1, 01, 387 sq.km. and the same exists till date.

Besides the famous Valley of Kashmir, the State comprises Jammu, Ladak, Baltistan, Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar. The major portion of the State is mountain studded. With the exceptional plain on the South-Western strip which is contiguous with the plains of Punjab, it may be easily divided into three clear cut regions:

1. The other Hills and the Middle Mountains of Jammu Division.
2. Kashmir valley with the Jhelum valley below Baramula including the tehsils of Uri, Karnah and Muzaffarabad.

3. The far side of the great watershed range including Astor, Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh.

By the virtue of its central position in the wider context of Asia, Kashmir commands an important and pivotal identity both politically and strategically. It is a neighbour of as many as four to five nations, namely - Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and to some extent Russia. It was originally a pass-way of the ancient Central Asian Trade route thus it became a halting place of travellers commuting between the plains of India and Central Asia.

A detailed and varied description of Kashmir's geography and physical setting is necessary to describe the vividity found in the lively state.

"It begins from the strip of level land at the northern - most - extremity of the plains of Punjab. This strip has the same geographical features as the Punjab, hence it continues. It does not extend long and low ridges of the hills begin soon. These hills, spread over a large tract constitute what is called the 'Region of the Outer Hills' or the 'submontane tract'. The hills run parallel to one another and vary in height from 2,000 to 4,000 feet above sea level. In between these rocky and rugged hills lie small narrow valleys"⁴.

4. P.N.K. Bamzai; *A History of Kashmir*, 1962. p.1.

In terms of geographical division this state can be partitioned into six different areas as described earlier. The state lies in the basin and catchment of areas of three major rivers the Chenab, the Jhelum and the Indus.

"The entire area from the plains of Punjab to Panchal range of Himalayas is drained by the Chenab. The Vale of Kashmir and western districts of Muzaffrabad, Poonch and Mirpur by the basin of Jhelum. The Indus drains the waters of Laddakh, Baltistan and Gilgit before turning south and cutting through the Himalayas to reach the Punjab plains"⁵.

The Six Distinct Regions

Jammu

The vast territory stretching from Suchet Garh near Sialkot in south to Pir Panchal range and Ladakh in the North and from Ravi in the east to LOAC in the West, earlier known as 'Dugar' but now as Jammu, is the most key region of the entire state. This is said to be the homeland of the founder of the state, as also of the 'Dogra' people. Its total area is about 1,200 sq. miles. Its contiguity with Punjab and Himachal Pradesh links it with the rest of India. As for the Jammu region, of the total population of about 2.7 million, there are about 800,000 non-Hindus as against over 1.9 million Hindus. In Jammu, the districts of Doda, Rajouri and Poonch possess 60 to 90 per cent Muslim population. As the state was founded by Dogras, they are the greatest in

5. Madhok B.R., *Kashmir: The Storm Centre of the World*; W. Little York, 1992, p.212.

number. Thousands of Kashmiris have also settled in Ramban and Kishtwar regions.

The spoken language of this region is Dogri which amalgamates a number of other local dialects and it is written in the Devnagari.

The whole of this region is mountainous except for a sole narrow belt touching on the Punjab. Beautiful valley of Bhadarwah is a part of this region. Maize and rice are the main crops. Lower Himalayan ranges of Jammu are densely covered with rich fir and deodar forests. Timber, therefore, is an important and earning source of business. Extensive deposits of coal, mica, iron and aluminium make this area rich in minerals.

Politically, Jammu had retained an identity of a divided and scattered land. Socially, culturally, and economically the people of this region are indissolubly linked with the Dogras of East Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. "In fact, the Dogra belt spread over Gurdaspur and Hoshiarpur districts of East Punjab, Kangra, Chamba and Handi districts of Himachal Pradesh, and the Dugar zone of the Jammu and Kashmir state forms a compact homeland of the Dogras. Naturally therefore, the people of this region aspire to remain connected with India, irrespective of what happens to other parts of the state"⁶.

6. Ibid., p.215.

The most attractive place in the region is the holy cave of 'Vaishno Devi' at a height of over five thousand feet above sea level. The city is also known as the Winter Capital of Jammu & Kashmir State.

Ladakh

It lies in the north-eastern part of Jammu. It is the largest region in size but the smallest in population. Possessing an area of over thirty thousand its population, mainly Buddhist, is not more than two lakhs. The region is drained by the Sindhu (Indus) river and its tributaries. Leh the capital of Ladakh, is the only habitat in the world at an amazing height of 11,000 feet. As known to us, the population of Ladakh is predominantly Buddhist, who speak a language akin to Tibetan. It is termed as 'Bodhi' and has a script similar to Devanagari.

Ladakh is a very backward region. Inhabitants have nothing important and relevant to prosper. So they practice and profess religion. They give their best in men and material to the numerous monasteries that act as an oasis in a cool desert. Monasteries work like education centres. Some of them has retained rich collections of ancient Buddhist literature in original.

A part of Ladakh was over run by the Pakistanis in 1947-48, when, after capturing Askardu and Kargil, they began their advances towards Ladakh. It is now the most strategic part of the Jammu and Kashmir state from the point of view of Indian security interests. It can serve a great purpose to Pakistan, as it connects Pakistan uninterruptingly with China. Because of prolytisation and settlement of Muslims, Buddhist majority in Ladakh is coming

down heavily. Government of India is trying to set up an autonomous council for a free and fair administration in Ladakh to let it continue with its peaceful Buddhist identity.

"The problem of Ladakh is basically socio-cultural. Once Ladakh loses its Buddhist majority and distinct cultural identity, its future will become as uncertain as of Kashmir valley"⁷.

Baltistan

The third separate and distinct region of the original state is Baltistan inhabited by the Balti people. It is situated in the north of Kashmir and west of Ladakh. With a total area of 14,000 square miles it holds a population nearly 1.5 lakh according to 1941 census. Majority of them are Muslims by religion.

"It is known as little Tibet"⁸. Like Ladakh this area also, is very thinly populated. Askardu the capital of Baltistan is called the fruit garden of Baltistan. This region unfortunately, was over-run by Pakistani intruders in 1947-48 tribal attack. A small part of Baltistan was fought back by India but its major portion including the town of Askardu (the capital) still lies in the illegally Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Baltistan though does not have any importance economically or strategically yet it is a convenient way for Pakistan to advance towards Yojila pass which is now under Indian suzerainty.

7. Balraj Madhok, *Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh: Problem and Solution*, New Delhi, 1987, p.41.

8. P.N. Tikoo, *Story of Kashmir*, New Delhi, 1979, p.194.

At present it is an excellent base for Pakistani troops on the Siachin Glacier. It is now a centrally administrated unit of Pakistan.

Gilgit Agency

It is the most important part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. It lies to the next of Baltistan and North-West of Kashmir valley. It includes the Gilgit district and the areas of Hunza, Nagar, Chillas, Punial, Ishkuman, Kuh and Ghizar. Total geographical area of this region is 16,000 square miles and the population in 1941 was about 1,16,000. This is a province with a thick majority of Shia Muslims. They belong to the Dardic race and are closely associated with the Chisralis in culture and language. Shina and Chitrali are the two main languages spoken in the region. This region shares its boundaries with Sinkiang province of China in the North and Afghanistan in the West. Islamic states of erstwhile Soviet Union lies very near to Gilgit Agency. Physically Gilgit is divided from Kashmir by the same Himalayan range which divides Kashmir from Ladakh and Baltistan. The whole of Gilgit including the Burzila Pass (Which connects Gilgit and Kashmir by the shortest route) now constitute the Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Pakistan has made it a centrally administered area ruled directly by the authorities in Islamabad. Pakistan has developed a Military base in this region with the mischivious help of U.S and China.

From the economic view point it is an unexplored province having vast potentialities. "Zira", (cumin), an unreplacable spice is the most known product of this region.

The Punjabi Speaking Belt

Mirpur, Poonch and Muzaffarabad linguistically Punjabi, constitute the fifth district of the state. This region lies along the river Jhelum which forms the western boundary of the state. The total area of this belt is about 6,000 square miles and total population about 11 lakhs. Nearly one lakhs Hindus resided in this area but they have been either killed or squeezed out by the local Muslims. Poonch is still under Indian occupation. Muzaffarabad is the head quarters of "Azad Kashmir" Government. This region links West Punjab and North West Frontier Province (both in Pakistan) with the Kashmir Valley. At Present most of the part of this region barring the towns of Poonch and Mendhar, lies on the Pakistan side of LOC which is just three miles away from the town of Poonch.

Kashmir Valley

"In the centre of the state, surrounded by the divers region and people mentioned above and cut off from them by high Himalayan Walls, lies the beautiful Valley of Kashmir, the 'Nandan Vana' of India"⁹. " Geographically Kashmir belong to that part of Central Asia which at one time was the cleaning house of several separate civilisations"¹⁰.

Out of the three of the Six regions which constitute the Indian occupied Kashmir, the most celebrated is the Valley of Kashmir. This is in fact the

9. Balraj Madhok, op.cit., p.221.

10. Elphinstone, *History of India*, p.515.

biggest Himalayan Valley over 5,000 feet above sea level. It has a length of nearly 80 miles and width of 40 miles. According to legends this part was a vast Lake. Kashyap Rishi, a great saint, Played an important role in making an opening near Baramula drained its water resulting in conversion of the bed of this lake into a vast valley. The area of the Valley is 15,853 square kms and the total population comes to 31,34,909 according to the last census held in 1981. Comprised between latitude $33^{\circ}.35'$ to $34^{\circ}.50'$ and longitude $74^{\circ}.30'$ to $75^{\circ}.35'$ the Valley is a part of North West Extreme India. The Valley has tremendous lakes, streams, Turfs, Fruits, Forests and beautiful mountain ranges. These mountains guard the lush green Valley from all sides. These mountains are not monotonous. The highest of them is Nanga Parbat 26,620 feet. Within the majestic mountains, there are depressions which are popularly called 'Darangas' (Passes) which provide several outlets between the Valley and the adjacent regions. Where the mountains cease to steep, there comes plain like deposits all around the Valley. These table lands, which are some sixty or ninety meters in height are called 'Wudars' or 'Karewahs'. Departing from this destination one moves down to the terraces of fine alluvial soil which slopes at ease towards the Jhelum.

Lidder Valley is the first upland valley to the east of Jhelum and it gives passage to a river at the same time. It extends from Anantnag to Pahalgam. Sind is the most beautiful lateral rich valley of Kashmir region. It owes its name to the river Sindhar which is fed by the glaciers and streams. It extends from Ganderbal to the Zojjila pass, covering a distance of over 58 miles. The

Lolab Valley is a fertile oval shaped. Valley, situated in the north-east side of Kashmir. IT is traversed by a considerable stream called Lahwal, which flows down from the surrounding hills.

Nature has fed the valley with ample water resources like lakes, rivers and glaciers. Not only these but springs and snow fields also join the water cordone.

Jhelum, locally known as 'Vitasta' is the life of the Valley. Its source being the Verinag spring situated at the foothills of Pir Panjal ranges. River is navigable uninterruptedly from Khanabal to Baramula over and course of 102 miles and with its numerous canals and tributaries serve as a means of transport from leisure trips to cargo and business loadings through boats.

People and Religious Composition of Kashmir Valley

"In the whole of this sub-continent it is Kashmir", said Sufi, "that has had the fullest and closest contact with a vast variety of cultures"¹¹.

This nature's paradise remained unhurt till recently of the materialistic needs and destruction. According to the latest registered census of 1981, the total population of the valley was around 31, 34, 909. The low density of population of the Valley is due to the environmental constraints like harsh topography, inaccessibility to various regions and severe cold climatic

11. G.D.M. Sufi, *Kashir*, New Delhi, 1974; p.696.

conditions. As far as the techno-social development is concerned the valley is still in its infant years. People of the Valley are much fit in their old cultural ethos.

The people of the Kashmir valley are physically a fine stock, the men being well built and tall. They are an ancient race with complexions varying from olive to a raddy and fair hue. The features of all are well shaped and regular. Lively and intelligent they are full of fun and fond of amusement. The beauty of their own women has been long and much extolled¹².

Kashmir Valley is an amalgamation of a variety of religions. Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs to name only a few are the part of one Kashmir. Muslims are in majority in the Kashmir Valley. There are several Muslim groups, in all numbering near about five million in the state of Jammu Kashmir. In fact that Kashmir is the only state with a Muslim majority of 68 per cent.

Table

Regional Break-up of Jammu and Kashmir Population based on Religion

Region	Hindu	Muslim	Sikh	Buddhist	Christian	Other
Jammu	18,02,832	804637	100164	1141	7778	1561
Kashmir	124078	2976932	33117	189	466	62
Ladakh	5338	61882	334	68376	237	5
State	1932248	3843451	133615	69706	8481	1628

If we observe the ethnic composition of the Valley alone, 94 per cent of the inhabitants are Muslim by caste and the rest of them belong to various

12. P.N.K. Bamzai, *A History of Kashmir*, New Delhi, 1962, p.16.

others. Hindus rank next to Muslims and the among the other communities
Skihs are the largest.

A student of the 'Rajtarangini will have no hesitation to admit that before the advent of Islam in the 14th century the population of Kashmir was not entirely Brahman. We find the names of several sects namely Nishads, Khashas, Darads, Bhauttas, Bhinshas, Damaras, Tantrins etc., who constantly gave trouble not only to the rulers of the state but also to the Brahmins¹³.

The Brahmins, popularly called Kashmiri Pandits, form a distinct class of their own and are considered to be the purest specimen of the ancient Aryan settlers in the Valley¹⁴.

The Kashmiri Pandits are divided into 133 exogamous 'gotras' each member of which claims to be a descendent of a Rishi whose name the gotra bears. Claiming to be the heirs of Rishis and affiliating to the highest order of Brahmins, the Sarswats, Kashmiri Pandits constitute a small community which is highly educated claiming the 80 percent of them as literates. They possess the knack of adapting to changed circumstances at short notice and have been adopting new avenues of profession.

Kashmiri Pandits are also known as Batta (but-ta) in Kashmiri. They form about 3 percent of the population of the Valley¹⁵. They claim themselves

13. Ibid.

14. Monier - Williams, **Modern India and the Indians**, p.151.

15. This percentage is based on the figures obtained as a result of the registration of Hindus as 'Refugees' in different Indian cities.

as the "original sons of the soil" tracing their origin back thousands of years. The Kashmiri Hindus have educed a separate culture of their own, different from the other Brahmins of North India. These Pandits speak Kashmiri and practice 'savism' without any orthodoxy. They have some of the most sacred places of pilgrimages for Hindus, like Amarnath, Khir Bhawani, and Sharda Bhawani all situated in the vicinity of the valley. "The Pandits recide within a radius of 15 to 20 miles in the Valley, and being small in numbers, they are very closely knit community. In other words the existence and survival of Kashmiri Pandits as a subgroup of Hindus is so closely dependent on their geographical surroundings in the valley that they will become extinct as a distinct community if they are separated from the valley for long"¹⁶.

16. Kaul; K.L., and Teng M.K., 'Human Rights Violations of Kashmiri Hindus', In *Perspectives on Kashmir*, Ed. Raju G.c. Thomas, San Fransisco, 1992, p.176-77.

Table

**Population of the Kashmiri Hindus &
Recorded by Census Department**

Decimal Growth Rate			
1931	63,088 (K.Ps of J & K together)	Increase during 1931-41-15,780	25%
1941	78,868		
Census could not be conducted in the year 1951.			
1961	63,000 (In Kashmir & Ladakh only, excluding Jammu province)		
1971	1,16,000	+ 53,000	84.1%
1981	1,27,000	+ 11,000	9.4%
1991	1,65,000 (anticipated)	+ 38,000	29.9%
Over-all growth rate in the entire state as per census records has been:			
1961-71		29.60%	
1971-81		28.97%	
1981-91		30.00%	

The Sikhs constitute another small community in the Valley. Before 1947 they were chiefly concentrated in Muzaffarabad district. Recent developments have forced them to migrate to other parts of the State most of them were originally Brahmins imported by Raja Sukh Jiwan (1754 A.D.) and were converted to Sikhism in the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1819-39 A.D.). They are hard working people adopting agriculture as their chief occupation. Recently they have taken to the military and police service of the state¹⁷.

17. P.N.K. Bsamzai, *Culture and Political History of Kashmir*, Vol.1, 1994, p.18.

DISS
327.09546
M3142 Ka



TH6029

TH-6029

94 per cent of the Valley's population is Muslim by religion. 13th and 14th century saw the advent of Islam in the Valley which slowly but surely converted its socio-cultural fabric, studded with traditions of love and humanity.

"The Mussalmans of the Valley may have retained, for sometime after their conversion to Islam, some of the Hindu customs of endogamy within the caste and exogamy outside the gotra, but there is no trace of these customs now and the different tribal names or 'krams' are names and nothing more"¹⁸.

There are several Muslim groups, in all numbering more than 4 million in the state of J & K, now divided unequally between India and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir, illegally occupied by Pakistan).

The information available at hand shows a dominant and powerful. Islamic and Musalman culture in the Valley. Islam which was of course non-fundamental in character has never disappeared from the Vale of Kashmir. The Muslim population of the Valley is divided into the Sunni and Shia sects, the former being in a preponderating majority. Shias are found in certain specific areas of the Valley. The Sheikh, Sayyid and Rirzada are still considered to be Krams of honour among the Musalmans. Mullahs or priests, though not very much, are very important to perform all the religious rituals of village people.

In a different respect, nevertheless, Muslim Kashmiri's do resemble their co-religionists in pre-partition, Pakistan and Bangladesh more than those

18. Sir Walter Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, London, 1895, p.306.

in India. Like Muslims of South Asia, Kashmiri Muslims show ranked, caste-like divisions which assert some sort of similarities to Hindu 'varna' and 'jati' system.

But Muslim Kashmiris distinguish themselves from Hindus or Kashmiri Pandits by subtle difference in dress, the beards on face, dialect and names. The Muslim sub castes are not well organised so it has resulted into the extended family system. With the above discussion I assume that Muslims occupy a positions of overwhelming importance in the population of Kashmir.

When we take religion into account we should never forget to include a staunch, secularistic stream, which Kashmir has respected throughout except some of the black years when people lost faith in democracy and popular rule. I'm talking about Kashmiriyat the truest identity of Kashmiris.

Sheikh Noor-ud-Din, the founder of the gentle Rishi order, was born in 1377. After disdaining the orthodox Islamic schooling and religious formalities he devoted his time, with Lal Ded (popularly known as mother Lalla. From her, he learnt to have faith in himself and not to depend upon the forbearance of super natural powers. According to a legend, he suckled at her breast as an infant, thus incorporating both mysticism and religious harmony. The philosophy of Lal Ded was an amalgamation of the finest of both Hindu and Muslim sects.

The valley still remembers the verses of Lal Ded who once pronounced:

Truth is not a prisoner of mosques and temples and is all pervading. Idol is of stone, temple is of stone; above and below are one; which of them wilt thou worship, O foolish Pandit, cause thou the union of mind and soul?

She always believed in moderate values.

Shikh Noo-ud-Din was popularly known as Nund Rishi. His mystical teachings, non-dogmatic and non-communal philosophy taught tolerance and fellowship to the Kashmiris. It was this secularistic section of Kashmiriyat which had averted the clash of two opposite and equally furious religions for long Sheikh said:

"Do not go to the Sheikh and priest and Mullah;

Do not feed thy cattle on ankor leaves; Do not shut thyself up in mosques and forests;

Enter thine own body with breath controlled; in communication with God."

Nund Rishi broke all the barriers of dogmatism and mysticism. He preached only peace and devotion.

Simply saying:

"Sow thou the seed of friendship for me everywhere

And slay not even my enemies."

The message of Lal Ded is even more clear and direct than that of Nund Rishi's.

"Shiva lives everywhere.

Do not divide Hindu from Muslim

Use your sense to recognise yourself;

that is the true way to God."

Every one knows that followers of this path were very few but I mentioned the importance of Kashmiryat-just because of its all-pervasive nature which could be felt minutes after entering into the Valley. In his work 'Valley of Kashmir' Sir Walter Lawrence, who was appointed its first settlement commissioner in 1890's recorded:

Generally speaking, it may be said that when one finds the Musalman Shrine with its Shady Chinars and lofty poplars and elms, a little search will discover some old Hindu as than.... I attribute much of the delightful tolerance which exists between the followers of the two religions to the fact that the Kashmiri Musalmans never gave up old Hindu religion of the country¹⁹.

The glorification of Kashmiriyat does not mean that it overshadowed all the other orders of society. With the above described values I just wanted to depict, that how kind hearted and sacred, the people of the Valley were.

19. Walter Lawrence, op.cit., p.143.

The great Sultan Zainul Abidin was the chief mourner when Sheikh Noor-ud-Din died. His grave at Tsrar Sharif continues to be a place of pilgrimage for followers of all religions.

The Bakkarwals

The people who constitute this community are Islamic (Sunni) nomadic goat and sheep breeders. This is not a distinct religious sect but is a part of the Muslim religion. In fact this community first emerged as a corporate group only in the early years of this century. It is a conglomeration of families, whose ancestors belonged to different ethnic groups, spread over large parts of northern South Asia. Numerically most important among them was represented by Gujar, who live as peasants and/or pastoralist in large parts of Pakistan and north-west India and in some parts of Afghanistan too. "Bakkarwals say that their ancestors had entered Jammu and Kashmir only a few generations ago from the valley of Allai and Kunhar"²⁰. Till 1947 a very large number of the summer time pastures of these people lay north of the Indo-Pak cease fire line. With the denomination separate nationhood in 1947, their approach to these pastures was cut off, and this has had many implications for them. The Bakkarwal economy has always depended principally on the animal sale; in addition, sheep wool and goat hair were also always important sources of income in cash and kind. Prosperous Bakkarwal with many horses and mules also hire out these animals, along with their

20. T.N. Madan, *Muslim Communities of South Asia*, New Delhi, 1995, p.292.

employees for the trekking to Amarnath, a place for annual Hindu pilgrimage²¹.

Table: Population flux among the Bakarwal between 1901-1981

Year	Population	Source
1901	466	Census of India 1901 (XXIII A (II): XXII
1911	583	Census of India 1911 XX (I) Report: 220
1921	-	No Data
1931	5349	Census of India's 1931 Part II: XXIV: 218
1941	15299	Census of India 1941 Part II: XXII (II): 359
1951	-	No Data
1961	5941	Census of India 1961 VI (IIC): 220
1971	8755	Census of India 1971
1981	12000	Census of India (unpublished estimate)

The figures from 1961 to 1981 indicate the number of persons who mentioned Bakarwal as their mother tongue.

Thus Bakkarwals not numerous have made there presence felt in Kashmir with their specific spheres of activities.

Languages

The languages spoken in Kashmir Valley are:

Kashmiri is the mother tongue of the people living in the Valley and the contiguous regions stretching to Poonch, Rajouri, Baderwah and Kishtwar.

According to the 1971 census report of India, 23,71,693 people speak Kashmiri, whereas the following additional languages are also spoken in Kashmir:

21. Ibid., p.295.

Table

Language	Number of People
1. Kishtwari	11,871
2. Siraji	29,188
3. Pouguli	3,621
4. Sarodi	2,045
5. Bhadurwhi	38,877
6. Whari	7,760
7. Kusalee	Data not available

Source: Census Report of India, 1971

Kashmiri language has withstood on slaughts of foreign languages, initially of Sanskrit and Hebrew and later of Persian and Urdu. Thus it retained its originality throughout the ages. It has absorbed and naturalized more than 33 per cent of its vocabulary from the foreign sources.

Urdu language is becoming popular these days. It was when Maharaja Gulab Singh annexed Kashmir to his territory in 1847 and formed the multiracial and multilingual state of J&K, Urdu as in other parts of the country, acquired the rank of a linking language. There was little literary activity during the reign of Gulab Singh. But we have evidence that official correspondence was carried on in Urdu. With the influence of Mughals and subsequent establishment of British Raj in the northern India, Urdu got importance as a language of work in the Valley and the entire state as well. The uptrend continued and the pattern of education started changing. The British influence was seen everywhere even in education. Western technical education and books on various subjects, were translated into Urdu. Now Urdu was adopted as a medium of instruction.

With this we come to the end of the Valleys introduction. The physiology, religions, castes and communities, languages and various other aspects noted above, tell us how multifarious the Vale of Kashmir is. Most importantly these geographical and linguistic regions of the state provide the geo-political background of the Kashmir problem.

Muslim Minority Complex in a Muslim Majority Area

Political organization in multi ethnic and multi religious societies is often contested between the majority and minority communities. A majority in one place is often a minority in another place and so the contest between these two ultimately leads to ethnic and religious forms of grouping which is oppressive to local minorities.

After independence the various South Asian states embarked upon ambitious plans of development and reconstruction. The economic and political modernisation processes that were set in motion, however, created a rather intricate clash of interest and identity. India took upon itself two very important tasks. One to develop the economic resources, and two, to unite the dissimilar ethnic entities which were the major constituents of a consolidated political state. "Giving direction to modernization and development has meant", said Gull Mohd. Wani, "an increasing intervention of the state in the life styles and established means of earning livelihood of the people. Politically this has meant that the state has been gradually pre-empting the autonomy of cultural and regional entities. Such a process has led inevitably to greater

concentration of power at the centre. In multi-ethnic societies this has often resulted in ethnic tension and conflict²².

In regions ethnically distinct from the central ruling elite class, tension has often taken the shape of a minority complex and subsequently a separatist nationalism.

The present ethno - religious forces in the Indian sub continent define themselves in terms of homogeneity in historical, lingua - religious and cultural + matters. These are further justified on the basis of political economic alienation. All this often results in majority-minority conflict or exploitation.

The distribution of such ethnic communities across the international borders, or their claims for separation as in the case of Kashmir, have created serious political and diasporic questions both in terms of their own ethnic identity or by causing international conflicts, questioning the validity of post-colonial international boundaries. Hence both state and nation as two concepts and over-arching super-structures are confronted with assertive ethnic - led defiance²³.

As discussed earlier, Kashmir is a land of contrasts and by virtue of its strategic location, it balances the geo-political issues of the region. The line

22. Gul Mohd. Wani, 'Kashmir: Need for Sub-continental Political Initiative, New Delhi 1995, pp.1-2.

23. Debate on a search for a synthesis between nationalism, ethno-nationalism and the state is going on in many countries. Picrre Trudeau mentioned it in his article in a British News Paper (Times, London, 23 June, 1990).

of actual control or the cease-fire line divides Kashmir into two parts. One, the one called Azad Kashmir, which consists of four districts and 2-5 million people, all predominantly Muslims. The other is Kashmir (Jammu & Kashmir), consists of the 2/3 of the land with population well over 6.5 million.

Lets have a look at the following table:

Region	Population	Total	Muslims	Hindus	Others
Valley	3,134,904	52.35	94.96	4.39	0.05
Jammu	2,718,113	45.39	29.60	66.25	4.15
Ladakh	134,372	2.24	46.04	2.66	51.30
Total	5,987,389	100	64.19	32.24	3.57

Source: Govt. Of India, Census of 1981.

From these figures it is clear that Muslims form almost 65 per cent of the total population; in the Kashmir region they form an overwhelming majority as much as 95 per cent of total.

The question uppermost in everyone's mind is, when the Muslims are in a majority in Kashmir, why do they suffer from a minority complex. Before acknowledging any good judgement, we must have an awareness about the concept of 'Muslim Minority'. What is a 'Muslim Minority'?

In order to ensure conceptual clarity from the beginning it is advisable to define the terms separately, and then the appellation 'Muslim Minority'.

"A group on some basis or other, has a sense of akinness, a sense of community or unity, said Humayun Kabir, "and further that this sense of community or unity distinguishes it from the majority of the inhabitants of the

area where this minority functions"²⁴. Apart from the above individual notion, the Webster's seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines a 'minority' as 'a part of a population differing in some characteristics and often subjected to differential treatment'²⁵.

The demand for an independent Muslim state resulted in the creation of Pakistan (separate homeland for Muslims) in the subcontinent.

Kashmir is a state of the Indian Federal Union in which Muslims had an overwhelming majority. And Kashmir has a common border with Pakistan.

The most important object to be taken into account is the affiliation of Kasmiri Muslim population with the rest of Indian Muslims as far as minority feelings is concerned. The Kasmiri Muslims think that they are defacto under non-Muslims rule and thus suffer from the same hardships and complexess as the Muslims of rest of the India suffer. This is one of the basic causes of frustration and minority complex among the Muslims of Kashmir who otherwise enjoy a numerical majority in the state. The problem of Muslim minority in Jammu and Kashmir is a problem not exclusively confined to it. Such a minority complex is present in other Muslim-majority areas of India as well.

Muslims in India, are simultaneously fighting with two fronts. One that Muslims in India, are not a part of the theocratic state but a secular one, of

24. Humayun Kabir, 'Minorities in a Democracy', New Delhi, 1968, p.2.

25. M. Ali Kettani, **Minorities in World Today**, London, 1986, p.2.

which the Islamic political thought gives no mention. At the same time Muslims face a powerful feeling of Hindu nationalism. But this is not the real problem. Humayun Kabir describes it in very absolute words:

"Proselytization on a large scale is almost impossible in the modern world and therefore for any religious group to think that it will convert all the members of some other religious group to its own religion is not practical politics today....."

In the modern world where politics is expanding its scope and where political power is impinging on almost every sphere of life, we have to be specially careful of the way in which interests are organized into groups. If a minority group is based on considerations which cannot be easily changed, it will ultimately be the minority itself which will suffer.

The Muslims of India, though substantial in number, feel discriminated against in many ways. They do not have a proper stake in government jobs in proportion to their population. They are more or less non-existent in the private sector.

Jammu and Kashmir (more specifically Kashmir Valley) is a Muslim - majority state in the Indian Union. Through Islam and Urdu, the common religion and language, their bond could have been strengthened and the others barriers which existed due to the geographical differences and social

alienation could have been overcome²⁶. "It has therefore, become the touchstone of Indian Muslim's loyalty to their motherland.

The real causes of minority complexes in a Muslim majority area like the valley of Kashmir, lies in the rigidity of their religion itself.

According to a widespread assumption - which seems to be up to date - that Indian Muslims, (including the Kashmiri Muslims) since independence, have shown relatively slow and gloomy interest in the process of modernisation, which has stormed the entire nation.

There is a view point that the anti modernistic orientation of Indian Muslims is due to the conservative nature of Islam.

Rational - critical and secularistic orientations are the two important notions of modernisation and both have been arguably precluded by certain fundamental characteristics of Islam. A rational approach to life is ruled out by the Islamic conservativeness. Islam has processed a fusion of all walks of life with religion, so that in the Islamic schema of life there appears to be nothing exclusively secular. Individual liberty and singularity are also victims of Islamic rigidity.

Islam precisely defines the role of every individual, his duties, privileges and obligations. The individual is completely subordinated to the dictates of

26. Rafiq Zakaria, *The Widening Divide*, New Delhi, 1995, p.261.

the religious leaders. In such circumstances when he compares himself with persons of society who have adhered to the modernisation he feels complexed and this complex rises to a level that the whole community feel aggrieved. Thus arises a minority complex.

If we look at the structural aspects of Islam, we come to know that the holy text of Quran, has enunciated a prescriptive society with all sorts of rigid social structures in which each element is interwoven with the others in a mutually interdependent system. For them, their religion has revealed a guideline not-only for theological and religious matters but for social, economic and political affairs too. However the above explanation could be challenged on the grounds that Muslim of India and the Valley as well deviate in significant ways from the prescriptions of the Islamic Laws. Indeed it may even be pointed out that religious dogma and prescriptions ,may be an instrument not only of the stagnation of a society but of its transformation²⁷. Still then the progress made by Muslim in India and elsewhere is not significant enough to eliminate their complexes.

Concerning the minority status, it may first be clarified that a minority in a sociological sense has to be distinguished from a numerical minority; indeed a sociological minority can even be a numerical majority. Sociologically, a minority group is one which is subjected to overt or covert

27. Hasan, Askari, **Technological Revolution and Indian Muslims**, in S.T. Lakhndwala (ed.), *India and contemporary Islam*, Shimla, pp.320-321.

segregation, exclusion, and discrimination by a dominant group because of its religious, racial or some other distinctiveness. In extreme cases, minority groups are subjected to hostility and violence. As a consequence, minority group members suffer economic, political and social disabilities, and as may well be imagined, discriminatory treatment makes the minorities inferior to the dominant-group in many ways leaving them in a aghast despair²⁸. But in the case of Kashmir Valley the Muslims, who ofcourse constitute numerical majority do not suffer from such distinctive behaviour which could leave them in flagrancy or savagery. Protected by a special article of the Constitution the population of Kashmir has been given concessions as well as privileges over their Indian counterparts.

To begin with the crucial aspect of minority complex let us take the problem of insecurity first. There appears to be something inherent in the majority-minority relation which creates a feeling of insecurity in the minds of minority group members. Similarly Kashmiri muslims too have anxiety concerning their identity. Vera M. Dean (1969) writes: "The dilemma for the Muslims is that if they go too far in co-operating with Hindus, their distinctive way of life may be undermined." In such a situation, it is no wonder that when minorities run into distress, real or imaginary, they are infuriated to identify themselves more and more with their ethnic group. Since the Muslims of Kashmir did not acknowledge the Indian Muslims as their co-partners they feel

28. H.M. Johnson, *Systematic Sociology*, New York, 1960, p.496.

a sense of insecurity and non-identification despite being the inhabitants of a Muslim majority area.

The Kashmiri Muslim, as I repeatedly say, have developed, a set of attitudes and values based on certain imaginary prejudices, which set them apart from the majority and it therefore has become the major cause of discontentment.

Insofar as discrimination in employment is concerned Kashmir Muslims are convinced that equality of opportunity does not exist, **Pandits** are treated with positive attitude, though there is no real policy of discrimination. Discrimination on the basis of caste, creed and religion is declared a legal crime. "To be sure the extensive unemployment in India, even of educated, affects each and every group, but among all these groups the Muslim are perhaps the worst hit. Sociologically, However, the discrimination that is felt to exist may not-necessarily due to the communal reasons²⁹. It is hard to evaluate that how much of it is due to the religious backwardness and educational rigidity and how much is based on the discriminatory tendencies.

Unfortunately, the minority's own oppression psychosis prevent it from looking at a situation dispassionately and realizing that there is a correlation between poor educational background and low competitive ability. An essentially socio- economic and educational dilemma has turned into a political and religious bigotry.

29. Percival Spear, **The Position of Muslims before and after Partition**, in Philip Mason (ed.), **India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity**, London, 1967, p.48.

One last consideration remains, namely, the condition of Muslims minority in commerce and industry, which is one of the most immediate causes of complexity beneath the surface we look at. One basic reason which also keeps Muslims away from prosperity and economic upliftment, is their rigidity towards entrepreneurship. Generally Muslims are found engaged in traditional works. A few of them are interested to invest capital in developing and modern industries. This, of course, is largely due to the inherent economic weaknesses of the community whose history is rooted in the feudal traditions of Muslim elites. Obviously, the lack of development of a prosperous industrial Muslim elite has further worsened the situation of this minority community.

M.R.A. Baig in his book **The Muslim Dilemma in India** traces the roots of their stagnation to general orthodoxy which is perpetuated upon the Muslims because of the hold of Islam over them. According to Baig, "the traditional orthodox, super-naturalism of Islam is totally opposed to scientific outlook".

Maxime Rodison in his book **Islam and Capitalism** argues that as an ideology for socio-economic upliftment Islam is impracticable. Large-scale migration of educated middle class Muslims to Pakistan in 1947 has further aggravated the situation³⁰.

30. A.H. Halsey, **The Sociology of Education**, in N.J. Smelser (ed.), New York, 1967, p.422.

The stereotype that religion is responsible for lack of education among Muslims of Valley and in the Indian context as well, is a fallacy. Indeed, the reality is just the other way round. Educational backwardness prevents an understanding of the process of modernization as well as its eventual acceptance, and this inability to appreciate and adjust to the process of modernization compels the educationally backward to seek security in religion.

Chapter - II

Islamic Transnationalism and Non Muslim Minorities in Kashmir Valley: Plight of Kashmiri Pandits and Gujjars

Islamic Transnationalism

Both in the past and present day, fear psychosis of a monolithic Islamic threat has been expressed in the conspicuous, Pan-Islamic terminology. Triumphant colonial Europe "saw all resistance to its domination as a sinister conspiracy. Such a plot could only be inspired by a cruel, Machiavellian spirit... whenever there was any show of anti-imperialism, even if it was purely local reaction, pan-Islam was blamed"¹. Despite the fractured nature and fragmented society of the entire Muslim world, in the early years of 20th century, during the mandate period and its continued European dominance, the tendency to generalize about a monolithic Pan-Islamic world, a "seething" Islamic ferment - remained firmly embedded in the West.

In its very hour of apparent triumph, Western domination was challenged as never before. During those hundred years of Western conquest a mighty internal change had been coming over the moslem world. The swelling tide of Western aggression had at least moved the "immovable" East. At last Islam became conscious of its decrepitude and with that consciousness a vast ferment, obscure yet profound, began to leaven the 250,000,000

1. See Maxine Rodinson, **Europe and the Mystique of Islam**, Washington, 1987, p.67.

followers of the Prophet from Morocco to China and from Turkestan to the Congo .. Today Islam is seething with mighty forces fashioning a new Muslim world².

The serious warnings of the noted orientalist Leone Caetani, speaking of the effect of World War I, commented:

The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental civilization to its foundations. The entire oriental world, from China to the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hidden fire of anti-European, hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, rising in Algiers, discontent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia, and Libya are different manifestations of the same deep sentiment and have as their objective the rebellion of the oriental world against European civilization³.

The fear of a Pan-Islamic, global-uprising still persists today. In the wake of the Iranian Revolution, the Khomeini's call for other Islamic revolutions found ready believers not only in the Muslim world but also in the West. In fact in 1980 the US secretary of State Cyrus Vance was compelled to say that a major reason for his objection to a military mission to rescue American hostages in Iran was fear of an "Islamic-Western War... Khomeini

2. Lothrop Stoddard, *The New World of Islam*, New York, 1921, pp.23-24.

3. As quoted in *New York Times*, June 1, 1919, p.9.

and his followers, with a Shiite affinity for martyrdom, actually might welcome American military action as a way of uniting the Moslem world against the West"⁴.

After almost a decade, when the communism collapsed everywhere, Charles Krauthammer wrote: "History is being driven by another force as well: the political reawakening of Islamic world"⁵.

It really is a global revolt, embracing not only Islamic core land but also the peripheries of the Muslim world where Islam confronts the Non-Muslim communities - in Azerbaijan, Kosovo in Yugoslavia, Lebanon, the West Bank and last but the most importantly in the Kashmir Valley.

Krauthammer's work reflects the threat approach to the Islamic world. Fundamentalism is equated with "fundamentalist Koran - waving Khomenism"⁶. The terms such as, "Pan, - Islamism" and "global intifada" are used to yield on imaginative rather than an empirical transnational Islamic unity and reality.

In context of Kashmir problem, the talk of a 'global' intifada also distracts and detracts from the real nature of discontent. The intifada is first

4. Cyrus Vance, **Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy**, New York, 1983, pp.408-410.

5. Krauthammer, **The New Crescent of Crisis: Global Intifada**, Washington Post, Feb.16, 1990.

6. Ibid.

and foremost an uprising of Arab Muslims and Christians. Moreover this phrase impose a superficial unity on events that occur in quite diverse contexts and obscures the profound differences between the Kashmir and Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Lebanon. To unfurl the real contention of pan-Islamism and its relation or proximity with the fundamentalism, I quote here Dr. Fazlur Rahman who says:

"It is, a curious and striking fact about the religious history of Islam that at each critical point of its career the force that comes to the forefront and takes over the situation is not the then formalized established 'orthodoxy' but rather something that presents itself at every juncture as the 'raw material' of the orthodoxy subsequently to be formed... To some extent, of course, this happens with all developing religions. But whereas in Christianity or even in as little 'reified' a religion as Hinduism, there is something that runs through it like a wave with new elements riding on its crest, Islamic orthodoxy seems to develop in recreated formations of quanta that issue from time to time the very heart of Islam. It is characterized by an indistinguishable blend of reinvigorated fundamentalism and progressivism; it develops not by self-propulsion, so to say, but by watching, adjusting, and absorbing within itself that which moves within it"⁷.

This is the feeling that reigns the entire non-progressive and ardent Muslims nationalities the world. Though Kashmir valley is not a proper part of

7. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, Islamic Research Institute, Karachi, p.111 (n.d.).

this unit yet we say that pan-Islamic culture, through various means, has infiltrated into it.

This external structure of transnational Islam which outrageously affected the minds of Muslims, reflects a strong unity but internally it is diversity rather than Pan-Islamic unity that is observed even in the foreign policy of various states. The common "Islamic" orientation or claim of some states reveals little unity of purpose in interstate and global relations because of conflicting national interests or priorities. Qaddafi was a bitter enemy of Sadat and Nimeiri at the very time when all three were projecting an "Islamic" image. Islamically identified governments also reflect differing relationships with the West. While Libya and Iran's relationship with the West and USA in particular, has mostly been confrontational at the same time, the USA has had strong to very strong ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan and Bahrain. National interest and regional politics rather than ideology or Islam remains the pivot in formation of foreign policy and diplomatic deliberations.

But contrary to the above said notion it is also equally true in the case of Kashmir Valley that many Islamic countries have helped Pakistan directly or indirectly to spread and preach, Islamic transnationalistic views, despite knowing the fact that Kashmir Valley is an integral part of a country which is by all means, secular. Integral to our view of the Islamic threat is the belief that Islam is inherently antidemocratic and intolerant. In the wake of the Gulf War of 1991, the issue of political liberalization and democracy reemerged in

the Middle East and in Western diplomacy⁸. Democratic movements and pressure upon Islamic countries for greater liberalization predated the unprecedented Gulf War. As the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were swept along by the wave of globalization in 1989-90, the demands of Muslims nationalities in the Soviet Union for greater autonomy, the Palestinian intifada, and Kashmiri Muslim's demand for independence from India and its demand for self determination captured the attention of many in the Muslim world. As a result of this upsurge, many Islamic countries who hold the dogma of Islamic transnational culture came forward to help the militants of the Kashmir Valley. National unity as well as political legitimacy have been undermined by the artificial nature of modern states whose national boundaries were often determined by colonial powers and whose rulers were either placed on their thrones by Europe or seized power for themselves. Weak economies, illiteracy, and high unemployment, especially among the younger generation, exacerbate the situation undermining confidence in governments and increasing the appeal of "Islamic Transnationalism".

Pan-Islamism, Islamic Fundamentalism, OIC* and Kashmir Valley

Even in those Muslim lands where European powers made no presence of ruling, European merchants enjoyed special privileges. This happened mainly

8. "Democratization in the Middle East", American - Arab Affairs 36 (Spring 1991) pp.1-47.

* Organisation of Islamic Conference (henceforth OIC).

in Ottoman empire and Iran. Through these the European powers exacted many unprecedented concessions and trade liberties. This virtually destroyed the native industry of the Muslim lands. It also feared the socio-cultural fabric of the Muslim people. It was this kind of ground that provoked the minds of Muslims and instigated them to revolt and helped them to grow an urge for unity to resist the Western penetration. This urge is commonly known as Pan-Islamism that found expression in the closing decades of the 19th century.

The term "Pan-Islamism" simply refers - that too in a general sense - to a common longing (even though it may not be always manifestly strong) of all Muslims of all places (of course, including Kashmir Valley where Muslims are dominant, numerically) for the regeneration and resurgence of the Muslim community both in the secular and in the religious sense, or in either of the two. It does not denote only stereo/ideal type and practical expression of this urge has not been a rigid and static. The Pan-Islamic Vision today is essentially the envisaging of each of the Muslim nations or communities - the Arab world, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia, Indonesia, and Kashmir Valley, individually regenerated, revitalized prosperous and strong.

This vision adds to the particular nationalism of each region. The Muslims of Kashmir Valley, though followers of Kashmiriyat, have drawn inspiration from the above said Pan-Islamic ideas. Organization of Islamic Conferences is basically an outcome of this kind of Pan-Islamic sight.

OIC, which is the brain child of Pan-Islamism, have its enormous impact on the people, socio-religious activities, geo-political setting and geo-strategic implications of Jammu and Kashmir and especially in Kashmir Valley. After Afghanistan issue, Kashmir issue remains the main cause of concern for the member states, whenever and wherever they meet. Most strikingly, with the rise of militancy and pro-independence uprising in Kashmir the conference for the first time in its history witness a thorough debate on the issue and for the first time a resolution on the subject was passed. Significantly Pakistan, in conformity with its commitment to Shimla Agreement, had never before raised the Kashmir issue for discussion in the conference. In fact Pakistan had been successful to get a statement released on Kashmir Valley by the OIC Secretariat as early as, 22 May 1990. This had information drawn from various sources, including well known Indian journalists and political analysts, on what it described as the reign of terror let loose on the Muslims of Kashmir⁹. The statement was issued at a time when Pakistani Premier, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto was touring eight Islamic states aimed at mobilizing the OIC members collective support for its position on Kashmir vis-a-vis India.

This was a clear example of touting an upper hand in Kashmir Valley by Pakistan with the help of Pan-Islamic fraternity. Pakistan's efforts did not remain fruitless. The Pakistan foreign secretary, Tanvir Ahmad Khan, said the resolution contained the reference to the UN resolution, showed that the

9. **OIC Secretariat on Kashmir**, Asian Recorder, 13-19 August, 1990, p.21296.

Islamic nations upheld the Pakistani view point¹⁰. In particular he expressed his gratitudes for inclusion in the resolution reference to the deep concern of the OIC at "the violation of human rights and violence against the people of Jammu and Kashmir". He even said that the only country (possibly Iraq) that had questioned the inclusion of Kashmir in the agenda was overruled at the end¹¹.

The conference in its meetings also repeatedly stated that Kashmir problem was a primary concern of the Muslims¹². In the Sixth Islamic Summit conference at Dakar (capital of Senegal), the issue was again raised. In one of the initial speeches, the Amir of Kuwait, as the outgoing chairman, referred to what he called the "state sponsored repression" in Kashmir of "the predominantly Muslim population of the state struggling for self-determination"¹³.

Subsequently in the twenty-first-conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers (Karachi 1993), the Kashmir issue was once again raised with fullest of its vigour. The tone of the Conference was set by the speech of the then interim Prime Minister of Pakistan, Balkh Sher Mazari. He used this opportunity for anti-India bashing. The fact finding mission which had been appointed by the

10. **OIC stand on Kashmir**, Asian Recorder, 0-14 Oct, 1990. p.21383.

11. *Ibid.*

12. **Keesings Record of World Events**, August 1990, p.37668.

13. **Pakistan's OIC Tool**, Patriot, New Delhi, 13 Dec. 1991.

20th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers and was charged with the task of visiting Jammu and Kashmir for an on-the-spot assessment of the situation there. Though the mission was not allowed to visit Indian occupied Kashmir yet it submitted a 13-page report based on the findings in POK*. This report suggested that what ever was happening in Kashmir was a legitimate struggle for self-determination¹⁴. It further accused the indian forces of deliberately attacking Kashmiri youth in "catch and kill" operations. It recommended extension of full political, diplomatic, moral and material support to the Muslims of Kashmir for the realization of their right to self determination¹⁵. Accordingly, the foreign ministers for the first time equated the atrocities and human rights violations in Kashmir by the Indian troops with similar acts in Palestine, South Africa and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This single mindedness of the entire Muslim population of the world gives us a picture of Pan-Islamic tantrum.

We can draw some generalizations from the previous discussions that the Muslim world of late, has been witnessing and protecting as well, what at first sight appears as the 'revival of militant Islam' and the assertion of "Islamic Fundamentalism". This Islamic-Fundamentalism has been in wholesale adopted by the Muslims of Kashmir Valley through various

* Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

14. Times of India, New Delhi, 27 April, 1993.

15. Ibid.

promoters such as APHC* and Jamat-e-Islami. This return of Islam and the so called 'Islamic self-assertion' has tried to assert the Islamic solidarity and spiritual unity by breaking the barriers of state boundaries and moving transnational. What the West and non-Islamic countries do not recognize, runs the argument, is that for the Muslim, Islam is not only universal but also central in the sense that it constitutes the essential basis and forces of identity and loyalty¹⁶.

In the context of Kashmir Valley, the Muslims who are the predominant occupant of that area, have come to realize that they are being treated as a second grade minority in their homeland. They also think that they are dominated by another religion that is Hinduism. They do not feel at ease with the lack of religious contiguity and naiveness. The loyalty of Kashmiri Muslims has been vigorously divided between the two nations that is India and Pakistan.

Fudamentalism if dealt with all its depredate identifications, has different meanings in different nationalities. In fact the national/ regional dimension of this phenomenon is too obvious to be missed. In Iran, it is the basis of the struggle of the people against a barbarous monarch. In Pakistan, it is a tool for legitimizing the rule of the army Junta which is backed by the

* All Party Hurriyat Conference.

16. Bernard Lews, **The Return of Islam**, Middle East Review, Fall 1979, p.17.

rightest Jamat-e-Islami. In Saudi Arabia, it is a plea for maintaining the status quo and for perpetuating the assertion of kingship. In India, it is the assertion of the rightest polities of the 'Ulama'. In fact to count on authentic sources, the Muslims all over the world constitute the second largest religious community, i.e., 750 million, while the Christians are 925 millions¹⁷. The Muslims do not form a single homogenous and well knit group in any country. In India they form twelve per cent of the total population and they are in majority (almost 95%) in Kashmir Valley, yet they are not homogenous. Important to be noted is that despite their adherence to Islam they are divided into ethnic groups. Social survitauade is also a fact of Muslim life.

As in most of the Islamic countries. Islamic fundamentalism has been used by non-democratic rulers for the legitimation of their authority. So is in Kashmir Valley.

The dogmatic and ardent Muslims in Kashmir Valley who preferred military to civil life, used the Islamic fundamentalism to impose their will upon the general public. It thus worked as a propaganda technique which in turn influenced the minds of general public.

Prakash Singh, a former D.G. of Border Security Force has said that the Jamaat-e-Islami is the soul of militancy in the Valley. We allowed this organisation to proliferate during the last several decades. 'Madarasas' were

17. This figure is recorded in 1979 in 'Time' April 16, p.24. For the latest see other sources.

opened by the Jamaat in every nook and corner of the state.... It provides the ideological motivation, sustains and supports the separatists and enhance the fundamentalist feelings in the Kashmir Valley¹⁸. Jammat is a banned organisation and yet no action has been taken against its members in the Kashmir Valley. The APHC claims to represent the people of Kashmir in reality but its claim remains baseless. It provides an illusion based on fundamentalist values which has no relevance to the realities of the existing situation.

As repeatedly said, Islamic fundamentalism is not voluntarily adopted by Kashmiri Muslims but it has been imposed by some of the fundamentalist Muslims who want to propagate Islam transnationally.

The Jamaat-e-Islami of India, in contrast to its Pakistani counterpart, had no choice but to abandon the idea of an Islamic state. It was however, able to find a convenient justification for its revisionist ideology in the original critique of its founder, Sayyid Maududi, against the creation of Pakistan, i.e., the geographic delimitation of Islamic **Umma** in the territorial confines of Pakistan would delay the growth and spread of Islam as a universal message. Indian Jammat has thus successfully avoided the question of establishing an Islamic state as it was articulated in its original constitution of 1941 by emphasizing the concept of the world wide Islamic **Umma** and the Indian Muslims being an integral part of it.

18. Prakash Singh, Indian Express, 17 Feb. 95.

The only place where the Islamic revival in India has taken a radical political stance and where the slogans of the Islamic state have been publicly raised in Kashmir (Khayal 1985). This Muslim majority state exhibits an increasing convergence of political forces representing the old style Islamic fundamentalist of the Jammat-e-Islami, Islamic radicalists "following the line of Imam Khomani and secessionists of the People's league, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Mahaz-i-Azadi and Liberation League¹⁹.

Both Jamaat and Al-Zihad movement, a clandestine organisation influenced by the ideology of the Iranian revolution, have used Islamic revivalist idioms to proclaim their rejections of the political status quo in Kashmir and to demand the right of self-determination for the Kashmiri Muslims²⁰. While Al-Zihad movement talks about "Islamic revolution" in Kashmir as the "primary objective" of the organisation and "the only way to liberate". Kashmir²¹. The Jamaat and its student wing believe that Islamically inspired political mobilization of Kashmiri Muslims would culminate in the establishment of an Islamic state in Kashmir²². The March 1987 election alliance between the National conference of Farooq Abdullah and the Congress (I) in Kashmir was prompted in part by what PM Rajiv Gandhi

19. Srinagar Times, 5 May 1995.

20. 'Kasheer', 26 Nov - 2 Dec. 1985, p.5.

21. 'Al-Zihad', No.34, 1985, p.1.

22. 'Aaeena', Srinagar, 15 August, 1984, p.6.

described as "the dangers posed by the dark forces of religious fundamentalism", in the state²³.

Thus, it is almost clear that Islamic fundamentalism has played a major role in ruining the already worse conditions of Kashmir with influential militancy, wings and ideological trucks with the fundamentalist countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Libya the Jammāt and many other like minded organisations have grilled the entire Valley vigorously.

The militancy of some of the Islamic regimes especially Pakistan, in context of Kashmir, has raised many questions which need to be answered. The liberals - both Muslims as well as non Muslims, the world over, are deeply concerned about the negative developments of the transnational spread of Pan-Islamic ideas. In short the people of the world are concerned in one way or the other about the future of the people of Muslims regimes and Muslims living in non-Muslim states such as India and especially in Kashmir Valley, as they are as much an integral part of the world political community as any other people.

In a backward society like Kashmir it is not very difficult to convince at least a section of people especially the petit bourgeois which suffer the most in a backward economy, that all their ills are due to dominating role of another religion, i.e., Hinduism. The only solution they suggest is Islamic resurgence and adaptation of fundamentalism²⁴.

23. 'Kasheer', 2 March 1987, p.6.

24. Maududi '**Islami Riyasat**', Islamic Pub. Lahore, 1974, pp. 132-33.

Non Muslims Minorities in Kashmir Valley

Social Basis of Ethnicity in Kashmir

Any analytical and empirical study on ethnicisation of Kashmiris is to be anteceded by an early preview of the social structure of the Valley in general. Shias, Gujjars, Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, Baltis, non-ethnic Sunnis (Tibetans, Darads, Pathans, Baltis etc.) put together, constitute more than half of the population of Kashmir Valley. The rest of the population e.g. ethnic Sunni Muslims of the Valley comprise just 22 per cent of the total population of J&K state.

This comparatively small ethno - religious group emerged as the new ruling class in 1947, and ever since has been at the centripetal stage of state politics. This ruling group is a queer mixture of communalist, sub-nationalists and secessionists. Since 1947, it has been the Kashmiri Sunni Muslim group only which has been consistently pressuring the state machinery with separatist posture. So other Muslims, though part of the grand Muslim population are counted as minorities of the state.

Ethnic politics manipulated to project the Sunni Muslims of the Valley as the sole spokesmen of the Kashmiris and of Jammu and Kashmir state as such, helps deflect the opposition of such significant but disadvantaged groups as the Shias, Gujjars and non-ethnic Sunnis. Sheikh Abdullah's onetime close associate and a very prominent Kashmiri Shia leader, Mr. Sadiq Ali told the Sunday Mail as this:

"The one million Shias in J&K are in danger as they face discrimination from the Pakistan supported militants, and the 1.8 million Sunnis....Now they will book no further exploitation. I know the crimes being committed under the grab of secularism. Secularism never means selectism. If we are 20 per cent of the population, why should not we get 20 per cent of what the state offers? Give each sectionize due and there will be secularism²⁵".

Similarly, the elderly patron-leader of two million strong Gujjar force, namely Main Bashir continued to berate the Central leadership by extending support to Congress leader, Mr. Ghulam Rasool Kar, again a Sunni Muslim. This explains the specificity of ethnicised Kashmir politics manifesting as separatist or secessionist postures of Jammāt-e-Islami, JKLF and other pro Pakistan groups. For building the emotive pitch for this Kashmiri Sunni Muslim Sub-nationalism, the strongly national group of Kashmiri Pandits began to be construed by them as the 'imagined adversary', the other. Therefore the others are charged with serious abgations and are termed as 'fifth columnist', 'Jan Sanghi', 'Shiv-Sainik', 'IB Agent' 'Mukhbir', 'Mafroor' (absconding) etc. only to rationalize the constructed identity e.g. Kashmiriyat.

25. Quote from Sunday Mail (n.d.) requested in 'Kashmir Sentinel' 16-31 March, 96.

The Sunni Muslims of the Valley, as compared to any other region in the entire country, form the most homogenous group. Ever since the accession, the purport of this ethnic politics has been reinforcing the political status of Kashmiri Sunnis, hostile attitude to religious and regional minorities, constitutional secessionist, changing the demographic pattern in J&K and refusing secularization of Kashmiri Muslim society and its emotional integration with the Indian nation as cornerstone of accession²⁶.

As compared to Shias of the Valley, Gujjars have been able to develop better politically articulate leadership, though economically they are far behind. Their political articulation is facilitated by their trans-religious and trans-regional movement and perceptions. These Gujjars have been very critical of Kashmiri militancy. They have kept it in check in Rajouri and Poonch sectors. I shall discuss their status in the following pages.

In a state like Jammu and Kashmir, which is a mosaic of ethnic groups, linguistics segments and religious dominations, active pursuit, of sub-nationalism has given rise to territory fragmentation and groups which creates much more serious problems for the state and the people. the most suffering victims of this situation are Kashmiri Pandits, who have been thrown out of their home land and are living an exiled life.

22. K.N. Pandita, '**Kashmir Sentinel**', 16-31 March 96.

Beleaguered Kashmiri Pandits- At the Cross roads

It was five years back, when the Kashmiri Pandits (KP) had to abandon their home and hearth, little did they realize that their stay outside would be so prolonged. They left the Valley in panic and confusion hoping that the conditions would improve, enabling them to return to their homes very soon. but all in vain. During these five years, the whole community passed through a night mare, facing unrepresented hardships and misery. Members of a group/community are guilty of being what they are and not what they do. In literal terms millions of people belonging to a certain minority class in Kashmir, i.e., KP's have been subjected to genocide physical or cultural because of the way majority construed them in ethnic or religious terms.

Forced extirpation of the Kashmiri Hindu minority in the wake of Islamic insurgency is in many ways a unique phenomenon. It constitutes the darkest chapter in the history of Secularism in post-1947 India. This act of ethnic-cleansing should have in itself sensitized Indian civil society to the grave consequences of the total secular breakdown in the only predominantly Muslim province of India²⁷.

Why did it all happen? who is responsible for such a mass displacement of this community? It is very difficult to ensure these equally difficult questions. For centuries Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims have lived in peace and harmony in the Valley. The members of both communities

27. Khemendra Kaul, 'Kashmir Sentinel', 1-15 Jan. 1996, p.7.

contributed equally for the causes of both communal harmony, they fought as one, in the freedom struggle. This oneness prompted Gandhiji to say that Kashmir till provided a ray of hope amidst the encircling gloom, in the sub-continent.

But ethnic-cleansing of religious minorities is integral to the Islamic fundamentalism . With the help of transnational Muslim support the fundamentalists were able to crack the Kashmiri society. Estimates tell that on the eve of exodus of KP's from the Valley their population was 3.5 lakhs. Out of this already small number, only ten to twelve thousand are left in the Kashmir Valley. The experience of religious minorities in **Tajikistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Sudan and Afghanistan** is relevant for ascertaining the forces behind the migration of the Kasmiri Hindu minority as also the broad forces endangering stable pluralist democratic societies. It was infact the success of larger ISI* unfolding since mid-1989.

In ISI perceptions, the expulsion of Pandit minority helped fool proof take over of the entire administration for subversion purposes. The second objective for ISI, in displacing the Pandit community was to forment large scale communal riots in North and Western parts of India, both to destabilise Indian State and to push Indian Muslim minority into total alienation from the national mainstream²⁸.

* Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan).

28. Ibid.

Through this unscrupulous behavior towards the Pandits, ISI and its ideological partners, i.e. muslim fundamentalists wanted to highlight the 'Islamic' character of Kashmiri separatist uprising, in pursuit of its prior plan of projecting Kashmir as a grave problem for the entire Islam across the globe. This plan left KP's with no other choice but to leave their homes and exile the Valley. KP's are, and always have been, the peaceful people of the Valley of Kashmir. The Pandit community has tried to practice the principles of the vedas and live in peace. Now the Pandits form 3.5 Laks displaced population, besides an equal number as early migrants in rest of the country.

The unresisted acquiescence of the ill-starred KP's to the dictate of Pan-Islamic fundamentalism has left them insecure and in an undecided future.

The Kashmiri Pandits are at the crossroads of history today. They have learnt the bitter lessons of life during the last five years. Their co-religionists outside Kashmir cannot be the substitute for their Muslim counterparts in the Valley²⁹.

Dilemma of Gujjars in Kashmir

Gujjars are infact not non-Muslims. They constitute the second largest ethnic group in the Muslim population of the state. They are called Gujjar Muslims. Though I was supposed to discuss only non-muslim minorities but the

29. O.N. Trisal, 'The Stroy of Kashmir: Yesterday and Today-2' 1994, p.739-40.

inclusion of Gujjars in this chapter is inevitable due to certain reasons. Firstly, the Gujjars are in no way 'Kashmiri'. Secondly they are nomadics and due to their frequent movement they face lots of socio-political problems in the Valley. Lastly, in the wake of insurgency movement in Kashmir, they have been politically exploited and it is necessary to deal with them and their relations with the Kashmiri Muslims who are the frontrunners of the separatist movement in Kashmir Valley.

All the Gujjars, as per information available, are nomadic peasantry and breeders of animals. There are three major groups of Gujjars as per their socio-economic strata and according to the animals they rear. One is sedentary group. They are called **Muqami** Gujjars. The **second** is semi-sedentary group. They perform little grain farming and rear a good number of buffaloes. The **third** group is or nomadic pastroalists. These are called **Khana Badosh** Gujjars. Among these, there are two sub-groups. One is of **Backarwals** who rear goats and sheeps. the other is of **Baniharas**; because they live in the forests (bans), that why they are called Banihara, (the residents of bans)³⁰. A Gujjar in Kashmir in appearance is very much different from an average Kashmiri most of them do not adopt - Kashmiri way of life and dress.

The relevance of this particular clause in the chapter suddenly increases when we come to know that despite being Muslims both, Kashmiri

30. R.P. Khatana, 'Dilemma of the Gujjars in Jammu and Kashmir' published in 'Society and Culture in the Himalayas', Ed. K. Warikoo, 1995 p.250-51.

Muslims and Gujjaras dislike each other upto a degree of strong hatred in the state. Kashmiri Muslims feel that Gujjars are outsiders. They treat Gujjars as inferior and invaders of Muslims' divine land. Gujjars, thus, suffer a great degree of economic disparity and discrimination at the hands of Kashmiri Muslims.

Islam is just a formal unifying cord between Kashmiri and Gujjar Muslims. The slogans of Islamic unity and brotherhood inspired by religion are used so often to arouse the feelings of the Gujjars³¹. But this false unity is perishing day-by-day and the slogans are henceforth proving ineffective. The Gujjars, despite being part of a larger Muslim community, are totally against the creation of a separate Kashmir nation and they fully endorse with the Indian view point on this crucial matter of bilateral discord. They in fact helped the Indian Army even in 1970-71 Indo-Pak War. The Gujjars of Kashmir have always been pro-establishment. Recent incidents of terrorism, kidnapping, the organised attacks on Kashmiri Hindus and Hindu shrines, and the plight of the Kashmiri Hindus who have migrated from the valley have been part of the separatist movement of the Muslims of Kashmir Valley. The Islamic fundamentalism and insurgent moves of the fanatic Muslims of the Valley has had its impact on the attitude of the Muslim Gujjars of Jammu and Kashmir also. Gujjars are even ready to keep their Islamic identity off the scene and to preserve their 'Gujjar' identity with a positive national character. As majority

31. Ibid, p.263.

of the Gujjar population lives on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), they do not openly express their sentiments but it seems that they are fed up with the Kashmiri Muslim domination, especially the kind which grew up in the 1990's.

Thus in few of the above discussed pages, the pictures of barbarous activities and terror of the fundamentalist and secessionist Muslims, have become more or less crystal clear. As I have maintained earlier in this work, Muslims of the Valley have tried their level best to clean the valley ethnically. KP's were the first and more unfortunate losers of their homeland. Gujjars, though not ethnically different from Muslims, have to face the crisis just because of there insistence of maintaining their self-identity along with other core groups.

With the help of transnational Muslim support on the basis of Pan-Islamic sentimental slogans and monetary support, Muslims of the Valley the religious minorities from the regional and national mainstream.

Chapter - III

Muslim Elite Dominance: An Ethnic Perspective

A changing society throws up very complex problems, the ethnic problem being one of them. Any analytical study on ethnicisation of Kashmir politics is to be preceded by an overview to the social demography of the Valley in general. However, physical existence precedes political existence. Everything depends on one's physical existence and well being. Minorities, ethnic, racial or religious, do come across many problems in this respect. And much more so if there is a history of conflict between the majority and minority, as in the South Asian countries especially India and Pakistan. Religious and ethnic minorities have suffered whether it is in respect of physical existence or well being.

In the case of Kashmir, Shias, Gujjars, Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, Baltis, non-ethnic Sunnis (Tibetans, Darads, Pathoms, baltis etc.) put together constitute more than half of the population of Kashmir division. the rest of the population e.,g. ethnic Sunni Muslims of the Valley comprise just twenty two per cent of the total population of Jammu and Kashmir. If we see the Muslims in a wider perspective, there are roughly around 120 million or more Muslims, in India. On the contrary there are just 1.3 million Hindus amounting to 1.51 per cent of the total population of Pakistan.

It is interesting to note that the Hindu Muslim conflict was of much greater intensity in the north which came under greater influence of Islam. The reasons were very clear. Muslim invaders came from northern mountain passes and conquered the northern India. Thus from medieval period we had observed a fierce struggle for power between Hindus and Muslims in this part of the Indian sub-continent.

North India happens to be the centre of Hindu fanaticism and Muslim fundamentalism. Even today the intensity is no less than yester years. In this region only the battle for the division of the country in the pre-1947 days was fought for its due share of power. **The Muslim elite** (of which we will discuss in detail) in this region was highly politically conscious and fought for its due share of power. When no understanding for sharing power could be reached, division of the country occurred. The Muslims opted for the north and north-eastern region where they were in majority and rest of the land was called India. Ironically the total Muslim population of India was and still is more than their total population in Pakistan.

The Ruling Elite

As we all very well know that Kashmir is the only Indian region where Muslims are predominant. But the ethnic composition of Muslims in Kashmir is not homogenous.,

The comparatively small ethno-religious group of ethnic Sunni Muslims of the Valley has emerged as the new ruling class¹. It was the class which dominated the rest of the ethnic and non-ethnic minorities in the Valley. Since the day of independence this ruling elite has been holding monopoly over the state's political and administrative power. Even in the areas of trade and commerce, it has emerged as the leading group taking full advantage of the liberal concessions made available by the successive ruling political elites.

The well known Indian sociologists seem to be obsessed with the great tradition of India. It is also to be noted that what is studied in the name of Muslim politics is not politics of the whole community, but only the politics of the communal leaders, having a base in the urban lower middle class. The non-communal politics of the Lower sections like that of the trade unions and the Kisan Sabha goes unnoticed. Mention should be made of the absence of any study of the class character and social composition of the Muslim political and non-political elite. One feels that the class character of the political elite has not changed. The feudal base and intelligent manoeuvring has helped the upper class Muslims to operate effectively in a competitive democracy polity².

To maintain its political ascendancy and to increase its all round clout it has evolved an effective mechanism of ethnic politics. It is a queer mix of

-
1. K.N. Pandita, '**Social Basis of Ethnic Politics in Kashmir**', 'Kashmir Sentinel', March 16-31, 1996.
 2. Moin Shakir, '**Muslim Attitudes**', 1974, p. xi-xii.

communalism sub-nationalism and secesionism. Since 1947, it has been the Kashmiri Sunni Muslim social and political group, the elite minority, which has been constantly dominating the social, political and economic life of the Kashmir Valley.

This elite section forms about 90% of the urban educated middle class of Kashmir whose evolution passed through three phases viz. pre 1947, new (1947-1963) middle class, and the following rural middle class (1968-1977)³.

On the whole, after partition, the Hindu community remained intact, while the Muslim community was splintered into three 'groups' - West Pakistan, East Pakistan and the Indian Muslims. The Muslim community no more remained one large unit. the Kashmiri Sunni elite group found its affinity with the Muslims of West Pakistan. The aspiring middle class of this elite social group, which is now identified with armed insurgency movement, has drawn inference from Pakistan and also sought help from across the borders.

In general the Muslim elites have been indulged in religious politics since independence. Though separatism has lost its validity. Maulane Azad had foreseen this development very early but the Muslim response to the changed reality has not been satisfactory. We have many examples to determine that various Muslim sects are facing an apple of discord.

3. K.N. Pandita, **Kashmir Sentinel**, 16-31 March, 1996.

The Muslim community is not a homogenous, well knit and consolidated community as its leaders want us to believe. The Shia-Sunni riot at Lucknow (1969) can be instanced here⁴.

In Kerala the conflict between the Sunnis and the Wahabis took the form of the separation of the congregational prayers, which is a "symbol of the worst sort of schism and sectarianism"⁵.

Besides there is no "sense of identity between Khojas, Bohras and Memons" in Bombay. Thus the community is "much more divided on questions of ideology, sectarian religious rites, identification as a distinct sub-community and elites and non-elites with in the community and the like..."⁶. Muslim communalism has been the practical ideology of the Muslim elite which has developed a vested interest in it⁷.

The Origins of Muslim Communalism can be traced in:

1. Muslim refusal to merge into the national mainstream⁸.

4. Pandit Nehru: quoted by Dorothy Normans. **The First Sixty Years Vol.II**, pp.504-505.

5. Moin Shakir, **Muslim Attitudes**, 1974, p.2.

6. Arees Chisti: **The Shia-Sunni conflict**, Secular Democracy, July 1970.

7. Moin Shakir **Muslim Attitudes**, 1974 p.5 (The following quotes have been taken from above mentioned book).

8. A.B. Shah: **The Dialectics of Communalism**, The Secularist, Jan-June 1970, p.6.

2. Pluralist character of the Indian society;⁹
3. External territorial loyalty¹⁰;
5. Nature of Islamic religion¹¹;
6. Sense of non involvement¹²;
7. Approach to history¹³.

Bringing our discussion to the mainstream problem, the stratification of the Muslim elite class in Kashmir along with the above mentioned parameters, is relevant to the understanding of the specific political role of different Kashmiri Sunni groups like National Conference, Awami Action Committee (Bakra faction), Jamaat-e-Islami and Peoples' Conference led by Ghani Lone. All these parties or rather elite groups tend to work for the safe future of Kashmiri Sunni population.

In pre 1947 period, ethnic features in Kashmir Muslim politics crystallized through focussing attention on non-Muslim Kashmiri character of Dogra rulers of Kashmir. Ethnic politics manipulated to project the Sunni Muslims of the Valley as the sole spokesmen of Kashmiris and of J&K as such, helps deflect the opposition of such significant but disadvantaged groups

9. K.M. Panikar: **Foundations of New India** p.251.

10. Hamid Dalwai: **Muslim politics in India**.

11. S. Sultan Ahmed: **India since 1947**, ed. A Chakarbarty, p.67.

12. A.B. Shah: **The Secularist**, July - October, 1969 p.6.

13. M.R.A. Baig: **The Secularist**, Dec. 1969, p.16.

as the Shias, Gujjars and non-ethnic sunnis. Actually Kashmir was an example of secular society and humanitarian civilization but the emergence of Afghanistan and Pakistan which were contiguous to Kashmiri religion and society, had a direct-bearing on it. With the insurrection of Pakistan and finally settling with the establishment of a theocratic state, Kashmir, naturally got influenced by the thoughts of communal identities.

From Morocco to Syria, from Iraq to Pakistan and Indonesia, Muslims are ruled by armed minorities. Nearly all Muslim governments are composed of corrupt and callous elites more adept at repressing the populace than protecting natural resources or national sovereignty¹⁴. That is the sole reason of Kashmir being repeatedly prevented from entering into a secular and democratic regime. The privileged class of Kashmir i.e., the **Mullahs** and their game plan to promote and achieve the vested interests is a serious set back for the developing society of Kashmir.

In Kashmir there is an institution of **Mir Waiz**, something very indigenous, it still continues to be very functional through the issuance of **Fatwa** or decree in accordance with Islamic injunctions. In the same manner the emergence of the **Shahi Immam** as a leader and elite pressure group was an unfortunate development for the Indian Muslims. This institution also exercised the discretionary powers to rule the Muslim majority without mass support as was given to leaders like Maulana Azad and Dr. Zakir Hussain.

14. Md. Asqhar Khan (ed), **Islam, Politics and the State**, 1986, p.15.

An important dimension of Muslim politics in India is that it has been controlled either by feudal or by religious elements. There never emerged a strong bourgeoisie among Muslims in India. There was a commercial bourgeoisie along the west coast and to some extent among Tamil Muslims, but it was not only insignificant in number but also unable to decisively influence Muslim politics in India.

In context of Kashmir, a distinction shall have to be made between the indigenous mullaism in Kashmir and the borrowed mullaism which had its roots in fundamentalism and fanaticism¹⁵.

According to Peer Ghiya Sud Din, there are four components of Kashmiri Muslim consciousness. These are **Mulla, Salariat, Kulak Elite and Lunpen**¹⁶. The term **Salariat** has been introduced for the first time by Prof. Hanza Alvi in his brilliant work 'Pakistan and Islam - Its Ethnicity and Ideology'¹⁷.

The **Salariat** being an auxiliary class, its class role determines its alliances particularly with landlords, weak capitalist class. Now in the context of Kashmir, the Muslim, bureaucracy not only serves economically dominant

15. K.N. Pandit, **Society and Culture in the Himalayas**, K. Warikoo (Ed.), 1995. p.22.

16. Peer Ghiyas Sud Din, **Understanding the Kashmiri Insurgency**, 1992, p.62.

17. **Mainstream**, Feb.21, 1987, p.15.

classes like Khwajas (big businessmen), landlords, orchardists, Muslim fundamentalist outfits, drugtraffickers and tax evaders, but also has its specific interest by virtue of its particularly local structure and its powers, privileges and opportunities for corruption as the 'governing class' in the post-colonial state due to their grip over the state apparatus¹⁸.

Muslim predominance in Kashmir has never been of a permanent nature. It has, at numerous occasions given rise to various ethnic identities. But the ethnic card serves the catalyst to the Kashmiri Sunni Muslim ruling class in realising the ambition of transforming itself into sovereign Muslim ruling class. This explains the specificity of ethnicised Kashmir politics manifesting as separatism (disguised secessionism) or committed secessionism of Jamaat, JKLF, HM¹⁹. and other pro - Pakistan militant and non-militant groups variety.

When the hegemonic group ascended to power and wealth, it insisted on Muslim identity with complete negligence of the composite culture of the province.

As told earlier, Kashmiri Muslims after the emergence of Pakistan and Afghanistan are in close relationship with these two rather than India. The Kashmiri Muslim bureaucracy shaped their society and imposed the will upon

18. Kathreen Gough and H. Sharma (eds.) **Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia**, 1972, p.117.

19. Hizbul Muzhideen (henceforth HM).

the helpless masses in the same manner as in Pakistan. That's why Kashmiri Muslim intelligentsia is a group torn by contradiction. The appearance of rural elite in Kashmir is the direct result of land reform Act of 1950 which dispensed with big landlords but gave rise to rich peasants and orchardists in rural Kashmir.

Thus when politicians of different hues acquiesced to the neo-rich supremacy and offered no solid ideology to lead the society along the path of egalitarianism, the rural elite and apple-kings-administrators, bureaucrats, urban elite, university and college teachers, revenue officers, low paid employees, judicial officers and professionals donned the fundamentalist robe and brought themselves under the umbrella of Jamaat-i-Islami. The Jamaat had made inroads silently but with determination through an extensive network of darsgahs or schools, where Islam was taught by the mullas or the fundamentalist zealots²⁰. Jamaat's role in ethnic politics is discussed in coming few pages.

Ever since the accession, the purport of this ethnic politics has been reinforcing the political status of Kashmiri Sunnis, hostile attitude to religious and regional minorities, constitutional secessionism, changing the demographic pattern in J&K and refusing secularization of Kashmiri Muslim society and its emotional integration with India as per the terms of IOA²¹.

20. K.N. Pandit in '**Society and Culture in Himalayas**, K. Warikoo (ed.), 1995, p.225.

21. Instrument of Accession (1947).

"With wealth and power in their hands, Kashmiri Muslim bureaucrats established close links with the sections of Kashmiri Muslims who had acquired wealth more thorough illegal and clandestine means than through the sweat of the brow... The upper and the elitist class moved in a subtle manner and used the arts of seizing the mosque by enrolling themselves as the members of the mosque committee of the local mosque... Members of upper class infiltrated all committees functioning under the board banner of welfare and reform committees. In other words they neutralized what originally was an anti-capitalist and anti bureaucratic move. They blunted its sharp edges by becoming the staunch supporters of Jamaat and its ideology"²².

The secessionist elements of Kashmir caught the 'young blood' the with the help of higher education, their minds were filled with the doctrine of communalism and fundamentalism.

As has been mentioned earlier, the Muslim elite, novo-rich class and bureaucracy combine managed to secure all lucrative posts, trainings, privileges and facilities for their wards. They used their official position, influence and money power to realise these objectives. The net result was gradual alienation of the deserving but the deprived class²³.

22. Kailash N. Pradhan, '**Changing Contours of Kashmirir Muslim Soceity**', The Kashmir Times, 13-16 Jan, 197.

23. K.N. Pandit, op.cit. 227.

Jammat-e-Islami and Kashmir

As told earlier, the Jammat was founded on September 25, 1941 eighteen months after the Muslim League resolution demanding a separate Muslim state by Saiyyad Abul Ala Maududi. It is in fact the only all India Muslim organisation with rigid discipline and organisation, like RSS for Hindus. Presently it exercises a tremendous influence on the Muslim mind and claims to be the authentic spokesman of the religion, socio-cultural and political demand of the community.

Its single purpose is to maintain the exclusive character of the community and strengthen the communal political identity. The application of its ideology, the political strategies and its view of the "self" evidently unfold the dangerous roles of the Jamaat in Indian politics²⁴. "What was uppermost in my mind", Mawdudi wrote in an article in Tarjuman al-Quran, his monthly journal, "was to keep alive in the Muslims a sense of their separate entity and prevent their absorption into a non-Muslim Community." According to him, the real object of 'Jihad' was to dispose Kafr from the seat of authority²⁵.

The Jamaat postulates to the Muslims that they have been chosen by God to deliver His message to the rest of the society of Muslims, which feels ignored at every juncture. How can secularism or an integration between the

24. Moin Shakir, **Jammat-e-Islami and Communal Problem in India**, 'Secular Democracy', Annual, 1972, pp.31-33.

25. Ibid.

two communities take place, when ideas are thrown into a community that the standard bearers of the true faith are besieged by those who have to be shown the light, if need be, by force!²⁶

The Jammāt in Kashmir is different from the main organization; it is not even affiliated to the national body. It is both covertly and overtly anti-national in its activities. The Jammāt in Kashmir makes a permanent cadre which remains committed to it. During the emergency when Jamaat was banned the conducted schools continued functioning under pseudonyms. Their money comes from Pakistan and Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Still the Jammāt is an unpopular political force in Kashmir, which is a Muslim majority state. The reason being a secular belief of majority of Muslims in Kashmir. They discard Jamaat on the basis of its fundamentalist activities. The Jammāt has been more successful among professional classes, consequently giving them the ruling and dictating power. As a result, Kashmir Muslim elites have supported sessionism and they deliberately impose their wish upon the majority of non-ethnic Muslims.

The Jammāt-e Tulba, the youth organization has become quite powerful under the presidentship of Sheikh Tajamul Islam. He wants to make Kashmir an Islamic state. If we see the traditional form of Islam in Kashmir we come across Tablik-ul-Islam, organized by village pirs who infact are more

26. D.R. Goyal, **The Communal Jammāt-e-Islami**, Sunday, Sept 27, 1980, pp.16-19.

important than the local **moulvis**. The Tablik interpretation of Islam is many times more secular than that of Jammāt which falsely claim to maintain a fraternal posture. But due to undue advantage provided to the Jammāt and its elite followers which are infact a handful of persons, Kashmiri Muslims have to adhere the imposed religion and behaviour.

In response to the above discussed autocracy, the other non-ethnic Muslims do not have courage to show any resistance everywhere. Unlike their counterparts in Kargil, the Shias of the Valley do not form a regionalised community. As such they are apprehensive of the powerful and elite Sunni authoritarianism. They feel that in the state of autonomy, they will be at full mercy of sectarian Kashmiri leadership.

Estimatedly less than 10 per cent Shias sympathise with militancy. But this is a very small entity. A few sections of Shia Muslim leadership in the Valley do make eloquent expression of their political aspiration but dull response of the central authority compels them to comply with the odd tunes of the Kashmiri political elite. No wonder, that they are left with one and only option, that is to make at least symbolic gestures of support to the insurgency, which has to be understood as preventive or survival politics²⁷. As compared to the Shias of the Valley, Gujjars are more politically aware and articulated. Their political success is a result of the trans-regional and trans-religions

27. K.N. Pandita '**Social Basis of Ethnic Politics in Kashmir**', Kashmir Sentinel, 16-31 March, 1996, p.7.

approach. The Gujjars of the valley do not hesitate to shake hands with their counter parts living throughout India. On the other hand the Kashmiri Muslims feel themselves isolated from the nationally characterized Muslims of India. This is an important reason why secession is an idea in Kashmir valley only and not in the rest of India.

Barring a negligible mercenary section acting as border guides, the Gujjars have been strongly critical of militancy in Kashmir. In Doda region, many of them have been done to death by the Islamists for refusing to cooperate with them²⁸. The patriot Gujjars of Kashmir have helped preventing the militancy in some of the sectors such as Rajouri and Poonch. Due to this anti-elite posture, Gujjars are facing still resistance from the entrenched Valley-based, Muslim bureaucracy.

Success of the ethnic conflict is reflected in Kashmir Muslim political class linking up Muslim majority character with accession, a phenomenon in which lies the root of the slogan for **autonomy**. This is precisely why all political formations of Kashmiri Sunnis, from communal to left, consider pre-1952 as the bottomline for every solution and negotiation for the solution.

The competitive politics has really been undermined in Kashmir by active forces of subnationalism, by misusing the elite political influence over the majority non-ethnic, non-elite Muslims and authoritarianism.

28. Ibid., p.11.

In a state like Jammu and Kashmir which poses an excellent example of fraternity among various ethnic groups, linguistic segments and religious variations, active pursuance of subversion, secession and sub-national movements has given rise to fragmentation in terms of intra-religious, territory and groups which subsequently creates much more dangerous repercussions for society and region at large.

Chapter - IV

Conflict Escalation: The Impact of Pakistan - US and China Axis

Most countries of the world including the United States are still in the process of adjusting their foreign policies to the demands of the post-cold war era. In this process Pakistan is an exceptional party. Its fixation about Kashmir has made it next to impossible for the Pakistani policy-makers to take fully into account the new priorities of the US and China. The reason is simple. Islamabad tried to exploit the utmost out of US and Chinese conflict with Soviet Union to gain diplomatic leverage as well as to enhance its military capacity with a plan to confronting India from a strengthly position over Kashmir. Pakistan, by hook or by crook, constantly tries to consolidate her alliances with China and US with just one single aim in mind, that is to annex Kashmir.

Pakistan's coveted axis with United States and China has non other than one most important reason, to put dire efforts to grab Kashmir and dismantle the spirit of Indian federalism.

The close access of the trio and there acts of past, leave no room to deny their active role in the ongoing Kashmir problem. To study the role of Pakistan, US and China in Kashmir valley, it is very important to evaluate their activities separately and develop an approach which can reveal the facts of this neoimperialist axis.

US - Pakistan Relations and Kashmir Dispute

The United States became involved in the Kashmir dispute from the beginning. The US favoured an early normalization of relations between Pakistan and India and urged continuation of the ceasefire and withdrawal of 'all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir¹. But of late, there have been a few significant developments which indicate that the United States is certainly adopting new postures towards India in relation to the Kashmir issue. President Clinton in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 27, 1993: said, "Bloody ethnic, religious and civil wars were ranging from Angola to Caucasus to Kashmir". In the same year, Robin Raphel, U.S. Assistant Secretary of state at a briefing for South Asian journalists, observed: "We do not recognize the instrument of accession as meaning that Kashmir is for ever an integral part of India... The people of Kashmir have got to be consulted in any kind of final settlement of the Kashmir dispute"².

Historically, South Asia has been a region about which Americans knew little where they had few interests. The United States started taking interest in South Asia in the context of Coldwar. But US stand on Kashmir shows hostility towards India since the origin of the dispute.

-
1. **The US-China Communique:** Pakistan Times, 28 Feb. 1972.
 2. Quoted from **Independent Kashmir**, article by Jagmohan, Indian Express, March 2, 1994.

To start the story, it is to be emphatically mentioned that under the Reagan administration, Pakistan was the third major recipient*, after Israel and Egypt, of American assistance throughout the 1980's. A five year, \$3.2 billion economic and military assistance programme, that included supply of advanced weapons systems such as the F-16s and Stinger missiles, was initiated. Subsequently, an additional, \$4 billion were committed. This was the continuation of the same policy which America followed two decades back, to contain Soviet Russia and to utilise the POK for its expansionist programmes. In the early days of Kashmir problem, under American and British lead, the Security Council adopted a political rather than a moral approach to the problem. It did not condemn Pakistan for its illegal invasion and intrusion, rather to satisfy the United States it questioned the legality of the **Instrument of Accession**, signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in favour of India on 27 October, 1947. Pakistan demanded, Kashmir's future should be decided by ascertaining the wishes of its people on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. US repeatedly supported this move in the security council. To that extent the American policy could be termed as pro-Pakistan.

US policy towards Pakistan is thus shaped primarily by considerations around Pakistan rather than within it, although Pakistani policy-makers tend to over-emphasize the importance of Pakistan to justify their alignment with

* For details see Appedix.

the US. Pakistan attracts 'peripheral and derivatives'³. US interest, and American policy towards Pakistan is formulated 'essentially to protect and serve US objectives in adjacent regions to the east and west'⁴.

As early as in 1953 the reports were published about the upcoming U.S.-Pakistan defence pact. This created enormous problems in U.S. - Indian as well as Indo-Pak relations. The signing of the pact in May 1954 not only corroded America's mediating role in Kashmir dispute but also ended the bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. In the words of an Indian scholar, "the hitherto bilateral Indo-Pakistani relations now assumed a triangular relationship with the United States as the third party."

In 1957 Kashmir debate in the Security Council was a re-endorsement of a plebiscite to be administered by the UN. In the Security Council, the U.S. representative expressed disagreement with the changes in the status of Kashmir effected in previous November by the Kashmir constituent assembly⁵.

In one of her last sincere attempts of positive intervention in the Kashmir dispute the Kennedy administration tried to help India and Pakistan

-
3. Peraiz Iqbal Cheema, **American Policy in South Africa: Interests and Objectives**, in Stephen P. Cohen (Ed.), *The Security of South Asia: American and Asia Perspective*, 1987, pp. 119-133.
 4. Leo E. Rose, 'The Superpowers in South Asia: A Geostrategic Analysis', *Orbis* (22, 2, Summer 1978), pp. 395-413.
 5. Paul E. Zinner, ed., **Documents on American Foreign Relations**, 1957, p. 355.

in finding a mutually acceptable accord on Kashmir in the wake of Sino-Indian war of 1962. But this attempt was full of misdeeds. As Americans came to realise, the Vale of Kashmir was the ultimate bone of contention, Dr. Rostow, who visited the subcontinent in 1963, reportedly came up with the idea that both India and Pakistan should gain "substantial positions in the Vale", implying that the Kashmir Valley was to be partitioned⁶. This approach would have given an advantage to Pakistan. The division of Kashmir Valley, which is a Muslim majority area, certainly have given sentiments to the rest of the Muslims living in India. This eventually have brought the condition of sub-nationalism and self-determination among the Muslims of India.

There was a marked improvement in Pakistan's relations with the United States during 1972-1975 against a backdrop of the controversial US 'tilt' towards Pakistan in the course of the Bangladesh crisis, 1971, and Pakistan's role in the promotion of Sino-US rapprochement. In fact, the normalization of relations between the United States and China in 1971-72 removed the irritant in Pakistan - US relations⁷.

US Assistance Packages to Pakistan

Though the American assistance to Pakistan does not have a direct bearing on the Kashmir issue yet their is some impact upon it. Since Pakistan spends

6. **New York Times**, 8 April 1963.

7. H.A. Rizvi, **Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment**, 1993. p. 87.

unaccounted amount of money on military and terrorist training activities, the US assistance thus indirectly affects the Kashmir Valley. A direct financial assistance is provided to POK by Pakistan which comes from no other source than the larger funds received by the US. Besides this, the maintenance of a separate department of Kashmir Affairs, conduction of training camps for terrorists in Pakistan and Pakistani occupied Kashmir, is also done with the help of the US aid programme. In the light of above stated statements it is very important to refer in short, about the aid packages provided to Pakistan from 1980 onwards.

The First Assistance Package

The six years assistance package (1981-87) which amounted to \$3250 million was equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. Approximately 55 per cent of economic assistance was provided as grants while the rest was in the form of loans, repayable in 30 years after and grace period of ten years, at 3 per cent of interest⁸. The core part of the military sales was the American decision to sell 40 high-class F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan. Pakistan purchased these in cash, partly from its own sources and partly from the funds provided by Arab nations⁹. Now these aircrafts had a serious security concern to India. They could possibly be used to grab

8. For details, see the articles on the aid relationship by interest G. Hagesty and Arshad Zaman in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose (eds.) **Pak-US Relations, (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, California) 1988, pp.237-65.**

9. *Ibid.*, p.254.

Kashmir or to disrupt peace and normalcy in India. This was done to prepare the grounds for U.S. to build military bases and to facilitate them when and wherever needed.

The increased diplomatic interaction between Pakistan and U.S. on security and political matters, including the Kashmir question surfaced time and again during the Zia-ul-Haq regime. From Pakistan's side Foreign Minister, Yakub Khan, was the most frequent visitor to the U.S. He undertook 13 trips during 1984-87¹⁰. Kashmir issue was repeatedly discussed between the two states. Without the participation of India as a party, U.S. and Pakistan proposed many unacceptable resolutions for Kashmir. There were other signs that U.S. and Pakistan were cultivating strong ties in the security field which were clearly anti-India. Since 1985, Pakistan began to extend transit - stopover facilities to American P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft¹¹.

Moreover, Pakistan's desire to obtain an airborne early warning system to strengthen its air defence in the wake of Afghan air raids and a perceived threat from India also led her to adopt a more pro-US disposition. The US thus agreed to supply the E-3A aircrafts known as AWACS.

-
10. This includes his visits to the UN headquarters in New York. As he also met with senior officials of the US Deptt. of state during these visits, they have been counted as visits to the US.
 11. Lawrence Lifschultz, **The US-Pak Strategic Relationship**, Muslim, 30 Oct., 1986.

The Second Package

It was in December 1987 that the Reagan Administration managed to obtain congressional approval for the new economic assistance and military sales package, with a two-and-a-half year waiver of the application of the Symington - Glenn amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, for Pakistan¹². Despite Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons and repeated protest of India, the United States offered a six-year (187-93) package of economic assistance and military sales worth \$4.02 billion at concessional rates of interest. This offer again gave Pakistan a chance to build up a more complicated military with some of the funds going to its intelligence service called ISI. The credit for the purchase of military equipment amounted to \$1.74 billion, repayable in 7 years after a grace period of 5 years at 5 per cent rate of interest¹³.

The Third Package

The much publicized Pressler Law under which all the U.S. aid to Pakistan had been suspended since 1990 because of her nuclear bomb related activities, was repealed by an amendment proposed by Republican Senator Hank Brown. This is just a step forward scrapping the entire Pressler Law, which favoured India and created a balanced Arms Regime - in South Asia for six years.

12. Nation, 18 December 1987.

13. Muslim, 25 March 1986; Arshad Zaman, **The Multi-year Aid programme: The Pakistani View**, in Hussain and Rose, 1988, p. 254.

This allows Pakistan to acquire arms assistance worth \$ 380 million, which includes three P-3 Orion Maritime Surveillance Aircraft, 28 Harpoon Missiles, 360 AIM-9L Sidewinder Missiles 24, M-198 Howitzers and 30 C-Nite Kits for Cobra Helicopter Gunship.

With this the US administration hails the Brown Amendment of 1995 with happiness and looks forward for a much stronger and flexible relationship with Pakistan. In fact, the US Senate voted (55 to 45) to bypass the Pressler Amendment in favour of Pakistan. Though the proposed Hank Brown Amendment did not permit the US administration to supply the F-16s to Pakistan yet the arms which were scheduled to be delivered are no less dangerous.

So it is, however, possible to construe the present U.S. policy towards Kashmir in a manner which may suggest a desire to maintain its hold in this region. As Cohen has argued, the U.S. must sustain its presence in South Asia, even when it has no vital interest in this region and advance a new South Asian Regional Initiative and for this it must keep pressing India regarding Kashmir¹⁴.

The U.S. Government has traditionally taken an anti-India stand on the Kashmir issue. To quote Cohen again, "The Kashmir issue needs an outside perspective, because Indian and Pakistani strategists are looked in a mindless

14. Stephen P. Cohen quoted in I.K. Gujral; **Off Track in Washington, The Hindustan Times**, Feb.13, 1994.

battle over tactical advantages, and short term calculations of gain and pain. A solution cannot occur until it is supported in both the states and by Kashmiris of several varieties but meantime it is also important to have a place or an institution, where ideas, possibilities and pressures can be focussed"¹⁵. Such statements not only encouraged the militants activity in Jammu and Kashmir, (Hazratbal and Charar incidents of 1993 and 1995 are the important examples) but also increased the sentiments to demand separatism and self-determination.

As Cohen has suggested: "The road to accession to the NPT runs through Kashmir." The U.S. is, therefore, not only condemning India for violating human-rights in Kashmir but also getting tougher on the nuclear question¹⁶.

Sponsored Terrorism and Subversive Activities

The nefarious alignment of ISI and CIA has masterminded the subversive activities in Kashmir Valley. Both the intelligence agencies are supported by Pakistan and USA respectively. Despite the repeated highlighting of Islamic fundamental dangers by India the US has not seized to work in favour of Kashmiri militants and to seek the Muslim majority support by force.

15. Stephen P.Cohen, **Kashmir the Roads Ahead**, p.6

16. Saleem M. Kidwai, **NPT, Kashmir and India-US Relations**, Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 1, Issue-2, Jan-Feb. 1994., p.52.

The massive proliferation of small arms and light weapons in South Asia is directly linked to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent creation by the United States of a system, commonly known as the Afghan pipelines, to funnel to the Afghan resistance. The Afghan pipeline enabled the transfer of tens of thousands of tons of weaponry to the mujahidin, the weapons were procured by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) served as the conduit. The ISI received and stored weapons acquired by the U.S. and distributed them to Afghan party leaders who turned them over to field commanders. To conceal U.S. involvement, the CIA provided limited oversight over the workings of the pipeline and imposed virtually no effective controls. Even the total numbers of weapons that the CIA transferred may have been impossible, or too sensitive, to document the former director of the Afghan bureau of the ISI maintains that the ISI kept no records.

Kashmiri militants have used advanced weapons in the course of attacks on civilians. It is also likely that the Kashmiri militant arsenal has contributed to their ability to instill terror in the civilian population, particularly local Hindus, tens of thousands of whom have fled the Kashmir Valley.

High-ranking Pakistani government officials have announced full moral and political support for the Kashmiri militants. Other Pakistani government officials have acknowledged the existence of training camps (presumably unauthorized) inside Pakistan for Kashmiri guerrillas. The Pakistani

government has, however, consistently denied arming or training the Kashmiri militants that are operating in India.

In addition, the ranks of the JKLF are drawn mostly from the urban Muslim middle classes, boat owners and carpet makers who can afford to buy their own weapons, which means that they are not forced to rely upon the largesse of the ISI. One press report quoted a member of the JKSLF, the student wing of the JKLF, as stating that the JKSLF bought its arms from smugglers in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India itself.

On December 27, 1993, President Bill Clinton wrote a letter* to Ghulam Nabi Fai, 'Executive Director', Kashmiri-American Council, saying that he shared latter's concern for human rights and looked forward to working with him to help bring peace in Kashmir. In reply to a letter from Congressman Gary Condit and others, Mr. Clinton said, "I am aware of the chronic tensions between the Indian government and the Sikh Militants and share your desire for a peaceful solution that protects the Sikh Rights."

All these statements and letters, issued in a very short time period of half a year, show how U.S. has worked to disrupt the Indian life. President Clinton, who has compared Kashmir with Somalia, and former Yugoslavia and his warm response to Ghulam NabiFai, a self styled interlocutor* who is

* See Appendix for detailed text of the letter.

* Termed by Jagmohan in '**Independent Kashmir**', Indian Express, March 2, 1994.

funded by Pakistan, and who is fuelling terrorism in Kashmir Valley; and Raphael's highly provocative observations, questioning even the validity of the IOA, are the real disclosures of U.S. increasing disposition to ignore Indian sentiments, tilt towards Pakistan and indicate, in the process, a subtle preference for independent or semi-independent Kashmir.

The above type of situation could serve as an effective instrument for putting pressure on China, if the need arises so. It could also give U.S. an upper hand in the Central Asia. To manipulate Russian activities in this region, semi-independent Kashmir is the best option for U.S.

In practice, that means the U.S. has turned Pakistan into a frontline state. It is busy setting up naval bases, aerodromes and espionage centres and delivering even more sophisticated weapons. The military construction which is under way in Pakistan with American participation has gained such wide scope that the entire Pakistan might virtually become a bridgeheads state. Apropos the new strategic map of South Asia region issued by the Central Military Command, all Pakistan is marked as an area fit for the stationing of the American Rapid Deployment Force¹⁷. A certain and grave loss to Indian territories, especially Kashmir Valley.

China, Pakistan and the Kashmir Problem

China, unlike the U.S. and some other countries, has kept a low profile for quite some time in its policy towards the Kashmir issue. That, however, does

17. V.D. Chopra (Ed.) **Pakistan Asian Peace**, 1985, p.65.

not mean that China is not very relevant to the problem. The importance of the theme discussed - lies in two facts.

As the Kashmir issue has always been a touchstone to test any country's relationship with both India and Pakistan, China's policy in this regard can also be observed as an indicator of Chinese strategic thinking on the subcontinent. Secondly, of the three extra-regional powers, which have exercised influence on Kashmir issue, namely the United States, the former USSR and the present Russia and China, only China is the territorial neighbour of both India and Pakistan. China shares borders with the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the line of control in J & K. This geographical factor determines that China inevitably has direct interest in the Kashmir Valley¹⁸.

Whereas South-East Asia became a virtual battleground of rival ideologies and nationalism due to active Super Power intervention and China's disturbing proximity, South Asia has fought battles from within, which have been short-lived but had long term consequences such as Indo-Pak wars, Sino-Indian war on the issues of Kashmir and the disputed border in the Himalayas respectively.

In the early fifties, Pakistan had volunteered to join US-led military alliances, SEATO and CENTO, which were against the communist expansion.

18. Siwei Mao, **China and Kashmir Issue**, Strategic Analysis 17 (12), March, 1995, p. 1573-1574.

The origins of an 'entente cordiale' between China and Pakistan are traceable to Sino-Indian conflict. Physical contiguity to Pakistan via Xinjiang - POK bordering region catalysed the tentative moves in bridging the gap between the Chinese and Pakistani positions¹⁹.

The abrupt relationship between China and Pakistan was directly related to the deteriorating relations of China and India, which followed the 1959 rebellion in Tibet, leading to Dalai Lama's escape to India which was a political asylum. By the end of year 1962, China and Pakistan had secretly reached an accord on the defining principles to negotiate the border between Xinjiang and POK. India's argument that China and Pakistan had no common border, was disregarded and an agreement was signed in March, 1963.

The pro-Pakistan strategic shift was subsequently reflected in the Chinese assertion that Kashmir issue should be determined by the plebiscite in accordance with the UN resolutions. In 1971 Indo-Pak war further reinforced a shared objective on behalf of China and it came out strongly in Pakistan's support. In 1965 too, when Mr. Chen-Yi visited Karachi in the wake of the Indo-Pak war, after long confabulations with the Pakistani leaders, he openly came out with his country's sympathy for those "so called freedom fighters' who were struggling "to liberate Kashmir from Indian domination"²⁰. While fully supporting the measures taken by Pakistan to resist such aggression,

19. T. Karki Hussain, **Chinese Puzzle**, Times of India, 13th June, 1996.

20. **Dawn**, 5th September, 1965.

Beijing, in a statement, declared that China considered that "India's aggression against any of its neighbors concerns all of its neighbours"; it further warned that a "chain of consequences" could follow from such Indian bellicosity if Delhi did not mend its ways²¹.

Sino-Pakistan co-operation in the field of defence, both to set up defence - related industry and to train military personnel, has reached a level that could match the relationship between the US and its allies. Beijing, therefore, gives top priority to Pakistan while formulating its policy moves in South Asia. Firstly, Beijing's perception that Pakistan's reliance on China would build pressure on India. Secondly China wants to use Pakistan's present position to extend its influence in the conservative Muslim countries including Jammu and Kashmir²². But while the China-Pakistan strategic partnership continues, China's position on Kashmir is no longer the same.

It favours an early dialogue between the two South Asian neighbours. Now China is not very adamant to support Pakistan's demand for "Azad Kashmir" and has started taking of the two protagonists to come to table on the basis of Shimla Agreement, supported by various political groups in Kashmir.

According to Beijing's new thinking which is in fact a resurrection of its stand held in the hey-days of Sino-Indian fraternisation, the parties to the

21. **Documents on China, India, Pakistan**, pp.428-31

22. V.D. Chopra (Ed.), **Pakistan and Asian Peace**, p.76.

dispute should work out their own solution without outside interference²³. It is important to note that if China supports the demand of 'Kashmiri Self-Determination' in the Kashmiri valley, it has to face the same demand lately being raised in the Muslim - dominated North-Western province of Xinjiang. But China has indirectly support the Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic separatism by assisting Pakistan in her anti-Indian plans.

Having remained a party with a vested interest in the Indo-Pak confrontation for a considerable length of time during which it developed a long term military relationship with Pakistan, China has not been able to remove New Delhi's pervasive doubts about its intentions²⁴. In this respect, Beijing's regular supply of sophisticated armaments, fighter aircrafts, M-11 missiles to Pakistan and Cately, its alleged transfer of 5000 ring magnets which can be used for Pakistan's uranium enrichment programme is construed in some quarters as perpetuating elements of divisiveness in the South Asian region.

In September 1993, a milestone agreement was signed between China and India during Prime Minister Rao's visit to Beijing in which the two countries agreed to cut troops placed along their common borders to maintain peace and tranquility, but this agreement does not prove very reliable for the future. In a recent assessment of Chinese arms proliferation by the US Army

23. T. Karki Hussain, **Chinese Puzzle**, Times of India, June 13, 1996.

24. Ibid.

War College, it was predicted that "in the 1990s China would continue its close military links with Pakistan in providing necessary hardware technology and assistance in developing Pakistan's indigenous weapons producing capability"²⁵.

U.S. China - Pakistan Triangle and Subversion of Kashmir

Benazir Bhutto's recent visit to Beijing and Pakistani Foreign Minister Asef Ahmed Ali's latest pronouncements on Kashmir show only one thing, that is their dogged pursuit of the old objective of a firm alliance with the US and China, committed to the realisation of the Pakistani dream of annexing Kashmir by hook or by crook²⁶. The belief in the feasibility of such a ganging up stems from a self-serving inference from India's differences with the US and China in the past on the various issues including the Kashmir problem. In 1971 the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship made Sino-American intervention in support of Pakistan even more strong. Pakistan alongwith the United States and China had done unlimited harm to the Valley in terms of ethnicity, religious haltered, Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism. On the other hand an axis with Pakistan was the last thing the U.S. and China wanted. This was very fastly done especially after the separation of East Pakistan from its Western part.

In terms of there role in the regional politics Pakistan and Israel have a common characteristic. Both were simultaneously created - Israel to subvert

25. T. Karki Hussain, **South Asia**, April-June, 1996, p.13.

26. G.M. Telang, '**A Pakistani Illusioin**' Indian Express, October, 1994.

Arab states and Pakistan to become one of the main instruments of subverting the Indian subcontinent through its active but falsely claimed intervention in Kashmir Valley on the grounds of its being a Muslim majority area.

There is no place to discuss the role of America, both inside the UNO and outside, on the Kashmir problem with a view to promote the concept of making it an "independent state"²⁷. It will thus not be incorrect to say that Washington had been building the military might of Pakistan in the same proportion as Pakistan had been increasing its efforts to subvert the Kashmir valley, though techniques changing from time to time. Besides, spying activities, the members of ISI and CIA smuggle arms from Pakistan into northern India. Yet another instrument of subversion fashioned by Pakistan is heroin smuggling into India.

The CIA has a wide network in Pakistan and keeps close track of heroin trafficking activities as well as the kingpins of this trade. However Pakistan is still relying mainly on subversive elements trained by her. She has reportedly set up camps in Chirat in Muree district and Allahabad near the famous Haji Pir Pass in POK to train terrorists who escaped to that country during the Army action.

The CIA and Pakistani intelligence establishments have all these years been actively involved in training anti-Indian terrorists in specialised camps in Pakistan.

27. V.D. Chopra, *op.cit.*, p.82.

* See Appendix for detailed list of Terrorist Training Camps set up by Pakistan in POK and Afghanistan.

On the nuclear issue, New Delhi's concern about China's subtle intimidation remain in place. Although China has refused to be drawn into the Indo-Pak nuclear controversy, and to play a more dynamic role to prevent a South Asian arms race as suggested by US Defence Secretary William Parry during his last visit to Beijing, India perceives a linkage between its Prithvi missile programme and China's transfer of M-11 missiles along with their technology as a conscious Chinese policy of helping Pakistan build an equitable deterrent against India. There is no chance of India forging its strategic options or of China going down in its high profile links with Pakistan, a certain convergence of views on regional stability is unlikely to happen.

At the end of the long discussion we can easily assume that how this coveted axis between Pakistan, US and China has worked to grab the Kashmir Valley. The active support to the militants and religious manoeuvre in Kashmir Valley by this nefarious triangle, has still more dangerous designs to plant in Jammu and Kashmir.

Chapter - V

Conclusion

Much has already been written on the conflict between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. It is a case of a political issue which is entirely internal and domestic matter of India, taking an international form. The formation of Pakistan on grounds of religion in fact internationalized an internal conflict between two major communities of undivided India and during the last almost 50 years it has led to so much of inter-community hostility, hardship and blood letting. And yet the conflict continues and comes in the way of India and Pakistan together with other states of South Asia, playing a constructive role in world affairs. The domestic consequences of this conflict are also there too obvious for anyone to see. This is what happens when states are formed on the basis of religion or some other ethnic criterion.

In this dissertation a preliminary effort has been made to analyse the emotive and politically inflammable issue of majority and minority rights with a state. It was this issue which had inflamed the communal feelings in pre-partition India when the Muslim League was formed and the demand for Pakistan was raised under the leadership of Jinnah. The flames of communal passion were fanned by the British and other vested interests to serve their short term gains. The result is that short sightedness and commitment to immediate gains in governance of the country have thrown the people of India and Pakistan into a situation in which they are continuing to fight with each

other at a very heavy cost to themselves and their people. The problem of Kashmir is one such problem which has its origins in the same old majority - minority relationship issues.

The dissertation focuses right on this issue and tries to see how an issue like this is narrowly contextual, devoid of any universal commitments and thus to see it in national context with an emphasis on its universal aspects is to completely overlook its localized manifestations which tend to run counter to national level generalization. Thus the local, national, regional and global levels of majority minority complex get intermixed in such a way that politics become highly complex and destructive. The need is to examine the majority minority relation in localized context with a view to minimise human misery consequent on discrimination and deprivation at a level where it occurs. Not to do that is only an attempt to make political capital out of people's grievances and imaginary fears.

This is what Jinnah did in pre independence India and is what many other leaders are trying to do in South-Asia. If we focus at the regional level and want to make a political capital of it then we will find that Muslim are a majority and Hindus are in minority.

As depicted earlier, political organization in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies is confronted with problems relating to majorities and minorities. This confrontation escalates the tension between the minor and major religious/ ethnic groups. A changing society poses very complex problems.

It is a well recognized fact that in a multi ethnic, multireligious society the changes are not totally free from majority - minority conflict and ethnic tensions. Wherever in a society, a particular ethnic group outnumbers the others the latter fear, often without any reason that the former would try to impose its own tradition, culture and various other traits on them. This leaves the minority with two options. One is to, join the mainstream and the other is to oppose the majority dominance and fight for autonomy.

Bring Kashmir Muslims in the National Mainstream

While oscillating loyalties and indecision on political issues the Kashmir Valley's Muslims get isolated from the national mainstream. The Muslims developed an attitude of indifference to the vital problem of the Jammu and Kashmir and of the country at large.

Constituting three per cent of the total population of India and despite having their own distinct culture, Christians have managed to retain their identity and live with co-existence as part of national mainstream. Baba Sahab said : "If the Muslims in India are a separate nation, then of course, India is not a nation". At present, the fact that Muslim minority is the most painful sufferer because of its being the largest minority group is undeniable. Unlike the Christians, who have engaged themselves in setting up academic institutions, hospitals and other welfare centers and have avoided to a great extent any kind of clash with others, Muslims go the opposite way.

1. Dr. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition (n.d.), p.12.

Muslims of Kashmir Valley and of entire India have earned a bad name for themselves. They are considered as problem community. This situation is not going to change unless and until the Muslims who try to keep a different profile than the national mainstream, change it. It applies on all the minorities. To remove the minority complex from themselves, they have to achieve a sense of togetherness without affiliating with their counter parts across the border. This is considered a multi cultural and multi-entoreligious model.

The above analysis makes it crystal clear that in order to bridge the community gap and to lessen the majority - minority confrontation an unreserved adherence to the multi-cultural model is very essential. The minority community unlike the the Kashmiri Muslim's (who are a local majority but part of a national minority because of Kashmir being an integral part of India) support to the separatist movement sponsored by the government across the border, should give whatever co-operation is necessary for the upliftment of the nation they are living in.

The Muslim plans of ethnic cleansing in the Kashmir Valley further complicates the widening divide. The Muslims living in India have never faced a position of genocide anywhere throughout the country but what has been done to the non-Muslim minorities living in Kashmir Valley is unacceptable.

The educational and social ill-facilitation in Kashmir Valley could be considered as their true problems and grievances put forward by the 'salariat'. But if we think over the causes we surely will find the roots in the Muslim

dogma itself. Their reluctance to adopt modernization as a basic social need gives them poor results in the field of education and economy. Kashmiri as well as Indian Muslims look strangely at the Indian government's campaign to promote family planning. They look upon it as a sinister plot to keep the Muslim population to a negligible level. Even Pakistan, which claims to be the topmost version of Islamic states, is having a family planning programme. Why, then, should the Indian Muslims feel reluctant about the national family planning schemes?

If we take an account of elections and Muslim voting behaviour of Kashmiri Muslims along with the behaviour of their counterpart Hindus (in the Hindu majority belt of Jammu division) and afterwards compare it with the voting behaviour of Muslims living in any Muslim majority area in the rest of India, we will come across some very interesting and strange findings. As discussed earlier, in this chapter that Muslims show a marked degree of disinterest in various national problems, at the same time they are much worried about their community rights and self-protection issues.

In the recently held elections for the eleventh Lok Sabha, out of 6 parliamentary seats, Congress bagged two, BJP also won two, one seat was captured by the Third Front and one went to an independent. Though the reports on the conduction of elections were not positive and deliberate voting was reported from the Valley yet the results showed that Muslims voted for the parties who externally maintain a secular character.

In the Kashmir Valley, Muslims are terrified by the incident of 6 December 1992, when Babri Masjid was demolished in Ayodhya, by the Hindu fundamentalist forces. They constantly perceive a threat from such forces. The BJP, as pointed out by Ajit Kumar Jha in his article in **The Times of India** dated May 18, 1996, lacks not only the popular mandate but the required social mandate. It has received only 3 per cent of the Muslim votes². The party which is based on the Hindu majority votes and stresses on Hindu cultural nationalism can never win over the minorities .

Muslims in Kashmir too, are reluctant to vote any such force which does not counter-guarantee their right to life. It is true that they have seen many atrocities happening in actual life. Thus they perceive such behaviour as a misconduct and threat to their life.

The Muslim voting behaviour is in some manner, guided by the Pakistani authorities also. The disruption created in the process of elections, the non-participation appeals by All Party Hurriyat Conference and other Islamic organizations and appeals to Kashmiri Muslims not to vote at all, were all anti-democratic moves but still those who voted for the candidates showed a psychological trend that their motive is to defeat the force which poses anti-Muslim. An analysis, attempted by the Express News Service and published in the Indian Express dated May 20, 1996 says; "Embittered by a series of

2. Quoted in an article 'BJP, Elections and Minorities', by Asgar Ali Engineer, *Mainstream*, 34(29); June 22, 1996, p.14.

'betrayals' (such as the aftermath of Bombay Bomb blast case of 1993) the Muslims in Maharashtra have voted overwhelmingly for the secular forces especially the 'Third Front'. They did not vote for congress because they find it responsible for the demolition of Babri Masjid and misuse of TADA. They were disillusioned by BJP as it abolished the Minorities Commission and Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry etc.

There is a basic difference in the voting behaviours of the Kashmiri Muslim voter and a normal non-Kashmiri Muslim voter living in a Muslim majority area other than the Valley. The voters or citizens of Kashmir Valley, predominantly Muslims, rejected the governments plan of holding Assembly elections because they were not sure of the personification of their demands of more autonomy in internal matters and the granting of more self determination rights. The Muslims of the Valley are much more influenced or rather provoked by the sentimental gatherings conducted by the political units of various militant outfits who proclaim themselves as 'freedom-fighters'. The real cause of this Muslim proximity and faith with APHC and other fundamentalist outfits, is the constant absence of the local leaders who represent the national political parties like Congress and BJP. The Muslim masses of the Valley become overwhelmed even if a local leader shows sympathy in hearing their problems. And this task has been impressively done by those leaders who seek guidelines from across the borders.

On the contrary the Muslims who are in the majority in the areas barring Jammu and Kashmir, do not behave as Muslims behave in Kashmir. The Indian Muslims do not demand a right to self determination. While voting they stress on issues which are local in nature and are beneficiary to their own community. The non-Kashmiri Muslims, primarily take into account the issues centered around their welfare. The Kashmiri Muslim majority claims that the effective and popular militancy was not built overnight. It developed over a period of time. One of their major grievances is that they have always got a discriminated treatment from the Central governance and been made to feel alienated from the mainstream. From their point of view, the feeling of alienation from the Indian mainstream has been aggravated by the Indian media projecting the wrong image- assuming all Kashmiri Muslims to be the supporters of Pakistan and insurgency movement. They claim that the state of unemployment and ill-managed, biased political processes of late eighties played a greater role than Pakistani involvement in building the movement for autonomy and secession.

Some of the above discussed grievances are genuine but not all of them. Muslims of Kashmir must realise that their future lies in making sincere efforts to end their plight through economic and educational progress and finally with joining the national mainstream leaving aside the demands of self-determination.

Transnational Islam for a Positive Good

In context of Kashmir problem, the talk for a 'global' intifada also distracts from the real bone of discontent. The external structure of transnational Islam which outrageously affected the minds of Kashmiri Muslims, reflects a strong unity. The demonstrations protesting against one aspect or another of Kashmir's links to India have not been uncommon in Srinagar and other parts of the Valley. Although there were anti-India riots in January 1964 but during the two wars viz; 1965 and 1971, Kashmiris remained Loyal to India. However in the eighties a growing proportion of Kashmiri Muslims began manifesting Pan- Islamic, pro-Pakistani and Islamic Transnationalism with a fundamentalist sentiments. It was combined with their perception of India's failures which gave Kashmiri Muslims the feeling that they would be better off outside India. Here the causes lie in the transnational and subversive character of Islam. The fundamentalist militancy of some Islamic regimes especially that of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Sudan has given a marked impact upon the Kashmiri Muslims.

The concept of 'Islamic Resurgence' has been apparently promoted by Iranian Revolution, Paksitan's adoption of Nizam-e-Mustafa and the confident and blunt statements of persons like Muammar Qaddafi of Libya on Islamic reconstruction of Muslim societies. This Islamic resurgence gave lift to the transnational Islam and the Muslims of Kashmir Valley could not remain alienated from it. The study of the second chapter brings out the fact that the Kashmir Valley has been run over by the Pan-Islamic sentiments. The

member states of the Organization of Islamic Conference have given full support to the Kashmir successionist movement, barring a few countries. As a result of it the Muslims of the Valley despite being the followers of Kashmiriyat, a secular tradition, drew inspiration to work on the guidelines of the fundamentalist Islam.

With this the ethnicisation of the Valley started taking a prominent shape. As a result of ethnic cleansing of the Valley the Kashmiri Pandits were either forced to vacate the Valley or were put to harsh genocide.

Forced extirpation of the Kashmiri Hindu minority in the wake of Islamic insurgency was a unique phenomenon. Unlike the Muslim majority of Kashmir, the Hindu majority of India do not believe in such kinds of brutal and nasty activities. This largely reflects the impact of transnational Islamic fundamentalism on the Muslim fundamentalists of the Valley. The treatment given to Hindu minorities and non-elite Kashmiri Muslims such as Shias and Gujjars shows the dominance of staunch Islamic thoughts. Such kind of behaviour have never occurred in the Hindu society towards the Muslims. Ethnic-cleansing of religious minorities which is integral to the Islamic fundamentalism, should stop working in India. To maintain a plural character of society, free of subjugation and exploitation, the people of Valley must adopt a multi-cultural model.

The Elite Dominance:Need to Restructure the Society

With the help of findings discussed in the third chapter, 'The Elite Dominance:An Ethnic Perspective', we came to know that the 80 percent Kashmiri majority is ruled by a small minority of elite social group. Since 1947, it has been the Kashmiri Sunni Muslim (social and political group, the elite minority), that has been constantly dominating the life and economy of the people of Kashmir Valley. It is an important dimension of Muslim politics in India that it has been controlled either by feudal or by religious elements. Kashmir is no exception to this trend. The Muslim elite of Kashmir Valley, not for religious, but for political reasons, began to urge the Muslim masses to purge their customs of local Hindu elements. The elite class gave the theme that unless Muslims in the Valley practised 'pure Islam' they would inevitably fall prey to a process of degeneration which could certainly give them a minority complex. In most towns, cities and villages of Kashmir Valley the Hindus and Muslim masses live cheek-by-jowl and in peace.

The poor Muslim masses of the Valley were always exploited by the clever and the cunning, be they politicians of Pakistan or the ruling elite of Kashmir.

The Muslim elite should apprehend that depending on such opportunistic policies which is not in the interest of the masses and only gives promotion to their own interests, is of no use. The young Muslim intellectuals, professionals and others, should come forward to help prevent this kind of

situation. The Muslim ruling elite, which have become supersensitive on religion-ethnic matters should restrain itself from turning into fundamentalists and communal. They should take into account the sensibilities of the majority and should understand that in a multi-culture model a minimum degree of tension is the best remedy of co-existence between majority and minority communities.

International Actors:Need for a Peaceful Co-existence

The Kashmir Valley, apart from the problems of the majority- minority relations, minority complex and its reflection on the politico-social life of the people of the Valley and the role of elite dominance over the majority Muslim masses, faces yet another grave problem that is the involvement of regional and international actors.

At the regional level, a major issues draws attention. It is the China factor. China cannot stay indifferent to the future disposal of the Jammu and Kashmir. The developments in Kashmir can have implications on the adjacent areas like Buddhist Tibet and Muslim Xinjiang province of China. Additionally, China is perturbed by the spectra of Islamic militants and fundamentalist groups using the Kashmir area as a launching pad for activities in the adjacent Chinese province of Xinjiang. More important is the much coveted trunk of China with Pakistan, which also has played a major role in Kashmir Valley.

The U.S. as an international actor has also given an important turn to Kashmir problem. To expedite its expansionist policy and to check the

advancement of communist Russia towards South and South East Asia, U.S. used Pakistan as a frontline state. It helped Pakistan to join the military alliances like SEATO and CENTO, which further helped Pakistan in consolidating its position on Kashmir vis-a-vis India.

America's direct approach to some of the terrorist groups, has further aggravated the problem. The constant arms and military supplies and the recently amended Hank Brown amendment are also some of the indications which send the messages of U.S. involvement in the Kashmir Valley.

Describing the role of Pakistan in Kashmir Valley, a Kashmiri leader has reportedly told that the ISI was prepared even to risk a war between India and Kashmir. Pakistan's nuclear weapon program has given it the courage to confront India, even though India was seven times larger than Pakistan. "Pakistanis, he said, 'has lot of guts'. He felt however that the call for 'Jehad against India', and the creation of Islamic order in the Valley was "counter productive movement".

General Zia had dream to 'Liberate' Kashmir. The same dream is possessed by his successors. A large amount of weapons and ammunition have been sent and are hidden all over the Valley. The US Task Force on terrorism and unconventional warfare, House Republican Research Committee, has prepared report which seeks and explores the extent of Pakistan's role in international terrorism in Central Asia with special reference to India. This report titled "The Kashmir Connection" was issued in Washington

on May 21, 1994 in the wake of Mr. Anderson's report in the Washington Post on May 16, 1994 which revealed Pakistan's continuous and extensive support and involvement in rendering support to terrorism in Kashmir Valley.

For Islamabad, the liberation of Kashmir is a sacred mission, the only task unfulfilled since the independence of Pakistan. Kashmir serves many domestic interests of Pakistani Government. Firstly, tension over Kashmir creates a diversion from frustrations at home. Secondly, the Pakistan's Islamist parties and the ISI are trying to 'Islamize' the entire Valley so that the Muslims could join them voluntarily. Lastly it provides the regime, an easy access to the Central Asian Islamic countries and to China. Pakistan in its cause, is being regularly helped by China and the U.S. Pakistan has tried time to time to raise an alarm about a nuclear war if Kashmir remains unresolved. The U.S. has also exploited India on the question of NPT. Chinese supply of 5000 ring magnets and the M-11 missiles to Pakistan is also part of the same old game.

This is not the symbol of a matured and polished diplomatic behaviour on the part of U.S. and China. The best contribution that United States and China can make to a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute, therefore, to keep off it and not to show extra interest in Pakistan. It is only then that Pakistan may show a genuine interest in serious negotiations with India.

Pakistan's case in Kashmir is based on the assertion that the majority of Kashmiris are Muslims and that therefore Kashmiri must become a part of

Pakistan. It is based on the premise that religion of a given people determines its nationality. Such premise can never be accepted today. As the Indian statesman Salman Khurshid has said, "if religion is used as a carving knife to re-design politics, virtually the whole world will have to ready itself for the chisel".

It should be remembered that Jammu and Kashmir, besides Kashmir Valley, has two more religiously and ethnically diverse regions i.e., the Jammu region, with Hindu majority and Ladakh, the Buddhist region. Only Valley has a Muslim majority.

Sunni Muslims, the elite dominating class, want independence, forgetting that by themselves they only occupy 20 percent of the land and 30 percent of the population. The intercommunity dialogue and inter-religious cooperation should be initiated so that each region can define the framework under which the constituents can exercise their political, economic, religious, and cultural rights freely and unequivocally, forgetting their minority complex at national level and leaving the Majority ego in the Valley. Protection of the human rights of minorities in each region must be guaranteed by specific legislative measures, including designation of geographic areas where various ethnic communities and minorities can exercise influence and create mass for their religious and economic security.

Appendices

Appendix - I

Table Showing the Total Population Chart of Hindus and Muslims in Jammu & Kashmir

1. Percentage of total Muslim population to the total population of the State	64.19%
2. Percentage of Muslim population of Kashmir Division to the total population of the State.	49.72%
3. Percentage of Muslim Population of Kashmir Division to the total Muslim Population of the State.	77.45%
4. Percentage of Muslim population of Jammu Division to the total Muslim population of the State.	13.43%
5. Percentage of Muslim population of Jammu Division to the total population of Jammu Division.	29.60%
<i>Hindu Population</i>	
1. Percentage of total Hindu Population to the total population of the State.	32.27%
2. Percentage of Hindu population of Kashmir Division to the total Hindu Population of the State.	2.07%
3. Percentage of Hindu population of Kashmir Division to the total Hindu population of the State.	6.42%
4. Percentage of Hindu Population of Jammu Division to the total Hindu Population of the State.	93.30%
5. Percentage of Hindu population of Jammu Division to the total population of Jammu Division.	66.32%

Appendix - II

Table: The percentage of each community in the employment of the Government Department of the State (Category wise) as on 1.7.1987.

Category of Service	Hindus	Muslims	Sikhs	Other	Total
Gazetted (percentage)	6,307 (51.18)	5,140 (41.71)	717 (5.82)	159 (1.59)	12,323 (100.00)
Non-gazetted (percentage)	49,705 (37.89)	73,780 (56.23)	5,555 (4.23)	2,136 (1.64)	131,176 (100.00)
Inferior (percentage)	14,370 (29.42)	32,011 (65.52)	1,010 (2.06)	1,469 (3.00)	48,860 (100.00)

Table: The percentage of employment and the percentage of population of each community

Name of Community	Nos. of Employees in Govt. Services	%age in Employment	%age in Population
Hindus	70,382	36.59	32.77%
Muslims	110,931	57.67	64.19%
Sikhs	7,282	3.79	2.23%
Others	3,764	1.95	1.37%
Total	192,359	100.00	100.00

Appendix - III

Table: The Employment position in respect of Scheduled Castes/Gujjars & Bakarwals and Ex-serviceman employees as on 01.07.87

Name of Community	Nos. of Employees in Govt. Services	% age in employment	% age in population
Sch. Castes	6,765	3.52	8.00
Ex-Serviceman	3,145	1.63	N-A
Gujjar & Bakerwals	1,071	0.56	7.00

Table: The percentage of employment and percentage of population of Various Communities in Jammu and Kashmir

Name of Community	Nos. of Employees	% of employees	%age in population
Hindus	10,398	33.75	32.27
Muslims	18,733	60.80	64.19
Sikhs	1,499	4.87	2.23
Others	178	0.58	1.31
Total	30,308	100.00	100.00

Appendix - IV

Instrument of Accession

Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion known as India, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omission, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General may be over specify, be applicable to the Dominion of India.

And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted, by the Governor General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof:

Now, therefore, I Shriman Inder Mahander Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji Jammu and Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipathi, Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State, in the exercise of my Sovereignty in and order my said State do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession; and

- i) I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession but subject always to terms thereof, and the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as "this State") such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India, on the 15th Day of August 1947, (which Act as so in force is hereafter referred to as "the Act").
- ii) I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.
- iii) I accept the matters specified in the scheduled hereto as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.
- iv) I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such

agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

- v) The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by Instrument supplementary to this Instrument supplementary to this Instrument.
- vi) Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this State authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purpose of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense, or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India.
- vii) Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangement with the Government of India under any such future constitution.
- viii) Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my Sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.
- ix) I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.

Given under my hand this 26th day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven.

Hari Singh,
Maharajadhiraj of Jammu and Kashmir State

Acceptance of Accession by the Governor-general of India

I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.

Dated this twenty-seventh day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven.

Mountbatten of Burma
Governor General of India

Appendix - V

Shimla Agreement, 3rd July 1972

Shimla Agreement on Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan signed by Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and President of Pakistan, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, in Shimla on July 3, 1972.

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

- i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.
- ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.
- iii) That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
- iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means;
- v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality;

- vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

Both governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such informations as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

In order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:

- i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border, posts and air links including over-flights.
- ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.
- iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.
- iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.

In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that:

- i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.
- ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control^{****} resulting from the

* Neither the Karachi Agreement to 1949 nor the Shimla Agreement of 1972 refers to the Siachen Glacier, 74 km long, believed to be the world's largest in the non-polar regions, now turned into a battleground at altitudes from 15,000 and 20,000 feet since June 1984. It remained undemocrated as no troops had ever been deployed there. Later Indian troops moved in when Pakistan was discovered encouraging foreign expeditions to go there. Pakistani contention is that the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, should go eastwards to meet the Karakoram Pass. India, on the other hand, maintains that Pakistan cannot have any right over

cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertaken to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

- iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

undemarcated uninhabited area belonging to J & K State which is an Indian State. A succession of meetings at different levels during the past over three years to solve the dispute have proved futile with the result that confrontation for control of 4,000 sq.km of the inhospitable Siachen continues.

Appendix - VI

Pakistan^{*} Cooperation

Agreement signed at Ankara March 5, 1959, Entered into force March 5, 1959.

Agreement of cooperation between the government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan:

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1958¹. Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperations signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955². Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;³.

Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations; Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan;

Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954,⁴ as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East;⁵ and

* The text of this Agreement is taken from United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 10, Part 1, 1959 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office), pp. 317-319.

1. TIAS 4084; 9 UST 1077.
2. British Command 9429, Miscellaneous No.5 (1955).
3. TS 993; 59 Stat. 1031.
4. 68 Stat. 832; 22 U.S.C. 1751 note.
5. 71 Stat. 5; 22 U.S.C. 1961-1965.

Considering that similar agreements are being entered into by the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of Iran and Turkey, respectively,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.

Article II

The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Pakistan such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.

Article III

The Government of Pakistan undertakes to utilize such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Pakistan and of preserving its national independence and integrity.

Article IV

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable provisions of this agreement.

Article V

The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the cooperation between the Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or arrangements.

Article VI

This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government of terminate the agreement.

Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.

For the Government of USA
Fletcher Warren

For the Government of Pakistan
Sayid M. Hassan

[Seal]

[Seal]

Appendix - VII

Letter Dispatched to Ghulam Nabi Fai

The White House
Washington

December 27, 1993

Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai
Executive Director
Kashmir-American Council
Suite 1100
733 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Ghulam

Thank you so much for your kind words about my recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly.

I share your belief that, in order to face the dilemmas of a post-Cold War global landscape, we all must look closely at our policies with regard to human rights. I am confident that we can bring about changes that are consistent with what the U.N. founders envisioned.

I look forward to working with you and others to help bring peace to Kashmir, and I appreciate your input.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

Appendix - VIII

List of New Training Camps and Forward Staging Camps in Pakistan & POK

Training Camps

- Muzaffarabad (10 Camps)
- Garhi Dupatta
- Peshawar
- Ilaqa Gair (on Pakistan Afghanistan border)
- Gund
- Khost
- Kotli
- Attock
- Garhi Habibullah
- Mirpur
- Abbotabad
- Bagh
- Rawalakot

Staging Posts

- Khojabandi
- Lipa Valley
- Dudhnial
- Kel
- Tejian
- Nekrun

Camps in Afghanistan

- Al Badar Training in handling small arms for 45 days.
- Al Badar II Training in automatic weapons, mortars ambushes, raids and explosive devices for 30 days.
- Al Badar III Commando and specialised training of 60 days.
- 8 other camps Location not known

Appendix - IX

Analysis of Militancy Based on Population Pattern and Affiliation of the Population

Demographic Pattern

The total Muslim population of Kashmir valley is above 30 lakhs. The breakdown being approximately:

- a) Shias - below 1,00,000
- b) Sunnis - 29,00,000.

There are six districts in the Kashmir valley, their demographic pattern is shown below:

Dist.	Muslims		Hindus (before Migration)	Sikhs	Others
	Shias/Sunnis				
Kupwara	NK	97.5%	2%	0.4%	0.1%
Baramulla	11%	87%	1.5%	0.3%	0.2%
Srinagar	26%	64.5%	8%	1.4%	0.1%
Budgam	32%	54.5%	2.8%	0.6%	0.1%
Pulwama	NK	95%	2.5%	1.6%	0.9%
Anantnag	NK	95.6%	3.8%	0.5%	0.1%

Age Structure	ANE* Below 20 Yrs.	Between 21 to 25 Yrs	Between n 26 to 35 Yrs.	Above 35 Years
Fully Trained	40%	47%	12%	19%
Partly Trained	28%	31%	27%	14%
Economic Background	Rs.500 - Rs.1000	Rs.1000 to Rs. 2000	Rs.2000 & Above	Depen- dent
Trained	68%	11%	2%	19%
Partly Trained	52%	21%	11%	16%
Education Factor	Illiterates	Under Matric	Under Gradute	Graduate and Above
Trained	21%	44%	29%	6%
Untraine d	22%	40%	25%	13%

Professions	Labourers	Petty Traders	Students	Agri- cultur ists	Govt. Servants
Trained	42%	14%	19%	22%	3%
Partly Untrained	25%	18%	17%	21%	19%

* ANE - Anti National Element

Motivational Factors

Under Duress	-	35%
Persuasion	-	28%
Allurement	-	22%
Ideology	-	16%
Other Reasons	-	9%

Major Militants Organisations and their Areas of Influence

Kupwara Dist.	-	JKHM, Al-Barq and JKLF
Baramulla Dist.	-	Al Johad, IUM, JKLF and JKHM
Srinagar Dist.	-	Al Umar, JKLF, JKHM, Al Jihad and IUM
Budgam Dist.	-	JKHM, JKLF and IUM
Pulwama Dist.	-	IUM, JKHM and JKLF
Anantnag Dist.	-	JKLF, Al Jihad, JKHM

JKHM - Jammu and Kashmir Hizbul Mujahidin

JKLF - Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

IUM - Ikhan-ul-Muslimeen.

Appendix - X

Table: Major Political Groups in Jammu and Kashmir

			All Party Hurriyat Conference				
Party	National Conference	Congress (I)	Jamat-i-Islami	Peoples Conference	Awami Action Committee	Peoples League	Muslim Conference
Head	Farooq Abdullah	Gulam Rasool Kar	Hakim Gulam Nabi	Abdul Gani Lone	Miswaiz Maulvi Umar Farooq	Many Factions	Prof. Abdul Gani
Character	Pro-India	Pro-India	Pro-Militant Anti-India	Anti- India	Anti-India	Pro-militant Anti-India	Anti-India
Excellence	Ruled the State for about 40 yrs	Never won public support in Kashmir	Believed to be cadre based	Formerly advocate of internal autonomy for Kashmir	Having stronghold in Srinagar city	Having widely recognised leader, Shabir Shah	Originally formed by Maulvi Yousuf Shah reformed by Prof. Gani
Present Status	Target of militants	Target of Militants	Banned by the Govt.	Not in good books of Govt.	Its activities disturb the Govt.	Banned by Govt.	Disliked by the Govt.
Effect	Lost about 3 dozen activists and leaders at the hand of militants.	Many workers killed by Militants	Many workers and leaders killed by the forces	Many workers and leaders killed by the forces	Lost its founder chairman Minwaiz Maulvi Farooq	Lost many workers and leaders at the hands of Indian forces	Nominally affected
Leadership	Away	Fled from Kashmir	Behind the bars and underground	Not vast	Limited	Arrested and underground	Limited
Election/ Political Process	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

Select Bibliography

Primary Sources

Original Documents, Acts and Reports

1. **Memorandum on Kashmir and some Adjacent Territories** by Charles Girdleston B.C.S., Officer on special duty in Kashmir in 1871.
2. **A Gazetteer of Kashmir and the Adjacent Territories**, Central Asia, Part II Sec. I, published in 1875 by Charles Ellison Bates.
3. **The Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette**, Vol. 51, No.17 a of 1941.
4. **Government of India Gazette (Extraordinary)** of 5th April 1926.
5. **Extract** from Lt. Col. H.M. Lawrence C.B. Aget to the Governor General (N.W.F.) to Lt. J. Nicholson on special duty to Maharaja Gulab Singh, Foreign Department Secret Proceedings No. 1247 of 26th Dec. 1846.
6. **A Short account of Kashmir** by Kishan Lal (Translated by P.A. Vans Agrews Assistant Agent Gov. General), Foreign Department Secret Proceedings Political No. 68 of 31st March 1848.
7. **Notes on Kashmir and Jammu** forwarded for submission to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General by Mr. Forsyth, Officiating secretary to the Government of Punjab, Foreign Department Proceedings, No. 73 of July 1863.
8. **Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir**, 1957.
9. **Constitution of India**.
10. **Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) order**, 1954.
11. **Jammu and Kashmir, A Review of Progress**, 1956 and 1962.
12. **Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazettes**.
13. **Kashmir Question (1947-56)**, Information Service of India, New Delhi.
14. **Report of Second and Fourth General Elections**, Election Department, Jammu and Kashmir, 1962 and 1967.

15. **White Paper** on Constitutional Relationship of Kashmir with India, Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front, 1964.

Publications of the Government of India and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

1. **The Graham Report** (1958).
2. **Meeting and Correspondence** between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, July 1953-October 1954 (1954).
3. Prime Minister Khrushchev's Visit to India: **Collection of Estimates** (1960).
4. Prime Minister's **Press Conferences** 1953-54 (1954).

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

1. Kashmir Answers Pakistan (1965).
2. Kashmir: V.K. Krishna Menon's **Speeches in the Security Council**, 1958.
3. Pakistan's War Propaganda (1956).
4. **Selected Speeches** of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, September 1946-April 1961 (1961).
5. **Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru**, Vol. I, Sept.-1946-May 1949, (1949); Vol. II, June 1949-February 1953(1954); Vol. III March 1953-Aug. 1957,(1958); Vol. IV, September 1957-April 1963(1964).

Publications of Pakistan Government

1. India's Threat to Pakistan, **Correspondence** between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India, 15 July-11 August 1951, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Karachi, 1951.
2. **Reports** on Kashmir by UN Representatives, Karachi, 1958.

United Nations sources

Security Council Documents

1. **S/628** Indian Complaint dated January 2, 1948 to U.N.
2. **S/646** Pakistan's counter complaint dated January 50, 1948 to U.N.

3. **S/3767** Pakistan's Letter dated January 2, 1957 to the Security Council requesting for a meeting of the Council.
4. **S/PV 762/Add.1**, Documents submitted as annexes to the statements made by V.K. Krishna Menon at the 762-64 meetings of the Security Council.
5. **S/5058** Pakistani letter dated January 11, 1962 to the Security Council for further action in the Kashmir dispute.
6. **S/5060 and Corr. 1**, Indian Letter dated Jan. 16, 1962 to the Security Council opposing the idea of a Meeting of the Council on Kashmir.
7. **S/5517** Pakistani Letter dated January 16, 1964 to the Security Council asking for an immediate meeting to discuss the situation arising out of the Hazaratbal incident.
8. **S/5522** Indian Letter dated January 24, 1964 to the Security Council that Pakistani demand for a meeting of the Council was propagandist.

U.N.C.I.P. Resolutions

1. **S/1430** December 1949 (Text of the Resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 respectively).

U.N.C.I.P. Reports and Statements

1. **S/1453** Report of General A.G.L. Mc Naughton, Feb. 6, 1950.
2. **S/791** Report of Sir Owen Dixon, Sept. 15, 1950.
3. **S/2375** First Report of Dr. Frank Graham, Oct. 15, 1951.
4. **S/2446** Second Report of Dr. Frank Graham, Dec. 18, 1951.
5. **S/2611** Third Report of Dr. Graham, April 22, 1952.
6. **S/2967** Fifth Report of Dr. Graham; March 27, 1953.
7. **S/3821** Report of Mr. Gunnar Jerring, April 29, 1957.
8. **S/3984** Report of Dr. Frank Graham, March 31, 1958.

Secondary sources

Books

1. Abdullah, Farooq, **My Dismissal**, Vikas, New Delhi, 1985.
2. Abdullah, Mohammed Sheikh, **Quit Kashmir (Memorandum to the British Cabinet Mission)**, (Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, 1946).
3. Adhikari G., **Documents of the History of C.P.I., Vol. I**, (1917- 22), PPH, New Delhi, 1971.
4. Ahmed, Aziz, **Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment**, Oxford, 1964.
5. _____, **Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1887-1954**, OAU, London, 1964.
6. Ahmed, Imtiaz, ed., **Ritual and Religion Among Muslims in India**, Manohar, New Delhi, 198-.
7. Ahmed, Mushtaq, **The United Nations and Pakistan**, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1955.
8. Akbar, M.J., **Kashmir: Behind the Vale**; Viking, London 1991.
9. Ayoob, Mohammed, ed., **The Politics of Islamic Reassertion**, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981.
10. Baig, M.R.A., **Muslim Dilemma in India**, Asia Pub. House, New Delhi, 1967.
11. Bamzai, Prem Nath, **Kashmir in Crucible**, Pamposh Pub., New Delhi, 1967.
12. Bannerman, Patrick, **Islam in Perspective**, Routledge, London, 1988.
13. Banuazizi, Alexandre and Myron Weiner, eds., **The State Religion and Ethnic Politics**, Syracuse Univ. Press, New York, 1986.
14. Bhattacharjea, Ajit, **Kashmir: The Wounded Valley**, UBSPD, New Delhi, 1994.
15. Brown, W.N., **The United States, India and Pakistan**, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1963.

16. Buchan, Alastair, Ed., **China and Peace of Asia**, London, The Institute of Strategic Studies, 1965.
17. Burke. S.M., **Pakistan's Foreign Policy**, OUP, London, 1973.
18. Chopra, V.D., **Genesis of Indo-Pakistan Conflict on Kashmir**, Patriot Pub., New Delhi 1990.
19. Choudhary, B.M. **Muslim Politics in India**, Orient Press, Calcutta, 1946.
20. Choudhury, Mohamed Ahsen, **Pakistan and Great Powers**, Council for Pakistan Studies, 1970.
21. Curtis Michael, ed., **Religion and Politics in Middle East**, Westview Press, Boulder colo., 1982.
22. Davis, Kingsley, **Population of India and Pakistan**, Prinston Univ. Press, Prinston, 1951.
23. Dekmejian, R. Hrair, **Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in Arab World+**, Syracuse Univ. Press, Syracuse New York, 1985.
24. Deora, M.S. and Grover R., **Documents on Kashmir Problem**, Ajanta Pub., New Delhi, 1991.
25. Dutt, V.N. and Cleghorn, B.F., eds, **Nationalist Muslims and Indian Politics**, Macmillan, London, 1974.
26. Embree, Ainzlie, T. ed., **Pakisthan's Western Borderlands: Transformation of a Political Order**, Vikas, New Delhi, 1977.
27. Engineer, A.A., **Indian Muslims : A Study of Minority Problem in India**, Ajanta, New Delhi, 1985.+
28. _____ **Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem**, Ajanta, New Delhi, 1991.
29. Esposito, John L., **Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society**, OUP, New York, 1991.
30. Gandhi M.K., **Collected Works (89 vols.)** Pub. Division, Government of India, New Delhi.
31. Goswami, B.N., **Pakistan and China: A Study of Their Relations**, Allied Pub., New Delhi, 1971.

32. Gupta, Shishir, **Kashmir: A Study of Indo-Pak Relations**, Asia Pub.House, Bombay, 1966.
33. Harrman, S., **Plight of Muslims in India**, D.K. Publishers, New Delhi, 1976.
34. Hasan, K. Sarwar, **China, India and Pakistan**, Pakistan Institute of Int. Affairs, Karachi, 1989.
35. Hasan, Mushirul, **Nationalism and Communal Politics in India**, Manohar, New Dlehi, 1991.
36. Hayes, Louis D., **Impact of U.S. Policy on Kashmir Conflict**, Tucson Univ. of Arizona Press, 1971 and 1990.
37. Imam, Zafar, **Muslims in India**, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1975.
38. Jagmohan, **My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir**, Allied, New Delhi, 1991.
39. Java, S.P., **The Social Structure of Hindi Muslim Community**, National, Delhi, 1975.
40. Jetley, Nancy, **India-China Relations, 1947-77**, Radiant, New Delhi, 1979.
41. Kabir, Humayun, **Minorities in Democracy**, K.L. Mukhopadhaya, Calcutta, 1969.
42. _____, **Muslim Politics, 1906-1947**, K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Farar, 1967.
43. **Kashmir Liberation Cell, Glimpses of Resistance Movement in Indian held Kashmir**, A.K., The Cell, Muzaffarabad, 1989.
44. Khaitan, Rajesh, **The Kashmir Tangle**, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1992.
45. Khan, Md. Ayub, **On the Crisis over Kashmir**, Government of Pakistan Press, 1965.
46. Kissinger, Henry A., **The White House Years**, Vikas, New Delhi, 1979.
47. Lamb, A., **Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy**, Roxford Books, UK, 1991.
48. Lawrence, Bruce, **Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age**, Harper and Row, New York, 1989.

49. Lawrence, Walter, **The Valley of Kashmir**, OUP, London, 1895; reprinted by Kesar Pub; Srinigar, 1967.
50. Lokhandwasa, S.T. **Indian and Contemporary Islam**, Simla Institute of Advance Studies, 1971.
51. Madhok, Balraj, **Kashmir: A Centre of New Alignments**, Deepak Prakashan, Delhi, 1987.
52. Mayer, A.E., **Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics**, Westview Press, Colorado, 1991.
53. Mishra, K.P., **Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy**, Allied Pub., New Delhi.
54. Mujtabi, F., **Aspects of Hindu-Muslim Cultural Relations**, National, New Delhi, 1978.
55. Narayanan, K.R., **India and America: Essays in Understanding**, Dialogue Pub., New Delhi, 1984.
56. Nayar, Baldev Raj, **American Geopolitics and India**, Manohar, New Delhi, 1976.
57. Nehru Jawaharlal, **Selected Works**, JNMF, New Delhi, 1986.
58. Noorani, A.G., **Kashmir Question Revisited**, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 1991.
59. Piscatori James, **Islamic Fundamentalism and Gulf Crisis**, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991.
60. Prasad, Rajendra, **India Divided**, Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1947.
61. Puri, Balraj, **Kashmir Towards Insurgency**, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1993.
62. Rao, G.N., **The India China Border: A Re-appraisal**, Asia Pub. House, New Delhi, 1968.
63. Rizvi, Janet, **Laddakh: Crossroads of High Asia**, OUP, New Delhi, 1983.
64. Sahliyeh, Emile, ed., **Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Modern World**, SUNY Press, Albany, 1990.

65. Shakir, Moin, **Muslims in Free India**, Kalamkar, New Delhi, 1972.
66. Sharma, Inderjit, **Kashmir India, Pakistan and United Nations**, Bhargava and Sons, Chandausi, 1956.
67. Stein, M.A., **Memoir on the Ancient Geography of Kashmir**, Archibald Constable, London, 1902.
68. Sufi, G.M.D., **History of Kashmir; 2 Vols.**, University of Punjab, Lahore, 1948 and 1949. Tapan Das, **Sino-Pak Collusion and U.S. Policy**, Asia Pub. House, New Delhi, 1972.
69. Teng, M.K., **Kashmir Article 370**, Anmol, New Delhi, 1990.
70. Thomas, Raju G.C., **Perspectives on Kashmir: Roots of Conflict in South Asia**, West View, USA, 1992.
71. _____, **The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security**, Lexington Books, Lexington Mass, 1983.
72. Warikoo, K., **Central Asia and Kashmir: A study in Context of Anglo-Russian Rivalry**, Gyan, New Delhi, 1989.
73. _____, **Society and Culture in Himalayas**, New Delhi, 1995.
74. Weiss, Anita, ed., **Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic laws in a Modern State**, Syracuse Univ. Press, Syracuse, N.Y., 1986.
75. Wolpert, Stanley, **Root of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Superpowers**, OUP, New York, 1982.
76. Younghusband, Sir Francis E., **Kashmir**, A and C. Black, London, 1909.
77. Zakaria, Rafique, **The Widening Divide**, Viking, New Delhi, 1995.

Journals and Periodicals

1. Ahmed, Firoz Bakht. **Assimilation: The Only Way**, Link, 36101; 17 Oct. 93; pp. 4-7.
2. Ahmed, Akbar., **Jinnah and the Quest for Muslim Identity**, History Today; 44(9); Sept. 94; pp. 34-40.

3. Akhtar M. Ramzan., **Modelling the Economic Growth of an Islamic Economy**, American Journal of Social Sciences, 10(4); Winter 1993; pp. 491-511.
4. Al-Azm, Sadik J., **Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critical outline of Problems, Ideas and Approaches**, Part-I, South Asia Bulletin, 13(1-2); 1993; pp. 93-121.
5. _____, **Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered**, Part II, South Asia Bulletin, 14(1); 1994; pp. 73-98.
6. Ahmed, Akbar. S., **Kashmir 1990: Islamic Revolt or Kashmiri Nationalism**, Strategic Studies, 14(3); Spring 1991; pp. 22-30.
7. Ali, M., **Jinnah Perception of Pakistan's Foreign Policy on Kashmir Issue**, Pakistan Horizon, 43(2); Apr. 90; pp. 71-86.
8. **Amnesty International, Report on Kashmir and Punjab Situation**, Muslim India, (135); Mar. 94; pp. 128-131.
9. Ansari, Iqbal A., **Indian Muslims and Kashmir**, Radical Humanist, 57(8); Nov. 93; pp. 16-21.
10. Aslam, F.I., **Muslim Minority in India**, South Asian Studies, 7(2); Jan. 90; pp. 1-24.
11. Bhattacharjea, Ajit, **Kashmir and its Heritage**, Mainstream, 32(29); 4June 94; pp. 9-18.
12. Bilgrani, Akeel., **What is a Muslim?: Fundamental Commitment and Identity**, Economic and Political Weekly, 27(20-21); May 1992; pp. 16-23.
13. Chopra, Surendra., **Islamic Fundamentalism and Pakistan's Foreign Policy**, India Quarterly, 49 (1-2); Jan-June 93; pp. 1-36.
14. Coll, Steve., **How the U.S. Backed Islamic Fundamentalism : On the Role of CIA in Afghanistan**, Philosophy of Social Actions, 18(3); July-Sept 1992; pp. 21-24.
15. Darshan, Singh., **India and the OIC**, India Quarterly, 50(4); Oct.- Dec. 1994; pp. 15-32.
16. **Economic Development of Indian Muslims: Issues and Problems**, Link, 35(39); 9 May 1993; pp. 12-27.

17. Eickhelman, Bale F., **Islamic Liberalism Strikes Back**, Middle East Studies Asso. Bulletin, 27(2); Dec. 1993; pp. 531-548.
18. Engineer, Asghar Ali., **Language and Mobility: North Indian Muslim Perspective**, Mainstream, 33 (29); 10 June 1995; pp. 15-17.
19. _____, **Muslims in a Multi-Religious Society**, EPW, 25 (44); 3 Nov. 1990; pp. 2420-24.
20. Engineer, Irfan., **Politics of Muslim Vote Bank**, EPW, 30(4); 28 Jan. 1995; pp. 197-200.
21. Faksh, M.A., **Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in Post Gulf War Period**, International Journal, 49(2); Spring 1994; pp. 183-218.
22. Ganguli, Sumit, and Bajpai Kanti, **India and the Crisis in Kashmir**, Asian Survey 34(5); May 1994; pp. 401-416.
23. Ghosh, Partha S., **Kashmir Tangle and Indo-Pak Relations-I**, Mainstream 28(34); June 16, 1990; pp. 15-18.
24. _____, **Kashmir Tangle and Indo-Pak Relations-II**, Mainstream, 28 (35); June 23, 1990; pp.33-34.
25. Gupta, C., and MKS, Pseud. **Muslim and the News**, Mainstream, 31 (14); 13 Feb. 93; pp. 15-19.
26. Gupta, Dipankar, **Communalism and Fundamentalism: Some Notes on the Nature of Ethnic Politics in India**, EPW, 26 (11 & 12); Mar. 1991, pp. 573-93.
27. Haque, Mozammel., **Muslim Kashmir Facing Genocide**, Pakistan Horizon, 44(3); July 1991; pp. 43-54.
28. Jayaram, N., **Ethnicity and Education: A Socio-Historical Perspective on the Educational Backwardness of Indian Muslims**, Sociological Bulletin, 39(1-2); Mar-Sep. 1990; pp. 115-30.
29. Kesavan, Mukul., **Invoking a Majority: The Congress Islam and the Modern Age**, 24(2); May 1993; pp. 108-130.
30. Khan, Ali., **Kashmir Dispute: A Plan for Regional Cooperation**, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 41(3); 1994; pp. 495-550.

31. Khan, N.A., **Study of Prejudice among Hindu and Muslim Youths in Relation to Feeling Security and Insecurity**, Indian Psychological Review, 33(5-6); May-June 1990; pp. 36-39.
32. Kishtwar, M., **Kashmiri and Kashmiriyat: The Politics of Language, Religion and Region**, Manushim (82); May-June, 1994; pp. 2-6.
33. Malik, I.N., **Pakistan's National Security and Regional Issues: Politics of Mutualities with the Muslim World**, Asian Survey, 34(12); Dec. 1994; pp. 1077-92.
34. Malviya, Gopal Ji, **American Approach to Indian Kashmir**, Strategic Analysis, 17(5); Aug. 1994; pp. 627-640.
35. Muhammad, Akbar, **Muslims in the U.S.: History Religion Politics and Ethnicity**, Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, 12(2); July 91; pp. 433-49.
36. Naim, C.M., **Minority Rights or Human Rights?** South Asia Bulletin, 12(2); Fall 1992; pp. 35-38.
37. Nasr, S.V.R., **Democracy and Islamic Revivalism**, Political Science Quarterly, 110(2); Summer 1995; pp. 261-85.
38. Noorani, A.G., **Indian Muslims**, Mainstream 29(26); 20 Apr. 91; pp. 15-16.
39. Osmaston, H., **Ladakh and Kashmir are caught in the Religious Crossfire**; Geographical, 62(6); June 1990; pp 17-21.
40. Pandita, K.N., **Kashmir Muslim Society: New Contours**, World Affairs, 3(2); Dec. 1994; pp. 51-53.
41. Pubjabi, Riyaz., **Inter-Religious Conflicts and Rise of Fundamentalism in India**, Mainstream, 29(11); 5 Jan. 1991; pp. 15-21.
42. Puri, Balraj., **Kashmiri Muslims, Islam and Kashmiri Tradations**, EPW, 25(9); Mar. 3, 1990; pp. 422-23.
43. Rahman, A., **Muslims in India: Need for Rethinking - II**, Mainstream, 30 (27); 25 Apr. 1992; pp. 25-30.
44. _____, **Muslims in India: Need for Rethinking - III**, Mainstream, 30(28); 2 May, 1992; pp. 20-24.

45. Raza, Monis., **Indian Muslims in their Homeland**, EPW, 29(39); 24 Sept. 1994; pp. 2540-45.
46. Robb, P.G., **Muslim Identity and Separatism in India: The Significance of M.A. Ansari**, Islam and Modern Age, 24(2); May, 1993; pp. 155-182.
47. Sazwal, V.K., **Towards a Strategic Solution of Kashmir Problem**, World Affairs, 2(2); Dec. 1993; pp. 24-26.
48. Siwei, Mao, **China and the Kashmir Issue**, Strategic Analysis, 17(12); Mar. 1995; pp. 1573-95.
49. Sonalkar, S., **Muslim Problem: A Perspective**, EPW, 28(26); 26 June 1993; pp. 1345-49.
50. Tayob, A.I., **Paradigm of Knowledge of the Modern Islamic Resurgence**, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 12(2); Summer 1995; pp. 155-169.
51. Warikoo, K., **Muslim Migrations from Xinjiang to Kashmir, 1931-1949**, Strategic Analysis, 14(1); Apr. 1991; pp. 17-34.
52. Wright, T., and Khalidi, O., **Majority Hindu Images, Stereotypes and Demands of Minority in India: The Backlash**, Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, 12(2); July 1991; pp. 321- 24.