

AFRICAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE
From 18th till the Early 20th Century

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PREFACE

The former Portuguese colonies, including Mozambique, are among the little studied areas in Africa. There is a great deal to be studied, particularly about Portuguese colonial policies and their impact on African societies until their liberation in the 1970s.

The Portuguese came to the Zambesi Valley in the early sixteenth century primarily in search of gold and ivory. They finally brought the region under direct colonial occupation around the time of the Berlin Conference of 1885. Prior to colonial occupation or even later, no proper policies vis-a-vis the African territories were formulated by the Portuguese. This was largely due to the weakness of their own economic and political institutions. Hence, it so happened that all the three phases of their presence in the area during the period under discussion - mercantile activities, prazo or landed estate system and the era of concessionary companies - were marked by outright and disorderly exploitation of African manpower and resources. Such exploitation ranged from the appropriation of trading and agricultural products, manipulative trade practices, abuse of manpower in the form of slavery, slave trade, forced labour and labour exports to the introduction of plantation economy on capitalist lines. They also interfered in the indigenous socio-political structures in

order to facilitate their economic exploitation. All this resulted in progressive impoverishment of the region and break up of the indigenous socio-political institutions. Africans reacted to these developments with vehement resistance which culminated in a series of rebellions around the beginning of the twentieth century.

Our study tries to examine these stages and consequences of Portuguese entry into the Zambesi Valley according to the following chapter scheme: the first chapter describes the pre-European Zambesian societies and their economic and socio-political institutions. The second gives an idea about the impact of the Portuguese intrusion and colonization of the region. The third sketches the initial and sporadic African resistance - both violent and non-violent - against alien incursions aiming at the preservation of their indigenous way of life. The fourth chapter narrates the various armed rebellions that occurred in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries aiming generally at the expulsion of the Portuguese and the restoration of African independence. The next and the last chapter tries to gather together various points raised during the course of the discussion in the form of a conclusion.

Whatever we have tried to examine covering these stages has turned out to be a brief narrative. This has

been so because of the paucity of secondary sources in English. There are of course a good deal of materials in the Portuguese language which could not be located in Delhi. Further, the writer who has just started learning Portuguese felt that for the time he need but concentrate on giving an insight of a remotely known aspect of the African past; so that if and when the opportunity arises he can locate Portuguese materials in original to fill up the gaps as also analyse the various important dimensions that have been merely touched upon in this M.Phil. dissertation.


Some of these dimensions we have examined include the impact of Portuguese mercantile loot and plantation economy, which set moving the process of continuous impoverishment. We could have gone into the details of this process had we the necessary materials available. Portuguese-speaking Africa being a much academically neglected area, there is a tremendous need for understanding the various aspects of African life and history in this region. For this we need access to the official Portuguese records and unofficial records such as travel accounts and company files (kept in different European languages). Another additional source could be oral traditions. Such traditions help to corroborate archaeological and other materials to trace the history of

African peoples in the years preceding and falling under colonial rule.

Several persons and institutions have extended their advice and help in the completion of this dissertation. My foremost thanks are due to Professor Anirudha Gupta, my supervisor, but for whose inspiring guidance I would not have succeeded in giving a proper shape and substance to this paper. I am indebted to Mr. Jose L. Ferreira (Jr.), my Portuguese teacher, who has been taking special care to train me in the language with all the patience in the world.

Thanks also go to the Librarians of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, the Indian Council of World Affairs, the Delhi University, the Indian Centre for Africa of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, the National Archives and the Central Secretariat Library who have provided me access to their respective libraries. Next, I must thank the management of 'The Hindu' (Newspaper, Madras) for granting me a Fellowship, which enabled me to pursue my studies. Lastly, I cannot but thank Mr. Yashwant S. Gusain and Mr. Mahender Singh who have done a neat job with typing and binding.

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(ASHOK TANKASALA)

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CHAPTER I

ZAMBESI VALLEY : LAND, PEOPLE AND SOCIETY

Zambesi Valley occupies an important place in the evolution of the history of Central Africa. Geographically, the area lies between tenth and twenty-fifth parallels from modern Zumbo to the Indian ocean. It comprises the coastal plains which are less than 1,000 feet above the sea level on the Indian ocean and the plateau, which ranges 1,000-5,000 feet high, in the interior. The entire area is criss-crossed by the River Zambesi and its various tributaries, which provide a life-line between the interior and coast. The regular trade winds bring rain to the area during the summer months of November to March. Still the annual rainfall varies between five and sixty inches in different parts of the region. The vegetation includes coastal forests, wood and grasslands.¹ These conditions were not strictly confined to present-day Mozambique, whose boundaries came into existence only in the nineteenth century.

¹ J.D. Clark, The Pre-history of Southern Africa (Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1959), pp.3ff.; E.Alpers, "The Mutapa and Malawi Political Systems", in T.O. Ranger, ed., Aspects of Central African History (Heinemann, London, 1968), pp.1-2.

The region south of the Equator in general and the Zambesi Valley in particular belong to a particular homogeneous culture that flourished over the centuries. The people - though differently grouped together - shared similar economic, political and social institutions. They influenced each other in diverse measures, and were equally affected by Portuguese colonial rule. Hence, it would only be proper to study the history of Mozambique as a part of the entire Zambesi Valley upto the late nineteenth century when the colonial boundaries came into effect.

According to traditions, Anoes or bushmen, were the earliest inhabitants of the Zambesi region.² They were small in numbers and depended on hunting and fruit-gathering for subsistence. During the early centuries of the Christian era they were overwhelmed by the Bantu migrants from the north, who possessed the knowledge of mining and farming and other such skills. The signs of their iron-making "are mainly in the form of little clay tubes which early iron-makers used ... so as to connect a pair of bellows to a simple kind of blast-furnace for smelting the mineral-bearing rock."³

2 A.F. Isaacman, Mozambique, the Africanization of a European Institution, Zambesi Praios, 1750-1902 (The Univ. of Wisc. Pr., Madison, 1972), p.3.

3 B. Davidson, The Growth of African Civilization, East and Central Africa to the late Nineteenth Century (Longmans, London, 1968), pp.13-14.

The arrival of these migrants marked the beginning of Iron Age in the Zambesi region.

The farming and mining skills of the Bantus led to the emergence of a settled life. They cultivated crops such as sorghum, millet and roots. Brought up cattle. Lived in stone and thatched houses instead of bushes and holes dug in the earth. Made pottery and other such artefacts. This settled life resulted in the formation of small communities, replacing the roaming bushmen. As a consequence, the population increased in size.⁴ In this manner, the effects of the mining and farming skills brought by the Bantus were simply revolutionary.

This situation led to two other important developments. Arab traders started arriving at what were to be the modern ports of Mozambique, Sofala, Kilwa etc., to trade with the indigenous people.⁵ Africans bartered their own metal products and ivory for Indian textiles and beads and Chinese porcelain with them. On the other hand, since the community life and growing trade

4 According to an estimation, in 1,000 A.D., the figure could be "two or three million" throughout east and central Africa. Ibid., p.38. If we are to accept this estimation, the share of the Zambesi Valley may roughly be taken as one million.

5 No exact time of their arrival can be given. The Periplus of the Eritrean Sea by a Greek-pilot and the works of al-Masudi, however, give the idea that these activities must have begun in the early centuries of the Christian era and greatly increased by the end of the first millennium A.D. See B. Davidson, Old Africa Rediscovered (Longman, London, 1970), pp.147ff.


activities required an authority to govern and provide security, it gradually resulted in the emergence of small kingdoms towards the end of the first millennium. Thus the elementary features of the future Zambesian politico-economic institutions began to show up in this period.

This evolution took a definite shape during the next phase starting from about the second millennium A.D. In the words of Basil Davidson, the period from 1,000-1,850 A.D. "... were the formative centuries of East and Central African life. They formed the peoples of these lands, gave them their ancestors and their customs, their strength in numbers and their skills, so that they master the countries where they lived."⁶

Those who 'formed the peoples of these lands' were the new waves of Bantu migrants into the area. They are today known as Shonas to the South of Zambesi and Malawis⁷ to its north. With their superior technical and organizational skills, they mastered these areas and developed and strengthened, in this process, the economic and socio-political institutions of the region.

6 Davidson, n.3, p.5; See Map 1 for the ethnic groups of the Zambesi Valley, p.5.

6 There had been a Malawi ethnic group when the Portuguese arrived in the early seventeenth century. But it was split into different groups as a result of the Ngoni invasions in the nineteenth century. Today the name Malawi applies not to any ethnic group but to the people of the modern state of Malawi. See Alpers, n.1, p.17.



University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory

Map 1: Ethnographic Map of the Zambesi.

Before taking up these institutions, we may as well have a glance at the composition and distribution of people, their language and religious beliefs to have a general idea of the evolving Zambesian society.

PEOPLE, LANGUAGE AND RELIGION

The Shonas took shape from different but closely related Bantu groups. By the time the Portuguese had arrived, these groups included Barue, Fungwe, Korekore, Manica, Tonga, Wisa, Tawara, Sena etc., in the present-day Zimbabwe and southern Mozambique. They all spoke different dialects of the Bantu language.

The important feature of the Shona religion⁸ was their belief in Mzimu, or ancestor spirits. The chiefs, after their death, were believed to become spirits and advise people, particularly in difficult times. The spirits were also connected with rain-making indicating the people's anxiety over the non-sufficient nature of rain-fall. The supreme spirit in the Shona pantheon was Mwari. When Mwari is approached through tribal spirits called Mhondoro, it expresses itself through mediums called Svikiro. Zimbabwe and Mapungubwe were two important Shona religious centres. At the time of hunting expeditions, drought, disease and such occasions, spirits were approached

8 We shall discuss the religion in two parts. Here we see the non-political aspect of it and the political aspect later when we examine the Shona polity.

at these centres. However, only chiefs could communicate with them through mediums.

We are not much aware of the early formation of the Malawis. Migrating into the area they dominated their predecessors and settled in the region. Their pattern changed after the Ngoni invasions of 1830s.⁹ Since then they have been known by their respective nomenclatures of Nsenga, Chewa, Manganja, Chikunda, Zimba, Chipeta, Ntumba, Mbo, Nyanja, Nyasa etc.¹⁰ They settled over the present-day northern Mozambique, Malawi and eastern Zambia. Except Nsenga, all of them spoke a Bantu-related language called Nyanja.

The religion of Malawis was similar to that of the Shonas. Ancestor spirits had a key place in the Malawi religious beliefs. Makewana and Mbona were their religious centres. Malawi spirit mediums could contact not only

9 As the high population increase in Zululand, beginning in the eighteenth century, caused pressure on land, it led to inter-tribal wars. In due course, large multi-tribal alliances emerged and the situation saw the foundation of strong military institutions and large kingdoms. Ultimately as the Zulus were victorious, other tribes moved into other parts of the continent. Among them, the Ngoni occupied the areas of modern Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania. See J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath (Longmans, London, 1966), pp.2-3.

10 As was noted earlier, today they are collectively known as Malawis after the name of the modern state of Malawi.

ancestor spirits but also the "God" himself. Malawi kings were also believed to possess powers of sorcery.

TRADITIONAL ECONOMY

As regards the Zambesian economy, its mainstays continued to be agriculture and trade. However, since the annual rain-fall varied between five and sixty inches, agriculture could not flourish in the region. The people depended partly on hunting and fruit-gathering and partly on cattle-raising for survival.

On the other hand, widespread availability of metals and ivory, and the skills acquired to exploit these items helped meet the growing demand of outside market requirements. The increase in trading activity is evident from the fact that hundreds of ancient mining sites have been found in the region. Gold, iron and copper and ivory were carried over long distances to the sea-coast and exchanged for items such as Indian cloths, beads, Chinese porcelain and later also for beverages, fire arms etc. Arab traders at the ports of Mozambique, Sofala and Kilwa were the media for this trade. Later on, Arabs even penetrated the interior and established trade-centres at the Zambesian entrepots of Tete, Sena and Zumbo. In these conditions, it was no surprise that trade began flourishing and provided growth avenues for the Zambesian economy. In due course, the commercial economy became so dominating and crucial in the Zambesian society that kingdoms rose and fell responding to its

fluctuations. Davidson contends that "... the political development of the Shona, much more than that of the earlier peoples ... was closely linked to the growth of long-distance trade in ivory, gold. For the period after 1100 was when the long-distance trade ... became really important for these inland peoples."¹¹

The small kingdoms of previous times developed into bigger ones solely due to commerce. This close connection between trade and political developments was due to two reasons. First, some of the chiefs themselves happened to be traders, and needing more and more goods for trade they occupied new lands. In turn, trade profits enabled them to expand their political activities further. Second, for reasons of trade expansion and better security, trading communities needed the formation of strong and larger kingdoms.

A similar situation existed in Malawi country too. Though the position of agriculture was better than in the south, ~~trade~~ trade was apparently fetching and hence attracted their attention. Malawi country was particularly rich in ivory. Long-distance trade in ivory and local trade in iron goods and food items became the mainstays of the Malawian economy. Malawi chiefs "...depended for much of their power on their control of trade....(they) had a

11 Davidson, n.3, p.73.

monopoly of the ivory trade,"¹² For similar reasons as among the Shonas, there were expansions and even moves for unification of different kingdoms.¹³

Such kingdoms maintained their position so long as production and trade were conducted/controlled by respective kings. As and when they lost effective control over mine-bearing lands, forests inhabited by elephant herds and trade routes their source of revenue also was lost. This inevitably led to weakening of armed might and loosening of political control over regional chiefs who rebelled. Thus economic decentralization set in motion the process of political disintegration.

A number of instances can be cited to illustrate this contention. For instance, the case of Mwenemutapa is a significant example in this respect. Mwenemutapa, who ruled from Guruhuswa in the beginning was able to acquire an empire with the help of riches available through mineral trade in the region. Later, when the empire became unwieldy in the late fifteenth century, by when he moved to Dande in the north, he appointed Changa as his Governor at Guruhuswa. This transferred the effective control over local mines and trade from Mwenemutapa to Changa. In due course the latter, together with Togwa of Mbire, "controlling the mineral wealth of the empire"¹⁴ and enriched by trade,

12 Alpers, n.1, p.20.

13 Davidson, n.3, p.240.

14 Isaacman, n.2, p.11.

rebelled against Nyahuma, the reigning Mwenemutapa, and declared independence. They could never be dislodged again. Having lost the source of wealth, thereafter, the Mwenemutapa had ever remained a weak kingdom until its demise in the twentieth century.

Even to the north of Zambesi, so long as Malawi kings maintained their hold over trade they could also keep their political authority. Accordingly, whereas the kingdoms in the interior - Mkanda, Chulu, Kenyenda, Kangulu and others - had this hold and kept power until the Ngoni invasions in the mid-nineteenth century, others like Kalonga, Lundu, Undi, Biwi and Kachombo who were nearer to the Zambesi faced competition from the Portuguese and Yao traders and soon disintegrated. In the words of Langworthy, until the nineteenth century when the Ngoni invasions took place, "... most Chewa kings had been generally successful in maintaining their authority, particularly their monopoly over trade.... It was only in the nineteenth century in most areas that external factors encouraged decentralization of kingdoms. The exceptions where earlier decentralization took place were along the Zambezi, where there was contact with the Portuguese...."¹⁵

15 H. W. Langworthy, "Chewa or Malawi Political Organization in the Precolonial Era", in B. Pachai, ed., The Early History of Malawi (Longmans, London, 1972), p. 118.

There were other disintegrative factors such as succession crises, weak successors coming to power etc. But, these can only be considered as secondary factors because, so long as the wheel of commerce kept moving uninterruptedly, they could not undermine the integrity or power of a kingdom.

The trade and its related activities of mining, metalwork, collection of ivory and transport, as well as the institutions like army that came into existence provided employment to a growing population. It meant: the continuation of these economic activities was necessary for survival of people and, in turn, the labour-intensive economy equally required continued availability of manpower.

In this way it was a situation of booming trade in the entire Zambesi Valley region. This implied that any harm done to its position could well retard the economy, disturb the life-line of people, undermine the power of chiefs and dislodge them. To put it more directly, if the pattern of African trade and its related activities were disturbed, the result was unemployment for people and weakening of the political position of the rulers. Similarly, the agricultural sector provided subsistence for people and its maintenance was essential for their survival. If food production failed to provide subsistence the result was scarcity and starvation. The impact of

Portuguese colonial rule in the region, as we shall see, accelerated this process of disintegration of the economic life of the Valley.

TRADITIONAL POLITY

The Zambesian political institutions were well developed during the Shona-Malawi period. To put it briefly, the authority of a chief rested upon his control over land, trade and religion. Actually the latter two flowed out of his control over land. Though land was communal and did not belong to anyone in the modern sense,¹⁶ a chief was the acknowledged guardian of all land. He had the duty to protect and right to distribute them. Since land was the source of food and place for inhabitation, this authority acquired for the chief influence and control over his subjects. As his authority expanded, he could also appoint his own men as local chiefs to govern on his behalf.

16 The modern concept of 'ownership of land' regards land as privately owned property which is transferable and saleable like a commodity. But, "the fundamental conception underlying native tenure all over Africa... is that land, like air and water, is God-given; that every individual within the community has a right to share in its bounties provided he carries out his social and political obligations to the community of which he forms part; that in the community as a whole is vested the ownership of land, and that consequently the individual member of the community cannot permanently alienate the land he occupies and uses." See E.D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden (Modern Reader Paperbacks, New York, 1969, Third Printing), p. 200.

Since land was also the source for trade in metals and ivory, a chief's control over land and people provided him full opportunities to exploit these materials. He collected them through slave labour force as well as from people in the form of taxes and tributes. In turn, the trade brought him profits which did help consolidate and expand his power.

The religious beliefs of Africans emanated from their day-to-day struggle for life. They were connected with the difficulties they faced in agriculture, hunting and other such activities. Faced with difficulties people looked toward unknown 'rain-making' and other spirits which they hoped to receive advice and guidance from. In this situation a chief, with all the resources and power at his command, appeared to be their saviour. Accordingly, they came to believe that the unknown spirits were their past kings and the living ones could contact them through spirit mediums for advice. This credibility as the agency to contact 'spirits' gained the chiefs further influence over their subjects.

A statewise apparatus was built through which the chiefs functioned and exercised their powers. The state had a pyramidal structure with three to four tiers. Mambo, or supreme chief, himself presided over it at its pinnacle. Next to him, there were provincial chiefs at middle rung and village chiefs at the bottom. In some cases there were also local chiefs between provincial and

village chiefs. Supreme chief divided his land and appointed provincial chiefs. He defended land, conducted trade and governed in general. The primary functions of lower authorities were to collect and send taxes and tributes to central authority; look after his trade and keep law and order in their respective areas.

Assisting supreme and provincial chiefs there were court-staff and armies. "Among the many important figures we may note the Court Steward, the Treasurer and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The mbokorume, usually the senior son-in-law of the mambo, was an important political power at court a more specialized function was performed by the nevinga, the hereditary title of a close relative of the mambo.... Among the women of the realm the queen-mother of the mambo occupied an especially important position".¹⁷ Armies were maintained in thousands¹⁸ to defend land and protect trade. The chiefs also maintained a labour force¹⁹ for the purpose of production and domestic work as well as to enlarge their families. They were obtained through commerce, war or as fines from offenders.

17 Alpers, n.1, pp.14-15; Also see Langworthy, n.15, p.114.

18 Alpers, n.1, pp.15 and 22.

19 This labour force has also been variously termed as 'adopted dependency' (Isaacman) and 'slavery' (Langworthy). Isaacman contends that the chiefs, in order "to expand and strengthen the lineage", gave this force the status of lower level members of their families. And they became full-fledged members after a generation. See Isaacman, n.2, pp.47ff.; Also see Langworthy, n.15, p.114.

In view of the importance of different court-positions relations or close confidants of the supreme chiefs were appointed to them. Although there appears to be some autonomy to local ethnic groups in choosing provincial chiefs, indicating the strength of local ethnic groups and economy, they were expected to be loyal to the central authority. Different kinds of rituals and customs were practiced to ensure the loyalty of subordinate chiefs. For instance, "at a designated time the Muenemutapa sent out trusted agents to the capitals of the principal regional and territorial chiefs ordering them to extinguish their royal fires and to proceed to the royal Zimbabwe where they would be rekindled as part of a larger ritual of fidelity. At the death of the reigning Muenemutapa, all fires were extinguished until the selection of his successor, at which time the vassal chiefs were expected to return to the Zimbabwe and ignite their royal flames from that of the new Muenemutapa. Failure to fulfil either ritual obligation was tantamount to treason, and the army would be sent to punish the guilty party."²⁰ Also, "...every year his most important subordinate chiefs had to send their own sons to visit him as ambassadors, each carrying appropriate tribute in ivory, gold, slaves and cattle."²¹

20 Isaacman, n.2, pp.8-10.

21 Alpers, n.1, p.14.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that though benefits of economic functions as well as political power were concentrated in the hands of the chiefs and their associates, their interests were intertwined with the well-being of their toiling subjects. They were intertwined in the sense that the chiefs could carry on their trade and keep political power so long as they provided employment and security to their subjects. Likewise, the latter could employ themselves and have security so long as the economy and political power remained in the hands of the indigenous chiefs. The moment this pattern was disturbed it affected both the classes. Now Portuguese intrusion into the region affected this pattern and their interests, we shall examine in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE COMING OF THE PORTUGUESE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Having examined the economic and socio-political structure of the Zambesian region, we may proceed to study how Portuguese colonialism wrecked this structure leading to large scale disruption of African life and their eventual resistance to alien rule.

In order to facilitate the study we may divide the period into three historical phases: (i) the phase of Portuguese incursions into the area in the early sixteenth century till about the mid-seventeenth century - a period marked by mercantile loot; (ii) the phase from the mid-seventeenth century till the 1890s when the Portuguese exploited the agricultural resources through the formation of the estate system; and (iii) the period of land concessionary companies which lasted from the 1890s till the 1930s and saw large scale alienation of African land, severe abuse of manpower, and accentuation of impoverishment through a plantation economy. It should be noted, however, that this is only a broad division and one period overlaps with another.

The First Phase

Stories of gold mines in the land of Mwenemutapa and the profits of the existing Afro-Asian sea-trade conducted by the Arabs attracted Portuguese merchants and they started

arriving at Sofala in the year 1505. Before penetrating the interior in search of the supposed gold mines, the Portuguese started seizing the coastal towns and looting the wealth of the Arab traders.¹ They violently drove away the Arabs even from Zambesian entrepots by the mid-sixteenth century, and established their own trading stations. These included the important ones at Sena, Tete and Zumbo.

The sacking of coastal towns and replacement of the Arabs seriously disturbed the age-old Zambesian trade. As we have seen in the previous chapter, trade had been the main source of wealth for African rulers and a large number of population depended upon related occupations for their livelihood. In this situation the disturbances in trade affected the revenues of African rulers as well as the employment opportunities of their subjects.

Another consequence was that the Portuguese traders thought that they could reap more profits by removing the African middlemen, like the Arabs, and thereby dealing directly with people. There was also the temptation of capturing the gold mines of Mwenemutapa. These motives prompted the Portuguese to penetrate the African interior.

To begin with, the Portuguese sent Christian missionaries

1 B. Davidson, Old Africa Rediscovered (Longman, London, 1970), p.259.

in 1560 to proselytize Mwenemutapa.² This was followed by an armed expedition in 1569. But these attempts, however, failed.

Frustrated in these attempts, the Portuguese concentrated on the small and weak kingdoms along the River Zambesi. Intra- and inter-African rivalries over land and succession came in handy for the Portuguese to meddle in their internal affairs. As a result they succeeded in acquiring political influence and trade concessions in the area.³ Apart from such influence, the Portuguese also came to possess lands which were either ceded by the chiefs, or directly occupied by force of arms. The process intensified during the end part of the first phase as the Portuguese occupied a number of Shona and Malawi kingdoms on either side of the Zambesi. Thus by the mid-seventeenth century they were "... in firm possession of the interior as far as Tete and the surrounding countryside."⁴

2 But they were accused as sorcerers and put to death by Mwenemutapa. See, A.F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambesi Velly, 1850-1921 (Heinemann, London, 1976), pp.1-2; Having witnessed the effects of Portuguese arrival for over half a century the Africans apparently suspected the alien intentions in this mission.

3 This entire phenomenon of influence and indirect control without formal colonial rule is termed 'informal empire' by historians like W.D. McIntyre and Isaacman. See McIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-75 (Macmillan, London 1967), pp.359-71 and Isaacman, n.2, p.3; See Appendix I : Text of the Treaty made by the Portuguese with Mwenemutapa.

4 Davidson, n.1, p.262.


The development of an 'informal empire' and alienation of lands affected both the economic and political life of the Zambesi. Economically, trade-concessions meant profits for the Portuguese at the cost of the Africans. It also implied the loss of sovereign rights over resources and trade for the latter. Portuguese occupation of land reduced the Africans into mere slave labourers.

Loss of control over economic matters, land and people naturally undermined the political authority of the indigenous chiefs. In this manner the ill-effects of the arrival of Portuguese on the Zambesian society became apparent by the mid-seventeenth century.


The Second Phase

During the mid-seventeenth century the Portuguese created estate system in the occupied territories. When landed estates began to emerge, the Portuguese Crown promptly recognized them and issued land-deeds to their owners on the condition that the latter pledge their loyalty to the Crown and pay a periodic tribute. Ultimately this estate system emerged into the famous prazo⁵ system of the Zambesi region. The estate owners came to be called prazeros.

5 The literal meaning of prazo, a Portuguese word, is 'period of time'. However, it was used to name the Crown estate. It could be so, probably because the Portuguese were granted land-deeds for a specific period of time; See Map 2 for prazos in the region,



TH-549.



Map 2 : Prazos and Company Areas

These developments transformed the peripheral presence of the Portuguese into a settled one, marking the beginning of a second phase in the history of Portuguese colonization.

The prazeros intended to collect different artefacts and trade in them in their own areas as well as with the outside world. Since this did not necessitate the destruction of existing administrative structures headed by African chiefs, they were retained and utilized to serve the prazeros' purpose. In addition to this old structure, the prazeros employed achuanga, who acted as their link with the chiefs, misambadzi or trading agents, and achikunda or slave army.

During the entire period of their existence, the one and only aim of prazeros had been to gain quick profits with minimum effort. In order to realize these ends, they operated through the appropriation of agricultural products, seizure of mines, monopolization of trade and exploitation of manpower for slave labour and slave trade.

To maintain slave armies and for their own consumption prazeros needed large quantities of food-grains. It was collected from African peasants in the form of taxes and tribute along with other

goods.⁶ Depending upon the needs of prazeros these taxes were increased and, also a measure called inhamucangamiza, or forced sale, was enforced. Manipulation of measures and payment of low prices was a common practice. While the production itself was of subsistence nature and Africans had to depend on hunting and fruit-gathering, loss of foodgrains in this manner aggravated scarcity. Meanwhile, peasants were forced to cultivate cotton because manchilla, a locally manufactured cotton cloth, was exchanged by the prazeros for a variety of goods. This resulted in a further decrease of food production. Slave trade and migration of people who tried to escape these ordeals began to depopulate the countryside.

By the mid-eighteenth century, the fall in agricultural production caused at least three major famines : one in the 1750s, one between 1792 and 1796, and the third one from 1822 to 1828. Distortions and regression in the

6 Taxes were annually paid to the village headmen in the traditional African society. Now the prazeros collected them in the form of grain, ivory, cloth and other such items. On the other hand, there was not any specific frequency for the payment of tribute. It was a symbolic gift from one's subjects as a mark of loyalty toward him. For instance, a hunter was supposed to present the larger tusk of every elephant that he hunted to the chief or the prazero, as the case may be.

patterns of population and productive activities also initiated the process of thorough impoverishment of the region.

Under the new system the prazeros monopolized trade in metal, ivory, cloth, beads and alcoholic drinks. The mines, elephant herds and trade routes passed into their hands.⁷ This commercial empire of prazeros continued for about two centuries from the mid-seventeenth century. It collapsed by the mid-nineteenth century as the prazo system itself crumbled under the weight of its inherent weaknesses⁸

7 Commerce with Africans was conducted under barter system and manipulatory practices were a matter of commonplace. Neighbouring chieftaincies also were insisted upon trading with the prazeros and those who resisted were attacked. In this situation no wonder their profits ranged from 200 to 300 per cent. See A.F. Isaacman, Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution, the Zambezi Prazos, 1750-1902 (The Univ. of Wisc. Pr., Madison, 1973), p.82.

8 The prazo system was weak both politically and economically. To begin with, contrasted with the traditional indigenous chiefs, the Africans naturally considered the Portuguese prazeros as aliens and this deprived the latter of any legitimacy. Its immediate implication was that their political authority had no foundation or strength. This attracted continuous resistance from the Africans. Next, the economic policy of the prazeros was self-defeating. They wanted to make quick money. As a corollary to this attitude they resorted to outright loot, which led to the destruction of resources and destitution of those who produced them. This cut at the very roots of the Zambesian as well as prazo economy.

as well as competition from the Goan and Yao traders.⁹ The final blow came with the Ngoni invasions of the 1830s.

Apart from productive and trading sectors, the prazeros also exploited African manpower. This was done by forcing them to work in estates, in production and household work. Their numbers reached, at times, as high as 15,000.¹⁰ Slavery was not new in the African society. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it was practiced by the African chiefs even before. But it acquired highly exploitative characteristics under the prazeros.

The prazeros also sold Africans as slaves to Arabs and Europeans. It assumed gigantic proportions particularly in the nineteenth century when there was a constant demand

9 "In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Yao caravans began to traverse the Zambesi River, moving into an area which historically had been the core of the prazeros' trading sphere." "The entrance of the Goan middlemen into direct trade relations with the surrounding Karanga peoples reinforced the economic pressures on the prazeros. Although a few Indian merchants had been active in the period before 1750, their importance in this sphere remained small.... (later) the Goans expanded their involvement in all areas of commerce and challenged the prazeros' pre-eminent trading position in areas south of the Zambesi." "By the beginning of the nineteenth century the once expansive trade network had been reduced to those marginal areas adjacent to Sena and Tete, primarily north of the Zambesi, and the total value of trade which the prazeros commanded had declined to a mere fraction of what it had once been." See Isaacman, n.7, pp.83, 84 & 85.

10 Ibid., p.18.

from the plantation owners in Brazil, Sao Thome, Cuba, Indian Ocean French islands and other places. These exports increased and continued inspite of umpteen restrictive measures taken, particularly by the British.¹¹

Apart from denuding the countryside of its population, slave raids created death and destruction everywhere. Villages were attacked and burnt to terrorize and capture people. Whereas the population was already sparse in the region, slave trade drained the countryside of its working population. With only the old over sixty and

11 The following table concerning only the port of Quelimane well illustrates this phenomenon:

Table 1

<u>Year</u>	<u>Slaves Exported</u>
1764	108
1768	158
1796	602
1806	1484
1814	1859
1819	5023
1820	5040
1828	4833
1829	4658
1830	4099
1832	5601

See Ibid., p.92.

young under fourteen¹² being left, economic and social activities came to a near standstill. Families broke up. Migrations increased. Scarcities led to crime and conflict and created tensions and insecurity.

The imposition of taxes was another mechanism whereby the prazeros profited at the cost of Africans. Taxes and tribute were collected in kind in the form of gold, ivory, cloth, foodgrains, slaves etc., so that they may add to their trade and consumption. These exactions were increased according to the requirements of the prazeros.

Politically, the dislocation of the chiefs and the creation of unstable conditions, which began in the first phase itself, intensified in this second phase. Since the indigenous chiefs were regarded as legitimate rulers by their people, the prazeros found it difficult to remove them at one stroke. Hence they were retained for religious and judicial functions, but were deprived of their economic functions. With the loss of land and trade the chiefs lost their economic base and were

12 The age group between fourteen and sixty was considered to be fit to work as slaves. Later, on the same consideration, only this age group was taxed in order to force them to work as wage-labourers to pay the tax-money.

consequently reduced to the position of mere subordinates to the Portuguese. Still later mestizos,¹³ as kings of mestizo states in the second half of the nineteenth century, trying to legitimize themselves even obliterated the religious distinctions. The chiefs and their people, however, did not accept this position mutely. How they resisted we will discuss in the next chapter on Resistance.

On the other hand, the changes in socio-economic patterns, and the Afro-Portuguese as well as inter-prazo rivalries resulted in a prolonged period of political instability in the region.

The components of Portuguese administrative machinery included both the slave armies of the prazeros and sepoys posted by the Crown. The duties of slave armies in assisting the collection of taxes gave them excellent opportunity to persecute the people. They looted fields, collected extra taxes and abducted women and children. In addition, some of them owned lands and engaged in

13 Children of mixed parentage between Portuguese and other races are called mestizos. In the present context it refers to the Goan-Portuguese breed. Starting as traders they became rich and strong enough by the nineteenth century to establish their own states.

trade which encouraged them to behave like mini-prazeros.¹⁴

The Portuguese bureaucracy in the region was limited to the Governor-General and his staff. In the prazos, it included achuanga, misambadzi and their subordinate staff. This entire machinery made corruption synonymous with the administration. Instead of collecting tribute from the prazeros and supervising the implementation of Crown regulations, the Governor-General and his staff gave the former a free hand in return for favours. The achuanga and misambadzi, on their part, extracted more taxes and manipulated trade much more to fill their own coffers.

Portuguese efforts to convert Africans to Christianity did not make progress. Nevertheless the missionaries with their own indulgent behaviour made life more miserable for the Africans. Father Joao de Menezes and Father Pedro da Trindade¹⁵ symbolised this prevailing trend among the missionaries. They engaged in land grab, trade, slavery, slave trade and tax collection with the help of

14 We must, however, note that though relatively better off, most of the slave soldiers had to undergo many hardships due to low salaries, insecurity of job and constant tensions. Because of such conditions many turned dissidents and participated in anti-colonial resistance in later period.


15 Father Menezes and Father Trindade worked in the Querimba Islands and Zumbo respectively, in the first half of the eighteenth century.

their own slave armies.¹⁶ The Portuguese Government, realizing the non-utility of missionaries for Portuguese interests, abolished all the religious orders and confiscated their lands in 1834. In spite of it, their activities continued unhampered.¹⁷ While the prazo system was declining in the middle of the nineteenth century, the mestizo merchants, who emerged strong both economically and militarily by that time, established their own kingdoms.¹⁸ Of these, the most important ones were Makanga, Massingire, Massangano and Gorongosa, which

16 C.R. Boxer, Race Relations in Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825 (Clarendon Pr., Oxford, 1963), pp.48-49.

17 I. Schapera, ed., Livingstone's African Journal, 1853-1856, vol.II (Chatto B'Windus, London, 1963), p.436; The missionaries also carried on educational activities, but a glance at its details should uncover the colonial motive behind it. As late as in 1909, there were 56 primary schools and some vocational institutions in Mozambique town. The total number of students was just around 1200. Significantly, there were no schools in the countryside. Even in the town of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) a primary school was opened as late as in 1907 only. The education did not cross the primary school level. Agricultural and technical training was of low standard. This kind of education and training prepared the African boys and girls not for managing their own affairs, but to become part of the Portuguese colonial machinery and serve its interests. See Eduardo Ferreira, Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: The End of an Era (The Unesco Pr., Paris, 1974), pp.57, 58 and 59-60; J. Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Harvard Univ., Pr., 1959), p.259.

18 See Map 3 for mestizo states. p.32.



University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory

Map 3 : Mestizo States

too functioned on the same lines as prazos. As these states were flourishing in the second half of the nineteenth century, a few significant developments occurred which turned a new leaf in the history of the Zambesian society.

The Third Phase

The Berlin Conference (1885), which ordained that territorial claims were contingent upon effective control of land, stirred Portugal into action and, after a series of wars till the 1890s, the mestizo states as well as the African kingdoms were directly occupied and colonized by the Portuguese Crown.

Thus Mozambique¹⁹ was subjugated, but the bankrupt domestic conditions²⁰ forbade Portugal from playing any

19 The definite boundaries of Mozambique emerged in these years as a result of the Berlin Conference and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891.

20 After forty years of credit borrowings from other countries "on the sort of terms habitually extended to borrowers with poor credit", the Portuguese Government ultimately declared national bankruptcy in 1893. In the same year a senior Government bank official lamented: Our colonies oblige us to incur expenses we cannot afford. See R.J. Hammond, "Uneconomic Imperialism: Portugal in Africa Before 1900", in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, vol.I (Cambridge, at the Univ. Pr., 1969), pp.352-3; In fact, Portugal had been a poverty-stricken country for a long time. Writing in the mid-eighteenth century Marquis de Pombal noted: "The English had firmly bound the nation in a state of dependence.... In 1754 Portugal scarcely produced anything towards her own support. Two-thirds of her physical necessities were supplied by England". Quoted in A.G. Frank, On Capitalist Underdevelopment (OUP, Bombay, 1979), p.3.

direct economic or political role in its colony. Hence, inspired by the work of the British South Africa Company (BSA), the Portuguese Government allocated lands to the concessionary companies such as the Companhia de Mocambique and the Companhia da Zambezia. Others were Nyassa Company, Nyassa Rubber Company, Nyassa Trading Company, Sena Sugar, Companhia de Boror, Societe du Madel, Correa e Carvalho etc. All these were formed, fully or partly, with British, French, German and Portuguese capital in the late 1880s or early 1890s.

Most of the land was leased out to these companies. In a total area of about 302,000 sq.miles, the Zambesi Company (80,000 sq. miles) and the Mozambique Company (62,000 sq.miles) alone parcelled out about half of the territory between them.²¹ In the remaining land some was allocated to the smaller companies and some remained with the prazeros. The companies obtained these concessions with nearly absolute powers and on the easiest terms. The Mozambique Company was granted exclusive commercial, mining, tax and fishing rights in its territory.²² It also looked after administrative and security functions, in addition to "developing" the area. For such a vast

21 See Map 2 for company holdings, p.22.

22 Duffy, n.17, p.91.

territory under its control, the Zambesi Company was to pay only £15,000 per year.²³ The terms of other companies were more or less the same.

Few of the companies, however, had the resources to develop the region.²⁴ In this situation the companies, in the fashion of the prazeros, tried hard for maximum profit with the minimum of expenditure. Hence they substituted slavery with forced labour, slave trade with labour export, and agricultural exploitation with exploitation through plantations. In addition to this, the practice of tax collection and manipulative trade continued as before.

In accordance with the demands of the West, the companies turned to export-oriented cash-crops. These included sugar cane, cotton, coconut, rubber, coffee, tobacco etc. Though extensive cultivation was not done due to the disadvantages of undercapitalization and

23 Isaacman, n.2, p.78.

24 For instance, the Mozambique Company's working capital was initially only \$200,000 and later \$400,000. See Duffy, n.17, p.91; the Nyassa Company was not able to pay its caution money of £10,000. So it had to be reduced by one-fifth. See Hammond, Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism (Stanford Univ. Pr., Stanford, California, 1966), p.125.

inadequate manpower, the cumulative effects of plantation crops and diversion of manpower proved disastrous for African agriculture. The African peasants were not only forced to cultivate cash crops but were also compelled to sell them to company agents inspite of the free trade regulations.²⁵

In the process the Africans, who were reluctant to abandon their own productive activities to work for the aliens, were forced to fall in line. Thus the use of forced labour was made legal by both the Crown and the companies. Even prior to the formation of the companies, when a Commission was appointed by the Crown in 1888 to suggest ways and means to stabilize the Portuguese presence, one of its recommendations was imposition of a head tax of 800 reis,²⁶ on people aged between ten and sixty, half of which was to be paid in labour. Another Committee in 1898 recommended to force the Africans to work "without scruples".²⁷ Next year a law made it obligatory upon the people to work compulsorily.²⁸

25 The companies also sub-leased the lands to smaller companies and individuals. The sub-lesers earned enormous profits through widespread collection of taxes from the people.

26 One thousand reis were equivalent to about three shillings. See Schapera, n.17, vol.I, p.139 f.n.

27 Isaacman, n.2, p.77.

28 Hammond, n.24, p.311.

Under the law of 1899 the male was to work for one week in a year on public works. But, all this was not sufficient to satisfy the labour demands of the administration and companies. Hence, other methods were devised to help the situation.

A whole lot of people ranging from 'beggars' and 'prostitutes' to so-called vagrants and 'habitual drunkards' were identified as "liable to detention work in work-camps or agricultural colonies or... non-institutional treatment... (some of them) may be detained ... from six months to three years renewable for successive periods of three years."²⁹ The penal codes also included provision for sending the convicts to labour camps or agricultural colonies.³⁰ In addition to this, the companies made their own territorial regulations. For instance, the Mozambique Company demanded six months of compulsory labour from "all the people."³¹ Penalty for trying to leave from work was a twenty months of "forced unpaid labour."³² There was the regulation

29 Gouveia Veiga, "Portuguese Africa", in A. Milner, ed., African Penal Systems (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969), p.221.

30 Ibid., p.218.

31 C.V. Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933 (Pluto Pr., London, 1976), pp.87-88.

32 L. Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies : The Rule of the Feeble", Journal of African History (Cambridge), vol.xvii, no.3 (1976), p.397.

for "repatriation of persons displaced from their place of residence",³³ operating throughout the land. And through the course of time additional taxes were imposed which the people were not in a position to pay. Those who were unable to pay were to work from one week to several months.³⁴

Even after the payment of taxes and fulfilment of labour obligations, the peasants were not free to work on their fields. They were taken away to work elsewhere. In 1913 about 11,000 forced labourers were working in the sector of sugar alone.³⁵ Only those who had "... sufficient capital to maintain themselves or who had a paying profession or who farmed a plot of land, who produced goods for export, women and men over 60, girls and boys under 14, sick, invalid, police, chiefs, prominent African leaders"³⁶ were exempted from forced labour.

33 Gouveia, n.29, p.218.

34 Isaacman, n.2, p.88; Use of forced labour by privates was prohibited in 1906, but it was hardly abided by. See Duffy, A Question of Slavery, Labour Policies in Portuguese Africa and the British Protest, 1850-1920 (Oxford, 1967), p.161; Wages were too low. The labourers on projects were paid six shillings per month. But after deduction for food they received only a third of it. Beating labourers and abusing women were common practices at these places.

35 R.N. Lyne, Mozambique; Its Agricultural Development (T.Fisher Unwin, London, 1913), p.54.

36 Duffy, n.34, pp.140-1.

Apart from the forced labour in estates a number of conventions were signed with recruiting companies for export of labour to mines, plantation and other work sites in the neighbouring as well as far off lands. The companies claimed that the recruitments were voluntary and the Africans were used to work in the neighbouring territories since long time back.

The following figures³⁷ show the intensity of these exports.

Table 2

Mozambican Labour in the South African Mines

	<u>1896-98</u>	<u>1906</u>	<u>1916</u>
Total Labourers	54,000	81,000	219,000
Percentage of Mozambicans	60.2	65.4	38.1
Total number of Mozambicans (Approx.)	32,500	53,000	83,500

Still this is not a complete table because it includes only those who were employed by the South African Chamber of Commerce. After 1896-98 it also does not include those from the North of the 22° latitude.

37 F. Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 1911-1969 (Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1972), p.70.
The total number of Mozambicans is our calculation.

Likewise, many more thousands were exported to other regions. Lastly, escaping all these facts and figures was the clandestine migration of labour. The forced labour and low wages in Mozambique, on the one hand and comparatively higher wages³⁸ in the British territories, on the other, encouraged many to leave secretly.

The exported labourers had to work in unsafe conditions in mines. Mortality rate was 67.6 per 1,000 in the South African mines in the first decade of the twentieth century.³⁹ Then many did not return home. From 1905 to 1912, out of 418,000 labourers who were expected back, 87,000 (over 28 per cent) were missing for one reason or another.⁴⁰

The companies tried to profit out of these contracts in every possible manner. They earned fees for workers' passport and even bargained on the labour force by offering to permit the Transvaal mines to recruit labour only if they agreed to transport goods through the port of Lourenzo Marques. The labourers from the territories of Nyassa Company were paid "substantial part"⁴¹ of their wages in tokens that were exchangeable for goods only

38 Hammond, "Some Economic Aspects of Portuguese Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", in Gann and Duignan, ed. n.20, vol.iv (1975), p.412.

39 Duffy, n.17, p.171.

40 Ibid.

41 Vail, n.32, p.400.

with the Nyassa Trading Company. To compel them to spend their earnings, the Governor of Lourenzo Marques even issued a decree ordering all the Africans to wear better cloths. This resulted in opening of twenty new cloth shops in the rural areas.⁴² In this manner, even if there was any small benefit for Africans through higher wages in other territories, it was taken away by a dubious means.

Taxes played a dual role in colonial Africa. They earned hard cash for colonial administration and, more importantly, compelled the colonized to work in order to pay tax money. We have seen how the head-tax worked on the African rural population forcing them to become compulsory labourers. In addition to that, other taxes were imposed. These included a hut-tax at the rate of 4\$50 per hut and others like commercial-tax, industrial-tax, stamp-tax, emigration-tax on labour, property-tax etc. For sometime there were independent inspectorates to check abuses in taxation. Their effectiveness apart, their abolition after sometime gave freer hand to the companies. For instance, after the abolition even those who were previously exempted had to pay taxes.⁴³

42 Duffy, n.34, p.153.

43 Isaacman, n.2, p.88.

From time to time these taxes were increased in accordance with the labour needs of the companies.

The Zambesi Company and its sub-lesers collected an amount of 177:543\$600 reis as taxes from the people in 1911.⁴⁴ Since the Nyassa Company lands were in the interior and did not attract any investments for plantations, it had to depend upon export of labour and taxes more than the other companies. For instance, hut-tax collections in its territory jumped up from around £800 in 1898 to £48,232 by 1912.⁴⁵

The effect of these taxes, particularly of the hut-tax, reached remote areas of the territory. According to one estimate, because of hut-tax, about 45,000 people migrated to Tanganyika and another 100,000 to Nyassaland, before 1920.⁴⁶

The officialdom and armies continued to be as oppressive as in the prazo period. There was an administrative reorganization in 1907 dividing the land into new administrative units and defining the responsibilities

44 Ibid., p.80.

45 B.N. Tomlinson, "Discussion : The Mozambique Company", Journal of African History, vol.xvii, no.2 (1977), p.118; Also see Duffy, n.17, pp.397-8 and 399.

46 Tomlinson, n.45, pp.117-18; Also see A.J. Hanna, The Story of Rhodesias and Nyasaland (Faber and Faber, London, 1960), p.211.

of the Governor-General. But it was of no help to the Africans and the officials, particularly in the interior, "... were virtually white chiefs."⁴⁷ The provision that they could keep a part of the collection led to many abuses. Besides, bribes from labour-recruiting companies, and holding a part of the labour wages, added to their earnings. The labourers provided by the Government were employed in other jobs to earn money for the officials and, also, to procure women for them.⁴⁸ The bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption was even acknowledged by a Government Commission of Inquiry in 1917.⁴⁹ Actually, this was only a manifestation of the inefficient and utterly abusive Portuguese colonialism itself.

According to the terms of concessions, the companies were supposed to develop Mozambique. But their attitude of earning easy money did not much require even the development of communications and other infrastructure. Some railway lines were constructed.⁵⁰ But they only

47 Duffy, n.17, pp.248-9.

48 Hammond, n.24, p.325.

49 Isaacman, n.2, p.82.

50 A line to Johannesburg was opened in 1895 in addition to the Delagoa Bay - Transvaal line that already existed before. Construction of a line between the mouth of Pungwe and Umtali and, another between Aruangua and Macequece was also started. But these were done by British companies on agreement with the Zambesian companies.

helped in earning transit charges for the concessionary companies. As far as social welfare was concerned, the companies just did not bother about it.⁵¹

Throughout their presence in the area, the Portuguese used to refer to the Africans as uncivilized, primitive, uneducable etc. As late as in 1893, the Portuguese leader Antonio Enes remarked: "Going native is a species of reversion of civilized man to savagery, and its main agent is the negress."⁵² In 1898 a government committee described them as semi-barbarians who were to be forced to work to become civilized.⁵³

This attitude was reflected in their deeds, too. The very practice of slavery, forced labour and slave trade demonstrated their racial attitude.

Often the Portuguese cited their marital relations with other races to buttress their claim to non-racial attitude. This was a fact. But the truth behind this fact was that such marriages were more a necessity than a policy for them.⁵⁴ They desperately tried for a long

51 For instance, the Mozambique and Nyassa companies did not establish schools or hospitals during the period under discussion.

52 Hammond, n.20, p.358.

53 Isaacman, n.2, p.81.

54 Racialism was introduced even into education when in 1869 African education was separated from the European education in Mozambique. See Ferreira, n.17, p.57.

time to keep their race pure by settling more Portuguese women and men in the region. It was the failure of all these attempts that led to marital relations with other races.

Though we are not aware of any protests or revolts by Africans in the region purely on account of Portuguese racialism, it must have played its own part to provoke Africans to revolt.

In this manner, the traditional economic, political and social institutions of the Zambesian people were broken up under the impact of the Portuguese colonialism. Since it was a case of outright denudation, the resultant socio-economic distortions over a long period firmly set in the process of underdevelopment. A natural outcome of this trend was the non-development of the region that could not provide alternate growth avenues for Africans.

These very conditions, however, led to the emergence of two social classes in the Zambesian society. On the one hand, those who worked in agriculture, mining, ivory collection, transportation, army and other such sectors before the Portuguese period were later subjected to slavery, slave trade, forced labour, labour exports, army services, and social abuses under the prazo and company systems. On the other, the traditional chiefs and their close associates, though severely affected by the arrival of the Portuguese, still owned some

properties and enjoyed privileges such as exemption from forced labour and taxes, thus being placed on a different footing from the aforesaid class. In addition, a new group of mestizos emerged, who too owned properties. Together, how these people fought against colonial onslaught and what role these class differences played in the anti-colonial struggle, we shall try to discuss in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

The Africans resented the Portuguese intrusion right from the beginning. This resentment took a variety of forms ranging from mild resistance to armed uprising, depending upon the nature of grievances and the level of political consciousness of the Africans.

The main grievances of the Africans against the Portuguese arose from the burden of taxation, forced labour, slavery, land alienation and exploitation in general. As the Portuguese advanced into the interior, Africans tried to protect their traditional socio-economic life as well as resist the abusive means employed by the aliens. Such reaction dated back to the sixteenth century with the rejection of Christian missionaries by Mwenemutapa and his victory over a Portuguese expeditionary force. African resistance reached a high level in the second half of the nineteenth century when the Portuguese tried to formally establish their rule in the region.

Isolated Resistance

We have already seen how the imposition of taxes affected the Africans. They adopted different ways and means to fight against this ordeal. Most commonly the people temporarily fled from villages on the approach of tax-collectors. Taking advantage of the exemption of those

above sixty and below fourteen years of age from taxation many pretended to fall into this category.¹ The exclusion of royal families from taxation facilitated temporary inclusion of several peasant families into them at the time of tax collection.² Sometimes the Africans even bribed the tax-collectors to evade payment of taxes.

The practice of forced labour also encouraged the Africans to flee when labour recruiters entered their villages. Whereas some continued to live in their homelands and hid themselves as and when required, some chose to abandon their places altogether. The latter either resettled in inaccessible interior or migrated to other areas. According to an estimate, in about twelve years from 1895 to 1907, more than 50,000 migrated to British territories from Tete, Milange and Massingire regions alone.³ As noticed in the previous chapter this kind of migration took place also during the prazo period. Thus Tawara chief Gosa of prazo Chibonga always crossed into Southern Rhodesia, along with his subjects, at tax time. Likewise, Neshangwa and Kanyemba, chiefs from the Hunyani

1 A.F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (Heinemann, London, 1976), p.105.

2 As there was no census data whatsoever, these tactics easily paid.

3 Isaacman, n.1, pp.107-8.

river and Zumbo provinces respectively, were among the several chiefs who permanently migrated to other territories followed by their peoples. Where the people resettled they too were "...under the leadership of a member of the indigenous ruling family."⁴ "On prazos Tipue and Boroma...the respective amambo mobilized public sentiment against Portuguese labour practices and refused to cooperate with the Europeans despite the fact that such actions jeopardized their position within the colonial hierarchy."⁵ In this manner the traditional chiefs provided leadership to the African resistance against alien forces. This demonstrates the continued strength of traditional social relations and loyalties of subject peoples towards their chiefs.

The forced labourers, when recruited, devised other tricks such as slow-downs, feigning illness, running away from the work sites etc. This kind of activities were aimed at minimizing or escaping the hardships altogether.⁶ They were largely of a peaceful nature and

4 Ibid., p.98.

5 Ibid., p.106.

6 They could escape from their difficulties to some extent. This happened not only because of their withdrawal from the scene but also due to its impact on their tormentors. For instance, "On prazo Chifumbaze the estate-holder was compelled to reduce the (tax) by nearly fifty per cent to prevent the local population from fleeing.... On prazo Boroma the renter willingly accepted a token back payment in the faint hope that the balance would be forthcoming in the future". See Isaacman, n.1, p.106.

the people seldom resorted to violent means.

TRADITION OF PROTEST

In this category of non-violent resistance we can also include oral tradition of protest portraying the sorrows and sufferings of Africans under alien rule. We may give here two illustrations: the Portuguese concessionary companies designed plantation projects in their estates, but failed to introduce any advanced technology. Instead, the age-old small hoe was replaced by a four-pronged hoe on the Sena Sugar Company estates. It dug more earth in shorter time and also demanded more grit and energy from the labourers. To put it straight, that was a colonial technique to exploit more labour with minimum expenditure.

The following song⁷ depicts how hard it was to dig the earth using that four-pronged instrument:

Song 1

Shamwale Ngawona!	My friend, look at this!
O-ay-ay-ay	O-ay-ay-ay
Shamwale Ngawona!	My friend look at this!
O-ay-ay-ay	O-ay-ay-ay
Shamwale Ngawona!	My friend look at this!
O-ay-ay-ay	O-ay-ay-ay
Shi!	Shi!
Yalu!	Yalu!
Shamwale Ngawona!	My friend look at this!
Shi!	Shi!
Yalu!	Yalu!

7 L. Vail and L. White, "Plantation Protest: The History of a Mozambican Song", Journal of Southern African Studies (Oxford), vol. v, no. 1, October 1978, pp. 3-4.

The word 'Ngawona' was how labourers called the hoe. 'Shi' and 'Yalu' were the sounds of digging and upturned earth, respectively. These few words repeated time and again showed the wastage of labour and the extent of African suffering in plantation areas.

Forced labour, low wages and abuse of women labourers had been a universal feature of colonial oppression, particularly after the formation of the companies. The following group song⁸ of men and women showed how disgusted and helpless the labourers were under the weight of their endless plight:

Song 2

Women

Kutitabusa iwe	You are making us suffer
Nakundimenya	Beating me up
Nakundimenya iwe	You, beating me up
Nyamachinde iwe	You, Mr. balls-owner
Mboli Yako	Your penis
Kutitabusa peze	You are making us suffer for nothing
Ine trabayare peze	Me, working for nothing
Mbatiwona nyatwa na misale	We've seen hardship with the sugar
Ona tambira mbondo ziwiri basi	Look, we're getting just two hundred only
Tambira mikuruzado mitato basi mboli yako	Getting three cruzados only, Your penis!

⁸ Ibid., p.11. In this, Paiva - Jose de Paiva Raposo - was administrator of prazo Manganja Aquem Chire under the control of Sena Sugars. Along with such songs that picturized their pathos, the Africans must have composed verses of rebellion, too. They need to be collected through the oral traditions of present generations. This as well as the first song are of chiSena people near Mopeia.

Men

Ngamala dinyero ache nkabe kuyiona tai	After everything, you can't see your money at all
Ndimba ziwiri zanyankwira	Two whole tasks of earthing up
Kotoka kotoka antu mbasiyale	People knocking off, knocking off at supertime
Kotoka na midiya ya masiku	Knocking off in the middle of the night
Ngamala tempo yache nkabe kuyiona tai	After everything you can't see your time at all.
Paiva, Mpika chita Paiva	Paiva. That's what Paiva did.

Armed Resistance and Social Banditry

Later on, Portuguese incursion attracted not only peaceful and passive reaction from the Africans, but also violent spontaneous uprising and continued armed resistance. Peasant revolts were one among such manifestations. Besides the other issues, land alienation, forced cultivation of cash crops, labour obligations in harvest seasons etc., that particularly affected the peasantry, galvanized them into violent uprisings.⁹

For instance, when the Mozambique Company decided to raise taxes by fortyfive per cent at one stroke, the peasants revolted more than half a dozen times in the 1890s. "The forced labour requirements created similar grievances. In many cases the companies or renters ordered the Africans

9 See Appendix II for a table on the peasant uprisings.

to work on their plantations at critical periods in the rural agricultural cycle when manpower was desperately needed to maximize peasant production. It is not surprising therefore that a number of uprisings occurred in reaction to these demands, especially at harvest times."¹⁰

On such occasions the peasants attacked the Portuguese tax-collectors and labour recruiters. They also destroyed administrative and trade installations, communication systems and enemy properties. But, having done that in angry outburst, they withdrew to their own villages. This clearly demonstrates that at this stage their aim was to preserve their own traditional society by merely pushing back the aliens from meddling in it.¹¹

Another kind of resistance was represented by social banditry¹² when groups of peasants or labourers went into hiding in small numbers and attacked tax-collectors and labour recruiters, and looted European property.

10 Isaacman. n.1, p.115.

11 In the case of peasant uprising "in almost every case where the leadership is identifiable, it was drawn from the royal family". See Ibid.

12 The definition of social banditry is discussed in the following pages; See Appendix II for a table on the Social Banditry.

Hobsbawm has described such bandits as "some kind of robbers" who are not regarded as "simple criminals"¹³ by people. Instead, their activity represented "a form of self-help" to escape social crisis and tensions. Such bandits "except for their willingness or capacity to refuse individual submission, have no idea other than those of peasantry."¹⁴ Their struggle, according to Hobsbawm, may turn into genuine revolutionary movement "...when it becomes the symbol, even the spearhead of resistance by the whole of the traditional order..."¹⁵

We know little of such banditry, but five instances of social banditry that occurred in Mozambique and southern Rhodesian region can be cited here: they were Moave, son of a Tawara chief who was threatened by the Portuguese; Samakangu and Capula, two village chiefs from prazo Inhacugouse who suffered due to taxation and forced labour; two workers from prazo Bororo; Dambukashamba, who hailed from a common family and resented slave trade, forced labour and taxes, and; Kashidza of Mazoe region. Among these except Dambukashamba¹⁶, all others were engaged in attacks and robberies against the Europeans.

13 E.J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (Penguins, Harmondsworth, 1972), p.17.

14 Ibid., p.24.

15 Ibid., p.27.

16 Who, for a large part of his career, was associated with Mapondera. We shall discuss Mapondera later in this chapter.

In all these instances of social banditry, the extent of popular participation was small. This was partly due to the violent consequences of such activities. Partly also, the attachment of peasantry to land and their familial responsibilities did not permit them to lead secret life and conduct violent action which such forms of resistance demanded. Likewise, not the African kings, but small chiefs and some brave individuals led such activities. This was because the kings with their large resources and following had obviously no reason to fight secretly. Thus smaller chiefs and local heroes with their small bands of individuals took to social banditry and guerilla warfare. Nevertheless they enjoyed wide sympathy and cooperation from the people, who regarded them as fighters against the common enemy.

Chief Mapondera's Resistance

Again, we see another kind of resistance against the Portuguese in this period. This was armed resistance somewhat on a larger scale than peasant uprisings and social banditry. The leaders of such resistance were either the traditional chiefs or persons of standing in society.

The case of chief Mapondera of a small kingdom called Nyota in the region of Mazoe, can be cited here as an example.

Hailing from a royal family that had a tradition of fighting for national interests, Mapondera, when he came to power, was adamant about maintaining independence while establishing economic relations with both the Portuguese and the British. He explicitly refused to pay taxes to the British or to accept their hegemony. This was his level of consciousness before he went into hiding in 1895.

Isaacman says that Mapondera turned to 'social banditry' due to a few personally related colonial abuses such as death of his nephew and half-brother under the Europeans.¹⁷ Perhaps these could be immediate factors, but European attempts to establish effective control over the area, increase in police patrols and beginning of hut-tax collection¹⁸ - against which Mapondera had been fighting - could as well be the catalytic factors that led to his decision to go underground and resort to arms. Mapondera's activities between 1895 and 1900, when he joined chiefs Chioco and Hanga, also do not justify calling him a mere social bandit. As Isaacman himself states, Mapondera "recognized the Europeans as the source of African oppression without regard to their national origin"; "fostered anti-European sentiment along

17 Isaacman, n.1, p.112.

18 Ibid.

the eastern frontiers"; and attacked both the Portuguese and the British.¹⁹ He did not spare African collaborators either. The same consciousness led Mapondera to join the Mwenemutapa and Barue rebellions from the late 1890s.²⁰

Another important point that needs to be emphasized is that Mapondera did not indulge in robberies.²¹

Interestingly, the British were much worried about the loss in flow of labour to their mines due to his attacks.²²

These attacks and disruption of European gold route,²³ and

19 Ibid., p.113.

20 After the Massingire rebellion of 1884 the next one took place only in 1897. So the question why Mapondera did not join broader anti-colonial rebellions before does not arise. Moreover, the process of alliance formation in the region had just begun from the mid-1890s.

21 Politically motivated guerilla attacks on colonial property cannot be termed as banditry. Mapondera does not seem to have robbed during these raids either. Isaacman considers Mapondera's attacks on some mine workers and fields in surrounding villages as acts of robbing the people. See Isaacman, "Social Banditry in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Mozambique, 1894-1907 : An Expression of Early Peasant Protest", Journal of Southern African Studies, vol.iv, no.1, October 1977, p.17.

22 Warhurst, "Troubled Frontier : North-Eastern Mashonaland, 1898-1905", African Affairs (Oxford), vol.77, no.307, April 1978, p.217.

23 Ibid., p.218.

later his leadership of the peasants to dissuade them from obeying the Portuguese or estate holders²⁴ suggest that Mapondera's aim was not to rob but to deprive imperial powers of manpower and other resources.²⁵

Not going into the other minor details we can conclude from this discussion that Mapondera had acquired an anti-colonial consciousness which persuaded him to act in a particular way. In the long-term perspective, Mapondera's resistance against the aliens led to a heightened consciousness among the people, the nature and consequences of which we shall see in the next chapter.

24 Isaacman, n.21, p.23.

25 Even if he had robbed during food shortages in desperation, as Isaacman assumes, this cannot alter his very character. Because, we come across such instances after the Barue rebellion of 1917 also, whereas the guerilla bands under Barue kings often rob food in desperation. See Isaacman, n.1, p.172.


CHAPTER IV
THE REBELLIONS

The period spanning for about forty years from 1880 to the turn of this century saw a series of rebellions by Africans all over the Zambesi Valley.¹ These rebellions were organized by the African kings or chiefs with the aim of ousting the Portuguese colonial rule. Such rebellions included those of the mestizo states of Massingire, Gorengosa and Makanga, and the African states of Barue, Tawara and Shona. We shall first describe various rebellions that occurred, and then try to discuss the aspects of their organization, character and leadership.

Massingire Rebellion, 1884

The Massingire rebellion of 1884 was the result of an intra-African rivalry. Massingire, a mestizo state, was afraid of Makololo, another mestizo state, and concluded a treaty of defence with the Portuguese in 1882. According to this treaty the Massingire accepted the overlordship of the Portuguese, so that the latter would in turn render assistance in defending their state.

¹ We stop our study of this series of rebellions, however, with the Shona rebellion of 1904. Because the next and last rebellion, by the Barue in 1917, is a very significant one and requires a full-fledged study, which is not feasible here; See Map 4 on rebellions, p.61, and also Appendix III.



Map 4 : THE REBELLIONS

Ignoring merely the political aspect of the Massingire treaty the Portuguese, however, sought to reap economic benefits by imposing a hut-tax during the subsequent years. This caused great African resentment and added a new dimension to Massingire-Portuguese relations. A crisis was precipitated when king Matequenha II died in suspicious circumstances and the Portuguese prevented the use of maubvi, or poison test, to find out the culprits. This prevention of the traditionally accepted practice of maubvi was considered an interference in the political and social institutions of the Massingire.

Upon this Bezingwe and Raposo, the two principal subordinate chiefs of Massingire, tried to expel the Portuguese. But they were quickly captured and deported to Quelimane. Some time later, the two managed to escape from Portuguese hands and rejoined their people to organize a rebellion against the enemy. In this they received support from the peasants of prazo Manganja who had experienced decades of resistances against the Portuguese. Some former slaves in the neighbouring areas also joined them. Even Miauri, a chief from the rival Makololo state came to assist the rebels.

The rebellion broke out on 20 July 1884. Not only did the Africans attack Portuguese settlements but also the French and Dutch trade establishments. The uprising

quickly spread out into neighbouring areas so that it seemed "... not to be the Machingire who are causing the disturbances, but all the tax payers from all the country from Chano to Luabo."² The rebels also started killing puppet chiefs appointed by the Portuguese.

By the end of July the entire lower Shire Valley was "liberated" helped obviously by the fragile nature of the Portuguese hold on the area. As the rebels were preparing to attack Mopeia, the last enemy station on the northern bank of the Zambesi, a Portuguese relief force that included African mercenaries repulsed the rebels. The muskets the Africans used proved no match to the long range rifles used by the enemy. Later they were outnumbered as the Portuguese launched a counter-attack with 4,000 troops. Gouveia, leader of another mestizo state of Gorongosa, joined the Portuguese as a collaborator and began attacking the retreating rebel forces. At this juncture, the Massingire sought help from Makololo but the British, in an expression of imperial solidarity with the Portuguese, prevented them from rendering any such assistance.³ Nevertheless the

2 M.D.D. Newitt, "Massingire Rising of 1884", Journal of African History (Cambridge), vol.II, 1970, p.97.

3 Ibid., p.101.

rebellion continued till October despite heavy losses suffered by the Africans.⁴

Gorongosa Rebellion, 1897

The rebellion that took place in the mestizo state of Gorongosa, after thirteen years since the rise of Massingire, was a significant landmark in the history of African struggle to retain their independence.

After the death of Gouveia in 1891 a power struggle started among his three lieutenants: Cambuemba, Gizi and Luis de Gorongosa. All the three, who had learnt enough about alien intrigues while serving under Gouveia, were quick enough to reject Portuguese overtures to meddle into their affairs. Also they kept on fighting the Portuguese individually. In due course Cambuemba, realizing the futility of isolated resistance, successfully forged an anti-Portuguese alliance with the help of Gizi and Luis de Gorongosa, his two rivals. The alliance further extended to include the states of Barue and Massangano, remnants of Massingire forces and peasants from fifteen estates.⁵ On the eve of the rebellion the

4 The African prisoners included thirtyseven chiefs. Incidentally, this shows the extent of the rebellion, and also explains its sustenance for three months.

5 The peasants who were reluctant at first to join Cambuemba, because of his previous record under Gouveia, finally extended their support in 1896 when the Mozambique Company reimposed hut-tax.

alliance was in a position to mobilize five to ten thousand soldiers.⁶

Starting in May 1897, the rebels occupied the prazos of Bandar, Tambara, Inharuca and Sone. Next month as they approached Sena, history was repeated. The Portuguese sent an additional force of about 2,950 well-equipped soldiers.⁷ By August the rebellion had been suppressed⁸ with hundreds of deaths on the side of Africans.

Makanga Rebellion, 1901

The rebellion of Makanga offers a different case from the ones described above. Chinsinga, the chief of Makanga, was a very different type of character from the chiefs of Massingire or Gorongosa. His background of colonial education and alienation from society (because of prolonged residence in the towns of Quelimane and Tete) made him adopt a pro-Portuguese stance even before he came to power. This was resented by important members of Makanga. Consequently, when king Saka-Saka died in 1885, subordinate chiefs forced him into exile and enthroned his cousin Chicucuru II. Seven years later, on the death of Chicucuru, in 1892, Chinsinga returned to power with Portuguese support.

6 A.F. Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique* (Heinemann, London, 1976), p.135.

7 Out of them only about thirty were of European descent. The rest were Africans.

8 In this case the African prisoners included forty chiefs.

In gratitude, Chinsinga agreed to subordinate the kingdom to the Portuguese. He also granted a number of economic concessions to the Zambesi Company and European traders. In this situation the chiefs and spirit mediums of Makanga, who were aware of the Portuguese exploitation, exerted tremendous pressure on him. "This united opposition forced him in 1897 to acknowledge past precedent and take no decision of national importance before consulting the royal council. He further assured his critics by promising that he would not initiate any policies which impinged on Makanga's sovereignty."⁹

As these internal pressures started to influence Chinsinga, the Zambesi Company served a notice on him asking that Makanga be merged with the Company's territory, that he should accept the imposition of taxes and recruitment of labour, and become a paid agent of the Portuguese. Simultaneously, the Portuguese also started cultivating African dissidents in the Casula-Chiuta region. The notice was sent in October 1901 and within two months events took a dramatic turn.

On receiving the notice, Africans decided to give a befitting reply to the Portuguese by launching a

9 Isaacman, n.6, p.137.

surprise attack on their settlements. The attack would nearly have succeeded had not two village chiefs - Mafa and Chidzio - warned the Portuguese before hand. Now it was the turn of Africans to get surprised as the Portuguese began a pre-emptive attack in December 1901. A number of dissident village chiefs collaborated with the Portuguese in this venture. Even though ^{no} full preparations were made and no alliances were concluded, Makanga, facing more than 6,000 Portuguese army with advanced weaponry, stood their ground for five long months. Finally in May 1902 their rebellion was crushed.

Barue Rebellion, 1902

Until 1902, the Barue underwent continuous succession crises, each marking a new stage of resistance against colonial interference in their internal affairs. In the first round of the succession struggle when Samacande, a moderate, emerged victorious over Hanga (1894), the Portuguese thought they could influence the former. But Samacande belied their hopes by refusing to enter into any relations with them. His successor Hanga (1896?) opposed all kinds of alien domination. During his time the Chibudu branch of the Barue royal family, led by Chipitura,¹⁰ started a new dispute. Chipitura conquered

10 Both Samacande and Hanga belonged to the Chipapata Branch.

some of the Barue lands with Portuguese assistance. This created new hopes for the latter to bring the Barue under heels. But just as Massingire who sought Portuguese help but refused to forge independence,¹¹ Chipitura also disappointed them by rejecting their claims to the land of Barue.

As an aberration to this tradition, Cassiche, the successor of Chipitura,¹² agreed to cede land to the Mozambique Company, but soon faced a revolt by the chiefs and was replaced by Cavunda. Cavunda repudiated any agreement giving the Portuguese the control over African land. At this stage, a third round of succession struggle erupted between Cavunda and Hanga which the latter won by 1901.¹³ Upon this the Portuguese who had been patiently waiting in the wings sent an offer of help to Cavunda. But Cavunda rejected their offer.

Once firmly placed in the saddle, Hanga proceeded to eliminate the Portuguese threat. With his long experience, Hanga correctly recognized the need for a wide

11 And, as the triumvirate of Gorongosa who, inspite of their power struggle, did not fall a prey to the Portuguese.

12 Chipitura died in Ca.1899.

13 We see the spectre of these succession rivalries haunting the Barue till their next rebellion in 1917, and even after that.

and strong coalition to accomplish this task. In this, his negotiations with the other Europeans - the British, the Germans and the Boers - failed but his efforts were fairly successful on the African front. The reputation of Barue who foiled the Portuguese designs and Hanga's own record readily rallied the Zambesian peoples around him. The influence of these developments was so much that, as the Portuguese themselves acknowledged, "...each day, the indigenous population became more reluctant to pay the taxes and provide labour. They consider the situation of the Barue as most desirable."¹⁴

For Hanga, the process of coalition began as soon as he succeeded Samacande in the early 1890s. In spite of his power struggle with the other branch of the royal family, he had been promoting an anti-European alliance under the leadership of Mwenemutapa Chioco.¹⁵ Thus an alliance of Barue, Tawara and Tonga polities had already been functioning since long before the Barue rebellion of 1902. Now the alliance also included some forces of Wisa and of Hanga's rival Cavunda. To build up this alliance Hanga, apart from stressing on the common

14 Isaacman, n.6, pp.57-58.

15 We shall examine the rebellion of Tawara under Chioco separately. In 1902 it coincides with the rebellion of Barue.

grievances of colonial threat and oppression, promised others to help free their own lands once the Barue succeeded in defeating the enemy. He also entered into matrimonial alliances with other chiefs to strengthen the front.

On the other hand, large-scale logistic arrangements were made in advance. As early as in 1896, Hanga reportedly collected 7,000 guns. Perhaps for the first time among the Zambesians, he established a small-scale arms industry and ammunition factories at Mungari and Missongue. Major fortresses at Missongue, Mungari and Mafunda, small defensive structures along the borders at important road and water ways, and a number of aringas¹⁶ were built. Over and above, Kabudu Kagoro, the national ancestor spirit, was invoked to extend support to the alliance. People held the belief that it was this support and the war medicines the ancestor spirit provided which enabled the Barue to withstand the Portuguese.¹⁷

16 Aringa was a stockade made of wooden stakes that served as a military camp.

17 On the eve of the impending rebellion, Kabudu Kagoro presented nyumbe, or magic medicine tail, by raising of which in a war the enemy bullets turn into water. Kabudu Kagoro also provided a special magic potion to mix in the soldiers' food to protect them individually and bute a special smoke, to safeguard Barue villages. The belief that the enemy bullets turn into water was held even by those Africans in the Portuguese army and they refused to fire later in the war. Upon this the Portuguese introduced another medium who predicted that Hanga would soon turn to be a weak hippo. The trick worked and consequently the African mercenaries had no hesitation to fight the Barue.

The war which broke out with the Portuguese attack on Tambara, a Tonga aringa, on 30 July, continued till December 1902. It finally ended in a total disaster for the Africans. It so happened that inspite of the elaborate preparations by the Barue, the Portuguese kept themselves on a military alert all the time. This is why they could seize the initiative to attack the Barue first. Starting from Tambara, Portuguese captured all the principal Tonga polities and Missongue, the Barue capital, within a month. Hanga fled into Southern Rhodesia with his followers and Kabudu Kagoro. The allies like Cavunda and Mapondera also lost on other fronts and one major loss was the death of Mwenemutapa Chioco.

Another reason for this failure was that Barue were outnumbered by a 20,000 strong Portuguese army¹⁸ and also outgunned by its modern armaments like machine guns and advanced type of artillery. Thirdly, the Africans were at a disadvantage in fighting from fixed fortifications whereas the Portuguese adopted the strategy of

18 In that less than three per cent were of Portuguese origin. Thousands of Africans were recruited with the inducement of high salaries and permission to keep the plunder and kidnapped women and children. See Isaacman, n.6, p.65.

mobile warfare. The speed of the enemy demoralized Africans. They thought that the enemy's medicines were stronger than the medicines of Kabudu Kagoro.¹⁹

Finally the alignment of Sena with the Portuguese was a contributory factor. As village chiefs of Casula-Chiuta region who were aggrieved against Makanga and sided with the Portuguese in the rebellion of 1901, the Sena also fought on behalf of the aliens because of their fear of the Barue. Perhaps it was the level of consciousness among the Zambesian polities at that stage in history, because even Hanga did not talk in terms of liberating the entire region in a pan-Zambesian war but, put priority only on safeguarding the independence of Barue.

Mwenemutapa's Rebellion, 1897-1902

By the second half of the nineteenth century, the only notable points about the Mwenemutapa kingdom were its past glory and the continued support of Dzivaguru, the Shona national ancestor spirit. But the series of African rebellions against the European colonialism inspired Mwenemutapa Chioce to try to put a stop to the

19 Probably the drowning of Mapondera's son by angry Fungwe rebels, on account of this failure, well demonstrates the extent of disillusionment it had caused. Tangwena, a powerful chief, and others also fled presumably for the same reason.

Portuguese domination. As soon as he did so, people rallied round him. By 1897 most of the Tawara chiefs pledged support to Chioco. And the spirit mediums pressurized the other African chiefs to fall in line with him. The mediums also played their role by rousing anti-European feelings of the masses.

The rebellion itself stretched for over a period of about five years. Beginning in 1897, Mwenemutapa's forces liberated most of the region from Tete to Chioco. Then in alliance with Barue, Massangano and Mapondera²⁰ they drove away the enemy from upper Zambesi and north-eastern frontiers of Mwenemutapa. By 1901 nearly the entire country was liberated and Tete, the last Portuguese town in the middle Zambesi, was under seize. On the other hand, Chioco was planning to revive his old Mwenemutapa empire. With this aim in mind he helped Tawara²¹ in Southern Rhodesia, who were resisting the British. Tawara spirit mediums actively supported Chioco in these efforts.

20 Mapondera was made Commander of the Army in 1900.

21 The Tawara people of the former Mwenemutapa empire were now spread over different regions in Mozambique as well as Southern Rhodesia. Chioco wished to bring them all together under one banner.

At this point the rebellion of Mwenemutapa coincided with the Barue rebellion of 1902. As we have already seen earlier, the Portuguese employed a large army with modern weaponry to crush the entire chain of revolts including that of Mwenemutapa by the end of 1902.

Shona Rebellion, 1904

The Shona rebellion of 1904, that occurred within two years of the crushing defeat of the Barue-Tawara-Tonga alliance, testified to the unbearable colonial situation as well as the irrepressible desire of the Africans to preserve their independence.

In fact, notwithstanding the successes or failures of the rebellions that broke out from time to time, the people had been relentlessly resisting the colonial oppression everywhere within their limits.²² Such resistance and a drought in 1903, in addition to the spread of a cattle-killing fever in Tete district and eastern Rhodesia, created a tenuous situation in the region in the early twentieth century. In such conditions the spirit mediums acted as revolutionary catalysts attributing the occurrence of natural disasters to the alien presence.

22 For instance there was a small peasant uprising in the Changara region in 1903, and a mutiny by conscripted soldiers in Tete.

Even as they encouraged the people to turn their wrath against the Portuguese, Kanowanga, the spirit medium of Chaminuka, declared Hanga leader of the rebellion.²³

Within the next few months an alliance that included major Tawara chiefs, Shona-related peoples, remnants of Mwenemutapa forces, Dambukashamba, a former lieutenant of Mapondera, and a number of dissidents emerged. The impact of colonial exploitation that was compounded by the natural calamities was so severe and widespread that even Tangwena of Inyanga, who fled during the war of Barue and, Mutassa of Manica, who never before agreed to go against the Europeans, also joined the front.²⁴ Arms were smuggled in from the Mozambican hide-outs where they were stored before, and they also looted Portuguese military posts.

Before the actual rebellion started, labourers on both sides of the frontier refused to work for European planters. A general and simultaneous rising was planned

23 Since the Barue are Shona-related people, there need not be any confusion as to why a Barue king was chosen to lead the Shona rebellion.

24 The exhortations of Kanowanga, the spirit medium, were instrumental in persuading these chiefs to join Hanga. When they approached Kanowanga to show a way out from the natural calamities, he cited the European presence as the cause of such calamities and directed them to rebel under the leadership of Hanga.

in which the countryside was to be liberated first and then the towns. Starting in September 1904 the region between Mazoe and Luia river came under rebel control in no time. But the reinforced Portuguese forces re-occupied it by suppressing the rebellion by November.

Characteristics of the Rebellions

From resistance to rebellion a change can be discernible, especially in the arena of African leadership. African resistance was either put up on individual basis or was initiated and led by traditional chiefs in a sporadic fashion. In the case of rebellions, on the other hand, we also see that in addition to the traditional chiefs, subordinate chiefs and spirit mediums playing a prominent role. Bezingwe and Raposo of Massingire, and Cambuamba, Gizi and Luis de Gorongosa of Gorongosa were subordinate chiefs who led their respective peoples against the Portuguese. Similarly when Chinsinga and Cassiche, traditional chiefs of Makanga and Chibudu branch of the Barue royal family respectively mortgaged African independence to the Portuguese, their subordinate chiefs either compelled them to reverse the position and rebel or ousted them in favour of militant anti-colonialists.

Contrary to the idea we may get at times that the spirit mediums were mere appendages of the powers that be, we observe them playing a key role in the rebellions.

They took some times stand even against the traditional chiefs. Thus we witness Chincango, Kabudu Kagoro, and Kanowanga of Makanga, Barue and Shona, respectively, playing such roles.²⁵ This emergence of new leadership from the lower ranks and their initiative at times to defy the superior chiefs was an indication of the growing awareness of the Africans. It also implied a decline in the powers of the traditional chiefs. The supreme consideration of the new leadership was African welfare and independence. Unlike some of the old leadership like Chinsinga and Cassiche, they did not betray any tendency to compromise for self-interest.

Again to compare with the resistance of previous period, the rebellions were neither individually based nor geographically limited actions but involved more than one polity and, by implication, were therefore extensive. This was because an open and prolonged armed warfare required men and material on a large scale which could be acquired only by means of cooperation with others. And as different African kingdoms were all threatened and exploited by the Portuguese, such a cooperation took

25 The mediums played similar roles also elsewhere in Africa during the colonial period. See Audrey Wipper, "The Gusii Rebels", in R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (OUP, New York, 1970), pp.377-426.

the shape of a political alliance. The seedlings of this kind of new organizational development may be seen in the very first rebellion by the Massingire in 1884. It began by initially involving neighbouring peasants and former slaves without involving any specific polity. But the trend steadily gathered momentum. By the time the Barue-Mwenemutapa rebelled the tide engulfed the entire region south of the Zambesi. Generally, an alliance was headed by a chief who took initiative in leading others. The alliance was supported by others either by sending men and material or by leading simultaneous uprisings in their respective areas. The actual functioning of an alliance, however, did not seem to have been well-coordinated. A single setback could drive rest of the commands off the field.

The character of African reaction also changed substantially from the time of resistance. For one thing, whereas resistance involved both armed and unarmed actions, rebellions were essentially based on armed warfare. Unlike resistance, the rebellions aimed at throwing out the Portuguese from the region. They were led by alliances of polities and it was a combined activity involving both the organized armies and the peasantry. The aim to expel the aliens made the use of force imperative. Accordingly, we see every rebellion involved in gathering

armed forces and arms. Traditional war medicines provided by the spirit mediums supplemented such efforts.

Still, it must be said that African aim to expel the Portuguese did not acquire a pan-Zambesian character. The leadership of different polities tended to concentrate on freeing their respective territories. This is evident from Hanga's promise to help liberate other alliance partners only after his own land was liberated. Other polities extending a limited cooperation and some even siding with the enemy was apparently due to this situation. They did not realize that the threat to one polity endangered in essence the entire region.

It was the lack of such a vision that gave scope at times for collaboration between certain African chiefs and the Portuguese. For instance, the Massingire initially collaborated with the Portuguese in order to fight the Makololo. It was only later that they realized the grave consequences of such a course of action and sought help from Makololo to fight the Portuguese. But even at this stage the Massingire aim was only to free their own land and not to liberate Makololo from the common enemy. Such limited options obviously put limits on various subsequent alliances and their activities.

One notable feature of the rebellions was, the peasants and labourers actively participated in them. The increased awareness on their part after a long period

of resistance was the obvious reason for this trend. In the first rebellion by the Massingire, it was the peasants and former slaves from the neighbouring territories who came forward even before their respective polities did so. Again in the instance of Gorongosa rebellion, the peasants, who were at first reluctant to support the chiefs, later made a common cause with them when the Portuguese imposed taxes. Thus, notwithstanding their distrust of some chiefly personalities because of their record of collaboration with the enemy, common grievances and a sense of African identity prevailed in the end to bring all of them together.

Finally, although similar to the instances of resistance which failed, the rebellions was another step forward in the Africans' historic march towards liberation. The struggles heightened African consciousness. United participation of chiefly authorities and their subjects, and alliances between different polities and peoples on the other, initiated the process of a new sense of intra- as well as inter-polity identity, which was to bloom into the sense of Africanness spanning over the entire region.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey of three centuries of Portuguese rule in the Zambesi Valley attempted to focus on: (a) the essential features of pre-colonial African societies; (b) the destructive impact of Portuguese incursions into the African societies; and (c) the consequent African attempts to defend themselves as well as organize resistance and rebellions against the alien invaders.

Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, African farming communities were to be found all over the region. This is borne out by ample historical records as referred to in chapter I. The expertise and skills of the communities in mining and availability of ivory enabled them to carry out long-distance trade with the coastal towns and Arab merchants. As a result of this trade, a number of Zambesian entrepots and Indian Ocean sea-ports attained great prosperity and importance. The trade flourished increasingly as the abundance of resources - copper, gold and ivory - well matched the demand of the external markets of the time. This, however, did not equally help the agriculture. The agricultural sector remained at a subsistence level due to various factors. Some of these factors were unfavourable rainfall, lack of growth-incentives and also the method of cultivation.

Long-distance trade and the growth of population leading to a widening of the economic network of production, transport and movements, gradually led to the emergence of African kingdoms. They were led either by traditional kings and chiefs or by a hierarchy of smaller chiefs. They had the control over land and the means of trade, thus gaining a monopoly over the widening pattern of economy. The social consciousness of those early communities gave birth to certain 'religious' beliefs which helped the kings to acquire further control over social institutions as well. In this manner the kings presided over the societies and governed with the help of an administrative structure which comprised court-staff, army and subordinate provincial chiefs.¹

In this situation the Portuguese entered the scene in the early sixteenth century. They began their activities first by looting the Arab traders. Later they tried to penetrate the interior with the aim of capturing the interior African trade routes as well. These predatory

¹ E. Alpers, "The Mutapa and Malawi Political Systems to the Time of the Ngoni Invasions", in T.O. Ranger, ed., Aspects of Central African History (Heinemann, London, 1968), p.6.

activities disturbed the established pattern of African economies. This resulted in a disruption of the traditional economic activities threatening African employment by impairing the productive capacity of the mines and other economic activities. This also resulted in the reduction of the power structure of the chiefs.

Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, the Portuguese began to occupy land on both sides of the River Zambesi for permanent settlement. These settlements took the shape of prazo, or the estate, system.² This system was based on an intensified exploitation of indigenous African resources. This gave rise to further destabilization of the African traditional institutions.

With their control over land and people the Portuguese gained a firmer footing in the Zambesi Valley. There began a large-scale alienation of land from Africans to the Portuguese. Increasingly, agricultural products and trade artefacts were appropriated through the imposition of taxes and tributes, in addition to the usual means of force. African manpower was severely abused by extension

2 See Chapter II, pp.21-23.

of slave labour for use in the prazos.³ This was carried out along with the infamous slave trade of the time.

In the political sphere, the traditional kings were reduced to the position of subordinates or displaced altogether. The break-up of political institutions created instability and caused the political disintegration.⁴

However, the prazo system, as noted in Chapter II, had neither a sound economic base or socio-political superstructure. Hence the system collapsed, in particular during the aftermath of the Ngoni attacks in the 1830s. In this situation the mestizo merchants of Goan origin, who had already been in the area as traders, acquired enough wealth and filled the political vacuum by establishing their own states.⁵

Further, spurred by the Berlin Conference of 1885, the Portuguese re-started their activities with an aim to fully colonize the region. Being backward both in economic and political terms the Portuguese, however,

3 As was noted earlier (Chapter I, p.14), slave labour existed in Africa in pre-European times. Slaves were used by the chiefs in a limited way. Moreover, such position was confined to one generation only. In contrast the prazos used them in large numbers for a variety of jobs. Their posterity was also condemned to be slaves.

4 See Chapter II, pp.28-29.

5 See Chapter II, p.31.

started parcelling out land among a number of European land concessionary companies.⁶ The companies followed the earlier forms of exploitative pursuits with only slight variations. They introduced a kind of plantation economy which was ultimately tied up with the newly emerging world capitalist market system. This resulted in large-scale destruction of local agriculture, in particular because of the system of crop-patterns the concessionary companies introduced. For both plantation cultivation and construction activities, large number of Africans were forced to work as labourers on meagre wages or for nothing. Since the companies could not capitalize on the resources available in the area through increased productive activities, they forcibly exported abundant African manpower elsewhere to earn huge profits.⁷

6 The Portuguese policy in this respect was, in a way, an imitation to what the British did in South Africa. Similar to the latter, who ruled through the British South Africa Company (BSA), the Portuguese also allotted land to various companies through whom they planned to rule. But there was a significant difference between the two. Whereas the BSA represented British capital and served the interests of the metropole, the Portuguese could not introduce their own capital or companies due to poverty. Hence the Zambesian companies were substantially owned by other European capitalists.

7 The companies were unable to employ this manpower within their territories because, as was noted earlier (Chapter II, p.35), they were undercapitalized which handicapped them from expanding productive activities. In this situation their ambition to earn the maximum, somehow or the other, encouraged them to cash on the demand for labour from mining and plantation companies in other territories.

The process of destruction of African societies which began in the period of mercantile loot and intensified during the prazo period, reached its extreme point under the system of concessionary companies.

The Africans tried to defend themselves from all these forms of external interference and exploitation from the very beginning. Their defensive activities were pursued in two different ways: resistance and rebellions. Whereas the resistance took both violent and non-violent forms, the rebellions were essentially violent in nature. Between resistance and rebellions no tight compartmentalization, however, can be made because, though resistance occurred mainly in the initial stages, it continued even in later stages. In both cases the African peasants and workers participated. They fled, either individually or collectively with their chiefs from villages, or migrated permanently, took to social banditry and at times to arms against their oppressors. When the Portuguese presence became a settled fact, Africans became more aware of the nature of alien domination and began waging a series of armed rebellions in an organized fashion. These rebellions became widespread during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this period, Africans were led not by the traditional kings alone, but also by local chiefs and spirit mediums. In contrast to sporadic resistance of the earlier era,

these rebellions were characterized by united activities among different kingdoms and peoples, and thus were geographically extensive. Another significant feature of some rebellions was the growing alienation between the chiefs and their peoples on account of the former's collaboration with the European powers. At times, this factor accounted for their reluctance to support their chiefs in their fight against the Portuguese. In general, however, the threat posed by a common enemy and the sense of identity brought the Africans a heightened consciousness to fight together.

Even a brief survey of the African opposition to the Portuguese colonialism, as undertaken in the foregoing chapters, explodes the myth that the Africans were imbecile and accepted the 'civilizing mission' of Europeans without any protest. It is arguable as to whether the rebellions made any fundamental impact on Portuguese rule; nonetheless, in the long time perspective these rebellions contributed enormously toward African awakening. In the course of our discussion we have seen how such awakening as a result of the early resistance movements led to the formation of inter-polity alliances. The same process continued to give rise finally to the rebellion of 1917,

a pan-Zambesian alliance⁸ comprising almost all polities and peoples on either side of the Zambesi. Again it was the same consciousness that carried forward this tradition to the final phase of national liberation initiated by the FRELIMO in the late 1950s.

Before we conclude, we may recall the new kind of leadership that began to emerge during the final decades of the nineteenth century. The growing consciousness of the masses pushed up personalities from the lower ranks into leadership roles and reduced the prominence of traditional kings. Parallel to this development, popular participation in the anti-colonial activity became increasingly extensive. These two trends intensified in the later stages, particularly after the World War II period.

8 We have, however, not discussed the rebellion of 1917 in this paper. This has already been indicated in the beginning of Chapter IV.

Appendix I

Copy of the Treaty made by the Portuguese with
king Monomotapa

First that this king is delivered to him in the name of the king of Portugal, our lord, of whom he shall acknowledge himself to be a vassal, since he gives him the kingdom taken by his subjects because of the treachery he committed against our lord the king, breaking the faith and word of brothers in arms, killing his ambassador, and robbing and killing the merchants who were in his land selling their merchandise under his faith and word; and he shall recognise all the captains who shall come to the fortress of Mozambique, and those empowered by them.

That he, the said king, shall allow all the religious of whatever order who may be in his Zimbahe to build churches and in all the other lands in his dominions, and to make Christians all those who desire to receive holy baptism, without opposition from any one; treating the said religious as holy persons, to who great respect is due.

That ambassadors who come to speak to him shall enter his Zimbahe shod and covered, with their arms in their belts, as they speak to the king of Portugal, and he shall give them a chair on which to seat themselves without clapping their hands; and other Portuguese shall speak to him in the manner of ambassadors, and shall be given a kaross to sit upon.

He shall treat with great respect the captain of Masapa, and shall give places for the meamocuros he may wish to make in his kingdom; he shall consult with him concerning war and any other novel events which may arise, and he shall have leave to come to the Zimbahe as often as he pleases without being obliged to make a present, and his servants the same; and those whom the king sends to the coast or to the captain of Masapa shall not require presents, nor shall they demand them, and to the captain of Masapa he shall give the usual lands, and at the market of Loanze he shall give him the land which belonged to the Inhama ^F Fururano, and at Bera of Mapundo and Palullua of Chuabo the captain shall reside in his Zimbahe, and he shall give him clothes.

He shall strictly respect the Portuguese travelling in his lands, and also their traders, without either he or his sub-chiefs demanding anything for so doing; and such empofias as many occur shall be judged before the captain of Masapa.

He shall not allow in his Zimbahe any of our traders, moquoque or Kaffir, to settle in his lands or to marry the daughter of a Mocaranga or Batonga, under penalty that the said woman shall become the property of the negro's

master; and he shall be bound to order any such negro to be delivered up wherever he may be.

He shall make his lands free to the Portuguese, and they shall be received in the villages; and should any rob them he shall be obliged to deliver the thief to the captain of Masapa without reward.

He shall not give land containing gold to any person of whatever rank, this being very prejudicial to the barter and commerce of the fortress of Mozambique.

Throughout all his kingdom he shall allow as many times to be sought for and opened as the Portuguese like, without ordering them to be closed, as this will be a source of great profit to the king and the merchants, and his lands will become very rich.

Within a year he shall expel all the Moors from his kingdom, and those who shall be found there afterwards shall be killed by the Portuguese, and their property shall be seized for the king of Portugal.

And as the fort of Tete has conquered some of the surrounding lands, they shall be annexed thereto, that his Majesty may make use of them; and he shall send to visit those of the monganos from Chirnua to Tete, and of the monganos from Mocomeara to the mongano, and from Ihamacoso to Tete and to Zoenha.

He shall send to visit the governor who comes every three years to the fortress of Mozambique, at the beginning of his government, and he shall be obliged to send him three pastas of botonga, and the said governor shall send him his sagoate.

He shall be obliged to inquire throughout the kingdom where there is silver, and make it known to the captain of Masapa, that he may inform the governor; and if his Majesty sends miners they shall be allowed to seek and dig for it freely throughout his territories.

MANUZA, Emperor of Monomotapa

On the 24th day of the month of May one thousand six hundred and twenty-nine Manuel Gomes Serrao, chief captain in this war, assembled the religious, captains, married men, and soldiers before the king and his nobles, and read to him the above articles, inquiring whether he was pleased to abide by them and comply with them as they had been read and declared to him. The said king, emperor of Monomotapa, replied that he and his descendants would ever be the vassals of his Majesty, and promised to observe them in the form in which they had been read to him. In witness whereof I signed my name and certify that he signed it with a cross which I saw him make with his own hand, and the letters of his name were written

by the revered father vicar of the Vara of Tete and chaplain of this expedition, Friar Luis do Espirito Santo, professed religious of the order of the Preachers. And the chief captain signed here with me and all those who were present.

Manuel Cabral, Manual Gomes
 Serrao, chief captain, Frei Luis do
 Espirito Santo, vicar of the vara,
 Frei Gonçalo Ribeiro, vicar of Masapa,
 Lourenço Pereira, Antonio Camillo
 Brochado, Luis Aranha Caldeira,
 Manuel Rodrigues Leal, Miguel de
 Magalhaes, Luis Ribeiro, Gonçalo
 Fernandes Franco, Gaspar Pereira
 Cabral, Domingos Froes de Brito,
 Joao Rodrigues Varella, Domingos
 Cardoso, Belchior de Araujo,
 Marcos do Avellar, Joao Pereira Rebello,
 Pedro da Costa.

Which copy of the articles of the treaty made by the said Portuguese with the king Monomotapa, I Joao Coelho, public notary in the fort of Tete to his Majesty, ordered to be faithfully copied from the original, adding or omitting nothing which might raise a doubt, and I certify.... and entire faith and credit may be given to

this as is given to similar documents in law and otherwise.

In witness whereof I have signed it with my plain customary signature as follows.

Tete, the 28th of June 1629.

JOAO COELHO.

Source: G.M. Theal, Records of South-Eastern Africa,
vol.V (C.Struik (Pty.) Ltd., Cape Town, 1964),
pp.290-3.

Appendix II

Peasant Uprisings and Social Banditry

(a) Peasant Uprisings

Name of Estate	District	Year
Mopeia	Quelimane	1878
Marrae	"	"
Mahindo	"	1879
Mugovo	"	"
Inhaucunge	"	1886
Mahindo	"	"
Marral	"	1887
Mahindo	"	1891
Malombe	Tete	"
Cheringoma	Sena	"
Gorongosa	"	1892
Chemba	"	1893
Tambara	"	"
Chiramba	"	"
Bororo	Quelimane	"
Chemba	Sena	1895
Gorongosa	"	1896
Bororo	Quelimane	1898
Chabonga	Zumbo	1900
Inhacombe	Tete	1901
Gosa	"	"
Boroma	"	"
Nyakatembe (estate unknown)	"	1904

(b) Social Bandits

Name/s of the Bandit/s	Area of Operation	Period
Moave	Tete region	Early 1880s
Samakangu and Capula	Chicoa region	1894-8
Two workers (names not known)	Quelimane district	Sometime in the late nineteenth century
Damabukashamba	Mazoe region	1890s-1900s
Kashidza	Mazoe region	Sometime in the late nineteenth century

Source for Section (a) : Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (Heinemann, London, 1976), p.102.

Appendix III
Rulers and Rebellions

Royal Family/ Kingdom	King/Chief	Years of Rebellion
Massingire	Bezingwe, Raposo	July-October 1884
Mwenemutapa	Chiwewe	1790-?
	Chissandu Uthiora	?-1825?
	Kandeya	1825-1835
	Kataruza	1836-1860 Ca.
	Kandie	1860s
	Dudza	1870s-?
	Chioco	?
Gorongosa	Cambuemba, Gizi and Luis de Gorongosa	May-August 1897
Makanga	Chamatowa	?1800-?
	Chicucuru	?-1849
	Chissaca- Maturi	1849-1858
	Kanhenzi	1858-?
	Chincomo	?-1870
	Chicuacha	1870-1874
	Saka-Saka	1874-1885
	Chicucuru II	1886-1889?
	Chigaga	?1889-1890
	Chinsinga	?1890-1902

Royal Family/ Kingdom	King/Chief	Years of Rebellion	
Barue	Chimbatta	1811-?	
	Capanga	1820-1822?	
	Sazua	1822-?	
	Bingo	?-1826	
	Inhamaguada	1830-?	
	Chibudu	?-1844	
	Chipapata	1845 Ca.	
	<u>Chibudu</u>	<u>Chipapata</u>	
	Chipitura	Samacande	
	Cassiche	Hanga	July-December, 1902
Cavunda			
Shona	Hanga (led by)	September- November, 1904	

Source: Partly based on Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (Heinemann, London, 1976), Appendices, pp.204-5.

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