

RUSSIAN-US RELATIONS DURING POST COLD-WAR ERA (1989-94)

Dissertation submitted to Jawahar Lal Nehru University
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Dedicated to
My Mother and My 'Sir'



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C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The period, immediately after the end of the Second World War, saw the emergence of the Soviet Union as a super power. Russia arose as a militarily strong country with a stable international repute, which can match the might and prowess of another super power, i.e. the U.S. The importance of Russian-US relationship lies in the fact that the post-World War international politics has been mainly dominated by the super.power rivalry. It has often decided the course of bilateral relations of even other countries and hence provided the very infrastructure of post-war international politics. But ironically, superpower relationship has been more marked by the disagreements than the agreements. The formal division of Europe at Yalta Conference resulted in the polarisation of Europe in two hostile blocs. The mutual mistrust created at the Yalta Conference and further repeated at Postdam Conference was so deep and intense that it took almost fifty years to overcome it.

A close review of Russian-US relationship reveals the fact that their antagonism had been a product of

complex and varied factors, ranging from ideological commitments to their outlook of world's problems. In a sense their confrontation was destined to be inevitable because of basic differences in their system itself. Right from the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Russia had posed serious ideological threats to the US. US has been the exponent of the capitalist system based on liberal democratic values and free market economy. In contrast Russia has time and again challenged the validity of capitalist system for its inherent imperialist and exploitative tendencies. Thus the clash between these two antagonistic systems was bound to take place.

Traditionally, the Soviet view of International relation is rested on Lenin's theory of imperialism. To Lenin, model of international relations in which the international behaviour of states is explained through the simple projection of the alleged international contradictions of capitalism into a crisis prone world capitalist system. Class interests are the key, and the national interests are definitely subordinate. International relations are essentially the product of the various socio-economic systems organised as separate

states.¹

Lenin identified three areas of highly developed capitalism -- Central Europe, Germany, Great Britain and US, that dominated the world. Lenin further saw revolutionary objectives best fulfilled in working to protect the interests of the Soviet State to promote the Cause of World revolution.²

The Soviet-US antagonism can be traced in their contrary world view. The Soviet Union and US became adversaries, since their basic perception and their political system were so opposite that the two countries for ever remained confounding and alarming to each other. Russia was committed to free the world from any kind of exploitation, whereas US was reluctant to strengthen the capitalist system based on exploitation and dehumanization of the working classes. This contradiction exists not in the international arena, but also in the way they function internally.³ The Soviet-US relationship was largely guided by these contradictions.

1. Lenin, V.I., Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978) p.83.
2. Martin McCaulen, The Motive Forces of Soviet Foreign Policy : A Reappraisal (Denver: University of Denver, 1971), p.13.
3. Joseph S. Nye Jr. (ed.) The Making of America's Soviet Policy, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984), p.183.

The first instance, Russia and US engaged in a polemical war relating to the policy of "Soviet Russia, was on September 10, 1920 when the then American Secretary of State, Brunbridge Colbly told the Italian ambassador that the American Government would like friendly relations towards Russia provided its Government should not be "Soviet one".⁴ In response, Russia called this kind of statement an entirely unprecedented one in diplomatic practices, which Soviet Russia could not ignore.

Thus, the US objection was rooted in the very Soviet System and its programme to secure international revolution. The growing popularity of Communist ideology after the Great depression was really an alarming situation for US, and the main objective of US administration was to check this ideological proliferation. Ever since the establishment of the Socialist regime in Soviet Russia, allegation and counter-allegation had been a typical feature of relationship between the two ideologically opposite

4. See, "circular note from Chicherin to Russian Representatives abroad concerning the United States note to the Italian Ambassador in Washington (extract)" in Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (1917-24), (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p.207.

states.

The major US hostility was further reflected in its non-recognition policy. The fundamental reason for this policy had been said on the "irreconcilability of the revolutionary communist theory and practice of government with the theory and practice of American democracy and capitalism". Thus, ideological hostility was the main incentive behind the non-recognition politics of US. Max Beloff has made a very interesting remark, "the non-recognition of the Soviet Government had been one of the political luxuries of US."⁵

Anyhow, despite these type of serious differences between the two, both fought the Second World War under the same banner. The conflicts and contradictions were sidelined merely to defeat the bigger enemy of fascism which was equally threatening for both. Although this alliance was held together, by the necessity of the hour, it was maintained during a time of Great national peril for the powers involved, amidst events effecting the whole future of Europe. However, it should not be surprising that the alliance was subject to serious

5. Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia (1924-41), vol.1, (Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 116-117.

tensions and strains.⁶

Despite the fact that USSR and US Cooperations were high in the Second World War, and both equally shared the pride of victory over the fascist forces, soon serious differences cropped up between them over the future of Europe and their respective sphere of influence. Yalta Conference held in February 1945 which envisaged the division of Germany into zones of occupation and a common pledge to hold free elections in all those countries set free from Nazi army, became a major source of antagonism.⁷ Because the dreams of America to set a democratic regime in this region was ravaged by the Red Army. The Western concern to this region and their differences with USSR became evident in the famous Fulton Speech, made by Churchill. He advocated an alliance between US and the Commonwealth Nations against the growing threat from the Soviet Union.⁸

Thus, in the wake of the Yalta Conference and the Fulton speech after the end of the Second World War, the

6. David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, (Penguin, London, 1965), p.25.
7. Walter Theimer, An Encyclopedia of Modern World Politics, (Rinehart and Company, New York, 1950) p.685.
8. Walter Laqueur (ed) A Dictionary of Politics (The Free Press, New York, 1971), p.195.

hostility surfaced between the US and the USSR - the two rigidly antagonistic camps. This hostility became known as the Cold War.⁹ After the beginning of the Cold War, Soviet US relations were marked by the continuous efforts by the two blocs to humiliate each other and a complete misunderstanding was a marked feature.

In the post-War period, a new type of foreign policy emerged. America being the leader of the Capitalist bloc, did everything to check the influence of communism. During this period, Marshall Plan came as a solution to reconstruct the war-torn economies of European country.¹⁰ But the actual intention behind concentration on the European economy, by America was to stop the growing popularity of communism.

After the War Stalin criticised the American imperialistic and hegimonic tendencies. While summing up the American motives, Stalin explained, "the US hopes to put its dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, out of action to seize foreign markets and world's raw

9. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. "Origin of the Cold War", Erik P. Hoffmann (ed.), The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Aldin Publishing Company, New York, 1980), p.228.

10. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987) p.18.

material resources and establish its world supremacy.¹¹ Later on, Stalin put forward his own theory in 1952, in which he argued that Capitalist collapse was imminent and that War among capitalist States was more likely than war between capitalism and communism.

Thus the entire post war strategy was shadowed by their perpetual effort to curb the influence of each other. An attack on communist ideological tenets was conceived as an effective weapon to obstruct Soviet propaganda and its propagation. The 'containment of communism' v/s 'containment of capitalism' became the main objective of their respective foreign policies. And except for direct war, no stone was left unturned for this objective.

The division of world into two explicit blocs, standing against each other as gladiators, also brought with it a feeling of insecurity, which compelled both the blocs to review their security and threat perceptions. The formation of NATO was its culmination. Harry S. Truman and Robert A. Taft, in a message to the Senate, on April 12, had aptly expressed this fear, "the World has grown too small, the oceans to our east and West no

11. Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1952) pp.34-50.

longer protect us from the reach of brutality and aggression.....the North Atlantic treaty is an expression of the desire of the people of the US for peace and Security, for the continuing opportunity to live and work in freedom."¹² The basic objective behind NATO was to secure the West Europe in case of Soviet aggression, because NATO members were unanimous about the view that Western values were seriously endangered by the Soviet ideology.

However, as a result of encirclement of Russia and its East European allies by U.S., security of the socialist bloc became the main agenda in the discussions of this bloc. On the 4th March, 1955 the Warsaw Conference of European countries, witnessed the emergence of Warsaw Military bloc to counter the threats that had been posed by the establishment of NATO. Warsaw Pact came not merely as a effective means to curb the American ambitions, but it also legalized Soviet military presence in the Europe.

Thus the creation of NATO and its counter part Warsaw Pact begins an era of exclusively military means

12. Ernest R., (ed.) "Letter to President Harry S. Truman", July 23, 1946 in The American Foreign Policy (Oxford and IBH Publishing Company, Calcutta, 1967), p.211.

of security and politics of deterrence which was one of the major reasons behind the Cold War. Soon after the polarisation of States on these two military blocs started, President Truman's dangerous dogma also accelerated the polarization of world politics. He stated that "to be with US or to be counted against us".¹³

With the arrival of N.S. Krushchev at the helm of Soviet power, and the revitalisation of summit diplomacy in world politics, we saw a decline in the intensity of Cold War. The new Soviet leader met the US President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Churchill and French Prime Minister Mullet at Geneva in the Summer of 1955. Most observers, both Soviet and Western, see the year 1956, the year of the 20th Soviet Party Congress and Krushchev's "Secret Speech" denouncing Stalin's crimes against the party, as the critical turning point in Soviet thinking on international relations.¹⁴

This was followed by the four power Summit held in Paris in 1960, which was actually aborted due to shooting down of the US U-2 Spy Plane. To lessen international

13. N. Sargergeva, "US Policy Today", . New Times, No.11, January 19, 1949, p.11.

14. Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives p.275 and Dimitri Tomshevsky, on the Peaceful Coexistence of States, (novosti Press, Moscow, 1973), p.34.

tension, the Soviet Union offered minor compromises in marginal areas -- the return of the Porkkala Naval base to Finland and the withdrawal from the eastern Austria. He favoured status quo in Europe and to enter into "competitive co-existence" with the West in developing areas. Krushchev also suggested that NATO and Warsaw Pact be fused into an overall European Security.

In his foreign policy discussions, he also induced several significant doctrinal shifts:

- i) he stated that War between the two systems is not inevitable;
- ii) Krushchev accepted the Titoist contention that there are several roads to Socialism;
- iii) Communists were encouraged to seek power, where and when possible, through peaceful Parliamentary means, in Western Europe.

After the new US President, John F. Kennedy took over, Krushchev met him in Vienna in June 1961. It was in this meeting that the problem of nuclear disarmament engaged serious attention. By all counts, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 initiated a process of the relaxation of tension and it also inaugurated an era of working relationship between the two countries. Although the tensions and clashes of interests remained, but a

trend towards negotiations and mutual accommodation and compromise was definitely surfaced.¹⁵

The Detente process in Soviet US relations was started in the year immediately after the end of the US War in Vietnam. It was generally recognized that USSR had achieved military parity with the US. It was known to have developed the potential to destroy the US and Western Europe in a nuclear war. This parity, however, essentially meant a start of the politics of balance of terror or mutual deterrence. Though the 'Brezhnev doctrine' which proclaimed an inherent right of the Soviet Union to intervene anywhere in the Socialist world to preserve socialism, was a major source of tension between the two.

By the beginning of 1970s, the Soviet-US relationship was certainly looking towards a new horizon. In a major breakthrough, the US President Richard Nixon made his historic visit to the USSR in May 1972 and signed an agreement on "Basic Principles of Mutual relations between the US and USSR". A memorable commitment of the document was its declaration that, "in the nuclear age, there is no alternative to conducting

15. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, The Soviet Foreign Policy (Random House, New York, 1960), pp. 247-281.

Soviet-US relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence of States". It also committed the two countries" to avoid military confrontation and to prevent the outbreak of the nuclear age."

The Soviet Leader Brezhnev, paid a return visit to the US in June 1973, and his talks with US leaders led to further relaxation of international tension. To further extend this cooperative environment, the USSR signed SALT-1 Treaty with US putting mutual restrictions on the number of nuclear missiles in Europe, in May 1972. Accordingly, SALT-2 was concluded in Vladivostok during the Summit meeting with US President.

Thus during Brezhnev era a number of steps had been taken to reduce the tension between two superpowers, and the start of detente was a major breakthrough in this regard. Although even during the detente period, the Soviet foreign policy was full with contradictions.¹⁶ The Soviet Union was on the one hand, trying to reduce the military tension and on the other hand, it was also looking interested in spreading its sphere of influence in the developing countries to draw them under the Soviet banner.

16. Imam Zafar, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1990, (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1990), p.38.

Meanwhile, by mid-September, Russia's relationship with its 'junior brother' China began to embitter due to border disputes. Taking full advantage of this situation, US started strengthening its ties with China. Thus Russia was confronted with the formidable task of ideological challenge put forward by China as well as American imperialist tendencies. This crisis was further worsened by the Soviet Union's direct intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The US reacted very sharply and called it a "communist imperialism", and thus the gains of detente were put to an end. With the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the Soviet-US relationship entered a new phase, i.e. the 'new cold war'.

The beginning of 1980s brought with it several crises in superpower relationships. The west had already gone hostile to Soviet Union and several third world countries were also not happy with the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The US took the lead in cancelling the major disarmament negotiations, reimposed trade embargo on the USSR and stepped up its arms supply to Afghanistan rebels. This decade also saw for the first time, involvement of sports and games in international politics. US and its allies boycotted the Moscow Olympic

games (1980).

During Andrapov period, who took over the Russian leadership after the death of Brezhnev in November 1982, Soviet-US relations reached its lowest point, unparalleled to even the worst days of the Cold War.¹⁷ A principle cause of friction was the US nuclear arms modernization programme, including the deployment of intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western Europe. Speaking on the January 17, 1983, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, described the US Government as "compulsive Gamblers and adventurists who declare that they are ready to plunge mankind into a nuclear catastrophe for the sake of their ambitions."

In response, President Reagan delivered what was regarded as a most harsh statement by any US President, at a Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, in Florida, famous as "evil empire" speech. He recommended prayer, "for the salvation of all those who live in totalitarian darkness, while they preach the supremacy of the State, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predicts its eventual domination of all people of the earth -- they are the focus of evil in

17. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Jan., 1985, p. 33346.

the modern world".¹⁸

But a serious concern towards normalizing the relationship between the two was expressed at Williamsburg Summit, on May 31, 1983. President Reagan said that he now anticipates an improvement in Western relationship with the Soviet Union. Andrapov also expressed deep concern about the normalization of Russian-US relationship. However, this period saw a rapid fall in trade between the two countries since the 1979, the lapsing of eight joint Working Groups was further taken as a sign of declining Soviet-US relations. In short span of Andrapov and Chernenko, there was not any significant move, as they hardly got time.

Thus, before the arrival of the Gorbachev, the Soviet US relationship was running on a zig-zag path. The main objective of both the superpowers remained the same, The minor concessions in the field of disarmament and other cooperations were only to deceive each other and to make their image brighter before third world countries. In fact, before the arrival of Gorbachev no Soviet leader ever expressed enthusiasm in breaking the taboo between east and west, except Kruschev.

18. quoted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Jan. 1985, p. 33353.

But ever since the arrival of Gorbachev as the General Secretary of the CPSU on March 10, 1985, we see his genuine concern for the reforming of Soviet Society and maintaining a close relationship with US. The twin intellectual 'children' of Gorbachev - Perestroika and Glasnost were not merely concerned with the domestic reforms only, but it also envisaged a friendly and cooperative environment in which Russian US relationship was given a special attention.

In fact, Gorbachev was compelled by the complex domestic crisis and needs to launch a reform movement. Perestroika has its origin in the failure of Soviet system to produce goods. Mr. Gorbachev may initially have supposed that a kick start was all that was necessary. However, he clearly bent on redesigning of the whole vehicle.¹⁹ Soon after his accession to power he realized that so far, Soviet foreign policy has produced nothing fruitful for Russia and the rigid and adamant foreign policies of his predecessors has only brought political and economic strains for the country.

Gorbachev's 'new thinking' herald a new era in

19. Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev", World Today, March 1989, vol.45, pp. 40-45.

superpower relationship. Gorbachev by deideologizing the Soviet foreign policy, came forward with an overall changed notion of security, in which normalizing relationship with West was a central theme. As he argued in his speech, delivered in the East Serbian City of Krasnoyarsk on September 16, 1988 "we have given priority to the problems of untangling the knots of conflict and confrontation and to bridling militarism".²⁰ Gorbachev's reforms were so overwhelming that within Five Years the Soviet Union crumbled like anything. One of the chief objectives of Gorbachev's new thinking was to save the declining prestige of Soviet empire. However, Gorbachev failed in his ambition and the very Soviet System itself collapsed.

With the collapse of Soviet empire, Cold War came to its natural end. Soviet Union lost its East European allies and its international stature declined considerably. The Soviet Union collapsed not merely a nation but also as a system. With the arrival of Yeltsin, we see a more compromisive soviet attitude towards US. Yeltsin in these years seems to be a subordinate of Washington, who is merely obeying the US dictates. The Soviet Foreign Policy in this post Cold

20. Party Life, Oct. 1988, vol.XXIV; No.10, p.12.

War era is not able to assert itself fully because of transitional nature of Russian society and its inherent contradictions.

CHAPTER : II

RUSSIAN-US RELATIONS DURING GORBACHEV PERIOD

The thawing of Soviet-US relations which had already made its way in the wake of commencement of detente theory during Brezhnev era, was further Concretized by the arrival of Gorbachev as the General Secretary of the CPSU on March 10, 1985. Although, the death of three Soviet leaders - Brezhnev, Andrapov and Chernenko in quick succession, had caused some damage by paralysing the relationship between the two key actors of post-war international scenario. This period was marked by an increased Communication gap between the two and the shadow of mistrust was clearly visible on super power relationship.

The Soviet-US relations reached its lowest point during Andrapov period. The bitterness was reflected in mutual mud-slugging between the political leader and Media. For the Soviet Union America's image as the 'Compulsive gambler' remained the same and similarly Russia's image as the 'evil empire' remained unmoved in the US official language. That is why the arrival of Gorbachev was not much celebrated in US and west. Keeping in mind their previous relationship records the political

analysts were not much hopeful to Gorbachev. Although, it was expected from him that he would concentrate on domestic policy and the Soviet foreign policy might see a little innovation. At best he was expected to pursue old Soviet objectives more vigorously.

In the first year Gorbachev did not come out with any significant and radical desire to improve relationship with US. Although, during the April 1985, plenary meeting of the CPSU central Committee he gave a slight-hint that he is not going to continue with the rigid foreign policy of his predecessors. In this meeting the options of humanity were stated as 'either stepping up tension and confrontation still further or searching in a constructive spirit for mutually acceptable accords that would stop the process of material preparations for a nuclear conflict.¹

But this hint was not much noticed and endorsed in the US. Washington was looking it as merely a rhetoric and a part of old Soviet game plan. This view was elaborately found expression in president Reagan's Statement

1. Congress of peoples Deputy's of the USSR Documents and Materials (Novosti Press, Moscow, 1989) p. 112.

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in which he commented that "as much as we hope for greater stability through arms control we must remember that the Soviet record of compliance with past agreements have been poor² He further announced that he has decided not to attend the funeral of president Chernenko. Here it should be mentioned that he had not attended the funerals of either of the two previous leaders. Thus amidst suspicion and mistrust the year 1985 failed to produce any major break through in Soviet US relations. This year was marked by old allegation and counter allegation politics by both the countries and thus hampering the progress of new dimensions in the superpower relationship.

The Geneva Summit (1985) didn't come out with any permanent solution and the serious differences remained the same. Although the two leaders, Reagan and Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Reagan's SDI programme was the main hindrance which also appeared during the Reykjavik summit.

2. Quoted from Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1985, Vol. XXXI, p.33927

However, Gorbachev offered a unilateral freeze on development and deployment of nuclear weapons in Space.³ US welcomed the summit call by Gorbachev but said his announcement of freeze of medium range missile was an old proposal.⁴ However, the Americans perceive it as a hope for a new beginning.

Meanwhile, the 27th Congress of the CPSU, held in March 1986, was crucial turning point in the history of superpower relationship. The reforms introduced by Gorbachev were so profound and its intensity were so deep that later on it culminated in the demise of the very Soviet system.

However, the reforms of Gorbachev can't be said merely an adventure which failed to save the declining prestige of the Soviet Union. It was a result of profound analysis of the situation and the harsh realities which the Soviet Union was facing.⁵ during the middle of the eighties.

(3) See, Telegraph (Calcutta), March 13, 1985.

(4) See, Indian Express (New Delhi) April 10, 1985.

(5) Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika : New Thinking for our Country and the world (London : Collins, 1987), pp.21-22.

The question arises here that what were those situations and realities which compelled Gorbachev to launch such type of overwhelming reforms. Keeping in mind the magnitude of the problems that the Soviet Union was facing, the problems seemed to be transparent in nature. The rigid and inflexible foreign policies adopted by his predecessors were chiefly responsible for those situations. Over emphasis on the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in international relations and the military aspect of security has led to a mere increase in the rift between the two superpowers. The bloc model of security had failed to reduce the increasing fear psychosis and in turn it has only brought serious strains for the soviet economy.

Soviet resources were further overloaded by the cost of supporting the seek East European and third world allies which had nothing to offer in return. This economic distress had reduced the Soviet union's stature as merely a military super power. In military strength the Soviet Union was a super power, but its economic capacity was no more than a middle income country.⁶ Soviet union was rapidly becoming a third world economy.

(6) The World Fact Book (Washington D.C. CIA. 1988).

Soviet Union is the only industrial nation in the world with rising infant mortality rates and declining life expectancy. Statistics as well as worsening living standards contributed for the felt need of change.⁷ Russian dilemma were further increased by the growing Soviet Security threats posed by US.

In binding barriers to Soviet 'expansionism' the US relied heavily on military means and President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) was its culmination.⁸ This ambitious security programme increased Moscow's fear that the US might gain certain military and political advantage over the Soviet Union. This concern was expressed in Gorbachev's attempt in Reykjavik to confine the SDI to laboratory research only.

(7) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick "Beyond the Cold War" Foreign Affairs 1989/90, Vol. 69, No. 1, p.4

(8) B.K. Shrivastava 'American perspective on issues in US-Soviet Relations in Sushil Kuamr (ed.) 'Gorbachev Reforms and International Change' (Lancers Books, New Delhi, 1993) p.60

Thus Gorbachev inherited from his predecessors not only a staggering and seek economy but also an increasing rigid and uncompromisive foreign policy. Gorbachev was successful in evaluating the fact that in relation with US, the Soviet leadership vacuum and attendant diplomatic inflexibility had so far produced nothing positive. The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan had not caused merely serious strains in its relationship with US, but it has also blackened the Moscow's reputation among non-aligned and Third World allies.

Soon after Gorbachev came to power he realized that a relative calm relationship with US will be quite useful in context of falling oil prices, increased soviet needs of hard currency stringency and heightened soviet need for western technological and Capital imports to help fulfill Gorbachev's grandiose plans for technological advance and the expansion of the machine-building industries.⁹ Thus he was induced by his internal needs to maintain a line of pursuing bilateral engagement with the US.

9. Harry Gelman, 'Gorbachev's Dillemas and his Conflicting Foreign Policy Goals' Orbis, 1986-87, vol. 30 P.104

But Gorbachev was aware of this fact that a fundamental reform of the Soviet economy can only succeed if other areas ideology, the party, governmental institutions and societal structures were also modeled according to the complex needs. In order to operationalize the reforms there was a need for fundamental structural change.¹⁰

The 27th congress of the CPSU, held in Kremlin Palace Moscow from February 25 to March 6, 1986 was very instrumental in this context.

Gorbachev came out with his 'new thinking' primarily aimed to end the Marxist orthodoxy. Gorbachev address, lasting more than five and half hours, was marked by the calls of extensive economic reform and fidelity to purist Marxist Leninist ideology. One of the most important objectives of this new thinking was to restructure Soviet American relations. An ambience conducive to debate and re-examination of the fundamental premises of Soviet foreign policy was thus created.¹¹

10. Mikhail Gorbachev, October Revolution and perestroika. The Revolution Continues Soviet Review, November 5, 1987, p.8

11. Margot, light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations (SUSSEX: Wheat Sheaf Books, 1988), p. 295.

Gorbachev was convinced that the ideological confrontation between Moscow and Washington, which had for decades provided the ground for cold war, was the main stumbling bloc in reviving the good relationship with the US. So he emphasized for a deideologized foreign policy. He criticizes the foreign policy of Brezhnev and Gromyko. The Brezhnev doctrine was termed invalid and the invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of intermediate range ss-20 missiles have been publicly denounced.¹²

The resolution of the 27th CPSU Congress on the political report of the CPSU Central Committee makes it clear that if the 'new thinking', has to do anything noble in international politics, it has to maintain a revised and non-confrontationist relationship with US with more emphasis on modern day realities and developments. The report came out with the conclusion that "the continuation of competition and historical context between the two systems with the mounting tendency towards the interdependence of states within the

12. Horst Teltschik, Gorbachev's reforms policy and the outlook for East-West relationship Aussen Politik, 1989, vol.-40.

world community is the real dialectics of the modern day world development.¹³ "

Gorbachev leadership has concluded that a favourable international environment can only be created on the basis of political accommodation with leading industrial powers, especially the US. For this, Gorbachev revised the central dogmas of Marxist-Leninist ideology by abandoning the CPSU's claim to undivided power and that the 'triumph of socialism' is historically predetermined. But here de-ideologization deemed to essentially mean the abandoning of only those dogmas which has been rejected by the historical experience and those who are not coping with the new realities. As Gorbachev had himself said, "The new phase also requires deideologizing relations among states, we are not abandoning our convictions, our philosophy or tradition, nor do we urge anyone to abandon theirs."¹⁴

Thus 27th Congress of the CPSU came out with a concrete plan to restructure the Soviet foreign policy

13. Soviet Review, March 17, 1986, vol. XX111 No. 12, p.14.

14. Party Life, October 1988, vol. XX1V, No. 10, p. 18
World Marxist Review, March 1988, vol.31, No.3 p. 37

especially with US and of course to keep aside the ideological barriers which had been hampering the way of good relationship between the two superpowers so far. Addressing the ideological conflict between capitalism and Communism, Gorbachev stressed that an understanding of "the key tendencies of the current reality" was essential to the pursuit of a correct and scientifically grounded policy. These realities are¹⁵ :

First, the development and accumulation of nuclear weapons, allow human kind to destroy all life on earth. It is now generally, recognized that there can be no victors in a nuclear war. Such a war means universal ruin.

Second, the world itself has changed substantially. It has become both more complex, diverse and contradictory and also more interdependent. It continues a contradictory entity with common problems dictating the need for mutually acceptable solutions precisely because of its diversity.

The basic aims and directions of CPSU'S foreign policy, designed during the 27th Congress was mainly aimed at reducing the traditional rivalry between Soviet

15. World Marxist Review March 1988, Vol.31, No.3, P.37

Union and the US. The new thinking was very instrumental in changing the Soviet Security perceptions. As Gorbachev explained that the Central committee had defined practical steps which might lead to an improvement in the situation, guided by the following considerations.¹⁶

- i) Security can't be built endlessly on fear of retaliation, in other words, on the doctrines of 'Containment' or deterrence.
- ii) In the context of the relationship between the USSR and US, security can only be mutual, and if we take international relations as a whole it can only be universal.
- iii) One can't confine oneself to relationship with any single, even a very important country but we attach considerable significance to the state and the character of the relations between the Soviet Union and the US.
- iv) The modern world has become much too small and fragile for wars and a policy of force. It is no longer possible to win an arms race. And aspirations to win military superiority can bring no political gain to anybody.

16. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1986, vol. 32, p. 34369.

Thus the main points underlying the foundation of new political thinking are the unity and interdependence of the world, supremacy of universal interests freedom of choice, deideologising state to state relations, demilitarization and humanization of international relations, comprehensive concept of international security and the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency.¹⁷

Although the 'new thinking' was very fruitful in opening a new outlook in Soviet-US relationship. Russia's changed military perception was perhaps its most profound impact. By the time of the 27th party Congress, Gorbachev not only argued 'the complete unacceptability of nuclear war' but also of the insufficiency for security of defence or deterrence in the nuclear age. The character of contemporary weapons he said, does not permit any state hope of defending itself by military technical means alone, even by creating the most powerful defence.¹⁸

17. Andrei G Bochkarev, 'Perestroika in Soviet foreign Policy', The Korean Journal of International Studies, summer 1991, vol. XXII, No.2, P.282.

18. Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson (ed.) Soviet Strategy and new Military Thinking (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992) .p84

However, despite the Gorbachev's radical reforms and continued effort to reduce tension between the East and the West, the 'new thinking' failed to produce expected results in the initial years. There were several occasions when 'new thinking' seemed to be shortlived. And shortly after the Gorbachev 'new thinking' formulations, a US presidential directive on March 7, 1986, calling for the reduction of the number of employees at the Soviet, Ukrainian and Byelorussian mission to the UN in New York came in the way of visualization of 'new thinking' in practice. The arrest of Col. Vladimir Izmaylov, allegedly collecting classified documents further weakened the hope for the normalization of relationship between the two. Soviet Union reacted in a similar manner and Mr. Nicholas Daniloff, a US Journalist was detained in Moscow on August 30, 1986, on the suspicion of espionage. US official claimed that he had been detained in relation for the August 23 arrest of Dr. Gennady Zakharov. However, good sense prevailed and a compromise was reached according to which both Daniloff and Zakharov were released.

This situation was further engraved by the expulsion of 25 Soviet diplomats from US in sep. 1986. This was

largest number of Soviet diplomats ever expelled by the US. The Soviet Union retaliated on October 19 by ordering the expulsion of five US diplomats.

Meanwhile, the Reykjavik summit held in October 1986 tried to compensate the loss of these minor strains over the superpower relationship. The summit was successful in long-range nuclear weapons, INF, short range missiles and nuclear testing areas. Although Mr. George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, disclosure in a statement to press at the end of the summit came as a surprise to many political analysts. He stated that there were no agreements on INF, strategic weapons reduction, apparently because of Soviet insistence on an overall package including agreements on SDI and US unwillingness to make sufficient concessions on SDI. Earlier President Reagan had said that "I told him (Gorbachev) I have pledged to the American people that I could not trade away SDI.. SDI is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks".¹⁹ Thus, US was all set to cash the SDI programme to persuade Soviet Union for unilateral and unconditional concessions. That is why Gorbachev while

19. See Times of India (New Delhi), October 14, 1986, see also, International Affairs, 3 March 1986, p. 56 and International Herald Tribune, May 14, 1985.

returning from the Reykjavik summit, criticized the validity of US view that Soviet Union can't bear the economic burden of most sophisticated arms race, and would break under the pressure and bow down before the west.²⁰

The signing of INF treaty in December 1987 in Washington was a genuine breakthrough on the road of nuclear disarmament. Living no doubts as to whether or not the task of phasing out nuclear arms was utopian. This was first ever agreement to eliminate two classes of nuclear weapons.

Apart from this it created a congenial political and psychological environment for negotiating other major issues regarding nuclear, strategic and other weapons.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU, while assessing the summit stated that "The signing in Washington of the treaty between USSR and the US on the elimination of intermediate range and short range missiles is an important milestone in international development. The practical beginning of creating a world without nuclear

20. See, CDSP, November 30, 1986. 21. Darshan Sing (Ed) "Soviet Foreign Policy Document (Sterling Publishers Private Limited 1987), p.VI

arms has been laid".²¹ The agreement concerning the basic outline of a new treaty on 50 percent reduction in Soviet and US strategic offensive arms, was another important outcome of Washington summit. The two leaders also instructed their respective delegations positioned at Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit both the sides to observe the 1972 ABM treaty.

Earlier, on September 15, 1987, the Soviet foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and US Secretary of state George Shultz signed an agreement on establishment of 'risk reduction centres in Moscow and Washington' to lessen the chances of accident, at white house. This was first direct communication channel between Moscow and Washington since the establishment of hot line in 1963.

Bilateral economic scientific environmental and cultural cooperation and joint handling of global problems recieved a fresh push. Inter parliamentary, cultural and public contacts also recieved a new boost. In 1987 five delegation of the US senators visited USSR and in turn the two Soviet delegations visited U.S. In context of these achievements the Soviet Foreign

21. Darshan Singh(ed.) "Soviet Foreign Policy Document (Sterling Publishers private Limited, 1987), p.VI.

minister's statement hardly looks exaggerated when he described 1987 "a relatively fruitful year for Soviet-US relationship". But one could easily see that the US administration was yet to rely upon exclusively political means of security. The growing US infatuation with 'miracle weapons' and persistence on SDI programme made the agreement anything short of fully satisfactory.

The INF treaty was welcomed in Europe by and large and the Warsaw pact nations fully approved the results of the summit. However, some NATO strategists came out with the conclusion that the treaty would weaken the NATO, leaving the western Europe at the mercy of & USSR, because of Soviet superiority in conventional weapons.²²

Regional conflicts together with Afghanistan was also a very hot issue during the talks. The Soviet side repeated its familiar position that the USSR would start with drawing its troops from Afghanistan as soon as arms supplies and material aid to Afghan rebels would be stopped. Soviet also cleared their stance that if it did not want a pro-moscow regime in Kabul, certainly it would not like the vice a versa case.

Encouraged by the vital break through gained during the INF treaty in December 1987, President Reagan visited

22. *ibid.*

Soviet Union for s summit meeting with Mr. Gorbachev on May 29 - June 21 1988. During the talks, arms control, human rights and regional issues were high on the agenda and a considerable progress was made in all these areas. But the result of the summit fall anything short of expectations. As Gorbachev while summing his assessment of the summit said, " we have gone up by one rung may be two.... we could have achieved more, but politics is the art of possible.²³"

Earlier a major confidence building step was taken by both the countries on January 11-14,1988 to wash out the clouds of mistrust. The 20 US Scientist toured the Russia's main nuclear test site at semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and on Jan. 26-29 Soviet scientists visited the US test site in the Nevada desert. The two sides expressed hope towards already expanding Soviet-US ties and noted with satisfaction that a number of bilateral issues agreements in such fields have been secured so far:

- i) Transport, science and technology ;
- ii) Maritime search and rescue;

23. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1988, vol. 34, p. 36060.

iii) The recent signing of a new memorandum on civilian nuclear reactor safety under the bilateral agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and

iv) The start of bilateral agreements on combating narcotics and trafficking.

The Soviet Union began the process of implementing the first stage of INF accord in February 1988 by withdrawing its SS-12 missiles from East Germany and Czechoslovakian territory. The counter step came from west Germany who announced that cruise and pershing II missiles would be withdrawn from German territory in October 1988.

Further, a series of meeting were held between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze in Washington, Moscow and Geneva alongside the ninth round of the nuclear and space talks concerned primarily with strategic weapons. Gorbachev himself at a session of Yugoslav Parliament on March 17, made public proposals for a Balkan nuclear free zone and for an effective freeze on the number of US and Soviet Warships in the Mediterranean which he described as one of the explosive regimes of the world.

The planned series of regular military level bilateral exchanges provided in the INF treaty were

implemented in 22 July 1988 by the visit of the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev to the US and a visit to Soviet Union by the US Secretary of Defence Mr. Frank Carlucci in August of the same year. Again the US and Soviet inspection teams carried out "baseline inspections" of Soviet and US military bases in accordance with the Moscow summit.

Meanwhile, Mr. Gorbachev was elected as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (de facto President of Soviet Union) on October 7, 1988 at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet.

Thus throughout the year 1985-88. We can see a qualitative as well as quantitative changes in Soviet US bilateral relationship. During these years a series of bilateral summit meetings were held, especially to overcome those barriers who were hampering the way of good relationship between the two. Most notable agreements were Reykjavik and Geneva. While the signing of the INF treaty in December 1987 was a major breakthrough aimed at reducing the tension between the two. Gorbachev first two years, witnessed the eager attempts by him to free the Soviet-US ties from the year old shackles of the cold war politics. His 'new thinking' was especially designed to achieve the Soviet security at

a minimum possible cost, and to make the world less threatening. The traditional 'containment of communism' vs. 'containment of capitalism' politics which had been the basic infrastructure of Soviet-US relationship is seemed to be disappeared from super power relationship, and it was no longer based on 'zero-Sum-Game' politics.

The abandoning of confrontationist politics and the adoption of cooperation was in accordance with the felt Soviet needs of foreign aid and helping hand from the US. But the US in these initial years of 'new thinking' was deemed to be acting like a political blackmailer whose motive was to take advantage of the weak domestic situation of the USSR. The minor strains in Soviet-US relational in the initial years of Gorbachev were mainly the result of this thinking of the US.

Moreover, these years provided with the prelude to the end of the cold war. The deideologization of Soviet foreign policy and similarly US promise to help Russia in its extensive economic, political and cultural reforms, aimed at democratizing the Soviet system was, very instrumental in starting the process towards the end of the cold war.

CHAPTER : III

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE RUSSIAN-US RELATIONS, 1989-91

The withering away of cold war was a major event in post world war era not merely because it saw the thawing of Soviet-US relationship and the end of traditional rivalry between the two superpowers, but it also opened the opportunities for the new foreign policy choices for both the countries. Gorbachev's new thinking's in international politics which sought for the cooperation and coordination in place of conflict and confrontation was instrumental in breaking the taboo between east and west. Although, the mutual distrust and a kind of fear psychosis which had been the dominating factor in Soviet-US relationship during the cold war period was already started showing a diminishing trend as a result of commencement of concept of detente during Brezhnev period. Gorbachev's new thinking, and the events in the eastern Europe proved to be final blow to the cold war. In the changed situation neither Soviet Union nor US was willing to bear this mental, material and psychological burden furthermore and both were eager to do away with this 'unnecessary burden'.

However, the 'new thinking was very helpful in breaking the earlier 'zero sum game' relationship between the two superpowers. Gorbachev came forward with a much

broader and more defused notion of security. The Denial of unilateral military solution and acceptance of multilateral cooperation and mutual reliance in order to reduce the possibilities of military confrontation, provided the initial break through in assuring the end of the cold war. The summit meeting at Reyjavik in October 1986, and the signing of INF treaty in December 1987 further confirmed that the cold war is breathing its last.

Finally, the post-war era collapsed in 1989, the year has made it clear that the Soviet Union and the US now have it in their power to put an end to the Cold War - the most important, expensive and dangerous phenomenon of the post war era.¹ The drastic changes in Eastern Europe are in themselves able to finish it off the nightmare of Cold War because it started from there and ended there too. The single set of events that was decisive in ending war time hopes for lasting Soviet-American friendship was the Stalinization of Eastern Europe between the arrival of red army in 1945 and the death of Jan Masaryk in 1948. The Roosevelt's efforts were pulled into vain, and the pledge of yalta conference to held a free election in all those countries set free from Nazi army were mercilessly trodden

(1). Mc George Bundy 'from Cold war towards trusting peace' foreign affairs, 1989/90, Vol.69, No. I, p. 197.

by Stalin's red army and his local henchmen. In the last years of 1990s international communism had seems to have lost its missionary appeal. Many of the communist regimes had been thrown out of Eastern Europe on the charges of exposed as corrupt, tyrannical and incompetent. During the fall and winter of 1989 communist rule was toppled in three key northern tier states of the Warsaw pact --- Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The communism was a declining force in Hungary and was on the slippery slope of multiparty reform even in Bulgaria. Although there were still communist regimes in countries like China, Cuba and North Korea.

But communism as a world wide political movement died in 1989, which was a major source of unhealthy relationship between the East and West. Thus for a layman a more appropriate question may be who lost more in the Cold War rather than who won the Cold War ? But for a keen observer of the international politics and by every measures of conventional post-war score keeping, 1989 was the year in which the west won the Cold War.² The Us was successful in deterring the Soviet Union from gaining preponderance in

2. Arnold L. Horelick, 'Us-Soviet Relations: the Threshold of a New Era' Foreign Affairs 1989/90, Vol. 69, No.1, P.51.

Eurasia, and in exhausting it economically along with discrediting its ideology.

Thus post war era collapsed in 1989. By the end of the year the East European Countries seem to have been liberated themselves from the shackles of ' Brezhnev Doctrines.' The division of Europe had been overcome symbolically with the collapse of the Berlin wall and literally with the opening of borders between Hungary and Austria, Czechslorakia and Austria, East Germany and west Germany.³ The Moscow was seeing all these events helplessly or unwilling to prevent the sudden deterioration of its most sensitive geopolictical position.

The Cold war thus ended without a hot war. In doing so it generator fundamental changes in two critical areas --the geostrategic and philosophical.⁴ In Eurasia Soviet power not merely shrank back to its 1940s. frontiers, but now it is being challenged even within its own borders.

3. Jean J. Kirkpatrick.' Beyond the Cold war' foreign Affairs 1989/90, Vol.69, No.i, P.

4. Dr. Zibigniew Brezezinski, 'The consequences of the end of the Cold was for international security,' Adelphi Papers, winter 1991, no, 265, p.5.

United Germany joined the NATO and thus geostrategic changes brought severe implications for Soviet security perceptions.

Philosophically, Soviet Union itself along with its erstwhile East European partners was dominated by the Western concepts of democracy and free market. Once so intellectually dominant competing notion of Marxism was discredited.

The geostrategic changes brought about by the events in Eastern Europe, compelled the Soviet Union to revise its security needs and perceptions. Because before the fall of its East European Warsaw allies they were working as the Russian's natural castle and a guarantee to Soviet security. Until the changes occurred in East Europe the Soviet nuclear forces had two main missions :⁵

- i) to neutralize major strategic targets in western Europe; and
- ii) to deter a first strike on the part of the Americans.

But with the collapse of Eastern Europe these motives of Soviet Union automatically become a non-entity. Soviet Union's profound concern for its safety was elaborately

5. Jean-Louis Gregorian 'Deterrence in post Cold War', Adelphi Papers, winter 1991, Vol.267, pp.3-13.

found expression in the 11th round of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) began in Geneva on June 19, 1989, aimed at the reduction and control of the superpower strategic nuclear weapons. The main areas of contention in the draft text were :

- a) Soviet demands for a linkage between START accord and the development of Space Weapons.
- b) Soviet insistence on the inclusion of submarine launched cruise missiles in any agreement;
- c) the question of mobile land-based missiles; and
- d) Verification procedures.⁶

At the Malta summit held in December 1989, between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, the convergence of American and Soviet positions on most agenda items was with minimum tension, low risk and prospectively at a greatly reduced cost.⁷ The two leaders displayed broad agreement on developments in East Europe, the aim of unprecedented.

6. Kessing's Record of World Events, 1989, Vol. 35, p. 36751

7. Arnold L. Horelick 'Us-Soviet Relations. The Threshold of a new era' Foreign Affairs 1989/90, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 51-69.

There relationship seemed likely to develop concluding a START treaty by June 1990 and a conventional weapons treaty by the end of 1990. The need to move towards a Global ban on chemical weapons was also felt and widely discussed too.

While assessing the Soviet-US relationship, Gorbachev pointed out that the soviet Union was attempting " to turn drastically its economy towards cooperation with other countries and said that what had happened during the meeting on this subject had been of principle importance.

President Bush also assured that he would recomend observer status for the Soviet Union within the GATT. It was further reported that Us had agreed to remove the existing restrictions on Us-Soviet trade and to award the Soviet Union most favorable nations treatment once the supereme Soviet had approved laws codyflying the liberalization of emigration.

Thus malta summit witnessed the collapse of the international order created at the yalta conference which later led to a massive polarisation of world and of course provided a breathing ground for the cold war. Malta summit also assured the assimilation of soviet union in world economy as it was promised by US to give it observer status within GATT, and most favour nation status. US was seemed

to be convinced with the Russian progress towards a liberated market economy and was already pressurizing Russia for the softening of its emigration laws. Thus Mata Summit marked the end of traditional rivalry between the two and the life span of cold war can best be described as from 'Yalta to Malta. Another major achievement of 1989 was the soviet acceptances that it would withdraw its troops from the Afghanistan . The soviet presence in Afghanistan had been one of the key sources of tension between the two superpower. To many scholars the soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 provides a new lease of life to the cold war, and period after it is often described as new cold war' era. There were criticism all around the world, ever since Russian troops landed in Afghanistan. Washtington was of the view that the military intervention in Afghanistan was an expansionist action on the part of Moscow and that Moscow had to be beaten back.⁸ There was immense diplomatic pressure on the soviet union to withdraw from Afghanistan. There was, however, a ray of hope when Gorbachev referred of Afghanistan as the Soviet Unions "bleeding wound".⁹

8. See Times of India, April 14, 1988.

9. Louis Dupree , " The soviet Union and Afghanistan in 1987", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 86, No. 516 ,1987,P.385

Soon after Gorbachev came in power Regan administration decided to increase support to the Afghan guerrillas. Actually , localized the Afghan conflict might have looked , it was fraught with fearful possibilities of history being repeated on a newly enlarged geopolitical scale which could have calumniated into a much wider conflict . Because the superpowers, Russia and America, had a direct stake in Afghanistan, they were pursuing diametrically opposite aims.¹⁰ In fact the Russian presence in Afghanistan had become a a economic liability of soviet union.

Gorbachev also realized that it is indeed very difficult to wit a war against Gorillas . Finally he decided to withdraw soviet forces from Afghanistan . He was willing to withdraw his forces without any accord.¹¹ However, the UN sponsored agreement paved a face saving way to the withdrawal of Russian forces.¹² The agreement was signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan and guaranteed by the US and the USSR .

10. Igor Malashenko, " soviet American relations after totalitarianism and the cold war ," International Affairs, June 1991,P.I.

11. See Times of India, April 2,1988.

12. See Hindustan Times (New Delhi), May 11,1989

The withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan flush out a major stumbling bloc between the two. The success of the superpower in providing solution over Afghanistan also provided lessions for other regional conflicts. First , if the superpowers could act rationally and pragmatically other regional conflicts can also be solved in a similar way . Secondly , that Russian's are true to their words.¹³

Another important decision has involved the reduction in military spending. In 1989 the military budget came to 77.3 billion roubles and in 1990m it is planned to further reduce this figure by 8.2 percent. According to Dimtri Yazov, minister of defence , there conversation in military spending will permit additional financial resources to be directed into production for civilian purposes. Four hundred military factories and one hundred civilian factories, which produced military goods, will be converted into plants which will produce civilian goods.¹⁴

13. See International Herald Tribune, January 6, 1988

14 D.T. Yazov , report on the 28the congress of the CPSU, Pravda, July5, 1990, P. 4. in Andrei G. Bockkarev, Perestroika in Soviet Foreign policy ' The Korean Journal of international Studies, summer 1991, vol, xxii, no.2 P.281

To further strengthen the newly achieved cooperative environment. The Soviet and US president, each send televised new year message to the other's country on January 1, 1990. The two leaders expressed enthusiasm in developing closer ties between their countries during the 1990s and referred to the Malta Summit in December 1989 as a turning point in their relationship and in disarmament talks. Gorbachev declared that 1990 "could become a genuine turning point in the efforts to limit and reduce arms and that it would open up a period of genuine Soviet US cooperation aimed at building a world ridding out subversive action pressure, interference and ground invasion."¹⁵ In accordance with this spirit the Soviet Union and US, in January, 1990 concluded three preliminary agreements on the levels of their forces stationed in Europe, the phasing out of chemical weapons and inspection of each others nuclear arsenals.

Bush and Gorbachev hold their second summit meeting in Washington on May 31-June 1, 1990. The main results of the summit were:

- a) the signing of an agreement banning the production of chemical weapons;

15. Keesing's Record of World Events, 1990, vol.36, p.37201

- b) A set of accords normalizing commercial relationship between the two countries for the first time in 50 years , and
- c) A provisional treaty on nuclear weapons. The comprehensive agreements on reductions in strategic nuclear arms (START) and conventional forces in Europe (CFE) , which were thought imminent at the time of malta summit, were not achieved but were assured to be concluded by the end of 1990. Further a trade agreement between the two provided for a reduction of customs duty on goods traded by the two countries was also concluded. The agreement also provided for better copyright protection for US companies and for reduction in the time US companies would have to wait for approval to begin commercial operation in Soviet Union. An agreement to extended commercial air travel and relations Governing maritime transport between the two were also simplified.

Meanwhile, by the end of the year 1990, the east European upheaval came to an end following the unification of German Democratic republic (GDR) with the federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on october 3,1990. However , the heads of state and Government of the 34 participants in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) assembled in paris on November 19-21 ,1990. The Paris

summit has a special importance in east west relationship, as it marked the end of four decades of military confrontation between East and west . It adopted a charter of paris summit for a new Europe.

Further, the agreement to dissolve the warsaw pact by the signing of 1992, provides a new impetus to the east-west relations. On November 19, leaders of the 16 member states of Warsaw pact signed an unprecedented treaty on conventional ground forces in Europe and endorsed a joint declaration renouncing the use of force. The Warsaw pact was also came under severe attack by its member states itself . The Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel described the warsaw pact as a remnant of past and a typical product of 'Stalinist expansionism.' At their final session on November 21, summit leader's formally inaugurated a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe. Thus the German unification resulted in the unification fo Europe and a agreed understanding between the east and west, condemning the bloc model of security.

The year 1991 started with the mounting chaos in soviet baltic Republic and the soviet naked use of forces came in the way of Soviet US relationship for a while. At the washington talks it had been agreed to postpone the summit meeting between Gorbachev and president Bush,

scheduled for February 11-13. Although both sides said that Bush was too busy with Gulf war but US unease with events in baltic was widely asserted as having also been a factor. However this was greatly tempered by western recognition of the need to maintain soviet support for the campaign against Iraq in the gulf war.

The Gulf crisis was a real test time for the post-cold war soviet foreign policy, not merely with gulf countries but also with west and the US. The Gulf crisis dominated the superpower relationship during the second half of the d1990. In entire Gulf crisis, the soviet foreign policy was in dilemma, especially in a era when many regional conflicts were resolved through peaceful negotiation. Soviet union had gained a lot of political advantage since the termination of the devastating Iran-Iraq war. It was successful in deepening its relation with Iran, established a satisfactory relationship with the Arab Gulf states.¹⁶ Thus Moscow's fear was genuine that it might loose all these positive developments.

Secondly as evidenced by the last stage of the Iran Iraq war where the US navy shielded kuwait from Iranian

16. Alex Pravoda (ED.) year Book of soviet foreign relations (I.B.Tauris publishers , London, 1991)p.22

attack, the destabilization of the Gulf involved a viable risk of western deployment in the region, a highly undesirable development from the soviet point of view.

Lastly, given the mounting turmoil in the USSR asiatic republic throughout the 1990, the soviet feared that any surge of nationalistic or religional sentiments in the gulf would entail grave consequences for these republics.

Hence, from movement Saddam made his quarrel with Kuwait public, the Soviet went out of their way to convince him of the merits of peaceful negotiations that will satisfy the interest of the both parties. The Soviet unions official stand was described as "the USSR is convinced that there are no conflicts, no matter how difficult, that can not be settled across the negotiation table.¹⁷ That is why Moscow moved to direct criticism only when the Iraqi leaders did not headed towards escalation.

The out break of Gulf war and the naked use of power by the united states against Iraq was under the disguise of UN resolution 678 was really a frustrating events. What could have been achieved through a sincere and effective negotiations under the aegis of UN, could not even achieved

17. Ibid, p.282

by the high technology warfare indulging the entire west.

What was more ironical for Soviet union was that it did not merely supported the US stance against one of its traditional ally but also failed to provide effective mediation and a peaceful solution to the crisis. In the initial moments of the gulf war the Soviet decision makers were highly confused over the issue, that whether it should actively participate in action against Iraq or should confine itself in merely criticizing the Iraqi invasion and supporting the UN resolution. On the other hand US was determined to involve Soviet ground forces in Iraq directly. In the helsinki Summit held in September 1990, the Soviet Union failed to convince the US to accept the Soviet position.

Similarly Soviet mediation role also resulted in a ludicrous fiasco as the veteran Soviet diplomat Yevgeny primakor's ideas and solutions were outrightly rejected by the G.C.C members. Thus in the entire gulf crisis the Soviet relations to US was more opportunistic, as the Soviet leaders were looking at the gulf crisis at a golden opportunity to show affinity with US interests and in turn gain maximum economic age and a often US reaction against

Soviet operations in Baltic Republics.¹⁸ Finally Soviet Union Supported the UN resolution No. 678, authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Although earlier Gorbachev held the view that "a military solution was fraught with the unpredictable consequences". In entire Gulf episode the Soviet leadership stood shoulder by shoulder with US with a view to maximize economic and other benefits from west, overlooking the long term Soviet interests.

Thus in the Gulf crisis we can see the entire Soviet policy oscillating between maximizing the benefits from west and hangover of being a superpower. The Soviet official position taken in Gulf war not merely differed from public opinion but also from some of its core decision makers. That is how the then Russian vice-President Rustkoi while answering a question from a Washington post correspondent, said. "I am against methods that rely on force, which with rare exceptions, do not produce

18. Mustafa Golam, Soviet Policy towards the Gulf crisis :
Realist or opportunist' Biis Journal, Jan. 91, vol.12,
No. 1, P. 74

results.¹⁹ However, even if convinced by the fact that the use of force is not a permanent solution to any problem, Soviet leadership went for a support to US, which was for a long time waiting to exhibit its hi-tech war instruments. Gennady Vasilyev, one of political commentator of Soviet Russia rightly stated Gulf war as a 'unprecedented proving ground for latest U.S western military hardware.'²⁰

However, amidst the gulf crisis there were serious developments taking place in Soviet domestic arena, which had has a profound impact on Soviet US relations. The differences between Gorbachev and Yeltsin were started taking place in Russian Federation. President Yeltsin, use a live nation wide television used a live nation wide television broadcast on February 19 to launch a personal attack on Gorbachev and to demand his immediate resignation. He also called on his fellow radicals to declare war on the leadership of the country which had led us into a quagmire.

Earlier Prime Minister Pavlov's announcement had already caused a serious strain on developing Soviet US closer ties. He made a astonishing announcement that

(19) The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1991 vol. XLIII, No. 7, P.9.

20. Ibid, No. 6, P 18.

January's sudden withdrawal of Rbs 50 and Rbs 100 bank notes had been prompted by the discovery of a western plot to flood the Soviet economy with billions of Roubles to create artificial hyper-inflation.

Two, further developments in February itself were also taken by commentators as signals of the deterioration in Soviet US relations. Firstly, the US administration announced emergency medical aid to to be channeled directly to the Baltic republics. Secondly, the US secretary of state, James Baker, recommend that the President should not Summit the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris in November, 1990, for Senate satification. Baker coupled his recommendation with expressions of support for the caurageous people of the Baltic States and warning to the Soviet leadership that Perestroika can't succeed at gun point.

However, these harsh US reaction can be analysed as the old American Pressure tactics to pressurise Russia to follow a soften policy towards the Baltic Republics and most important to accelerate the democratization and liberalization process. The Soviet leadership, keeping in mind the demand of the situation, tried to satisfy US by destroying the last of its SS-20 intermediate range missiles at the Kapustinyar test site, on May 12, ending a

three year process initiated under the terms of the 1987 INF treaty.

In June a number of steps had been especially designed to repair the political damage caused earlier in the year by differences over the Gulf war, the Soviet crackdown in the Baltic Republics and difficulties in arms control negotiations. on June 3 President Bush announced the waiver for a further year of the so called Jackson Vanik restrictions, and on June 11 congress approved credits of 1,500 million to Soviet Union, for the purchase of US farm products.

The last phase of the year 1991 saw the emergence of Boris Yeltsin as the national leader and declining prestige of Mikhail Gorbachev both inside the country as well outside. The election of Boris Yeltsin as the President of the Russia confirmed this fact. By the end of the year 1991, US also started taking more interest in Yeltsin because Gorbachev's popularity was on decline. In contrast, Yeltsin was expected to accelerate the ongoing reforms more vigorously and hence serve the US interest in Russia better than Gorbachov. What was more important from the US point view, Yeltsin was not at all concerned with the task of halting the declining Soviet prestige, rather he was more interested in overcoming the domestic economic problems.

Thus the Russian Foreign policy after the end of the cold war suddenly became transparent and predictable, as Russia's domestic problems increased. The end of the cold war resulted in the decline of Soviet Union's international stature which in turn reduced its bargaining capacity with United States. By the end of the year Russia suddenly found itself groveling before the US. The zero sum game relationship came to an end the US was seem to playing from the both sides in the new international game with Russia.

The end of the cold war proved very costly for the Soviet Union, it lost its cold war satellites in East Europe and its own integrity came under serious threat. Finally USSR disintegrated under the severe domestic and international pressure.

CHAPTER IV

THE RUSSIAN-US RELATIONSHIP AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION, 1992-94

The storm of massive political, economic and social reforms started from east Europe soon reached the soviet union, crossing the urals through its Baltic Republics. By the time this devastating storm reached the soviet Union it was already fighting with the menacing domestic problems - crippled economy, endless ethnic conflict and a growing tide of rising nationality problem standing in a bellicose gesture to come out of soviet Umbrella. This situation was added with Gorbachev's disparate attempt to solve the guardian knot of problems by deideologizing the soviet structure and his unwillingness to continue with the old soviet policy to retain its empire at any cost. Once the cradle of marxism-Leninism loosened, the soviet republics came out in direct revolt against the central authority, one after another. The well cherished shock therapy, proved futile for the dieing soviet economy, political negotiation and even the use of sheer necked force failed to end the ethnic problems and conflicts and eventually the prestigious soviet empire succumbed to its own contradictions.

With the conclusion of minsk declaration, which reads "we the republics of Belarus, Russian federation

and the Ukraine as the founder states of USSR which signed the union treaty of 1992, henceforth described as the high contracting parties, conclude that the USSR has ceased to exist as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical entity,"¹ marked the final disintegration of soviet union.

Keeping in mind the magnitude of the problems the soviet union was facing, it came hardly as a surprise for world, or even for Russian leadership itself, for that matter. Even since the beginning of 1980s the country had been facing the multivaried crisis and the crisis also progressed as the decade progressed. The soviet union could have existed with the crisis and its continued efforts to overcome it²

but it might have been a worst situation even than its disintegration. Thus this event come as a news for whom the world was waiting for a long time, rather, than as a disbelief.

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1. SIPPRI Year Book (oxford university Press, 1992) p. 558
 2. Zafar Imam, 'How and why soviet Union disintegrated' International Studies, Oct-Dec., 1992 vol. 29, No. 4, P. 378

Gorbachev himself has analysed the reasons which had brought the downfall of the communist system. In his farewell address to the nation, televised on 25 december 1991.³ He identified the dismal economic performance of the system as primary reason. He stated " Fate had it that when I found myself at the head of the state it was already clear that all was not well in the country. There was plenty of everything, yet we lived much worse than the developed countries and kept falling behind them more and more". He further identified three ills of the Soviet Society primarily responsible--the command bureaucratic structure, its subservience ideology and consequently the terrible burden of arms race.

Thus for Soviet Leadership itself it was an unhappy event but not the surprising one. For the west, especially for US it was a most welcomed event as it is clear from the President Bush's christmas message of 1991 over the US victory in the cold war. He exclaimed in joy while saying that " who could have thought twelve months ago that the Soviet Union would no longer exist".⁴

3. See Times of India (New Delhi, 27 Dec. 1991).

4. See Times of India (New Delhi) of 24 Dec. 1991

However, immediately after the formal disintegration of Soviet Union west did not show any hesitation in giving recognition to the Russia as the legal successor of the former soviet union. On 24 December Russia was recognised by the British Government as a Sovereign state and as the inheritor of the international rights and obligations of the soviet union. The following day, after gorbachev's dignified valedictory televised speech, Russia recieved diplomatic recognition from the US. By early January 1992 more than 110 states had granted diplomatic recognition to the Russian Federation.

The US was aware of the fact that even after its disintegration Russia remained a very significant geo-politic entity and maintaining a good relationship with Russia would serve its own interests. The US had obvious reason behind this thinking :

- I) Even if after its disintegration no one can deny the potential military strength of Russia.
- II) Russia still remains the biggest country in the world in terms of territory.
- III) Its place among permanent member of Security Council enables it offer ambitious plans for restructuring the world system.

- IV) Still Russia has effective influence over the large number of developing third world countries and this influence can be channelised in NPT and other safeguard areas ; and
- V) In Us view Russia was capable of keeping the spread of nuclear arms in CIS, under control.

Thus Russia was fulfilling all the requisites to be aptly called the legal successor of the USSR. Russia occupies the bulk of soviet territory and has a population of 150 million, just more than half of the soviet total ; more important, it controls most soviet natural resources. According to the most recent available figures, Russia maintains 90 percent of the Soviet oil, nearly 80 percent of the natural gas, 60 percent of its electricity, 70 percent of gold production, and 10 percent of trained workers for the overall union.⁵

However, Russian diplomats were slowly but surely enlarging the scope of their independent activities ever since the August coup. The for most difficulty in this way was that Russia was yet to achieve international diplomatic recognition as a separate entity. Nevertheless, in anticipation of the logical end of this impasse, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had

already, at the beginning of October 1991, spoken about Russia assuming its place at the United Nations under its own name. Finally Russia got recognition in early 1992, as a separate and independent entity, and soon after it Russia came out with its own foreign policy perceptions.

Anyhow, it will be a mistake to consider Russia as the synonym of erstwhile Soviet Union, even though it is widely recognized legal successor of the Soviet Union. At best Russia can be a good substitute of USSR, otherwise there is no comparison between the two entities in matters of power, influence and authority that the former Soviet Union had and the present Russia is having now. The international role of Russia has weakened now, it has lost its bargaining capacity with the United States, and more importantly, so far it has not shown interest in asserting its previous super power stature. For this, the present Russia neither has the capacity nor the political will. So in this post communist, neo-capitalist era Russian relationship with US is likely to be guided by its domestic international imperatives rather than by the geo-political and external considerations. In the initial years of its recognition Russian foreign policy

5. Quoted in Dimitri Simes. "Russia Reborn", Foreign Policy, Winter 1991-92, No. 85, p. 42.

showed its unwillingness towards those moves that was destined to threatening its international reforms and confront it with other countries.

The early Russian relationship with US was seemed to be guided by the norms and compulsions of new international world order, which is based on two premises. First, the end of the cold war and the confrontation between the two superpowers and two blocs, reduced threats of nuclear of encounter and the liquidation of a threatening military bloc like the Warsaw pact.⁶ And second, that western style democracies based on multi party system and free market economy has proved itself more efficient and flexible than the command economic and the Russia is trying to consolidate it in there domestic sphere. This become most marked in statements which came from Russian Foreign Ministry in early, 1992. It was repeatedly stated that Russia intended to enter the club of the most dynamically developing democratic countries and that it was the missing component of the democratic pole of the Northern

6. Vladimir verse, M.A., New Foreign Policy of Russia: From world aspirations to Realism', Review of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No.1009-11, p.20, 1992.

Hemisphere.⁷.

In the initial years Yeltsins foreign policy is seems to be follow up of what was pursued by his predeccessor Gorbachev. In these years Russian policy to US continues to be based on hopes of aid and credit packages.

As Russia is looking towards a new century, the leadership of Yeltsin was seemed to be intended on reconciliation with the west especially US. Moscows attitude is no longer considered as hostile, though there were some differences over its nuclear forces and military. Industrial complex. That was evident following a friendly and informal four hour meeting between President Bush and Gorbachev at Camp David in early 1992. Both the leaders declared that their nations no longer consider themselves potential adversaries and instead a trusted friends.

They also issued camp david declaration of New Relations between the two nations . In accordance with the provisions of the declaration they pledged to together to remove any remnant of cold war

7. Neil Malcolm, ' The New Russian Foreign Policy', world today, Feb. 1994. Vol.15, No.2, p.28.

hostility.⁸

They also promised to make every effort to support the promotion of shared values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and peaceful change around the globe. Yeltsin became more enthusiastic and proposed a joint research by scientists of the two countries to evolve a global defence that will protect the world from surprised nuclear attack by terrorists. Right from the beginning one of the key concerns of US foreign policy had been to disarm the soviet union and dismantle the concept of parity from their bilateral relationship. Russia was never a economic power is new past history and its parity with US was only in its capacity to destroy each other. Russia's main strength lies chiefly in its superiority in strategic nuclear arsenates. After the collapse Russia had only one thing to offer in return to US economic aid and that was its super power stature. The signing of START-II treaty in February 1992 made the entire soviet foreign policy fully transparent living no doubt about its real intentions.

Although, the treaty was a land mark accord designed to wipe out the most deadly weapons of the cold war by

8.

8. Bangkok Post (Bangkok) 3 Feb. 1992.

the year 2003. The agreement reduced US and Russian arsenals by two thirds, cutting the number of strategic nuclear war heads from 10,000 to a maximum of 3500 on each side the levels of nearly 30 years ago. But a close analysis of the treaty reveals the fact that US especially design this treaty in its favour and to deprive Russia from its super power position. Traditionally, the basis of Russia strength lies in its land based missiles while the source of American superiority was its nuclear submarines. According to the provisions of the treaty Russia will destroy all of its land based missile while the US will only reduce its nuclear submarines. Thus the provisions of the treaty is clearly tilted towards the US.

That is why the western analysts and media endorsed the treaty in poetic way. Thus supergeon Kenny, President of the Arms control association, a private think tank said shortly after the conclusion of the treaty that the pact is an example of a treaty in which both sides are clearly winners.⁹ He further asserted that START - II codified the end of the cold war and under scores a fundamental change in thinking about the role of nuclear

9. New Strait Times (Kuala Lumpur) 2 Jan. 1993.

weapons in warfare. President Yeltsin also took up the western line and said in defence that the real power of any nation should be judged by the living standard of its citizens rather than by the number of its missiles.

However, the US started worrying that the landmark START - II treaty slashing long range nuclear arsenals may never be approved by the Russian parliament. The US has obvious reasons behind this fear.

Right from the beginning the hardliners attacked this treaty severely, accusing Yeltsin for selling the country's sovereignty and denying the long term national interests. Although the conservatives hardliners are in minority in Russian Parliament, but still they are able to make their presence felt. Conservatives argue that retaining huge nuclear stockpiles is somehow necessary to prove the importance of Russia in today's world. Thus hardliners in a way are talking of continuation of old balance of terror politics and this type of thinking can help only revive the unlamented days of the cold war. But still they had a point to be heard carefully. Their real concern is to save the Russia from its deteriorating international stature.

The American fear became evident in Nikolai Pavlov

statement. One of most prominent members of a hardline faction he suggested that the opposition could resort to terrorism if necessary to stop the cuts in the long range nuclear weapons, agreed by Mr. Yeltsin. He told reporters I am not calling for violation of constitution, but if parliament does not prevent Russia from coming under Americas nuclear umbrella, the clashes are inevitable.¹⁰ Further, the destruction of such arms is very costly and technical. It is also time consuming. The Russian economists have long warned that destroying their nuclear weapons could bankrupt the country. Thus the foremost question arises here, will Russia be able to bear such economic burden, which is already facing a economic crunch. Another argument against this ambitious treaty is that at least three members of the nuclear club China, France and Britain are not covered by the treaty.

The three former soviet republics, Ukraine, Kzakhstan and Belarus, which together have more than 3.000 strategic nuclear war heads are also not covered by the treaty provisions. Ukraine has already showed its reliable unwillingness to ratify the treaty.¹¹ In such a

10. See, Times (London) 19 Jun. 1992.

11. see, Bangkok Post (Bangkok) 4 Jan. 1993.

hostile environment the provisions of the treaty automatically becomes meaningless.

Finally, as the most extensive of any disarmament treaty ever signed, START-II is undoubtedly an achievement of historical significance. But it may be mentioned here that START-I, signed in June 1991, is yet to be ratified and Yeltsin will have to steer START II through the Russian Parliament which is seemed to be very tough keeping in mind the hardliners empathy towards the treaty.

On 17 June, 1992 during a state visit to Washington, D.C. President Boris Yeltsin joined with President Bush in signing the charter of Russia-American partnership and friendship. The agreement affirmed their commitment to the establishment of a and durable basis for relations resting on partnership and friendship to democratic principles and practices and to the quest for a strengthening of international peace and security. Yeltsin committed the Russian Federation to acceleration of the processes of privatization and democratization and to implementation of extensive structural reforms in all sectors of society and the economy.

However, a number of moves by the Russian Govt. is considered to be potentially serious disagreement and a

breach to the Yeltsin's commitments. In early 1993 Yeltsin removed his promarket Deputy energy Minister, Victor Lopukhin and signalled that movement towards world level prices for Russian oil and gas, a key IMF condition, will be postponed.

But this decision of Yeltsin was taken by US as merely a move that will silence his hardliners rivals rather than Russia asserting its previous adamant posture. Bill Clinton continues his support to Yeltsin saying, he is the first elected leader of the Russia in a thousand years and one who had shown a great deal of courage in sticking up for democracy, civil liberties, and market reforms. ¹². Earlier, Warren Christopher, the US secretary of state after meeting Andrei Kozyrev, his Russian counterpart, in Geneva, 25 Feb. 1993 has asserted the same voice, " the US" is determined to support the cause of reforms in" Russia."

In fact US has its own interest in supporting the ongoing domestic reforms in Russia. As President Bill Clinton argues, the US has three interests in our cooperation with Russia. first, was to make the world a safer place, by continuing to reduce the threat of nuclear

12. See, The Hindu (Madras), 25 March, 1993.

war and nuclear proliferation.¹³ Clinton's this motive was already expressed in his Feb. 1992 agreement with Russia in which they agreed to set up an international centre to provide work to top nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union now facing the unemployment. This sympathetic treatment of US towards the starving nuclear scientists is not an example of American benevolence, rather it is American concern to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation what was more perturbing for US was the news that some middle east countries are trying to hire these nuclear scientists.

Secondly to support the development of democracy in Russia.

Third, to support the development of a free market in Russia.

The most serious concern of Clinton administration is to assure the final death of communism in Russia and its conversion in a capitalist country. Although, the evoking of a " Communist Ghost " is far from reality but can't be totally wiped out. The failed August Coup was an eye opener for America. There is a influential lobby in

13. see, Times, (London) 19 June, 1992.

America who emphasized that Russia should not be considered safe. The former US President Nixon has become one of the most dedicated advocates of the notion that US must not ignore Russia that communism has collapsed now.

United states also needs Russian help in solving some of the regional and ethnic conflicts for example Russia can play a major role in reaching at a peaceful negotiation in Bosnia Herzegovina. Because of Russia's historic links with Serbia, her support is essential if America attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Bosnia.

However, the goodwill Mr. Yeltsin engendered in Washington in mid 1992, was unquantifiable, and seems bound to translate into concrete rewards. An US reward came very soon as an official statement said that America was dropping claims for 30 million against Moscow for bugging its new embassy. He made such an impression on Mr. Bush, congress and the general American people that the congress passes a US aid package for Russia, even in an election year. Bush also promised to put pressure.

On the IMF to stop quibbling about details of Russians economic reforms plans and speedly to free up a 24 billion western aid package.

Similarly, on the eve of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Vancouver in early 1993, Western creditors took a decision in a meeting at Paris to financially back the Yeltsin regime by agreeing to reschedule the bulk of the estimated 20,000 million debt service obligations. The Vancouver summit was altogether different from other previous summits. The summit no longer was the talk dominated by guns and missiles or who gave to whom ¹⁴ in contrary the both presidents talked about aid and investment, about democracy and development.

In the year 1993 Russia has shown some interests in coming out of US influence. The Russian reluctance to put pressure on Serbia, and Mr. Yeltsin remarks that Russia may be moving away from western emphasis clearly shows this trend. However, the Russian Parliaments refusal to ratify the START-II, are pointers which are causing some dismay.

But these types of differences are fortunately not coming in the way of Russian- American relationship. for the obvious reason that US is aware of the Russia's internal contradictions it continues to help Russia with aid and package obligations. There are two reasons for not penalizing Yeltsin for Russias current foreign policy

—14. see,

14. The Hindu (Madras) 4 April, 1993.

premise. First he is not in the control of situation and secondly he can not force the Russian Parliament to ratify START II Apart from Pro Russian lobby in US is also arguing that Russia has its own domestic problems.

In the year 1993 Clinton administration showed more interest in keeping up the pace of economic reforms in Russia and to wipe out the legacy of communism at any cost, rather than concentrating on the arms reduction treaties. Clinton stressed this view in his first summit visit to Russia in Jan. 1994. Certainly the both countries are compelled by the complex need to maintain a close relationship and have come to know the importance of each other. The US vice President Al Gore's meeting with Yeltsin in Moscow in the December 1994 has waved to underline the continuing fluidity in Russian American relationship. He held out a prospect of "a strong and healthy partnership" between the two powers.

Although the year 1994 saw may ups and downs in their relationship. On June 1994 Moscows political temperature suddenly shot up high when President Boris Yeltsin and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin canceled their planned meeting with former US President Richard Nixon. The reason was Nixon's long and highly published meeting with former Russian Vice-President Alexander

Rutskoi¹⁵ one of key rivals of Yeltsin in the country.

Knowing the importance of their close ties President Yeltsin and President Clinton held fine summit meetings during their tenure. The summit meeting held in October 1994 was also marked by some disagreements ranging from Iran to Bosnia. The Americans were unhappy over the reported Russian sale of arms worth \$ 1,000 million to Iran. But despite their differences the Russian- US relationship is now running on a plane surface.

The Russian US relationship in this post soviet and post communism era is likely to be guided by the complex and transitional realities of the Russian society. In the wake of cataclysmic changes, the new institutions are yet to replace the old communist structures. Russia is still working with the old constitution. Dangerous power vacuums have been created at the levels of bureaucracy, a continued power struggle between legislative and executive. These all symptoms present a picture of a transitional Russian Society where decision makers are themselves confused over the Russia's relationship with the US.

15. see, Times (London) 23 June, 1994.

The Russian Foreign Policy making apparatus is also extremely contradictory over the Russia's position and role in international politics. The Russian decision makers are sharply divided between several school of thoughts like "westerners", "nationalists", "Eurasians" and "Geopotical school" each having its own thought about the Russian foreign relationship. More Ironically they are not merely different in opinion but also contradictoy to each other.

Although the Yeltsin regime is by and large dominated by the pro-western decision-makers and bureaucrats. But due to serious policy differences with other factions, the Russian relationship with US is hinging between persuing west for the economic aid to asserting Russia national pride and its supre power place.

Fortunately, Boris Yeltsin has come to rescue and he is trying very hard to overcome the inherent contradictions of the Russian Society. In the years after the collapse of Soviet Union he has steadily asserted himself as the only acceptable leader of the Russia to the west as well as inside the nation. Yeltsin has over the years come to know this fact that there is no alternative to the Russian - US partnership, and he is behaving accordingly to this basic premise.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

No single event in the post-War history has been so dominant in deciding the course of history, than the end of the Cold War. It has altered the entire infrastructure of international relations and Russian-US relations are not an exception to it. The Russian-US relationship in this post-Cold war and post-communist era is decided by the unipolar nature of international order in which United States' hegimonic tendencies and its uncurbed domination has no match. In contrast, the Russia which had for long been provided a challenge to capitalist, imperialistic and exploitative dangers, is itself fighting with the formidable task of restructuring its own society.

The Cold War was destined to wither away because of its unfruitfulness and futility. The immense dangers it had posed for the very survival of the mankind and voluminous tension it had involved, was unbearable for both the countries. In the changed situation, neither Soviet Union nor US was ready to bear this unnecessary burden. But it is quite surprising that the two superpowers took almost 50 years to realize this.

However, Gorbachev took initiative in bringing it to an end. Although his twin brainchilds - Perestroika and Glasnost were initially aimed at to put his own house in order and to save the declining economy and prestige of the Soviet Union. But later on openness and restructuring of Soviet Society set a course which was instrumental in ending the nightmare of Cold War. Gorbachev's 'new thinking in international politics' came out with extensive ideas of restructuring the bilateral relationship. His more defused notion of security and abundance of claims of Soviet Union as a champion for the cause of international revolution, added with a deideologized foreign policy wiped out all the suspicions about his real motives.

Deideologization of Soviet Foreign policy assured the fact that Gorbachev is seriously concerned with the cause of ending the year long antagonism and hostility between Russia and US. He criticized the Stalin's dangerous dogmas of -- 'two worlds theory' and 'saving the Communist World at any cost'. Lenin's idea of inevitability of collapse of capitalism was also denounced while the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' came under severe attack. Gorbachev was aware of the mistakes of his predecessors and he was not ready to continue with those mistakes and errors, which had so far producing nothing fruitful for the Soviet Union. In contrast it had brought only serious strains for soviet

economy in particular, and in general, for the entire Soviet system.

In fact Cold War was never appreciated by any of the two Super powers. This fact becomes clear in Henry Kissinger's definition of the very term Cold War and the behaviour of the Super powers during those days. He describes it as "the superpowers often behave like two heavily armed blindmen feeling their way around a room". But despite its futility, it continued merely because none of them were interested in ending it. It was merely a war of ego, considering the fact that the both countries never directly fought a war against each other in the past history. What was needed more was an initial breakthrough, and that was provided by Gorbachev.

The traditional rivalry rooted from Yalta and Postdam were mainly created by Stalin's expansionist tendencies and were further intended by George F. Kennan's 'policy of containment'. The encirclement of Soviet Russia by military alliances (NATO, CENTO etc.) were the final results of containment policy. Soviets also reacted sharply by establishing Warsaw Pact. But even after creating huge military alliances and possessing devastating nuclear weapons, their security was falling anything short of satisfactory. Because cold war was more a psychological concept rather than a physical and material one.

Meanwhile Gorbachev came as a saviour and his continued efforts assured the end of the Cold war. And Swedish Noble Committee has aptly remarked him as the 'man of the epoch'. One of the chief objectives of Gorbachev's new thinking was to restructure the superpower relations on new lines. Gorbachev was induced by his domestic needs to follow a compromisive foreign policy towards US. He concluded that a favourable international environment can only be created on the basis of political accommodation with leading industrial powers especially the US. Because USSR was lagging behind the Western countries, in technical advancement and economic development.

The abandoning of exclusive military means of security and the realization of dangers of nuclear weapons compelled the Soviet Union to reduce its nuclear burden. That is why ever since the Gorbachev arrival disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear arms gained central place in each and every summit. The maintenance of these weapons were too heavy for a economically exhausted country like Soviet Union.

However, US took full advantage of this situation and it was successful in disarming it considerably. The conclusion of START II made the whole American intention fully transparent. In fact US wants to establish its

hegemony in international politics and this hegemony can only be secured through a superior military strength, unchallenged by any power. Keeping in mind the Russian military potential, US had obvious fear that it might challenge its hegemony.

Further, Russia had nothing to offer in return to US economic assistance except for its super power status which was mainly based around its military parity with US. US has been so far successful in bringing about this balance in his favour. Gorbachev was helpless to concede the US demands despite the repeated warning from hard-core nationalists that Russia is rapidly loosing its previous pride and prestige. However, Gorbachev showed some resistance against the US in his initial years, but after the arrival of Yeltsin US seems to be playing from both the ends.

In fact, now a days, Russia after loosing its empire is passing through an interregnum and presents a classical example of a transitional society. The system is finding it very difficult to cope with the new realities. The new institutions are yet to replace the old one, the lack of communication between State and Civil society, sabotage by old bureaucracy and the ongoing power struggle between legislature and executive are some of its marked features. The adjustment of new capitalist institutions with the old

communist structures are reducing the adaptiveness of the Russian system.

The complex needs of a transitional society provides the decision makers with ample scope to get confused. That is what is happening in Russia now. There is no unanimity among decision makers about the role of Russia in international politics. The parliament is divided among several factions -- 'Eurasians', 'Euro-Atlantists', 'Westerner', 'nationalists' and 'geopolitic school', each having its own conception about the future role of Russia in international politics. This confusion became apparent during the Gulf War and Bosnia-Herzegovina problem.

Present Russian decision making apparatus is largely dominated by the pro-westerners who are committed to model Russia on Western development pattern and for them Russia's relations with West is the only possible choice. The importance of the third world countries in Russian Foreign Policy agenda is certainly reducing. The former allies of the erstwhile Soviet Union has been cited now as 'distant countries.

US has become so important for Russia now that it is also deciding Russia's relationship with other countries. This became clear in cryogenic episode. India has been a traditional and natural ally of Russia even during the bitter days of Cold War. There has been an agreement

between India and Soviet Union regarding the transfer of cryogenic technology. But despite the repeated assurances by the President Yeltsin that "he would not like any country to come between Russia and India", he finally bowed his head under American Pressure. Earlier, US had warned Russia not to transfer cryogenic technology to India. US plea was that India may use this technology for its ambitious missile programme and that it would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). More interesting thing in this entire cryogenic episode is that Russia is not a signatory to MTCR, it had only assured US that it will act in conformity with the MTCR. The cryogenic episode highlights the American influence on Soviet foreign policy.

In present context, Russia is neither pursuing its national interests sufficiently, nor it is asserting itself before US. Though in May 1993 foreign policy percepts Yeltsin declared that 'Russian Federation foreign policy is oriented towards the vital interests of the country. These interests including defending territorial integrity, fostering conditions that would ensure stability and irreversibility of political and economic reforms, and ensuring Russia's active and equal participation in building of a new system of international relations.

But here, the Russian decision makers are not merely confused over the basic national interest, there is also a confusion over how to achieve these national interests, with what means and how? Merely listing the National interests does not make any sense until and unless there is a strong political will lacking to visualise these in real practice. So far Yeltsin has failed to assert the Russian foreign policy before the US and for that matter before the World community too.

Yeltsin is posing himself as the champion of Western democratic norms and human rights values. But the Chechnya problem unmasks his real face. The brutal and naked use of force by Russian troops may be an eye-opener for a layman who considers him as the champion of democratic values.

However, the dismantling of Soviet Union both as a system as well as a nation has certainly reduced its political and strategic status, resulted in the overall reduction in the bargaining capacity of Russia. In this complex situation, there is a need of strong conviction and determination to come out of the shadow of American hegemony. The present Russian situation has been best elaborated by Francis Fukuyama who has drawn an analogy between Hegelian guist and present Russian society, "We stand on the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit move forward in leap, transcends its

previous shape and takes on a new one. All the mass of previous representations, concepts and bonds linking our world together are dissolving and collapsing like a dream picture. A new phase of the spirit is preparing itself."

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