

INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF WAR

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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Shalini Saxena

*Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of
Master of philosophy
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
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
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Shalini Saxena

***Dedicated to my
'Grand mother'***

Chapter-I

Introduction

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

The invasion of Kuwait radically altered the global strategic environment. It introduced a series of political economic and security imbalances which, persuaded and aggravated threat perceptions of the entire global community, varying only in degree and nature.

THE BACKGROUND :

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute that broke out on Aug. 2nd 1990 has been simmering for quite a long time and it mainly centred around the Iraqi charges of Kuwaiti territorial claim, stealing of oil from Iraqi oil fields and deliberate attempts to lower the price of oil.

On 17th July 1990, some more serious claims were made by President Saddam Hussein. President referred to the Iran-Iraq war, and the material and human losses suffered by Iraq and said that, " instead of rewarding Iraq which gave them the flower of its youth, the Arabs and the Gulf states were acting as badly as possible towards Baghdad. ¹⁾

President demanded that they should write off their loans estimated at U.S. \$ 50 billion- as brotherly assistance and in addition

1. Summary of world Broadcasts (SWB), Part IV A/5, July 20, 1990

help Iraq with U.S. \$ 30 billion which in his opinion the oil rich Arab states owed Iraq. His claimd from Kuwait were more specific. He demonded U.S. \$ 14 billion as compensation for oil revenue losses due to a deliberatelly lowered oil price and a further US \$ 24 billion for oil that Kuwait allegedly stole from Rumaila oil fields. President Saddam Hussien also demanded that a U.S. \$ 12 billion was time loan be written off. ⁽²⁾.

Moreover, he claimed the Bubiyan and warban islands in Gulf and demanded an access to the sea through Kuwait. Kuwait rejected these demands in the high level meeting held at Taif on Aug 1, 1990, between the Iraq Vice-President of the Revolutionary command council, Izzat Ibrahim, and the Kuwait Prime Minister Sheik Saad Al-Abdullah Al- Salim Al- Sabah. Instead of further negotiations, Iraqi forces march into Kuwait hardly facing any opposition from the meagre Kuwaiti force of 3,000. In less than a week (on Aug. 8, 90) Baghdad announced the mergeing Kuwait in Iraq and the Kuwait was declared the 19th province of Iraq. Thus the stage was set for a crisis that involved not only regional powers of West Asia but also raised an alarm that put the two super powers and the rest of the world on their toes.

While most countries of the world were caught by surprise, the United States, ever since the end of the Iran-Iraq war was antici-

2. K.R. Singh, " Changing International Environment & Regional Stability in West Asia " Paper presented at the seminar on West Asia organised by the Nataji Institute of Asian Studies, Calcutta, 23-24 Jan., 1991

pating the future plans of Saddam Hussein to emerge was the big brother of the region and fill the vacuum left by President Nasser.

During the decade long war with Iran, Baghdad strengthened its position both in terms of conventional and chemical weapons and has emerged as a threat to the pro-U.S. oil regimes in the Gulf and also to Israel. In May 1990, President Saddam Hussein addressing a gathering of Arab leaders in Baghdad, remarked that "he considered oil production above the limit set for each producer nation by the OPEC to be an act of war Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC limits at that time."³

IRAQ'S CLAIMS ON KUWAIT :-

Iraq's interest in Kuwait was expressed first by King Ghazi in the 1930's while the British still controlled Kuwait. These claims were then revived by Iraqi strongman Qasim's threat to take over immediately after the British withdrawal from Kuwait in 1961. Resistance first by the British then by collective action of the Arab league dispelled the threat and in 1963 the Ba'athist regime which overthrew Qasim recognised Kuwait and its frontier. Qasim recognised Kuwait and its frontier. After the Ba'athist coup in 1968 in Iraq and the buildup of Iraqi forces with Soviet assistance in 1972, Iraq turned its interest to acquiring the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warba, and some adjacent coastline, which command the entry

3. Time ; March 11, 1991 , P-51

to Umm Qasr, Iraq's only port on the Gulf. These Gulf islands became the objects of renewed disputes. A series of incidents at the Kuwaiti frontier with Iraq occurred in the 1970's. These were followed by less blatant but equally persistent Iraqi pressure for concessions from Kuwait for the use of the islands in the early 1980.⁽⁴⁾

(1) KUWAIT BEING PART OF BASRAH, SO SHOULD BE A PART OF IRAQ :

Modern Iraq is a comparatively recent creation in 1922, Great Britain carved out a kingdom of Faisal, an Arab chieftain, and named it Iraq. Earlier, it was known as Mesopotamia, or the land between two rivers, i.e. the Euphrates and the Tigris.

Historically, contacts between India and Present day Iraq go back to the third millennium B.C. and were shaped by cross-currents of commercial and cultural interection. At that time, civilization in India flourished on the banks of the Indus while Arab culture blossomed along the Euphrates and the Nile. The Persian Gulf acted as a bridge through which India traded with the western world while the Arabs had economic interaction with the eastern world, including India. These contracts, continued till Islam came to the subcontinent in the 7th century A.D. the period upto 10th century A.D. is often termed as the golden age of trade and cultural interaction between the Arab world and India.

4. Wm. J. Olson, "US Strategic Interest in the Gulf region", 1989-P-11.

It is important to draw attention to this distinction at this time firstly to clarify the Iraqi claim to Kuwait. This territorial claim is judged according to three main criteria. The first is the documented history of the sovereignty exercised over the territory in question, the second is the behaviour of the claimant state with regard to the state whose territory is claimed and the third relates to the established behaviour of other states and the international community as a whole.

The Iraqi claim to Kuwait is based firstly upon its interpretation of the status of Kuwait as part of the ottoman empire that is, as part of the ottoman province of Basrah, secondly upon the fact that the state of Iraq was constructed out of the unification of the ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Barrah after the first world war, and since Kuwait was part of Basrah it should also be part of Iraq. Thirdly, it is implicit in the Iraqi's case that had Turkey been able to oversee the succession to its empire, Kuwait would have been made part of Iraq.

Thus any judgement as to the validity of the Iraqi's claim must rest upon three consideration-

- (1) An examination of Iraq's contention regarding the status of Kuwait as part of the ottoman empire;*

- (2) *Whether there was any 'natural' continuity of the provinces that became Iraq from pre-ottoman times upon which a post ottoman structure could be based; in other words, is there a pre-ottoman logic making for the state of 'Iraq' and could be said to be part of it.*
- (3) *Some judgement as to the validity of the succession to the ottoman empire in the absence of Turkey as a key player.*

The Iraqis made a number of justifications for the invasion of Kuwait

- (1) *Kuwait is part of Iraq;*
- (2) *Part of Kuwait is part of Iraq;*
- (3) *Iraq was invited in by revolutionary democratic forces who wanted to overthrow the Kuwaiti government;*
- (4) *Kuwait was undermining the economic well-being of Iraq by refusing to limit oil production and thus helping to keep the price of oil low.*
- (5) *Iraq's contention that the 'Kuwait problem' could be considered in the same context as the palestinian problem with implication that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait at the same time as Israel withdrew from the occupied territories The implication of that is, that Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to solve the palestinian problem.*

It has already been established that Iraq's territorial claim is a very weak claim more over is under-mined by claiming at one time the whole of Kuwait and at another only part of it. Point 3, above was merely a device and not persisted in for more than a couple of days, after which the annexation of Kuwait was announced.

INDIA'S INTERESTS

Though India's immediate interests is the safety and security of her citizens in both the countries, however, on a long term basis, India cannot afford to be indifferent. On account of other factors too viz., the size of Indian expatriates in the Gulf region, the volume of the monetary remittances, the supply and prices of oil, the security implications, especially the effect on Indo-Pak, military equations,

INDO-IRAQ RELATIONS SINCE INDIA BECAME INDEPENDENT :

Indo-Iraq relations improved considerably after India become independent. In November 1952, India and Iraq signed a treaty of perpetual peace and friendship, and the cultural links between the two nations were revived and formalised with the signing of a treaty in 1954 to that effect. ⁽⁵⁾.

5. Foreign Affairs Records; N. Delhi, Govt. of India No. -1952, P-76.

It must however be noted that despite of these treaties, the relations between India and Iraq did not prosper in the mid fifties because of the emergence of the Baghdad pact which was perceived by India as an encirclement of the country. (6)

A positive turn in Indo-Iraq relations took place after 1958 when Iraq came under military rule resulting in the rise to power of a radical group. Under the new dispensation, Iraq declared it self a republic and pulled out of the pro-western Baghdad pact It is note worthy that India was one of the first few countries to recognise the new government of Iraq with Nehru describing the regime as well established stable and popular (7). India welcomed the change because the new government of Iraq not only pulled the country out of the Baghdad Pact, but also encouraged the development of Arab nationalism. Not only was a trade agreement signed between India and Iraq, the two countries also agreed to give the most favoured nation treatment to the goods produced and marketed by each other.

Though Iraq maintained strict neutrality in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962- its position changed. How ever, in favour of India in 1964 when president Arif said that , " The aggressor should not

6. Jawahar lal. Nehru, "India's Foreign Policy" , New Delhi, Govt. of India- 1962.

7. Foreign Affairs Records, Dec. 88, P-362.

be allowed to enjoy the fruits of aggression and the Indo-Pak war of 1965, such an Iraqi posture did not in the way of the friendship that had characterised the relations between the two states." ⁽⁸⁾

The second half of the sixties however witnessed great cordially in Indo-Iraq relations. The visit of Iraq's Foreign and Defence Ministers to India in March and April, 1967 resulted in India's decision to send its Air Force instructors to Iraq to help, organise and train their counterparts in Iraq. India also again fighter aircraft to Iraq as a symbol of its assistance to Iraq defence build up. ⁽⁹⁾

It is again interesting to note that during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 over Bangladesh though all the Arab countries supported Pakistan, Iraq maintained strict neutrality. Iraq was quick to support the Simla Agreement as the basis for support the Simla Agreement as the basis for futhur Indo-Pak relations.

From 1973 on wards Iraq assisted India in a big way in the latter's crude oil requirements. As part of an agreement signed in 1973, Iraq agreed to supply 30 million tons of crude oil to India for a period of ten years, thus covering 50% of the crude oil requirement of India. Additionally it gave India \$ 50 million credit in the shape of crude for meeting in part of foreign exchange requirements

8. Ajay N. Jha, "India's relations with the Gulf Countries", *Inter regional cooperation*, N. Delhi 1987, P- 54

9. *Ibid* , P-55

for the setting up of the Mathura oil refinery. ⁽¹⁰⁾.

Moreover, Iraq agreed to participate, to give the oil and natural gas commission of India a service contract for exploration of oil in an on shore concession in Iraq ⁽¹¹⁾.

India reciprocated in good measure by agreeing to assist Iraq with the supply of goods and services for a number of Iraq development projects such as railway lines, ship building and manufacture of light engineering goods.

While the seventies marked the high point in Indo-Iraq trade and economic relations, the 80's witnessed a noticeable decline. The Iran Iraq war continued throughout the 80's, resulted not only in the loss of Iraq's industrial, technological and crude oil capabilities, but also had its direct impact on Indo-Iraq relations. As a result of Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi economic assistance to India also declined sharply and its place was taken up by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq also found it difficult during the 80's to pay Indian contract over owing them more than Rs. 900 crores. The Indian work force in Iraq during the 80 's also came down to 20,000 as against 1.3 million in other Gulf countries. ⁽¹²⁾.

10. Jay Savarkar, "India-Baghdad Pact", *Far Eastern economic Review* 28, May, P-35-37

11. *Ibid*

12. Arun Kumar Banejee, "The Gulf war and the energy crisis" 1993 P- 38,

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Indo-Iraq relations remained stable during the 80' s largely because Iraq represented secularism, a progressive outlook and modernity in a region, and modernity in a region dominated by Muslim fundamentalist and feudal monarchs some of whom have often provided military assistance to Pakistan and may have been sources of arms sent through Pakistan to the terrorists in India. More than all these, it has been a matter of politico-strategic gratification to India that Iraq has been the only country in the Organisation of Islamic Countries have supported India's position on Kashmir⁽¹³⁾ Indian leaders, in their Policy towards Iraq were also influenced by the secular muslim appreciations of Saddam Hussein's policies.

INDIA-KUWAIT RELATIONS :-

Ever since the eighteenth century the status of Kuwait had been ambiguous one, being on the periphery of the ottoman empire, on the one hand it was considered as being inside it because it flew the ottoman flag, but on the other being sufficiently autonomous and even 'wild' as not to be with in the military control of the ottoman empire.

All through the Gulf crisis, India sympathised with Kuwait and supported it at the U.N. Security Council as well as other international force to regain its independence and sovereignty.

13. Ibid

The reasons for the strained relationship between the two traditional friends was India's stand during the Gulf crisis. India's ambivalent attitude-interpreted as 'cool' by the Kuwaitis, and it caused many a ripples in Kuwait. In 1971, during the war with Pakistan some west Asian countries, including Saudi Arabia, -had declared an oil embargo against india. The only country which opposed this embargo and continued petroleum supplies to India was Kuwait. Secondly, in 1982 when the then Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi was finding it tough to host the Asian games because of the enormous expenditure involved in building flyovers and stadia, the Amir Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed al Sabah came to rescue by providing generous assistance. The Indira Gandhi indoor stadium is a standing symbol of that co-operation. Because of all this Kuwait obviously wanted a categorical condemnation of Saddam Hussein's misadventure across the border into Kuwaiti territory, which India could not do in view of its close relationship with both the countries.⁽¹⁴⁾

Further India's domestic political scene as it prevailed then, had its impact on its approach towards the Gulf crisis. Just one week after the Iraqi troops rolled into Kuwaiti territory India found itself in the midst of Political turmoil over the V.P. Singh government's decision to implement the Mandal Commission Report. Added to this

14. Bansidhar Pradhan, "Indo-Kuwait Relations : Back on the track", Link, March 1992, P-2510.

was L.K. Advani's Rath Yatra over the Mandir-Masjid dispute in Ayodhya. These two issues causes a lot of political uncertain. The Muslim population also by and large rallied behind Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein's palestinian card made things futher difficult for India. The advancement of U.S. led allied troops into the Gulf was seen as an attempt to subjugate and intimidate the third world. And our foreign policy orientation then was not benifit of its moral precepts so as to the American line. Thus a complex set of factors compelled India to maintain such a stand towards the Gulf crisis. The Kuwaiti Government expressed its displeasure in numerous ways.

All through the Gulf crisis, India sympathesied with Kuwait and supported it at the U.N. Security Council as well as other international force to regain its independence and sovereignty. The reasons given by Iraq for invading Kuwait in 1990 compare favourable with the reasons given in the past by stronger neighbouring powers while making military intervention in smaller states.

CRISIS OF HUNGARY (1956)

USSR invaded on Hungary in 1956. Jawaharlal Nehru made a statement in Lok Sabha - "Even as we were distressed by the events in Egypt, we viewed with grave concern and distress the events in Hungary. It is possible that what happened to one country produced its reactions in the other, and the two taken together, created a very serious international situation. But it is well to remember that though

both deserves serious attention, the nature of one differed from the other."⁽¹⁵⁾

There was a resolution in U.N. General Assembly in regard to Hungary, sponsored by Pakistan, Cuba, Italy, Peru and Ireland, against which we voted. The resolution was improperly worded. But the most objectionable part of it demanded that elections should be held in Hungary under the supervision of the United Nations. We took this was contrary to the charter and would reduce Hungary to less than a sovereign state. Any acceptance of intervention of this type, namely foreign supervised elections, seemed to us to set a bad precedent which might be utilized in future for intervention in other countries.

Nehru said, "In regard to Hungary the difficulty was that the broad facts were not clear to us. Also the occurrences in Hungary took place at a moment when suddenly the international situation became very much worse and we had to be a little surer and clearer as to what had actually happened and what the present position was. Therefore we were a little cautious in the expression of our opinion in regard to facts, though not in regard to the general principles that should govern conditions there."⁽¹⁶⁾

15. *Jawaharlal Nehru, "Statement in Lok Sabha", Nov. 16, 1956*

16. *From the Speech during debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, Nov. 19, 1956.*

The Problem of Hungary and the Soviet Union, was no immediate aggression there in the sense of something militarily happening as there was in the case of Egypt. It was really a continuing intervention of Soviet armies in these countries, based on the Warsaw Pact. It is sure that the great force of the Soviet Union triumphed in the military way in Budapest and Hungary.

INDIAN RESPONSE :

When the Hungarian crisis broke out, Nehru's primary concern was to keep the conflict localized. In the United Nations on Nov. 9, 1956 India voted with the Soviet bloc against the General Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary to be followed by elections under U.N. auspices. (17).

From Nov. 15th onwards, however Nehru unequivocally called for the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary and for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Hungarian people. Yet he refused to support the application of pressure by the U.N. to achieve these ends.

17. *Krishna Menon's vote was apparently made without direct authorization from New Delhi. Nonetheless Nehru enclosed position taken by Menon on Nov. 15, told The Indian Parliament's consultative committee on foreign that an election under auspices might create a bad precedent (In-relation to Kashmir). It is worth noting that almost all the other non-aligned Afro-Asian nations abstained on the issue.*

The soviet were natrually pleased with India's initial response to the Hungarian situation, but became somewhat annoyed at the attitude towards East European conditions in 1957-58 . During the period the Soviet leaders pointedly reminded Nehru of India many pressing domestic problems, particularly Kashmir.

Nehru said, " Our great anxiety and the anxiety of many other peoples, in this matter has been the situation should not be allowed to drift towards war. Naturally, this house and all of us have witnessed the gravest tragedies that have been enacted in Hungary and have the greatest sympathy for the people there. But we have also kept in mind that this tragedy might be infinitely greater if war should break out not only elsewhere but in Hungary itself. Therefore, our approach has been to prevent this happening inso far as a country like ours has only weight in the councils of the world. This has been the object of the recent activities of our delegation in the U.N. ⁽¹⁸⁾.

Another case which is quite similar with the case of Gulf, is USSR Czechorlovakia case. Here also we can see the invasion from the side of stronger neighbour. Soviet leaders imposed some terms on the leaders of Czecholovakia. First, that Russian and satellite

18. *Jawaharlal Nehru. " From the speech in Rajya Sabha" .Dec. 13, 1956*

troops will occupy czechoslovakia untill the situation normalises. and it is the Russian who will decide when the situation becomes 'normal' Secondly, that some Soviet troops will remain in western Czechoslovakia on the frontier with West Germany permanently. Last january even Novotny, that stalinist stooge, had refused to allow this concession which the Soviet had asked for and now Dubeek has had to agree to it. Thirdly, that the Czechoslovak communist party will reimpose censorship of the press radio and television. This has already happened. Foruthly, the supermacy of the communist party will be re-established and all unauthorised groups will eliminated.

INDIA'S STAND :-

India abstained in the Security Council on this issue. During the Soviet intvention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, some external Af-fairs Committee of the Indian Cabinet wanted New Delhi to condemn the Soviet action. But Prime Minister Indira Gandhi pointed out and that this would only alienate Moscow and jeopardise India's supply of arms without any positive benefits to the Czech cause.⁽¹⁹⁾.

It is instructive to recall that during the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, some members of the External Affairs Committee of the Indian cabinet wanted India to condemn the Soviet action. But Prime Minister Indira Gandhi pointed out "that this would

19. Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Indian response to the crisis of Afganistan", *International Relations and Foreign Policy of India*. By Verendra Grover P-82.

only alienate USSR and jeopardise India's supply of arms without any positive benefits to the Czech Cause" despite the fact that the Soviet decision to supply weapons to Pakistan in 1968 had caused much resentment in India.

AFGHANISTAN (1979) :-

The trouble in Afghanistan had been brewing up since the beginning of 1979 when the anti-kabul elements in Afghanistan began receiving assistance directly from Pakistan and indirectly from the United States and China.

On 27 December 1979, Hafizullah Amin had been replaced by Babrak Karmaj as President of Afghanistan the Soviet ambassador in New Delhi informed Foreign secretary R.D. Sathe that, " at the request of the Afghanistan leadership Soviet troops have been sent to Afghanistan to enable it to resist external aggression and interference" ⁽²⁰⁾.

INDIA'S RESPONSE :-

The Charan Singh Government first expressed its concern on 31st December 1979, to the United states over the reported resumption of arms supply to Pakistan. Though the Prime Minister did not urge immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces, he indirectly expressed his disapproval of Soviet action when he reminded Moscow of the June

20. The Tribune, 29 Dec. 1979.

1979 joint Indo-Soviet resolve to "oppose any interference by outside forces in the internal Affairs of Afghanistan." (21)

The Prime Minister further told the Soviet ambassador that "the presence of Soviet troops will have far reaching and adverse consequences for this region and expressed the hope that the Soviet troops, would withdraw as soon as possible." (22)

Atal Behari Vajpayee who was Foreign minister in Janata Government (March 1977 to July 1979) seemed to have realized the threat to India's security, for Soviet military presence in Afghanistan would imperil peace and stability in South Asia. Though Indira Gandhi had a clear understanding of the issues at stake, what led to Soviet intervention and the implications of foreign interventions in an area close to our frontier and what response was it is quite a denger to us" (23).

The floating attitude of India towards the Afghan crisis and with regards to the new structure of power came to an end soon after the election results revealed the overwhelming victory of Congress (I). Under Indira Gandhi's instructions, the Indian envoy at the United Nations, Brajesh C. Mishra, in a speech clearly stated India's stand

21. Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Indian response to the crisis of Afghanistan", *International relations and Foreign Policy of India* by Verendra Grover N. Delhi - 1992, P-78

22. *Ibid*

23. The Sunday Tribune, 13 Jan. 1980.

on the Afghan issue. He said-

- (1) *Moscow sent troops to Afghanistan at the request of the government in Kabul.*
- (2) *India was opposed to the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country.*
- (3) *But the Soviet Union had assured India that it would withdraw its troops when asked to do so by the Afghan government and New Delhi had "no reason to doubt assurances, particularly from a friendly country like the Soviet Union" with whom India had "many close ties".*
- (4) *"India hopes that the Soviet Union will not violate the independence of Afghanistan and that the Soviet forces will not remain there a day longer than necessary."*
- (5) *India disapproved of attempts made by certain "outside powers" in encouraging disturbances and subversion inside Afghanistan.*
- (6) *Construction of military bases and pumping of arms into countries of the region posed a threat the India's own security. ⁽²⁴⁾*

The attitude of the political leaders towards the crisis on the whole was cautious and calculated. They certainly had Muslim voters in mind when they desired or demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

24. *Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Indian Response to the crisis of Afghanistan" International relations & Foreign Policy of India by Verendra Grover, N.Delhi-1992, P-80*

Chapter-II

The Security Council
and The Gulf War : India's Stand



THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GULF WAR : INDIA'S STAND

The Iraqi invasion on 2, August 1990 and its continuing occupation of Kuwait represent a most blatant challenge to the body of rules governing state behaviour, as laid down in United Nations Charter, viz. settlement of international disputes through peaceful means, non-use of force, respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is not to say again, that Iraq is the first and the only country to have committed a gross violation of the Charter of principles. Indeed, Korea (1950-53), Guatemala (1954), Hungary & Suez (1956), Dominican Republic (1964) Chechoslovakia (1968), Afganistan (1979- 89), Canada (1983) and Panama (1989) bear glaring testimony of such gross violations. But what is different in this particular case is that the basic premise of the United Nations Security system as envisaged in the Charter- and which remained unoperational because of the cold war that ensued between the major architects of the U.N. system is being put to test for the first time.

TH-6002

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,



The United Nations Security Council consists of fifteen members, of which five are permanent-Soviet Union, France, China, the

United Kingdom and the United States - and ten are non-permanent, and these are elected by General Assembly of serve for two years. At the time of Iraqi invasion the non-permanent members were Canada, Colombia, Cote d' Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen and Zaire.

VOTING ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION :-

Voting on non-procedural matters in the Security Council is by nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. Here the terms 'concurring' means an affirmative vote or an abstention, a non-concurring vote by a permanent member is a veto. Of the twelve resolutions five were passed by unanimous vote, one resolution (660) was passed 14-0 with the Yemen not participating in the vote, three were each passed 13-2; one was passed 14-1; and one was passed 12-2 with one abstention. The only two members to vote against any of the resolution were Cuba and Yemen, who also accounted for all the abstentions except one. All the permanent members voted affirmatively on all the resolutions save except one that was resolution 678 in which China abstained. Such a record of voting in the security council on a major security issue was unprecedented. ⁽¹⁾.

Of the five resolutions passed by, unanimous vote, three related to Iraq's breaches of international law - specifically the an-

1. Ken Mathews, "The Gulf Conflict and International relations." 1993, P-77.

nexation of Kuwait, the treatment of third country nationals and the treatment of diplomatic personnel and property, one related to assistance to member suffering hardship as a result of imposing sanctions on Iraq, and one related to the Iraqi attempt to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait. Of the three resolutions attracting the abstention of Cuba and Yemen, two related to the imposition and implementation of sanctions against Iraq, and one related to the treatment of third-country nationals, collection of information of Iraqi breaches of international law regarding those persons and the Iraqi liability for loss and injury as a result of such breaches. Two of the three resolutions attracting negative votes related respectively to the determination of 'humanitarian circumstances that might warrant exceptions to the resolution on economic sanctions against Iraq, and the authorisation force the use of 'all necessary means' to restore peace and security to the area. The one resolution in which a negative vote by Cuba was not accompanied by the Yemeni one was 670, extending sanctions, to aircraft as well as sea and land transport. Though Yemen had abstained in the resolution imposing sanction, she had by that time declared her intentions to abide by the security council resolution.

THE U.N. SECURITY HAS PASSED A TOTAL OF 12 RESOLUTIONS SINCE IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT ON AUGUST 2, 1990.

Resolution 660 (2 August 1990) :

(i) *Determining that there exist a breach of international peace*

- and security, Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the charter of the United Nations (i) Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait:*
- (ii) *It demands that Iraw withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August, 1990;*
- (iii) *It calls upon Iraw and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the league of Arab States.*
- (iv) *It decides to meet as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution ⁽²⁾. The purpose of the first resolution (660) was essentially to define the invasion as a breach of international peace and security under article 39 ⁽²⁾ of the charter and to place on record the demand of the security council that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait and that the two parties should begin immediate attempts to resolve their dispute preferably within the context of Arab league ⁽³⁾ This first resolution was a sort of holding operation which established the concern of the security council and signalled its intention to take some action. It had the effect of placing the issue on to the international agenda immediately without having to await agreement on what should be done*

2. B.N. Ghosh Nonika Singh, "Politics economics of the Gulf War", - 1991, N. Delhi- P- 151.

3. Ken Mathews, "The Gulf conflict and international relations", 1991, P-74

without it, which was bound to take a little more time. In the event it was some four days before the second security council resolution (661) was passed, which imposed mandatory sanctions on Iraq and Kuwait covering all items except medical supplies and food stuffs 'In humanitarian circumstances.'

2- RESOLUTION 661, (AUGUST 6 , 1991) :-

Acting under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations.

- (i) It determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with operative paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped accepted the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait.*
- (ii) It decides, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait.*
- (iii) It decides that all state shall prevent;*
 - (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of this resolution.*
 - (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait.*

- (c) *The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait.*
- (iv) *It decides that all states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or in any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources.*
- (v) *It calls upon all states, including states non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provision of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;*
- (vi) *It decides to establish, in accordance with Rule 2(b) of the provisional rules of procedure of the security council;*
- (vii) *Calls upon all states to co-operate fully with the committee in the fulfilment of its task including supply of such information as may be sought by the committee in pursuance of this resolution;*
- (viii) *Requests the secretary General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the secretariat for these purposes;*
- (ix) *Requests the Secretary General to report to the council on the*

progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;

- (x) *Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq* ⁽⁴⁾.

Though article 41 was not mentioned in resolution 661, there is no question that these economic measures were taken under that article. It may be noted that the United States, the European Community, Japan, Canada and the Soviet Union had already, even before the adoption of resolution 661, announced measures like freezing of bank accounts, ban on oil supplies, stoppage of export of arms to Iraq etc. The resolution was a collective endorsement of these unilateral measures. It may also be recalled that there were at least two precedents when the security council used such economic sanctions under Article 41 ⁽⁵⁾.

3. RESOLUTION 662 (9 AUGUST, 1990)

As Iraq continued to defy the world community and the Security Council resolution and even formally annexed Kuwait on 8 August, 1990 the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 662

4. B.N. Ghosh & Nonika Singh, "Politics and economics of the Gulf War", N. Delhi-1991, P-154

5. R.P. Anand, "United Nations and the Gulf Crisis", 1994, P-8

on 9th August, 1990 declaring the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait as null and void and announced that its claim had no legal validity ⁽⁶⁾.

Recalling its resolution 660 (1990) and 661 (1990), Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "Comprehensive and eternal merges" with Kuwait. Demanding once again that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the position in which they were located on 1st August 1990, Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait. Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait.

In response to the above three resolutions passed by Security Council, Deputy Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait Sabah Al- Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah wrote a letter to the secretary General in which he stated- "I should like to point out to you that this step on the part of Iraq is yet another indication of its refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 660 (1990), in which the council decides that annexation of Kuwait is considered null and void. The aforementioned step carries within it the seeds of destruction of your mission even before you embark upon it. Furthermore, it provides an indication that Iraq does not wish even to

6. *Ibid*

negotiate on withdrawal and the restoration of legitimacy to Kuwait, the two demands that the Security Council has enjoined on Iraq and that it has called upon it to meet unreservedly and unconditionally."⁽⁷⁾.

4. RESOLUTION 664 (18 AUGUST, 1990)

This resolution (664) is related to the Iraqi treatment of third-state national diplomatic personnel and diplomatic premises all of which was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic immunity. ⁽⁸⁾.

Acting under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,

- (i) Demands that Iraq permits and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq to the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals.*
- (ii) Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardise the safety, security or health to such nationals.*
- (iii) Reaffirms its decision in Resolution 662(1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore, demands that the Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular mission in Kuwait and the with-*

7. *Kuwait Documents, "Kuwait Diplomacy against Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait", Cairo-1992, P-34-35*

8. *Ken Mathews, "The Gulf conflict and International Relations" P-77, Newyork- 1993.*

drawal of the immunity of their personnel and refrain from any such actions in the future.

- (iv) *Requests the Secretary- General to report of the council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.* ⁽⁹⁾.

5. RESOLUTION 665 (25 AUGUST, 1990)

In spite of the extensive informal negotiations, when the draft was discussed in the council on 25 August, several members expressed their concern and reservations on different counts, Yeman, for example, was alarmed to write that for the first time in the history of the United Nations- and particularly in the history of the security Council nuclear powers are being granted to undertake unspecified actions without clear definition of the security council's role and powers of supervision over those actions." ⁽¹⁰⁾.

Columbia regretted that the hasty drafting to the text deprived non-permanent members of adequate time and leisure to negotiate improvements in it. The representative of Colombia made a root point that through resolution 665, the council would be "establishing" a naval blockade, even though it may not say so, and that though the council may not say so either- it is acting pursuant

9. R.P. Anand, "United Nations and the Gulf crisis," 1994-P-10

10. A. M.M. Abidi and K.R. Singh, "The Gulf Crisis", Gulf Studies Programme and National Security Programme. 515, 3210 N. Delhi-1991 P-30-31

to Article 42 of the charter.⁽¹¹⁾ France emphasized that the resolution must not be understood as a "Blanket authorization for the indiscriminate use of force." Malaysia, as a non-aligned country expressed opposition to military presence of outside powers in any region even if it were done on the basis of legitimate appeals by aggrieved parties. China also expressed its principled opposition to military involvement by big powers and did not favour using force in the name of the United Nations, for it would only hinder prospects of a political solution to the problem and would only aggregate the situation. The Soviet Union was much more accommodating, however, while underlining the need for dialogue and negotiation, its representative reaffirmed its readiness to take joint action within the Security Council and outside it to seek timely measures capable of settling the crisis in the region.⁽¹²⁾

6. RESOLUTION 666 (13 SEPT. 1990)

This resolution is related to the determination of humanitarian circumstances. The resolution imposed strict control on humanitarian food aid to Kuwait and Iraq. All food aid had to be dispensed through the U.N. in co-operation with other international agencies.⁽¹³⁾

11. *Ibid*

12. *Ibid*

13. Arun Kumar Baneji, "The Gulf war and the energy crisis of India", New Delhi- P-88

7. RESOLUTION 667 (16 SEPT. 1990)

Iraq's decision to order the closure of diplomatic and consular mission in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunities and privilege of their personnel, was strongly denounced by the Security Council in its resolution 667 adopted on 16th September. Iraqi action in entering the French and Canadian ambassador's residences in Kuwait, detention of the French military attacks, and the consuls of Australia, Britain and Ireland on 14 September, provided the background to the passing of resolution 667, Iraq's action was termed as constituting a new escalation of its violation of international law. The Security Council resolutions referred to the violation by Iraq of the Vienna Conventions of 18 April, 1961 on diplomatic relations and of 24 April, 1963 on consular relations to both of which Iraq is a signatory. The council decided to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as possible under chapter VII of the charter. ⁽¹⁴⁾

8 RESOLUTION 669 (24 SEPT. 1990)

Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of, 6 August, 1990. Recalling also article 58 of the charter of the United Nations.

Conscious of the fact that on increasing number of requests for assistance have been received under the provision of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations.

14. *Ibid- P- 8916. R.P. Anand, "United Nations and the Gulf crisis", 1994- P- 16*

Entrusts the committee established under resolution 661 (1990) conceiving the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requesting for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendation to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action. ⁽¹⁵⁾

9. RESOLUTION 670 (27 SEPT. 1990) :

This resolution condemned Iraq's violation of international law. The Security Council committed itself to ensure by all necessary means the application of measures laid down in resolution 661 (sanctions). Provision of article 29 and 48, by which member states are bound to carry out the decisions of the Security Council were invoked by the resolution. The military option though never ruled out, was atleast not contemplated by resolution 670. The determination to ensure by all necessary means was in relation to application of measures laid down in resolution 661 and not resolution 660. In resolution 667 council had decided to consult urgently to take further concrete measures and now under resolution 670 reference was made to further serious action by the council including action under chapter VII of the Charter. Thus a clear warning was given to Iraq that unless it complied with the council's resolution it ran the risk of mili-

15. B N . Ghosh and Nonika Singh , "Politics and economics of the Gulf war" , 1991 P-161

tary action since enforcement measures not involving the use of armed force were already invoked by resolution 661. The resolution also extended the applicability of sanction to include all means of transport including aircraft.

10. RESOLUTION 674 (29 OCT. 90)

Resolution 674 demanded that Iraq should accept the decisions of the Security Council and abide by the fourth Geneva convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law. The resolution also clears the next claims of restitution or financial compensation from Iraq.

This resolution also reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and to undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait (including the human rights violations) on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 660, 662 and 664 and calls upon all the states, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in conformity with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace, security and stability.

This resolution also requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the results of his good offices and diplomatic efforts.

The resolution also demanded an immediate end to hostage taking and called upon Iraq to ensure immediate access to food, water and protection to Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait.

11. RESOLUTION 677 (29 NOV. 1990)

The resolution condemned the Iraqi attempts to alter the demographic destruction of civil records there.

12. RESOLUTION 678 (30 NOV. 1990)

It was resolution 678 which converted the United States policy of military coercion against Iraq under Article 51 into a United Nations policy of military coercion under the Article 42. The Security Council adopted this resolution on 29 Nov. 90, by 12 votes (Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, by Ivory coast, Malaysia, Rumania, USSR, U.K. U.S. and Zaire) to 2 (Cuba and Yemen), with one abstention (China) Acting under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations.

- (1) It demands that Iraq comply with Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent resolutions and decides while maintaining all its decision to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so.*
- (2) It authorizes member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January, 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing*

- resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;*
- (3) *It requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions under-taken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;*
- (4) *Requests the states concerned to keep the security council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;*
- (5) *Decides to remain seized of the matter.* ⁽¹⁶⁾

By this resolution the Security Council allowed Iraq one final opportunity the security council allowed Iraq one final opportunity as a pause of goodwill to comply fully with earlier resolution of the Security Council, 15 January 1991 was set as the 'deadline' for Iraq to fully implement the Security Council resolutions. In fact, framers of resolution 678 did not wish to foreclose political and diplomatic means to avert the military option. Therefore a grace period of 45 days was given to Iraq as a pause of goodwill.

In adopting resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, implicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq in response to Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council made light of fundamental U.N. charter

16. R.P. Anand, "United Nations and the Gulf Crisis", 1994 -P- 16.

precepts and thereby flirted precariously with "generally accepted principles of right process." It eschewed direct U.N. responsibility and accountability for the military force that ultimately was deployed, favouring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States. And, in so doing, it encouraged a too-hasty retreat from the peaceful and humanitarian purpose and principles of the United Nations ⁽¹⁷⁾.

Regarding the resolution 678, the Secretary General Mr. Perez-de-Cuellar said that history showed that hostilities and diplomacy could line together and that is hoped that there was still a possibility to minimise loss of life. ⁽¹⁸⁾.

Inderjit Gupta in a Lok Sabha debate said, "I only want to say is that resolution 678 never sanction the use of force. It said that if he does not vacate kuwait by the 15th of January, by any means that are required or considered necessary to make him vacate will be undertaken. It does not say that as soon as the deadline of 15th January is over, from the 16th or 17th, you should begin an all out military assault on Iraq. This is what they did therefore, everybody is now understanding that they were very eager to carry on this war

17. *Agora "The Gulf crisis" The American Journal of international Law, vol. 05 1991*

18. *The UN Letter, Published weekly by UN information centre N. Delhi-Mar.91*

until, as they say, they can destroy Iraq, perhaps dismember Iraq as a country, finish off Saddam Hussein, finish off all his military strength. They have said they are saying it every day in different ways. But that was not the war objective. That was the objective of the United Nations Security Council resolution."⁽¹⁹⁾

INDIA'S REACTION ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS :

In the first phase, India's diplomatic strategy addressed mainly three aspects, viz, refraining from condemning Iraqi aggression, seeking from the United Nations relief in the context of impact of implementation of sanctions, and supporting the cause of a Political settlement without resort to war.

India under Prime Ministership of V.P. Singh decided to support all United Nations resolutions, passed by the U.N. Security Council between August and December 1990. While the U.N. resolutions calling for the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq for not vacating its highly unjustified and indefensible occupation of Kuwait, was having its effects. India should have strived simultaneously alongwith its traditional Arab friends, and more so the Arab league, to workout an Arab Solution to the Gulf crisis. The leadership at the highest level should have established contact with President Saddam Hussein and tried to evolve a package deal under which Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait and an Arab or U.N. monitored

19. Lok Sabha debates, Ninth Lok Sabha, N. Delhi Vol-XIV, P-521

arrangement would decide the future of Kuwait's political set up, to be followed by an arbitration, at the international level, to look into Iraq's demands over the two islands belonging to Kuwait. On the Security Council Resolution 661 (Aug. 6, 1990) regarding imposition of sanctions against Iraq India held the view that the United States action amounted to a blockade (Article 42 of the U.N. charter) which exceeded the U.N. mandate." ⁽²⁰⁾.

On August 20, 1990 the Indian contingency plan for the evacuation of its expatriates was completed. Foreign Minister, I. K. Gujral was one of the few foreign dignitaries who were able to visit occupied Kuwait, and meet President Saddam Hussain. While returning to India, he brought alongwith him the first batch of 200 stranded Indians in his special IMF Ilyushin -76 transport ⁽²¹⁾.

The next day he diverted attention of the world by his ideas which were based on India's Gulf war response as follows :-

(a) Opposition to the use of force in dealings between states and the earliest possible withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

(b) Disapproval of unilateral action against outside the U.N. frame work by any country to enforce the sanctions mandated by the world body ;

20. The Hindu, August 17, 1990

21. The Hindu, August 23, 1990

(c) Opposition to the presence of induction of foreign military forces. ⁽²²⁾

Although India had accepted the U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 on sanction, it wanted the supplies of foodstuffs and medicines to be exempted from the embargo, if only because Indian constituted the largest number of foreigner in Kuwait. ⁽²³⁾ According to the official thinking, the peace efforts needed to be more broad-based so as to include other countries which were also being affected by the crisis.

Accordingly, I.K. Gujral, External Affairs Minister wrote separate letters to the five permanent members of the Security Council urging the convening of a conference under the aegis of the U.N. in order to defuse other Gulf crisis ⁽²⁴⁾.

India's stand on the Gulf crisis become somewhat clear when Dr. Rasheed Al- Ameer, a Kuwaiti Minister, visited India and held talks with V.P. Singh and I.K. Gujral on Sept. 5, 90. India asserted that it did not recognize the annexation of Kuwait and stood for the restoration of the latter's sovereignty and the withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

22. *The Hindu*, August 24, 1990

23. *The Hindu*, August 28, 1990

24. *The Hindu*, 4 Sept., 1990

The Kuwaiti Minister, on his part in a prepared statement was quite forthright when he stated " We expect our good friend India to play a more positive role strongly condemn the brutal Iraqi regime's invasion and complete occupation of peaceful Kuwait take part in the attempts to isolate Iraq and exert pressure on it to abide by the Security Council resolution." (25).

While reaching on resolution 666 (16 Sept., 90), India stepped up its food diplomacy in view of the hardship faced by its nationals stranded in Iraq and Kuwait. This involved the following actions :-

- (1) The Indian Prime Minister wrote to President Bush and Gorbachev separately to pinpoint the difficulties faced by the Indians in Kuwait. He, also reiterated India's position in settling the issue by peaceful means.*
- (2) The External Affairs Minister Mr. I.K. Gujral, communicated India's stand to his counterparts in Washington and Moscow who were going to meet in preparation for the Helsinki Summit.*
- (3) The India permanent representative at the U.N. was directed to make a case of humanitarian relief and exemption of food supplies from the operation of sanctions;*
- (4) Indian wrote separate letters to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council regarding the problems faced by the*

25. *The Hindu*, 6 Sept., 1990

stranded nationals and urged the broadening of the U.N. so as to include other nations severely affected by the crisis.

- (5) *Gujral decided to visit the Hague on his way to Belgrade to brief human rights agencies on the problems facing the Indians in Kuwait.* ⁽²⁶⁾

This line of programme was necessitated by the stand taken by some maritime powers that food could not be allowed to be supplied to Kuwait while Iraq was insisting that evacuation of Indian nationals could only be possible if the ships or aircrafts meant for their repatriation also brought in food. In view of this, it was felt that a concerted drive needed to be launched to rush humanitarian aid. However, there was an element of obscurity in the Indian Government's statements in so far it chose not to identify the U.S., the major actor behind the enforcement of these sanctions.

When the Security Council passed resolution 667 (16 Sept., 1990) condemning the Iraqi attacks on diplomatic premise in Kuwait, Indian observers noted that this resolution had come with exceptional haste. Interestingly, in passing the earlier resolution 666 (Sept., 13, 1990) on delivery of food supplies to Asian workers, the Security Council took more than ten days to finalize its wording, whereas resolution 667 took only 36 hours. This, according to India,

26. *The Hindu*, 7 Sept., 1990

showed that in its reactions to Iraq the Security Council had allied itself with the club of the privileged which catered to the rich nations instead of the third world ⁽²⁷⁾.

India took a clear and apparently final position in the Gulf crisis, during the Minister's visit to the U.A.E. In a prepared statement to the media, I.K. Gujral said " we believe that states have the right to take steps that are necessary in order to defend themselves" ⁽²⁸⁾.

This was an expression of understanding and support for the presence of the U.S. led multinational force in the Gulf. While speaking in Dubai, I.K. Gujral added that India supported the 'early convening' of an international conference on West Asia to resolve other outstanding issues. Although this formulation did not amount to acceptance of a direct linkage between the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and resolution of issues such as Palestine and Labanon, it did concede the "linkage" principle atleast sequentially.

There was a little response to the resolution 674 and 677 as the Indian Government was pre-occupied with its own domestic Problems. V.P. Singh's 11 month old government fell on November 7,90 and Chandra Shekher assumed charge after a prolonged crisis. During this period Security Council passed resolution 678 on 29 Nov.,

27. *BISS Journal " India and the Gulf crisis", Vol. 13, 1992*

28. *The Hindu, Oct. 1990*

1990 and gave a final ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw its forces by Jan. 15, 1991.

In the Lok Sabha debate held on 22 Feb. 1991, the Deputy Speaker A.K. Roy said, "If the United Nations Resolution No. 678 is to be accepted and respected, why not the two resolutions of the UNO also which call for withdrawal of Israel from Golan Heights, the west Bank of Gaza strips and all those places which they occupied? There is no reasons why it should not be done. I would like to ask how many U.N. resolution have not been honoured where the allied faces have not come. Their conscience did not prick at that time. For example, the implementation of Security Council resolution No. 242 of 1987 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories (West Bank, Gaza strip) occupied after the 1967 conflict, of resolution No. 465 of 1980 demanding on end to Israeli settlements in occupied Arab lands and of resolution No. 478 of 1980 again condemning legislation in Israeli Parliament that declared Jerusalem an indivisible capital of Israel. Thus you will find that nowhere the conscience of Americans and all those western people has pricked them their desire for keeping freedom is never there."⁽²⁹⁾

India welcomed President Bush's invitation to Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to visit Washington for talks on the Gulf crisis. It also appreciated the decision to send secretary of state, James Baker, to Baghdad for talks with the Iraqi President. At the same

29. *Lok Sabha Debate - Seventh Session (Ninth Lok Sabha) Feb-22, 199 P-471, Vol. XIV*

time, it expressed apprehensions of a war breaking out in the Gulf with 'disastrous consequences' not only for the region but the whole world. ⁽³⁰⁾ India desired that the peace process be persisted with in real earnest.

A spokesman of the Indian Foreign office said that India had supported all U.N. resolution calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This support to the U.N. resolutions amply demonstrated that India had remained "in step with the international community" ⁽³¹⁾ It also mentioned the "traditional" friendly relation and close co-operation between India and the Gulf state and warned that "untold devastation" was likely in the event of an outbreak of war. The Indian External Minister, I.K. Gujral told the parliamentary committee of the Ministry of External Affairs that no Indian forces would be deployed in the Gulf under any circumstances and that India did not believe in the use of force for resolution of the crisis in the Gulf" ⁽³²⁾.

Viewed against the categorical stance of the U.N. Security Council, India's "low-key and reasonable" posture of non-condemnation of Iraqi aggression and its plea for "earliest possible" withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait stood in stark contrast. India was re-

30. The statesman, Dec. 3, 1990

31. *Ibid*

32. *Ibid*

mind of this deviation by Kuwait as well as by the United States. Kuwait politely registered its disappointment over India's stance during a visit by the Emissary of the Emir of Kuwait to New Delhi in the first week of September. He said, " We expect our good friend, India, to play a more positive role.....strongly condemn the brutal regime's invasion and complete occupation of peaceful Kuwait.....take part in the attempts to isolate Iraq and exert pressure on it to abide by the Security Council." (33)

Presumably the United States, too, emphasised the need for India to be part of the world opinion, India's External Affairs Minister, I.K. Gujral, after his visit to Washington, noted India's wish to be " in step with" the world community on the Gulf crisis.

Consequently India's view as regards the aggression became much more critical of Iraq. For instance, Gujral stated while participating in General Debate in the forty fifth session of the General Assembly, " The crisis has arisen from Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It follows that Iraq must withdraw its forces from Kuwait as demanded by the Security Council. India does not recognize Kuwait's annexation. Kuwait's independence must be restored." (34).

He also toned down India's opposition to induction of out-

33. *The Hindu*, Sept. 6, 1990

34. C.S.R. Murthy, "*India's Diplomacy in the United Nations Problems and Perspective*," 1993, P- 142

side forces to mean only permanent foreign military presence in the Gulf. Gujral acknowledged, during a visit to the United Arab Emirates, the right of the Gulf states to take necessary step (like inviting foreign military, pressence) to defend themselves. ⁽³⁵⁾

A national debate was conducted on the violated situation in West Asia, in the course of which the Minister for Petroleum and Chemicals, M.S. Gurupadaswamy said that, the time limit set by the aforementioned U.N. resolutions did not necessarily mean that Iraq would withdraw by the stipulated date. Romesh Bhandari, former Foreign Secretary, maintained that even if there was no war after the January 15 deedline, the " no peace no war" situation would be equally dangerous. While explaining India's stand, I.P. Khosla, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, said that whereas the Indian Government had supported the U.N. resolution 678 it did not agree that the resolution authorized the U.S. to use force" ⁽³⁶⁾.

Chandra Shekher described the developing Gulf situation as a "serious threat" to peace with grave repercussions for the Indian economy. Hoping that the crisis would be resolved by mutual talks, he welcomed the accouncement by President Bush to extend the D-Day for going to war with Iraq. Replying to charges that " India was no longer speaking up at world forums on behalf of the neglected

35. The Hindu, 23 Oct., 1990

36. Ibid

and the third world", he said that India would continue to take suitable initiatives for solving the crisis by peaceful means and that it would continue to speak for the poor and small nations after it takes its seat on the Security Council. ⁽³⁷⁾

In the meantime, India offered its good offices to both the U.S. and Iraq for the peaceful settlement of the crisis, Replying to queries on the visit of a special envoy from President Saddam Hussein and Indian spokesman observed that India would " only offer its help" but there was" no suggestion for India's mediation from Iraqi side". He said that the Iraqi special envoy had again offered oil in lieu of old outstanding debts, totalling about \$ 400 million, and proposals of Joint ventures in both countries. However, the spokesman added, India would carefully weigh these suggestions strictly within the context of the Security Council resolutions and their interpretation by the U.N. sanctions committee ⁽³⁸⁾.

37. BIHSS Journal " India and the Gulf crisis", Vol. 13, 1992

38. Ibid P-23

Chapter-III

India's Stand
on the conduct of the War

CHAPTER-III

INDIA'S STAND ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Iraq has been a time, tested friend of India. In the Islamic conferences in Cairo when Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue, Iraq supported India. Yet New Delhi did condemn the Iraqi invasion. But precious little was done to reverse the aggression by diplomatic means. It how-ever, was against the U.S. led multinational force against Iraq. It refused to offer even symbolic assistance to the colition. The only active part that it took in the war was when it gave permission to the U.S. Air force, planes on their way to the Gulf to be refuelled. But even this created a great hue and cry, and after, Rajiv Gandhi threatened to withdraw his support to the Janata Dal (S) Government, the refuelling facilities were withdrawn.

INDIA'S ROLE AS A LEADER OF NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT :

As a founder member of NAM, India could have played a more decisive role. India should have stepped in with the help of countries like Jorden, Algeria, Cuba and Zimbabwe, Egypt, one of the founding fathers of the movement, had chosen to side with western alliance. Hence, India's responsibility had increased even more. But it evaded its task. Instead, it did not know how to react. It was one of the many buildered nations.

India was for peace and some generalities were muttered. President Saddam Hussein should vacate Kuwait, yet war should not take place. India has been one of the most vocal supporter of Arab cause and Indira have no diplomatic relations with Israel. And when the Palestine issue was clubbed with the Kuwaiti withdrawal, Indira were in a fix. India's stand on Kuwait only weakened NAM, just as our stand on Afghanistan had done in the past. Even when sanction were imposed on Iraq. NAM could have played a role and forestalled harsh sanctions which caused great privation to Iraqi civilians. It is now being felt that in the post- cold war period, heading towards unipolarity, NAM has lost its significance. Moreover, it is a parallel organisation to the United Nations. As all the members are members of NAM, they have to uphold the principles of U.N. and cannot take a decision outside NAM which is in conflict with U.N.'s decision. But then, NAM nations could have used their good offices to influence U.N. Many argue that NAM should be wound up and U.N. should be strengthened and not allowed to be hijacked by one nation. (1).

About the non-aligned role of India I.K. Gujral in Lok Sabha said "If from the very beginning the United voice of India would have been in favour of a cease-fire then results would have been different. The NAM'S voice could have been different. Unfortunately, the NAM'S voice was not heard by several reason may be for rea-

I. K.V. Chacko, "Non-alignment at cross roads"; The Tribune, March 4, 1991.

sons historical the fact is that the NAM powers themselves were divided in the Arab lands and due to the fact that all of us were functioning through the United Nations. I am one of those who believe firmly and strongly that the Non-Aligned Movement has a great deal of relevance and a great deal of force. And I think particularly today when there is a great pressure coming on all of us, the Non-aligned movement provides an umbrella for all of us to come together. Therefore, nobody should be under the impression that because the cold war has ended the role of NAM has ended. When the NAM was formulated in Nehru's time, at that time our political sovereignties were under attack. Now our economic sovereignties are under attack. And, therefore only collectively we can safeguard ourselves. Otherwise, we see the new scene emerging in Europe. We see the new condominiums emerging to pressurise us, sometimes in the name of Uruguay sounds and sometimes in the name of protection and what is not. The NAM is a protection, a collective protection for all of us and therefore I think we must not let anybody make us believe that NAM has become irrelevant or something that can be disposed of."⁽²⁾

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA :-

By not supporting the multinational forces alliance against Iraq. Indian interests have suffered a setback. First of all, U.S. may not be very favourably inclined towards India because of the furor

2. Lok Sabha debates (Ninth Lok Sabha - Seventh Session- Feb. 22, 1991, Lok Sabha Secretariat New Delhi, P- 501.

created in the refuelling issue. The manner in which the subject became controversial and ultimately the way refuelling was put to an end, may create some bitterness between India and only super power in the world. In the post war Gulf security set up, India has no chance of qualifying as a nation to be conferred with. Though it is biggest power in this area, where will be no seat for it at the conference table to decide the final Gulf security arrangement. When our foreign Minister visited Kuwait, it gave a sort of legitimacy to Saddam's annexation.

In the Lok Sabha debate Jaswant Singh stated the stand of BJP on the refuelling issue He said, (1) "Refuelling, berthing hospitality is a routine countesy shared between and extended to sovereign nations. (2) If refuelling was granted to the United States of America, that was an act in consonance with all earlier practices and also an extension of India's national interests. (3) India enjoys and benefits from such reciprocal countesy from at least fifteen countries. Routiently, Indian Air Force Indian Navy has an opportunity to berth in various countries of the world and IMF aircraft have a facility to refuel at least in fifteen other countries of the world. (4) The first review of the refuelling facility ought to have been made by the government on or soon after 2nd of August, 1990.

He said, ' that such a review should have included a process of consultations with all political leaders and all polttical parties in

Parliament." ⁽³⁾

By not sending a token to the Gulf, Indian lost the Kuwaiti support. Already there is ambivalence about reopening of Indian Embassy in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Ambassador seems reluctant and has declared in no uncertain terms that only those who fought on behalf of Kuwait shall be given priority in its reconstruction programme. It may even lose its say in the compensation for the losses suffered during the economic embargo and of Indian nationals working in the Gulf.

"For the U.S Coalition forces victory in the Gulf with a minimum of casualties was mainly due to their superior weaponry. The likely consequence is heightened emphasis on defence research and the creation of even more sophisticated weapons systems. Developing countries will also be eager to update their armed forces. This is bound to effect the security environment of India. The Government of India should look into this aspect at an expert level." ⁽⁴⁾

It is obvious that we need to evolve a forward- looking strategy in which the armed forces and the industrial and economic strength of the country play their respective parts. ⁽⁴⁾

3. *Lok Sabha debates Ninth Lok Sabha; (Seventh Session) Feb- 22- 1991- Lok Sabha Secretariat New Delhi P 507*

4. *Rajender Nath; "We must learn from the war"; The Tribune, March 18, 1991.*

The Gulf war was a battle between developing nation and developed nations in which the developing nation stood battered in its defeat. With the might of their superior technology, allies crushed Iraq by destroying its economic infrastructure, a large number of tanks and armoured personal carriers. Iraqi army failed to realize the supermacy of U.S. air power. Iraqi withdrawal was unplanned. Kuwait city and southern Iraq were connected by one single road and Iraqi return on this road provided allies with an ideal target for destruction. Air supremacy reigned and relentless air pounding affected Iraqi morale.

According to K.S. Rustamji, " we need to develop a new Asian identity and our old policy of merely following populist postures should be avoided. We have a habit of making a mountain out of a mole hill, for in the context of West Asian peace, refuelling was a very trivial issue blown out of proportions only to destabilise a government. Infact some changes are needed in our Foreign Policy We must support the U.N. and help in the creation of world law, a world police force accountable to U.N.

During the Lok Sabha debate I.K. Gujral said. " so far as overflights were concerned one aspect must be kept in mind and that is overflights did not start in India in 1990. They started in 1984, and the overflights were going on during all the peace times that was going which continued the only regret that I have and that is what I submitted personally to the Prime Minister also relates of my

feeling that all policies in foreign affairs, in peace time should be reviewed when even a war comes therefore, when war came, it should have been reviewed. It at all I have a grievance about refuelling it is on that account which they will possible tell us, thought that they were serving India's interests by permitting refuelling, I will be glad to here that. But so far as we are concerned I can only tell you that a request for refuelling comes to us also which we rejected for reasons that we have already given." (5) Jaswant Singh, A BJP member, in Lok Sabha,

(1) " It is in 1984 when the Soviet occupation of Afganistan was still continuing and when late Mrs. Gandhi was the Prime Minister, if I am not mistaken, in August, 1984 that reberthing facility, the facility for refuelling overflights etc. were extended yet again to the United States of America of course, that has been existing on the basis of non-alignment but non-alignment as my previous speaker mentioned, cannot be reduced merely and blindly to anti American is more anti Sovietism." (6)

(2) We should review the question of diplomatic relationship with Israel and support the resolution of Palestine problem. It is surprising that though Israel is an important country in West Asia, we know very little about it. Similarly we know little

5. *Lok Sabha debates- Seventh Session- Ninth Lok Sabha Vol. XIV, P-498- Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi.*

6. *Lok Sabha debates- Ninth Lok Sabha, Seventh Session, Vol- XIV, P- 506.*

about Palestine problem. It is amazing that no newspaper has correspondents in this area and the issue of Israel of Palestine is rarely mentioned in the parliament. Is this a Gandhian approach of reconciling and liberation. (7).

(3) *The non-resident Indian in America and elsewhere and those who will find work in Kuwait and Iraq will have to be taken into consideration in formulating a foreign policy.*

(4) *We need to develop an Asian identity to make others aware of the greatness of Asia and find ways for co-operation with Islamic, Chinese, Japanese and other nations. The war has dealt a severe blow to the policy of disarmament. So in future, the rule of gun may disappear. Hence we need to form one Asia, just as one Europe and one America and even make efforts to form a union similar to the European common market.*

According to Arun Shourie, "we pursue a foreign policy which serves neither our national interest nor is based on principles."

In today's world i.e. the world short of all values and principles, it would be surprising if we did not pursue interest. But then we do so under the garb of moral principles. Moreover, our foreign policies are shaped by politicians and the politicians take a stand which would suit them in catching votes, which according to them is

7. K.S. Rastumji, "Old Policy no longer relevant": The Tribune- March 5, 1991.

most profitable bargain. As a result, our responses to international crisis are shaped by the whims of our politics. ⁽⁸⁾

The Gulf war has proved beyond doubt that superiority of Americans technology over Soviet technology, which costs a shadow over all the countries depending upon Soviet Union for their defence needs, including India. With the collapse of soviet economy, it becomes clear that in future, U.S. would be a power to reckon with, and hence, our policy needs to be realigned, Already, out of the four permanent members of U.N. apart from U.S., Britain is a close allies of U.S., France despite its occasional show of independence, is a part of western alliance and U.S.S.R. is today dependent on the west for money. As for China, its recent conduct has proved that it too is looking for what Soviets want i.e. technology, credit and investments. So, in the present state of affairs, what are we to do? With the fall of Iraq, we have lost a time- honoured friend in the middle east. The countries we avoided all along Iran, Saudi Arabia and of course Israel have gained a position of considerable influence in the region. So merely talking about our traditional friendship with Palestine Arab brothers is not going to help. We should try to persuade Arab Palestinians to accept arrangements which are realistic and practical. Shouting anti-American rhetoric won't take us far and it is not really a way to fight unipolarity. What is needed is to build links with countries which matter, like Japan and Germany and other European

8. Arun Shourie, "The Real World and US". *The Economics Times*, March 10, 1991.

Nations.

Traditionally, Indian foreign policy has rested on four pillars. Protecting India's interests through the cold war by not being drawn into superpower created regional conflicts, meeting the threats of Sino- Pak combine : identifying the role of third world and Non-Aligned Movements in the political and economic sphere, within a bi-polar world order : and finally, furthering India's own ambition to being a dominant power in the subcontinent.

The end of the cold war has also diminished Pakistan's usefulness to the U.S. making it possible for India to explore an entirely new relationship based on an understanding of valid India fears of U.S. dominance over the region and Indian exploitation both economically and politically, and of American's search for new friends in this volatile region.

While it is quite clear that India will not maintain a defence relationship with the U.S., the process of improving ties, began by Mrs. Gandhi and pushed forward by Rajiv Gandhi and later quiteely sustained by the V.P. Singh Govt., could lead to greater economic and scientific cooperation. Nor will this preclude a search for ways to develop Indo- Pak relations and for a totally new security relationship among the three countries, Finally, improved Indo- U.S. relations may also be compatible with third world solidarity in major institutions like General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

But, as the Gulf crisis showed, there will be strong domestic resistance, particularly from the Indian left towards strengthening such ties. Given predictions that India is heading for a period of coalition government, the role of the left in influencing public postures on foreign policy issues cannot be underestimated⁽⁹⁾.

Take the decision of the Government of India to permit refueling facilities to U.S. transport aircraft connected with the Gulf war, which was criticised by all political parties except BJP. Congress (I) which extends support from the outside to the ruling Janata Dal's claimed that in doing so India's non-alignment had somehow been seriously eroded since a super power, the United States, was involved. It was deliberately ignored that India had supported the U.N. security council resolution No. 678, which while authorising the use of force to bring about the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, simultaneously requested all states " to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken".⁽¹⁰⁾. Obviously, India had a commitment to extend assistance and by going back on it, we have, to that extent, hurt our own interests.

This controversy serves to illustrate the chronic ambivalence in the attitude of many in India in regard to our relations with

9. Shahnaz Anklesaria Aiyar, "Goofing around India's Stand on the Gulf." *International relations and Foreign Policy of India and West Asia and India's Foreign Policy* Ed. by Verendra Grover- New Delhi- 1992- P-581.

10. A.P. Venkataswaran, "Gulf: Need for a new policy"; *International Relations and Foreign Policy of India-* Ed by Verendra Grover- N. Delhi- 1992- P 585.

the United States, which Indira seem to be unable to overcome. Furthermore, by subsequently stopping the transit facilities, Indira succeeded in convincing the Arab members of the coalition forces that Indira were still inclined to favour Iraq rather than to support their cause.

ECONOMIC AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR:

The Gulf crisis come at a time when the pace of world economic activity had clearly showed down and the strength of inflationary forces was rising. International institutions had forecast a modest improvement in the rate of economic growth in 1991, based on various assumptions. The Gulf crisis has already hurt the world economy. The psychological impact on the world economy is clearly one of beerishness in the matter of production activity and of inflation in the matter of consumer prices. In other words, it would appear there are signs of a return stagflation witnessed in the later half of the two oil stocks. This seems to be clearly evident in the developed countries generally. The growth of GNP is slowing down markedly, unemployment is increasing, prices are moving up and interest rates are ruling generally high. Corporate profits and decreasing and share prices have on undertone of beerishness, corporate investment is also declining.

THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC RELEVANCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GULF FOR INDIA :

British policy considered the Gulf as the gateway to India and

was keen to protect the area from German invasion through Balkans, Turkey and Iraq or through southern USSR and Iran. After independence Nehru found it necessary to curb Pakistan's effort to campaign in the Gulf countries against India.

Apart from the two Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 when Baghdad remained silent without taking the side of Pakistan, very recently in the Islamic conference held in Cairo, in July 1990, it was due to the effort of Iraq that Pakistan failed to raise the issue of Kashmir. ⁽¹¹⁾

India and Gulf state are natural partners in more senses than one. Their resources complement one another in export of produce, technology and manpower from India and Gulf reciprocate in the black gold India need. Over the decades a whole intermeshing of personal, family and trade relationships has taken place with Bombay as the Indian focal point and Kerala the biggest supplier of manpower. The Gulf states welcome Indian manpower because in addition to skills, the bulk of it does not embrace the Islamic faith. For countries with great faith for countries with great wealth, small populations and large number of expatriate workers, Indians provide a natural buffer to enable the rulers to practise their moderate form of Islam. ⁽¹²⁾

11. Anklesaria Aiyar, *"India's Gulf Policy: Walking a Tight Rope"*, *India Today*, Feb 18, 1991, P-31.

12. Nihal Singh, *"Task in the Gulf"*; *Hindustan Times*, June 15, 1993.

The importance of Iraq to India's foreign policy makers need not to be explained more. Because India depended heavily on the import of crude from Iraq. of the total annual demand of 55 million tonnes of oil in 1989-90. India could produce only 31 million tonnes of crude oil and the gap was filled by imports where Iraq was one of the principal suppliers. ⁽¹³⁾

Further, the presence of 1,85,000 Indians in Iraq and Kuwait together remitting U.S. 1,000 to \$ 1,500 million annually was a large source of foreign exchange earning for the Government of India ⁽¹⁴⁾.

The full implications of the Gulf war on the Indian economy can be judged only in the period following the conflict. The crisis affected the entire world economy but for the third world countries the pressure was really back breaking. The fiscal year following the Gulf war reflected how the entire Indian economy reeled under its influence. The Gulf crisis had the predominant role in making India's foreign exchange reserve hit the rock-bottom. The economic survey for 1990-91 that was presented to the parliament by the newly elected congress government in June 1991, indicated that the combination of the growing fiscal deficit and the external deficit created serious doubts about the future sustainability of the growth rate of the Indian economy. The grim situation becomes all the more evi-

13. Arun Kumar Banerji, "The Gulf War and The Energy Crisis in India", New Delhi- 1993, P- 70.

14. V.P. Dutt, "Need For a Gulf", The Hindustan Times, Jan 10, 1991.

dent if a contrast is made between the two fiscal years of 1989-90 and 1990-91. In terms of consumer price index, the inflation rate was 13.6% during 1990-91, compared to only 6.6% during 1989-90.

In terms of rupees exports registered a growth of 17.5% in 1990-91, while import recorded a relatively higher growth at 21.9%. Consequently, the trade deficit increased by 38% from Rs. 7,735 crores during 1989-90 it grew to Rs. 10,644 crores during 1990-91. Net invisibles were also estimated to have declined during the year owing to the fall in the net private transfers on account of the Gulf crisis, a relatively slow growth of tourist traffic and a steady increase in interest payments on past borrowings.

The impact of Gulf Crisis on the balance of payments was very harsh. The cost of oil imports in 1990, which was projected at Rs. 6,400 crores in April 1990 was estimated around Rs. 10,800 crores due to the sharp increase in the international prices of oil. Because of the disturbances in Assam the production of crude oil declined by 3.1% in 1990-91 resulting in a shortfall in the domestic production estimated at 2.4 million tons compounding the hardship. The economy also lost approximately Rs. 965 crores in remittances from abroad, particularly from Kuwait and Iraq due to the mass return of Indians escaping the political uncertainties of these two countries ⁽¹⁵⁾.

Since the end of the Gulf war the picture has not been so gloomy

15. *The Statesman*, July 21, 1991.

as far as the re-employment and the return of the Indians to the Gulf countries were concerned. In fact, by July 1991, Kuwait gave clear indications that it was willing to allow Indian doctors and other professionals to resume their work there. The American companies that have bagged the contracts from the Kuwaiti Government for reconstruction works have given sub contracts of many Indians companies who were working in Kuwait before the crisis broke out. This definitely will contribute albeit in a small way, to the recovery of the Indian economy. In recent years Indians in Kuwait had accounted for 8.5% for the entire remittance to India.

The criticism of India's policy during the Gulf crisis, as put forward by the different foreign policy analysts is, of course, not entirely unfounded. For example, during his J.K. Gujral's visit to Kuwait in August 1990, just after the outbreak of the crisis, the then Indian Minister for External Affairs, I.K. Gujral, could have maintained a low profile. The Kuwaitis more or less indifferent to the Indian community there, were incensed by a speech of Gujral and called the Indians 'dogs' and 'traitors'.⁽¹⁶⁾ Although a transcript of Gujral's speech is not available, it appears from the interviews of the Indians who attended the meeting that he apparently urged the Indian community to show solidarity with Iraq. He also took pride in the fact that India was the first to close its Embassy in Kuwait. As a result, the situation became such that Indians hurriedly started leaving Kuwait in large numbers. Worse followed when the External Af-

16. *The Statesman*, Sept. 12, 1990.

fairs Minister arranged to fly out with him more than 150 of the richest Indians in Kuwait overriding the sick, the aged and even pregnant women.

THE GULF CRISIS AND INDIA'S OIL NEEDS

The crisis that was budding in August 1990 culminated in January 91. Long before the Gulf crises began, the oil experts, during the 70's and 80's had sounded warning, about the uncertainties that were likely to develop in the oil market, as they visualised a reduction in production and an increase in price of oil in the last decade of this century. Despite this long standing pessimistic forecast, the Gulf crisis came as a shock to the oil importing states, especially the less developed countries like India, having little or no control over the global political economy of oil. When the war was in progress, a very sharp rise in oil price was anticipated- the anticipated rise being as high as 55.60 per barrel (TERI 1991).

Hence, a disastrous impact on the Indian economy was apprehended with a strategic petroleum reserve for only 45 days compared to a stock for 70 days in the developed countries. In this situation, the government had no other option than taking a short term measures in the oil sector in the form of a 25% hike in the price of petrol and petroleum products and 15% reduction in supply of petrol and petroleum products under the guise of demand management. Our Government had to face strong criticisms for not announcing any long term energy policy but, India's domestic instabilities should also

not be ignored. Prior to that an approach paper to eight plan was approved by the national Development Council in June 1990, which provided a new guide line for the energy sector where a few long term perspectives were laid down with the political uncertainties prevailing in India, no clear cut long- term policy for the energy sector emerged during the one and half year period since the end of the Gulf war, so this conclusion can be easily drawn out that the oil crisis which his the Indian economy had not been caused by the Gulf crisis alone, although it had certainly aggravated the problem. Similarly, the termination of the military confrontation does not mean an end to India's travails, though it provided a temporary respite to the government to formulate a comprehensive energy policy. Since oil still remains one of the cheepest sources of energy, its importance in India's economic development is unlikely to decline in the near future. While coal, oil, gas and electricity are the chief primary sources of commercial energy in India, over the last three decades the share of oil in meeting India's energy requirements has increased steadily. e.g. oil and gas met a mere 18.6% of energy demands in 1960-61, their share increased to over 38% in 1989-90, Over the same period the share of electricity increased marginally from 10% to a mere 10.5% while that of coal declined from 71.4% to 51.2% " (17).

This, by itself, makes the Indian economy vulnerable to international developments, particularly, those developments that af-

17. Arun Kumar Banerji, "The Oil Crisis, Frim Temporary Bonanza To Profligacy and After"; *The Gulf War and the Energy Crisis in India*, New Delhi-1993, P- 141.

fect the availability of oil at a reasonable price. Since a substantial portion of India's need for petroleum products is met by imports, even a marginal increase in the price of oil in the international market will have serious repercussions on India's balance of payment. e.g., an increase in the price of oil of \$ 1 barrel, will push up the cost of imports by Rs. 400 crores at the rate of exchange prevailing before the depreciation in the value of the rupee. So a new strategy is required to not only meet the short term contingencies but also provide for long term stability to the Indian economy.

What is often described as Indian oil crisis, is the result of the yawning gap between domestic consumption and production of oil and petroleum products, and the government's failure to close the gap by evolving an integrated and comprehensive energy policy. But one accurate estimate about Indians oil reserves and future prospects is difficult to make because of the absence of adequate data.

The Indian government's reaction to the Gulf crisis was panicky. In the early phase of the crisis- in August, September and October- when oil prices peaked in the market, India went on a shopping spree and brought oil at an average price of \$ 30 per barrel. The price of oil fell after that and the purchases made a panic led to a large outflow or so scarce foreign exchange resources. One may justify the governments decision in view of the uncertainties prevailing at the time, about the availability of oil at the price announced by OPEC in July. Once the crisis broke out, speculative trading led to a

rapid price rise and Indian decision makers apprehended the worst. S.L. Khosla, the then Chairman of the ONGC told the India today early in February, 1991, that three months ago he had estimated that the government should be prepared to pay as much as \$ 50 a barrel in early 1991. Later, he revised his estimate and said that the 1990-91 average price should be around \$ 25 a barrel ⁽¹⁸⁾.

After the termination of hostilities in the Gulf, the price of oil in the international market declined appreciably. All those developments could not, possibly have been foreseen, but they reflect poorly on the abilities of the ONGC, as the nabal agency for the exploration of oil in India, to make intelligent forecasts about the international oil market. The cutflow of foreign exchange could have been checked had the government built up a strategic reserve, by entearing into long term contracts in, say, May, 1990 when the price of oil was still below \$ 15 a barrel. The Chief constraint was the storage capacity which was equivalent to 45 days consumption ⁽¹⁹⁾.

FUTURE OPTIONS :-

If India's oil crisis was of its own making, its continuance has been inextricably mixed up with the general health of the Indian economy. Since a third of India's requirements of petroleum and petroleum products is met by imports, the Indian economy has become more vulnerable to developments aboard, particularly in the Gulf

18. *India Today*, Feb. 15, 1991- P- 44

19. *Ibid* - 4- 44.

states, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union which was one of the important sources of supply of crude to India at concessional rates. long term solution of the problem will depend on a judicious mix of three strategies " (20).

- (a) augmentation of domestic production;
- (b) conservation and ;
- (c) substitution.

Augmentation of domestic production is difficult to achieve in short-run. The question of increasing domestic product in the longer term- is intimately associated with the larger issue of India's own reserves. Any increase in the domestic production of crude oil will also require augmentation of refinery capacity. However, it is doubtful whether expansion of refinery capacity can keep pace with the demand. Because of this there are many who argue that it would be advantageous to import more finished products of creating additional refinery capacity especially because of the existence of surplus refinery capacity in the international market.

CONSERVATION AND SUBSTITUTION :-

Since domestic production of oil cannot meet the increasing demand for petroleum and petroleum products, and given the scarcity of foreign exchange resources, substitution and conservation have become imperative. Substitution of oil is possible in selected indus-

20. Arun Kumar Banerjee, "The Gulf Wart and Energy Crisis in India." New Delhi- 1993, P-150.

trial and transport sectors, (e.g. in the Railways), as well as in the domestic sector, by switching over to such fuels as coal, cooking coal, bio gas, and solar energy⁽²¹⁾.

Substitution has, however, its limits, side by side the efforts at substitution, efforts should be made for conservation. The future programmes for the development of petroleum resources have to be integrated with a comprehensive energy policy. It may be mentioned in this connection that national energy efficiency programme has been launched under the eighth plan which will provide a comprehensive frame work for co-operation between and among major sector of the economy such as industry, agriculture, transport and household which use energy and the energy supply sectors coal, power and petroleum. If these targets be achieved, they will go a long way in reducing the gap between the demand and supply of commercial energy.

21. Ibid - P- 152.

Chapter-IV

*India's Response to the
US Approach towards a New
World Order*

INDIA'S RESPONSE TO THE US APPROACH TOWARDS A NEW WORLD ORDER

The Gulf war may be regarded as a watershed in world affairs because it acted as an important catalyst for the US proposal for a new world political order. The end of the cold war was perceived by many in the U.S. as a triumph for America, its ideology and system. Since the Vietnam war, Americans have generally viewed any foreign entanglement with deep skepticism. But at the end of the Gulf war, President Bush was able to tell the Americans. "Finally we have kicked the Vietnam syndrome once for all." He further said. "the spectre of Vietnam has been buried forener in the desert sands of the Arabian Penansula." Perhaps the excited texan speaking over CNN summerises it all : "we taught the whole world a lesson. Don't mess with the United States."⁽¹⁾

The Gulf war has perhaps, burried deep the post cold war euphoria highlighting the irrelevance of military power and that permanent peace has dawned. The war represented the asymmetries in objectives, capabilities and strategies. Both sides made their share of miscalculation.

On this context Margerate Thatcher said " A' new world or-

1. Vinod Mehta, "Don't Mess With Uncle Sam", Sunday, March, 10-16, 91, P-8.

der' is one of those vague phrases. I think what the Bush administration meant was that they were very pleased indeed to see the United Nations acting together, the five permanent members in particular and then to get the nations through the Security Council so firmly as we have done (the concept) carries one very important implication, that you have to be prepared for what ever may happen because otherwise when it happens it will be too late to be prepared. And then you have to make regional arrangements with the consent of the countries, NATO is such a regional arrangement in the Middle East. But in the end, some of us will have to carryout the role that we have carried out for years, having forces ready to deploy out of urea, what ever area in the base organisation, for the simple reason that we have always been used to playing a world role. Great trading nations will always have to protect supply routes." (2)

Ever since the Soviets retired from the contest that kept the cold war going and more specifically during and after the confrontation with Iraq, the American President has been advocating a New World Order, albeit under the benevolent tutelage of the Americans as the only remaining super power in the unipolar world. The assumption on which the concept of the new world order is based, is best summed up by Theo Sommer, " The unspoken assumption was the American military power would serve as the ultimate arbiter, that the industrial democracies would share the financial burden of such

2. K.L. Chanchreek, "The Gulf War- A Global Crisis Causes and Further Affects", *International Opinion World Press on Gulf crisis*, P-78.

arbitration, and that the developing countries, in the absence of another world power to look for help, would by and large be happy to conform to the views of the only remaining super power" (3).

In the same view while analysing the President's statements Earl. C. Ravenal suggests one of two interpretations, " U.S. strategy can now be directed to active intervention to resolve conflicts in other regions on terms favourable to American interests; and that those interests themselves are to be defined broadly as the maintenance of stability and order in any and every region of the world. (4)

Charles Krauthammer said, "The immediate post cold war world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The centre of world power is the unchallenged super power, the United States, attended by its Western allies (5).

The vacuum created by the removal of the Soviet threat left the U.S. bereft of a driving force on which to base their future foreign policy. They turned their attention to other issue in the world that had been exercising their concern in the past. The Bush administration considers this an opportune time to pay greater attention to global issue that need to be brought into conformity with the American ethos. The threat they conceive for themselves relates primarily to

3. V.K. Nair, "War in the Gulf, Lessons For the Third World", -1991, New Delhi- P 203.

4. Ibid

5. Ibid

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the commensurate delivery means that would indicated by on exponentially increase the military element of the power equation of the otherwise weaker world community. "The Iraqi invasion demonstrated, there are still dangerous people abroad who have power to jeopardise western interests. It also demonstrated that when those interests must be defended by force the principal responsibility rests with the west's leading power, the United States. (6).

The developing world needs to take serious note to Kranthammer's conclusions, as these impinge upon the third world's credibility and aspirations to grow into equal members of the world community. He states, our best hope for safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will to lead a unpopular world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them" (7).

This has been amply demonstrated in management and execution of the confrontation in the Gulf.

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the joint Chiefs of the U.S. armed forces explained American post war strategy to Dan Oberdorfer. He said, " You have got to step aside from the context we have using for the past 40 years, that you base (Military plan-

6. Ibid

7. Ibid- P- 204

ning) against a specific threat. We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for. We are the major players of the world stage with responsibilities around the world."

Rosenfeld goes on to interpret these remarks, " In claiming a free hand to intervene just about anywhere at any time on the basis that we are super power, he (Colin Powell) was making it a virtue out of global unilateralism." ⁽⁸⁾.

From the above remarks one can easily make out that a post cold war United States has unilaterally chalked out a strategy for absolute domination of a new world order to be ratified in the light of what it considers to be acceptable norms that would ensure the security and well being of America and its Western allies.

A NEW WORLD ORDER

The transformation of relations between East and West has ended the cold war, freeing minds and resources that for so long were bound by fraught confrontation. Though the opening presented by this new situation are real, the process is fraught with danger, especially regarding the extreme difficulties facing the Soviet Union's transformation. Additionally the Gulf crisis has revealed the weakness of the present international system of security. Freed from the constraints of the cold war, the U.N. did respond with unprecedented speed to the Iraqi invasion.

8. Ibid

Since the mid- 1950's, major power politics in the middle east has been characterized by the predominance of the external powers and the strongly adversarial. Even confrontational relationship between them.

The most striking feature of this 'New World Order' has been the emergence of the U.S. as the dominant power. Such predominance was evident at several levels during the conflict. To begin with the U.S. demonstrated that it was the only power able and willing to deploy substantial military strength in the area. United states troop constitution forces as well as the decisive factor in Iraq's defeat. The American military performance also showed clearly that its weapons technology was superior to that of any other major power. In the political sphere the U.S. was the major driving force in the formation of the international coalition and played a dominans role in setting coalition strategy and tactics. Throughtout the conflict it displayed significant authority and influence over a wide range of states. Globally, it was able to secure not only, the co- operation of the Sovlet Union and People's republic of China in legitimizing international action but also the active participation of Britain, France and numerous other countries in carrying this out.

India, which is the biggest land mass comprise of a large number of states in a comparatively advanced stage of development, politically sensitive to the global environment third world countries should respect each others tenitorial integrity. On face the common

might of the centres of power in the west. President Bush said that the third world should know that the United States has immense capability to achieve its global goals. The U.S. revealed its huge military industrial power during the war against Iraq and it demonstrated to the third world that immense capabilities of the U.S. exist to maintain its leadership in global of affairs.

The new world order of President Bush is not an empty rhetoric, it is the logical extension of its military and economic power. Any third world country dare not stand up against the U.S., otherwise it will be punished. Further, the U.S. has a differential approach towards the third world countries, depending on the strategic and economic interests of the United States. The Gulf and the middle East is central to the U.S. for 'oil' and sale of arms to the client states who are rich in cash. The utility of the third world countries will be decided by the U.S., and it will be determined on the basis of strategic raw materials like oil.

1 President George Bush has also declared that the U.S. support to third world countries for economic development would be decided on the basis of their attitude towards the U.S. during the war in Iraq.

Egypt was unambiguously with the U.S. and India showed ambivalence and ambiguities during the war. India did allow refuelling of U.S. planes in transit, later it suspended this facility. In the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. will observe the conduct and behaviour

of the non- permanent members to decide the degree of U.S. support to such countries in the future. The U.S. foreign policy will be based on a rating list where the third world countries will be graded on the basis of their support to the U.S. such a grading of countries was always a part of U.S. foreign policy, but its public announcement by President Bush is a signal to every country that the U.S. role is not based on ambiguities.

II This conflict set the tone for much of regional politics. While at the same time providing Arab states with some alternatives in terms of meeting their national needs. By the late 1980's important changes was underway as the position of the Soviet Union progressively weakened the cold war gave way to accomodation and detente. But they also accelerated these trends with important implications for members of the Arab system.

Regionally, it convinced the leading Arab powers of the necessity for confronting Iraq and dissuaded Israel from doing so. Additionally, U.S. actions made clear that apart from superior capabilities and leverage, it also possessed the will and determination of use these to protect its interests and those of its allies. In the economic sphere, however, the picture was more complex:

III On the one hand, decisive U.S. action protected not only important American economic interests but also those of the Gulf oil producers and major western consuming states.

On the other hand, strained financial resources obliged it to seek substantial contribution from Japan, Germany and the Arab Gulf states to pay for the cost of the war.

The Gulf crisis thus demonstrated the strength of American capabilities, leverages and interests in the middle East. It also made clear that it had no effect major power rival in the area and the likely to face any serious external challenge for some time. Since the Soviet Union is no longer perceived to be as reliable ally or as a dangerous opponent, its leverage and influence vis-a-vis both the U.S. and regional states has declined considerably.

Nevertheless this shift toward detente and co- operation has Created new opportunities for Soviet Union. The less threatening and adversarial its policy. The easier it is to improve relations with key U.S. allies. ⁽⁹⁾

The Gulf crisis confirmed the major western powers acceptance of the U.S. leadership role in the region. In the aftermath of the war, economic competition will quickly resurface and France will seek to reassert it semi independent role, competing with the U.S. in some areas. However, cooperation is likely to be maintained on security related issues, notably arms supplies and the containment of Iraq.

9. Brynen Rex & Nobel Paul, "The Gulf Conflict and The Arab State System", A New Regional Order", Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. -13, 1991- P- 119

The Asian community has voiced serious misgivings about the unilateral manner in which the United States has demonstrated its will to enforce the New world order in the middle east. They bear that future U.S. compulsions to safeguard their economic and security environment would impinge on the national interests of the Asian states. As it is the United States has already placed North Korea on notice vis-a-vis its nuclear and missile programme. This force would always be available to enforce American Policy, if the occasion arises, on stubborn states of the region. As it is diplomatic and economic pressures are already being brought directly on Pakistan and indirectly on India to conform to the U.S. declared position on nuclear politics and missile restraints.

AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE REGION :

This is an important factor to be examined in the Gulf crisis is whether the oil weapon was the only factor instrumental in influencing the American response to the crisis. There is no denying the fact that U.S. oil companies were apprehensive about the consequence of President Saddam Hussein adding Kuwait's 1.6 million barrels per day to his 2.8 million barrels. This would force a hike in the price of oil and also threaten the American interest.

Though it may be out of place to say that oil does not have a significant role to play. In the attitude and policies of the U.S, it is quite true also that it was not the sole factor in the U.S. response.

In an unusual step taken jointly on Aug. 3, 1990, by the Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and the U.S. secretary of state James Baker, both the countries initiated series of measures to pressurise Baghdad to pull out of Kuwait. The Soviet Union suspended arms deliveries under existing bilateral agreements of Iraq, and the U.S. froze Iraqi assets in its banks. For the first time in recent political history the great powers responded to a crisis in tandem.

The Security Council resolutions provided the U.S. operations the much needed legitimacy the security council witnessed an unprecedented meeting of minds resolution 678 (the 12th resolution) even authorised the use of "all necessary means", thereby implying measures including military, unless the Iraqi's withdrew from Kuwait by the midnight of Jun., 15, 1991. Iraq's reaction to the U.S. sponsored resolution was perhaps only to be expected. The Foreign minister of Iraq Tariq Aziz rejected what he called "the Unjust resolution". He further accused the security council of becoming "a tool of the U.S."

It seems unlikely that such massive action was undertaken only because of U.S. dependence on the Gulf oil. The European countries and Japan are more dependent on Gulf oil and hence should have reacted more vigorously. Japan imports 64% France 35% Italy 32% Britain 14% West Germany 9% in comparison to the United States 11% of their total requirement from the Gulf.

American troops were sent not only to defend Saudi Arabia against a possible Iraqi invasion, but also to protect the vital interests of the U.S. in the region. President Bush identified the vital interest of the U.S. as follows :-

- (1) Reinstating the Amir of Kuwait the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwaiti soil;*
- (2) Safety of the Americans lives ; &*
- (3) The health of the U.S. economy. In this context President Bush made a speech at the white House on August 8 wherein he contended that since the U.S. nearly imports half of the oil it consumes, it could face a major threat to its economic independence.*

President Bush said, " Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny. We share in their joy, a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal.

Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand, and tonight America & the world have kept their word.

The suspension of offensive combat operations is contingent upon Iraq's not firing upon any coalition forces, and not launching Scud missiles against any other country. If Iraq violates these terms, coalitions forces will be free to resume military operations.

At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them, but instead with their leadership, and above all with Saddam Hussein." (11)

President Bush's projection of the vital interests of the U.S. was a clear sign that Washington would go to any length to meet the challenge posed by President Saddam Hussein.

The chief American delegate to the U.N., Thomas R. Pickering was convinced that the resolution was " sufficiently broad to use armed force, indeed minimum force depending upon the circumstances." Publically the U.S. and Saudi military official were saying that the primary role of the U.S. armed forces was to protect the Saudi Kingdom against attack, But in private, senior U.S. officials insisted that a continued build up would give President Bush " additional military options".

Before the war started, hypothetical scenarios visualised major shortcomings in the ability of the U.S. armed forces to sustain combat in the Gulf. These included the problem of getting large members of American ground forces to the region; difficulties in resupplying troops; the fear that the use of chemical weapons by Iraq would reduce the ability of the troops to fight by forcing them to wear protective gear.

11. George Bush; "Iraq Invasion of Kuwait" Speech delivered at the white House, On Aug, 1990, *Vital Speeches of the day*, 22 Sep- 1990.

The U.S. interests in the Gulf were no where more forthrightly articulated than in a memorandum by the Navy Secretary James Forrestal to secretary of State James F. Byrnes in 1945. Forrestal wrote that "the American goal" is to promote the orderly, early development of petroleum reserves in the more remote areas, such as persian gulf thereby supplementing the western hemisphere sources and protection against their early exhaustion. I do not care which American company or companies develop the Arabian reserves, but I think most emphatically it should be American".⁽¹²⁾

While Forrestal articulated the American interests more clearly in the aftermath of the second world war, the U.S. oil interests in the Gulf region is not of recent origin. The principal objective of the United States, not with-standing its leading position among the world's oil exporters since the second half of the last century until the second world war, has been to explore the petroleum resources of other regions first in order to keep its domestic reserves intact.

Emerging as a super power out of the war, since 1945 in the United States appeared to have set a goal to maximise its control over the oil resources of the Gulf, checkmating any other single company or country that would seek to dominate the region's petroleum reserves. Throughout the cold war period, whenever Washington rightly or wrongly perceived that the Soviet Union was about to threaten its interests in the Gulf, the White House openly warned the

12. Chintamani Mahapatra, "U.S. Policy Towards the Gulf"; *World Focus*, Vol 12, 1991, P-12.

direct commitment of the military forces in order to protect its interests in the region. (13).

U.S. assessment of its requisite role seems to have been influenced by three major considerations:-

First, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait endangered the tenuous political balance which had historically enabled the U.S. to presence its dominant role in the region. On the one hand Iraq was fast becoming militarily too powerful for other local powers, and a formidable biological, chemical and perhaps, nuclear arsenal was suspected to be at its disposal; on the other, it suddenly went the radical, anti-western, anti-imperialist way holding the banner of a pan-Arab upsurge. This could be the worst thing to happen to the USA after the loss of Iran. (14).

Secondly, the last thing the U.S.A. could accept was an imminent threat to its access to oil in this region; which it wanted for itself as well as its allies in such quantity and at such price as must be satisfactory to the taker. The oil producing Gulf nations, especially Kuwait and Soudi Arabia, have been most obliging in this respect. Hence it was imperative for the U.S. to see that the capitulation of Kuwait was undone, or else, the Saudis might succumb to a

13. Ibid - P- 12.

14. R. Chakrabarti , "U.S. Intervention in the Gulf War (1990-91) and The Energy Crisis in the Gulf War & the Energy Crisis in India"- 1993, N. Delhi P- 21.

similar fate. In fact as the saying went round, the U.S. would have felt the least disturbed by the Iraqi action had Kuwait been an orchard rather than an oil field of immense value.

Also, the way the Kuwaiti rulers had been behaving in the larger international diplomacy in the pre attack period trying to cultivate special relations with the Soviet world by way of aid and trade might have caused the U.S. look the other way in Kuwait's days of distress.⁽¹⁵⁾

Thirdly, under the rubric of 'freedom of navigation', the U.S. had been steadily pursuing objectives that went much beyond and amounted the securing a permanent military surveillance over this region. Though the doctrinal posture for an extended use of the freedom was formulated earlier in the context of the Afghan crisis it continued to be reiterated in more emphatic terms by subsequent administration⁽¹⁶⁾. In fact the creation of CENTCON, sale of AWACS and the stationing of Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia (1981), blockade of the Hormuz strait (1984), a near permanent stationing of the U.S. naval task force around the Gulf- all pointed to the determination of the US to keep this area as its exclusive preserve. Given the rapid shift in U.S.-Soviet relations from a confrontationalist to a conciliatory stage in the Middle East, the task become all the easier.

15. Ibid P-22.

16. Ibid.

In the punitive action that followed with a massive application of deadly weapons to bring Iraq to the needs, it was therefore essential to ensure that the entire operation would be in accordance with the war-plan chalked out by the U.S.

By a remarkable feat of a persuasive diplomacy the U.S. achieved two things. It enlisted the active cooperation of all its allies in the venture. The US also made the Soviet Union and China consenting parties to its scheme on the easy condition that the latter would not be required to participate in the collective action. That certainly suited the U.S. intentions. On 29 Nov. 1991 the day the Security Council adopted resolution 678 authorising use of 'every necessary means', secretary of State James Baker made it plain, "Whether or not force would be used once it is authorised will be decided at the highest levels of the countries that have force on the ground in the Gulf." That means the U.S. and such coalition force as the U.S. would admit. ⁽¹⁷⁾

saying in fact that what the world witnessed in the Kuwait crisis was an unprecedented- U.N. enforcement action carried out actually under U.S. banner which looked as though it was flying for world conscience. It was essentially a U.S. led coalition job with the U.N. providing but a flimsy legitimacy.

17. Ibid P- 23.

U.S. DOMINANCE ON THE U.N. :-

This situation inevitably led to the questioning of the role of the United States in the conduct both of the crisis diplomacy and of the military action when it came.

The issue points up a fundamental problem of whether the United Nations can ever be 'autonomous! The United Nations is essentially a reflection of the political force in the international community and most centrally of the mutual accommodation or lack of it between the major powers in the system. Thus independent military action on the part of the United Nations is unlikely even to be a possibility, since it has no unique territory or population to fight for. It has only become a issue now, 46 years after its formation, because the cold war has kept the possibility of United Nations action under Article 43 (the maintenance and restoration of peace and security) firmly off the agenda. But the prospect of the Security Council has paradoxically revealed the intrinsic limitations of such a concept.

Hence the U.S. emergence as the only state with sufficient military power to effect a military solution meant that its role was bound to be an ambiguous one. Thus the answer to the question as to who was using whom must be that it was a bit of both. There was little doubt that the United states had its own agenda and interests independent of the United Nations. There was also little doubt that its interests and those of the principles of the United Nations overlapped such that serving one would serve the other.

On the other hand the pursuit of American interests through the United Nations was not an act of altruism on the part United States. Careful United Nations diplomacy was a pre-condition of American action, and in that sense the need for the United States to work through the Security Council acted to some extent as a constraint. There was some clear indication of a degree of conflict between the United States and the United Nations Secretary General Perez de-Cuellar, in the latter's persistent emphasis on peaceful resolution and the United States pursuit of a coercive strategy against Iraq which involved the possibility of military action. ⁽¹⁸⁾

Not only did the security abdicate its obligation in preventing war as far as possible by giving economic sanction a real chance to work, but once the hostilities started the U.N. had no way to control it. As we can see, under the guise of the U.N. authorised action the U.S. and its coalition partners waged a relentless and ruthless war against Iraq not to achieve the objectives laid down by the security council in its resolutions, but to the bitter end, to teach President Saddam Hussein a lesson of his life and in the process go much beyond any U.N. action could and should have gone. In such a U.N. action as authorised by resolution 678, one would expect and the Secretary- General to be playing an active role. But as the fighting continued with ever increasing ferocity, the Secretary- General it is said, " was related to the role of file clerk and messenger boy, essentially to operate within the Bush administration's guidelines. Indeed,

18. Ken Mathews, "The Gulf Conflict and International Relations"- 1993 P-87.

he was given no more than an hour's notice of Washington's decision to go to war, and was informed thereafter of the war's progress only after action occurred." (19).

The United Nations could not take action without the United States. If the United States had not taken on the leadership role both in United Nations diplomacy and in the use of its own military resources than it is doubtful if the United Nations could have succeeded in bringing effective action to bear against Iraq at all. The relationship was one of mutual dependence from which both benefited. It is conceivable that the U.S. could have served its own interests in the crisis without the United Nations- albeit at considerable political cost. It is much less conceivable that the United Nations could have served its interests in the matter without the action and leadership of the United States.

Right since the crisis started, the U.S. has been trying to build up an international consensus against Iraq as its leader. In an interview on television, the U.S. Secretary of State James. A. Baker raised the possibility that the U.S. would eventually seek U.N. authorisation for military action against Iraq. " We can't begin to walk a way from six Security Council resolutions. That's simply not going to happen." (20).

19. R.P. Anand, "United Nations and the Gulf Crisis", New Delhi- 1994- P- 30.

20. A. K. Pasha, "The Gulf in Turmoil: A Global Response", New Delhi- 1992, P- 183.

Baker even hinted that if required the U.S. would act on its own if American citizens in Iraq or Kuwait were harmed. Such actions would be taken, under the U.N. charter in order to "impliment" existing U.N. resolutions. The U.S. has always maintained that the charter authorises military action in defence against unprovoked aggression.

The Bush administration's tactics included more threats by the President and the Secretary of State to use force, the deployment of tens of thousands of additional armoured troops. James Baker's visit to the Gulf and many more resolutions in the U.N. The stepped-up American pressure on Iraq was looked upon by many to be part of a new exercise in brinkmanship. Perhaps one may safely say that President Bush succeeded in his rehetorical and logistical offensive.

The U.S. Administration's next task was to try and impress upon its allied partners that the sanctions were not yielding the expected results testifying before the senate armed services committee. Defence Secretary Dick Cheney warned that there was a price to be paid for waiting for sanctions to work. he told the committee members that the U.S. would not " wait indefinitely".⁽²¹⁾

In a last ditch effort to prevent war, James Baker held talks with the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva on Jan., 9, 1991. The talks failed. After a marathon meeting Baker said, "regrettably

21. Ibid -P- 186

I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility " in complying with the U.N. deadline. With the deadline fast approaching, a desperate effort was made by the U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar on Jan. 14 when he met President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. The statement make by the dejected U.N. Secretary General after the meeting summarises it all. " God only knows if there will be peace of war in the Gulf." (22). When Saddam Hussein virtually snubbed the last ditch attempt to the U.N. Secretary General to negotiate a peaceful settlement he invited war on himself.

The final land assault was perhaps on exception where everything happened exactly as planned. Bereft of satellities or even aerial reconvaissance, Saddam's. commanders could not see what was going on behind, the allied lines. General Schwarzkopf was able to hoodwink Beghdad into concentrating its forces in the wrong places. Six of Iraq's 42 divisions were amassed along the Kuwaiti coast guarding against a sea. borne invasion. U.S. maries repeatedly rehearsed amphibious landings. As zero hour approached an armada of ships swang into action. It has now been revealed that the amphibious deception plan was devised way back in August 1990 itself. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf himiself admits this " when I saw the way he had stuck all his forces in his one bag down there I started thinking in desert warfare you can deceive your enemy as to the point of the main attach, and I said that's it, that's the key (23).

22. Ibid -P- 186

23. Ibid P- 188

THE THREATS TO INDIA :-

It is well established that India has manifested the entire range of characteristics that the U.S. receives as a possible threat to the New World order it aspires to create.

INDIA HAS :-

- (1) A well established and entirely independent nuclear industry with a potential for exports. This would aggravate fears of global proliferation.*
- (2) Having detonated a nuclear device as far back as 1974, she has a proven technological and engineering base to produce nuclear weapons devices.*
- (3) A substantial stock of weapons grade uranium and plutonium beyond the purview of international safeguards. This gives her the capacity to assemble a comprehensive nuclear arsenal if she even decides to go nuclear.*
- (4) Her resistance to the Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968, is likely to have a direct bearing on the negotiations to extend the life of NPT it is considered in 1995. The renewal of the treaty will have a high precedence in America's 'New World Order'.*
- (5) Has successfully tested short and intermediate range missiles capable of being armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, and is in a position to productionise these.*
- (6) Developed the technology for medium/intercontinental missiles by virtue of a well defined space programme.*

- (7) *The increasing naval overall power potential of India would degrade the capacity of the United States to influence events in the Indian Ocean currently the pressure of the United States.*
- (8) *Has had an on going confrontation with Pakistan and this situation lands itself to regional conflicts. A major destabilising factor in the eyes of the U.S. (24).*

While General Collin Powell laments the existing vacuum in the threat scenario on which to base future plans, an analyst from General Dynamics was obliging the pentagon by drawing their attention to the next possible target of the New World Order. (25).

According to the defence analyst who attended the briefing India stands identified as the most probable target that would need to be brought in line with the New World Order, by use of military force if so required.

This is a live threat in being which needs careful consideration by policies makers in India. Their endeavours must be directed to prophylactic diplomatic activity to safeguard their national security while continuing the primary activity of Nation building. However, in so doing, it is important to reiterate that the overall power equation of a country flows from a combination of its strength in the political, economic and military spheres. However, if the United

24. V.K. Nair, "War in the Gulf: Lesson For the Third World", New Delhi, 1991, P-212.

25. Ibid P- 213.

States does create a situation where a military confrontation becomes imminent, then India must have the economic resilience and military capacity of safeguard her interests.

With the collapse of the bipolar macrosystem, some international relations concepts developed during the cold war lost their meanings or were defined and interpreted differently, some were brought together as new concepts and with new meanings, while many of the concepts were expanded or became narrower. The degree of these changes can be assessed on the basis of vertical and horizontal relations between macro or micro Lands or both situations. In this transitional process, we are faced with tumultuous conditions which in turn have effects and implications for the international relations arena. This situation makes the assessment of the real behaviour of the main and side players, and the quality of relations between macro and microlevels difficult. The speed of international transformation strongly influences the process of change in concept and their meanings. (26).

Overall, the Gulf war has hastened the emergence of a new strategic environment of the Middle East a situation of one power dominance combined with a mixture of muted competition and partial concert among the intrusive powers. The concentration of power and initiative has heightened Arab dependence on the U.S. The ex-

26. Sayed Abdul Ali Ghavam, "Conceptual Shifts in International Relations and the Changing World", *The Iranian Journal of International Studies*, Spring- 1995, Vol VII P- 175.

perience of wartime cooperation and continued feelings of insecurity particularly in the military sphere among Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states will contribute to a strengthening of ties with the American military. Moreover, the performance of U.S. forces will undoubtedly heighten the demand for American weapons technology among Arab armed forces. As a result, the U.S. role as a supplier of arms to the region will be enhanced and links with Arab militancy establishments strengthened. In the political sphere, the emergence of the U.S. as the focal point and dominant force in regional diplomacy means that Arab states must largely work through it in dealing with unresolved national and regional issues. American leadership of the international coalition enables it to play a fundamental role in defining the shape of post war Iraq, a crucial question in regional politics ⁽²⁷⁾. Moreover, since the Soviet Union is no longer an effective force and the U.S. is the only power which will be pivotal in any attempts to resolve the Arab- Israeli conflict.

Much before the recent bloody war in the Gulf the American President in his speech at the United Nations had dreamed of a "New World Order" where there would be "open borders, open trade and -most important open minds."

President Bush also envisioned the emergence of "a new part-

27. Rex Brynen and Paul Nobel, "The Gulf Conflict and Arab State System", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol 13, 1991 P- 120.

nership of nations based on consultation, cooperation and collective action." (28)

It is important to note that President Bush had sketched his lofty idea of the New World Order on Oct. 1, 1990, in the back drop of the cessation of cold war, unprecedented improvement in the cooperation between the Soviet Union and his country and, no less significant, the eruption of Gulf crisis with Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

However, towards the end of the Gulf war, it was already becoming clear that Bush would soon change his tune and add new dimensions to his concept of a New World Order.

Today the Soviet Union not only lacks, the political will and economic wherewithal to play such a role, but also selectively plays ball with the domestic disorder and economic crisis.

The danger to the third world emanates first of all from the expansion of U.S. military presence in various parts of the globe. India and a large number of third world countries are firmly on the road towards dependency and subordination in the New World Order. It will be extremely unexpected if the U.S. does not exploit the growing vulnerability of the third world and follow a foreign policy of dictation, arm-twisting or benign neglect of some of the third world

28. Chintamani Mahapatra, "US Policy Towards The Gulf", *World Focus*, Vol 12, 1991, P-14.

countries. The present, current situation is full of uncertainties, delemas difficulties and disorders for many third world countries.

The Gulf crisis has revealed the weakness of the present international system of security. Freed from the constraints of the cold war, the U.N. did respond with unprecedented speed to the Iraqi invasion. The U.N. must have improved capabilities for anticipating and preventing conflicts. The general implications for the third world are quite clear that the U.S. has decided to play a big and active global role to resolve its domestic crisis and its contradictions with other industrialised countries, Out of this will flow the agenda of U.S. foreign policy and its dealings with different third world countries. A diversity of approach towards various third world countries will be the basis of U.S. foreign policy during the last decade of the twentieth century.

India will have to define its relationship with the U.S. around these parameters of the U.S. global approach. India is neither marginal nor critical for the U.S. But many third world countries will be marginal in the U.S. foreign policy framework because some kind of raw material of the third world is not relevant at the present stage of technological development of the U.S. The U.S. will have a global foreign policy with a distinction based on criticality or marginality of various third world countries in its global scheme of domination of the contemporary world.

Chapter-V

Conclusions

CONCLUSIONS

After taking a broad view on the Gulf crisis. It can be summed up that India was herself very much busy with her domestic ups and downs. But some decisions show India's position on the crisis of re-fuelling case, It was indeed unfortunate that the government led by Chandrashekar who succeeded V.P. Singh, also displayed no interest in taking initiatives to resolve the Gulf crisis. While the government of V.P. Singh had taken an apparently softline towards Iraq, the Chandershekar regime pursued a pronouncedly pro-American stand ever since the war broke out in the Gulf. Chandershekar's repeated statements callings for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, his refusal to see any linkage between the crisis in the Gulf and the resolution of the Palestinian problem, his government's decision to provide refuelling facilities to the American military aircrafts and his initial refusal, even after nation wide protest against it. To stop such facilities are all indicative of the shift in the official Indian stand. ⁽¹⁾

While speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 25 Feb. 1991, Chandrashekar explained his decision, and said, " the decision to allow American planes to refuel in India was that of the Government of India of which I am the Prime Minister today and I take the full

1. The Times Of India, Feb 14, 1991.

responsibility without finding any alibi from any other source. But there are certain things which should not be distorted. I would not like to go into the past, I would not like to go into the records as to who did what. But one thing I should make quite clear in order to keep India's position intact and clear in the world opinion, that at no time was there any agreement signed, whether at the time of Indira Gandhi or Rajiv Gandhi or even Vishwanath, Pratap Singh, for refuelling or for overflights. The position is that, according to international norms, if we allow any aeroplane to fly over our air space, it is the practice that there should be a transit landing compulsory because then the country can use her sovereignty to inspect what it is carrying. This is not done when the aeroplane is flying a VIP, head of a Government or an Army General. This is the practice not only in India but also all over the world, but let us not get confused whether overflight is justified or not.. Overflights are more serious when you allow overflights over your territory. Then, after landing, refuelling is a normal practice and refuelling is not something special. If the plane lands at a particular airport, refuelling is done and it is done all over the world" (2).

While speaking in Lok Sabha on Feb 22, 1991, Chandrashekher said, " The situation is such that if this facility cannot be used by you, it will be better immediately, when I came to know about the opinion, not of all sanctions of the house but important sanctions of

2. Parliamentary Debates (Rajya Sabha) Official Report, N. Delhi- 25 Feb- 91 P. 23

the House, I immediately conveyed to the U.S. Government that they should discontinue it. It takes some time. If I'm at fault on that, you can blame me." (3)

This controversy serves to illustrate the chronic ambivalence in the attitude of many in India in regard to our relations with the United States, which we seems to be unable to overcome . Futhermore, by subsequently stopping the transit facilities, we succeeded in convincing the Arab members of the coalition forces that we were still inclined to favour Iraq rather than to support their cause.

It should have been clear from the very beginning to the policy maker in New Delhi that the action taken by Iraq in regard to Kuwait was totally unacceptable. both in principle and in practice. By seeking to extinguish the independence of Kuwait, the very first principle of Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful co-existence, namely, "mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, had been brazenly violated by Iraq. This principal constitutes the becllock of the Non-aligned movement there was no ground, accordingly, for India to have overlook this action of Iraq, even for a moment.

In fact with the collapse of the biopolar system, some international relations concepts developed during the cold war lost their meanings or were defined and interpreted differently. Some were

3. Lok Sabha Debates, Ninth Lok Sabha: Vol - XIV 22 Feb, 91, P- 556

brought together as new concepts and with the new meanings, while many of the concepts were expanded and became narrower. The degree of these changes can be assessed on the basis of vertical and horizontal relations between macro or micro or both situations. In this transitional process, we are faced with tumultuous conditions which in turn have effects and implications for the international arena. This situation makes the assessment of the real behaviour of the main & side players, and the quality of relations between macro & micro levels difficult. The speed of international transformation strongly influences the process of change in concepts and their meanings.

As a non-aligned nation India could have done something for the problem because Iraq and Kuwait are members of the Non-aligned Group and when something happened in that region which would ultimately tell upon our interests, our economic interests, our individual interests, because a lot of Indians were working in the Gulf. Twelve lakh Indian are working in the Gulf area and our own economy is so much linked with the Gulf. So to permit any kind of international global war taking place in the Gulf is always suicidal for our over all interests.

If we take a look at our past then we can judge that how much difference is there in Indian politics within some decades during the time of Pandit Nehru, when suez canal crisis broke out, Pandit Nehru the Prime minister of India sent a message to all over the

world. He said, "keep your hands off the Indian ocean and the Persian Gulf. Do not interfere. It is a local issue, we will sort it out", Nehru's voice was heard and respected. Nobody from the west came here to have a global fight in the Indian ocean and nobody came here to fight a war in the middle east. So India had a powerful voice.

It is indeed unfortunate that the government of Chandrashekhar which succeeded V.P. Singh also displayed no interest in taking initiatives to resolve the Gulf crisis. Even after becoming a member of the U.N. Security Council on Jan 1, 1990, India did not do anything to mobilise the support of other nations to impress upon the U.N. Security Council to continue with the economic sanctions against Iraq and give peace another chance.

However under heavy pressure from the congress party and its President Rajiv Gandhi to come up with a creative and relevant response to the Gulf crisis, the Prime Minister despatched his foreign minister V.C. Shukla to Yugoslavia, the current Chairman of the Non aligned movement and Iraq. Reportedly the 'new' Indian plan envisaged the following-

- (a) a firm commitment by Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait followed by a ceasefire,*
- (b) induction of a monitoring force to oversee the withdrawal within a specified time frame and,*

- (c) *convening of an international conference under U.N. auspices to discuss security in the Gulf region, including settlement of the Palistiniam question.*

While the Yugoslav leadership agreed that the Indian proposal could be discussed at the NAM foreign Minister's meeting, the Iranian leaders were reported to be not very enthusiastic to the Indian proposal in view of their strong displeasure over India's refuelling facilities to the American military aircrafts and largely also because of their own peace initiative for the region. Iraq strongly protested to India's actions as unfriendly regrettable and strange & called upon Indian Government to stop the refuelling activity, ⁽⁴⁾

It is also necessary for us to understand the refuelling issue against the background of the perceptible improvements in Indo-U.S. relations in the post cold war era. While it is nobody's argument that Indo-U.S. relations should not improve, it is difficult to believe that there are any convergences in the Indian and American interest in the Gulf. Again, as some analysts have pointed out India's decision to refuel American aircrafts also need to be seen in the context of the American help in getting the IMF oil facility worth \$ one billion as against the earlier expectations of only \$ 400 million. The other stand by credit of \$ 777 million was also negotiated, with great speed at the instance of the United states. The U.S. cooperation, this time round contrasts sharply with its opposition in 1981 under Ronald Reagan

4. Deccan Herald, Feb 1, 1991.

when India approached the IMF for a loan. Thus, while India's co-operation with the U.S. in its war efforts brought tangible benefits, it cannot however be denied that the entire episode affected India's image in international circles, and more so in the Arab world with whom we have had extremely cordial and beneficial relations in the past. Also by its refuelling decision the Indian leaders denied themselves an opportunity to strive to resolve the issues in the best Nehruvian traditions.⁽⁵⁾

It is, however, heartening to note that the Indian diplomacy vis-a-vis the Gulf crisis showed some changes and improvements as the war progressed. At the meeting of the NAM Foreign ministers in Belgrade where the leaders could not agree on a consensus about the nature and content of the NAM initiative to bring peace to the Gulf and at a time when the meeting was about to collapse without any decision, India succeeded in convincing the NAM foreign ministers that the movement should send peace mission to Baghdad and Washington and hold talks with Kuwait. The Belgrade consensus as revealed by the Indian foreign minister emphasised the cessation of hostilities as well as an end to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait simultaneously and measures initiated for a durable peace in the region by the early convening of a peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations to discuss the Palestinian question. In the United Nations India abstained in the Security Council meeting on the first

5. *Economic Times*, Jan 29, 1991.

day in protest against the closed-door nature of the meeting. The Prime Minister called for a simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from the region and their replacement by U.N. forces and efforts initiated to resolve the Palestinian problem. ⁽⁶⁾.

During and since the Gulf war, Paul Kennedy's concept of "imperial overstretch" has become a popular theme of discussion in the policy making academic and media circles in the U.S. ⁽⁷⁾.

Robert Gates, Scowcroft's deputy points out that repeatedly in this century the U.S. had led efforts to set up international security arrangements. Woodrow Wilson in the establishment of the League of Nations; Franklin Roosevelt in cold war rivalries. How Gates visualises a transformed geopolitical landscape. After decades during which "every issue that came before the U.N. was stymied", he says, today this automatic east-west conflict whenever there is an aggression or problem in the world, has really disappeared. And I think the best and first manifestation of its reality is in the Gulf situation. ⁽⁸⁾.

The U.S. did not send its troops into the Gulf merely because Kuwait was a nice place. Many nice places have been swallowed earlier. President Bush did not send his forces to protect freedom or preserve human rights and human dignity because neither the house

6. The Times of India, Feb 16, 1991.

7. A.K. Pasha, "The Gulf in Turmoil: A Global Response", 1992 P-89.

8. *Ibid.*

of sand's nor the Al Shiekh's family stood for any of these values. In short, U.S. forces were sent to Saudi Arabia to protect the western world access to Gulf oil.

Some of these influences and values have been partly reflected in Bush's attitude towards the Gulf crisis. Most American Presidents have believed that freedom in the world is intimately linked to American power. As former secretary of state Henry Kissinger expresses it on one occasion, "if we do not lead, no other nation that stands for what we believe in can take our place." (10)

American foreign policy right since world war II has been one of tension and interaction between the state system and the American approach/style of dealing with other countries.

Ironically the Gulf conflict also carries the seeds of future troubles for America. Saddam's Iraq is virtually crippled but its collapse can only benefit Iran to the detriment of the oil rich Gulf Arabs. It is interesting to note that Iranian had expected shia refugees from the lower Iraq to pour into Iran once hostilities began and had let up one hundred thousand tents on their side of the Iran-Iraq border to welcome them as possible allies in any future show down with Iraq. But none turned up. After the interim ceasefire, the Iranian were reported to have abetted anti-Saddam rebellion in Basra, karbala and Najaf. The Baghdad government eventually succeeded in sup-

10. Ibid

pressing the uprising with an iron hand But with the Kurds in the north clamouring for "safe havens" under a protective American umbrella and the simmering unrest in the South, the Iranians feel sensitive about extending their influence into Iraq and eventually to link up with the militant Shia's of Labanon. Should that materialise, it would be far more unpleasant scenanio for the Americans to comtemplate that the one resulting from Saddam Hussain's occupation of Kuwait.

Another source of American troubles is the mighty jolt that the crisis has given to the paternalistic regimes of the Gulf emicrates and kingdoms. The toughest challenge is being faced by the ruling family of Kuwait achich had fled the scene the moment it got wind of the Iraqi intentions. Kuwaith who stayed behind and did whatever they could to resist Iraqi occupation are now unlikely to submit to the absolute rule of the Sabahs.

They have already mounted strong pressure for early elections to the National Assembly (summarily dissolved in 1986), for more powers to the elected bodies, and for women's suffrage. There are tremors in Riyadh too that Saudi Arabia faced the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with no more credible response than impotent rage and a frantic call to the Americans to do whatever they thought fit to defend it, has seviously eroded the public image of the Saudi dynasty. The weakening of the traditional governments is bound to create difficulties for the United State in regard to its own plans for regional security.

Above all, the fact that the man in the street in the Arab world would not see the Gulf conflict in terms of a fight between good and evil, as the Americans would have liked him to believe, The outcome of the war is seen by him with a sense of deep disappointment. How it will work out in political terms in the months and years to come is difficult to predict. ⁽¹¹⁾

The Gulf war has shown that the U.S. will not hesitate to intervene militarily to protect what the Americans see as their vital interest. The U.S. perceived the Gulf crisis as a challenge not only to fundamental American interests, but also to essential American values. The adventure or misadventure of Saddam Hussein, posed a serious threat to America's political and economic interests Hence Washington had its stakes in preventing Saddam from getting away with his invasion and annexation of Kuwait.

Much before the Gulf war came to an end, President Bush had outlined his idea of 'New World Order'. It may be recalled that in a speech before the UN on Oct. 1, 1990, President Bush had observed that the New World Order would be characterised by "open borders, open trade and open minds." The highly successful allied strikes in Iraq and with the writing clear on the wall, President Bush was prompted to say that Washington would act as a 'healer' American leverage in the Gulf is now more than what it has been all these

11. M.S. Agwani, "Gulf War: The Aftermath". *World Focus: April- May- 1991.*

years. In his moment in triumph president Bush and spoke in terms of a new American century. ⁽¹²⁾.

The Gulf war is over. The aggressor has been taught a lesson, but peace still eludes the region. Solutions to many key issues concerning the area are still elusive. The Gulf war partly reflected the fact that Iraq's greatest tragedy is not so much the enemy with in but the enemy without.. The war has bitter lessons for both the victor and the vanquished.

Perhaps Saddam Hussein's mix adventure and folly, as abetted by the lopsided way in which the western world particularly the U.S. rushed to the help of Iraq in its war against Iran. In the process it was forgotten that if Iran was excessively weakened, Iraq might emerge as the next aggressor, the genuine international peace and security will depend upon whether the parties to the conflict, in the recent Gulf crisis are willing to learn their lesson.

India's policy was, as officially dubbed, "low profile and reasonable". Low-profile, in the sense of its disinclination to play a role of self-appointed mediator and an inclination to feel the ground and work with like-minded, non-aligned countries. Reasonableness related to its opposition to use of force in international relations, earliest possible withdrawals, and comprehensive negotiations for settlement of all problems even if in a sequential manner.

12. A.K. Pasha, "The Gulf War: A Global Turmoil", - 1992 ,P-12

India's stand on the Gulf crisis can be stated as a mix of continuity, in terms of the emphasis on political solution, early cessation of hostilities and following to the UN charter principles and change, in terms of low profile posture constructive reaction to initiations, and 'cooperative' voting behaviour. This attitude was adopted by India to achieve its aims with the new, global power realities.

India's strong opposition, regarding any external aggression is notable. India never supported any of the aggression by any country. But due to one or the other reason India could not emphasized on its stand strongly.

Regarding India's stand on Afghanistan, It can be said that India could have joined the United States, China and Pakistan and their allies in General Assembly and voted for the resolution which strongly deplored the Soviet action and called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops⁽¹³⁾. But how could India disregard the fact that the United States had been arming Pakistan Since the mid 1950's and that China had been supplying arms to Pakistan since the mid 1960's or the fact that in the 1971 India- Pakistan war, Pakistan had the support of both China and the United States, but U.S.S.R's. full support to India made it difficult for the United States and China to intervene militarily in the war.

Finally, a word about India's response to the Gulf crisis. By a curious coincidence, India had its first minority government in the

centre installed when the cold war era formally coming to an end. By another coincidence, the factional fights in the ruling party in Delhi came to a head at a moment when the post cold-war world faced its first major challenge in the form of the Gulf crisis. In other words, the Gulf crisis caught India off balance on the domestic front.

India's response lacked both coherence and sense of direction. The resultant confusion was evidently sought to be obfuscated by endless rounds of official visits to defuse the crisis even after it had become abundantly clear that there was little room for mediation. The failure on the diplomatic front was compounded by the clumsy exercise to refuel American military planes at Indian airports. On the contrary India could have adopted a sensible alternative which might have gained international support both within and outside the non aligned fraternity.

Appendix-I

12-Key United Nations Resolutions Adopted Against Iraq

Condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait-demanded Baghdad withdraw.

Imposed sanctions on all trade to and from Iraq except for medicine and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.

Declared null and void Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

Demanded Iraq allow foreign nationals to leave and Kuwait and rescind its order to close diplomatic missions in Kuwait.

Permitted use of Limited naval force to ensure compliance with economic sanctions, including the right to inspect cargos.

Approved food shipments to Iraq and Kuwait for humanitarian purposes, if distributed by international groups.

Condemned raids by Iraqi troops in French and other diplomatic missions in occupied Kuwait.

Entrusted sanctions committee to evaluate requests for assistance from countries due to embargo.

Prohibited non-humanitarian air traffic into Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

Asked states to document financial losses and human rights violations resulting from the invasion.

Asked the U.N. Secretary-General to safeguard a smuggled copy of Kuwait's preinvasion population register.

Authorized States "to use all necessary means" against Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait on or by Jan. 15

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