

**COLD WAR TO COLD PEACE : NATO'S
EASTWARD EXTENSION**

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*To the memory of my
father*




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CHAPTER I

NATO: CONTINUING, STRENGTHENING, CHANGING?

NATO MATTERS. Although end of the Cold War in late 1989 raised questions about future of NATO and its identity in changed scenario, NATO is one of the key vehicles in promoting the post-Cold War international order and stability. The objective of this study is to show whether such claim will stand scrutiny. The testing of so large an assertion demands caution as well as clarity. Only then we will be able to assess properly the pressure that NATO's success and failure exerts on the international system in general and European security, stability and well-being in particular.

How essential is NATO to post-Cold War Europe ? Can NATO's eastward expansion be inevitable and effective ? Has the demise of the Soviet Union totally undermined NATO's success by undermining the primary reason for its existence? What is there left for a politico-military alliance such as NATO to do now that

the threat that dominated West's planning assumptions for nearly half a century has disappeared ? What is the new agenda that can be achieved only by means of the Alliance ? How, conceptually, does the Alliance fit into a new European architecture whose purpose will not be the staving off of a single, collective and overwhelming challenge from an external and alien power ? What are the future options for NATO ? How much of the old NATO is still alive in the new NATO ? The disintegration of the Soviet Union and its satellite states and the demise of the Warsaw Pact-in short-the end of the international political conflict of world wide dimensions commonly referred to as the Cold War, has forced scholars to answer these questions in very different ways from those that they might have chosen even five or six years ago. Although I do not propose to make a scrutiny of all the arguments and viewpoints

that have been advanced to explain the crisis of NATO, such questions form the sub text of this study.

The central hypothesis of this study is that a reformed NATO is indispensable for a better Europe. One perception in particular governs the whole of the analysis presented here : NATO is a democratic alliance that is increasingly becoming a more liberal one and that it has been more than a military alliance. This research was done in 1994-1995, as the class of events with which it was concerned was still unfolding. My work thus suffers from all the problems of contemporaneity and should be viewed as only preliminary assessment and explanation of NATO's transition. An EXPLANATION, as Samuel P.Huntington remarked "is inevitably complex, dense, messy and intellectually unsatisfying. It succeeds not by being austere but by being comprehensive". I am afraid, my explanation is not comprehensive either.

The Argument

NATO has reached the post-Cold War world as a most successful alliance, symbolizing 'peace with freedom, victory over Communism, borders defended without fighting a single battle'. Its status as the most powerful democratic, military juggernaut in Europe is no longer a matter of debate or qualification. NATO's name is now almost certain to be added to that very select list of military alliances which have been most successful in modern history. Yet NATO has been much more than a military alliance - it is, in the words of former NATO Secretary General and chairman of the North Atlantic Council, Manfred Wörner, "a political commonwealth of like-minded and equal nations sharing common values and, increasingly, common interests." It has successively and successfully stood at the cutting edge of a very important perhaps the most important - global political development of the late twentieth century :

the end of the Cold War with the transition of former Soviet satellite-countries from nondemocratic to democratic political systems. This work is also an attempt 'to explain why, how and with what immediate consequences this wave of democratization' will influence NATO in the coming years. However, this study does not spell out the general course of democratization in eastern Europe nor does it describe the democratization of individual nations. It instead attempts to explain briefly the regime transitions that are occurring in central and eastern Europe and their connection with NATO's agenda.

What the Alliance has achieved is a singular achievement. Against enormous odds and the weight of history in deterring the Soviet Union, NATO has transcended its weaknesses to play a dominant role in helping a historic transformation : democratization sweeping former Soviet-type political systems. Its

success also lies in its former adversaries in the Warsaw Pact making desperate attempts for their membership in the Atlantic Alliance. As contemporary history shows, NATO, unlike the Warsaw Treaty organization "enjoyed considerable support among the public of the member countries, it was remarkably adaptable and it scrupulously avoided interfering in the internal affairs of its members."

All this and much more can be argued with confidence; yet it appears to be equally true that the consequences of NATO's continuation and emergence to the front ranks of influence and power in Europe (consisting of the EU, CSCE, Council of Europe and Western European Union etc.) have been only poorly grasped among the European public and also outside the West. Nevertheless NATO's transition has fuelled enormous academic and journalistic interest. Future historians may come to judge the last decade of the

twentieth century as the turning point in the coming of the so-called 'European Century'. Because, efforts at European integration have been magnified by the rapid pace of change during the present decade and in all likelihood, Europe may arrive on the international financial, trade and possibly security fronts with irresistible force. In such a scenario, NATO will have more key areas of activity.

After the post-communist revolution of the 1990's NATO started to change in significant and unprecedented ways. The impact of this ongoing metamorphosis has made it more important than ever that we understand the 'new NATO'. This transition is going to be both statistical and qualitative, and it throws into air the assumptions made about NATO and its future by scholars and journalists on both sides of the Atlantic writing before 1989-90. NATO IS HERE TO STAY. Facing its greatest challenge since its creation in 1949, NATO now

stands at an historic crossroad. It is not going to be an 'empty shell', no longer performing any useful functions. Neither is it going to be succeeded by 'a largely institution-free anarchy characterized by much looser, shifting alliances, nor by other European security institutions' like the CSCE. The Realists are only being pessimistic in expecting the dissolution of the alliance.

NATO does indeed matter. To appreciate the force of this conclusion, the present evolution and character of NATO, especially its role after the Cold War and its likely eastward expansion, must be examined.

CHAPTER II

THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD AND

NATO

Two major events shook the world in 1991 : the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The events, particularly the dramatic disappearance of the Soviet Union, will have a wide-ranging, deep, and lasting impact on the transformation of the global framework and the development of international affairs.

The disappearance of one of the two superpowers spelled the unmistakable end of the old world order and the beginning of a truly new era in history. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in a significant shift in the balance of power in favour of the West, and this has also meant a spectacular success of the Atlantic Alliance.

However, when the Cold War ended in Europe, critics have argued against NATO on both practical and theoretical grounds. On practical grounds, the specific threat that the NATO was formed to guard against - an invasion of Western Europe from the Soviet Union -

has disappeared. Without that threat, they argue, there is no basis for formulating military plans. The remaining threats, such as economic hardship and social turmoil, are not of a military nature; consequently, a military alliance is not the appropriate way of responding to them. On theoretical grounds, it is argued that states form alliances to protect members against a common threat. When this threat disappears the alliance should dissolve.¹ Holders of this view would conclude that on theoretical grounds, the NATO alliance will not be sustained.² It was even said that in NATO's place would emerge a largely institution-free

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1. Stephen M. Walt "The origins of Alliances" (Cornell University Press 1987). P. 168-69.
 2. Fred Chernoff, "Can NATO outlive the USSR ?", INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Vol. XI, No. 1 April 1992, P.

anarchy, characterized by much looser, shifting alliances and a significantly greater risk of conflict.³

Contrary to such expectations of critics including Realists, NATO has not become moribund. Indeed, it remains the leading security organization in Europe, even as the initial Cold War institution-building winds down.⁴ The end of the Cold War has provided the opportunity to achieve what was once only a dream—a Europe whole, free and secure; a Europe at peace with itself.⁵ In building such a Europe NATO has an immense role to play.

The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have been dissolved and this has left behind a security deficit

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3. John Mearchimer, "Back to the Future : Instability in Europe After the Cold War", INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Vol. 15 Summer 1990. P.60.
 4. John S Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Vol. 109 Number 5 1994-95, p. 763.
 5. Willy Claes (Sec. Gen. of NATO), "NATO and the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture", NATO REVIEW Dec. 94-Jan. 95, p.3.

in Central and Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War did not alleviate people from the sense of threat they had been feeling all along. These problems are mainly to be found in Eastern Europe or in the former Soviet Union, and they bear direct relevance on the economic and security system of the Western Europe. Marie-Carine Scheffel has spelled out precisely these problems in following terms :

1. There is first of all the economic and environmental ruin socialism has left behind ;
2. The necessary concepts, understanding, institutions, or even people are lacking for a smooth transfer to the Western ideas and political order such as liberality, democracy or the rule of law ;
3. Through the current confusion and upheaval the authority of the state has weakened and there had been a decline in values, which has resulted in the spread of lawlessness ;

4. There are territorial controversies in most Eastern areas, based on ethnic or historical legacies. This is especially to be found in the former Soviet Union, which not only has to come to terms with its imperial past, but also has to put up with a lot of emotional antagonism between Russians and non-Russians. This is also a problem in other parts of Eastern Europe.⁶

Several security risks result from these problems. The risks that remain are multi-faceted and multi-directional, and thus hard to predict and assess. In this new context, the role of the Alliance itself has shifted from straightforward deterrence of a full-scale

6. Marie-Carine Scheffel, "European Defence and Post-cold War Security" WORLD AFFAIRS, December 1994. P.69-70.

attack, to the more complex task of projecting stability in a new and uncertain world.⁷

NATO has not only survived the demise of the Warsaw Pact but has even added to its elaborate organizational bodies and undertaken new activities. For the first time in the history of the 16-nation alliance, it has played an important role in UN peace activities in the former Yugoslavia. In the former Yugoslavia, the Alliance has supported the United Nations, both to assist the humanitarian mission and to underpin international efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. Without NATO's support, the UN could simply not have enforced the Adriatic embargo or the 'No-Fly Zone' over Bosnia. UNPROFOR personnel would not have the protection afforded by NATO air power as they carried out humanitarian and related peacekeeping tasks in threat-

7. Gregory L. Schulte, "NATO's nuclear forces in a changing world," NATO REVIEW Feb. 1993, P. 17-22.

ening circumstances. And the people of Sarajevo and Gorazde would not have benefited from the Alliance's imposition of weapons exclusion zones.⁸ The example of Bosnia shows that relations between NATO and UN have vastly expanded in recent months. Two different international organizations are attempting to work together for the first time in their history. However, in this emerging relationship there will be inevitable ups and downs. NATO will maintain its autonomy as a sovereign organization. The UN may be broader organization but NATO is not its subcontractor.

After the enforcement of UN Security Council resolution to end the bitter conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the NAA Presidential Task Force on America and Europe has put forward the following proposals :

8. Willy Claes, "NATO and evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture", NATO REVIEW Dec. 94-Jan. 95, P.6

- (a) to accept crisis prevention and management as formal missions and accordingly NATO should adopt planning, force guidelines, and means of cooperation with non-member states, and with international and regional organizations such as the UN and the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE);
- (b) to adapt the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept, which viewed territorial defence as the primary Alliance mission, with a view to producing a new kind of public document which focuses equally on the political purposes of NATO and on the actual security requirements for Alliance missions so as to provide meaningful guidance to member governments and parliaments with a view to helping rationalize unilateral adjustments in defence

postures and budgets.⁹ and obtaining greater public and parliamentary scrutiny to provide public information drawing on reports on the implementation of NATO defence planning and policy decisions;

(c) to agree on a code of conduct in defence trade which comprehensively sets the ground rules for eliminating obstacles to the transfer of defence technology and all barriers to free and open trade;

(d) to establish a Transatlantic Economic Cooperation Council linking North America and the EC to promote mutual understanding, dispute resolution, and trade partnership, and to limit the potential for trade disputes-previously kept in check for the sake of Alliance unity in the face of an identi-

9. Bruce George, "The Alliance at the flashpoint of a new era", NATO REVIEW Oct.93, p.10.

fied threat-from damaging the core of the indispensable transatlantic relationship;

(e) to curtail potential uncertainty regarding the implementation of all Alliance core functions by forging greater certainty regarding full participation and commitment by all Allies, including a substantial US forward presence involving no less than 100,000 troops and the closest possible participation of France and Germany in all of NATO's missions and as the report stipulates. "Sustained US congressional support for the critical forward presence of US forces in Europe will demand a corresponding, and equally serious and relevant, commitment of forces from other NATO Allies" ;

(f) to determine whether consensus can be achieved to establish ballistic missile defence as an opera-

tional NATO requirement, acting upon NATO's repeated reference to this risk as a new challenge:

(g) to prevent additional institutional duplication :

"If NATO is prepared to act, efforts to carve out parallel missions for other organizations for the sake of profile rather than value-added contribution would be ludicrous."

Internally, there is no erosion of support for NATO. In fact, the enemies of the old Cold War scenarios have become its partners in peace and are seeking membership of the Alliance. United Germany has repeatedly expressed the view that NATO is still vitally relevant. France, traditionally the most critical of NATO too has acknowledged its enduring relevance.¹⁰

NATO has not only survived the immediate aftermath of the Cold War but is addressing the longer-term

10. See J.J. Holst, "The Future of NATO, "The Norwegian Atlantic Committee Series, No. 154, 1993.

question of existence primarily through changing its goal rather than its structure. In particular, it developed two new goals : a new political role involving dialogue and cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact states; and a capability to intervene in conflicts in Europe or elsewhere (for missions ranging from peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to the defence of strategic interests).¹¹


The Atlantic Alliance has an immense role to play in the coming years. A crucial question raised after the end of the Cold War is whether the world has moved into a period when economic power is more important than Political - military power.¹²

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11. Colin McInnes, "Europe's jurassic Park ? NATO and the end of the Cold War," JOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, 2(1), March. 94, p.152.
 12. Richard Rosecrance, "The Rise of the Trading State : Commerce and conquest in the Modern World," (New York : Basic Books, 1986) p. 60-61

This question is now increasingly answered in the affirmative. In the post-Cold War era military forces will form a smaller part of overall security, but they will not become irrelevant. Efficient military planning and arms control remain goals of Western states, and NATO with its enormous experience facilitates both. Consideration of NATO's past performance coordinating arms control positions together with present arms control reduction aims shows that NATO alone is well-designed for such tasks.¹³

In sum, at the end of the Cold War the Euro-Atlantic Alliance is proving to be a stabilizing element in European affairs. In order to continue to perform core security functions which no other institution (EU, WEU, CSCE etc.) could take over, NATO has to decide how to meet the challenges of the new "World disorder" in the

13. Fred Chernoff, "Arms control, European security and the future of the Western alliance," STRATEGIC REVIEW 20(1) Winter 92, p.92.



absence of a clearly discernible threat. The logic of the Post-cold war system demands that the military element of NATO has to be reorganized and slimmed down, without disappearing as its core element; the focus of the alliance's long-term relations with especially Eastern Europe will gradually shift away from the military sphere and sharpen on political and economic aspects. To deal with future security problems a further and even closer combination of military, economic and social policies is required. Only a thus reformed NATO has the capability to perform the core political and military functions of post-Cold War European security : to keep the US and Germany in and to bring former communist countries perhaps including Russia in.¹⁴

14. Thomas G. Otte, "Continuity and change : NATO's role after the Cold War, "ARMS CONTROL 13(2), Sept. 92, p. 29.

The most important of NATO's external and internal functions in the post-Cold War era are described in the following pages.

A. NATO's EXTERNAL FUNCTIONS

Despite the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the transformation of the USSR into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) the earlier threat has not disappeared completely. The challenge to NATO depends essentially on the course the CIS itself will travel; but that course is not possible to predict. Two features of the CIS's evolution are especially important in enhancing NATO's external function the process of democratization and the process of fragmentation. Both affect the calculations of NATO. In nuclear forces, the CIS retains preponderance in Europe. Russia remains Europe's only nuclear super power, and even Ukraine has so far retained a nuclear arsenal larger

than those of Britain and France. Moreover, despite the Soviet departure from Central Europe, flank countries such as Norway and Turkey still face powerful Russian conventional forces stationed near their borders. Thus the paramount issue is clear : How NATO policies can be crafted so as to bring them into line with neutralizing the residual Russian threat. Over the 45 years of its existence, the North Atlantic Alliance has shown itself capable of taking difficult decisions concerning the most appropriate and effective ways of providing for the West European and the Allies' security. The countries of Western Europe alone can not deal with Russia's nuclear capabilities. It is here that the US comes into the picture and , as David M.Abshire and R.James Woolsey argue , it is primarily through NATO that American military power is linked to Europe.

It is virtually impossible to imagine either the US or West Europe being able to meet the nuclear proliferation threat without the closest consultation and cooperation for which NATO is the forum. Europeanism and Atlanticism are truly reinforcing.¹⁵

Secondly, the risks that allies now face in the transformed European landscape of security arise not from planned, ideologically-motivated aggression but from the strategic consequences of risks and instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁶ In the new scenario of ethnic, territorial and national conflicts within and among the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, NATO has the potential to play a key role. The Atlantic Alliance, with its capacity for change, is fully capable of responding to the rapid

15. William H. Taft, 'The NATO role in Europe and the US role in NATO,' NATO REVIEW Aug. 1992, p.16.

16. Manfred Worner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the new era," NATO REVIEW p. 11..

pace of political developments in Europe.¹⁷ In addressing the new security agenda, NATO is making adjustments in its force structure, doctrine and military mission.¹⁸

Another related but significant function of NATO is that of stabilizing the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In the past, the vast expanse of the Soviet empire from the Elbe to the Pacific was governed by one political entity, with few exceptions. Today, in its place, there are eleven autonomous states that compose the tenuous Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and ten independent governments in Central and Eastern Europe. This does not include the independent republics of the former Yugoslavia which should also be added to the number of sovereign political units in

17. Dr.Klaus Kinkel, "NATO's enduring role in European security," NATO REVIEW Oct.92, p. 5.

18. Michael Brenner, "Miltilateralism and European Security," SURVIVAL Vol.35 no.2 summer 93, p.150

NATO's sphere of concern.¹⁹ Several of these new states have undertaken ambitious political and economic reforms the failure of which can lead to domestic turmoil, mass migrations, armed conflicts, and even direct military threats to nearby NATO members.

In contrast to the Cold War situation, contemporary East European conditions permit a wider range of activity by Alliance partners. Under the new circumstances, NATO directly fosters the success of political reform in the region. NATO's role of reassurance helps Central and East European states to pursue their ambitious agendas of domestic reform with greater confidence. By founding the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), NATO has taken a promising initiative in avoiding conflicts. The NACC which met for the first time in December 1991 has made a decisive contribution towards redefining the role of the armed forces

19. Ibid.

in the new democracies in Eastern Europe in the sense of parliamentary and civil control, financial transparency and internal leadership structures. The NACC is playing an important part in the change over from the old patterns of confrontational security to new cooperative structures.²⁰ the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme formally introduced in January 1994 is an important step in this direction. The PfP offers each participant formal consultations with NATO (in case of any direct threat to its security), and concrete military cooperation.²¹

NATO's INTERNAL FUNCTIONS

The Atlantic Alliance is a living testament to the West's unity and cohesion in pursuing the common security objectives. The Washington Treaty commits the 16

20. See NATO REVIEW, October 1992.

21. See NATO REVIEW, February 1994.

Euro-Atlantic nations to defend collectively their way of life, democratic values and independence, their freedom from coercion and threat. This unity and solidarity are the cornerstones of the Alliance. The January 1994 Brussels Summit gave ringing endorsement to the enduring validity of NATO based on a strong transatlantic link.²²

There have been differences of perspective between Europe and America as indeed there have been within Europe. The impact of such differences can not be exaggerated. In any gigantic organisation of advanced democratic nations debate is natural. From very early in its history, NATO has played a significant role in smoothing relations among its members.²³ Differences between the United States and its allies have been

22. NATO REVIEW, No.1, February 1994, p.7.

23. Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," FOREIGN POLICY 54, Spring 1984, p.82.

there in the 45-plus years of NATO's existence. In 1960 the American proposal for creating a multilateral force to address nuclear storing in the Alliance triggered controversy within NATO that abated only when the plan was shelved. When President Charles de Gaulle withdrew French forces from the NATO command and ordered NATO installations removed from French territory by 1967, his actions precipitated dire predictions about the ability of the Alliance to fulfill its military commitment in a crisis.²⁴ In the absence of a common external threat differences are bound sometimes to characterize NATO's increasingly complex and interdependent relationship. Misperception and misunderstanding and political differences among member states must be sorted out amicably.

24. Linda P. Brady - 'NATO in the 1980s : An Uncertain Future' ? in NATO IN THE 1980s - CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES ed. by Linda P. Brady and Joyce P. Kaufman, (Praeger Publishers New York 1985) p. 37..

NATO's integrated military structure provides it with an effective and reliable means of defence far beyond the capability that any of its member-nations could muster separately. An elaborate network of bases, equipment and infrastructure serves its core functions. Military restructuring and rationalization are important internal tasks of NATO in the post-Cold War period. NATO should be careful not to downsize its military structure. Because a militarily weak NATO would create risky uncertainties and perhaps even encourage instability in a Europe still in the formative stages of establishing its new cooperative security relationships.²⁵

Developing multilateralism will be imperative for NATO multilateralism reflects a logical response to current circumstances within the Alliance. Changing

25. Willy Claes, "NATO and the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture," NATO REVIEW Dec. 94-Jan. 95, p.3.

patterns of relations among the Atlantic democracies will be a formidable challenge. NATO must overcome habits of mind and behaviour that have been entrenched by 45 years of successful experience.²⁶ Today's more fluid conditions, and the absence of a tangible military threat, encourage diversity. They also encourage more parochial national criteria to dictate answers to questions about NATO's organization and mission. It is important to maintain NATO's cohesion. Europe's new security environment highlights the need to preserve the Alliance's capacity for concerted action, solidarity and cohesion. NATO must promote mutual confidence by facilitating a high degree of intra-alliance transparency.

The Atlantic Alliance is much more than an exceptionally durable version of the classic 'security

26. Michael Brenner, "Multilateralism and European security", SURVIVAL, Vol.35 no.2, Summer 1993, p. 154.

community'. Rather, it is an evolving civil community whose pacific relations are the institutionalized norm, rather than merely the calculated preference of states.²⁷ The imperative for NATO today is to maintain that civic community

The end of the Cold War means that the German question, far from being solved, had just begun.²⁸ The continued existence of NATO assures its members that they have nothing to fear from one another. NATO makes German power controllable and acceptable to allies and political adversaries alike. Germany outside NATO would raise international concerns.²⁹

27. Ibid.

28. Lamcin Xiang, "Is Germany in the West or in Central Europe?", ORBIS Summer 1992, p. 411.

29. Christoph Bertram - "Visions of leadership : Germany" in Steven Muller Gebhard Schweider, eds : 'From Occupation to Cooperation : the US and United Germany in a Changing World Order' (New York : Norton, 1992) p. 85.

CHAPTER III

NATO'S EASTWARD EXPANSION

With the end of the Cold War having eliminated major divisions between East and West, NATO's mission has been to encompass the states of Central and Eastern Europe. A desire for membership has been openly stated by number of countries of erstwhile Warsaw Pact.¹

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the destruction of Yugoslavia, the division of Czechoslovakia and the unification of Germany have notably changed the map of Europe. In the territory bordering on Germany and Russia, new states have been created whose security is neither guaranteed by the superpowers nor by any kind of regional security system.² Thus, a security vacuum has developed in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and new security arrangements are urgently needed to fill that void. Though these states

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1. Jeffrey Simon, "Europe's Past, Europe's future. Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?" ORBIS Winter 1993, p.22
 2. Jaromit Novotny, "The Czech Republic-an active partner with NATO" NATO REVIEW June 1994, p. 5.

certainly view the U.N., the Conference on Security and Cooperation In Europe (CSCE now OSCE) or the Western European Union (WEU) instead of NATO as necessary and useful tools, they do not regard them as sufficient security guarantees. The security architecture of Europe, experts believe, is likely to be in future, mainly at three complementary levels:

- (a) The European Union, with the WEU as an integral component;
- (b) The Atlantic level, consisting of the Atlantic Alliance and its Cooperation Council, which extends far into Eastern Europe and Asia;
- (c) The comprehensive all-European level, which brings together the 52 member states of the OSCE.³

There has been much discussion on WEU as an alternative to NATO. A European defence entity has existed, in embryonic form, since the Brussels Treaty of 1948; it became the Western European Union (WEU) in 1955, and

3. Dr. Klaus Kinkel, "NATO's enduring role in European security" NATO REVIEW October 92, p. 5

today has nine members viz., Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.⁴ Though the WEU is appropriate for some security operations, it is simply not credible for many European security challenges. Not only the WEU lacks political will, it needs American military assets to be effective. "It is impossible to turn the WEU into the European arm of NATO by simply giving all European NATO commanders within the integrated military structures a second WEU/European hat."

Similarly, East European states regard the CSCE as simply too general and not as a single Unit. The CSCE, as it exists now, has limited uses. In spite of the Helsinki Summit of July 1992 and the setting up of a number of institutions such as the CSCE Center for Free Elections in Warsaw and the CSCE Secretariat at Prague,

4. Beatrice Heuser, "What Nuclear Strategy for Post-Cold War Europe"? ORBIS, Spring 92, p. 223.

there is so much to be done. The fact that the CSCE has not succeeded in putting a stop to the bloodshed in Yugoslavia is also a disappointment. The former Communist states believe that the fifty-two - member CSCE with its many limitations is not an alternative to NATO.

Thirdly, the East European states have faith in the U.N. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary participated in the U.N. mandated Gulf coalition. Poland and Czechoslovakia also expressed their willingness to send military contingents to U.N. peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia. For their own deeds, however, East European states see the U.N. as simply too large to be an effective security guarantee.

The Central and East European states also attempted to explore the possibility of organizing themselves as a security alliance. Between mid-February 1991 and mid-May 1992, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland held

two summits, three meetings of defence ministers, two meetings of foreign ministers, two meetings at the deputy defence level, and two at the deputy foreign minister level. But the result of these meetings was the belief that the Central and East European states must work toward integration into the EU and NATO.

There are several factors that instigate Central and East European states to seek NATO membership. The Russian plan for a defence community within the frame of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with a joint armed forces supreme command and joint "strategic" forces, the Russian demand for the retention of forward military bases, and the concept of troop deployment on the territory of other CIS states specified in Moscow's new military doctrine have created the impression of a potential Pan-Russian chauvinist threat

in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Warsaw, Kiev, Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn.⁵

There is a general consensus among Russian political and military elites that Russia should fill the security vacuum in Central Eurasia and exert its influence over the states of the former USSR. Moscow's new regional "assertiveness" labeled "neo-imperialist" by some in the West and in the former Soviet republics, is motivated by strong geopolitical, ethnic and economic interests and has manifested itself in Russian military redeployments and even military intervention in the "near abroad".⁶ Advocates of NATO's expansion argue that Russia's role in Chechnya makes the case for expansion obvious. "This enlargement", argues Otto Lambsdorff, "must be conducted positively. Which is to

5. Lothar Ruehl, "European Security and NATO's Eastward Expansion", AUSSEN POLITIK II/94, p. 116.

6. John W.R. Lepingwell, 'The Russian military and security policy in the "near abroad" ' SURVIVAL 36(3) Autumn 94, p. 210.

say, not as a threat to Russia (no forward deployment of NATO forces, as in the case of Eastern Germany) but as a bridge toward what a democratic Russia can only want: a stable Central European neighbourhood". Holders of the expansionist view argue that Chechnya shows the Central European countries ever so legitimate yearning for a strong and secure anchor (NATO) to where they belong.

Russia remains one of the world's two major nuclear powers. In terms of military potential it is still much greater by far than that of any other European nation. Regardless of the country's economic and financial situation, Moscow is giving key importance towards military reconstruction. When substantial troop-level reductions are the norm in Europe, Russia's armament efforts being made on a scale far beyond what

is otherwise usual in Europe, cause concern.⁷ However, it is argued that the potential for far reaching Russian military involvement in the south is constrained by treaty obligations, the desire for good relations with the West, the high cost of maintaining troops abroad and memories of Afghanistan; the Russian threat should, therefore, not be exaggerated. The West needs to counter Russia's more assertive military policy while being careful not to overreact to it.⁸ Some argue that Russia's escape from its authoritarian and imperial past will be slow and difficult, but it can not be ruled out. The West should understand the unique nature of Russia's post-colonial situation and

7. Gerhard Wetting, "Moscow's Perception of NATO's Role", AUSSEN POLITIK II/94, p. 124

8. John W.R. Lepingwell - "The Russian military and security policy in the "near abroad" ' - SURVIVAL 36(3) Autumn 94.

do more to support Russian economic reform with patience and understanding.⁹

The newly independent Central and East European countries also fear an increase of Moscow's aggressiveness as a result of Russian domestic political scenario-in view of the election successes of the nationalist-imperialist politician Zhirinovskiy in December 1993. Zhirinovskiy is demanding the re-establishment of the frontiers of the Tsarist Empire.

The emergence of nationalist, right-wing groups have the potential to jeopardize East European security and stability. The West is slowly and inadequately recognizing this new challenge to regional harmony and stability. The failure of the West to respond constructively to the new realities in Eastern Europe can

9. Rodric Braithwaite - "Russian realities and Western Policy" - SURVIVAL 36(3), Autumn 94, p. 226.

be seen in the Yugoslav disaster.¹⁰ Russian ultra-nationalists have openly claimed that Russia has a right to appropriate various foreign territories because of its historic domination of those territories. These same groups also justify their support for particular factions in foreign conflicts (such as the Serbs) on other nebulous grounds, such as "Slavic brotherhood". These groups are vocally expansionist and view other nations as being anti-Russian. Their criterion for security decisions seems to be a romanticized version of Russian historical rights. They also reject any argument that Russia must join a Western-style international system conceived by the West.¹¹

These factors explain the major significance of the yearning of Central and East European states to

10. Paul Hockenos "Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-communist Eastern Europe", (New York: Routledge, 1993), p.29.

11. James H. Brusstar, "Russian Vital Interests and Western Security" ORBIS, Fall, 1994, p. 61.

join NATO. If the new eastern democracies are not soon given eventual security within a broader NATO, they may come to feel rejected, to look elsewhere or to succumb to internal reactionary forces; efforts to create liberal democracies in the Central and East European region will then diminish.

Never before in history have totalitarian regimes undergone a process of democratization on such a large scale.¹² Between 1974 and 1990 more than thirty countries in southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems of government. Samuel Huntington analyzed the causes and nature of these democratic transitions, evaluated the prospects for stability of the new democracies, and explored the possibility of more countries

12. See Introduction: Sten Berglund & Jan Ake Dellenbrant (Eds), 'The New Democracies in Eastern Europe, Party Systems and Political Cleavages Studies of Communism in Transition' (Brookfield, 1991).

becoming democratic. He argued that these transitions were the third major wave of democratization in the modern world. Each of the two previous waves was followed by a reverse wave in which some countries shifted back to authoritarian government. He concluded that the third wave, the "global democratic revolution" of the late twentieth century, will not last forever. It may be followed by a new surge of authoritarianism constituting a third reverse wave. He went on to remark that a fourth wave of democratization may develop sometime in the century.¹³

However, the fourth wave of democratization had come earlier than Huntington's predictions. Most new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have definitely chosen capitalism and democracy. Or, to be more precise, these countries have taken the road that might

13. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Third Wave Democratization in the late twentieth century". (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1991), p. 164-68.

eventually lead them to both capitalism and democracy. What kind of a future the post-communist transition process promises to the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe? This question immediately poses the problems of scenarios and likely outcomes of transition-related development.¹⁴ Many NATO members regard East Europe as a security nightmare-fraught with complex religious, political, economic, and ethnic rivalries. A. Nagorshi argues that the problems faced by these new democracies are: the emergence of the new bourgeoisie often recruited from the deposed (but not dispossessed) nomenclature; the growing chasm between the former dissidents and new elites; and the ability of former rulers to convert themselves into prosperous businessmen. Focussing on Poland, Hungary, and the

14. Adam Przeworski, "Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America". (New York: Cambridge University Press 1991) p. 87.

Czech Republic on the grounds that these three countries have decisively chosen the road "to Europe", Nagorshi argues that northern tier has more chances to develop procedural institutions and genuine market economies than their southern neighbours.¹⁵ Some others argue that although societies in Eastern Europe change, they rarely seem to move along the path to modernity. The problem is not, as one might suppose, that East European and Balkan societies were unaffected by such major shifts and changes as the French and Industrial Revolutions. Rather, according to Daniel Chirot, the problem is that these societies adopted modern Western political forms, such as nationalism, but failed to adopt Western economic models.¹⁶

15. Andrew Nagorski "The Birth of Freedom: Shaping Lives and Societies in the New Eastern Europe", (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993) p. 70.

16. See Introduction : Daniel Chirot (ed.) "The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

Capital market formation is fundamental to the economic evolution underway in Central and Eastern Europe. The (rapid) development of effective capital markets is essential to a successful economic transition in the region. The process of escaping the centralized past and creating the market-oriented future in these evolutionary environments is immensely complex, contrary to early post-communist euphoria, east and west. Although "foreign inflows of private capital are necessary and indispensable" for attainment of marketized economies in Eastern Europe, the problems of control, valuation, property right, inconvertibility, insolvency, corruption and more, constrain those inflows "Creating capitalism" in Central and Eastern Europe is a daunting and complex task.¹⁷ However, this uncertainty must not constrain the NATO members to view

17. John R. Lampe, "Creating Capital Markets in Eastern Europe", (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992), p. 62.

that the situation for eastward expansion is not ripe or that if NATO enlarges now, it will be dysfunctional and counterproductive than constructive and contributory.

Suspensions about the future of democracy in the region also stand in the way of Central and East European states acquiring NATO membership. Roeder argues that since the breakup of the USSR in late 1991, "the important political development in many of the fifteen successor states has been the retreat from previous gains of democratization and the consolidation of new forms of authoritarianism."¹⁸ The question is whether in their post-communist state of transition along the road to democracy and a market economy, the Central and East European states provide a political guarantee for harmony and stability. While asking this question of

18. Philip G. Roeder "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes", POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS Vol.10, Jan-mar.1994, p.75.

democracy as a condition for NATO's membership, it should be remembered that other countries such as Portugal and Turkey were also accepted as NATO members at a time when they were neither democratic nor stable because the alliance wanted interalia to give them firm support and a basis for the strengthening of a free system. Greece too had been a member of the alliance for 15 years when a 1967 coup led to seven years of military rule. Yet it remained a member till the colonels were in power.¹⁹

Critics of NATO's expansion argue that far from solving an alleged crisis (neo-Russian imperialism), expanding NATO now would fatally weaken it. Fred C. Ikle says that expanding NATO eastward is a deplorable idea. "The Atlantic Alliance must not become a chain letter-some Ponzi scheme that escapes bankruptcy only

19. Fred C. Ikle "Why Expanding NATO Eastward Is a Deplorable Idea" International Herald Tribune, Hong Kong, Jan. 12, 1995.

by signing up new members."²⁰ Further, they state that the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in NATO on the ground that it would contribute to their economic progress is even less logical an argument for building a new NATO. That subject is more appropriate for the European Union and NATO a politico-military alliance, should not troll behind the EU trying to hook the same fish.

The argument that democracy in former Warsaw Pact nations must be nourished and consolidated by NATO's embrace is another point for attack. In fact, NATO membership neither guarantees nor requires democracy. NATO put up for almost thirty years with the dictatorships of Spain's Franco and Portugal's Salazar, and reconciled itself with successive military regimes in Turkey. Finally, NATO did nothing to prevent in Greece

20. Ibid.

the 1967 coup of the "black Colonels" who subsequently ruled a member country of a democratic alliance for seven years. Dictators come to power not because a given country does not belong to an alliance of democratic states but for much more profound reasons.²¹

It is also said that military-political alliances do not exist for the sake of abstraction or charitable purposes. They are always directed against someone or something. Ethnic conflicts in Europe could be a good target. But to meet this end it is hardly necessary to enlarge NATO by admitting some states and rejecting others. Therefore, some critics conclude that NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe can be directed only against one country: Russia.

The Alliance's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative and the outcome of the current debate on NATO's

21. Alexei Pushkov "Building a New NATO at Russia's Expense" (Letters to the Editor) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, 1994, p. 173.

future enlargement are intended to help overcome old divisions in Europe, not lead to new ones. Yet some segments of opinion in Russia fear that it will lead to the country's isolation, a view that was robustly refuted recently by NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes when he emphasised that Russia was too large a country to be isolated by others; it could only isolate itself. There are at least four factors shaping public attitudes on this subject in Russia:

- (a) The democratic community has been disappointed by Russia's failure to integrate quickly into the community of Europe;
- (b) The foreign policy pursued by the Yeltsin government lacks consistency;
- (c) National philosophical and moral ideals have not developed;
- (d) Losing the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR have caused national humiliation.²²

22. Alexander Velichkin, 'NATO as seen through the eyes of the Russian Press' NATON REVIEW, March 1995, p. 20.

Within Russia there are two general positions: for and against close partnership with NATO. Some argue that Russia must join NATO as it offers a great deal. Boris Fyodorov, a deputy in the State Duma, says that Russian membership in NATO would mean the reform of NATO and the end of the dominant US role in the alliance. The situation in Europe would be stabilized, with Russia providing the counterbalance to the growing weight of a United Germany, which has been a cause for alarm in the eyes of many. This would mean the effective end of the Cold War. Russia's integration into the international community would be an additional guarantee for the development of democracy in Russia. Another shade of opinion recognizes the limitations of the Partnership for Peace programme and believes that nevertheless it is fairly harmless. PfP "may even be useful if it dispels some of the West's

prejudices regarding Russia and provides an opportunity to realize our mutual interests" (Vyacheslav Nikonov).

On the other hand, some argue that Russia has nothing to gain from Partnership for Peace. They plead for the establishment of a collective security system within the limits of the former USSR. Some others conclude that having withdrawn its troops from Central Europe, Russia is no longer sufficiently European to aspire to a place in NATO. It is also said that NATO's gradual expansion to take in the countries of Eastern Europe is only to create a new line of division. NATO's plan for expansion means, according to this view, a potential new Yalta, a potential new split of Europe, even if less severe than before. "By accepting the rules of the game which are being forced on her,... Russia will lose. And Europe will lose, too" (Sergei Karaganov) Advocates against NATO's eastward expansion warn that attempts to isolate Russia, to

throw it back beyond Europe's confines, in the end only play into the hands of those antidemocratic forces in Russia who tend to view the West with distrust or even animosity. Infact, they argue, the national consensus on these issues is still in the making and it may yet take different forms. At this critical stage, an enlargement of NATO interpreted as a move against Russia risks to distort heavily the formation of this consensus, to foment additional tensions in the society and to eclipse the prospects for the political stability that Russia so desperately needs. Such an expansion according to them, would also give an excellent pretext to those who call for a *de facto* imperialist policy toward the former Soviet republics. In sum, holders of this view argue that the West should not risk fabricating an enemy out of Russia just to have a Post-Cold War *raison de'tre* for NATO.

Initially, the Atlantic allies were reluctant to accept new partners with substantial security needs. Fear of experiments, complications and risks was also a reason for the hesitation. The Alliance partners pointed out inter alia that it was important not to ostracize and antagonize Russia. The geopolitical-strategic considerations, on the other hand, press for enlargement. From a Polish, Ukrainian, Baltic, Hungarian, Czech, Slovakian and, by and large, also Romanian and Bulgarian points of view the territorial status quo established in the east of Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea in 1991 is not sustainable as long as it is not consolidated by an enlargement of NATO with the accompanying American guarantee of protection. This demand for, and the recognition of the necessity of, NATO's eastward expansion has finally resulted in the launching of Partnership for Peace program.

When the Clinton administration unveiled its Partnership for Peace program in 1993, critics dismissed it as a vague compromise that did little to satisfy Central European states clamoring to scramble under the West's security umbrella or reassure a testy Russia worried about being left out of Europe's post-Cold War security scheme.²³ "The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how", President Clinton responded after NATO formally adopted the plan in January, 1994. Several developments preceded the launching of Partnership for Peace that date back to 1990.

NATO extended its first "hand of friendship" at the London Summit of July 5-6, 1990, that is, mere months after the revolutions of November-December 1989. Six Warsaw Pact members-Bulgaria, Czechoslova-

23. Tim Zimmerman 'NATO rumbles to the east' U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 21st 1994, p. 68.

kia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union - were invited by NATO to visit Brussels to address the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which is the highest authority within NATO. NATO also invited the Warsaw Pact nations to establish regular diplomatic liaison with it and accordingly new liaison ambassadors from these countries participated in briefings at NATO headquarters.²⁴ On October 3, 1990 East Germany, a key Warsaw Pact member, became a full member of NATO when Germany was united in October, 1990.

At the Copenhagen NAC meeting in June 1991 NATO allies agreed to intensify NATO's program of military contacts at various levels with former Communist states. The foundation was laid for extensive military contacts between former adversaries. The November, 1991 Rome Declaration was a significant one. The

24. Jeffrey Simon, "(Europe's Past, Europe's Future) Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?" ORBIS, Winter, 1993, p. 29.

declaration, approved at the NAC summit held in Rome on November 7-8, 1991 provided for further broadening of NATO's activities with Central and Eastern Europe to include annual meetings with the NAC at ministerial level; periodic meetings with the NAC at the ambassadorial level; additional meetings as circumstances warrant; and regular meetings with NATO's subordinate committees.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) inaugural meeting was held on December 20, 1991 which was attended by all former NATO's adversaries including the newly independent Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The NACC meeting in Brussels adopted a "Statement on Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation." The shared goal of NATO and countries attending the meeting - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the CIS was to make Europe "whole and free" The focus of the NACC consul-

tations was on security and related issues such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, Civil-military relations of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes.²⁵

Partnership for Peace is an ambitious initiative intended to enhance stability and security in the whole of Europe by strengthening the relationships between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and other CSCE participating states.²⁶ It provides for deepening and intensifying their ties with the Atlantic Alliance through practical cooperation, mostly in the military sphere. It also helps foster the ability to work together in peace keeping and humanitarian assist-

25. See NATO REVIEW, No.1, February, 1992.

26. Gebhardt von Moltke "Building a Partnership for Peace", NATO REVIEW, June 1994, p. 3.

ance. Its chief political dimension is the promotion of, and commitment to, democratic principles. Twenty countries had joined PfP by 1 June, 1994 including Finland and Sweden. On 22 June, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev signed the PfP Framework Document at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at NATO's Brussels headquarters. Main points of discussion between the NAC and Russia's Foreign Minister were:

- (a) Both the Alliance and Russia have important contributions to make to European stability and security. Constructive, cooperative relations of mutual respect, benefit and friendship between the Alliance and Russia are therefore a key element for security and stability in Europe and in the interest of all other states in the CSCE area. Both the Alliance and Russia welcome the progress already made in their relations, including within the framework of the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), and seek to strengthen them further.
- (b) The signature of Partnership for Peace by Russia opens a further important opportunity to develop relations through practical cooperation in the fields included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document. The Alliance and Russia

agreed to develop an extensive Individual Partnership Programme corresponding to Russia's size, importance and capabilities.

- (c) They agreed to set in train the development of a far-reaching, cooperative NATO/Russia relationship both inside and outside Partnership for Peace. This relationship, aimed at enhancing mutual confidence and openness, will be developed in way that reflects common objectives and complements and reinforces relations with all other states, and is not directed against the interest of third countries and is transparent to others.
- (d) The Alliance and Russia agreed to pursue a broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power, through:
 - * Sharing of information on issues regarding politico-security related matters having a European dimension,
 - * Political consultations, as appropriate, on issues of common concern;
 - * Cooperation in a range of security-related areas including, as appropriate, in the peacekeeping field.²⁷

27. See NATO REVIEW, August, 1994.

Russia sees as the main goal of the Russia-NATO partnership the establishment of a system of collective security and stability in Europe. Russia believes that its partnership with NATO can contribute to transforming the NACC into an independent body which would be closely linked to the CSCE and which would promote military-political cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. Further, Russia argues that the CSCE should aim at coordinating the activities of NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the WEU and the CIS in the sphere of enhancing stability and security, promoting peacekeeping and protecting human and national minority rights. This, however, does not mean establishing the CSCE as a hierarchical leader or "commander".²⁸

28. Andrei V. Kozyrev (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), "Russia and NATO: a partnership for a United and peaceful Europe", NATO REVIEW, August 1994, p. 4-5.

Russia maintains that the above stated political goals should take precedence over military cooperation. In Russia's view, military cooperation can develop along the following lines:

- (a) operational exchange of information and coordination of military activities within the framework of the Russia-NATO partnership programme;
- (b) participation in the activities of the military planning coordination unit;
- (c) participation in meetings of the NATO Military Committee for discussion of military aspects of partnership;
- (d) exchange of information on matters of defence planning, including military budgets;
- (d) training of military personnel.

Recognizing the necessity of maintaining permanent liaison with NATO partners, Russia agreed to establish its mission at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Russia also expressed its willingness to allocate troops for training peacekeeping forces under the PfP program. Russia is also prepared to join, on a permanent basis,

the special forum which is being organized by NATO to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The aim of Partnership for Peace is a fundamental transformation of the relationship between NATO and the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Apart from offering all participants closer political and military ties to NATO and a stake in the process of strengthening security in Europe, PfP also plays an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of the Alliance.²⁹ The Clinton administration already declared that some participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace would become full alliance members within as little as three to five years. Notwithstanding NATO's European allies concerns about the strategic and budgetary implications of expansion and the complaints of

29. Robin Beard "Defence procurement and cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe", NATO REVIEW, August, 1994, p. 7.

Pentagon planners that the US risks promising security guarantees to Central Europe that it has little prospect of delivering, President Clinton is convinced that the West has a historic opportunity to anchor Central European states in the democratic fold by taking practical steps now to help ensure their security. ✓ The U.S. is animated in part by frustration with the European Union's slow progress toward integrating the East and by a warriors of Russia's increasingly assertive foreign policy. U.S. also insists that integrating the East is the logical next step for Europe in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER IV

AN ASSESSMENT OF NATO'S

FUTURE

NATO stands only half a decade away from the beginning of a new century and a new millennium. In a very swiftly changing world it is not possible to chart with any certitude the definite course of the political-military future of the Atlantic Alliance. There are many uncertainties about the future not only of NATO but of entire Europe, and the discontinuities are also pronounced.

The future is not foreordained. It will evolve from the interplay of many forces, European and global. The future of NATO will be the outcome of contending (national) interests and new ideas of creativity and leadership. It will be conditioned by existing and new problems in which NATO responds and deals with the dilemmas of European nations that are already present and bound to arise.

NATO must not remain a passive bystander in this process of change. It must seek to exercise the maxi-

imum influence on the course of events, inspired by its vision of the kind of Europe it wants and guided by the long-term interests of the world. Towards this end, NATO must expand to include Central and East European states.

It is said that military alliances are partnerships of opportunity that are disbanded when the object of common apprehension has disappeared. The Warsaw Pact fell apart under the impact of democratization, and having outlived its purpose, it was disbanded on 1 July 1990. NATO, in contrast, has always had a very important political role in addition to its military function, as was clearly stressed in the Harmel Report of 1967.¹ Former US secretary of State James Baker stated that the alliance should become a more political alliance in the future. He argued that NATO's future

1. Brigitte Sauerwein, "NATO's role in the new European security environment" STRATEGIC DIGEST, March 1992, p. 261.

role could focus on coordinating verification efforts required to implement the treaties on conventional armed forces in Europe. NATO should be sustained to help develop common Western approaches to regional conflicts and weapons proliferation outside Europe. Several seizures of small quantities of smuggled plutonium, including four significant seizures between May and August 1994, directed attention to the threat of proliferation and possible terrorist use of nuclear weapons and to the need for stricter controls, in particular on plutonium and uranium sources in the former Soviet Union. The importance of Russia and other former soviet republics for the global fissile-material-control regime is twofold. First, many thousands of nuclear weapons and sprawling nuclear establishments in combination with political instability and economic crises, make the former soviet union a potential source of proliferation. Second, the republics,

and especially Russia, can play a crucial role in enforcing the international fissile-material-control regime by participating in global non-proliferation efforts, mainly by negotiating and implementing a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons.² NATO must formulate a coherent policy to address the diversion of fissile materials and other proliferation risks. In future, NATO must give significance to arms control efforts. Between 1945 and 1990, the Cold War proved to be a greater simplifier as far as most arms control proposals were concerned. Ideologically loaded bipolar antagonism (a) provided a clear framework for arms control negotiations and (b) set relatively clear limits on what could and could not be achieved. The arms control agenda is more complex and diffuse in the mid-1990s than at any time previously. This agenda

2. Oleg Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union" SURVIVAL, Vol.36, no.4, Winter 1994-95, p.176.

encompasses limitations on the development, testing, production, stockpiling, deployment, use, and concealment of military power - as well as restrictions on the transfer of (including the trade in) weapons related technology and materials. Current arms control measures include activities as diverse as prohibitions on the transfer of nuclear warheads, restrictions on the export of particular types of propellant technologies, the monitoring of movements of industrial chemicals, limits on the number of tanks in Europe, constraints on the militarization of Outer Space, and the inspection of military facilities. The various arms control measures agreed to by Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the US in 1991-1993 need to be implemented, especially with regard to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START); the Safety, Security and dismantlement Talks (SSD) ; and the US - Russian Agreement concerning the disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium

Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU Agreement). NATO can play an immense role in aiding the countries, like Ukraine, to eliminate strategic nuclear weapons. Russia is threatening that NATO's eastward expansion will result in scrapping both the treaty on conventional forces in Europe and the ratification of START II, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In the light of this, NATO should prepare it self for any "new nightmare". NATO members have been intensifying their cooperation on non proliferation policy.³ The January 1994 Alliance Summit established two working groups dealing with the political and military aspects of the proliferation policy. The ensuing policy framework was made public at the Istanbul NATO ministerial meeting in June 1994. In future, it is especially important for

3. Andrew Butfoy "The Evolving Framework for Arms Control" AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Vol.48, No. 1, May 1994, p.7.

NATO to consider an "assertive non-proliferation policy", including

- i) defusing proliferation incentives;
- ii) enforcing international sanctions;
- iii) offensive military action; and
- iv) ballistic missile defence

NATO should also focus on post-Cold War "geonarcotics". The end of the Cold War has witnessed the reconstitution of the international security agenda, with the narcotics phenomenon commanding increasing prominence. This phenomenon involves the dynamic interaction of four factors : drugs; geography; power; and politics, and it has given rise to significant relations of conflict and cooperation within the international community.⁴ The main narcotics problems are production, consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money

4. Michael Ruhle, "NATO and the coming proliferation threat" COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 13 (3) July-Sept. 1994, p. 70

laundering. These are global in scope, but not uniform in pattern or impact on societies. But there is no denying the fact that Euro-Atlantic societies suffer the worst. Security goes beyond the traditional military variable; international drug operations have military, political, economic, and environmental security implications and impact.⁵ NATO is not merely a security system; it has the duty of protecting its populations from geonarcotics also.

The concept of global interdependence describes a fundamental trend in the post-Cold War World. The interrelationships among nations have enormously increased and diversified to an unprecedented degree. The trend towards the globalization of economic, social and political processes which is now firmly established is likely to be further accelerated in years to come.

5. Ivelaw L. Griffith "From the Cold War geopolitics to post-Cold War geonarcotics" INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 49(1) Winter 93-94, p. 261.

The implications of this process have already led to NATO's historic departure from the past. It is increasingly difficult for NATO to insulate its policies from processes, actions, and decisions in the broader global setting.

The task that the new context poses for NATO is two-fold : on the one hand, to devise new arrangements for dealing effectively with the host of new political-military issues raised by growing global interdependence; on the other, to incorporate East Europe into it and allow its fair sharing of the benefits of incorporation and interdependence. The European system is not symmetrical : the East of Europe is not an equal partner of the West but is in a position of subordination. It has little influence on its external environment; it is by and large at the West's mercy. The resolution of this is indeed a momentous challenge for NATO.

One of the conclusions of this study is that the destiny of former communist countries in Europe and their economies and societies will become even more dependent on the present NATO members in the period to come, and in a number of new, diverse, and complex ways. In view of their weaknesses and vulnerabilities, it is therefore of critical importance for all East European countries to try to secure an (adequate degree of) institutionalized protection of their independence and freedom of action through NATO

Today, at the end of the Cold War, NATO faces a different sort of challenge. The Central and East European states have been crippled by fatally flawed economic and political systems, not devastated by military conflict. There is no denying the fact that the task of establishing new institutions and relationships to suit new political realities will run into many obstacles placed there by history that have not

been removed by the end of the Cold War.⁶ NATO has an immense potential to help the recovery and reconstruction process. The release of Cold War pressures has been associated with a new development of security concern - the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, often taking a violent form. Some ethnic groups are being prepared to pursue their claims for self-determination within the framework of existing states-treating them essentially as claims for minority human rights protection-but many others have made clear that they will be satisfied by nothing less than their nations become states, causing the fragmentation of existing states in the process. And again, the proliferating availability of weaponry of every degree of sophistication has given

6. Stanley R. Sloan "NATO's future in a new Europe : an American perspective" INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 63 (3), 1990, p. 496-497.

a sharp new edge to these new concerns.⁷ The collective will of the Alliance is required to meet these new challenges. "NATO is essential for peace, but a NATO which knows not only where it has come from but where it is going." Lord Carrington's words are relevant now more than before.

Apart from the East, insecurity on Europe's southern flank must also concern NATO's decision-making. Already Southern European governments have identified the stability of North Africa as essential to their own security interests. NATO can attempt to promote stability in that area. European support for non-democratic but otherwise Europeanised elites now threatened by a variety of Islamist movements poses political dilemmas reminiscent of the Cold War.⁸ The collective

7. Gareth Evans "The World After the Cold War-Community and Cooperation : An Australian View" THE ROUND TABLE Issue 329 Jan.1994, p. 261.

8. Margaret Blunden "Insecurity on Europe's Southern Flank" SURVIVAL Vol.36, no.2, Summer 1994, p. 262.

security provided by NATO, rooted in the shared values and close partnership between Europe and North America remains more essential than ever in future. It is argued that the change in the Alliance is "both indispensable and incomplete". The work of defining NATO's future contribution to international peace and stability is unfinished. The terrible bloodshed in former Yugoslavia is a forceful reminder of the urgency of the task. Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabekh, Georgia and Moldova show that peace is yet to be secured and protected even after the Cold War is over. only a strong and vigorous transatlantic axis can provide the necessary stability to enable change to take place peacefully. "NATO can and must make a major contribution to broaden international security; it must be active in crisis management and peacekeeping; it must help to spread

democracy, military reform and security to its Central and East European neighbours".⁹

NATO's international standing today has been built on its being a liberal democratic alliance of advanced democracies.

And in the future it will also mainly be relying on democratic (not coercive) means to participate in international affairs and to play its role as the 'Big Alliance'. However, NATO can make real contributions to world stability and order by overcoming the negative tendencies in its defence policy, by (its member-nations) doing away with national egoisms, by refraining from imposing its own economic interests and culture on others including the East European infant republics and from seeking to be merely a military giant, and, finally, by treating the UN as a greater

9. Sir John Weston "The challenges to NATO : a British view" NATO REVIEW December 1992, p. 9-10.

organization in seeking common prosperity. Only in doing so can NATO's international status and its role be accepted by the world. This, therefore, is the direction that NATO's strategy should follow. NATO is adjusting to the new circumstances of the post-Cold War era by making itself and the NACC available to the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for Pan-European Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and peace enforcement operations. NATO, with its unique combination of political-military resources, is indispensable for the preservation of Pan-European order.

During the Cold War era, Europe was the front line of East-West conflict and yet enjoyed relative stability whereas social turmoil and armed conflict continued unabated in the Third World. In the post-Cold War era, "hot points" in the Third World, which once invited superpower intervention, are cooling down, but the

disappearing balance of power in Europe is turning that region into the most unstable area of the World. NATO has a rich and complex history as a forum for political consultation, dispute resolution and policy coordination, given the present European scenario, NATO must show itself as a source of stability and security.

NATO should look again at its decision-making process. Multilateral decision-making in a more egalitarian Atlantic alliances is bound to be challenging. The flourishing of divergent, even incompatible outlooks, is likely in the post-Cold War Europe's security environment. Working out difference, or managing those that are irreconcilable, will be accomplished, only by a close and candid collegial efforts. Continuing modes of consultation should be developed. Consultations must be thorough and flexible; allied governments should understand why they agree or disagree. Formulation of coherent policies based on identifiable premises and

objectives is essential. The new European security architecte demands not merely expansion but also the transformation of the Alliance into a more egalitarian, partnership.

Increased European nuclear control within the integrated military structure of NATO is both preferable and possible in future. Europeans also need to acquire greater responsibility for their defence, something Washington has long sought. Some argue that there is little role for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe; European nuclear weapons should be negotiated down to the lowest politically feasible levels.¹⁰ Some others expect European-American relations to grow increasingly more distant.¹¹ However, a non-US NATO is

10. See Richard H. Ullman's "Securing Europe" (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1991) p. 72.

11. James Schlesinger in Henry Brandons (ed.) "In Search of a New World Order : The Future of U.S. - European Relations" (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1992) p.79.

highly unlikely. The USA remains strategically committed to Europe. In an increasingly disorderly and unstable world, the Euro-American link should be viewed as a rare force for stability. The United States will continue to guarantee Europe's security against major threats and will participate as 'a normal European country' in the management of security on the continent. It is my intention here to avoid a discussion of America's foreign policy. I have chosen not to examine views that the mix of increasing American military power and declining economic power portends Massive American military adventurism;¹² and that "the United States has been atleast as responsible as the Soviet Union for putting the Cold War show on the road, and in fact did more to intensify the conflict by its determi-

12. See Noam Chomsky "Deterring Democracy", (New York : Verso, 1991), p. 29-31.

nation to spread the Pax American,"¹³ whatever their truth.

No claim is made here for a deep study of all the formidable challenges NATO might face in the period ahead. In particular, an attempt has been made to deal with European integration, and international political and economic issues that do not remain totally unrelated to NATO. However, I have been conscious of the implications of some powerful trends which could have a profound bearing on the ability of NATO to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century. There is a need for early strategy and specific agenda if these opportunities are to be exploited and undesirable outcomes minimized.

In conclusion, the post-Cold War era presents a reformed NATO with greater opportunities than at any

13. See Fred Inglis "The Cruel Peace : Everyday Life in the Cold War", (New York : Basic Books, 1991), p. 62-64.

point in the entire Cold War period to play a positive contributory role in the World, particularly in the whole of Europe. Over optimism has to be avoided for "NATO is not a magic instrument to heal all the wounds of this world".

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