

**A STUDY OF SOVIET TREATIES WITH
THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES
SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

ASHWANI KUMAR GAUR

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**Centre For Soviet And East European Studies
School Of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067**

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CENTRE FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

It is certified that the dissertation entitled A STUDY OF SOVIET TREATIES WITH THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR submitted by Mr. ASHWANI KUMAR GAUR in fulfilment of six credits out of the total requirement of 24 credits for the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of the University, is his work according to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before the examiner for evaluation.


R.R. SHARMA
(CHAIRMAN)


ZAFAR IMAM
(SUPERVISOR)

PREFACE

Treaty relationship has today emerged as one of the most important aspects of Soviet foreign policy behaviour, particularly in the Third World. However, very little attention has been paid to this important aspect of Soviet conduct and behaviour in international affairs. This study is a modest attempt to fill in this gap.

Soviet treaties with Afghanistan, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Mozambique, North Korea, Somalia and Vietnam are included in this study and it is divided into Six Chapters.

The First Chapter deals with the importance of treaties in international politics, Soviet treaties in historical perspective and their significance for Soviet foreign policy. The Second Chapter examines the framework for signing the treaties. In the Third Chapter an attempt has been made to identify the general and specific features of the treaties. The Fourth Chapter deals with various far reaching implications of the treaties. In the Fifth Chapter, the record of these treaties has been assessed; and finally the Sixth Chapter attempts to identify an emerging pattern of Soviet relationship in the Third World.

The study is based upon published source material available in English and translated from the Russian language.


Finally, we may add that this is essentially a study of Soviet behaviour and conduct in relations to the Third World.

I am greatly indebted to Dr. Zafar Imam, my supervisor, for his unfailing cooperation, able guidance, constructive criticism, and invaluable suggestions throughout the course of my study.

My sincere thanks to Mr. L.C. Kumar, Documentation Officer, and Mrs. Arati Basu, Research Assistant at the Centre for their kind cooperation in the Library work. Likewise, I am grateful to Miss Nisha Vozma and Miss Renu Puri - M.A. Students from the Centre for Russian Studies, School of Languages of the University, for helping me in the translation work of important first-hand Soviet sources on concerned topic.

Lastly, failings and shortcomings in this study, if any, are indeed mine.

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ASHWANI KUMAR GAUR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

**The Role of Treaties in International
Politics, Soviet Treaties in Historical
Perspective and their Significance for
Soviet Foreign Policy.**

Alliances and treaties "are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system. Nation A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armaments race, when they choose the second and the third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances".¹ Further, Palmer and Perkins write : "These have been the most commonly employed devices of the balance of power system. Whenever one nation threatened the balance in Europe, other states formed coalitions against it, and were always able, at times after an exhausting war or series of wars, to curb the power of the overly ambitious nation".²

Noted western social scientists have always seen the treaties and alliances as devices for maintaining the balance of power. Such a generalisation does not take into consideration the socio-economic compulsions of a given society for signing of a treaty and speaks only about the aggressive nature of alliances and treaties. A treaty has a direct bearing on

1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (Calcutta, 1973), p.181.

2 Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations, (Calcutta, 1976), p.224.

people of both the contracting parties. In order to make a correct analysis of a treaty, one must take into account socio-economic and political factors that bring the two parties closer and provide common basis for the signing of a treaty.

The western scholars have further divided the treaties in two categories : offensive and defensive. Both these categories are again concerned with the balance of power, for an offensive treaty seeks to upset the balance in favour of its members and a defensive one aims at restoring the balance or at tipping it in favour of the states signing a treaty. The balance of power which figures so importantly in national policies may be the world balance or it may be a strictly regional balance.³

Soviet view of treaties does not coincide with the western view-point. As one Soviet writer put it : "Any international agreement or pact calculated to undermine peace (aggressive military blocs), to enslave other states (colonialism old and new), and to foster national or racial discrimination, and the like, are legally invalid".⁴

While the western scholars have divided the treaties in two categories, offensive and defensive, the Soviet scholars

3 See Ibid., pp.224-225, and also Nicholas J. Spykeman, American Strategy in World Politics, (New York, 1942), pp.103, 256.

4 Korovin, Cited in Georgi Zedorozbny, Peaceful Coexistence (Moscow, 1968), p.256.

see them as unjust and just. An unjust treaty is the one, which is guided by the desire of a powerful state to force the other party or parties to agree to its terms and conditions. On the other hand, a just treaty is based on a community of interests of the signatories.⁵ While stressing on the nature of a just treaty, Lenin had remarked : "If the agreement is to be a real agreement, and not a verbal screen for subjection, both parties to it, must enjoy equality of status".⁶

We may agree with an eminent scholar of international law, when he points out : "Treaties are conventions or contacts between the sovereign powers of two states concerning various matters of interests".⁷ Although treaty requires a community of interests, this, however, does not imply that both the parties to it must always have common social system, aims and objectives. The goals can be different also, but if the interests coincide, it can lead to the signing of a treaty. The only bond that endures both the parties to it, is the absence of the totality of clashing interests, on a given issue or for a time period. Likewise, any change in these is bound to result in the virtual abrogation of the treaty.

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- 5 See Ibid., pp.254-258, and also, V. Bolov and Others, Socialist Policy of Peace, (Moscow, 1979), pp.28, 70.
- 6 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow, 1964), Vol.24, p.336.
- 7 J.G. Castel, International Law, (Toronto, 1973), p.814.

Treaties have historical origin. For instance, in 944 A.D., King Igor of Russia signed a treaty with the Greeks. In 1505, treaty of Blois was signed between France and Aragon. However, the most important treaties of the Pre-First-World-War period were signed in the second half of nineteenth century. These treaties were of three different nature.

One, treaties which were forced by the victorious nation or nations on the defeated state or states. Important among these are : (with Victor' name coming first) Treaty of Nanking (1842; Britain and China), Treaty of Prague (1866; Germany and Austria), Treaty of Frankfurt (1871; Germany and France), Treaty of San Stepano (1878; Tsarist Russia and Turkey), Treaty of Shimonoviki (1895; Japan and China), and the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905; Japan and Tsarist Russia). In all such treaties, the defeated nations had to pay a huge indemnity in both land and currency.

Second, treaties which were meant to maintain balance of power, resulting from the fear of two or more states in their attitude towards one or more states. Important among such treaties are : Treaty of Dreikaiserbund (1873; Germany, Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary against France), Treaty of 1879 (Austria and Germany against Tsarist Russia - secret treaty), Treaty of 1881 (Germany and Tsarist Russia against France), Treaty of 1883 (Germany and Rumania against Tsarist Russia - a secret treaty), Treaty of Reinsurance (1887; Germany

and Tsarist Russia against France), Treaty of 1893 (France and Tsarist Russia against Germany), Treaty of 1902 (Britain and Japan against Tsarist Russia), and Treaty of 1904 (France and England against Germany and Austria).

Thirdly, treaties that contributed to the spheres of influence for the European powers in the countries, now known as the third world countries. Important among such treaties are : Treaty of Tientsin (1858, Britain, France, Russia and the U.S.A. against and with China), and Anglo-Russian Treaty (1907, Britain and Tsarist Russia against Persia).

Most of the western scholars have linked the treaties of the second category with the concept of the balance of power --- a device for maintaining peace and security.⁸ An analysis of the treaties of first category against the background of the second, shows how paramount this balance was for peace. For example, the treaty between the Britain and Japan (second category) viewed against the background of the treaty between Japan and Tsarist Russia (first category), shows this balance was instrumental in

8 Four important scholars from the West, have advocated this concept. To put it briefly, if some balance can be maintained or created between two or more hostile powers, wars can be checked. See Doris A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy (Washington, 1959), Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit., pp.167-221, Nicholas J. Spykeman, op. cit., Palmer and Perkins, op. cit., pp.211-237, Soviet writers do not agree with this concept, see V. Belov and others, op. cit., pp.276-287.

Russo-Japanese war. Moreover, the signing of these treaties (first and second categories) was one of the major immediate factors for the out-break of first world war. Nevertheless, treaties played an important role in the development of international politics.

We have seen that Tsarist Russia was also a party to these unequal treaties and these included secret treaties too. After coming to power one of the major actions of the new Soviet Government was to publish secret diplomatic documents of the Tsarist and Provisional Government' Foreign Ministries. On November 9, 1917, a squad of Bolshevik Party workers led by N.G. Markin, Secretary of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, opened the ministerial safe, took out a plethora of important documents, quickly selected and prepared for publication the most important treaties signed by the Tsarist and Provisional Governments with other states. The texts of the secret papers from the archives of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared as early as November 1917 in Soviet newspapers : Izvestia, Pravda, Rabochi i Soldat and Armiya i Flot Svobodnoi Rossi. Some of the important documents published were : (a) a secret convention signed in 1907 by Tsarist Russia and Britain on division of spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, (b) a secret treaty signed by Japan and Tsarist Russia in the summer of 1916, and (c) a secret convention signed by the Entente powers in 1916, on payment to Rumania for its entry into the war against Germany.⁹

"We began", Lenin said, "... by publishing the secret treaties, and the whole ^{world} /saw why millions of people had been sacrificed".¹⁰

The new Soviet government adopted a very cautious stand vis-a-vis, those treaties which were signed by the Tsarist and Provisional Governments. The treaties which were unequal in character were declared null and void and abrogated. By a decree of December 3, 1917, the new government announced : "we declare that the treaty on the division of Persia has been annulled and destroyed. Troops will be withdrawn from Persia as soon as military operations stop, and Persia will be ensured the right freely to decide their own destiny".¹¹ Similarly by another decree of August 29, 1918, Soviet Russia annulled all the unequal treaties and acts signed by the previous governments with Germany and Austria-Hungary on the division of Poland, "in view of the fact that they contravene the principle of self-determination of nations and the revolutionary sense of justice of the Russian people, who have recognised the Polish people's inalienable right to independence and unity".¹² Similar steps were taken in abrogating unequal treaties with China.¹³

10 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow, 1965), Vol.30, p.386.

11 "Message from V.I. Lenin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and J.V. Stalin, People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs, to all the working Moslems of Russia and East", in Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967, (Moscow, 1967), p.34.

12 Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, (Moscow, 1957), Vol.I, p.460 (translated).

13 See Ibid., (Moscow, 1967), Vol.12, pp.383-384.

However, the Soviet Government emphasised that they view just treaties as an important aspect of foreign policy conduct and behaviour. As Lenin put it: "we reject all clauses on plunder and violence but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good neighbourly relations and all economic agreements, we cannot reject these".¹⁴ Though these were rejected by the western powers hostile to new government. Hence, the new government had to start diplomatic and trade relations with the outside world on a clean slate.

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The first major task of the new Soviet Government was to withdraw from the first world war and break hostile encirclement. With the Decree on Peace (November 8, 1917), it unilaterally withdrew from the war and made repeated proposals to the combatant countries to begin peace negotiations.¹⁵ None of these appeals even received an answer from the Entente Powers. Under the circumstances the Soviet State was compelled to begin negotiations with Germany and its allies. At first in December 1917, an armistice was concluded.

On December 22, 1917, a peace conference opened in the small Byelorussian town of Brest-Litovsk. The aims pursued by Germany at the Conference, were in no way related

14 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow, 1965), Vol. 32, p. 255.

15 See, "Decree on Peace", and "Concluding Speech delivered by Lenin following the discussion on the report on Peace", in Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, (Moscow, 1967), pp. 27-32.

to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Germany demanded that Poland, Lithuania, part of Latvia and part of Byelorussia be ceded to Germany. The new government knew that these were brazenly annexationist demands. However, the signing of a peace treaty, even on these incredibly harsh and extortionary terms would have given the Soviet Republic a much needed breathing spell. Lenin strongly urged within the Party for this treaty, although there was disagreement in the party leadership on this point.¹⁶

Finally, on March 3, 1918, the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk signed this important treaty with Germany and its allies Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. On March 14, the treaty was ratified by the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

It was ^{an} extremely ~~hard~~ treaty. Lenin admitted : "We have extricated ourselves from the war. We are not saying that we extricated ourselves without giving anything in return, without paying a price. But we managed to get out of the war. We gave the people a breathing space".¹⁷

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was followed by other peace treaties with Estonia (February 2, 1920), Lithuania

16 Lenin, though supported by Sverdlov, Sergeyev, Stalin and many other members of the Central Committee, was opposed by Bukharin, who wanted to continue the war and Trotsky, who gave a vague doctrine of "neither peace nor war". For details, see V.I. Lenin, On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State (Moscow, 1977), pp.48-77.

17 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow, 1965), Vol.27, p.166.

(July 12, 1920), Latvia (August 11, 1920), and Finland (October 14, 1920). The signing of these treaties withdrew Soviet Russia from the war and contributed to the end of the First World War. With the end of the war, foreign intervention and civil war, Soviet Russia was still in diplomatic isolation and encircled with hostile powers. Hence the immediate need was to gain diplomatic recognition and develop trade and economic relations with the outside world, especially the West. On the other hand, it was understood that the problem of hostile encirclement can be eased by promoting an overall policy of peaceful co-existence among states with different social systems. Both these aims were pursued simultaneously and Soviet treaty relationship played an important role in it.

One of the most effective ways to establish diplomatic relations was the development of trade. In the beginning the western countries were not ready for it. Lenin wrote : "There is a force, more powerful than the wishes, the will and decisions of any of the governments or classes that are hostile to us. That force is world general economic relations which compel them to make contact with us".¹⁸

Britain was first western power to react to Soviet' call for the development of trade relations. On March 16, 1921, it signed provisional trade agreement with Soviet Russia and accorded de facto recognition to it. Similarly on April 16, 1922,

18 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, 1966), Vol. 33, p. 155.

at Rapallo, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Germany on the renunciation of reciprocal claims and re-establishment of diplomatic and trade relations. In 1925, another trade agreement was signed with Germany. By now Soviet diplomatic relations were established with most of the European states and finally in 1933 with the U.S.A. also.

Thus by the beginning of the 1930's, the treaty relationship had ended diplomatic isolation of the Soviet Union and it entered the League of Nations. Likewise the objective of peaceful co-existence made a headway as a result of diplomatic and economic contacts between the Soviet Union and the western countries.

Another important aim of the Soviet foreign policy of early period was to bring the new socialist system into contact with the world, especially with the countries of the East. As discussed earlier, one of the first tasks performed by the new Soviet government was to abrogate all the unequal treaties that previous governments had signed with the eastern countries. The new relations with these countries were established on the basis of equality. In twenties, Soviet relations with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia and China were regularised by various treaties. These treaties had

provisions for friendship, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations.

The rise of Nazi-Germany in 1932-33, completely changed the international environment of inter-war years. "The Bolshevik menace" being the main target of Nazi-Party added a sense of urgency in resolving the problem of defence and security of the Soviet Union. During 1932-39 Soviet foreign policy had the primary objective of securing a defensive shield for the Soviet Union through promoting the idea of collective security inside and outside the league of Nations.¹⁹ Side-by-Side in pursuance of this objective, the Soviet Union signed a number of bilateral treaties with various countries. Some of the important such treaties were : Treaties of Non-Aggression with Finland (Jan.21, 1932), Latvia (Feb.5, 1932), Estonia (May 4, 1932), Poland (July 25, 1932), France (Nov.29, 1932) and China (Aug.21, 1937), Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression and Neutrality with Italy (Sep.2, 1933), and Treaties of Mutual Assistance with France (May 2, 1935) and Czechoslovakia (May 16, 1935).

However, the Soviet objective of collective security fell through and the Soviet Government swung round to sign a treaty of Non-Aggression with Nazi-Germany on August 23, 1939. Meanwhile, developments unfolded swiftly and on June 21, 1941, Germany' attack on the Soviet Union corrected the imbalance and the Soviet Union forged an alliance with the western powers

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For details see, Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II (Moscow, 1973), in two Vols.

which lasted till the war. It is relevant to point out that the war time alliance was also based on formalisation of relationship through treaties, to which the Soviet Union was also a party. Important Soviet treaties during this phase were : Treaty of Alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates, with Britain and Ireland (May 26, 1942) and Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance with France (December 10, 1944).²⁰ Several other such agreements were concluded with various countries including the U.S.A.

Likewise, an immediate post-war settlement was also the result of peace treaties that the Soviet Union and other participants in the anti-Hitler coalition signed with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland in 1947.

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It can, thus easily be seen from the preceding pages that the Soviet Union has attached significance to treaties and agreements. This is further emphasized by the fact that it was through these treaties and agreements that the Soviet foreign policy objectives were promoted, even

20 Both these treaties were denounced by the Soviet Union on May 5, 1955, after Britain and France signed Paris Agreement, which envisaged the re-militarization of the West Germany, the creation of a West Germany Army and the inclusion of West Germany in NATO Bloc. These actions were taken by the Soviet Government as violation of the obligations of above two treaties.

fulfilled. Indeed the international environment of the inter-war period had prompted the Soviet leadership to define and formalise Soviet relations with the outside world in these specific behaviour frameworks.

With this pre-occupation of the Soviet Union with formalisation of its relations, ^{we may} now turn to a similar foreign policy behaviour, more sharpened, during the period under study. As the post Second world war' international environment continued to experience major changes it is worthwhile for us to begin by focussing our attention on the framework of Soviet behaviour (with the Third World) in signing these treaties with the Third World countries, during the period under study. This we propose to do in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

FRAMEWORK FOR SIGNING THE TREATIES

To probe a theoretical framework for Soviet foreign policy is a valid exercise. Right from the very beginning the Soviet leadership has consistently claimed that they have a characteristic view of international politics, based on Marxism-Leninism, and it has played a determining role in Soviet foreign policy. It is indeed true that for a better understanding of Soviet foreign policy, its theoretical framework needs to be understood.

Karl Marx was the originator of the idea that the international politics, is in the main, determined by a basic contradiction of social forces, namely the Labour and the Capital. He rejected the notion that the nation states or their leaders determine international politics. Although he conceded a formalistic role of nation states in international politics, he stressed that international politics is essentially the extension of class conflict within a nation state to international class conflict, the basic contradiction between Labour and Capital.

Another important strand of Marx's view was the inter-connection between internal social structure of a nation state and its foreign policy. In other words, the ruling class project their interest in foreign policy as well as it is affected by the nature and degree of social structure of a nation state and the class conflicts within it.¹

1 See, Sh. P. Sanakoyed and N.I. Kapchenko, Socialism : Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice, (Moscow, 1970), pp. 18-25.

Lenin further developed Marx's ideas and identified the main forces involved in international politics. The three main forces identified are : the Imperialist-Capitalist Countries, the proletariat movement achieving its first success by capturing power in Russia, and the third, national liberation movement in the East.

Lenin is of the view that it is the contradiction and harmony among these three social forces that in effect determine international politics, while nation states, play the role of actors in it. Further, this formalistic role of nation-states is itself dependent on their internal socio-economic formation above all, on the social composition of the ruling class that controls power and wields influence.

To sum up, international politics is essentially an extension of class struggle between labour and capital to an international level.

Stemming from above, the foreign policy of a country is a mere extension of its domestic politics and it reflects the formalistic aspect of the social composition of the ruling class that controls state apparatus. But certain non-ideological inputs like historical, cultural, geographical and other such factors also play a role in it. The point, however, is to strike a balance between ideological and non-ideological inputs in the making of a foreign policy, Soviet foreign policy in particular. This certainly is more true of the functional aspect of foreign policy and international politics.

Hence, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, as of any other country, can be understood accurately only if it is considered in the context of its internal policy, the social and economic system, and security and defence needs. To put it differently, internal politics and foreign policy are closely and constantly inter-linked.

Having discussed Soviet view of international politics and foreign policy, briefly, it may not be out of context to discuss the specific theoretical framework of Soviet foreign policy.

During the initial period of Soviet state, one of the difficulties was that the foreign policy of a socialist state surrounded by hostile encirclement had not drawn the attention of Marx and Engels in as much as they had not foreseen the possibility of the proletarian revolution triumphing in a single country. When they put forward the idea that peace would be the international principle of the new society, they had based it on the principle that "its national ruler will be everywhere the same --- Labour".² But in 1917, labour became the ruler only in Soviet Russia. A fundamentally new problem arose, as Lenin himself admitted: "It did not occur even to Marx to write a word on the subject; and he died without leaving a single precise statement or definite instruction on it. That is why we must overcome the difficulty

2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, (Moscow, 1963), Vol.2, p.104.

entirely by ourselves".³ Lenin, in effect, successfully coped with this problem and elaborated, in the difficult circumstances of that time, the theory, strategy and tactics of foreign policy for the Soviet Union.

To start with "Economic interests and economic position of the classes which rule our state will be at the root of both our home and foreign policy."⁴ He saw a vital condition of politics generally and of foreign policy, in particular, in "the need for a strictly objective appraisal of the class forces and their alignment before taking any decision".⁵

As we have already pointed out, Lenin had identified the imperialist-capitalist countries, the proletarian movements and the national liberation movement as the three main forces involved in the battle field of international politics. While designing the foreign policy behaviour of the Soviet state, he further developed the typology of relationship among these forces. (i) The proletarian movement exerts its influence as a rule in unity and solidarity and in harmony with the national liberation movement directed against imperialist-capitalist states, (ii) The imperialist-capitalist states invariably play their role in contradiction with proletarian movement as well as national liberation movements in the East, (iii) The proletarian movements invariably act in unity and solidarity in the same way as the imperialist-capitalist states are united

3 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, 1966), Vol.33, p.278.

4 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, 1965), Vol.27, p.65.

5 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, 1966), Vol.31, p.33.

against it. (iv) The Unity of the imperialist-capitalist states is beset with its own contradiction mainly because of rivalry among them. On the other hand, although, the proletarian forces invariably act in solidarity, they may probably act differently in a peculiarly given situation, as for example under the condition of being swayed by a false consciousness of 'nationalism' and 'national interest', (v) The national liberation movements represent a force, against imperialist-capitalist states, although they may waver from time to time, (vi) Finally the proletarian and the national liberation movements, being interdependent have common interest in weakening imperial capitalism.⁶

Keeping in mind above typology of relations, Lenin stressed that all the forces conducive to socialism should be strengthened, while antagonistic forces should be weakened. In this scheme the unity and solidarity among socialist states, working class movement in the west and national liberation movement in the East occupy primary importance.

The idea of harmony between a socialist country and the national/^{liberation}movement permeates all of Lenin's major works dealing with the national and colonial question. Lenin had made a profound analysis of the social and economic conditions in the colonies and dependencies and concluded : "It is beyond

6 Zafar Imam, "Soviet View of Non-Alignment", (A Paper presented on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee Programme of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi), pp.7-8.

doubt that any national movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, since the overwhelming mass of the population in the backward countries consists of peasants who represent bourgeois-capitalist relations".⁷ Yet Lenin advocated for support to all such movements. "In doing so", Lenin summed up, "we will be motivated by the consideration that the proletarian movement for socialism and the national liberation movement share a common objective, namely their struggle against imperialism. The sustained development of the struggle for national liberation, with the active participation of the working class would eventually develop into a struggle for social liberation. Given certain conditions, an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggle has every chance of turning into an anti-capitalist movement. It is perfectly clear that in impending decisive battles in the world revolution the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and will perhaps, play a much more revolutionary part than we expect".⁸ This provided the bases for Soviet policy towards national liberation movement.

The discussion, above, brings us to the attitude of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the independent countries of Lenin's time. Lenin wrote "that a Socialist Society will not possess

7 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, 1966), Vol. 31, p. 241.

8 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, 1966), Vol. 31, p. 482.

not only colonies, but subject nations in general".⁹ He, further advanced the idea that it was necessary to furnish material assistance to countries, which were lagging behind in their development and establish broad economic cooperation with them. "It is unquestionable" he noted, "that the proletariat of the advanced countries can and should give help to the working masses of the backward countries, and that the backward countries can emerge from their present stage of development when the victorious proletariat of the Soviet republics and is in a position to give them support".¹⁰

Hence there emerges the bases for Soviet support to the national liberation movements and liberated countries of that time. This must not be confused with the imposing of Communism on the East. The Soviet government' instruction to the Soviet envoy in Afghanistan stated : "you must at all costs avoid fatal mistake of artificial attempts at planting Communism in the country. We tell the Afghan government : You have one system, we have another; we have our ideals, you have your; however, we are linked by the common aspiration for the complete sovereignty, independence and independent actions of your peoples, we do not interfere in your internal affairs or the independent actions of your people; we assist every development that play a progressive role in the advancement of your people. We donot for a moment think of imposing on

9 Ibid., pp.243-44.

10 Ibid., p.241.

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your people a programme alien to it".¹¹

To sum up : the support to national liberation movement and help to independent nations of the East, based on peaceful coexistence constituted Soviet policy towards Eastern countries.

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Let us now turn to the relevance of Soviet treaties with the countries of the East against the background of the above framework. The Soviet stand with regard to these countries found expression primarily in the complete and unconditional renunciation of unequal treaties and abandoning of the privileges that Tsarist Russia had enjoyed in underdeveloped countries and in the nullification of the secret treaties and agreements signed by the deposed Tsar on the seizure of Constantinople and the carving up of Iran and Turkey. On December 2, 1918, without waiting for a normalisation of relations with China, the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee passed a decision to stop exacting Boxer indemnity from China. In the summer of 1919, when the Soviet army was advancing eastward across the Urals after defeating Kolchak, the Soviet government once more reiterated to the Chinese people and the Governments of South and North China that it had abrogated the secret treaties signed by the Tsarist Russia with Japan, China and other former allies.

11 Dokumenti Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, (Moscow, 1960),
Vol.4, p.167 (Translated).

New relations based on equality, peaceful coexistence and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity were established and continued with the countries of the east. In the process, Soviet relations with Afghanistan, Turkey, Persia, Mongolia and China - the only independent and semi-independent countries in the third world at that time, were regularised by the signing of various treaties. These were first equal treaties ever concluded by these countries with a great power. Similar trends were noticeable during the inter-war period and Soviet Russia managed to develop good friendly relations with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

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The second World War brought about phenomenal changes in international politics. The Soviet Union emerged as a powerful nation after the war. It along with many new socialist countries commanded greater authority in international politics, than ever before. There were fifty Embassies in Moscow against twenty three before the war. On the other hand, only one western country, the United States of America, emerged from the war immeasurably stronger than it had entered in. The primary contradiction in the world politics, as seen by Soviet theorists, between imperialism-capitalism and socialism, was clearly felt.

During the initial phase of the post Second World War period, the U.S. policy was to openly confront with the Soviet Union. In March 1946, Winston Churchill at Fulton, said that "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended upon the continent", and he appealed for Unity "against eastern Communism". Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947) and Marshal Plan (June 5, 1947), were next steps towards friction with the Soviet Union. An almost mad race for armaments, including nuclear, and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in April 1949, must be seen in this light. The world was set to witness a clash of diametrically opposite ideologies - a clash that started and intensified the cold war.

Another important feature of the post Second World War modern world was the unprecedented success of the national liberation movements and the rise and growth of the third world. In most of the cases, the new states decided to follow non-alignment.

At this stage we may focus our attention on the Soviet view of the third world.

Soviet foreign policy, immediately after the Second World War, concentrated largely on the West. The Third world remained a region of marginal interest to the USSR - at least until the mid-fifties. The year following Stalin's death saw a perceptible change in Soviet attitude towards the third world. Khrushchev depicted the world as being divided into the "zone

of war" comprising the capitalist-imperialist west and the "peace zone" composed by socialist states as well as non-socialist peace loving states. The Majority of the third world countries were put in the group of the peace loving states.

The characteristic common features of these countries may quickly be identified thus : (i) had emerged from direct colonial or semi-colonial dependence; (ii) were economically and socially backward; (iii) were drawn into international capitalist division of labour on unequal terms of subordination and exploitation; (iv) were target of west, as they had massive natural resources; (v) were going through a transitional period of overcoming pro-capitalist relations, establishing new socio-political and cultural relations, and in most cases were engaged in nation building, and (vi) were becoming active in international politics through the policies of non-alignment and solidarity among themselves.

These common features of the majority of the third world countries gave Soviet leaders enough ground for linking the third world with Lenin's views on the national liberation movement in the East. Moreover, they provided the necessary incentives for the activation of Soviet role in the third world beginning with the Soviet economic aid programme since the mid-fifties.

Here it may be relevant to have a quick look at a specific feature of Soviet foreign policy, in the context of its relationship with the third world. This bring us to the concept of the non-capitalist path of development.

Although this concept set to have originated from Lenin,¹² it really gained currency in 1956 (20th Congress of the CPSU), coinciding with the beginning of the period of activation of Soviet foreign policy in the third world.

The essential elements of the concept of non-capitalist path of development are summarised by Zafar Imam, on the basis of theoretical works of Soviet and Marxist scholars as under :¹³

a) The non-capitalist path of development is the socio-economic formation led by the middle and intermediate strata of the national bourgeoisie with a conditional support of the working class. It is not yet a socialist revolution, neither it is a capitalist socio-economic formation; while it is a stage of transition to either socialism or capitalism. It is thus a social process of complex, multi-dimensional and uneven character, taking various forms in the newly emergent countries depending on their specific characters and the multifarious roles of various social classes. Hence no clear-cut pointer to the future can be made. However, the non-capitalist path of development may either lead to the orientation of the social process towards socialism or may strengthen the forces of capitalism. In the final analysis the future depends on the organisation and movement led by working class and peasantry as well as on a favourable balance of world social forces.

12 When Lenin spoke about this concept in the Second Congress of the Third International (Comintern), he was claiming its validity in Soviet Central Asia. He was not very sure about its implication in the places where working class has not captured state apparatus.

13 Zafar Imam, Supra Note 6, pp.19-21.

b) The economic basis of the non-capitalist path of development is a mixed economy of industrial, or semi-industrial, or, in rare cases, even an agrarian type, with the state and public sector playing a gradually increasing, and finally, a decisive role. In practice, it really means a gradual control over the monopoly of political power in the hands of the national bourgeoisie through a long, tortuous and uneven struggle for progressive socio-economic measures.

c) The most significant aspect of the superstructure of the non-capitalist path of development is essentially a state which mainly relies on progressive sections of the national bourgeoisies and on workers and peasants for its policies as well as their implementation. While adopting such a policy it should have the dual objectives of, on the one hand, a controlled and restricted development of capitalism, and consequently preventing its subordination to imperialism on a neo-colonial pattern, and on the other, a planned and unhindered growth of public sector in national economy, gradually paving the way for a socialist form of economic development. The class essence of such a state is a broad united front, initially controlled by the national bourgeoisie yet gradually heading towards a split in their own rank; and thus the national bourgeoisie is compelled to rely more and more on petty bourgeois sections and its middle strata, and finally, lean on workers and peasants. In other words, it is a broad national front composed of those national forces that are against neo-colonialism, big national capitalism and

reactionary forces, and that it strives for progressive socio-economic policies and closer cooperation with the socialist camp".

From the above it can be seen that as far as the practical programmes and policies regarding foreign policies of the third world countries are concerned, the Soviets identified certain specific features. These are : "a marked striving for abolition of economic exploitation and diktat by imperialist-capitalist states, for promoting closer around cooperation with socialist countries and for vigorously supporting national liberation movements".¹⁴

Such a specific feature (the non-capitalist path of development) of the theoretical framework of Soviet foreign policy as applied in practice in the third world need not imply a consistent record of success or failures. Infact it has provided the Soviet leadership with an additional insight into the working of the foreign policy of the third world countries, thus helping them to formulate their own policy toward them.

From the above it is logical that the Soviet Union has pre-occupied itself with the foreign policy postures of the third world countries without keeping pace with its assessment of their internal domestic situations. It has given more attention to the non-aligned movement, particularly to its active adherents.

The common features of the third world countries, which we referred to earlier, have provided the basis for the community and convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and ~~the~~ third world countries. The specific features of their foreign policies (e.g. non-alignment) have further sharpened and focussed such a community and convergence of interests. Hence both the common features as well as their specific dimensions appear to provide the basis for formalising and institutionalizing Soviet relations with the third world through treaties.

Finally it is worthwhile to emphasize that it is the theoretical framework of Soviet foreign policy through which these interests and commitments are operationalised by the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER III
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC FEATURES
OF THE TREATIES

In the previous chapters we have discussed that against the historical background of the Soviet involvement in world affairs, Soviet treaty relationship with other countries signifies a formalistic aspect of the conduct and behaviour of Soviet foreign policy. Further, Soviet treaties with the third world countries stem from the framework of Soviet foreign policy, and its specific features vis-a-vis the third world.

During the post-Second World War period the Soviet Union has signed treaties with about ten countries of the third world, while another (the 11th) was signed with Persia in 1921, and legally it is still in force.* The countries involved are : two socialist countries i.e., North Korea and Vietnam, and rest are non-socialist and were/are active members of the non-aligned movement, i.e., Afghanistan, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mozambique, Persia (Iran), and Somalia.** In almost all the cases title of the treaty is identical, namely Treaty of Friendship and co-operation. However the following additions to the general titles are noted. Afghanistan and Persia - Good Neighbourliness, India - Peace, and North Korea - Mutual Assistance.

* It was only during the final stages of this study, that the Soviet Union signed treaties with South Yemen and Syria. Therefore, unavoidably these treaties could not be included in our study. Soviet treaty with China has not been included for the obvious reason that it has lost its relevance.

** Egypt and Somalia have abrogated the treaties unilaterally.

It may not be out of context to mention here that the treaties with North Korea, Egypt and Iraq are signed for a period of 10, 15 and 15 years respectively, while most of the other treaties (Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique and Somalia) are signed for a period of 20 years. While with Vietnam it is signed for 25 years, with Persia no time limit has been mentioned and the treaty is in force for the last 60 years.

The process of signing these treaties has coincided with the activation of Soviet role in world politics, as well as with Soviet involvement in the characteristic problems of the third world. The process began in early 60's^{*} and reached its high watermark during the 80's.

Moreover, these treaties have a background of Soviet economic and trade relations with the countries involved over a long period. In most cases, they also have a long history of Soviet diplomatic and political support inside and outside the United Nations.

In this chapter, we propose to identify the general or common as well as specific features of the treaties.^{**} Thus

* Treaty with Persia, signed in 1921 is an exception.

** Note: With a view to avoid burdening our discussion, the full texts of the relevant articles of various treaties, mentioned in this chapter, can be seen in the Appendices, arranged chronologically, as under:

Persia - App.I; North Korea - App.II; Egypt - App. III;
 India - App.IV; Iraq - App.V; Somalia - App.VI (translated);
 Angola - App.VII; Mozambique - App.VIII; Vietnam - App. IX;
 Ethiopia - App.X and Afghanistan - App.XI.

our exercise must necessarily begin with a quick survey of the circumstances leading to the signing of each of these treaties.

Soviet-Persian (Iranian) Treaty
(February 26, 1921)

Immediately after the October Revolution, the new Soviet Government had annulled all unequal agreements and treaties concluded in the past between Iran and Tsarist Russia.¹ Meanwhile, in 1919 Britain tried to impose a direct treaty on Iran, that would have continued British occupation of Iranian territory and the capitulation regime. Iran refused to sign this treaty. In the meanwhile, Iran signed a treaty with Soviet Russia, which had provisions for friendship, cooperation and good neighbourliness relations.

The treaty did a great deal towards helping Iran to put an end to British occupation and fettering away the proposed British treaty. It renewed the trade links between Iran and Soviet Russia. To sum up, it helped to strengthen Iran's political and economic independence.²

1 One of the important agreement abrogated by the new government was Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907. It had divided Iran into three zones: (1) Russian, (2) Britain, and (3) a buffer zone between the British and Russian zones. The Iranian Government had protested against this treaty, which was concluded without their knowledge, nonetheless it came into force. See, Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (Moscow, 1967), pp. 312.

2 See, B.G. Gafurov, and G.P. Kim, ed. Lenin and National Liberation in the East (Moscow, 1978), pp. 306-327.

Soviet-North Korean Treaty
(July 6, 1961)

In August 1945, Korea achieved independence from Japan, with the Soviet Union playing a crucial role.³ Likewise, during the Korean crisis, the Soviet Union openly sided with the Korean People's Democratic Republic (North Korea). In 1950's Soviet-North Korean relations covered many fields.⁴

In 1960, Syngman Rhee was overthrown in South Korea. The new government which was soon headed by Park Chung Hee (from military), followed the American guided old policy of hostility towards North Korea. With U.S. assistance the South Korean armed forces, whose numerical strength had reached 6,00,000, within six months of Park Chung Hee Regime, were modernised. This was in addition to the US troops present there. Besides, North Korea feared a novel war, thus the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed with the Soviet Union on July 6, 1961.

Indo-Soviet Treaty
(August 9, 1971)

By 1971, Indo-Soviet economic relations had already covered twenty one years.⁵ Since the mid-fifties, India and the USSR had shown identity of views and convergence of interest on vital issues affecting them directly and on crucial world problems.

3. See, P.N. Pospelov, etc.Ed., Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45 : A General Outline (Moscow, 1970), pp.411-432.

4. See, Y. Dmitriyev, "Korean People's Democratic Republic : Three Glorious Decades", Far Eastern Affairs, No.4, April 1978, pp.20-28.

5. See, H.K. Sharma, Indo-Soviet Relations : Economic Analysis (New Delhi, 1980), pp.2-89.

The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed against the background of a serious threat to India's security. During the Bangladesh crisis an atmosphere of tensions prevailed between India and Pakistan. India whose security "was imperilled by the events on her eastern border and whose economy was undermined by the influx of refugees",⁶ had other problems too. U.S. Seventh Fleet had already reached the Bay of Bengal. The possible Chinese intervention could not be ruled out. The signing of a treaty with the Soviet Union at such a crucial juncture meant a guarantee from the Soviet Union for India in respect of latter's independence and sovereignty, in addition to the general economic cooperation which was continuing for the last twenty one years.

Soviet Treaties with Egypt and Iraq
(May 27, 1952 and April 9, 1956)

In April 1952, Gamal Abdol Nasser came to power in Egypt, and the Soviet-Egyptian economic relations started growing.⁷ In addition to economic help, in 1956, when Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt, the Soviet Government sent diplomatic notes with stern warning to those countries. One of the notes stated : " the Soviet Government resolves if necessary to use force to terminate the aggression and restore peace in the Middle East".⁸ Likewise, in the Six Day War of 1967, the

6 K.P.S. Menon, The Indo-Soviet Treaty : Setting and Sequel (New Delhi, 1972), p.139.

7 See, Lalumud Ata Alla, Arab Struggle for Economic Independence (Moscow, 1974), pp.247-265.

8 See СССР и Арабские Страны, 1917-1960 гг. (Moscow, 1960), p.259.

Soviet Union sided with Egypt and Arab countries.⁹

Soviet political relations with Iraq ^{started} growing after 1958, when Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. The economic relations also developed.¹⁰

In 1970-71, the Israeli Government did not reply to Jarring Request,¹¹ though other Arab States had agreed to follow its terms and conditions. The Israeli Government declared that it would not evacuate its troops and as a condition for peace, demanded the perpetuation of Israel's seizure of Golan Heights, Gaza and some other parts of Arab territory. The United States stopped its deliveries of military supplies and in 1970-71, granted Israel, further credits for armaments. Washington's mediation in securing the implementation of the proposal for opening the Suez Canal, made by Egypt in early 1971, was used by the US diplomacy for an effort to legalise the occupation of Arab' territories, on the pretext of a partial settlement.¹² With US encouragement, Israeli leaders not only obstructed the peaceful settlement as recommended by Jarring Commission, but also escalated aggressive actions.¹³ A new

9 See, Vnochnaya Politika Sovetskova Soyuz Sbornik Dokumentov (Moscow, 1967), p.160.

10 See, Kalamud Ata Alla, above Cit.

11 Gunnar Jarring - a Swedish Diplomat was appointed by the United Nations' Secretary General as his special representative in the Middle East after 1967 war. For the maintenance of peace in the region Jarring Commission recommended the evacuation of Israeli troops from the occupied areas of Arabs. For details see, I.D. Ovsyany, etc., A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), pp.305-310.

12 See, L. Kalb and B. Kalb, Kissinger (Boston-Toronto, 1974), pp.193-4, 204-05 and 206.

13 Ibid., p.512.

war was not ruled out. It was against this background that the Soviet Union signed Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Egypt (May 27, 1971) and Iraq (April 9, 1972).

Soviet-Somalian Treaty (July 11, 1974)

In October 1966, a Supreme Revolutionary Council headed by Syed Barre came to power in Somalia. On the very first day of his power, Syed Barre issued a statement condemning the western world as imperialist and calling them enemy-number one of peace and security in the world.¹⁴ Somalia was treated by the Soviet Union as an out-post of the liberation movements in Africa, and was given around assistance.

Unlike most other cases, there was no specific threat to the security of Somalia, when on July 11, 1974, Soviet-Somalian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, though relations of Somalia with neighbour Ethiopia were far from normal.

Angolan-Soviet Treaty (October 8, 1976)

During the independence movement and civil war in Angola, the Soviet Union effectively supported the popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). By March 1976, South African troops were forced to vacate Angola, UNITA and FALA were defeated and MPLA emerged out victorious.¹⁵

When the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Angola and the Soviet Union, there was no specific

14 See, Pravda, October 21, 1966.

15 For details see, Oleg Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa (Moscow, 1977), pp.133-105.

threat to Angola's security, though "NATO arms supplies continued to arrive at the bases on Angolan border from where the followers of UNITA and FNLA were attempting to organise subversive activities in the country".¹⁶ In addition to economic help, it was the need for a powerful defence capability that provided bases for the treaty.

Soviet-Mozambique' Treaty
(March 31, 1977)

From the very beginning, the Soviet Union supported the national liberation movement in Mozambique and it achieved independence from Portugal on June 25, 1975, under the leadership of FRELIMO.

After independence Mozambique decided to actively support Zimbabwe in its struggle for independence. Hence Mozambique was virtually in a state of open war with Rhodesia throughout the year 1976. Zimbabwean guerrillas infiltrated from base camp in Mozambique, while Rhodesian troops and aircrafts raided repeatedly into Mozambique to strike at Guerrilla' camp and economic targets. Mozambique needed both military and economic assistance and on March 31, 1977, Soviet-Mozambique' Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed.

Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty
(November 3, 1978)

The Soviet Union rendered alround support to North

Vietnam in its fight against the USA and the unification of Vietnam :¹⁷ After the unification of Vietnam, a visiting Vietnamese Communist Party delegation voiced disagreement with China on "hegemonism" and "social imperialism" --- the Chinese terms used for Soviet foreign policy. China responded by decreasing assistance to Vietnam. On the initiative of China, the Kampuchean Government under Pol Pot-Ieng Sary influence started provocative armed attacks, aimed at weakening the Vietnamese military and economic capabilities. Chinese propaganda (especially after the visit of US Secretary of State) became extremely hostile to Vietnam.¹⁸ Tensions prevailed on both Kampuchean-Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese borders. It was against this background that the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on November 3, 1978.

Soviet-Ethiopian Treaty
(November 20, 1978)

In September 1974, the old monarchial set up was overthrown by PMAC in Ethiopia. The subsequent developments saw the rise of Mengistu Haile Mariam to power. The Soviet Union supported the new government.

In August 1977, Somalia attacked Ethiopia. The Soviet Union resolutely denounced Somalia's attempts to violate Ethiopia's territorial integrity and together with Cuba and other socialist countries, at the request of Ethiopian government, rendered all possible help. In the war, "until

17 See, Militant-Solidarity, Fraternal Assistance : A Collection of Major Soviet Foreign Policy Documents on Vietnam Problem (Moscow, 1970), and also, K. Noolkent, Sino-US Collusion in Vietnam (New Delhi, 1972), pp.23-30.

18 See, Peking Review, no.26, 28 and 31, 1978.

September 1977, the balance was heavily in favour of Somalia, but by early 1978, the balance had begun to move heavily in favour of Ethiopia - due entirely to its allies the Soviet Union and ...¹⁹ After the war Soviet-Ethiopian relations matured further and on November 20, 1978, were regularised by a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Soviet-Afghan Treaty
(December 5, 1978)

The first Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness Relations was signed on February 28, 1921. The treaty helped Afghanistan to end British control over Afghan trade. The relations between the two developed further and were again formalised by the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression in 1931. The treaty was extended several times, the last one being in 1975, for another term of ten years.²⁰

Meanwhile in 1978, the April Revolution took place in Afghanistan. From the very first day America, China, Pakistan and Egypt were engaged in subversive activities directed against the new Afghan Government. These developments were seen by the Afghan and the Soviet Governments as a gross ~~just~~ intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of Afghanistan.²¹ The new government needed assistance for

19 Colin Legum and Bill Leo, "Crisis in the Horn of Africa", African Contemporary Records : 1977-78 (London, 1979), Vol.10, p.445.

20 For a brief description of the history of Soviet-Afghan relations, see, B.G. Gusev and G.K. Kin, ed., Lenin and National Liberation in the East (Moscow, 1978), pp.285-305.

21 The Truth About Afghanistan : Documents, Facts and Eye Witness Reports (Moscow, 1978), pp.5-32.

economic and defence purposes. Thus the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on December 5, 1978.

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Our survey, above emphasizes the need of identifying the general and specific features of the treaties. Although the circumstances have varied, there is a marked element of a common approach to the treaties. Likewise specific provisions in relation to varying needs of the treaty partners are also seen. However, both the common and specific features are inter-related in order to provide a common framework. The common framework is obviously the community and convergence of the interests of the Soviet Union and its treaty partners, on vital issues affecting them directly and on crucial world problems. Likewise, an absence of clash of interests on a given issue in a given time period is no less an important element in this framework.

General Features of the Treaties

Broadly speaking these treaties have three dimensions, namely world-wide, regional and bilateral. Hence it is appropriate to discuss the general features of the treaties : (1) in the international context; (2) in the regional context, and (3) in the context of bilateral relations, keeping in mind the above three major dimensions.

(1) In the International Context

An emphasis on the community of interests on vital

issues of world importance runs through all the treaties. The relationship with North Korea and Vietnam sharply put into focus such a community of interests, because of the identity of their socio-economic system with that of the Soviet Union, indeed added significance of these treaties may be understood in the very context, an exercise which we will briefly take up, while discussing specific features.

Likewise Soviet policy at consolidating and strengthening the role of the third world countries, particularly the non-aligned ones, is clearly another important common feature of these treaties.

The emphasis on community of interests on vital world issues is seen by the fact that all treaties speak of the need to fight against imperialism, colonialism and racism, and work for peace and disarmament. Likewise, they stress on pursuing the policy of peaceful co-existence.

The other important common features can be understood by the commitment of these treaties to uphold non-alignment, interdependence without compromising national sovereignty, and resolve to work collectively in strengthening the United Nations.

Let us amplify the points made above.

Generally speaking a vital world issue of common interest identified is the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, racism and apartheid. In all the cases both the parties condemn, and resolve to fight against them.

As for example Article 3 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty reads :
 "Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination. The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other states to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination".²²

The question of disarmament is another point of common interest. For instance, Art.3 of Soviet treaty with Iraq says :
 "The High Contracting Parties, will continue in future ... to work for ... the achievement of general and full disarmament, extending both to nuclear and ordinary types of arms, under effective international supervision."²³

A marked community of interests is seen in all the treaties by their resolve to uphold and pursue the policy of

22 See Preamble also - App.IV; Art.9 - App.XI; Preamble and Art.5 - App.VII; Preamble and Art.4 - App.III; Preamble and Art.5 - App.X; Preamble and Art.4 - App.V; Preamble and Art.7 - App.VIII; Preamble and Art.7 - App.VI, and Art.5 - App.IX.

23 See App.V; Art.7 - App.XI; Art.4-App.VII; Art.3 - App.III; Art.4 - App.X; Art.2 - App.IV; Art.6 - App.VIII and Art.5 - App.VI.

Peaceful Co-existence,²⁴ among nations of different social systems.²⁵ An interesting case to point here, is the reaffirmation to the policy of peaceful coexistence with Vietnam as Article 5 reads : "They shall steadfastly work for the development of relations between countries with different social systems on the principle of peaceful co-existence, for broadening and deepening the process of detente in international relations".

Treaties with non-aligned nations signify Soviet attitude towards non-alignment. To quote Article 3 of Soviet treaty with Angola : "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respect the policy of non-alignment followed by the People's

24 The five following principles of peaceful co-existence, were taken as criteria for identifying this feature :

- (1) Repudiation of war as a means of settling difference between the two governments, differences are to be solved through negotiations;
- (2) equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries, countries to take each other's interests into account;
- (3) non-interference in the internal affairs, recognition of the right of each nation to decide its own affairs;
- (4) Strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the two countries; and
- (5) expansion of economic and cultural cooperation on a basis of full equality and mutual advantage.

25 See, Art.1 and 7 - App.XI; Art.1, 2, 4 and 6 - App.XII; Art.1-App.III; Preamble and Art.1, 2 and 4 - App.I; Preamble and Art.1 - App.IV; Art. 1, 2, 3,--App.V; Art.1 and 6 - App.VIII; Art.4 -- App.V; Art.1 - App.VI and Art.5 - App.IX.

Republic of Angola, which is an important factor in maintaining international peace and security²⁶. Likewise through Soviet-Vietnamese treaty both the countries declare to support the non-aligned countries. On their part the non-aligned nations formalise their attitude towards Soviet Union by stating that they respect the policy of peace pursued by the USSR, which is aimed at friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.²⁶

In all the treaties both the parties reaffirm their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. They further decide to solve the major issues of world affairs in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.²⁷ The treaty with Persia is an exception in this regard as it was signed long before the emergence of the United Nations and Soviet Russia's entry in the League of Nations.

The feature regarding the interdependence of two states without compromising their national sovereignty gets a clear expression in all the treaties. In this regard, Art.11 of Afghan treaty declares : "The High Contracting Parties state that their commitments under the existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present

26 See, Art.5 - App.XI; Art.3 - App.VII; Art.3-App.X; Art.4-App.IV; Art.5-App.VIII; Art.6-App.VI; and Art.5-App.IX.

27 See, Preamble and Art.4-App.XI; Preamble-App.VII; Preamble and Art.3-App.III; Preamble and Art.4-App.X, Preamble-App.IV; Preamble - App.V; Preamble - App.VIII; Preamble - App.II; Preamble-App.VI; and Preamble - App.IX.

treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreement incompatible with it".²⁸

(2) In the Regional Context

Though the treaties deal issues concerning world affairs and bilateral affairs in considerable details, the regional issues are not given that much importance. Nevertheless, this aspect has not been totally ignored. On most of the occasions this aspect has been viewed against the background of regional security and stability.

Treaties with Afghanistan (Preamble, Art.7 and 8) and India (Preamble and Art.8) concentrate on the peace and security in Asia,²⁹ while in the case of Vietnam (Preamble and Art.8), Asia and South East Asia have separately been given due importance.³⁰ Treaty with North Korea has similar provisions for Far East. Likewise, treaty with Egypt (Art.3) emphasizes on peace and security in the Middle East³¹ and with Iraq (Preamble), it proposes to strengthen unity among Arab States.³² Similarly treaty with Ethiopia (Art.3), emphasizes on strengthening the organisation of African unity (OAU).³³

28 See, Art.11-App.XI; Art.12-App.VIII; Art.10-App.IV; Art.12-App.X; Art.10-App.IV; Art.11-App.V; Art.11-App.VIII; Art.11-App.VI; and Art.7-App.IX.

29 See, App.XI and IV

30 See, App.IX

31 See, App.III

32 See, App.V

33 See, App.X

As a matter of fact it can be said that the pre-occupation with regional issues constitutes the general features of the treaties in the regional context. However, it is interesting to note that in this context the relevant provisions of the treaties underline the crucial, if not primary role of Soviet treaty partners in their respective regions.

(3) In the Context of Bilateral Relations

As mentioned earlier, in the context of bilateral relations, the Soviet Union and the other parties deal the various issues in great details. These features of the treaties stem from the economic needs and defence and security requirements of the countries involved.

To start with, treaties declare that between both the parties, there exist a bond of friendship. Each party shall respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in each others' affairs, and shall continue to develop, deepen and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship and comprehensive cooperation existing between them on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

This cooperation covers various fields - subject to the need of the involved parties. It is stressed that the two parties shall develop and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry, transport, communication, agriculture, the use of natural resources, development of power generating industry, and other branches of economy, to give each other assistance in

the training of national personnel, and in planning the development of national economy. It is further proposed that the two sides shall expand trade on the basis of equality, mutual benefits and most favoured nation treatment. The two sides also affirm to promote cooperation and exchange of experience in the field of culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sports and other fields. The parties decide to facilitate the expansion of cooperation between organs of state power and public organisation enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions, with a view to make a deeper acquaintance with the life, work, experience and achievements of the people of two countries.³⁴

The above discussion essentially involves only one aspect of the bilateral relations, i.e., the around socio-economic cooperation and development of a self-reliant economy. The other aspect deals with the problem of defence and security.

In this regard, to start with, is the commitment from the Soviet Union with respect to other party's defence capabilities. As Article 4 of the Afghan treaty says: "In the interests of the strengthening the defence capacity of the high contracting parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them". We see similar provision in most of the other treaties.³⁵

34 See, Preamble and Art.2 and 3-App.XI; Preamble and Art.1, 2, 8 and 9-App.VII; Preamble and Art.1,2,5 and 6 - App.III; Preamble and Art.1,2,8 and 9 - App.X; Art.1,6, and 7 -App.IV; Art.1,2,5 and 6-App.V; Preamble and Art.1, 2 and 3-App.VIII; Preamble and Art.4-App.II; Art.14,19 and 23-App.I; Preamble and Art.1,2, and 3-App.VI; and Preamble and Art.2,3 and 4 - App.IX.

35 See, Preamble and Art.4-App.XI; Art.10-App.VII; Art.8-App.III; Art.10-App.X; Art.9-App.V; Art.4-App.VIII; Art.4-App.VI.

Related with Security and defence is the attitude of one side towards other during a threat to the independence of either of the parties, or a threat to peace or violation of peace. The general provision is, as explained in Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet treaty : "In the event of either party being subjected to an armed attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries". Likewise Article 4 of Afghan treaty reads : "The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good-neighbourliness as well as the UN Charter, ~~shall~~ shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries".³⁶ To put it briefly, generally, treaties have a very limited collective security arrangement involving the security of two states against one or more states.

Stemming from above both parties in all the cases decide and declare that they will not join any military or other alliances or take actions directed against the other party.³⁷

36 See, Art.4-App.XI; Art.7-App.VII; Art.7-App.III; Art.7-App.X; Art.9-App.IV; Art.8-App.V; Art.9-App.IV; Art.8-App.V; Art.9-App.VIII; Preamble and Art.1-App.II; Art.9-App.VI; and Art.6-App.IX.

37 See, Art.6-App.XI; Art.11-App.VII; Art.9-App.III; Art.11-App.X; Art.8 and 9-App.IV; Art.10-App.V; Art.10-App.VIII; Art.5-App.I and Art.10-App.VI.

Thus the general or common feature of the treaties identified above emphasize, through their major dimensions, that the community of interests between the Soviet Union and its treaty partners has provided the basis for this treaty relationship. Needless to add, that these are conditioned by the desire of the third world countries for a self reliant economy and defence and security needs. By providing a favourable response, the Soviet Union, in addition to other desired objectives, strengthen the role of the third world countries, the non-aligned ones in particular, in world affairs.

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Specific Features of the Treaties

Specific features of the treaties may be identified by comparing the emphasis laid on their general features against the background of socio-economic and political factors that led to the signing of the treaties. Needless to add, that these features are conditioned by the diverse bilateral needs, of the involved countries, depending upon regional and international environment. Moreover, various specific features of the treaties must necessarily be seen in the perspective of the socio-economic composition of the government of the countries, at the time of signing the treaty.

As the specific features of the treaties come out of their general features, they may be viewed accordingly. Hence it would be appropriate to examine the special features, keeping

in view the three major dimensions of the treaties discussed earlier, namely (i) in the international context, (ii) in the regional context, and (iii) in the context of bilateral relations.

(i) In the International Context

A close look at the provisions of the treaties leads us to the view that the circumstances leading to the signing of the treaties are emphasized. In this context a marked specific feature is the emphasis on the diverse background of signing the treaties along with the socio-economic character of the third world signatory.

The treaties with Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique were signed in the specific context of their struggle against colonialism and racialism. Hence the preamble of the treaty with Angola states that the treaty is a result of "friendship and around cooperation established between them as a result of the struggle for freedom and independence of Angola..."³⁸ Likewise, in the case of Mozambique the treaty is a product of relations which took place "in the difficult years of peoples' war for the liberation of Mozambique and which have grown stronger since the formation of the people's Republic of Mozambique".³⁹ Similarly the treaty with Afghanistan was signed in face of a social change more conducive to socialism. The preamble to the treaty of Vietnam says that the treaty "is guided by the principles and aims of socialist foreign policy",⁴⁰ while in

38 See, Preamble in App. VII

39 See, Preamble in App. VIII

40 See, Preamble in App. IX.

the case of North Korea the treaty is "based on the principle of socialist internationalism".⁴¹ Ethiopia has been introduced in the treaty as Socialist Ethiopia. All these treaties are more international in character than others.

Although all the treaties propose to fight against imperialism, colonialism and racialism, the emphasis on these objectives is not uniform. Treaties with Vietnam, North Korea, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique ~~is~~ seen against the background of the joint statements issued by the two governments,⁴² convincingly propogate for the cooperation, unity and cohesion of the forces fighting for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.⁴³

Likewise, the role of non-aligned movement is lauded in most of the treaties. Though in the case of India there seems to be more emphasis on it, as article 4 reads : "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world".⁴⁴

Thus we see that the specific features of the treaties also (in the international context) seek to strengthen the role of the third world countries in world affairs and support ~~abroad~~ Soviet objectives, we discussed in the second chapter.

41 See, Preamble-App.II.

42 See, Pravda, July 7, 1961; October 9, 1976; April 19, 1977; November 4, 1978, November 21, 1978; and December 6, 1978.

43 See also, Preamble and Art.9-App.XI; Preamble and Art.5 - App.VII; and Preamble and Art.7-App.VIII.

44 See, Art.4-App.IV.

(11) In the Regional Context

In the regional context, specific features of the treaties keep in mind the diverse regional needs of Soviet treaty partners in Asia, Middle East and Africa.

As mentioned earlier treaties with Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique lay more emphasis on the support to national liberation movement. Treaty with Ethiopia even talks about the unity of the organisation of African unity.

Treaties with Iraq and Afghanistan are most remarkable in the regional context. Treaty with Iraq is inspired by the "ideal of struggle against zionism" and it declares the resolve of both the parties to wage "an unwavering struggle" against it.⁴⁵

Likewise, treaty with Afghanistan gives extraordinary importance to Asian peace, cooperation and security as article 7 of the treaty lays emphasis on this point.⁴⁶ Furthermore in accordance with Article 8 of the treaty, "The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the development of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace-good neighbourliness and mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent".⁴⁷ Here the treaty gives an impression of Soviet idea of Asian Collective Security.

45 See Preamble and Art.4 - App.V

46 See in App.XI

47 See, in App.XI

To be brief the specific features in the regional context deal with the issues of regional importance, though these issues are definitely linked with the issues of world affairs and bilateral relations.

(iii) In the Context of Bilateral Relations

As discussed earlier, although all the treaties deal bilateral issues in great details; those with the North Korea and Persia are remarkable in this regard.

Treaty with North Korea shows a strong desire on the part of both the sides to work peacefully for the unification of Korea, as Article 5 reads : "The Two Contracting Parties consider that the unification of Korea should be brought about on a peaceful and democratic basis and that such a solution is in keeping with the interests of the Korean people".⁴⁸

This treaty is most specific in terms of defence and security also. The Preamble emphasizes that both the parties resolve, "to extend assistance and support to one another in the event of military attack upon either of the Contracting Parties by any State or coalition of States".⁴⁹ Further Art.1 states, "should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any state or coalition of states and thus find itself in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal".⁵⁰ Hence the thrust of this treaty is towards the defence of Korea against hostile forces.

48 See, App.II.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

Treaty with Persia deals in great details the renunciation of the earlier unequal relations between Persia and Tsarist Russia and the start of new bilateral relations on equal terms.⁵¹

To sum up; all the parties express their deep interest in the promotion of universal peace and security and attach great importance to the cooperation between them in international affairs. To achieve these aims, they decide to regularly hold bilateral discussions and exchange of views on all important international, regional and bilateral problems.⁵²

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To sum up, general and specific features of the treaties stem from the community and convergence of interests on important international, regional and bilateral issues. Further, these appear to show that Soviet aim is to expand and consolidate economic, scientific and technological ties with the developing countries on a long term, stable and mutually advantageous basis, furthering the common objective of third world countries namely, self-reliance and security, and thus to encourage their role in world affairs. They also signify Soviet commitments to support and encourage non-alignment and struggle against colonialism and racism.

The treaties increase the defence capabilities of the third world countries and can be taken as a powerful stimuli

51 See, Art.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, and 18, App.I

52 See, Art.10-App.XI; Art.6 - App.VII; Art.6-App.X; Art.5-App.IV; Art.7 - App.V; Art.8 - App.VIII; Art.3-App.II; Art.21-App.I; Art.8-App.VI; and Art.6-App.IX.

in the crisis managing ability of both the involved partners. Moreover, they display Soviet desire to provide a defence shield to its treaty partners at the time of crisis and also on a long-term basis.

However, the general and specific features of the treaties cannot be seen in isolation from their implications. Therefore it will not be out of context to shift our focus to the implications of the treaties. This we propose to do in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATIES

- (i) For the Socio-Economic Development of the Third World Countries involved;
- (ii) For the Security and Defence of the Third World Countries involved;
- (iii) For the Regional Security and Stability; and
- (iv) For World Politics.

Our earlier concern for identifying and assessing the general and specific features of Soviet treaties with the third world, logically leads us to their implications. An analysis of the implications of these treaties must include the impact potential for the present and for the future. Thereafter an assessment of the record of those treaties is bound to become more meaningful.

In the present chapter, we propose to deal with the implications of these treaties. For our purpose we may look at them issue-wise, systematically, i.e. (i) for the internal socio-economic development of the third world countries involved; (ii) for the security and defence of the third world countries involved; (iii) for the regional security and stability; and (iv) for the world politics.

(i) For the internal Socio-Economic development of the third world countries involved

In order to understand the implications of the treaties for the internal socio-economic development of the third world countries involved, the provisions of the treaties concerning bilateral co-operation are extremely important. As identified in the last Chapter, in all the cases the contracting parties pledge to make efforts to strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them. It is further stressed that both the parties shall develop and deepen co-operation in the

fields of industry, transport, communication, agriculture, the use of natural resources, development of power generating industry and other branches of economy; further, they pledge to give each other assistance in the training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy. It is also proposed in most of the cases that the two sides shall expand trade on the basis of principle of equality, mutual benefit and most favoured nation treatment. The two sides also affirm to promote co-operation and exchange of experience in the field of science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sports and other fields. The parties decide to facilitate the expansion of co-operation between organs of state power and public organisation enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to make a deeper acquaintance with life, work, experience and achievements of the two countries.

Further, in order to understand the implications of treaties that the Soviet Union has signed with the various countries of the third world, on the internal socio-economic development of the other parties involved, one shall have to examine principle characteristic of Soviet aid and trade agreements with them.

First, it is directed in the main to building basic industry which is the prerequisite of self-reliance

and economic independence. The following table shows the pattern of Soviet economic assistance programme to the third world.

Pattern of Soviet Economic Assistance^{*}

	Percentage
Industry and Energy	68.7
Agriculture	6.2
Transport and Communication	10.0
Geographical Prospecting	10.0
Education, Culture, health and sports	4.2
Community-Housing and Communal Services	0.4
Others	0.5
Total	100.0

* Source : V.I. Kuznetsov, Economic Integration : Two Approaches (Moscow, 1976), p.155.

Secondly, it is an aid to the Public Sector of the economy under state control, and strengthens the state sector of the economy. Thirdly, Soviet aid produces a whole new army of specialists and skilled workers in the contracting countries. Large number of skilled workers and technicians from the developing countries have been trained with the aid of Soviet specialists in the USSR, on the production sites, and in training institutes set up with Soviet help in the countries receiving assistance.

Fourthly, the terms of payment are an important

feature of Soviet aid to other contracting parties. Soviet loans are normally repayable over 12 years, at a low interest of 2½ per cent, with no repayment of the principle, till the enterprise built with the credit has begun to produce, or till one year after the last of the deliveries.¹ The Soviet Union takes payment in the country's own traditional exports or in its own currency which is then used for Soviet purchases in that country. Sometimes payment is taken in products of new enterprises being built. The temporary cost of maintaining Soviet specialists is met in the country's own currency. On these easy terms the country becomes complete master of important new resources which transform its future prospects.²

For a better understanding, let us examine the Western aid to the third world countries.

The Western Powers, first of all, are mainly concerned to set up, not basic industry, but the sort of industry that will help them to ship out cheap raw material and foodstuffs from the developing countries, and enable them to receive in return finished products from the aiding country. In this respect they "really follow old colonialist practice except that instead of private companies the investing is largely done by their state agencies and by the International Bank which is also their agency. The drive for cheap raw material imports is specially strong in the case of the

1 Geoffery, Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, (London, 1970), p.277.

2 H.D. Malviya in World Peace Council Journal, New Perspective, May 1971.

United States, whose giant corporations depend on imports for all their natural rubber and tin for nearly all their chromite and manganese, for over two thirds of bauxite and tungsten, etc.³

The aid goes mainly to the private sector of the economy. Dean Rusk said in 1966 : "We are increasing our effort to stimulate the private sector in the developing countries and increase the role of U.S. private enterprises in our assistance programme".⁴

Repayment terms are more difficult than on Soviet loans. Interest rates are usually higher. Repayment is often demanded in hard currency. Terms of repayment are extremely important. Debt repayment contribute a large and rapidly rising burden for the developing countries. Half of the western aid to Africa returns promptly as repayments.

So a comparative study of aid provides one with ample ground to distinguish Soviet role in the socio-economic development of other High Contracting Parties.

One of the most important implications of the industrialisation through Soviet aid is the building up of a large industrial working class in the world countries, which may in the long run play a decisive role in turning the country along the road to progressive movement.

3 See, "Neo-Colonialism : Survey of Soviet Academy of Sciences", in Peace, Freedom and Socialism, 1973.

4 See Jukes, op. cit., p.260.

In this connection, three points can be stressed :

- (a) relationship that matures further after the signing of a treaty, gives the government and the people of the third world countries involved an alternative to Western aid;
- (b) it does not lead to replacement of old imperialism by a new one; and (c) it creates a social base with the potentials of playing a dominant role for a social change.

An important point is involved here. In accordance with Soviet view main strength and dynamism of the relationship that matures after treaty, lie in the qualitative aspects of socio-economic changes within the other contracting party. The more a given country identifies itself with non-capitalist path of development, i.e. a commanding role of the state with a view to planning of national economy, development of public sector, increasing restrictions of national capital having linkages with foreign monopoly capitals, unhindered growth of new social forces through rapid industrialisation and land reforms and social reconstruction, the more vigorous and viable its postures become self-dependent in internal socio-economic affairs and in anti-imperialist foreign policy. On the other hand, the less a given country identifies itself with the path of non-capitalist development, the less vigorous, indeed amounting to playing a role of imperialist Trojan Horse (self-reliance - in internal development and deviations - in foreign policy) its postures become. However, it is

possible that under the pressure of internal social forces or as a result of sudden change in power structure (e.g. military coup d'etat or social upheaval, or even a popular verdict in election) may reshuffle the role of these states. A given country receiving the aid from the Soviet Union after the signing of a treaty and following a path of non-capitalist development may transform itself into a socialist-oriented state, eventually/even a socialist system, while others may begin to follow the path of non-capitalist development. Similarly a state following the path of non-capitalist development could gradually turn into a capitalist path while continuing to pay lip service to its anti-imperialist foreign policy framework and a social change in internal order.⁵

Stemming from the above the aid that follows the treaty can well be fall in the hands of a government which may at a given point of time, take retrograde steps and the aid given by the Soviet Union may provide it with an oppressive strength. Similarly a change in government by any means may transfer the help in wrong hands. Therefore while discussing the implications of the treaties on the internal socio-economic developments of the third world countries, involved, it should be made clear that certainly the signing of a

5 See Zafar Iman, "Soviet View of Non-Alignment", (A Paper presented on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi), pp.16-22.

Friendship and Cooperation treaty by the Soviet Union, provides no guarantee against counter productive results in any other contracting party - a possibility which may defeat the very purpose, aims and objectives of the Soviet treaty relationship.

To sum up : the implications of treaties on the socio-economic development of the involved third world countries signify, that Soviet aim is to expand and consolidate economic, scientific and technological ties with the developing countries, on a long term, stable and mutually advantageous bases, furthering these countries' national economic development, economic independence and growth of their scientific and technological capabilities. All these implications may work for a social change within a given country.

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(11) For the Security and Defence of the Third World Countries Involved

The setting up of aggressive military blocs and alliances and overseas military bases was used by the Western countries, not only against the socialist countries but also for combating the influence of the third world countries, who had decided to adopt a non-aligned posture in their foreign policy. For the purpose of our study, till 1972 Pakistan was a member of SEATO.⁶ In 1965 an "Islamic Pact" was proposed.

6 The Original members of SEATO were the United States, Britain, France, Australia, Pakistan, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. In 1972, Pakistan withdrew from the bloc. Pakistan along with Britain, Iran and Turkey had also been a member of CENTO. The United States has been an associate member.

This was a new attempt designed against the non-aligned nations of Africa and Arab world. It was openly stated that such countries as Egypt, Syria, the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Mali should not be admitted to it. The practice continued and extended with militarisation of the Indian ocean and increasing flow of western arms to some of the third world countries. Such trends caused a definite anxiety among various non-aligned nations.

Situation became more complicated in the 70s with a sharp anti-Soviet turn in Chinese foreign policy. This very period was also marked by Soviet involvement in the problems of regional character, where non-aligned nations were directly involved, particularly from their interests of defense and security. Behind this move there was an obvious realisation by the Soviet leadership that without a firm commitment to the regional security and stability, in addition to economic development of the third world countries, the non-aligned movement may begin to tilt away from the socialist system and lean on the USA and its allies, including China.

It is against this background, as discussed in the last chapter, security is given its due importance, in all the treaties. The Soviet Union makes firm commitments with the defence and security of the involved partners. It is proposed that both the parties shall develop and continue

cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them; further, in the event of war or threat to peace it is proposed that both the parties will contact each other in order to co-ordinate their positions to remove the threat that has arisen or to restore peace.

Let us take a case study of India in this regard. The Soviet Union is a major supplier of sophisticated military equipment to India. These military supplies include AN-12 heavy transport planes, IL-14 and TU-124 transport planes, Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters, Mig-21 fighter-interceptors, Mig-21-UT1 trainers and SU-7B fighter bombers, K-13 "atoll" air to air missiles, SA-2 Surface-to-air missiles, PT-26 amphibious tanks and T-54, and T-55 main battle tanks, OT-62 and OT-64 armoured personnel carriers, landing craft, patrol boats, frigates, submarines and motor torpedo boats. Besides, India also manufactures Mig-21 fighter-interceptors under licence from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is also supplying arms and technical know-how to India.

Coming to the other aspect, the attitude of Soviet Union during the situation of threat to peace. We have seen that during Bangladesh crisis, the Soviet Union firmly stood on the side of India.

A country to country survey in this regard would be undertaken in the fifth chapter, when we will be discussing the record of the treaties in terms of successes and failures. Suffice here to point out that as a short term measure the treati

serve the
 needs of the recipient countries against hostile forces, particularly at a time of crisis. As a long term measure these ensure the commitments of the Soviet Union to the security and stability of its treaty partners, by increasing their defence capabilities as well as by providing support against hostile forces.

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(iii) For the Regional Security and Stability

The treaties Soviet Union has signed with the countries of the third world, also work for the maintenance of regional peace, security and stability. Experiences have shown that during the crisis of a regional nature, when a threat to regional peace and security becomes imminent, and when a treaty partner of the Soviet Union is directly involved, Soviet Union tries to save the situation from escalating further. Soviet-Pak communication during the Bangladesh crisis can be taken as an example here. But the efforts have not met success at every occasion. Generally, two factors are relevant here : (a) adamant attitude on the part of a country involved in the crisis (take for example the role of Pakistan during Bangladesh crisis) and (b) permanent policy of pitting one state against another of the west. Doris A. Graber, a known foreign policy expert of the United States writes : "Expressed in simplest terms, the national interests of the United States ... requires that United States should enjoy political predominance ... Hence it is essential for

American safety that the balance of power ... within Asia should be maintained in which two or more power groups are pitted against each other.⁷

In such a situation, the Soviet Union is forced to play the role of a balancer.

The concept of "balance of power" is inseparably linked with the isolation of states. Let us take three case studies in order to stress this point.

In 1971, when the war for the national liberation was going on in Bangladesh, the Western World, China and their allies, particularly Pakistan tried to isolate India. Virtually all important bordering states were hostile to India. It has also been revealed that Henry Kissinger - who later became US Secretary of State for foreign affairs, visited Pakistan and from here secretly went to China. According to a reliable Pakistani source, the Chinese leadership assured him of the opening of a third front against India in a situation of Indo-Pak war on Western front.⁸ With 7th fleet of U.S. in the Bay of Bengal, and with West Pakistan on one side of the border and China on the other, India was more or less an isolated country.

In 1975, MPLA was on the verge of emerging victorious in national liberation movement and civil war in Angola. The

7 Doris A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy (Washington, 1959), p. 14.

8 For details see Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan : Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale (London, 1974).

two other organisations UNITA and Frelimo decided to turn the table by inviting South African troops to fight for them.⁹ In the face of the threat of direct military intervention by South Africa and Zaire, MPLA-the virtual controller of power in Angola was an isolated force.

Similarly in the case of landlocked Afghanistan, there has of late been a marked attempt by China, Pakistan and Egypt with the approval of the United States to isolate Afghanistan. Before Soviet military action, the balance of forces was fast turning in favour of anti-Afghan forces and Afghanistan's territorial integrity was threatened.¹⁰

In all the three cases the signing of the Friendship and Cooperation treaties by the Soviet Union with the three countries, India (August 9, 1971), Angola (October 8, 1976) and Afghanistan (December 5, 1978) changed the entire complexion. Gone was the sense of isolation, that had swung heavy on Indian, Angolan and Afghanistan's scene. Subsequent developments are well known enough to need recounting.

It can be seen that in the specific context of a crisis, the signing of the treaty emphasised its immediate relevance and implication for regional peace, security and stability. As a short term objective they served the needs in terms of defence and security of the contracting party against hostile forces.

9 For details see Oleg Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa (Moscow, 1977).

10 For details see, The Truth About Afghanistan : Documents, Facts, Eye Witness Reports (Moscow, 1980).

There remains to discuss the long term implications of these treaties from the point of view of regional security and stability. The Soviet view of the problem of regional security and stability is interlinked with the objectives of a self reliant economy and territorial integrity against hostile forces. Having discussed the implications of Soviet treaties for developing a self reliant economy and defence needs of the third world countries, we may, now look at the problem of security and stability in the regional context in a little more detail.

Here the obvious implication of the treaty is the commitment of the Soviet Union with the long term security of its treaty partners and thus helping to ensure regional peace, security and stability. Moreover, the Soviets appear to have a desire of transforming these bilateral treaties into a multi-lateral treaty system in Asia. In this connection it is relevant to look at Soviet idea of Asian Collective Security, which gets a clear expression, as discussed earlier, in Soviet-Afghan treaty.

In a speech at Alma-Ata, in Kazakhstan, on 15 August 1973, Brezhnev listed a number of immediate objectives of Soviet foreign policy. The first he listed was "to facilitate the complete success of the All-European Conference". The second was "to strive for the expansion of relaxation of tensions beyond the continent of Europe for spreading it to all over the world".¹¹

In particular Brezhnev had earlier advanced the idea of a collective security system for Asia in 1969. He later remarked : "It is becoming increasingly clear that the real road to security in Asia is not the road of military blocs and groupings, not the road of pitting states against each other, but the road of good neighbourly co-operation among all states that want this".¹²

It should be mentioned here that various alliances of Asian nations arose in the Asian-Pacific area during the last three decades. Western powers were their members and they had inspired their formation. The first was SEATO (South -East Asian Treaty Organisation) formed in 1954 during cold war and after the French defeat in Indo-China under the guidance of John Foster Dulles. It included the US, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. Another group was formed in 1966 to bolster up SEATO when both France and Pakistan seemed to be withdrawing support from that body.¹³ This new group was ACPAC, composed of Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan. A third body, ANSUK, was also created. Its members were Britain, Austria, the New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.

12 Quoted in I. Lyadov, The Soviet Union, (Moscow, 1972), no. 10, p.46.

13 For details about the fate of SEATO, see, Vasily Vokhrushev, Neo-Colonialism : Methods and Manoeuvres (Moscow, 1973), pp.119-24.

Thus by 1970 there had appeared in South East Asia and the Far East, a whole system of military-political blocs uniting the main Western powers with Australia and New Zealand and some Asian nations. With Sino-US rapprochement and China's attack on Vietnam and American's presence in the Indian Ocean, the situation is further complicated. In accordance with Soviet view it is possible to replace this tension stricken area with a collective organisation of security for all the countries in the area. On the idea of Asian collective security Soviet leaders appear to have put forward the following dimensions :¹⁴

(1) That the Soviet Union is an Asian as well as a European Power and therefore has a special interest in the peoples of Asia living in peace;¹⁵

(2) That an Asian Collective Security System is needed to put an end to close military alliances in Asia;

(3) That the collective security system would not be directed against any particular country. Soviet spokesman deny the claim that it is intended to rally forces against China. They also deny the charge levelled against them by Western mass media that the Soviet Union is trying to fill a vacuum and gain for itself some special position of advantage. "We

14 Trevor Drieberg, Harji Malik and P.K. Joshi, Towards Closer Indo-Soviet Cooperation (Delhi, 1974), This work is a record of Leonid Brezhnev's visit of India. The Chapter "Collective Security in Asia", pp.48-63 deals with this aspect. Another useful work on the same topic is Attar Chand, Asian Collective Security (New Delhi, 1976). The writer in introduction deals the question of Asian Collective Security. Rest of the book gives a detailed and useful bibliography on the same topic.

15 Gromyko's foreign policy report to USSR Supreme Soviet, Tribune (Ambala, now printed from Chandigarh), July 23, 1969.

have said many times and we repeat again", said Brezhnev in his speech at Alma-Ata, "The Soviet Union stands for equal participation of All Asian states without exclusion in the Collective Security System. The system we are advocating does not and must not give anybody unilateral advantages".¹⁶

But a collective system for Asia cannot be created quickly. The Soviet Union realises it. Gromyko, speaking at the Helsinki Conference, said : "The whole question, it should be understood, demands discussion and consultations of countries involved to find a mutually acceptable decision".¹⁷ The creation of a collective security system in Asia "is not easy the more so that on that continent and outside it there are forces interested in preserving the atmosphere of alienation and distrust between different Asian states. The need is of cooperation among all the Asian nations on an equal footing, stage by stage advancement towards a collective security system".¹⁸

Soviet spokesmen are flexible in their idea as to what form the collective security arrangement should take. It certainly seems to depend upon the reaction of involved countries. The idea has, however, received mixed reaction, hence not been implemented so far.

16 Moscow News, August 25, 1973.

17 Pravda, August 7, 1973.

18 D. Volsky, New Times, no.25,1973.

From the above it can be seen that the problem of regional security and stability is both of a short term, and a long term nature. The implications of the treaties are thus linked with potentialities of the treaties to serve these short term and long term objectives. We may conclude that on both counts the treaties imply a clear commitment from the Soviet Union. We shall further amplify this point in subsequent chapters.

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(iv) For World Politics

In order to understand the implications of the treaties, on world politics, let us have a quick look at the main trends of post-Second World War world.

During the initial period, the US policy has been to confront openly with the Soviet Union, though this attitude softened after the Cuban crisis, when the process of detente was initiated. Nevertheless the primary contradiction in the world politics as viewed by Soviet leaders, continued to be between Socialist and the imperialist-capitalist states.

During this very initial phase, the US policy in the Third World can be broadly characterized by three main trends : (a) Direct military intervention to retain the country within its fold (i.e., aggression in Korea, CIA staged coup in Iran and the overthrow of Mossadegh government, landing of US troops in Lebanon, the take over of South Vietnam in 1961, followed by a military offensive against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia); (b) Building up of a system of military-political blocs of client states, which would have to remain dependent on the United States (i.e. treaty

with Philippines in 1952, with South Korea in 1953, with Taiwan in 1955, the expansion of SEATO in 1955 to include Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia); and (c) indirect intervention or penetration in the third world countries, following the failure of the first two strategies, especially after the US' retreat from Vietnam (i.e. Angola and Afghanistan).¹⁹ The foreign policy was guided by the aim of exploiting the third world countries, through multinationals and other agencies. So the secondary, but at the same time most important contradiction, in the modern world remained between capitalism-imperialism and the national liberation movements, more so when national liberation movements after achieving political independence became movements for self-reliant economy.

Stemming, from above, there was a genuine community of interests between the socialist world and third world. So the relationship between the two as discussed earlier, matured and in some of the cases was institutionalised by friendship and co-operation treaties. These treaties in most of the cases marked the Trends for breaking away of the third world countries from their colonial past (its political, economic, social and cultural legacies) and for progressive changes within them, with a view to effect their foreign policies, in an anti-imperialist direction.

It is against this background that one perceives the following implications of the treaties on world politics.

19 Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, "US Neo-Colonialism and its policy of destabilisation of India in Recent Times : An Appraisal", Soviet Review, Vol.XVII, No.57, pp.83-96.

Since the Second-World War there has been a consistent growth of Soviet role in world affairs. From a pre-occupation with the West, the Soviet Union gradually began to play a world wider role. In this activation of Soviet role, its policy towards the third world has been crucial. From a modest programme of trade and aid with some third world countries in the mid-50's, it gradually covered by the end of 70's about 75 countries of the third world. Likewise, by the end of 60's, there was definite indication that Soviet policy towards the third world has become an important element of Soviet foreign policy, balancing its earlier over-preoccupation with the West.

Needless to add, that far-reaching changes in world politics during the post Second World War period (which we have already discussed) have also contributed, to the evaluation of a world-wide Soviet role. However, in the very transformation of Soviet role in world affairs, it is obvious that the third world countries and their over-all influence on international politics has been no less decisive.

The Soviet Union has always claimed a special relationship and a selfless interest in the Third World. As we have pointed out in our earlier chapter, the Soviet Union, indeed claims both a community and convergence of interests with the third world countries, the non-aligned ones in particular. These are marked in identity of views on crucial world issues as colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism,

disarmament and peace. Likewise, these are also viewed in the context of regional and bilateral interests.

Thus it is relevant for us to identify the implications of Soviet treaties with the third world in terms of their role in world affairs. Firstly, they have contributed to the strengthening of those countries of the third world in whose foreign policy postures the Soviet Union finds community and convergence of interests. The obvious example here is what the Soviets call progressive non-aligned countries like India and Iraq. Secondly, it may help in enlarging the zone where western interests may eventually be lessened and withdrawn, thereby helping Soviet foreign policy aims and objectives. Thirdly, it may also secure a safe zone around the perimeter of the USSR and its allies. Finally, it has institutionalised Soviet role in these countries, a development which may be important for future.

In world affairs the implications of the treaties are not confined to the role of the Soviet Union and the Third World countries only. They have far-reaching implications. To point out some, this relationship has forced American foreign policy to undergo a change in the last decade. Besides, there was a clear cut consolidation of capitalism in some of the treaty partners of the Soviet Union (i.e. in India and Iraq). In this changed situation US policy today is one of accommodation as against confrontation. A slight change in US foreign trade and aid

programmes and renewed assurances by President Reagan to India of good relations should be seen in this light.

Likewise, the signing of the treaties and the subsequent relations of the Soviet Union with the third world countries, open new avenues for the Chinese criticism.²⁰ This development, specially after the mid-sixties, started some rethinking in the minds of American foreign policy makers, as propogated by Hans J. Morgenthau : "If we do want to set ourselves goals that cannot be attained with the means we are willing to employ, we must learn to accommodate ourselves to the political and cultural predominance of China on the Asian mainland".²¹ The process for practical steps in this direction was virogously started during Nixon's period.

To sum up, all these implications identified above when taken together have already affected the quality of world politics and the process is poised for further development, in an increasingly complex international environment. Such a conclusion is further strengthened by our assessment of Soviet treaties in the following chapter.

20 Whenever Soviet Union signs a treaty of friendship and Co-operation with some third world country, the maximum criticism always comes from China. For details see the following articles published in Peking Review, (a) "Horn of Africa-Soviet Union's Naked Imperialism", no.5, 1978; (b) "Horn of Africa-Moscow is Fueling the Conflict", no.7, 1978; (c) "Soviet Strategy in Africa : from Angola to Horn of Africa", no.6, 1978; (d) "Vietnamese-Soviet Treaty : Holy Alliance of Big and Small Hegemonists", no.47, 1978; (e) "USSR-Ethiopia : Military Cooperation", no.48, 1978; (f) "Soviet Vietnamese Treaty Jeopardizes Peace in Asia", no.49, 1978; and (g) "Soviet Vietnamese Treaty: An Alliance of Aggression", no.50, 1978.

21 Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York, 1969), p.76.

CHAPTER V

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RECORDS
OF THE TREATIES : SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

The record of Soviet treaties with the third world countries must necessarily be assessed in the light of the implications discussed earlier. However, with a view to assess this record in a more purposeful manner, we may focus our attention on two basic criteria. One, whether the treaties have helped the third world countries in their socio-economic development, thereby promoting their common objective - the development of self-reliant economy in the third world. The other, whether the treaties have contributed to the solution of another vital objective of the third world-treaty-partners, namely security and stability, vis-a-vis, hostile powers and influences.

Here it is necessary to point out that these two categories neatly sum up the four major dimensions of the implications of the treaties that we have discussed in the last chapter. For instance, the problem of internal socio-economic development is infact a problem of developing a self-reliant economy. On the other hand, the problem of security and stability from a national view point and in regional and world context is essentially a problem of security and defence from hostile powers and influences.

Keeping in mind our two criteria, we may now take up a systematic country-wise assessment. For our purpose, we have put these countries into four categories : (1) Countries with positive impact, i.e., North Korea and Vietnam;

(2) Countries with favourable impact, i.e. Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique; (3) Countries with mixed impact, i.e., India and Iraq; and (4) Countries with negative impact, i.e. Egypt, Somalia and Iran.

A. The Problem of Developing a Self-reliant Economy (Category wise)

(1) Countries with Positive Impact

NORTH KOREA (KDPR) :

Following the treaty, the Soviet Union and North Korea concluded a whole number of trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural agreements.¹ Diversification and expansion of the two countries' economic ties and the subsequent long term agreements required the establishment of a single bilateral coordinating body and to this end an inter-governmental Soviet-Korean Consultation Commission for economic, scientific, and technical questions was set up in 1967.

The decade ending in 1970 was the decisive stage of industrialisation. Although additional appropriations for defence purposes had made it necessary to alter the rate of KDPR's economic development, the national income in these ten years continued to grow on the average of 9.1 per cent and industrial production by 12.8 per cent per annum. In

1 For details, see Y. Dmitriyev, "Korean People's Democratic Republic : Three Glorious Decades", Far Eastern Affairs, (Moscow), vol.4, 1978, pp.20-28.

1970 industry produced in 12 days as much as it had done in the whole 1944 and its share in the total volume of industrial and agricultural production came to 74 per cent as against 56 per cent in 1960.² The Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in November 1970 recorded in its documents that the country had become a socialist industrial state with a developed agriculture.

To sum up, the years after the treaty have brought massive socio-economic benefits for the Korean people. Utilising "all its internal resources and closely co-operating with the Soviet Union and all other fraternal countries, the KDPR has made much headway in building the material and technical basis of socialism".³

VIETNAM :

The Soviet Union is helping the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to build up its national economy. The co-operation between the two countries, after the treaty, in the economic, scientific and technological areas is constantly growing. Now the Soviet Union is helping the Vietnam to implement the tasks set by the 4th Congress of its Communist Party. Helped by the Soviet Union, Vietnam is designing and building nearly 100 major engineering, mining, power generating, metallurgical

2 Nodon Sinmau (Pyongyang), 3 December 1970.

3 I.D. Ovsyany and Others, A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), p. 69.

and other projects, as well as agricultural ones, as part of its current five year plan. These projects include Southeast Asia's biggest hydro-power station, on the Da River, the Mo Tam coal mine designed to extract 2.4 million tonnes of coal per year, and the 500 megawatt Dha Lai thermal power station.⁴ These projects are to give the Vietnamese economy a tremendous boost. The Soviet Union continues its assistance to Vietnam in prospecting for mineral resources, including oil and gas.

Keeping in mind the enormous strides Vietnam is making, it can be said that in very near future, it will emerge as a very powerful socialist state.

(ii) Countries with favourable impact :

AFGHANISTAN :

In Afghanistan the Government has decided to develop the state sector, to give every encouragement to domestic production, to revise the system of taxation and to bolster domestic and foreign trade. Much attention is being paid to extend government's control over private sector and land reforms. The efforts are also directed at increasing national income and creating conditions for doing away with unemployment, at increasing the production of grain in order to satisfy the country's requirements to the maximum. Large sums are being

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For further details, see Y. Glazunov, "Soviet Union and Vietnam : Unity of Brothers", International Affairs (Moscow), vol.1, January 1979, pp.3-7.

spent on the creation of power-generating facilities on road building and on the mining industry.⁵

ANGOLA :

During the short period, Angola has been able to lay firm foundation for the development of its public sector. Enterprises in the mining, textile, engineering and food industries have been nationalised, or placed under the control of state through workers committees. These include all the major companies and enterprises formerly owned by the foreign capital. The state has taken over power generation facilities, ship building, an oil refinery with an annual capacity of one million tonnes of petroleum products, 61 per cent of the capital (the Portuguese share) of diamond mining concern, Diamong (the industry is of great importance for the country's economy). The state receives over fifty per cent of the US Gulf Oil Corporation of Kabinda.

State Corporation for fisheries and transport have been set up. Angola has a national airline. The government has introduced state monopoly over foreign trade and set up a network of people's shop for internal trade, various forms of consumer co-operatives are encouraged. Banks were nationalised in 1976 itself, and national monetary unit began circulating in 1977.

5. For further details, see L. Mironov and G. Polyankov, "Afghanistan : The Beginning of a New Life", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 3, March 1979, pp.46-54.

The government in the guidelines for economic and social development of the People's Republic of Angola 1978-80 envisage further comprehensive development of the public sector.

Agostino Neto explained : "Drawing upon the experience of the long national liberation struggle, and in full accord with the general law of social development, we have opted for socialism. We have made a choice in favour of building such a social system under which there will be no exploitation of man by man. And our choice determine our attitude to, and our relations with socialist states. They are our national allies in the struggle for socialist society and against imperialism".⁶ While mentioning Soviet help in particular he said : "Soviet aid has been the key factor in our historical development, in achieving independence and in country's reconstruction".⁷

ETHIOPIA :

In Ethiopia the programme of the National Democratic Revolution states that the main objectives of the government are to totally free the country from feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism, unite all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces in the struggle for a new Ethiopia, and

6 The First Congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Luanda, 4-10 December 1977 (Moscow, 1978), pp.54, 57-58 (Russian edition).

7 The Visit of the Party and Government Delegation of the People's Republic of Angola to the Soviet Union (Moscow, 1976), p.13 (In Russian)

establish a solid base for the transition to socialism. Deep socio-economic changes are taking place under the leadership of country's supreme governing body - the provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC).⁸ Banks, insurance companies and major industrial enterprises have been nationalised, the state monopoly over foreign trade has been introduced. Land has also been nationalised, and on this basis agrarian reforms are being implemented and cooperative and state farms have been set up. New Labour legislation has been enacted which provides for eight hour working day, guaranteed remuneration and paid leave.

MOZAMBIQUE :

The People's Republic of Mozambique has nationalised land and real estate.⁹ The state controls, banks, cement factories, insurance companies, and the operation of many foreign firms. Education and health services are now in the hands of government.

Major changes have been introduced in agriculture.

The larger sugarcane, tea and cashew farms have been nationalised. A start has been made to introduce co-operative production

8 For details see, S. Sergev, "Ethiopia Starts a New Life", International Affairs (Moscow), vol.5, 1979, pp.16-24, and L. Davydov, "The USSR and Ethiopia: Close Friendship and Co-operation", International Affairs (Moscow), vol.2, 1979, pp.90-94.

9 For details about Mozambique, see B. Pilyatskon and S. Linkov, "Mozambique in Work and Struggle", International Affairs (Moscow), vol.7, 1978, pp.108-115; and V. Alekseyev, "Mozambique Builds a New Life", International Affairs (Moscow), no.10, 1979, pp.75-79.

in the form of "community fields", where 10 to 30 families jointly farm the land and sell their crops to state purchasing agencies, and "communal villages" where the degree of socialisation is considerably higher. At present the country has about 1,500 "communal villages" with a population of 3 million.

(iii) Countries with mixed impact :

INDIA :

Details of Indo-Soviet economic cooperation are too well known to be repeated here.¹⁰ Suffice is to point some major trends. India and the Soviet Union have now begun to implement their long term programmes of economic and technical co-operation. The Soviet Union is India's leading trade partner. By December 1973 there were 50 enterprises actually operating in India which had come into being with Soviet aid. They accounted for 85% of India's engineering output, 60% of her heavy electrical engineering, 38% of her steel, 35% of her petroleum product and 20% of her electricity. While Soviet Union buys India's industrial traditional exports (tea, jute, hides, etc.), industrial goods now form nearly half of all its purchases from India.¹¹ The years preceding these, have provided India with more gains.¹²

India assisted by the Soviet Union has built major

10 For a detailed survey of Indo-Soviet Economic relations, see, R.K. Sharma, Indo-Soviet Relations : Economic Analysis (New Delhi, 1980).

11 Moscow News, December 1973.

12 For details of Soviet role in India's industrial Development, see, Vinod Mehta's Soviet Union and India's Industrial Development (New Delhi, 1975), Writer in Appendix gives a detailed list of various enterprises.

heavy and manufacturing industries under public sector.

Indian industrial products - ranging from electrical engineering components and steel pipes to railway carriages and machine tools - are exported to industrially-developed countries, including major capitalist ones.

Powerful electric transformers, precision instruments and even the Indian built and Soviet-launched Aryabhata earth satellite are more characteristic of today's India.

IRAQ :

The Soviet Union gave economic and technical assistance to Iraq in developing the state oil extracting industry by carrying out prospecting and surveys, supplying equipment and material, and sending experts to organise the extraction of oil in North Romaila and other deposits. Soviet specialists have done a big job in afforesting, draining and irrigating 600,000 hectares of land in Iraq. Soviet Union helped Iraq to build a big dam. It has also built an agricultural machinery works, a tractor assembly plant, a plant producing electric motors, power transformers and other electrical items. It helped Iraq in building three thermal plants; an oil refinery at Mosul with a capacity of 1.5 million tons and a 600-km pipeline from Baghdad to Basra. An anti-Biotics Factory has also been built in Samarra.¹³

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For further details, see Malamud Ata Alla, Arab Struggle for Economic Independence, (Moscow, 1974), pp. 247-265.

Coming to developments within Iraq it nationalised the property of Iraq Petroleum Company, one of the world's largest oil monopolies. The state owned Iraq Company for oil operations was set up. Agrarian reforms were undertaken, which limited feudal property and undermined the foundations of pre-capitalist forms of agricultural exploitation. The reforms led to some progressive changes in rural areas and benefited the peasantry. In the ten years preceding 1972 about 3 million dunums (one dunum equals one-fourth of an hectare) were distributed among peasants and by the second half of 1975 the figure rose of 6,165,000 dunums. By July 1978 the total area of land taken over under the agrarian reforms was 11.8 million dunums. In that very year the country had 1,967 co-operatives (mainly distribution and sales), with a membership of 366,000 households and a total land area of 34.5 million dunums. Apart from that Iraq has 79 collective farms where according to Iraq press reports the "means of production land, machines and equipments are the collective property of their members".¹⁴ Public sector developed, and replaced private sector in some of the enterprises.

Though the treaty relations of the Soviet Union helped India and Iraq to overcome the problems of developing a self-reliant economy to a large extent, there are certain features in their socio-economic development that cannot be overlooked.

14 See, Al-Jumhuriya, (29 August 1972); Tarik al Shaab, (30 September 1975); Al-Sama, (29 September 1977) and 27th October 1978).

These features include attitude toward foreign capital and the strategy of using public sector and as a result character of their industrial development. There is a marked difference in the industrial development of India and Iraq and that of the countries with favourable impact. While the latter are by-passing the stage of capitalist development and in the process laying a foundation of socialist economy, there is a clear cut consolidation of capitalism in both India and Iraq.

(iv) Countries with Negative Impact :

With a view to have a better understanding of these countries, we may discuss, in addition to our basic format (the problem of developing a self-reliant economy), some important aspects of political development and foreign policy of these countries.

EGYPT :

In case of Egypt, relationship with the Soviet Union started during Nasser's time. When Sadat came to power, there were already several Soviet-Egyptian projects in operation. In order to continue this relationship there was a definite need of a strong vanguard party (political organisation) capable of dealing the revolutionary process in Egypt.¹⁵ Specially in the face of growing pressures from the forces which had a bad time during Nasser's period and were now trying to recapture

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Nasser had theoretically recognised the importance of such an organisation but he failed to take any practical steps to translate this idea into reality. For details see, P.J. Vatikitis, Nasser and his Generation (London, 1978).

state apparatus.

It was during this period, and in the face of added strength of Israel that Soviet-Egyptian relationship was institutionalized by a friendship and co-operation treaty. As a result, Egypt got massive economic benefits,¹⁶ but the process of nationalisation and public sector's development which was started during Nasser's time could not be continued.

Side by side, Sadat after assuming power, succumbed to the pressures of internal forces, which were kept low before. Sadat ordered the arrest of Nasser's closest men Ali Sabri, Shaaraj Gomar and others. Then a process was started to undo the transformation effected during the years of the Nasser.

First of all, political rights were restored to the big capitalists and feudal owners who had been effected by the agrarian reform. Then the agrarian transformations were revised, the attitude towards private sector was changed and a new "open door" policy of liberalisation, the so-called "infittah" was inaugurated. The doors were thrown open, above all to the foreign capital. All these measures were accompanied by initially muted and later increasingly clamorous and bold criticisms of Nasser's alleged mistakes.¹⁷

The reversal in internal matters was accompanied by a similar change in foreign policy. On March 15, 1976, Egypt

16 For details see, Mahmud Ata Alla, op. cit.

17 Karen Brutente, Liberated Countries in the 70's (Moscow, 1980), p.58.

abrogated the treaty it had with the Soviet Union.

The present policies of the Egyptian government, "combined with enormous difficulties, have greatly aggravated the internal contradictions. Frustration and Disillusionment are widespread among the broad masses. At the same time, the national patriotic forces have lately become more active. The years of progressive development left their imprint on the country and its public opinion. Sadat's government has applied draconian measures to deal with the situation by abrogating all democratic liberties and giving the police unlimited powers. The United States, on its part is looking for ways to prop up the regime. All these moves make the policies of the Egyptian Government increasingly unpopular".¹⁸

SOMALIA :

In October 1966, a Supreme Revolutionary Council headed by Syed Barre came to power in Somalia. Soviet Union recognised the new government and promised all possible help as the new government had declared to follow socialist path of development. Soviet Union provided Somalia with key-turn technology, Soviet experts came to Somalia and did remarkable work for its development. Syed Barre admitted : "Our cooperation covered many fields including defence, education, training, trade and economic cooperation which provided great benefits to the Somalian people".¹⁹

18 Ibid., p.59

19 Cited in African Contemporary Records, vol.10, 1977-78, (New York, 1979), p.80.

Several progressive steps were taken within the country. The leaders of the new regime "carried out such important measures as nationalisation of foreign capital, establishment of a state monopoly of the sale and purchase of grain, reduction of the interests rates on agriculture"²⁰ It was under this background that the Soviet Union signed the treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia on July 11, 1974. The Soviet Union also supported Somalian stand on Eritrian problem.²¹

The relations were maturing satisfactorily till September 1974 Revolution took place in Ethiopia. The subsequent developments saw the coming of Mengistu Haile Mariam to power and it was announced that Ethiopia will follow socialist path of development. Soviet Union after a careful study of the situation, proclaimed all out help to Ethiopia.

When Somalia made certain territorial claims on Ethiopian land (1977), the Soviet Union refused to oblige the former. The crisis blew up in July 1977, when on 26 July America declared that on the request of Somalia, it is ready to supply arms to Somalia. The Soviet Union tried its level best to

20 Luigi Pestalezza, Somalia - A Chronicle of Revolution (Bari-Italy, 1973), p.71. Also see V. Sofinsky, "Somalia : On the Path of Progress", International Affairs (Moscow), no.11, November 1974, pp.62-66.

21 Eritrea was a colony of Britain and in 1950, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution whereby Eritrea was to constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown. In November 1962 the Eritrean Parliament ended its federal status and Eritrea became an integral part of Ethiopia. From 1963 onward a movement was launched there against the monarchy. But once the revolution took place, Soviet Union tried to settle the issue peacefully. Somalia continue its old stand on Eritrea.

settle the issues peacefully, but could not succeed. Somalia did not pursue further negotiations, as it was too confident of its military superiority over Ethiopia.

In August 1977, Somalia/attacked Ethiopia. The Soviet Union denounced Somalia's attempts to violate Ethiopia's territorial integrity and together with Cuba and other socialist countries, at the request of Ethiopian government rendered it all possible help. In November 1977 Somalia abrogated the treaty they had with the Soviet Union. Soviet experts were called back.

In war "until September 1977, the balance was heavily in favour of Somalia, but by early 1978 the balance had begun to move heavily in favour of Ethiopia - due entirely to its ... ally the Soviet Union"²² After the war Soviet Ethiopian relations matured further and in December/1978 they entered into a treaty relationship. The subsequent developments in Somalia reversed the path adopted earlier.

IRAN

Soviet relations with Iran have been more complex and varied than with any other treaty partner. The treaty was signed in 1921 and various important matters including border dispute and foreign loans were settled through various provisions of the treaty itself. Till 1933 relations matured satisfactorily. But in 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany and Raza Khan was

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Colin Legum and Bill Leo, "Crisis in the Horn of Africa", African Contemporary Record (London), vol. 10, 1977-78, p. A45.

most influenced by Hitler. Various concessions were given to Germany and with the start of Second World War, Hitler was seriously thinking of opening the Second front against Soviet Union, from Iran itself. As a precaution the allied powers entered Iran on August 25, 1941. Reza Khan left the country and Mohammad Reza Shah was declared the new emperor of Iran. By 1946 allied power's forces had gone back to their respective countries. The period between 1945 and 1953 was a period of great political hurly burlies in Iran in which about ten new Prime Ministers were to share the power, one by one. In 1951 Mossadegh came to power and announced the nationalisation of oil companies. During the short span of Mossadegh's prime Ministership the Soviet-Iranian relations were at highest peak.

On August 16, 1953, the first unsuccessful attempt was made to oust Mossadegh. Shah was also a party to this and after the failure of this attempt he flew to Rome. On August 19, the second attempt was made, this time successfully and Mossadegh was arrested. Within a week Shah came back to Iran and from now onwards he was not only de jure but also the de facto ruler of Iran.²³ During Shah's tenure, the Soviet

23 There are enough evidences to believe that in the removal of Mossadegh and succession of Shah, C.I.A. had a direct involvement. After coming to absolute power, Shah's actions justify this belief. See, Tulsī Ram, Ragnītik Vidhvans Ka Ameriki Hathiyar - CIA (New Delhi, 1978), p.43.

Iranian relations can be divided into two periods. First from 1955 to 1962 and second from 1962 to the end of Shah's period,

The first period was marked by Iran joining the Baghdad Pact (1955), its Bilateral Agreement with the United States (1959) and tacit approval to U.S. Proposal of missile bases on Iranian soil and invitations to American military advisers to Iran. All these actions had a direct bearing on the Soviet Union's security. The Soviet Union sharply reacted at these developments.²⁴

During second period Soviet policy had been "to detach Iran from the west and persuade it to adopt neutral policy".²⁵ So in 1957 an agreement was signed on the transit of goods for Iran and on the joint utilisation of the water and power resources of the frontier rivers. As a result, Iran within its general pro-west foreign policy framework, contrary to the expectations of the western world, did not deteriorate its relations with the Soviet Union beyond a point.

After 1962, technological developments and the detente in the cold war virtually nullified the question of missile bases in Iran.²⁶ Shah himself declared : "we would not allow either

24 See, T. Korotkora, "Against Iran's Interests", New Times (Moscow), no.43, October 1955, pp.9-11 and K. Iranov and A. Vassilyev, "A Slippery and Dangerous Path", International Affairs, (Moscow), no.2, February 1956, pp.29-39.

25. Shahrhan Chubin and Sepahr Zabih, Foreign Relations of Iran (London, 1974), p.44.

26 Ibid.

the pact or our territory to be used in furtherance of aggression designed upon the Soviet Union".²⁷ Subsequently Shah insisted on his right to determine international posture while emphasizing that Iran's ties with the West should not be considered an obstacle to good relations with the USSR. The decision was welcomed by the Soviet Government and Press.²⁸ In 1963 reciprocal visits by the Heads of State and Government were resumed and this facilitated positive understanding. In January 1966 the USSR and Iran reached agreement on Soviet technical assistance in the construction of an iron and steel plant and a heavy engineering works, and also of trans-Iranian pipeline. Agreements were signed on the supply of gas to the Soviet Union via this pipeline and on deliveries of machinery to Iran for the period - 1970 to 1985. At the talks conducted by Nikolai Podgorny in Iran (Teheran) in 1970 the sides expressed their satisfaction with the operation of standing Soviet-Iranian Commission for economic cooperation and planning and charted the further expansion of business contacts.

From 1974 onwards, anti-Shah and anti-America movement started getting momentum in Iran. Without interfering, Soviet position was as expressed by L.I. Brezhnev, "with utmost clarity, the Soviet Union considers that only the Iranian people can resolve the questions placed before them by the course of historical developments".²⁹

27 H.I.M. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahalvi, My Mission for My Country (London, 1964), pp.119-120.

28 Sec. K. Ivanovsky, "Important Steps on the Path of Improving Relations Between the USSR and Iran", Pravda (Moscow), ~~XXXXXX~~ September 17, 1962 and "A Good Start", International Affairs (Moscow), no.2, February 1963, pp.82-1

29 Cited in Belov and others, Socialist Policy of Peace, (Moscow, 1979), p.235.

Finally in Jan. '79, the monarchial and pro-west regime of Iran collapsed, thereby ending a long period of domination by the U.S. capital and the military presence of the United States. Soviet Union promised all possible help to the new government, yet the new government nullified Article 5 and 6 of the Soviet Iranian Treaty.

Today events in Iran are "very complex and difficult. The Iranian Revolution has some positive trends, e.g., the determination of the Iranian people to remove all outside interference and base their development on their own genius and ethos. However, there are also certain negative trends, e.g., the so-called Islamic Fundamentalism, which can lead to upheavals in this region. The exploitation of religion for political purposes can lead to internal and as well as external upheavals and take the world back to Middle Ages. 'Pan-Islamism can lead to similar movements of Pan-Christianity, Pan-Hinduism, Pan-Buddhism etc.'.³⁰ Soviet Union in such a situation, is closely watching all the developments. The course of future developments will decide the fate of Soviet-Iranian relations.

To sum up, Soviet-Iranian treaty and subsequent relations did not work out well.

X ----- X ----- X ----- X ----- X

To sum up, Soviet treaty relationship with the Third World countries has produced diverse results as far as the

30 T.H. Kaul, "Peace, Security and Development in Asia", Soviet Review (New Delhi), Vol. XVIII, No. 57, December 8, 1980, pp. 13-21.

common objective of developing a self-reliant economy in the third world countries is concerned. We note a success in the socialist countries (North Korea and Vietnam), where a firm foundation of Socialist Economy has been laid. Likewise, we find favourable results in some countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique), where they are by-passing the stage of capitalist development and in the process have begun to lay the foundation of socialist economy. On the other hand, we see a reversal in Egypt, Somalia and Iran. India and Iraq are two exceptions, that do not fall in the above two categories. In these two countries, though the development of a self-reliant economy has taken place to a large extent, the stage of by-passing capitalist development is not in sight; on the contrary, there are definite signs of consolidation of capitalism in both India and Iraq.

Understandably, there are contradictory views than what has been said above, both in the treaty-partner-countries and abroad, particularly emanating from China. However, the Soviet Union and its treaty partners have shown a recognition and appreciation of the totality of the impact of these treaties, as far as the problem of developing a self-reliant economy in the third world-treaty-partners is concerned. Even where, we have noted adverse results, the role of Soviet economic aid and trade is not totally denied by either side.

B. The Problem of Security and Stability

While posing the question earlier, we have pointed out that the problem of security and stability for the third world treaty partners must necessarily be seen in the national context, as well as against the background of regional peace and security and world politics. Hence we may assess the Soviet records in this vital area by examining three issues involved, namely : (1) Security and Defence of the countries involved, (2) the treaties in the context of regional peace and security and (3) the treaties in the perspective of world politics.

(1) Security and Defence of the Countries Involved :

Let us first discuss the military help that Soviet Union has rendered to the third world countries involved in the relationship. In this respect the following tables are self-reliant :

Table I

~~THE~~ TREATY PARTNER (THIRD WORLD) ARMS IMPORT
(1970-74)

<u>Importing Region</u>	<u>Recipient Countries</u>	<u>Largest Supplier to each country</u>	<u>Percentage of countries' total import</u>
Middle East	Egypt	USSR	98
	Iran	USA	60
	Iraq	USSR	94
Far East	North Korea	USSR	100
South Asia	India	USSR	70
Sub-Saharan Africa	Somalia	USSR	100

Table II
 THE TREATY PARTNER (THIRD WORLD) ARMS IMPORT
 (1975-79)

<u>Importing Region</u>	<u>Recipient Countries</u>	<u>Largest Supplier to each country</u>	<u>Percentage of countries' total import</u>
Middle East	Iran	USA	81
	Iraq	USSR	93
Far East	Vietnam	USSR	91
Sub-Saharan Africa	Ethiopia	USSR	95
	Angola	USSR	99
	Mozambique	USSR	100
South Asia	India	USSR	57
	Afghanistan	USSR	100

Source : SIPRI Year Book 1980 (London, 1980), pp.96-97.
 (Figures regarding North Korea 1975-79 are not available).

The tables show that except Iran, all other countries were able to strengthen their defence capacity with the Soviet help. Variety of supply differed from country to country in accordance with needs. Generally Soviet supply to other countries include IL-83 maritime reconnaissance transport planes, AN-12 heavy transport planes, IL-14 and TU-124/Planes, MIG-21 fighter-interceptors, MIG-21 UTI trainers, SU-7B fighter-bombers, K-13 "Atoll" air-to-air missiles, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles and SS-N-2 "Styx" surface-to-surface

missile, PT-26 amphibious tank and T-54 and Z-55 main battle tanks, OT-62 and OT-64 armoured personnel carriers, landing crafts, patrol boats, frigates, submarines and motor torpedo boats.³¹

These Soviet supplies cost less in a comparison with American and Western arms. For instance the IL-38 maritime reconnaissance plane costs Rs.6 crores (Indian currency) as compared to British Nimrod which costs around 10 crores. Soviet Union has also helped the other parties in setting up various ordinance factories. For example in India a MIG factory was set in India. Air Frame Factory (Nasik), Engine Factory (Koraput), Air to Air and Radar Equipment Factories (Hyderabad) have also been set up in India by Soviet help.³²

To put it brief, as a treaty obligation Soviet Union helped the third world countries involved in improving their defence capacity.

In addition to this general nature of help, Soviet Union acts promptly in a situation of crisis. Here political help in the United Nations add the country's strength along with prompt military help. Let us have a look at the case studies involving security and defence of the third world countries.

31 For details about country to country supply, See SIPRI Year Book 1980 (London, 1980).

32 Vinod Mehta, Soviet Union and India's Industrial Development (New Delhi, 1975), p.71.

NORTH KOREA :

In South Korea anti-popular Syngman Rhee clique was deposed in the Spring of 1960, during turbulent actions by the people. But the new government which was soon headed by Park Chung Hee continued the same old policy. With US assistance the South Korean armed forces whose numerical strength reached 600,000 were further modernised.³³ North Korea feared another war from South Korea. It was under this background that the treaty was signed and the threat of another armed aggression was removed.

Throughout the sixties, the South Korean and US forces systematically fomented provocations against the KDPR. The US spy ship Pueblo was detained in KDPR territorial waters in January 1968. The vessel's captain and crew admitted that they had been on a CIA espionage mission.³⁴ The USSR openly supported the protest of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and warned US that actions of this kind "may lead to another war in Korea and to a more serious complication of the situation in the Far East".³⁵

Similarly on several other such occasions Soviet Union firmly stood on the side of North Korea and successfully prevented any threat to peace.

33 I.D. Ovsyany etc., A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1975), p.279.

34 Ibid.

35 Pravda (Moscow), 27 January 1968.

VIETNAM

On Feb.17, 1979, China's armed forces invaded the territory of Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam was in danger.

Moscow was first to respond; on 18 February 1979, Soviet Government issued a statement saying : "The heroic Vietnamese people who have become victims of a fresh aggression are capable of standing up for themselves this time again, and furthermore they have reliable friends. The Soviet Union will honour its obligations under the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam".⁵⁶ The Soviet Union warned China to "Hands off Socialist Vietnam, Before it is too late".³⁷

During the war, the Soviet Union backed Vietnam with arms, and intelligence equipments to monitor Chinese movements, sophisticated Soviet ships were already patrolling not very far from the Gulf of Tonkin, and sending out reconnaissance sorties high over the border regions. Armed ships had also joined the intelligence gathering units ready to deal a staggering blow to the Chinese if they step out of bounds.

Chinese attention was also distracted on the

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Tass, 18 February 1979, Cited in Soviet Review, Vol.6, no.10, February 22, 1979, p.18.

37

Ibid.

northern and north eastern borders by a troop build-up on the Soviet side, with warning to the Chinese to withdraw their aggression on Vietnam.

Nguyen Khac Vien, Director of the Vietnamese Studies pointed out : "We do not worry about any military difficulty. Our main worry is the economic difficulty and the new ravages of the war that we will suffer".³⁸

By the first week of March, it was clear to China that the entire operation could face a debacle. Any further attempt to escalate the situation would have forced the Vietnamese to seek direct military help from the Soviet Union. So they were compelled to withdraw.

Once the war ended Soviet Union gave Vietnam huge economic help for the reconstruction of economy and to face the economic crisis, which was a by-product of Chinese aggression on Vietnam.

AFGHANISTAN :

Afghanistan - occupying a strategically important position in the Central Asia has traditionally been a target of aggression by colonial and imperialist powers. Till the Second World War, it was a victim of Britain, and after the war, USA replaced Britain, but failed to turn Afghanistan into a US military spring board, in the southern border of the Soviet Union. In April 1978 came the Revolution in Afghanistan.

The April Revolution was an outcome of a situation, in which people had lost faith in Daud's administration, and the Parcham and Khalaq parties, with the help of a section of army, managed a change of government. The new government headed by Noor Mohammad Tarraki had only one way to continue stay in power by maximising the benefits of revolution to people. The task was not so small and the difficulties were many. First the western world over reacted and took the whole development as a direct threat to their interests in the region. Secondly, Afghanistan was a country, where only five to ten per cent of the land was cultivated, and industrialisation was almost negligible. Thirdly, whatever surplus was available was controlled by the feudal landlords who had the blessings of religious mullahs. Their interests were now at stake.

The new Afghan government perceived all these difficulties quite early. In order to deal with the first threat; a treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed, on 5 december 1978. Article 4 of the treaty states: "The High Contracting Parties ... Shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the countries".

In order to deal with the second and the third difficulties massive land reforms and industrialization programmes were planned with massive Soviet aid. The snatching

away of the privileges of the landlords and mullahs created a situation where resistance against the government was engineered by the same. The encounter resulted in the influx of refugees (now known as rebels) to Pakistan. Convinced that direct intervention is not possible, the hostile countries (America, China, Egypt and Pakistan) seized the opportunity and refugees were given most up to date training for subversive aims.

The rebels after completing their training went back to Afghanistan and organised a resistance movement. The Afghan government preoccupied with the development plans, was not in a position to deal with this novel threat by itself. It was dubbed as an aggression by the Afghan Government. Military help was sought from the Soviet Union on several occasions, starting from March 1979 onwards and very urgently in December 1979.

The Soviet Union was left with two alternatives. First to play a passive role and allow the western powers to have a satellite government on the bordering state. Second, to act boldly and render Afghanistan prompt military assistance. Brezhnev admitted: "It was no easy decision for us to send Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan. But the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet Government acted in full awareness of their responsibility and took into account all the relevant circumstances We on our

part warned those concerned that if the aggression was not stopped we would not abandon the Afghan people in their time of trial. As is well known, we keep our words"³⁹ So on 29 December 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan fully in accordance with the United Nations Charter⁴⁰ and in letter and spirit of the treaty. So in this way the treaty worked as a stimuli in both Afghan and Soviet crisis managing ability.

ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE and ETHIOPIA :

In Angola, though MPLA emerged victorious and effectively controlled the state, yet, it has never been relieved of the novel threat to its security from South Africa and Zaire. In the face of such difficulties Angola is building up its defence capabilities. Leaning on Soviet-Angolan treaty and Soviet help, the People's Liberation Armed Forces of Angola (FAPLA) are developing and growing stronger. Similarly the defence capabilities of Mozambique and Ethiopia have also increased to a considerable level.

39 Pravda (Moscow), 13 January 1980.

40 Article 58 of the Charter provides for an inalienable right of States to collective self-defence and individual self-defence against aggression.

INDIA :

During Bangladesh crisis,⁴¹ on 3 December 1971, Pakistani aircrafts bombed a number of Indian towns and war broke out. Indian troops went to the assistance of the East Pakistani population who proclaimed their country the sovereign state of Bangladesh. The USA declared its neutrality but in effect sided with the Pakistani military against India and the liberation forces of Bangladesh. Units of the US 7th Fleet led by the Aircraft Carrier Enterprise sailed into the Bay of Bengal in a "show of force". The Soviet Union came out openly against this American move.⁴² Only a few hours later Soviet Naval Task Force was also reported to be reaching the Indian Ocean.

41 In March 1970, elections were held in Pakistan. In the East Pakistan Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats. So the Pakistan's National Assembly of 313, it had an absolute majority - a legitimate claim to form a government. But the rulers of Pakistan banned the Awami League and the genocide was started in East Pakistan. As a result millions of refugees entered India and India, too, was dragged into the crisis. During this phase Soviet Union through various communications asked Pakistan to solve the crisis peacefully. For details about the Bangladesh crisis and Soviet attitude to it, some useful works are : Bimal Prasad, ed., Indo-Soviet Relations, 1947-72 : A Documentary Study (New Delhi, 1973); Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia and Hindustani Subcontinent (Bombay, 1973), and K.P.S. Menon, The Indo-Soviet Treaty : Setting Sequel (New Delhi, 1972).

42 "Indian Ocean is not an American Lake", Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), (Moscow), 16 December, 1971.

In the United Nation's Security Council, on the pretext of achieving a cease-fire, the USA and its supporters sought to help crush the Bengali patriots and hinder the settlement of the refugees problem with the result that the situation was further aggravated. The Soviet Union strongly made attempts to force a settlement that would ignore the rights of the people of Bangladesh. The Soviet delegation constantly maintained this stand in all subsequent debates on the issue in the Security Council and General Assembly. By 13th of December the Soviet Union had to use its veto power three times in the Security Council. Every US sponsored resolution, which sought to side-track the basic requirement of a political settlement in Bangladesh was vetoed.

A firm Soviet stand checked the threatened American and Chinese military involvement in the crisis ridden area. During this crisis the treaty proved to be crucial for India.

EGYPT AND IRAQ :

An Armed Conflict flared up again in the Middle East in October 1973. This time the hostilities demonstrated the increased strength of the Arab States. Egypt and Syria played a dominant role. Iraq also met the challenge with added strength. As a result of treaties Iraq and Egypt were better prepared this time.⁴³

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For details see, Y.M. Primakov, Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict (Moscow, 1978). Chapters Five and Sixth of the book deal with 1973 crisis.

In connection with Soviet help Sadat's own words are quite interesting. On 7 October 1973, he told the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo : "I find myself at a loss of words to express our profound gratitude to the Soviet leaders who are real friends of Egypt. This will always remain in my heart and in the hearts of all Egyptians". Four days later he again told the Ambassador : "Your position is the position of real friends who came to help us on the most difficult and crucial days. The actions of the Soviet leadership are of historic importance and will certainly have great impact on the subsequent friendly relations between our countries".⁴⁴

The hostilities in the Middle East were halted through the vigorous moves of the Soviet Union, particularly in the United Nations. Agreement was reached on the convocation of a Peace Conference at Geneva with the purpose of achieving a settlement in the region. The Soviet Union's active involvement resulted, for the first time in the history of Arab-Israeli conflict, in the UN Security Council ceasefire resolution being directly linked to eliminating the conflict's general causes. Another achievement was the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 October, in which the call for a ceasefire was accompanied by the demand to observe the UN Security Council Resolution No.242 of 22 November 1967. In this way Soviet Union fulfilled its basic foreign policy's obligations to Egypt Middle East in general and treaty obligations to Egypt and Iraq in Particular.

From the above, it can be safely asserted that the signing of these treaties and their operation have certainly not created a crisis for the countries involved; neither it has compromised its existence and postures as an independent nation state.

On the contrary the treaties, though signed against the background of crisis of various nature, have certainly equipped the treaty partners with much needed defence shield as well as political support. On a long term basis the treaties have further accelerated the process of self-reliance in their defence needs through supply of Soviet arms and help in manufacturing of armaments and their know-how.

(ii) Regional Peace and Security

At this stage it is worthwhile to look at the other major dimension of the problem posed earlier, namely the problem of stability and security in a regional context.

While assessing the role of treaties for the regional peace and security, let us see Soviet efforts to save the situation from aggravating further in some of the regions, where their treaty partners were directly involved.

During the Bangladesh crisis, President Podgorny sent a message to Yahya Khan on April 2, 1971, urging the Pakistani ruler "to stop bloodshed and repression against the Population of East Pakistan and turn to the methods of a peaceful political settlement."⁴⁵ As late as in September 1971

Kosygin maintained : "At this crucial juncture we again address a call to the President Yahya Khan to take the most effective steps for liquidation of the hot-bed of tension that has emerged".⁴⁶ Similar attempts were again made on 1 October, when Podgorny laid stress "on preventing the further sliding of the situation towards a military conflict and offered to render all possible assistance for an equitable political settlement in East Pakistan, if all sides desired it".⁴⁷ On 7 November 1971, V.V. Grishin, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, while delivering his report on the October Revolution anniversary meeting, said that "as a result of mass suppression in East Bengal more than nine million people have fled to neighbouring India. The Soviet Union is gravely concerned at these events and it hopes that a peaceful settlement of the complications will be reached. The Pakistani authorities should stop repression and create conditions for the return of the refugees".⁴⁸

During the Indo-Pakistan war Soviet Union played a crucial role. On 5 December 1971, the Soviet Government issued a statement through Tass, calling upon all outside powers "to refrain from steps signifying in this or that way their involvement in the conflict and leading to a further aggravation of the situation in the Hindustani Peninsula".⁴⁹

46. Ibid., p.124.

47. Ibid., p.127.

48. Ibid., p.130.

49. Ibid., p.132.

On 14 December, the US made a show of force and indulged in gun-boat diplomacy by ordering a task force of the US 7th Fleet, headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, to steam into the Bay of Bengal, on the pretext of evacuating a few dozen US citizens from East Bengal. The Soviet Union warned the US that "its gun boat diplomacy could further complicate the situation".⁵⁰ Simultaneously, Soviet warship in the area had immediately moved forward in pursuit of the US task force.

It was understood that Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty had already been revoked and the Soviet side had assured India that the US fleet would not be allowed to intervene in Bangladesh. In New Delhi, the Soviet Ambassador N. Pegov, was reported to have assured Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 13 December that in case of Chinese intervention, the Soviets would open diversionary action in Sinkiang.⁵¹ In the United Nations also the Soviet Union acted like a balancer and put its weight on Indian side against Sino-US-Pak axis. So none of the external powers could intervene in the crisis, it was solved in a remarkable short span and with the independence of Bangladesh and India's unilateral ceasefire decision, and normalcy was again brought to this continent.

Similarly in the case of Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979, a firm assurance from the Soviet side and

50 "The Indian Ocean is not an American Lake", Red Star (Moscow), 16 December 1971.

51 Basant Chatterjee, op. cit., p.138.

readiness on its part to fulfil its treaty obligations, worked for Chinese withdrawal. In the case of Angola the treaty checked Zaire and South Africa from committing an attack on Angola.

Just before the Middle East crisis of 1973, the Soviet Union repeatedly warned that Middle East developments were taking a dangerous turn. The last instance was virtually on the eve of the October war, when the Soviet Minister for External Affairs spoke at the United National General Assembly and again indicated that things in the Middle East were moving in the extreme menacing direction.⁵² But the Israeli and the Western attitude was one of escalating the situation and the peace could not be maintained.⁵³

With a view to bring peace in the Middle East, where two of Soviet treaty partners are directly involved (recently Syria has also signed a friendship and co-operation treaty with the Soviet Union), Soviet policy bases itself on the understanding that the Arab-Israeli conflict has many causes. Israel occupation of Arab lands, denial of inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the continued state of war. For the regional peace and security in this area Soviet diplomacy has worked in the direction of eliminating all these causes taken as a whole (emphasis added). Only a comprehensive solution can lead to a just and enduring peace in the area.

52 Y.M. Primakov, Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict (Moscow, 1978), p.307.

53 Ibid., pp.303-8.

The key aspects of the problem were set forth in the Soviet proposals on a Middle East settlement and on the Geneva Peace Conference, published on 2 October 1976, as follows :

1. Withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967;
2. Realisation of the inalienable rights of the Arab People of Palestine, including the right to self-determination and to the establishment of its own state;
3. Ensuring the right of independent existence and security of all states directly involved in the conflict - Israel's Arab neighbours, on the one hand, Israel itself, on the other - and granting them appropriate international guarantees; and
4. Ending the state of war between the relevant Arab countries and Israel.

These are the aspects of a settlement which the Soviet Union suggested be considered in the agenda of the Geneva Peace Conference, pointing out that this agenda "takes into consideration the legitimate rights and interests of all sides directly involved in the conflict - the Arab States, the Arab people of Palestine and the State of Israel".⁵⁴

For the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, Soviet Union had welcomed all the efforts of the Korean

people to take steps towards the country's unification. The presence of US forces is a hindrance in way of peace and security in this region. During a visit to the Korean People's Democratic Republic in September 1972 a CPSU delegation declared that the Communists of the Soviet Union and all Soviet people "supported all the constructive steps and efforts of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party and the Government of the ~~KDPR~~ to normalise the situation in Korea, secure the evacuation of the US forces from South Korea and achieve the country's independent peaceful unification".⁵⁵

As discussed in the last chapter, an important initiative for regional peace and security has been Soviet idea of collective security in Asia. One feels the greater need of such an arrangement in view of Chinese aggression on Vietnam and developments in Afghanistan. The idea has met mixed reactions. Among treaty partners, ^{North} Korea, Afghanistan, and Vietnam seems to be ready for some such arrangements.

India has come forward with mixed reactions. In accordance with T.N. Kaul's balanced views : "In the ultimate analysis, the peace, security and development of the countries of Asia and various sub-regions in it depend mainly on the countries themselves. Asia is a big continent and any attempt to have a collective security system for the whole of Asia at one stroke does not appear to be feasible. It would, therefore, seem more desirable and practical to try to foster mutual treaties of peace, co-operation, development and non-aggression between the

various countries of each sub region o.g. the Indian sub-continent, South Asia, South East Asia, the Indo-China, the Gulf countries etc. India could play a very positive role in promoting such areas peace and co-operation in the various sub-regions because of her strategic position as a sbprt of bridge between South and South East Asia, on the one hand, and South and South West Asia, on the other. The Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation is an example of how two big countries, with different social, political and economic syttems can agree to respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and co-operate in meeting threats to peace and security of each other without entering an alliance. It is this pattern which could be multiplied among the coun-tries of the sub-region and there is no reason why the non-aligned developing countries should not agree among themselves to have such treaties of mutual ~~friendship~~, non-aggression and cooperation once we succeed in having such treaties in each sub region, we could then link them together by having a collec-tive security system for the whole of Asia".⁵⁶ It should be mentioned here that today Soviet Union has such treaties with North Korea, Vietnam, India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and Vietnam and India have similar treaties with Kampuchea and Bangaldesh respectively.

About Asian collective security, a popular notion created by Western press is that the Soviet Union had put

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T.N. Kaul, "Peace, Security and Development in Asia", Soviet Review, Vol.17, No.57, December 1980, pp.12-21, esp. p.21.

forward this idea with the aim of "containing" or "encircling" China. In reply to this notion Brezhnev himself pointed out : "As we conceive the idea, the People's Republic of China will become an equal partner of such a system.⁵⁷

There are many difficulties to be overcome in the realisation of collective security in Asia. But if this is achieved, it will be the greatest contribution of the Soviet Union and peace-loving states of Asia towards regional peace and security.

Thus the discussion above further confirms our conclusion arrived earlier while dealing with the problem in a national context.

(iii) In Perspective of World Politics

Let us now shift our focus to the third major dimension of the problem posed earlier, namely, treaties in the perspective of world politics.

A noticeable impact of Soviet tradition in the third world is, that they have institutionalised Soviet relations with these countries. From a bilateral relationship it has evolved into a more firm and durable relationship. In other words they have formalised Soviet behaviour in relation to these countries and institutionalised Soviet commitments to them.

Such an impact is obviously of world importance. In the first place its importance can be seen in the fact that

it has strengthened and sharpened Soviet role in world affairs, particularly in the third world. Secondly, the fact that the treaties signify Soviet readiness to enter into a well defined long-term commitments in a region unknown to it until recently, is of immense relevance. This may generate trends in the third world in favour of the Soviet Union in solution of their vital national objectives indicated earlier.

The treaties have certainly encouraged the Soviet leadership to view international politics in terms of an overall favourable balance of social forces inspite of the growing complexities of world politics. Such a growing belief obviously adds to the confidence of the Soviet leadership to carve out a more active role in its confrontation with the West even at a higher price (e.g., Soviet military action in Afghanistan).

All these factors obviously affect the quality of international politics, particularly when seen against the background of the Community of interests of the Soviet Union and its treaty partners on vital issues of the time.

At this stage it is relevant to look at the impact of these treaties on world politics from the view point of third world treaty partners. As we have pointed out earlier these treaties have been invariably signed with those third world countries, who share common social system with the Soviet Union (i.e. North Korea and Vietnam) or with those who have been ~~also~~ active members of the non-aligned movement. Perhaps the

only exception here is Iran, a fact which can be seen in the perspective of Iran being a bordering state and one of the oldest semi-independent third world nation.

Since the signing of the treaties almost all the countries involved have shown an increasing activity in their foreign policy. The characteristic example here is Vietnam. Likewise the non-aligned treaty partners have stressed their continued adherence to non-alignment. In other words their role in world affairs has been strengthened, while in regional affairs they acquired a pre-dominant position. A characteristic example here is India.

Such an increasing world role of these countries has naturally begun to affect the quality of world politics and from Colombo to Havana there lies the increasing strength of the non-alignment movement, both in terms of members and basic community of interests, not withstanding the stresses and strains of the movement.

In this context it is worth noting that in face of growing Soviet-third world relationship, American foreign policy has undergone a change in the last decade. A slight change in the US foreign trade and aid programme and renewed assurances from President Reagan to India of good relations must be seen in this light.

It is therefore, no surprise that Soviet treaty relationship with the third world has generated envy, fear and anger. Not to speak of the critiques of the treaties in a

national context and western countries but even China's reaction to them are symbolic. We have already discussed this in the last chapter.

Briefly, the treaty relationship of the Soviet Union, while coping with the problems of security and stability also, has brought about mixed results. This helped to solve with a large degree of success, the problems of security and defence of the third world countries involved. It helped to solve immediate crisis, this is true of a country like Egypt which later decided to abrogate the treaty. In the long run it has consolidated the defence capabilities of the third world treaty partners. In the maintenance of regional peace and security, it had limited success, while for world politics, it covered a broader perspective.

X ----- X ----- X ----- X

The questions posed earlier in the chapter are inter-related and cannot be seen in isolation. As a matter of fact the discussion in the preceding pages clearly brings out the point that self-reliance and defence and security go hand in hand together.

The totality of the impact of these treaties on the third world certainly appears to promote these two twin objectives for the third world countries involved. However, in the pursuit of these objectives varying results are noted.

As far as the objectives of self-reliance is concerned, the success is certainly more marked, perhaps because of the

fact that the treaty came against the background of growing Soviet aid programme to third world. Even in the cases where the treaties have brought about dismal results (e.g., Egypt, Somalia, and Iran), they have shown quite a considerable degree of success.

On the other hand, similar pattern is again marked in the pursuit of the objectives of defence and security. Moreover, it has certainly lead to generating trends in world politics which have strengthened the role of the third world countries involved, in facing the challenges of the time.

Such a record is indeed not a story of total success or remarkable failures; yet it is marked with more positive results than the negative ones. This pattern must be seen against the background of community of interests of the Soviet Union with the treaty partners and its varying degree of influence in their perception from both the sides. Although all the third world countries involved share common long term objectives with the Soviet Union, some of them have shown more pre-occupation with their short-term needs and gains (e.g., Egypt, Somalia and Iran).

One cannot foresee the future, but the totality of the record of these treaties has certainly been conducive to the Soviet Union and its third world treaty-partners.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS AN EMERGING PATTERN OF
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD

There remains to examine the problem of Soviet treaty relationship as a pattern of Soviet behaviour and conduct in world affairs particularly in the third world countries. It is already clear that Soviet treaties with the third world countries do not simply amount to a bilateral agreement or commitment but they also have a wider relevance for the present and the future. The task, however, is to quantify its overall importance.

During the course of our study we have found that against the background of Soviet involvement in the world affairs, Soviet treaty relations with other countries signify a formalistic aspect of the conduct and behaviour of Soviet foreign policy. Further we have noticed that in the inter-war period the Soviet Union had already begun to regard its treaty relationship with outside powers as a definite relationship giving it a formalistic character. Since the second world war the trend not only continued but got strengthened. Moreover, during the post-Second World War Period, the changed international environment and the community and convergence of Soviet and the third world interests provided this trend with further inputs.

An investigation of the general and specific features of the Soviet treaties with the third world countries further shows that in the bilateral, regional and international contexts, the treaties and subsequent development of Soviet relations

with the third world countries have far reaching implications. Needless to add that these implications are conditioned by an overall community and convergence of interests of the Soviet Union and the third world countries involved.

Finally we have correlated the implications of the treaties with the actual records, in terms of successes and failures; and we have found that on most of the occasions, this pattern of relationship brought about desired results.

Thus our study has clearly shown that the bases of this relationship are the community and convergence of the interests as well as an absence of clash of vital interests. Through the treaties, the Soviet Union has managed to channelise its interests in the third world by identifying its own interests with those of the third world countries. More importantly, it has succeeded in convincing the leadership of these countries that Soviet interests converge and coincide, and not collide and contradict with their own interests.

The treaty relationship developed as a process of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the third world countries. This process has begun in some ways, right after the Bolshevik Revolution, developed by the mid-fifties through increasing aid programmes of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc and got accelerated by Soviet involvement in the characteristic problems of the third world, even outside the confrontationalist relationship with the West. On the other hand the liquidation of the colonial system, and above all, the

growing role of the non-aligned movement in the world affairs contributed to the development of this process.

Thus it is significant to note that the signing of these treaties, mostly in the 70's, has coincided with the activation of Soviet foreign policy in general and its role in the third world, in particular. This process reached a definite stage of development by formalising and institutionalising Soviet relationship with those countries, which became treaty partners of the Soviet Union.

However, this process is not linear, nor is it always forward. On the contrary it has encountered great difficulties, and zig-zags and reversals are marked. The success or failure depends upon whether the third world treaty partners continue to share common long-term objectives or solely pre-occupy themselves with their short-term needs and gains. We have witnessed negative impact in the case of Egypt, Somalia and Iran, while in all other cases this relationship has been a success and brought about varying positive results. The successes and failures are only natural for a process of such magnitude and by no means they minimise its historical importance, as the balance sheet is on the side of positive results.

- To sum up; Soviet treaty relationship with the third world is indeed a kind of a model. This model emphasizes the pattern of relationship that states of different social systems can enter into a stable form of relationship on a

long-term basis, with a view to promote common and converged interests without compromising their independent identity or over-all objectives. Likewise, this is a model that signifies Soviet behaviour and conduct in the third world.

However, it would be naive to look at this relationship as a permanent feature of Soviet-third world relationship. By the very nature of this relationship it is bound to change both in nature and content. It certainly seems poised for further development.

At this point of time, one possible direction of development appears to be that this relationship may move from bilateralism to multilateralism, whereby the Soviet Union would like to draw more and more third world nations.

A pointer to this direction is Soviet idea for Asian Collective Security. Although the details have not yet been spelled out by the Soviet Union, it certainly envisages a multilateral arrangement based on regional economic cooperation and not a military arrangement directed against others. With a different background, in some ways such a development has already taken place in Europe by the signing of the Helsinki Agreement of 1975.

X ----- X ----- X ----- X

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Appendix - ITREATY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
FEDERATIVE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND PERSIA

(February 26, 1921)

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, of the one part, and the Government of Persia, of the other part, desiring to establish firm good-neighbourly and fraternal relations between the Persian and Russian peoples, have decided to engage in negotiations, for which purpose they have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries :

For the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic :

Georgi Chicherin and
Lev Karakhan;

For the Government of Persia :

Ali Gholi-Khan Mochaver-ol-Menalek;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following :

Article 1

In accordance with the declarations set forth in its Notes of January 14, 1918 and June 26, 1919 regarding Russia's policy towards the Persian nation, the Russian Soviet Government solemnly reaffirms that it irrevocably renounces the tyrannical policy towards Persia pursued by the imperialist Russian Governments that have been deposed by the will of the workers and peasants.

Accordingly and desiring that the Persian nation should be independent, prosperous and free to dispose of their patrimony, the Russian Soviet Government declares the whole body of treaties, conventions and agreements concluded by the tsarist Government and leading to infringements of the rights of the Persian nation to be null and void.

Article 2

The Russian Soviet Government stigmatises the policy of tsarist Government, which without the consent of the Asian peoples and on the pretext of safeguarding the independence of these peoples concluded treaties with other European States concerning Eastern countries with the end purpose of gradually seizing the East. The Russian Soviet Government unconditionally rejects this criminal policy, which not only encroaches upon the sovereignty of the Asian States but also makes the living nations of the East a prey to the organised flagrant tyranny of the European predators.

Accordingly and in conformity with the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 4 of this Treaty, the Russian Soviet Government declares its refusal to take part in any action which might undermine or violate the sovereignty of Persia and declares as null and void the entire body of conventions and agreements concluded by the former Government of Russia with third powers to the detriment and in respect of Persia.

Article 3

The two High Contracting Parties agree to recognise and respect the frontier between Persia and Russia as drawn and established by the Frontier Commission in 1881.

At the same time, refusing to enjoy the fruit of the tsarist Government's policy of aggrandizement, the Russian Soviet Government renounces all claim to the Ashouradeh Islands and to the other islands on the Astrabad Littoral and restores to Persia the village of Firouzeh and the adjacent territory ceded to Russia by Persia under the Agreement of May 28, 1893. For its part the Government of Persia agrees that the town of Seraks, known as Russian or Old Seraks, and the territory adjacent to it along the Seraks River shall be retained by Russia.

The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights to the use of the Atrek River and other frontiers rivers and waters, and in order to settle the question of the use of frontier waterways and all other frontier and territorial disputes by a commission composed of Russian and Persian representatives shall be appointed.

Article 4

In recognition of the right of each nation to settle its political affairs freely and without hindrance, each of the two High Contracting Parties renounces and shall strictly abstain from intervention in the internal affairs of the other Party.

Article 5

The two High Contracting Parties undertake :

1) To prevent the formation or presence on their territory of organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they call themselves, or of individuals, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia or against the allies of Russia. Moreover, they shall prohibit the recruitment or mobilisation in their territory of troops for the armies or armed forces of such organisations.

2) Not to allow Governments or organisations, irrespective of the name by which they call themselves, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against the other High Contracting Party, to bring into or transport across the territory of any of the two High Contracting Parties anything that may be used against the other High Contracting Party.

3) To prevent by all means at their disposal the presence on their territory of troops or armed forces of any Third Power in cases in which their presence create a threat to the frontiers, interests or security of the other High Contracting Party.

Article 6

The two High Contracting Parties agree that in the event third Powers, by means of armed intervention, shall attempt to implement a policy of aggrandizement on Persian territory or use Persian territory as a base for military

operations against Russia, in the event the frontiers of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic or of its allies are menaced, the Persian Government is unable to avert this menace, the Russian Soviet Government shall have the right to advance its troops into Persian territory in order to take the necessary action in self defence. The Russian Soviet Government undertakes to withdraw its troops from Persia as soon as the menace is removed.

Article 7

In view of the fact that the considerations set forth in Article 6 may concern security in the Caspian as well, the two High Contracting Parties agree that in the event the personnel of ships of the Persian Navy includes citizens of third Powers who utilise their presence in the Persian Navy for actions hostile to Russia, the Russian Soviet Government shall have the right to demand the expulsion of such harmful elements.

Article 8

The Russian Soviet Government completely renounces the financial policy pursued in the East by the tsarist Government, which loaned the Persian Government money not for the sake of promoting the economic development and prosperity of the Persian people but for purposes of political subjugation. Accordingly, the Russian Soviet Government renounces all its rights in respect of the loans granted to Persia by the tsarist subject to repayment. Moreover, it renounces all claim to those Persian

State revenues which were specified as security for the loans in question.

Article 9

In conformity with the declaration by which it has repudiated the imperialist colonial policy, which has been and remains the cause of the countless misfortunes and so much bloodshed, the Russian Soviet Government abandons the financial undertakings of tsarist Russia, the object of which was the economic subjugation of Persia. It therefore cedes to the Persian people the full ownership of all funds and of all the assets and liabilities of the Discount and Loan Bank of Persia, and also all real and other property of the said bank in Persia.

Note. The Government of Persia agrees that in the towns where it has been decided to establish Russian Consulates and where buildings belonging to Discount and Loan Bank of Persia exist, one of these buildings, to be chosen by the Soviet Government, shall be placed at the disposal of the Russian Consulate free of charge.

Article 10

The Russian Soviet Government rejects the striving of world imperialism to build roads and telegraph lines in foreign countries not so much as to promote the cultural development of the peoples as to ensure for itself a means for military penetration. Accordingly and desiring to provide

the Persian people with the possibility of freely disposing of the means of communication and intercourse indispensable for their independence and cultural development and, at the same time, to compensate to Persia as far as possible for the losses inflicted on her by troops of the tsarist Government, the Russian Soviet Government cedes, without compensation, to the full ownership of the Persian people the following Russian installations :

- a) the Enzeli-Teheran and Kazvin-Hamadan highways with all their land, buildings and stock;
- b) the Djoulfa-Tauris and Sofian-Lake Urmia railways with all their installations, rolling-stock and other property;
- c) the landing-stages, warehouses, steamships, barges and other means of transport in Lake Urmiah with all the attendant property;
- d) all the telegraph and telephone lines built by the tsarist Government in Persia with all the attendant property, buildings and stock;
- e) the port of Enzeli with its warehouses, power station and other buildings.

Article 11

In view of the fact that by virtue of the principles proclaimed in Article 1 of this Treaty, the peace treaty of Turkmanchai, concluded between Persia and Russia on February 10 (Old Style), 1828, and under the terms of whose Article 8 Persia was forbidden to have a fleet in the Caspian, is declared

null and void, the two High Contracting Parties shall, from the date of the signing^{of} the present Treaty, enjoy equal rights of free navigation in the Caspian Sea under their own flags.

Article 12

Having solemnly renounced the economic privileges obtained by military preponderance, the Russian Soviet Government, declares that in addition to the concessions enumerated in Article 9 and 10, all other concessions obtained by force from the Government of Persia by the tsarist Government for itself and its subjects shall also be regarded as null and void. As from the date of the signing of this Treaty, it restores to the Government of Persia as representing the Persian people all the concessions in question, whether already being worked or not, together with all the land obtained on the basis of those concessions. Of the land and the property situated in Persia and belonging to the former tsarist Government, Russia shall retain the premises of the Russian Legation at Teheran and at Zerguendeh with all the buildings and property in them, as well as real and other property of the Russian Consulates-General, Consulates and Vice-Consulates in Persia.

Note. The Russian Soviet Government waives the rights to administer the village of Zerguendeh which were assigned to the former tsarist Government.

Article 13

For its part, the Government of Persia promises that the concessions and property restored to Persia under the

present Treaty shall not be transferred to the possession, disposal or use of a third Power or its citizens, and that all the rights in question shall be retained for the welfare of the Persian people.

Article 14

Recognising the significance of the fisheries of the southern coast of the Caspian to the normal food supply of Russia, the Government of Persia agrees, upon the expiry of the operating treaty commitments relating to these fisheries, to sign an agreement with the appropriate food organ of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on the exploitation of the fisheries in question on the special terms that may be drawn up by that time.

Moreover, pending the signing of the said agreement, the Government of Persia agrees to discuss with the Russian Soviet Government the means enabling the food organs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to convey the produce from the fisheries in question to Russia.

Article 15

In accordance with the principle of freedom of religious worship proclaimed by it, the Russian Soviet Government desires to put an end to missionary religious propaganda in Moslem countries whose real purpose has been to exercise political influence over the masses and thus support the predatory intrigues of tsarism. The Russian Soviet Government therefore declares the closure of all the religious missions

instituted in Persia by the former tsarist Government and shall take steps to forbid the sending of such missions from Russia to Persia in the future.

The Russian Soviet Government cedes to the Government of Persia as the representative of the Persian people, without compensation and for its use in perpetuity, the land, buildings and property of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Urmia as well as all the property of other similar institutions.

The Government of Persia shall use the land, buildings and property in question for schools and other cultural and educational institutions.

Article 16

In accordance with the Soviet Note of June 26, 1919, on the abolition of Russian consular jurisdiction, Russian subjects residing in Persia and Persian subjects residing in Russia shall, as from the date the present Treaty is signed, enjoy equal rights with local citizens and shall be subject to the laws of the country of residence. All their judicial affairs shall be handled by the local courts.

Article 17

Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall be exempt from military service and from all military taxation.

Article 18

As regards free travel in the respective countries, Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall

enjoy the rights granted to the most favoured nation, except countries allied to Russia.

Article 19

Within the shortest possible period after the present Treaty is signed, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for organising the import and export of goods and for paying for them, as well as the size of and the procedure for levying customs duties on Russian goods by Persia shall be determined by a special Trade Convention to be drawn up by a special commission of representatives from the two Parties.

Article 20

The two High Contracting Parties shall reciprocally grant each other the right of transit for goods passing through Persia or Russia and consigned to a third country. The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than those levied on the goods of the most favoured nations, except countries allied to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

Article 21

Within the shortest possible period after the present Treaty is signed, the two high Contracting Parties shall restore telegraph and postal communications between Persia and Russia. The terms for these communications shall be defined in a special Telegraph Convention.

Article 22

In order to maintain^{the} good-neighbourly relations

established with the signing of the present Treaty and to strengthen friendly understanding, each of the High Contracting Parties shall be represented in the capital of the other Party by Plenipotentiary Representatives who shall, in Persia and in Russia, enjoy the rights of extra-territoriality and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives are entitled by International Law and usage as well as by the norms in operation in the two countries.

Article 23

With the purpose of promoting relations between their countries, the two High Contracting Parties shall establish Consulates in places to be determined by mutual agreement. The rights and competence of the Consuls shall be defined by the Consular Convention to be concluded as soon as this present Treaty is signed, and also by the rules and norms in operation in the two countries in relation to Consular establishments.

Article 24

This Treaty shall be ratified within a period of three months. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Teheran as soon as possible.

Article 25

This Treaty is done in duplicate, in the Persian and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Article 26

The present Treaty shall come into force as soon as it is signed.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Moscow on February 26, 1921.

Georgi Chicherin
L. Karakhan

Mochaver-ol-Memalik

Source : Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67
(Moscow, 1967), pp.39-47.

Appendix II

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (July 6, 1961).

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of the Korean People's Democratic Republic,

Anxious to promote and strengthen the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Korean People's Democratic Republic based on the principle of socialist internationalism,

Desiring to maintain and strengthen peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Resolved to extend assistance and support to one another in the event of military attack upon either of the Contracting Parties by any State or coalition of States,

Convinced that the strengthening of friendship, good-neighbour relations and co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Korean People's Democratic Republic is in accordance with the vital interests of the people of both States and will best serve to promote their further economic and cultural development,

Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries :

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics : Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of

the Council of Ministers of the USSR;

The Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of the Korean People's Democratic Republic : Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

The two Plenipotentiaries, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The Contracting Parties declare that they will continue to participate in all international action designed to safeguard peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world and will contribute to the realisation of these lofty aims.

Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a State of War, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

Article 2

Each Contracting Party undertakes not to enter into any alliance or to participate in any Coalition, or in any action or measure, directed against the other Contracting Party.

Article 3

In pursuance of their desire to strengthen ~~the~~ peace and universal security, the Contracting Parties shall consult

together on all important international issues involving the interests of both States.

Article 4

The two Contracting Parties undertake, in a spirit of friendship and co-operation in accordance with the principles of equal rights, mutual respect for State sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs, to develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, to render each other all possible assistance and to effect the necessary co-operation in the economic and cultural fields.

Article 5

The two Contracting Parties consider that the unification of Korea should be brought about on a peaceful and democratic basis and that such a solution is in keeping both with the national interests of the Korean people and with the cause of maintaining peace in the Far East.

Article 6

This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Pyongyang.

This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years. If neither of the Contracting Parties gives notice one year before

the expiry of the said period that it wishes to denounce the Treaty., it shall remain in force for the succeeding five years and shall thereafter continue in force in accordance with this provision.

Done at Moscow on July 6, 1961, in duplicate, each in the Russian and Korean languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authorisation
of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

N. Khrushchov

By authorisation
of the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of
the Korean People's Democrat
Republic

Kim Il Sung

Source : Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67,
(Moscow, 1967), pp.211-213.

Appendix III

TREATY
of Friendship and Co-operation Between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic
(May 27, 1971)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United Arab Republic,

firmly convinced that the further development of
friendship and all-round co-operation between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic corres-
ponds to the interests of the peoples of both states and
serves the cause of strengthening general peace,

inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism
and colonialism, and for freedom, independence and the social
progress of peoples,

full of determination unswervingly to wage a struggle
for the strengthening of international peace and security, in
accordance with the unshakeable course of their peace-loving
foreign policy,

affirming their loyalty to the goals and principles
of the United Nations Charter,

motivated by the desire to strengthen and solidify
the traditional relations of sincere friendship between both
states and peoples by concluding a Treaty of Friendship and
Co-operation, having created thereby a basis for their further
development,

have agreed to the following :

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that
between both countries and their peoples there will always

exist an unbreakable friendship. They will in the future develop and strengthen the relations of friendship existing between them and the all-round co-operation in political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other areas on the basis of the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention in the internal affairs of one another, equality and mutual benefit.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a socialist state, and the United Arab Republic, which has set as the goal a socialist reconstruction of society, will closely and thoroughly co-operate in securing conditions for the maintenance and further development of the socio-economic achievements of their peoples.

Article 3

Guided by the desire to aid in every way the maintenance of international peace and the security of peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic will continue with full determination to work for the achievement and securing of a firm and just peace in the Middle East in accordance with the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Conducting a peace-loving foreign policy, the High Contracting Parties will work for peace, the easing of international tension, the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the banning of nuclear and other types of

weapons of mass destruction.

Article 4

Guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of all peoples, the High Contracting Parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue in the future to denounce imperialism and ^{call} for the complete and final liquidation of colonialism through the implementation of the UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and they will wage an unwavering struggle against racialism and apartheid.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties will continue to expand and deepen their all-round co-operation and exchange of experience in economic, scientific and technological spheres --- in industry, agriculture, water use, irrigation, development of natural resources, construction of power projects, training of specialists and in other areas of the economy.

The parties will expand trade and shipping between the two states on the basis of mutual benefit and the most-favoured-nation principle.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties will aid the further development of co-operation between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinematography, tourism, sport, and other areas.

The Parties will help expand co-operation and direct contacts between political and public organisations of working people, between enterprises and cultural and scientific institutions with a view to deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, labour and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 7

Being deeply interested in safeguarding peace and the security of peoples and attaching great significance to the coordination of their actions in the international arena in the struggle for peace, the High Contracting Parties will, for this purpose, regularly consult each other at various levels on all important problems affecting the interests of both states.

In case a situation develops that creates, in the opinion of both sides, a threat to peace or the violation of peace, they will without delay contact each other to co-ordinate their positions in order to remove the threat that has arisen or to restore peace.

Article 8

To strengthen the defence capacity of the United Arab Republic, the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop their co-operation in the military sphere on the basis of existing agreements between them. This co-operation will

provide, in particular, for aid in training the military personnel of the UAR, in the mastery of arms and equipment delivered to the United Arab Republic to strengthen its capacity in the matter of overcoming the consequences of aggression as well as to strengthen its capacity to resist aggression in general.

Article 9

Proceeding from the goals and principles of the present treaty, each of the High Contracting Parties declares that it will not enter alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, or in actions or measures, directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that its obligations under existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present treaty and pledges itself not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with them.

Article 11

The present Treaty is operative for 15 years from the day it comes into force.

If neither of the High Contracting Parties declares, one year before the expiration of the time indicated, its wish to discontinue the treaty, it will remain in force for another 5 years, and so on, until one of the High Contracting Parties

makes a written declaration one year before the expiration of the current five-year period of its intention to discontinue the treaty.

Article 12

The present treaty is subject to ratification and will come into force on the day instruments of ratification are exchanged, which will take place in Moscow in the very near future.

The present treaty is drawn up in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Cairo, May 27, 1974, which corresponds to the 3rd day of rabia ath-thani 1391 year of Hijra.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

N. PODGORNY

For the United Arab
Republic

ANWAR SADAT

Source : The Policy of Soviet Union in the Arab World
(Moscow, 1975), pp.168-172.

Appendix IV**TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (AUGUST 9, 1971)**

DESIROUS of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

BELIEVING that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both the states as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

DETERMINED to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism.

UPHOLDING their firm faith in the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states with different political and social systems,

CONVINCED that in the world today international problems can only be solved by cooperation and not by conflict,

REAFFIRMING their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side,

HAVE decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India :

Sardar Swaran Singh,
Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A.A. Gromyko,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

who, having each presented their credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order,

HAVE AGREED as follows :

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive cooperation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE II

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

ARTICLE III

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality

of all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other states to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of India respects the peace-loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

ARTICLE V

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual cooperation in the international field for achieving those aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both the states by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations

and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE VI

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological cooperation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive cooperation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970.

ARTICLE VII

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

ARTICLE VIII

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE IX

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

ARTICLE X

Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more states, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligations exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other state or states, which might cause military damage to the other party.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party

twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XII

Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty which may arise between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in New Delhi, on the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.

On behalf of the
Republic of India

Sd/- SWARAN SINGH
Minister of
External Affairs

On behalf of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

Sd/- A.A. GROMYKO
Minister of
Foreign Affairs

Source : M. Venugopala Rao, FRIENDS AND PARTNERS : FIVE YEARS OF INDO-SOVIET TREATY, (Allied : New Delhi, 1971), pp. 67-71.

Appendix VTREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ (APRIL 9, 1972)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Republic of Iraq,

firmly convinced that the further development of
friendship and all-round co-operation between them corresponds
to the national interests of both states and will serve the
cause of peace throughout the world and in the region of the
Arab countries, the interests of the freedom of peoples, their
security and respect for their sovereignty;

Considering the strengthening of the solidarity of
all the forces of peace and progress, including the strengthening
of the unity of the Arab States, on an anti-imperialist basis
an important means of struggle for a firm peace and international
security;

inspired by the ideals of the struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, Zionism and reaction, and for freedom,
independence and the social progress of peoples;

convinced that in the contemporary world international
problems must be resolved through co-operation and search for
mutually acceptable solutions,

affirming their peace-loving foreign policy and their
loyalty to the goals and principles of the United Nations
Charter,

Wishing to develop and strengthen the existing relations
of friendship, co-operation and mutual trust, striving to raise

these relations to a new level, have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and have agreed to the following.

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties declare that unbreakable friendship will exist between the two countries and their peoples and that all-round-co-operation will develop in political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other spheres on the basis of respects for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intefexence in the internal affairs of each other.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Iraq declare that they will co-operate closely and thoroughly in securing conditions for the preservation and further development of the socio-economic achievements of their peoples and for respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties, consistently following a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures, will continue in the future, in accordance with their peace-loving foreign policy, to work for peace throughout the world, a lessening of international tension, the achievement of general and full disarmament, extending both to nuclear and ordinary types of arms, under effective international supervision.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties, guided by the ideals of the freedom and equality of all peoples, condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to wage an unwavering struggle against imperialism and Zionism and for the full, final and unconditional abolition of colonialism and neocolonialism, racialism and apartheid, to work for the rapid and complete implementation of the UN Declaration of Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The Parties will co-operate with each other and with other peace-loving states in support of the just struggle of peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

Article 5

Attributing great significance to economic, technical and scientific co-operation between themselves, the High Contracting Parties will continue to expand and deepen this co-operation and the exchange of experience in industry, agriculture, irrigation and water economy, exploitation of oil and other national resources, in the field of communications and in other branches of the economy, and likewise in the training of specialists. The Parties will expand trade and shipping between the two states on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and the most-favoured-nation principle.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties will further the

development of contacts between themselves in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, cinematography, television, tourism, sport and in other fields.

For a more complete acquaintance with the life, labour and achievements of the peoples of both countries in various fields, the Parties will aid the expansion of co-operation and direct contacts between the state bodies and public organisations, enterprises, and cultural and scientific institutions of the two sides.

Article 7

Attaching great significance to concerted action in the international arena for guaranteeing peace and security, and likewise to the development of political co-operation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the High Contracting Parties will regularly consult each other at various levels on all important international questions that affect the interests of both states, as well as on questions of the further development of bilateral relations.

Article 8

In case of a threat to either of the Parties or a threat to peace or a violation of peace, the High Contracting Parties will immediately contact each other in order to co-ordinate their positions to remove the threat that has arisen to restore peace.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parties, in the interests of the

security of the two countries, will continue to develop their co-operation in the matter of strengthening their defence capacity.

Article 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that it will not enter any alliances or take part in any groups of states, or in any actions or measures, directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent the use of its territory for the perpetration of any act that could inflict military harm on the other party.

Article 11

Both High Contracting Parties declare that their responsibilities under existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present Treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements, incompatible with it.

Article 12

The present Treaty is concluded for a period of 15 years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless one of the High Contracting Parties declares its desire to discontinue its operation, having informed the other High Contracting Party 12 months before the expiration of the term of operation of the Treaty.

Article 13

Any differences that may arise between the High Contracting Parties relative to the interpretation of any provision

of the present Treaty will be resolved bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and will come into force from the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which will take place in Moscow in as short a time as possible.

The present Treaty is drawn up in two copies, each in Russian and in Arabic, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Baghdad on April 9, 1972, which corresponds to 25th safar 1392 year of Hijra.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

A. Kosygin

For the Republic of
Iraq

A.H. al-Bakr

Source : The Policy of the Soviet Union in the Arab World,
(Progress : Moscow, 1975), pp.178-183.

Appendix VITREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE
SOMALIAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (July 11, 1974)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the
Somalian Democratic Republic,

believing that, further development and strengthening
of the relations of friendship and all round cooperation
between them, meet the basic national interests of this
peoples of the two countries and serve the cause of stren-
gthening peace throughout the world,

inspired by, the ideals of struggle against imperialism
and colonialism, and being guided by the desire to render
support to the peoples fighting for their freedom, independence
and social progress and to achieve complete liquidation of
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations,

firmly restoring, to promote the strengthening of
international peace and security in the interests of the
peoples of the world,

convinced, that the international problems of modern
world must be resolved by peaceful means,

reaffirming, their adherence to principles and
purposes of the United Nations Charter,

motivated by the desire to consolidate the establishmen
of friendly relations and cooperation of mutual benefits between
both the countries, and laying the foundations for their
further development,

decided to conclude a genuine treaty of friendship and cooperation and agreed upon the following :

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that an everlasting peace and friendship will exist between both the countries and their people. The parties will develop and strengthen their relations on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs and complete equality. They shall cooperate in every possible way to ensure the conditions for preserving and deepening the socio-economic achievements of their people.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the Somalian Democratic Republic shall further enhance and deepen the all round cooperation and exchange of experiences ⁱⁿ the economic, scientific and technical fields --- in industry, agriculture, cattle development, breeding, irrigation, natural resources and development of energetics, in training of personnels and in other corresponding fields of economy.

The High Contracting Parties shall expand trade and navigation between them, on the basis of the principles of mutual benefits and greatest favour in accordance with the trade and payment agreements between both the countries, which was concluded on June 2, 1961 in Moscow.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties shall promote the further development of cooperation between them in the field of science, art, literature, education, public health care, science, film, television, tourism, sports and other fields.

The Parties shall promote the further development of cooperation and abiding ties between the political and social organisations of workers, enterprises, cultural and scientific instruments with aim of deeper mutual acquaintance, with the life work and achievements of the peoples of both the countries.

Article 4

In the interests of ensuring the defence capabilities of the Somalian Democratic Republic, the High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop cooperation in the field of armed forces, on the basis of respective agreements concluded between them. Such cooperation shall envisage in details, the promotion of the training of Somalian military personnels in assimilation and supply of armaments and equipments to the Somalian Democratic Republic, with the aim to strengthen its defence capabilities.

Article 5

Pursuing a peace loving foreign policy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and Somalian Democratic Republic, shall assist in every possible way to maintain peace and weakening the international tensions, to solve international disputes by

peaceful means and to achieve universal disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament.

Article 6

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic respects the Somalian Democratic Republic's policy of non-alignment, which is an important factor in maintaining international peace and security.

Somalian Democratic Republic respects the peace loving foreign policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic which is aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties, following the ideals of freedom and equality of all the people, condemn imperialism and colonialism, in all its forms and manifestations. They shall cooperate against the forces of imperialism and colonialism, with other states also, in supporting ~~their~~ just struggle of the people for freedom, independence and social progress on the basis of the principles of equality and self determination of the peoples ~~as~~ as is expressed in the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 8

Expressing their deep interest in the promotion of universal peace and security and attaching importance to the cooperation between them in international affairs, to achieve these aims, the High Contracting Parties shall regularly hold

discussions and will exchange their views on important international problems. These discussions and exchange of views will include :

international questions, including the situations causing tensions in various regions of the world, with a view to cooperate for the relaxation of tensions, development of cooperation and strengthening of security,

issues which are the subjects of multilateral talks, including those which are being discussed by international organisations and conferences,

questions of political, economic and cultural importance and other questions, concerning relations between the two countries,

Such discussions and exchange of views shall take place by the means of meetings of the leading statesmen of both the sides, visits of official delegations and special representatives, as well as through diplomatic channels.

Article 9

In the event of situation that constitutes a threat or a breach of international peace, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to immediate contact with each other, with a view to eliminate the threat that has arisen or restoring peace.

Article 10

Both the High Contracting Parties declare, that they shall not enter into alliance or participate in any groupings of states or in actions or measures directed against any of

the High Contracting Parties.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties declare that the provisions of the present Treaty, are not inconsistent with their commitments under their existing international treaties, and undertake not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with this treaty.

Article 12

The treaty shall remain into force for twenty years after its entry into force.

Unless either High Contracting Party declares, one year prior to the expiration of the said period, its desire to terminate the treaty it shall remain in force for the successive periods of five years until one of the High Contracting Parties gives, one year prior to the expiration of the current five year period, a written notice of its intention to terminate it.

Article 13

The treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Moscow.

The treaty is made in two copies, each in Russian and Somali languages, both the texts being equally authentic.

Done in Mogadisho on 11 July, 1974.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

N. Podgorny

For the Somali Democratic
Republic

Mohammad Syed Barre

Source : Pravda (July 12, 1974).

Appendix VII

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
(OCTOBER 8, 1976)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
People's Republic of Angola :

believing that the further development and
strengthening of the relations of friendship and all-
round co-operation established between them as a result
of the struggle for freedom and independence of Angola is
in the fundamental national interests of the peoples of both
countries and serves the cause of peace all over the world;

inspired by the ideals of the struggle against
imperialism, colonialism and racialism in all their forms and
manifestations and by their unswerving desire to render
every support to the peoples fighting for freedom, independence
and social progress; determined to promote international
peace and security in the interests of the people of all
countries;

reaffirming their loyalty to the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter;

advocating the unity of all progressive forces in
the struggle for peace, freedom, independence and social
progress and believing that the development of friendly
relations and extensive co-operation between the socialist
States and the developing States^{is} in accord with their common
interests;

Taking into consideration the Declaration on the Principles Governing Friendly Relations and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Angola of 26 May 1976 and prompted by the desire to strengthen the relations of friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation existing between both States and peoples; have decided to conclude this Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties declare that between both countries and their peoples there shall exist unbreakable friendship and that all-round co-operation shall develop in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and equality.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties declare that they will exercise close and all-round co-operation in ensuring conditions for the preservation and further development of the social and economic gains of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

Article 3

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of non-alignment followed by the People's Republic

of Angola, which is an important factor in maintaining international peace and security.

The People's Republic of Angola respect the peaceful foreign policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a Socialist State.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to work for peace in the world, the deep development of detente and its embodiment in specific forms of mutually beneficial cooperation among states, for settling international problems by peaceful means, for the conclusion of a world treaty against the use of force in international relations and for the achievement of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to wage an unrelenting struggle against the forces of imperialism and for the final abolition of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racialism and apartheid and shall work for the full implementation of the UN Declaration on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples.

The Parties shall co-operate with each other and with other peace-loving States in supporting the just fight of nations for sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties, expressing their deep interest in ensuring universal peace and security and attaching

great importance to co-operation between them on the international scene to achieve these aims, shall regularly exchange opinions with each other on major international issues and also on questions of bilateral relations.

These consultations and exchanges of views shall cover; international issues, including situations causing tension in various parts of the world, with a view of promoting detente, developing co-operation and strengthening international security; questions which are the subjects for multilateral talks, including those considered by international bodies and at international conferences; political, economic and cultural questions and other questions concerning relations between the two countries.

These consultations and exchanges of views shall take place at various levels notably through meetings between leading statesmen of the sides, during visits by official delegations and special representatives and also through diplomatic channels.

Article 7

In the event of any situation arising that may create a danger to peace or disturb peace, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately establish contact with each other in order to co-ordinate their positions in the interests of removing the danger or restoring peace.

Article 8

Attaching great importance to economic, technical and scientific co-operation between them, the High Contracting

Parties shall continue to expand and deepen such co-operation and exchange experience in industry, transport, field and animal husbandry, fishing, the working of natural resources, the development of energy and communications, in the training of national personnel and also in other fields of the economy.

The sides shall expand trade and shipping between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most-favoured nation treatment.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the future development of ties and co-operation between them in the field of science, art, literature, education, public health, the press, radio, the cinema, television, tourism, and sport/in other fields.

The sides shall facilitate the expansion of co-operation and close ties between political and public organizations, enterprises and cultural and scientific institutions in order to promote a still broader mutual acquaintance with the life, work and achievements of the peoples of both countries.

Article 10

In the interests of strengthening the defence capability of the High Contracting Parties, they shall continue to promote co-operation in the military field on the basis of corresponding agreements concluded between them.

Article 11

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that

it will not enter into alliances or join in any grouping of States, nor will it take part in any moves or undertakings directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not run counter to the provisions of this Treaty and pledge that they will not conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 13

Any questions which may arise between the High Contracting Parties in relation to the interpretation or application of any provision of this Treaty will be settled bilaterally in a spirit of friendship mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

This Treaty shall run for a period of 20 years from the moment it comes into force. Unless either of the High Contracting Parties states, no later than one year before its expiration, its desire to terminate the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next five years, and this shall continue until either of the High Contracting Parties notifies the other in writing, no later than one year before the expiration of the current five-year period, of its intention to terminate its operation.

Article 15

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, and shall come into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification, this to take place in the city of Luanda.

Source : Soviet News, 26 October 1976.

Appendix VIII

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
(APRIL 18, 1977).

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
People's Republic of Mozambique :

considering that the relations of friendship and
co-operation which took shape between the Soviet and
Mozambique peoples in the difficult years of the people's
war for liberation of Mozambique and which have grown stronger
since the formation of the People's Republic of Mozambique
are in keeping with the vital interests of both sides and
serve the cause of world peace;

being determined to support each other in the crea-
tion of more favourable conditions for the consolidation of
the revolutionary social and economic gains of both peoples;

inspired by the ideals of the struggle against
imperialism, colonialism and racialism;

prompted by the desire to render support to the
struggle for world peace and security in the interest of the
peoples of all countries;

declaring themselves in favour of the unity and
co-operation of all progressive forces in the struggle for
independence, freedom, peace and social progress;

reaffirming their loyalty of the aims and principles

of the UN Charter;

and striving to strengthen the existing relations of friendship and mutually-beneficial co-operation between their two states and peoples, which are natural allies;

have decided to conclude this Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and have agreed on the following :

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties proclaim their resolve to strengthen and deepen the unbreakable friendship between the two countries and peoples and to develop all-round co-operation. On the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and equality, the two parties will co-operate in every possible way in creating ever more favourable conditions for preserving and deepening the social and economic gains of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Mozambique.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties attach great importance to all-round co-operation between them and to the exchange of experience in the economic, technical and scientific spheres. For these purposes, they will expand and deepen co-operation in industry, transport and communications, agriculture, fisheries, the development of natural resources, the development of (energy) and other spheres of the economy, and also in the training of national personnel.

Both sides will expand trade and shipping on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured nation treatment.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties will promote the development of co-operation, mutual assistance and the exchange of experience in science, culture, art, literature, education, the health services, the press, radio, the cinema, tourism, sports and other spheres.

The two sides will promote the broadening of co-operation and direct links between political and public organization, enterprises and cultural and scientific institutions in order to deepen mutual knowledge of the life, work, experience and achievements of the peoples of both countries.

Article 4

In the interests of reinforcing the defence potentials of the High Contracting Parties, they will continue developing co-operation in the military sphere on the basis of appropriate agreements.

Article 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of non-alignment pursued by the People's Republic of Mozambique - a policy that is an important factor in maintaining world peace and security.

The People's Republic of Mozambique respect the

policy of peace aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all peoples that is being pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties will continue the struggle for world peace and will go on making every effort to deepen the relaxation of international tensions. They will support its implementation in specific forms of mutually-beneficial co-operation between states. Both sides will make every effort to achieve general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control, to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to conclude an international treaty on the renunciation of the use of force in international relations.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties will continue the consistent struggle against the forces of imperialism and for the final abolition of colonialism, neocolonialism, racialism, and complete implementation of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The two sides will co-operate with each other and with other peaceful states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for freedom, independence and social progress.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties, expressing profound interest in ensuring peace and international security and

attaching great importance to their co-operation in the international field for the purpose of achieving these goals will regularly exchange views on important international questions in the spirit of mutual understanding. Such consultations and exchanges of opinion will also include questions concerning bilateral relations.

Consultations and exchanges of opinion will be held at various levels, and specifically through meetings between leading statesmen of both countries, during visit of official delegations and special representatives and through diplomatic channels.

Article 9

If situations arise that threaten peace or lead to an outbreak of war, the High Contracting Parties will immediately get into touch with each other in order to co-ordinate their positions in the interests of eliminating the threat that has arisen or restoring peace.

Article 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that it will not enter into any military or other alliance, or take part in any groupings of states, or in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not

at variance with the provisions of this treaty, and pledge themselves not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12

Questions that may arise between the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or the application of any provision of this treaty will be settled in a bilateral way, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and mutual respect.

Article 13

The present treaty will operate for 20 years from the day it comes into force.

If neither of the High Contracting Parties expresses its wish to terminate the treaty one year before the expiration of the aforementioned term, the treaty will remain in force for the next five years, and so on, until one of the High Contracting Parties makes a written statement, one year before the expiration of the current five-year period, signifying its intention to terminate the treaty.

Article 14

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and will come into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to take place in Moscow.

Appendix IX

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND
THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (November
3, 1978).

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam,

proceeding from their close fraternal relations
of all-round co-operation, from the unbreakable friendship
and solidarity resting on the principles of Marxism-Leninism
and socialist internationalism;

firmly convinced that the utmost strengthening of
solidarity and friendship of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is in the
vital interests of the peoples of the two countries and serves
the cause of the further consolidation of the fraternal soli-
darity and unity of the countries of the socialist community;

guided by the principles and aims of socialist
foreign policy and by the desire to ensure the most favourable
international conditions for building socialism and communism;

reaffirming that the two sides regard it their inter-
nationalist duty to assist each other in consolidating and
protecting socialist gains achieved at the cost of the heroic
efforts and selfless labour of their peoples;

resolutely favouring the unity of all forces fighting
for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress;

expressing firm determination to promote stronger
peace in Asia and throughout the world, to contribute to the

development of good relations and mutually beneficial co-operation between states with different social systems;

striving to continue developing and perfecting all-round co-operation between the two countries;

attaching great importance to the further expansion and consolidation of the contractual-legal basis of their relations;

in keeping with the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

have decided to conclude this Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and agreed as follows :

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties shall, in keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism, continue to strengthen their relations of inviolable friendship, solidarity and fraternal mutual assistance. They shall steadfastly develop political relations, deepen all-round co-operation and give each other all-round support based on mutual respect for state sovereignty and independence, equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties shall join efforts for the purpose of strengthening and expanding mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical co-operation so as to expedite socialist and communist construction, and steadily raise the material and cultural standards of the peoples of both countries.

The Parties shall continue to co-ordinate their national economic plans on a long-term basis, agree promising measures on development of key branches of the economy, science and engineering, and exchange knowledge and experience accumulated in the course of socialist and communist construction.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate co-operation between the organs of the state power and public organisations, and promote broad ties in science and culture, education, literature and the arts, the press, radio and television, public health, environmental protection, tourism, physical culture and sports, and other fields. They shall encourage the development of contacts between the peoples of the two countries.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties shall, consistently and in every way, further strengthen the fraternal relations, unity and solidarity of the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

They shall do their utmost to further consolidate the world socialist system and shall actively contribute to the development and protection of socialist gains.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to make every effort to safeguard international peace and the security

of the peoples, vigorously counter all the designs and intrigues of imperialism and reactionary forces, support the just struggle for the final abolition of colonialism and racism in all their ~~existing~~ forms and manifestations, support the struggle of the non-aligned countries, the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and for stronger independence, in defence of sovereignty, for the right freely to manage their natural resources, for the establishment of new international economic relations free from inequality, dictate and exploitation, and shall back the striving of the peoples of Southeast Asia for peace, independence and co-operation between them.

They shall steadfastly work for the development of relations between countries with different social systems of the principles of peaceful coexistence, for broadening and deepening the process of detente in international relations, for completely excluding aggression and wars of conquest from the life of the peoples, for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism .

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties shall consult each other on all important international problems of concern to both countries. Should one of the Parties become the object of attack or threat of attack, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately begin mutual consultations for the purpose of removing

that threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

Article 7

This treaty does not affect the rights and commitments of the Parties under operating bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded with their participation, and is not directed against any third country.

Article 8

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification to be held in Hanoi at the earliest date.

Article 9

This Treaty shall be in force for twenty-five years and shall be automatically prolonged for successive ten-year periods until either of the High Contracting Parties furnishes notification of its intent to terminate the Treaty 12 months prior to the expiration of the respective period.

Done in the City of Moscow on November 3, 1978, in duplicate, in the Russian and Vietnamese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

L. Brezhnev
A. Kosygin

For the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam

Lo Duan
Phan Van Dong

Source : Visit to the USSR of the Party and Government Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, November 1-9, 1978, (Progress : Moscow, 1978), pp. 16-19.

Appendix X**TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND
SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA (November 20, 1978).**

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Socialist Ethiopia believing that the further development and strengthening of the relations of friendship and all-round cooperation which have come into being between them meet the basic national interests of the peoples of the two countries and serve the cause of strengthening peace and security throughout the world;

desirous of making their corresponding contribution to the development of peaceful relations between states and fruitful international cooperation;

determined to advance social and economic achievements of the Soviet and Ethiopian peoples;

inspired by the ideals of consistent struggle against imperialism and expansionism as well as against colonialism, racism, apartheid in all their forms and manifestations and being guided by the desire to render support to the peoples fighting for their freedom, independence and social progress;

reaffirming their adherence to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, including the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other;

bearing in mind the Declaration on basic principles of friendly relations and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Socialist Ethiopia of May 6, 1977

and motivated by the desire to consolidate still further these relations of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states and peoples;

have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties shall develop and deepen the relations of unbreakable friendship and comprehensive cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific and technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties declare that they shall closely cooperate in every way in ensuring the conditions for preserving and further developing socio-economic achievements of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

Article 3

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy pursued by Socialist Ethiopia based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and non-aligned movement which constitutes an important factor in the development of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

Socialist Ethiopia respects the peace-loving foreign policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which

is aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to make every effort to safeguard international peace and the security of peoples, deepen the process of international detente, extend it to all areas of the world, lend it concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation between states, and settle international controversial issues by peaceful means without prejudice to the legitimate rights of states to defend themselves, individually or collectively, against aggression, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. They shall actively contribute to the cause of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall continue actively to work for the complete elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid, and the full implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties shall consult each other on important international questions directly involving the interests of the two countries.

Article 7

In the event of the situation which constitute a threat to or a breach of international peace, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to immediately contact each other with a view to coordinating their positions in the interests of removing the threat that has arisen or restoring peace.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties shall, attaching great importance to economic, trade and scientific cooperation between them, expand and deepen cooperation and the exchange of experience in these fields. The parties shall expand all-round cooperation between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nations treatment.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parties shall promote the further development of ties and cooperation between them in the fields of science, culture, art, literature, education, health, press, radio, cinema, television, tourism, sports and in other fields for the purpose of more profound mutual acquaintance with the life, work, experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 10

In the interests of ensuring the defence capability of the High Contracting Parties, they shall continue to cooperate in the military field.

Article 11

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that it shall not enter into any alliance or participate in any groupings of states or in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties declare that the provisions of the present treaty are not inconsistent with their commitments under international treaties in force and undertake not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with this treaty.

Article 13

Any questions that may arise between the High Contracting Parties with regard to the interpretation or application of any provision of this treaty shall be resolved on a bilateral basis in the spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

The treaty shall remain in force for twenty years after its entry into force.

Unless either High Contracting Party declares, one year prior to the expiration of the said period, its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force for the successive periods of five years until one of the High Contracting Parties gives, one year prior to the expiration of the current five-year period, a written notice of its intention to terminate it.

Article 15

This treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Addis Ababa as early as possible.

This treaty is made in two copies, each in the Russian, Amharic and English languages, all the texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on November 20, 1978.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

L.I. BREZHNEV

For Socialist Ethiopia

MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM

Source : International Affairs (Documents), (Moscow, January 1, 1979), pp.148-150.

Appendix XI

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS AND
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
(December 5, 1978)

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,

" Reaffirming their commitment to the aims and
principles of the Afghan-Soviet Treaties of 1921 and 1931, which
laid the basis for friendly and good neighbourly relation between
the Afghan and Soviet peoples and which meet their basic
national interests".

" Willing to strengthen in every way friendship and
all-round cooperation between the two countries".

" Being determined to develop social and economic
achievement of the Afghan and Soviet people, to safeguard their
security and independence to come out resolutely for the cohesion
of and the forces fighting for peace, national independence,
democracy and social progress".

" Expressing their firm determination to facilitate
the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and the whole
world, to make their contribution towards developing relations
among states and strengthening fruitful and mutually beneficial
co-operation in Asia, attaching great importance to the further
consolidation of the contractual legal basis of their relations".

" Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter".

"Decided to conclude the present treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation and agreed on the following :

Article 1

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare their determination to strengthen and deepen the inviolable friendship between the two countries and to develop all-round cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty-territorial integrity and non-interference in each others national affairs".

Article 2

"The High Contracting Parties shall make efforts to strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them. With these aims in view, they shall develop and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry transport and communications, agriculture, the use of national resources, development of the power generating industry and other branches of economy, to give each other assistance in the training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy. The two Cides shall expand trade on the basis of principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured nation treatment".

Article 3

"The High Contracting Parties shall promote the development of cooperation and exchange of experience in the field of cooperation and exchange of experience in the field

of science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sport and other fields".

"The two sides shall facilitate the expansion of cooperation between organs of state power and public organisation enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to making a deeper acquaintance with the life, work experience and achievements of the people of the two countries".

Article 4

"The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good-neighbourliness as well as the UN Charter, shall consult the each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries".

"In the interests of the strengthening the defence capacity of the high contracting parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

Article 5

"The democratic Republic of Afghanistan respects the policy of peace pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of non-alignment which is pursued by the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan and which is an important factor for maintaining international peace and security".

Article 6

"Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not join any military or other alliances or take directed against the other high contracting party".

Article 7

"The High Contracting Parties shall continue to make every effort to defend international peace and the security, ~~and~~ spread it to all areas of the world, including Asia, to translate it into concrete forms of mutually beneficial co-operation among states and to settle international disputed issues by peaceful means".

"The two sides shall actively contribute toward general and complete disarmament including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control".

Article 8

"The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the development of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace-good-neighbourliness and mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent".

Article 9

"The High Contracting Parties shall continue their

consistent struggle against machinations by the forces of aggression, for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations".

"The two sides shall cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggles of the peoples for their freedom independence, sovereignty and social progress".

Article 10

"The High Contracting Parties shall consult each other on all major international issue affecting the interests of the two countries".

Article 11

"The High Contracting Parties state that their commitments under the existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it".

Article 12

"Questions which may arise between the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of the present Treaty, shall be settled bilaterally, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect".

Article 13

"The present treaty remain in force for 20 years of the day it becomes effective".

"Unless one of the high contracting parties declares

six months before the expiration of this term of its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force for the next five years until one of the high contracting parties warns in writing the other party, six months before the expiration of current five-years term about its intention to terminate the treaty".

Article 14

"If one of the high contracting parties express the wish in the course of the 20 years term of the treaty, to terminate it before its expiration date it shall notify in writing the other party, six months before it suggested date of expiration of the treaty, about its desire to terminate the treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the treaty terminated as of the date thus set".

Article 15

"The present Treaty shall be ratified and take effect on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to take place in Kabul".

"Done in Duplicate, each in the Dari and Russian Languages, both texts being equally authentic.

"Done in Moscow on December 5, 1978"

Source : The Times of India, (December 6, 1978)

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