

**EAST TIMOR : THE PROBLEM OF ITS
INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA**

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
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
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We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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**"Dedicated To My
BAU and BAPA"**

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19th July 1996

Sunil Kumar Mohanty
Sunil Kumar Mohanty

PREFACE

The problem of East Timor is a product of colonialism, faulty process of decolonization and of course, ethnic nationalism. This is a classic case of state authority for unity and integrity, versus, the secessionist movement backed by demand for self-determination. Out of this continuous process between the two contradicting winds through howling, suppression and blood-shed, the demand for stopping human rights violation arises from the International Society with the powerful Western backing. Subsequently, a fierce debate takes shape - whether there is the capacity of the so-called 'human - rights-model' to accommodate the territorial state-system of the under - developed and culturally-diversed third-world countries.

East Timor is a reflection of the above problem. It has particularly got utmost significance after the end of cold war and subsequently, the formation of small and new state-units on the basis of 'ethnie'. Once again it has sparkled the ever-controversial aspect i.e. 'ethnic-based-nationalism'. My dissertation tries to find out a solution to this.

The first chapter relates the early history and colonial period that East Timor has come across. It emphasises the issue of Indonesia's take-over of the island in 1974. The unsystematic process of decolonization which is one among the causes of East Timor's problem, has been reflected. The process how East Timor got to be the 27th province of Indonesia is also included.

The second chapter has exposed the torture, oppression, severe human rights violations by Indonesian army through detention and 're-settlement', limitations to access, extrajudicial executions and 'disappearances' etc. The politico-religious role of the Church in arousing East Timorese nationalism has also been sketched. Finally, the Asian view to the Western imposition of human rights model has been analysed.

Chapter III is the longest one. It has successfully proved one vital truth - how the concept of basic national interest overrides the so-called foreign policy principles and idealism. It has focussed the reaction of some important countries, including India, Australia and Portugal to the East Timorese problem. The pseudo-sincerity of many Western countries have been exposed when, on the one hand they are the critic of human rights violations in the island, but supply arms and ammunitions to Indonesia on the other hand. Of

course, Indonesia being the largest ASEAN member has been successful in silencing down the International criticisms.

The fourth chapter has shown that despite severe army oppression in the past, Indonesia has shown sincerity in the economic development of East Timor. The suggestion for a "special treatment of a second kind" for East Timor has been given. The attitude of Indonesia towards East Timor has been changing with army taking a bridge-building role. Other recent changes have been added.

The concluding chapter is the most important one. It has analysed the problem from a theoretical angle. The problem has been properly located and thus, the most practicable solution has been discussed. Indonesia must try to win the 'hearts and minds' of the East Timorese. The best solution lies with East Timor being within Indonesia, but on the other hand, Indonesia to give due respect to the unique cultural identity of East Timor and the oppressive role of army to be modified.

I would be happy if my pain-taken work can help in any respect for finding a solution to the problem of East Timor. The message is clear - both the Indonesian authority and East Timorese dissidents must change their attitudes to each other. And the so-called champions of human rights dominated by West

must not provoke and negatively provide a feeding-spoon for the secessionists. The constructive role mainly by these above three parties will solve the problem of East Timor.

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CHAPTER - I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

East Timor, Indonesia's Foreign Minister once remarked, "is a pebble in Indonesia's shoe". As the world's fourth most populous nation tries to stride confidently about the international stage, the human-rights pebble makes it step awkwardly. Since the events of August 1975, when fighting broke out between the two main political parties of the territory, the "overseas province" of Timor, has drawn international attention. Portugal's traditional policy of keeping a minimum link between the Timorese under its rule and the neighbouring Indonesian communities with some of whom the former shared ethnic and cultural contacts are the main reason why East Timor remained inside backwater and shielded, as it were from the turbulent and dramatic events which accompanied the rise of nationalism of the East Timorese.

Yet, the remoteness of East Timor, the lack of great power involvement, the absence of an active indigenous political elite and its sheer physical and cultural isolation - all these served to keep the island not only outside the focus of keen attention of the international community, pressing the decolonization when Portuguese was there or even afterwards

when Indonesia integrated it into her territory. However, almost twenty years after Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 when Portuguese abandoned their colony, the United Nations and some countries still refuse to recognise Indonesian rule.

East Timor is consisted of the eastern part of the Timor island of the Nusa Tenggara archipelago, situated at the eastern end of the Lesser Sunda island chain. The territory of East Timor covers 14,952 sq. kilometers and comprises the eastern part of the island, some islets, including Atauro, and the enclave of Oecusse in the west.

If historically observed, East Timor problem is a very complex one. It is often said 'Timor is to Indonesia what Goa is to India. In other words, Timor problem is the legacy of Portuguese colonialism'¹. Nevertheless, it is essential to know the early history of East Timor, especially the colonial one, which might give us some perspectives for today's developments. In 672 AD Timor became a part of the Srivijaya empire. Even the Majapahit Empire had kept the island under its domain for two hundred years until 1520.

¹ Financial Express (New Delhi), 26 April 1992.

Portuguese sailors and traders were the first Europeans who came to trade and established posts in several places in Indonesia. Although as early as 1512 Timor had been mentioned by Portuguese sailors, it was not until 1566 that Portugal could establish a post near Timor. The post was on Solor island built by Dominican priests. From Solor, Portuguese traders sailed to Timor to trade sandalwood and so did their slaves who mixed freely and married with local women which eventually produced a mixed-blood generation known as 'Topasses'. Over the years the Topasses out-numbered the Portuguese in the region and became powerful in sandalwood trade.

Portuguese presence in the region was then seriously challenged by the Dutch who took over Solor in 1613 and drove Portuguese to move to Lavantuka in Flores. Eventually both the Dutch and the Portuguese established their respective posts in Timor in 17th century. The first Portuguese settlement in Timor began in 1633 at Silabau, west of Atapupu. This was the beginning of Portuguese occupation of Timor, although the original emphasis was on spreading Christianity to the native people. In the last quarter of the 16th century the Portuguese were successful in snatching the island from Sultan Baabullah of Ternate, who was then the ruler of Timor. With the assistance of Topasses Portuguese traders could control the

sandalwood trade in Timor and defeated local kingdoms and contended the Dutch effort to gain hegemony in the region. But throughout the period, the Topasses in cooperation with local inhabitants confronted Portugal's efforts to take total control of Timor. In 1769, they forced Portugal to withdraw Oecussi to Dili, which from that day onwards became the centre of Portuguese administration in Timor.²

Many of the conflicts and tensions emanating today from territorial claims and counter-claims among neighbouring countries have got roots from their respective colonial histories in the past. The unnatural boundaries drawn with different spheres of influences by various colonial powers for respective economic exploitation later gave rise to post-independence confrontations among many Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. The European colonial powers had never heeded the natural boundaries on the basis of language, ethnicity or common culture. After confrontations between different ambitious colonial powers, spheres of influences finally were drawn overnight by mutual bargains and agreements. These were leading to unending tensions, armed conflicts once the colonial powers left them.

² Facts on East Timor; House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, 1990, p. 9.

East Timor problem has got similar basis. In 1651, the Dutch occupied the western part of Timor and later in 1859 entered into a treaty with Portugal. Portugal and Dutch agreed to divide Timor into their respective control - the Dutch occupied the Western and Portuguese, the eastern part of Timor. Since then Portugal secured full control of East Timor until it left the region in 1975. However, even during the years it colonized East Timor, Portugal had to face great difficulties in ruling the Timorese. During 18th century there were uprisings in Maubisse, Remexio, Kamenasa-Suai, Bobobnro and Cailaco. In 1912, a full scale war was initiated in Manufahi-Same by Timorese which compelled Portugal to send reinforcement to defend its administration of East Timor. And in 1959 there was an uprising against Portuguese administration at Uatolari that spread to Viqueque.³

Almost in all third world countries, the wave of nationalism arose from the anti-colonial struggles. The loss of freedom, common suffering and exploitation at the hands of the repressive colonial masters gave rise to the ethos of patriotism and nationalist feelings. But the isolation of Portuguese-dominated East Timorese had an all total different enemy other than the Dutch-dominated West Timor and Indonesia.

³ Facts on East Timor, House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, 1990, p. 10.

This, along with Portugal's traditional policy of keeping to a minimum contact between the rest Timor under its rule led to the rise of a different nationalistic ethos for East Timorese. Nevertheless, the serious nationalist struggle in Indonesia under Sukarno had less impact on East Timorese society. Taking extra-caution in this regard that the PIDE (Policia Internacional de Defase do Eastado), a security body established by Portugal in 1945 to investigate the political activities, extended its full activities in East Timor. Due to PIDE's tight control, the political situation in the colony which since 1963 was classified as an overseas province of Portugal was calm.

It is no doubt a fact that the basic difference in attitude of the two conflicting colonial powers helped in the evolution of different nationalistic ethos in these two societies. (The Portuguese had come in 16th century from Malacca, an enterpot port for their valuable China trade and later established themselves in Makassar, which replaced Malacca as the export centre, until they were driven out by the Dutch in 1667 and made their way to Flores and Timor. Conscious of their small numbers, Portuguese established their tenacious hold in the archipelago mainly in three ways - their capacity to use the extraordinary blend of races which formed the administrative hierarchy of the colony - European, Chinese,

African, Goanese, Timorese and Arabs; secondly, their instinct to interfere as little as possible of ^{political} divide and rule among the local chiefs, the 'regulos' as called them or 'radjas' as they were called in Dutch Timor.⁴

In Western Timor the Dutch pursued a different policy through which they sought to bring as many Timorese as possible under the writ of administration. Dutch was more oppressive than Portuguese. Where the Portuguese sought to reinforce the authority of 'regulos' the Dutch sought to curb that of their 'radjas'. Where the Church in Portuguese Timor was restrained in its proselytising the Dutch encouraged rival Catholic and Protestant missions to vigorous and competitive evangelism⁵. Nevertheless, the Portuguese system tended to create fairly enduring loyalties among the chiefs and their followers.

During the most tumultuous span of President Sukarno's regime, Indonesia showed astonishingly little keenness in Portuguese Timor, an attitude no doubt influenced by the fact that no other outside power and certainly none of the major powers indicated the slightest interest in the remote province. In fact, during the West Iranian and 'Konfrontasi' campaigns

⁴ Peter Hastings, "Timor, Indonesia and Australia", World Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 1975, p.5.

⁵ Ibid. P.5.

Indonesia's policy of non-interference in East Timor was sometimes referred to by Indonesian leaders as evidence that they entertained no territorial or expansionist ambitions⁶.

During the thirty years period before Portuguese left East Timor, only two countries of the region - Australia and Indonesia - had shown other than a passing interest in East Timor. But until the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Lisbon in April 1974, none including the colonial power itself gave any serious attention to the prospects and implications of eventual decolonisation of the territory. It was the potentially rich African provinces of Angola and Mozambique with which Lisbon became absorbed, but not for the remote, sleepy and economically backward East Timor which merely constituted a drain on Portugal's hard-pressed resources for overseas development. Thus the drama of the disintegrating Portuguese empire in Africa completely overshadowed the political events and subtle fundamental changes in the attitudes in East Timor. On the other hand after Suharto regime came to power, Australia tried to consolidate her relation with Jakarta and her interest in Timor; at least from defence point of view declined even further. Thus in 1971 the

⁶ J.S. Dunn, "The Timor Afair in International Perspective", World Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, Oct 1978, P. 14.

Australian Consulate in Dili which had been there for some thirty years was closed⁷.

INDONESIA'S TAKE-OVER OF EAST TIMOR

In the aftermath of upheaval of 1965-1966, the new military regime in Jakarta was gratified to have as a neighbour a regime ideologically strongly opposed to Communism and intolerant of radical influences. The Indonesians were also aware of the growing conviction in Canberra that Timor's future lay as part of Indonesia. In a perceptive article in 1966, Prof. Weatherbee expressed a view commonly held at that time by many Australian officials, politicians and academics when he wrote, "in a sense Portuguese Timor is a trust territory, the Portuguese holding it in trust for Indonesia"⁸. This curious kind of assumption perhaps was the reason why there was virtually no precedent in the contemporary experience of decolonization, regardless of size, level of culture or economic viability of the former colony. Adding more, India's seizure of Goa in 1961 had been suggested as a precedent.

⁷ Ibid. P. 13.

⁸ Donald E. Weatherbee, "Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma", Asian Survey, No. 10, 1966, P. 10.

But most surprisingly, Indonesia had consistently denied any territorial claim to East Timor. Moreover, in Timor a process of decolonization was underway for integration with Indonesia as one of the options officially acknowledged by the colonial power. But East Timor's cultural backwardness, lack of bright prospects for economic viability and its smallness were the drawbacks which seemed to prejudice the attitudes of many Australians, Indonesians and Portuguese in the position of influence and power. Yet, the level of culture and economic development in East Timor was not so much different from that experienced by million Indonesians in many less developed parts of the archipelago.

However, some Portuguese and Australians gave weight to the views of certain Indonesian generals that an independent state of East Timor would pose a threat to Indonesia's security - to its "soft underbelly". And at a meeting in October 1974 President Suharto and his national security advisers concluded that an independent state of East Timor would be inimical to Indonesia's interests and resolved that steps should hence-forth be taken to bring about as soon as possible the integration of the territory into the Republic⁹. This decision was not of course a public one. Perhaps the growing feeling that an independent East Timor might create problems for West Timor and

⁹ Bangkok Post, (Bangkok), 28 October 1974.

it would excite former secessionists in North Sulawesi and in Moluccas forced Indonesia ponder in terms of integration. Apart from the threat to Indonesia's unity and integrity, the question that - would an increasingly left leaning Portugal allow East Timor become a centre for Communist exploitation of Indonesian weakness, a springboard for an ideological war against Indonesia, a focus of infection from which agents could make their way into the Republic and make contacts with the banned PKI for the promotion of anti-government subversion¹⁰ - added coal to castle.

Right up until a few days before the invasion of December 1975, Indonesian officials continued to reaffirm that their country had no territorial ambitions concerning East Timorese and that it was upto the East Timored to decide their own future. Even in June 1974, the Foreign Affairs Minister Mr. Malik received Ramos Horta of Fretilin and gave him a letter explicitly welcoming the advent of future independence in the colony and promising support for a future independent East Timor. The letter faithfully reflected Indonesia's general anti-colonialist stance¹¹. However Mr. Malik was not by then the real arbiter of Indonesian foreign policy which was already

¹⁰ Peter Hastings "Timer, Indonesia And Australia", World Review, Vol 14, No. 2, July 1975, P. 11.

¹¹ Bangkok Post, (Bangkok), 24 June 1974.

increasingly being fashioned among the President's close palace advisers - the four former Aspri generals and in BAKIN, the state security apparatus. Thus, with the government in Lisbon divided and weakened and facing crisis to crisis, Indonesian interference and clumsy attempts at subversion were largely responsible for the build up of tensions in Timor and for throwing the territory into civil war in August and September 1975.

Prior to that the promises of 'decolonization and democratization' for East Timor after the 'flower revolution' in Portugal did arouse East Timorese to respond to with establishing political parties. As of May 1974 three parties emerged in East Timor; firstly, Uniao Democratia Timorese, UDT, secondly, Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente, Fretilin and thirdly, Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense, Apodeti. Later on two other parties were established namely the Klibur Oan Timor Aswain, KOTA and Partido Trabalhista.¹²

However, the first three parties had wide-spread support among the population. Fretilin was for independence, UDT was for limited autonomy of East Timor in association with Portugal and Apodeti favoured integration with Indonesia. Sharp

¹² Facts On East Timor, PP. 11-12.

conflicts between the contending parties developed and a more or less anarchical environment emerged. The unacceptability to the Indonesian Government of an independent East Timor under Fretilin control was made clear to UDT leaders who made repeated visits to Jakarta during 1975. On 11 August 1975 the UDT launched a "coup" apparently with the intention of eliminating Fretilin¹³. By early September when Fretilin managed to drive UDT out of Dili, subsequently political equation changed rapidly. In late September 1975, members of UDT, Apodeti, KOTA and Trabalhista driven over the border into Indonesia announced that they now favoured integration with Jakarta.

Indonesia, keeping in mind her national interest and the growing refugees from East Timor due to defeat of UDT and other parties in the hand of Fretilin made repeated incursions into East Timor with the help of former parties. Fretilin responded it with a unilateral "Declaration of Independence" of East Timor on 28 November 1975¹⁴. The declaration was followed by the announcement of the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

¹³ East Timor: Violation of Human Rights, Amnesty International Publications, 1985, P.3.

¹⁴ Jakarta Post, (Jakarta), 29 November 1975.

Opposing this action, on 30 November 1975 in Balibo, UDT, Apodeti, KOTA and Trabalhista issued a proclamation known also as the Balibo Proclamation. On 7 December, Indonesian forces launched a full-scale invasion of the territory, landing troops by sea and air in the principal towns of Dili and Baucau and despatching a large force across the border. Official Indonesian accounts claimed that this was an extension of earlier civil war and that Dili and Baucau had been liberated by forces of UDT and Apodeti assisted by Indonesian 'volunteers'. On 18 December 1975 the formation of a Provisional Government of East Timor was announced with presidents of Apodeti and the UDT as respectively chief and deputy chief executives¹⁵.

The General Assembly of UN at the twenty-ninth session in 1974 had considered the question of East Timor briefly as part of the Assembly's overall examination of the status and condition of territories under Portuguese domination. It had welcomed the acceptance by the new government of Portugal " of the sacred principle of self-determination and independence and its unqualified applicability to all the peoples under

¹⁵ East Timor: Violations of Human Rights, Amnesty International Publication, 1985, P. 4.

Portuguese colonial domination¹⁶. The referendum in East Timor which was to take place in 1975 also stipulated to decide the status of East Timor.

With reference to East Timor question, Indonesia's basic position was that should the people of East Timor wish to join Indonesia, they cannot do so as a state, but they will become an integral part of the Unitary State Republic of Indonesia¹⁷. This basic policy was declared by President Suharto through the session of the Council for Political and National Security stabilization on 8 October 1974.

Several agreements were reached between Government of Republic of Indonesia and Portugal on cooperation with regard to the decolonisation process in East Timor. The first agreement was reached at the negotiations held in New York in which Indonesia was represented by Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Portugal, by its Foreign Minister Mr. Mario Soares. Another agreement was reached in negotiations held between Mr. Ali Moertopo being the representative of President Suharto and the Portuguese Government represented by Portuguese PM Vasco Goncalves, Foreign Minister Mario Soares and Minister for

¹⁶ See also. Decolonization - Issue of East Timor, UN Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, August 1976.

¹⁷ Jakarta Post (Jakarta), 9 October 1974.

Inter-territorial coordination Dr. de Almeida Santos. This agreement was reached on 4th October 1974 with regard to the possibility that the population in East Timor demanded the integration of East Timor with the Republic of Indonesia. It was finally signed at Lisbon.¹⁸

Again the meeting in Jakarta on 18th October 1974 with Portuguese Minister for Inter-territorial Coordination Dr. Santos, the view of President Suharto was delivered. That Indonesia has no territorial ambition for the Portuguese Timor, but opposes colonialism in any form as per her 1945 Constitution. However, the Indonesian Government was willing to accept the integration of East Timor with the Republic should such opinion be expressed by the East Timorese. Furthermore, another agreement on 12th November 1975 at Rome held that the decolonisation process in East Timor was the fullest responsibility of Portugal and Government of Portugal was for taking immediate steps of an integral nature without putting pressure on, but with respect to the aspiration of the people of East Timor.¹⁹

¹⁸ Indonesia 1979; An Official Handbook; Compiled and Produced by Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Service, PP. 77-78.

¹⁹ Ibid, P. 78.

However, Indonesia alleges that decolonisation process did not go as she had expected due to the unilateral proclamation of independence of East Timor on 28th November 1975 by Fretilin. At a time when thousands refugees fleeing into Indonesian territory, East Timor Governor Lemos Pires with some of his colonial officers instead of pacifying the civil war fled to the island of Atauro off the north coast of East Timor. Because of geographical proximity Indonesia could not remain unconcerned in any development which might threaten the stability and security of the region. Above all, since the unilateral proclamation of independence by Fretilin was a gross violation of Rome Agreement, therefore the other political parties including UDT jointly proclaimed the integration of East Timor with Republic of Indonesia. It was also on the basis of the fact that East Timorese share a common kinship with the other Timorese under Indonesia.²⁰

The parties controlling the territory and the Provisional Government of East Timor having discussed with the Indonesian Government as Portugal ceased her de facto control agreed to receive the United Nations Representative to visit the island as a part of UN efforts to assess the situation in the territory on 20 to 22 January 1976. But Indonesian agencies allege that UN Representative's response had finally been

²⁰ Ibid, P. 78.

inconclusive however expected was the role of UN on the final stage of the decolonization process of East Timor.²¹

Sharp contrast to it, the UN source clarifies the matter quite differently. The Secretary General had despatched Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi as representative to assess the situation. Although Provisional Government finally agreed for his visit, but only to allow for two days in the territory. The Special Envoy then sought to visit Fretilin-held areas from Darwin, but on the eve of his intended visit Indonesian aircraft attacked the four aircrafts which had been specified by Fretilin in a radio message as appropriate points of entry.. Due to major amphibious landing operation on the south coast by Indonesian forces Jose Horta informed the envoy that Democratic Republic of East Timor could not guarantee the safety of the UN delegation. Nevertheless, Mr. Guicciardi's report to Secretary General concluded that "any accurate assessment of the situation in East Timor remained elusive". As for the views of the Timorese he noted that there was "a slender common assumption" that the people of East Timor should be consulted about their future.²²

²¹ Jakarta Post, (Jakarta) 26 January 1976.

²² UN Document S/12011

Meanwhile, the Provisional Government on its own began preparation for the exercise of right of self-determination by forming a 'People's Assembly' consisting of representatives elected from all districts and prominent leaders from various walks of life of East Timor. UN refrained from this process although delegation and cables were sent to various quarters. Finally, Provisional Government proceeded with the exercise on 31 May 1976. On that day, a petition was made by the People's Assembly requesting the Government of Indonesia to accept the integration of East Timor without even referendum. On 7th June 1976, a delegation of the People's Assembly and Provisional Government of East Timor submitted a request for integration of East Timor into Indonesia²³. A fact-finding mission sent by Indonesia submitted its report of satisfaction to Indonesian Government on the genuine wish of majority East Timorese for integration. However, a question mark is always drawn by the Western agencies on the truthness of this report without UN observations. Finally, Indonesian House of Representatives approved on 15 July 1976 a bill of integration of East Timor into Indonesia which was then promulgated as Act Number 7/1976²⁴.

²³ Facts on East Timor, PP. 16-17.

²⁴ Ibid, P. 17.

With the promulgation of the Act, East Timor became the 27th Province of the Republic. But the UN has not recognised this integration. Since integration in July 1976, the Indonesian Government has rejected the UN's right to discuss the question of East Timor. In this regard Indonesia's basic position was reflected by President Suharto on his State Address on 16 August 1976.

"Time and again we stated that East Timor problem is a question of self-determination. It is a problem of abolishing colonialism. The fate of the people of East Timor can only be decided by themselves and right there on the soil of East Timor. Not in New York, not in Lisbon and not even in Jakarta. Now the people of East Timor have made their own decision about their own future, namely integration with people and the State of Republic of Indonesia. There is no other way, therefore, but to accept with full responsibility such an integration".²⁵

However, the Western countries led by Portugal allege that the process of self-determination in East Timor was not genuine and democratic, rather it was an act done at gun-point by Indonesian army. It can be observed that the issue of self-determination has become the most controversial one in the modern world. If the self determination of territorially

²⁵ Ibid, P. 17.

defined civic nations has sometimes posed problems for the inter-state order - as with Belgium, India, Indonesia and Nigeria - that of ethnically defined 'genealogical' nations have created far more persistent, complex and bitter conflicts and challenges. True self-determination is not expressed in the normal functioning of existing participating processes and in the duty of other states not to interfere, but in the existence and free cultivation of an authentic communal feeling, a togetherness, a sense of being "us" among the relevant group.


No doubt it is a duty enjoined upon the states in the international system to promote self-determination. But most of the cases of self-determination claims dealt at the international level have, in final analysis, been in the nature of a remedy of a breach of self-determination. Therefore, as Emerson put, "the realistic issue is still not whether a people is qualified for and deserves the right to determine its own destiny, but whether it has the political strength which may well mean the military force, to vindicate its own claim." This focuses on how to assert the right of self-determination rather than just defining and elaborating the right.

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CHAPTER - II

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INDONESIAN OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR

CHAPTER - II

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INDONESIAN OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR

Indonesian forces launched a full-scale attack of East Timor on 7th December 1975, with landing troops by sea and air in the principal towns of Dili and Baucau and despatching a large force across the border. In the face of such an attack, Fretilin forces withdrew south to Aileu and when that town fell, then to Ainaro in the mountains. Official Indonesian sources reported in January 1976 that Indonesian forces controlled a third of the territory, which was countered by Fretilin in April 1976 claiming to have controlled 80 per cent of East Timor by their forces. Although Indonesian forces were slow to consolidate their foothold outside the main towns, but a series of localized campaigns from September 1977 until early 1979, involving massive aerial bombardment of areas thought to be under Fretilin control, led to the capture and surrender of many thousands of East Timorese. Transport from one town to another was not safe unless under armed escort and even then safety could not be guaranteed.

In March 1977, sixteen months after the invasion, a US State Department spokesman estimated that only 200,000 of the

650,000 people could be "considered in areas under Indonesian administration".¹ A delegation of diplomats and journalists which visited East Timor in September 1978 at the invitation of the Indonesian Government reported that captured and surrendered East Timorese whom they had seen in "resettlement camps" were evidently suffering from serious malnutrition. As Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong have put it:

"Indeed 1978 was the most difficult year in the liberation struggle of the East Timorese Maubere people. The deliberate campaign of starvation, the relentless aerial bombardments, the destruction of the agricultural system brought untold suffering for the Timorese people. Despite the resistance movement's successes in the early stages of the encirclement and annihilation campaign, which thwarted the Indonesian advances in the west for a while, the steady onslaught from land, sea and air brought most of the country under Indonesian military control."²

In the same year 1978 too, Fretilin lost its President Xavier do Amaral and its Minister of Information, Alarico

¹ Torben Retboll, "The East Timor Conflict and Western Response", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 19(1), Jan-Mar 87, P. 24.

² Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Soei Liong. "The War Against East Timor", London, Zed Books, 1984, P.34.

Fernandes, both of whom surrendered to the Indonesians, as well as the new President Nicolau Lobato who was killed in battle in December 1978. In March 1979 Indonesian authorities declared the end of "Operasi Seroya" (Operation Lotus) launched at the time of the invasion and announced that thenceforth East Timor would be fully under civilian administration. However, resistance to the Indonesian occupation persisted with continuing reports of attacks by Fretilin on Indonesian outposts. To eliminate this resistance, Indonesian forces launched dry-season offensives involving the conscription of large numbers of population.

The offensives included the April to September 1981 "Operasi Keamanan" (Operation Security) in which many thousands of civilian aged between 15 and 55 (according to the Indonesian authorities) are reported to have been deployed in human "fences" to converge on remaining Fretilin positions. However, Fretilin recognized its forces under the leadership of Jose Alexandro Gusmao, known as Xanana. In June 1980, they attacked Indonesia's television transmitter in Dili and several military targets of Indonesian troops.³ More surprisingly, in March 1983 the Indonesian Commander in East Timor, Colonel Purwanto entered into official negotiations with Xanana who demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Indonesian troops and UN-supervised

³ Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 June 1980, P. 8.

provision for self-determination. A ceasefire was put into effect.

The ceasefire however did not last very long, for in that same month of March 1983 General Benny Murdani who had been responsible for planning and commanding the 1975 invasion became Commander-in-chief of Indonesia's armed forces. In his new policy approach he sacked Colonel Purwanto and Murdani sent a confidential warning to Xanana: "Don't think that you can entangle yourself. Don't think that you can receive assistance from other countries. There is no country on this globe that can help you. Our own army is prepared to destroy you if you are not willing to be co-operative with our Republic. We are preparing an operation - Operasi Persatuan (Operation Unity) - which will come into force in August".⁴

The International Red Cross which was operating relief works in East Timor was withdrawn in July 1983. General Murdani visited the island in the same month. Known for his merciless track record of oppressions, he gave a public threat to Fretilin to wipe out if it does not surrender. "This time, no more fooling around. We are going to hit them without

⁴ Jill Jolliffe, "East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism", St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978, P. 269 (This book was banned in Indonesia by Indonesian Government).

mercy," he said, adding, "If this call goes unheeded, the government will use its armed forces and all its arsenal to clean up the remnants of Fretilin rebels".⁵ Following his statement large number of additional Indonesian troops were brought to East Timor in yet another operation "Operasi Sapu Bersih" (Operation Clean-Sweep) aimed at eliminating Fretilin.

Despite Indonesian propaganda machinery claims, the resistance given by Fretilin to the army is a fact beyond controversy. Beginning in 1983 Fretilin re-established contact with outside world and a wealth of written material and pictures were smuggled out of the country. In May 1985 Abilio Araujo, leader of Fretilin's external delegation told a news conference in Lisbon that a guerilla radio began transmitting from East Timor in January that year. He said, the radio smuggled into the former colony in 1984, had a range of 1,600 kilometers and could reach Australia and neighbouring nations. He also distributed texts of broadcasts which he said were made earlier that year over the radio. The texts detailed Fretilin attacks since August 1983 and accused Indonesian forces of killing, torturing and imprisoning civilians.⁶

⁵ Torben Retboll, "East Timor: The struggle Continues", International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs: Copenhagen, 1984, PP. 158-159.

⁶ Reuters, London, 28 May 1985, not presented in any European newspaper, but the story was picked up by Australian press, see East Timor News, no. 83-85, 1985, Post Office Box A

Interestingly, Fretilin captured a set of secret instructions on counter-insurgency operations issued to the Indonesian troops in 1982. One of the documents dealing with the interrogation of prisoners as written by Budiardjo and Liong in their book "The War Against East Timor" reflects:

"Avoid taking photographs showing torture in progress (people being photographed at times when they are being subjected to electric current, when they have been stripped naked, etc.) Remember not to have such photographic documentation developed outside which then be made available to the public by irresponsible elements.

It is better to make attractive photographs such as shots taken while eating together with the prisoner or shaking hands with those who have just come down from the bush, showing them in front of a house and so on. If such photos are circulated in the bush, this is a classic way of assuredly undermining their morale and fighting spirits. And if such photos are shown to the priests, this can draw the church into supporting operations to restore security"

716, Sydney South, NSW 2000, Australia: On the radio link see further below.

No wonder, then, that Indonesian officials denied outright the authenticity of these revealing documents when they were made publicly available in the West. But the documents have been authenticated by Amnesty International as well as TAPOL in London, the British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia.⁷

During 1984, conditions in East Timor worsened with widespread hunger, disease and repression among civilians and continuing battles between rebels and Indonesian troops. The combat had reached a military stalemate by mid 1980s, leading the army to return to an earlier strategy of holding strategic locations and attempting to keep the Fretilin forces at bay. The Government sought to show that the political situation was under control by holding trials of Fretilin forces beginning in 1984. By the end of that year, one hundred and ninety five prisoners had been tried under Articles 106, 198 and 110 of the Indonesian Criminal Code, then given sentences ranging from two to seven years although many had already been in jail for years.⁸ The rebels however suffered a serious set-back in

⁷ Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Soei Liong, "The War Against East Timor," London Zed Books, 1984; PP. 236-237 (the complete set of nine documents is in this book, PP. 167-244).

⁸ Anne Greene, "Indonesia's Forgotten War" (review article), The Indonesian Quarterly, XXI/1, First Autumn, 1993, PP. 114-115.

August 1985 when the Australian Government recognised Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor.

But once again in October 1989 East Timor came to limelight when the Pope visited the unfortunate island as a part of a tour of Indonesia and made a plea to the Suharto Government to halt repression against Timorese. Following a mass conducted by the Pope in the provincial capital Dili, anti-Government protesters clashed with security guards. The visit of US Ambassador to Indonesia prompted further protest demonstrations in January 1990. This was violently suppressed by the armed forces. In the same year in October, once again the student protests led to the occupation of two schools by the armed forces and it led to the arrest and alleged torture of nearly 100 students.⁹

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Fortune has always shown its back to East Timor since the colonial period. More than 400 years of colonialism, East Timorese were inherited with backward social, economic and political life and with very poor health condition. These

⁹ The Europa World Year Book 1993, Vol - 1, Europa Publications Ltd, London, P. 1431.

further worsened by the civil war of 1975 and its aftermath. And for those living, fundamental human rights have been violated on a scale that surpasses the abuses of most dictatorships. It is unfortunate that virtually the entire International Community made little fuss when the worst of the human rights violations and repression took place, that is, in the three years immediately following integration. During that time of high intensity civil conflict in the province, casualties were high in the several armed factions involved in the fighting as well as among the unarmed civilian population.

Though exact statistics is not available, but numerous people have lost their lives as a result of war, starvation and disease. In 1977, the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, estimated the number killed as "50,000 or 80,000". But, he added soothingly, "what does this mean if compared with 600,000 who want to join Indonesia? Then what is the big fuss? It is possible that they may have been killed by the Australians and not us. Who knows? It was war."¹⁰ However, the total number of deaths based on the examinations of the last, admittedly sloppy Portuguese colonial census in the early 1970s and the first Indonesian government census in 1980 from

¹⁰ Torben Retboll, "East Timor, Indonesia and the Western Democracies, Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1980, P. 12; The Economist, London, 23 April 1994, P. 31.

combat, mistreatment, privation and disease is most reliably estimated to have been between 50,000 and 75,000.

Later Indonesia waged a counter-insurgency campaign and many more people died in the subsequent famine. Since the late 1970s the figure for the number killed that is most widely accepted is 200,000, a figure that was confirmed in 1983 by Msgr. Martinhu da Costa Lopes, a former bishop of Dili. Comparisons between a census by the Portuguese in 1974 and an Indonesian census of 1980 suggest that the population had fallen by between 100,000 and 130,000 despite heavy immigration from Indonesia. Using Church figures, the decline is anything between 199,000 and 329,000. However, one thing is clear that East Timor is the conflict that has suffered the second-largest number of deaths figuring 200,000 in all wars currently raging world-wide after the Kampuchea conflict, according to the Washington - based Center for Defence Information headed by Rear Admiral Gene R. LaRocque (retired) of the US Navy.¹¹

Amnesty International (AI) is one of the several nongovernmental organizations that has been watching East Timor issue closely. In early 1985, AI submitted a formal complaint on the continuing human rights violations in East Timor to the

¹¹ Jim Dunn, "Timor: A People Betrayed", Milton, Queensland: Jacarnda Press, PP. 320-323.

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41st session of the UN Human Rights Commission. Amnesty International has received reports from a variety of sources of "disappearance" and arbitrary killing of non-combatants; of torture and ill treatment of people taken into custody of Indonesian forces, including their detention in cruel and inhuman conditions, and of the imprisonment without charge or trial of people most often held on suspicion of opposing Indonesian occupation. The most serious of these waves of repression occurred in 1978 and 1979. Several Timorese have been executed or disappeared and the Indonesian offensive drove thousands out of the bush and down from mountains. Noting that there was little evidence of improvement over the past year, AI specifically complained about four types of human rights abuses:

1. Limitations on Access: including stringent restrictions on access by international observers and attempts to impose an embargo on information from East Timor. The violations described in this report have occurred in a situation in which the fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, association and movement have not existed and in the absence of constraints of legality. Timorese leaving to join relatives abroad are routinely warned not to reveal anything that would discredit the Indonesian occupation forces at the risk of reprisals against

relatives who remain behind. It is a regret that visits by different humanitarian organisations, particularly the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) was not permitted to undertake activities of any description in East Timor from December 1975 to October 1979. Interestingly, Amnesty International has proof from tape recorded where the Indonesian-appointed interpreter misinterpreted crucial points of one meeting.

2. Detention and Resettlement. Substantial numbers of East Timorese have been concentrated into "resettlement villages" (daerah pemukiman baru in Bhasa Indonesia) since the Indonesian invasion, but particularly since large scale surrenders of 1978 and 1979. Overall figures for the number of people resettled since 1975 vary from 150,000 to 300,000. Conditions in these settlements particularly with regard to food provision were extremely serious - might be worse than that in Biafra or Cambodia. These villages are situated due to wider strategic reasons low sands, previously shunned by the population because of infertility of the land and the prevalence of disease, malaria in particular. AI disputes Indonesia's claims about Atauro prisoners returning to the main island, saying that many persons sent back to the main island have not been allowed to return to their homes but have instead

been placed in "resettlement villages", where they continue to face severe restrictions on freedom of movement, food having small quantities of rice, work without pay and poor health and medical care facilities. Same is the case at yet another prison i.e. the Comarca prison.

3. Torture. Despite Indonesian attempts to cast doubt on the authenticity of military documents issued by Indonesian army and captured by Fretilin in 1982, which contain guidelines regarding the use of torture, AI confirms its conviction that the documents are genuine. It has particular informations about torture in private house in Dili requisitioned by the security forces and used for interrogation purposes. The kinds of torture alleged include beatings, electric shocks, burning with lighted cigarettes and sexual abuse, including rape of women prisoners. Interestingly, AI has names of several former UDT members, who once supported Indonesian integration, are arrested by Indonesian forces. For example, Joao Baptista, about 30, a teacher from Laleia, who was reportedly interrogated and tortured at the house of Joao dos Martires in 1977 after he had refused to go on operations with Indonesian troops. His toe-nails are said to have been pulled off.

4. Extrajudicial Executions and Disappearances. Beginning in 1975, the extrajudicial executions and "disappearances" reached peaks during the 1978 series of "waves". The victims of these human rights violations have included groups of as many as 400 men, women and children said to have been killed on a mountainside in September 1981. Again in March 1984 there was a reported mass killing of 100 men near Hua Ba in the western sector.

The evidence of large-scale "disappearances" in East Timor is more extensive than that of extrajudicial executions. Families and friends have reported that relatives and others have been taken into custody and have gone missing. Amnesty has received persistent reports that many of the "disappeared" were extrajudicially executed after being seized. These include reports that a number of people were taken from detention in the Comarca prison in Dili in February and April 1979 and executed at Areia Branca beach east of the capital and Lake Tacitolu to its west and others were taken from the KODIM barracks in Lospalos in April and May 1979 and executed in villages of Kili and Tutuala. There are also reports of people being killed by being injected with water, publicly beaten up and stoned to death, beheading and by mutilation and by being

thrown from helicopters.¹² Amnesty International launched a worldwide campaign on the East Timor issue.

Not only the Amnesty International, but also a rare foreign visitor who is given a carefully guided tour into East Timor may occasionally catch the glimpse of the grim reality and record some of the pathetic conditions under which the East Timorese are working. Before Richard Carleton of the British "Observer" became the first independent reporter to travel to the island in 1977, the land was closed to foreign press for almost two years after the invasion. An eyewitness gave him (in secret) a gruesome account of the 1975 invasion: " I saw at least 150 people lined up on the wharf and shot. It took about forty minutes. As each shot was fired, a body fell into the water and they all eventually floated out to sea." And Carleton is no Fretilin spokesman, as is clear from his concluding paragraph where he states that "despite the brutality of the annexation, Timor may be better off in the long term within Indonesia for the territory is economically nonviable and dependent on aid."¹³

¹² East Timor: Violations of Human Rights, London: Amnesty International Publications, 1985.

¹³ The Observer, (London), 31 July 1977.

In early 1980, Henry Kamm, the well known "New York Times" reporter who is quite sympathetic to the Jakarta government explained that he had to wait for two years for the final limited freedom in travel to the interior. Major Benny Mandalika of the Indonesian military intelligence from Jakarta was always present with him and often peered openly at the notes Kamm was taking. Explaining his actions when challenged, Mandalika said, "I must stay with you so you get the right information. My boss told me to go with you wherever you go. If you interview the man in the street you may get the wrong information."¹⁴

Anyway, the report and experience of Rod Nordland of the "Philadelphia Inquirer" exposes the truth. While many of the Timorese interviewed were frankly fearful of talking dozens did so nonetheless, saying as one did, "please tell the world so they can help the Timorese people". At least six of those interviewed, he later learned were summoned afterwards to military headquarters. One evening, a young Timorese man fell quickly into step with Mr. Nordland on Dili's Rua Antonio de Carvalho; "We are not allowed to speak to foreigners," he said, "but I just want to tell you. Before, we had Portuguese colonialism. Now, we have Indonesian colonialism." Nordland's report from East Timor and other parts of Southeast Asia won

¹⁴ New York Times, 28 January 1980.

him the Geroge Polk Award for journalism in 1983. It did not however win him another invitation from Indonesians.¹⁵

A five-person delegation from West German Parliament, led by Social Democrat Hans-Ulrich Klose visited East Timor in February 1985, the first group of West European Parliamentarians to do so. The delegation called on the Indonesian government to dissolve the hell-like Atauro prison camp as soon as possible and to allow the detainees there to return to their places of origin. "Generally speaking, the whole island appears to be under arrest," Klose stated, calling on the Indonesian government to allow free access to the international community.¹⁶

In 1991 tension in East Timor increased in preparation for a proposed visit by a Portuguese parliamentary delegation. The mission which was to have taken place in November was postponed owing to Indonesia's objection to the inclusion of an Australian journalist who was prominent critic of Indonesia's policies in East Timor. The postponement caused disappointment particularly among young political activists in the province.

¹⁵ Philadelphia Inquirer, 28 May 1982.

¹⁶ Der Spiegel, 29 April 1985; Aktuelt, Denmark, 14 May 1985; TAPOL Bulletin, No. 68, March 1985; as mentioned by Torben Retboll, "The East Timor Conflict and Western Response", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 19(1), Jan-March 87, P. 29.

On the night of October 28, clashes in front of the Motael Church resulted in the death of an anti- and a pro-integration youth. The spark to the "Dili Incident" was lit after a large group of political activists marched from the Motael Church to join a non-political religious observance at Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery to memorialize the young anti- integration demonstrator.

The marchers encountered an army major who attempted to dissuade them from joining the religious observance at the cemetery. The major was stabbed in the melee by an unidentified assailant. The attack proved to be the cause for out-of-control soldiers to attack demonstrators later at the cemetery with reckless firing. The scene was chaotic. It took place because of poorly informed commanders, uninformed intelligence officers, the dispatch of very junior officers to control volatile troops and foolish Timorese youth who should have known better than to taunt armed soldiers.¹⁷ Indonesian Army admitted of killing 20 civilians, but independent observers and human rights groups refute this and estimated the number in between 100 and 180. Under intense international pressure, Gen. Suharto established a National Investigation

¹⁷ John B. Haseman, "The Dili Incident", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 8, August 1995, P. 762.

Commission which declared that 50 people had died and 90 disappeared in the massacre.

Later in 1992 Xanana Gusmao was arrested. He was subsequently taken to Jakarta where he was to be tried in February 1993 on charges of subversion and illegal possession of firearms. Xanana Gusmao's detention provoked international concern and his replacement as leader of Fretilin, Antonio Gomes da Costa (Mau Huno), claimed that his predecessor had been tortured. Two weeks after his capture, Xanana Gusmao publicly recanted his opposition to Indonesian rule in East Timor and advised Fretilin members to surrender. Subsequently, in early December 1992 the government announced an amnesty for the separatist guerrillas and thirty six reportedly surrendered.¹⁸

Although the human rights violations by Indonesian forces are many, but some abuses have been recorded through Fretilin channels. They include:

- * Reports of the killing and serious ill-treatment of prisoners held by Fretilin in Dili and Aileu in the period from August 1975 to January 1976.

¹⁸ The Europa World Year Book 1993, Vol. 1, Europa Publications Ltd, London, P. 1431.

- * A statement issued by Fretilin itself reporting the execution in December 1983 of a number of East Timorese alleged to have collaborated with Indonesian forces.

- * Complaints about "Fretilin brutalities" made by Msgr Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator for the Diocese of East Timor, in the press interviews given between July and September 1984.¹⁹

THE ROLE OF CATHOLIC CHURCH

In East Timor, the Catholic Church plays a major role. The Indonesians blamed Fretilin for the cause of East Timorese dying of hunger, as Fretilin has been forcing villagers into mountains to fight against army. But according to Catholic Church in East Timor, the single biggest cause of famine was Indonesia's insistence that villagers live in guarded settlements which prevented them from farming normally. Signs of discontent are easy to spot within East Timorese. A plaque celebrating East Timor's integration into Indonesia has been smashed. Father Domingos Soares, a Roman Catholic priest contradicted the official Indonesian line that Fretilin is little more than a bank of criminals. He said that the

¹⁹ East Timor: Violations of Human Rights, London: Amnesty International Publications, 1985, P. 13.

guerrillas in the hills are supported by a clandestine organisation in the towns and by the Timorese leadership abroad. Together, he said, the three groups are authentic face of Timorese nationalism. Florentino da Sarmiento, the head of a local development organisation said that he favoured integration with Indonesia in 1975 as "the most realistic option". But, said Mr. Florentino, "What we have got now is not integration, but military occupation".²⁰

With Indonesia in the throes of an Islamic revival, the news from Timor of Catholic rioters burning mosques and beating up Muslims in early September 1995 prompted calls for a fundamental policy shift - possibly to the hard right. The Muslim population of the province in 1995 was some 26,000, still a tiny minority among nearly 800,000 Timorese. As a result of 400 years of Portuguese rule, the East Timorese are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic in a 90% Muslim country. The main target of Muslim anger is Timor's Catholic bishop, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo. He came under intense criticism after being quoted in the weekly "Gatra" as calling for a "special Catholic region". Muslims insist that this contradicts the

state ideology of Panccasila, which grants equal status to five

²⁰ The Economist, London, 23rd April 1994, P. 31.

recognised religions.²¹

In a bid to ease tension, Religions Affairs Minister Tarmizi Taher planned to go to Rome and discuss the Timor issue with Pope. But some observers doubted that would provide a cure for the province's ills. "The problem of East Timor is not a religious problem", said Salvador Ximenes Soares, a Timorese member of parliament and general manager of the daily "Suara Timor Timur". "It is a political problem, involving lack of employment, sharp social jealousies and the undermining of self-respect." Islam co-existed peacefully with Catholicism in the colonial era. And even following the 1976 annexation, catholics helped lay the foundation for a mosque in Dili, while Muslims lent a hand for Capital's Motael Church.²²

But the important fact is that, with the influx of voluntary migrants since 1989, the spirit of mutual cooperation has soured into mutual suspicion. It is indeed a fact that the migrant influx has threatened the traditional Timorese, to alter the face and character of East Timor. It is alleged that as many as 1,000 Indonesians from other islands in the huge archipelago have been reaching each week. "They have taken

²¹ Margot Cohen, "God and Country", Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 October 1995, P. 22.

²² Ibid, P. 23.

over the best land, the best jobs, even the small shops in the street", said Mr. Ramos Horta, the civilian representative of the Fretilin guerrilla movement. "In public service jobs, only 3 out of 10 is Timorese. In the streets, selling in the markets, the average we estimate is one Timorese for nine Indonesians, although Timorese still outnumber other Indonesians by at least 5 to 1. But if the trend continues for the next 10 years, the Timorese will be completely outnumbered."²³ However, the Indonesian officials say that it's not a controlled program of transmigration but since East Timor was opened in 1989 to other Indonesians, people have flocked there for better life from most populated islands to less dense ones.

It is not surprising that Church remains a powerful channel for East Timorese nationalism and plays the role of a watch-dog to their interests. The only pre-existing institution in East Timor not destroyed by the Indonesians is the Roman Catholic Church, which has a large following among population. Church leaders such as Martinhu da Costa Lopes are virtually the only persons who have been able to speak out against Indonesian military without being harmed. Perhaps Indonesian regime has realized that people may die out of

²³ Barbara Crosette, "Migrant Influx Altering Face of East Timor", International Herald Tribune (Paris), 31 Oct 1994.

torture and hunger, but they won't see their religious sacrileges go to coffin before them by others.

The Bishop of East Timor, Ribeiro resigned in late 1977 from his post. He had refused to speak publicly, but in private, had described the Indonesian invasion of East Timor as a brutal and rapacious act. Although he initially favoured integration with Indonesia and disliked Fretilin because of its Communistic ideology, but later he wrote to President Suharto that the murdering, raping and looting the innocent people by Indonesian army was "one thousand times worse".²⁴ Lopes, known as the bishop of Dili was appointed apostolic administrator in 1977. He complained privately to General Dading but otherwise remained silent until 1981, when he decided to speak openly and condemn the abuses at a rally of 12,000 people. In April 1983 he was forced to resign, after which he went abroad, travelling worldwide to support East Timor and giving testimony to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February 1984.

His successor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo who was believed initially to be more cooperative with the Indonesians, delivered a sermon in October 1983 at Dili Cathedral protesting against Indonesian brutalities. In an interview with Reuters,

²⁴ J.S. Dunn, "The Timor Affair In International Perspective," World Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, Oct. 1978, P. 33.

he revealed the existence of two mass graves where the victims of the Kraras massacre of August 1983 are buried. "I am ready to be removed," he said in July 1984, "if that is the price of defending human rights of the East Timorese".²⁵

However, one thing is very clear that although the Church had been dominant provider of education in East Timor since the eighteenth century, its role was evidently limited since ninety-three per cent of the population (according to 1973 statistics) was illiterate. Now that church in East Timor is playing more a political role. Aware that the church remains a powerful conduit for East Timorese nationalism, the Indonesian Jesuits have been sent to the province to balance the nationalism of local church.²⁶

In the context of the human rights violations of Indonesia, it is to be noted that practically all the countries in the region have authoritarian rulers and they are generally unresponsive to the wishes and aspirations of the people. Their emphasis on strong government is also a function of their experience with long periods of chaos and instability in the

²⁵ Newsweek, 3 September 1984; and also in East Timor Report, nos. 7-8. June - September 1984. Published by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 124 Napier Street, Fitzroy Victoria 3065, Australia.

²⁶ "East Timor's Past Won't Stay Buried", The Economist, 23 April 1994, P. 31.

region which they ascribe to too much of freedom and liberty characteristic of Western democracy.

Many of these patrimonial states are rich in history and civilization carrying the "weight" of ancient pride. It is during the 20th century that most of these countries came out from the clutches of colonialism. It's natural that these pre-colonized countries are too jealous of their hard-earned sovereignty and independence to share them with the developed West in the name of human rights, democracy and the issue of self-determination.

Most of the Southeast Asian states are under autocratic rule. Innumerable fissiferous social trends related to diverse cultures, different ethnic groups with variety of languages justifies it with army playing a major role. Problems relating to economic development are much more important for them than that of human rights. Is not it a violation against human right with people living in a handful of states and representing less than one-fourth of the world's population who are enjoying 90 per cent of the world's resources and output through various exploitative mechanisms? Therefore there are justifications behind the chorus of demand from these countries that social and economic rights are prerequisites for the enjoyment of civil and political rights. Because without the first one, the second one has no meaning. Promotion of human rights through development cooperation with due respect to their social structures, thus, will help solving the problem.

CHAPTER - III

**INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
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The integration of East Timor by Indonesia has given rise to different international reactions at different points of time. It can be observed that the problem of the island has taken different colours by different medias. More than the Indonesian media, Indonesia's diplomatic campaign has been more successful, particularly in Western countries in the strategic justification for Indonesian opposition to the emergence of an independent state of East Timor and that the situation in the former Portuguese colony was quite irreversible. In the early years, with the territory sealed off from outside world by Indonesian army, the only information readily available came from Indonesian sources. However, the Timorese refugees who managed to flee away and get into Portugal, as well as the Church authorities were the main sources to inform the world about the brutalities on East Timorese.

With the situation in East Timor virtually inaccessible to the outside world it was impossible to build a picture of its reality. Before 1980, foreign diplomats including some from US State Department and some of the most reputable of

international newspapers and journals have tended to report along the lines that "Indonesia intervened when civil war broke out between the two Timorese political parties" or that "Indonesian troops intervened in support of the struggle of pro-Indonesian forces against Fretilin, at the former's request". Although the US and Australian diplomats and intelligence agencies were not fully aware of what really happened in East Timor, but their official spokesmen seemed to be careful not to contradict what emanated from Jakarta.¹ J.S. Dunn reports ascertaining the fact that civil war between Fretilin and U.D.T. had ended some weeks before Indonesia's military intervention began. Moreover, after U.D.T. remnants retreated into Indonesian Timor the operation against Fretilin became an entirely Indonesian military operation, in which a few hundred pro-Indonesian Timorese played relatively minor non-combatant roles.²

In the later phase, the Western media gave some space to the East Timor problem. Time and again the severe violation of human rights was reported. But the majority Western countries who are the known crusaders against human rights violations, of

¹ Testimony of State Department Officials in "Human Rights East Timor and the question of Use of US Equipment by the Indonesian Armed Forces", US Congressional Report, 23 March 1977.

² J.S. Dunn, "The Timor Affair In International Perspective", World Review, Vol. 17 No. 4, Oct 1978, P. 23.

course barring some very few, kept rather silent on the issue not being vocal against the Indonesian authorities. Bilateral trade, healthy foreign relation and strategic interest with Indonesia was the main cause behind the deliberate silence. After all, national interest thrives under the cloak of the so-called principles and ideological commitments. For years, all these developments have handicapped the hopes of the struggling Timorese. "Our people are being slaughtered and bombed and imprisoned and executed. Yet, Australia and the rest of the Western world does almost nothing," said Father Guterres, "Until Timor is free, this situation is the shame of the world".³ Amidst the expectations of the islanders, it is truly interesting to know the response of some countries, regional and international organizations on the East Timor crisis.

AUSTRALIA

It is quite natural on the part of Australia to be interested in the East Timor affairs due to geographical proximity with Indonesia. It is the only Western country where the press has covered the topic regularly since 1974. The first historical factor is the World War II experience where a force of 400 Australian and Dutch troops operated as a

³ Ross Fitzgerald, "East Timor: Shame of the World", World Review, Vol 27, No. 1, Mar 1988, P. 9.

guerrilla force in the East Timorese interior with the support of native population and harried a Japanese occupation force of more than 20,000 troops. This operation costed 40,000 East Timorese lives for which Australia is indebted to East Timor.⁴ But Even if there was much sympathy for the people of East Timor, there was always the strategic and economic importance of Indonesia to consider and this fact was clearly demonstrated well in advance of the Indonesian invasion.

On 16 October 1975 five journalists - two Australians, two British and one New Zealander - were killed in Balibo. They were killed by Indonesian troops advancing into the territory in order to destabilize the Fretilin administration. But the Australian government did not really want the truth to become public knowledge, because this would hurt Indonesia. Jim Dunn states in his book that "the killing of the newsmen was probably the worst and most wanton act of its kind in the history of Australian journalism and yet, incredibly it evoked not a formal word of protest to Indonesia." As a matter of fact it was later revealed that Canberra had known the truth all along because they were monitoring the Indonesia's secret traffic. And to Indonesia, Canberra's silence and cover-up had a clear message: it was a green light for an outright invasion

⁴ James Dunn, "Timor: A People Betrayed", Milton, Queensland: Jacaranda Press, 1983, P. 128.

of East Timor.⁵ However, the Australian government deplored the military intervention of 7 December 1975 and voted against Indonesia in the General Assembly. The Foreign Minister Mr. Peacock, under caretaker Prime Minister Malcom Fraser's Government initiated a policy calling for Indonesia to withdraw its forces and for a genuine act of self-determination to occur.⁶ Australia also protested the so-called 'note on self-determination' by the 'People's Assembly', a puppet of Indonesian military. This was not recognised by the then Australian government which co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN's Fourth (Decolonisation) Committee supporting the East Timorese right to self-determination.⁷

But as early as October 1976 Australia gave de facto recognition of the integration of East Timor and in January 1978 a de jure recognition followed. In March of that year, the Australian government announced that the gift of twelve Bell Sioux helicopters and in June, six Nomad Search-master planes would be given to Indonesia.⁸ In 1982, concerned that

⁵ National Times (Australia), 7 July 1979.

⁶ Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 47, March 1976, P. 131.

⁷ C.M. Chinkin, "The Law and Ethics of Recognition: Cambodia and Timor" in Ethics and Foreign Policy, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992, P. 202.

⁸ Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Soei Liong, "The War Against East Timor", London Zed Books, 1984, P. 30.

the humanitarian focus of Fraser government was ignoring the issue of human rights, the Senate, now controlled by the Labour Party and Democrats began an inquiry into the allegations of human rights abuses. The Senate inquiry was conducted in spite of the government's opposition, exemplified in its failure to issue a visa to Jose Ramos-Horta, Fretlin's external political leader, so he could address the Inquiry.⁹

When Fraser was the Prime Minister, the opposition led by Ken Fry and Gordon McIntosh had adopted a platform that was committed to self-determination in East Timor under UN observation. However, following the change of government in March 1983, the new Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his Foreign Minister Bill Hayden worked to maintain good relations with Indonesia, thus openly betraying their own platform.¹⁰ Hayden put the dilemma quite clearly: if we support East Timor, he said, an Australian airline company may lose its flying rights to and through Indonesia and this will cost us 160 million Australian dollars. So the implied question was: how much are

⁹ Report of the "Inquiry into the Human Rights and Conditions of the people of East Timor", Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1983, PP. XIV and 78.

¹⁰ See John G. Taylor, "Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor", Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press, 1991, P. 134.

half a million East Timorese worth?¹¹ Although the ALP Conference of July 1984 had caused friction for the Australia-Indonesia relationship, but one year later, Australia publicly acknowledged Indonesian sovereignty over the former Portuguese colony. In an interview recorded on 25 July 1985 in Canberra for Indonesian television, Prime Minister Bob Hawke recognised "the sovereign authority of Indonesia" over East Timor and went on to describe the East Timorese as "citizens of Indonesia".¹²

Heyden's retirement as Foreign Minister in 1988 was replaced by Gareth Evans. The dominant theme in the Foreign Policy approaches of Hayden and Evans to East Timor were similar in so far as a solid relationship with Indonesia was viewed as a necessary condition for effective bilateral representations on human rights while criticisms in multilateral forums were predicated on their anticipated effectiveness in 'influencing' Indonesian government policy rather than exerting 'pressure' that could provoke an Indonesian reaction. For example, after the death of protesters at the Santa Cruz cemetery in 1991, Australia was instrumental in supporting a chairman's consensus statement at

¹¹ Torben Retboll, "The East Timor Conflict and Western Response", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 19(1), Jan-Mar 87, P. 33.

¹² Canberra Times, 19 August 1985; and also in Le Monde (Paris), 19 December 1985.

the 48th session of the UN Commission of Human Rights in 1992, rather than a strongly worded resolution condemning Indonesia. Overall, Australia's human rights diplomacy with regard to East Timor is predicted on maintaining a firm relationship with Indonesia.¹³ However, it is becoming clearer that the non-intervention espoused by the Whitlam government in the case of the conflict in East Timor is an anachronism that has little relevance for Australian policy-making in the Post-Cold War era.

RESPONSE OF PORTUGAL AND OTHER EUROPEAN STATES

Portugal is directly involved in the East Timor issue as the former colonial power. Technically, it is the administering authority as the UN still upholds its authority on the island; and formally it is committed nevertheless to ensure an orderly decolonization of the territory. But the reality is somewhat different, since in the first place, Portugal has not administered anything at all since it withdrew from the main island during civil war in August 1975 and secondly, successive Portuguese governments have done nothing

¹³ See Geoffrey Gunn, "A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor", Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1994, P. 151.

to fulfill their constitutional obligations. Moreover, in October 1981, a secret 1000 page report declassified by President Eanes revealed that after the April 1974 revolutions, Portuguese left wing leaders had secretly negotiated with Indonesia and accommodated that country's ambitions to annex the territory. According to a description of the last of these meetings held in Hong Kong in June 1975, a Portuguese delegation told Indonesian officials that it would give them a year to try and persuade the East Timorese by peaceful means to accept incorporation into Indonesia. But if they did not and Indonesia choose to use force, "the Portuguese government is not prepared to create problems and could easily send a ship to Timor to evacuate all Portuguese. President Eanes had suppressed the report since 1976 on the grounds that the Portuguese public was not ready for its release soon after the traumatic decolonisation in Africa and also due to the fact that reputations of some of the President's closest political associates, stood to be damaged".¹⁴

The April 1974 revolution in Portugal had little impact upon the mass of the people although it had profoundly affected administrative society and local chiefs, the 'regulos'. Among

¹⁴ Jill Jolliffe, Guardian (London), 17 October 1981; see also Torben Retboll, "East Timor: The Struggle Continues", International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen, 1984, pp. 114-116.

the Timorese political parties, it was UDT that started out as a Spinolist party advocating Timor's adoption into a Lusitanian Federation. It then espoused a long period of association with Portugal and seizure of power by pro-Portuguese elements, then independence within 15 years and then, yet again, it formed a coalition with Fretilin within five years or so. But as Portugal moved increasingly leftward, UDT seemed simply more concerned with maintaining Portuguese link as long as may be possible.¹⁵ Its central committee was dominated by administrative officials, Portuguese, Timorese and some Portuguese planters, although European Portuguese were forbidden active role in Timor's politics afterwards.

A new round of secret talks between Portugal and Indonesia began in July 1983, this time under the auspices of the UN Secretary-general and his special deputy for East Timor affairs - the Pakistani diplomat, Achmed Rafeeuddin who is believed to be a pro-Indonesian. The reason for secrecy is due to the fact that Indonesia claims that East Timor was properly decolonized by the act of the Popular Representative Assembly on 31 May 1976, after which it became an 'internal affair' not to be discussed by outside parties.¹⁶

¹⁵ Peter Hastings, "Timor, Indonesia and Australia, World Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 1975, PP. 7-8.

¹⁶ See Jim Dunn, "Timor: A People Betrayed", Milton Queensland: Jacaranda Press, PP. 369-373.

In 1987, after the Indonesian Parliament invited members of the Portuguese parliament to send a delegation to East Timor, Lisbon opened UN talks with Jakarta to plan a visit. Then followed three years of very complex dealings, until an accord was signed in September 1991. Under the accord the parliamentary mission would be "fact finding, but not investigative". This delegation would have free and private access to any East Timorese it wished to interview. And finally, it would be accompanied by journalists: ten Indonesian, ten Portuguese and six foreign correspondents from Lisbon, chosen by Portugal whose names must be communicated to each other three weeks before the visit.¹⁷

Everything was alright, but at the eleventh hour the Indonesian authorities objected to the inclusion of an Australian journalist Jill Joliffe who has been extremely critical of Indonesian occupation. "Under pressure, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas insisted on my exclusion," writes Mr. Joliffe in Guardian, "describing me as 'a crusader for Fretilin'. I have written two books on East Timorese nationalism which also included criticisms of Fretilin's own human rights record." Finally, parliamentary speaker Vitor Crespo announced the suspension of the visit describing a press

¹⁷ Parimal Kumar Das, "The East Timor Question", Financial Express (New Delhi), 26 April 1992.

ban was intolerable. Even the International Federation of Journalists condemned the move. America and Australia formally denied Alatas's claim that they supported his position.¹⁸

The interesting thing happened in February 1992 when a Portuguese ship, *Lustiana Expresso* started heading towards East Timor with the intention to pay tribute at the Santa Cruz cemetery where the killings had taken place in November 1991. Indonesian Foreign Ministry reacted sharply describing the real purpose of the "Peace ship" was to provoke a confrontation and there by disturb peace in the island. Of course, this particular move of Portugal didnot receive support from other Western countries. The 48 students from 18 countries aboard the ship finally strewed flowers into the sea after a dawn confrontation with Indonesian navy forcing them to give up the plan to travel Dili. "We will put the flowers in the sea. The sea will take them to the shore of Timor," Roman Catholic Priest Father Jose Baptista told the students.¹⁹

It is true that Portugal has been successfully utilising the forum of European Community to focus the attention of the world on the East Timor issue. Not only Portugal, but also a

¹⁸ Jill Joliffe, "Behind The Timorese Massacre", The Guardian (London) 1 December 1991.

¹⁹ Bangkok Post (Bangkok) 12 Mar 1992.

large number of Dutch parliamentarians from almost all political parties signed a joint appeal with parliamentarians from eight European Community countries calling on governments of the Community "to work collectively for the self-determination of the people of East Timor". This appeal organised by TAPOL in Britain and published on 29 July 1983, was signed in toto 170 parliamentarians of the community.²⁰

Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek paid an official visit to Jakarta in January 1984, having been instructed by Parliament to raise with not only the issue of the death squads but also the offensive in East Timor and the situation in West Papua. In point of fact, East Timor was hardly mentioned and West Papua apparently not at all. Even although he raised the death squads issue only, but it was protested by Benny Murdani for interfering in the internal affairs of Indonesia, after which Van den Broek apologized for creating this impression. Three months later in April 1984 Dutch Minister for Overseas Development and chairperson for IGGI Mrs. Schoo visited Indonesia. Her statements shocked the human rightists. "Human rights problem prevail in all developing countries", she stated, "If we use respect for human rights as a sanction, it is as if we are punishing underdeveloped countries for what is

²⁰ Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Soei Liong, "The Was Against East Timor", London Zed Books, 1984, P. 155.

a characteristic of underdevelopment". Two months later, in June, the IGGI convened in Hague for its annual meeting and approved aid commitments to Indonesia for the next fiscal year of 2,460 million US dollars, an increase of around 10 per cent above what was pledged in 1983.²¹ However, it is true that after the 1991 massacre Netherland had suspended aid programmes in protest against the shooting.

Sweden had supported East Timor in the UN General Assembly from 1975 to 1979 while at the same time selling arms (especially Bofors cannons) to Jakarta. In 1980, Sweden abstained in the UN and asked to join IGGI. The following year when the same thing happened in the UN and Sweden joined IGGI as an observer, the Scial Democrats (then in opposition) had protested strongly. But when the Social Democrats came back in government in 1982 they too abstained in the UN and did not pull out of the IGGI. Meanwhile, Swedish arms exports to Indonesia were growing by leaps and bounds, from a value of 21 million Swedish crowns in 1980 to 72 million in 1984.²² From 1985 onwards, except on certain few incidents, Swedish government has come down on the side of Indonesia.

²¹ Jim Dunn, "Timor: A People Betrayed," Milton Queensland: Jacaranda Press, pp. 368-369.

²² Torben Retboll, "The East Timor Conflict and Western Response", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 19(1), Jan-Mar 87, P. 35.

Several Western governments knew of Indonesia's plans long before the invasion but did nothing to stop it. In July 1975, the British ambassador to Jakarta wrote that "the people of Portuguese Timor are in no condition to exercise the right of self-determination". He continued: "It is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon as unobtrusively as possible. If it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the United Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid siding against the Indonesians".²³ In 1983 however, 128 members of the British Parliament supported a resolution calling on the government "to halt the sale of arms and military equipment to Indonesia". In January 1984 a deputation of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, led by Lord Avebury (Liberal), urged the Foreign Office that the UN consultation should include Fretilin and could only do so if the Secretary General or his envoy were physically present in East Timor. In May, this group sent out a dossier to all members of the IGGI in advance of the upcoming annual meeting in the Hague, calling on them to cease giving economic assistance to Indonesia because of the genocidal conditions in East Timor and injustices in West Papua i.e. Irian Jaya.²⁴

²³ Ibid, P. 30.

²⁴ Ibid, P. 39.

But surprisingly, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's official visit to Indonesia in April 1985 came hard on the heels of a series of arms deals which had made Britain Indonesia's major source of war equipment in Western Europe. Commenting on Thatcher's visit, TAPOL stated that "it is inexcusable for the British Prime Minister to turn a blind eye to the numerous human rights violations being perpetrated by Indonesia's military rulers, while boosting the sale of military hardware to Indonesia's armed forces which are responsible for so much bloodshed".²⁵

UNITED STATES

The invasion began itself immediately after president Ford and Henry Kissinger had concluded an official visit to Jakarta. While asked, Kissinger told a reporter, "the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question" of East Timor. These frank reactions were reported in the "Los Angeles Times" (7 Dec. 1975) and the "Boston Globe" (8 December 1975), but apart from these references, further mention of them appears to have been effectively suppressed in media.²⁶ Before

²⁵ Financial Times (London), 3 January 1985.

²⁶ Noam Chomsky & Edward Herman, "The Political Economy of Human Rights", Boston: South End Press, 1979, Vol. I, PP. 156 & 394.

the invasion took place, it was Kissinger who had attacked pro-left Fretilin saying, "US will not recognise Fretilin which has declared unilaterally the independence of East Timor in Nov. 1975."²⁷ One month later, in January 1976, a State Department official declared that "in terms of the bilateral relations between the US and Indonesia, we are more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor," adding that "the United States wants to keep its relations with Indonesia close and friendly. We regard Indonesia as a friendly, non-aligned nation - a nation we do a lot of business with".²⁸

The same policy line was adopted by all succeeding presidents, including the famous human rights crusader, Jimmy Carter, whose vice-president, Walter Mondale, travelled to Jakarta in May 1978 to finalize details of the sale of sixteen A-4 Skyhawk air-craft to Indonesia. Even as the war was raging in East Timor, Mondale felt able to commend the rulers of Indonesia on their human rights record because they had finally decided to release tens of thousands of political prisoners (tapols) held for nearly thirteen years without trial. "Warplanes have been bartered for political prisoners," wrote the TAPOL Bulletin in June 1978, while "Indonesia's embattled

²⁷ The Hindu (Madras), 7 Dec 1975.

²⁸ The Australian, 22 January 1976.

democratic opposition has been forgotten" and "East Timor is ignored".²⁹

During Reagan's visit on 12 October 1982 to Indonesia, the president of America told at the arrival ceremony that "the United States regards Indonesia as an important force for peace, stability and progress." He however avoided the issue of East Timor. It was during President Bush's tenure that the Dili massacre happened. A few American journalist who had been able to make their way to the burial ground unseen, filmed the incident. It was later flashed which stirred various human rights group, trade unions, Church agencies. As a result, about 55 Senators addressed a letter to President Bush to end the blood-letting and "bring about true self-determination for the territory". All these protests resulted in the adoption of a Resolution by the US Congress deploring the attack on the mourners.³⁰ Along with the European outcry, the US also said that its aid to Indonesia now will be conditional on a full and impartial inquiry. Finally Indonesia had to establish a national Investigation Commission which stated that 50 people had died and 90 had disappeared in the massacre.

²⁹ New York Times, 14 may 1978.

³⁰ "Agony of East Timor", Peoples Democracy, 23 Feb 1992.

INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS EAST TIMOR PROBLEM

India has always blushed when standing upto bullies, be it the Soviet occupation of Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan. But India's attitude towards Indonesian aggression in East Timor has been quite strange. The Indians appear to have regarded East Timor as a kind of Indonesian Goa; an anomalous situation which justified Indonesian intervention.³¹ India took its initial stand against self-determination by the people of East Timor in the company of countries not distinguished by their attitude towards progressive causes. Against the majority view at the UN, India's representative made common cause with those of Chile, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Zaire, Pre-revolution Iran, Pre-Sandinista Nicaragua and a few others usually known for their conservative or downright reactionary policies. Some countries like Syria, Iraq, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Singapore adhered to the pro-Indonesia camp because of their value they attached to their Islamic or ASEAN links.³²

³¹ J.S. Dunn, "The Timor Affair in International Perspective", World Review, Vol 17, No. 4, Oct 1978, P. 28.

³² Punyapriya Dasgupta, "East Timor's Woes", The Statesman (New Delhi), 9 April 1982.

During President Sanjiva Reddy's visit to Indonesia in December 1981, the Press Trust of India reported from Jakarta that Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusummatmadja told newsmen that he thanked the president for India's support to Indonesia on the East Timor island issue. The UN and most countries invited by Jakarta to witness a make-believe ceremony of so-called Timorese representatives asking for integration with Indonesia, had refused to attend. India was among the handful that choose to witness the dubious sanctification of Indonesia. Even on the Dili churchyard massacre, the External Affairs Ministry's official spokesman declined to utter a single syllable in condemnation.³³

The Non-Aligned Movement whose philosophy India believes in, had at its fifth summit in Colombo and the sixth in Havana, rejected Indonesia's forcible annexation of East Timor and affirmed the right of the people of that territory to self-determination. But at the seventh summit in New Delhi, India removed East Timor from the agenda. Normally, the political declaration drafted by the host as the framework for the deliberations at the summit should have contained at least one paragraph on what earlier sessions had said about East Timor. India omitted the issue and argued that no session was bound by the decisions of the earlier ones. At the same time, on the

³³ Ibid.

issue of Kampuchean representaion, India mantained that there was no mechanism for changing a decision between two sessions. Ministers and MPs representing India at UN meetings on decolonisation and human rights have surprised the world by demanding the deletion of East Timor from the agenda.³⁴

In contrast, at times of India's crucial need, particularly during Indo-pak war, Indonesia sided with Pakistan. Even while the tragic drama was unfolding in East Timor and Indonesia was preparing for its aggressive role, a remark by Adam Malik was heard all over the world and could not have been missed in New Delhi. The then Foreign Minister of Indonesia tried to comouflage annexationist plans behind a statement that his country didnt wish to make Portuguese East Timor "another Goa" and wanted the people there to decide. In other words he disapproved in retrospect of India's recovery of Goa and promised better international conduct on his part. How could India, the untiring preacher of international morality turn into such a zealous advocate for an aggressor? The answer is in the allergy the bureucrats in South Block have developed for the expression "self-determination". To every government in New Delhi, self-determination has become a dirty word. After failing to convince many in the international arena that

³⁴ Punyapriya Dasgupta. "Twenty Years of Timor's Tragedy", The Times of India (New Delhi) 8 Dec 1995.

the concept of self-determination is something not applicable to Kashmir, Indian diplomacy thought it should debunk self-determination wherever possible.³⁵

When one compares the Kashmir issues with East Timor, it can be observed that it is quite different from the issue of East Timor. The background and origin of both issues are quite different. After all, there is a Pakistan to instigate in creating problems for Kashmir. Secondly, although as alleged by Mr. Ramos Horta, as many as 1,000 Indonesians from other islands have been arriving each week to be settled into East Timor, where as , lakhs of Kashmir Pundits have been kicked out from Kashmir by Pak-trained terrorists. There are other points of difference, but most importantly the security of more than 10% of the Indian Muslims lies with the integrity of Kashmir in India. Finally, unlike East Timor, Kashmir's accession to India has been recognised by UN and most countries of the world.

However, it's true that there are certain factors which make India adopt this line to support Indonesia. Indonesia is an important supplier of crude oil and an influential voice in the Islamic world, being the largest Muslim populated country. It has in the past kept in check the hawks in the organisation

³⁵ Ibid.

of Islamic Conference in the diplomatic tug-of-war over Kashmir. Afterall, in the post-cold war scenerio, with India trying to be a full-fledged dialogue partner of ASEAN, it has to keep the largest ASEAN member state in good humour.

SILENCE OF ASEAN

Although two decades have passed since Indonesian occupation, but no ASEAN member state has ever protested, nor has the issue been discussed in any of ASEAN's formal meetings. None of the member wants to embarrass the powerful ASEAN partner. The ASEAN five including Indonesia had no morality one year after the occupation of East Timor to propound the concept of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and Treaty of Amity and cooperation. When Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia in 1978, ASEAN emerged as a single collective voice, crying the loudest (with the call to bleed Vietnam white) against the aggression and subsequent illegal occupation of Cambodia. Sadly, this collective will was absent in case of Indonesian aggression of the island. Even the death of more than 200,000 Timorese was unheard to ASEAN.

ASEAN leaders today may pretend that East Timor is already a dead issue. They may also pretend not to hear the cries for freedom of the East Timorese. But they cannot escape the sense

of guilt which will forever leave a scar in their hearts and minds. In fact, East Timor is a test of will between the forces of democracy and dictatorship, and between the forces of right and wrong.³⁶ However, the answer of Dr. Dewi Anawar, an Indonesian scholar at an international seminar at IIC, New Delhi on 19th December 95 speaks the truth. When asked about ASEAN's alleged silence on East Timor issue, she replied, "those who live inside glass houses cannot throw stones at others". In fact, the majority Southeast Asian countries are governed by army-dominated autocratic rulers with serious accusations of human rights violations. Their common sin gets them together.

The incident of Jakarta's all-out opposition to the "Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor" in Manila in 1993 elevated the privately organised forum to the level of an international incident, threatening Philippines' economic and political ties with Indonesia. In the end, it was President Fidel Ramos who backed down, banning foreign participation in the conference. "This is a clear surrender to Indonesian pressure", said the chief organiser of the conference Mr. Renato Constantino Jr., "The Ramos administration is acting as if Philippines is Indonesia's 28th province". For Ramos, the storm was troubling

³⁶ "Timor: ASEAN's Shame of Silence", Bangkok Post, 25 July 1994.

in other ways. Not only is there an unwritten rule among the six ASEAN states that they must avoid becoming embroiled in each other's internal problems, Jakarta has also been playing a particularly constructive role in the on-going peace talks between Manila and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) - a role that was obviously jeopardised as well.³⁷

However, despite restrictions, the conference was held to the embarrassment of Indonesia. The thirteen groups closely involved in the organisation of the May 31 - June 4 conference include the National Council for Maubere Assistance, the umbrella group that includes East Timor's Fretilin resistance organisation. Also involved were the Netherland-based International platform of Jurists for East Timor and British Lord Eric Avebury's Parliamentarians for East Timor. Interestingly, of the four Indonesian invitees, only human rights activist H.J.C. Princen and Satya Wacana University lecturer George Aditjondra initially confirmed that they would attend. Aditjondra is probably the only Indonesian intellectual to hit out openly at Indonesia's policy on East Timor. In March, Australian newspapers published excerpt from some of his papers on the issue, including one that gave a much higher death toll for the 1991 Dili massacre.³⁸

³⁷ Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 June 1994.

³⁸ Ibid.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has been watchful to the plight of East Timorese. Both the Security Council and General Assembly in New York as well as the Human Rights Commission in Geneva have been pondering on the issue since the trouble started. At the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly in 1974, the question of the future of the island was considered briefly, as part of the Assembly's overall examination of the status and condition of territories under Portuguese domination. But the situation in East Timor was not really taken up at the UN until a few days before the Indonesian attack of Dili. The Australian Government had not favoured UN involvement.

Curiously, the General Assembly draft resolution sponsored by Indonesia on 3 December 1975 in its revised form called all states "to respect the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence. It also requested Portugal to continue her efforts to find a solution by peaceful means by talks with the political parties of Timor. However, this nine-power draft resolution was immediately withdrawn after the news of Indonesian armed attack on Dili. Two other resolutions introduced in place, one sponsored by Algeria, Cuba, Guyana etc. and the other by India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Saudi

Arabia etc. The Algerian draft expressed "deep concern" and "strongly deplored" Indonesia's military intervention and asked Indonesian military to withdraw immediately to enable the process of self-determination. The second resolution drawn up by India and other countries for an Indonesian solution to Timor problem did not get the required support and was in due course withdrawn. The Algerian draft was subsequently adopted by vote of 69 for (including Australia), 11 against and 38 abstentions including United States.³⁹

On the other hand, the Security Council met between 15 and 22 December and unanimously adopted a resolution which recognised "the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence", in accordance with the principles of the Charter and Declaration of Decolonization.⁴⁰ The Secretary-General was requested "to send urgently a special representative to East Timor to make an on-the-spot assessment of the existing situation". The Security Council again adopted a resolution on 22 April 1976 calling the withdrawal of Indonesian forces without delay.⁴¹ Although these resolutions are binding, Indonesia has not complied with them. The General Assembly has adopted similar but non-binding resolutions

³⁹ General Assembly Resolution 3485, 12 December 1975.

⁴⁰ Security Council Resolution 384 (1975).

⁴¹ Security Council Resolution 389 (1976).

annually from 1975 to 1982. Indonesia has simply ignored them. However, more the days are passing by, more and more the UN diplomatic support has been eroded, with a gradual decline in number of support of countries and the watering down of the language of the resolutions. In 1975, seventy-two countries supported the resolution condemning the Indonesian invasion (with ten against and forty-three abstentions). By 1982, the number of countries supporting the by-now diluted resolution had declined to fifty (with forty-six against and another fifty abstentions - a very narrow margin).

A clear voting pattern emerged from the very beginning with few exceptions and only minor exceptions over the years: Fretilin's African friends, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau succeeded in winning support of the majority of African states. Predictably, Communist states with exception of Yugoslavia opposed Indonesia, but so did many of the smaller members of the UN who are traditionally active in issues involving small states or minority peoples⁴². Most Western countries abstain while US and Australia (since 1978) have been against the resolution. Brazil is in favour because of the Portuguese connection. Support for Indonesia's position comes from regimes like Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Turkey which

⁴² J.S. Dunn, "The Timor Affair in International Perspective", World Review, Vol 17, No. 4 Oct. 1978, P. 19.

has its own invasion in Cyprus, as well as Indonesia's ASEAN colleagues. Indonesia's chief trading partner Japan has always supported Jakarta. Among the few Western countries that have supported self-determination, one may note Sweden (until 1979), Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Ireland and finally Portugal which is committed by its constitution.⁴³

The discussion of East Timor by General Assembly was deferred in September 1983 and the same thing happened in the fall of 1984 and of 1985. The proposal to defer was initiated by Portugal and moved by Iceland. Two reasons were given: uncertainty about the actual situation in East Timor and the fact that consultations were continuing between the Secretary General and the parties involved. As for the actual situation, it should not have been too difficult to discover that there was a war going on. As for the consultations, Fretilin had been completely excluded although General Assembly resolution no. 37/30 of 23 Nov. 1982 instructs the Secretary-general to initiate consultations "with all the parties directly concerned". Indonesia, of course hailed the deferral as a victory, saying it might be "the last nail in the Fretilin coffin", as the 'Jakarta Post' put it. Some observers also speculated that Portugal preferred to postpone the issue rather

⁴³ Torben Retboll, "The East Timor Conflict and Western Response", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 19(1), Jan-Mar 87, P. 37.

than risk losing the vote, which may be true, though there was no evidence that Portugal had engaged in any serious lobbying for the Timor cause prior to the General Assembly.⁴⁴

The Human Rights Commission did not discuss the issue until February 1983, when it adopted a resolution that supported self-determination and condemned human rights abuses. The same thing happened again in February 1984 (when former bishop Martinhu da Costa Lopes gave testimony), but in early 1985, during its forty-first session, the Commission decided to delete East Timor from agenda. Even so, the issue was discussed but only under general item of self-determination where Amnesty International and three other non-governmental organizations gave testimony. This was a serious set-back. Even Secretary-general Perez de Cuellar told the press in Jakarta that the atmosphere at the UN on the question of East Timor "is improving so much that I don't think it will come up any more. Or at least, that is what I hope".

However, despite limitations the UN has not left the field. In April 1993, the Secretary-general dispatched his Personal Envoy, Mr. S. Amos Wako of Kenya to East Timor to follow up on the recommendations arising from his first visit in February 1992 in connection with the tragic incident which

⁴⁴ UN Document S/17592, 29 October 1985.

took place in Dili on 12 Nov 1991.⁴⁵ Since 1992 to 1994, the Secretary-general had convened four rounds of substantive discussions between Foreign Ministers of Portugal and Indonesia for a political solution to the problem. In January 1994, the Secretary-general dispatched a mission to Portugal, Indonesia, East Timor and Australia to conduct detailed discussions on various possibilities and to consult with East Timorese groups and personalities representing various trends of opinion.⁴⁶

However, the UN still now recognises Portugal and not Indonesia as administrator of East Timor. After the failure of UN sponsored talks between the two countries, hopes were raised early in June 1995 when Indonesian officials concluded three days, of UN sponsored talks with East Timorese in Australia. The confidence buiding steps taken by the UN in the case of East Timor will show the next generation how far it is going to be successful in crisis management.

However it's generally complained that the organisations like ICRC and others with western influences which work in the name of helping the distressed ones, generally indulge in the secret intelligence activities and reporting which go against

⁴⁵ UN Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/Sub 2/1993/14, 28 July 1993, P. 4.

⁴⁶ UN Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/Sub 2/1994/14, 11 July 1994 P. 3.

the host nation. Today if one analyses the realistic angle, it's to be seen that the bulk of the strong Western reaction is generally taken for granted as the International response to any problem anywhere on earth. The double standard of West is exposed, when on the one hand they criticise the human rights violations, terrorist activities etc, but on the other hand sell arms to those countries. It is by force of these arms and modern ammunitions that the repressive activities go on. There is also another exploitative angle of linking financial aid with human rights records.

It is no doubt true that Indonesia has been undergoing serious offensives against ^{the} East Timorese. Indonesia must stop that and should try to find out a political solution on the basis of consensus. But at the same time the Western elements must stop their extreme anti-Indonesian propaganda machinery and other means which never help in deriving a proper solution to the problem, rather help the insurgents double their secessionist activities. Instead of stopping human rights violations, this rather adds coal to castle for more and more deaths, injuries from both the sides.

CHAPTER - IV

**INDONESIA'S EFFORT TOWARDS
INTEGRATING EAST TIMOR**

CHAPTER - IV

INDONESIA'S EFFORT TOWARDS INTEGRATING EAST TIMOR

Indonesia is very much conscious of her rights and possession of East Timor as well as any developments taking place in its twenty-seventh province. Of course it is quite sensitive to the continuing turmoil. As a pacifying step, the government has given more attention and resources for the development of East Timor. Not only in case of East Timor, but it's a world-wide phenomena that wherever there is the voice of dissent and trend towards secessionism, the government authority tries to calm down by special economic packages. In case of Indonesia, including more economic sanctions, the system has paid more attention to "Indonesianizing" East Timor than showing due respect and attention to unique mix of Timorese and Portuguese cultures of the province.

However, it is true that before Indonesia took over East Timor, Portugal, the previous colonial master had profited for generations from sandalwood and coffee exports, but did little to better the lives of the Timorese or prepare for their self-reliance. The process of "de-colonization" was a record of failure and ineptitude. In August 1975, the colonial

authorities had simply packed up and left East Timor, allowing the situation in the territory to deteriorate to the point of civil war. In fact, as the Indonesian representative to UN, Mr. Dos Reis has alleged in 1993 at the UNHRC that rather "Portugal had been guilty of instigating the civil war by secretly turning over its arms and ammunitions to one particular minority group. "Having bungled the decolonization process, Portugal had forfeited any right to be regarded as the 'administering power' of East Timor". Today Portugal has turned to be the leading champion of the West for the East Timorese human rights, whereas it had drained the Timorese by the process of economic exploitation in her colonial days.

JAKARTA'S ENDEAVOUR TOWARDS EAST TIMOR'S DEVELOPMENT

The dissident East Timorese would have to admit that since the invasion of their territory Indonesia has built roads and other infrastructures and improved education, health-care, and agricultural facilities. The Indonesian Red-Cross has been in operation in the region since December 1975 upon the request of the Provisional government of East Timor. East Timor was considered to be one of the poorest in Southeast Asia with per capita income in terms of Gross National Product in 1973-4 having little more than US \$ 40. With the exception of coffee,

which represented more than 90% of export earnings, most of the people were dependent on underdeveloped primitive way of agriculture.¹

Today, as a province, East Timor is administered by a governor who is currently assisted by some 11,036 civil servants of which more than 80 per cent are East Timorese. In order to run the administration and development program, the government has allocated to East Timor a total of more than US \$ 450 million during the first decade. As a general rule, the budget has been used to finance routine expenses for administration, sectoral development projects and special projects established by Presidential Decisions, known as 'Inpres' project.² Till 1988, "special treatment" was accorded to the province for twelve years. This special treatment was manifested in the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Coordinating Secretariat for East Timor Affairs with the task of planning and overseeing the economic development. The financing of East Timor's development by the central government was undertaken through "budget item 16" in the budget of

¹ "Facts On East Timor", House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, 1990, P. 21.

² Ibid, P. 26.

Department of Internal Affairs, specially allocated to East Timor.³

The special attention that had been given to East Timor had brought a remarkable result to the economy of the region. It can be seen from the region's economic growth, as shown by the rates of growth of Gross Regional Product (GRDP), which was close to 6 per cent annum during 1983/86 while Indonesia's was less than 5 percent at the same period. While in 1978 East Timor's capita GDP could not be more than 60 per cent of that of East Nusa Tenggara (one of Indonesia's poorest provinces), in 1983 it was about 90 per cent.⁴

Agriculture is the dominant sector with almost 90 per cent of East Timorese engaged in it. Before 1979, new irrigation networks had been built in the districts of Maliana, Manatuto, Baucau, Ambenu, Aileu, Ermera, Los Palos and Comoro, while new agricultural land with an area of 2,000 hectares was reclaimed at the end of the Second Five Year Development plan for rice cultivation and another 5,500 hectares of dry land for second crop cultivation. By the same period, development of animal

³ Hadi Soesastro, "East Timor's Economic Development Seen From Jakarta" The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1995, PP. 288-289.

⁴ "Facts On East Timor", P. 26.

husbandry had been accelerated by sending 1,000 stud bulls and cows and 15 horses to be further raised.⁵

With regard to land transportation network, by the end of 1989 more than 3,795 km of sealed roads, hardened earth roads and gravel roads have been built. Along with this, 18 bridges have been completed and some more are still under construction. Sea and air transportation facilities have also been developed to facilitate intra-provincial and inter-insular transportation and communications. Various ships of upto 5,000 DWT can be handled along the pier of the Dili harbour. For air transportation, a new airport was built which can handle F-28 jet passenger air-craft. Merpati Nusantara now served daily flights from Dili to various destinations. Meanwhile, with the operation of the mini Earth Station in Dili in May 1979, the province of East Timor had been linked by telephone line through palapa Domestic Communications Satellite System. At the same time, diesel generated electricity plants have been installed in many districts and sub-districts. By 1989, more than 136 km irrigation network built in East Timor, were capable of supplying water for 6,000 hectares of peddy field.⁶

⁵ "Indonesia 1979: An Official Handbook", Published by Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, P. 81.

⁶ "Facts On East Timor", PP. 29-33.

As a main part of social welfare programme, education has taken the main role. Scholarship and fellowship programs, with 1,577 students and civil servants were provided scholarships in universities in Java, Bali, Sulawesi and other places. A private university was established in East Timor in 1986. Through the Eradication and Community Education Development programs effort is on to eradicate illiteracy among East Timorese. Ironically, the Indonesian built university is a centre of dissent for young people. Timorese parliamentarian Salvador Ximenes Soares said, "a new breed of young Timorese who are better educated than their elders and much more critical of government actions are swelling the ranks of the resistance".⁷

With regard to public health, emphasis has been given on health services by establishing health facilities and increasing number of medical personnel. While before 1976, there was only one hospital with 3 doctors and 2 dentists in East Timor, in 1989 there were 104 medical doctors, 6 specialists, 14 dentists and 8 pharmacists. In addition, UNICEF in cooperation with Indonesian Government, has been assisting in the child, mother and family welfare improvement programs. According to the 1980 census, the total population

⁷ John McBeth, "Deja Vu", "Far Eastern Economic Review", 2 March 1995, P. 20.

of East Timor was 555,350 with an average density of about 38 persons per square kilometer. With a 2.4 per cent average of growth rate per annum, the population in 1989 was estimated at 701,196 persons. Viewed from population density, East Timor is still under-populated. Many people live in small villages consisting of only a few families, scattered and isolated in remote and mountainous areas. This poses a serious problem in promoting social and economic development of the region. There is a programme "Mode Village (Desa Binaan) Development Programme has been initiated. This would develop 223 model villages with each village comprising 200 families.⁸

Despite Indonesia's best efforts towards East Timor's development, the Timorese are dissatisfied. "It does not matter how many bridges, roads and schools Indonesia builds, the Timorese people need to keep their culture and beliefs and their souls," Bishop Belo said.⁹ The government sponsored influx of people from other crowded parts of Indonesia is a sore point. They number about 100,000 in a total population of 720,000. They are coming at the rate of 25,000 per year. Local people complain that they take the cream of jobs and money created by Indonesia's development efforts.

⁸ "Facts On East Timor", PP. 35-37.

⁹ Geoff Spencer, "Development efforts fail to calm Timor", Bangkok Post, 2 Dec 1994.

Some analysts believe that East Timor's problems are more economic than military. The province remains poor by Indonesian standards, even though Jakarta has poured in development funds. "As far as improvement in the economy is concerned, who benefits?" asks Bishop Belo. "Many Timorese just spend their time in Jail." With 24,000 unemployed youth in Dili, many have become absorbed in East Timor's two main pre-occupations: religion and politics.¹⁰ East Timorese are against the continuing domination of the local economy by non-Timorese interests. P.T. Demog, for example, is a company controlled by parties linked to Benny Murdani, the country's former military chief. Until mid-1994 it enjoyed a lucrative monopoly in the trade of coffee, the province's major cash crop.¹¹

However, since the integration of East Timor as the youngest province of the Republic, the development of religion has made rapid headway without any resistance. A cathedral, the Imaculata Conceptio Church in Dili had been built and inaugurated by President Suharto in Nov. 1988. As to the development of the Catholic community, before the integration the number of Catholics only totalled about 200,000 with an average increase of 100-200 believers a month in each parish.

¹⁰ Asia Week, 3 March 1995, P. 28.

¹¹ Ibid.

After the integration the number of Catholics amounted to 1,000-2,000 a month in each parish and the number of worshippers has doubled, compared with that before integration.¹²

On 9th October 1989 Pope had his second visit to Indonesia. As is well known, the Pope usually kisses the ground when visiting a new country. However, the Pope's gesture of not kissing the ground upon arrival at the airport of Dili may be interpreted as a recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor since he had already kissed the ground at Halim Airport in Jakarta. And when he kisses a crucifix on reaching the site of the Papal Mass at Tasi Tolu, ten kilometers east of Dili, it was a purely liturgical act. Be that as it may, the fact that Pope John Paul II has brushed aside the Portuguese President's repeated pleas to skip East Timor in his visits seems to indicate that the Pontiff favours East Timor's integration with Indonesia.¹³ The Pope exhorted the estimated 200,000 believers using the Tetum dialect "to remain one soul and one heart" and to forget the past. He also reminded the East Timorese of their religious responsibility

¹² Daniel Setyawan, "The Visit of Pope John Paul II to Indonesia," The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol XVII, NO. 4, 1989, P.293.

¹³ Ibid, P. 293.

to the state - Indonesia - to be "the salt of the earth, the light of the world".¹⁴

From administrative and political point of view, East Timor is headed by a governor with the status of province. Like other provinces, it is divided into districts headed by 'bupati'. At present there are 61 sub-districts and 442 villages. The seat of governor was filled by Arnaldo Dos Reis Araujo, succeeded by Guilherme Maria Goncalves who, in turn, was replaced by Mario Viegas Carrascao, all are East Timorese. The people of East Timor had participated in the 1982 and 1987 General Elections with three contestant parties, namely Development Unity Party (PPP), the Functional Group (Golkar) and the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI). In the House of Representatives, four members represent East Timor and as the result of the 1987 General Election, 45 representatives have been installed to fill the seats in the Provincial Representative Council.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid, P. 294.

¹⁵ Facts On East Timor, PP. 41-42.

ABROGATION OF 'SPECIAL TREATMENT'

In mid-June of 1988, the governor of East Timor Carrascalao asked President Suharto to declare the province an open territory. By "open" he meant that visitors - at least from other parts of Indonesia - no longer require a special permit to enter and that East Timorese can freely travel to other provinces.¹⁶ In 1989, East Timor was opened up finally. But seen from Jakarta, the "East Timor Problem" poses a major dilemma. There is basic fear that if this youngest province is treated too differently from the rest it will become too different from the rest. But then, how can equal treatment be justifiably applied to a province which did not share a national history and is economically so far behind than the rest?

Till 1988, the special treatment of East Timor through the singular importance of economic development was seen as the principal instrument for integrating East Timorese into Indonesia, economically as well as politically. But on 1st January 1989, the Indonesian government granted East Timor an equal status as that of the other provinces in the country. Through this policy East Timorese were allowed to travel freely

¹⁶ The Jakarta Post, 20 June 1988.

in the country and entry restrictions for outsiders were consequently lifted.

There may have been various reasons for the discontinuation of the special treatment in 1988. The "optional" argument is that such a special treatment only attest to the central government's inability to solve East Timor problem. The "logical" argument is that the East Timor problem is essentially a political problem and thus, to be solved politically.¹⁷ Because economic development should not and perhaps cannot be seen as an instrument to obtain a number of objectives. As Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha has observed in his book "The Political Economy of East Timor Development" (1994) that economic development failed to win the hearts of the East Timorese people. While economic development may not produce an economic solution that would lead to a political solution; economic development thus is desirable in itself.¹⁸

Even Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas would agree when he says "We are victims of our own success. Indonesia had built more roads, bridges, schools and clinics". he said, "than

¹⁷ Hadi Soesastro, "East Timor's Economic Development Seen From Jakarta", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1995, P. 289.

¹⁸ See Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha, "The Political Economy of East Timor Development", Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994.

Portugal did during its entire 465 years of colonial rule. But the program has also raised aspirations and produced many more high school graduates than there are jobs for them".¹⁹ That's why perhaps Saldanha has argued in his 1994 book for the need to design "a new economic development strategy". As implemented today, economic development is seen as further aggravating the problem. It has become part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

However, the withdrawal of the special treatment in 1988 doesnot appear to have had any adverse effect on East Timor's economic growth performance. The province's growth rates increased from an average of 6.9 per cent over the period 1984-87 to an average of 9.9 per cent over the period 1988-92. Even in comparison to the other two poorest Indonesian provincial islands such as West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, the economy of East Timor has done fairly better. Over the period of 1983-92, the average annual real growth rate of East Timor's per capita GRDP (gross regional domestic product) outperformed the other two provinces: 7.1 per cent versus 4.8 per cent (West Nusa Tenggara) and 3.9 per cent (East Nusa Tenggara).²⁰

¹⁹ International Herald Tribune (Paris), 28 April 1994.

²⁰ BPS, Regional Income of Provinces in Indonesia by Industrial Origin 1983-1990 (August 1992) and Gross Regional Domestic Product of Provinces in Indonesia by Industrial Origin 1987-1992; Indonesian Quarterly, XXIII, No. 3., 1995, P. 290.

It is to be noted that public sector has played a significant role in generating growth. With government consumption continuing in the order of about one quarter of the province GDRP. The investment in East Timor increased to 24 per cent of GDRP in 1992 from less than 20 per cent in 1987. The province imports continue to be higher than its exports, but the region's "trade gap" has declined from 18 per cent of GDRP in 1987 to 7 per cent of GDRP in 1992. In this regard, East Timor has performed much better than West Nusa Tenggara or East Nusa Tenggara. The decline in the region's trade gap does not necessarily mean a reduction in the "savings-investment gap" of the public sector. In 1991, for instance, the sum of subsidies and contributions for the central government to financing of the budget of the local government amounted to about one-third of East Timor's GDRP.²¹

The withdrawal of special treatment in 1988 also does not appear to have negatively affected the transfer of resources to East Timor. In 1991-92, per capita expenditures in East Timor's local government's budget were still about twice the national average. This increase calls for greater autonomy in the 1990s appear to have taken the central government by surprise. In his call for greater autonomy, Governor Abilio

²¹ Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1995, P. 293.

Jose Osorio Soares, a native of Timor, argued that centralistic policies would make it impossible to eradicate poverty in East Timor and other eastern regions.²² Thus a form of "special area" status should be granted to the territory as a compromise, he suggested.²³ However, it is too simplistic to expect that autonomy would automatically solve the problem. President Suharto has reacted to those calls and has announced the government's policy of not granting special autonomy to East Timor, meaning a kind of autonomy which is different from the autonomy enjoyed by other provinces.²⁴

President Suharto's blunt refusal even to consider a special administrative package for the province has dashed the hope of those who were encouraged a few months ago by signs of a more flexible approach from government circles. "It was like a pyramid", said an Indonesian senior official, describing the internal debate on East Timor that preceded the APEC summit. "It built up and built up, but when it reached its apex, the president said, 'NO'".²⁵ East Timor's status from "province" to "special area" (such as now exists for Jogjakarta and Aceh)

²² Jakarta Post, 22 November 1993.

²³ Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 2nd December 1994.

²⁴ Suara Pembaruan, 18 November 1994; as referred in Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1995, P. 296.

²⁵ John McBeth, "New Generation of Timor Militants Arises", Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 Feb 1995, P. 21.

would accommodate much of the East Timorese desire for more cultural and social autonomy.

Acceptance by the people of integration into Indonesia is a matter of time, probably of two generations. It is unrealistic to expect East Timor truly to prosper, as it shares with other southeastern Indonesian islands an unfortunate geography and climate - an extensive coral rock surface with relatively small areas of rich soil and low annual rainfall. But there is considerable potential for development of aquaculture (the Portuguese forbade offshore fishing for hundreds of years) and possibly mineral extractive industries.²⁶

However Hadi Soesastro suggests for a "special treatment of the second kind" for East Timor which can be built on the idea of a Development Authority involving the Office of the Governor and Regional Planning Agency (Bappeda) in direct link, policy and administrative wise, to a special division within the National Planning Board, (Bappenas). The delivery system should be based on the local government apparatus, assisted by experts from the technical departments in their capacity as "hired consultants" and in cooperation with development-oriented non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - both national

²⁶ John B. Baseman, "Catalyst For Change in Indonesia", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 8,, August 1995, P. 766.

as well as foreign. This more modest proposal may have a greater chance of being acceptable to the powers in Jakarta.²⁷

Meanwhile, after ten years of negotiations, since 1978, the Indonesian and Australian government signed the significant "Timor Gap Treaty" on 11 December 1989 and ratified on 12 December 1990 "The Treaty Between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Zone of Cooperation in Area between the Indonesia Province of East Timor and Northern Australia". Whatever benefits of oil and natural gas both the countries may have in economic terms, in political terms, the treaty signifies the improvement of political relations between the two. Most importantly for Indonesia, "as East Timor became an issue in international relations, any agreement on delimitation of the Timor Gap continental shelf would mean de jure recognition of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia in 1976."²⁸ Incidentally, Portugal whom UN recognises as the soul authority on East Timor has launched a case against Australia in International Court of Justice for violating the rights to

²⁷ "The Indonesian Quarterly", Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1995, P. 297; see for more knowledge, Hadi Soesastro. "Foreword" in Saldanha, Joao Mariano de Sousa, "The Political Economy of East Timor Development" 1994; and also see, Hadi Soesastro, "East Timor: Questions of Economic Viability". Hal Hill (ed), "Unity and Diversity - Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970," Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989.

²⁸ Asnani Usman, "The Timor Gap Treaty", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1991, P. 105

self-determination of the East Timorese by signing on the treaty.²⁹

THE CHANGING ATTITUDE OF INDONESIA

It is to be observed that after the famous Dili massacre in 1991, Indonesia's attitude towards East Timor has been softened enough, which was of course as a result of severe international criticism against Indonesian brutality. Suharto appointed a distinguished National Investigation Commission composed of both civilians and military officers. The Army Chief-of-staff General Edi Sudradjat appointed a Military Honour Council to investigate the details of the military involvement. The council was chaired by Major General Feisal Tanjung, viewed as a highly professional and honourable officer whose lack of political ambition made him beholden to few whose involvement might have proved embarrassing. The senior military officers in East Timor were replaced and 14 members of the armed forces were tried by a military tribunal. The most severe penalty for the soldiers involved was 18 months' imprisonment. However, this contrasted starkly with the

²⁹ See Bangkok Post, 27 Jan 1995, and also 20 Feb 1995.

sentences of convicted demonstrators, which ranged from five years' to life imprisonment.³⁰

It was the first time in Indonesian Army's history that senior military officers were held personally responsible for the misdeeds of subordinates, an extra-ordinary step that reflected a new emphasis on professionalism and accountability within the military establishment. The first outside battalion of troops were withdrawn from East Timor in 1993 and the government had repeatedly stated its policy of removing all outside battalions on a phased basis by the end of 1995. That would leave only two largely ethnic Timorese battalions assigned under the military territorial structure. "Most soldiers in the province," as Foreign Minister Ali Alatas clarified, "are now engaged in bridge-building and other public works rather than military operations against Fretilin guerrillas". He further added with conviction that the rebel group was becoming a spent force.³¹ Indonesia's military Commander in East Timor Col. Niki Syhanarki had promised not to punish rebels who surrender and also said the cemetery massacre in 1991 was "an accident" that won't be repeated.³²

³⁰ Indonesia, The Europa World Year Book 1993, Vol.3, Europa Publications Ltd., P. 1431.

³¹ Asia Week, 3 March 1995, P. 28.

³² Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 2 Dec 1994.

When President Suharto came down decisively on the side of openness and investigation, the professionalists within the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) gained opportunity to assert themselves on the traditionalists and change an attitude that had endured for thirty years. The new ABRI leadership is committed to improving respect for human rights. It is vexed and agitated by the tide of foreign criticism which it feels is unfair and fails to consider the changes that have come about since Dili Incident.³³ It is to Indonesia's lasting credit that in responding to Dili Incident the nation's leadership seized the opportunity for change. The burning example is that Indonesia's military confessed to have committed an error in the killing of six East Timorese in January 1995.³⁴ Despite this, the government in Jakarta remains unpopular to the East Timorese. This should not be thus surprising: welfare seldom creates gratitude.

However, the hooded 'ninja', a dubious social group, alleged to have been sponsored by the military were patrolling the streets of Dili at night, terrorising residents who have been opposed to integration. However, military authorities have strongly denied any link between the unknown gangs and the

³³ John B. Hasegan, "Catalyst For Change In Indonesia: The Dili Incident," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 8, Aug 1995, P. 767.

³⁴ Bangkok Post, 11 Mar 1995.

army.³⁵ But no doubt, the formation of the National Human Rights Commission in June 1993 by Indonesian government with the help of a special decree is a positive development, which can be a watchdog against the army excesses. Headed by former Supreme Court Chief Justice Ali Said, the Commission announced on 1st March 1995 that it "deeply regrets the incident that occurred on 12 January 1995 (the military had killed six civilians), which in its essence is a grave violation of human rights".³⁶

Indonesia realizes that it has to find out a political solution to the problem which has to come from the top. From the top means the upper decision-making body in political and bureaucratic level. Nevertheless, it is showing more flexible attitude, in the diplomatic level, but with certain basic conditions uncompromised. On the diplomatic front, Indonesia and Portuguese officials have been encouraged by the progress of Boutros-Ghali's initiative to organise talks between Timorese groups that favour integration with Indonesia and those that oppose it. However, the talks won't address East Timor's political status. The so-called All-Inclusive Intra East Timor Dialogue (AETD) in Burg Schlaining (in Austria) had

³⁵ Mystery of the 'Ninjas', Asia Week, 3 Mar 1995, P. 28.

³⁶ Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 mar 1995, P. 16.

been intended as a 'reconciliation' meeting of Timorese factions ahead of the 8 July 1995 ministerial meeting between Portugal and Indonesia. Both the pro and anti - Indonesian Timorese factions issued a declaration that called for more such meetings, directly linked to UN sponsored talks on Timor's future.³⁷ Anyway, Jakarta has won praise for its decision to include several out-spoken figures such as East Timor Bishop Carlos Belo in the sixteen strong delegation from Indonesia.

The advocates of diplomacy always believe strongly that there is always a thin way somewhere in conflict-management, how much complex may be the problem. But the first criteria required is to sit on the table for dialogue and to listen each other, despite bitter opposing views. In the process of give and take, definitely a solution will emerge with the passage of time. The recent trend shows that the East Timor problem is passing through the same phase. Thus it is time for a solution perhaps.

³⁷ Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1995, P. 21.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION - TOWARDS A PRACTICABLE SOLUTION

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The period after the end of cold war is witnessing various secessionist movements and demands for secessionism, especially on the basis of ethnicity. The collapse of Soviet Union and formation of numerous small, sovereign state units have encouraged this trend. In the post-second-world-war period, the latent, passive ethnic identity of a group of people within a territory under the, powerful state, all of the sudden took a violent, disintegrating form once the centre became weaker in the post-cold-war phase. This of course proves one thing clearly - how-ever modern the world might be, the basic age-old questions and identities relating to race, ethnicity, religiousity and basic belief-structures still play an important role in state-formation.

Today, the territorial nation-state is being challenged from two sides. From above, at the supranational level it is being challenged by forces such as the multi-national companies, common markets, globalisation of economy, the inter-dependence among nations as well as because of the advancement of information technologies, international public opinion

through global net-work and telecommunications etc. None of the above has much respect for the traditional political boundaries and the integrity of the sovereign state. From below, at the subnational level the nation-state is being threatened by a new wave of ethnic nationalism that has manifested itself across the globe, demanding for greater autonomy or self-determination.

The second phenomenon i.e. 'ethnic nationalism', has been aided by three major developments. The first is the democratisation of hitherto authoritarian societies which gives ethnic minorities in those countries the freedom to express themselves. The second is the heightened international concern of the International Community for human rights, including those of minorities. Third is the greater scope that emerging regional powers enjoy to negatively influence the events in neighbouring countries, either for the sake of advantages of the situation or out of a desire to bigger one's neighbour.

These above factors have played a crucial role against the territorial integrity of the third-world nation-states, particularly the Asian countries. Asia is a unique continent with heterogenous, multiple social structure having different cultures, ethnicity and varying way of lives within territories and peoples. Nevertheless, the Asian state system is more

prone to secessionism and disintegration than anywhere in the world.

The components and character of separatism is however more or less universalistic. It may have several contending factions each claiming the mantle of legitimacy to represent the aspirations of a group which becomes an organised struggle with the passage of time. It seeks a territorial base which often is enshrined in the claim to be 'homeland' in which to govern itself, avoid exploitation and preserve its way of life. More often than not, separatist demand is backed by the primordial 'ethnic-identity-realisation' which is based on language or dialect, distinctive dress or diet or customs, religion or race.

In fact, these primordial factors are the subjective, symbolic and emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups, mainly the ruling one. In the movement to create greater internal cohesion and to press more effectively the ethnic demands against rival groups, ethnic and nationalist elites increasingly stress the variety of ways in which the members of the group are similar to each other and collectively different from others.

These primordial factors are encouraged by secondary factors which make the voice for disintegration louder. The ruling authority's neglect, exploitation, domination and internal colonialism, repression, discrimination and forced annexation serve as the triggering mechanism of collective consciousness felt by the group as it proceeds to define its demands. It affirms the right to self-determination in order to materialise the claim and ultimately for getting international support and recognition.

The case of East Timor can be analysed in this light, of course with certain differences and contradictions. This analysis should be seen in the pre and post-colonial historical basis along with the recent administrative political contradictions. Although East Timor came under the rule of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empire, but Portugal's traditional colonial policy of shielding East Timor towards keeping minimum contact with rest of Dutch Indonesia, even with West Timor, despite past ethnic and cultural links with some, helped in the emergence of a 'We-East-Timorese' feeling. It was some sort of East Timorese nationalism.

The people of East Timor are predominantly Melanesian stock. In the sixteenth century A.D. the Portuguese traders sailed from Solor island to Timor to trade sandalwood and so

did their slaves. These slaves mixed freely and married with local women which eventually produced a distinct, mixed-blood generation known as 'Topasses'. Even since the colonial period the East Timorese were called Maubere people. 'Maubere' is quite a common name, held in contempt in colonial days. Fretilin adopted it as the name for the people of East Timor, thus turning contempt into pride.

As we have noted earlier, East Timorese are divided into more than thirty distinct ethno-linguistic groups, with one language 'Tetum', serving as the main lingua franca. There is a continuous effort to popularise Bhasha Indonesia in Timor through schools and radio broad-castings, as one of the ways to Indonesianise East Timor. However, some cultural differences can be smelt in the East Timorese society. Traditionally, most Timorese have lived in isolated small villages often comprising only three to four houses, a settlement pattern regarded as having been a response to the terrain and climate.

The people of Timor were organised into petty kingdoms ruled by 'liurai'. In the early 1970s, most of the population were animists worshipping sacred objects known as 'lulik'; most of the rest, about a third were baptized Roman Catholics. At the end of 1984 about half the population was reported to be Roman Catholic. Today the East Timorese are overwhelmingly

Roman Catholic in a 90% Muslim country. This basic religious difference encouraged by the growing politico-religious role of the Church and priests have provided oxygen to the East Timorese separatism.

Thus, in nutshell, the problem of East Timor is a product of colonialism, unsystematic process of decolonization and most importantly, of 'ethnic-nationalism'. Indeed, being the colonial government in East Timor, Portugal occupied a crucial position in the decolonization process of the region. Along with the change of government in Portugal previously, this directly affected the process of decolonization with the authority in East Timor instead of performing as an honest referee, interfered with the political parties. The rapid deteriorating conditions in East Timor only made Portugal authority no longer capable of maintaining and restoring order and security in the colony with growing civil war, chaos and confusions. And it is a truth that Indonesia caught fish out of this muddy water. But the systematic solution remained a far cry.

Along with the brutal torture and suppression by Indonesia, the growing feeling of a distinct 'ethnie' consolidated East Timorese voice for separatism. It is known that 'ethnie' is a named human population with a myth of common

ancestry, shared historical memories and cultural elements, a link with a specific territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity. The important role usually played by intellectuals and intelligentsias in promoting the idea of ethnic nationalism, has been fulfilled by the elites within Fretilin and priests of catholic church in case of East Timor. A trend has been observed that the educated East Timorese and students are the main ideologue of dissent.

The matter of ethnic nationalism has gone deep into the passion of East Timorese. And passionate national commitment seems rather like falling in love - obsessive, emotional, violent, but often swiftly forgotten. Fickle it may be, but while in its intense form, it can lead to the greatest heights of courage and self-sacrifice. The nationalism of national liberation thus includes, for the minority of national group involved a paradox: a loyalty to the idea of national group even to the point of sacrificing one's life, but which is also on the other hand, quite shallow, apparently bounded upon intellectually erroneous grounds.

The European immigrants who had migrated to America or Australia embraced a new nationality in course of time. If nationality is so speedily abandoned, it is also no less speedily invented. However, perhaps the case of shedding

national identity is more impressive than its retention. In case of East Timor, the feeling of nationalism which backs the separatist echo from the clutches of Indonesian rule should be soothed down, considering various practical political, strategic and economic grounds. East Timorese separatists need to think of an 'O'-turn: from Srivijaya and Majapahit empire in early history, to Dutch colonialism and for a longer span, under Portugal and finally back to the starting point i.e. to get integrated with Indonesia.

Those inside East Timor who visualise the national liberation of the island after a genuine self-determination must realise the reality: what turns passionate national commitment into a stable nation-state is the accomplishment of state power. It is more a political, rather than a psychological phenomenon which first and foremost concern the statehood - a kind of ideational shadow to the operation of public power and will of the nation led by government.

And of course, 'defence' is vital for the independent existence of a nation. No doubt the creation of an armed wing - or the fact that nationalists are armed guerrillas (Fretilin in case of East Timor) is a kind of proto-state. This armed body of men and women, for example, LTTE in case of Srilankan Tamils, JKLF in case of Kashmiries indicate that national

liberation is no longer a world of private sentiment but a serious aspiration.

It is the first step on the road to the creation of a new state. But still it is very far. The secessionist militants single-mindedly focus upon the conquest of state power and see their end as opening the doors to freedom. But states in general and new, poor states in particular are part of a competing system and one marked by profound inequalities. The defence of a newly won national independence against actual or potential threats from other states imposes an entirely new discipline upon society.

Military power requires the capacity to purchase the equipments abroad and usually a measure of industrialization at home. Ensuring the loyalty of the population entails all-round development. Imagine an independent East Timor. Can its tiny size and serious under-development afford to remain within a westernized Australia and a would-be-hostile, populous and powerful Indonesia? It may be squeezed in between the economic interests of both the strong states at the oil-reservoirs of Timor gap. And East Timor is no Brunei, although both are tiny in size. Due to the climatic, geographic conditions, the economic underdevelopment of East Timor would impose unprecedented social strains. It would perhaps lead the East

Timorese to a state worse than that of the poor Southwest Pacific islands.

Thus, what begins in the spring time of national liberation as a great sense of popular emancipation becomes a range of new and often heightened oppression, those required for economic development. The reality of independence is distant from the hopes of national liberation. For, it becomes apparent; the terms of the competition between states are constantly changing, which would therefore make the East Timorese aspiration for national independence never complete.

However, the above mentioned reasons should not be mistaken for the fact that smaller and under developed states have no right to continue with their independent existence. Even Richard Carleton of British 'Observer', a die-hard critic of Indonesia's human rights violations concludes in his report of 31 July 1977 that "despite the brutality of annexation, Timor may be better off in the long term within Indonesia, for the territory is economically non-viable and dependent on aid."

Above all, considering the case of Indonesia it is to be observed that it cannot afford the secession of East Timor. It will no doubt threaten the unity and integrity of Indonesia which comprises of more than 13,000 islands and islets. First

of all, it will create problems for Western Timor. Secondly, it would be very difficult to silence down the former secessionists in North Sulawesi, in Moluccas and recently, the growing demand for disintegration in Aceh and discontent at Iriyan Jaya. Once the trend starts with East Timor it will open up a Pandora's box; And mind it, there is already a bitter feeling of dominant Java vs. rest of Indonesia. All these will push Indonesia to another Yugoslavia ultimately, so the leaders of the country feel.

Not Indonesia alone, but the whole Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular, is a mosaic of different cultures, languages, ethnic and religious groups. There are innumerable secessionist movements like Moro Muslim group in Philippines; Karens, Kachins, Shans and Chins in Burma and ethnic Chinese in Malaysia. Almost all Southeast Asian countries are facing ethnic-related problems. So whatever minimum justification may stand for East Timor's demand for self-determination, but it would certainly set a dangerous precedent for other countries of Southeast Asia and rest of the world.

In the diplomatic level, different factors play in favour of Indonesia. It is national interest which plays a major role in guiding foreign policy options. Indonesia is an important

supplier of petroleum, petroleum products, textiles and natural gas. It is the important member of powerful organisations like OPEC, OIC, APEC and ASEAN. The major trading partners of Indonesia are Japan, USA, Singapore and Germany. Besides exporting, Indonesia gives them markets by importing machinery, electrical equipments, chemical and mineral products. It is a fact that after the end of cold war, today's bilateral relations are mostly determined by trade, investment and economic relations. In presence of these factors, East Timor has little strategic intrests, but has vast oil reserves in the adjoining seas which Indonesia uses to silence down the International opinion for self-determination and human rights violations.

What is the future for East Timor then? There can be five possible scenarios: an Indonesian victory over the Fretilin, a Fretilin victory over Indonesian forces, an Indonesian referendum manipulating a vote for merger, a plan to give East Timor limited political autonomy and change caused by outside pressure on Indonesia.

However, none of the scenarios would succeed if these are analysed from a realistic angle. Indonesia will not gain a victory over Fretilin because Fretilin will always be able to evade the combatants. Fretilin forces are unlikely to be

victorious either with only about 2,000 members - in the absence of an upsurge in separatist movements. A referendum is unlikely since Indonesia will not want the problem brought to international attention. Limited autonomy for East Timor is doubtful because Indonesia does not want to make the island look extra-ordinary by increasing East Timmorese participation in the system. Because this would encourage other disintegrating areas demand the same. International pressure also is unlikely to increase due to Indonesian lobbying effort and other economic grounds.

It may be suggested that the only alternative remaining is by changing in the relations between East Timor and Indonesia. It can be done either by changing the traditional Indonesian policy towards East Timor in order to win 'hearts and minds' of the Timorese, or if there is a new government in Jakarta. The coming of a new government at the very outset will alter the basic mind-set of the East Timorese against Indonesia. It will fill them with a new hope.

The second way-out which asks for change in regime seems to be far away. However, both the ways have one thing in common i.e. 'change of policy or attitude'. Basically East Timor problem is related to political and cultural ones. The political solution includes talks at the top diplomatic level

between various parties, coupled with the change in the nature of army rule over East Timor.

Clearly one of the main obstacles to an eventual solution is the mindset at the highest levels of the government and military. Perhaps Indonesian government has realised this. Thus recently it has shown greater interest in participating in the UN-sponsored various rounds of talks between Portugal, the former colonial power, Indonesia and intra-East Timorese factions. At the same time, at the military level, the process has started by which the professionalist are gaining edge over the traditionalists. The army is encouraged towards a role of bridge-building, fulfilling security and welfare needs of the Timorese. The number of battalions have also been reduced from East Timor.

It has to be admitted that economic development has an indirect role to play. While economic development may not produce an economic solution, but that would lead to a political solution. The traditional economic development policy has been more a problem than a solution. Agriculture plays an important role in East Timor's GDRP, along with the export of coffee and rubber. That is why, there is the need for an "agriculture cum employment-led strategy", along with

"marketisation of economic life" to increase the underdeveloped trade.

Not necessarily the kind of 'special treatment' as prevalent before 1988, but a 'special treatment of the second kind' is required for East Timor. It has been briefly discussed in Chapter - IV. However, the most important aspect is the cultural one. Instead of Indonesianising East Timor, much more effort is needed to further social development and find a way to safeguard the province's unique culture and language.

While Indonesia must try to win 'hearts and minds' of the East Timorese, the West which is the so-called champion of human rights, must realise that the solution to the problem lies beyond human rights. The state-system has to look into the territorial integrity along with human rights of the individuals. Above all, rights should be followed by duties. And if one is not prepared to do the minimum duties towards the state, then rights will automatically be violated. Thus perfect solution is not an one-way traffic, rather complementary to each other. Indonesia must be cautious about the human rights while the East Timorese are expected to be dutiful.

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