

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CYPRIOTE CRISIS OF 1974

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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1980

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PREFACE

The United States' interest in the East Mediterranean region is of recent origin. Although American educational missions were established in the area nearly one hundred years ago, its commercial and strategic interest developed much later. The reason for this was that the region was dominated by Britain and France primarily. Only after these two powers faded from the region that the United States entered into the region on a major way. In the period immediately following the Second World War, the United States Foreign Policy was dominated by its perceived threat emerging from the Soviet Union. The United States felt that the Soviet Union's policy was motivated by its desire for expansion and Eastern Mediterranean was particularly vulnerable to Soviet penetration. The policy of "containment" of Communist expansion and the announcement of "Eisenhower Doctrine" in 1947 flowed from this assumption.

Although the US policy had changed but its basic response to any crisis was still determined by the assumption of the earlier years. For the United States, Cyprus crisis of 1974 was basically the crisis in alliance. Since Greece and Turkey, the two strategically located allies and members of the NATO, were deeply involved in the crisis, it became unavoidably the responsibility of the United States to avert a war between the antagonists.

The attempts have been made in this dissertation to show us to how the United States' policy before and after the crisis could not achieve the goals it set out to achieve due to its conflict between military and political goals.

I owe a profound sense of gratitude to my supervisor, Professor B.K. Shrivastava, without whose guidance, patience and moral support during the difficult days of my research, this work could have been inconceivable. I express sincere thanks to Professor H.S. Venkatarangul who has been a constant source of inspiration.

I wish to thank the librarians and staff members of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, Indian Council of World Affairs Library, the American Library and the Library of Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis.

Last but not the least, I wish to thank my parents, who though far away from me while I worked on this dissertation, have always been a source of strength and encouragement in all my endeavors and adventures.

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NEW DELHI
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CHAPTER - I

THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE

EAST MEDITERRANEAN UNION

Soon after the Second World War, the world was split into two hostile camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States led its camp in the name of the "Free World", and the Soviet Union led a group of nations in the Eastern Europe in the name of an ideology -- the ideology of communism. Since then, the relations between them became intensely bitter as time passed. This pattern of relations came to be known as cold war. The Soviet American relationship has been that of basic conflict. Not only have they represented two diametrically different ideologies and socio-political systems, but they also have had wide diverging interests in terms of power politics. As an eminent US Sovietologist, Marshall Schram, observed:

There are differences of opinion about the essential nature of the conflict....Since World War II, the Soviet American relationship has been mainly a nation state rivalry for military power and for political influence, complicated by differences in political culture and ideology.¹

The interest of both the super powers in West Asia is comparatively of recent origin. There is sufficient evidence of their keen interest in the region since the beginning of the present century, if not longer. However, Britain and France were

1. Marshall D. Schram, Soviet American Relations and the World Order: The Two and Only (London, 1970), p.1.

the two important powers whose interaction with the region far exceeded those of the others. For a very long time, France had a great deal of interest and had even territories under its control. But it was thrown out of the "Levant States" during the Second World War. The influence and ties of Britain with its Arab friends and many of its traditional commitments had become loose by the end of the Second World War. This was due to two factors, namely, lessons of the Second World War and the upsurge of nationalism in the region.² With the waning of the Anglo-French power in the region, the United States and the Soviet Union made their entry, claiming to be more responsible powers than their predecessors.

The United States proclaimed that its main objective in the region was "peace and stability with freedom." The objective required that the area should enjoy political independence and freedom from outside domination, especially those who were hostile to the U.S. interest in the region. Moreover, the U.S. approach towards the region reflected the broader concept of freedom. At the same time, it believed that the region should be accessible to economic, political and cultural contacts. Furthermore, the U.S. policy was based on the presumption that the region could serve as an export market for the American products. It could also serve

2. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in the World Affairs, (Berkeley, Cal., 1958), p.510.

as a source of raw materials. The American scholars feel that in principle, there is nothing inherent in America's relation with the West Asian region which would make their peaceful collaboration undesirable or impossible.³ The Imperial British power started declining during the Second World War itself. After the war it was not in a position to continue to bear the heavy responsibility of helping Greece and Turkey against the possible Communist subversion. On 21 February 1947, Britain informed the United States that it could no longer bear the financial burden of aiding the Greek and Turkish governments, and would "pull out" from the area on March 30 1947⁴. In addition to this, during the early years of cold war (1945-6), Greece and Turkey seemed more directly threatened by the Soviet power and to the Truman Administration, they appeared to be in dire need of American protection for survival than almost any other members of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In addition to the Soviet threat, Greece was also threatened by internal civil war as well as external communist pressure from Yugoslavia and other Balkan States. Some have contended that Turkey was the target of Soviet campaign, apparently aimed at the control of the Black Sea Straits.⁵ Greece and Turkey both heavily depended on the United States and western powers to resist the infiltration of the

3. George Janowski, United States in the Middle East (ed.), (Washington, 1968), p.77.

4. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope, (New York, 1965), Vol.II, p.100.

5. Coral Bell, The Highway of Nations: The Kizilirmak Era, (New Delhi, 1979), p.140.

Soviet Union into the region. Moreover, the Soviet moves of expansionist nature in Greece, Turkey and Iran in 1946, were obvious indications of its attempts to penetrate into the region.⁶ The proclamation of "the Truman doctrine" was a signal to the Soviet Union and the rest of the world which was intended to indicate the American resolve to stand firmly against what it considered to be a Soviet move to subvert free governments on its periphery. Although it was the result of the cumulative frustration of the Truman Administration in dealing with the Soviet Union, its immediate cause was the situation in Greece and Turkey.

Truman told the Congress that the U.S. Government had received an urgent request from the Greek Government for financial and economic assistance. The existence of the Greek Government was threatened by several thousand insurgents led by the Communists. "Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy," the President said. He then asked aid for Turkey whose existence "as an independent and economically sound state" was no less important for the United States and the rest of the "freedom loving" people of the world. "The integrity of Turkey," said the American President, "is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East....."

President Truman made almost a universal commitment to help nations maintain "their free institutions and integrity against

6. John C. Campbell, Defense of Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York, 1950), p.34.

aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes." Such a development necessarily undermined the security of the United States.

In his speech, the President emphasized the importance of Greece for the security of the world. "If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East." Again he added: "Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East." The President asked the Congress to provide 400 million for assisting Greece and Turkey for the period ending June 1948.⁷ The Truman Doctrine, however, was not a blind reaction to a possibility of Communist governments in Greece and Turkey, since the U.S. was aware of the fact that the security of Greece and Turkey were vital to the United States. It should also be recalled that the U.S. did not immediately admit Greece and Turkey either to Marshall Plan, or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Subsequently, both Greece and Turkey became members of the NATO in 1952.⁸ The U.S. commitments to Greece and Turkey were and even now are based on the strategic importance of these nations both to the United States and the NATO. Moreover, the NATO, in turn, offered a natural

7. Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of President of United States, 1947, (Washington D.C., 1953), p.176-80.

8. See Facts About NATO, NATO Information Service (Paris, 1955), p.9

forum for Athens and Ankara to seek to coordinate their approach.⁹ Further, the geographic position of these two countries made them an important obstacle to the Soviet attempts to expand into the eastern Mediterranean. Appearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on 9 June 1970, Roger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, said:

Though Soviet techniques had varied since that time, domination of Eastern Mediterranean clearly remained a primary goal of Soviet Policy, so long as that was true, the United States and NATO would continue to share strategic interest with Greece and Turkey..... The entry of Turkey and Greece into the NATO alliance in 1952 was derived from the basic importance of these two countries to the West as a whole. The participation of Greece and Turkey into NATO contributed substantially to the strength of the alliance and remained of great importance, given the increasingly complicated situation in the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁰

The U.S. policy for the Mediterranean has been based on some clear cut propositions. These are to maintain naval superiority; strengthen the NATO so that any challenge from Soviet Union, military or political, could be contained; support those allies which were in most exposed position, such as Greece and Turkey; to resist Soviet pressure and reduce the gains made by the Soviet Union in its relations with Arab States on the Mediterranean's Eastern and

9. George S. Harris, Doubled Alliance: Turkish American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1942-1971, (California, 1972), p.109.

10. U.S. Senate, Ninety-first Congress, Second Session, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Greece and Turkey, (Washington, D.C., 1970), p.377.

Southern shores; and to maintain the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to buttress its strategic position.¹¹ Moreover, the Soviet Union has built a Superfleet, and its Mediterranean Squadron is now five times larger than it was a mere eight years ago. In conjunction with the land-based air power, the Soviet Fleet poses a serious threat in the Mediterranean and an increasing politico-naval challenge to the American Sixth Fleet in the inland sea.¹²

In pursuing all these aims as well as challenges, the U.S. very frequently spoke in terms of Western Solidarity but in fact took the lead and acted alone. It was, however, a logical outcome of its significant position in NATO, the primacy of its naval power in the Mediterranean and of its special relations with Greece and Turkey. But the U.S. was caught in the web of the complex question of Cyprus involving its two allies.

The U.S. had sought a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem for the last two decades. The relations between Cyprus and the U.S. had been normal, and various steps had been taken to develop a friendly and amicable relationship. In June 1962, on the invitation of President John F. Kennedy, President Makarios had visited the United States. As a gesture of reciprocity, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson paid a courtesy visit to Cyprus in the later part of the year. By the end

11. John C. Campbell, "Mediterranean Crisis", Foreign Affairs, (Washington, D.C.), Vol.53, July 1975, p.695.
 12. Harry N. Howard, Turkey, The Straits and U.S. Policy (Baltimore, 1974), p.277.

of June 1963, the U.S. had provided to Cyprus economic assistance worth \$ 20 million. It was a considerable amount in view of the short duration of the aid relationship and the small population of the Republic. Cyprus had purchased more than two million dollars worth of wheat under the Food for Peace Agreement, and had been allowed to pay for it in local currency. This had been extended to it by the United States Agency for International Development to enable Cypriote's purchase of American industrial machinery.¹³

The main objective of U.S. approach towards Cyprus problem was to find a solution to it within the broad framework of the Western alliance, thus trying to pre-empt the exploitation of the crisis by the communists. President Johnson in a telegram to President Nicosias and Vice-President Bouk, in December 1963 expressed his unhappiness over the fighting between the two communities. He said:

I will not presume to judge the root causes, or rights or wrongs between Cypriotes of the two communities. This is in any case inappropriate when innocent human lives are at stake. I hope that tomorrow will find all Cypriotes living at peace with one another.¹⁴

The United States had no intention to enter into the merits of the case because that would have alienated one side or the other

13. H.I. Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverge Nationalism on a State (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1978), p.33.

14. New York Times, 29 December 1963, p.1

and would have weakened the position of the western powers. It wanted to solve the problem by mediation and negotiations. Following the line, on 7 February 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, at a press conference, stated that the U.S. was willing to participate in the United Nation Peace keeping operations with the other NATO partners.¹⁵

On 9 February 1964, George Ball, the U.S. Under Secretary of State, was sent to London to work out an acceptable compromise for the establishment of a peace keeping force from the NATO as well as non-aligned states. The main mission of George Ball and the policy of the United States was "that it had no preconceptions or preferences as to the shape or form of final solutions that might be developed for the Cyprus problem.....the United States must emphasize that it does have a major interest in the maintenance of peace in Eastern Mediterranean -- an interest that definitely coincides with many other nations. It will do whatever it can to achieve that objective."¹⁶

A few days later, on 12 March 1964, Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus unless all attacks on the Turkish communities in Cyprus ceased and an immediate cease fire was arranged. The statement, coming on the heels of American effort to bring the situation under control, deeply angered President Johnson.¹⁷

15. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.50, 24 February 1964, p.203.

16. Ibid., p.204.

17. Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967, (Oxford University, 1974), p.64.

On 5 June, Johnson addressed a sharply worded letter to Turkish Premier Ismet Inonu. He reminded him that Turkey had signed a military agreement with the United States in 1947 and Article IV of that agreement required Turkey to obtain the consent of the United States for the use of military assistance "for the purposes other than for which they were applied". He bluntly stated that "the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances." President Johnson sternly warned that if Turkey's precipitate action brought about Soviet intervention, Turkey's NATO allies were under no obligation to come to its rescue because they had no opportunity to consider the matter.¹⁸ Johnson's letter was a serious reminder to Turkey of its legal obligations to its NATO allies. Furthermore, it was also obvious caution to Turkey regarding the possible serious consequences of the potential and direct Soviet involvement in the conflict between Greece and Turkey. Johnson's blunt talk possibly averted the Turkish intervention but it caused a lot of resentment.

As stated earlier, a solution to Cyprus problem that would satisfy both of its allies, Greece and Turkey was to be sought and the interest of the U.S. in the Eastern Mediterranean maintained thereby.

18. U.S. Senate Hearings, no.10, p.1849.

Keeping this purpose in mind, U.S. took a lead in the convening of the Geneva conference in July 1964. The United Nation's mediator Sakari S. Tuomioja and the delegates of Greece and Turkey met in Geneva for discussion on Cyprus problem on 4 July 1964.¹⁹ President Makarios was not invited for the meeting. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State of the United States, attended the Geneva talks at the request of President Johnson. He was to assist in finding a solution to the Cyprus issue by trying to establish contact between the Turkish and Greek governments. The first development to emerge from the talks between Acheson and the other delegates was that they accepted his proposal known as the Acheson Plan as the basis of negotiations. The "Acheson Plan" had the following main points:

1. Cyprus was to be given a choice between independence and "unions".
2. On the Cyprus Peninsula (in Famagusta District), a territory was to be given to Turkey over which it was to have indivisible sovereignty.
3. Turkish Cypriotes who had been living in the area inhabited by a majority of Greek Cypriotes were to continue to live there. They were to be governed by the Greeks and were to have rights of 'Local self administration'. According to this system, Turkish

19. Philip Windsor, NATO and Cyprus (London, 1964), p.18.

Cypriotes would have collected not only local taxes but also administered its judicial system. This system, however, was not to be like a 'state within a state' but an administrative arrangement for Turkish Cypriotes in the area, where they were in majority.

4. A central Turkish Cypriote administration was to be established in order to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriotes in the other part of the island in which they were in a majority.
5. The Turkish Cypriotes residing in the areas under the Greek administration were to be the citizens of that government and would enjoy the majority rights.
6. There was to be an International Commissioner either appointed by the United Nations, or by the International Court of Justice, to look into the communal or individual rights of Turkish Cypriotes. If it failed to give proper justice, the injured party was to entitle to appeal either to the International Court of Justice, or the ICJCO.
7. In order to strengthen Greek-Turkish relations, the Greek government was to be persuaded to give Turkey the Isle of Nicos to ensure Turkish security in the Mediterranean.²⁰

20. Dean Acheson, "Cyprus: The Anatomy of the Problem," Speech delivered by Acheson before the Chicago Bar Association, 24 March 1965, as cited in H.I. Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State (Tusculum University, 1975), p.43.

The Greek government rejected the Acheson Plan as the basis of discussion. Turkey, however, informed Acheson that it would revert to its firm and explicit stand favoring partition of Cyprus.²¹ Neither was President Makarios happy with Acheson's Plan because he believed in seeking self-determination for the Greek with the support of the non-aligned nations at the United Nations. Acheson considered Makarios to be a political priest with considerable gifts of demagoguery and ruthlessness.²²

On 31 August 1964, after it was known that both Greece and Turkey had rejected the Plan, the United States decided to recall Acheson for consultation. The Geneva conference was adjourned.²³ The matter remained suspended.

In November 1967, the National Guard of Cyprus launched an attack against several Turkish Cypriotes which angered Turkey but it held its land when Greece agreed to withdraw all its soldiers on Cyprus, in excess to the contingent authorized under the 1960 Settlement.²⁴

The policies of the United States and its NATO allies in the 1967 affair were similar to those in 1964 crisis. They wanted to restore peace to Cyprus in the short run, to promote a new settlement

21. Ibid., p.43.

22. Salih, no.13, p.50.

23. Ibid., p.50.

24. Ehrlich, no.17, p.64.

in the long run, and above all to avoid war between the two NATO allies. On 22 November 1967, the United States chose to join with England and Canada in proposing a settlement formula with regard to Cyprus. The Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson was chosen to make the proposal. The Pearson proposal may be summed up as follows:-

1. The strength of Greek and Turkish troops was to be reduced to the Treaty of Alliance level;
2. The United Nations force was to be enlarged;
3. Turkish Cypriotes who had suffered losses were not only to be compensated but also their security in future was to be assured; and
4. Turkey was to guarantee not to intervene in future.²⁵

The Pearson proposal met the fate of earlier proposal. It could not produce any practical results due to the rapidly shifting situation in Cyprus. Turkey reiterated its demand for the withdrawal of all Greek troops and asserted that there could be "no discussion without withdrawal," and the Greek leaders on their part insisted on "no withdrawal without discussion." Under these circumstances, a third party mediation was essential to avoid the crisis.

25. *Ibid.*, p.300.

On 22 November 1967, President Johnson appointed former Deputy Secretary of Defence, Cyrus Vance as a special envoy to help in mediating the dispute. Also, on the same day, the United Nations Secretary General appointed as his special representative in the crisis, his Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, Jose-Rolz-Bennett. Two days later, Athens and Ankara accepted a third mediator, Euzbio Erosio, the Secretary General of the NATO.²⁶

Vance concentrated his efforts on Athens and Ankara while Rolz-Bennett focussed on bringing the parties in Cyprus together. Erosio provided further support in trying to bring the NATO nations to an agreement.

Vance's classic mode of mediation between Greece and Turkey avoided the war. His efforts to persuade Greece and Turkey produced quite successful results. He insisted on some settlement between Greece and Turkey and then put the Archbishop Makarios in the position of either accepting it or ending up being the cause for the potential crisis. On 30 November 1967, Greece and Turkey finally reached an agreement.²⁷ The Greek-Turkish settlement provided for withdrawing of all their forces in excess of the authorized contingents within 45 to 90 days, disbanding the Greek National Guard, scaling down the Cypriote police force, and enlarging the United Nations' force.²⁸

26. *Ibid.*, p.111.

27. *Times* (London), December 1967, p.1.

28. *Dzulich*, no.17, p.113.

Vance's method produced results because of his able diplomacy aimed at bringing all the concerned parties on the negotiation table. He successfully avoided the crisis of 1967, which erupted again in 1974.

The success of Vance only brought temporary relief but not a permanent solution to the problem which remained as intractable as before. It was only a matter of time before it would surface again. It again erupted in 1974, the crisis with which this study deals.

CHAPTER - II

THE CYPRIOT CRISIS

Cyprus is an island located in the northern corner of the Mediterranean sea. It lies 40 miles South of Turkey, 60 miles West of Syria and Lebanon, 240 miles north of Egypt and about 500 miles from the Greek mainland. It is the third largest island in the Mediterranean sea after Sicily and Sardinia, with an area of 3,572 square miles. It is 140 miles long from East to West and about 60 miles wide from North to South.¹ It is thus somewhat larger than the two English counties of Norfolk and Suffolk combined.² At the end of 1971, the total population of the island was estimated to be 640,000 of which 78 per cent were Greek Cypriotes and 18 per cent were Turkish Cypriotes, the remaining 4 per cent belonged to various minority groups.³

Cyprus has a predominantly agrarian economy. The crops include grapes, cereals, olives, tobacco, citrus fruits, potatoes and cotton. Among the mineral resources it has, the most important is copper. Indeed, the island derives its name from the Greek word for copper - Kypros - Kyprifos.

The main exports of the island are copper and copper products, iron, pyrites, citrus fruit, potatoes and cotton. Despite his professions

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1. The Statesman's Year Book: 1974-75, (London, 1975), p.236.
 2. George Hill, History of Cyprus, (Cambridge University, 1972), Vol.1, p.1.
 3. New York Times, 16 July 1974, p.16.

of "neutrality", Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios has managed to court the European community. Trading with members of the community has been Cyprus's main source of revenue. Furthermore, Britain alone accounts for 42.2 per cent Cypriot exports, while Communist countries altogether account only for 14.2 per cent of the exports from the island.⁴ Cyprus has thus succeeded in establishing links with European Economic Community. Traditionally, neutral countries like Switzerland, Austria and Sweden felt that such links with one block of nations would be incompatible with their status of neutrality. But, impelled by the requirements of its economy, Cyprus established strong linkages with the Western world despite its non-alignment.

In the first decade of its independence, due to the pressure generated by its chronic trade deficit, Cyprus was forced to export its mineral resources. However, there was a shift in the structure of its exports. It moved away from mineral to farm products, primarily citrus fruits, which came to constitute nearly 60 per cent of its exports. The tourist trade constituted another important indirect export commodity of the island. Apart from the large groups of tourists from Scandinavia and West Germany, the United Kingdom still accounted for 15% share of tourism. The U.K. also maintained, for its own economic interests, two bases in Cyprus. These independent bases were centres of indirect or "other permanent tourism".⁵

4. A.J. Fisher, "Cypriot Background to the Crisis", Contemporary Review (London), no.224, September 1974, p.115.

5. Ibid.

The Greek Cypriotes, who constitute the majority of population, desire 'Enosis' - the Union of Cyprus with Greece.⁶ But, Turkish population on the Cyprus are bitterly opposed to it. This issue became the bone of contention between the two ethnic communities. The conflict in Cyprus did not remain confined to the small island. It produced tension between Greece and Turkey and impaired their relations. When Britain was the colonial power, it found that it was left with no other option but to avoid war between Greece and Turkey. Its position was precarious since it had military and economic interest in Cyprus.

A Seven-Year partnership Plan, unveiled by British Prime Minister Macmillan in June 1958, offered a "tripartite" dominion of Cyprus with Cyprus's international status remaining unchanged for the period of seven years.⁷ The basic flaw of this scheme was that Britain's offer to share sovereignty over Cyprus with Turkey and Greece ignored the Cypriote themselves.⁸

By this time, the southern flank of NATO was endangered by the deepening rift between Greece and Turkey, both NATO members. Efforts had been made by NATO as early as 1954 to resolve the Cyprus dilemma through an offer of mediation. In September 1958, NATO Secretary-General

6. New York Times, 15 July 1974, p.1.

7. J.A. Stengers, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), p.23.

8. Ibid.

Paul Henry Speck, at the NATO Council meeting in Paris, presented a plan similar to the Heacillan Plan.⁹ It too ignored the Cypriotes.

In December 1958, the United Nations General Assembly, failed to approve any of the several differing resolutions. The tripartite powers realized that the international organizations were an "inappropriate mechanism" for arriving at a settlement. Greece and Turkey, in January 1959, decided to hold bilateral talks which eventually led to the Zurich and London agreements on the future of Cyprus.

The London-Zurich agreement became possible partly because of the realization on the part of Greece and Turkey and partly because of external pressures. Larger interest of NATO solidarity and Greco-Turkish relations demanded a settlement of some kind. In addition to these factors promoting the London-Zurich agreements, great credit has rightly been given to the Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, and the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, for a statesmanlike and politically prompt initiative. Likewise, Archbishop Makarios showed great courage in signing the accords.

In the end, each party made major concessions in the interest of peace. For the time being at least, Greece and Greek Cypriotes gave up 'Enosis' for limited independence, the Turks gave up the idea of partition and received in turn extensive

9. Ibid., p.23.

constitutional safeguards and a disproportionate amount of political power in the form of a government that might be called "ethnic federalism", and the British gave up "sovereignty" over its bases on Cyprus.¹⁰

The Zurich Agreement was reached on 11 February 1959, between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, Cameronis and Menekides. In accordance with the agreement, the representatives of Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and the leaders of the two communities of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kucuk met in London. They endorsed the Zurich agreement on 19 February 1959.¹¹ The participating nations, attending the Conference expressed their satisfaction with the accord.

The Zurich-London Agreements had the following provisions:

1. From one year of the signing of the agreement, Cyprus would become an independent republic.
2. The new Republic of Cyprus would have a Greek Cypriote President, and a Turkish Cypriote Vice-President each elected for a period of five years from the communal rolls, each having veto power over the decisions of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defence or security.
3. Both "Enosis" and Partition would be forever prohibited.

10. Ibid., p.23

11. H.I. Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, (Sussex, 1978), p.13.

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4. Britain would retain sovereignty over two areas containing British Military bases.
5. One of the key Ministries, Defence or Finance or Foreign Affairs, would be held by a Turkish Cypriote.
6. The Cypriote Civil Service and Security Forces would be composed of 70 per cent Greek Cypriotes and 30 per cent Turkish Cypriotes.
7. The 2000-man Army would be in the ratio of 60 per cent Greek Cypriotes to 40 per cent Turkish Cypriotes.
8. The House of Representatives would be composed of 70 per cent Greek Cypriotes and 30 per cent Turkish Cypriotes. Chosen by universal suffrage from communal rolls, the House was to have legislative authority over all matters not reserved to the two communal factors.
9. The two communal chambers, one for each community, were to have the rights to impose taxes, for the needs of each community and were also to have authority in the matters of religion, cultural affairs, education and personal status.
10. Each of the five largest towns was to be divided into Greek and Turkish municipalities, each of which was to have its own Council.

11. A three-member Supreme Constitutional Court was to be established. It was to consist of one Greek Cypriote, one Turkish Cypriote and a foreign neutral judge. All were to be chosen jointly by the President. They were required to rule on any conflict of authority that might arise between the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers.

12. The two treaties were to be considered as integral parts of the Cyprus Constitution.¹²

13. The two treaties were as follows: First was a treaty of guarantee which gave Great Britain, Greece and Turkey - the three powers - the right to take individual or joint action in Cyprus to maintain its independence and constitutional integrity. Second, was Treaty of Alliance which established a Tripartite Headquarters (Cypriotes, Greek and Turkish in Cyprus). The treaty further permitted Greece and Turkey to station 350 men and 650 men respectively on Cyprus. The President and Vice-President could jointly request either of the mainland Governments to increase or reduce the strength of these contingents.

13. The Agreement categorically provided that the basic structure of the Republic cannot be altered.

12. Ibid., p.13.

Following the Zurich-London Agreements, Cyprus became independent on 16 August 1960. Archbishop Makarios became its first President. Under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriotes formed the National Organization of Cypriote Fighters, popularly known as EOKA.¹³ Even though the Archbishop was the leader of a country consisting of communities of Greek and Turkish Cypriotes, he used his Church authority to lead a political struggle for 'Enosis'. For years, Makarios did not disclose the fact that he had contacts with EOKA and its leader General Grivas. Later, it came to be known that he did maintain these contacts. It was a strong enough ground for the alienation of the Turkish Cypriotes.

It should be recalled here that during the Greek-Turkish Conference in Zurich in 1959, the two countries had agreed on a prohibition of Union, or even a partial Union, of Cyprus with any other country or the participation of Cyprus in the two independent States.

The merger of Cyprus with Greece 'Enosis' was therefore calculated to undermine the bi-national foundation of Cyprus. The espousal of Enosis was, therefore, a very important factor in the politics of Cyprus. Moreover, the nature of the Cyprus crisis has

13. Selis, no.11, p.9

been complicated by the issue of the Enosis. As one analyst, Coral Bell, has observed:

The nature of the conflict over Cyprus has always been much the same: determined Hellenism of the Seventy-eight per cent of Cypriotes who are of Greek origin has made it inevitable that they should aspire to Union with Greece (Enosis). The fact that the island is located just off the Coast of Turkey makes it inevitable that Turkish Government will be better able than Greek to exert military strength there, and will always give any government in Ankara strategic reasons for wanting to do so. Moreover, the existence of Turkish minority will give them equally an excuse and a bridge-head for intervening, and the Turkish minority was after 1963 subjected to enough ill-treatment to put an element of moral strength to the Turkish case.¹⁴

Before the independence of Cyprus, President Makarios had showed the desire of the Greek Cypriotes for the Enosis. But after independence he recoiled from his earlier position. There were probably several reasons for this. We can identify a few here. First, probably he came to the view that a precipitate union with Greece might not be in the best interest of Cyprus. Second, he had come to enjoy his role as President of the Republic so much that he did not intend doing anything which would jeopardise his office. Or, thirdly, he realised that the way to Enosis was fraught with dangers which could arise from the provisions of the London-Turkish accord. He, therefore, decided to give up Enosis as practical

14. Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era (London, 1977), p.139.

politics but not as an ultimate objective.¹⁵

The Right Wing Greek Cypriotes accused Makarios of pro-Soviet leanings. This attack undoubtedly was due to internal political factors. For his parliamentary majority, Makarios needed the support of the left leaning 'AKEL' party which represented approximately 40 per cent of the Greek Cypriote voters.¹⁶ It was alleged that the AKEL was being financed by the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In short, President Makarios tried to be all things to all men.

General Grivas, one of the powerful leaders of guerrilla forces of EOKA, did not approve of President Makarios' handling of Enosis. Actually, General Grivas' main objective was to prevent Makarios from reaching an agreement with the Turks that would have blocked the realization of Enosis forever.¹⁸ At a rally held in Athens to mark EOKA's sixteenth anniversary in April 1971, he told the crowd that a change of government was needed in Cyprus.¹⁹ General Grivas disappeared from Athens in August 1971. He was reported to have slipped out of Greece disguised as a Greek orthodox priest. He went perhaps with his EOKA friends. The leaflets which appeared

15. P.H. Vanonis, Makarios: Faith and Power (New York, 1972), p.147.

16. T.W. Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus (Paleo AERD, California, 1972), p.147.

17. Fischer, no.4, p.114.

18. E.C. Harfides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus, (New Haven, 1977), p.86.

19. Salih, no.11, p.66.

in Cyprus in the month of October 1971 claimed that General Grivas was leading the Enochia struggle. The leaflet stated:

We come back to Cyprus to continue and consummate the struggle for the fulfilment of the age-long aspiration to the Union of Cyprus with Greece, to hand over to the judgement of history and of the nation the unworthy leadership and the men who are unworthy of even the bearing the name of Greeks We shall bring Greece to Cyprus and we shall not allow any one to humiliate Greece and cut off the national trunk.²⁰

At this point, Greece was sincerely trying to reach an amicable solution with Turkey, but Makarios was not interested in making any concession to the Turkish Cypriotes on the island. General Grivas, with the support of senior bishops, namely, bishops Phophos, Yemadion, the bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, and bishop of Citium, Athinos, had been pressurising Makarios to step down. The bishops demanded Makarios' resignation on the ground that his temporal duties had prevented him from devoting himself to his Church and ethnarcly duties. Furthermore, these three bishops, with the consent of Greek orthodox church, succeeded in getting a law in 1972. According to it, Bishop of church, was not entitled to hold a secular office in the government simultaneously. The motive behind the adoption of the law was to use it against President Makarios. But, President Makarios and his supporters vehemently

20. Ibid., p.65.

opposed it. They argued that the canon law had not been used for approximately one hundred years; "Why had it not been invoked in 1960 to prevent Makarios from accepting the Cyprus Presidency", his supporters asked. Further, they assailed the bishops calling them "a shame" and their Act "a national betrayal". President Makarios refused to abide by the law passed by the Church and wrote a letter to the three bishops, in which he stated that "the abolition of Cyprus State is conceivable only through the Union of Cyprus with Greece".²¹ In their letter dated 1 June 1972, the bishops threatened the President. They wrote demanding once again that the President "abandon forthwith and without delay" the post of President of the Republic, which, according to them, was incompatible with the status of Archbishop. They asked him to confine himself to his "clerical and ethnarchic" duties. They warned him that "in case you should continue in confrontation to the Holy rules, we would inform you with utmost regret that we are compelled to impose on you the sanctions provided by the Holy rule and the charter of the Church."²² But eventually the bishops were not in a position to enforce their views on Makarios. It was not Archbishop Makarios who was forced to resign from the Presidency, but the three bishops were themselves defrocked. But the hold on the Enosis idea over the mind of Greek Cypriote was as strong as ever.

For Turkish Cypriotes, 'Enosis' was a "perpetual nightmare".²³

21. Salih, no.11, p.67.

22. Ibid., p.67.

23. Fischer, no.4, p.118.

Each of Archbishop Makarios' contradictory position was analysed by them as to whether he might still uphold the old idea of unification or prefer to maintain his own position of power. Turkish Cypriotes had fought a bitter and costly battle against EOKA and Enosis. Their status in Cyprus was confirmed in the agreements of Zurich and London. Furthermore, it was stipulated that the Vice-President was to be elected by the Turkish population. They also had the right to veto.

As stated earlier, Turkish minority was 18 per cent of the total population. It was granted a 30 per cent share in the government and administration and 40 per cent share in the police and military forces. After four years, Cypriotes were to themselves decide whether the principles of the 1960 Constitution was workable or whether any change was required. President Makarios wanted to amend the Cyprus Constitution, abrogate the international agreement, initiate the idea of self-determination and bring about Enosis by the means of a plebiscite. In 1963, he submitted a long list of revision in the Constitution to the Turkish minority.²⁴ When the Turks refused to accept the proposed amendments to the Constitution, Makarios went ahead with his plan without caring for the overwhelming Turkish feelings on the subject. This resulted in bloody clashes in 1964 and once again in 1967. However, the leaders of the two ethnic communities in Cyprus realised that problem could not be solved by force. Therefore, they began negotiations to find a peaceful solution to their problems. The

24. I. Kourou, "Cyprus Crisis of 1974", in Seyfi Tashan (ed.), Die politische Foreign Policy Cyprus, 1974, (Antara, 1974), p.66.

intra-communal talks started in 1968 between Glafkos Cleridas, the President of the House of Representatives representing the Greek Cypriotes and Rauf Denktaş, President of Turkish Cypriote communal Chamber, representing the Turkish Cypriotes. Since there were fundamental differences between the two communities on the problem like education, autonomy in the matters of religion, cultural and personal status, they could not reach an amicable solution.²⁵ Since the beginning of the intra-communal talks, the Greek Cypriotes made three demands. As summed up by Salih these were:

1. Unitary, sovereign and independent state with a Constitution adopted by the people of Cyprus and based on democratic principles and the principle of the United Nations Charter.
2. Enjoyment by all citizens of the Republic of the equal rights irrespective of race, community or religion and the incorporation of human rights for all citizens in the Constitution.
3. Autonomy to the Turkish Cypriotes with regard to matters pertaining to education, culture, religion and personal status.²⁶

Denktaş interpreted the position of Greek Cypriotes as an attempt to force Turkish Cypriotes to accept a minority status. Denktaş argued that Greek Cypriotes' understanding of democratic rule was commonly held

26. Salih, no.4, p.62.

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in the nineteenth century. According to it, it was the will of the majority which found expression in a political democracy. The wishes, fears and doubts of the minorities were simply ignored. However, in modern democracies, the emphasis was on the rights of all. Denktas asserted that where the minority was denied the expression of its rights, the democratic rule always degenerated into mob rule. He countered that the concept of partnership had been evolved in Cyprus in order to establish modern system of democracy with sufficient safeguards to prevent the emergence of mob rule. He implied that the Greek proposals, if accepted, would only succeed in achieving mob rule and nothing more.²⁷

Denktas felt that only under the auspices of Turkish Federal State could the community of Turkish sector and villages be safeguarded. Under no circumstances was he willing to give up either his police force or the guarantee of independence by Turkey.²⁸ His own concept of Cyprus envisaged a Greek and Turkish unit which would, at the same time, constitute a fundamental federation of a communal basis. The only concession Denktas was prepared to make was the renunciation of the veto right and twenty per cent participation (instead of the previously agreed 30 per cent) in the Central Government. Neither Clarides, nor inflexible Makarios thought federalism as a feasible solution. It was Clarides' conviction that it would require compact settlement blocks for each ethnic group which, according to him, was nowhere in existence.

27. Ibid., p.82.

28. Fischer, no.4, p.118.

Furthermore, he was unwilling to risk a Turkish "Anosis" -- a Turkish Federated state breaking loose and joining with adjacent Turkey.²⁹

General Grivas died on 27 July 1974. He was convinced that Makarios had betrayed the nationalistic sentiments of pan-Hellenism. As a result of the death of General Grivas, the EOKA-B, the successor organization of EOKA, started to decline in power. Nevertheless, it had given rise to a new force in the organization. It continued to infiltrate into the National Guard. Six hundred fifty officers of the well-equipped military formations came from Greece. Many of them were reliable in the eyes of Cypriote Government.³⁰ President Makarios had decided to move firmly against the EOKA-B leaders as well as the National Guard. Following some unpleasant incidents, in his declaration on 6 June 1974 President announced a "purge". He declared that hereafter the General Staff was to act only in an advisory capacity on the appointment of new officers and officer-cadets. Final decision was to rest with the Council of Ministers. During his monthly press conference, on 5 July 1974, President Makarios used provocative language against the ruling Military Junta in Athens.³¹ He charged Greek military regime with supporting and guiding EOKA-B organization. In his letter to Greek President Phaedon Gheorgiadis on 2 July 1974, he stated that he found "certain situations and events unacceptable". He considered the Greek government responsible for these. He wondered

29. *Ibid.*, p.119

30. Charles Waley and V.I. Seebic, The Struggle for Cyprus, (Palo Alto, Cal., 1973), p.174.

31. Time, 29 July, 1974, p.29.

why the Greek officers supported an organization like EOKA-B, an illegal and harmful organization. He asked how much of this had the support of the Greek government. He asserted that the opposition press supporting the illegal and original activities was financed by the Greek government, for this, Makarios contended, there was irrefutable evidence to support this view. He did not hesitate to name these officers in Second Bureau of the Greek Army High Command in Athens and Cyprus echelon of the Greek Central Intelligence.³²

Without any further loss of time, President Makarios demanded the recall of all the Greek officers. At the same time, he reduced the duration of military conscription from 24 to 14 months. The conscript could now alternatively serve in a special police formation, whose main task was to eliminate approximately 500 active members of EOKA-B. There was tremendous protest in Athens against the measures taken by Makarios. Athens accused Makarios of "treason against the Greek nation".³³

Since 1970, the Intelligence Service and tactical police of Makarios had frustrated repeated coup attempts aimed at the overthrow of the government of Archbishop. As early as March 1974, the Cypriote Ambassador to Washington, Nikos Dimitriou, went to see the then

32. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (London, 1976), p.22661.

33. Salih, no.11, p

Assistant Secretary of State for Near-Eastern Affairs, the late Rodger Davies, and told him that a serious effort will be made to assassinate Archbishop Makarios before the Easter.³⁴ Archbishop Makarios charged in June 1974 that Athens had organized a plot to overthrow him under the code name, "Operation Apollo".³⁵ President Makarios made no secret of his suspicions.

What President Makarios had been saying about the plots turned out to be true. Archbishop Makarios was overthrown as the President of Cyprus on 15 July 1974, by a violent military coup staged by the Cypriote National Guard that was dominated by Greek officers. The 10,000 strong Cypriote National Guard, that was commanded by 650 Greek officers staged the coup. According to reports the rebels used tanks, machine guns and explosives to take the palace of President Makarios. Then the rebels quickly seized the Nicosia broadcasting system, declared a twenty-four hour curfew, cut the international communication channels and closed the Nicosia airport. There was no immediate information on how the Archbishop met his death. Although Nicosia Radio, the only link between Cyprus and the outside world, maintained that President Makarios was dead, the Monitoring station later said that they had heard his voice on a clandestine radio station assuring his supporters that he was alive.³⁶ Indeed, the Archbishop had escaped. He first

34. Intrence Stern, "How We Failed in Cyprus", Foreign Policy (New York), Vol.19, Summer, 1975, p.76.

35. Ibid., p.36.

36. Ibid., no.32, p.22661.

flew to Malta and the following day to Britain.

Manshile, Nicos Giordinos Sargson, a Greek Cypriote, the deputy leader of the Progressive Party and the publisher of the newspaper named 'Mensch' (Battle), had been sworn in as the President of the Republic. One American newspaper, Long Island Press described him as follows: "Mr. Sargson is well known as a fanatical Fascist, no stranger to bloody uprisings and military coups. Seventeen years ago, he was sentenced to death by England for his role in the assassination campaign against British forces on Cyprus."³⁷

The newly elected President formed the Government. He claimed that it was to be "The Government of National Salvation". He defined the basic task before the government in highly idealistic terms. The immediate task of the government was to restore "The Spiritual unity of the Cypriot Hellenism and pacify the Church. The efforts for the settlement of the Cypriote problem were to continue through inter-communal talks. The government was to announce elections as soon as conditions permitted." There was to be no change in the foreign policy of the new government. The policy of non-alignment was to continue.³⁸ The pronouncement was intended to calm people and the world community.

37. Editorial in Long Island Press, "Turks Invade: Civilian Rule Restores in Greece" in Materials on File (New York), Vol. 14, 16-31, July 1974, p. 912.

38. Ibid., no. 32, p. 22662.

36 But the Government of Sarason remained in the office only for one week. He stepped down in favour of Glarides. Makarios was in New York to plead his case before the United Nations.

CHAPTER-III

THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY DURING THE CRISIS

The first reaction of the United States on the coup in Cyprus, came from Under Secretary of State, Robert Anderson, who said: "Our prime objective in Cyprus crisis is to prevent further exacerbation of the situation."¹ One can understand the seriousness with which the United States viewed the coup in Cyprus from the fact that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger convened the meeting of the Washington Special Action Group, a subcommittee of the National Security Council, twice in twenty four hours. Furthermore, the United States applied diplomatic pressures on the Greek and Turkish Governments in an effort to prevent a military clash between the two important members of the NATO alliance. Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Silco rushed to Athens for long series of meetings with Greek civilian and military leaders and then went to Ankara for further talks with the Turkish authorities. During his talks with the Turkish leaders, he suggested a solution on the following lines:² Greece would have to ensure that the newly-proclaimed President of Cyprus left his office soon; it would provide Turkey with more guarantees regarding the safety of the island's ethnic Turkish minorities; it would spell out more clearly its acceptance in principle of the British proposal to replace the 650 Greek officers of Cypriote National Guard.

1. New York Times, 16 July 1977, p.16.

2. Ibid., p.8.

Turkey rejected the offer to replace the Greek officers and insisted on their complete withdrawal. Kissinjer in his talks reiterated the U.S. interest in maintaining the independence and "constitutional arrangements" on the island.

The newly-elected President of Cyprus, Nicos Sampson was neither acceptable to the Greek Cypriotes nor to the Turks. The Turks were opposed to his being President because of the prevailing impression that he had always hated Turkey. As long as the plot to overthrow Makarios had not succeeded, the Turks had no reason to intervene in Cyprus, but after it had and Sampson had become President, Turkey found it necessary to intervene directly in Cyprus. However, Turkish Premier, Bulent Ecevit was opposed to any unilateral action by his country in Cyprus. The Soviet government began talks with the government of the U.K. The talks began in London on 17 July 1974 between Premier Ecevit and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan.³ Nothing came out of these talks. In these talks Ecevit demanded two things -- that Greek officers should be withdrawn by Athens and that President Sampson be replaced forthwith.⁴ Otherwise, he warned that the Turkish Army would intervene. When military junta in Athens refused to agree on a compromise over the restoration of the constitutional leadership in Cyprus, Turkey

3. Time, 29 July 1974, p.8.

4. Ibid., p.13.

decided to act. On 20 July 1974, about six thousand Turkish forces in the three brigades, equipped with armoured personnel carriers and tanks under naval and air cover landed six miles to the west of Kyrenia. Their action met with little resistance from the Greek National Guards.⁵

Turkey justified its action under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee which granted each of the three Guaranteeing powers "the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty". Turkey viewed its operation in Cyprus as a "police action" taken with the sole aim of preserving the integrity and independence of the island and checking any move for Enosis. Turkey also justified its action on the basis of the Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which states that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of United Nations".⁶

On 20 July the United States announced that Greece and Turkey had agreed to a cease-fire between their forces on Cyprus. The Turkish invasion did not bring about any change in American priority. It remained as before to prevent a war between the two NATO allies.⁷

5. A.H. Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, (Tuscaloosa, Ala, 1978), p.90-91.

6. Salih, no.5, p.91.

7. New York Times, 29 July 1974, p.14.

40 But the attempts made by both the U.S. and Britain to bring about a cease-fire between the two parties did not succeed.

Since the coup in Cyprus, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger avoided passing any moral judgment about the coup. He also avoided taking sides in the confrontation. He intended to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. effort by maintaining a stance of impartiality. The idea was to use American influence to mediate rather than to arbitrate.⁸

The United States was afraid that any public posture which leaned towards Archbishop Makarios would make the Greeks more intransigent, when time came for negotiations to restore peace on the island, finding a new policy arrangement acceptable to all parties. But the American neutrality on the issue resulted in ambiguity and confusion. It seemed that the Pentagon, concerned about its bases in Greece, favoured a policy of accommodation with the leaders of the coup. But the Nixon Administration never did seriously "contemplate recognition and support" for the Government of Nikos Sampson.⁹ He was as unacceptable to Washington as he was to Turks. Kissinger decided against joining Britain in supporting Archbishop Makarios for practical reasons. The Archbishop was simply not in control of Cyprus, or "in position" to vie for such support. Kissinger also opposed the Makarios demand,

8. *Ibid.*, p.15.

9. New York Times, 22 July 1974, p.15.

which was backed by the British and others, for the immediate withdrawal of the Greek officers who had engineered the coup. He feared that this would create a vacuum of authority and might precipitate a civil war with Cypriote Communists taking arms and seeking Soviet support.¹⁰

Indeed, the U.S. search for an understanding between the two rivals was bound to be frustrating. During the course of the crisis, the Turks raised their demand. The Turks not only demanded the restoration of status-quo ante, but demanded new constitutional arrangements for the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority. They asked for more powers to them. As one observer put it, "The Turks have been seeking Double Enosis: That Union of Greek part of the Cyprus with Greece and that of the Turkish part with Turkey. When Greek discuss 'Enosis', they mean Union of the entire island with Greece".¹¹ However, this observation ignores the fact that Turks were satisfied with the existing constitutional arrangement and wanted it to continue. It was only in response to the Greek effort to seek Enosis that they demanded the integration of the Turkish part of the island with Turkey.

The collapse of the coup in Cyprus had one good result. There were political upheavals in Greece and Cyprus. As it was the

10. Salih, no.5, p.91.

11. Ibid., p.13.

42
 Greek Military Junta which had organized the coup, there was strong public demand for the restoration of democracy in Athens. Constantine Karamanlis, a strong personality in Greek politics of undoubted democratic convictions, was persuaded to return from Paris after his prolonged exile to take over the leadership of the country.¹² The resumption of interim Presidency in Cyprus by the President of the House of Representatives Nicos Clerides brought to power a skilled moderate Greek Cypriote who was acceptable to most Turkish Cypriotes.¹³ This led to a positive improvement in the situation.

The First Geneva Conference was held on 25 July, 1974. The purpose of the Conference was to restore peace in Cyprus and to negotiate with the parties concerned for setting up a constitutional government in Cyprus. The three powers, namely, Turkey, Greece and Great Britain, attended the Conference and discussed such subjects as arranging the cease-fire, establishment of a Security Zone between the two rival forces and lifting of the siege around the Turkish villages still in the Greek sector.¹⁴ At the conference, Britain was represented by the Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. The United States sent to the First Geneva Conference, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization, Bill Duffin.

12. Time, 5 August 1974, p.29.

13. New York Times, 24 July 1974, p.49.

14. Cited in E. Jinnah, "Geneva Conference: July-August, 1974" in S. Jinnah's Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Speeches, (Adana, 1974), p.47.

It would be relevant to mention here that the First Geneva Conference was held in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 22 July 1974. The resolution stated: "The Security Council calls on Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and Constitutional government in Cyprus."¹⁵

Despite the clear and unambiguous language of the resolution, the discussion on the cease-fire proved to be difficult. Greece claimed that although Turkey had announced the cease-fire from the evening of 22 July, it continued to advance further even after this date. It demanded that Turkish troops should return to the 22 line immediately. In response to this, Turkey underlined that the ceasefire call was addressed not only to the Turkish forces but to Greek Cypriote forces as well. Turkey's point was upheld when the three powers at the conference, namely, Britain, Turkey and Greece, signed a declaration which presented a compromise which was somewhat closer to the Turkish position. This included the rights to keep forces on the island until an "acceptable settlement" was reached and send them back if deemed necessary under the treaty provisions.¹⁶

During the five days conference in Geneva, both sides made accusations and counter-accusations regarding cease-fire violations.

15. Utman, no.14, p.52.

16. New York Times, 31 July 1974, p.1.

44

At the end of these discussions, on 30 July 1974, a declaration was signed. The declaration recognized the importance of measures to adjust and regularize the situation in Cyprus within the framework of the agreement signed earlier on 16 August 1960 and the Security Council resolution 1853. The declaration went on to call on all forces to desist from all offensive or hostile activities and freeze the situation as on 30 July. It created an Emergency Force of UNICYP. The parties also agreed that further talks should begin on 8 August at Geneva.¹⁷ p

In accordance with this decision, the Second Geneva Conference was held between 8 and 14 August 1974. This time, the three powers, Turkey, Greece and Great Britain, invited the representatives of both Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus, namely, Denktas and G. Glafides respectively. The United States sent Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Arthur Hurman as an observer. The main purpose of the Second Geneva Conference was to determine the political future of Cyprus. At the Conference, Denktas proposed that a fundamental revision of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus was necessary to avoid the repetition of the tragic events of the past and to provide the minimum conditions for permanent peaceful co-existence. He suggested that the Republic of Cyprus should be an independent binational state with combination of two federated states

17. Ibid., p.2.

with full control and autonomy within their respective geographical boundaries. This Kerkiras proposal was, however, "totally unacceptable" to the Greek Cypriotes. Moreover, when Greece and Greek Cypriotes asked for an adjournment of 48 hours, Turkey rejected this demand. The Second Geneva Conference thus ended in the early hours of 14 August 1974 without achieving any results.¹⁸

The prospect of failure in Cyprus peace talks was apparent to the participants from the very beginning of the Conference. The Turkish position was quite rigid. As one commentator put it: "Turks were presenting an ultimatum and not negotiating". It also seemed that Turkey was determined to impose some kind of a permanent political solution on the island with its hostile Greek and Turkish communities.¹⁹ Another serious miscalculation which contributed to the failure of Geneva Conference was insufficient use of influence by the United States despite "telephonic diplomacy" between the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and Henry Kissinger. Henry Kissinger maintained telephonic contacts with Kerkiras and Callaghan directly. The role of the American delegate was thus reduced to a minimum. But what pressure Kissinger exerted on these leaders is not known. The failure of the conference would indicate that it was not enough or effective.²⁰

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, 15 August 1974, p.14.

20. *Ullman*, no.14, p.50.

45 The final collapse of the tripartite talks in Geneva, resulted in the resumption of fighting and the Turkish troops rapidly advanced in the Eastern and Western part of Cyprus. Turkey decided to use military force to gain the political concessions it had failed to achieve through negotiations since 1964. Ankara reinforced its troops, amassing about 35,000 - 40,000 men and approximately 250 - 300 tanks.²¹ By 16 August 1974, the Turkish Forces had sliced the northern part of the Cyprus from Nicosia or Koldim Bay line in Nicosia to Famagusta. After securing its military objective Prime Minister Doevit declared a cease-fire on 16 August 1974. He said: "We are now in a situation where the foundations have been laid for a new Federal State for Cyprus".²²

Like the two previous occasions in 1964 and 1967, when the Cyprus issue had flared up, the over-riding American concern this time was not to decide the rights or wrongs of the issue, but to limit the potential damage to NATO and the American strategic position in the Mediterranean. This time too, the American concern was guided by the same motivation. On 15 July 1974 the United States sought to diffuse the immediate crisis and to prevent a war between Greece and

21. Salih, no.4, p.96.

22. Newsweek, 26 August 1974, p.28

Turkey. While the United States had successfully intervened and averted a war between its two allies earlier, in the 1974 crisis it did nothing to secure a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem.²³ Most importantly, its posture in the crisis aroused the resentment of both allies, each of which felt that the United States had betrayed it by supporting its adversary.

The American foreign policy towards Greece and Eastern Mediterranean was based on very short-sighted assumption that attached to military objectives higher priority over political considerations. Furthermore, the United States showed a tendency to put short-term political considerations ahead of long-term political interests. This had serious repercussions. First, it served to discredit the United States in the eyes of many Greeks and contributed to the growth of a latent anti-American feeling that had become even more intense since the 1974 crisis and the fall of Junta. Second, the U.S. was willing to tolerate the Junta and its suppression of democracy because the Junta continued to support NATO. This resulted in further erosion of support. Third, it resulted in friction between the United States and its Western European allies, many of whom took a less charitable view of the Junta.²⁴ Therefore, instead of ensuring amicable Greek-American ties and promoting stability in the Mediterranean,

23. Stephen Larnabee, *Balkan Security*, (London, 1977), p.19.

24. *Ibid.*, p.19.

the American support of the Junta had precisely the opposite effect. When the Junta fell, the United States found itself in a far weaker position in the Mediterranean than ever before.²⁵

The Cyprus crisis of 1974 and the American involvement in it, however, must be viewed against the background of the gradually deteriorating relations between Greece and the United States during the previous decade and more particularly against the background of tactical American support to the Greek Junta since 1967. A US special study mission sent by the Subcommittee of International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs headed by Donald H. Fraser (D-Minn), and which had Clifford Hackett, Staff Consultant to the Subcommittee to Europe, as one of the members of the mission, visited Greece on 18 January 1974.²⁶ On its return, the Study Group submitted its report on 22 February 1974 to the United States House Foreign Affairs Committee. It concluded that "an extremely serious situation...today exists in Greece and that U.S. policy in Greece since April 1967 has been ill-conceived, short-sighted, impractical and faulty - even unconscionable."²⁷ The report deplored the overwhelming military consideration of U.S. policy in Greece and

25. *Ibid.*

26. Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Report of Special Study Mission to Greece, Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece, (Washington, D.C., 1974).

27. *Ibid.*, p.1.

contained it as unbecoming of the leader of free world and NATO alliance.²⁸

In short, the Study Group implied that to a large extent the Cyprus crisis was a by-product of American tolerance of and, to some extent, even cooperation with military Junta. The U.S. attitude encouraged the colonels to believe that the United States would not react strongly to the overthrow of Makarios as long as it did not jeopardize its rights to bases in Greece.²⁹

The military leaders' attempted coup against Makarios was essentially, an act of desperation that was based upon a total misreading of American policy and international situation. Brig. General Ioannides, the strong man in the Greek Government, apparently expected the United States to condone the coup and restrain Turkey as it had done in 1963 and 1967.³⁰ But circumstances and dynamics of interaction in 1974 were far different from earlier years. Certainly the relations between Turkey and the United States had been far from smooth during the last decade due to the "Johnson Letter" of 1964 and "Opium Controversy"³¹ between the two countries.

28. Cited in P.J. Vitelliotis, "Greece: A Political Essay", Washington Papers, no.22, (Washington, DC, 1974), p.47.

29. Laurence Stern "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus", Foreign Policy (Washington, DC), Vol.9, Summer, 1975, p.56.

30. Larabee, no.23, p.20.

31. For detailed study of the issues, see F. Ahmed's The Turkish Experiment In Democracy: 1960-1975 (London, 1975), p.416.

The opium issue aroused a bitter debate between the two countries. Briefly stated, the problem was like this. In 1972, the Turks agreed to ban poppy growing in return for \$ 36 million paid by the United States as compensation. But, although Ankara had accepted the arrangement, it was not very happy with it because opium poppy was the only crop the Turkish peasants wanted to grow on their lands.³² Consequently, when the Turkish American relations were strained over Cyprus, the Turkish Government, already resentful of American interference in their domestic affairs, saw no reason to continue to deny its farmers the profits which they were intent upon earning. The two additional factors also encouraged the Turks to start growing poppies again. First, it soon became apparent that Turkey's ban on poppies had caused a shortage in the world's pharmaceutical industry. But, most infuriating to the Turks was the news that United States was thinking of asking Indian and American farmers to grow poppies in order to meet the shortage.³³ However, when Turkey resumed poppy growing, the Turkish Government tried to placate the United States by pledging strict policing of poppy growing and by imposing severe penalties for smuggling and for illegal use of opium. In the U.S. Congress, Turkey was even accused of harbouring criminal intentions against the United States. Senator Walter Mondale (Dem. Minnesota) in the Senate described the Turkish decision of 8 July lifting the ban on poppy cultivation

32. Salih, no.4, p.92-93.

33. Salih, no.4, p.93-95.

as "a declaration of war against our children".³⁴

The Cyprus crisis also led to a trend towards polarization in domestic politics of Turkey. This particularly manifested itself in the rise of the radical left and the emergence of students as an important political force. In turn both these trends increased political instability and anti-Americanism. Furthermore, during the Turkish invasion, the Air base of Adana, which is jointly operated by the Turkish and American Forces, was used as a springboard for Turkish air attack against the Greek forces on Cyprus. Since Turks resented American pressure against their Cyprus invasion, they closed this NATO base to all American Air Force flights during the Cyprus crisis.³⁵ The United States, however, assumed prime responsibility for the tragedy in Cyprus because of its diplomatic ineffectiveness -- too little and invariably too late. Throughout the period, since the Athens directed coup against Archbishop Makarios ignited the crisis, there were grounds for believing that the U.S. had opportunities to prevent the crisis, but it let them pass by, because its long-held dislike and distrust of President Makarios and unwillingness to offend the military rulers in Greece.³⁶

34. Walter Reuther's speech in the U.S. Senate. Quoted in "Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus", in Cyril Pugh's Dispolitika Cyprus, (Ankara, 1975), p.170.

35. Salih, no.5, p.93.

36. New York Times, 15 August 1974, p.18.

52 There were several points along the path of the crisis where the United States could bring it under control by exerting proper pressure. But the U.S. missed the chance. Once the coup had taken place, the United States could have restrained Turkey from military intervention. Had Kissinger given prompt and vigorous support to Britain's proposal to recognize Cyprus headed by Raspoen and also Great Britain's demand that Greece should immediately recall its officers, who had directed the operations, the crisis could have been easily avoided. Further, after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, there was growing need to dissuade Turkey from embarking on a reckless military adventure aimed at the forcible partition of the island. Here again, the U.S. was too mild and too late.³⁷

What was required was a kind of tough, clear message that President Johnson gave to Turkish Premier Ismet Inonu, which prevented Turkish invasion in 1964. Why did the United States not try harder and ended up with an image of ineffectiveness in the management of the crisis? The answer could be found in the fact that the United States' critical mistake came very early, right after the 15 July coup. Kissinger's mind was probably preoccupied with the Watergate crisis. He showed no sign of recognizing the potential trouble as a result of the ouster of Makarios. The United States took a line that supported the Greek Government.³⁸ The military junta was ousted within eight days after

37. Ibid., p.51.

38. Ibid., p.52.

the coup. This was the direct result of the crisis. Indeed, the United States gave every impression of not being disturbed over the ouster of President Makarios and seemed unwilling to offend the military rulers. It appeared that the United States felt even a little better without Makarios. Kissinger viewed the Archbishop as the "Fidel Castro of the Mediterranean". This U.S. approach gave an altogether different impression to Turkey. It believed the U.S. as pro-justice. Even then it did not launch the military operation. Its first response was to seek a diplomatic solution. The U.S. hesitation increased the Turkish sense of alarm and indirectly contributed to the Turkish decision to undertake the first invasion on 20 July 1974.³⁹

In the second phase of the crisis, after the Turkish invasion, the United States seemed to wake up to the implicit danger and started devoting its attention to Cyprus. The United States improved its position by asking the Greeks what Turks were offering and asking the Turks to accept the cease-fire.⁴⁰ But Turkey was in no mood to listen to the United States. On the other hand, Kissinger was unwilling to anger Turkey because it was a country which had a common border with the Soviet Union and was important to the NATO alliance. The United States, therefore, decided to pull its punches. Kissinger sought to persuade Greece to resume peace talks with Turkey in Cyprus. He pledged that the

39. Israbb, no.23, p.20.

40. New York Times, 19 August 1974, p.3

United States would use its influence "in any negotiations to take full account of Greek honour and national dignity". He said that the United States would use its influence for the firm maintenance of Cyprus cease-fire and press Turkey to display flexibility and concern for Greek sensitivities. He further stated that the original trouble caused by the coup of 15 July and ouster of President Makarios, was not of "our own making" and "the United States, while trying to be helpful, cannot solve all the problems around the world."⁴¹

With regard to Cyprus, the United States put forward the following six points.⁴²

First, it approved the cease-fire. Second, it felt that there was urgent need to begin negotiations. Third, the United States would support efforts to get the parties to the negotiations. Fourth, it would play a key role in the negotiations and would lend support to a similar policy pursued by British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan. Fifth, it would persuade Turkey to display flexibility and concern for Greek sensitivities in terms of territories and size of forces in Cyprus; Finally, as the United States greatly valued the traditional friendship of Greece, it would take into account Greek honour and national dignity.⁴³

41. Secretary Kissinger's Press Conference on 13 August 1974. Department of State Bulletin, 9 September 1974, Vol.45, p.357.

42. New York Times, 20 August 1974, p.1

43. Ibid., p.1.

As pointed out earlier, for quite some time after the beginning of the crisis, the American approach towards Greece had not been satisfactory. Under the Johnson Administration, the United States separately gave Greece a tacit 'go ahead' to overthrow the civilian Government installed by King Constantine. The Nixon Administration went out of its way to approve of Greek military junta, even shifting the Sixth Fleet from Italy to Greece,⁴⁴ to demonstrate its support.

The entire record of American interference in the domestic affairs of Greece was unjustified. In return, the United States made no additional gain in the security in the Mediterranean. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball felt that the crisis damaged the American-Greek relations to the extent that the United States might not be in a position to prevent a substantial increase in the Soviet influence in Greece. He also said that the United States could have at least tried to avert Turkey's invasion on Cyprus on 20 July 1974. He added that lack of "American initiative" had left the impression that the United States favoured Turkey and this had led to an intense anti-American feeling in Greece.⁴⁵

By this time, the Soviet Union began to take greater interest in the region. Formerly, the Soviet Union had merely denounced the overthrow of President Makarios as totally "undisguised armed aggression by some NATO quarters" and had demanded the reinstatement of Makarios

44. New York Times, 21 August 1974, p.13.

45. Ibid., 21 August 1974, p.3

as President and restoration of Cyprus as a sovereign Republic. But on 22 August 1974, the Soviet Union tried to assume a more active role by suggesting that an eighteen-nation international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations be convened to find a solution. It suggested that the Conference should be attended by the 15 members of the United Nation's Security Council and Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.⁴⁶

What the Soviet Union wanted was desilitarisation of Cyprus. In order to achieve it, the Soviet Union wanted to force the U.K. to evacuate its bases and prevent the island from being turned into a possible NATO base. The Soviet Union did not want the bases to fall under the U.S. domination. What it had meant by "certain NATO quarters" was not the Netherlands, but mainly the United States.⁴⁷ Greece was not very eager to have Soviet interference in the Cyprus issue. It felt that the Soviet presence could complicate the crisis. Nevertheless, Premier Constantinos and Glarides accepted the Soviet proposal. Turkey, however, rejected it.⁴⁸

American diplomacy during the Cyprus crisis, by most official accounts, showed "neutral stance". But it tended to favour the Greek military junta in the first phase of the crisis and worked to the advantage of Turkey thereafter.⁴⁹ But, the neutral stance of the

46. New York Times, 23 August 1974, p.4

47. Eyfi, no.54, p.170.

48. Salih, no.5, p.57.

49. New York Times, 9 September 1974, p.8

United States was not sufficient to prevent the coup or to induce Greek junta to accept a workable compromise after Archbishop Makarios had been toppled. It became clear during and before the Cyprus crisis that once Turkish troops had landed on the island in large number, American position enabled them to overturn Greek Cypriote forces and provided no time for American diplomacy to work. The United States expressed its "powerlessness" to alter basic decisions in Athens and Ankara.⁵⁰ The United States' stiff pressures on both the countries did not work and public statements condemning dictatorship or aggression were no more than public posturing without any positive action. Probably, the United States was left with no alternative but to adopt a "middleman strategy" in which it was acceptable to both sides as a mediator to moderate the crisis. According to the New York Times, Kissinger adopted his favourite two-track diplomacy - limited and restrained public statements to save every one's face plus bolstering activity behind the scene to put the United States in the middleman role.⁵¹ This approach, however, failed to bring any practical benefit to the United States.

On 27 June 1974, the State Department received the news of an impending coup against Archbishop Makarios.⁵² American Ambassador to

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., 9 September 1974, p.8.

52. Ibid., p.8.

Greece Henry Tasca and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Chief in Athens had conversation with military junta's Brig. General Demetrios Ioannides. Both of them conveyed to Washington that the junta was planning to overthrow the democratically elected government which was dominated by the ethnic Greeks. The State Department sent Tasca to warn General Ioannides that any attempt to change situation by violence would have serious effects.⁵³ But at this point of time, Kissinger did not think of bringing any pressure on Demetrios Ioannides, since he thought that would be tantamount to interfering in the internal affairs of another nation. Tasca delivered the warnings at the various levels of the Greek government. While doing so, Tasca used the C.I.A. Chief as a channel of transmitting the caution to General Ioannides.⁵⁴ Kissinger was suspicious of Tasca since Tasca had become too dependent on CIA men and he would not deliver the message with sufficient authority and credibility. Kissinger warned Tasca to see General Ioannides and the Ambassador Tasca became a "Scapegoat" of Kissinger's policy.⁵⁵ Tasca differed with Kissinger on this issue. He said, "I do not deal with Ioannides. He was after all the chief of military police in Greece and it was not the Ambassador's role to make diplomatic denunciations to a cop, but he got the message".⁵⁶

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Lawrence Stern, "Bitter Lessons How We Failed in Cyprus", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Vol.19, September 1975, p.49.

56. Newsweek, 2 September 1974, p.34.

59

Tasca never saw the General. In fact, the first Senior American official to meet him at the time was Under Secretary of State, Joseph J. Sisco and that too, some days after the coup.⁵⁷ About 11 July 1974, there was indication that coup was less likely than before. President Makarios, indeed, had every reason to be happy about it. Further, the CIA Chief in Athens had a conversation with "a number of junta" and reported that plan seem to be changing. Ultimately, coup did take place on 15 Au _____ and other members of NATO supported _____ and Makarios but also a return to constitutional arrangements.⁵⁸

Kissinger is reported to have felt that he had only two real options - either he could have maintained the position he had taken or the direct involvement of American forces. The latter was ruled out on the ground that it would both be ineffective and counter-productive.⁵⁹ The United States reading of the prevailing situation was that some fighting was "inevitable" in Cyprus. If it had taken place, Kissinger would have been certainly in a position to mediate between the concerned parties. He did begin the round of "Telephonic Diplomacy". His action was motivated by the main assumption that since Washington was not keen on pressurizing Greek junta for Archbishop Makarios' return, he felt that Greek junta could back out politically

57. Ibid., 89, 55, p. 8

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

by accepting the return of Archbishop Makarios. Instead, it was the United States' policy to back the successor, President Glafkos Clerides, as a compromise political candidate and try to keep Turkey from invading.⁶⁰

Tsaox was sent on 17 July 1974 to London to caution Athens and Ankara against the use of force and also to warn that continued hostility could impair their relations with United States. The basic message was enlarged over the following weeks. A state department spokesman declared: "We painted a strong picture for the parties". The United States told the Turks that force would hamper the relations with Greece and the security of the area would be endangered.⁶¹

The message conveyed by the United States lacked clarity, thus confusion was worse compounded, since the State Department and Pentagon, the two important departments of the United States, interpreted this message differently. On the one hand, some Pentagon officials believed that it was a threat to cut off military aid to both Greece and Turkey, on the other, State Department feared there was such an intrusion.⁶²

However, the hope of a negotiated solution rose when fragile peace-line was achieved late in July 1974. As noted earlier, the negotiation among the concerned powers were held in Geneva in the months of July-August, under the leadership of the United Kingdom.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

61

But negotiation did not produce any tangible result on account of the differences over the nature of guarantees that Ankara wanted for Turkish community in Cyprus. The United States announced that it favoured greater autonomy for the Turkish community in Cyprus.⁶³ The British announced that the Turkish position was "arbitrary and unreasonable". When General Nikos broke down, the Turkish forces quickly overcame the opposition offered by the Greek Cypriots, taking more than two-thirds of the island. The Cyprian government in Greece withdrew from NATO military command in protest against the Turkish invasion. The United States "deplored" Turkey's military action. Kissinger again ruled out the option of applying strong pressure against Turkey. According to him, Turkey was more important to the United States than Greece.⁶⁴ He said, "we have trouble with Turkey over the "ogian issue" and we are worried about increasing Soviet influence in Ankara and Soviet were breaking down our necks, then we have to take care of Turkey's interest first - but mainly we were neutral". He further added, "we knew Cyprianis would have to be anti-American to counter the pressure from the left", but we decided to receive short term reverses quietly, hoping that long term interests would bring Greece back into its fold.⁶⁵

From the beginning, the United States' main concern in Cyprus crisis was to avoid any confrontation between its two NATO allies,

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

mainly Greece and Turkey. Due to this reason, the United States took a neutral position in the crisis. But in the process, its policy constituted de facto tilting, first towards Greek military junta and afterwards Turkey. It was Kissinger's understanding, based perhaps on U.S. strategic interest in the Mediterranean, that Turkey was more important than Greece. Because of this consideration, Kissinger did not effectively react to the Turkish invasion on Cyprus. It ultimately resulted in Gennamias' diplomatic move of withdrawing Greek military forces from NATO. The decision of Gennamias also meant a great blow to NATO solidarity and cohesion. The most important implication of Greece's decision to pull out its forces from NATO was that it damaged the prestige of the U.S. not only as a NATO leader but also as a global power.

CHAPTER - IV

THE NATO, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS CRIMES

Consistent with its interest in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean region in general, the United States was primarily interested in restoring peace in the area before the crisis could endanger the vital American interest. It acted at different levels; at bilateral level, at the level of the NATO and at the United Nations. At the United Nations, it did not play a very significant role, nor did it effectively use this channel. It placed more faith in its diplomacy at the bilateral level and the efforts of the NATO. Here we will make an effort to analyze the role of the NATO in this crisis.

In the first place, the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Cyprus crisis seemed unnecessary and even unwarranted. Since both Greece and Turkey are members of the NATO, it became ultimately the responsibility of the NATO to offer its service to the antagonists to preserve its own solidarity. It was quite doubtful whether the intervention of NATO could be successful at all. The three guarantors of the London-Constantinople Agreements were members of the NATO. Moreover any hostilities between its members are of serious and immediate concern to the NATO as a whole. Furthermore, the report of three, namely, Gaetano Martino of Italy; Halvard Lange of Norway; and Lester B. Pearson of Canada, on Non-military Cooperation in the NATO was set up in 1956 after the Suez debacle.

The Report has stated:

In the development of effective political cooperation in NATO it is of crucial importance to avoid serious intra-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place a direct responsibility of the member governments concerned.... To clarify NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly, and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help in the settlement of such disputes.

The Council subsequently adopted a resolution under the Article 1 of the Treaty, which tried to define the responsibility of other members in disputes among members. The resolution affirmed that it was the obligation of the members themselves to settle any dispute among themselves by peaceful means. If the members failed to settle the dispute by their own effort, they were required to submit the dispute for "good offices procedures" within the NATO framework before resorting to any other agency. The members themselves or the Secretary General could bring the dispute to the attention of the Council, any dispute among members which could threaten the solidarity and effectiveness of the NATO organization.¹

The Report of the "Three Wise Men" which was subsequently adopted sets the political philosophy of the NATO and formed the basis of its concern in Cyprus.

1. Cited in NATO - Facts About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO Information Service, Paris, 1965), p.372.

The NATO's interest in the Cyprus dispute was threefold. In the first place, the alliance as a whole was vitally concerned to prevent an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey, either in Cyprus or in the Mediterranean, or on the territory of the two countries themselves. Secondly, NATO had direct interest in the security of Cyprus as it involved security of the British bases on the island, which, though were primarily needed to maintain mobility of the British strategic reserve as well as of the NATO itself.² Thirdly, and probably the most important objective of the NATO in Cyprus was to prevent the Soviet infiltration in the Mediterranean.

Although the United States had not been directly involved in negotiations between the two Cypriote committees, it was deeply concerned. James Reston, the well-known columnist of the New York Times, identified three constraints of U.S. Foreign policy in the crisis. First, the US deplored the authoritarian regime in Greece but it had an important base in Suda Bay in Crete which is located across the sea route from Europe to the unstable West Asia. Second, the United States sympathized with the plight of President Makarios. But it had to take into consideration the fact that Makarios had sought help from Moscow, a development which the United States wanted to avoid at all costs. Except for losing the base rights in Greece, what the United States dreaded most was to see Soviet Union firmly entrenched in Cyprus from where it could outflank both Greece and Turkey.

2. Philip Windsor, NATO and Cyprus (London, 1964), p.6.

Third, the United States' assumption was that the operation of Sixth Fleet would be difficult without the Greek bases. However, it was not easy for the US to provide congressional assistance to Greece because of military junta's hand in the overthrow of Makarios' government.³

Harassed from all sides, the United States did not resort to a bold initiative. It worked for a negotiated settlement. In the beginning of the crisis the United States did not show much concern for its European partners in the NATO. There was some discord in the NATO. It was reported that the Nixon Administration engaged in behind-the-scenes diplomacy. For example, the Under Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, warned the Turkish premier, Bulent Ecevit that if he went to war against Greece, he would isolate Turkey and lose American military aid. A day later Sisco warned the Greek premier, Andreas Andronikopoulos, that if Greece went to war against Turkey, it would face total cut off of American arms supplies and find itself politically isolated.⁴

Had a war resulted between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, both the sides would have fired at each other with American weapons. "Whenever the next war takes place in any of the several overwrought parts of the world", said George Ball, "the sides will probably shoot one another with American made weapons procured by sale or gift through the agency of our government... when Turks battle on Cyprus in 1964,

3. New York Times, 17 July 1974, p.57.

4. New York Times, 26 July 1974, p.3

both sides used American weapons,"⁵ George Ball wrote referring to an earlier crisis. He wanted, since tried to avert such an eventuality.

It was still true in 1974 that the United States was firmly in command of the NATO, should it have chosen to act.⁶ The United States did not wish to act because a pre-occupied Kissinger failed to stop a Turkish invasion. Only when a crisis occurred in one of those areas did Kissinger get in his air plane and try to do something.⁷

The United States believed that Turkey was more important. However, this relative importance of Turkey could not turned into a policy. If the United States valued the strategic importance of these two countries namely, Greece and Turkey, it did not succeed in bringing, if not all members of the NATO, but at least, Greece and Turkey under its diplomatic influence. According to Kissinger "wise alliance policy will not gear everything to the expectation that common position can be developed on a global basis....(but) it may be possible to agree on permissible range of divergence".⁸ But with regard to Cyprus crisis, there was no unity, even for that matter, common outlook, between the NATO allies on the one hand, and United States on the other. The

5. George Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World, (London, 1976), p.271.

6. Lothar Kuhl, The Nine and NATO, The Alliance and Community: An Uncertain Relationship (Paris, 1974), p.41.

7. *Ibid.*, p.16.

8. Robert Ball, "NATO Needs A Fresh Breeze", Fortune (Chicago, February 1975) p.112.

The economic and political interests of the European allies in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were different from those of the United States. The European Common Market had developed close economic relations with Greece and Turkey. Both of these are now associate members moving slowly towards full membership. The significance of these relations went beyond fresh fruits or credits.⁹ In other words, the other NATO partners tended to look at the Cyprus crisis beyond the military viewpoint. They were not able to sacrifice their economic interest for the sake of alliance solidarity.

The NATO is still an indispensable protection for Greece and Turkey because on their own they cannot resist a probable Soviet attack for long. Moreover, since the beginning of the political unrest in Cyprus, the Soviet Union had always been eager to fish in in the troubled waters of the Mediterranean. From the various pronouncements of Soviet Foreign Policy Spokesmen, one could identify the following goals of its policy with respect to Cyprus:

- a) avoid war between Greece and Turkey;
- b) avoid a great power confrontation;
- c) encourage Cyprus to remain an independent state under the Cypriote Communist control;
- d) induce Turkey to adopt a non-aligned policy;
- e) intensify discussion in NATO;
- f) eliminate the two British bases and the United States.¹⁰

9. John C. Campbell, "The Mediterranean Crisis", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 53, July 1975, p. 613.

10. H.A. Habib, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverge Nationalism on a State, (Trenton, N.J., 1970), p. 56.

The Soviet Union interest was not to control Malaya or widen the Cypriote conflict but to strengthen its relations with two important members of NATO allies, namely, Greece and Turkey, and at the same time, underline the United States strategic and diplomatic interest in the area. Had there been a unity between the United States and the NATO in the Cyprus crisis, the Soviet Union would have been forced by the developments to demonstrate its cooperative approach during the crisis. As President Lyndon B. Johnson had observed in the earlier crisis:

I was convinced that the stronger and more unified we were, the more incentive the Soviet and Warsaw Pact allies would have to work with us in solving outstanding problems and differences. If Communist believed the Atlantic Alliance began to fragment, they were likely to hold back to see what would happen.¹¹

This analysis turned out to be true in the case of 1974 crisis.

Had the United States been really interested in maintaining the NATO solidarity, and while doing so, were it also keen to increase its interest in the region, it should have taken into account two things: First, the territorial integrity of these regions against the incursion of the major hostile power like Soviet Union; second, the political stability and freedom from internal disorders.¹²

11. President Lyndon B. Johnson's autobiography, The Vantage Point: The Perspective of Presidency - 1963-1969 (New Delhi, 1972), p.306.

12. Edward Stillman and William Fraff, Power and Importance: Failure of America's Foreign Policy (London, 1966), p.197.

The United States diplomatic ineffectiveness vis-a-vis Greece and Turkey, not only failed to prevent the growth of influence in the region, but also contributed to create political disorder in the two countries. The furious show of anti-American feelings in Greece and Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military structure testified to a decline in US influence. Turkey, on the other hand, was seriously hurt by the American attitude toward its problems like, opium and air bases.

In the ultimate analysis, since the NATO was not keen to get involved too much in Cyprus crisis because of the economic interest of the member countries, the United States could not succeed in coping with the Cyprus crisis successfully. In any military alliance, what matters is not only strategic interest of the member countries but also their economic interests. The US failed to convince the NATO members that an active role was in their own interest.

CHAPTER - I

CONCLUSIONS

Cyprus is an illustration of a State which represents tremendous cultural, religious and ethnic diversities. This diversity has become a permanent source of conflict between two ethnic communities on the island. As some writer has noted:

Cyprus has always been in the past and continues to be today, the home of races that meet but do not mingle, there is no Cypriote nationality, as there is for example, a sense of Maltese a homogeneous people, in race, language and faith. The Greeks and Turks of the Cyprus, with smaller colonies of Maronites Armenians, have nothing in common but the fact that they inhabit the same island.¹

It is an island located in the northern corner of the Mediterranean sea. At the time of the crisis, the population of the island consisted of Greek and Turkish communities of which 78 per cent were Greek Cypriotes, 18 per cent were Turkish Cypriotes and the remaining 4 per cent belonged to the various minority groups.

The Greek Cypriotes who constituted the majority of the population on the island desired Enosis --- the Union of Cyprus with Greece. But the Turkish population firmly opposed it. The London Zurich Agreement of 1959 made Cyprus an independent republic, thereby ruling out the Enosis. The logic of the situation demanded that 'Enosis' could take place only with the Turkish part of the island seceding and joining Turkey. But the Greek Cypriotes wanted

1. Harry Katz, Cyprus: A Portrait and an Appreciation, (London, 1957).

the Enosis and at the same time wanted to preserve the unity of their country. The conflict was therefore inherent. The London-Suzrah conference only postponed it. Archbishop Makarios became its First President. The Constitution of 1960 had disproportionate arrangements for British Cypriotes. The problem was made more complicated by President Makarios when in 1963 he proposed an amendment to the Constitution without taking into consideration the strong British feelings on this issue. This resulted in bloody clashes in 1964 and again in 1967. In order to restore peace and resolve the crisis, the intra-communal talks were started in 1968 between Glafkos Klirides and Rauf Denktaş, representing the Greek and Turkish sides respectively. Since there were fundamental differences between the two communities, on issues like education, cultural and personal status, they could not reach an amicable agreement.

The issue of Enosis had been a bone of contention between the two communities. General Grivas, a Greek Cypriote and a guerrilla leader of EOKA played an important role in the politics of Cyprus, particularly on the issue of Enosis. According to him President Makarios had betrayed the cause of Enosis. He mobilized the EOKA organization and thereby posed a formidable challenge to President Makarios's political survival. He died on 27 July 1974, but the challenge posed by the supporters of the Enosis did not end. Since 1974, repeated attempts were made on Makarios's life. He had lost not only the sympathy of Greek Cypriotes, but also the military regime in Athens.

Finally, he was thrown out in a coup on 15 July 1974. Those who led the coup immediately formed the provisional government in Cyprus under the presidency of Nicos Cioyidiades Sarpan, a Greek Cypriote, who enjoyed the reputation of being "a thug" and "a killer". His government remained in office only for one week. He had to step down in favor of Glarides because his government could not muster enough support. Makarios left for New York to make an international appeal for his case.

The crisis posed a complex problem for the United States as two of its NATO allies confronted each other over Cyprus. Its interest was primarily in resolving the conflict so that it might not lead to a war. The immediate task was to save the situation from deteriorating any more. With this objective in view the United States took the lead in calling two Geneva conferences. The first was held on 25 July 1974. Its purpose was to restore peace by means of a constitutional arrangement. The United States sent Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization, Bill Ruffin to the first Geneva conference. The second Geneva conference was held from 8 to 14 August 1974. The main purpose of this Conference was to decide the political future of Cyprus. It invited the Cypriote community leaders, namely Demetris and Glarides to participate in it. This proved to be a wise move as it brought the two contenders to the negotiating table. The United States this time sent Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs, Arthur Herman as observer. The two Geneva Conferences did not produce any result.

From the American viewpoint, the crucial thing about the quarrel was not the rights and wrongs of the two communities of the island, but the damage it did to relations between Greece and Turkey.²

For the United States the security of American bases in both the countries was as important as the avoidance of war between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, the United States took a neutral position in the Cyprus crisis. And in order to strengthen that position, Kissinger allowed Great Britain to play the major role in the management of the crisis on the specious ground that it was a guarantor power of the London - Zurich Agreements of 1959. The policy of neutrality however did not for long remain genuinely neutral. It first tilted toward the Greek military Junta and then towards Turkey. As a result, the United States left both Greece and Turkey resentful. Greece and Turkey, both felt equally strongly that the United States had betrayed it by not giving it unlimited backing against the order, even when its cause was just.

The Turkish relations with the United States had been strained even before the Cyprus coup. Kissinger's blind reaction to the coup irritated the Turks and immediately after the Helsinki overthrow, they indicated their intention of invading to restore its political and

2. Maurice Goldblum, "United States Policy in Post War Greece," in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (ed.), Greece Under Military Rule (London, 1972), p.236-37.

military balance in Cyprus. Ironically, the United States underestimated the Turkish move in Cyprus, since its diplomatic pressure on Turkey had succeeded in averting the war in 1964 and 1967. However, after the coup, circumstances were different in Cyprus in two respects. First, Makarios was no longer in Cyprus, second, without him, Turks felt that their presence on the island was imperative. Moreover, Russians, at this point of time, were sympathetic to Turkish aims, which appeared to them to prevent Greek controlled Cyprus from falling into NATO orbit. Ultimately, Turkey invaded Cyprus in July, 1974 and captured almost 40 per cent of island. Kissinger did not prevent Turkey from achieving its immediate aim. He acted invariably too late and too little. He lost the sympathy of Greece.

Cassilis withdrew the Greek military forces from NATO as a protest against the inability of the United States to prevent Turkish invasion. The United States failed as the leader of NATO to resolve the crisis between its two NATO allies. It lacked a courageous and imaginative leadership. In 1964, President Johnson's blunt talk had stopped Turkey from waging a war against Greece over the Cyprus issue. Former President Eisenhower had declared that the Cyprus Settlement "represented not only a victory of common sense" but also "an imaginative and courageous act of statesmanship which cannot fail to strengthen and encourage the whole NATO alliance."³ Cassilis' move

3. Cited in A.J. Cottrell and James E. Dougarty, The Politics of Atlantic Alliance, (New York, 1964), p.214-16.

of pulling out Greece out of the NATO seemed justified, since the alliance despite its official claim to safeguard democratic traditions, did nothing to curb dictatorship in Greece. Karamanlis's decision to withdraw from NATO had a profound impact on the cohesion and solidarity of the NATO alliance.

The Nixon Administration's handling of the whole crisis revealed uncoordinated response of various branches of government dealings with the crisis. They worked at cross purposes. The State Department and the American Ambassador in Greece, Tassos spoke in two different voices. The State Department blamed the Ambassador to Greece for failing to avert Cyprus crisis. But it was misplaced. According to an analyst, Stanley Karnow

From what I gather, he (Tassos) did advise Ionnides through CIA channels before the coup that U.S. disapproved of designs against Makarios. Afterward, when he learned that Kissinger was not going to take decisive action to prevent the Turkish invasion of the island, Tassos resorted to desperate means. He sent a message to the Pentagon urging that the Sixth Fleet be deployed in the Aegean Sea to discourage the Turks. A copy of the message of course reached Kissinger, who fired back a cable to Athens accusing Tassos of having become 'hysterical' and warned him against attempting another coup.⁴

Had the United States decided to act in the Cyprus crisis, it could well have avoided the coup. It missed an opportunity to

4. Stanley Karnow, "Greece in Transition". The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 171, 21 September 1974, p. 15.

intervene when the Greek military regime first signalled its serious intention to attempt a coup against Makarios. Even after the coup had resulted in the overthrow of Makarios government, the United States refrained from joining a condemnation being expressed of the attempted assassination against Makarios by most of the Western countries. The United States did not even bother to speak about President Sengco after Makarios fall. Had the United States been more active during the hours of crisis, Turkey would not have found a justification for intervention. The United States had every chance to tell the Turks that they have gained sufficient territory in Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority and there was now need for an intra-communal settlement on the island. Probably, none of these efforts would have worked but they were worth trying. The United States did not even try because Cyprus was a small nation. To quote Stanley Karnow again:

The U.S. failed to demonstrate to the world that it is as concerned about the well being of small nations as it is with peace among the big powers. In this respect, the contention that America is not a global policeman lacks credibility. To treat an aggressor and a victim impartially is to side with the aggressor -- which is what Kissinger did when he leaned first toward the Greek Junta and later toward Turks⁵.

In the ultimate analysis, the United States policy toward Cyprus crisis was guided by the motivation of short term military gains over the long term political achievements. Any way it lost on both counts due to lack of clear cut diplomacy.

5. Stanley Karnow, "Mediterranean Poul-up", The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), Vol.171, 7 September 1974, p.6.

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