

**PARTICIPATORY LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR :
A CASE STUDY OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF UZBEKISTAN, 1946-64**

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
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CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the dissertation entitled "Participatory Leadership in the USSR: A Case Study of Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 1946-64," submitted by Mr. M.S. Sensanwal in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of Master of Philosophy of the University, is a bonafide and original work to the best of our knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.



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To
My Mentor, Late Shri Surjan Singh

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
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(M.S. SANSANWAL)

Preface

This is essentially a study of functionalisation of Soviet Political System in a specific context. We have focussed our study on the problem of political participation and participatory leadership, in particular. Likewise, we have investigated the role and function of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan vis-a-vis this problem during a well-defined period of the development of Soviet political system, 1946-64.

The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter I identifies the framework constituting the ideological inputs vital to the functionalisation of the Soviet Political System. Chapter II, provides the historical, ideological and political background and traces the evolution of the Uzbek party. Chapter III examines the composition and growth of the Uzbek party during the post-war years. It also focusses attention on the role of the party during the period 1946-53 and investigates the problem of political participation during this period. In the context of the Uzbekistan, post-Stalin liberalisation, economic development and the growth and composition of the Uzbek party during 1954-64 are discussed in Chapter IV. Chapter V is an attempt towards an assessment of political participation in Uzbekistan during the period under study.

Although effort has been made to make use of Russian sources, wherever feasible, but the study mainly relies on published materials available in English.


(M.S. SAN SANWAL)

CHAPTER I
THE FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet political system derives its institutional legitimacy and political ethos from Marxism-Leninism. The operational principle of the Soviet political system is democratic centralism. The application of this principle is to build a delicate balance between democracy and centralisation. One of the essential pre-requisites of the application of this principle to the functioning of Soviet political system is the widening of the scope of mass participation in the administration of affairs of the society. The process of mass participation is seen both in terms of centralisation and democracy, a development that may be described as the problem of "participatory leadership."

In fact, the very concept of democratic centralism is based on the participation of the mass of the people at every level of administration. In terms of the participation in leadership, centralisation signifies control and direction not from one centre or one leader but from collective body functioning as collective leadership. On the other hand, even this collective body while exercising its collective responsibility must derive sanction from observance of democracy at each of its levels as well as from participation of the masses in implementing and carrying out the decisions. In other words, the participation of masses in implementing and carrying out decisions also signifies a significant role

in providing legitimacy to centralisation as well as provides ample opportunity for participatory leadership and political participation. To put it differently, both centralisation and democracy are inter-linked as a process of participation of the mass of the people in the administration of the society.

This problem has confronted the Soviet political system right from the very beginning. To strike an optimal relationship between centralisation and democracy remained problematic depending on the stages of development of Soviet society. Hence we may investigate the problem of participatory leadership in the Soviet political system as a problem of mass participation in the administration of the society. The Soviet political system has evolved various channels for participatory leadership at the apex as well as at every tier of its institutional structure. Party and state organs, along with other mass organisations, like trade unions, are such important channels. Broadly speaking, following are significant channels provided by the system for participation:

- (1) The institutional structure of participation -- the Soviets, from Supreme Soviet, down to the local Soviets.
 - (2) The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
 - (3) Mass Organisations.
-

We may point out here that the supremacy of the Communist Party in the Soviet Political system is undeniable. Indeed, the various channels for participatory leadership, mentioned above, operate within the supremacy of the role of the party. Although the role and function of the Party have undergone changes through the years, it does remain the most important channel for political participation and leadership. Therefore, our focus on the Communist party in this study.

In fact, in a multinational state like Soviet Union with 15 Republics and 110 nationalities, the problem of participation in leadership has acquired an additional dimension. This added dimension is directly connected with Soviet nationalities policy as it has evolved through the years. The non-Russian part of Tsarist empire has developed from a pre-capitalist and feudal society to a modern socialist society since the October Revolution. In the conditions of Central Asia the Uzbek Communist Party was obviously the most reliable and important agent for such a change, and consequently for participation of the native population in the management of their own affairs. Therefore, the detailed study of Uzbek Communist Party may throw some new light on the process of participatory leadership in the USSR in general and Uzbekistan in particular.

As we intend to study an important aspect of Soviet political system in a specific context, it is worth our while to begin by investigating a framework relevant for us. The

framework has to be investigated on the basis of ideas and practice of men and movement involved in making the revolution and building a novel political system in the Soviet Union. We intend to undertake this task in the following pages.

* * * * *

I

MARXISM-LENINISM AND PARTICIPATORY LEADERSHIP

(a) Ideas before the Revolution

Following Marx and Engels, Lenin had discussed the leadership role of the Communist Party and the various tasks to be undertaken by its members as also their role in guiding the masses in their struggle against Tsarist absolutism.

The need to organise the militant section of workers in an independent and separate party to guide and lead the masses for emancipation and freedom from exploitation was emphasized by Marx and Engels. Frederick Engels in the preface to the German Edition of 1890 of Communist Manifesto, wrote, "For the ultimate triumph of the ideas set forth in the Manifesto Marx relied solely and exclusively upon the intellectual development of the working class, as it necessarily had to ensue from united action and discussion."¹

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels clearly defined the role of the working class party and put forth the tasks of

1. Frederick Engels, "The Preface to the German Edition of 1890 of the Communist Manifesto", Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 102, Moscow, 1973.

This Party as the involvement of the working class, and leading and guiding them. Regarding the educative and leadership role of the Communist Party they said, "The Communists therefore are on the one hand, practically the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movements." ² In accordance with the theory and principles as propounded in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels founded the Communist League - the first international communist organisation of the proletariat, which existed from 1847 to 1852. They argued for an independent workers party, which should have no relationship with other bourgeois and democratic-constitutional petty-bourgeois parties, because all other parties articulated and enhanced their class interests and the workers would only sub-serve their interests. The Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, written in March 1850 by Marx and Engels stated in unequivocal terms the urgency and necessity of founding an independent workers party. It said, "at this moment a new revolution is impending, when the workers party, therefore, must act in the most organised most

2. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party", Selected Works, Vol.I, Moscow, 1973, p. 120.

unanimous and most independent fashion possible if it is not to be exploited and taken in law again by the bourgeoisie as in 1848.³ Regarding the foundation of a workers party, it further stated, "the workers and above all the league, must exert themselves to establish an independent, secret and public organisation of the workers' party alongside of the official democrats and make each section the central point and nucleus of workers' societies in which the attitude and interests of the proletariat will be discussed independently of the bourgeois influences."⁴

The main task before the workers as set in the programme was, "to do the utmost for their final victory by clarifying their minds as to what their class interests are, by taking up their position as an independent party as soon as possible and by not allowing themselves to be seduced for a single moment by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeois into refraining from the independent organisation of the party of the proletariat."⁵ The Communist League which was founded on the theoretical principles as propounded by Marx and Engels and as discussed above, provided the leadership to the workers and undertook the role of educating and guiding the masses in their struggles during 1848-49 in France. From the role, which the League played, Marx and Engels drew two lessons. In their Address to the

3. Ibid., p. 176.

4. Ibid., pp. 179-80.

5. Ibid., p. 185.

Central Committee they wrote, "In the two revolutionary years 1848-49, the League proved itself in double fashion: first, in that its members energetically took part in the movement in all places, that in the press, on the barricades and on the battle-fields, they stood in the front ranks of the only decidedly revolutionary class, the proletariat - the League further proved itself ... that an end must be put to this stage of affairs, the independence of the workers must be restored,"⁶

The ideas of Marx and Engels about the independent role of the workers party in its struggle against the exploiting classes, clearly highlight firstly, the participation of the workers in discussion and debate in the party about the socio-economic and political conditions, and secondly, in providing leadership for educating the masses, equipping them theoretically and also preparing them for struggles on all fronts, economic, social and political.

Though the broad principles about workers organization into a vanguard party to involve and lead the masses in their struggle against exploitation were laid by Marx and Engels, Lenin extended them to provide a theoretical framework. He drew a party programme and further elaborated the organisational principles of Social Democratic Labour Party in his major theoretical work, What is to be Done. He discussed in details the problem of participation of workers

6. Ibid., p. 175.

in the party, the need for their becoming professional revolutionaries for giving political and ideological training to the masses, organising them and leading them in their fight against tsarist absolutism. The most urgent task before Russian Social Democracy, according to Lenin was, "to imbue the masses of the proletariat with the ideas of socialism and with political consciousness, and to organise a revolutionary party closely connected with the spontaneous labour movement."⁷ Highlighting the role of the party he further argued, "Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers... To bring political knowledge to the workers the Social Democrats must go among all classes of the population; they must despatch units of their army in all directions."⁸ On the political leadership which the party should provide, he wrote, "Not a single class in history has achieved power without producing its leaders, its prominent representatives able to organise a movement and lead it."⁹

The political leadership which Lenin advocated was, however, to be qualitatively different. It was to participate

7. V.I. Lenin, "Urgent Tasks of Our Movement," The Struggle for the Bolshevik Party (1900-1904), Selected Works, vol.II, London, 1936, p. 11.

8. V.I. Lenin, "What is to be Done", Selected Works, vol.I, Moscow, 1976, p. 152.

9. V.I. Lenin, n.7, p. 13.

in decision-making process as well as in implementing the policies of the party. He clearly defined the role of the party members of that which acted as participants in leadership: "We must go among all classes of the population as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators and as organisers." ¹⁰ He was, therefore, advocating a party of professional revolutionaries.

According to Lenin the party was to function on the principles of democratic centralism. Under the circumstances obtaining in Tsarist Russia the principle of democratic centralism meant inner party democracy to discuss and debate the issues and election to all party bodies and strict centralised discipline and subordination of local party committees to the central committee.

Due to historical exigencies, Lenin advocated strict discipline and centralisation in the party. He was not advocating an organisation isolated from the masses. On the other hand, the party had to be in close touch with the masses and to educate them and draw the best sections in the party to exercise the political leadership. Lenin wrote: "to do service to the masses and express their interests, having correctly conceived those interests, the advanced contingent, the organisation, must carry on all its activity among the masses, drawing from the masses all the best forces without any exception, at every step verifying carefully and objectively whether the contact with the masses is being main-

¹⁰. V.I. Lenin, n^o. 8, p. 155.

tained and whether it is a live contact. In this way and only in this way, does the advanced contingent train and enlighten the masses, expressing their interests, teaching them organisation and directing all the activities of the masses along the path of conscious class politics." ¹¹ On the principle of democratic centralism Lenin founded the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. It essentially means, one programme and single rules; one sovereign leading body -- the party congress, and its Central Committee in the interval between congresses; one discipline, equally applied to all members - subordination of the minority to the majority; subordination of the individual branches to the Party Congress and of inferior to superior branches.

All major problems arising in party branches and executive bodies are solved by collective discussion. Criticism and self-criticism, especially criticism from the party rank-and-file, are indispensable to the correct realisation ¹² of democratic centralism.

These ideas, discussed above, became the founding principles of the functionalisation of the Soviet political system. It was perhaps symbolic that the Lenin and Bolshevik movement first groped with the problem of democracy and mass participation in the context of the organisation of the party itself. Hence we may point out that the functionalisation of the party on the basis of democratic centralism became

11. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.19, p. 40.

12. E. Chekharin, The Soviet Political System under Developed Socialism, (Moscow, 1977), p. 42.

a barometer to measure the functionalisation of Soviet political system after its establishment.

(b) IDEAS AFTER THE REVOLUTION

Organisation of Political Power and Mass Participation in Socialist Democracy

The October Revolution brought in its wake host of new problems for the new leadership. One of the most important and pressing problems was the organisation of political power into a systems of government. It was again Lenin who gave the lead in providing the framework of functionalisation of the political system. After the October Revolution a number of his theoretical works like "Can the Bolsheviks retain state power?," (October 1917), and "The immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (January - March 1918). The main question before the Bolsheviks, immediately after the seizure of political power in 1917 was, how to organise and consolidate it. Political power was organised in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which became the novel feature of the Soviet political system. The organisation of political power into the dictatorship of proletariat was to be made functional through the Soviets of workers', soldier's and peasant's deputies. The Soviets, therefore, became one of the main agencies for the functionalisation and consolidation of the Soviet political system.

Thus the Soviets as the organs of state apparatus, besides the communist party, opened up new avenues for political participation of the people. Lenin thus stressed the roles and functions of the Soviets. "The Soviets are a new state apparatus which, in the first place, provides an armed force of workers and peasants, and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is very closely bound up with the people. --- Secondly, this apparatus provides a bond with the people, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so easily verifiable and renewable, that nothing even remotely like it existed in the previous state apparatus. Thirdly, this apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject to recall at the people's will without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourthly, it provides a close contact with the most varied professions, thereby facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most radical reforms without red tape. Fifthly, it provides an organisational form for the vanguard, i. e., for the most class-conscious, most energetic and most progressive section of the oppressed classes, the workers and peasants, and so constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of the oppressed classes can elevate, train, educate, and lead the entire vast mass of these classes, which has up to now stood completely outside of

political life and history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of the parliamentary system with those of immediate and direct democracy, i.e., to vest in the people's elected representatives both legislative and executive functions."¹³

The entire system of Soviets provided opportunity to the people to exercise political leadership in the administration of the affairs of the state and society. Needless to add that the entire system of the Soviets, indeed the whole political system, were organised on the basis of the supremacy of the role of the Communist Party.

Lenin thus described the relationship between the party and the masses: "In Russia today, the connection between leaders, party, class and masses, as well as the attitude of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its party to the trade unions are concretely as follows. the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat organised in the Soviets; the proletariat is guided by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks"¹⁴. In the post-revolution period, therefore, the Soviets and the Communist Party became the main vehicle for carrying forward and for fulfilling the tasks of revolutionary transformation of the society.

The functional principle of the Soviet political system is democratic centralism, i.e. the combination of

13. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, vol. II, p. 363.

14. V.I. Lenin, On Participation of the People in Government, Moscow, 1979, p. 52.

democracy and centralisation. "The combination of these two elements became the novel feature of the Soviet political system, a principle of government both in theory and practice."¹⁵ The essence of democratic centralism as a principle of government is the combination of democracy and centralisation, that is to say, the sovereign power to the working people, election of various governing bodies, the accountability of the leadership to the people and centralisation or administration from one centre, subordination of minority to the majority, undivided authority and rigorous discipline.

However, mass participation to Marx and Lenin was always class-based and not an elitist. "Mass participation is an essential process by which the worker is educated to bring about the revolution and to take hold of state power."¹⁶ Lenin in his celebrated work, "State and Revolution", while commenting on Marx's civil War in France emphasised on the people's participation in the management of state affairs. He wrote, "in the bourgeois democracy, the oppressed are allowed once in a few years to decide which particular

15. Zafar Imam, "Decision-making in the USSR Today - Towards a framework", unpublished paper, Presented at the All India Seminar on Politics and Society in the USSR, 1956-77, held at the Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, (March 28-30, 1979), p. 4.

16. K. Seshadri, Studies in Marxism and Political Science, (New Delhi, 1977), p. 74.

representative of the oppressing class shall represent and repress them in Parliament." ¹⁷ In Capitalist society, the democracy, according to Lenin, "is always hemmed in by the narrow limits set by the Capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains, in effect a democracy for the minority, only for the propertied classes, only for the rich -- owing to the conditions of Capitalist exploitation, the modern wage slaves are so crushed by want and poverty, that they cannot be bothered with democracy, cannot be bothered with politics, in the ordinary, peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participation in public and political life." ¹⁸ It is only after a Socialist revolution, when the dictatorship of the Proletariat is established, that democracy for the people is created for the first time. According to Lenin, "The Socialist Democracy signified the formal recognition of equality of citizens, the equal right of all to determine the structure of, and to administer the state." ¹⁹

Emphasizing the urgent need in this direction Lenin said: "We demand that training in the work of state administration be conducted by class conscious workers and soldiers and this training be begun at once, i.e., that a

17. V.I. Lenin, "Reference to Marx's 'The Civil War in France'", in his work, The State and Revolution, Selected Works, Vol. 2, 1976, p. 302.

18. Ibid., p. 301.

19. Ibid., p. 311.

beginning be made at once in training all the working people, all the poor for this work."²⁰

Currently these ideas are further elaborated in the Soviet Union. According to a contemporary Soviet theoretician, Afanasyev: "the principle of democratic centralism gives expression to the most essential substance of the socialist system, its centralised and simultaneously democratic character. While providing for centralisation and plan, it also provides for unfettered initiative and democracy in the functioning and development of the social system, giving scope to the creative initiative of millions of workers. This principle is the concrete manifestation of^t the dialectics of the whole and the parts in social development; the whole plays the leading and determining role while its parts enjoy relative independence."²¹ The crucial problem of democratic centralism, however, is the optimal proportion of centralism and democracy, which, in the long run, depends on the concrete historical conditions, the level of production and the social relations. The optimal proportion can be achieved provided that centralism is not universalised but is exercised on the basis of democracy, whereby increasing numbers of people - and ultimately the whole people are involved in administration. Thus the development of democracy

V.I.

20. / Lenin, "On Participation of the People in Government", (Moscow, 1979), p. 52.

21. V.G. Afanasyev, "The Scientific Management of Society", (Moscow, 1971), p. 187.

expands the social basis of centralism ensuring the participation of greater number of people in administration, while such a process of strengthening of centralism improves the organisational form of democracy for performing the important tasks that the society faces.

Now it is worth our while to discuss the role and functions of participatory leadership within the framework as discussed in the proceeding pages.

II

ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF PARTICIPATORY LEADERSHIP

The main problem before the government was to mobilise the masses, through Soviets, through mass organisations like trade unions and above all through the Communist Party, to effectively exercise the political power.

Participatory leadership means the active, independent and effective participation of ordinary citizens, through various channels, in the political life and the organisation of the State. It provides a dynamic relationship between the policy-making organs and the masses. The people who assume this role (participatory leadership) are ready to educate the masses and in turn get their education from the masses regarding their aspirations and capacities. One single individual's leadership role yields place to greater participatory role of the aggregate of the people. It is

the main vehicle to carry the political ideas to the people and to imbue them with the spirit of change in their outlook. It plays a very crucial role in the transformation of a feudal and semi feudal society into a socialist one, where the political battle is the most important one. The change cannot be brought about without mass mobilisation. In Central Asian parts of the Soviet Union particularly, the participatory leadership specifically assumed this important role.

Participatory leadership is generated from among the masses. The recruitment of leadership takes place through the mobilisation of the people, by educating them ideologically, politically and by training them organisationally. This kind of leadership does not operate on the basis of relations of command and subordination, like the elitist leadership. The main principle of participation in leadership through the Soviets, Party and mass organisations is the Leninist principle of collective leadership. This principle is the very essence of the Soviet political system. "Only relying on the principle of Collective Leadership can one properly direct and develop, the constantly growing creative energy and activity of the party and people, correctly analyse and soberly appraise the objective situation, the successes achieved, promptly disclose and remove shortcomings."²²

²²Ibid., p. 128.

Participatory leadership is an inter-linked process. It serves as a link between the government and the masses. It also serves as a channel for the flow of information between the top policy-making organs of the party and the people.

The functions of Participatory leadership can be discussed in terms of its, Political, Ideological and Educational roles. In the party this leadership participates in the preparation of the party political line. The party political line is founded on its programmes which reviews the tasks of the stage of developments in progress and indicates its long-term prospects. The leadership is involved in the formulation of political line through party and Soviet organs at various levels. The leadership proceeds in its activities on the basis of the line formulated. All the decisions regarding current politics are taken in accordance with the basic principles of the political line. The leadership takes appropriate measures for the implementation of the decisions taken according to the political line. The chief task of the political leadership therefore, is to acquaint the masses with the party political line and the government policies and to mobilize them and prepare cadres for the implementation of the decisions taken. "Thus participation in the preparation of the political line, implementation of current policy measures, organisation of the

system of selection and development of cadres are the principal forms of political leadership."²³

In the ideological and educational spheres the task of participatory leadership consists in educating and informing the people. These tasks of enormous scale and complexity can be divided into several different parts; the inculcation of patriotic and internationalist awareness, a Communist attitude to work, a collective sense, public spiritedness, the shaping of a scientific world outlook etc. Besides, a major role is played by the leadership in purposeful educational work to influence people's minds through propaganda.

Propaganda and agitation are one of the most important functions of the leadership. The purpose here is not only to bring Marxist-Leninist ideology to the masses but also to conduct day-to-day work explaining the policy of the party and the government, spread new progressive ideas derived from the practical experience, and help shape public opinion and ensure a correct assessment of various current problems.

The viability of any political system depends on the reliability of the inflow and the outflow of information, the two way link between the Controller and the Controlled. A constant two-way link between the whole of the society and its political organisation, therefore assumes decisive importance. For it is the only basis on which the policy making can take into account all the various social

23. G. Shakhzardov, Socialist Democracy, (Moscow, 1974), p. 74.


interests, the essential current requirements and the long-term aims of the society. The participating leadership acts as the two way link between the party and the government on the one hand and the people on the other. The function of the outflow link on the part of leadership involves explaining to the people the policy of the party and the Soviet government, the organisation of the workers in fulfilling the tasks of communist construction. The inflow link role of the leadership involves discovering and presenting the wishes and demands of the people, including the specific interests of various social strata, harmonizing these interests and expressing the people's will in party policy.

The link between the government and the people is ensured above all by the broad representation in leadership of various social classes and nationalities of the multinational Soviet state. Every individual exercising the leadership role and taking active part in preparing the party's and government's policy and solving various practical questions requiring the attention of party and Soviet organisations, draws on the accumulated experience and outlook of his class and of his social environment. In this way, the party and the government not only receives valuable information, about the sentiments and needs of various social groups, but takes direct account of them in its policies and decisions.

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V.G. Afanasyev has summarised the functions of the participatory leadership as,

"To live in the midst of the masses;

To know what their sentiments are;

To understand the masses;

To have the proper approach

To win their absolute confidence".²⁴

And Lenin speaking about leadership, said: "the leaders must not lose contact with the masses they lead, the vanguard must not detach itself from the army of labour."²⁵

However, one may point out that the role and functions of the leadership in Soviet Union were influenced by the specific problems faced in every stage of development of the Soviet society. Therefore, we do find that the problem of mass participation essentially became a kind of ding-dong battle between centralisation and democracy during the period 1917-64.

Participation in leadership within the nationalities framework became a novel feature of the Soviet political system immediately after the Revolution in 1917. The peoples of border regions of the erstwhile Tsarist empire were backward culturally, economically and politically. The

24. V.G. Afanasyev, Scientific Management of Society, (Moscow, 1971), p. 129.

25. Lenin Miscellany XXXVI, p. 389 (Russian ed.) Cited in V.G. Afanasyev, The Scientific Management of Society (Moscow, 1971), p. 129.

main task of the Bolshevik Nationalities policy was to develop these regions economically and involve the native population in the building of Soviet type of organisations to bring them at par with other part of Soviet Russia culturally, economically and to ensure their participation in political activities. A discussion about participatory leadership within the Bolshevik Nationalities policy framework, therefore, becomes relevant here.

III

PARTICIPATORY LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE BOLSHEVIK NATIONALITIES POLICY FRAMEWORK

The problem of Nationalities never received serious attention of the Tsarist Government, though 104 distinct nationalities inhabited the territory of Tsarist empire.²⁶ The Tsarist government never took account of national, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity of the population. It always assumed that Russia was a uni-national state and accorded the position of privilege in all walks of life only to the Great Russian Nationality.²⁷

The growing importance of the National question attracted the attention of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in its founding congress in 1898, which asserted

26. Avraham Yarmolinsky, The Jews and other Minor Nationalities Under Soviets, (New York, 1928), p. 141. Cited R. Vaidyanath, The formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, (New Delhi, 1967), p. 251.

27. R. Vaidyanath, The Formation of Soviet Central Asian Republics, 1967, p. 251.

the right of nations to self-determination. The right was more explicitly embodied in Point 9 of the programme, which was adopted at the Second Congress of the RSDLP in 1903. The right of self-determination, for all nations entering the composition of the Russian state was recognised, by this point of the programme of the RSDLP.²⁸

In an article entitled "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", Lenin said, "If we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations not by juggling with legal definitions or inventing abstract definitions but by examining the historic-economic conditions of the national movements, we must invariably reach the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the political separation from alien national bodies and the formation of an independent national state."²⁹ There was no unanimity on the right of nations to self-determination between the social-democratic parties. The Polish Social Democrat, Rosa Luxemburg argued that the recognition by RSDLP of the right of nations to self-determination was tantamount to supporting the bourgeois nationalism of oppressed nations.³⁰ Lenin replied to his critics and held that the bourgeois nationalism of every nation has a general democratic content which is directed against oppression and this content should be supported unconditionally.³¹

28. Ibid.

29. V.I. Lenin "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", Selection from V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin on National Colonial Question, (Calcutta, 1975), p. 15.

30. R. Vaidyanath, n. 27, p. 253.

31. Ibid., p. 256.

Just as Marx in his time had supported or opposed the national movements of various European Peoples on the basis of the objective role they played, in helping the cause of democracy and socialism, the Bolsheviks also argued that their support or opposition to the exercise of right of self-determination in any case depended on, (a) what stage of social development the nation seeking political separation had reached, and, (b) which of its various classes expressed its will.

The Poronin Conference of the Central Committee of the RSDLP in 1913 pronounced the need (a) to protect the right of national minorities by providing them regional autonomy and full democratic, local self government, the demarcation of the boundaries of these regional autonomies and self-governing units must be undertaken by the local populations themselves in conformity with their economic and ethnic distinctions and national composition etc.

(b) the interest of the working class demands the Union of Workers of all nationalities of a given state in proletarian organisations.

(c) the party supports the right of oppressed nations of the Tsarist monarchy to self-determination, i.e. to secession and formation of independent states.

(d) the question of the right of nations to self-determination must not be confused with the question of expediency of separation of any given nation. The issue

must be dealt with by the party separately in each individual case from the point of view of the whole social development and the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism.³²

The above analysis of the Bolshevik Party brings two points in sharp focus, i.e., Firstly - opposition to the Tsarist Policy of National oppression and the need to draw wider stratum of the population of all nationalities into the revolutionary movement. Secondly, the achievement of socialism for which the RSDLP was fighting, required a closer union of all workers irrespective of their national affiliations in a single workers organisation. The recognition accorded to the claims of nationalism in the platform of the RSDLP, indicated the appreciation of the legitimacy of national claims in Russia where the remnants of feudalism continued to survive even in the twentieth century. But this did not prevent the Bolsheviks from proclaiming the primacy of capitalist claims of socialism over the claims of nationalism and subordinating the right of self-determination to the right of the working class to achieve a socialist order, whenever a conflict arose between the two divergent ideologies. But this did not lead to the repudiation of the right of self-determination altogether. On the

32. Kommunisticheskaia Partia Sovetskogo Soiuza V Rezolutsiakh i resheniakh S'ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov Tsk. 1898-1925 (7th edn. Moscow, 1953), vol. I, p.40. Cited in Valdyanath, n. 27, p. 259.

contrary its validity under Capitalism, imperialism and even under the initial stages of socialism was admitted. But the stipulation of the qualifications, which were incorporated into the clause on self-determination in the Poronin Conference of the Party's Central Committee, had rendered the exercise of the right possible only in certain circumstances, on a relative and conditional basis. In deciding the exercise of the right in any given case, the 'class historical viewpoint' was to be the sole determining factor.

The Seventh Congress of Party held in April 1917 adopted a resolution on the national question which declared, "All nations composing Russia must have full right freely to separate and to form independent states." For nations not desiring to separate from Russia i.e., not desiring to exercise their right to self-determination, the Congress recommended, far-going regional autonomy; abolition of control from above, abolition of compulsory state language; drawing of boundary lines of the self-governing and autonomous regions on the basis of consideration by the local population itself of economic and ethnic conditions, of the national composition of the population.

Such was the form of Soviet Nationalities Policy that had crystallised in the period before the October Revolution. The first act of the Soviet government was to issue a series of proclamations which outlined the principles, which were

33. Cited in Vaidyanath, n. 27, p. 263.

34. Ibid., p. 264.

to guide the work of its organs. The document on the 'Rights of the Peoples of Russia' proclaimed, (1) the equality and sovereignty of the Peoples of Russia; (2) the rights of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination even to the point of separation and formation of independent states; (3) the abolition of all kinds of national and national-religious privileges and limitations and, (4) free development of national minorities and groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.³⁵ Shortly afterwards the Soviet government addressed a special appeal to "All Tilling Muslims of Russia and the East" in which it stated, "From now on all your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are declared free and inviolable. Build your national life freely. You have the right to do so. Know that your rights as well as the rights of all peoples of Russia will be protected by the entire might of the Revolution and its organs, the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants³⁶ Deputies."

These declarations were immediately put into practice. The Soviet Government accepted the independent status of Poland, Finland, annulled all secret treaties and concessions from Iran and China. Moreover, the impact of the Soviet policy of implementing their commitment to the right of nations to self-determination was widespread. From Ukraine

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

in the West to Central Asia and Trans-Caspian secessionist movements of all sorts began to threaten the very stability of the Soviet government. Foreign intervention and the civil war added fuel to the fire.

The Central Asia, had a peculiar situation. In Tashkent the Soviet power was established while almost all the adjoining areas were rising in revolt under the influence of Jadidists and foreign, mainly British intervention. Under these circumstances the party had to re-examine its policy on the right to self-determination. The debate began in party forums immediately after the revolution and finally it was closed after the civil war in 1921. In the 10th Party Congress held in 1921, the party finally, adopted a class-historical viewpoint to the application of the principle of self-determination in the former regions of Tsarist Russia. It was reaffirmed as that the principle must be applied in the interest of the class struggle of the proletariat under the conditions when political power has already passed into the hands of the proletariat.³⁷

So Central Asia which had witnessed Tsarist Colonial oppression and exploitation, and where pre-capitalist and semi-feudal conditions prevailed became the testing ground for the Bolshevik nationalities policy. The Soviet government had to perform a dual task in the bordering region i.e. the fight for socialism in the Central parts of Russia and

37. For details see Zafar Iman, Colonialism in East West Relations, New Delhi, 1969, (chapter I).

had to be merged with the fight against national and colonial oppression in the border regions of the colonial empire and secondly these areas had to take a socio-historical leap to socialism from pre-capitalist and semi-feudal conditions, having practically no national proletariat.

The principle of self-determination as enunciated in Bolshevik Nationalities Policy found its application in the former colonial regions of Tsarist empire in historically different conditions. The Working class had seized power in Russia and the interests of the Russian proletariat coincided with the interests of the toiling masses of the border regions. Therefore, the demand for autonomy by the Islamic nationalists in Central Asia was rejected by the Soviet government. The principle of self-determination by the people of these areas meant exercise of political leadership by themselves to manage their own affairs. Because of the absence of the class-conscious proletariat in Central Asia and the educational backwardness of the local population, the main responsibility for involving the people in Soviet organisations, fell on the Communist Party. Though in nascent form, it became the main school for educating the masses, and a platform for the native people to exercise the right of self-determination and participation in political leadership. Regarding the participatory role in leadership of the Communist Party the immediate tasks in this direction

were put forth in the "Theses on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in connection with the National Problem," in 1921 in these words,

"The Congress considers that reinforcements to the ranks of the Party in the border regions should be recruited chiefly from among the proletarians and the poor and toiling peasants of those regions and that at the same time activities must be directed to strengthening the party organisations in the border regions by improving the quality of its membership." 38

It can thus, well be seen that the problem of participation in the management of society, and leadership in particular had acquired a peculiar characteristics in Uzbekistan. The overall backwardness of the native population, obviously meant that a conducive environment has to be created where political participation becomes meaningful for the local population. Therefore, a multi-dimensional process of the ~~certain~~ creation of conducive socio-economic conditions through a programmatic use of political powers (i.e. Soviet power) as well as concessions and encouragement to the local population was required. Thus, political participation in this specific context of Uzbekistan no longer remains purely a theoretical problem but a framework for a well defined programmatic policy to be implemented in stages.

38. J.V. Stalin, "The Policy of the Soviet government on the National Question in Russia", in Selections from V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin on National Colonial Question, 1975, p. 121.

Our discussion in the preceding pages have underlined theoretical percepts of political participation and participatory leadership in particular. Later, our discussion on the problem of nationalities has stressed the actual realities of implementing these theoretical percepts. Taken both these together, a framework of Soviet policy of political participation and participatory leadership in particular, is thus identified in the specific context of Uzbekistan. We may, however, add that the application of this framework proved to be problematic in practice, while the experiences of the Soviet Political system, particularly after 1964 further elaborated the details of this framework thus, maintaining an essential continuity. In the following chapters we propose to deal with the application of this framework ^{to} ~~in~~ Uzbekistan during a well defined period of the development of ~~the~~ Soviet society, 1946-64.

CHAPTER II

THE BACKGROUND - HISTORICAL, IDEOLOGICAL
AND POLITICAL, 1917-45

The socio-economic conditions in Central Asia, on the eve of the October Revolution, presented an entirely different scenario from that of European Russia. These conditions were not the least conducive to the Soviet Power in Uzbekistan. Moreover the working class existed only in rudimentary forms. Added to all these problems was foreign intervention and secessionist movement inspired by the Jadidists and their supporters. Indeed, the soviet power in Uzbekistan during the first few months of revolution was nearly confined to city of Tashkent, drawing support mainly from Russian Rail-road workers. The future of the Soviet Political system in Central Asia largely depended on the mobilisation of the native people in favour of the regime. The Communist party, besides the Soviets, was such an agency which could undertake the task. The Bolsheviks, therefore, carefully devised their strategy of building and nativising of the party apparatus in Uzbekistan. This problem was directly related to the natives and the role of social classes in Central Asia. Therefore, we must begin with a discussion of the socio-economic structure of the society in Central Asia.

I

Socio-economic Conditions of Central Asia on the eye of the Bolshevik Revolution

The colonisation of Central Asia by the Tsarist regime was completed by the last quarter of nineteenth century.

The province of Turkestan was directly under the control of Governor General appointed by the Tsarist Government. The province of Governor-General of Turkestan had Tashkent Oblast, Ferghana Valley, Syr-Darya region and the Samarkand in its fold. The region was economically backward and feudal social relations along with nomadic tribalism existed on the eve of its colonisation. In these regions inferior quality of cotton was grown with primitive methods. Industry was almost non-existent and virtually there was no proletariat.

After colonisation, Central Asia was to supply raw materials, particularly cotton to Tsarist Russia and to provide market for Russian manufactured goods. The growing need of Tsarist Russia for cotton, therefore, led to the introduction of long staple cotton variety in the fertile regions. The cultivation of long staple cotton and its export to Central Russia resulted in the construction of Trans-Caspian Railways and the establishment of manufacturing industries in Central Asia. Various small industrial establishments engaged in cotton processing and ginning activities appeared on the scene. At the end of 19th century, there were about 235 enterprises in Turkestan employing 15,000 workers.¹ The activities of these enterprises were confined to cotton ginning, production of coal, and tanning of leather. By 1915, the number of enterprises in Turkestan rose to 702,

1. R. Tuzmuhamedov, How the National Question was solved in Soviet Central Asia, Moscow, 1973, p. 63.

employing 21,000 workers of whom 16,000 were native inhabitants,² Though during the first decade of twentieth century the manufacturing and processing industry developed in Turkestan, yet it did not have any heavy industry. The handicrafts industry was on the decline, while industries like ginneries, tanneries and silk production factories were rapidly growing in numbers.

By 1917 the industrial proletariat numbered 60,000 of whom 50 per cent were employed in Railways.³ The Russians constituted about 22.8 per cent of the total industrial labour force (about 14,000); about 70 to 79 per cent of them were skilled workers.⁴ The nationality-wise distribution of the Railway workers was as follows: Russians, 80.7 per cent; Muslims, 14.8 per cent; Poles, 2.4 per cent; Kirghiz, 2.1 per cent.⁵ Though among Railway workers, the Russians were the largest in numbers, in the total labour force employed in the railways and the manufacturing industries, etc. the Russians were heavily out-numbered by the native workers. The situation in 1920 was as under: Russians, 22.8 per cent, Uzbeks, 60.7 per cent; Kirghis, 4.5 per cent; Tadzhiks, 9.5 per cent; and Uigures, 2.5 per cent.⁶ With the growing number of industries and expanding industrial activity, the

2. Ibid., p. 63.

3. Ibid.

4. Zafar Iman, "Origin and Development of Socialism among the Muslims of Russia, 1890-1917", International Studies, vol. 15, No. 2, 1976, p. 195.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

total labour force also increased and the percentage of native workers also registered a significant rise, while most of the native Muslim workers were employed in unskilled jobs with lower wages and harder working conditions. This is evident from the table below for 1916-1917.⁷

	Percentage of total labour force in industry	Percentage of skilled labour force in industry	Percentage of skilled labour force outside industry (Railways etc.)
Russians	13.2	79.9	70.3
Natives (Mostly Muslims)	86.8	20.1	29.7

By 1915-17 the native labour force (largely Muslims) was about 30,000, i.e. about half of the total labour force in the whole of Russian Turkestan. And of these roughly speaking, the Uzbeks were 79%, the Tadhziks 17 per cent, and the Kirghiz and Kazakhs, 8 per cent.⁸ Leaving aside the railway workers, who were mostly Russians (80 per cent) the native workers made up nearly 78 per cent of the total labour force. In spite of the above figures, taken together, by

7. Ibid., p. 196.

8. Ibid.

1916 the percentage of workers in Turkestan was a mere 0.35 per cent of the total population.⁹

On the eve of the October Revolution the total Russian population in Central Asia was between 150,000 to 200,000.¹⁰ Among these, there were about 14,000 railway and industrial workers, about 68,000 were engaged in agriculture with lands to cultivate while more than 100,000 were soldiers.¹¹ The overwhelming majority of the natives were landless labourers. In 1916, 80 per cent of the population of Central Asian region depended on agriculture and nomadism.¹²

Thus, the colonisation of Central Asia, disturbed the socio-economic structure of the society. Before, the Tsarist annexation of ~~the~~ these areas the structure of the society was feudal and nomadic. By 1917, the stratification process had started and on the eve of October Revolution the society, excluding the Russian settlers and bureaucracy, was divided into:

- (1) Traditional Feudal elite, (2) the religious elite,
- (3) The traders and artisans, (4) Peasantry, (5) Industrial workers - including Russians.¹³

In the sphere of education and culture the Central Asian region remained backward. According to an estimate,

9. R. Tuzmuhamedov, n.I, p. 63.

10. Geoffrey Wheeler, The Peoples of Central Asia, (London, 1966), p. 39.

11. Zafar Imam, n.4, p. 196.

12. Ibid.

13. Shams Ud Din, Secularisation of Politics in USSR: A Study of Uzbekistan: 1917-38, Unpublished Thesis, (JNU: New Delhi, 1979), p. 51.

in 1897, the literacy rate in Russia was 21.1 per cent, while in Turkestan, the corresponding figure was 1-2 per cent. By 1917, it was 2-4 per cent.¹⁴ Education was imparted to the natives in Maqtabs and Madrasahs. The mullahs controlled the education system. No far-reaching changes were introduced in the educational system by Tsarist administration. The Turkestan Governor General introduced a system of so-called Russo-native schools. But these schools attracted very few native students on account of exclusion of Muslim religious education from their curriculum. By 1911, there existed 105 such schools.¹⁵ A movement for reformed schools was born as a result of the modernising influence of the Russian culture. The New-Method Schools were opened in Turkestan region largely due to the efforts of Jadidists. The number of such schools operating in Turkestan in 1912 was 57¹⁶ while in 1917 this number rose to 92.¹⁷ Gradually, a small native intelligentsia arose in Turkestan from the ranks of petty and middle traders and school teachers.

II

Origins of Social Democratic Movement in Central Asia

Under the socio-economic conditions obtaining during the first decade of the twentieth century, the socialist

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14. A Leap Through Centuries (Moscow, 1968), p. 282.
 15. Devendra Kaushik, Socialism in Central Asia, (New Delhi, 1976), p. 61.
 16. Zafar Imam, n. 4, p. 197.
 17. Devendra Kaushik, n. 15, p. 62.

movement faced numerous problems. Before, the socialist movement was born in Central Asia, two Muslim movements were already going on there, of course, divergent in programmes but not radically different. At the turn of the 19th century, the most numerous and socially and politically dominant group was that of the Quadimists i.e. defenders of the sanctified tradition. They exercised exclusive control over the native economic, socio-cultural and educational institutions. These institutions were used to block the penetration of all modernising influences, including those emanating from the fold of cultural tradition.¹⁸ The dominant power elite controlling the movement, took shelter behind religion in order to maintain its privileged socio-economic position. Consequently, neither class consciousness, nor national differentiation was allowed to strike in the society. The Quadimists vigorously opposed not only the alien culture of Russian intruders but also 'reformist' elements in their own culture, elements popularly known as the Jadidists. The most effective tool in the hands of the Quadimists, which helped them to impose their rigid values of cultural conformity was the native education system, financed and regulated by the religious endowments. The resistance, which the Quadimists sought to put against the Russian rule, took on a character that was more religious than national.¹⁹

18. R.R. Sharma, "Intelligentsia and the Politics of Underdevelopment and Development: A Case Study of Soviet Central Asia, 1917-40", International Studies, Vol.15, no. 2, 1976, p. 207.

19. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal-Lemerancier-Quellejey, Islam in the Soviet Union, (London, 1967), p. 16.

Counterposed to the Qadimists, another "Muslim Re-
formist Movement" as Geoffrey Wheeler calls it,²⁰ the Jadidists
had also originated almost simultaneously. Their political
philosophy propagated Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. They of
course, advocated few reforms in the education system, but
socialism appeared repulsive to them, not only on account of
its political and economic philosophy, but also because it
basically violated the spirit of Islam and ran counter to the
laws of Shariat.²¹ Therefore, no radical difference of outlook
between the ideological standpoints of the Qadimists and
the Jadidists was discernable. Thus, Professors Bennigsen
and Lemercier-Quelquejay rightly summarise the situation that
"Turkestan up to 1917 revolution remained a bastion of narrow
reaction."²²

The seeds of the socialist movement were sown in the
Central Asian social soil against such a socio-economic and
political background. The socialist ideas were injected in
the Central Asian society by the Russians. They were the
originators and propagators of the Socialist movement,
since they formed the largest chunk of the railway and indus-
trial workers. The Russians who were exiled to Central Asia
on political grounds by the Tsarist government also played

20. Geoffrey Wheeler, "The Problem of Nationalities", Studies on the Soviet Union, (Munich, 1967), vol. 7, no. 4, p. 100.

21. R.R. Sharma, n. 18, p. 209.

22. Bennigsen, Quelquejay, n. 19, p. 36.

a prominent role in this mission. In 1902 a small group of Social Democrats was already working among the railway and industrial workers. After the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) in 1903, Social Democratic groups were organised in Russian Turkestan by the Russian Workers, political activists and members of Progressive intelligentsia. But their activities were confined to Russian Turkestan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Kyzyl-Arvat and Askhabad.²³ To the Tashkent and Samarkand centres were drawn members of the native workers and intelligentsia, like A.G. Rasheed, V.T. Bakaranje, M.V. Muratov, A.V. Khudash, and A.R. Bakhisov. By 1906 in Turkestan and Steppe region the number of Social-Democratic groups had gone up to 15 and these groups were spread over in places like Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand and Andijan. These groups participated in the 1905 revolution, in their centres near railroad junctions and railway workshops. But up to 1905 only a few native workers were attracted to this movement.²⁴

In February 1906, the first Turkestan Conference of the RSDLP was held. During this Conference a decision was taken to launch a Union of Turkestan Organisations of the RSDLP.²⁵ Though during and after 1905-07 revolutionary struggle, the movement received sever blows in Russian Turkestan, yet the social democratic groups became more

23. Ocherkii Istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Uzbekistana, (Tashkent, 1964), p. 16. Cited in Zafar Imam, n.4, p.198.

24. Zafar Imam, n.4, p. 197.

25. Ibid., p. 198.

active and the movement regained its old momentum by 1910. After 1910 the socialist movement received an impetus, when the Jadidists became active and participated in the national liberation and the socialist movement. A splinter group emerged among the Jadidists, comprising of clerks, shop salesmen, and teachers. This group called itself the Young Party. This group was located at Kokand and old Tashkent.¹ By 1912 this young party became instrumental in forming a similar party in the Khanate of Bukhara and was known as the "Young Bukharans". This group of Jadidists, a small hardcore, first went over to the Social Democratic Movement and later to the Socialist Revolutionaries and finally to the Bolsheviks.

After the 1916 rebellion in Central Asia and its suppression, the Jadidist movement, with its strongholds in Turkestan, witnessed further splits within its ranks. The younger members of the intelligentsia in Turkestan were disillusioned with the ideology of the Jadidists which was pre-occupied with Pan-Turkism and being mildly liberal in its socio-political outlook. They found themselves increasingly in harmony with the policies and programmes of the Young parties that had sprung up in a number of places in Central Asia. Therefore, the natives who joined the Bolshevik movement in Turkestan in 1917 were mostly former Jadidists alongwith the members of the young parties,

coming from the intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie and, also from among the workers and landless peasants.

Thus, on the basis of the scenario which emerges from the above discussion about the Social Democratic movement in Turkestan, we can safely conclude, that the native participation of the native's in the movement gradually increased by the year 1917. But this movement was dominated by the Russian workers. The native peasants, and women had hardly any significant representation in the Social Democratic groups.

III

Due to the virtual absence of native proletariat and not so significant participation of poor peasants and landless labourers in the Social Democratic Movement, the Bolsheviks had to devise a very careful strategy of drawing the native people into the party apparatus. The implementation of the Soviet policies in Central Asia and Uzbekistan with a view to bringing about radical changes in the socio-economic structure of the Republic depended on the support of the native people. This in turn meant the recruitment of the local people in the party organisation and thereby acceleration of the political socialisation process.

Bolshevik Strategy of Development of Party
Apparatus, 1917-23

The October Revolution in Central Asia occurred on a barren socio-political soil. The new socio-political system envisaged by the Bolsheviks was thus to be built in a non-conducive socio-cultural setting. The building of the new socio-political structure, thus depended on the demolition of the archaic structure of social relationship. This goal could only be realized by intensifying such social processes as class differentiation, a radical programme of agrarian reforms and the modernisation of the native traditional educational system.

The implementation of these strategic tasks made it imperative for the Bolsheviks to create a sizeable and politically reliable native party cadres, who were to play a crucial role in building anew the native socio-political structure. The most urgent task before the Bolshevik leadership was the mobilisation of public opinion for the acceptance of the new system. Along with the socio-economic reforms of development the success of the Bolshevik strategy, therefore, entirely depended on the creation of native cadres in the party. The Communist Party in Turkestan urgently needed native party activists, propagandists and teachers to exercise the political leadership role. The members of the Bolshevik Party, had to play a decisive role as organisers of a formidable socio-political change. In

the words of Antonio Gramsci, the function of the members of a political party is to direct and organise, which means their educational and intellectual role.²⁶

The tasks before the party were formidable, while the cadres were in short supply. The first Conference of the Communist Party at Tashkent held in June 1918, was attended by 250 actual party members only.²⁷

The first step of the Soviet Government immediately after the October Revolution was to reassure the non-Russian nationalities their political status. Its "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples' of Russia" proclaimed on November 1917 assured the nationalities of Russia:

- (i) Equality and sovereignty of the Peoples of Russia;
- (ii) The right of the Peoples' of Russia to self-determination;
- (iii) Abolition of all and any national-religious privileges and restrictions.
- (iv) Free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia. (28)

After this Declaration the Soviet Government, passed another important document in the form of an appeal to "All working Muslims of Russia and the East" published on

26. Cited in R.R. Sharma, n. 18, p. 213.

27. G. Safarov, Kolonialniia Revoliutsiia (Opyt Turkesana), Moscow, 1921, p. 50; Cited in R.R. Sharma, n.18, p. 211.

28. USSR Foreign Policy Documents, Moscow, 1957 (in Russian), vol. I, p. 15; Cited in R. Tuzmuhaedov, n.I, p. 70.

November 20 (December 3), 1917. The Soviet Government proclaimed: "Arrange your national life freely as you think fit. This is your right - You must know that your rights, just as the rights of all peoples of Russia are upheld by the entire might of the Revolution and its institutions."²⁹ The realization of these rights by the people of Central Asia depended on their participation in the party and the Soviets. Lenin urged the Russian proletariat to play the role of liberators in Turkistan, and despite the objective difficulties it would inspire in the masses an urge for independent political thinking and independent political action, even where a proletariat is non-existent."³⁰

The new Soviet Government provided institutional framework for the political participation by the people. The institutions available to the people to exercise this right were, the Peasants' and workers Soviets and the Communist Party. Since there was practically no native proletariat in Central Asia, the peasant Soviets and Peasant Organizations (Koschi), became the main platform for people's participation. Lenin in the "Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Question" during the Second Congress of the Communist International urged the Communists to assume the leadership role and guide the Peasants' Soviets despite the difficulties encountered in the absence of the native class conscious proletariat.

29. Ibid., p. 70.

30. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 3, p. 407.

The Tenth and Twelfth Party Congress held in 1921 and 1923 respectively highlighted the need of levelling up of the wide gap between various regions and peoples, politically, economically and culturally. The Tenth Congress urged the Party to develop and strengthen courts, economic, administrative and other organs of power, to involve local people fully who are familiar with the customs and psychology of the local population and to rapidly prepare the native cadres of qualified Soviet and Party workers in all spheres.³¹ J.V. Stalin who was Commissar of Nationalities also emphasised the participation of native population in political leadership in his report on the policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia. He said, "It is therefore, necessary that all Soviet organs in border regions - the courts, the administration, the economic bodies, as also the organs of the party - should as far as possible be recruited from among local people."³²

The most important Bolshevik strategy, for the implementation of the Soviet Government's programme in Turkistan and Central Asia, was to recruit the native cadres in the Communist Party for propaganda and organisation purpose.

31. Devendra Kaushik, n.p. 15, p. 23.

32. J.V. Stalin, "The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question on Russia," in Selection from V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin on National Colonial Question, (Calcutta, 1975), p. 121.

The Soviet leadership believed that socio-cultural transformation in the backward regions must go hand in hand with the drawing of non-Russian nationalities into the Soviet political system, even if it required granting of certain special concessions to them. The low level of technical and cultural development in Central Asia had led to a situation in which, even the political intelligentsia of nationalist persuasion was called upon to join the Party and to assume the pioneering role of initiating socio-cultural political and economic development.

The first Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan, which met in June 1918 passed a resolution emphasising on the need of the party work among Muslims. It called upon the party to establish the organs of the Turk-omnats (Turkistan Commissariat for Nationality Affairs), all over the republic. The organs of the Turkomnats were to be utilized for propagating the ideas of the Soviet regime among the indigenous population, for creating native cadres of propagandists and Red Army recruits, and for organising the publication of Communist literature in the local languages. ³³ By the time the Second Congress of Communist Party of Turkestan was held in December 1918, the native Communists formed about half of the entire party membership and Muslims working masses served on such high organs of

33. R. Vaidyanath, The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, (New Delhi, 1967), p. 90.

Soviet power as the Turkestan Tsik and Sovnarkom. The Second Congress of the Party expressed dissatisfaction with the educative and propaganda work among the Muslim masses and demanded wider participation of working people of local nationalities in the day-to-day working of the Soviets and other social organisation by giving them administrative and other posts.³⁴

During the Third Party Congress of Turkestan, held in June 1919, the Muslims working in various committees were placed under the control of Muslim Bureau of the Party. The persistent efforts to recruit more Muslims to the local party organisation finally led to the mass infiltration in the party by Jadidists, who had recently become converts to Communism. These nationalist elements sought to transform the Central Asian section of the Communist Party into a nationalist Turkic Communist Party and aimed at transferring its leadership into the hands of Jadidists.³⁵ The Jadidists who came from the Merchant Class had very little connection with Muslim or Russian workers and flatly refuted the theory of class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat. During 1920, after the arrival of the Turkestan Commission, the Party was purged of the nationalist elements. The Muslim Bureau was dissolved in 1920. During 1920 and onwards, the new membership included mainly the workers.

34. Materialy i Dokumenty II Svezda KPT, p. 62. Cited in Devendra Kaushik, n. 15, p. 92.

35. S.A. Zenkovsky, Pan Turkism and Islam in Russia, (Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 245.

The nativisation of the party apparatus created problems giving rise to nationalistic and chauvinistic trends. The chauvinistically inclined Russian elements did not fully believe in the creative abilities of the natives. Therefore, Lenin in 1920 advised the Russians to abandon their privileged position to accommodate other nationalities, particularly in Central Asia. He said -- "In one way or another by one's attitude or by concession, it is necessary to compensate the non-Russians for the lack of trust, for the suspicion, and, the insults to which the government of the nation subjected them in past."³⁶ Moreover, he had been consistent in appealing that the Party must act cautiously and without haste in view of the peculiar situation in Turkestan.

The Party also undertook the task of educating the peasant masses and mobilising them in favour of the land reforms. The party cadres worked among the poor peasants and landless labourers to organise them in the peasants' Unions known as Koshchi. In August 1921, the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party Commissioned 686 Communists to explain the essence and character of the new Economic Policy to the Working People.³⁷ The Young Communist League played an important role, particularly in cultural work among the peasants.

36. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 36, p. 308.

37. R. Kh. Aminova, Changes in Uzbekistan Agriculture, 1917-29, Moscow, 1974, p. 31.

The basic strategy which the Bolsheviks adopted in Turkestan during the initial period regarding the nativisation of party apparatus was an inter-linked process of encouraging political participation by the natives. The Bolshevik strategy can be summarised^{as} under:

(1) Application of the uniform system of political socialisation. The creation of Party cells, primary party organisations and organising the peasants in Koshchi (Peasants' Union), and organizing the Youth in Young Communist League. These organisations provided institutional framework to the natives for political participation. The workers and Peasant Soviets were created for drawing the local population to administrative apparatus.

(ii) Granting of certain party recruitment concessions to the local population with a view to isolate the feudal and orthodox religious elite.

(iii) Imparting of political education to the workers, peasants, youth and women to prepare cadres for responsible political tasks and for the exercise of leadership in the future.

The Soviet government introduced the agrarian reforms in 1920. These reforms were undertaken for the purpose of transfer of land to the native peasants from the Russian settlers, who had seized these lands from the native peasants. During the New Economic Policy period the soviets adopted a cautious approach towards the people of border regions. By

the decree of 1922, the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, restored the properties of Waqf and mosques to the religious bodies for places of worship. The traditional schools and mosques were reopened. These measures were adopted by the government to win the confidence of the local people and to popularise the Bolshevik party. These steps proved instrumental in popularising the party and in the recruitment of natives in the party. At the end of 1924 the representation of the Uzbeks in the party went up to 42 per cent.

This policy was adopted roughly till the beginning of collectivisation and industrialisation. This was necessitated owing to the Basmachi revolt and resistance of the Kulaks and landlords to Land and Water Reforms. One may conclude that inspite of the tremendous odds, the Uzbek party managed to organize itself and began to draw the native cadres. Moreover, it was still early to speak of political participation of these cadres in making decisions and implementing them.

IV

Socio-Economic Development since 1924 and the Role of the Uzbek Party

The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in 1924 according to the national delimitation project. The delimitation of Central Asia also led to fundamental changes

38. Kommunistcheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana v Tsifrakh, (Tashkent, 1964), p. 17. (Hereafter cited as KPUS).

in the Communist Party organisations of the region. Following the abolition of the Communist Parties of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezem, there came into existence the Communist Parties of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and Oblast Party, organisations of Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Karakalpakia. In December 1924, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan had a total membership of 16371 persons, of which 6,883 (42.2 per cent) were Uzbeks, 6,666 (40.7%) were Europeans and Russians and 946 (6.8 per cent) were Tadjiks.³⁹ A provisional organisational Bureau managed the affairs of the Uzbek Communist Party until February 1925, when the First Congress of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR was held. The Party Congress proclaimed the Uzbek communist party as an integral part of the All Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and elected its permanent organs. The newly elected central Committee of the UZBEK Communist Party replaced the provisional organisational bureau.

By 1924, the Soviet Government now felt reassured to undertake further new measures. The agrarian reforms of 1925-28 were meant to eradicate the feudal property, nationalisation of land and water resources and extension of help to the poor peasants by providing them with agricultural implements and livestock. The extensive preparation and implementation of land reforms required the necessary political infra-

39. Ibid., p. 17.

structure. M.I. Kalinin was deputed to Central Asia by the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in 1925 to look into the political and economic problems of the region. He opened the First Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and impressed upon the party cadres to accelerate their political work in the countryside. The implementation of the Communist Party's agrarian policies and the native peoples political participation were an inter-related processes. The implementation of the Soviet policies meant mass-mobilisation and mass political propaganda work among the toilers and to rally them around the party. These tasks in turn required trained cadres to take the policies to the masses. Therefore, the twin tasks of creating political infrastructure and political propaganda and political education of the masses went hand in hand in Uzbekistan.

The propagation of Marxist-Leninist ideas constituted the basic communist programme of political socialisation. In the regions which now comprise the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan, native activists were further encouraged to form a society known as Koshchi, (which in Uzbek means ploughmen). This organisation aimed at raising the political consciousness of the native peasants and landless workers and infusing them with the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Koshchi served as an important link between the peasants and the party. This society of the toilers in no time turned

into a big political organisation. At the time of the formation of the Uzbek SSR all important towns and cities of Uzbekistan had the branches of the Koschi. The membership of the Koshchi which was 99,873 prior to the establishment of new national boundaries went up to 354,763 by the end of 1926.⁴⁰ The membership of the Koshchi helped in the stabilisation and legitimisation of the Soviet political system as the network of Koshchi provided new bases of political power to the Bolsheviks and served as a means for the recruitment of the peasants in the Communist Party. The Koshchi also included the women and young communist League activists. At the end of 1926 the number of women unionists stood at 4,800. As a result, the membership of the peasantry in the party which was 5977 in 1924 rose to 9017 in 1929. (Table I). The percentage of membership of the peasants declined from 42.17 in 1924 to 24.98 in 1929. On the other hand, the percentage share of workers increased from 35.06 in 1924 to 49.82 in 1929. The workers gained percentage increase in the party at the cost of peasants. The decrease in the percentage membership of the peasantry was largely due to the strict membership conditions during the period 1924-29. After the October Revolution certain relaxations were made in the recruitment policy of the party which led to the mass infiltration of nationalist elements in the party. As mentioned earlier, the party was purged of this

40. R.K. Aminova, n. 37, p. 128.

membership in 1922-23. Therefore, a cautious approach was adopted in the recruitment of members in the party.

The task of carrying out land reforms went ahead with the restoration of the industry to the pre-1917 level. Central Asia's rudimentary industry suffered badly during the civil war. The Republic of Uzbekistan in 1927-28 had already realized, the crucial recovery of industrial production in many of its principal industries. Between 1922-28, there had appeared in Uzbekistan such industries as chemicals, leather-shoe, sewing and silk reeling. This period witnessed the massive expansion of power resources in Uzbekistan. Diesel hydro-electric and thermo-electric plants were built in Tashkent, Kadyrinsk and Fergana.⁴¹ Two small oil refineries were built in Fergana Valley. Silk spinning plants were started in Samarkend, Margellan and Bukhara and already existing metal facilities were expanded.

The restoration of the industry to the pre-war level and building of new plants resulted in changes though negligible, in the social structure of the society. The growing number of workers in turn resulted in an increase in the total membership, and increasing representation of the workers in the party. The percentage of the workers in the party increased from 35.06 percent in 1924 to 49.82 in 1929 as shown in Table I.

41. R.R. Sharma, A Marxist Model of Social Change, New Delhi 1979), p. 132.

Table I

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE UZBEK PARTY
(1924- 45)

Year	Total Membership	Workers	Peasants	Services/White Collar workers	Others
1924*	13972 100%	4899 35.06	5977 42.17	3230 23.17	517 3.22
1929	36093 100%	17980 49.82	9017 24.98	7786 21.57	1310 3.63
1935	33834 100%	13348 39.45	14605 43.17	5881 17.38	-
1940	63847 100%	18507 28.99	20967 32.84	24373 38.17	-
1945	82505 100%	20691 25.07	26159 31.71	35655 43.22	-

Source: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana v
Tsifrah, (Tashkent, 1964), pp. 13, 34, 48, 71, 92.

1924* Figures as given in original source.

Thus on the eve of collectivisation and industrialisation certain significant trends are revealed by Table I in the composition of the membership of the party. The total membership of the party in 1924 was 13972 which rose to 36093 in 1929. The membership of the party during 1924-29 therefore, more than doubled. The representation of the Uzbeks also increased from 6,883 (42.04 per cent) in 1924 to 17081, (i.e., 46.32 per cent) in 1929. If we include Tadjiks, Kirgiz, Turkmen and other small local nationalities, then the percentage of natives in the Uzbek Party comes to 53% approximately. The number of Europeans including Russian also increased from 6,666 (40.72 per cent) in 1924 to 15,467 (42.85 per cent) in 1929. The percentage representation of Europeans including Russians increased by 2 per cent while the representation of Uzbeks increased by 4 percent. (Table II) For women and young Communist League members figures are not available for 1924. But in 1929, there were 3339 women and 3860 young communist League (Komsomol) members of the party.⁴²

The adoption of such measures as agrarian reforms and restoration of industry, by the Soviet Government and the Party, during the formative years in Uzbekistan, resulted in changes in the social structure. A socio-economic base was created through these measures on which the Soviet power could rely in further creating objective conditions for the promotion of social and political mobility of the natives. The

Table II
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UZBEK PARTY
(1924-45)

		Total No. of Uzbeks Communists	Tatar	Kirgis	Tadjik	Darimen	Uig ^{ur}	Jews	Other Local nationalities	Europeans	Not clear	Karkalpak	Kazakh	Russians	Ukrainians	Bylorussians	All others
Uzbek	SSR	16371	6863	384	744	964	19	4	36	6665	124						
	1924	100%	42.04	2.35	4.54	5.89	0.12	0.02	0.22	40.72%	0.76%						
	1929	36093	17081	298	1227	160	270	115	592	18427		47	841				
		100%	46.32%	0.80	3.68	0.43	0.76	0.32	1.64	42.38%		0.13%	2.33%				
	1935	38634	20493						233					20661			1914
		100%	50.6%						9.8%					23.95%			5.6%
	1940	62843	31962	2287	392	1732	160	1078	3733			1268	3629	15201	2099	260	
		100%	50.05%	3.55%	0.6	2.7	0.2	1.7%	5.85			2.15	5.7%	23.81%	3.3%	0.4%	
	1945	82505	35205	3236	438	2070	313	6825	4766			2040	4003	19082	3992	629	
		100%	42.67%	3.92%	0.53	2.51	0.38%	8.27%	5.78%			2.47	4.85%	23.14%	4.72%	0.76%	

Source: *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana V. Tajikah, Tashkent, 1954, pp. 17, 26, 30, 72, 93.*

changes in economy, political system and expansion of educational system were deemed necessary for the nativisation of the Soviet apparatus in Uzbekistan. Indeed, the creation of harmonious political conditions for the establishment of satisfactory relations between the local nationalities and the Russians entirely depended on these changes.

At this stage, we turn to the impact of industrialisation and collectivisation on the growth and composition of the Uzbek party up to World War II. Further, the role played by the party in the realisation of the objective of collectivisation and industrialisation in face of the stupendous problems will also focus our attention.

V

The Social Composition, Growth and Role of the Party During Collectivisation and Industrialisation

The collectivisation of agriculture and industrial development of not merely Uzbekistan but the entire Central Asian region was the declared aim of the Soviet leadership. These measures in the long run were related to the imperatives of social and economic change. Therefore, in some ways, particularly from the viewpoint of socio-economic structural changes, the collectivisation and industrialization were the extension of the agrarian reforms and industrial development carried out in the earlier phase. The creation of industrial centres, development of agriculture along socia-

list lines, and training of Soviet and party cadres from the local people, all these were deemed necessary for the Alliance of working class and peasantry and for building socialism in the Central Asian regions.

The major emphasis in the first two five year plans, 1928- to 1932 and 1933 to 1937, was towards collectivisation and modernisation of agriculture and laying the foundation of heavy industry in Uzbekistan. The plan for collectivisation in Uzbekistan was worked out by a special commission of the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party in Uzbekistan. The Plan was confirmed on 27th November 1929. Therefore, the policy of Collectivisation of agriculture on a large scale was put into action by the close of 1929-30. The most important feature of the collectivisation of agriculture was the policy of eliminating Kulaks and Beisys as a class. Their households had already been reduced to nearly 4.5 per cent after the reforms in Uzbekistan. It was now decided to do away altogether with these Kulak households. Their holdings were mainly converted into subkhozes, i.e. State Farms. After the agrarian reforms and on the eve of collectivisation the number of middle peasant was 53 per cent and those of poor peasants 35 per cent. The number of farm labourers and Chairikers even after the reforms was as large as 46 thousand and 50 thousand.⁴³ The situation was indeed serious and therefore, posed a serious challenge to

43. R.R. Shama, n. 41, p. 132.

the Bolshevik leadership. It is, therefore, clear that the Beiys and well to do peasants maintained a de facto control over the land holdings of the poor peasants.

The main thrust of collectivisation policy was to create agriculture artels. During the decade 1930-40, all the agricultural holdings in Uzbekistan were transformed into collective farms - of the Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz type -- the majority of them being in the category of the Kholkoz type. Thus by 1940, 99.3 per cent of the peasants household⁴⁴ were transformed into collective forms.

Collectivisation of agriculture facilitated an institutional switch over to large-scale mechanised agriculture. It also served as a useful socio-political instrument in shattering the feudal foundation of the old class structure of a society which over the centuries had become stagnant. The process of collectivisation brought about significant changes in the class-structure of the society. The collective form peasantry became a close ally of the working class in the building of future communist society. In the sphere of industrialisation the main thrust in the first two five year plans in Uzbekistan was to create suitable conditions for expansion and reconstruction of such industrial enterprises as were already in existence and to lay the foundation of the heavy industry. During the first Five Year Plan,

44. Ibid. p. 135.

the total capital investment in the industrial sector was about 238 million roubles. The second Five Year Plan for Uzbekistan laid stress upon the development of the technical basis of the industry and on the expansion of cotton production and the development of local cotton industry. The total investment during the Second Five Year Plan was 2078 million roubles.⁴⁵ During the Second Five Year Plan period, nearly 189 new enterprises were undertaken to be built in Uzbekistan. Some of the most outstanding among them were the textile combine at Tashkent, the 'Tashsel' machine building plant, two fertilizer plants at Kokand and Kagan, an oil extraction plant at Kattakurgan, the Chirchik, electrochemical combine and the meat combine at Tashkent. The value of industrial production in the Uzbek SSR rose from 684 million roubles in 1932 to 1,668 million roubles (a rise of 2.4 times) in 1937. Production in the cotton textile industry increased 4.8 times during the Second Five Year Plan period, 7.8 times in oil and gas industry, 3 times in power production and Five times in metallurgical industry.⁴⁶

The Third Five Year Plan carried forward the earlier trends of industrialisation. The plan envisaged a further investment in the expansion of the industrial enterprises created during the First and Second Plans, a further

45. Ibid.

46. Itogi Vypolneniya Vtroygo Pyatiletnogo Plana razvitiya narodnogo Khozyaistva SSR, Moscow, (1939), p. 54. Cited in Devendra Kaushik, n. 15, p. 114.

expansion of energy resources, the building of new electric stations and the expansion of textile industry. Some new features were the development of the natural gas-oil industry and the copper smelting plant at Almalk. New food industries were established at Tashkent, Fergana, Samarkand and Koodzhent.

Now it is worth while to examine the impacts of economic development and industrialization on the social structure of Uzbekistan.

The urbanisation process in Uzbekistan was accelerated due to massive transfer of rural manpower to the urban centres. Initially the percentage of urban population declined from 24 per cent in 1913 to 18.3 per cent in 1926.⁴⁷ The reason for the decline were the dislocation and destruction of urban population during civil war. But from 1926 and onwards, the urban population showed an upward trend and by 1939, it had reached about 30 per cent of the total population.⁴⁸ The working class which constituted the microscopic segment in Turkestan on the eve of October Revolution was constantly growing. In 1914 the strength of the industrial proletariat was 49.9 thousand workers in the whole of Turkestan (Before 1924 Uzbekistan was part of Turkestan). At the end of Second Five Year Plan the strength of workers was 1,12,860.⁴⁹ The most significant feature in the increase in

47. Shams Ud Din, n. 13, p. 262.

48. Istoriya rabochesgo Klassa Uzbekistana, Vol. I, Tashkent. Cited in Devendra Kaushik, Central Asia in Modern Times, (Moscow, 1970), p. 73.

49. Shams Ud Din, n. 13, p. 261.

the working class was the indication of native women into production activities. In 1938, of the total industrial workers 24.2 per cent were women. Moreover, large number of women had also joined the professions like engineers, skilled workers, teachers and office workers.

The achievements in development of education and eradication of illiteracy were also no less significant. The literacy rate in Uzbekistan rose from 11.6 per cent in 1926 to 78.7 per cent in 1939. The corresponding figure for women was 7.3 per cent in 1926 and 73.3 per cent in 1939.⁵⁰ The number of teachers also rose from 2748 in 1924-25 to 19314 in 1932-33.⁵¹ During this period educational institutions were opened to prepare scientific and technical cadres like, the polytechnical institute, the textile institute, the railway transport institute, the Electro-technical communications institute, the Agriculture Institute the Finance and Economic Institute, the Medical Institute and Pedagogical Institutes. The annual expenditure on education per head population in Uzbekistan exceeded the average for USSR. In 1940 it was 89 rouble for USSR. While in Uzbekistan it amounted to 101 roubles. In 1946 the average for USSR was 133 roubles, while in Uzbekistan the corresponding figure was 147 roubles. The figures, therefore, clearly indicate that special attention was paid in the development and expansion of education in Uzbekistan.

50. A Leap Through the Centuries, Moscow, 1968, p. 284.

51. Shams Ud Din, n. 13, p. 150.

Rapid industrialization and collectivisation of agriculture was accompanied by a radical shift in the occupational and consequently - the class structure of the population in Uzbekistan. The Communist Party which was a weak organization, at the time of the formation of Uzbek SSR gained in strength. The rapidly changing social structure during the 1930's had its impact on the social composition and indigenization of the party membership. The expansion of the party was strategically important for the successful implementation of the Soviet programme of development and change. It was the party cadres, who were assigned the crucial role of political socialisation.

The total membership of the Uzbek Party increased from 36903 in 1929 to 81612 in 1933 (see Table IV). In 1933, the Workers constituted 50.48 per cent and the peasants 39.25 per cent of the total membership. While in services only 10.27 per cent members were represented.⁵² The tremendous growth in the membership was a result of the "membership drive" launched in 1927-30. The increasing proletarianisation of the party was due to the expansion of industrial work. The widespread mass collectivisation and implementation of the policy of liquidating the Kulaks as a class led to the expansion in the membership of the peasants. The representation of the Uzbeks in the Party increased from 47.32 per cent in 1929 to 60.85 per cent in 1933.⁵³

52. KPUS, pp. 34, 44.

53. Ibid., pp. 36, 44.

Table IV III

MEMBERSHIP OF THE PARTY
(1924-45)

Year	Total Members	Full Members	Candidate Members	Women
1924	13972	6461	7511	NA
	100%	46.24	53.76	--
1929	36093	21860	14233	3339
	100%	60.57	39.43	9.25
1935	33834	19196	14638	5163
	100%	56.74	43.26	15.26
1940	63847	29605	34242	9854
	100%	44.37	53.63	15.43
1945	82505	52733	29772	25135
	100%	63.91	36.09	30.46

Source: KPUS, pp. 13, 34, 48, 69, 89.

The increasing trend in the Party membership was reversed due to purges carried out in the Party from 1934 to 1936. On 28th April, 1933, the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) declared a purge with the object of cleansing the party ranks from socially alien class elements. The purge began in May 1934. The president of the Council of Ministers of Uzbek SSR Faizullah Khodjhaev in his speech of 5th September 1934, on the "Tenth Anniversary of National State Delimitation in Central Asia" remarked, "In the Second Five Year Plan, the Communist Party and all the toilers of Uzbekistan are faced with a grim struggle against agents of Kulaks and have to wage a struggle against the Kulak ideology." ⁵⁴ As a result of the purges the membership of the party declined sharply. In 1935 the total membership of the party declined to 33834, more than two times decline as compared to 1933. The impact of the purges was more severe in the ^uUrban areas than in the rural areas. As a result, the representation of workers in the Party declined from 50.48 per cent in 1933 to 39.45 per cent in 1938. The percentage of peasants and white collar workers increased from 39.25 and 10.27 per cent to 43.17 per cent and 17.38 per cent respectively. The increasing representation of the peasants clearly indicates that the party's base in rural areas strengthened during the collectivisation period and the party's links with the masses were broadened.

54. Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Uzbekistana, Tashkent, 1974, p. 353, (Hereafter OIKPU)

The expanding industrial activity and mechanisation of agriculture during the and after the Second Five-Year Plan or what is called the period of "Socialist Reconstructions demanded an increase in the level of party leadership and further perfection of organisational work of the party. In the conditions of all round development of economy, when the task of harnessing new technology came to the fore, the leadership and cadres of the party, were required to be more concrete goal oriented and more differentiated in their approach. From the Party workers was required not only the capacity of conducting political agitation and propaganda, but also the ability to understand deeply the question of production without which the agitational propagandistic work was useless. Therefore according to the decisions of 17th Congress of the All Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Party organs were gradually founded on the functional and production principle.⁵⁵ The reorganisation of the organs was meant to increase the role of the party in supervision of production.

Following the decisions of the 17th Congress of the AUCP(B), the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan suggested the reorganization of Party cells and primary party organisations. In the Central Committee of the Uzbek Party a number of departments relating to production branches were established. By 1935 all the party organisations in Uzbekistan were reorganised on the basis of territorial and production principles.. The total number of such

55. Ibid., p. 348.

organisations was 1810. This number rose to 2980 on the eve of Second World War. Due to the transfer of machinery and plants from European part of Soviet Union to Uzbekistan and expansion of primary party organisations in the Kolkhoze, the number of these organizations went up to 5935 in 1945 (the end of Second World War). (Table IV). During the war period, the number of primary party organisation in the industrial sector, Kolkhoze (collective farms), Economic Administration Sector and health organisations, increased tremendously. The number of primary party organisation in industrial organisation increased from 201 in 1940 to 409 in 1945. During the same period the number of Party organisation in the Economic Administration Sector and Collective farms increased from 385 to 601 and 894 to 2631 respectively (Table IV).

After the purges of 1934-36, efforts were made to replenish the ranks of the party. A decision to this effect was taken by the Central Committee of AUCP(B) on 4th March 1938 on admitting new members into the Party.⁵⁶ As a result, the total membership of the Uzbek Party which had sharply declined during 1934-36 period (81612 in 1933 to 33834 in 1935) increased tremendously. It increased from 39834 in 1935 to 63847 in 1940, and could cross the 1935, when it went up to 82805. (see Table IV) During the two decades, i.e., from 1924 (when Uzbek SSR was formed) to 1945

56. T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-67 (Princeton, 1968), p. 217.

Table ^{IV} III

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UZBEK PARTY
(1935-45)

Types of Party Organisations	Primary Party Organizations		
	1935 (1)	1940	1945
1. Industry	151	201	409
2. Transport and Communication	11	150	201
3. Construction	16	28	34
4. Primary Party Organisations in Party Organs	-	141	172
5. Admn. Sector		385	601
6. State Farm (Sovkhoz)	58	58	82
7. MTS/MM	72	163	198
8. Kolkoze (Collective Farm)	632	894	2631
9. Educational, Cultural Research & Health Org.	91	195	325
10. Other Agricultural Organisations (Rural Regional Centre, Agricultural Territories)	133	451	815
11. Various Institutions	556	--	--
12. Misc. (Craftsmanship, Trade and Catering, other types non-working)	31	314	485
Total	1810	2980	5953

Source: KPUS, pp. 49, 70, 90, 91.

the Uzbek party registered a tremendous growth, i.e. 6 times increase in its membership, ~~while~~ the increase in the membership, while at the All Union level was 12 times in the corresponding period.

The social composition of the party in Uzbekistan differed substantially from the USSR average in particular by containing far more peasants and less workers. This situation in the Uzbek party was due to predominance of peasantry in the Uzbek society. As far as the social composition is concerned, Table I reveals certain interesting trends. During the purge period the number as well the percentage representation of workers declined, while the number and percentage of peasants increased. One point which emerges from the increasing number of the peasants in the party is that the party succeeded in creating its social base among the peasantry. During the period 1935-45 though the number of workers and collective farmers increased (workers 13343 in 1935 increased to 20691 in 1945 and peasants membership increased from 14605 to 26159 in the corresponding period). (see Table I). But their percentage representation in party showed a decline. The percentage membership of the workers in the party registered decline from 39.45 in 1935 to 28.99 in 1940 and further fell to 25.07 in 1945. Likewise the percentage share of peasantry also declined from 43.17 in 1935 to 32.84 in 1940 and further went down to 31.71, in 1945.⁵⁷

Interestingly enough, on the other hand the white collar workers/services increased their share in percentage representation in the party. Their share increased from 17.38 in 1935 to 38.17 in 1940 and further soared up to 43.22 in 1945. The white collar workers gained this increase at the cost of both workers and peasants as shown in Table I.

The Conclusion that emerges from the increase in proportion of white collar party members is that more workers and collective farmers after receiving political education and technical training were assigned more responsible and supervisory tasks and were placed among white collar workers though by social status they remained either workers or peasants. Secondly, the increases in white collar workers was due to the emergence of native intelligentsia in Uzbekistan.

Table II reveals what T.H. Rigby calls "rapid indigenization in the Central Asian Party membership" during early 1930's.⁵⁸ The representation of the Uzbeks in 1935 had gone up to 60 per cent. The representation of Europeans (Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainians) was approximately 40 per cent in 1935. The representation of Uzbeks and other local nationalities increased to 70.79 percent while the share of Europeans in the Uzbek declined from 40 per cent in 1935 to 28.21 per cent in 1940. But this trend was reversed during

58. T.H. Rigby, n. 56, p. 372.

the war years. The proportion of Uzbeks and other nationalities declined to 63.11 in 1945, while the Europeans increased their share which went up to 36.89 in the same year. The reasons for this changing trend during the war years as revealed in Table II was due to migration of European workers and technical cadres to Uzbekistan during the war years.

Another significant trend is revealed in the composition of the party. The representation of the women increased from 9.25 per cent in 1929 to 30.46 per cent in 1945 as shown in Table IV.¹¹ It is interesting to note that in 1945 around 28 per cent members were in the age group 0-30 years and nearly 44 per cent in the age group 31-40 years.⁵⁹ It is apparent that the party made concerted efforts to base its entire structure on comparatively younger age groups. Thus with the changing social structure in Uzbekistan, the social basis of the party also expanded. The increasing membership of the party mobilised the masses in favour of Soviet Government and its policies during the collectivisation and the industrialisation period. During the Second World War, the tasks of the party multiplied. Now the party members were called upon to mobilise manpower and material resources for the war and the defense of the country.

The Communist party of Uzbekistan on the instructions of the Central Committee of AUCP(B) started political work among the people for the mobilisation of resources for the

59. T.H. Rigby, n. 56, p. 356.

war. On 10th June 1941 the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan decided to form party committees to mobilise war resources in the field of industry, transport and agriculture.⁶⁰ The party committees formed propaganda groups. During the wartime 8000 party propaganda groups carried out political and ideological propaganda lectures among various sections of the society.⁶¹ During 1944 alone 17,000 political lectures were delivered by these groups in which around 2 million people participated. During July 1941- June 1942 special party schools were started and courses conducted to train personnel for agricultural work in which 130.8 thousand persons, were trained, 52 per cent of which were women.⁶² Evening courses were also started under the guidance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan to train workers.

The Party Committees were assigned with the responsibility for the voluntary recruitment of people in the army. In the first months of war these committees received more than 32,000 application for enrollment in the army out of which 30,000 were communists and Komsomol members. In Karkalpakia ASSR alone during the war 62,000 persons were recruited out of which 1,752 were Communist and 16,000 Komsomol members.⁶³

60. OIKPU, p. 418.

61. Ibid., p. 425.

62. Ibid., p. 432.

63. Ibid., p. 419.

On 18th October 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan took a special decision to form party political commands in the army division and brigades.

Nearly 5000 communists and 15,000 Komsomol members were sent to the army divisions to form political commands and to carry out political work among these divisions and brigades.

The Fifth Plenum of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan met on 5-7 December 1941 and discussed the production of war materials and agriculture products. This plenum took decision to increase the capacity of industries and transport and to increase the production of coal and petroleum and speeding up of the Construction work of power stations. The party organisations were directed to mobilise the workers and the peasants to fulfil these tasks. The Secretaries of industrial party's organisation were assigned the responsibility of supervising production in their factories.

During the war years the membership of the party increased from 77.6 thousand on 1st January 1942 to 82.5 thousand on 1st January 1945. Workers and peasants constituted 60 per cent of the candidate membership, while more than 40 per cent of the total number of candidate members were women. ⁶⁴ The increase in the membership of the party during the war was partly due to admission of new members who came to Uzbekistan with evacuated industries.

Thus Communist Party which was a weak organisation on the eve of Revolution gained in strength during 1924-45, In Uzbekistan, the Bolsheviks adopted a flexible approach in the recruitment of members to the party. During the land reforms and industrial restoration period, the social base of the party was extended. The extension of Party's social base helped in the implementation of Party and governments' policies during the crucial period of collectivisation and industrialisation brought about radical changes in the socio-economic structure of the Uzbek society. As a consequence new social classes like, native working class, collective farm peasantry and intelligentsia emerged in Uzbekistan. The emergence of these social classes had a deep impact on the growth and the composition of the Party. The party served as an institution of political socialisation and this process in return helped in the nativisation of the party apparatus. Thus by 1945 the party succeeded in drawing more and more native people, in the management of the social and political affairs. The increasing number of the party cadres on the other hand provided legitimacy to the Soviet system.

In the preceding pages, we began by bringing into focus the historical background of the establishment of Soviet power in Uzbekistan and identified the various policies, strategies and tactics, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) adopted in strengthening the base of Soviet power, leading to the

emergence of Uzbek SSR itself in 1924. Against tremendous odds the Bolsheviks managed to bring about fundamental changes in the socio-economic structure of Uzbek society. The process of collectivisation and later industrialisation in Uzbekistan inevitably, led to the creation and strengthening of new social classes among the natives and more importantly to the provision of new opportunities for the political participation of the natives.

The impact of the increasing political participation of the natives was felt first in the state organs of the Uzbek republic, both at the lowest and highest levels; so much so that the Uzbek republic had Uzbeks as its first president and Prime Minister.

The Uzbek Communist Party played a pivotal role in these developments as shown earlier. The composition of the party itself had undergone considerable changes during the period under review. Moreover, the beginning of the second world war provided an impetus to the development and growth of the party. Likewise, the role and functions of the party were transferred during collectivisation and industrialisation, the party took the lead in the mobilisation of masses, thus paving the way for more political participation. During the war the party redoubled its efforts in mobilising men and material, thus further strengthening this process. Although, an overall centralisation of party apparatus proved inevitable during the war period.

Though the primacy of party in Soviet Political System always remained, there had been fluctuations in the position of the party. For example, during collectivisation and industrialisation, the party became more centralised, particularly at the lower level. Although by 1934 some correctives were introduced for greater participation of the party in decision making process at the lower levels, when it was organized on production and territorial basis. However, during the war this reorganization was set aside only to be corrected in the immediate post-war years.

We may thus conclude, that the ^{years} period 1917 to 1939 was essentially the period, when conducive environment was created for the operational mechanism of Soviet political system, delicate balance between centralisation and democracy. The creation of this conducive environment proved congenial later after the war for increasing political participation of the Uzbeks and other natives through the medium of the party. We may add, that the war-years inevitably disturbed the delicate balance between centralisation and democracy, thus making it more problematic for the optimal use of the conducive environment, created during 1917-39, for the participatory leadership and political participation, and also later after the War.

CHAPTER III

Development of the Communist Party of
Uzbekistan and the Process of Political
Participation, 1946-53

The Soviet Union emerged from the war victorious. Paradoxically, the victory underlined increasing strength and potential of the Soviet system as well as emphasised its internal weaknesses. The victory was achieved at a tremendous cost of men and material while what remained bore little resemblance to the Soviet society on the eve of the war. One third of the means of production was either destroyed or completely dislocated, twenty million people died, while the system itself had to find new avenues for its consolidation and further development.

Central Asia including Uzbekistan had its share of pride and sorrow in this tremendous endeavour. A number of times during the war, the front almost touched the Uzbek borders, while Uzbek human and material resources were completely geared to the war needs, although industrialisation in Uzbekistan was yet to reach a take-off stage. On the eve of the war, the collectivisation had yet to bring about desired results. The impact of war on Uzbek society was all the more catastrophic. More so, when the process of consolidating and creating new social classes, through education, wider economic activities and political participation was yet to envelop a considerable majority of Uzbeks and native population. Hence, the challenges that the Soviet system faced after the war were of a more serious nature in Uzbekistan than elsewhere.

It is now fairly well known that the Soviet leadership was well aware of all these difficulties mentioned above.¹

It moved at a break-neck speed, yet cautiously. The first task was the restoration of the pre-war economy and to assure the Soviet people that the worst was over. In fulfilling both these tasks, the leadership had to rely primarily on the party apparatus and also to mobilise people for hard-work and continued economic hardships. Inevitably, the result was that the collective leadership and trends of mass-participation gradually gave way to centralisation and superimposition of state apparatus over party organisations. Hence it was no surprise that the immediate post-war years had acquired quite similar characteristics in the Soviet Union as those of the period of collectivisation and first two Five Year Plans. Likewise, the party could assert itself only after 1951, after the restoration of pre-war economy, when the 19th Party Congress was held after an interval of 14 years in 1952. However, it is worthwhile to note that the process of development and consolidation of the party continued, though at a slower pace. The problem of participation at the Central and the republican level, was logically relegated to the background. Yet the facts, that the Soviet society regained its momentum for development and

1. See Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, Penguin, 1977.

the party continued to register growth and upward mobility, were symptomatic. In other words, the period 1946 to 1953 was essentially the period of restoration of all facets of Soviet society, and success achieved laid the ground for further development of Soviet society including political participation, in the years after 1953.

Against this background it is worth our while to investigate these two crucial areas of activity namely, the role of the Uzbek Party in the restoration of Soviet economy and the growth and development of Communist party apparatus in the specific context of Uzbekistan.

I

Party's Role in Post-war Restoration and Reconstruction

In 1930s the Communist Party played a crucial role in the mobilisation of masses and their political socialisation. Natives were recruited in the Party for achieving the objectives of industrialisation and collectivisation. During the war years, the whole emphasis and efforts of the party in Uzbekistan shifted to the defence of the country and for mobilisation of manpower and material resources. The policy of nativisation of the party apparatus thus got an impetus during the war years.

The tasks of the party in the post-war construction and rehabilitation of the economy were no less important.

The Communists in Uzbekistan were once again called upon to assume the participatory role for achieving the post-war objectives.

The party's immediate and long term tasks in the political economic and ideological fields were specified. In the sphere of production the party had to mobilise all the resources for the restoration of the national economy as speedily as possible and to surpass the pre-war production levels.

In the sphere of economic relations the task of the party meant an improvement in the socialist production relations and strengthening and consolidation of the collective ownership of means of production. In the sphere of political education, ideology and culture, the party was assigned the tasks of resolute struggle against survival of bourgeois views, morals and customs and to raise the political consciousness of the masses.²

In March 1946 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the Five Year Plan for the period 1946-50. According to the guidelines of the 4th Five Year Plan, the 8th Session of Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan adopted the laws on the plan on 30th August, 1946.³ In the rear regions of the country and particularly in Uzbekistan, rehabilitation and development of economy had its own specialities. Here in the

2. B.N. Ponomaryov, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1960, p. 616.

3. ОΙΚПУ, p. 465.

first place it meant intensification of cotton cultivation and development of industry, particularly heavy industry. During 1946-50 the industrial production in Uzbekistan was to be raised by 89 per cent (For USSR it was 48 per cent) and agriculture production by 52 per cent (for USSR 27 per cent).⁴

The rate of growth was thus higher for Uzbekistan. The Communist party devised concrete ways and methods for cultural and economic development of each region by taking into account economic, geographical and natural resources conditions of each region. The Ferghana Valley was the main Centre of Cotton Cultivation, production of textiles and extraction of oil. Tashkent region was to concentrate on cotton cultivation, sheep rearing and animal husbandry. It was also to develop extraction of coal, metallurgical, chemical and power industry. The Bukhara region was to intensify development of cotton cultivation and rearing of Karakul sheep. The Karakalpak ASSR was to concentrate on cotton cultivation, animal husbandry and fisheries.

The tasks of the Five Year Plan became complicated as a result of colossal loss of manpower in the war. In Uzbekistan there was an acute shortage of cadres, particularly cadres of qualified and skilled workers. In March 1946 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan adopted a resolution on the agitational and propagandistic

4. Ibid., p. 465.

work of the party organisations in connection with the laws of the Five Year Plan and for the rehabilitation and development of economy of the republic during 1946-50.⁵ The Central Committee made it obligatory for all the party and social organisations to start work among the masses and to explain to them the tasks of the post-war Five Year Plan. It was stressed that it was not a short term campaign, but the most important part of constant agitational and propagandistic work. The Tashkent city Party organisation took an active part in conducting propaganda lectures about the plan. In all 5,540 political lectures were organised during January-July 1946, out of which 2,687 lectures were related to the explaining of the basic task of five Year Plan.⁶

In 1946 the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) in its decision on "On Organisation of Socialist Competition for fulfilment of Five Year Plan," recommended widespread use of socialist competition by Party, trade unions and Komsomol organisations.⁷ The socialist competition was to be promoted between toilers, institutions, collective forms, villages, cities and regions. The party organisations in Uzbekistan guided and supervised the socialist competition. As a result of socialist competition, and movement for perfection of technological process and intensification of mass political

5. Ibid., p. 466

6. Ibid., p. 466.

7. Ponomaryov, n.2, p. 617.

work in Uzbekistan an additional accumulation of 173.6 million rubles took place in 1948 in the factories and plants over the plan.⁸

In the rehabilitation of agriculture the party paid serious attention to the economic and organisational strengthening of the collective farms and the development of the democratic basis of the management of the affairs by the agriculture artels.⁹ Several measures were taken to preserve the community land for collective farms. As a result of the investigations carried out by party organisations in 1946, it was discovered that 1,994 households, which did not join any collective farm were utilising community lands. About 2,000 hectares of public lands were transferred to various public organisations.¹⁰

The party organisation made all efforts to reduce the inflated administrative and service personnel in the collective farms. As a result of the work by party activists in collective farms in Uzbekistan about 51,000 persons employed in the administrative apparatus of collective farms were retrenched.¹¹ This number constituted 32 per cent of the entire strength of administrative personnel in the collective farms of the republic. According to the instructions of the 16th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

8. ОИКПУ, p. 468.

9. Ibid., p. 472.

10. Ibid., p. 472.

11. Ibid., p. 473.

of Uzbekistan, held in March 1947, the party activists started a campaign for the return of lands, animals and other property taken away from collective farms.¹² Experienced cadres from among party activists in the regional and district centres, and the cadres who passed out from the Republic Party School were sent to the Collective farms to work as assistants to the directors of Machine and Tractor Stations, and as secretaries of Party organisations and collective farms.

The Party organised socialist competition among the cotton cultivators of Uzbekistan and also entered into socialist competition with their counterparts of Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan. In 1946, about 12,806 Komsomol units and 1,132 work brigades participated in the struggle for a bumper cotton harvest. By November 1946 the plan for cotton cultivation was over-fulfilled. It exceeded the target by 7 per cent. In 1947 the pre-war level of cotton cultivation was obtained and in 1948 the pre-war cotton production level was surpassed.¹³

In May 1949 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and the Council of Ministers appealed to all the workers of the republic urging them to unleash socialist competition in the honour of 25th Anniversary of the Uzbek SSR. The appeal called it the patriotic duty of the collective of every enterprise to overfulfill the targets, in

12. Ibid., p. 473.

13. Ibid., p. 474.

every possible way.¹⁴ At the initiative of the party agreements for socialist competition were concluded among the various cities of the Republic like Tashkent, Chirchik, Ferghana and Andhijan. By the beginning of 1950 more than ninety per cent of all the workers, employed in industry of Uzbekistan, were participants in the movement. At the initiative of the Republican Party organisations, special courses and seminars were organized for engineers and technical workers. Steps were taken to strengthen the management of factories and plants by making available to them highly qualified cadres.

The party organs in Uzbekistan directed their members to carefully study the innovative and productive process and to make their experiences available to the popular masses. To this end, various forms of oral and printed propaganda and agitation materials were used. Scientific Conferences of innovations in several factories and branches of industry were organized. However, many deficiencies were left: sub-quality goods were produced, raw materials were not used economically and local industry was not developed satisfactorily on the basis of locally available raw materials.

In the sphere of ideology and culture, the party came out heavily against the survival of bourgeois views and ideas. It set the aim before it, to make every citizen of the USSR a conscious patriot and an active fighter for communism.¹⁵

14. Ibid., p. 469.

15. Ponomarev, n.2, p. 630.

The party activists in Uzbekistan were asked to wage a ruthless struggle against apolitical and formalist trends and uncritical appraisal of bourgeois culture. The party activists delivered 4,000 political lectures in the Republic in this regard. This number rose to 5,000 in 1952.¹⁶ Lectures were delivered on the internal and external situation of the USSR and about the tasks before the toilers of the republic. A wide network of political agitation covered the republic and served as an important instrument for political socialisation of the masses. Agitational work was carried out in the shops of industrial units, agriculture fields, tractor brigades, in Mohallas, red chaikhanas and hostels. The agitators systematically conducted collective reading of papers, group and individual discussions and brought out wall papers.

In 1948, Uzbek SSR had 72,000 agitators. In 1952 their number rose to 100,000. The lecture bureaus of Party organizations in the cultural and educational institutions also played an important role in the ideological upbringing of the people. In 1951, 45,000 lectures were organized by these bureaus covering nearly 4 million people.¹⁷ Party organizations staged plays in the villages on political, economic and scientific themes. Books and magazines were sent to collective farm libraries. Party members and workers from

16. OIKPU, p. 482.

17. Ibid., p. 483.

factories participated in the construction of village clubs and places of culture. The participation by workers in these programmes further mobilised the workers and peasants.

It can be easily seen from the above that the role of Uzbek party was crucial in the restoration and development of Soviet economy. It is interesting to note that in the process of playing this crucial role the party not only began to reorganise and reassert itself but also moved towards strengthening and consolidating the bases of Soviet power in Uzbekistan. These developments were largely dependent on the wider participation of the party members, particularly the native ones in making decisions and implementing them.

Against the background of purges in the party in the immediate post-war years and the imposition of strict discipline, these successes were indeed remarkable. It may be mentioned here, that the process of bringing the native apparatchiki in the party bureaucracy began to gain momentum after 1950 when the process of restoration of war-torn Uzbek economy was more or less complete.

At this stage it may not be out of place to look at the development and growth of the party during 1946-53.

II

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY

(a) Memberships

During the post-war years, i.e. 1946-53, certain interesting trends were revealed in the party membership in

Uzbekistan. The largest number of party members were recruited during the war years. The growth in the membership of the party continued during the period 1946-53, but the recruitment process slowed down. From 1st January 1946 to 1st January 1953, the membership of the Communist Party increased by 45673 members.¹⁸ During the post-war years the improvement in the quality of membership was stressed in terms of its ideological and political understanding. Not to speak of cadres, even the secretaries of many primary party organisations in the republic had little experience of party work.¹⁹ The young cadres recruited during the war years were not given proper ideological and political training. After the war, therefore, the whole emphasis was shifted from expansion to consolidation of membership, which meant further intensification of training programmes. The central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party passed a resolution in July 1946 entitled "On the Growth of the Party and measures for strengthening Party-Organisational and Party-Political Work among those Newly Admitted to the Party."²⁰ The Party Central Committee decided not to press the further growth of the Party ranks but to organise party education on a large scale. As a result the total number of Communists (including candidate members) increased from 96,981 in 1946 to 134,994

18. OIKPU, p. 481.

19. Ibid., p. 481.

20. Cited in T.H. Ridby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR: 1917-67, Princeton, 1968, p. 278.

in 1948.²¹ According to T.H. Rigby the July 1946 decision of the Central Committee led to reduced recruitment in many areas in the USSR.²² Its effects were felt in Uzbekistan only in 1949. The membership declined from 134,994 in 1948 to 132,918 in 1949, i.e. a net decrease of 2076.²³ This decline can be accounted by the fact that in 1947, 6397 candidate members were accepted while in 1948 only 2219 candidate members were accepted. The conclusion which emerges from the above discussion is that more and more emphasis was laid on political education of the candidate members before granting them full membership and less emphasis on the intake of candidate members.

In the period under study increased emphasis was laid on raising the ideological and political level of the party members. In the republic during 1947-48, there were 205 district and city party schools, 26,100 local political schools and 1,107 study circles for political training of the cadres. Besides there were seven Evening Universities, which were conducting courses in Marxism-Leninism for the party members.²⁴ In 1946-48, 67 leading party and Soviet cadres of the Republic received training at the higher Party school, and 745 members passed the courses in Marxism-Leninism in Republican Party school. From 1948 to 1952 this number increased to 3000.²⁵ In the academic year 1951-52, Party's

21. KPUS, pp. 94, 104.

22. T.H. Rigby, n.20, p. 279.

23. KPUS, pp. 104, 109.

24. OKPU, p. 486.

25. Ibid., p. 482.

political education Department imparted training to 133,000 communists and 50,000 Komsomol members.²⁶ More and more attention was paid to the training of propagandists. In 1952, 1,780 propagandists were trained in the courses held under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. If in 1949 there were 6,000 propagandists in the republic: in 1950 this number went up to 11,000. It further rose to 13,689 in 1952.²⁷

As a result of extensive political education and theoretical upbringing of the cadres, the weaknesses which have crept up, due to heavy recruitment in the Party, were overcome. Between 1950-53, efforts were made to further reflate recruitment. During 1950-53 the party membership grew by 10318. (see Table I). This period was marked by increase in the number of Full members. The total number of full members on 1st January 1953 stood at 118340, as against 106567 in 1950. Of this total number, 44309 (37.44 per cent) were admitted during the period 1946-52.²⁸

Thus, comparatively speaking, the recruitment during 1946-52 was the highest except the war years. The following table showing the comparative growth of the party clearly indicates that the process of inducting more and more people in the party apparatus was further strengthened and accelerated during the period, 1946-52.

26. Ibid., p. 486.

27. Ibid., p. 487.

28. KPUS, p. 132.

TABLE I
SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY (1950-53)

Year	Total Members	Full Members	Candidate Members	Workers	Peasants	White Collar Workers/ Services	Women	Y.C.L.
1950	132336	106567	25769	29931	39415	62990	25770	2178
	100%	80.53%	19.47%	22.62%	29.78%	47.60%	19.47%	1.64%
1953	142654	118340	24314	30704	43726	68224	28573	2882
	100%	82.96%	17.04%	21.53%	30.65%	42.82%	20.03%	2.02%

SOURCE: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana V Tsifrakh, Tashkent, 1964, pp. 113, 116, 129, 132.

GROWTH OF THE PARTY IN STAGES (As on 1st
January 1953)

Total Full Members	Before 1917	From 1917	From 1918- 1920	From 1921- 1924	From 1925- 1936	From 1937- 1940	From 1941- 1946	From 1946- 1952
118340	9	81	1060	654	11216	13392	47619	44309
100%	0.00	0.07	0.90	0.55	9.48	11.32	40.24	37.44

Source: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana V Tsifrakh,
p. 132.

(b) Social Composition

As mentioned earlier, more and more emphasis was laid on the consolidation of the party membership and on the strengthening of party organisational work. As a result the representation of workers in the party declined from 23.67 per cent in 1946. to 22.62 in 1950 and further fell to 21.53 in 1953 as shown in Table I. Likewise, the share of peasantry in the total membership of the Uzbek party also declined from 32.35 in 1946 to 29.78 in 1950. But its percentage representation rose to 30.65 in 1953, as revealed in Table I. On the other hand interestingly enough, the percentage share of white collar workers increased significantly from 43.98 in 1946 to 47.60 in 1950 and further rose to

29. KPUS, p. 97.

47.82 in 1953. The white collar workers gained this increase at the cost of both workers and the peasantry. In fact the decline in the percentage representation of workers and peasantry was not due to decrease in their absolute numbers. On the other hand, the representation of white collar workers in the Uzbek party increased due to expanding industrialisation in the republic which demanded more and more managers, engineers and technically qualified cadres. The emergence of native intelligentsia was another factor which also contributed to the increasing representation of white collar workers.

(c) Occupational Structure

Now it is worth our while to examine the distribution of party members in various occupations/sectors of employment. The points made above may be further clarified by taking into account the occupational structure of Uzbek party. Table II presents an overall picture of occupation structure of the party during 1950-53, and we can summarise it as under:

(a) Among the workers, the largest share of membership in the Uzbek party was to be found in industrial sector. However, their overall share declined from 14.18 per cent in 1950 to 13.40 percent in 1953. The second place was taken by transport and communication workers which shows only a negligible increase, from 5.09 in 1950 to 5.27 in 1953.

TABLE II
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY
(1950 - 53)

Types of Primary Party Organizations	TOTAL MEMBERS			
	1950	1950 - % of total membership	1953	1953 - % of total membership
1. Industry	18775	14.18	19129	13.40
2. Transport & Communications	6744	5.09	7518	5.27
3. Construction	1019	0.7	1479	1.02
4. Administration (including Municipal undertakings)	16120	12.18	18585	13.02
5. Education, Culture & Health	12687	9.58	15923	11.16
6. Local Organization under Party organs.	4227	3.19	4614	3.23
7. Komsomol Trade Union and Other Social Organizations	488	0.36	676	0.47
8. State Farms	2852	2.15	2757	1.93
9. Collective Farms	43609	32.95	44275	31.03
10. Machine & Tractor Stations (MTS)	4423	3.34	5122	3.59
11. Other agriculture organizations (Rural District Centres, Rural Territories, Forestry)	11903	8.99	14043	9.84
12. Miscellaneous (Trade & Catering, Small Producers, artisans, non-working)	9489	7.17	8538	5.98
TOTAL	132336		142654	

SOURCE: KRUS, pp. 114-15, 130-31.

(b) The percentage share of collective farm workers declined insignificantly from 32.95 per cent in 1950 to 31.03 per cent in 1953. Also the state farm workers registered a decrease in their representation from 2.15 per cent to 1.93 per cent in 1953. Interestingly enough, on the other hand, party members in allied agricultural organizations like, Rural territories and fisheries etc. increased their representation from 8.99 in 1950 to 9.84 in 1953. On the whole, the percentage representation of peasantry was not much affected during this period.

(c) On the other hand the intelligentsia (Education, culture and health) registered significant increase during this period i. e., its share increased from 9.58 per cent in 1950 to 11.16 per cent in 1953.

Among the administration sector, the percentage increase in representation was 12.18 in 1950 to 13.02 in 1952.

Hence it is significant to note that the white collar workers and intelligentsia gained in percentage representation at the cost of both workers and peasantry.

(d) Nationality

On the eve of World War II, i. e. in January 1941, the Uzbeks and the Karkalpaks taken together constituted the majority in the party. They were 51 per cent of the total membership.³⁰ The Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians

30. KPUS, p. 76.

together formed 28 per cent of the total membership. The representation of the Uzbeks (including Karakalpak) declined to 36 per cent in 1943. While the percentage of Europeans (including Russians, Ukrainians and Bylorussians) soared to ³¹ 36 per cent.

These developments in the national composition of the party were a result of the emigration of Communists from European parts alongwith plants and machinaries to Uzbekistan during the War. But during the post-war years, i.e., by 1953, in Uzbekistan the recruitment of indigenous Communists, had sufficiently outrun the effects of emigration. Table III clearly indicates that in 1953 the percentage representation of Uzbeks and Karakalpaks together went up to 49 per cent. The number of Russians, which formed 27 per cent of the total members in 1950, declined to 25 per cent in 1953. (see Table III). The percentage of Ukrainians also declined sharply from 8.54 per cent in 1943 to 3.34 in 1953. ³² The wartime evacuation from the Ukraine, Bylorussia and other western areas, also brought a large number of Jewish Communists in Uzbekistan, whereby by 1943 they constituted 12 per cent ³³ of all party members. At the end of the war many of these Jewish Communists left Central Asia and Uzbekistan. By 1950 their representation in the membership was reduced to 3 per cent, which remained almost constant up to 1953. The position of other

31. KPUS, pp. 76, 84.

32. Table III and KPUS, p. 84.

33. KPUS, p. 84.

TABLE III

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE UZBEK PARTY
(1950 - 53)

YEAR	Total No. of Communists	Uzbek	Rus- sians	Kara- Kalpak	Tatar	Kazakh	Tadjik	Jews	Kir- giz	Ukrai- nian	Turk- men	Bylo- rus- sians	Others
1950	132336	57901	35811	2945	7948	6244	3420	4504	676	4774	415	491	7207
	100%	43.75	27.06	2.22	6.00	4.72	2.58	3.40	0.51	3.61	0.31	0.37	5.47
1953	142654	66246	36287	2980	8308	6264	3768	4691	484	4759	470	494	7903
	100%	46.44	25.44	2.09	5.82	4.39	2.64	3.29	0.34	3.34	0.33	0.35	5.53

SOURCE: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana V Tsifrah, Tashkent, 1964
pp. 117, 133.

local nationalities in the republic during this period remains almost constant. Thus the national composition of the party during the period can be summarised as follows:

In 1950 the Uzbeks and other local nationalities constituted 65.56 per cent of the total membership, while the share of Europeans, (Russian, Bylorussians, Ukrainians, Jews) was 34.44 per cent.

On the other hand, in 1953, the share of Uzbeks and other local nationalities rose to 67.48 per cent while that of Europeans declined to 32.42 per cent.

Another interesting point to note here is that the Uzbek delegation to the 18th Congress of the CPSU in 1939 constituted 1.5 per cent of the total Congress delegates. This percentage increased to 2.1 per cent in the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952,³⁴ although there is no indication as to the percentage of native members in these delegations. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to interpret the marked changes which have occurred in the relative size of the delegation. In Rigby's opinion this trend in the national composition of the Party is a prima facie evidence of a reduction in the degree of under-representation of the Central Asian nationalities.³⁵ The indigenous nationalities which were under-represented during the war years due to unavoidable historical conditions managed

34. T.H. Rigby, n.20, p. 375.

35. Rigby, n.20, p. 376.

to regain, a numerical majority in Uzbekistan. The process of recruitment of natives in the party, which was initiated just after the October Revolution and war further strengthened during the post-war years.

III

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY

The post-war years also witnessed the reorganisation and growth of party apparatus in Uzbekistan. In 1946, there were about 6494 primary party organisations and by 1950 they grew to 9653 (Table IV). Interestingly enough in 1953, the number of Primary Party organizations declined to 8131. On the basis of Table IV we may investigate further the organizational structure of the party.

Between 1946-50, the number of party organizations in the collective farms shows an increase. If it was 3093 in 1946, the number went up to 4845, in 1950, the increase in the number of party organisations being a result of an intensive campaign to shift the main focus of rural party organizations from village to Kolkhoz cells with the ultimate aim of drawing more and more collective farms in the party and thereby providing the party with a base in every collective farm.

Between 1951-53 the reorganization of the collective farms started in Uzbekistan. The consolidation of the material and technical base of collective farm production and the

TABLE IVORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY (1946 - 53)

Distribution of Primary Party Organisations	Number of Local Party Organisations		
	1946	1950	1953
1. Industry	411	526	553
2. Transport & Communication	198	254	312
3. Construction	40	50	91
4. Administration	620	863	1016
5. Education, Culture and Health	328	803	1205
6. State Farms	82	103	103
7. Collective Farms	3093	4345	2513
8. Machine & Tractor Stations (M.T.S.)	199	226	257
9. Other Agriculture Organisa- tions (Rural District Centros Rural Territories)	671	1152	1224
10. Local organisations under party organs	173	175	199
11. Miscellaneous (small pro- ducers arteles, trade and catering, nonworking and others)	479	600	596
TOTAL	6494	9653	8131

Source: KRUS; pp.95-96; 114-115; 130-31.

supply in large numbers of the latest agricultural machines to the machine and tractor stations made it imperative to improve the social sector of production in the collective farms. Machinery was used badly at the small farms and management expenses were high.³⁶ In 1950, Communists initiated a broad movement among the collective farmers to amalgamate small collective farms into big ones.³⁷ As a result of reorganization of the collective farms the number of party organisations declined to 2513 in 1953 as shown in Table IV. But this did not affect the party membership in the collective farms.

The expanding industrial activity in Uzbekistan led to the increase in the party organisations in the industrial enterprises as shown in Table IV. The number of such organizations which was 411 in 1946 increased to 526 in 1950 and further went up to 553 in 1953. The expansion of educational system was followed by the expansion of party organizations in the Higher Educational Institutions, The number of party organisations in Education, Culture and health increased by 397 during 1950-53. The party organisations in transport undertakings, communications, construction and building and Economic Administration sector also registered a significant increase during the period, as revealed in Table IV.

36. Ponomaryov, n.2, p. 623.

37. Ibid., p. 623.

During the post-war years the network of party organizations was strengthened in all the sectors of the economy, The increasing membership of the party during this period, of course, except 1948-49, had its impact on the national composition of the party in Uzbekistan. As discussed in the previous chapter, the party leadership through its conscious efforts and a well-defined programme of nativisation of party apparatus, succeeded in drawing the local nationalities in the affairs of the party. On the eve of World War, the Uzbeks constituted the majority in the party membership and dominated the party apparatus. During the war years, the membership of the party increased tremendously but the percentage representation of the Uzbeks declined. The reasons are obvious. During the war the plants and machineries from the European part were shifted to Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Large number of workers also migrated to Uzbekistan during this period.

A significant development after 1950 was the induction of native communists in the party bureaucracy. The practice of appointing Russians as first secretary of the local party organizations particularly at the regional, district and republican level began to be changed. A number of natives were appointed as first secretaries at the district level, while the growth in the number of primary party organisations further strengthened this trend. As mentioned earlier, even at the central level the share of Uzbek representation was increased.

IV

PROBLEM OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Most of the Western writings have treated the Stalinist period as one, in which the state apparatus came to dominate the party apparatus. It is argued that during the Stalin period the party lost something of its privileged position and became merely one of the several instruments of personal despotic rule.³⁶ According to another authoritative writing on the Soviet Union: "As the new industrial elite emerged and crystalized, it sought to strengthen both its authority and the privileges... The one man management became the prevailing practice in industry. The powers of the trade unions were curbed, and the activities of the local party organisations were re-directed towards broad control rather than detailed interference in the minutiae of managerial decision making. Factory directors were vested with considerable discretion to manoeuvre with the means at their disposal as long as the goals assigned to them were fulfilled."³⁷

As mentioned earlier, during the war the whole system of balance between the party organisations on the one hand, and the Soviet and economic organisations on the other, was disturbed. The primary party organisation which used to exercise day to day control over industrial enterprises before the war years lost it during the war.

36. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (London, 1970), p. 511.

37. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Massachusetts, 1970), p. 106.

Immediately after the war certain corrective steps were undertaken. Meetings and conferences of party activists³⁸ began to be held regularly, reports were delivered and elections held on time. During the post-war years, more and more party organizations were set up in collective farms of Uzbekistan. As discussed in the preceding section, by 1950 the number of primary party organisations in collective farms almost doubled, thus providing better opportunities for the grass-root workers of the party to participate in political leadership. Besides, party members, who passed out from Republican Party School were sent to Collective farms and Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS) to work with their chairmen and directors. This move on the part of the Party leadership meant granting of more and more political participation to the native party members. Moreover, this ensured an effective supervision and control on the powers of directors of MTS who were mainly Russians or Europeans. Our argument in this direction is further reinforced by the fact that after 1950 more and more Uzbeks and other local nationalities were recruited to the party apparatus (see National Composition of the Party Table III). Also during the post-war years and particularly after 1950, the immediate concern of the Uzbek party was to restore discipline in the collective farms over which the party grip had been weakened during the war. The managing staff of the collective farms

38. OIKPU, p. 480.

and Machine and Tractor Stations, which consisted mainly of Russians and other Europeans was heavily reduced and the natives began to be appointed to the key posts.

At the local levels, from a decision-making point of view, according to Jerry Hough, "the most interesting responsibility of the primary party organization is the right of supervision assigned to most of the organizations not located in administrative agencies, cultural institutions or army units."³⁹ After 1945, the primary party organizations were instructed to prevent shortcomings to encourage and support initiatives and innovations of lower officials, to struggle against managerial bureaucratism and to ensure that the right persons were selected for key positions in various enterprises and collective farms. In other words, the immediate post-war years were essentially devoted to the restructuring of the role of the party in the changed environment of the day. Inevitably, the process was a difficult one as the entire socio-political system was geared to centralisation and bureacratism of party apparatus.

However, after 1950, the trend towards the transformation of the party in terms of its social composition and reorganization of the party apparatus had begun to show results. For example, the party emerged stronger in quantity and quality even after the purges of immediate post-war years and it was geared to further revitalisation. However, this was essentially, the time for stock taking. The political participation of party members was thus poised for greater advance by 1953.

39. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, Massachussets, 1979, p. 357.

CHAPTER IV

The Communist Party of Uzbekistan and the
Process of Political Participation,
1954-64.

INTRODUCTION

The death of Stalin in March 1953 is a watershed in Soviet history. It marked the beginning of a new stage of development of Soviet society. Not, that the trends and internal dynamics of change could have been put in abeyance even by Stalin, but the very fact that the passing away of Stalin from the Soviet scene coincided with the immediate pressing needs of the Soviet society. Under the leadership of Khrushchev far reaching changes began to be felt in all facets of Soviet development. In economic sphere, the trend began to gain momentum for less centralised control and development and more for regional and republican development. In political sphere, the Party began to be revitalized to reassume its crucial role of guidance and control over state apparatus in particular; likewise, centralisation in management began to be balanced by decentralisation, while the extra- legal activities of various organs of control were curbed. In social and cultural fields experimentations began and the problem of nationalities was seen in the wider and yet specific context, of overall Soviet as well as national development.

On the whole the ~~note~~^{mood} was cool appraisal of the past, a pre-occupation with making the system more functional and indeed, a marked confidence in the ability of Soviet leadership, to tackle the tasks ahead, successfully. These trends

were officially confirmed in the three party congresses held during 1953-64.

Against this background, the problem of revitalising Soviet democracy and functionalisation of the Soviet political system received and involved attention from the Soviet leadership. The curbing of extra-legal activities of various control organs, like the secret police and the reiteration of the commitment of the CPSU to observe legal norms created a conducive environment for the functionalisation of the system. The 20th Party Congress paved the way for the enforcement of the 1936 Constitution both in theory and practice. First of all a clear distinction was made between the role of the party and the state organs, with emphasis on the leading role of the party. Secondly, political institutions like supreme Soviet, Council of Ministers, above all Procurator's office and local Soviets were encouraged to function as the constitution had empowered. Thirdly, special emphasis was laid on the principle of collective responsibility and observance of democratic norms within the party and the government. Fourthly, the party was specially shaken of its lethargy and was yet to play a leading and crucial role in fulfilling the tasks ahead.

Finally, the powers and functions of the union republics and in particular the problems of national relationship were given special attention. By mid 50's the rights of the Union

republics in economic management were extended and by the early 60's had acquired a wider character. The 22nd party Congress of CPSU defined its approach to all questions of national relationship as "To continue the all round economic and cultural development of all Soviet nations and nationalities, ensuring their increasingly close fraternal cooperation, mutual aid, unity and affinity in all spheres of life, thus achieving the utmost strengthening of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; to make full use of, and advance the forms of national statehood of the peoples of the USSR."¹

The problem of political participation in general and the problem of participatory leadership in particular during the period under study have to be seen against the overall development of the Soviet society. It can be easily seen that the overall framework was rapid economic development and resulting socio-cultural changes. Hence, all activities were geared to this central task. In this context the role of the CPSU is of special importance. Hence it is worth our while to look at the problems, in the specific context of Uzbekistan against the background of socio-economic development in Uzbekistan and the role and function of the Communist party there.

1. The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (Moscow, 1961), (Foreign Language, Publishing House), p. 560.

I

THE POST-STALIN DECENTRALISATION AND LIBERALISATION

The major development of the Khrushchevian era has been the rejuvenation of the party and the reaffirmation of its leading place in the Soviet society. The western writers like Merle Fainsod also expressed the same view about decentralisation and increasing participation of the people in the party in the following words, "The effort to pour new vitality into the party took the form of a call for wider participation of members in the party life, adherence to the norms of elections in choosing party officials, and more frequent and regular convocations of assemblies and governing bodies at every level of the party hierarchy."²

Thus, in the period under study, the major institutions of the Communist party and government began to operate on a more regular basis. According to the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Union Republics and district party committees were to be called at least once in four months and the congress of Union republics were to be convened once in four years. The Plenum of the city party committees were to be held at least once in three months.³

2. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, 1970. p. 127.

3. OIKPU, p. 528.

During this period the principle of collective leadership began to be consistently implemented in the higher party organs and local party organisations as well. To encourage inner-party democracy, the central committee of the CPSU abolished the post of central committee organiser in industry and elsewhere, and the political departments on the railway, in the river and maritime fleets and in the fishing industry. Greater responsibility for the work of these enterprises and organizations was assumed by the local party organizations.⁴ In September 1953, the political departments of the MTS (Machine and Tractor Stations) were abolished and the task of close and effective supervision over the farms was laid upon the district party secretaries. In addition to the efforts made to strengthen the primary party organizations inside the farms many thousands of party members were sent to the collective farms to take up the post of chairman. In the opinion of Leonard Schapiro, "As party organizations on the spot improved so increasing decentralisation, was permitted. The functions of local party officials increased as those of central officials diminished." Some other important measures were also undertaken during this period. The party committees were divided at all levels into two: an agricultural committee and an industrial committee. The aim was to make party control over

4. B.N. Ponomarev, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1960, p. 656.

5. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, London, 1970, p. 602.

these two branches of national economy more effective, less spasmodic and less remote.⁶

The party's role not only increased in various branches of economy but the party was assigned with the responsibility of supervising the work of state security service, the courts and the procurator's office. In July 1953, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, upon knowing the malfunctioning of procurator's office in Ferghana region asked the regional party committee to keep a tight control over the offices of Procurator's court and the police. The regional party committee was further advised to make the workers of these offices socially conscious about their duties and for the correct observations of socialist laws.⁷

The above discussion makes it amply clear that the measures undertaken during the period under study to strengthen inner-party democracy and to enhance the role of the party in decision making process led to more and more participation of the people in the party. There was constant exhortation to party organs and members, in the party press and in public utterances, to extend the democratic process at all levels.

II

Socio-Economic and Cultural Development

Industrial development in Uzbekistan under the Soviet regime was impressive. The gross industrial production in the

6. Ibid., p. 600.

7. OIKPU, p. 508.

republic in 1961 was more than 23 times higher than 1928 as shown in by the following figures.

8

Gross Industrial Production in Uzbekistan

<u>1928</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1961</u>
100	522	2350

In the year 1962 the per capita production of steel in Uzbekistan was 345 kilograms and it was more than any other Central Asian Republic.⁹ The generation of electric energy in the republic in 1957 was two times more than the whole of Tsarist Russia in 1913.¹⁰ In 1962, 779 kilowatts per capita of electricity was being generated.¹¹ In the generation of electric energy also, Uzbekistan topped the Central Asian Republics.

The basic and essential factor in the economic development of any area is construction of transport facilities. The Soviet Government since the middle 20's has pursued a vigorous programme of railroad construction not only in Uzbekistan but in the whole of Soviet Central Asia. The operating length of Rail Lines in the republic more than doubled during 1913-61 as shown in the following figures.¹²

8. Charles K. Wilber, The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries, 1969, p. 190.

9. Alec Nove and J.A. Neweth, The Soviet Middle East, 1967, p.41.

10. OKPU, p. 539.

11. Alec Nove and J.A. Neweth, n.9, p. 41.

12. Wilber, n.8, p. 185.

KILOMETERS				
1913	1933	1940	1950	1961
1,100	1,890	1,910	2,070	2,330

In agriculture, the cotton output in Uzbekistan increased by 6 times between 1913-61.¹³ The gross agricultural output in Uzbekistan during 1953-61 is shown by the following table.¹⁴

Gross Agricultural Output: 1953-61

Value of Output in Million rubbles			Index 1953 = 100		
1953	1958	1961	1953	1958	1961
1233	1603	1698	100	130	138

Thus, the gross agricultural output kept on increasing during the period under study.

One of the major factors enabling Uzbekistan in particular and Soviet Central Asia in general to develop at a rapid rate has been the large amount of investment made every year. Since 1928, in Central Asia as elsewhere in the USSR a large share of national income has been devoted to investment.

13. OIKPU, p. 539.

14. Wilber, n.8, p. 177.

Though no figures are available separately for Uzbekistan yet we can deduce from the State investments made in Central Asia. The figures given below in the Table show that State investment in physical assets per capita has generally been close to 70-80 per cent of all union average.¹⁵

State Investment in Central Asia

Annual Average during	Ruble per capita in constant prices	%age of all union average
1928-32	63	70
1933-37	141	72
1938-40	187	82
1946-50	271	70
1951-55	560	82
1956-61	1,121	93

According to Wilber the investments made by collective farms in Central Asia were on much higher levels than in USSR. They amounted to 26 per cent of State investments over the period 1928 to 1961, while they averaged 10 per cent for the USSR as a whole. They were 42 per cent of State investments in Uzbekistan in 1955.¹⁶ The average expenditure on education, health and other social services, which comprise investment

15. Ibid., p. 193

16. Ibid., p. 193.

in human capital, have tended to be higher in Central Asia. During the Second Five Year Plan (1932-37), per capita expenditure on human capital were one-fifth higher than the USSR average. During the fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-55) they were about equal and amounted to 150 per cent of state investment in physical assets within Central Asia.¹⁷ These large investments in physical and human capital have contributed greatly to the rapid economic development of the region.

Thus, due to overall economic development of Uzbekistan, in 1959, there were about 70 branches of economy, 1,300 being plants and factories. According to an estimate, in terms of volume of production, Uzbekistan occupied fourth position in the USSR.¹⁸

Due to economic development of Uzbekistan, the social structure of Uzbek society also registered significant changes. In the whole of Turkestan before the October Revolution the strength of workers was 49.9 thousand.¹⁹ While in 1958, there were 397.9 thousand workers and other employees in Uzbekistan alone. Women constituted 41 per cent of this total strength.²⁰

17. Ibid., p. 194.

18. OIKPU, p. 555.

19. Istoriya rabocheho Klassa Uzbekistana, Tashkent, 1964, vol. I, p. 24. Cited in Devendra Kaushik, Central Asia in Modern Times, Moscow, 1970, p. 73.

20. OIKPU, p. 555.

Figures are available for the percentages of total working population engaged in Uzbekistan for 1939 and 1959 as shown in the following table.²¹

Percentage of total working population engaged

	1939		1959	
	Industry, Building and Transport	Agricul- ture	Industry, Build- ing & Transport	Agri- culture
USSR Average	30.1	50.1	36.9	38.8
Uzbekistan	14.3	70.8	21.1	58.9

The figures given in the table clearly indicate that proportion of the population engaged in industry building and transport in Uzbekistan was far below the Union average and in agriculture, it was quite above the Union average. This is obvious, due to specifications of Uzbekistan. Yet the increase in the proportion of population in industry, transport and building in Uzbekistan kept pace with the increase in the Union average during 1939-59.

The growth of Urbanisation has been another factor characteristics of the industrial development of Uzbekistan, In 1913, in the republic per one urban dweller there were three rural dwellers (1,060,000 and 3,306,000) and in 1965

21. Alec Nove and J.A. Newth, n.9, p. 41.

this ratio had changed to 1 : 2 (3,864,000 and 7,032,000).²²

The changes in the cultural development of the Uzbek population were also no less significant. In 1959, 98.1 per cent of the population was literate, while before the October Revolution only 3.6 per cent of the Uzbek population was literate.²³ In 1957, 1,300 thousand children were studying in schools against 17.5 thousand in 1913.²⁴ The number of persons with higher or secondary (complete or incomplete) education per one thousand of population rose from 92 in 1939 to 304 in 1959.²⁵

By 1960, there were 13 persons with a higher education per one thousand of the population in the republic.²⁶ The number of scientific personnel grew much faster in Uzbekistan than in the Soviet Union as a whole. Compared to 1939 the number of scientific personnel in the USSR as a whole, rose by 7.5 times in 1965-66, while the number of Uzbek scientists increased by almost 16 times in the corresponding period (500 in 1939 and 7,900 in 1965-66).²⁷

The improvement in the medical services in Central Asia was another significant achievement of the Soviet regime. The table below clearly indicates the improvement in the medical facilities of the Central Asian population.

22. R. Tuzmuhamedov, How the National Question was solved in Soviet Central Asia, 1973, p. 144.

23. A Leap Through Centuries, 1968, p. 294.

24. OIKPU, p. 539.

25. R. Tuzmuhamedov, n.22, p. 149.

26. Ibid., p. 148.

27. Ibid., p. 153.

Medical Services in Soviet Central Asia
per thousand of Population (28)

	<u>Year</u>	<u>Physicians</u>	<u>Hospital Beds</u>
Soviet Central Asia	1913	.03	.24
	1940	.44	3.59
	1961	1.39	8.18
Soviet Union	1913	.17	1.26
	1940	.74	4.15
	1961	1.97	8.54

The Table clearly indicates that the number of physicians and hospital beds per thousand of population has increased tremendously and almost equals the Union average. The number of hospital beds per thousand of population was five to twenty times higher than in Asian countries.²⁹ As a result, of the development of medical services in Central Asia the mortality rate also declined in Central Asia. In 1940, the crude death rate was 14.6 for all Central Asia. In 1961, it was 6.0 in Uzbekistan.³⁰

Thus, during the period under study the Uzbek economy had reached commanding heights. Almost cent per cent literary was achieved and tremendous progress was made in the republic in the cultural attainment of the people. These developments

28. Charles K. Wilber, n.8, p. 166.

29. Ibid., p. 165.

30. Ibid., p. 665.

further accelerated and consolidated the process of political socialisation. The problems faced by the communist party in the formative period in involving the native peoples in the affairs of the state and party, owing to illiteracy, cultural backwardness and religious orthodoxy, no longer existed on the scene.

III

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF UZBEK PARTY

(a) Membership

We have pointed out in our last chapter that the growth in the membership of the party had slowed down after the war particularly during 1948-49. Likewise, we have mentioned that the stringent application of rules in screening membership as well as the post-war purges in the Uzbek party, were some of the main causes for the slowing down of the party recruitment. However, it is interesting to note that much of the purges were directed at the Russians, normally occupying a post of second secretary in the Uzbek party apparatus. Except some leading Uzbek functionaries like the Uzbek Prime Minister much of the leading functionaries of the Uzbek party remained comparatively untouched. One of the overall impacts of the post-war purges in the Uzbek party apparatus was that the Russians occupying the formalistic position of the second man in the command yet wielded much more influence and power than the first secretaries, normally Uzbeks or other nationals,

had to leave their posts. This opened up wider avenues for the mobility of Uzbek party members. Moreover, it strengthened, the trends of more and more nativisation of the party apparatus, which were felt after 1953.

The process of normalisation and revitalisation of the Uzbek Communist party was an integrated process of the overall developments in the CPSU.

The first moves were made for the restoration and extension of inner-party democracy and collective leadership. In July 1953 the Plenary meeting of the Uzbek party called upon the party members for the observance of inner-party democracy and for the extension of collective leadership.

Indeed the party membership had begun to grow in 1954 but the rate of increase had trebled in 1956, from 1.47 (1954) to 4.36 (1956). From 1957 onwards, the percentage increase doubled, as compared to 1956. The percentage increase in the total membership of the party was the highest during 1962-64 when it increased from 8.92 per cent in 1962 to 18 per cent in 1964. The average annual increase during the period 1955-64 was 8.26 per cent.³¹ Thus Table I (Appendix) clearly reveals that the trends in percentage increase in the membership of the Uzbek party were maintained, however, it slowed down earlier in 1948-49.

It is worth our while to correlate the growth of the Uzbek communist party with the increase in Uzbek population.

31. Based on our own calculations.

Such an approach may help us in fathoming the full significance of the growth of communist party in Uzbekistan from 1926 to 1964-65. According to Table II (Appendix), the total population of Uzbekistan in 1926 was 4,565,000 and it grew in 1964-65 to 101,80,000. Likewise, Table II (Appendix) shows the total membership of the party for the years 1926, 1939, 1959, 1964/65, comparing these figures as given in Table II we note that the communists per thousand of population in the years 1926, 1939, 1959, 1964/65 were 5.34, 5.44, 22.70, 28.27 respectively. In other words we can note the following from the above.

(a) that the increase in population in Uzbekistan was the highest during 1926-39 for the obvious reasons of heavy influx of the Russians during collectivisation and industrialisation. Correspondingly, the party membership remained static in terms of population increase. This shows that the nativisation process in the party had a slower impact during this period.

(b) During 1939-59 the population growth was significant yet it has slowed down. While jump in the party membership was recorded as the highest (22.70 members per thousand of population). Making allowances for the loss during the war and slower internal migration of Russians to Uzbekistan, it is obvious that the highest growth can be accounted for by the increasing pace of nativisation in membership.

(c) the figures for 1964-65 further confirm the increasing trend towards nativisation.

The above conclusions are obviously significant from the viewpoint of changes in the process of political participation as channelised by the communist party of Uzbekistan. We will further amplify these points at a later stage.

We may refer here to yet another aspect of the growth of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan. Table IV (Appendix) shows that the age structure of the membership had considerably changed in favour of younger members. Indeed, by 1964, the younger members were in a majority.

The membership of the party aged up to 20 doubled during the war years, due to obvious reasons, but before and after the war we find the representation of this age group almost stable. While the membership in the age groups 21 to 30 and 31 to 40 increased before and during the war but declined during the post-war period and remained almost stable in the Khrushchev period, showing only marginal increase. The party membership up to the age of 40 always constituted around sixty percent of the total membership. On the other hand, membership in the age group 41 to 50 increased after 1950. The percentage representation of members between 51-60 doubled in the post-war years. The membership in the age group over 60 was quite insignificant up to 1950 but it doubled during 1955-64. The increase in the percentage representation of membership between

41-60 and over 60 was also due to upward mobility of the members who were in the age group up to 40 during the early period. Therefore, the table IV (Appendix) clearly shows that the communist party in Uzbekistan had remained young throughout the period under study and the younger membership always constituted majority in the party.

(b) Social Composition.

Since 1953, renewed attention was paid to the recruitment of workers and collective farmers to the party. The 20th Congress of the CPSU laid down the guidelines for the recruitment of workers and peasants in the following terms, "The Congress obliges party organizations to intensify their concern for the individual recruitment of front-rank people, choosing them first and foremost from the ranks of the workers and collective farmers."³²

The effect of such a policy was marked on the general pattern of membership in the CPSU and consequently on the Uzbek party. As shown in Table I the representation of workers in Uzbek party showed an upward trend during 1955-64. From 20.61 per cent in 1955, it rose to 28.04 in 1964. Likewise, as Table I shows the growth in the number of workers in the party was 66 per cent during 1955-60 and 63 per cent during 1960-64.³³ Interestingly enough, the percentage of workers gained at the cost of white collar workers in the party. For example, Table I

32. Cited in T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in USSR, 1917-67, 1968, p. 302.

33. Based on our own calculations.

TABLE I

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF UZBEK PARTY (1955 - 64)

Year	Total Members	Full Members	Candidate Members	Workers	Collective Farmers/Peasants	White Collar Workers (Services)	Women
1955	143878	134014	9864	29656	42042	72180	27971
	100%	93.14%	6.86%	20.61%	29.22%	50.17%	19.40%
1960	202865	182924	19941	49267	60540	93058	36235
	100%	90.17%	9.83%	24.29%	29.84%	45.87%	17.86%
1964	287857	264746	23111	80703	84282	122872	52624
	100%	91.97%	8.03%	28.04%	29.28%	42.69%	18.97%

SOURCE: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana V Isifrah, Tashkent, 1964
pp. 142, 164, 167, 185, 189.

shows that the proportion of white collar workers in the party increased up to 1955, while it fell significantly by 1960 and continued to decline, from 50.17 per cent in 1955 to 42.68 per cent in 1964.

Significantly, the representation of the peasants remained static during 1955-64, i.e. around 29.0 per cent, although it continued to be higher than the total share of workers in industry transport, communication and construction. The fact that the peasantry constituted the largest share (occupation wise) of party membership was reflective of the agrarian base of the economic structure of Uzbekistan. It also indicates that a fairly large share of new recruits came from the peasantry. Thus, enabling the party to continue to develop its base among the peasantry. Thus it is significant to note that the Uzbek party registered a decline in the membership of the white collar workers and a consistent upward trend in the membership of the workers. From this it can be seen easily that the overall content of the native population in the party membership had increased. When we keep in mind the fact, that a substantial number of white collar workers in Uzbekistan was Russian. Likewise, it points to the fact that the process of politicalisation had further gained ground by the increasing recruitment of workers mostly coming from the native population.

(c) Occupational Structure

The points made above may be further clarified by taking into account the occupational structure of Uzbek party during 1955-64. Table II provides us with an overall view of occupation structure of Uzbek party during the period and we may summarise it as under:

(a) the largest concentration of workers in the Uzbek party was to be found in industrial sector and also it grew during 1955-60. In 1955, it was 15.2 per cent in 1960, 16.2 per cent, while in 1964 it rose to 16.50.

(b) the second, share was taken by the transport and communication workers from 5.10 in 1955 to 6.16 in 1964, while construction workers rose from 1.48 per cent in 1955 to 4.79 per cent in 1964.

From (a) and (b) above, it can be seen that the impact of industrialisation in Uzbekistan was obviously visible in the occupational structure of the workers. From an overwhelming share of Transport and Communication workers in the Uzbek party in the 20's it gradually enveloped the rising number of workers in Uzbek industry. Hence, the strategy of development was bringing about the desired result of strengthening the base of the Uzbek party.

The peasantry also showed an interesting pattern of development. The percentage share of collective farm workers

TABLE II
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UZBEK PARTY
(1955 - 64)

	Total Number of Communists					
	1965	% of total Membership	1960	% of total Membership	1964	% of total Membership
1. Industry	21884	15.21	32950	16.24	47506	16.50
2. Transport & Communication	7343	5.10	11149	5.49	17752	6.16
3. Construction	2135	1.48	6248	3.07	13790	4.79
4. Education, Culture & Health	18817	13.07	26513	13.06	40171	13.95
5. Administration Sector	21134	14.68	22834	11.25	26140	9.08
6. State Farms	2472	1.71	20489	10.09	32625	11.33
7. Collective Farms (Including Fishers)	41371	28.75	55838	27.52	76525	26.58
8. K.T.S.	7230	5.02	-	-	-	-
9. Repair Stations K.T.S.	-	-	3035	1.52	-	-
10. Other Agricultural Organi- zations (Rural District Centres, Agriculture Territories, Forestry)	15631	10.86	15365	7.57	17447	6.06
11. Miscellaneous (Trader, Cat ring, other types, non-working)	5591	3.88	8394	4.13	15901	5.52
TOTAL	143873		202865		287857	

SOURCE: KRUS, pp.140-41, 165-66, 188-87

marginally fall from 28.57 in 1955 to 26.58 per cent in 1964. While that of the state farm peasantry increased from 1.17 in 1955 to 11.3 per cent in 1964. However, as the table indicates, percentage for state farm peasantry obviously includes skilled workers and managers.

But the peasantry remained the single largest constituent of the party.

It may be argued that the reason behind the relatively slower growth of the peasantry in the party membership were both a deliberate policy of the party leadership as well as it showed the impact of growing pace of industrialisation in Uzbekistan from late 50's onwards. The party leadership obviously felt satisfied that its objectives are fulfilled by keeping the share of peasantry in the party membership in Uzbekistan much higher than that of its share at the All Union Communist Party level (CPSU).

Among the intelligentsia, the percentage share remained more or less the same with 13.07 per cent in 1955 and 13.95 per cent in 1964.

On the other hand, among the white collar workers (administration sector), the percentage sharply declined from 14.68 per cent in 1955 to 9.08 per cent in 1964.

Hence, it is significant to note that less and less administrators were being recruited in the party, while the share of intelligentsia remained unaffected. The party, thus had a majority of membership coming from industry and collective

farms, about 58 per cent in 1964, and 42.68 per cent coming from other sectors of the society. The corresponding figure for 1955 was 49.83 per cent and 50.17 per cent. Indeed this was a significant shift in the social bases of the party achieved by mid 60's.

(d) National Composition

The picture of overall growth of the Uzbek Communist Party will remain incomplete unless we bring into focus the national composition of the party during 1955-64. Earlier, we have referred to some of its aspects. Here, it is worthwhile to return to the subject.

The policy of mass involvement and further strengthening of the party apparatus in the Khrushchev period produced a widespread improvement in the indigenous party membership in Uzbekistan. This is borne out by the fact that in 1959-60 the natives of the republic constituted 62.3 per cent of the total population, while in the party in the same year, they constituted 63.5 per cent of the new candidate members.³³

According to Table III, this trend continued and by 1964, the share of the Uzbeks in the party membership rose to 52.16 per cent. In other words the trend of rising proportion of Uzbeks as against the Russians continued during 1955-64, when in 1955 the Russians constituted 25.07 per cent of the total membership of the party and in 1964 they fell to 22.04. Even if we add the figures for Bylorussians, Ukrainians and Jews to the share of Russians in the party the corresponding figures

33. Rigby, n.32, p. 392.

TABLE III
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UZBEK PARTY (1955 - 64)

YEAR	Total No. of Communists	Uzbek	Russian	Karakalpak	Tatar	Kazakh	Tadjik	Jews	Kirgiz	Ukrainians	Turkmen	Bylorussians	Others
1955	143878	65679	36073	2991	8220	6233	3805	4774	784	4797	552	503	7467
	100%	47.04	25.07	2.08	5.72	4.33	2.64	3.32	0.55	3.33	0.38	0.35	5.19
1960	202865	102663	46514	4123	10956	8231	6139	5582	1323	6119	845	635	9735
	100%	50.61	22.93	2.03	5.40	4.06	3.03	2.75	0.65	3.02	0.41	0.31	4.80
1964	287857	150134	63439	5148	15804	13014	8093	6659	1935	8168	1160	964	13339
	100%	52.16	22.04	1.79	5.49	4.52	2.81	2.31	0.67	2.85	0.41	0.33	4.63

SOURCE: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana V, Tsifrekh, Tashkent
pp. 143, 168, 189

remain less than the Uzbeks as under: 1955 -- 32.07 per cent and 1964 -- 27.53 per cent.

On the other hand, if we take the cumulative figures of all the local nationalities, these ⁱⁿ share in the party membership is still higher as shown below:

1955 -- 67.93

1964 -- 72.47

Moreover, the representation of Uzbeks not only increased in the republican party, but in the CPSU also. The figures for national composition of the CPSU are available for 1961 and 1964-65. The representation of Uzbeks increased in CPSU from 1.48 in 1961 to 1.64 in 1964-65.

The percentage representation of the Uzbek communist party in the CPSU also shows an increasing trend in the following table.³⁴

Year	CPSU membership	Uzbek party membership	Percent of CPSU
1925	801,804	16570	2.06
1935	2,358,714	33834	1.43
1945	5,760,369	82505	1.43
1955	6,957,105	202865	2.91
1964	11,022,369	287857	2.61

34. Compiled on the basis of CPSU Membership data given in, The CPSU: Stages of History, Moscow, 1975, p. 104, and KPUS, pp. 19, 50, 92, 142, 185.

The participation of the Uzbek party in the CPSU Congresses also increased over a period of time. The size of Uzbek party delegations increased during the 18th, 19th and 22nd Congresses of CPSU, for which data is available. In the 18th Congress of CPSU held in 1939, the Uzbek party delegation constituted 1.5 per cent of the total CPSU delegates. In the 19th and 22nd Congresses the strength of the Uzbek party delegates increased to 2.1 and 2.5 per cent respectively. ³⁵

We may recall that the share of the Uzbeks in party membership had fallen considerably during the war due to emigration of the Europeans, but after the war this balance was restored leading to the emergence of the Uzbek and other nationalities as a reckoning force in the party membership. The mere fact that in terms of numbers the Uzbeks and other local nationalities had greatly outnumbered the Europeans was important. First of all, it does indicate that the emergence of the new social classes in Uzbekistan had accelerated the process of the nativisation of the communist party apparatus. Secondly, the harmful effect of post-second World War on the Uzbek party, as mentioned in our last chapter was considerably overcome. Finally, it can be easily seen that more and more Uzbeks were drawn to the first rank of the party apparatchiki beginning to replace the Russians as first secretaries of the party, committees at the republican, regional and primary levels of party organizations. So much so that in 1959, an

35. T.H. Rigby, n. 32, p. 375.

Uzbek, S.R. Rashidov, who was Uzbek President from 1950-59 became the first secretary of Uzbek communist party, later in 1961 he was elected to the C.C. of CPSU and in the 25th party congress 1976, he was promoted as alternate member of Politbureau of the CC of CPSU.

IV

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY

At this stage it is worthwhile to have a quick glance at the institutional structure of the Uzbek communist party and its development during 1955-64. As it is generally known, the Uzbek party has a similar institutional structure as that of its parent body namely, CPSU. In other words the base of the party is the primary party organizations. While it has a Pyramid structure with various tier organizations at the district and regional levels with the party leadership at the apex of the pyramid. On the other hand, the link with the parent body, the CPSU, is maintained through its membership in the central party organs like the central committee, and the central party secretariat, while direct link is maintained through the congress of the CPSU, when it elects delegates for representation to the party congress. In the preceding pages we have pointed out how the share of the Uzbek party had registered an upward trend in the CPSU leadership. In other words, this pattern of linkages with the CPSU and its development had provided a due opportunity for the Uzbek party to participate in leadership at the Central level. We may add

that in various state organs at the central level like the Supreme Soviet and, policy makers in various ministries, the share of Uzbek party members had also registered an upward trend.

The Uzbek party on the other hand, had its own wide network, as our Table IV (Organisational structure of the Party 1955-64) amply shows. On the basis of Table IV we can point out the following:

(a) The main unit of the party namely the primary party organization has a total of 8098 in 1955, it declined to 7296 in 1960 and again increased to 8320 in 1964.

(b) Considering the representation of the peasantry the highest in the Uzbek party, the number of primary party organisations in collective farms is the highest; 2200 (1955), (1065 in 1960), (997 in 1964), a considerable decline from 1955 indicating preoccupation with discipline and organization of the agricultural sector (for example amalgamation of smaller uneconomic farms with bigger ones).

It may however be noted that at the department level the number of party organisation increased from 1784 in 1960 to 5285 in 1964; this obviously indicates decentralisation and wider avenues for party members to participate in administration.

TABLE IV
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY
(1955 - 64)

	Number of Primary Party Organization			Organizations at Department Level		
	1955	1960	1964	1955	1960	1964
1. Industry	823	868	823	313	762	1060
2. Transport & Communication	347	408	518	40	120	192
3. Construction	140	258	414	13	112	212
4. Education, Culture & Health	1508	1964	2633	61	138	147
5. Administration Sector	1121	981	1068	124	214	225
6. State Farms	109	185	244	NA	772	1215
7. Collective Farms (including Fishers)	2200	1065	997	-	1784	5285
8. M.T.S.	281	-	-	-	-	-
9. Repair Stations (R.T.S.)	100	-145	-	-	-	-
10. Other Agricultural Organization (Rural District Centres, Agriculture Territories, Forestry)	1237	1023	937	-	-	-
11. Miscellaneous (Trader, Catering, other types, non-working)	332	399	686	-	15	27
TOTAL	8098	7296	8320	551	3917	8370

SOURCE: KFUS, pp. 140-41, 165-66, 186-87

(c) A corresponding trend is visible in the industrial sector. As the chart below shows,

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1964</u>
	<u>No. of primary party organizations</u>			<u>Organisations at Department level</u>		
Industry	823	868	823	313	762	1060

Likewise, it can be easily seen that the trend in the increasing number of party organisations at the department level indicates both the accelerating pace of industrialisation and decentralisation, leading to wider opportunities for the members in policy making in the administration.

(d) the party has a wider network of primary organisations, indeed more than in industry and agriculture among the intelligentsia; 1508 (1955), 1964 (1960), 2633 (1964). Interestingly enough, here the trend is towards increase rather than decrease as was the case in industry and agriculture.

Interestingly enough here again a different trend is visible as far as organisation at department level is concerned. Although it increased from 61 in 1955 to 147 in 1964, it is substantially less than in industry and agriculture.

More or less the same trend is visible in the administrative sector. Although considerably less than in education, culture and health.

Against the background of declining share of intelligentsia and white collar workers in the overall membership of the party during 1955-64, and the increase in the number of party organisations among them signifies more control and centralisation of this section of the Uzbek society. This is further confirmed by a much slower growth of party organizations at the department level in non-producing sector. In other words, a comparatively better opportunity of participation in leadership was provided to the Uzbek intelligentsia, although it has obviously affected the Europeans more than the local nationalities. This development was in conformity with the overall policy of the CPSU leadership towards the local nationalities.

The preceding pages have put together the overall development in the Uzbek party during 1955-64. These developments have gone a long way in qualitatively changing the role and function of Uzbek party. It has certainly become a mass base party involving 2.8 per cent of the population. Moreover it has attracted new social classes with peasantry still constituting the largest number. Against the background of socio-economic development of Uzbekistan since 1917, this indeed was a significant achievement.

More importantly the process of nativisation had grown both in quality and quantity. Not only the number of

Uzbeks and other local nationalities gained at the expense of Russians and other Europeans but also the balance of leadership tilted in favour of the Uzbek and other local nationalities. The non-European party members were now given more opportunities to occupy vintage position in party hierarchy like the first secretaryship of various party organizations, even at the republican level.

Moreover, the overall emphasis of the CPSU leadership on the restoration of inner party democracy, particularly the observance of collective leadership had brought about more purposeful results at the lower hierarchy of the party. Likewise, growing emphasis on the observance of democratic norms and on promotion and encouragement of mass participation was felt more at the lower level. As pointed out earlier, various economic reforms and widening of powers of Union republics and local Soviets had changed the political environment of the Soviet Union.

All these developments accelerated the process of revitalising the Uzbek party. By 1964, the Uzbek party had begun to provide an important channel for participatory leadership for its members and thus contributing to the consolidation of Soviet society. Needless to add that the process continued perhaps at a more rapid pace after 1964, when the new leadership took over in the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER V

Towards An Assessment

TOWARDS AN ASSESSMENT

The problem of functionalisation of the Soviet System has attracted the attention of Soviet leaders right from the very beginning. Relying on the armoury of ideas, accumulated by Marx, Engels and other socialist thinkers, Lenin further developed the theory of the State and of functionalisation of Soviet system. Earlier in our first chapter, we have tried to identify this framework laying particular emphasis on one of the essential hallmarks of the functionalisation of the Soviet System, namely, the problem of political participation and participatory leadership in particular.

This framework had to be applied in practice. Lenin and other soviet leaders were conscious of the enormous difficulties in applying the principles of socialist democracy in the conditions prevailing in Russia after the revolution. For instance, the constraints of foreign intervention and civil war as well as scarce economic condition imposed a centralised functioning of the system. Hence, political participation during the formative period of the Soviet political system remained largely operative in the party apparatus. However, efforts were also underway to apply these principles to the overall management of the society as the provisions of the first three constitutions of Russia (later USSR) amply show. These trends were more marked as Soviet society moved towards creating favourable objective conditions for the functionalisation of the

system to collectivisation and industrialisation.

The application of these principles proved to be more problematic in Uzbekistan with which this study is primarily concerned. On the eve of October Revolution, Uzbekistan in particular and Central Asia in general, presented an entirely different scenario from other parts of Russia. The semi-feudal and nomadic structure of Uzbek society with virtual absence of native proletariat posed numerous problems to the Bolsheviks for building there a Soviet type of state apparatus and for the functionalisation of the Soviet political system. Mass illiteracy and religious orthodoxy stood in the way of political socialisation. These problems were further compounded by civil war and foreign intervention.

In the initial phase, i.e. immediately after the October Revolution, the Soviet government and the Communist Party moved ~~continuously~~ in implementing their policies in Turkestan (Uzbek SSR in 1924 after National State Delimitation). The natives were to be won over to the Soviet system, by drawing them in the state and party apparatus. To undertake these tasks, the Bolsheviks were first of pre-occupied with the creation of a conducive environment for mass participation in the affairs of the society.

The Soviet government and the party devised strategy and tactics of involving the natives by taking into careful consideration the specifics of the Central Asian situation.

Moreover, after 1950, certain trends were marked in the transformation of the social and national composition of the party. The natives were represented more and more in administration sector due to emergence of native intelligentsia and the representation of Uzbeks and other local nationalities in the party also made progress.

The period 1946-53 was essentially the period when the Soviet society regained its traditional momentum for development.

The years after 1953 witnessed qualitatively different political situation when the new leadership took over. The new leadership took certain corrective measures for the revitalisation of Soviet democracy and functionalisation of the Soviet political system. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU a conducive environment was created to restore the operational principle of Soviet political system i.e., the principle of democratic centralism. The State organs stipulated to operate within the parameters of the Constitution. Legal norms were created to curb the extra-legal activities of state organs like state police and the procurator's office. The primacy of the party was restored and special emphasis was laid on the observance of the principle of collective leadership within the party and the government.

The reorganisation of the party at the department level and creation of more and more micro-organisations at the Shop/Floor level provided increasing opportunities to the grass-root party workers for participating in the decision-making process.

Some concessions were granted to the local people in recruiting them to the Party apparatus in the face of demands for regional autonomy. Of course, the granting of some concessions and relaxation in the conditions of admitting local people to the party resulted in infiltration of bourgeois nationalist elements in the Party. To overcome Great Russian chauvinism of the Russians and nationalist tendencies among the natives the party was purged of such elements during 1921.

During the land and water reforms period, keeping in view, the problems encountered in admitting the natives to party, the Uzbek Communist party adopted a cautious approach in its recruitment policy. Now more concerted efforts were made to organise the peasantry in the mass organisation Koshchi, which in fact provided a platform to educate the peasants politically and eventually to recruit them to the party.

From the above, it is obvious, that the first task was the creation of necessary conditions for the political participation of the mass of the people. It was naive to speak of political participation in the formative period and it was too early to apply the theoretical framework in toto. Like every aspect of its policies, the Soviet leadership saw these tasks in terms of an inter-related process of socio-economic change. In other words, a concerted policy was pursued with the dual objectives of creating favourable

socio-economic conditions, as well as of generating a process of increasing political participation, through a programmatic use of political power. In the conditions of Uzbekistan, immediately after the revolution, which we have investigated earlier, the Communist Party in the republic was the most reliable and important agency for pursuing such a policy. Hence, we have taken up the specific case study of the Uzbek Communist party for our purpose.

Fundamental changes in the society and political participation were seen as inter-dependent processes. Collectivisation and later industrialisation brought about radical changes in the structure of the Uzbek society and thus they provided conducive environment for participation in political leadership by the natives. On the other hand, political participation by local people paved the way for the party in playing a crucial role in mobilising the masses and in the fulfilment of its objectives. It is interesting to note that during this period the Bolsheviks succeeded in drawing the Uzbeks and other local nationalities to the party in large numbers and in fact the natives dominated the party apparatus. The Second World War provided impetus to the further development and growth of the Uzbek party. But the Uzbek majority in the party was reduced due to the migration of Russians and other Europeans to Uzbekistan. More importantly, the war all the more disturbed the optimal relationship between centralisation and democracy when centralisation took predominance over democracy.

The most serious concern of the party leadership in the immediate post-war years was the restoration of the pre-war economy. As a result, the principles of collective leadership and mass-participation gave way to centralisation and in some ways a super-imposition of the State organs over the party apparatus. Yet the process of development and consolidation of the party continued, though, at a slower pace.

The immediate post-war years indeed witnessed the consolidation and improvement in the quality of membership in the party. More and more emphasis was laid on the education of party membership and less on new recruitment. Steps were undertaken to reorganise party organisations in collective farms. More and more party organisations were set up in collective farms to provide enhanced opportunities of political participation to the party members. Natives were sent to the collective farms after political training in the Republican party school to assist and work with the chairmen of collective farms and directors of Machine and Tractor stations, thereby providing increasing mobility for the natives. Efforts began to be made to restore the primacy of the party in the Soviet political system. The results of this policy were already being felt, particularly after 1951, when the 19th CPSU Congress was held after an interval of 14 years in 1952.

These changes in the political environment of the country coincided with the rapid pace of the development in the economy. All these accelerated the process of the emergence and consolidation of the new native social classes.

The changes in the socio-economic structure of the society had an impact on the social and national composition of the Uzbek party. This period witnessed the increasing share of the workers and intelligentsia in the party, which, in essence meant more and more opportunities for political participation to the natives. For instance, the weightage of the Russians in the party as a result of war time internal migration gave way to Uzbek majority in the party. Besides the natives began to appointed for sensitive and key party posts.

Thus, during the period 1954-64 preoccupation with striking an optimal balance between centralisation and democracy was marked so as to reinvigorate Soviet democracy. To sum up, the process of mass participation was strengthened, and it continued after 1964 when a new leadership took over.

Starting from a scratch in 1924, the Uzbek Communist Party became a mass party by 1964. The Party became an important channel for political participation and participatory leadership to the native people not only at the local level but also at the republican and national level. Thus our study has shown that during the period under study the

process of political participation and participatory leadership was strengthened not only in Uzbekistan but in the USSR as a whole. Needless to add that this process continued and gained momentum during the subsequent stages of development of the Soviet society in the sixties and the seventies.

APPENDICE

APPENDIXE

Table I.

GROWTH IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF UZBEK PARTY
(1925- 64/65)

Year	Total Membership	Percentage Increase
1925	16570	--
1935	33834	104.18
1945	82505	143.8
1955	143878	74.3
1964-5	287857	100.07

Source: KPES, pp. 19, 48, 89, 139, 185.

Table II
PARTY MEMBERS ^{PER} THOUSAND OF POPULATION

Year	Total Population	Total Membership of Party	Communists per thousand of popu- lation
1926	45,65,000	24383	5.34
1939	64,40,000	35087	5.44
1959	82,61,000	187541	22.70
1964-65	1,01,80,000	287857	28.27

Source: Violet Conolly, Beyond the Urals, London, 1967, p. 109 and KPUS, p. 24, 65, 161, 187.

Table III
POPULATION INCREASE IN UZBEKISTAN

Year	Population	Percentage of Increase
1926	45,65,000	--
1939	64,40,000	41.07
1959	82,61,000	28.27
1964-65	1,01,80,000	23.22

Source: Violet Conolly, Beyond The Urals, London, 1967, p. 109.

Table IV

AGE STRUCTURE OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN UZBEKISTAN

Year (as on 1st Jan.	Percent of Party Membership in Age Groups						Age not known
	Up to 20	21-30	31-40*	41-50	51-60	Over 60	
1925	0.7	46.5	33.65	18.13			0.97
1937	0.002	29.0	51.8	15.1	3.6	0.5	
1940	1.5	36.8	44.8	13.0	3.2	0.6	
1945	0.4	26.3	44.1	21.8	5.2	1.0	
1950	0.4	25.7	41.2	25.5	6.1	1.0	
1955	0.2	20.8	36.1	30.4	10.5	2.0	
1960	0.3	19.7	36.8	25.7	14.1	3.4	
1964	0.2	23.2	37.8	20.4	14.1	4.2	

Source: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Uzbekistana V tsifrakh, Tashkent, 1964, pp 21, 58, 71, 92, 116, 142, 167, 189.

* For the year 1925, the age group is shown 31 to 41 in KPUS.

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