

# **NUCLEAR PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL ASIA**

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
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
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**CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the dissertation, titled "~~N~~uclear Problems in Central Asia" by Mr. Satish Kumar which is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Philosophy degree is an original work to the best of our knowledge. It has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

We recommend this dissertation to be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
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SUPERVISOR

  
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Satish Kumar

## CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1-13
FIRST CHAPTER : THE GREAT GAME IN THE PRE NULCEAR AGE.	14-36
SECOND CHAPTER : COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER OF CENTRAL ASIA- STRATEGIC AND IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION.	37-49
THIRD CHAPTER : NUCLEARISATION OF CENTRAL ASIA.	50-69
FOURTH CHAPTER : IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR CENTRAL ASIA TO SOUTH ASIA	70-83
CONCLUSION : DENUCLARISATION OF CENTRAL ASIA.	84-102
BIBLIOGRAHPY :	i-v

## INTRODUCTION

Five decades of nuclear age, the images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the disaster of Chernobyl continued to haunt the world. The advocates of nuclear power argue that it is safe clean and economical and that problems such as waste disposal can be solved. They have great faith in the technology and dismiss their opponents as 'Uninformed'. A recent Harvard study entitled Cooperative Denuclearisation has succinctly summarized the present nuclear predicament: about 50,000 nuclear warheads are scattered at hundreds of locations throughout Eurasia and North America; approximately 3000 strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are located in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. At present 417 power reactors operating in 26 countries with a generating capacity of about 3,00,000 Mws. This is expected to increase to about 5,00,000 Mws. by 2005.

The world is divided into nuclear power states and non-nuclear power states. The power of the state is rated in terms of having or not having nuclear power. Warren Christopher, the U.S. Senator pointed out that American Stockpiles even after START-II will "have capacity to destroy civilisation as we know it several times over". Sergei Kortnov, Director of the Department of Non-proliferation, Arms

Transfer controls and conversion in the ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federations wrote in 1992: Nuclear deterrence is a modus vivendi of the world we live in, and will continue to be until nations devise a fundamentally new system of maintaining international Security./

This paper is confined to the nuclear problems of Central Asia. My work will deal with the certain complexities of nuclear policies of China and Russia in Tibet and Kazakhstan. This paper will also try to trace out the repercussion of nuclear proliferation in Asia.

Before explaining the nuclear problems of Central Asia. It is pertinent to make out strategic location of Central Asia. Since the establishment of the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, Central Asia has generally come to mean Soviet Central Asia. This image of Central Asia not valid in as much as it excludes Afghanistan and Mongolia, which are nothing if not Central Asia. There is, moreover, Chinese Central Asia. The constant use and popularisation of the term inner Asia by American Scholar instead of the term Central Asia for the entire are is mainly responsible for the narrowing down of the meaning of the expression of Central Asia to denote only the Soviet part of the heartland of Asia. According to our concept and

definition, Central Asia comprises the entire area between the Great wall of China in the east. The Himalayan Hindu-kush and pamir mountains. In the south, the-Caspian sea and the Ural Mountains in the west and Siberia the north. Tibet Sinkinang and inner Mongolia constitute Chinese Central Asia. Kazakhstan, the kirghiz, Tajik, Turkman and Uzbek republics constituted Soviet Central Asia.

By and large the neighbouring countries of China, India and Russia there have had a deep impact on the politics of Central Asia. Central Asia was one of the key areas of rivalry for supremacy between Britain and Russia through most of the nineteenth century and between Japan and the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century. Just as the coming of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey and the Sovietization of Russian Central Asia in the 1920s were matters of grave concern to the makers of the British policy towards Central Asia. The emergence of Japan in China and Chinese territories bordering the Soviet Union in the 1930s caused much anxiety in the Soviet Union. Central Asia is now an area of a struggle for primary between China and the Soviet Union.

China and Soviet Union between them now possess most of central Asia. Afghanistan and Mongolia are the only two

Central Asian states which lie outside their territorial limits. China controls entire eastern Central Asia. The Soviet Union controlled entire western Central Asia.

In the broader perspective, I will touch upon the American policy, Soviet policy and the emerging nuclear power states like Korea, Germany, Pakistan and other countries. I will also try to point out the hazardous implications of nuclear proliferation. There is also an effort to make an Islamic countries. My paper will deal with these concerned topics in general and nuclear problems in Kazakhstan and Tibet in particular.

Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union people are dying for being Armenian, Azarion Chochlen. The conflicts seems endless. Kazakhstan on the contrary has barely experienced demonstration. Independent Kazakhstan is a country of Steppes and mountains of nearly 3 million square kilometer. Its population is about 17 millions; about 40 per cent are Kazakhs and another 40 per cent Russians. The remaining 20 per cent consists of 130 different nationalities.

After Russia, Kazakhstan is the next largest country to emerge from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It stretches from the deserts of the middle east to the Sibe-



rian fringe from China to Volga. This country is the junction of Europe and Asia and the people of west and east have intermingled.

The Soviet Union is first nuclear explosion took place in Kazakhstan on August 29, 1949 four years after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On this day the dream of Soviet Leaders to strike a "powerful blow" came true Tragically this blow fell not on imperialist enemies but on the unsuspecting people of kazakhstan.

The power of the first Soviet bomb was 18 Kilometers. Its radioactive cloud one of the biggest in the history of nuclear explosion drifted over eastern kazakhstan and the Altai mountains and thousands of people were exposed. As result of many years of testing a large part of Central Asia and Eastern Kazakhstan has been subjected to radioactive contamination. Radiation has been discovered in soil, food, water and dwelling Tests for the presence of radioactive particles in milk in Semipalstinsk show that rates exceed the accepted norm by 25-530 times. The presence of the same particles in bones of animals exceeds the norm by 47-30 4 times.

The importance of Kazakhkistan is not because of area but because of being a nuclear power state, after disinte-

gration of the Soviet Union and the geo-strategic importance of Kazakhstan attached the attentions of the world. Asian and European countries lined up to establish an special and cordial relations with Kazakhstan.

Presently however, the strategic weapons are said to belocated in Russia, while the remaining percentage in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Russia's stock of strategic arsenal includes 1,067 ICBMsequipped with 4,308 warheads. The entire Soviet missile submarine force including 892 missiles carrying some 2,828 warheads and 22 heavy bombers probably carrying 350 warheads. Kazakhstan holds 104 10 warheads heavy SS 18 ICBMS and 40 bombers carrying 1,400 warheads.

The most significant risk lies in the possible emergence and the Minsk Agreement January 1992 clearly stated that the strategic operational forces of the former USSR were to be subordinated to a joint command and that the decision on their use would be taken following consultations with the presidents of the other CIS members. 'All this taken in good faith to control the nuclear weapons outside Russian Territory has implications which in the long run might promote further proliferation.' The Joint control clause happens to be in direct contravention of the under-

taking a specified in Article 1 of the NPT whereby nuclear weapon states have undertaken "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly". The joint control provided in the Minsk Agreement may not be acceptable to other states partly to the NPT and it may also weaken the other established Non-Proliferation norms.

By the agreement Kazakhstan has given the nuclear button to Russia, but dispute and discontent among the people of Kazakhstan is taking place. The major change in the perception of President is also manifested. By spring 1992 Nazarbaev's position appeared to shift. He told a delegation from the conference on security and cooperation in Europe that Kazakhstan ought to be considered a "temporarily nuclear state". Nazarbaev emphasised to maintain to nuclear forces for the interest of the security of the country. Other nuclear experts of Kazakhstan point out that removal of Soviet Strategic Arsenal from Kazakhstan's territory makes this young state virtually defenceless in the face of violent and military might of some others.

Despite as early pledge to become a non-nuclear state, Kazakhstan is in no hurry to join the nuclear Non-

Proliferation (NPT). Kazakhstan's relationship to its closet and most powerful eastern neighbours China deserves special attention. This relationship had more than favourable beginning. But there is also fear that sooner or later, China will press territorial claims to a part of Eastern Kazakhstan even though the lands in question were occupied during the Ozhungarstr invasion in the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Nazabaev listed five conditions that could accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament.

First he wants Kazakhstan to be able to recycle the ballistic missiles now in soils - to use them to launch foreign setellites and take commercial cargo into orbit.

Second, he expects the Uranium and Plutonium removed from warheads had taken from Kazakh soil to be used for the benefit of his country as fuel for domestic nuclear power plants or as commodities for export.

Third, he thinks that the empty missile soils which are stated for destruction under start I, should not be destroyed. Instead, they should be maintained as potential housing for atomic power stations of the future.

Fourth, he expects Kazakhstan to receive its share of hard currency that is being given by the west to facilitate Soviet nuclear disarmament. He wants a good part of the millions of dollars appropriated for this goal by the U.S. Congress to be sent directly to the new nuclear states of the former Soviet Union.

And Finally, he wants Kazakhstan to receive adequate security guarantee.

China entered the nuclear age at a breakneck speed faster than any other nuclear power. It took only 32 months during the early 1960s, a decade of chaos, failure and famine in China. The location was a closely guarded state secret and the security was absolutely top-notch. The place was the Tibetan plateau, in Haibal Tibetan Autonomous prefecture: 100 Kilometers west of Xiang.

The Chinese nuclear facility is known as the Ninth Academy which is under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Bureau, the most secret organization. The bureau was established in 1958 and was later called the Nuclear Weapons Bureau. All of the functions of the Ninth Academy are still not exactly known. But it is clear that the Ninth Academy was responsible for designing all of China's nuclear bomb through the

mid 1970s.

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) finds that the various nuclear activities being conducted by the Chinese government in Tibet pose serious human and environmental threats, and that injury and death occurred and are likely to persist under present policies. The nuclear activities and their effects include.

- a. Building a top secret city on the Tibetan Plateau known as the "Ninth Academy" which designed all of China's early nuclear bombs. The Ninth Academy is China's "Los Alamos". Its primary nuclear weapons research and design facility.
- b. Dumping an unknown quantity of radioactive nuclear waste known the Ninth Academy.
- c. Credible reports of illness and death among Tibetan nomads near the North West Nuclear weapons Research and Design Academy.
- d. credible reports of illness and deaths to Tibetans near Uranium mines.
- e. Deploying nuclear weapons in at least 3 sites, one of which is acceptable only be a rugged dirt road posing transportation risks.
- f. Proposing to build a nuclear reactor in Lhasa to meet the increasing energy demands of Chinese settlers and enterprises.

g. Substantially increasing regional tensions by deploying nuclear missiles and facilities on the Tibetan Plateau and negating its role as a buffer zone.

Current Chinese government policy is that low and medium level nuclear waste is handled locally. Highly radioactive materials are believed to be taken to central storage facilities in Gansu province and other sites in the north west, which may include Qinghai. China announced in late 1988 that a nuclear waste treatment plant would be constructed in the Gobi desert in Xinjiang, to be completed by 1995. It is unclear how the waste will be stored, but one report indicates that "strong geological pills" are being explored. Another report indicates that "existing dumpsites" include "the underground caverns created by nuclear tests" in the Gobi Desert.

The recent change in the political set up of China is detrimental to Tibet, as well as for the Asia. During the Deng period, it was a policy of balance between economic and military developments. Since 1991, China has initiated another series of measures aimed at restructuring the defence system. The need for current reexamination of the security doctrine stems from domestic compulsions as well as external aspirations.

At the international front, the Chinese see the collapse of the Soviet-U.S. bipolar balance of world power as an opportunity for China to emerge as a major power in the post cold war era. China has made a massive academic campaign in advocating the idea of the world transforming into a multi-polar configuration.

In this introductory chapter I will deal the historical background of Central Asia and the Great game between Russia and Britain. Its geopolitical importance is also described.

This Chapter will point out the occupations of Central Asia by communist powers. Because of this, the Central Asia got divided in inner Asia and Soviet Central Asia. Inner Asia is controlled by China and five Central Asian republics were controlled by erstwhile Soviet Union.

- a) Lopnow (Xianjiang)
- b) Tibet
- c) Kazakhstan

This chapter describes and documents the establishment of the nuclear stations in Lopnow, Tibet and Kazakhstan within the context of Chinese and the former Soviet nuclear programme. I will discuss the choice of locations for nuclear facilities. It will be a brief history of nuclearisation of Central Asia.



Having described the establishment of nuclear stations in previous chapters, this chapter will discuss the implications of nuclearisation of Central Asia to the regional security in South Asia in general and Indian National Security in Particular. It will also discuss nuclear leakages from Kazakhstan as one of the dangers as well as emergence of the possibility of Islamic Bomb.

After the end of the cold war, the biggest threat is the nuclear (NPT) as perceived by the West. So, what are the main differences between the western concepts and Asian concepts on nuclear proliferation. Some Asian proposals for nuclear-free-zone in Central Asia will be discussed.

## CHAPTER - I

### Strategic Importance of Central Asia : The Great Game in the Pre Nuclear Age:

This Introductory chapter will deal with the historical background of Central Asia and The Great Game between Russia and Britain. Its geopolitical importance is also described.

By and large the neighbouring countries of China, India and Russia have had a deep impact on the politics of Central Asia. Central Asia was one of the key areas of rivalry for Supremacy between Britain and Russia through most of the nineteenth Century and between Japan and the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth Century.

Since the establishment of the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, Central Asia has generally come to mean Soviet Central Asia. This image of Central Asia is not valid in as much as it excludes Afghanistan and Mongolia. The constant use and popularisation of the term Inner Asia by American Scholar instead of the term Central Asia for the entire area is

mainly responsible for this narrowing down of the meaning of the expression Central Asia to denote only the Soviet part of the heartland of Asia. According to our concept and definition, Central Asia comprises the entire area between the Great wall of China in the East, The Himalaya, Hindu Kush, and Pamir Mountains in the South, The Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains in the West and Siberia in the north. Tibet, Sinkiang and inner Mongolia constitute Chinese Central Asia. Kazakstan and Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek republics constitute Soviet Central Asia.

#### Russian conquest And Anglo-Russian Rivalry

Russia advanced towards Turkey and Persia during the early part of the eighteenth Century. This advance, especially its campaign of 1826-28 against Persia, put it in conflict with Britain. In formulating As policy towards Persia and Central Asia, therefore, Russia found it necessary to take the British interest there into account. Similarly Britain had to take due note of the Russian interrests in Persia and Central Asia. Britain

and Russia became deeply involved in the area.<sup>1</sup> Their advance was not for commercial purpose alone : it was conquest plus commerce, commerce consisting in the sale of just their goods and in the exclusion of those of other nations. The Local powers realised this and also the growing antagonism between the two expanding powers. Britain and Russia confronted each other from China to Persia in the 1880s and the 1890s. The position of Afghanistan and Persia in relation to the defence of India was of vital importance to Britain.

The British advanced steadily and irresistibly towards Afghanistan and Persia, and the Russians advanced as steadily and irresistibly beyond the Caspian Sea and each felt annoyed at the other's getting in its way. The British ever jealous of their vast possessions in the East, feared that the real objective behind their vast possessions in India. They never liked the idea of the Russian Government to become a party to the question of Afghanistan ; for they wanted Afghanistan to preserve its integrity at all costs. The Russians, on the other hand, feared that under British influence Afghanistan

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1. Cited by S. Gopal, British politics in India, Cambridge, 1965, p.43: "Closer relations" to the British meant only the reduction of Afghanistan to a vassal State.

might become a disturbing factor in the peace of Central Asia. In 1869, therefore, the two powers- Britain and Russia began negotiations on the Status of Afghanistan. In January 1873, they concluded an agreement in St Petersburg concerning the northern limits of Afghanistan. By the agreement of 1873 Russia also gave a positive commitment that Afghanistan lay wholly outside its sphere of influence. By the Anglo-Russian Convention of 31st August 1907, the two further defined their respective spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. By the compact of 1907, Britain undertook not to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan, and Russia confirmed that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of influence.

Britain and Russia, which had evinced special interests in Eastern Turkminstan ever since the first half of the nineteenth Century pursued an active forward policy there from the 1860s onwards. Their interest in Eastern Turkminstan (now called Sinkiang) in the 1870s, infact, represented their recognition of its independence from China, during the decline of the Chinese Empire, British and Russian imperialism competed with each other to gain strategic Control over it. The Chinese, like the Afghans, withdrew from much of the Pamir region. Later,

after the mid 1880s<sup>1</sup>, the British developed a policy of appeasement of china all along India's northern frontiers. They pressurised the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir into withdrawing from the trans-karakoram and especially to waive Hunza's claim to its pasture in the pamir region. After the Russian Revolution the British concerted their efforts to stop the spread of Soviet influence in Sinkiang. However, in the early 1930s Sinkiang fell into the economic orbit of the Soviet Union. In the mid 1930s the Soviet Union pursued certain politico-military objectives in Sinkiang and Sinkiang became practically an outpost of the Soviet Union.

The spread of Soviet influence in Sinkiang had dimensions which the British Government in India could not afford to ignore.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir with its vast Muslim population was contiguous to the Soviet Union. During 1936-40 the Chinese administration in Sinkiang constructed posts and held them in strength, on the Hunza border facing the approaches to India. In the early 1940s thousands of Indians, mostly Muslims from Kashmir, who

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1.     ibid

were engaged in the Caravan trade with Central Asia and who had been living in Yarkand, Khotan and Kshgar for generations, had to throw away their British Indian passports because the Chinese regime frowned upon those not adopting Chinese nationality. All trade between Sinkiang and India ceased. The Japanese agents also spread the rumour that the Soviet Union was trying to gain a foothold in Tibet. The British Government in India, already uneasy over the developments in Tibet, suspected that the pro-chinese elements in Lhasa might well be the puppets of Japan.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union was forced to divert all its attention and energy to its war with Germany, which began in the summer of 1941. It, therefore, entered into an agreement with China towards the end of 1942 which empowered the latter to take over regular control of Sinkiang. This proved favourable to the British; for the Chinese relaxed their restrictions on the Hunza border and instead strengthened their posts on the Sarikol border with the Soviet Union. There were also other signs of improved relations between the British and the Chinese in Sinkiang. For instance, the Chinese allowed

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1. Iane Degras, ed., Soviet Documentson Foreign Policy (London, 1952).

the opening of a British consulate at Urmchi and a postal service between India and Sinkiang for the first time.

The Chinese communists "liberated" Sinkiang<sup>1</sup> in October 1949 and made it an integral part of their unitary state- that's the People's Republic of China. On 1st October 1955, the Chinese government reorganised Sinkiang as the Sinkiang- Uigur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China.

The Tibetans, who suspected the British of evil designs on their country, resented British influence in the Himalaya. They felt that it was directed essentially against their country. The British were originally interested in the Himalaya, as in Central Asia, in expanding their trade in Tibet, as well as in China. When, however they heard rumours of Russian influence in the counsels of Lhasa and Chinese inability to prevent acts of aggression by the Tibetans on the border countries of Garhwal and Sikkim during 1880-1900, they subordinated their interest in trade to the security of their Indian empire. Their main preoccupation in the Himalaya and Tibet thus became one of reasons for containing Russian influence there. China had always enjoyed sufficient influence in

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1. Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma (London, 1962), pp. 562-64



Tibet though little power and its failure to restrain Tibet therefore irked the British who sent a military expedition to Tibet in 1903-04. This expedition disturbed the easy pattern of the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The growth of British influence in Tibet also sharpened Nepalese jealousy and reduced the importance and prestige of the Nepalese agent in Lhasa, sole intermediary between Tibet and outside world. It also increased Russian suspicion of British imperial policy.

It was in this context that Britain and Russia negotiated the Anglo-Russian convention of 31st August 1907. The convention defined the British and Russian spheres of influence in Central Asia and spelt out the specific understanding that the two powers should deal with Tibet only through agency of China. This greatly buttressed the Chinese position in Tibet. Though the British outwardly maintained that there was no substance in the Chinese claim of authority over Tibet, they pursued a policy of appeasement towards China. By their acknowledgement of China's suzerainty over Tibet, they made the chances of an understanding with the Tibetans all but impossible. The Chinese, on their part regarded British penetration into Tibet in 1903-1904 as encroachment in a sphere historically their own. In 1908 they

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appointed Chao Enh Feng, who as warden of the marches of Eastern Tibet, had annexed several frontier states in Eastern Tibet in 1905 as Ambay (Political Agent)<sup>1</sup> in Lhasa and charged him with the task of reconsolidating chinese control over Tibet. The main aim of the Chinese forward policy in Tibet during 1910-11 was to reduce it to the position of a province of China.

British Government in India recognised China's suzerainty over Tibet, but not its sovereignty, when the Republic of China, established on 1 January 1912, claimed Tibet and objected to the right activity to intervene in Tibet's internal affairs. In the context of the question of the recognition of the Republic of China muted by the United States in the Spring of 1913, both the British and Russian Government instead on prior recognition by the Chinese of their respective interest in Tibet and Mongolia. In a memorandum on 17th August, 1913 the British Government plainly declared that until China accepted its demand, it would not recognize the Republic. It took this hard line because the Tibetans had themselves eliminated Chinese influence from their

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1. Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback, - Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, (Ney york, 1963)

country in 1912 and had established a connection with Russia through Mongolia in 1913. Russia also had strengthened its hold on Mongolia and was drawing nearer to Tibet. When Tibet concluded a Treaty of alliance with Mongolia which was virtually under Russia's protection in Urga on January 1913,<sup>1</sup> Russia acquired a special though indirect position in Tibet. The British finally succeeded in getting China's consent for the maintenance of status quo in Tibet and for the holding of a conference of the representatives of the British, Chinese and Tibetan Governments' to define the political status of Tibet. Yuan Shih - Kai provisional President of the Republic of China since 12 February, 1912, took full advantage of the tentative agreement. He announced China's recognition of the autonomy of outer Tibet and Outer Mongolia on 7th October, 1913; and on the same day British and Russian Governments recognized China.

The British Government in India obviously realized that China wanted both to dominate Tibet and to incorporate as much of that country as possible, but lacked the power to do so. British policy therefore, was geared to

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1. A.C. Yate, "England and Russia Face To Face in Asia : Travels with Afghan Boundary Commission", (Edinburgh and London), p.190

ensure the survival of an autonomous, secluded, and friendly Tibet on India's 2,000 mile long frontier.

The British sent a communication on 26 August 1921 to the Chinese Government, reminding it of the nature of their interest in Tibet and restating their policy of maintaining the integrity of Tibet and of ensuring in Tibet a Government capable of keeping peace and order along India's frontiers. They sent representative to Tibet to obtain first-hand information about events on Sino-Tibetan frontier, as well as to demonstrate to the Chinese that they were in earnest about reopening the abortive negotiations of 1913-14. Further, they advised the Government of Tibet to build up its army, for they felt that in event of negotiations China was unlikely to talk on a basis of equality and reason with a weak Tibet.

Tibet, whose frontiers march along China, Burma, India and Nepal, needed a large army. According to the old system, the responsibility for collecting soldiers to meet any military threat was that of the landlords. Thus, Tibet need to strengthen and train its army. The stumbling block was want of inadequate funds. When the Government asked the monasteries for contributions, they said that they did not have enough money even for

religious purposes and for the expenses of the monks. Even the government reminded the administration that the Tashihunpo Monasteries to expedite payment of the levy, the Panchan Lama, as its head, only explained his problems. When more pressure was put on the monasteries, they thought that all this was due to the influence of the British. This increased the misunderstanding between them and the Government of Lhasa. The Panchan Lama felt the levy had made his position untenable and fled secretly northwards in the Winter of 1923.<sup>1</sup> (He died in Jyetrundo along the Sino-Tibetan Frontier in 1937). Thus the British position in Tibet suffered a set back. Dalai Lama XIII wielded enormous power, and he realised fully the need for adequate military preparations for the defence of Tibet. However, he was not able to do much in the direction of army reform. It was this failure which eventually became responsible for the reappearance of China in Tibet in 1950-51.

China was jubilant at the conclusion of the agreement of 1954; for it had secured recognition from India that Tibet was integral part of Chinese Territory. It had also effectively put an end to India's special posi-

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1. Report of the Officials of Government of India and Peoples Republic of China on the Boundary Question (New Delhi, 196) C.R. 3-4

tion there. India had acquainted in China's ultimate control of Tibetan relations and had derived itself right to interfere in Tibetan affairs. The most important development was the acceptance of Tibet as a part of China by Asia's major countries particularly by Indonesia, which had only recently freed itself from foreign rule.

Historians dispute China's claim to Tibet. China held sway over Tibet as over Mongolia, but its suzerainty over Mongolia was reduced to non-existent by Russia in the early 1920s<sup>1</sup> Mongolia, therefore, escapes "liberation" by China.

On the fall of the Manchu regime in China in 1911, the Jetsundamba Khutukhtu, the religious head and the leader of the Mongols, declared Mongolia's freedom and independence from Chinese control and overlordship. In order to establish itself as the paramount power - superior to the British and the Japanese - Russian took advantage of this event to advance into China's sphere of influence, bring Mongolia within its own sphere of influence, and grant it protection. Naturally the Mongols,

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1. Suchitra Ghosh, Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations (1899-1914), New Delhi, Sterling, 1977 p. 107

who had suffered Chinese domination for long, accepted the Russian assurance of protection of their independence. Mongolia is now under the protection of the Soviet State, successor to the Russian State.

The torch of the Russian revolution - The torch of freedom also shed its light on the Mongols and inspired them to fight for complete independence from Chinese rule.<sup>1</sup> The formation of an independent people's Government of Mongolia on 10 July, 1921 mark the victory of the people revolution.

The First People's Great Assembly, which adopted a constitution on 26 November 1924, proclaimed the birth of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR)<sup>2</sup> and renamed Urga - The Capital of the country' Ulan Batur. A plebiscite held on 20 October, 1945, overwhelmingly favoured the Independence and Separation of MPR. In January 1946, China formally recognized the Independence of the MPR. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 February 1950 confirmed and guaranteed it.

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1. Peter Hopbirk, Trespassers on the Roof of the World (London, Oxford University Press, 1983), p.61

2. I. Kovalenko, "Cooperation not Confrontation (a Comprehensive approach to the problem of Asian Security)," Far Eastern Affairs, No.3, 1986.

Mongols staunchly support the Soviet Union in its policy towards the Sino-Indian border dispute, the West Asian crisis, Vietnam and so on. They think the Soviet policy to be right. Pro-Sovietism, therefore, is a conscious decision of the Mongols. China pressurizes them to accept its point of view. The Mongols, who want to be masters of their own house and to be free to decide their own destiny, consider the Chinese advice as a piece of interference in their affair and strongly resent it. The basic factor determining and governing the Mongolian alliance with the Soviet Union, is, therefore, the Mongol anxiety over Chinese intentions towards their country. They knew of the Chinese attempts to Colonise inner Mongolia.<sup>1</sup>

Long Centuries ago the Russian objective in control Asia was to unify all subjects of the Tsar in a single allegiance to the state Church. The fear that the Muslims might be affected to the Ottoman empire was an additional factor in the Russian advance. Later, after the Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union hoped to influ-

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1. Marina T, "The USSR and the Friendly Countries of Asia," Far Eastern Affairs, No.1, p. 132



ence Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey through granting federal autonomy to Uzbekistan, Turkmanistan, Azerbaizan; and finally Tazikistan., When, however, it realized in the early 1930s that Pan-Turkie and pan-Iranian influences might foster secessionist tendencies, it came down heavily on Islam and reduced the federal autonomy of the Muslim nationalities in Soviet Central Asia and the caucasus to a mere administrative formality. It would be interesting to know., In the context of the present relationship between China and the Soviet Union, the nature of Soviet policy towards such Muslim areas as the area inhabited by the Kazakhs, who live on both sides of the Sino-Soviet frontier in Central Asia.

#### Strategic Importance of Central Asia

Central Asia occupies a distinct space of geopolitical importance in the post cold war era. It is only land locked region of the gigantic Asian Continent. It is contiguous to six large states Russia in the West, China in the east, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India in its southern fringes.<sup>1</sup>

The disintegration of the USSR and the entailing division of geopolitical and military space of the common wealth of independent states into two opposite areas the

1. Khan, Rashidudeen, "Strategic Importance in Central Asia", World Focus August, 1992

Slav-Christian and the Turk-Muslim ones - put on the agenda the problems of ensuing security of Southern borders of the former Soviet Union.

The Military political situation in Kazakhstan and Central Asia republics shows that if in the near future they get out of the Russia's government control they become a real threat for the CIS southern regions security.

The nuclear factor in Kazakhstan and the nationalisation by Central Asian States of military hardwares, arms, and ammunition of the former Soviet armed forces stationed on their territories, as well as the process that has started of creating national armed forces indicate that the role of military and political factors in the system of inter state relations in Asia is permanently growing.<sup>1</sup>

The problem of the CIS security is also especially important due to the activization of the policy of the states - Turkey Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, aimed at widening the spheres of their influence, political, economic, ideological and military, in Central Asian republics Kazakhstan and Transcaucasia. It is very important to make a note. Asian companies have begun to

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1. R.G. Gidhaduhi, Socio-economic Transformation of Soviet Central Asia, New Delhi, 1987

invest in Central Asia in a so-called guerilla style, but western interests can be indicated in Kazakhstan, where German govt. helps the ethnic Germans.

The mighty nuclear potential grants Kazakhstan the status of "nuclear Muslim powers" which undoubtedly will be for securing dominant influence of the republic in the region and strengthening its international policies.

In its struggle for the leadership in central Asia Kazakhstan will try to play the "new independent force" in its relations with the CIS and especially with Russia. It is quite possible that Alma-Ata will try to create under its aegis a system of regional security of Central Asia. Muslim states from which Russia will be excluded. The policy line aimed at dissociation from Russia Alma-Ata will support by its strict policy, concerning territorial controversies with Russia, aimed at preservation in the Kazakhstan structure of the fine northern regions with predominant Russian-speaking population. It will pursue the geopolitical aim to create with the aid of those states the "Northern Islamic Buffer" and to move further from Kazakhstan the Russian border.

It is quite possible that such states as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan will fall under the complete or partial influence of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and take part in their Military-political and

political economic unions and groups. In perspective it is quite possible that the process of militarization will affect the central Asia region which will be saturated with arms by the neighbouring Muslim, states. All this will contribute to the strengthening of military and forcible methods of the central Asian regimes policy.<sup>1</sup>

The possibility that in the course of global political changes in Asia some central Asian states (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) can be involved in local armed conflicts is quite real. The key role in all this will seemingly be played by Iran and Afghanistan, staking on encouraging the bellicose Muslim fundamentalism and being interested in provoking 'Holy wars' in the territories to the north to its borders. The powerful Islamic factor strategically will determine. The Central Asia Southern Republics, gravitation towards their Asian neighbours. So on perspective, there are possibilities not only of political, economic and military unions, but more close forms of cooperation, upto territorial unification - at the first stage in the shape of confederation of the Islamic states of Central Asia and the middle

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1. D. Bannerjee, "Central Asia After the demolition of the former Soviet Union" Strategic Analysis August 1991, p.73-79.

states Central Asia and the Middle east.<sup>1</sup>

It is quite possible that Kazakhstan will play the role of "soothing buffer" between the Slav-Christian North and the Turk Muslim south, while maintaining the military-political Union with Russia and other Slav members of the CIS - The military political alliance between Kazakhstan and Central Asia republics, according to Alma-Ata should give a additional advantages not only in the course of solving controversial problems with Russia and other members of the CIS, but in the development of relations with Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East and even with leading western powers.

In moderate minded circles in central Asia there are fears that independence will revive old disputes over borders between the various republics and serve as a serious source of friction.

The drawing of borders between republics from 1924<sup>2</sup> by Stalin was highly arbitrary with the excuse of creating republics based around the major peoples of Central Asia, the Communists engineered new and arguably artificial regional units. Uzbekistan was the republic which

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1. Ibid.

2. Shams-ud-Din, Demographic Changes and nationality problems in Soviet Central Asia. In Shams-ud-Din (ed.) Perestroika and Nationality Question in the U.S.S.R., Delhi, 1990-p.96

benefited most at that time, emerging with fertile territories and the largest population. It gained the large city of Tashkent. Tajikistan's small capital Dushanbe steadily grew in size but Tajik irrendertists years to get a revision of the borders and a transfer to Tajikistan of the historic persian speaking cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, together with their provinces.

A clear trend is visible among Tajik intellectuals that of emphasising close historical and cultural links with their two persian speaking neighbours, Iran and Afghanistan. This may well have a political inspiration. Demonstrations in Dushanbe in April 1992 reportedly drew comfort from a wild rumour that the Afghan Tajik warlord Ahmad Shah Massod was preparing to advance on the city with 40,000 battle hardened Mujahideen, to take on the unpopular Nabiyevev regime.

Muslim states are among the keenest in developing their relations with the Central Asian republics. The most important are Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, together with Saudi Arabia, malaysia and Egypt. Each clearly has specific priorities and interests in Central Asia. The Economic cooperation Organisation (ECO) is a group linking to countrties. This defunct remnant of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) was revived and enlarged by Iran, Turkey, Pakistan in 1992 to take in five Muslim

republics of the CIS as well as Afghanistan.

Is this the first stage towards creating an "Islamic Common Market". Is it a contemporary pan Islamic initiatives or instead purely commercial and economic block of regional states? As a regional grouping of Muslim republics of the ex-USSR with their neighbours Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan has far reaching geopolitical implications. The five Central Asian republics together with Azerbaijanian and Afghanistan formally joined ECO in Nov. 1992.

China is an important for the Central Asian republics with small populations and without effective defence forces of their own, the governments of those newly Independent states have been worries about their security and are wary of their huge neighbour. However, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where Chinese territorial claims exist from the last century, are now collaborating closely with China cross border trade is flourishing now, with border posts opened and rail links established since June 1992 between Alma-Ata and Urmchi Capital of Xinjiang.

The closeness of the Chinese border cuts both ways, where China carried out an underground nuclear test on 10 June 1994, in a region of Xinjiang adjacent to Kazakhstan, the Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan at once concern. It worries us that this test was carried out in the neigh-

bouring state and that it might cause serious ecological problems.

Peking has good reasons also to be worried over. The attraction of independence upon the Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslim peoples of Chinese Central Asia. If Turkic peoples of Central Asia can role themselves as independent republics, then minorities in Xinjiang will have more confidence in their own ability to do the same - even if because of geography and economic weakness, Xianjiang looks certain to remain dependent upon Beijing. Certainly, the Turkic Muslim factor in Xinjiang cannot be ignored, even if Chinese policy of Han Chinese settlement in the region threatens to after it beyond recognition.



## COMMUNISTS TAKEOVER OF CENTRAL ASIA - STRATEGIC AND IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

This chapter will point out the occupation of Central Asia by the Communist Power. Because of this, the Central Asia got divided into Inner Asia and Soviet Central Asia. Inner Asia is controlled by China and five Central Asian republics were controlled by erstwhile Soviet Union.

The principle of national self-determination was basic to the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union. Both V.I.Lenin and J.V.Stalin, the founding fathers of Marxism-Leninism, have written extensively on the subject. They not only advocated the right of national self-determination for the colonial people struggling to gain independence but also agreed, in theory atleast, that the various minority nationalities in the Soviet Union possessed that right. In contrast, the Maoists in China are almost silent on the vital

National self-determination is an ambiguous concept which has been a subject of constant controversy. For our purpose of working definition maybe that each nation (or people, as the usage of United Nations) has a "ought to constitute an Independent State and determine its own govern-

ment.<sup>1</sup>

Self-determination invariably entails secession to some extent. The question does not seem to arise in the case of a tribe living in the middle of nowhere. It is not so much that the 'primitives' lack political consciousness although even this may sometimes be true. The question of self-determination arises when the political life of a nation or people appears to be determined by others.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, self-determination means secession in practice. It has certain serious implications for empires and multinational states. In the Leninist definition of self-determination emphasises shift from popular will to 'national oppression' as a critical criterion and not the determination of popular will. It did not really matter whether the people in question expressed a desire for national self-determination. But where 'national oppression' existed there was a general will to self-determination. The 'oppressed people' should enjoy the right of self-determination and secede from the 'oppressing nation'.<sup>3</sup> In Lenin's words, "

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1. Clarke, G., *China's Reforms of Tibet and Their Effects on Postmartiem*, Institute of Development Studies, University of Suesex, 1987.
  2. Richard Lugar 'Dismantling the Soviet arsenal' *Washington Post*, 22 November, 1991
  3. Seldn and Lippit, *The Transition to Socialism in China*, Armonk, Ny M.E. Shaupe, 1982, p-12.

What is the most important, fundamental idea of our thesis? The distinction between oppressed and oppressor nation. The right self-determination means only the right to independence, in a political sense, the right to face, political secession from the oppressing nation".

As Marxist-Leninist, the Chinese fully accepted Lenin's theory of capitalist imperialism, which provided the rhetorical basis for the anti-colonial national movements. They wholeheartedly agreed with Lenin and Stalin that the right to secession applied only to colonial cases and that the principle of self-determination in a socialist context meant only self-government or autonomy. They, however, differed on the question of self-government, while the Soviets adopted a federalist framework, China opted for regional autonomy.

While there is no dispute among Marxists, Chinese or Russian, about the general strategic need to subordinate thus allow a certain degree of flexibility which might be used to determine the weight of the national question in relation to the socialist cause. This is indeed the theoretical source of the tactical differences which often tend to coincide with national interest. Much of course depends on the historical circumstances under which the Marxists had to tackle the national question but the essential differences

between the Soviet and the Chinese position lies in this.<sup>1</sup> While Lenin and Stalin thought that it might occasionally be necessary to recognise the right to self-determination even in a socialist context to oppose imperialism, and in the longer term interest of socialism, Mao felt otherwise. He argued that the national minorities should be mobilised to oppose imperialism without the promise of national self-determination and that the self-government was enough to entice them. He stuck to this view even during the anti-Japanese campaigns.

To summarise the differences between the Chinese and the Soviet position on the national questions. In Principle the Soviet Union still recognises the right to self-determination for its national minorities, which is in fact enshrined in the Soviet Constitution.<sup>2</sup> The CCP's position has changed over a period of time. Till 1934 the CCP followed the Soviet model and recognised the right of its national minorities to national self-determination. However from the time of Mao's ascendancy about the year 1934, the CCP has completely dropped the right of its national minorities to national self-determination.

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1. S. Tasgabm "Caucasus and Central Asia : Strategic Implication. Foreign Policy Institute Antrace, 1993
  2. June T. Dreyei, China's Forty Millions minority Nationalities and National Integration in the people's Republic of China, Hervend University Press, 1976. p-16.

**Chinese Nationalism and Chinese Nationalities Policy:** The evolution of the Chinese state was characterised by the predominance of culture over the ethnicity to the extent that the cultural unity became the essential legitimising factor for Chinese political ideology. Cultural unity was maintained by the traditional ideology of universal harmony 'the great togetherness' by which conflict between the individuals and nations could be avoided by egalitarian communalism and uniformity of thought. In the political realm this ideal was expressed in the concept of mandate of heaven by which universal political harmony was maintained through centralised political control and universal dominance of Chinese culture.<sup>1</sup>

China, encounter with European imperialism in the 19th Century created a dilemma for Chinese political Ideology. The European Nations obviously enjoyed material superiority, and they refused to acknowledge the superiority Chinese culture or the universal political authority of China. Foreign imperialism specially that of Japan another asian state which China has traditionally considered inferior, causing instrumental in the development of modern Chinese

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1. Qian Qichen, "China and Changing world Scene"  
Foreign Affairs no-25, Sep 1992.

nationalism which was therefore of a defensive and anti-imperialist nature.

The lessons learned by Chinese nationalists about the effects foreign imperialism on the development of national consciousness were not applied in China's own relations within what it considered to be its traditional spheres of influence. Chinese nationalists, though anti-imperialists did not, recognise the nationalist aspirations and rights of those on China's territorial frontiers specially, Turks, Mongols and Tibetans<sup>1</sup>. Whom it considered to be area within the sphere of Chinese cultural and political assimilations.

The fundamental purpose of the Chinese nationality policy was to deny nationalities separatism in favour of multi-national unity, to defuse nationalistic sentiments and to prepare the way for the socialist transformation of the nationalist areas in a process common with Han China. Chinese control of nationalities areas of no less condition was very slight. Much emphasis was placed upon propaganda to convince members of minority nationalities their true interest lay in union with the Chinese socialist masses in opposition to their own exploiting classes. At the same time

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1. Gerald Segal, "China and disintegration of the Soviet Union". Asian Survey No. XXXII No-9 Sep 1992.

upper classes were the co-optate by means of the United Front Policy which maintain local leaders in authority ( With new titles and large salaries) Until CCP authority could be established.

The Lennist doctrine on Self-determination was dropped after the founding of the people's Republic because it was claimed. The chinese nationalist had already determined their choice by 'common revolutionary struggle' along with the Han in opposition to foreign imperialism.

The chinese nation as a whole has long been a nation suffering external imperialist oppression, among our various nationalist. They have slaved will and woe in and cemented a militant friendship in the revolutionary wars, culminating in liberation of this big family of nationalities. The relationship among ourselves and our relations which the outside world do not require us to adopt the policy as was followed by Russia at the time of October Revolution, which laid emphasis on national self determination and at the same time allowed secession of nationalities.<sup>1</sup>

The broad masses of all nationalitieis included the

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1.Zhon Enlai, Beijing Review, March 3, 1980.

Han, defined as one of the nationalities of multinational China; therefore the noble wish of the people of all nationalities was in fact the will of Han majority. Han determinism had been substituted for self-determinism.\*

The CCP adopted the system of regional autonomy, rather than federalism, based upon the theory that China was 'unitary multinational state'. The Chinese nationalities had supposedly opted for union with China's big family of nationalities' as part of a natural historical process and furthermore had integrated to such an extent that none now occupied a distinct territory without inclusion of Han or other minority nationalities.

CCP ideologists explained the obvious exceptions of Xinjiang and Tibet by claiming that Xinjiang 'had few Han but otherwise composed of nationalities and that Tibet was 'comparatively unmixed, but was only in the area of the Tibet Autonomous Region, whereas in other places the Tibetans live among other nationalities.\*

Zhou Enlai further elaborated the theory in a speech of nationalities policy in 1957. \*

Large numbers of Tibetans live in compact communities in Tibet. However, if the Tibetans who live in Szechuan, Chinghai, Kansu and Xunnuam provinces are taken into account., It is true to say that the Tibetans, like the other minority people of China, are dispersed in different part of



the country and do not live in compact communities in a single area.<sup>1</sup>

These rationalisations ignored lack of any legitimacy of Chinese rule in Xinjiang or Tibet, or the arbitrary political divisions of Tibet by thge Chinese themselves. Zhou also failed to mention that all of the Tibetan cultural areas, divided by the Chinese into different provinces, were contiguous and formed a single cultural territory.

### **Socialist Transformation**

Integration of the nationalities into the PRC political system was a pre-requisite for their socialist transformation. The Socialist transition process itself was a method to increase central control over minorities. The nationalities were to be politically mobilised for socialist construction and transformed in social structure, economic relations and cultural ideology.

The CCP was adamant in its assertion that the nationalities could not develop culturally or economically, without the assistance of the advanced nationality, the Han.

The Transition to socialism in Chinese practice was of three stages:

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1. Zhou Enlai, Beijing Review, March 3, 1980.

1. Democratic Reforms
2. Co-operativisation and aid teams.
3. Collectivisation.

The Chinese Communists were initially intent upon avoiding the traumas and violence which had accompanied forced collectivisation in the Soviet Union. Collectivisation would have to proceed by careful stages initiated only when peasants themselves were convinced that collectives would outperform individual farming both in production and distribution. Democratic reforms and founding of the mutual-aid teams in the early 1950s had proceeded on the initiative of the peasants themselves; in some cases the party even had to restrain the enthusiasm of the poorest peasants.

In 1955 Mao adopted the Stalinist theory on Socialist accumulation and stalinist methods of state coercion. With the mobilisation of the Chinese masses for socialist transformation. Chinese agriculture would provide the basis for industrialisation which would then make the mechanisation of agriculture possible.

In late 1955 and early 1956, during the 'hightide' of collectivisation, 88 percent of China's peasants entered advanced APC's. The collectives were intially supported by poor peasants because they expected personal gains similar to these they had received during the previous land reforms.

Many middle peasants, however, experienced the transition as a loss of personal property and freedoms to increased state control. Another source of peasant discontent was the very high rate of socialist accumulation, agricultural 'surplus' was very liberally defined in favour of state accumulation; and agricultural products were priced low in relation to manufactured products.

During the great leap forward of 1958, collectives were amalgamated into communes. The communes were the first level of collectivisation which transcended traditional village organisation. The coincidence of communisation and the Anti-Rightist movement of 1958, which was against those who had criticised the party during the 1957 Hundred Flowers liberalisation, led to an equation of any criticism of communisation with rightist anti-party, anti-socialist opposition. This added a new level of ideological and physical coercion to communisation.

Mao's vision of the socialist transformation required mobilisation of the peasants on a scale transcending the traditional village and required essentially military methods of organisation. During the Great Leap, basic level government administration was shifted from villages to the communes which were then placed under direct party control. The collectivised peasants were organised into Peoples Militia, which facilitated their mobilisation for large-

scale land reclamation and water-works projects. A slogan of the time reveals the Militarist frenzy which characterised this period: Militarise organisation, Turn Action into struggle, collectivise life! Military mobilisation was also intended to 'repel imperialist aggression and their running dogs.

In 1958, due to the exphoria of the impending transition to communism in China and of the advantage in ballistic missiles which had been gained by the Soviet Union, Mao assumed very aggressive domestic and foreign political stances.

#### **Chinese Strategic Perception of Tibet.**

Just as the Indian elite seems to perceive Tibet primarily in strategic terms, the Chinese counterpart does so even more. The difference in the intensity of perception has to do with different historical experiences. For the British, Tibet was a second or outerrampart of a grand imperial strategy, born out of the luxury of imperial power.

In fact, one of the main reasons for the communist takeover of Tibet is strategic, rather than historical claims or ideological motives. Historically, Tibet's relations with China in terms of the tribute-paying system are not much different from Korea's or Mongolia's relations with

the middle Kingdom. If, however Chinese frequent military intervention in Lhasa especially during the Yuan and Ching dynasties renders Sino- Tibetan relations somewhat different from other cases, we must remember that we find a similar pattern of Chinese intervention in Vietnamese affairs for centuries. In other words, if we continue to believe in Chinese historical claims over Tibet, we have to explain why other similar dependencies like Korea or Vietnam were not 'Liberated' on the same historical ground.

We therefore, suggest that the Chinese Communists who were strategists par excellence through their lifelong guerilla warfare, realised early the strategic importance of Tibet and decided to shut China's backdoor in 1950. As the years rolled by, and events moved, Chinese strategic appreciation of Tibet deepened.

## CHAPTER III

### III. NUCLEARISATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

- a) Lopnow (Xianjiang)
- b) Tibet (Amdo)
- c) Kazakhstan

This chapter describes and documents the establishment of the nuclear stations in Lopnow, Tibet, and Kazakhstan within the context of Chinese and the former Soviet Union nuclear programme, I will discuss the Choice of locations for nuclear facilities. It will be a brief history of nuclearisation of Central Asia.

On October 16, 1964, China detonated its first nuclear weapon in the Xinliang desert near the Oasis of Huangyanggou, 150 kilometers northwest of the Lop Nur marshes. The test marked a historic feat for a leadership then celebrating its fifteenth anniversary in power.

The Study of the Chinese nuclear program raises a number of questions, and these questions will guide any study. They fall into three groups.

1. Under what conditions did China's leaders decide to undertake a nuclear weapons program, and how did the leadership in guidance of the programmes change over time?
2. How did Beijing organize the program and what role did

the Soviet Union play? How much affected was the programme's and direction in the late 1950s by the sweeping policy changes at home and by Soviet involvement?

3. How did Beijing manage technological progress and innovation on such a scale in a poor society just recovering from major wars?

Chinese leaders hold that they reached the decision to inaugurate the nuclear weapons programme under duress. The Chinese politburo had tentatively initiated the nation's first five year plan in 1953,<sup>1</sup> but then the party leaders delayed formal approval for two years because of "objective difficulties". Chinese specialists agree that, in addition to the country's internal problems, the government had to postpone the effort to modernise China because, during the years, of the Korean war (1950-53) and the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-55). The United States was actively seeking to unseat communist rule in Beijing and restore Chiang Kai-Shek to power on the mainland.

The events in Korea, Indochina, and the Taiwan strait constituted the proximate cause of the Chinese decision to build national strategic force.

Nevertheless, the revolutionary elite under Maozedong

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1. Harry G Gelberg, "Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy."

came to power in 1949<sup>1</sup> with beliefs that may well have led to the nuclear weapons decision even without the unbroken Chain of Crisis. The leaderships nationalistic ideology and concepts of force and diplomacy " shaped its perceptions of the enduring dangers to China and to the restoration of China's international position. In pondering the response to the recurrent American Strategic threats after 1949, China's leaders would have weighed fully the vulnerabilities exposed in the Korean battles and their own ultimate reliance on themselves. The decision to acquire a nuclear arsenal rested on fundamental national interests as much as on the immediate security threat.

China wanted to break the US imperialism. People's Daily lashed back "The successful explosion of China's first atom bomb can be a tragedy only for U.S. imperialism, if it is a tragedy at all.... so long as U.S. imperialism possesses nuclear bombs, China must have them too."<sup>2</sup>

When the crisis with the United States began deepening in January, the Chinese politburo expressed ever greater concern about the possible American use of nuclear weapons against China. No sooner was the Formosa Resolution passed than the Chinese press alleged that it included the threat  
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1. Halperin, "Chinese Attitudes towards Nuclear weapons, China in Crisis, vol.2.

2. Devikanandan "How china may use Atomponds.



to use atomic weapons against the Chinese people. By this time,, the Chinese Politburo had launched the nation's nuclear weapons programme.

On January 17, 1955, the Soviet government had announced that it would give aid to China and several East European countries to "help them promote research into the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This commitment, confirmed in April, would provide China with a cyclotron and a nuclear reaction as well as fissionable material for research. In exchange, China agreed to provide the Soviet Union with "necessary raw materials". On the basis of secret deliberations, the two socialist countries also reached an accord to undertake joint exploration for Uranium in China.

China's strategic missile programme also began to take shape during early 1956. Zhang Aiping later remembered 1956 as the year the Party's "Central Committee decided that developing missiles and developing atomic energy were the two key projects in China's defence modernisation."

A turning point seems to have been reached with the decisions taken at a conference of the Central Military Commission held from May 27 to July 22, 1958. Just after the session of the Party congress. The Commission, chaired by Mao, dealt directly with the nuclear weapons programme, and its protracted deliberations, we believe, produced "The Guidelines for Developing Nuclear Weapons". The eight

guidelines read in part as follows:

1. Our country is developing nuclear weapons in order to warn our enemies against making war on us, not in order to use nuclear weapons to attack them.

2. The main reason for us to develop nuclear weapons is to defend peace, save mankind from a nuclear holocaust, and reach agreement on nuclear disarmament and the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

3. In the process of developing nuclear weapons, we should not imitate other countries. Instead, our objective should be to take steps to "catchup with advanced world levels" and to "proceed on all phases of the nuclear simultaneously."

4. To this end, we have to concentrate our energies on developing nuclear and thermonuclear warheads with high yields and long-range delivery vehicles. For the time being we have no intention of developing tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup>

5. In order to achieve success rapidly in developing nuclear weapons, we must concentrate human, material, and financial resources ... Any other projects for our country's reconstruction will have to take second place to the development of nuclear weapons.

6. It is time for science and scientists to serve the par-

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1. Marvin Resnikoff, "Nuclear weapons and Chinese policy."

ty's policies, not for the party's policy to some science and scientists. Therefore, we must guarantee the party's absolute leadership of this (nuclear weapons) project.

7. The task of training successors (for the nuclear weapons program) is as important as the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

8. We must set up a separate security system so as to guarantee absolute secrecy.

#### **Lop Nur Nuclear Base (Sin...)**

The sites for China's nuclear weapons tests and the impact zones for most of its missile tests lie hidden in the deserts of the Xinjiang Vjgur Autonomous Region.

The Chinese name for this northwestern province, Xinjiang, now an autonomous region, means "new domain", with its vast Tarim and Junggar basins and majestic Tian Shan and Kunlun Shan ranges, Xinjiang accounts for one sixth of all China.<sup>1</sup> An admixture of ancient and modern heightens the mystery that envelops this land, which long ago served as the meeting ground for Chinese from the east, Mongols and Tribal bands from the north, Slavs and other peoples from across the Pamirs, European from the West, and Indians and

1. Terry Cannon, "Regions: spatial inequality and regional policy" in the contemporary Geography of China.

Tibetans from the South.<sup>1</sup>

In picking this spot of long history, fierce climate, and hostile topography to carve out the nuclear weapons test base, the Chinese leaders were returning to an area they first came to as revolutionary victors.

On June 13, 1959, while the search for ground Zero was proceeding and four months before the formal establishment of the Lop Nur Nuclear weapons Test Base on Oct. 16 the party committee of the proposed base convened its first enlarged meeting.<sup>2</sup>

A tract of more than 100,000 square kilometers was set aside for the test base - an area as large as china's eastern province of Zhejiang'; According to a former commander of the test base, "more than 2,000 kilometers of highways have been built on the base (by 1984). At each test site there is a command centre, a communications hub, a control centre, a permanent survey station. At the air testing grounds, there also are some simple houses, airports, and underground water pipes. In the distance there is an airport and a factory to assemble test items. Two reporters who visited the area have written of the "fantastic picture" before them; "Broken cars on dispersed rocks; piles of scrap iron

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1. ibid

2. ibid.

that had originally been armoured personnel carriers; the wreckage of planes, destroyed cement buildings some of which had a surface of melted glass".

On the Lop Nur base, too, the three hard years" exacted their human toll. In 1960, hunger and malnutrition struck the builders of the base, and the army construction workers soon consumed all available vegetables.<sup>1</sup>

### **Chinese Nuclear Installations in Eastern Tibet**

China entered the nuclear age at a breakneck speed-faster than any other power. It took only 32 months during the early 1960s, a decade of chaos, failure and famine in China. The location was a closely guarded state secret and the security was absolutely top-notch. The place was the Tibetan plateau in Haibei Tibetan Autonomous prefecture, 100 kilometers west to Xining.<sup>2</sup>

The selection of the Tibetan plateau for China's primary nuclear weapons research and development base was the first in a series of decisions that put China's nuclear infrastructure-including test sites, nuclear processing

1. John Lewis and Xue Jiansheng "China builds the Bomb" Stanford University Press 1988.

2. Xue Jianghe "China puts Security in first place in the Development of Nuclear power plants" Renmin Ribao Oversea Age, Aug, 27, 1976.

facilities and nuclear weapons production and assembly - in region populated by non-Chinese people. There is now little doubt that china's nuclear program had an inordinate impact on Tibetans, Uygiers and mongolions. From land apporopria-tion, to nuclear fall-out, to toxic and radioactive pollu-tion in rivers, lakes and pastures, the story about the ugly side effects of China's nuclear program is just beginning to emerge.

As with many of the critical environment problems facing China and Tibet. The govt. has repeatedly restricted public debate, even among experts, and has not shown much willingness to institute measures which would effectively monitor hazardous facilities and hold officials responsible for breaches of safety.

The significance of placing nuclear missiles on the Tibetan plateau is critical for understanding the historical and current geo-political regional relationships. When china conducted its first nuclear blast in 1964. India immediately realised it must enter the nuclear race. Howev-er, Tibet, the traditional buffer between the two great nations, was now under Chinese control. The humiliating defeat suffered by India in the 1962 Indo-Chinese war was launched from the Tibetan high ground. The prospect of being faced with not only superior conventional forces on the Tibetan plateau, but nuclear ones as well put India in a

vulnerable position.

### **Nuclear Weapons in Tibet**

The first nuclear weapon was brought into the Tibetan plateau in 1971 and stationed in the Quidam basin, in northern Amdo. China currently has approximately 300-400 nuclear warheads, of which at least several dozen are believed to be on the Tibetan plateau in what is today Qinghai province.

### **Land-Based Nuclear Warheads**

To the west of haiyen, China established a nuclear missile deployment and launch site for DF-4 missiles in the Qaidam basin in the early 1970s. The Da Quidam site (37.50N, 95.18E) has two missiles stored horizontally in tunnels near the launch pad. Fuel and Oxidizer is stored in separate tunnels with lines to the launch pad.<sup>1</sup>

The Xiao Quidam site (37.26N, 95 08E), is presumably organised similar to the Da Quidam deployment and launch site. The missiles were moved into the plateau to Xiao

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1. Richard Fieldhouse, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons. A current and Historical Overview." Natural Resources Defense Council, March 1991.

Qaidam and Da Quidam in 1971<sup>1</sup>, which probably represents the first introduction of operational nuclear weapons to the Tibetan plateau. According to diplomatic sources who asked not to be named, nuclear missiles are only stationed at Xiao Quidam and Moved to Da Quidam in times of emergency thus, the sites may be more properly classified as one site.

The DF-4 is China's first international ballistic missile, which when originally deployed in 1971 only had a range of 4,800 km and could not reach Moscow. During the 1970s however, the range was extended and the modified version deployed on the Tibetan plateau have a range of 7,000 km and can reach Moscow and the rest of the former western USSR.

Another nuclear missiles site on the Tibetan plateau is located at Delingha (37.6N, 97.12E), about 200 km south-east of Da Qaidam, which also house DF-4s. This is the missile regiment headquarters for Qinghai which contains four associated launch sites. The organisation of the site is similar to Da-Qaidam.<sup>2</sup>

A new nuclear missile division has also been established on the Tibetan plateau on the border between Qinghai and Sichuan provinces, in the Tibetan province of Amdo.  
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1. Fieldhouse-China in Crisis- The Role of the Military

2. S.K.Ghosh "Chinese Air and Missile power" IDSA Journal, vol 2, No-3 January, 1970.



Four CSS-4 missiles were deployed here, which have a range of 8,000 miles, capable of striking the United States, Europe and all of Asia. This area includes one of the only rural areas on the Tibetan plateau where portions have been consistently open to individual travelers, albeit with restrictions. Other missile divisions are in each of the four Military Regions in the north-xinjiang, Lanzhoce, Beijing and Shenyang.

This site is unusual in that it is not on a railway line, which contradicts those who argue that nuclear missile sites on the plateau are only on rail lines whenever the site is on the Sichuan/Qinghai border, it is only accessible by relatively rugged dirt roads posing serious transportation risks. This placement may represent one of the most rugged and remote nuclear missiles sites in the world.

There is no credible evidence that nuclear missiles are permanently stationed at nagchuka, although many sources say there are Nagchuka is nearly 15,000 feet above sea level between Golmud and Chasa and access is only by an extremely long and very poor road from Golmud.<sup>1</sup> There is no major

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1. A common argument that Nagchuka is an unlikely site for nuclear weaponry is because it is not located on a railway line. Carrying missiles over such terrain by truck would be costly and dangerous. This is true, yet it should be remembered that the nuclear missile site on the Qinghai-Sichuan border is also not accessible by train and could involve a steep climb.

airstrip there and the road is often poorly maintained. Assertions that China would station 70-90 nuclear warheads - a quarter of their its arsenal- at Nagchuka are extremely difficult to believe. Why would China concentrate such a high percentage of its nuclear arsenal in single remote place that is not accessible by train? The Soviet Union, not India, has been the main target of China's arsenal. Moreover, China has sought to decentralise nuclear missile sites in as many different locations as possible to protect them in the event war.

Almost all of China's nuclear warheads have been aimed at the Soviet Union and while some must also be aimed at India, there is not much strategic advantage of placing them at Nagchuka, rather than at other sites on the northern Tibetan Plateau.

The sites at Delingha, Da Qaidan and Xiao Qaidam are 5,000 feet lower (at approximately 10,000 feet above sea level), and approximately 500 miles further from Indian targets than Nagchuka.<sup>1</sup> However the DF-4 had a range of 4,800 km when it was deployed on the Tibetan plateau and by the late 1970s its range was extended to a maximum of 7,000 km putting Indian targets easily within its range. This range classifies if not as a full intercontinental Ballistic

1.R.k. Supramaniam, "China's Nuclear Posture in the 1980s IDSA Journal, vol. XC, No.4 April June. 1983.

Missile (ICBM), but a "limited range ICBM" New Delhi is approximately 2,000 km from Da-Qaidam.

A report that China was shifting its principal nuclear base from Lop Nur to Nagchuka emerged in 1969 from Indian Intelligence Sources and was later reportedly confirmed by a French air force periodical. The report could have referred to an expansion and modernisation of military facilities at Nagchuka at that time. It is possible that China was upgrading air defence missiles which could easily be deployed at Nagchuka.

#### Air-Based Nuclear Weapons

Between 1968 and 1973, China brought its neighbours to the South within effective nuclear range by expanding existing Tibetan air fields and building new air bases in the Tibetan region.

There are three types of aircraft in China currently available for nuclear bombing missions. The Hong-6 bomber, the Hong-5 bomber and the Qian-5 attack jet.<sup>1</sup> The Hong-6 has a combat radius of 1,200 km. While it has not been proved that the aircraft used in Tibet, presumably all of

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1. Richard Fieldhouse, China Today : Avocation Industry Beijing : China Aviation Industry Press, 1989 p.22)

the above craft could land and take off from airfields on the Tibetan plateau.

The main military airbases in Tibet during the 1960s and 1970s were the Chasa airfield, approximately ten km north of Chasa at Damshung, the Chabeha airport 25 km south of lake Kokonor and Golmud airfield.

### **Kazakhstan's Nuclear Inheritance problem**

It was generally assumed during the cold war that the two nuclear superpowers were invulnerable to external or internal pressures with the exception of each other's nuclear forces and that it was not only irrational but even mischievous for any country to doubt it. The demolition of the Soviet Union has resulted in totally unexpected arms control problems. Its strategic nuclear forces were located in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan while tactical nuclear weapons were scattered in about ten republics. Approximately, 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons were deployed in the three republics outside Russia and 6,500 tactical weapons were spread across four military organisations in the republics. The former Soviet custodial system was devised for guarding against isolated attempts to capture these weapons against a background of party discipline and KGB control. It was not designed to cope with socio-econom-

ic distress and political disorder.<sup>1</sup>

At the insistence of the United States, Russia was recognised as the sole legal heir to the Soviet Union nuclear stockpile and by May 1992 it was reported that all tactical weapons had been transferred to locations in Russia. The Removal of strategic weapons, however, is a technically complex and time consuming operation. The weapons located in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, if controlled by the two republics, would have made them the third and fourth most powerful nuclear weapon states respectively. Both republics resented the American prediction to regard Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet nuclear legacy.

Kazakhstan's strategic nuclear stockpile consists of 1,410 warheads, 370 of them on heavy bombers and 1,040 on 104 SS-18s, the former Soviet Union's largest ICBM's: The semiplatnsk nuclear test site was prepared 1948 and the first Soviet test was conducted there in August 1949. After many nuclear test explosions, it was closed down on August 29, 1991 on orders from Nuru Sultan Nazarbaxevev, this important decision was taken even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union under pressure from a mass movement against nuclear testing led by a famous poet of Kazakhstan. While Belarus and Ukraine old members of the United nations, had

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1.P Stobdan, Central Asian Regional Security Strategic Analysis- vol XV, No.5 August 1992.

subscribed to the partial Test Ban Treaty, Kazakhstan was not a party to it.

Kazakhstan inherited a sophisticated nuclear establishment with a military potential. It has several important fuel cycle facilities. The republic has a nuclear power plant as well as a beryllium production facility. Its liquid metal fast breeder reactor, BN-350, at Aktau (formerly Shevohonko) started commercial operation in 1973 and has a license to operate until the year 2003. There is a phased array radar at Sarishagan. Kazakhstan used to produce about 50% of the Uranium mined in the former Soviet Union. All these facilities, being part of an integrated nuclear weapon complex, functioned without international inspection. The famous Baikonur cosmodrome is also located in Kazakhstan. What mandates the denuclearisation of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are not the STARI force limits but the Lisbon protocol of May 23, 1992<sup>1</sup> according to which they accepted the schedule of force reductions covering a period of seven years and made a commitment to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states " In the shortest possible time". Ukraine and Kazakhstan made claims amounting to 'Proliferation by inheritance' president Nursultan Nazarbayev pointed

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1. Mohiaddin Mestahi " Russian foreign policy and Security in Central Asia and the caucasus" Central Asian Survey 1993.

out that his country is sandwiched between two nuclear weapon powers. Russia and China, both having some territorial claims on Kazakhstan. He, therefore, sought, security guarantees from the United States. In Feb. 1992 he linked his denuclearisation of his country with the elimination of American, Russian and Chinese nuclear arms. On another occasion he even maintained that because nuclear test explosions were carried out at the Semipalatinsk test ground when the NPT was being drafted his country was entitled to be a member of the executive nuclear club. Because of its nuclear neighbourhood, there was considerable reluctance to allow Russia to have a monopoly of nuclear arms. Oumirserik Karnov and Kairat Abusetov of the centre for strategic studies in Almaty maintained that their country could not exclude the possibility of the emergence of a resurgent and expansionist Russia. Under American pressure however, Kazakhstan became a signatory to the Lisbon protocol thereby committing itself to the status of a non-nuclear weapons state.

Planning a major expansion of its nuclear infrastructure, Kazakhstan has established two new organisations. The Kazhak Atomic power and Engineering Industry Corporation is given the responsibility for uranium production, power Management and facility construction and the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency will manage the development of export controls

and safety regulations. There are plans to build a second fast breeder reactor (350 MW). All this would require financial and human resources. It remains to be seen whether Kazakhstan can develop its nuclear capabilities without external assistance.

The Nuclear Threat Reduction Act passed by the United States congress in 1991 provided for financial and technical assistance in the transport storage and dismantling of the nuclear weapons of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union in accordance with arms control agreements. The four nuclear republics lacks the resources to cope with their nuclear delay. By the end of 1994 a total of 1.27 billion dollars had been allocated for this purpose. A major portion of this assistance is earmarked for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazhak are also to receive American help in dispensing with their nuclear inheritance.

The parliament of Kazakhstan ratified the NPT in Dec. 1993. Vice President Al Gore was in the icy capital Alma Ata when this crucial decision was taken. The instrument of accession to the treaty was deposited with the United States on Feb. 12, 1994. The United States has promised assistance to the tune of 85 million dollars of which 70 million dollar will be needed to blow up 104 ss-18 Silos. No progress has been made in this welcome enterprise due to Russian concern regarding potential access to sensitive silo design informa-



tion which American experts may use to their advantage.

Approximately 600 kilograms of weapons grade enriched Uranium was stored at the Ulbinsky Metallurgical plant in Ust kamengorsk. Product of a reactor fuel research programme, it was not removed to Russia before the Soviet break up concerned about the safety of this material, enough for 24 nuclear weapons. The Kazakh government offered to sell it to the United States. Three American transport Planes carried personal and equipment to the plant. About 40,000 pounds of humanitarian assistance for an orphanage in the Ust Kamenogersk region was also sent from the United States. The nuclear material was picked up by an American team of experts in November 1994 and transported to the United States where it will be blended down for use as low-enriched uranium fuel in commercial nuclear power stations.

## Chapter-IV

### Implications of Nuclear Central Asia to South Asia

Having described the establishment of nuclear stations in previous chapter. This Chapter will discuss the implications of nuclearisation of Central Asia to the regional Security in South Asia in general and Indian national Security in particular.

Although the desire for International recognition is an important factor, fundamentally, the risk of further nuclear proliferation in South Asia stems principally from their interactions with three major powers - the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States - each of which plays a significant military role in the region.\*

Since the Chinese Revolution in 1949 India has considered the People's Republic of China (PRC) an antagonistic, save for a brief period of friendship during the mid 1950s. The two powers fought a brief but bitter border war in October and November of 1962 over the status of two strategically important areas the Aksai Chin region of India's northern boundary with China, to the west of Tibet and the region that is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, on India's extreme north eastern border with the PRC, to the east of Tibet.

China's first nuclear test in October 1964, only two

years after defeating India in the border war, led Indian prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to suggest publicly for the first time that India might develop nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and he may have initiated a program to pursue this objective.<sup>1</sup> Significant work is not through to have begun until 1969 or 1970 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, however nor did India test a nuclear device until 1974. despite china's nuclear advances, including the testing in 1967 of a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. India has not conducted further test or deployed nuclear weapons since its 1974 detonation. India has cited the potential nuclear threat from China as a principal reason for rejecting the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and similar controls that would restrict its freedom to develop nuclear weapons in the future. An added reason for this stance is that India perceives China as a political rival in the global arena; some Indian strategists have argued that only by acquiring nuclear arms, as China has done, will India be considered China's equal.<sup>2</sup>

China's ties to Pakistan have also troubled India. Beijing supported Pakistan in the 1965 and 1971 wars, rais-

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1. Mohan C. Raja, "China in Space" Strategic Analysis" vol. VIII August 1984.

2. D. Banerjee, "Security and Nuclear issues" World Focus March-April 1993.

ing Indian fears that the PRC "might open a second front. Although it is unlikely that China would risk hostilities with India on Pakistan's behalf in the future, Indian Security Planners cannot disregard the risk with China might intervene in an Indo-Pakistan conflict. Thus China's diplomatic and military support of Pakistan helps to equalibrate the balance of power in South Asia.

China is also believed to have assisted Pakistan's nuclear weapons program reportedly providing aid in operating the Kahuta enrichment plant and giving Islamabad the design of one of its early nuclear weapons. Such assistance is believed to have ended in 1985.<sup>1</sup>

It appears however, that Beijing's backing has been insufficient to alleviate Islamabad's concern to the point that it is prepared to fore go its quest for nuclear arms. Pakistan's strategists point out that in 1965 and 1971 China accepted its ally's defeat rather than intervene against India, undoubtedly for fear of provoking a Soviet response. Moreover, while china has been a reliable source of conventional arms, it can not offer the high-performance weapons that Pakistan is seeking today. At the same time, China apparently has been sympathetic, until recently to Pakistan nuclear aspirations.

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1. Robert Mathew- "Nuclear Waste Sites to be Built" South China Morning Post, Feb 1989.

Thus, China has contributed to the risk of proliferation in South Asia in two ways. On the one hand, it poses a threat to India with a possible nuclear dimension. On the other, because China is able to offer its regional ally only limited support, it appears to have encouraged Islamabad to maintain its security independently by acquiring nuclear arms.

#### **THE SOVIET UNION**

Soviet Union in South Asia pose a multi-faceted challenge to Pakistan. Soviet conventional arms transfers to India played a major role in building the latter's conventional forces over the years. These, as noted earlier, pose a serious threat to Pakistan's security and are one of the principal factors motivating Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons. Similarly, the prospect that Moscow might again take steps to limit Chinese support for Pakistan in a future Indi-Pakistan Conflict can only increase Pakistan's sense of isolation and vulnerability and contribute to its desire for nuclear arms.

With its occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 the Soviet Union became a direct military threat to Pakistan for the first time. Pakistan has experienced major economic and domestic political stresses from the influx of nearly three million Afghan refugees and has suffered repeated border raids by the Afghan Air Force, as well as numerous terror

bombings reportedly sponsored by the Kabul regime. The Soviet Union's longstanding ties to India have amplified Islamabad's anxieties over Moscow's military presence in the region, raising fears that Pakistan might face hostile forces on two borders in any future conflict with India.

Although several Soviet officials repeatedly claimed to be in full control of their nuclear arsenals, the exact number of warheads produced and deployed in the FSU is still shrouded in secrecy and therefore a matter of estimates.

Nuclear weapons were apparently deployed in all the fifteen republics of the Soviet Union. Long-range, strategic weapons were and are more concentrated, being deployed in three republics (Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus), besides Russia. But the sheer dimensions of these deployments are clearly a matter of concern: The number of strategic, offensive weapons in the territories of Ukraine and Kazakhstan would make two republics the third and fourth powers in the world - each with more nuclear warheads than Britain, China and France combined.

Kazakhstan has ratified START (July 1992) and deposited its instruments of accession to the NPT in Washington Feb 14, 1994's. An agreement reached in Moscow on March 28, 1994, between the Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Kazakh counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbayev, calls for the withdrawal of all warheads to Russia by mid-1995 and the dismantlement

of all SS-18 silos and missiles by mid- 1997. As of Mid-February 1994, 12 SS-18 had been sent to Russia for dismantlement; all the Bear it fliet had als been transferred to Russia to be incorporated in the latter's strategic forces. In both cases, however, the associated warheads 120 from the SS-185 and 370 Air launched Cruise Missiles (ACMS) from the bombs- have remained stored on Kazakhstani Soil, at Semipalatinsk, probably pending an agreement with Russia on fissile materials compensation similar to that reached by Ukraine.

Although keen on maintaining its Independence, Kazakhstan has also managed to keep good security relations with Russia - at least to date. An original signatory of the January 1993 CIS Chapter including its collective security pact, the government in Almaty shares Moscow's concern with threats from the South (Muslim Fundamentalism) and From the East (China).<sup>1</sup>

#### **THE UNITED STATES**

The U.S. Policy towards South Asia has been dominated by American efforts to contain Soviet influence in the region. When the United States established military ties with Pakistan in the early 1950s, India established close ties to Moscow. Subsequent U.S. relations with New Delhi

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1. *ibid.* p.39.

have been troubled, despite the of stated commonality of interest and outlook of the democracies, and Washington has turned instead to Pakistan as a regional partner, including in the anti-Soviet CENTO and SEATO Pacts. In addition, after the Iranian revolution, Pakistan, because of its location and its ties to moderate Arab States, became increasingly important to the defense of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.\*

Additionally, India fears that growing U.S. military ties to Pakistan may result in the establishment of U.S. bases, there, and New Delhi has expressed concern over the inclusion of Pakistan under the U.S. central command, covering the Persian Gulf. India also objects to Washington's enhancement of Pakistan as ultimately directed against India.

U.S. Military ties with the People's Republic of China, which include the provision of technology for modernizing China's military forces, are a further source of Indian concern. Indeed, some Indian analysts have expressed fears of a U.S. China-Pakistan coalition against India.

Of the three major outside powers, the United States has been the most active in attempting to retard nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Washington has maintained constant diplomatic pressure on both India and Pakistan to restrain their nuclear activities, albeit with only limited



success.\*

China, the Soviet Union and the United States, as nuclear powers, also influence nuclear developments in South Asia by their example. In particular, the continuing nuclear race between the superpowers provides New Delhi and Islamabad with a moral justification for nuclear arming and incentive to emulate the superpowers and China on nuclear difference, moreover offers a model that encourages the adoption of comparable strategic doctrines on the subcontinent.

#### **Nuclear Future for South Asia**

Irrespective of their public pronouncements, India and Pakistan are emerging as undeclared nuclear-weapons states. For the moment, both remain in the early stages of denuclearisation, with India's program by far the more extensive.

Momentum is building, moreover, towards further nuclearisation. A critical factor is that both nations appear to be striving to accumulate nuclear weapons material free from non-proliferation controls. Thus, even if their nuclear weapons programs remain undeclared, the number of weapons available to each side will steadily increase in the months and years ahead. By 1991, Pakistan had as many as 15 Hiroshima-size devices, while India might have produced more than 100.

China's policy towards South Asia was shaped and de-

veloped by two sets of cold wars- the first being the larger global East West rivalry and the second, the subsequent Sino- Soviet rift. In a little over a decade, the Chinese assessments of India, whom it perceived to be the major power in South Asia, went full circle.<sup>1</sup>

India also provided to Pakistan (in January 1994) "bilateral agreement on no first use" of nuclear capabilities (the term obviously includes weapons, even if at a future date) against each other. Pakistan has rejected the proposal. The foregoing would reinforce the view that Pakistan does not subscribe to the concept of non-offensive defence. General Mirza Aslam Beg, the then Army Chief while talking about Pakistan Army doctrine in 1989 had stated, " In the past, we were pursuing a defensive policy; now there is a big change since we are shifting to policy of offensive defence. Should there be a war the Pakistan Army plans to take the war into India, launching a sizable offensive on Indian territory"., Pakistan having shifted to a clearly offensive dominated doctrine creates one of the major hurdles to a wider and deeper application of the non-offensive defence doctrine in Southern Asia.<sup>2</sup>

The other major problem is the Chinese politico-

1. *ibid.*

2. Michael Wines " Kazakhstan accepts atom-arms pact. New York Times" 20 May 1992.

military doctrine which has to go a long way to adopt a non-offensive defence posture. For example, China continues tens of hundreds of ballistic and cruise Missiles, armed with conventional and nuclear warheads. New, more accurate and longer range ballistic missiles under development re-scheduled to enter service by the turn of the century. There are also no signs that China has given up its doctrine of "teaching lessons", a doctrine fundamentally antithetic to non-offensive defence. The continued absence of even rudimentary transparency in its military posture creates additional uncertainties about Chinese policy.

As regard, the other states of Southern Asia, among the major military powers, there is little authentic information about Iran. There have been continuing reports of Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. It possessed ballistic missiles and is developing longerrange missiles with assistance from North Korea and China. Last year, Iran spent almost 11 percent of its total governmental expenditure on defence.

The general structure and equipment of Iranian military forces is still defgence oriented, possibly dictated by circumstances rather than choice. It is, however, clear that Iran has been pursuing an aggressive political philosophy of exporting its Islamic revolution and destabilising what it refers to as oligarchies in the Arab states across the persian Gulf. Iran has also been accused of sponsoring

and supporting transnational terrorism.

Central Asian states offer an interesting situation for study. After breaking away from the former Soviet Union, they were left with virtually no military capability, offensive or defensive, and to that extent the doctrine affecting them continues to be that of the Russian federation. The other countries of Southern Asia have to clearly articulate their strategic doctrine.

**An Alternative Feature: Nuclear Restrain, Rapprochement and an Improved Security Environment**

New Delhi and Islamabad both remain at the threshold of nuclear arming. The immediate cause of the current escalation of nuclear tensions in the subcontinent has been the process of action and reaction in Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons capability in recent years have been major contributor to the process. India has simultaneously expanded its own nuclear weapons potential significantly, and New Delhi has declared that it may build nuclear arms in response to Pakistani activities - steps which Islamabad, in turn, sees as threatening. The result is that the pace of proliferation in the region is accelerating. As a first step toward reducing pressures for further proliferation, India and Pakistan should refrain at least for one year - from new actions with respect to their nuclear proliferation programmes that may

appear provocative to the other state. In essence, a significant slow-down in the efforts of both nations to enhance their respective nuclear capabilities, even if temporary, would be a major step forward the reduction of regional nuclear tensions and would improve the prospects for serious bilateral negotiations.

The United States, The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are nuclear powers that are major actors in the South Asian Security equation. They have the potential for discouraging further proliferation in the region - as well as for heightening Indian and Pakistani motivations for nuclear arming. By the example of their reliance on nuclear deterrence, moreover, these three powers legitimize nuclear weapons as instruments of military and political power. At the same time, their nuclear arsenals have come to symbolise, in the eyes of India and Pakistan, the subordinate position of the South Asian states in the global order.

China's nuclear forces are believed to be targeted exclusively against the Soviet Union, and they do not appear to pose an immediate threat to India. Such a targeting strategy would be consistent with Beijing's declared policy of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. New Delhi has never attempted to develop a nuclear deterrent against Beijing, and official Indian statements indicate that India is today considering the stance against

nuclear arming only because of the emerging nuclear challenge from Pakistan.

Finally, China contributes to Indian security concerns because it has aided Pakistan to bolster its military power. China supplies relatively unsophisticated conventional military equipment to Pakistan but is thought to have assisted Pakistan's nuclear weapons program during the early 1980s, both by providing the design of a nuclear weapon and by offering technical assistance to help Pakistan run the Kahuta enrichment plant. Such nuclear assistance is believed to have ceased in 1985, when China also took a number of steps to declare its commitment to nuclear proliferation. China should reiterate its commitment to non-proliferation and should continue to refrain from providing any aid to support Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China has a strong incentive to withhold nuclear assistance from Pakistan; if Pakistan acquired a nuclear force, India would be certain to follow suit, a step which would confront China with a second unfriendly nuclear power on its borders.

The foregoing section proposed mechanisms by which certain threats to India and Pakistan posed by China, the Soviet Union, and the United States could be tempered, thereby reducing some of the concerns that are stimulating proliferation in South Asia. In themselves, however, these

steps could not be expected to halt the momentum toward nuclear arming in the region. Determined efforts by these three major powers and by other interested parties aimed specifically at influencing Indian and Pakistani nuclear behaviour could, however, help significantly to achieve this result.

The Task Force had divided these initiatives into two categories:.

- : efforts to strengthen non-proliferation norms and firebreaks and

- : new diplomatic interventions.

These initiatives by the United States and others, should be unified under the leadership of one or more of the external powers. Historically, the United States has played this role in championing new non-proliferation initiatives. The Task Force believes that the United States should take responsibility for initiating discussions aimed at building an international consensus on the need for restraining the nuclearisation of South Asia and for coordinating the diverse diplomatic actions needed to achieve this objective.

## CONCLUSION

### TOWARDS DENUCLEARISATION OF ASIAN PROPOSALS

The concept of establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in different parts of the world is now new. The effects to control proliferation of the nuclear weapon to other countries began with the advent of the atomic age itself.<sup>1</sup> Efforts were made to somehow stop dissemination of knowledge to and acquisition of materials and technical knowhow by other countries. However this could not be accomplished. Nuclear weapons did proliferate and were acquired by the USSR, UK, France and China subsequently. Although nevertheless continued relentlessly and found expression in strategies aimed at preventing, controlling, managing and at times even physically destroying acquisition of such capabilities.

The Concept of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty emerged to put into practice the strategies mentioned above. In effect, the concept of NWFZ went a step further in that it aimed at preempting the threat of further proliferation at any time in the future. The reduction of the lethality and effects on the

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1. Devid Pitt and Crosdon Thompson (ed.) Nuclear Free Zones, 1987, p.41



environment of these weapons, apart from various other factors, played a major role in bringing a large number of the Non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) into the folds of the Central Regime subsequently.<sup>1</sup>

It also tries to highlight the imperatives of the global levels, without which an NWFZ in South Asia may never come into existence. It is a hypothesis based not on assumption but on empirical evidence.

### The Background

It was in the 1950s that the idea of establishing NWFZs began to be discussed extensively. The advantages to limit areas where nuclear weapons could be used, tested or deployed were fully understood and appreciated by this time. The idea was also used to prevent or inhibit proliferation of nuclear weapons to specified geographical areas in future where there were no indications even of desire for such proliferation. Earlier efforts bore fruit in the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. This applied to a region which was uninhabited. It raised no questions nor caused any controversies. This was followed by the Treaty on

1. Savita Datt "CIS : Risks of Nuclear Proliferation" World Focus, May 1993.

Principles governing the activities of the states in the Exploration and use of Outer Space including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies in 1987. This was followed in 1971 by yet another Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and subsoil thereof. Therefore, the first major achievement of the NWFZ concept was the conclusion of the Tlatelolco Treaty (14 Feb, 1967) whereby the states of the Latin American region concluded a treaty in NWFZ in their continent which is densely populated area.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Concept

The idea received greater attention in 1975 when a study was carried out by an ad hoc group of governmental experts established by the CDD. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which defined the concept as follows:

"A nuclear weapon free zone, shall as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone recognised as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Which any group of states, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby? (a) The Statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject including the procedure for the limitation

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1. S.T. Laeo, Nuclear waste in Tibet "South China Morning-Post". January 20.

of the zone, is defined; (b) In international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that Statute."<sup>1</sup>

(a) The resolution also set out the principal obligations of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention serving as the constitutive instrument of the zone.

(b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance on the territories forming part of the Zone acts involving a violation of the treaty or convention.

(c) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the states included in the zones.

**The Imperatives of an NWFZ In South Asia**

In establishing an NWFZ<sup>2</sup> in South Asia, the characteristics of the region, as specified by the 1978 Final Document of the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, must be taken into account. The security environment of the region is not conducive to the establishment of an NWFZ for the simple reason that the security

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1. Jasjit Singh "Southern Asia and the Nuclear Threat", issue -0970 - 0161.
  2. Jasjit Singh, "Managing Regional Security" Asian Strategic Review 1992-93 (IDSA, New Delhi, 1993)

concern of the countries of the region vary too much and so do the states. There is no parity nor is there any hope for it in the future. India in practical terms cannot be equated with any of its neighbours. This should not be taken as arrogance; it is a fact that cannot be ignored. It should be established in the free exercise of their sovereignty without any pressures from outside. It should originate in the region itself as a result of consensus amongst the states of the region. That this has not happened is well-known. It is the US pressure which has brought this about and the security concerns of India have not been taken into account. It does not enhance the security of India - a major country of the region.<sup>1</sup>

#### Nepal as a Zone of Peace

The zone of peace proposal has been a major pre-occupation of Nepal's foreign policy since mid - 1970s. Apparently a foreign policy proposed it had vital and far-reaching implications for domestic politics including the sustenance and survival, not only of the panchayat system but even of Monarchy.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Nazir Kamal, "Non-offensive defence paper presented of UN Expert Group Meeting", January 9-10, 1992, New York.
  2. Permanent, The Nepali Congress Since its inception, Delhi, 1982.

It is interesting to note in this respect that the Nepal side sought only a token statement of endorsement from India for the moment. A close probing of the Nepali thinking on the question of the ZOP proposal's intended international status suggests that once and token endorsement could be secured from India. Nepal would have then raised it on the United Nations on the lines of the Pakistani proposal for South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone. Without India's token endorsement, the proposal could face tough weather at the UN because according to the world body's norms, any proposal to be endorsed by it should have the consent of concerned regional and neighbouring countries. India is objecting to the Pakistani proposal because it lacks such a regional consensus. Nepal may like to avoid such controversies in pursuing its proposal. However, the fact that Nepal had all the intentions to seek international endorsement of the proposal could be seen in its attempt to get the proposal introduced in the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee.

Nepal;<sup>1</sup> Zone of peace proposal in its currently defined form appears to be quite ordinary and insipid on the

1. P. Mishra, B.P. Koirala: A Case Study in the Third World Democratic Leadership, Ironaik Publisher, Bhubaneswar, Varanasi, 1985.

face of it. It essentially presents the famous five principles of peaceful co-existence (Punchheel) on a slightly elaborated and redefined form. Since Nepal and its two neighbours, India and China have already committed themselves to the principles of peaceful coexistence, the proposal may even appear as redundant and superfluous. Particularly so because Nepal has since long, concluded treaties of peace and friendship both with India (1950) and China (1960),<sup>1</sup> and has enjoyed settled, demarcated, stable and demilitarised borders with them. The kingdom has also generally remained unaffected by their mutual conflicts in the region.

In a very significant way, the proposal can be seen as the continuation of Nepal's efforts to undo its special relations with India and redefine them on a balanced and 'equal' footing. The possibility of interested external powers having exploited the King's apprehensions vis-a-vis India had prompted him about the ZOP proposal cannot be ruled out. China, Pakistan and the USA may be mentioned here. China and Pakistan have always encouraged Nepal to weaken the dependence upon, and security relations with India as we have already mentioned in the previous chapter. The ZOP proposal eminently suited their objective in the

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1. S.D. Muni, "India and Nepal : A Changing Relation,"  
Konark Publisher.

sub-continent.<sup>1</sup>

Some reliable observers in Nepal also attributed the idea of ZOP to Kathmandu-based American and Chinese diplomats. While the authenticity of such attribution cannot be conclusively established. This may not be too farfetched either, because the US was equally interested in "restraining India" particularly in the subcontinent, in the aftermath of the emergence of Bangladesh.

The Nepali proposal was compatible with the implications of Sino-US rapprochement developing since 1972. It was to nurse this new found friendship with China that the US had withdrawn support to the Khampa armed operations against the Tibet region of China. These operations were launched from bases in Nepal's Mistang region with the backing of the United States. As a result of the US disinterest in the Khampa operations, following President Nixon's visit to China and the Shanghi Communique of 1972. Nepal got a green signal to remove this irritation in its relations with China. By 1974, the Khampas were forced to lay down arms and were rehabilitated away from the Tibet Border. Having achieved that, Nepal could have an easy conscience

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1. Bhola Chaterrjee, Palace, People and Politics, Ankur, New Delhi, 1980.

and make bold claims for being declared a Zone of Peace because since then Nepal could not be blamed for allowing its territory to be used for hostile activities against one of its neighbours.

### International Support

King Birendra has made Vigorous diplomatic efforts to secure International support for his ZOP proposal. The American support for the proposal during King Birendra's visit to the US in December, 1988 was highlighted. The US in fact was mentioned as one of the early supporters of the proposal along with China, the Soviet Union and Pakistan.<sup>1</sup>

The most unqualified, enthusiastic and immediate support extended to the proposal came from China and Pakistan. Naturally, since the proposal, in effect aims at qualitatively changing the existing nature of Indo-Nepalese relations to India's disadvantage. Chinese support was elaborated in May, 1976 when the Chinese Premier Hu Yaobang said: "we firmly support the just stand taken by the Majesty the King of Nepal, in declaring a zone of peace. We are ready to assume appropriate commitments arising therefrom."

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1. President Reagan's statements and King Birendra's speeches during the latter's State visit to the U.S. - Department of State Bulletin, Feb., 1989.



Over the past few years, however, they have tried to interpret it in the context of growing need for cooperation and understanding in South Asia. This perhaps is intended to turn down its anti-Indian facet in view of the growing process of Sino-Indian normalisation. Pakistan has considered the proposal as being in consonance with its own move to get South Asia recognised as a nuclear weapon free zone.

Nearly the same thing happened in the case of French support which was extended by president Mitterrand on May 2, 1983 during his visit to Nepal. The next day, explaining the French position, the French Ambassador to Nepal clarified that the precise formulation of the French stand was to be declared later.

#### India's Reservations

All the countries in South Asia, with the exception of Bhutan and India have endorsed Nepal's ZOP proposed. Nepal is acutely conscious of the fact that the proposal would not make much sense in effective terms without agreeing to it.

India's reservation on the substance of the proposal

appears to be on three major counts. One is that India abhors the Nepali stance, originating mainly from the Royal Palace, of equidistance with its neighbours, which is being sought to be pursued through the ZOP proposals. There is considerable understanding and appreciation in India for Nepal's desire not to get involved in regional conflicts. It is being argued that India respects Nepal's this desire and accordingly never wished Nepal to be directly involved or even affected by India's regional conflicts with China (1962) and Pakistan (1948, 1965 and 1971).<sup>1</sup> During 1959-60, with the intensification of tensions with China, India encouraged and helped Nepal, in whatever manner to reach a boundary Agreement (March 1960) and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (April 1960) between India and China.

#### Tibet as a Nuclear Free Zone

Tibet is at the centre of South Asia's nuclear states - India, Pakistan and China. The nuclearization and militarisation of the Tibetan plateau has obvious destabilising effects on South Asia.<sup>2</sup> The Indian nuclear and conventional weapons programmes such as they are, have been funded by

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1. Mavin Kurve "Nepal's Peace Zone Move: Attempt to Change 1950 Treaty," Times of India, 14 January 1981
  2. S. Devkinandan, How China May Use Atom Bomb; Militancy Scenario, Delhi :

the threat of China and more recently by Pakistan. Establishing a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) on the plateau, thereby partially restoring Tibet as a buffer state, would decrease regional tensions measurably.

The feasibility of establishing a NWFZ in Tibet will be greatly increased if relations between India and China continue to improve. However, the incentives for establishing any nuclear free zones in South or Central Asia depend upon complex regional politics which in recent years have prevented any serious talk of such a move. Specifically, there would have to be major breakthrough on the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, as well as between India and China.<sup>1</sup>

Denuclearizing Tibet would involve these regional issues, but it invariably raises global issues. India has consistently said that proposals regarding India's nuclear capabilities are discriminatory and that the problems are global, and must be tackled at a global level.

Repeated Pakistani proposals for a South Asian NWFZ leave China out of the equation rendering them unsatisfactory-----

1. Han Crulvane, "China A country of Nuclear Power," Beijing Review Dec. 23-29.

ry to India. Bringing China into the equation brings up not only nuclear missiles on the Tibetan Plateau, but conventional militancy forces as well.

Moreover, it would involve China's nuclear capability throughout her contemporary borders. The incentives for Pakistan and India to freeze their military nuclear programmes and to nuclearize are high. However, absent a more global trend, and particularly a willingness by the U.S. to engage in confidence building measures, China is unlikely to enter into arrangements which entail sovereignty, such as NWFZs.<sup>1</sup>

China's stated support for nuclear free zones appears to be relatively genuine for beyond its territorial borders. Its official position is that "China supports and respects the countries and regions concerned in their endeavor to establish nuclear -free zones or zones of peace on the basis of voluntary agreement to be reached through consultation among themselves. Limiting or banning nuclear weapons from Tibet may encounter even more domestic Chinese reluctance because Beijing already feels their sovereignty over the

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1. Yolana Sharma, "China working with Taiwan Towards a Nuclear Waste Deal," Inter. Press Service, Jan. 16, 1992.

region in dispute. Again such a development only seems possible in the context of other nuclear powers making major steps towards global denuclearization.

The proposal to make Tibet a nuclear free zone has had support and recognition even before the Dalai Lama proposed it formally in his Five Point Peace Plan from Indian nuclear experts. Brahama chellaney includes the denuclearisation of Tibet as part of an ideal anti proliferation proposal for South Asia. While such proposals have in the past been tragically unrealistic, it is possible that several years from now, new regional relationships will have involved to a point where a nuclear free Tibet is feasible.

However, proponents of a nuclear free Tibet have yet to develop the idea beyond a well-meaning concept. Nuclear free zones are complex entities involving the highest levels of cooperation, trust, and verification if they are to be meaningful. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone bans states in the zone from manufacturing, acquiring or controlling nuclear weapons and bans nuclear testing and the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. However it allows other countries to move nuclear weapons, their vehicles and their command and back-up at will through the zone's ocean. Nuclear waste disposal is not banned on land, nor is uranium

mining.

There is no doubt that the Tibetan plateau is an appealing region for a nuclear free zone. The Buddhist ethics of its inhabitants, its role as the headwaters for many of Asia's great rivers and its natural role as a buffer in a volatile area make it a logical area. As the Dalai Lama said in his Five point peace plan:

"The Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace and believe they are in a unique position to do so. Tibet's highly strategic position in the heart of Asia. Separating the continent is great powers - India, China and the USSR has throughout history endowed it with an essential role on the maintenance of peace and stability. This precisely why, in the past, Asian empires went to great lengths to keep one another out of Tibet. Tibet's value as an independent buffer state was integral to the region's stability."<sup>1</sup>

#### The Role of U.S. and Sino-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation

The U.S. position in the origin has been characterised  
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1. S.L. Law, "Xinjing Residents Sick From N. Tests : Report," South China Morning Post, Nov. 4, 1991.

by "passive support" for whatever regional arrangements or confidence building measures that have emerged. Generally speaking, U.S., Chinese nuclear cooperation undermines regional stability because it indirectly funds the Indo-Pakistan nuclear rivalry through Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.

Sino-U.S. nuclear cooperation formally began 1985 when president Reagan submitted to congress a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation had met the legal requirements of the NPT. The agreement which passed, was the first nuclear agreement between the U.S. and a Communist country.<sup>1</sup>

Although the agreement passed congress, there was controversy resulting in adding conditions to guard against proliferation. China's cooperation with Pakistan was in the Spotlight.<sup>2</sup> There are even some reports that Pakistan had tested nuclear devices at Lopnor and Xinjiang because Reagan and Bush could not certify that this condition had been met, The U.S.- China Nuclear cooperation Agreement never actually went into force.

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1. Richard Pascoe, "Uranium Rich Test Still Awaits Steam," South China Morning Post, Aug 24, 1982.
  2. T. Cochian; W. Arbin "U.S. Nuclear Warheads Production"

In 1989, Congress called on Bush to stop all nuclear cooperation with China after Tiananmen Square. Sanctions on arms sales were subsequently imposed. In June, 1991, The U.S.A. replaced additional sanctions on China because of China's track record as a clandestine arms supplier to such countries as Saudi-Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan.

In March 1992, China finally signed the Nuclear-non-Proliferation treaty and in the same month declared its readiness to follow the Missile Technology control regime (MTCR). \*, although it stated its intent to proceed with missile sales to Pakistan and Syria which were contracted before agreed to abide by the MTCR. The U.S. administration subsequently lifted the June 1991 sanctions imposed on China. As a result, the president can again consider, on a case by case basis, the export of high performance computers and satellites to China as before June 1991.\* In the meantime, China is emerging as a Military giant in the Region, supplying arms to outland states such as Burma and being increasingly viewed as an expansionist power.

In December 1992 China developed a new ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and the Bush administration postponed selling a sophisticated super computer to China. But then on December 22, 1992, on the eve of his departure from the White House, Bush lifted the ban on arms sales that were imposed in 1989 and decided to close out four cases of



suspended foreign military sales. As a result, China will receive upgrade avionics for its F-8 Aircrafts, equipment for a munitions production line, four auto submarine Torpedos and to military locating radars.\*

While the U.S. Congress and to a lesser extent U.S. administration has shown some concerns for Proliferation issue in nuclear cooperation with China vis-a-vis Pakistan, playing the (China Card) against the former Soviet Union ultimately prevailed. Promoting regional stability through the nuclearisation in the Tibetan plateau and else where, has never been a prominent feature in U.S. policy. Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senat Foreign Relations Committee, has said that any nuclear-non-proliferation initiative (should take into account India's legitimate concerns about Chinese Nuclear's Weapon. At a minimum, we should look for the D-Nuclearisation of Tibet and the other regions bordering South-Asia).

Another aspect of the catching of a process is that China like the other nuclear powers before it, needs to experiment in getting bigger and bigger bands with smaller and smaller bombs or war heads. In this scene, the nuclear test on May 15th and the mobile ICBM\* test around May 29th are all obviously part of a single programme. China's current deployment of 14 ICBMS in fixed silos gives it the ability to hit any nuclear power, that also gives those

powers the ability to wipe out China's nuclear threat pretty quickly. So China is leap-frogging a prolonged state of acute nuclear power by developing if mobile ICBM which, with solid fuel, can already hit most potential nuclear and non-nuclear enemies. The key remains miniaturisation of the nuclear war heads which the new, less easily detectable mobile ICBM will carry.

It is not easy to understand what is probably happening in China's opaque nuclear programme. In the light of prevailing Chinese rhetoric it is likewise difficult to comprehend by Beijing is doing it.

Kazakhstan, the country closest to the Chinese nuclear test site at Lopnor asked Beijing to halt tests. Evidently the radiation level on ALMA ATA., the Kazak, rose after the last Chinese underground test last October. \*

Russia requested China to reconsider its plan for more tests, while Indonesia foreign Minister Syed Jakarta really regretted China's action. New Zealand promptly delivered a note of protest while Canada saw the Chinese explosion as a clear violation "of the positive spirit that led to the indefinite extension, supported by China, of the NPT just three days ago".

The double standard of nuclear nations policy will jeopardize. The denuclearisation process in the South Asia. The recent Chinese test is clear indications. Chinese

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