

CRISIS REPORTING AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS: THE CASE STUDY OF HAZRATBAL

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

by

JAMMULA PRAVIN KUMAR

**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH EAST
ASIAN AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

NEW DELHI - 110067

INDIA

1995




जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST ASIAN
AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC STUDIES

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled
*CRISIS REPORTING AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS: THE CASE STUDY OF
HAZRATBAL* submitted by Mr Jammula Pravin Kumar in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree
of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY is his original work and has not
been previously submitted for any degree of this or any
other University.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the
examiners for evaluation.


[BALADAS GHOSHAL]
CHAIRPERSON


[NANCY JETLY]
SUPERVISOR

JULY 17, 1995

TO THOSE NOBLE SOULS
IN
INDIA & PAKISTAN
WHO CONTINUE TO DEFY
THE PAST AND PRESENT
IN ORDER TO SECURE
A
FUTURE OF PEACE IN
INDO-PAK RELATIONS

CONTENTS

	PAGE NO.
LIST OF TABLES	i
PREFACE	ii-x
CHAPTER-1 MASS MEDIA, INTER-STATE CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL CRISIS	1-25
I. THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF NEWS MEDIA	
II. NEWS MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	
III. EVOLVING PATTERNS	
IV. LOGIC OF CONFLICT	
V. CONFLICT VS CRISIS	
VI. CRISIS AND IMAGE POLITICS	
VII. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM: A CRISIS	
CHAPTER-2 A BACKGROUND STUDY	26-66
I. INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT	
[i] Pattern of Group Mobilization and Communal Competition	
[ii] Crystallization: Insecure Elites and Embedded Conflicts	
[iii] Reinforcement: The Antagonist Syndrome	
[iv] The Kashmir Tragedy: Protectors Duplicity and Invaders Complicity	
II. HAZRATBAL CRISIS	
[i] The Significance of Holy Relic and the Holy Dargah	
[ii] The First Crisis [27 Dec 1963-4 Jan 1964]	
[iii] The Present Crisis [15 Oct 1993-10 Nov 1993]	
CHAPTER-3 INDIA, PAKISTAN MEDIA AND HAZRATBAL CRISIS	67-92
[i] Hypothesis and Rationale	
[a] Indian News Media	
[b] Pakistan News Media	

- [ii] Study Sampling and Measurement
- [iii] Selection of the Study period
- [iv] Inventory
- [v] Sample
- [vi] Method of Analysis
- [vii] Reliability of Means
- [viii] Findings and Analysis

CHAPTER 4 A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

93-130

I. QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS

- [i] The Quantity of News Item on Indo-Pakistan Relations
- [ii] Placement of Indo-Pakistani News
- [iii] Types of News
- [iv] Sources of News
- [v] Origin of News
- [vi] Frequency of News
- [vii] Themes of News
 - [a] Indian Press
 - [b] Pakistani Press

II. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS

CHAPTER-4	CONCLUSION	131-134
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	135-145

LIST OF TABLE

S.No.	Table No.	Title	Page
1.	1	Profile of the Newspapers Sample from India and Pakistan	81
2.	2	Total News Items on Indo-Pakistan Relations and its Placement in the Indian and Pakistani Press	94
3.	3	Types of News Concerning Indo-Pakistan Relation during Hazratbal Crisis [in No's]	99
4.	4-A	Types and amount [2-In Col.] of news items Concerning Indo-Pakistan Relation during Hazratbal Crisis [in Per Cent]	100
5.	4-B	Indian Press Vs Pakistan Press [Proportionate Type of News]	101
6.	5-A	Place of Origin of News Under Study	108
7.	5-B	Indian Press Vs Pakistani Press [Proportionate Origin of News]	109
8.	6-A	Frequencies of News on Daily Basis [in No's]	111
9.	6-B	Frequencies of News on Daily Basis [2-Inch Column Size]	112
10.	7-A	Total Frequencies of Reference made to Items in Pakistan Inventory by the Indian Press During the Hazratbal Crisis.	118- 119
11.	7-B	Total Frequencies of Reference made to Items in Indian Inventory by the Pakistan Press during the Hazratbal Crisis.	120- 121

PREFACE

There are many gaps in the field of international relations which remain to be filled to have a clear and coherent picture of the nature and behaviour of mankind and its basic building blocks, nations. These gaps exist owing to the limitations of traditional research tools used to study the conduct of nations with one another. The problem of war, for instance, was initially explained through political science and historical analysis perspective and little or no emphasis was paid on communication flows, civilizational differences and ethnic discord, to name a few of the many essential modern interdisciplinary approaches. It was because either these new concepts were not developed properly or the earlier explanations seemed convincing.

However, when those new approaches gained currency in usage and importance, not only unfilled gaps, were filled up but also the entire problem was looked anew and revised to see if better explanation could be found for a convincing paradigm. This is precisely the case with this research dealing with Indo-Pakistan relations, characterized in the recent past as one of conflict. It fulfills the two

criteria mentioned above; it looks at Indo-Pakistan conflict with a new perspective, the mass communication approach which has not been treated with sufficient emphasis, and through it seeks to explain the many neglected areas of adversarial image formation which exist in the mindset of Indian and Pakistani government and people, crucial to their bilateral relations.

There are few studies on Indo-Pakistan mass communication, fewer still are relevant works that are methodologically sound. Two of the relatively good studies are those of N. Bhasker Rao and Raju, Jagadeshwari and Dissanayake. Rao examined the role of the prestige press during 1985 Indo-Pakistan War and found that the frequency of the editorials from the Times of India and the Pakistan Times increased considerably as tensions mounted and relations became strained between the two countries. His observations on India and Pakistan Press during the conflict fell in line with the thinking of James M. Markham, who observed "the countries involved increasingly used their respective mass media systems through which to pour out their feelings of frustration and hostility".

Raju, Jagadeshwari and Dissanayake departed from Rao's sampling period and studied the Indo-Pakistan relations from mass communication perspective during a period when there was formal working relationship. The period chosen for their study was June 1981. They analysed only the Indian press perspective and chose to see through content analysis, the percentage of news items that were peace-oriented and conducive for improvement of bilateral relationship. Their finding led them to believe the Indian news media approach aimed at facilitating the understanding between the two countries and stressing the need for cordial relations.

There are, besides these two studies, numerous studies on the pattern of news stories about one another [India in Pakistan and Pakistan in India] in India and Pakistan press. However, their consideration has been ignored owing to unscientific sampling. A selective study of some news items from both the countries' press is highly flawed and does not stand the minimum objectivity, this researcher believes it is imperative to account for all news items to attain a proper perspective.

In this study, the Indo-Pakistan situation is observed in a different setting and a different stage of relations.

The period under study is during the crisis at the Dargah of Hazratbal from 16 October 1993 to 16 November 1993. The background to the crisis is located to the larger issue of Kashmir dispute and Indo-Pakistan conflict which are explained sequentially. This study like Bhaskar Rao's deals with the Indo-Pakistan relations during a period of conflict, some scholars term it as low intensity warfare. This study, unlike Bhaskar Rao, who only concentrates on editorials, deals with the entire range of news items, broadly classified into feasible categories like editorials, special articles, news analysis... etc. The study also broadens the representation of press, taking two prestige papers from each country, instead of one each that Rao did.

Much like Raju, Jagadeshwari and Dissanayake, the issues dealt in the selection of samples are those that bears direct relevance and mention of India and Pakistan in the context of bilateral relationship only. This will enable one to explore the mindsets of India and Pakistan mass media during the crisis and to see how much of emphasis they attribute to the problem of Kashmir and what besides Kashmir are the issues, which they believe are causes of Indo-Pakistan conflict.

The purpose of this research is three fold. Firstly, to understand the Indian as well as Pakistan mass media perspective of Indo-Pakistan relations, secondly to compare the findings of each other's perspectives to see if there is any scope for better bilateral relations and thirdly, based on the findings, to explore new avenues for a greater understanding between the two countries.

This dissertation is largely guided by the theoretical links established between mass media and inter-state conflict, and as such is dealt separately from the case study. The study has five chapters.

The first chapter lays focus on the communication aspect during inter-state conflict. Communication itself being a broad field, it is restricted to mass-media in general and print media in particular. An overview of the current literature on the theoretical basis for mass media in international relations is followed with a specific explanation of their role during inter-state conflict between adversaries.

The second chapter takes off, where the case study begins. It can be broadly divided into two sections, the

first section is a narrative account of the historical basis of Indo-Pakistan discord and mutual mistrust. Since the idea of Pakistan gained currency in the political vocabulary in colonial India, in the early part of the 20th century during the freedom movement, the origin and evolution of conflict between India and Pakistan is encapsulated in a brief summary, keeping the dispute over Kashmir in the background.

The second section of chapter two deals with the socio-cultural importance of the Dargah of Hazratbal to the Kashmiris. The political significance of the Platform used by Kashmiri leaders at the Dargah for the developments in the Kashmir valley is traced since the mid-30s of this century. The two important events which took place at the Dargah, one in 1963 and the other thirty years later in 1993, are discussed separately locating them in the contemporary environment and prevailing political rhetoric. The later period is studied in detail, to bear more focus on the case under study.

Chapter three is the core part of the dissertation. Following a detailed treatment to the research design, quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods are applied to the sample. The findings are listed and

explained through a comparison of the mass media perspective of Indian and Pakistan mass media of each other in order to study the Indo-Pakistan relations.

A brief summary of the research findings comprises the fourth and concluding chapter. It includes the findings of the earlier chapters and provides a brief overview.

This research would not have been possible, but for the support I received from various people and association. My limitations were constantly removed due to cooperation from teachers and friends, to name all of them would only mean belittling the importance I attach to their intellectual and emotional support. However mention must be made of a few of the more significant ones.

I wish to extend my sincere and heartfelt thanks to Dr Nancy Jetly, who supported the idea of this research and gave me her valuable guidance during work on this dissertation and earlier in the framing of my research proposal. But for her constant prodding, strict and friendly attitude this work would not have been accomplished.

I also wish to thank Mr Basem al Loughani [Information Officer, Embassy of Kuwait] for the generous guidance he has

rendered in the course of my research, his expertise on many communication aspects honed my intellectual skills, he used his privileges in securing the necessary primary sources, books and research material without which this dissertation would not have seen the light of the day.

A special mention must be made of Prof. Q.P. Bakshi, Prof. Muchkund Dubey, Dr Pushpesh Pant, Dr Regina Mulay and Mrs Vijaya Thakur Singh [MEA] all of whom through numerous discussions and careful browsing brought the best out of my research potential. They liberally shared their time and personal research materials to enrich my scholarship.

I am especially thankful to the staff and members of Nehru Memorial Library, Public Opinion Trends, I.D.S.A., Sapru House, JNU Library and my former colleagues at Rajiv Gandhi Foundation who went out of their way and professional duties and gave me their invaluable cooperation which made my research pursuit a lot enjoyable.

I would be failing in my duties if I do not acknowledge UGC for providing me fellowship without which I might never have been able to pursue this research.

I deeply appreciate the typing skills of Mr Shudh Swaroop and photostat skills of Mr Rizwan and

Mr. Upendra, but for whom this dissertation would not have attained the neat and professional shape.

A word of thanks and deep acknowledgement to my friends who have with constant goading and support gave me the necessary inspiration to pursue all my endeavours, especially to Ajay, Kishore, Lenin, Praveen Singh, Keshav, Ambika, Abhay, Sanjay, Tanuja, Anna, Dhananjay, Anar, Navneet, Devender, Dubey and Deepak.

Lastly, from the Northwest corner of my heart, I am thankful to my younger brother and torch bearer of my family, Chinna, who provided me with confidence and strength to pursue my M.Phil. Whatever little I have been able to accomplish, it is solely due to his incessant love and inspiration.

NEW DELHI

J. Pravin Kumar

[J. PRAVIN KUMAR]

July 17, 1995

CHAPTER ONE

**MASS MEDIA, INTER-STATE CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS**

The field of international relations as a whole and that of international crisis in particular bristles with communication problems. How do the write ups in news media influence the foreign policy behaviour? Do their content cause some of them to become more crisis-prone, or more obstinate in crisis management and conflict resolution? How do adversary images build up? How does positive reporting affect peace? How can we explain and prevent crisis behaviour? Do diplomats and government spokesman have certain attitudes in common? What are the conditions that lead crisis into conflict? Do the mass media influence foreign affairs? How does the rhetoric of conflict affect perception and misperception? Is crisis reporting in media an expression of conflict?

It is not difficult to see why there are few ready answers to such questions. In the past few mass media scholars have concerned themselves with conflict studies or peace research in international relations, similarly scholars in international relations tend to consider the analysis of media in international conflict as insignificant.¹ It is only since the 1960's that the emergence of Peace Research as a field of study in its own

1. Paper read at the East -West centre, (1981) by Schudson, Jeffrey.

right brought about some changes, accompanied by establishment of inter-disciplinary centres of knowledge.²

In seeking answers to the inter-disciplinary nature of the problems posed, it is but inevitable to freely borrow the explanations used from the domain of political science, history, international relations, psychology, sociology, linguistics, mass communication and conflict and peace studies.

Conflict and cooperation are co-existing, determining the ongoing state of relationship among social entities, such as persons, groups or nations. The state of relationship is determined by the level of agreement over an issue and is expressed in words or actions. Cooperation is not an anti-thesis of conflict, both can exist together.³ Conflict results from lack of agreement over an issue and is expressed in words or actions. In form and character, conflict is as highly variable as the social relationship and like any other relationship, it is evolved, sustained and abolished through exchange of messages. When conflict is

2. For an exhaustive study on emergence of peace studies, see Juergen Dedring, *Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research*, [London and Beverly Hills, CA, 1976].

3. See Dean G. Pruitt, *Theory and Research on the Causes of war* [London and Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1969] for more case studies, refer also to James N. Rosenau (ed.), *In Search of Global Patterns* [London, 1976].

not addressed for resolution through communication channels there is a possible danger of misunderstanding and war may breaking out.⁴ Communication and conflict therefore are intimately related and certain institutionalized pathways of communication are associated strongly with conflict related exchanges with regard to conflict at national and international levels, the news media are among the most important of such channels.

I. THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF NEWS MEDIA

Communication textbooks assert that the function of the news media is to inform the people about public affairs. The media create awareness and reinforce the opinion and attitudes of the readers, listeners and viewers. They present alternative views and approaches to the problems and issues and interpret the events in a given arena, constructing a coherent framework, taking a position, and bringing to bear on the issues the strength of evidence and values. They open their forums to the public for discussion of the implications of a given event or policy. The media mobilize historical and contemporary evidence to support a

4. W. Phillips Davison, *Mass Communication and Conflict Resolution* [New York, 1974].

particular position or oppose it. They provide information and insights to the public so that they will be able to make informed judgments on given issues in given situations. In playing such roles, the media have to operate within the context of laws and traditions that reflect the values of equity, justice and fairness.

Of course not all Societies conform to this ideal. Some critical differences among countries concern the structure of governmental organization, the communication participation and styles of the governmental and non governmental actors playing different roles in the policy arena; the resources, quality, capacity, and expertise available for media, the laws and regulations that promote and maintain certain journalistic traditions and freedom of information; and the culture of restraint and self policing of the media profession.

Modern news media are not just passive channels. Dramatic advances in communication technology are resulting in wider and faster dissemination of news, with a related growth in the potential of world and national public opinion as a political force. The media, in fact acting through the ephemeral, intermittent, but explosively powerful coming together of new sources, print or broadcast organizations, and both mass and specialized audiences, are partially autonomous parties to the relationship in which conflict

situations exist. The news media are rather volatile entities different in some ways from individual or organized, stable groups. To the extent that they do not merely transmit, but also frame and interpret messages, however, they must operate within the contexts of shared cultural meanings just as other social actors do. Turning the reality of conflict into stories, which then become part of the reality, Media organizations necessarily observe social and cultural conventions, and cultural patterns are essential determinants of the roles that the news media take during conflict.

Systematic, purposive involvement in a conflict situation is the most immediately salient feature of the anatomy and behaviors of the news media in relation to other contemporary social entities. They insert themselves or are drawn into virtually every kind of conflict because, in a basic sense conflict is news.

II. NEWS MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Reports of conflicts fill the pages of news media. The most cursory examination of a front page or an evening headline will confirm that conflict is the stuff of the

news.⁵ Conflicts occur at all levels. Nations confront one another, as do all manner of groups and categories defined by difference along economic, political, religions and ethic lines. Such conflicts attract the attention of all those who perceive their interests to be represented by one side or the other as well as those not directly involved who see the fact of conflict itself as a potential threat.

As a noted scholar has asserted, news is defined by its conflict focus and that there is nothing deplorable about the fact⁶ Some scholars argue that the predominance of conflict stories in the news gives a distorted picture of the world that in "undistorted," where what is good and positive is portrayed in realistic proportion to what is evil and dangerous. It is ascribed to the human disposition to find alarming reports more stimulating than stories about what is right with the world.

Newspapers may probably provide material to educate and entertain, but people also want accurate information about conflicts and problems. When it is not supplied by the

5. James A. Schellenberg, *The Science of Conflict* [New York, 1982] and Michael Scudson *Discovering the News*. [New York, 1978].

6. Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (ed), *News Media in National and International Conflict* [Boulder, 1984] p. 1-15.

conventional, they are apt to seek it from alternative channels. This is not to claim that any amount of conflict is good in itself but a problem, implying some sort of conflict, that is known about is better than a problem that is neglected. This is not always the case as an expert on *negotiations* points out,⁷ but often it is. Left to themselves, many problems grow worse, and what gives conflict its bad name is its potential if not controlled and managed, to escalate and become destructive.

Conflict can be dangerous and destructive if it gets out of control and escalates to the point of destroying necessary or desirable relationships. Conflict management is the Politico-social process of allowing conflict to run its course and perform its beneficial functions in society without becoming destructive to basic structural relationships. Communication has always been a central part of the management process, especially when parties to a conflict have attempted to generate consensus for their own positions through persuasion. In modern, large scale societies as in international relations, the mass media have become an essential part of the process and their content is an indicator of the importance of their roles.

7. Lewis A. Coser, *Roads to Agreement* [New York, 1956].

To the question as to how communication about conflict is related to the actual conflicts that exist in and among nations. A scholar has argued that communication about certain kinds of issue can actually create or intensify conflict. At the interpersonal level, rumor and gossip are condemned on such grounds. On the other hand he maintains, as have many media philosophers⁸ that by supplying information about conflict issues to a wide audience, the press and television constitute an essential part of a "court of public opinion" and help to contain social conflict by assisting in the solution of underlying community problems.

Both arguments reinforce that media content does not merely reflect the level of conflict between nations but has a functional relationship to it, it either intensifies or diminishes it. The conflict issue may have a starting point, a period of definition during which it is shaped into a form that can be recognized by parties and the media; a crescendo of evaluation, analysis, and information, and finally some

8. Prominent among those who studied the Media's role in formulating international public opinion are Majid Tehranian, Otto klineberg, kurt lewis and Elie Abel. Abel is noteworthy for studying the impact of television in international conflict. See Majied Tehranian, (International communication: A dialogue of the deaf?) *Political communication and Persuasion* [New York, 1982] 2(1):21-46.

kind of resolution, however temporary it might be. During such a process, the media may at times play the role of intensifying controversy and at the times diminishing it. Drawing inference from similar arguments, another communication expert on conflict resolution has put forward that media in various settings are themselves actors in the conflict situation they report.⁹

Discovering the nature and characteristics of news media as actors in international conflict scenarios is a complex project, and the result will be a description of something not quite like other social actors with which one is acquainted. Still, as a noted scholar¹⁰ has suggested, every scientific venture begins with a metaphor and it helps to clarify one's assumption by thinking about the basic metaphors that may be applicable. If news media are actors what kinds of parts do they play? Are they merchants of information, or would it be better to think of them as priests of information? Perhaps information is not quite the right concept, it would be better to think of media organizations as storytellers. With regard to their

9. Hanid Mowlana, *Media roles in the US -Iranian conflict*. Paper presented at the conference of the East-West Communication Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii [1981].

10. Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* [Thace, 1962].

actions, do media organizations, like lawyers act as the mouth pieces of some particular individuals, groups or nations of world society? And, as professionals, do they also serve their own interests and ideals, which are not totally coincident with those of other social entities? How do the media see themselves, and how are they seen by their users? How are they linked to the political, economic, and social structures of communities, nations, and the world, and what are the effects of these linkages on their nature and functions? It is against these dimensions of reality that the proposed metaphors must be measured.

A short answer to the questions posed, has been provided by a scholar who states "it all depends on the particular news organization, the particular issue which the news item is concerned, and the social and political context in which the medium operates".¹¹ The problem of discovering a coherent set of description of the media as actors, although complex, is not quite so intricate as it would seem at first because all possible combinations of the many salient characteristics are not found. Whether as a matter of logic or simply as a historical fact, certain

11. Yoet-lin Lee, *The role of the press in the 1967 riots in Hong Kong*. Undergraduate thesis, Department of Journalism and communication, Chinese University of Hong Kong [1981].

constellations of features are associated in few distinct traditions of journalism and these traditions are parts of larger socio-political complexes. In other words, ideas as news and processes of news gathering, explication, and dissemination are social artifacts, and they exhibit a certain functional and symbolic consisting both internally and or parts of larger political contexts. The main traditions and their many variations are what, the founder of Modern Communication Theories¹² building on his classic studies of the Press, called theories of news.

Another eminent scholar has presented seven metaphorical characterizations of media organization as they play various roles through out the world.¹³ According to the point of view of the observer and the social context in which the media operates, they are all described as *selfless revolutionaries, fearless truth-Seekers, responsible agenda setters, benign gatekeepers, development promoters, hidden persuaders, and sinister manipulators*, each of them illuminates a part to the complex role that any media organization plays depending on the relationship it has to the community it serves and the issue it reports.

12. Fred S. Siegart, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm *Four Theories of the Press* [Urbana].

13. Majied Tehranian, n. 8.

III. EVOLVING PATTERNS

There may be a variety of models, including distinctive elemental storylines as well as structural arrangements, that explain how communication systems, function as parts of conflict management processes in specific nations. Each one may be quite effective in its own social and political context and yet persons used to the role of media in one may not understand the role they play in another. This lack of understanding - not on the part of experts, but among the ordinary users of news media becomes a problem when one national media system becomes involved in the conflict management process of another nation.

In some cases, participants in a national conflict situation may want to use external media exposure to exert pressure in an internal problem. For example, during the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. The students after staging a mass demonstration with elaborate visual and sound effects to attract television news coverage, openly chanted slogans of democracy seeking world support. In examples of this kind, the participants in the conflict process acted as though segments of a world audience would, actively or passively influence the outcome. The parties to a national conflict, then may be conceptualized to include dispersed multinational interest groups who can exert some degree of

influence on the outcome through economic, political, or other channels.

Another situation in which national communication systems interact in a conflict situation involves international rather than national conflict. When nations are themselves parties to a conflict, the content of one nation's media systems sometimes becomes part of the content in the media system of the other nation. In the hostage crises between the United States and Iran, for example, the mass media became a significant forum for information exchange. The information in this case may have been less about objective facts than about the moods, emotional reaction and state of public opinion in the two nations. Communication directly between governments is still of primary importance, but public participation through mass media is becoming an increasingly important factor in international conflict management. In former times, primary contacts were restricted to trained diplomats who developed an international sub-culture of their own to ensure a common understanding of the process. They in turn could inform the people of their countries about the issue. The contact is more direct now, and it probably will become more so.

The question-crucial to the evolution of supranational conflict management systems of how widely

theories of news may be shared by media organizations throughout the world is complicated by several powerful but opposing factors. In support of a trend towards growing uniformity is a sense of professionalism among media practitioners. Being in contact with one another more and more on personal and professional basis, they come to have similar standards of work, ideals, and prejudices. media Journalists in many countries to the extent that they deal with foreign-produced copy on a daily basis and at times send their own work abroad, are perhaps more likely than members of other professions to see themselves as part of a peer group that spans national boundaries.

Another factor tending to produce uniformity of behavior in the news field is the values related to production, not to the substance of conflicts that are reported. Becoming involved with a newspaper does not make people conservative, liberal, pro this or anti - that in any obvious way. In analyzing the role of a party in conflict situation it is important to distinguish between the substantive issues of the controversy and the techniques that govern how the issue are presented and dealt with. If one makes the assumption that under certain structural conditions, which in fact are inherent in the sociology of conflict situations, a party's predisposition to one side or the other in matters of substance become divorced from and

subordinated to a concern for techniques of presentation and procedure, it becomes clear that values of this kind can make the difference between a particular piece of material being included in or deleted from a newspaper. When the material is printed on the paper, the link between technique and substance is made. In other words, the decision to put together a segment in form A rather than form B may be made on purely technical grounds with regard to production values rather than political or social values and yet form A may have a slightly different substantive impact than form B.

While professionalism and production values, two closely related factors exert a homogenizing affect on world media systems, there are also countervailing tendencies that operate to make media organizations in various countries different from one another. In certain political contexts, the professionalism of the media practitioners is minimized in its effect on final products because political or social values are reasserted in the decision making process and ultimately have the greater weight. Differences among forms of governments then may show up as differences in the behaviour of media organization in conflict situations—all these factors that delineate elemental storylines in news reporting and analysis and also make a difference in the ways a media organization becomes involved with various kinds and levels of international conflict.

IV. LOGIC OF CONFLICT

It is notorious that conflicts appear to lie along a spectrum according to how difficult they are to resolve, extending from those that might in imagination be managed with a modicum of goodwill, to those for which it seems impossible to conceive a reasonable solution. There also exists a class of irresolvable disputes that can end only in victory or stalemate.

An expert on Conflict Studies, in his study on Origin of conflict, states, "It is of course an established tactic for adversaries to announce that a particular issue is non-negotiable. This stiffens resolve in their allies and disheartens their enemies. People in conflict often sincerely believe that theirs is an inevitable dispute that can only be concluded by death or victory. But to infer from this that some conflicts must be pursued to the bitter end is to be deceived by the ambiguity of the imperatives 'Must'.¹⁴ The 'must', however, is neither logical nor sociological necessity, as the imperative is not always an act of choice, a decision solely on the part of the actors

14. De Reuck and V.S. Anthony, "The Logic of conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution" in Banks *Conflict in world Society* [Brighton, 1984], p. 96.

concerned, but is greatly affected by the agenda pattern and power matrix in the world society.

Conflict like other Socio-political concepts has undergone changes in its definition. The traditional view on the logic of conflict was understood in terms of mutual incompatible objectives between parties (however defined and organized). The more valuable the objectives, the more intense the conflict. The more numerous the objectives, the greater its scope. The more parties there are in conflict, the larger its domain.

The traditional view held its sway till the advent of psychology and behavioral emphasis on almost all social science disciplines. In the field of conflict and peace research along communication lines. The behaviouralists differed from earlier ones by their emphasis on Zero-Sum nature of the parties relationship.¹⁵ Simply stated, it means, conflict is the pursuit of genuinely incompatible complex and extrinsic objectives. The incompatibility may arise because the parties are like players competing for the same prize (territory or raw materials) or disagreeing about rules of the game (human rights or N.P.T.). The former are

15. A.N. Oppenheim, "Psychological Process in world society "in Banks *Conflict in world society* [Brighton, 1984], p. 112-27.

conflicts of interest and the latter conflicts of value, though the distinction is rarely clear cut.

The present view on the logic of conflict, subscribed by many, considers a universally, inescapable reason, that "enemies develop a characteristic mentality whereby a gain or loss to one is experienced as loss or gain by the other."¹⁶ Indeed it is this feature of conflict which distinguishes it from competition or games. Competitors in a market or in sports cooperate to engage in ritual conflict. At the level of win or loss their interests are opposed, at a higher level, they share the superordinate goal of competing for its own sake.

Rational conflict resolution therefore implies reaching an accommodation - a new situation of compatibility at a minimum cost to the parties individually. The total gains or loss are measured not only in terms of objectives attained, modified or abandoned (and evaluated against other opportunities postponed or foregone while those objectives were pursued), but also in terms of the costs incurred in bringing about the new compatibility, referred to cost of decision by some scholars. Thus the distribution of the costs of decision between the parties and the question of

16. Burton Whaley, *Stratigies: Deception and surprise in a war*, rev.ed. [New York, 1973].

compensation for cost already incurred become additional issues in the conflict.

V. CONFLICT VS CRISIS

Social scientists tend to differ in their definitions of a problem or an issue. Whether a situation that caused confrontation is a conflict or a crisis may be seen differently by one individual to another. They both convey the same image at times interchangeable, but both are not one and the same. A definition of crisis accepted by many scholars identify it as a situation that threatens high priority goals of a decision making unit, restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed and surprises the members of the decision making unit by its occurrence. Thus, threat, time and surprise all have been cited as necessary traits of crisis.¹⁷

It must be noted that in operationalizing this definition of crisis for research purposes, international relations analysts have used the PRESTIGE PAPERS INDEX¹⁸ as

-
17. See Charles F. Hermann, *International Crisis: Insight from Behavioural Research* [New York, 1968], p. 6-8.
 18. Defined in Chapter 3 in the section dealing with Sample Selection and Measurement.

on indicator of salience and potential threat. For instance, in the case of United States, the first requirement is a Minimum of three New York Times Index entries per day, and a minimum of ten additional entries for any event to be considered a high threat. Inherent in this operational definition is the implication that the number of items the press reports on events adds to its salience and, in effect can create a crisis.

Conflict like crisis exists when two or more groups make mutually exclusive claims to the same resources or position, but unlike crisis does not involve the element of surprise or impose time constraints. It, however, implies existing threat of loss or gain with respect to a claim. conflict, does not necessarily involve a short time period, and therefore it allows for different handling of the decision-process and lends itself to the use of various techniques for conflict resolution. In addition conflict as a characterization connotes real discrepancies in the power relationship between nations that demand redress and systemic changes as opposed to fleeting aberration on the international scene that do not affect the political order.

The important distinction in both is however the Psychological aspects. As a scholar has put it, "what do people actually do at the beginning of a crises situation?" For a start they often work each other up into a crises.

They bring into play all the culturally approved attitudes and rhetoric of conflict: they will threaten posture and close ranks.¹⁹ In other words their thinking and behaviour will become polarised: they tend to see things in black and white terms, each side projects all kinds of negative qualities of their opponents while reserving only positive percepts for their own side, and they can henceforth only see "one way out" as he puts it rather than a range of possible alternatives. Communication with the opposite side is likely to break down, and as they can no longer put themselves in their opponents shoes, the latter then becomes dehumanised, treacherous and unpredictable, subtle long-range thinking becomes impossible; only practical, short term issues are considered. The need for unity may become so great that a line of action may be chosen not because it is 'best' but because it the only one that commands general agreement. What commands general agreement is one favourable to mass media. For the same reason, people may 'sink their differences' in the face of a common opponent. In the short run a certain amount of pleasurable elation, excitement and role expansion may take place.

19. A.N. Oppenheim, "Psychological Process in world Society" in Banks [ed] *Conflict in World Society* [Brighton, 1984], p. 112-127.

DISS
327.5405491
K9603 Cr



TH5558



TH-5558

As one scholar²⁰ has noted, wars and conflicts have some positive or pleasurable effects, and the same can apply to crisis. A crisis can "clear the air, may create a feeling of team-work, could enable participants to find out 'who your real friends are' and may root out some deadwood in the organisation or comity of nations". One nation's strife is a moment to recognize the true face of 'who is an enemy' and 'who is a friend', at least on the issue concerned. If nations do not open up themselves still, the mass media does much necessary to see where the opponents and the supporters stand.

VI. CRISIS AND IMAGE POLITICS

In a brilliant polemic, *The Image, A Guide to Pseudo events in America*, its author²¹ has identified and diagnosed a new malady of modern civilization: (Mediacracy). Boorstin argues, powerfully and disturbingly, that the new, complex apparatus of Image-Making throughout the world is systematically creating not only serious distortions about life, but also a distinct preference for lively illusions

20. Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* [London, 1971].

21. Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo- Events in America* [New York, 1975].

over dull facts, minor communal disturbances over a nege-secular event, rabid fanatics over social peace hawks, and glittering images over challenging ideals.

The arguments against "hidden persuaders," "mind managers", "captains of consciousness," have become so familiar by now that even the media themselves have begun adopting the arguments. In a thoughtful essay, however, another distinguished scholar²² has proposed a counterargument. He focuses on the positive and integrative role that certain historic events, dramatized by the media play in the lives of viewers and nations. One could cite the media coverage of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Rajiv Gandhi's assassination and PLO-Israel peace treaty all of which have brought home great moments in history to million of readers and viewers as around the world and produced, at least in some a catharsis of the tensions and conflicts that divide humankind.

The events of crisis especially showed, what an earlier scholar²³ called the three how's, (1) how image politics centering on the uses of new telecommunication facilities

22. Elihue Katz, 'In defense of media events'. Chapter four in *Communication in the twenty first century*, edited by Robert W. Haigh, George Gerbner, and Richard B. Byrne [New York, 1981].

23. Majied Tehranian, n. 6.

can supersede traditional power politics in some situation of international conflict, (2) how old cultural stereotypes and new political fears blown up by the international mass media can sometimes impede progress in resolution, and (3) how increased awareness by the public of the complexities of an international issue can also serve to limit excessive reaction to redress legitimate grievances. Thus newsmedia through simplistic explanation of a complex political drama leaves lasting images and stereotypes in the minds of the nations involved over the conduct of the other, and this serves as an impediment for future relations.

VII. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM: A CRISIS

Crisis is always about change, crisis is about change in political structure and institution, in the distribution of resources, in human relation at many levels. It may be about who is to win or who is to play in the game, about the prizes they play for, or about the rules of the game. It may be about the name of the game itself. Those who promote one form of change enter into confrontation with those whose interest is to promote another, and both are resisted by most opposed to all change. At the same time each contestant seeks to pass the burden of adaptation onto the other. There are, therefore, always likely to be two sets of issues in

any crisis, which gathering momentum over time, becomes a conflict.

It is rarely that a crisis remains as it is, without either of the party losing, winning or arriving at settlement or resolution. Settlement is imposed by a third party such as an international court or a greater power. It could be a compromise which the parties feel they have to accept because neither party has the resources to oppose it. Resolution on the other hand implies a situation acceptable to all concerned, which does not sacrifice any basic interest, and which no party will later wish to repudiate. At best settlement reduces the level or intensity of conflict behaviour but it leaves the conflict situation substantially untouched. Resolution removes the very ground of disputes, if crisis is result of an ongoing conflict (actual or passive) then it provides impetus by eliminating or transforming the conflict situation.

The task of crisis analysis, then is to relate the origin and development of the crisis to its termination and also, locate the crisis to a larger conflict if any, for developing insights as to how channels of communication, especially news media act in national and international conflict.

CHAPTER TWO

A BACKGROUND STUDY

Human conflict is a complex social process and requires of those who would understand it, a very broad range of perspectives. The social problems that erupt into political violence are themselves clusters of conditions, attitudes and opportunities, each capable of different interpretations. How much more complicated is war that springs from social conflict and spills over state frontiers! And the intergroup violence of war that persists over decades, alternating between conditions of armistice and belligerency, requires an understanding both of the roots of the conflict and of its evolution as a political process constantly adapting to, and shaping historical change.

Convincing theories of intergroup conflict are few. Those for intergroup conflict when resulting from interstate conflict are fewer still, because the requirements for rigorous analysis are so demanding and the evidence so ambiguous. The difficulty is compounded further when the approach includes study of perceptions through news media, owing to mounting evidence of the significance of mass media to the evolution, exacerbation and finally resolution of the conflict. The gap in the study of conflict is serious because persistent conflict is relatively typical of multi-ethnic systems and has become widely prevalent in the post-cold war world.

In this attempt, the worst brunt is faced by those countries which were a result of forced partitions, [through military or ideological instruments] who were once united like Korea and China [Vietnam and Germany of the same kind were, however, reunited]. In this situation neighbouring governments will be bidding against one another for the same potential citizens without themselves possessing an effective political base. In some extremes, neighbouring governments will be actively aiding one another's citizens to disrupt the unity and integrity. The undemarcated frontiers of many nation-states that emerged from colonial clutches became the irredentist causes of new nations, and national loyalties are forged in the heat of wars of self-definition.

In the European system, war facilitated and enforced political change. In the contemporary world, however, the entry of new political idioms in international relations like ethnicity, nationalism, human rights and self-determination introduces great uncertainty into the calculation of warring powers and may deny a potential victor the fruits of a nation's sacrifice. Local conflict may, therefore, become indecisive, persistent and threaten the entire national integrity and bring the estranged parties into war. This chapter examines the relationship between India and Pakistan from this perspective, the

relationship currently prevailing can be defined as one of conflict, and the root cause of this at present being the dispute over Kashmir. It is essential to trace the roots to locate the crisis called Kashmir in the broader India-Pakistan conflict. Any study that attempts to analyse a major crisis must relate to the larger whole before it is dwelt upon. This is precisely the reason for studying firstly [I] Indo-Pakistan Conflict and subsequently [II] Hazratbal crisis, involving the issue in question — Kashmir.

I. INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT

An analysis of four aspects of conflict in South Asia helps to explain its depth, complexity, and persistence. First, the roots of the conflict lie entangled in the patterns and consequences of political change and communal competition in the last two decades of British rule. Second, the conflict was made less manageable as part of the process by which what had been a colonially balanced system of group competition was transformed by independence into an unmanaged and unstable inter-state relationship. Third, the conflict was embedded in the public life of both countries in undesirable intensity, the historic roots of the conflict were constantly renewed, and reinforced by the

interstate violence that flowed from political separation and by unresolved group tensions within both states. The severer dent was the further vivisection of the already partitioned state, with one blaming the other as responsible. Fourth, while in the cold war period, the impact of the international system on the region tended to preserve the freedom of local elites to undertake hostile actions without creating conditions that would lead to their resolution, the changed global order demands discipline in conflict management, offering less opportunity for state actors to gainfully resolve through instruments of violence.

**[i] PATTERNS OF GROUP MOBILIZATION
AND COMMUNAL COMPETITION**

Group competition, motivated and symbolized by different religious, ethnic, tribal or cultural loyalties, is a historical phenomenon in South Asia. Most colonial governments, whether Moghul, Afghan or British, welcomed the lack of unified organization in the society and found group conflict as imperial convenience as long as it did not become "unmanageable".¹

1. For a rigorous analysis, on the Imperial Insight, see Mushirul Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930* [Delhi, 1991].

As education, urbanization and the unifying aspects of the new western culture came to be important in India, it was the Hindu upper classes that responded to new opportunities. The Muslims distanced themselves from the winds of change and continued to nurse the wounds of a fall from imperial power and did not respond to modernization process.² Thus they got left behind in sharing the benefits of a new order.

By 1906, the Muslims elite recognized they were much behind the Hindu community. They organized the All-India Muslim League along the lines of a communal trade union.³ The weak new Muslim professional classes, the landholding elite and the young came together in a revitalized Muslim League following the government reforms in 1935 to demand "quotas" to protect them from the better-trained elite of the majority community.

The Muslim landlords, extremely influential felt that 'socialist reforms' of Congress would end their privilege and Muslim politicians, representing a one-in-five majority,

-
2. Besides Mushirul Hasan, see Sandra Freitag, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India* [California, 1989].
 3. See Bipan Chandra, *Communalism in Modern India* [New Delhi, 1984].

were uncomfortable with the thought that majoritarianism was the post-British prospect for Indian politics.⁴

The epilogue to World War II sealed the British fate as a world power. Once the British announced that they would leave at war's end, all Indian parties knew their absence would leave no "balancer". The dominant peaceful voice of Gandhi was receding⁵, Jinnah and Nehru became the forerunners of the sub-continent's fate. They did not give in to one another. The Muslim elites and especially the leaders of Muslim League sought to withdraw from a multi-group political system and establish their own system of authority.⁶ The departing British instead of leaving after

4. The politicians reflected their community's anxieties to a great degree because the British electoral rolls were not territorial but communal. Muslims ran for office in Muslim-only constituencies, limited by property requirements. Only in Punjab, Bengal, and Northwest Frontier Province were the Muslims strong enough in numbers and organization to find coalition politics attractive. In Northern and Western India, the experience with the 1937 elections was disastrous to the cause of communal coalition-building in politics. See especially Abdul Kalam Azad's *India Wins Freedom* [New York, 1960] pp. 15-27.
5. See Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight* [Delhi, 1976] for a narrative account of Gandhi's working influence on Congress leaders after the independence till his tragic assassination.
6. Almost all the groups in India realized that the State was central to the relationship of groups and communities, and had been even before British rule, see Robert Schaeffer, *Warpath: The Politics of Pakistan* [New York, 1991] and also Stanley A. Wolport, *A New History of India* [New York, 1989], pp. 301-349.

due political settlement left after a hasty partition, leaving a legacy that brought untold misery to the region, which has over many times plunged the two partitioned nations into incessant war and rivalry. The hostile memories of partition remain with the third generation citizens even though they were not witness to it. The relationship is aptly summed up by an eminent Indian scholar on India-Pakistan relations as:

The major elements in this conflict are the images that India and Pakistan have created of themselves on the partition.⁷

**[ii] CRYSTALLIZATION: INSECURE ELITES
AND EMBEDDED CONFLICTS**

In the spring of 1947, Lord Mountbatten facing two intransigent nationalist elites, interpreted the cabinet's decision to "grant" Pakistan as needing to be implemented with the greatest haste.⁸ Seventy-two days after the announcement, the British withdrew. In the same period, "Indian" and Pakistani officials catalogued, negotiated and divided the government assets of more than a century of

7. See Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* [Bombay: Asia, 1966], p 440.

8. See W.H. Morris-Jones, "The Transfer of Power, 1947", *Modern Asian Studies*, XVI, 1982, pp. 1-32.

British rule. They did so in the midst of unprecedented social violence and personal anguish. Two events in the summer of 1947, in the midst of undeclared civil war cast a dark shadow on the future relationship, an unplanned population exchange of perhaps 13 million people accompanied by the death of perhaps half a million more, and a war for the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Jammu and Kashmir State was ruled somewhat irresolutely by a Hindu Maharaja and his retainers at the expense of the governed⁹. Lord Mountbatten, Gandhi and Jinnah all attempted to get the Maharaja to declare which country, Jammu and Kashmir state would join, but he refused. At that point, instigated by Pakistan, Pakistan tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan and from the contiguous tribal zones in Afghanistan invaded the state, looting and raping their way to the gates of Srinagar, the state capital.¹⁰ The Maharaja released Sheikh

9. For an original insight through a societal approach, which analyses the evolution of Kashmir identity as owing to Misrule by the Maharaja, See Asghar Ali Engineer, *Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem*, [Delhi, 1991] and also see Riyaz Punjabi, "Kashmir: The Bruised Identity" in Raju G.C. Thomas [ed] *Perspectives on Kashmir* [Oxford, 1992].

10. The History through the ancient times to contemporary period is dealt with intense details by M.J. Akbar. See his *Kashmir: Behind the Vale* [New Delhi: Viking, 1991].

Abdullah the leader of the state's largest political movement from jail whom he had earlier arrested and made him Prime Minister, signed an instrument of accession to India, and witnessed the dispatch of Indian troops to Srinagar to fight the invaders, which they did. Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession of the Maharaja "subject to a reference to the people".¹¹ As the war in Kashmir developed, the government of Pakistan committed regular units to battle, and the war was "internationalized".¹²

-
11. If any treaty has evoked any conflicting interpretation, it is definitely this, has plagued controversies. For an incisive study on the treaty to have the various opinions of Indian, Pakistani and as well as international experts and Kashmiri people, both Hindus and Muslims, see the edited book by Thomas n.9. It has in all twenty contributions.
12. No brief summary of this dispute does justice to its baroque complications and fine points of legal, military, clandestine, diplomatic and moral practice which it witnesses. Most good arguments develop from three points: [1] Why did the British permit the princes to choose their dominion of choice, and why was the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir "immune" to the blandishments of Lord Mountbatten? [2] How much did Pakistan's Government have to do with organizing, arming, and transporting the tribes to Kashmir, and how much collusion was there with the Poonch forces? [3] What was the nature of Gandhi's Mission to Srinagar in the spring of 1947, and what covert Indian strategy was being pursued to encourage the Maharaja to join India without violating political ties to Sheikh Abdullah? A good comprehensive study is Sisir Gupta's, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* [Bombay: Asia, 1966], which has 20 page bibliography.

Once Pakistan was "officially" in the war and responsible for the non-Indian forces fighting in it, it was no more possible for Indian government to give in any concession to Pakistan demand to hold plebiscite and requisition UN to play the role once reserved for the British, the management of intergroup competition [now inter-state] in South Asia.

The Indian leadership also seems to have been badly divided in the aftermath of partition, especially on policies towards Pakistan. Maulana Azad was for reconcilliation, as was Gandhi; Nehru as Prime Minister was struggling with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, for control of the government, and Patel stood for hard line towards Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten, the residual British guarantor of the partition had a special voice with Nehru. Thus, what appeared to Pakistani political elite as unremitting hostility was indeed a measure of the complex interplay, within the Indian government, of competing leaders and priorities.¹³

13. This process reconfirms the reality of images, projected insecurities, and expectancy of violence as more important than "objective realities". For a wide range of insights on this aspect of conflict, see the contributions in Leon Bramson and George Goethals [eds] *War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology* [New York, 1964] and for historical narrative of complex configurations within the minds of leaders in India and Pakistan, see also Anita Inder Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India* [Delhi, 1987].

In the face of his weakness, Liaquat Ali, the Pakistani Prime Minister, pursued a strategy of seeking a UN Settlement of Kashmir question, and attempted to centralize political authority within his government. The Indian state and Kashmir since then have become the cornerstone of Pakistan policy — domestic and foreign. What only changed meanwhile was the Kashmir nationalists role; from one who fought alongside Indian armed forces against Pakistani backed invaders and Pakistani forces several times, in a span of four decades, reversed their roles.¹⁴ Insurgent groups sprang up and Kashmiri Hindus, with whom they were living harmoniously while rest of the subcontinent was plagued with communal violence, were threatened and most of them had to leave the valley. What account for the 180° turn? Apart from Pakistani involvement in formenting trouble in the valley, the Indian role is no less significant. Alienation of Kashmiri Muslims from developmental process, imposition of leaders from above, rigged polls, heavy military excesses have largely been responsible for the ire against India.

This came as an opportunity to Pakistan to exploit the disenchantment, raise anti-India feelings and scheme turmoil

14. See Rajesh Kadian, *The Kashmir Angle: Policy and Options* [New Delhi: Vision Books, 1992].

in the valley. The policy helped the ruling elite to divert the nation's attention from domestic issues and settle scores for the humiliation it faced at the hands of India, especially in 1971, that dismembered Pakistan, for East Pakistan to secede to form Bangladesh. In almost more than four decades, all Pakistani attempts to find an international solution to the Kashmir dispute were unsuccessful, and India-Pakistan relations have corresponded to Hobbes definition of war:

As the nature of foul weather lie not in a shower or two of rain but is an inclination thereto of many days together; so that the nature of war consists not in actual fighting but the known disposition thereto during all¹⁵ the time there is no assurance to the contrary.

[iii] REINFORCEMENT: THE ANTAGONIST SYNDROME

In 1953, Nehru, angry at the prospect of US-Pakistan Military alliances scrapped whatever little concession he had given to Pakistan in terms of Kashmir like holding plebiscite. Besides Pakistan had not kept its word and evacuated troops from the Kashmir territory under its occupation — Azad Kashmir. India pursued a policy of non-alignment and wanted the Super Power rivalry away from the

15. Leviathan II, cited in Alastair Buchan, *War in Modern Society* [London, 1980 reprint].

sub-continent, Pakistan had none of it. The alliance with US was forged in 1954 and was reinforced by Pakistan's participation in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. The resulting military aid helped the build up of a Pakistan army that was in reality directed chiefly against India.

Most India-Pakistan interstate conflict since 1947 has been generated by Pakistan. The weak policy in this situation is also that of the revisionist power, and at times it has pursued what a noted disarmament scholar could characterize as "national aggression", "the deliberate planned conflict or game of ruin"¹⁶ against India, in the calculated hope of relative benefit. Indian posture, at least until 1962, was that of a satisfied power. Indian status and prestige in international forum till Sino-Indian war of 1962 was appreciated widely as she emerged as the voice of the Third World.

In the face of worsening Sino-Indian relations, Nehru remained resistent, when Pakistan sought press India to discuss Kashmir under third party aegis. Ayub was disappointed and when the Sino-Indian border dispute burst

16. Kenneth Bouldings notion of three possible bargaining outcomes — Conflict, Sole Bargain, and Acceptable Alternative — is a useful structure for this analysis. See his *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* [New York: Harper and Row, 1962].

into war in 1962, he tended to blame India. Indian defeat [in reality the result of poor leadership and inadequate acclimatization to high altitudes] may have led him to underestimate the quality of the Indian army. He may also have hoped that Nehru's successor as Prime Minister, Shastri, would prove weak. In 1965, he took the initiative [before the reconstruction of the Indian army was complete] first in the Rann of Kutch [where Britain mediated a ceasefire], then [in August-September] in Kashmir itself. Ayub was proved wrong; India gave as good as it got, and Pakistan eventually accepted UN calls for a ceasefire.

In January 1966 at Tashkent, the Soviet Union mediated the restoration of diplomatic relations and military withdrawals to the 1949 ceasefire line. Pakistan, however, remained bitter at having had no breakthrough on Kashmir. In the event, Tashkent remained only on paper even as Indo-Pakistan relations remained brittle at best. The zig-zag course of Indo-Pakistan relations continued, until Pakistan began to fall apart in the wake of the government resort to massive repression in East Pakistan. Indira Gandhi then took her chance, supported the liberation struggle helping East Pakistan to become "Bangladesh" [in 1971]. This definitely established Indian supremacy within the sub-continent. In 1972 at the summit conference at Simla between Mrs Gandhi and the new Pakistan President, Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto, both countries committed themselves to peaceful coexistence, the resolution of differences by peaceful means of bilateral negotiation and the respect for the existing cease-fire line of Kashmir.

This accord was projected as a base for both countries to build a structure of peace and from which people-to-people free contact was expected to develop. There was a set back to the process of normalization following Indian peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokharan in 1974. Bhutto protested against the Indian explosion and lobbied at the United Nations for a nuclear free [weapons] zone in South Asia which India opposed. It may be pointed here that Bhutto had already committed himself to developing nuclear weapons as only way to seek parity with India. That Pakistan had also embarked on a determined bid after 1972 to secure arms from China and West Asian countries underscored its continued quest for parity with India.

Concerns, strains and tensions began to be felt more actively when the Soviet Union moved into Afghanistan in 1979. International events external to both India and Pakistan began creating new strains in their relationship. Pakistan on the ostensible grounds of a security threat from the Soviet Military presence in Afghanistan. It sought and received support and assistance from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and others. United States was to eager

to help, its security interests both in terms of checking Soviet influence and enhancing international power harmonized with the security needs of Pakistan. This led to massive arms shipment and support from the United States to Pakistan.

The increased foreign military support and supplies to Pakistan created obvious concern for security in India. The arms supposedly to be used against Soviet Union, flowed into the hands of Punjab militants during the first half of the 80's till it was arrested by the Indian state and then from 1985 onwards into the hands of Kashmir militants. The ISI and the army in Pakistan were only too eager to foment subversion in the Indian valley as it would help them become indispensable to the political authority.

In 1986 there were significant clashes on the Siachin troop concentration on the border. Although the damage was immediately contained and a hotline set up between the two capitals to establish communication and report, if any tension arose to resolve amicably, relations between the two countries remained cool. In 1988, there was a brief sign of promising future for Indo-Pakistan relations. Democracy came to Pakistan by accident following Gen Zia's death in a plane crash under mysterious circumstances and Benazir Bhutto got successfully elected. In India, Rajiv Gandhi had outlined a blue print for modernizing India. That both leaders were

Oxbridge educated and of new generation created much hope following Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad, for SAARC Summit, as they pledged to work honestly for a better relationship.

The logic of 'imperatives', however, does not allow good intention in Pakistan politics to work unless backed by strong will. Benazir Bhutto was alleged to be soft towards India by her opponents and in order to prove otherwise to the masses to retain power, launched into a vitriolic campaign of unmanageable intensity. Countless peace offers and reconciliatory propositions from Indian side were shunned. Meanwhile the developments in Jammu & Kashmir were far from promising as defections were engineered, polls rigged, governor's rule imposed. For Pakistan, it was a lifetime opportunity, as it found a fertile ground, to interfere in Kashmir. The borders were too porous for the Indian Army to successfully prevent cross border movements. Pakistan abetted secessionist uprising that has convulsed Indian Kashmir since. It also made determined efforts to 'internationalize' the issue, setting all agreements aside, raking Muslim identity when it served its interests and human rights when it did not.

In Pakistan, the logic of raising Kashmir at international levels has an altogether different dimension — one which does not allow for pursuing a rational course

of action at dispute settlement. It pursued incessantly to pass a resolution of human rights violations by India in Kashmir, first at the OIC and then at the Commonwealth meeting in 1994. It made a desperate attempt to mobilize international opinion against India, but failed miserably in its attempts. At the UNCHR meeting in Geneva, the Pakistani delegation once again made a feverish attempt to create support for the resolution condemning India, it targeted Muslim countries and some West European countries, who have made human rights a major plank of their foreign policy. Like its earlier attempts, Pakistan could not evoke enough support even to pilot the resolution. However, its activities sabotaged Indian efforts to produce a genuine solution to Kashmir through negotiations in keeping with the Shimla spirit.

Continued support to terrorist groups and lauding their militant activities, including the attacks carried out by the Hizbul-Mujahidin during 1995 Republic Day celebrations in Jammu and Srinagar are strong evidence of Pakistan's disinterest in letting normalcy to return in the valley.

To add further strain in the already tense bilateral relations, Pakistan unilaterally closed its consulate in Bombay in 1994 and asked India to shut down its consulate in Karachi in 1995 accusing India of formenting subversive

activities in the Karachi. India-Pakistan relations touched a new low since partition.

Having looked into the genesis of Kashmir crisis from a broader perspective of the bilateral conflict, it would be pertinent to focus on the internal developments in Kashmir.

**[iv] THE KASHMIR TRAGEDY: PROTECTOR'S
DUPLICITY AND INVADER'S COMPLICITY**

After nearly a quarter century, Kashmir has again become the focus of international media. The present crisis that triggered off in 1989, shows no signs of receding. India has charged Pakistan with instigating, aiding and abetting the insurgency in its state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan in turn, has denied the charges and attributes the militancy as people's movement against the unjust merger of the state with the Indian Union. It is absolutely essential to assess accurately where the truth lies.

August 15, 1947 and India was free, but the Maharaja was vacillating and in October 1947 the invasion by Tribesmen backed by regular Pakistan army settled the issue. The Maharaja agreed to Kashmiri accession to India and Sheikh Abdullah wielded the real power. In 1948, he was made Prime Minister and the friction with the Maharaja continued with the Delhi agreement in 1952. Heredity

monarchy was abolished and Sheikh Abdullah was supreme. But trouble started soon after.

Inflammatory speeches and anti-national activities resulted in Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal and arrest.¹⁷

Bakshi Mohammad replaced him. Bakshi Mohammad too went under the Kamaraj plan and Shamsuddin took over in 1963.

In the early morning of 27 December 1963, Holy relic of Prophet Mohammad, kept at the Dargah of Hazratbal got stolen. The incident plunged the entire valley into chaos, mass protest and agitation of unprecedented numbers took place.¹⁸ The agitation gained political overtones and pro-Abdullah slogans were raised, seeking his release. Plebiscite front, a pro-Pakistan organization had a field day, the agitation found echo in Pakistan. Strikes and agitations took place in Lahore and Karachi, besides Pakistan occupied Kashmir or Azad Kashmir.¹⁹

Meanwhile, Ayub was nurturing ambition to attack India and seize Kashmir by force. He felt that the Indian army defeated at the hands of China in 1962, would not brave a

17. See Arun Nehru's *Kashmir-II* in *The Hindu*, 26 April, 1995.

18. See B.N. Malik, *Kashmir: My Years with Nehru* [Bombay: Allied, 1971].

19. See reports in *The Pakistan Times*, [28 December '63 — 7 January '64].

fight. The agitation in the valley to him was a long awaited boon. The government sponsored rallies in Pakistan to show solidarity with the valley people. The media was abuzz with rumours of mosques being burnt, Pakistan radio, and its Kashmiri language bulletin made massive efforts to channelize the holy relic agitation to anti-India and pro-Pakistan movement. However, the relic was discovered under mysterious circumstances²⁰ and the agitation in Srinagar petered out. Nehru, however, realized the graver implications and in a bid to revitalize the political process, he withdraw charges levelled against Sheikh Abdullah in April 1964. A month later he died, and Abdullah stirred his anti-India tirade. Constant touch with Pakistan and China and blatant political propaganda resulted in his arrest again in May 1965.²¹ To Ayub, the situation to attack was now or never, he underestimated Lal Bahadur Shastri who succeeded Nehru as Prime Minister and attacked India in September 1965 to take Kashmir. Events proved otherwise, a determined nation under Shastri dealt a shattering blow and the Tashkent agreement followed. The 1965 war with India proved fatal for Pakistan. The

20. See B.N. Malik, op.cit.

21. See Ajit Bhattacharjea, *Kashmir: The Wounded Valley* [New Delhi: D.K., 1984].

Pakistani troops had a humiliating defeat at the Indian hands, Ayub's ambitious foreign minister Bhutto, who originally inspired the war against India laid the seeds for deep mistrust in Indo-Pakistan relations whose resonance continued to be felt for another half a decade. It convulsed in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war under different circumstances.

The war clouds were gathering again. The liberation movement in Bangladesh, the defeat of Pakistan and the Shimla agreement became the cornerstone of India-Pakistan relations.²² G.M.Sadiq died in 1971 and was followed by Syed Mir Qasim as next Chief Minister. The latter played a decisive role in bringing about the Kashmir accord in February 1975. He resigned and Sheikh Abdullah became the Chief Minister.

Trouble started immediately. Sheikh Abdullah praised Nehru and Indira Gandhi, but decried the Congress. The National Conference was revived and he encouraged defections from the Congress. He once again sought an independent role for himself. The emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi and her party's govt in 1975 resulted in the assembly dissolution and in June 1977, the National Conference swept the polls.

22. See for an exhaustive analysis from a global perspective and super power's viewpoint, Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession* [Berkeley: University of California, 1990].

The power syndrome resulted in the Sheikh expelling his comrade of four decades, Mirza Afzal Beg and quite clearly he was looking into the future and his succession.

The Janata Party had come and gone and Sheikh Abdullah once again had to deal with Mrs Gandhi. Dr Farooq Abdullah, son of Sheikh entered the scene with his father's death. A little after Sheikh Abdullah's death, family squabbles started in the first family of the Kashmir politics. The Abdullah dynasty differences was exploited by the Congress in due course. Dr. Farooq Abdullah flirted with groups opposed to Mrs Gandhi, the Congress engineered a split and Abdullah was reduced to a minority and Mr G.M. Shah took over as the Chief Minister in July 1984. G.M. Shah, however, was not a people's leader. Thrust from above, he did not survive long and was dismissed in March 1986. The State was put under Governor's rule. The next eight months were reasonably peaceful. During this period, Dr Farooq Abdullah and the opposition made scathing attacks on Jagmohan, a brilliant Administrator and surely the most capable Governor the State has produced.²³

23. A person least understood, but undoubtedly a great administrator, branded as rightist by the Congress, had contained the strife in the valley as governor very well, till he was unceremoniously asked to resign by Rajiv Gandhi at the behest of Farooq Abdullah. He had foreseen the implication of misgovernance by the centre and the excesses

The internal politics in the Congress where friends became enemies and the hunters became the hunted made changes necessary. The Rajiv-Farooq accord came into being in November 1986 and fresh elections were called in March 1987. The election was the prologue to the present Kashmir crisis. Rigging as usual was resorted to and what the National Conference did in 1983 was now done by both the parties.²⁴ This was the beginning of the end. An eminent Kashmir Congress Leader, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed left and the Congress lost its most effective arm. Disillusionment of the Kashmir people, which earlier took position with either Congress or National Conference led to their disassociation with both. There was no other third front which had a grassroot network and seemed credible, the space created by the alienation got gradually taken over by Kashmiri Nationalist forces funded by Pakistan and other Muslim states, trained by ISI and Afghan Mujaheedin and provided with deadly arms and ammunition to wreck Indian control. The Indian Security force had not been able to quell so far their anti-India activities which seems to rise.

...Continued...

of terrorists. His book *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir* [Delhi: Allied, 1991] is highly recommended for insight into the present situation.

24. See special articles in the Co-ed Page in *The Hindu* [13-17 April 1995].

The period between 1988 and the better part of 1993 was marked by anti-national acts, bomb blasts, kidnapping and the assassination of several innocents. In order to control this, the Indian state had to resort to force, which further helped the anti-India forces.

The present crisis is not surely due to any one of the reasons, historical, legal, socio-religious or external involvement and internal mismanagement, but a contribution of a lot many factors. One way of analyzing the current state of affairs, is to study the perception of the parties during a time of severe tension. The 1993 military seizure of the Dargah of Hazratbal is a good indicator to gauge the real perceptions of all participants and observers. To India the solution to the crisis was crucial for its credibility and to Pakistan, foiling of the Indian plan would be a vindication of its criticism and mobilize Kashmiri Muslims against Indian state. The crisis in itself is important, but more so is the content and nature of issues that emerged, Hindu-Muslim relations, logic of Pakistan, bilateral relations, Kashmiriyat and the Kashmiri Movement. The crisis at the Dargah of Hazratbal, was not an isolated event, it was located within the Kashmir problem and the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

II. HAZRATBAL CRISIS

The Dargah of Hazratbal is situated on the western bank of the picturesque Dal Lake about 8 kms to the northeast of Srinagar, a city of great antiquity. Kashmiris hold this shrine in great reverence as the house of the holy relic, the *Muy-e-muqqadas*, strand of hair that came from the head of the prophet of Islam. Not long ago, before the advent of terrorism, thousands of pilgrims could flock to the Shrine from all parts of Kashmir valley, especially on the eve of two important local festivals, namely, *Miladun-Nabi* and *Mi'raj-i'Alan* carrying with them the flags of famous saints.²⁵ The shrine has become an important element in the religious and political life of the people of Kashmir.

In the present context, it is essential to study the distinct Kashmiri aspects of thought and behaviour as reflected in the local Muslims veneration of the sacred hair of Prophet Mohammed, to focus on the meaning and direction given to politico-social action by the Dargah of Hazratbal, because it is a conspicuous element in the politico-religious life of Kashmiri Muslims. The interpretation of

25. Walter Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir* [reprinted in India] [Srinagar, 1967], p. 293.

facts is made in close relationship with the recent Kashmir Muslim political resurgence from their centuries-old torpor.

[i] THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HOLY RELIC AND THE HOLY DARGAH

Khwaja Nuruddin Ishbari, a rich Kashmiri merchant, is reported to have purchased the holy relic for a lakh of rupees from Sayyid `Abdullah of Bijapur, who had brought it to th Deccan [now South India] from Medina. Ishbari died on his way home from Bijapur in 1699, but the relic was brought to Srinagar alongwith his dead body, where its arrival created a state of reverential enthusiasm. So joyous and heart-touching was the reception given by the ulama, *fuzala`*, *Mosha`ikh* and *fuqara* to the holy relic that they vied with each other to carry the dead body of Ishbari on their shoulders. Men and even women chanting litanies flooded the streets and bazars of Srinagar to glimpse the relic. As a mark of respect to popular sentiments, Fazil Khan, the Mughal governor of Kashmir [AD 1698-1701], ordered that the relic be housed at a mosque in Bagh-i Sadiqabad, situated on the western bank of the Dal Lake. There is besides another strong belief that the relic came into the possession of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb through a series of accidents and adventures. He apparently had a dream directing him to take it to the valley where it would

be kept²⁶, and so in AD 1700, the relic came to Kashmir. The strand is suspended in a vacuum in a glass vial and kept in the Mosque. The place has since come to be known as Hazratbal²⁷, the abode of Prophet Muhammad.

The elevation of Hazratbal to *Medina thani* [second Medina] is also worthy of examination; this must have come from the devotees practical difficulties in performing the sacred duty of Haj. Haj was beyond their reach owing to abject poverty, a visit to the Shrine would, at least, have reduced in the devotees' religious consciousness the physical barriers between 'Arab and 'Ajam.

It is no surprise, therefore, that in course of time, crafty and materialist custodian at the Shrine have made much of the credulity, ignorance and innocence of pilgrims. For the great number of Kashmiri Muslims, the Prophet is venerated and the sacred hair is held.

Having detailed the significance of the relic and the Dargah in the religious life of the Kashmiri Muslims, it is easier to locate the importance of the Shrine as a symbol of Kashmiri identity and relate the activities at the Dargah

26. Salman Khurshid, *Beyond Terrorism: New Hope for Kashmir* [Delhi: UBSPD, 1994], p. 80.

27. See Ishaq Khan, *History of Srinagar, 1846-1947: A Study in Socio-Cultural Change* [Srinagar: Amir Publications, 1978].

not only in the personal life of Kashmir Muslim, the Kashmiri Muslim Society, but also its polity. It is here Sheikh Abdullah almost launched his political career. He could do it because of his activities, which would be discussed due, he attained a larger than life status, the devotees would seek his blessings at the Dargah, who to them was a *Darwish*.

However, one result of Sheikh Abdullah's emergence as an ardent champion of Muslim sentiment was the combination of the religious and political leadership of Kashmiri Muslims in his own person. He had profound faith in secularism, and was able to influence Kashmiri Muslim belief towards adopting a secular view of religion, culture and civilization. He changed the name of his political congregation from Muslim Conference to National Conference in order to give it a more secular base. He rejected for Kashmir a theocratic conception of the Islamic State; nevertheless, he used the effective and conative power of Islamic symbols in pursuing his particular goals. In his several speeches delivered at the Dargah and also in his autobiography²⁸, he exemplified a high incidence of Islamic symbolism when he attributed the theft of the holy

28. W. Christian Troll, *Muslim Shrines in India* [Delhi: 1989], p. 183.

relic from the Dargah to forces which aimed at undermining the solidarity of the Kashmiri Muslim community. The solidarity of the community, he believed, was based on the social and religious ties fostered by the Shrine of Hazratbal.²⁹ Following the recovery of this relic on 4 January 1964, the entire valley was in jubilation, Hindus joined their Muslim brethren. Three decades later, when the Dargah again came into prominence, the entire valley's political mosaic had changed altogether, terrorism had infiltrated to every nook and corner of the valley. In 1993, the Dargah of Hazratbal came into international media focus because of the seizure of the Dargah by Indian security forces to nab terrorists hidden inside. The incident created a wave of resentment throughout the valley against the Indian forces. It would be worthwhile to examine briefly the nature of response which it evoked as an Islamic symbol in Kashmiri society. Firstly, Hazratbal crisis of 1963, referred to as the first crisis, will be examined to situate a background for the present case under study, Hazratbal crisis of 1993 which would be analyzed subsequently.

29. Ibid.

[ii] THE FIRST CRISIS [27 DECEMBER 1963 - 4 JANUARY 1964]

The fact that the relic is something special was vividly demonstrated to the world when, on 26 December 1963, the vial containing the sacred relic disappeared. The news of the disappearance of the relic spread like wild fire throughout the valley. Angry mobs set fire to government building, cinema halls and even police vehicles. All offices and shops remained closed. B.N. Mullick, the Intelligence Officer, who was specially deputed by Jawaharlal Nehru to recover the relic gives an eye-witness account of the people's resentment in these words:

There was no end to the streams of people and all the main roads were blocked by thousands of people and the smallest procession was at least a mile long covering the entire width of the road including footpaths. Administration had completely collapsed and no vestige of it remained visible except the armed political guards.³⁰

The theft of the relic enveloped the valley in gloom. Nehru, in a special broadcast, appealed to the people of Kashmir to remain 'calm, patient and co-operate' with the Intelligence Officer to recover the relic. So critical was the agitation that Nehru felt that the holy relic agitation

30. Mullick, pp. 128; 130.

might 'seriously jeopardize India's position in the valley'.³¹

Although the agitation started purely on religious grounds, it assumed a political nature when the Action Committee was formed with Maulvi Muhammad Farooq as its Chairman.³² The Committee, while demanding the immediate recovery of the relic, brought to the forefront certain political issues. Among them was the release of Sheikh Abdullah and the settlement of the Kashmir problem. The crowd shouted pro-Sheikh Abdullah slogans and demanded his release. Radio Pakistan and stray pro-Pakistani elements in the valley had a field day, calling for *Jehad* against "the Hindu rulers of India who had outraged Islam".³³ The Indian media felt perturbed by Pakistan's media campaign, the Statesman [Delhi] on 31 December 1963 in an article "*Propaganda in Pakistan*" wrote on Pakistan's sinister campaign to fuel anti-India feelings not only in the valley but also far way in the western capitals.

The holy relic agitation continued for nine days and came to an end on the evening of 4 January 1964, just as

31. Ibid, p. 124.

32. Ibid., p. 128.

33. Salman Khurshid, p. 82.

mysteriously as it had disappeared, the relic reappeared. The importance of Hazratbal was not lost on the political leadership of Kashmir as well as Delhi. Sheikh Abdullah used it as a platform for his National Conference activities, using a not very subtle way to oppose the pro-Pakistan Awami Action Committee, led by Maulvi Mohammad Farooq [the popular Maulvi, who was himself gunned down by pro-Pakistan terrorists in 1990].

It would not be too bold to assume that, by virtue of its control over the Dargah of Hazratbal, National Conference leadership had developed against the centre's attitude towards Kashmir a system of self-defense and self-preservation. It remains a fact that during the agitation the Kashmiri Muslim community showed its solidarity in spite of various religious and political differences on some issues concerning the community.

The first twelve days of Rabi'-ul Auwal, and Fridays following the 12th Rabi'-ul Auwal and Mi'raj-i Alam are grand occasions in the religious life of Kashmiri Muslims, lakhs congregate at the shrine. Such occasions were utilized by Sheikh Abdullah and then by his successor Farooq Abdullah [till he was popular among the people] for a reaffirmation of their resolve to defend the special status of Kashmir. [In recent times the same platform and method is used by Kashmir nationalists like Shabir Shah and Yaseen

Malik]. On these occasions, the National Conference has used the Muslim rhetoric in defense of Kashmiri Muslim identity as well as in condemnation of communal politics in the country.

Through the Dargah of Hazratbal, the National Conference had made much of the psychological genocide with which Kashmiri Muslims are threatened in the face of centre's attempts at undermining the special status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It had not only sought to unite the Kashmiri Muslims, but also had even motivated psychological commitment to the avowed struggle of the National Conference then and the militant groups now for the preservation of their distinct historical identity.

That the shrine symbolizes the religious and political aspiration, providing hopes to Kashmiri Muslim was once again evident after three decades in October 1993, in an altogether changed global order and political environment. The Indian security forces cordoned off the Shrine to flush out terrorists holed up inside the Dargah. It was, however, not an easy task, the rhetoric, the issues that arose plunged the valley into chaos, surpassing the first crisis which seemed a trial rehearsal in comparison.

[iii] THE PRESENT CRISIS [15 OCTOBER'93 - 16 NOVEMBER'93]

When terrorism took centre-stage in the valley after 1989, the JKLF, whose ideology seems the most popular of all militant outfits in the valley, used the Hazratbal Shrine to defy the authorities and address large Friday congregations, to instigate mass action.

During 1992, the JKLF suffered decimation in its ranks. The heavily armed fundamentalist pro-Pakistan Hizbul Mujahideen emerged as the most lethal of the terrorist organizations. They were still unable to gain any mass support, and during 1993, set their sights on capturing the Hazratbal Shrine and in a dramatic effort at creating a popular base.

It was not only the shrine that was a terrorist heaven, but also the security of the entire Hazratbal complex posed a problem for the government. In particular, the two educational institutions flanking the shrine, the Regional Engineering College and Kashmir University had become hotbeds of militancy. In October 1993, the security forces started an operation to flush out terrorists out of the area. The pressure from the searches forced terrorists hiding in the REC and the University to seek refuge in the Hazratbal Shrine.

It was against this backdrop that on the evening of 15 October 1993, the authorities received a message from the J&K Armed Police contingent stationed inside the shrine complex compound that several militants were inside the mosque. This seemed routine for the anti-terrorist squad to tackle, but what was not was the implication of the operation, should it go wrong, and the scared relic be damaged. The administration was alarmed and the flush out scheme was put off. December 1963 had already shown the potential for disturbances that Hazratbal could trigger off. It got in touch with the Muslim Auqaf Trust, the traditional custodians of the Shrine, and a member of the Trust filed a complaint with the police that the militants had tampered with two of the three locks on the door leading to the room where the relic was kept.

The state government went into action, and the Paramilitary Border Security Force [BSF] laid a cordon around the complex. That night, BSF was replaced by the Indian Army, which sent word to the terrorists inside to surrender. It did not, however, decide to undertake an operation to storm the shrine. There were some sections in the Indian political parties which criticised the decision not to storm and cited a favourite parallel. It may be noted here that in 1979, when a group of militants took over the holy Ka'bah in Saudi Arabia and called for overthrow of the

monarchy; the Saudi Arabian Armed forces stormed after the negotiations failed, the Ka'bah was cleared of the militants but the operation details never mentioned.

At Hazratbal the authorities could not storm the shrine for several reasons. Firstly, the militants were armed, but it was uncertain how much hardware they possessed. Secondly, a number of innocent pilgrims had been trapped inside the shrine when the seize was laid; their lives could not be endangered and the wrath of the community to be faced for quite some time, like what followed the 'operationa bluestar' in 1984 in Golden Temple at Amritsar. Thirdly, there was the danger that precipitated action could lead to the unthinkable damage to the *Moi-e Muqqadas*. A holy relic of the Muslims, who following the destruction of *Babri Masjid* on 6 December 1992 were deeply hurt at the government's insensitivity. Above all, enough alienation of the Kashmiri Muslims had taken place, the authorities wanted to display their concern for the sacrilege, no matter the price they had to pay.

The terrorists refused to come out, instead warning the Army that were anything to happen, the government would be held responsible. They gave a call for a strike in the entire valley, and for the next five weeks, Kashmir remained virtually stunned and paralyzed. The Army decided to draw the militants out by making life 'uncomfortable' for them.

They would cut off electricity and water supply to the hold up terrorists, and would prevent any food being sent to them. The government wanted the strategy to work.

In the meantime, however, pressure mounted steadily. During the first week of the standoff, there were daily demonstration in Srinagar, and violent confrontation between the police and agitated residents. Former state opposition politicians, who had come together to join the *Kull Jamaat Hurriyat Conference*, an omnibus organization of overground bodies of separatist organizations, called for procession for the first Friday after the stand off began.

Tension built up in the days leading to 22 October 1993, with the result that it was a day of pitched battles and confrontation all over the valley. It was a nightmarish experience without end. New Delhi remained concerned as International opprobrium was heaped upon the government. On 29 October 1993, a functionary of the USA's State Department in Washington told correspondents in a background briefing that the USA "does not recognize the instrument of accession as meaning that Kashmir is forever a part of India. There were many other issues at play in time as we all know".³⁴ This remark stunned India, the negative impact in Kashmir, when India was locked in a war of nerves with terrorists,

34. International Herald Tribune [Hongkong], 30 October 1993.

was incalculable. The terrorists were able to effectively put across their message that even the sole remaining superpower was on their side, that the US had legitimised their militant movement and attack on the Indian state.

Despite clarification by the US government, the damage had been done. Militancy in the valley had been given a boost. Throughout the cities of Pakistan, there were massive rallies and procession, shouting anti-India slogans and calling for Jihad against India. The Indian government seemed to be held to ransom by the terrorists inside the shrine, who were found to be in touch with Pakistan through powerful wireless communication devices. Pakistan encouraged the terrorists inside Hazratbal Shrine to hold out, telling them that 'salvation' from India would come at any moment. It also put diplomatic pressures on New Delhi, making daily allegations about India's Human Rights record, telling the rest of the Islamic world that India was determined to defile Islamic shrines. Apart from this, domestic pressures on New Delhi were mounting to bring the crisis a clean end increased.

The state administration as a measure of confidence building between the Chief Negotiator, Wajahat Habbullah and the Militants, decided to overrule the Army and allow some food to be sent to the shrine. On 24 October sent in 35 kg of meat, a tubful of rice and traditional Kashmiri bread.

For a good measure, a doctor was allowed to treat the ill among the pilgrims.

In the meantime, the state high court directed the administration to provide food for the people inside the shrine following the Srinagar Bar Association and Auqaf Trusts petition that food be allowed inside the shrine, besides water and electricity provided on the act of cutting the supply was in violation of their constitutional rights. What the administration intended as a one time measure to break down the nerve of the holed-up terrorists, the state high court ordered to be termed into a regular routine. The terrorists shouted slogans of defiance.

The Army allowed one instalment of food, and then put their foot down. The supreme court was asked to decide, so it did. The Apex Court ensured that the delivery of food became a regular feature, no matter what situation, the citizens fundamental right, as guaranteed in the constitution was to be followed. The state government was even accused of holding the state high court in contempt by not ensuring regular supply of food after the initial delivery. Nowhere in the world has the highest courts of the land directed a government to act in this manner. If there were any doubt about the guarantee of a citizens fundamental rights in India, there could have been no better litmus test.

Eventually, the terrorists were worn out. On the night of 14 November 1993, three terrorists came out and surrendered. Late into the next night, the rest sent a message to the authorities that they were ready to come out. In the wee hours of 16 November 1993, 35 civilian pilgrims, 27 militants and two Pakistani terrorists came out in batches of three. The crisis was resolved, without any bloodshed or any damage to the holy relic. A few days later the hartal was lifted in the valley.

The hazratbal Crisis II, as the incident is referred, was more serious than the earlier one in 1963, the crisis figured prominently in the International Media. India and Pakistan were locked in allegations and counter-allegations. The mass media of both these countries played a significant role. Whether they were independent entities who had a perception of history or reflected the narrow national interest is worth studying. So too were the issues raised in the media in the context of Kashmir, Hindu-Muslim relations, Indo-Pak relations and many others which are followed up in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

INDIA, PAKISTAN MEDIA AND HAZRATBAL CRISIS

The primary function of mass media is assumed to inform the people about public affairs. The media create awareness and reinforce the opinions and attitudes of the readers, listeners and viewers. They present diverse views and approaches to the problems and issues and construct the events in a given environment, picturing a logical contour, taking a position and bringing to bear on the issues the strength of evidence and values. They also open their forums to the public for a debate on the implications of a given event or policy. The media mobilize legal, historical and contemporary evidence to support a particular position or oppose it. They provide information and insight to the public so that they will be able to make informed judgements on given issues in a given situation. In playing such roles, the media is not free to print as it wishes, it operates within the context of laws and traditions that reflect the values of the equity, justice and fairness.

Nevertheless, the reality is far from just, not all societies conform to this ideal. Some critical differences among countries concern the structure of governmental organization; the communication participation and styles of governmental and pressure groups playing different roles in the policy arena; the autonomy, resources and expertise available for media; the laws and regulations that promote and maintain certain journalistic traditions and freedom of

information, and the culture of restraint and self-policing rules of the media profession.

No newspaper anywhere in the world can print all the news that comes to it from various sources. Severe selection processes are thus inevitable. *Economic consideration* of total space, size and advertisement put constraints on the amount and types of news and feature materials that go into the newspaper. In addition to economic consideration, *technological imperatives* affect the nature and quality of news, particularly foreign news, in a modern newspaper. They depend heavily on the satellites and global wire services.

The *wire services* play an important role in the selection process in all news organizations that have installed teleprints. Since newspapers are in the business of producing under pressure, they find it convenient to adapt readymade wire services reports and meet the deadline. Moreover, most newspapers cannot afford to station their correspondents in major places that provide most of the news. Heavy dependence on the wire services is quite characteristic of all newspapers. Diversity of news is likely to suffer from the practices of all newspapers depending on the same wires. If the wires are even relatively under government control like Press Trust of India [PTI] and United News of India [UNI] in the case of

Indian media and Associated Press of Pakistan [APP] and United Press of Pakistan [UPP] in the case of Pakistan, there is scope for the information to reflect government opinion and instill bias.

Access to the press is supposed to be a corner-stone of democracy since it ensures open debate on public issues. The freedom of the press is ultimately people's freedom to express their views even when those views are against the prevailing authoritarian forces. But, can every citizen be guaranteed access to the media? The concentration of the media in the hands of a powerful elite minority is not conducive to citizen's access and to the freedom of press. In India and Pakistan, there are thousands of small towns and villages which do not have any newspaper circulation at all. Lack of access leads not only to the loss of vital information, but also to the stifling of dissenting views and to a lack of diversity.

Connected with selection and access is the idea of *objectivity*. Objectivity is, no doubt, an ideal worth striving for. In it are included other ideas such as impartiality, fairness, truthfulness, reality and total detachment of the newsmen from their sources and their news. It is considered attainable by reporting opposing points of view. In fact, searching for the opposite side has almost become a ritual with newsmen. But there are a thousand

shades of opinion between the two sides. Since the newsmen's objectivity is limited in scope, the differences they try to bring out from opposing camps are not real differences, but artificial ones couched in term and by opposing camps. This creates a semblance of objectivity. The average citizens are sometimes marked by the artificial objectivity in news reports.

Issues of foreign policy consideration are equally important in the process of news selection and reporting, domestic news becomes foreign news depending on the foreign policy action of a country. When millions of refugees from East Pakistan fled to West Bengal and Bihar, their plight was considered a foreign problem, but the stern action taken by India against Pakistan made it a domestic news in India. Similarly, news about internal developments in another country, although strictly news of foreign origin, becomes domestic news because of some special domestic links with the nationals residing abroad. With the deep involvement of India in Sri Lanka during IPKF deportation, the latter country became domestic news in Indian media. Issues of nationalism and patriotism might motivate the media to conform to their national government's foreign policy. It was difficult to find consistently favourable reports about socialist countries in capitalist countries newspapers [unless there is a very special relationship between them]

and vice-versa. Similarly, it is difficult to find reports not to mention favourable reports about enemy countries in a nations news media unless the government itself wants certain information to be passed on to the people in order to alert them.

In all newspaper organization, irrespective of the economic or political background of the country in which they operate, there is an inevitable selection process underway. Given this broad understanding of the functioning of the media and the institutional context in which the media have to perform their roles, India and Pakistan provide an example of a press that has faced challenges both from within its own profession and from the government in several ways — India has a long tradition of a fierce and independent press since independence, the press during the national movement for freedom from British colonialism participated in the liberation, the spirit of *watch-dog* of the government activities got institutionalized. There was intermittant obstacle and press freedom got briefly stifled during the emergency situation in 1975 and following which it has shown no sign of being choked.

In Pakistan, however, the case is entirely different, the state has been reeling under one form or the other type of autocratic rule and as such press freedom was stifled. It was only following the establishment of democratic regime

in November 1988 that the press got a new lease. It has gradually become firmly entrenched as a *fourth estate*, and has steadily grown in its professional influence as an institutional mechanism to influence policy-makers and public opinion alike. There is in India and Pakistan a special situation when broadcast media are completely under governmental control while only the print media enjoys freedom from such control. With the extension of satellite television, the monopoly of state governed television has to a great extent lessened among the elite and urban middle class sections which have access to foreign channels. In both the countries, the growth of a thriving press has been inhibited by the cultural barriers caused by social and linguistic differences. Consequently, the English-Language press with its appeal to the educated middle-class urban readership throughout the country has retained its dominance. It is influential in political, academic and professional circles.

Indian news and information gets reported in the Pakistan press frequently and prominently. While reports of other countries are found in the international page section. In *Dawn*, *Muslim* and *Pakistan Times* — Indian news figures in general pages, besides the international page. The news stories apart from dealing with developments in the Indian political arena also report on important and popular Indian

personalities, and about movies, culture and sports. The same is true of Indian media's attention to political and socio-cultural happenings in Pakistan. Pakistani sports and cultural personalities are followed keenly, it is an evidence of the deep bonds that have remained between the two people's in spite of the partition and the trauma that followed it.

Given the kind of roles that Indian and Pakistani press has played in providing freedom and access to national and international resources, the questions raised here are: How do the media then handle news and information? What kinds of perspective do they bring to bear on a situation that has been marked by tension and tragedy during a period when a new definition of the situation is emerging? How is the press in the individual countries trying to present the situation when the national actors, the international observers and the public are trying to define the situation as it is developing? Guided by this question, some representative newspapers from India and Pakistan are chosen to examine the role these news media played in managing, handling, collecting and interpreting information relating to Indo-Pakistan relations during Hazratbal crisis [17 October 1993 - 17 November 1993], when relations were at a lowest ebb.

1. HYPOTHESIS AND RATIONALE

Two sets of propositions have been formulated to explore the role and ways, Indian news media and Pakistan news media have managed the information on the Indo-Pakistan situation during through the Hazratbal and Kashmir crisis from 17 October 1993 to 21 November 1993. Besides a period of five days since the resolution of the crisis is also taken up to study the immediate and aftermath reaction of both the countries to the role of one another in the crisis. The first set of proposition is regarding the Indian news media and the second set is about the Pakistan news media.

[i] INDIAN NEWS MEDIA

- [1] The Indian news media tend to play up the news and information relating to Pakistan's assistance to separatist forces in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
- [2] The Indian news media adopt a positive stance towards the Indian government's position and carry information that is not critical of India's stand on the resolution of Kashmir crisis.
- [3] The Indian news media are very critical of Pakistan and are hostile towards the government of Pakistan.
- [4] The media viewed the Hazratbal crisis as a domestic problem to be resolved effectively to establish the will of the state.

- [5] The Indian news media play the role of informing the public on the views and comments expressed in Pakistan, the Islamic countries, the United States and other foreign countries insofar as they have a bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations directly or indirectly through references to Kashmir specifically.

[ii] PAKISTAN NEWS MEDIA

- [1] The Pakistan news media tend to play up the news and information relating to India's role in handling the affairs of Jammu & Kashmir.
- [2] The Pakistan news media adopt a positive and sympathetic stance towards the Pakistan government policy on Kashmir and carry information that is not critical of Pakistan's stand on the resolution of Kashmir dispute.
- [3] The Pakistan news media are very critical of India and are hostile towards the government of India.
- [4] The news media viewed the seizure of Hazratbal Dargah as an instance of India's heinous design towards Kashmir Muslims and portrayed it as an international problem concerning human rights and self-determination.
- [5] The Pakistan news media played the role of informing the public on the views and comments expressed in Pakistan, the Islamic countries, Europe and other foreign countries insofar as they have a bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations especially on the issue of Kashmir.

These hypothesis are not theoretically derived. There are dominant cases in literature on international relations and communication, especially those concerning the factors that influence bilateral and multilateral international relations in bringing about ideological realignment; the role of ethnic, linguistic and religious factors; external involvements and transparency, the need to resort to military containment and maintain a human rights prescription. There is a need, however, for low-level general proposition to aid the research in observing, analyzing and understanding a particular situation. In many cases, common sense propositions have the the most direct approach and pragmatic applicability. For example, in the logic underlying the many statements made by public figures and political leaders in India regarding the involvement of Pakistan in Kashmir secessionist movement, one could see a "theory or hypothetical" scenario with an argument somewhat like the following:

- o Terrorists and secessionist activities against the Indian state and people considering themselves Indians take place when there is flow of arms, funds and people across the border along Pakistan.
- o During winter there is less violence perpetuated in the valley by the terrorists because there is difficulty in the flow of materials for anti-national activities as the borders are impregnable due to harsh winter.

- o Come summer, the subversive incidents increase because of flow of goods and traffic illegally from Pakistan occupied Kashmir to Indian territory.
- o If Pakistan stops providing arms and ammunition, there will be no militancy and subversive activities, and with due political process the problem can be solved.

Based on this scenario, the policy recommended for India is: India should seal up the line of control effectively and prevent all mercenary border traffic for the problem to be solved.

One could consider another such theory from Pakistan side regarding integration of Indian occupied Kashmir with Azad Kashmir:

- o India has been effectively able to thwart Pakistan attempts to seek international mediation to conduct plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir because of previous cold war conditions, India being a Soviet Client State succeeded in vetoing all Pakistan efforts to condemn Indian atrocities.
- o The cold war being over and Russia, Soviet Union's successor state being marginalised in world politics, it is now difficult for India to ward off international intervention.
- o Pakistan should, therefore, work ceaselessly to raise the Kashmir issue and human rights violations by Indian troops at every possible international forum to pressurise India and compel it into submission for holding the long due plebiscite.

These are the kinds of arguments underlying Indo-Pakistan conflict theory. The political actors, defense analysts and diplomats have to contend with those in making their foreign policy and plans for defense strategy.

In an international situation such as Indo-Pakistan discord, one that is built upon mutual misperception and negative images based on conflicting themes. What is the role of mass media? Assuming that the newspapers function is to keep the people informed of national and international situation and provide them with well argued position, perspectives and analysis of developments, the contribution of the newspaper to the management of conflict situation can be inferred from content analysis of the news reports and stories. An analysis of news content both quantitatively and qualitatively would produce evidence to support or refute the hypothesis presented earlier.

II. STUDY SAMPLING AND MEASUREMENT

It has been frequently stated that the elite press provides an indicator of the attitudes of the national political elite. According to Merrill an "elite press" is that which is

...read by the elite of the country where it exists as well as by the elite in other countries and expressing a significant segment of international elite opinion.¹

Such a newspaper is read by more opinion leaders than are other type of newspapers. Using the notion of "prestige paper", Some scholars point out more specifically that such elite newspapers are "widely read about by those seeking clues as to the dominant attitudes in the countries in which these papers are published".² It is assumed that an "elite" or "prestige papers" has built a reputation for being well-informed and for expressing the serious, well-seasoned opinion of the nation concerned. The scholars further suggest that the "elite" or "prestige" newspapers have widespread news coverage and that they always maintain intimate relations with the government, especially the foreign office. It is in this context of the nature of elite press that this study attempts to analyze the aspects of trust as it might reflect in four such elite or prestige newspapers — two each from India and Pakistan.

The phenomena of an elite press is to be found in every nation , totalitarian or pluralistic. In Beijing, for example, there is *Jen-Min Jin-Pao*, in America, there is *New*

1. N. Bhaskar Rao, *Controlled Mass Communication* [Delhi, 1973], p. 132.

2. Ibid.

York Times. *The Times of India*, *Hindu* and *The Pakistan Times*, *Muslim* are the elite newspapers of India and Pakistan respectively. All these papers were selected as reflecting a general orientation of their respective governments and the policy makers in general on matters of Indo-Pakistan relations.

All the newspapers, *The Hindu*, *Times of India*, *Muslim* and *Pakistan Times* selected for analysis in this study are published simultaneously from key political centres of their respective countries and have important editions from their respective capitals [see Table 1]. In both the countries, the English press is the most important even though the newspapers in this language reach only a small segment of the population. All the dailies are among the top three largest circulated among the English language press of their respective countries.

The publishing companies of all the four newspapers also publish few other mass-circulated influential dailies and periodicals: *The Illustrated Weekly of India* [now under suspension], *The Economic Times* and one Hindi language daily in the case of *The Times of India*, *Frontline* in the case of *The Hindu*. *Illustrated Weekly of Pakistan*, one urdu language daily, besides others in the case of *The Pakistan Times* and one urdu daily in the case of *The Muslim*. In all, the four newspapers are influential and prestigious in their

TABLE 1

PROFILE OF THE NEWSPAPERS SAMPLES FROM
INDIA AND PAKISTAN [17 OCT - NOV 1993]

	INDIA		PAKISTAN	
	Hindu	Times of India	Muslim	Pakistan Times
Language	English	English	English	English
Circulation	482,000 ^a	677,000 ^a	N.A.	50,000 ^a
Place of Publication	Madras, Delhi and 5 other places	Delhi, Bombay and 4 other places	Islamabad	Islamabad and Lahore
National Position [in terms of circulation]	3rd ^b	1st ^b	3rd ^{b&c}	2nd ^b
No. of Pages	24	24	12	14
No. of Columns	6	8	8	8

Sources: [a] The Far East and Australia, 1994, Europa Publications, London.

[b] Based on the statistical data in Europa and then on comparison with other leading English dailies.

[c] Based on information compiled from Pakistan Year Book, 1994 and Europa.

respective countries among the politicians, the bureaucrats, the intellectual community, the business and in most other professions and in cities in general. Each newspapers maintains reporters in the other countries, and both are available to the potential readers in both countries. Besides, they have special correspondents of other countries nationals reporting on their home country. *The Times of India*, for example, avails of the services of M.B. Naqvi, a Pakistani journalist, based in his country to report on developments in his country. Similarly, for *Dawn*, Aditi Phadnis, an Indian journalist writes from India on the events and happenings within India.

These papers, maintain a constant watch on each other's coverage and print news stories of the others reportings. The November 6, 1993 issue of *The Pakistan Times*, for example, published in toto a news story favourable to Pakistan by Tavleen Singh, an Indian columnist, the article was earlier published in *The Pioneer*, a New Delhi daily. The article was titled "Hazratbal symbolizes the siege within".

III. SELECTION OF THE STUDY PERIOD

An analysis of the relation between the two countries since 1988 in the context of Kashmir problem should be more

interesting and revealing of what this research is trying to do. In October 1993, as mentioned earlier, the tensions between India and Pakistan heightened to no-retrereat proportions for about five weeks following the seize of the Dargah by Indian security forces. Indian troops took initiative to flush out the inmates from the shrine some of which it believed were terrorists [proved true later] and whom Pakistan maintained were genuine freedom fighters. Pakistan hurled allegations against India at various international forums and capitals to censor the Indian actions as uncalled for. It was imperative for it to derive maximum mileage out of the seize of the Dargah by the Indian security forces as to vindicate its stance that Indian policy is anti-Kashmiri Muslims. The period during Hazratbal crisis witnessed Indo-Pakistan relations getting further worsened and it is for this reason the period makes a good subject for research.

In all the four newspapers for thirty-six days consecutively from 17 October 1993 were selected for analysis. The assumption for including 17 November 1993 to 21 November 1993 is that a climax period will be followed by reviews, introspection and further suggestions which is essential to follow the explanation given by the press about the country's behaviour. The five-day period is not a strict condition in methodological terms, it is assumed that

on 21 November [being a Sunday, when there are special reports in Indian newspapers] and 19 November [being Friday in which Pakistan newspapers will have special write-ups] newspaper editions will have more news stories with special treatment on Hazratbal crisis because it would be the first weekly special edition issue since the resolution of the crisis. Special editions are published by all newspapers, all over the world at least once in a week and it is normally the official weekly holidays. It is only to include the special edition from both the countries that the limiting period is kept for five days otherwise the normal practice in communication research is to include only two days following the occurrence of any major event to study the reaction.

The crisis occurred in the early hours of 16 November 1993, by which time the newspapers in India and Pakistan would have started their printing process and preparing for the circulation. As such no news relevant to Hazratbal is mentioned in any of the newspapers. The first news on the incident came out only on the 17 October 1993, therefore, the starting period of the analysis is 17 October 1993 and not 16 October when the event took place.

IV. INVENTORY

As a first step in this research, an inventory of the official position of each nation on main issues that figured during the crisis period was prepared. A list of issues that figured from official releases, spokesman and documentary evidences like Memorandums, letters were compiled on the basis of information items in the country's newspapers.

The issues are overtly stated claims, grievances or positions. These issues were not the underlying basis of the conflict in the researchers opinion, but only the symptoms. The reason for isolating these issues is the assumption that a problem may be the sum total of a series of disputes and as such, each issue requires a separate treatment.

The purpose of the inventory was first to prepare the positions taken by both the sides on given issues and then, by analysing the news items, to see whether the news items in newspapers are making any references to the official position of the other country. Whatever the case may be, and if so, whether they are granting any legitimacy and if so, to which issues. The inventory provides a basis for analysing the news content.

Conflicts normally have deeper causes, which are not overtly expressed either because they would compromise the conflicting parties or because the conflicting parties are not aware of them. Such "deeper causes" or hidden interests, intentions, motives sometimes come to the surface because an opposition party has been alleging or a communal group trying to induce, or because an editorialist of one nation was advancing these hidden causes as being the "real" determinants of the adversary policy.

To make the analysis more scientific, a running inventory was kept of "hidden" interests, intention, motives advanced by news stories of one nation as being the "real" "reasons" behind the adversary's policies on issues involved in the conflict. The inventory for each conflict thus includes both the official positions and hidden intention or interests on issues involved. The inventory code sheet, however, consists of provision for analyzing the news items of one country alongside or against the inventory items of another country. The inventory code sheet containing the inventory of India, for example, will be tallied against the news item in *Muslim* and *Pakistan Times*. Inventory code sheets for both these countries, as they were used in this study, can be seen from tables 8-A and 8-B.

V. SAMPLE

In the defined period [17 October 1993 to 21 November 1993], news items that appeared in *The Times of India*, *Hindu*, *Muslim* and *Pakistan Times* dealing with any aspect related to their mutual relations and/or with any aspect concerning the other countries domestic matters bearing an influence on [for instance, apart from Kashmir, on issues like NPT or Islamic fundamentalism] each other's relations are included in this study. The simple method is to include all the news items broadly classified into six categories, they are: editorials, special correspondent reports, by-lines and feature articles, wire service reports, combined wire service reports and others, that met either or both of the above conditions.

The method followed was to go through all the news items in each of the newspapers, [excluding the supplementary edition] that appeared during the period of analysis and then decide whether to include a given news item or not. This time consuming method was followed to make sure that news item which do not form their captions give the impression of being related to India-Pakistan relations and/or any of the aspects concerning the other country's

international affairs but considered as domestic affair in the country.

The other items of importance treated less specifically and not thoroughly analyzed for reasons of limitation of this research are photographs, cartoons and letters to the editors which are of specialized nature and require separate treatment.

VI. METHOD OF ANALYSIS

A content analysis procedure was adopted for examining the four newspapers. Apart from the inventory coding sheet, in which the corresponding posture of the message was listed. For the sake of qualitative content analysis, the news item was read through, most of them more than once and the attributes of each for the following variables indicated in a coding sheet:

- o Volume of information - length of the 2 inch column [except for *The Hindu*, the rest of the newspapers followed the standard international practice of 2-inch column. Whenever the column was not of 2-inch, appropriate conversion was made.

- o Source - whether the information item was from wire-services, newspaper correspondents, columnists, analysts, author of articles, or other services.

- o **Place** - the city or town where the information originated.
- o **Display Mode** - whether the news story, information was a news report, news analysis, editorial, commentary, backgrounder, in-depth treatment in a feature article, interview, press release or carried a correspondents byline.
- o **Actors** - the main participants in the situation covered by the news story, analysis or other presentation.
- o **Content** - a brief description of the setting of the news or information situation.
- o **Theme** - broad classification of the central meanings of the item was made and then the following data from each sample was coded in the inventory coding sheet:
 - [1] frequency of instances in which item on the inventory of country A's official position appear in the news item produced in country B.
 - [2] frequency of instances in which any of these items are agreed upon.
 - [3] frequency of instances in which any of these items are explicitly rejected.
 - [4] frequency of instances in which "hidden" reasons or interests are advanced by news items of country A as the "real" basis for the behaviour and stance of country B.

[5] frequency of instances in which any of the above items are agreed upon.

[6] frequency of instances in which any of the above items are rejected.

The data gathered from the news items of the countries was expected to yield a profile of how each country in terms of news item context, looked at the other country's official position. Besides an effort was made to find out, what are the other issues that dominated the political discourse in one country through its newspapers and how much attention was paid to the issues discussed and to what extent they were similar or dissimilar with the other country's position.

VII. RELIABILITY OF MEASURES

There is no claim of complete objectivity, especially regarding the theme or posture of the message. Many research scholars in order to dilute their nationality bias, resort to sample testing through non-participant foreign nationals and cross check if their analysis tallies with them. In this case, however, this is not resorted to and an

attempt has been made to design the research in a scientific manner to avoid the nationality bias of the researcher. Any researcher following this research design would come to the same conclusion at least as far as the findings of quantitative content analysis is concerned.

VIII. FINDING AND ANALYSIS

The seizure of the Dargah of Hazratbal on the morning of 16 October 1993 gained prominent display in Indian and Pakistani newspapers. For a period of thirty-two days that the seizure lasted, until the total surrender by the militants and inmates holed up in the shrine, the press in India and Pakistan played up the entire event. The incident took place in Srinagar, but the implications were felt far off. There were more reports from places other than Srinagar city and Kashmir valley. News stories flowed in from all parts of Pakistan and some important places in India, besides many other world capitals also generated news. The news stories were invariably not treating Hazratbal crisis as an isolated event but located it to the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The period

under study is very large. The four newspapers, *The Hindu*, *Times of India*, *Muslim* and *Pakistan Times* were analysed for 36 days involving in all 137 numbers of newspapers which had in all 1200 news items, printed in about 15,478 inches [length] of 2-inch columns. *The Hindu* in the period under study was not published on the 24 October 1993 and 14 November 1993, *Times of India* did not get released on 14 November 1993, *The Muslim* and *The Pakistan Times* were not available for two days each on the 11 November 1993 and 20 November 1993. This accounts for 7 number of newspapers short of 144, which would have been the real count had all the newspapers been published regularly and made available.

The approach to discuss the findings has been to separate the quantitative aspects of content analysis from the qualitative content analysis. They are discussed one after the other.

CHAPTER FOUR

A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

I. QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS

[i] The Quantity of News Items on Indo-Pakistan Relation in the Four Newspapers

Table 2 shows the amount of space given to Indo-Pakistan news by each newspaper in the two press systems, expressed as a proportion of its newshole. While no Indian newspaper gave more than 8.9 per cent of its newshole to Indo-Pakistan relations, the Pakistan press gave between 17 per cent to 25 per cent of their newshole relating to Indo-Pakistan relations or issues bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations. If the two presses newshole are compared, the Pakistani press devoted an average of 19 per cent of its total newshole, which is more than double of the Indian press, whereas the Indian press devoted an average of 8 per cent of its newshole to Indo-Pakistan relations.

The Indian newspapers, under study print about a minimum of 24 pages of news stories daily on week days, whereas Pakistani newspapers print about 12 to 14 pages of news stories on week days. The Indian newspaper thereby contain 100 per cent more news pages than Pakistani newspapers. The total newshole of Indian and Pakistani newspapers is about 45 to 50 per cent, the rest of the space accounting for advertisements and other non-journalistic purposes. Therefore, owing to the larger quantum of news pages, the Indian newspapers print larger amounts of news

TABLE 2

TOTAL NEWS ON INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND ITS
PLACEMENT IN THE INDIAN AND PAKISTAN PRESS

Newspapers	Total No. of News items on Indo-Pak	Total Length of 2-inch Col of news items on Indo-Pakistan	Total Length of 2-inch Col of news of all items	Indo-Pakistan News as % of total news	% of Indo-Pak news Placed on pref'd pages
		[A]	[B]		
INDIA					
Hindu	312	2372	41458	5.7	37.8
Times of India	236	3511	35416	9.9	39.4
Total	548	5883	76874	7.6	38.6
PAKISTAN					
Muslim	280	4242	23800	17.8	59.0
Pakistan Times	372	5353	27768	19.2	64.7
Total	652	9595	51568	18.6	61.8

than Pakistani newspapers. However, on issues relating to Indo-Pakistan relations, the Pakistani press printed 652 news stories of length 9595 inches of 2-inch column in contrast to Indian press which printed 548 news stories of length 5883 inches of 2-inch column.

There was no substantial intra-press difference in the case of Pakistan newspapers in terms of the proportion of space devoted to Indo-Pakistan relations, but such a difference did exist in the Indian press.

The press in the two countries differed significantly not only in terms of the total space devoted by each to bilateral issues, but also in terms of average space devoted daily to the issue. The average length of news item on Indo-Pakistan relations each day in the Indian press varied between 65-97 inches of length 2-inch column, with an Indian press average of 81. In the Pakistani press, the corresponding average for the newspapers varied between 118-148 inches of 2-inch column per day with the Pakistani press average of 133. One could explain this difference in terms of news territory of a newspaper; the daily issue of an Indian newspaper covers news items from almost all parts of India which is very large, compared to Pakistani newspapers news territory. The Indian newspapers inevitably have more news to report. This is one of the many reasons which account for the largeness of Indian papers to Pakistan papers

which are relatively small with less news items. This, however, cannot explain the difference in the length of the newshole on Indo-Pakistan relations. One explanation for the Pakistani press's keenness on Indian affairs is that India looms large in their domestic as well as international agenda. The policy of any newspaper is to devote more attention to issues that the government, policy makers, editors and audience consider important. Therefore the logical conclusion that follows from the newshole difference about Indo-Pakistan relations in Pakistan press to Indian press is that the Pakistani press is "obsessed" with India. Table 2 lists out the percentage of news on Indo-Pakistan relations or news bearing influence on Indo-Pakistan relations that was found in the preferred pages in Indian and Pakistani press. The Pakistani press average is calculated to be 61.8, about 80 per cent more than the Indian press average of 38.6. It indicates the relative importance of India in the mass media of Pakistan and through it to the political discourse of Pakistan. This 'over-importance' or 'over-occupation' with India could be succinctly termed as "obsession". The natural corollary that follows from this finding is that India does not consider Indo-Pakistan relations as much important as Pakistan does and that Indian political discourse can live without Pakistan.

Mere quantification will not suffice in bringing out the differences between the two systems. The placement of news regarding Indo-Pakistan relations is equally important. The study of placement of news is a litmus test to gauge the relative importance given by one press to the affairs of the other country. There is no yardstick to distinguish "obsession" from 'importance'. However, consistent concern with the other's affairs than the other shows in return can be treated as "obsession". The following section shall see if it exists in either country's press under study.

[ii] PLACEMENT OF INDO-PAKISTAN NEWS

The world over, newspaper organizations and newspaper readers consider news appearing on front page, editorial and centre pages as specially important. When readers refer to the importance of a news story, their judgement is invariably influenced by the positioning of news as in 'lead story' and other such descriptive phrases. The three pages mentioned above may be called 'preferred pages', usually reserved for news of comparatively greater importance [in the judgement of editors and hence that of the readers]. When many news stories of importance have to be given prominence by the newspapers they print part of the news story on the preferred pages and the rest in the general

pages usually the back pages. The newspapers of India and Pakistan, under study, have practiced this method.

Table 2 shows the percentage of news on Indo-Pakistan relations that appeared on preferred pages. The more a news item appears in preferred pages, the more is the importance of the issue in the consideration of the press. The findings show Indo-Pakistan relations gained comparatively more prominence in Pakistani press than in Indian press.

[iii] TYPES OF NEWS

If a newspaper devotes space for editorials and long feature articles on certain selected news items, it is an indication of its interest in those news items or themes. Usually feature articles and editorials appear on those items that are considered important. In the case of Indian and Pakistani Press, of the numerous news items that dealt with Indo-Pakistan relations, only some were featured more prominently. Table 3 shows the number of news items of various types and Table 4-A and 4-B illustrate the same through graphical representation.

Out of 652 news items dealing with Indo-Pakistan relations in the two Pakistani newspapers together, about half [52.62 per cent] were news items from wire services, [corresponding figures for Indian newspapers is 13.50 per PN

Table 3
Types & No's. of News Items Under Study






TABLE 4-A

TYPES AND AMOUNT [NEWSHOLE] OF NEWS CONCERNING INDO-PAKISTAN
RELATIONS DURING HAZRATBAL CRISIS [IN PER CENT]

Newsletters	Editorials	Special Corres- pondent	Bylines & Feature Articles	Wire Services	Combined Services	Others
	A	B	C	D	E	F
HINDU	1	46	26	10	6	11
TIMES OF INDIA	5	23	39	18	12	3
TOTAL [INDIA]	3	36	32	13	9	7
MUSLIM	2	17	19	47	7	8
PAKISTAN TIMES	4	17	6	57	3	13
TOTAL [PAKISTAN]	3	17	12	52	5	11

Table 4B
 Indian Press Vs. Pakistan Press



A=Editorial; B=Spl. Correspondent;
 C=Feature Articles; D=Wire Services;
 E=Comb. W. Services; F=Others

cent] Indian newspapers used its own infrastructure through field personnel, staff reporters and special correspondents who contributed 189 news items or about one-third [corresponding figures for Pakistani newspapers is 17 per cent] of the total news items on Indo-Pakistan relations. In-depth treatment to a news issue is not found in every kind of news item, it is available normally in the analysis reports, feature articles by specialists, media analysts and columnists. In the Indian newspapers around 32 per cent [175 news items] were of this kind [Corresponding figure for Pakistan are 76 news items or 11.65 per cent]. The Indian press in spite of its relatively less quantum of news on Indo-Pakistan relations in comparison to Pakistan press, was far ahead of the Pakistani press as far as investigative, analytical and indepth write-ups were concerned.

The editorial space devoted by Indian press and Pakistani press to matters relating to Indo-Pakistan relations were of the same order with each printing about 3 per cent of their total newshole on the subject [14 editorials in India and 20 in Pakistan].

There are many news items that cannot be dovetailed into formal categories, like snippets and extracts from old issues. These have been categorised as miscellaneous and others, it also includes letters to the editor, weekly round-ups and news briefs. All such items formed 7 per cent

of the news item in India, and 11 per cent in the Pakistan press.

Pictures are also very important means of conveying news. These were not qualitatively analysed, but a numerical count and posture of the picture was noted. In the Pakistani press, there were in all 85 pictures [40 pictures in the *Pakistan Times* and 45 pictures in the *Muslim*]. On the other hand, there were only 45 pictures [28 pictures in the *The Times of India* and 17 pictures in *The Hindu*] in the Indian press. All the pictures in the two countries relate to Hazratbal crisis and its impact, a large number of pictures in Pakistani press [63 pictures] were regarding strikes, rallies, and agitations held in Pakistan against the Indian troops sacrilege of the Dargah. This indicates the impact of the crises in Pakistan.

[iv] SOURCES OF NEWS

In the Indian press, there is an extensive networking of news gatherers, who contribute the maximum news reports. It also relies on news agencies, Indian as well as foreign. During the Hazratbal crisis, Indian press used newspapers from PTI, UNI and Agence France Presse [an international press agency only]. The news items from wire services accounted towards 121 news items [74 independent news items

from wire services and 47 combined news items, compiled from the various wire services] which is 22 per cent of the total news items dealing with Indo-Pakistan relations. But in the Pakistani press, the wire services accounted to large extent for the sources of news. These wire services were AFP, AP, API, APP, DPA, DPI, IPB, IPS, KMS, KP, KPI, NNI, NPI, KPT, PPI, PR. In all these, wire services together accounted for 374 news item, which is 57.36 per cent.

Most of the wire services that were printed as sources in the Pakistani press are not listed in any of the standard communication yearbook like Unesco or Europa; even Pakistan Year Book 1983-84, produced in Pakistan does not mention all of them, the few well known sources that reported on Indo-Pakistan relations were API, PPI, KMS. AFP and AP [an international news agencies].

The study of the sources of news is an important indicator to judge the credibility and reliability of the news story. News agencies that are less known naturally have relatively poor credentials than the widely known ones. PTI and UNI of India are quoted extensively in Pakistan and the international media, likewise, API and PPI of Pakistan are quoted in India and other places abroad. DPI, DPA, IPP, KP and KPI which accounted as sources of news for a large number of news items in the Pakistani press do not find any mention in the Indian press or in foreign press. This

indicates that much of the news in the Pakistani press about Indo-Pakistan relations originated from lesser known or unknown news agencies.

Besides the sources of news, the origin of the news is equally important. An analysis of the quantum of news items that originate from various places is to be done to determine, where the impact of an event is largely felt and through it to analyze the impact of an event in terms of geographical distance and degree sensitivity to an issue.

[v] ORIGIN OF NEWS

News relating to Hazratbal crisis, Kashmir, and Indo-Pakistan conflict or cooperation bearing on the Indo-Pakistan relations originated from various places far away from the theatre of Hazratbal operation, that is Kashmir. The Indian press printed 356 news items that originated within India [64.96 per cent] and 53 news items [8.6 per cent] that came from Pakistan dealing with Indo-Pakistan relations directly or indirectly through reference to the other. But Pakistan had 498 news items [76.38 per cent] originating within Pakistan and 103 news items [15.79 per cent] originating from India.

The international opinion was widely covered and reported extensively in the Indian press, the news came from

various cities of the world. The Indian press had 70 news items [12.77 per cent] whereas Pakistan press had 32 news items [4.90 per cent] that dealt with international reactions originating from foreign countries on Indo-Pakistan relation or issues impinging on Indo-Pakistan relations.

The Pakistan press reports that came from within Pakistan originated in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Muzaffarabad, Sialkot, Kamobe, Tondo Jan, Mirpur, Minchanabad, Faisalbad, Rawalpindi, Hafizabad, Toba Tek Singh, Peshawar, Multan, Barmula, Sakkar, and Muridke. The news items from India came in from New Delhi, Bombay and Srinagar. The foreign cities besides those in India that provided news stories dealing with the crisis and/or Indo-Pakistan relations, came from Washington, New York, [United Nations also included] Dhaka, Dubai, Jakarta, London, Larnaca [Cyprus], Nicosia and Chittagong.

The Indian press reports emanating inside India came from New Delhi, Srinagar, Bombay, Una [HP], Ahmedabad, Jammu, Lucknow, Shimla, Thiruvananthapuram, Chandigarh, Pune, Vishakhapatnam, Hyderabad, Bareilly, Kanpur. News items having their origin in Pakistan came from Islamabad only and the foreign cities, besides Pakistan, which sourced the news items were Washington, New York [UN included]


London, Manama [Bahrein], Limmasol [Cyprus] Nicossia, Colombo and Dhaka.

Besides these, there were many news items that did not mention any place of origin. Going through the news content, it was difficult to trace the origin, in which case they were treated separately as 'untraced'. Also in this category were included monitored reports for e.g. *Pakistan Times* on 11 November 1993 had a news item "Benazir seeks world support on Kashmir", beneath the caption was written "P.T. monitoring".


Table 5-A indicates the origin of news that were found in the four newspapers separately and Table 5-B indicates the origin of news in the press of the two countries separately. The figures for the Indian press and the Pakistan press were arrived by combining the data of the individual countries newspapers that were chosen for this study.

The place which generates the maximum press coverage is the place where the impact is mostly felt. During Hazratbal crisis, the echo was felt more strongly in Pakistan than in India even though the place of crisis is located in India. Secondly, if it is considered that on foreign policy matters, newspapers mostly deal with only those news reports that seem favourable to their country against the adversary state, then it follows from the data obtained that the Indian press printed 13 per cent of news items on Indo-

Table 5A
Place of Origin of News Under Study




The Hindu




The Times of India

A=within India; B=from Pakistan;
C=outside (Other than A&B);
D=Not traced



The Pakistan Times




The Muslim

A=within Pakistan; B=from India;
C=outside (Other than A&B);
D=Not traced

Table 5B
Indian Press Vs. Pakistan Press (in %)

109




Pakistan relations or reports bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations from foreign sources other than Pakistan which is 7 per cent more than what Pakistan printed on the same subject from foreign sources other than India. It also follows that international opinion was, to a great extent, in favour of India as against Pakistan. Thirdly, countries in a state of adversarial relations do not hesitate to print news from estranged belligerent country sources, if the news items are favourable in furthering their foreign policy goal. This may help to explain why Pakistan printed 3 per cent more favourable reports from its adversary, i.e., India than the latter, could obtain from it.

[vi] FREQUENCY OF THE NEWS

Table 6-A and 6-B display the daily frequency of news items in numbers and length of 2-inch column printed space of news items analyzed in the present study from the four newspapers. The frequency of news items increased, instantly within 3 to 4 days of the eruption of the crisis at Hazratbal and reached a peak point in the mid-way. On 4 November *The Pakistan Times* printed 18 news items whereas *Times of India* printed 7 news items. There was consistency in the frequency of news items in the intra-country newspaper domain, but in the inter-country context, the

Table 6A


Frequency of News on Daily Basis (No's)



The Hindu
 The Muslim

The Times of India
 The Pakistan Times

Table 6B
 Frequency of News (2-inch Column Length)



Pakistani newspapers printed 150 per cent news items more than the Indian newspapers. When the crisis was finally resolved on the 17 November 1993, a significant trend was observed. Indian newspapers maintained a consistent frequency variation of the news items as before till the end of the crisis, when it was resolved in India's favour. Pakistani newspapers since the beginning of the crisis gradually increased the number of news items on the subject and devoted a large amount of their newshole. When the crisis was resolved in India's favour, there was drastic fall in the news reports in terms of number of news items and also newshole percentage. The Pakistani newspapers drastically cut down their focus on Hazratbal, Kashmir and India. *The Pakistan Times* printed 15 news items on the 17 November 1993 issue, when it was not known that the crisis was already resolved in India's favour, and the following day on 18 November, only 6 items were printed by which time the resolution of the crisis was already known.

This finding is a rather glaring instance of the nexus that exists between mass media policy and national interest, and as to how, important information is deliberately not highlighted by the media when the information seems unfavourable to the country's national interest. Pakistani press surprisingly found it important to print Indian newspaper articles critical of Indian state, whereas they did not give even moderate attention to the end

of the crisis with which it was "obsessed" all through.

Table 7 also highlights that in the Indian press the resolution of the crisis was paid relatively less attention than during the time when the crisis was seemingly tense. In the case of Pakistani press, the resolution was only not paid even moderate attention, but it became totally unimportant.

[vii] THEMES OF THE NEWS

There is very little difference in the themes discussed in the intra-country newspapers, in terms of the issues raised and the opinions held. There is, however, some difference as far as the content value or importance of the theme is concerned in terms of the news item in the preferred pages. The themes which largely figured in the preferred pages are considered more important from the editor's point of view and those themes which are often discussed are considered still more important than those discussed less. In the inter-country context, the themes discussed in the press of the two countries are not tangent to each other, nor are they similar to each other. Some issues discussed in the two countries, newspapers regarding their bilateral relations are common to both whereas some are relatively present or completely absent in the others consideration. The posture and qualitative content of the

news items under study in the Indian press and Pakistani press are different. However, the themes in one country's press find a discussant in the other's write-ups.

It is difficult to distinguish between the themes of the news items from one another, owing to the seemingly similar nature. However, by broad classification, it is possible to indicate and count the themes that are mentioned in the Indian and Pakistani press.

[a] INDIAN PRESS

The following are the broad themes discussed in the two newspapers during the Hazratbal crisis. These are not the only ones but the important ones [importance to the themes is lent by constant focus in the preferred pages].

THEMES IN THE INDIAN PRESS

(1) Developments at/due to Hazratbal

- [a] Security operation
- [b] Safety of the holy relic
- [c] Means to flush out terrorists
- [d] Situation of pilgrims trapped inside
- [e] Supply of food to inmates
- [f] The negotiations and negotiators
- [g] Important possibilities [the military, Kashmir leaders, separatists and state officials]
- [h] The role of judiciary
- [i] Surrender of inmates and end of seize
- [j] Significance of Dargah in Kashmir policy & culture
- [k] International Reaction, and
- [l] Domestic reaction

(2) Issues Relating to Kashmir

- [a] The problem in Kashmir, its genesis
- [b] Pakistan's role in the problem
- [c] Terrorism and political impasse
- [d] Resolution of the situation
- [e] internationalization
- [f] role of Kashmir leaders, Indian leaders and Army
- [g] Firing at Bijbehara
- [h] Human rights

(3) Issues Relating to Pakistan

- [a] Relationship with India
- [b] Reaction to Hazratbal
- [c] Role in Kashmir secessionist movement
- [d] Reactions of leaders, Army, ISI and Mujahedin
- [e] Shimla accord
- [f] Propaganda and diplomatic maneuvers
- [g] Bilateral differences on NPT, Strategic and Security issues

- (4) Other issues like Indo-Pak War, hints of partition and the international environment.

[b] PAKISTAN PRESS

The following are the broad themes discussed in the Pakistani press:

THEMES IN THE PAKISTANI PRESS

(1) Developments in/due to Hazratbal

- [a] Illegal seize of the Shrine by the Indian troops
- [b] Oppression of freedom fighters held inside
- [c] Destruction of the holy shrine and holy relic
- [d] Significance of the Dargah to Muslims
- [e] Domestic reaction
- [f] international reaction

(2) Issues Relating to Kashmir

- [a] Issues relating to Kashmir
- [b] Indian oppression of Kashmiris
- [c] Hindu-Muslim conflict
- [d] Unfinished agenda of Pakistan

- [e] Plebiscite and integration with Pakistan
- [f] Human rights violation by India
- [g] UN and international mediation
- [h] Bijibehera firings
- [i] Role of army, J&K Government, Indian State, Kashmiri leaders and Hindu fanatics
- [j] Solution to the disputes

(3) Issues Relating to India

- [a] Relationship with India
- [b] Indian hegemony
- [c] Anti-Muslim designs
- [d] Misinformation and diplomatic exercises
- [e] Revenge for Indian barbarism

- (4) Other issues like Indo-Pakistan War, India's nuclear policy, South Asian Cooperation and the partition themes

Besides these, the news items also contained reports, legal documents, contemporary evidence by the press of both these countries. The themes are mentioned to provide information before some analysis is offered in terms of the findings of qualitative analysis.

II. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS

Table 7-A and 7-B list the inventory code sheets for both the countries, as they were used in this study. It presents the totals of the six frequencies suggested as indices of agreement-disagreement continuum for the inventory of each country. Table 8-A shows the number of times a particular item in Pakistan's inventory was

TABLE 7-A

TOTAL FREQUENCIES OF REFERENCES MADE TO ITEMS IN PAKISTAN
INVENTORY BY THE INDIAN PRESS DURING THE HAZRATBAL CRISIS

No. Inventory Item: Pakistan Side	Reference Made	Granted some explicit measure of Agreement	Explicitly Rejected
Official	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃
1. The rights of self-determination of Kashmiris be restored	213	0	213
2. Integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into India is illegal	304	0	304
3. Just Settlement of "Kashmir" Dispute is corner-stone of Indo-Pakistan relationship	176	64	257
4. India pledged to hold plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir—it should uphold its commitment	257	0	257
5. Muslims in India are unsafe and victims of Hindu India and Hindu fanaticism	61	9	245
6. Those fighting the Indian state fare not terrorists but freedom fighters.	296	51	245
7. UN is the just forum for resolution of Kashmir dispute.	81	0	81
8. India is sponsoring state terrorism and violating human rights of Kashmiri Muslims.	113	28	85
9. International support be mobilized to pressurise India to stop ethnic cleansing of Kashmir Muslim.	52	0	52
10. Pakistan has every right to provide moral support to the freedom fighters Movement and solicit support for them from foreign governments.	197	0	197

TABLE 7-A

TOTAL FREQUENCIES OF REFERENCES MADE TO ITEMS IN PAKISTAN INVENTORY BY THE INDIAN PRESS DURING THE HAZRATBAL CRISIS

No. Inventory Item: Pakistan Side	Reference Made	Granted some explicit measure of Agreement	Explicitly Rejected
"HIDDEN"	F ₄	F ₅	F ₆
1. India's Defense Policy is not against China as for deterrence but aimed at Pakistan	72	31	41
2. India's missile program, nuclear policy and arms build up - a threat to Pakistan Security	51	6	45
3. Kashmir is a Hindu-Muslim conflict as unfinished agenda of Pakistan.	218	85	133
4. India wants to maintain hegemony in the region and does not want Pakistan to progress and maintain stability.	19	0	19
5. Pakistan cannot realise its identity without Kashmir.	114	90	24

TABLE 7-B

TOTAL FREQUENCIES OF REFERENCES MADE TO ITEMS IN INDIAN INVENTORY BY THE PAKISTAN PRESS DURING THE HAZRATBAL CRISIS

No. Inventory Item: Indian side	Reference Made	Granted some explicit measure of Agreement	Explicitly Rejected
Official	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃
1. Jammu & Kashmir is the integral part of India and Pakistan should accept it.	304	0	304
2. Principle of self-determination cannot be applied in Jammu and Kashmir — Kashmir is not negotiable.	261	0	261
3. Pakistan is the agressor aiding and abetting terrorism in the state. It should be declared a terrorist state.	90	0	90
4. Conflict between the two is one of domestic and ideological compulsions of the basis of Pakistan bond as religion; Kashmir is merely the symptom. Kashmir is not the basic issue.	42	0	42
5. Pakistan is not abiding by Shimla agreement, to which it is committed in order to resolve any bilateral dispute.	84	0	84
6. Pakistan is not keen on negotiation, it unanimously wants to internationalise to create further tension.	60	0	60
7. Pakistan is playing with religious sentiments with Muslims in Kashmir and India through its propoganda and mis-information campaign.	51	0	51
8. Pakistan is responsible to Sikh extremism, Bombay bomb blasts & is keen to create disturbance in India.	31	0	31
9. Pakistan does not want India's stability.	18	0	18
10. Misc: India is secular and peace loving; the problem in Kashmir will be solved through political process.	61	0	61

TABLE 7-B

TOTAL FREQUENCIES OF REFERENCES MADE TO ITEMS IN INDIAN INVENTORY BY THE PAKISTAN PRESS DURING THE HAZRATBAL CRISIS

No. Inventory Item: Indian side	Reference Made	Granted some explicit measure of Agreement	Explicitly Rejected
"HIDDEN"	F ₄	F ₅	F ₆
1. Pakistan is happy about internal division and communal tension in India and would like to explicit India's internal problems.	210	70	140
2. Pakistan is not keen for political dialogue and bilateral negotiations with India.	187	61	126
3. No Pakistan leader or political policy can afford to have peace with India, they will lean to enjoy power.	18	18	0
4. Pakistan realises it cannot win a war against India, so it resorts to low intensity conflict by formulating turmoil in Kashmir Punjab and other parts of India.	74	0	74
5. Pakistan constantly seeks parity with India, it also wants to avenge the defeats at Indian hands thrice and secession of East Pakistan in 1971.	111	84	27

TH-5558

mentioned in the news stories in the Indian press [results of *Hindu* and *Times of India* are combined] and the frequency of the rest of the five indices. Similarly, Table 8-B presents the number of news items in the Indian inventory that were mentioned in the news stories in Pakistani press [results of *Muslim* and *Pakistan Times* are combined] and the frequencies of the remaining five indices.

The "hidden" inventory items are not mentioned as often as the official ones in either newspaper. This finding should be of importance to those interested in observing the critical differences between the public posture through official response and "hidden" or "real" intention discovered through non-official sources as indicated in the inventory. Diplomacy is not only about dealing and negotiating through documents and notes. Real diplomatic intentions are more or less transparent and visible but not officially attested because it could hinder the winning strategy. The higher the tension, the stronger the tendency to report, consciously or unconsciously rumors more often than at other times, "hidden" items in the inventory represented some of the intentions, motivations, fears and doubts as evidenced in the news stories of the respective countries. Amongst the various categories of news items, it is in the editorials, co-ed articles and special features only that the real intentions are located.

The Pakistani Press quite often made references to negotiations with India [item No.7 in Table 8-A] in the official section of the Indian Press. Each time such a reference was made, it was explicitly accompanied by a rejection from the Indian side. As one example of such reference in *The Muslim*, here is an editorial of October 24:

It is time government in Pakistan accorded to Kashmir the sincerity it deserves. Our defensive and almost apologetic attitude has increased the miseries of the Kashmir people. False confidence building measures and step-by-step diplomacy have only embolden the Indians to exact one *my lai* after another.

Tables 8-A and 8-B provide issue-cases that were emphasised or the underlying arguments in the news stories of the four newspapers. The press in both countries, as seen from Table 8-A and 8-B, referred, whenever they did so to the same issue in almost all editorials and analysis articles. Seen at a glance, Table 8-B indicates the concentration by the Pakistan Press on the issue of Kashmir [item 2 and 3 in the Pakistan inventory] One example of such frequent references to the Kashmir issue is the following editorial from the *Pakistan Times* of October 18:

The incident [Hazratbal] amply depicts India's criminal disregard of religious sentiment of the Kashmir people and provide another instance of the grave violation of human rights being committed in the incarcerated areas of Kashmir.

The *hidden* interest section of the Pakistan inventory is more evident in almost all the features in Pakistan Press. The day when Hazratbal crisis got resolved with the end of the seize and surrender of all militants and pilgrims, the news item reported the event on the November 17, but however, the editorial of the *Pakistan Times* had reported the following:

The late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself said "we in India should accept the blame for what is going on in Kashmir and it is not enough to go on blaming Pakistan for whatever is happening"— India should withdraw from Hazratbal. It shows the irresponsibility of the editor and reveals the inner thinking which meant, the Pakistan press for all had concluded on the inevitable resolutions against India's favour.

The maximum amount of references in the Indian inventory by Pakistani Press is in the context of legitimacy of the integration of Jammu & Kashmir with India, the need to implement plebiscite and India's internal problems especially communal riots. In all these cases, Pakistani Press supported the official stand of their government. The issues which gained some measure of agreement is the understanding that [item No.3 in Table 8-B], peace process with India cannot be established. In a reference to the PLO-Israel negotiations, and applying the same in Indo-Pakistan context, the *Muslim* in its editorial on the October 24, criticised the Pakistan Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto

for citing the West Asian Peace initiatives as a model for Indo-Pakistan dialogue in the Commonwealth Summit. What it criticized was there should be no secret negotiations and behind the screen parleys with India. The editorial of the *Muslim* in the previous day on October 23, said:

The timing of the drama is in itself indicative of the actual plan and motives behind it — it was not before the Babari Mosque in Ayodha that the Bhartiya Janta Party and other Hindu fanatics parties forced route into the vote Bank of the Hindu majority at the expense of the ruling Congress [I]. Consequently, Congress[I] smelt that it could never confront the Hindu nationalist parties without responding to the anti-muslim sentiment of the larger Hindu community.

The above news item is indicative of the increased references to the communal problems in India and extending the same to the bilateral relations. There are increased references to terms such as Hindu India, Hindu Fanaticism, Hindu Barbarism, Oppression of Muslims. The first editorial following the Hazratbal crisis in the *Pakistan Times* on the October 18, was itself a telling story. It said:

India's policy of terror and repression in occupied Kashmir continues to acquire the deadlier dimensions, in the latest incidents of this sort over 10,000 troops stormed and set fire to the Kashmiri Muslims holiest shrine, Hazratbal complex.... The incident amply depicts India's criminal disregard of religious sentiments of the Kashmiri people and provides another example of the grave violation of the human rights.

The etymological meaning of the message in the editorial is factually incorrect, there is no similarity

between the word **seized** and **stormed**. The latter was not done by the Indian troops and it was known to *Pakistan Times* as many news items on the day itself, mentioned about it, in one of its news stories headlines read "Indian troops seize Hazratbal", the editorial was undoubtedly a propaganda with a set design to fuel anti-India feelings among the readers and lend support to the official policy of the government. When the shrine was finally evacuated of the militants following their surrender to Indian troops. *The Pakistan Times* glorified the outcome even though its earlier prediction about the Hazratbal crisis becoming a turning point in Kashmiri separatist movement, which would eventually lead to their liberation from Indian occupation and thereby merge with Pakistan proved wrong. In a U turn from its earlier analysis, its editorial on November 18 said:

although the Indians claim that they [terrorists] surrendered conditionally, a major Kashmiri group contend that they came out voluntarily to avert an Indian plan to demolish Kashmir's holiest shrine.

Was Indian press far behind in distorting factual truths as the event developed? It is seen in Table 8-A, that there are at least 8 items in which the Indian Press has accorded some amount of legitimacy even to the inventory

from the official side of Pakistan. It reflects that the Indian press reported diverse views in its news items even though the reports were not favourable to the Indian government and not accord total legitimacy to official Indian policy in dealing with Hazratbal crisis. There were many news stories by Indian columnists that got printed in Pakistan press like, articles of Nikhil Chakravarty and Tavleen Singh. These write-ups were on Indian policy in Kashmir and its failure in terms of human rights record. In other words, Indian press remained vigilant and free to criticize the Indian government. Its stand was quite often unfavourable to Indian government as compared with the Pakistani press stance which remained loyally committed to the government's policy. The news stories from the Indian press were even used by its adversaries for substantiating their anti-India claims. The Indian press even treated the terrorism in Kashmir with some amount of sympathy and addressed all the issues raised in the Pakistan inventory. The Indian press did not lose sight of its watch dog characteristic which warranted a consideration of Pakistani sensibilities. In the process, some of these were misused by Pakistan. *The Times of India* in a news story on October 24, said:

Pakistan propaganda misuses Indian press reports and statements by Indian human rights activists which make the

task of the Indian side even more difficult. They do not get any helpful material from Pakistan.

In a news item on October 25, Times of India said:

India cannot be too happy with Ms Benazir Bhutto's initial utterances on Indo-Pak relations as well as on Kashmir. There is refreshing lack of fire breathing rhetoric, and awareness that India's difficulties do not normally mean Pakistan's gain.

The Indian Press noticed Pakistan's own compulsion in its communal approach in understanding the problem [inventory item No.5] by providing the Muslim angle to the crisis at the Dargah. *Hindu* in its editorial on October 21 said:

Because of its religious and historical significance, it is not surprising that Pakistan views the mosque as part of its legacy in the sub-continental context. As a powerful symbol of Muslim community, the besieged shrine would provide Pakistan with an opportunity to appeal successfully not only to the emotion of Pakistan in the sub-continent, but to the entire Islamic world. India could easily be portrayed as insensitive to the feeling of the community.

The hidden interest in one is at times the official inventory of the other. This is clearly visible on the issue of Hindu-Muslim angle to the Kashmir problem. There are no official utterances in Pakistan to the extent it is a Hindu-Muslim problem. However, numerous news stories and editorials, succinctly speak of Hindu atrocities. It was discussed widely in the Indian press, *The Hindu* on November 8, in an article by Pran Chopra said:

Pakistan cannot claim Kashmir on the ground that its people are Muslims without arousing the spectre of resurgent brotherhood among Muslims, which gravely disturbs the western-Christian imagination. Nor can it continue to aid and abet the terrorism of the Mujahedeen without exposing itself once again to the risk, which it has only just escaped of being branded as a terrorist state. Therefore what would best suit Pakistan is an opportunity for condemning India for yet another brutal assault by Hindu feelings upon a non-Hindu shrine.

The hidden intention of Pakistan inventory of being happy at India's problems and convinced of India's humiliation following Hazratbal crisis was revealed openly by the *Hindu* only following the end of the seizure. In its news item on the November 17, it said:

It is a matter of relief that the seizure was lifted without any loss of face for the Indian state.... Had the cordon been lifted without accepting a surrender by the militant, India would have lost further credibility in a terrain where its political activity is already being sharply criticized. *Who shouts, is who wins* attitude best summarises the Pakistani press as far as quantitative and qualitative analysis is concerned. It could be perhaps true in the world events gradually being determined by media rhetoric.

The reporting on Hazratbal crisis reveals clearly as to how the adversaries behaved. To the Pakistani press, it was a zero sum game where *India's loss was Pakistan's gain*. The elite press of Pakistan on matters of national interest, strongly sided with the states's adhered policy. There was a remarkable absence of self-criticism, in the case of

Pakistani press. The inference derived from the content analysis explained as, on matters relating to India and relationship with India, Pakistani press is relatively more negative. Indian press, on the other hand, is relatively more balanced in its perspective towards Pakistan and is positively inclined to have better relations with it.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The role of media in today's world remains crucial in terms of both of informing the people of the actual state of affairs and at the same time reflecting the thrust of their government's policy. It is clear that normalcy in the Indo-Pakistan relations is possible only when news media functions in a transparent environment, committed to free and objective reporting.

The agenda of issues and events found in the four newspapers from India and Pakistan under study assumes a forward and backward looking stance. News analysis items from India and Pakistan press generally focused on the Hazratbal crisis, less as an isolated crisis event, involving some hijackers or police atrocities, but more as a symbol of each country's aspiration and destiny. The content of the news text was embedded with historical, cultural and ideological meanings. Standardization of media content between the *Muslim* and *Pakistan Times* on one hand, the *Hindu* and *Times of India* on the other, their valuable convergence on conclusions drawn from the Hazratbal crisis and prescription given for its resolution, leads one to question now related was the news to the real events.

Although the task of this research has not been to apportion, the responsibility of the present conflict on India or Pakistan. The mass media analysis, however, does through some light on the problem and its diagnosis. Enmity

like friendship is not a permanent feature between two individuals, groups or countries. Unimportant differences assume serious importance threatening the bilateral relationship between two countries and at the same time dangerous matters get resolved amicably if the countries party to it are guided by goodwill and peace towards one another. Hazratbal belongs to the former category. The Indian media, much like the Pakistani media, while reporting about the developments at the Dargah, compulsorily referred to each other's country role in accentuating the crisis. Bilateral differences and the other's evil blandishments figured larger than the issue.

Indian and Pakistani news media seemed to remain guided by their own notion of history and democracy. History is more of a subjective notion, whereas democracy has some features accepted by all its adherents. The pluralistic model of news media is an indication of a responsible and democratic press. In this context, the Indian mass media outperforms the Pakistani mass media. Although one cannot extend the category of "closed mindedness" to Pakistan Press as far as Kashmir is concerned, it is conspicuous for its lack of pluralism and sensitivity to the others point of view which does not help in confidence building process.

On the other hand, although there were numerous news items in the Indian press criticising human rights

violations by the terrorists and asked for stern measures to be taken by the state, the Indian press in its entirety urged the security forces to exercise restraint even while handling with the militants, in order to safeguard the holy relic from sacrilege. The BSF excesses at Bijibehera came in for sharp criticism. The *Hindu* even published an interview with Ms Benazir Bhutto during the crisis, in toto. This speaks of the tolerance and capacity of the Indian press. Even in time of a crisis, the adversary was provided space to air its opinion.

The frequency variation of the press in the two countries validates only a few sets of hypothesis and negate quite others. Overall, there are increasing references to Pakistani views and arguments available to Indian audience, whereas the reverse is not true. The Indian view is not accessible to Pakistani readers which explains why storming of the golden temple by the Indian troops was frequently mentioned in the Pakistani press during the time of the seize of the Dargah as a reminder of Indian state's oppression against minority sentiments.

The successful operation by the Indian troops was lauded by almost all countries of the world. Pakistan, however, had no word of appreciation for the Indian action. It treated the positive development at Hazratbal with indifference. This could be because, India's success came

as a setback to Pakistan's ambitions. One reason as to why Pakistan could never speak about the fall out in terms of India's admirable restraint could be that it could not afford to go against its hidden or real policy, which was to aid and abet terrorism in the valley. The conclusion of the Hazratbal operation did not find any significant mention in the Pakistani press unlike the time when the crisis was at its peak seemed dangerous to the Indian state.

The Pakistani press, by siding with the foreign policy makers and by supporting the status quo without using its immeasurable power to delve deeper into the historical background of the present Kashmir crisis in relation to flow of arms from its territory into the valley, was at best a great disservice to its own audience. It also seemed to compromise on truth, objectivity and accuracy, principles upheld as ideal norms for media personnel. The Indian press was relatively more objective and restrained in its tone and projection.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Ahmed, Akhtaruddin, *Nationalism or Islam: Indo-Pak Episode*, [New Delhi, D.K., 1984]
- Akbar, M.J., *Kashmir: Behind the Vale*, [New Delhi: Viking, 1991]
- Ali, S.M., *International Cooperation for the Activation of Information Flow*, [Media Asia, vol.12, no.2, 1985]
- Ali, Tariq, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power*, [London: Jonathan Cape, 1970]
- Almond, G.A., *The American People and Foreign Policy*, [New York, Praeger, 1961]
- Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities*, [London, Verso, 1983]
- Arno, Andrew and Wimal Dissanayake, *The News Media in National and International Conflict*, [London, Westview Press/Boulder, 1984]
- Azad, Abdul Kalam, *India Wins Freedom*, [New York: Longman Green, 1960]
- Bagdikian, Ben, H., *The Information Machines, Their Impact on Men and Media*, [New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971]
- Barns, M., *The Indian Press: A History of the Growth of Public Opinion in India*, [London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970]
- Batscha, R.M., *Foreign Affairs News and The Broadcast Journalist*, [New York: Praeger, 1975]

- Berelson, B., *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, [New York: Free Press, 1975]
- Berger, P.L. and Luckmann T., *The Social Construction of Reality*, [Penguin, 1966]
- Bernet, R. and R.E. Muller, *Global Reach, The Power of the Multinationals*, [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974]
- Bhattacharjea, Ajit, *Kashmir: The Wounded Valley*, [New Delhi: D.K., 1984]
- Bipan Chandra, *Communalism in Modern India*, [New Delhi: Vikas, 1984]
- Black, Max, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy*, [Thace: Cornel University Press, 1962]
- Boorstin, Daniel J., *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo Events in America* [New York: Atheneum, 1975]
- Boulding, Kenneth, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*, [New York: Harper and Row, 1962]
- Bramson, Leon and George Goethals [eds], *War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology*, [New York: Basic Books, 1964]
- Bryson, B.L.(ed), *The Communication of Ideas*, [New York: Harper and Row, 1948]
- Buchan, Alastair, *War in Modern Society*, [London: 1980 reprint]
- Carney, T.P., *Content Analysis* [B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1972]
- Carvaino Bernardo, *New Information Order, Third World, Ideology News*, [Thesis, Columbia, 1978]

Chaudhuri, Nirad C., *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*
[London: Macmillan, 1951]

Chopra, Surendra, *UN Mediation in Kashmir: A Study in Power
Politics*. [Kurukshetra, Vishal, 1971]

Choudhary, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-66*,
[New York: Praeger, 1988]

Collins Larry and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight*,
[Delhi: Viksa, 1976]

Coser, Lewis A., *Roads to Agreement*, [New York: Harper,
1956]

_____, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, [New
York: The Free Press, 1956]

Davidson, Walter Phillips, *International Political
Communication*, [New York, F.A. Braeger, 1965]

_____, *Mass Communication and Conflict Resolution*,
[New York: 1974]

De Reuck, Anthony V.S., *Conflict in World Society* [Brighton:
Harvester Press Publishing Group, 1984, p.96]

Dikshit, J.N., *Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance* [Delhi:
Konark, 1995.

Dubey, D.K., *Press and Foreign Policy in Third World: A Case
Study of Newspaper Coverage of India's Foreign Policy
During the Janata Rule, 1977-79*, [New Delhi, J.N.U,
diss. 1982]

Engineer, Asghar Ali, *Communalism and Communal Violence in
India: An Analytical Approach to Hindu-Muslim Conflict*,
[Delhi: Ajanta, 1989]

-
- _____. *Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem*,
[Delhi: Ajanta, 1991]
- Feolinger, Leon, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*,
[Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957]
- Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I., *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research*,
[Wesley, Addison, 1975]
- Freitag, Sandra, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India*
[California: 1989]
- Ganguly, Sumit, *Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pak Conflict Since 1947*, [Boulder: Westview Press, 1986]
- Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, [New York: Doubleday & Co., 1973]
- Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism*, [New Delhi: OUP, 1990]
- Golding, P., *The Mass Media*, [London: Longman Press, 1974]
- Gordon, George, *Communications and Media Construction: A Cross-Discipline*, [New York: Hastings House, 1975]
- Gozzi, R., *Mass Media Effects in High and Low Context Cultures*, [Sage, 1992]
- Gupta, Sisir, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations*,
[Bombay: Asia, 1966]
- Holsti, Ole R., *Crisis, Escalation, War*, [London: Haigh & Hochland, Montreal: McGill-Queen University Press, 1971]

- Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir* [Delhi: Allied, 1991]
- Jalal, Ayesha, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985]
- Jaswant, S.Y. and Abhilas, M., *Foreign News in Indian Media*, [New Delhi: IIMC, 1982]
- Jha, D.C., *Indo-Pak Relations 1960-65*, [Patna: University Press, 1972]
- Juergen, Dedring, *Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research*, [London: 1976]
- Katz, Elihue, *Communication in the Twenty First Century* [New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981]
- Khan, Ayub, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, [Oxford: OUP, 1967]
- Khan, Ishaq, *History of Srinagar, 1846-1947: A Study in Socio-Cultural Change*, [Srinagar: Amir Publications, 1978]
- Khan, Ishaq, *Perspectives on Kashmir*, 1983. Ziring, Lawrence, Braibati Ralph and Wriggins W. Howard (ed), *Pakistan: The Long View*, [Durham, NC: Duke Univ Press, 1977]
- Khandu, Sangjia, *No War Pact in Indo-Pak Diplomacy: The Role of Indian Press*, [New Delhi, J.N.U., diss. 1984]
- Khurshid, Salman, *Beyond Terrorism: New Hope for Kashmir*, [Delhi: UBSPD, 1994]
- Klapper, J.T., *The Effects of Mass Communication*, [Glencoe, 1960]

- Kumar, D.P., *Kashmir: Pakistan's Proxy War*, [New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1993]
- Kumar, Satish, *The New Pakistan*, [New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1980]
- Lamb, Alister, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy. 1846-1990*, [Melksham: Roxford Books, 1991]
- Lasswell, H.D., *The Structure and Function of Communication in Society* in W.Schramm (ed), *Mass Communication*, [Urbana: University of Illinois, 1949]
- Lawrence, Walter, *The Valley of Kashmir*, [Reprinted in India] [Srinagar: Kesar, 1967]
- Lee, John (ed), *Diplomatic Persuaders: New Role of the Mass Media in International Relations*, [New York: Wiley, 1968]
- M.K. Asante, E. Newmark and Blake C.A.(ed), *Handbook of International Communication*, [Sage, 1979]
- Manekar, D.R., *Whose Freedom? Whose Order? A Plea for a New International Information Order by Third World*, [New Delhi, 1981]
- Manshardt, Clifford, *The Hindu-Muslim Problem in India*, [London: Allen and Unwin, 1936]
- Mcquail Denis and Windhal, S., *Communication Models: For the Study of Mass Communications*, [London, 1981]
- Merril, C.J., *Global Journalism*, [New York: Longman, 1983]
- Merrit, Richard, L.(ed), *Communication in International Relations*, [Illinois, Urbana, 1972]

- Michael, *Discovering the News*, [New York: Basis Books, 1978]
- Mullick, B.N., *My Years with Nehru*, [New Delhi: Allied, 1971]
- Mushirul Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930*, [Delhi: Oxford, 1991]
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, *Autobiography*, [London: Macmillan, 1934]
- Neve, Arthur, *Thirty Years in Kashmir*, [London: Edward Arnold, 1913]
- Oppenheim, A.N., *Conflict in World Society*, [Brighton: Harvester Press Publishing Group, 1984, pp.112-127]
- Oskamp, S., *Attitudes and Opinions*, [Prentice Hall, INC, 1977]
- Press Council of India, *Crisis and Credibility*, [New Delhi: Lancer, 1991]
- Pruitt, Dean G., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* [London & Englewood Cliffs: 1969]
- Pye, Lucian, W. (ed), *Communications and Political Development*, [Princeton, N.J., 1963]
- Rajan, M.S. and Ganguly (ed), *Sisir Gupta: India and the International System*, [New Delhi: Vikas Pub, 1981]
- Reed, Blake H. and Haroldson Edwin O., *A Taxonomy of Concepts in Communication*, [New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1975]
- Rikhye, Ravi, *Fourth Round: Indo-Pak War, 1984*, [New Delhi: ABC Pub., 1982]

- Rosenau, James N [ed], *In Search of Global Patterns*, [London: Collier Mcmillan, New York; Free Press, 1976]
- Rosenau, James N. and et al. *World Politics, An Introduction*, [New York: The Free Pres, 1978]
- Sackman, H. and Norman, Nie (ed), *The Information Utility and Social Choice*, [New Jersey: AFIPS Press Montavle, 1970]
- Saha, B.P., *Liberation Struggle and After*, [New Delhi: Vikas, 1985]
- Saksena, Ajay, *India and Pakistan: Their Foreign Policies; Areas of Agreement*, [Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1987]
- Sarferaz Hussein Mirza, *Not the Whole Truth, East, Pakistan Crisis (Mar-Dec '71): Role of the Foreign Press*, [Lahore: Centre for the South Asian Studies, Univ of Punjab, 1989]
- Sarkar, Sumit, *Modern India, 1815-1947*, [New Delhi: Macmillan, 1983]
- Schaeffer, Robert, *Warpath: The Politics of Pakistan*, [New York: Hill and Wong, 1991]
- Schellenberg, James A., *The Science of Conflict*, [New York and Scudson: 1982]
- Schramm, Wilbur (ed), *Mass Communication* [2nd ed, Illinois, Urbana, 1960]
- Siegert, Fred S., Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press*, [Urbana: University of Illinois Press]
- Singh, Anita Inder, *The Origins of the Partition of India*, [Delhi: OUP, 1987]

- Sisson, Richard and Leo, E. Ross, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and Creation of Bangladesh*. [New Delhi: Vistaar Publication]
- Smith, Anthony, *Politics of Information: Problems of Policy in Modern India*, [London: McMillan, 1978]
- Spain, James W., *The Way of the Pathans* [Karachi: OUP, 1975]
- Sreedhar, J.K., *Indo-Pak Relations: A Documentary Study*, [New Delhi: ABC Publishing, 1993]
- Sunderji, K., *Blind Men of Hindoostan: Indo-Pak Nuclear War*, [New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1993]
- Sushila Agarwal, *Press, Public Opinion and Government of India*, [Jaipur: Asha Publishing House, 1970]
- Thomas, Raju G.C., *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflicts in South Asia*, [Oxford: Westview, 1992]
- Todorov, D., *Freedom Press*, [Prague: International Organization of Journalists, 1966]
- Touchman, Gaye, *Making News*, [New York: Free Press, 1978]
- Upadhyay, M.K., *Indo-Pak Relations and Public Opinion in India (1980-90)*, [New Delhi, CPS/JNU, diss. 1991]
- Varma, S.P. and Mishra, K.P.(eds), *Foreign Policies in South Asia*, [Bombay: Asia, 1969]
- Venkataramani, M.S., *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-58*, [New Delhi: Allied, 1982]
- Venkataramiah, E.S., *Freedom of Press, Some Recent Trends*, [New Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1987]

Wakefield, *The Happy Kashmir*. [London: 1879]; [first Indian Publication: Seema Publications, 1979]

Whaley, Burton, *Strategies: Deception and Surprise in a War* (rev. ed.), [New York: Praeger, 1973].

Wolpert, Stanley, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Superpowers*, [New York: OUP, 1982]

—————, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, [New York: OUP, 1984]

—————, A., *A New History of India*, [New York: OUP, 1989]

Woodruff, Philip, *One Men Who Rules India: The Guardians*, [London: Jonathan Cape, 1954]

ARTICLES

Akbar, M.J., "The Second Problem" *Seminar*, 392, Apr. 92: 15-17.

Bhagat, Parminder S., "Pakistan's India Policy: Shift from Zia to Benazir", *India Quarterly*, 45 (1), Jan - Mar 89: 35-45.

Bhatty, Maqbool Ahmed, "Changing US Perception on South Asia", *Regional Studies*, 11(1), Winter 92 - 93: 3-34

Dutt, Savita, "India and Pakistan: Alternative Strategy for Bilateral Security", *Strategic Analysis*, 13 (6), Sept 90: 645-658

Gaan, Narottam, "Superpower Involvement in Indo-Pak Relations: Case Study of the United States", *India Quarterly*, 46(4), Oct - Dec 90: 1-32

Ganguly, Sumit, "Avoiding War in Kashmir", *Foreign Affairs*, 69 (5), Winter 90 - 91: 57-73

_____, "Deterrence Failures Revisited: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 13(4), Dec 90: 77-93

Haque, Mahmudul, "US Role in Kashmir Dispute: A Survey", *Regional Studies*, 10 (4), Autumn 92: 72-87

Jagmohan, "Past, Present, Future", *Seminar*, 392, 18-24

Jones, Rodney W., "Old Quarrels and New Realities: Security in Southern Asia After the Cold War", *Washington Quarterly*, 15 (1), Winter 92: 105-128

Kaul, D.N., "Militancy: A Comment", *Seminar*, 392, 43-45

Khan, Tanvir Ahmed, "Pakistan's Regional Policy with special reference to India and Afghanistan", *Pakistan Horizon*, 43 (4), Oct 90: 9-28

Khanduri, Chandra B., "Analysis of the Kashmir Problem and an Approach to Solution", *Strategic Analysis*, 13 (6), Sept 90: 619-644

Malik, Iftikar H., "The Continuing Conflict in Kashmir: Regional Detente in Jeopardy", *Conflict Studies*, 259, Mar 93: 1-25

Nayar, Kuldip, "Kashmir Re-reading its Past in order to Proffer a Practicable Solution", *The Round Table*, 322, July 92: 303-314

Subramaniam, K. "Kashmir", *Strategic Analysis*, 13 (2), May 90: 111-139.

Tehranian, Majied, "International Communication: A Dialogue of the Deaf", *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 2(1), 1982: 21-46