

**TERRORISM IN NORTH EASTERN INDIA: A CASE STUDY
OF NAGALAND WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KUKI -
NAGA INTER-TRIBAL CONFLICT, 1983-92**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of*
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

RAMESH KUMAR SINGH

**CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110 067, INDIA**

1995



CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA

DECLARATION

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled "Terrorism in North Eastern India: A Case Study of Nagaland with Special Reference to Kuki - Naga Inter-Tribal Conflict, 1983-92" submitted by Ramesh Kumar Singh, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) of this University, has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

DR. RAKESH GUPTA
(SUPERVISOR)

21.7.95

DR. KIRAN SAXENA
CHAIRPERSON


CHAIRPERSON
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES,
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES-II,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY,
NEW DELHI-110067,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work owes its origin to intellectual stimulation and kind suggestions of my guide and teacher Dr. Rakesh Gupta. I acknowledge my heart felt gratitude to him.

Besides, my friends, Amitabh, Archana, Bhawani,, Pandey, Sonu, Mandu Sir, Ranjit, Reena and Ishwar whose invaluable help and encouragements made the work easier and interesting.

Finally I am thankful to Mr. Bhupal Singh Bisht who took the pain of immaculate typing and binding.



RAMESH KUMAR SINGH

CONTENTS

	Page No.
PREFACE	i
Chapter I: Terrorism, Ideology and National Liberation Movement.	1-23
Chapter II: Evolution of Naga Nationalism and the Separatist Tendencies From 1947- to Shillong Agreement 1975.	24-42
Chapter III: Kuki-Naga Inter-tribal Conflict and its Characteristics.	43-58
Chapter IV : Elections, Participation and Centre's Role in the State Politics of Nagaland.	59-76
Conclusion :	77-82
Bibliography:	83-87

PREFACE

In Nagaland the problem of separatist underground movement is almost half a century old. But recently, after the formation of NSCN in 1980 it has ushered in a new era of militancy which has in course of time developed terroristic characteristics that are peculiar and distinct from the early phase of the Naga National liberation movement.

The study through historical analytical approach tries to underline peculiarity of inter tribal conflict, along with the genesis of the movement in Nagaland. The first chapter gives a brief account of historical and analytical aspects of terrorism, its linkages with ideological politics, national liberation movement and ethnic divides. Second chapter takes into account the evolution of Naga secessionist movement and factors responsible for it. Third chapter throws light on the genesis of inter-tribal conflict of Kuki-Naga and the characteristics of second phase of terrorism in Nagaland.

Fourth chapter captures the evolution and performance of political and electoral process in a violence torn state. This is followed by a conclusion when we say that the inter-ethnic conflict is a complicating phenomenon in political process.

It is based on secondary sources viz books, journals and newspaper clippings.

CHAPTER I

TERRORISM, IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Methods of obtaining political goals by means of controlled fear and violence have always existed. But the French 'Rein of Terror' of 1793-94 is most commonly cited as a major watershed in the starting of history of modern European terrorism. Since then during the last two centuries the nature and permissibility of political violence has gone under seachange not only in Europe but world over due to several factors. The most important of all the factors is the rise of ideological politics which have provided a sort of legitimacy to the perpetuation of terror in the name of nation, class, ethnic groups religion etc. The growing centralisation and ever increasing monopoly of violence in the hands of modern states, the cataclysmic development in the field of mass communications and rapid urbanization have been factors responsible for the change in the nature of terrorism.

The last two hundred years of history of terrorism in Europe and world wide can be divided in several stages to have a closer understanding of the development of 'politics of terror'.

The first stage can be cut out as from Robespierre's 'Reign of Terror to the First World War'. This stage can be termed as an age of predominantly 'guerrilla adventurism'. Terrorism at this stage initially appeared as the mode of activity of small conspiratorial groups, such as student bodies and secret societies which sprang up throughout Europe in the post Napoleonic restoration. The ideological banners were mainly nationalism and Republicanism.

The high priests were Mazzini and Carlo Bianco. Mazzini in his work 'Rules for the conduct of guerrilla bands' declares that 'The Political Mission of Guerrilla bands is to contribute to the armed apostolate of the insurrection'. Carlo bianco (1795-1843) who was one of the organizers of Mazzini's disastrous attempt to invade Savoy published a work entitled 'A Hand book for Revolutionary Bands'. In this work he showers admiration for those who are animated by a 'sacred enthusiasm' and freely dedicated his life to the sublime cause of Italy's regeneration. His guerrilla is exalted blend of the spirit of Christ and Robin hood.¹

1. O'Sullivan, Noel ed. Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution, 1986, pp. 10-11.

The year of 1848 is important in the history of Europe as it saw the complete failure of revolutions which swept the capital cities of Europe. The year is also important in the history of terrorism as it marked the conversion of the image of guerrilla into that of a terrorist. The explanation of this change can be traced in the destruction of revolutionary hopes about a spontaneous popular uprising. Three main responses emerged to this event. August Blanqui analysed the failure in terms of organisational problems and suggested that mass spontaneity alone can never turn on the wheels of history and the need was to organise the people on military lines.

On the other hand Marx and Engels called for further organisation and preparation of the proletariat for revolutionary aims.

The third answer came from Karl Heinzen whose work "Murder" has been described as 'the most important ideological statement of early terrorism. He concluded after reviewing the events of 1848 that the authorities were too powerful and blood thirsty to let a popular uprising be a success. In this situation a revolutionary must accept the fact that 'murder is the chief instrument of historical progress'.²

2. Ibid. p. 13.

The remaining period down to the First World War can be termed as increasing 'professionalisation' of terrorist activity. The process saw its culmination in the writing of Nechayev 'Catechism of the Revolutionary, 1869' which equipped the terrorist with pure nihilism. It provides for the study of every aspect of modern science which relates to the technology of destruction. Others following the line were Johann Most, who wrote 'The Science of Revolutionary War' 1884, and Kropotkin who emphasised 'propaganda by deed'.

The second phase of terrorism drew heavily from the developments in the 19th century. The major changes were due to general change in attitude towards violence during the twentieth century, the spread of ideological politics, and the various social and technological changes which have an impact of terroristic activities on the public opinion.

One of the most notable characteristic of this period is the combination of nationalistic ideology with the Neo Marxist doctrine of class conflict. This blend has been the most influential in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Main protagonists are Franz Fanon, Che, Debray Marighella and these were influenced by the writings of Herbert Marcuse.

INDIAN POLITICAL TRADITION ON VIOLENCE

Almost right from the beginning the Indian attitude to violence has been characterized by a deep and healthy ambiguity. The ambiguity arose from its attempt to come to terms with what may be called as two fundamental but contradictory features of the world. First living beings are qualitatively different from the non-living. They represent the divine and feel pain. As such all life is one' and is sacred. Hinsa or violence is therefore evil and must be avoided. Second Jivo Jivasya Jivanam. Every living being lives on or forms the livelihood of some other living being. To live is to kill and destroy. Violence is thus inherent and inescapable.³

This ambiguity permeated down the nationalist struggle in India. The early 'revolutionary' nationalistic terrorism drew heavily from the Indian religious tradition for justification of violence. It was Gandhi who came to reinterpret the entire tradition attacked terrorism and persuaded bulk of people for non-violence as the only path for India's freedom.

Although India's struggle for independence was largely non-violent it periodically witnessed the phases

3. Bhikhu Parekh, 'Gandhi's Theory of Non-violence: his reply to the Terrorists' in Noel O'Sullivan (ed) Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution, p. 178.

of small but vocal terrorist movement which galvanized the spirits of nationalists. The movement began in the 1870s reached its peak during the partition of Bengal, went into decline and reemerged in 1920 and enjoyed a chequered existence until India's independence in 1957.⁴

In independent India violence as a tool of political struggle has mainly remained the forte of two types of movements: the first is the Naxalite movements in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh and the second is separatist movements in the border states of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern states. These separatist movements have their own specificities due to the specific cultural historical and geographical context.

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

Before moving further the discussion on terrorism, its ideological roots and its role in national liberation movements, it is very much desirable to what we actually mean when referring to the term terrorism.

Several experts on the topic have tried to explain and elaborate the term. But the most suitable for this study is one given by Thomas Perry Thornton, which will be discussed in detail. The most important thing in

4. Ibid. p. 180.

Thorton's definition is that it does not deviate from 'the centrality of terror'.

Beside, Crozier has tried to distinguish between the activities of insurgents who wish to disrupt the existing order and achieve power and the incumbents who wish to suppress the challenge in an internal war situation. He calls the former the terrorist and latter as the counter terrorist.

Thorton, however contradict this nomenclature with the argument that by no means it is inevitable that the insurgents will initiate terrorism in some cases they might well be counter terrorists reacting to the terror of the incumbents. So, Thorton devises new terms: 'enforcement terrorism' to describe the terrorism (or counter terrorism) launched by those in power and 'agitational terrorism' to describe the terroristic acts by those aspiring for power.⁵

Defining terrorism Thorton says, terror is a symbolic act designed to influence political behaviour by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence. Then Thorton discusses the terms individually.

5. Thomas Perry Thorton, 'Terror as a Weapon of Political agitation' in Harry Eckstein (ed) Internal War Problems and Approach, p. 72.

DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

Thorton excluded all the non-political forms of terroristic events in an internal war situation. And since terror is a weapon with political implications, it should be considered in its entire spectrum of political agitation. The appropriateness of terror varies according to the political support enjoyed by the insurgents. Thus it is very desirable that the political function of the terror must be emphasised in contrast to the military function often ascribed to it.

ENTAILING THE USE OR THREAT OF VIOLENCE

In view of the high level of alienation inherent in any insurgent group, that feels impelled towards terrorism, it is inevitable that violence will play a characteristic role in terroristic activities. A non-violent programme could hardly qualify as terrorism.

"BY EXTRANORMAL MEANS"

Terror occupies the highest reaches of the spectrum of political agitation, immediately above other types of political violence. Terror may be distinguished from other types by its extra normal quality that is

terrorlies beyond the norms of violent political agitation that are accepted by a given society. However the level of extra normality differs from society to society and time to time.

"A SYMBOLIC ACT"

This means that the terroristic activities are intended and perceived as symbolic. The symbols of state power are particularly important but more important are those referring to the normative structures and relationships which constitute the supporting framework of the society.⁶

TERRORISM AND IDEOLOGY

Today there exists a plethora of literature on the subject, how terrorism interacts with ideologies. Chiefly there are two schools of thought defining the relationship between terrorism and ideology. The first school of thought tries to explain terrorism on left-right spectrum basis and concludes that it is a phenomenon characteristically belonging to the left and right extremities.

But as O' Sullivan contradicts that this way of proceeding is unsatisfactory, not because it is wrong but

6. Ibid. pp. 73-78.

because it disconnects terrorism from the mainstream of democratic thought and practice by confining attention too narrowly to a collection of more or less romantic and egotistical fanatics. The result is to encourage a sense of complacency, since the causes of terrorism are dismissively pushed to the eccentric fringe of the intellectual and political world.⁷

Sullivan, breaking fresh ground in this field asserts that the phenomenon of terrorism is more intimately connected with the main currents of modern liberal - democratic tradition and terrorism cannot be satisfactorily analysed within the left-right spectrum approach.

He further enumerates the three major assumptions which mark the advent of modern ideological politics and sustained it also since French Revolution in 1789.

The first assumption was that it is within the capacity of men to reshape the society from top to the bottom. For the first time it was believed to be possible to translate the earlier utopias into reality. Without this belief in the possibility of radical change the more ambitious aspiration of modern terrorism would be inconcievable.⁸

7. Noel O'Sullivan (ed) Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution, p. 6.

8. Ibid. p. 7.

The second assumption was that man is naturally good. This optimistic view found expression first in the theory of evil forwarded by Rousseau and later accepted by others. The theory contends that evil is not from outside and ineliminable part of the human condition, but originates in the structure of society and may therefore be removed from the world. This approach tends to identify an outgroup within the society and every form of atrocities and violence is justified against that group. Thus it is obvious that this assumption lends itself to the interpretations which make the use of terror for ideological ends appear as natural.⁹

The third one is closely related to the concept of political legitimacy. The doctrine of popular sovereignty proclaimed by the Declaration of the Rights of man and the citizen. According to this doctrine power is legitimated only if it is conferred 'from below', by the people. This means that an appeal to popular sovereignty can be used to justify any government, but it can also be invoked by anyone who claims to be truer representative of the popular will than the established authorities are. Thus, this way of legitimizing their actions has been of great help to modern terrorists, all of whom claim to act in the

9. Ibid. pp. 7-8.

name of the people.¹⁰

These assumptions as a whole created a political atmosphere where no form of political violence can be left indefensible morally on ideological grounds.

TERRORISM AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

One man's terrorist is other man's freedom fighter. Nationalism is probably the most important and potent of ideologies which has provided for legitimacy to the acts of terrorism. The relationship between the national liberation movements and terrorism is indeed close, intrigued and interesting.

Today if the relationship between the revolutionary violence and terrorism seems to be confused and blurred that is precisely because of wars of national liberation. These wars of national libation (often violent struggle in the industrially backward societies by groups seeking self determination, independence, social revolution or both) generally don't correspond to a single theory and thus any neat region holing is ruled out. Some of them were protracted civil consuming the life and energies of generations some took less time to be

10. Ibid. pp. 8-10.

completed and claimed fewer life. Some challenged the existing social order and called for a radical restructuring while some just compromised with political independence while leaving class relations unquestioned. But the most common were a curious mixture of both - a hotch potch mix, which tried to aim at independence with certain degree of radicalisation of existing social structures.

In 1960s when an alliance between the liberal business people and radical nationalists was shattered in cuba, Castro joined with the communists (who have individually opposed his guerrilla adventurism) to unleash a social revolution on the island. In Algeria a regime proclaiming itself Marxist and radical easily gave up to moderate nationalists who were more interested in Saharan oil than in the class struggle.

The relationship between these diverse struggles and terrorism is complex. But the confusion can be dispelled by differentiating terrorism from terrifying violence. Guerrilla fighters may be terrorists but terrorism properly defined is exemplary small group violence. Its function is to create a mass movement, where as in guerrilla war sabotage or assassination may simply represent a choice of weapon by the mass movements.

But the moot question, while analysing the relationship between national liberation movement and terrorism, is whether terrorism can generate movements for national liberation ? The question is surely not whether HO Chi Minh as leader of North Vietnam and southern insurgency, was a terrorist. The issue is whether he became the leader of his nation by converting a small guerrilla band into a mass-based people's army. It can be understood that successful national liberation struggle generally end by involving the masses actively as fighters and militant supporters, but it is suspected that there may be some truth in the idea that this struggles begin as terrorist adventures. They could as well die as misadventures if the alienated intellectuals had failed to mobilise the masses. He, who is unable to adjust to the failures of mobilisation and continues to engage in desperate acts is a terrorist. National liberation movements or a leader like HO Chi Minh may or may not depend on this tactic.

Terrorism does not flourish arbitrarily. There are certain circumstances where it can be at its best. So question arises what are those conditions where it is most effective:

- 1) The theatre of action is a society already disrupted by economic crisis or war.

- 2) The activists are supported by fellow members of some ethnic religious or national group.
- 3) The activists aim is to destabilise the regime in power or opposition.
- 4) When the opponents lack the finances the will power and the political strength to conduct an effective counter terrorist campaign.

All of these factors were present and operative when a few thous and KKK fighters were successful in 'liberating' the American south after the civil war. Klan terrorism was purely nationalist. Its success was directly proportion to its negativism localism and modesty of aim. It never touched upon the class question. So a racial solidarity across the class lines could be drawn. And that was key to success for the KKK campaign.

But the similar thing could be repeated in the case of European right wing terrorism. Why ? Because their opponents were mainly the socialists and communists were organised on class basis. And it is more than a fact that it requires more than small group violence to demolish class based organisations.

Thus whatever their political character successful nationalist struggles involve far more popular participation than the word 'individual terrorism'

implies. Nevertheless terrorism can play an important role in the formation and development of a nationalist movement as a tactic particularly when their political orientation is conservative or moderately liberal.

During the 1940s, for example conservative Jewish terrorist groups succeeded in driving the British out of Palestine for many of the same reason that the KKK was successful in driving the Northern troops out of south.

The Algerian nationalists used the same tactics in 1956-57 when they unleashed a wave of terrorism against French civilians and native collaborators. It did not drive the French out of the country. But at the same it made the fact clear that they were fairly capable of harassing the French authorities in Algeria. And although the French might have not loosed military. But finally after three years they had to leave Algeria amidst local and international pressures.

Indeed the examples provided by the Algeria and Palestine presents a parade of nationalist terrorism: it is most successful when a non terrorist army supported by a broad based coalition waits in the wings while terrorists and their opponents play out their prologue.

Since in most of the third world countries the national liberation movements have tried to reconcile between two important ideologies of the present day, nationalism and social revolution, and it will certainly be not out of place to draw a contrast between the two. Social revolutionaries' aim is not just drive the foreigner/occupier out or replace old regime with a new one. They attempt to replace an entire ruling class. For them the passive support of a sympathetic population is not enough.

But what happens in a predominantly nationalist struggle is that it may become possible for masses to delegate the war making functions to military specialists. In contrast social revolution tends to become people's war because the institution they attach are organised to meet the needs of daily life of the people.

Thus whatever their ideological tilt may be, the nationalist coalitions are typically organised across the class lines. They are generally organised by suspending the questions of class relations in favour of nationalist cause. And thus creating a common front.

There can be valid objections to this contrast on the ground that national liberation movements in the third world countries do not come packaged neatly and labeled

'social revolutionary' or 'nationalist'. In fact most have had a mixed character. To these type of mixed movements the usefulness of terrorism seems to vary directly according to the components of the mix. Although the terrorist fighters rarely take power under nationalist auspices, predominantly nationalist movements have been able to take the advantage of a terrorist phase of struggle. By contrast the liberation movements seriously committed to overthrowing capitalism have generally renounced terrorism or have come to see it as counter productive to their social aims.

In this connection it will be quite illuminating to compare the two mixed movements that relied heavily on guerrilla warfare tactics, the Chinese and Cuban revolutions. Both movements mixed nationalist aspirations with social revolutionary goals. Both were characterised as terrorist movement by their opponents.

Mao emphasis on the 'barrel of the gun' and the incidents like kidnaping of Chiang Kai Shek gave his opponents solid grounds to call him a terrorist. But this contains no truth. From its inception PLA was a disciplined force which consisted of regular and guerrilla units acting under civilian control, and not a 'hardly band' of 'guerrilla adventurers'. Its tasks were to

defend the liberated territories, to harass a temporarily superior army and finally to defeat that army in conventional warfare. This type of protracted armed conflicts can advance the cause of social revolution but only when it is possible to administer and govern the liberated territories. Variation of Chinese model are possible but without an opportunity to govern either the guerrilla force tend to become a purely military force and become more susceptible and vulnerable to the attacks of larger forces or degenerate into populist terrorism.

Whatever tendencies towards terrorism may have existed in the Chinese revolutionary movement were countered by the establishment of liberated areas as Centre of revolutionary administration and foci for expansion.

The Cuban case was in this context, is more than unique. By the time Castro was able to establish his base in the mountains opposition to the regime was rising both in cities and plantations. Strikes and protests were ruthlessly suppressed. The organisational weakness among the oppositional groups and the state terror of the regime produced a statement. The success of Castro was due to the fact that he was able to break this statement by 'pricking the Batista bubble by his relatively small force'.

This brought to the power a cross-class coalition whose common features were Cuban nationalism, the desire to modernise the country and hatred for the deposed regime. It is only when this coalition collapsed that the road to social revolution was followed by the Cubans.

Following observations can be made on the basis of above discussion. Oppositional groups that begin by practicing small group violence don't grow gradually into guerrilla armies capable of contending the regular forces of the regime. Generally either they enjoy broad mass support from the beginning or are cursed to remain at the margin awaiting for a mass uprising.

✓ Unless the guerrilla has succeeded in making the social revolution piece meal by defending the liberated areas. Their possibility of coming to the power is only as leader of cross-class coalition.

The evidences tell that once in power, the guerrilla leader is most likely to act like a liberal nationalist than waging class war. Of long list of third world countries, that gained political independence by relying, at least in part, on small group violence only Cuba undertook the social revolutionary path.


ETHNIC DIVIDE AND TERRORISM

In the newly independent states of Asia and Africa there has been two processes at the work. One has been the process of nation building undertaken by the national elites which includes marginalising the primordial loyalties, while the other process is the eruption of primordial loyalties in the form of ethnicity destabilising the nation-states both at the conceptual and empirical level. The liberal expectation that the growth of capitalism and market forces will ultimately dissolve the primordial loyalties has been shattered even in the case of advanced European countries.

But what are conditions which are most potent base for ethno-nationalism and ethnic divide in modern period. There are three general conditions for ethnic mobilisation: (a) existence of separate ethno-national community (b) actual or perceived disadvantages (c) territorial continuity.¹¹

The mobilisation of an ethnic precursor to political actions to make demands on the government. The extent and intensity of the conflict depends upon the

11. Glazer, Nathan & Moynihan, Daniel P, (eds) Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, 1978, p. 76.



N83



TH-5372

strategy followed by the ethnic group leaders and the government.¹²

Though the accommodation is reached in most of the cases. But when the process of accommodation is pushed beyond accommodation it results in expulsion, counter expulsion, exchange of population and in extreme cases genocide.¹³

In view of Phadnis the preconditions for an ethnic conflict are:

- (a) a socially mobilised population.
- (b) the existence of a pool of symbols connoting distinctiveness.
- (c) the selection, standardisation and transmission of such symbol pool to the community by the leadership.
- (d) a reference group in relation to which a sense of deprivation (real or imagined) is aggregated.¹⁴

These are the conditions for an ethnic conflict. And all these conditions are present in most of the cases of ethnic conflict in Africa, Europe and Asia and these

12. Ibid. p. 76.

13. Brass, Paul R. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparisons, 1991, p. 20.

14. Phadnis, Urmilla, Ethnicity and Nation building in South Asia, 1990, p. 26.

conditions are also present to some extent in the case of Nagaland inter tribal conflict which will be discussed in chapter III in detail.

But the situation becomes more explosive and complicated when the ethnic groups are engaged in mutual terroristic activities. Then the situation becomes more akin to civil war and brute coercion from the central political authority becomes the necessity to keep the nation-state intact and avoid balkanisation.

In next chapter there is a narrative description of conceptualisation of 'Naga nationalism' and the political and underground efforts for its separation from Indian union.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF 'NAGA NATIONALISM' AND THE SEPARATIST TENDENCIES FROM 1947 TO SHILLONG AGREEMENT 1975

Modern nationalism is a political concept which stands for the situation where each nationality have a right to self-determination. A nation has been defined a group of people sharing common race, language, geography, religion and history. The most natural political manifestation is emergence of nation-states. The ideal of one nationality one state' has been the motivating force behind the emergence of most of the nation states in Europe. But there also exists a different kind of development where an independent nation emerges with a multi-ethnic population. Here generally efforts are made to evolve a 'national identity' which simultaneously represents the spirit of diversity and strikes a sense of uniformity. The American nation state is a glaring example of this process. The process of nation building generally tries to reduce the claims of subordinate nationalities/ethnic groups.¹

The case of Indian nationalism is more than unique and interesting. The spirit of Indian nationality of -----

1. Datta, Birendranath, 'Ethnicity, Nationalism and Subnationalism' in Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in North Eastern India (ed.) by B. Pakem, 1990, pp. 36-37.

Indian identity is not a new thing. But the interesting thing about it is that this identity has been based on spiritual and cultural factors and not political. The political identity of India has been one of several regionally controlled centres of power. This does not mean that in India there has been no such attempt to create an 'All India Political Identity'. But nevertheless fact remains that it was only during the British rule that India could come under an unified political and administrative authority. This unification, together with spread of education and western ideas indeed, contributed towards a emergence of Indian nationalism and further the demand for independence and self determination. But in the process of freedom struggle, several centripetal force also played their role. The consequence was emergence of two nation theory on the basis of religion and subsequent partition of India into two sovereign units in 1947. The language culture based identity ultimately led to creation of Bangladesh.

In the post independence India there has been some developments which has been causing problems for the process of Indian nation building. The most evident of this process is the formal emergence of what can be called "little nationalism", "infranationalism" or "sub nationalism". These 'proto nationalistic identities are

centered around some or other major language culture group. Local pulls of such linguistic cultural identities had always existed but this pull has been strengthened by two political and constitutional acts. First is the reorganisation of states on linguistic basis and second the idea of state autonomy within a federal setup gave semi-political recognition to the primacy of particular language - culture group in particular states, such sub-nationalism often got mixed up with regionalism. At the same time constitutional recognition of the need for special treatment to the smaller ethnic communities, particularly the hill tribes of North-eastern India, combined with the increasingly growing consciousness among these communities about their right to manage their own affairs led to the creation of new administrative units with varying degree of autonomy.²

Thus these developments have helped evolving separate identities of the various tribals inhabiting in this area. The minority tribal's anxiety and resentment can only be understood and explained in terms of 'identity crisis'. The reasons behind this identity crisis can be traced into the socio-economic and political realities of the area. Hounded by the specter of identity crisis these ethnic groups often resort to agitational path.³

2. Ibid. p. 38.

3. Ibid. p.39.

The entire North eastern region of India in general and Naga hills in particular remained loosely occupied and administered ever during the British rule. The British domination over Naga territories has a history of eight decades from 1866 to 1947. The British, soon after their initial attempts to have a strong control over the area, realised the fact that only beneficial way to have a presence in Kohima is to allow the Nagas to practice their own way of life, laws institutions etc. The traditional way of life of Nagas was not touched upon. However, the impact of British rule cannot be ignored when evaluated in terms of social modernisation of Nagas and even emergence of 'Naga nationalism'. One of the most important impact was related to the prevalent violence the head hunting and the inter tribal warfare. Both got reduced during the British period. The other outstanding impact were brought by the introduction of currency, English education and the advent of church and missionary activities in Nagaland. Soon people in large number started embracing christianity. The english education and the european ideas had a deep impact on the outlook and world view of traditional Nagas. The introduction of currency further led to the formation of middle class in the Naga society which had so far remained classless.

THE INNER LIVE POLICY

The British also tried to isolate the Nagas from the subcontinent by following Inner Line Regulations (1873). This was in effect to prevent the plains people to enter the Naga areas. Only exception was granted to the Christian missionaries. Consequently while Nagas can be described as one of the freedom loving people they remained outside the theatre of action during the independence movement.

THE TWO WORLD WARS AND THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF NAGA NATIONALISM

The wars and the developments related with these wars certainly played a major role in the conceptualisation of Naga national identity. During the first world war many Nagas joined the Labour Corps and went to the western fronts of Europe. When they returned home they came with a different outlook which transcended the boundaries of their localism. Naga Club, which can be described as the earliest political organisation, was formed by these Nagas only. The basic purpose of this Naga Club was to promote the cause of Nagas and identify the direction for their development. They also ran a cooperative store at Mokokchung. Soon this Club acquired the status of common platform for all the Naga tribes.

SIMON COMMISSION

When Simon Commission visited Naga Hills in 1929. This Club sent a delegation which submitted a memorandum to the Commission demanding the exclusion of Hills from the proposed reforms. They prayed for keeping the Naga Hills under the direct protection of British. The Government of India Act 1935 declared 'Naga Hills' as an 'Excluded Area' which in effect meant that the governor had some discretionary powers.⁴

Ten years later after the Second world war the clamour for special status to Naga started all again. This time under a new organisation, Naga National Council (NNC) which was formed out of Naga Club in 1946. The formation of NNC could be possible only after the moderate members of Naga Club resigned and left. The formation of NNC can be explained in terms of unity it brought to the Naga people and the ferment it caused in the mind of Naga people despite the difficulties and hardship it suffered first in the wake of Japanese aggression and later invasion of Eastern India by Azad Hind Fauz.

The formation of Naga National Council in April 1946 was indeed a major step in the consolidation of Naga

4. Horam, M. 'Naga Insurgency: The last Thirty Years', 1988, pp. 37-40.

nationalistic forces. The most significant fact about the council was that the term 'national' was used and the council was composed of 29 members representing different tribes based on proportional representation.⁵

When Cabinet Mission came to India in June 1946, to prepare propitious ground for India's independence NNC submitted a 4 point memorandum to the Cabinet Mission:

- 1) This Naga Nationalist Council stands for the solidarity of Naga tribes including those in the administered areas;
- 2) This Council strongly protests the grouping of Assam with Bengal.
- 3) The Naga Hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous Assam, in a free India, with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interests of Nagas; and
- 4) The Naga Tribes should have a separate electorate.

If properly examined the text and spirit of this memorandum, from nowhere it smacks of a demand for separate sovereign and independent Naga state. But soon the movement of Nagas for greater autonomy went underchange in terms of attitude. In February 1947 the

5. Barpujari, S.K., 'Assertion of Naga Ethnic Identity: A Historical Background' in Nationality, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in North India(ed) by B. Pakem, 1990, pp. 312-13.

NNC came up with another memorandum which demanded an interim government for 10 years at the end of which Nagas will be free to choose the form of government they liked.

While the change in the political goal of Naga movement under NNC was hasty it is certainly not in explicable what factors contributed towards a change of mind ? The factors are as follows:

1) With the help of Inner line Regulations, British were able to prevent any proper contact between the plains people and people residing in the hills of North Eastern India, which otherwise would have played a role in the integration of Nagas to the freedom struggle.

2) There also existed a mischievous campaign against Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism. They were told that all the three communities hated them.

3) Again the role of British and American Missionaries and certain government officials is also doubtful. It is said that they induced the feeling that if they (Nagas) remained united they could make a nation.

Shortly, afterwards Sir Akbar Hydari the then Governor of Assam visited Kohima in June 1947 and had a week long discussion with the Naga leaders. As a result

came what is known as 'Hydari Agreement'. This Agreement consisted of 9 points. However, the ninth point soon became a bone of contention in terms of its interpretation and hence it never could be implemented.

Meanwhile, when the constitution of India was drafted, there were special provision made for the tribal areas of Assam but these arrangements hardly satisfied the aspirations of the NNC. The attitude of NNC further got toughened when in 1950 Zapu Phizo, was elected the President of NNC. He had been throughout his life a staunch supporter of Naga independence. In 1951 he conducted a plebiscite in Naga land.

As the First General Elections 1952 approached NNC asked all Nagas to boycott the elections. The result was that nobody contested the elections and Naga did cast his/her vote. The whole process of elections was a molding exercise.

Verrier Elwin writes that the first technique of agitation was Civil Disobedience, which was not strange to India, and the people began to refuse to pay house taxes or to cooperate with Government for example development schemes or the repair of roads and bridges, paths; they forced official teachers to resign and children to leave schools. They would no longer give labour or sell

supplies to officials and police, village headmen turned their red cloches in token of resignation. They boycotted national and official celebrations.⁶

Frustrated by the failure of its boycott and attempts at negotiations, the extremists appear to have toyed with the idea of an armed uprising from sometime in 1953, though the NNC never officially approved a policy of violence. The first plan was to infiltrate agents into the most recently administered villages in Tuensang and by mobilising the more visible tribes there whose contacts with the administration had been shorter and where the communication were difficult, to set up a base for operations backed by the international frontier with Burma.⁷

From this point started a proper underground movement by Nagas. In 1953 Government of India banned their weeklies "Naga Nation" and "Naga Herald" as the underground activities of Nagas stepped up. With the help of Thongdi Change (an exmilitary officer of Indian Army) Phizo started armed operations. For arms and ammunitions they did take the help of neighbouring countries like China, Burma and Pakistan. From 1953 to 1955 there

6. Elwin, V., Nagaland, 1961, p. 54.

7. Ibid. p. 55.

prevailed fierce terror in the minds of Naga general public.

While the general climate of hostilities was still there some of the leaders of Naga came overground and made pleas to government to maintain peace and law and order. Mean while T. Sakhrrie the secretary of NNC, sided with the moderates. He was kidnaped and murdered in January 1956. Phizo and his followers further stepped up rebel activities as on 22 March 1956, they declared the Federal Government of Naga land. A constitution was also drafted which declared Nagaland a people's sovereign republic. It also made provision for a creation of a parliament (Haho) with a strength of 100 members (Tatars). The president would be elected by the people and the cabinet would be consisted of 15 ministers (kilonsers). During 1956-57 Indian Army called many operations to suppress the Naga insurgency. In 1957 an important leader of Nagas, Mr. T.N. Angami brake away from Phizo's group and joined the ranks of moderates to form a reforming committee of NNC. This committee was in favour of a negotiated settlement. The committee was ready for a solution under the framework of Indian constitution. Evidently now the political stage was set for constitutional and administrative change in Nagaland. The final clumination was the creation of the state of Nagaland, a constituent state of Indian Union.

The motive behind the creation of state of Nagaland was the restoration of peace and facilitate the development activities and fulfilling the political aspiration of Nagas. But to what extent this political agreement and the resultant action could solve the problem of Nagaland is a relevant question here? Up to this point the net result of Naga insurgency were following:

- a) granting of statehood to Nagaland.
- b) a clear emergence of strong overground elements.
- c) resultant division among the extremists and the moderates.⁸

When the state ministry was formed several new faces made their appearance on the political scene. Ex underground sympathisers like Jasokie and T.N. Angami now emerged as moderates. The underground persisted in their intransigence. They expected that peace did not come. Underground ranks continued to swell. Many overground Nagas played a double game and fully supported the guerrillas. The parallel government in Nagaland merely proliferated the misery and grief of the common man. The only bright spot was economic development of Nagaland to a certain extent but even this was not as far reaching as it could have been for only, certain individuals and families

8. Horam, M., 'Naga Insurgency: The last Thirty Years', 1988, p.90.

thrived during this economic boom. The Naga problem was far from being solved. If any thing it had only become more "tangled".⁹

PEACE MISSION AND CEASEFARE AGREEMENT

Under the renewed intensification of insurgent activities the life of common man in the Naga Hills become all the more difficult. At this juncture a fresh initiative came from the Church quarters. Leaders of Baptist Churches organised a convention in Wokha in March 1964 to form a peace mission and requested the Government of India to take initiatives. Finally a three member Peace mission was formed comprising Rev. Michael Scott Jai prakash Narayan and B.P. Chaliha. After the initial contacts, the Peace mission reached the conclusion that it is prerequisite to the peace talks, that both the sides should stop hostilities. A Cease-fire Agreement was drafted which came into effect from the midnight of 6th September 1964.

After the cease-fire Agreement came into force, the Chief Minister of Nagaland Shilu Ao created a congenial atmosphere by announcing certain concessions to

9. Horam, M., Naga Insurgency, 1988, pp. 88-90.

underground Nagas. Now the stage was set for a meaningful peace talk. Negotiations for political settlement began from 23 September 1964 at Chedema Peace Camp. These peace talks were held into two phases and were further upgraded to ministerial level. The first phase consisted of as many as seven round which the second phase lasted for six rounds.

During the last phases of talks stalemate started taking shape between the two parties on the issues like 'undergrounds' demand for plebiscite, and inclusion of Phizo, the unilateral change of venue of peace talks by the undergrounds. The talks with the government was suspended and it could be resumed only after seven months in New Delhi.

Thus, the Peace Mission, albeit, in all sincerity could not make any head way with the two sides. While the government of India softened and yielded to several fresh demands of Nagas the Nagas themselves remained unbending and believing that they were arguing from a position of strength, took the conciliatory mood of New Delhi for granted. That the New Delhi was willing to put up with a lot but they were willingly to go this far and no further was to become abundantly clear during the New Delhi palavers. The adamant attitude of Nagas and the stern

posture adopted later by the Government of India finally led to the fiasco of talks in New Delhi.¹⁰

The failure of New Delhi talks had long term effects on Naga politics. First of all this produced dissatisfaction among the ranks of Naga leaders and they accused the delegates of not handling the issues in the best way. A 'no-confidence' motion was passed in Tatar Hoho and the Prime Minister Sukhai resigned. Further, there were developments regarding the Federal Army and its ex-General and Defence Minister was assassinated. This event eroded the long worked unity among the Naga tribes and sowed the seeds of tribal feud among the different tribes of Nagaland especially among the Semas and Angamis. The inter-tribal rivalry further widened the gap by incident of kidnaping of President of Federal Government of NAGALAND and one leader called Ramyo by the same group.¹¹

After this incident the Sema group announced formation of new party called Council of Naga People (CNP). They declared that the FGN stood dissolved and they formed new government called Revolutionary Government of Nagaland. The Federal Government denounced the actions

10. Horam, M., Naga Insurgency, 1988, p. 117.

11. Ibid. p. 140

of Revolutionary Government and the general statement between the two parallel governments could only be broken when in 1973 the Revolutionary Scato Swu surrendered unequivocally to the government of India. There was an assassination attempt on Hokishe Sema's (the then Chief Minister of Nagaland) life. While he survived miraculously, his daughter was injured and his two body guards died of injuries. In the wake of this event government of India banned the Federal government of Nagaland, the Naga Federal Army and the Naga National Council. This ban also further added that all the active supporters of these organisations insurgent activities were liable to arrest and prosecution.¹²

After the surrender of the splinter Revolutionary group and escalated security operations which intercepted the undergrounds' teams who were returning home after a training in Chinese soil it seemed that the insurgency in Nagaland was petering out simultaneously over ground the political and constitutional crises deepened due to floor crossings. Subsequently President's rule was clamped. But the final blow to the movement came into the form of declaration of National Emergency in mid 1975. After the Emergency was declared the security forces were given full autonomy in dealing with the insurgents. This hastened

12. Ibid. p. 162.

the pace of 'unconditional' surrenders by Naga undergrounds during Shillong Accord in 1975. The whole state was in a state of politico-military convulsion during 1973-75. Once again in 1974 the Church took the leadership to initiative to peace in the Naga Hills. Through their effort Naga Peace Council was constituted.

The 1974 Nagaland Peace Council was markedly different from the previous 1964 Peace Mission in the way that it was less ebullient, less publicised and a more experienced body. But now the government of India had learnt many bitter lessons from its past mistakes and was not going to accept any preconditions for talks. On the other hand the underground question has been imposed by the political changes in Kashmir and Sikkim both of which had decided to remain within Indian Union. The attitude of the underground leaders were also mellowed down and the time was ripe for a political settlement.¹³

The final product of the peace talks between the Naga undergrounds led by Phizo's brother Kevi Yallya and the government of India was the signing of Peace Accord on November 11, 1975. But the question is what factors led the undergrounds to surrender unconditionally ? Following are the reasons:

13. Ibid. p. 177.

- a) Ever since 1973 Nagas were a divided house.
- b) They were pressured from all sides especially by the Government of India either to choose the settlement or face the consequences.
- c) A section of Nagas led by NNO party were opposed to the violent movement of Naga undergrounds and they hampered their activities immensely.
- d) The Chinese verbal support to the Naga rebels was not substantial. They provided military training and arms but they denied physical assistance.¹⁴

The impact of Shillong accord on the Naga problem has been mixed one. While it might have marked the beginning of an era of peace and progress in Nagaland as the undergrounds came overground and surrendered their arms but at the same time problem could not be solved wholly, as the Nagas, who were gone outside the country for training and arms, remained hostile to Indian even after repeated official appeals by government of India to them to surrender and play their part in the development and progress of the state.

These elements criticised the Accord and finally in 1980 formed a new organisation called National Socialist Council of Nagaland under the leadership of

14. Ibid. p. 179.

Muivah and Issac. Their aim is to liberate Nagaland from India and establish socialism there. Since then they have been an insurgent force in the state to reckon with and have been carrying armed ambushes against military and government targets.

Thus the Peace Accord in Nagaland could bring only partial success. The Accord did throw curtain on the first part of Naga nationalist insurgency but the aftermath has been marked by yet another era of 'degeneration' of terrorism involving the control of drug routes, further divides in the rank of underground activists. And above be all the appearance of inter tribal rivalry mainly among Kukis and Nagas and bloody clashes between them.

These developments after the signing of accords clearly points out at certain things. First of all it indicates very evidently the decreasing unity among the different tribes of Nagas and the inter-tribal mutual faith and friendship, which was so emphasised and worked during the first phase of insurgency. The seeds of these rivalry can be traced back in modern Naga politics.

CHAPTER III

KUKI-GANA, INTERTRIBAL CONFLICT AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

In the last chapter it has been discussed how 'Naga nationalism' has been conceptualised after India got independence and how the separatist tendencies manifested in a formidable underground movement dominated the political scenario of Nagaland till the Shillong Accord (1975) came into existence. But unfortunately the Accord could not settle the issue once and for all. The underground movement gain raised its head after the formation of Nationalist socialist council Nagaland (NSCN) under the leadership of Muivah in 1980. This underground organisation suffered many factional splits but even today the Munivah faction is the most strong and calls shots in the hills of Nagaland. Every underground organisation gravitates around NSCN. But what is the main theme of this chapter is which deals with the most bloody tribal imbroglio of the North Eastern India - the Kuki - Naga conflict. This inter-tribal conflict adds a new angle to the problem of separatist violence in the region and distinguishes it from the problem of terrorism and in surgency in the other parts of India e.g. Punjab and Kashmir where terrorism has different features. Only tentative parallels can be drawn the case of some of the African nationalist struggle (e.g. Algeria) where tribal

solidarity has witnessed an acidic fragmentation when the movement entered a mature phase. The clash of leadership ego and patched up differences regarding the identities have surfaced making the question of united front more knotty and next to impossible.

But the conflict between Kukis and Nagas has not been generated overnight. It certainly has socio-cultural, historical political and immediate cause and it certainly bears impact on the nature of violence by the separatist movement of national liberation movement in Nagaland by Pro-Beijing NSCN (M) and the militant Kuki organisations.

The socio-cultural genesis of rivalry between these two tribes takes us to the process of identity articulation in Naga Hills area and the pitched identity of Kukis and Nagas.

IDENTITY ARTICULATION IN NAGA HILLS AREAS

As early as in 1942 Reid wrote that "(in Naga Hills) both place names and names of tribes are exceedingly confusing throughout the older writings" Lt. Vincent stated that the people called by us 'Angamee Nagas' were totally ignorant of the signification of the term and he learnt that this was a term given by the

Catchers to all independent Nagas signifying their language, "unconquered". This is repeated in 1873 by captain Butler in the long tract regarding the Naga tribes which is quoted in Mackenzie's book. Similarly the phrase 'Hatiguria' was for long used as a synonym for 'AO' though it was certainly known as early as 1886 that the latter was more correct. Very frequently a tribe applies to itself the word meaning 'man' - with the implication that the members of that tribe only are the real men in the world. Thus the 'Lhota' call themselves 'Kyon', the name 'Lhota' being apparently that applied to them by the Assamese".

The same process went on at the southern - end of Naga Hills areas. Reid mentions "western Angami names were soon brought into use, the often misspelt and for long western Angami names were used for Eastern Angamis and Kacha Naga linkages. In fact in the whole belt of western and southern Nagaland the identity question has been exceedingly problematic. Inclusion of small Naga tribes like Pochury, Chakhri and Khezha into wider tribal constellations is a case in point. The Pochurys were interestingly, called interchangeably as 'Eastern Rngmas' or 'Sangtams'. The Chakhri and Khezha were called by the British as Eastern Angamis while today they have become Chakhesang. Chakhesang, infact, is an acronym

formed by the letters derived from the tribal names of Chakhri, Khezha and Sangtam and therefore Chakhesang acquires a territorial framework rather than an ethnic framework. Phek district of Nagaland is home Chakhesang tribe.¹

EMERGENT NAGA IDENTITY IN MANIPUR

As mentioned by Kabui (1985) "the Anal is Originally an old Kuki tribe, but during the past two decades the Anals have started to align themselves with the Nagas". The Naga and Kuki systems have been oscillating from one end to another for quite some time, but ultimately the Kuki identity is being submerged into Naga constellation of tribes. This is the point where the problem of identity germinates and when articulated politically the process creates a fear of absorption in the minds of the people and people tend to organise themselves to reassert their identities.²

THE KUKI IDENTITY VIS-A-VIS NAGA IDENTITY

But apart from this process of identity submergence of Kukis into Nagas, one must agree that at certain institutional and structural levels the Kuki and

1. Das, N.K. 'Ethnic Identity, Ethnicity and Social Stratification in N.E. India, 1989, pp. 209-10.

2. Ibid. p. 211.

Naga societies differ from each other. Generally most of the Naga groups don't have hereditary chiefs, while the Kukis have; the Nagas, in most of the cases, have the communal pattern of land ownership, while the Kukis, in most of the cases have the individualistic pattern of land ownership. Attempts have been made, in recent years by the scholars to describe this aspect of tribal dynamism.³

A local scholar (Gangte, 1984), has tried to make a proper classification of Naga and Kuki groups of tribes. It is well known fact that proper categorization of all small Kuki class and groups had created problems because of their migratory habits. Emergence of Lushais as a distinct group of tribe had further created problems in the context of formation of Kuki identity. This is more particularly because of historical ethnic combination of the Lushai Kuki class. Shakespear in his famous book the Lushai Kuki class, divided the people in five categories.

- 1) Class included in the term Lushai
- 2) Class which are influenced by the term Lushai
- 3) The old Kuki class, such as Amol, Anal, Chawte, Chiru, Kother, Vaiphee, Khaw Thlang and Khawachhat.
- 4) The Thado (Thadou class)
- 5) The Lakher or Mara class.

3. Ibid. pp. 210-11.

Besides the above Kuki Lushai - Lalcher constellation the Naga ethnic element has also always been very significant thus, Brown opened that since the Chirus were similar to the Kabui Naga in manner and dress, they "..... found connecting link between the southern tribes (Kukis) and the toupees (Kabeus)" Mcculloch and Hodson also treated the chirus as a link between the Kukis and Nagas while at the same time categorized them as one of the Kuki tribes.

Thus we find that there has always been a problem of proper recognition of nature ethnic categories particularly in case of Kuki groups of people.

The Nagas with bigger and more clear-cut corporate social groups than the Kukis have always occupied well defined areas and are not scattered like the Kukis. The Kukis had been historically moving from one place to another all over hill areas, "mingling with the Nagas in the Naga preponderant areas" (Gangte). In further development, while a group of Kuki tribes stunchy pleaded for adherence to the conventional nomenclature 'Kuki', despite its complete deletion from the list of recognized tribes in the Manipur, for a common identity of all the Kuki tribes. Another group propounded the chin theory with a policy to create a Chinland for all the ethnic groups of the Kuki tribes on the plea that the term

was being used in Burma for the same groups of people who were known as Kuki in India. A third groups advocated 'Mizo' as the most accepted appellation with an argument that the nomenclature "Kuki was absolute" several common terms have since been coined to bring all "Kuki and allied tribes" together under single frameworks, such as from chin Kuki Mozo and Chikim.

One scholar feels that the great awakening among the Tangkhuls for a Naga identity aroused the spontaneous response from their tribes to accept the term 'Naga' as their common entity. Among all the Kuki clans, the Thadou (living in the North East and west in Manipur) have been greatly influenced by the Nagas. In view of Gangte (the Thadou are "the exponents for continuance of the term 'Kuki' as a common identity". The Hmars and Paites are found in the south. According to Gangte ("the smaller tribal groups like the Gangte, the Simte, the varphei, the zon etc. are being sandwiched in between the Thadous and their cognates on the one hand and the Hmars and the Paites, on the other. Thus we see that these Groups on either side of them are therefore, non averted to adopting any of the nomenclature for a common identity provided such adoption gives all the groups a sense of solidarity and unity.⁴

4. Ibid. pp. 212-14.

It is curious to note that the problem of identity and the resultant hostility and conflict is the anti-thesis of this process. But this is not unusual in the sense that modernisation has two pronged impact on the patterns of tribal interactions. They might be pushed towards an ethnic fusion at the same time it might leads to further fragmentation under the impact of politicisation and creation of vested interests as happened in the case of Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda and Burundi.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT

The basis of the rivalry between Kukis and Nagas can be traced to the history of invasion of Naga areas by the British imperialist forces in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Recorded history shows that Kukis were a wandering tribe and were first heard in Manipur between 1830 - 1840. They came from the hills surrounding south Manipur in Burma.

The British requisitioned their services to bring Nagas, who were stately resisting them, under their control. The Kukis were armed and supplied with rations and let loose in Naga areas by colonel McClloch in what he called "policy of planting Kuki settlements in the exposed

frontiers". In time, Kukis who settled in Naga areas were accepted as neighbours.⁵

Meanwhile, the British in their attempt to give some semblance of legitimacy laid down boundary lines between Manipur and Naga territories. After the British left they gave about one third of Naga territory to the Burmese and another two thirds to India. These boundary lines were inherited by the Indian government. Thus one can see how under the general policy of 'Divide and Rule' British pitched one community against another to maintain its control. However, in recent history Kuki tribes has been slowly and gradually moving towards assimilation, the germs of divide sowed by British raised its head again, and this time in a more ugly and barbaric way.⁶

POLITICAL FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR SHARPENING THE DISTINCTNESS OF IDENTITY OF VARIOUS TRIBES

The political development after the independence has been such that in some way or other sharpened separate identities of different tribes for political gains. And even in some indirect way it has created inter-tribal problems.

5. Samchon, N., 'Nagas under attack', The Pioneer 31 Oct. 1993.

6. Ibid.

It is argued by some scholars that special provisions to tribals have inordinately accentuated the growth of a sort of communal consciousness. Thus, to quote N.K. Bose Tribal communities formerly tried to better identification with the Hindus or with the ruling class through westernisation and Christianity. Now power can be derived by political organisation into parties. There is truth in Bose's observation particularly in the context of North East electoral Politics has significantly given rise to inter-group conflicts in the North East it is also affecting the democratic values and traditions of the tribals. In the formation of Kuki Nationalist Assembly, a political party representing the Kukis, the Thadous have a greater control and the growing conflict between the Thandous and other smaller Kuki tribes like Kom and Koirang is more than apparent. Certainly tribalism and ethnicity have become more pronounced as result of adult suffrage in most tribal areas. It has shattered the very foundation of Naga customs, and created divisions and sowed the seeds of disunity in terms of inter-tribal rivalry as well as intra tribal schisms.⁷

IMMEDIATE FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR KUKI - NAGA TANGLE

It is true that the Kuki-Naga tangle has a long history. When the erstwhile Naga hills district of Assam

7. Das, N.K., 'Ethnic Identity, Ethnicity and Social Stratification in N.E. India, 1989, pp. 213-15.

became a state of the union of India in 1963, some of the Kuki leaders also aspired for a Kukiland. The demand for the creation of Kuki homeland comprising of the districts of Chura Chandrapur, Chandel, Senapati, Ukhrul and some parts of Nagaland and Assam and some parts of Mynamar have been presented to government of India under various forums such as 'Kuki Refugee Settlement' 'Creation of New Districts - Sadar Hills' etc. It is worth noting that the Kuki militant organisations, namely, the Kuki National Army (KNA), (KNO) and Kuki National Front (KNF) have often laid their emphatic claim on these areas. But this contention has been opposed by the Nagas both in Nagaland and Manipur in general, more particularly by the NSCN (M). The present crisis is between NSCN(M) and the Kuki's.⁸

The current escalation of violence in this area had its roots in what had happened in march in May 1992, when some of the Kuki militants asked the Nagas to vacate Moreh town forthwith. It should be noted that the Kukis are in majority in Moreh, a small town near the Burmese border. Moreh thrives mainly on smuggling activities. One estimate says that about six kilo grams of heroine is smuggled out of Moreh and into this region. Nearly half of it is consumed all over the region and the balance is

8. Thomas, C. Joshua, 'Kuki-Naga Tangle', Mainstream, 12 Feb. 1994, pp. 17-18.

smuggled into the rest of India and even to other countries.⁹

The other factor is the issue of extortion. The Kukis claim that the violence in Moreh started after the Kukis refused to pay 'Loyalty tax' to the NSCN, the latter started harassing the former etc. But whatever may be the reason the fact is clear that both of them wanted to maintain de facto rule in Moreh for three basic reasons:

- a) to get control over monetary support from smugglers,
- b) to get their arms and ammunition from outside the country, and
- c) to have easy access of crossing over to Mynamar and South East Asia.

THE IMPACT OF THIS TANGLE ON THE NATURE OF VIOLENCE AND POLITICS

From its inception the Naga 'Nationalist struggle' has been espousing the case of tribal solidarity. And it has been successful in providing an ideological omnibus of tribal unity where different smaller tribes can identify themselves with this greater constellation. The main purpose of NNO was to bring about tribal solidarity and bring an end to the head hunting tradition.¹⁰

9. Ibid. pp. 17-18.

10. Mao, Ashikho Daili, 'Nagas Problems and Politics, 1992, pp. 32-36.

Throughout the period of insurgent activities Naga movement has been regarded as 'light house' to other tribal struggles in the areas. The links between the Naga underground ULFA and Bodo militants is well established and the NSCN(M) had supported these movements in terms of training and assistance.

But this process has been reverted and if the development in insurgent and terroristic activities in the region in pre 1992 period and post Mid 1992 period is compared one can gauge a major change in the nature of violence. Earlier the target of attack and ambush was the symbols of State machinery and coercive forces and government property like police, military personnel and railways etc. but now the barrel of gun has been turned to each other groups and also killings of innocent civilians and destruction of property. This internal hostility has fragmented the cherished tribal solidarity as more than 500 civilians has been killed in this intertribal conflict.

This development has also some relevance in terms of response of the state power which can now use legitimised force to annihilate the militants.

The politics of this region has also being affected by this mutual rivalry as a sort of communal

hatred is there deep entrenched. A Naga candidate cannot freely campaign in Kuki dominated areas and vice versa. It has been also noted that out of fear the politicians in this area fund and sympathise the opposite group just for the sake of their survival.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM IN NAGALAND:

General K.V. Krishna Rao in his book 'Prepare or Perish' writes about the general characteristics of Nagaland terrorism and mentions:

(a) NSCN has overtime built up itself to a considerable strength (estimated to about more than 2000) with both Indian and Burmese Nagas.

b) It has been providing training facility and assistance to United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, Mizo National Front (MNF) and ULFA of Assam.

c) Terroristic activities in Nagaland are now generally united to rations and tax collections, looting of banks recruitment of personnel and odd elimination of selected personnel.

d) Inter tribal feuds, like Nagas attacking Kukis, Konyak attacking Changs and so on.¹¹

11. K.V. Krishna Rao, 'Prepare or Perish', 1991, pp. 259-66.

Apart from these, there are some other facets of terrorism in Nagaland in terms of Kuki-Naga tangle, as follows:

a) In this inter-tribal conflict generally the Kukis are at the receiving end of Naga ethno centrism. Nagas are literally engaged in full blown 'pogroms and ethnic cleansing' against Kukis except in the channel district where the fight is mutual. The number of deaths in last 2 years has been more than 500 and out of these 2/3 are Kukis. More than 1000 houses has been set ablaze and more than 10.000 Kukis are rendered homeless. There is a qualitative degeneration in the nature of violence.¹²

b) Earlier Naga rebels used to aspect women and children while in current conflict they are the worst sufferers.¹³

c) Generally the arms used by NSCN include American gun, Chinese made automatic weapons, AK-47s, G-3 Carbines, M series weapons and handgrenades.¹⁴ Even Kukis are now armed as a Kuki leaders and former power

12. T.H. Tarunkumar, 'Deadly Factions', in Sunday Observer, 11 July, 1993.

13. Tribunes, 27, August 1993.

14. Indian Express, 9 February 1995.

minister in Manipur admitted during an interview that earlier Kukis had only single barrel gun now they also possess sophisticated weapons like AK-47s.¹⁵

d) Generally Assam Rifles has not been involved in arming the Kukis but there has been some reports to the contrary.¹⁶

e) There has been mutual allegation e.g. Muivah the leader of NSCN in an interview told that they (Kukis) want to chase Nagas out of chandel districts Moreh border town and foot hills and centre is backing them.¹⁷

While a Kuki leader says that they (Nagas) have finished us in Ukhrul and Tamelong districts. They want as to pay discriminatory taxes.¹⁸

f) Generally there always has been clamour by all political parties about lifting ban from NSCN this proves that how over ground politics in Nagaland has been influenced by the militants and now for them it is unafford able to antagonise the underground elements.¹⁹

15. Ibid.

16. The Pioneer, 31 August 1992.

17. The Times of India, 16 December 1993.

18. Indian Express, 9 February 1995.

19. The Times of India, 12 February 1993.

CHAPTER IV

ELECTIONS, PARTICIPATION AND CENTRE'S ROLE IN THE STATE POLITICS OF NAGALAND

The importance of the Nagaland elections does not lie in the victory or defeat of particular parties and the success and failure of individual leaders. To understand the political dynamics and its implications in the insurgency torw state of Nagaland one has to go back to the history of Naga political development with particular reference to the general elections since independence. The success of India's or more specifically centre's policy towards Nagas can only then be realised and appreciated.

On May 16, 1951 Mr. A.Z. Phizo held a referendum asking the Nagas to choose between independence and being a part of India. The referendum was held in an atmosphere of intense anti-India propoganda, including injecting fear that the new government will interfere with their property and religion. His plebiscite was a great success. Every single Naga believed that the new government would destroy his ancient way of life and ownership of land.

The Nagas of 1950s gained his impression of India from what he saw happening in the Assam valleys. This life was repugnant for them. No national leader incited

the Naga areas. The freedom movement bypassed the tribal areas of North east India.

1952 and 1957 ELECTIONS

Naga Hills which was a district of Assam had three seats in Assam Assembly. During the first general elections government made all the arrangements but there was a complete boycott of Assembly as well as Parliamentary elections. No body voted and nobody contested. It was an unprecedented situation. The changes in the electoral scenario of Nagaland have to be studied in this background.

During 1957 elections only 3 Nagas from different dominant tribes fielded nominations and they were elected unopposed. Indications were still there that the general political mood of Nagas were opposed to the idea of giving the political and electoral process.¹

The courage and desire to join the national mainstream through democratic political channels shown by the three leaders during the 1957 general elections attracted Nagas towards political progress and participation Mr. Satuso, the moderate leader among the

1. Ramunny, Murkot 'Meaning of Nagaland Elections', the Hindu 11 February 1989.

three elected in 1957 general elections, organised Naga People's Convention and accepted Nehru's two conditions namely renouncing violence and giving up the demand for independence . In 1957 Naga Hills and Tuen sang area was taken out of Assam and in its place it was made a centrally administered territory. Thus there were semblance of change in the Naga political attitude towards elections. But soon the militancy which was opposed to the idea of political participation of people in the Parliamentary and Assembly elections took the toll and within one year Satsuo was shot dead allegedly by Phizo's followers.

The Naga People's convention asked for statehood to Nagaland in 1959. This was readily accepted by Nehru. Nehru asked the leaders whether the elections could be held on traditional lines of Naga pattern of authority. Village administration varied from village to village and tribe to tribe from the most democratic system of Angamis to the importance of some families in the Ao area, to the chiefship of Konyaks. But whenever leaders had to be elected it was done by consensus.²

There were no parties no majority and minority opinion. The men of whole village sat and discussed

2. Ibid.

openly and finally the leader was chosen by consensus. Everyone accepted the leader whether they apposed him earlier or not. Nehru's suggestion was not accepted by the leaders. However an interim body of 45 members was elected by their traditional system. All the tribes were represented and they elected five Executive Councilors of whom one was elected the Chief Executive Councilor and other chairman of the interim Body. They functioned as an Assembly and Council of Ministers. Within a year Chairman of the Interim body Dr. Imkongliba AO, was shot dead by the insurgents. Though the underground elements could not prevent the formation of the Interim body they registered their violent opposition through the murder of the Chairman.

ELECTION MACHINERY

In February 1962, in the wake of granting Nagaland statehood, a separate election machinery was erected, there were two political parties, Naga Nationalist party and Naga Democratic Party. Adult franchise and voting by ballot papers were adopted for the first time in February 1964.

MASSIVE PARTICIPATION

If seen from the point of participation of people in the electoral process, there has been a tremendous

change in the attitude of the people of Nagaland since the days of Plebiscite and boycott of elections. The percentage of vote polled was 76.57. Ninety two people filed nominations for 40 constituencies. After rejections and withdrawal only 73 remained in the fray. The Nagaland Nationalist party won 34 seats and the democratic party 14. All the six indirectly elected members of the Tuensang area joined the Nationalist party.

The underground elements tried to disrupt the elections occasionally. The sound of the guntire was heard in the neighbourhood of the villages where the polling was taking place. But that did not deter the people from participating in a massive way. And underground was by no means a defeated force. They kept their strikes on.³

1961 ELECTIONS

These elections were conducted during the period of cessation of operations. The elections were held in February 1969 and fought by ruling Naga National Organisation (NNO) and the opposition which changed its name to United Front of Nagaland (UFN). The polling percentage was 78.75 a record for any state at that time.

3. Ibid.

There were some special features. For the first time two women were in the fray. One was a niece of Phizo. The NNO won 43 while opposition got 9 seats in an Assembly of 52 members.

A strong ministry under Mr. Hokishe Sema achieved a lot during the period. He was one of those few leaders who had nothing to do with the underground movement directly or indirectly. He refused to compromise with the unity and integrity of the country. He survived at least seven attacks on his life.

Soon the struggle for leadership started between S.C. Jamir (who became Chief Minister of Nagaland later) and Hokishe Sema. The rift finalised in the break up of the party.

The next election was held in 1974. The ruling party under Mr. Hokishe won 23 seats and United Democratic Front (UNF had become UDF) got 25 seats. There were 12 independents. After a lot of horse trading seven joined UDF and five went over to NNO. The UDF first time formed a ministry under Mr. Vizol. The ministry lasted only about one year. Some independent ministers who had joined the UDF deserted it and brought the ministry down. Meanwhile the NNO merged with the I.N. Congress. For the first time a national party came into being in Nagaland.

There were two major implications of 1974 elections. First, a major national party came in the State as one of the competitor for political power, which meant that the subsequent elections were held on national Vs. regional issue. Second, first time money power came to play its role in the horse trading of independent MLAs.

Centre interference increased as after the fall of UDF ministry President's rule was clamped on the state of Nagaland. Centre fully exploited the political instability in the state caused by infightings in the opposition party.

During the long spell of President's rule Shillong Accord 1975 was signed. But a section of insurgents who were outside the country for training did not accept the Accord and formed NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) in 1980. Since then they are engaged in insurgent activities under the leadership of Issac - Muivah - Khaplang.⁴

In the elections after the Shillong Accord the contest was between congress and opposition, which changed its name often. But what is most notable point is that the people's integration in the electoral politics is almost complete and they accept it as a part of their life

4. Ibid.

in Nagaland. Unfortunately, in Nagaland the politics has been plagued by frequent defections as in the rest of India. It was more pronounced in Nagaland because the number of seats were only 60 and any narrow majority exposed the Cabinet to defections. Members were made to defect or stay for consideration. This has been the bone of Nagaland elections. Tribal considerations and political ambition of individuals increased the instability. The Anti-defection law has somewhat arrested the trend.

1977 ELECTIONS

After a long spell of President's rule in the state in November 1977 Nagaland went to polls. This time the contest was between United Democratic Front (UDF) and Nagaland Nationalist Organisation (NNO) UDF secured clear majority by winning 35 out of 60 Assembly seats. This election proved with 80-85% turnout despite Phizo's directives to abstain from polling, that increasingly people meant the path of conciliation. UDF campaigned with the slogan "By faith and not by Arms". The verdict of the people also marked that they favoured stability and progress. One of the notable feature of this elections were that not a single defector was returned by the people.⁵

5. The Times of India, 20 Nov. 1977.

1982 ELECTIONS

In 1982 Assembly elections the fight was between NNDP (Naga National Democratic Party) . And this election for the first time, was marked by lavish campaigns. These campaigns included feasts, wine, liquor, distribution of clothes and thus injected the virus of money power in the electoral politics of Nagaland. Congress and NNDP were evenly matched with winning 24 seats each. However fields were lay open as 12 independents were to be wooed. Certainly, congress with its vast resources and experience of political manipulations throughout the country made forays in the ranks of independents and was able to get an absolute majority in the Assembly.

1987 ELECTIONS

The election of 1987, apart from the increasing money power in the election, can be cited as an event when national political parties, other than congress were also heavily involved in the elections. Bharatiya Janata Party made its debut by fielding two candidates. Leaders of opposition like, Bahuguna, Devilal and N.T. Ramarao campaigned for NNDP. But Congress could return to power, amidst rebel candidates and sabotage by Mr. S.C. Jamir.

One of the major significance of this election can be its importance in the context of national politics. It marked that the Nagaland elections were an indicator for the future poll prospects of national party. As it gave a renewed confidence to the congress which had suffered drubbings in the hands of opposition parties in Kerala, Andhra etc. while it gave temporary setbacks to those leaders of opposition who dreamt of first capturing different states before making a final attack on New Delhi. Thus Nagaland was a battleground for test of strength for the national parties.

DEFECTIONS AND PRESIDENT'S RULE 1988

The jubilations of securing absolute majority in Nagaland could not last long and the Sema government was exposed to a defection made by 13 legislators including 4 ministers, reducing its strength to 21. These defectors formed Nagaland Regional Congress and joined hands with the NNDP and staked their claim to form a government. Instead of embarking on a fact finding exercise which would have established the bonafides of new group's contention the Governor Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao "short circuited" all democratic norms to recommend President's rule.⁶

6. The Hindu, 15 December 1988.

THE POLITICAL QUICKSANDS FROM 1989 TO 1992 IN NAGALAND

Following the January 1989 midterm poll, the congress (I) formed a government with 36 members in a house of 60 under Mr. S.C. Jamir but was brought down by opposition Naga People's Council leader, Mr. K.L. Chisi, who engineered the defection of 12 congress (I) MLAs and formed a government. However Mr. Chisi lasted only 29 days when 15 members walked out and sided with the congress. The resourceful Mr. Jamir was able to settle scores with Mr. Chisi and in a clever move offered Mr. Vamuzo, his staunch critic and political rival, and a close associate of Mr. Chisi, the Chief Ministership. Within six months the NPC congress I coalition was in trouble when 10 NPC and 5 congress (I) members deserted him. However the speaker came to his rescue by disqualifying all of them, thus reducing the strength of the house to 45.⁷

Afterwards on the advice of Chief Minister the governor dissolved the house and asked the Chief Minister to remain as care taker. Feeling 'outraged' at this independent act of the Governor of Nagaland centre reacted in a politically unhealthy manner and clamped the President's rule which has been criticised throughout the

7. The Statesman, 31 March 1992.

country by media and experts on constitution. These criticisms, as follows focuses upon the nature and extent of interference in an insurgency torn state and also contains against the implications of distorting the normal democratic process in a state which need political integration more than anywhere in the country.

Soli J. Sorabjee, the noted jurist and constitutional expert commented - "Imposition of President's rule in Nagaland is yet another addition to the constitutional sins committed in the name of Article 356 of the constitution. The purpose of Article 356 is remedial, to restore constitutional machinery. It is not puritive and certainly not to settle partisan scores with the government of a state run by a political party different from the party at the centre. Power to impose President's rule is meant to be used sparingly as a last resort That was the definite understanding of the founding fathers. That it the unequivocal view of the Sarkaria commission. Consider the position prevailing in the Nagaland before President's rule. The recent budget session of Nagaland went off smoothly..... There was no deadlock or impasse of any kind. However, some legislatures were set on indulging in toppling game and there by impact instability to the government. The Chief Minister, Mr. Vamuzo, advised the governor to dissolve

the ministry with a view to seeking fresh mandate from the people of the state. The governor accepted the advice, as he was bound to, dissolved the house and requested the Chief Minister to continue as caretaker government till further orders.

The centre was taken unawares, resented the action and has apparently retaliated by imposing President's rule on the people of Nagaland.

But surely there must be some ground for the drastic action ? None appears or is set out in the Presidential proclamation which merely recites inter alia that "after considering the information received the President is satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the government of Nagaland cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution"

Invariably President's rule has been imposed on the basis of the Governor's report In the present case there is no report by the Governor. The 'sole' basis of the present action is 'information received'. What is this information ? What is its gist ? Surely it is incumbent upon the Union Government to indicate in the proclamation the substance of the information on the basis of which the present drastic action has been taken, particularly in the absence of the Governor's report.

If the proclamation chooses to exhibit the inscrutable face of the 'sphinx' and does not give any clue or indication of the so called 'information', it must suffer the consequences of its invalidation.

True, there were internal disputes and factionalism within the ruling party but, as rightly observed by the parkario commission "the use of this power to sort out the internal differences or the problems of ruling party would not be constitutionally correct". What is overlooked by the centre is that President's rule is an invasion of the federal principle. The power must be exercised on the ground which are substantial and undisputable and which have a real nexus with the underlying objective of Article 356".⁸

The centre's move to impose President's rule on Nagaland was criticised by another noted expert, A.G. Noorani who opined "The imposition of President's rule on Nagaland on April 2, was certainly not due to breakdown of constitutional government in the state. But it does mark a breakdown of all the checks devised in the constitution against the centre" abuse of a draconian power which is unknown to any federal democracy.

8. Sorabjee, Soli J., 'Insufficient grounds for President's rule', The Times of India, April 4, 1992.

The action is fraught with grave consequences, Nagaland is a border state with a long record of protracted insurgency. But, what an example to demonstrate to the militants in Punjab and Kashmir. The strongest plea we can make to them is that Indian federalism is genuine enough to satisfy their legitimate aspirations. Moreover, the constitution stands as a whole. If the limitations it provides for the preservation of federalism will be so lightly set at naught, those it lays down for the preservation of democracy are also imperilled.

What needs to be emphasised is that while there have undoubtedly been outrageous instances of imposition of President's rule for partisan rules in the past the one in Nagaland is unique and by far the most damaging to the federal structure....."⁹

These were the views of some of the experts on constitution. All of them unequivocally abhorred the action and cautioned against its consequences.

MEDIA REACTS

Apart from these individuals media, the fourth pillar of democracy also discredited the centre's

9. Noorani, A.G., 'President's rule Nagaland step unconstitutional', The Statesman, New Delhi, April 11, 1992.

imposition of President's rule by declaring it outrageous. Following are the gist of the reporting in some of the leading dailies of the country. 'The Hindu' carried editorial with the title 'An Arbitrary Move' and upholding the Governor decision it raised question how the President's rule is going to be better than the caretaker government till the elections are held.

"Indian Express" called the action "petty and partisan" and maintained that transparency and logic are bound to be casualties in the case of this act which was petty and vindictive and tailored to serve the congress's partisan ends".¹⁰ The newspaper also demanded that Mr. Thomas be neither transferred or removed from the office before the elections to the Assembly and latter are held without delay. Otherwise the credibility of the constitutional government will be further undermined in the North-East, where insurgency has yet to lose its appeal.

'The Pioneer' carried editorial with the title 'Centre Sins Against Nagaland'. It lamented that no longer is a governor's report - so far considered a sine qua-non-required for New Delhi to violate the federal principle and assume remote control over a state.¹¹

10. Indian Express, 6 April 1992.

11. The Pioneer, 1 April, 1992.

The Times of India called it a 'Partisan Act' and challenged the grounds of 'fluid' party position on which Mr. Jacob said that the President's rule was resorted to. If such fluidity is to be made the criteria some of the congress ruled states 'should be first to suffer'.¹²

The only reason to cite the gist of media reports is to drive home the fact that how grossly, centre has been erring in a state where the need is of political and socio-economic integration of the people. This is in no way going to solve the problems of Nagaland. These distortions of constitutional structures and democratic process by flouting all the norms of political ethics can lead to nowhere but will swing the support of the people in the favour of the militants who will try to take the fullest possible benefits of this sort of situations.

LINKAGES BETWEEN UNDER GROUND AND OVERGROUND POLITICS

There has been always, at least a tenuous link between the overground and underground politics of Nagaland. As discussed in the chapter earlier the whole electoral politics of the state has been evolved under the shadow of the gun. There have been many instances where

12. The Times of India, 6 April, 1992.

the earlier undergrounds have joined the overground or mainstream politics when they are pushed to the wall. Most of the politicians of Nagaland had at sometime any connection with the insurgents. In this atmosphere it will not be an out and out exaggeration if one remarks that many of the politicians covertly sympathise with the underground elements.

There have been, always, a tendency among the political leaders of the states of India which have witnessed the parallel development of electoral politics and political violence in any form, to provide tasty support to the militancy. Because it provides them with more bargaining power with the centre. A sort of vested interest has been created and if the militancy has to be wiped out of the state a new generation of politicians is also needed, strong willed, who want to end the era of bloody politics in Nagaland.

The worst sufferer has been the developmental process, which has been lagging in the state amid such developments, which will cause serious strains to society and polity of Nagaland in future and its integration with the rest of India.

CONCLUSION

During the discussions in the earlier chapters, the inferences derived can be put into three schemes: (a) what is the general context of terrorism in Nagaland? What are its uniquenesses? what are its strengths and weaknesses? (b) what is the future of Nagaland terrorism both on conceptual level as well as empirical level? (c) what are possible desired interventions which can bring peace in the state as well as in the entire region of North Eastern India?

As discussed in the previous chapters Nagaland and rather whole of North Eastern India had been loosely administered territory during the British period. They did everything to keep it aloof from the rest of India e.g. through 'Inner line policy of 1873', and several other measures. India's struggle for freedom bypassed Nagaland, which otherwise would have resulted in the proper political integration of the region with the rest of India. Even at the time of independence British rulers and some missionaries (allegedly) created a fear psychosis in the minds of freedom loving Naga about their future in India ruled by plainmen. This fear psychosis has been exploited by the then emerging middle class who in terms of identity, conceptualised 'Naga Nationalism'. And when

Phizo took the commanding position in the movement it went the militant way, which finally culminated into a full bloomed underground movement. This movement saw many ups and downs but even after the Shillong Accord 1975, some elements who opposed it, finally formed the National Socialist Council for Nagaland (NSCN). Through the formation of this organisation the second phase of underground movement started in Nagaland. For almost 12 years it continued its fight against the Indian state during which it also witnessed several ups and downs including intra organisation fictionalization and splits in the organisation. Their mutual fightings only in mid 1992 the fight has taken in its orbit the inter tribal rivalry. The factors responsible for it has been discussed in chapter III.

Meanwhile the democratic process of elections has taken its firm roots in the state albeit the mindless interventions from the centre and the inept political parties have recently facilitated the erosion of institutions in the state. And today tribalism and money power rules the politics of Nagaland which is not a healthy sign especially for a troubled state like Nagaland. Besides the specter of terrorism has always been shadowing the politics of Nagaland. This is the general context of terrorism in Nagaland.

Apart from this the separatist terrorism in Nagaland has more recently acquired some unique feature which can be distinguished from the earlier phase of underground movement. This time it is entangled with the narco underworld of 'Golden triangle', inter tribal conflict between Kukis and Nagas, killing of innocent civilians, support from ISI via Bangladesh. However the latter can be true in the case of Kashmir also but it certainly distinguishes it from the first phase of Naga underground movement. It is also distinguished on the basis of ideology as it unlike the first phase swears by the name of Mao and is 'Pro Beijing'.

Despite the might of Indian security forces the terroristic activities of NSCN(M) has been surviving which speaks of its strengths. Following can be cited as factors favourable for terrorism in Nagaland:

a) the mountaneous and hilly terrains of the region about which the undergrounds are well acquainted and have a comparative advantage over the security forces.

b) Nagaland being a border state also is in many ways favourable to terrorism as it makes the infiltration after training in Burmese bases of Kachin guerrillas. It is convenient for the agencies like ISI (Pakistan) and countries like China to supply arms and aid

through the border. Besides, the militants also have control over drug smuggling which is rich source of finances.

c) Last but not the least is internal support in terms of finances, forced 'Loyalty taxes' from non-Naga population and the covert and overt support of politicians who either support the NSCN out of their vested interests or out of fear.

d) its connections with other insurgent and terrorist groups of the region like ULFA and Bodo security force.

e) its reputation as most professional guerrilla fighters of the region with most sophisticated arms.

If abovementioned facts are favourable for terrorism in Nagaland the weaknesses are as follows:

- i) rampant fictionalization
- ii) internal splits in the groups
- iii) inter tribal imbroglio
- iv) the increasing pressure of Burmese army on Kachin rebels which mean the NSCN will loose bases of training and constant supply of arms.
- v) India's improving relations with China.
- vi) the growing public inconvenience which might lead to the demand for stringent counter terrorist campaigns.

Regarding the future of Naga terrorism as it has been discussed in chapter I, that it is most effective when (1) the theatre of action is a society which is already disrupted by economic crisis or war.

(2) the activists are supported by fellow members of some ethnic, religious or national group.

(3) the activists aim is to destabilise the regime in power or opposition.

(4) when the opponents lack the finances and the will power and the political strength to conduct an effective counter terrorist campaign.

In case of Nagaland only second and third conditions exist. Again as cited in the case of PLO and Algerian terrorism it is most effective when a broad based coalition army waits in the wing while the terrorist play their game. In case of Nagaland even this condition is lacking. Apart from these factors the Israel -PLO Accord, the end of IRA terrorism suggest that there can be solution the problem of terrorism when enough bloodshed has occurred and people are against the terrorist campaign.

Even the conceptual and empirical literature related to liberal democracy and its responses to terrorism

suggest that terrorism has no future in the long run however for a while (this can be some years also) it can destabilise the regimes.

The problem of entire North East in general and Nagaland in particular needs to be addressed in a new context. It is to be conceptualised in the form of psycho-social integration apart from military, political and economic packages.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Abbi, B.L. (ed), "N E: Region: Problems and Prospects of Development", Chandigarh, 1984.
- Alemchiba, M., "A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland", Kohima, 1970.
- Allen, B.C., "Naga Hills and Manipur", New Delhi, 19980.
- Anand, V.K., "Nagaland in Transition", New Delhi, 1967.
- Anand, V.K., "Conflict in Nagaland", New Delhi, 1980.
- Aram, M., "Peace in Nagaland", New Delhi, 1974.
- Barpujari, H.K., "Problem of Hill Tribes", N.E. Frontier, 1843-74.
- Bhat, S., "The Challenge of North east", Bombay, 1975.
- Brass, Paul, (ed), "Ethnicity and Nationalism Theories and Comparison", London, 1991.
- Campbell, A., "The Siege from Kohima", London, 1956.
- Chakravarty, B.C., "British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam since 1858", Calcutta, 1964.
- Chaube, S., "Hill Politics in North East India", Calcutta, 1973.
- Das Gupta, P., "Common Perspective for North East India", Calcutta, 1967.
- Elwin, V. "The Nagas in the 19th Century", Bombay, 1969.
- Gavin - Young, "The Nagas - An Unknown War", London, 1962.
- Ghosh, B.B., "History of Nagaland", New Delhi, 1982.
- Ghosh, S.K. & Chopra, P., "Echoes from the North East India", New Delhi, 1982.
- Glazer, Nathan and Daniel A. Moynihan, "Beyond the Melting-Pot", Cambridge, 1963.

- Gundevia, Y.O., War and Peace in Nagaland, Delhi, 1964.
- Horam, M., "Naga Insurgency" New Delhi, 1988.
- Hunter, W.W., "Statistical Account of Assam", Vol. 2, London, 1921.
- Hutton, J.H., "The Aagami Nagas", London, 1921.
- Laskhmi Devi, "Ahom - Tribal Relations", Gauhati, 1968.
- Luithui, L. and Haksar, N., "Nagaland File: A Question of Human Rights", 1990.
- Luthra, P.N., "Nagaland from a District to State", Shillong, 1974.
- Mao, Ashikho Daili, "Nagas: Problems and Politics", New Delhi, 1992.
- McCulloch, W., "Account of the Valley of Manipore and the Hill Tribes", Calcutta, 1859.
- Majumdar, S.N. "AO - Nagas", Calcutta, 1925.
- Mankekar, D.R., "On the Slippery Slope in Nagaland", Bombay, 1969.
- Mitra, R and Dasgupta, B. (ed), "A Common Perspective for N.E. India", Calcutta, 1981.
- Phadnis, Urmilla, "Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia", New Delhi, 1990.
- Phizo, A.Z., "The Fate of the Naga People, An Appeal to the World", London, 1960.
- Rammuni, M., "The World of Nagas", New Delhi, 1988.
- Rao, General K.V. Krishna, "Prepare or Perish", New Delhi, 1991.
- Rao, V.V., "A Century of the Tribal Politics of North East Frontier", Delhi, 1976.
- Reid, Robert Sir, "History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941", Delhi, 1983.
- Roy, David, "The Frontier of North East India", Shillong, 1947.

- Rustomji, N., - "Enchanted Frontiers", London, 1971.
 - "Imperilled Frontiers", London, 1983.
- Sareen, H.K., "Insurgency in N.E.", New Delhi, 1980.
- Sareen, V.I.K., "India N.E. in Flames", New Delhi 1980.
- Scott, Michael, "Nagas Problem: India's or World", London, 1967.
- Sema, H., "Emergence of Nagaland Socio-economic and Political Transformation and Future", Delhi, 1988.
- Shakespeare, W.L., "History of Upper Assam and North East Frontier", London, 1914.
- Shukla, B.P., "What Ails India's N.E. ?", Delhi, 1980.
- Singh, C., "Political Evolution of Nagaland", New Delhi, 1982.
- Singh, K.S., "Tribal Movements in India", Vol. I & II, New Delhi, 1982.
- Singh, Prakash, "Nagaland", Delhi, 1972.
- Stracey, P.D., "Nagaland Nightmare", Bombay 1968.
- Swinson, Arthur, "Kohima", London, 1966.
- Yaden, L.L., "Nagaland", Kohima, 1970.
- Yonuo, Assoso, "The Rising Nagas", Delhi, 1974.
- Yogendra Singh, "Indian Sociology", Delhi, 1986.

ARTICLES

- Ahmed (Imran), Political Violence and Developing Nations Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 12(2), Winter 88, pp. 16-37.
- Balgopal, K., In Defence of India Supreme Court and Terrorism, EPW, Bombay, 29(32), 6 August 1994, pp. 2054-59.
- Chakravorti (Robi), Terrorism - Past Present and Future, EPW, Bombay, 29(36), 3 Sept. 1994, pp. 2340-43.
- Chopra, (Surendra), Terrorism: The Apex of violence, India Quarterly, New Delhi, 47(4), October-December 1991, pp. 83-96.
- GIBBS (Jack P), Conceptualisation of Terrorism, American Sociological Review, 59(3), June 1989, pp. 329-40.
- Goldberg (Joseph E), Understanding the Dimensions of Terrorism, Perspectives on Political Science, Washington D.C., 20(2), Spring 1991.
- Major Rajiv (Kumar), Combating Terrorism in India, World Affairs, Wellington, (3) December 1991, pp. 75-83.
- Nandy (Ashis), Terrorism: Indian Style Seminar (401) Annual, January 1993, pp. 35-41.
- Noorani (A.G.), Terrorism and Human Rights, Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, 25(36), 28 July 1990, pp. 1621-22.
- Padia, (Chandrakala), Terrorism: An Analysis, Indian Journal of Political Science, Guntur, 49(3), July - September 1988, pp. 351-55.
- Politics of Terror Comparative Studies in Society and History, Cambridge, England 32(2), April 1990, pp. 201-81.
- Ramchandra (G.P.), Understanding Terrorism, Asian Studies, Massachusetts, 5(1), January-March 87, pp. 25-42.
- Ross, Jeffery (Ian), Structural Causes of oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model, Journal of Peace Research, 30(3), August 1993, pp. 317-29.

- Ross (J.I.), Psychological Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards an Integration of Findings, International Journal of Group Tension, New York, 24(2), Summer 1994.
- Sheffer (Gabriel), Ethno National Diasporas & Security, Survival, London, 36(1), Spring 1994, pp. 60-79.
- Singh (L. Randeep), New Dimensions of Terrorism, Strategic Analysis, Delhi, 13(4), July 1990, pp. 35-42.
- Singh (Randhir), Terrorism, State Terrorism and Democratic Rights, Economic and Political Weekly, 27(6), Bombay, 8 February 1992, pp. 279-87.
- Terchman (Jenny), How to Define Terrorism, Philosophy, Cambridge, Great Britain, 64(250), October 19989, pp. 505-18.
- Uberoy (Virinder), Terrorism and Media, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, 14(9), December 1991, pp. 1119-30.

NEWSPAPERS

1. The Times of India, New Delhi.
2. Indian Express, New Delhi.
3. The Pioneer, New Delhi.
4. The Statesman, New Delhi.
5. Tribune, Chandigarh.
6. Hindustan Times, New Delhi.
7. Sunday Observer, New Delhi.
8. Financial Express, New Delhi.
9. The Hindu, Madras.