

**RELIGION AS A DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT
IN PAKISTAN'S INDIA POLICY**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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1995**



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Certified that the dissertation entitled **RELIGION AS A DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT IN PAKISTAN'S INDIA POLICY**, submitted by Mr Dhananjay Kumar in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University and is his own original work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


PROF. V.S. MANI
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SUPERVISOR

**DEDICATED TO THE
VICTIMS OF COMMUNAL AND
SECESSIONIST VIOLENCE**

The devil can cite scripture for his purpose.
An evil soul, producing holy witness,
is like a villain with a smiling cheek
A goodly apple rotten at the heart;
O, what a goodly outside falsehood hath;

[Shakespeare: Merchant of Venice]

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I express my deepest gratitude to all those who have helped and encouraged me in writing this dissertation.

First of all, I am grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Satish Kumar for his constant support, valuable guidance and constructive criticism. It has been an unqualified privilege for me to work under such colossus of an authority on Indo-Pak relations.

I am grateful to Prof. Pushpesh Pant for constantly boosting my confidence.

I am indebted to my classmates — Madhumati, Kaljong Bhutia, Sibapada Rath and Maheshwar Singh for lending valuable support. Vinny Sahay, Rahul Tripathi and Jannula Pravin Kumar of the South Asia Division and Kaushik Roy of the Centre for Historical Studies also came up with important suggestions and other academic inputs. Thanks are also due to my juniors from other centres — Sarfaraz and Birendra Chaudhary for helping me in collection of material for the research work.

I compliment the staffs of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, the IDSA Library, the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library and the British Council Library for their unfailing cooperation. I also thank Mr Shudh Swaroop for wordprocessing the dissertation in a fabulous manner.

JNU, NEW DELHI
JULY 20, 1995

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PREFACE

It is never easy to work on Indo-Pak relations, particularly the place of religion in it. When I decided upon *Religion as a Diplomatic Instrument in Pakistan's India Policy* as the topic for my M.Phil dissertation, the reactions from my friends and batch-mates were varied. Some saw 'motives' in the selection of this particular topic whereas others felt that it would be extremely challenging. Challenging it has been, but once my supervisor Prof. Satish Kumar accepted the topic and I began working on it, I found the exercise to be thoroughly engaging. There are few specific writings on the subject and I had to cull most of the information and ideas from sources dealing with related but different subjects. For writing the first two chapters, I had to go through writings dealing with religion and history and it was an enlightening and satisfying experience.

However, given the constraints of time and resources at the M.Phil level, I feel that nothing short of a Ph.D. thesis could do justice to the present study. Given a chance, I would gladly write my Ph.D. thesis on the same topic.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Amnesty International
APHC	All Party Hurriyat Conference
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BSF	Border Security Force
CBI	Central Bureau of Investigation
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
HB	Hizbul Mujahideen
HUL	Harkat-ul Ansar
ICFM	Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IDSA	Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis
INC	Indian National Congress
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ITBP	Indo-Tibetan Border Police
JII	Jamat-i-Islami
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JNU	Jawaharlal Nehru University
JUI	Jamiatul-ulena-i-Islam
JUP	Jamiatul-ulena-i-Pakistan

LOAC	Line of Actual Control
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NSCN	National Socialist Council of Nagaland
NSG	National Security Guards
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
POT	Public Opinions and Trends
PPP	Pakistan Peoples' Party
RAF	Rapid Action Force
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
RDX	Research and Development Explosive
RR	Rashtriya Rifles
RSS	Rashtriya Swyam-Sewak Sangh
SAPTA	South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization
SGPC	Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Assam
UNO	United Nations Organization
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VHP	Vishwa Hindu Parishad

INTRODUCTION

Since independence, Indo-Pak relations have been dogged with turmoil and conflict even though the two nations have a lot in common. There is no dearth of brilliant studies dealing with various aspects of the Indo-Pak relations but few of them have isolated religion as a diplomatic tool in Pakistan's India policy. Indeed, most of the studies seem to underestimate the importance of religion in the evolution of the Indo-Pak relations. It is my contention that religion has been a major strand in Pakistan's India policy and that consciously or unconsciously Pakistan's policy makers on India have been swayed by religious considerations.

Pakistan is an Islamic state whereas India is secular though widely perceived as 'Hindu' by most of the Pakistanis. The fact that there is a sizeable Muslim population in India in effect negates the very basis of Pakistan's creation as a 'homeland' for the Muslims of the sub-continent and causes an identity crisis in Pakistan, accentuated after the creation of Bangladesh. The identity crisis and the feeling of self-doubt leads Pakistan to seek shelter in the espousal of the concept of the universal Islamic brotherhood [Islamic Ummah], the idea being that all the Muslims of the world irrespective of the place of their residence are bound by a common Islamic culture and ethos

and have common interests. This concept is the basis of Pakistan's mobilization of 'international Islam' against India [described in Chapter IV] which is accused of 'oppressing the Muslims and failing to protect them against fanatic Hindus'. Pakistan's argument got a shot in the arm with the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. For once, Indian secularism described as a facade by Pakistan, got discredited.

Due to various reasons described in detail in Chapter II, India and Pakistan see each other as arch-enemies and biggest foreign policy challenges. In the same Chapter, I have also shown how Pakistan's use of religion as a diplomatic instrument in dealing with India rests upon solid foundations of ideology, domestic compulsions and realpolitics. Thus, Pakistan's [mis]use of religion against India is not at all surprising.

The policy has paid good dividends to Pakistan both in terms of material and diplomatic aid from the other Islamic countries as well as in terms of putting India on the defensive both internally and externally. India has been tormented and weakened considerably over the last fifteen years as a result of Pakistan's diplomacy of religion. The Third Chapter gives a detailed account of the Pakistani

policy 'in action' against India. India is yet to find a suitable answer to the challenge which threatens to break-up India once again along communal lines. The separatist movements supported and funded by Pakistan, continue to bring unfold suffering and strife to the Indian people.

Yet not many Indians seem to understand the implications of Pakistan's attempt to sweep sections of Indian minorities off their feet through a clever use of its propaganda machinery. Also the fact that the strengthening of the concept of international Islamic brotherhood could spell doom for India and that Pakistan has made significant strides towards achieving that goal in recent years has not been analyzed in its proper perspective. Samuel P. Huntington's warning that "the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future"¹ should have been taken more seriously by the Indian scholars and policy makers than has been the case. Without being alarmed, it is always advisable to keep the worst case scenario in mind and plan accordingly. However, it is

1. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, New York, Summer, 1993, p. 22.

unfortunate that many Indians who claim to have 'understood' the Pakistani 'design' end up in violent and knee-jerk reactions against the Muslim community in India. This only serves Pakistan's purpose.

The objective of this study is to dispel the myths and to project a proper picture of this aspect of Pakistan's diplomacy. To an average Indian, the Pakistani 'design' may be 'sinister and unethical' but only a proper understanding and mature response to the challenge can save India and neutralize Pakistan's diplomatic advantage. Religious and ethnic identities have been sharpened in the post Cold War period all over the world and the religious content in the Indo-Pak relations should be located in the wider global context also. Fundamentalism, terrorism and human rights have become major issues of international concern and India and Pakistan would ignore these issues at their own risk.

It is unfortunate that the Indo-Pak rivalry has outlived even the Cold War and at a time when several former Cold War antagonists are building bridges of understanding, cooperation and even unity, India and Pakistan remain trapped in a time-warp. Economy has taken precedence over political disputes the world over as the formation and strengthening of several regional trading blocs would

testify. However, as the dalliance over SAPTA shows India and Pakistan still lack the political will to call quits to mutual hostility. The present study could particularly be both useful and relevant since the existing sad state of affairs between India and Pakistan is all set to continue in the foreseeable future.

Indeed as has been argued in the Second Chapter, India-Pakistan relations have been reduced to zero-sum game, thanks to a host of factors. A two person zero-sum game "is a game of pure opposition. It is strictly competitive. There is no need for communication, discussion or bargaining.... It is completely meaningful to call the participants in such a struggle opponents.... The gains of one are always equal to the losses of another".² In such a situation, as has been discussed in the 'Conclusions' section, the role of diplomacy in improvement of relations becomes limited. Pakistan would not come to the negotiation table for meaningful talks as long as it fancies its 'chances' through the barrel of the gun in Jammu and Kashmir. Although Pakistan has seemingly failed in creating 'Khalistan' as a buffer state between India and Pakistan, it

2. J.C. Johari, Comparative Politics, New Delhi, 1986, p. 152.

is still keeping-up its efforts to balkanize India as is clear from the unstinted support lent by it to the North-Eastern and Kashmiri insurgent groups.

Pakistan, however, is neither the first nor the only country to use religion in its bilateral relations with another country. Chapter One which deals with the use of religion in diplomacy as an international phenomenon provides several examples proving that Pakistan is not alone in this game and that since ancient times religion has been utilized for the purpose of furthering national interests. The first part of the chapter brings out the nature of the relationship between politics and religion in Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. For our purpose, it is essential to know that in Islam "each aspect of life is inseparable from the other. Religious and secular are not two autonomous categories; they represent the two sides of the same coin.... Islam is a worldview and an outlook of life".³

In addition to ideology and the demands of realpolitics, the domestic milieu of Pakistan also goes to

3. Maulana Abul Ala Maududi quoted in Golan W. Choudhuri, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, Essex, 1988, p. 80.

reinforce religion as an important component in Pakistan's India policy. Domestic politics is always a major determinant of a nation's foreign policy and much more so in the case of Pakistan's India policy. Like Indians, the Pakistanis have not forgotten the partition-riots and the memories of three conflicts with India are still raw. Creation of Bangladesh still hurts and the feeling remains that Pakistan is 'incomplete' without Kashmir. In this situation, it is no surprise that the Pakistani leaders vie with one-another in India-bashing and they cannot afford to be seen as being 'soft' on India without jeopardizing their political career. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the Pakistani rulers since independence have lacked in political will to settle the outstanding disputes with India in a spirit of give and take.

The fact is that in the domestic milieu of Pakistan, Islam has been reduced to a mere extremist ideology, thanks to the pressure exercised by a host of powerful internal forces such as the orthodox ulema and the Maududi variety of Islamic fundamentalists. The development of religio-political thought in post-independence Pakistan has revolved around a conflict between the idealized model of an Islamic state and the reality of a secular state system. "The ulema

emerged as a political force for the first time in Pakistan's history during the 1970 election campaign....During the 1977 anti-Bhutto agitation, the ulema and a vast number of religious-minded people acquired a heightened political consciousness...".⁴ General Zia realised the tremendous potential of the Islamic idiom in order to strengthen his own position as president of Pakistan. His programme of Islamization let loose the genie of Islamic fundamentalism which the subsequent governments have found difficult to handle.

General Zia's Islamization programme can be divided into three categories — punitive measures, reconstruction of the economic system and general Islamization of morals, education and science. First in February 1979, the President announced the Haddood Ordinance which contained severe punishments for theft, adultery and drinking. `Shariat courts were established and punishment meted out by them to the guilty included flogging, amputation of limbs and

4. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, Islamabad, 1994, p. 377.

stoning'.⁵ Status of the women was reduced and the testimony of two women before an Islamic court was considered equal to that of one man.

"President Zia held a national referendum in December 1984 on two questions: The propriety of Islam as Pakistan's guiding philosophy and his right to continue as President. The answer in both cases was "yes" although the turnout for the referendum was low".⁶ This shows the success of Zia's Islamization programme.

Zia continued Bhutto's project of building the 'Islamic bomb' which made him popular among Pakistanis and in the Islamic countries. "The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan an important member of OIC and Zia a major spokesman for the 45 [now 52]-nation Islamic bloc".⁷ As the importance of Pakistan as a 'frontline state' increased, the

5. Anwar Hussain Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, New York, 1982, p. 542.

6. Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building in Pakistan" in Banuazizi and Weiner (ed), The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, Lahore, 1987, p.329.

7. Mir Zohair Hussain, "Islam in Pakistan under Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq" in Mutalib and Hashmi (ed), Islam, Muslims and the Modern States, New York, 1994, p. 70.

US opposition to Pakistan's drive for the atom bomb was reduced to occasional statements and warnings. No wonder Pakistan attained the nuclear capabilities as early as 1987 as disclosed by Mirza Aslam Beg recently.⁸

Religious organizations such as the Jamat-i-Islami, Ahl-i-hadith, Jamiatul-ulema-i-Islam and the Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba have come to acquire a definite role in shaping Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies. Some of these organizations are acting as fronts to the Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir. This has been brought out in the Third Chapter.

Drug running, terrorism and ethnic and sectarian clashes have also come to mark the domestic milieu of Pakistan. "Trafficking of heroin, a refined form of opium, has assumed the dimensions of a fullfledged industry in Pakistan...giving rise to the drug lords. Pakistan falls under one of the two main areas of opium poppy cultivation in the world — the 'Golden Crescent'.... The drug money flowing into the society has corrupted the entire social and

8. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 13, 1995.

political structure of Pakistan".⁹ In Pakistan, a vicious connection between drug peddling, terrorism and fundamentalism has emerged and Pakistan is trying to harness its powers for destabilizing India. The Bombay blasts present a classic case of the nexus between drug and arms runners, criminals, fundamentalists and militants. The brain-work was done by the ISI as established in the Third Chapter.

The fact is that Pakistan has been stoking in India have burnt its own fingers too. In October 1994, a violent Islamic insurgency occurred in the Malakand Sub-division of the NWFP in which scores of people and paramilitary troops were killed.¹⁰ The insurgents were demanding implementation of the sharia law in the region. The Federal government was forced to make concessions to the fundamentalists. On the other hand, Karachi in the Sindh province has become a theatre of daily murder and mayhem over the last several years. The kalashnikov culture has taken over 800 lives

9. Ruchita Beri, "Poppy Politics", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI, No.8, Nov 1993, pp.1024-32.

10. Herald, Karachi, November, 1994, p. 43.

till June this year alone in Karachi as the ethnic strife between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis shows no signs of abatement.¹¹ 300 people were killed in June alone despite 'stepped up' patrolling and vigilance by the security forces.

However, instead of learning any lessons Pakistan seems bent upon exploiting the religious diversity of the Indian society. This of course, is the easier option for the Pakistani rulers given the lack of political will and diplomatic foresight in them. India will remain the 'punching bag' of the Pakistani politics in the coming years. Pakistan will keep up its diplomacy of religion against India as long as India does not put its own house in order and keeps getting destabilized at the slightest provocation. Only then can India hope to win the proxy war being waged against it by Pakistan.

11. India Today, New Delhi, July, 15, 1995, p. 31.

CHAPTER I

**USE OF RELIGION IN DIPLOMACY AS
AN INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON**

Religion and diplomacy have had an interesting interrelationship since ancient times. However, as diplomacy is a part and extension of politics in general, this chapter would first elaborate the nature of relationship between politics and religion in the context of (a) the Hindu (b) the Christian and (c) the Islamic thought on the subject. This discussion would put into perspective the study that would follow of the instances of the use of religion in diplomacy as an international phenomenon. The idea is to show that Pakistan's diplomacy of religion is not an isolated or unique case.

A. RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE HINDU THOUGHT

Hindu philosophy has long been recognized as presenting original solutions for the problems of spirit and matter. There is nothing surprising in the fact that a good deal of Hindu (in this work, the term Hindu has been used in a generic sense including not only the followers of Brahmanic sects but also Buddhists and Jainas) political thought is found in religious compositions of the Hindus.

"Hindu political thought has a spirit, a milieu, an atmosphere of its own as different from their western counterparts as Hindu personality, temperament and outlook

are different from what one finds in western Europe"¹ Hindu Thought does not fall under any of the accepted categories of western speculation and stands by itself.

But as in medieval Europe, in ancient India also theory saw the universe as one articulated whole. The belief in the unity of all life strengthened this habit to thought. "Not merely in Hindu poetry but in Hindu speculation on moral and religious life, the fortunes of men and gods are linked together so that there almost appears the vision of a commonwealth of which human and celestial beings alike are members"² In the Jaina Harivansa Purana the kings of Videha are gods who have descended to earth on the expiry of their allotted life in heaven.

The Puranic evidence shows that the king was not only the source of the origin of the state that consisted of seven organs (the saptangas) but also the chief among all its organs. The Mahabharata furnishes two theories of the origin of the institution of kingship. The first one is about the divine origin of the king and the state. Bhisma tells Yudhishthira "that in the dim past there was neither

1. Beni Prasad, Theory of Governments in Ancient India, Allahabad, 1968, p. 337.

2. Ibid, p. 374.

any king nor any state."³ People followed the rule of Dharma (law) and there was no need for danda (punishment). But gradually degeneration set in, people became selfish as a result of which there was anarchy and chaos. "Ultimately, the Chief god Brahmadeva prepared a comprehensive code of law called 'Nitisastra', consisting of one lakh chapters"⁴ and appointed Viraja as the first king. But it was only during the time of king Prithu that the word 'Raja' came into being for the first time. 'Raja' originated from 'ranj' which means 'to please the people'.

The second theory given in the Mahabharata says that in the kingless remote past anarchy and rule of the jungle prevailed. The people appealed to Brahmadeva, the creator to appoint a king to look after them and the put an end to the state of anarchy. The creator appointed Manu as their first king.

"....Hindu theory Views the governmental power as sustaining social life, and giving it security and completeness. So the king who stands for the government and the state is extolled as divine and even more than

3. G.P. Singh, Political Thought In Ancient India, New Delhi, 1993. p. 33.

4. Ibid, p. 34.

divine....The government claims all loyalty".⁵ However, all this is not inconsistent with another Hindu idea that political power is a trust. The king had to serve a definite purpose and an oppressive king had no right to rule. Theory found a check to misrule in the inculcation of the idea of Dharma to which all must conform. Dharma was the supreme, all-comprehensive Law which represented the Divine will and purpose, the true way of life.

In Hindu Thought , the human life has a three-fold aim, Dharma, Artha and Kama--duty of religion, profit and pleasure. The government was concerned with all the three aims and as such it touched human happiness at every point.

The Mahabharata, Manu, Kautilya etc. take a rather low view of human nature, justifying it on the degeneracy of the present kaliyuga. In this situation, the government stands forth as the saviour of society.

"In ancient India the king's function was conceived not only in terms of legislation but also...of protecting varnashrama dharma as laid down in the sacred texts."⁶ A good ruler was supposed to listen to the advice of wise

5. Prasad, no.1, p. 345.

6. A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, Delhi, 1967, p.88.

ministers including the purohita, keep in mind the welfare of the people and rule in accordance with the Dharmashastras which gave a high status to the brahmanas.

King Asoka made Dhammavijaya the keystone of his foreign policy. A chakravartin was one who could establish the rule of dharma over a large area by defeating unrighteous rulers. Thus by and large, religion and statecraft were not separate entities in ancient India.

The Indian society itself was divided into four varnas of which though the ksatriyas (the ruling class) and the brahmanas (the clergy) had the highest status, their areas of activity and function were totally different. There was even a conflict for supremacy between the two but by and large it was accepted that only a harmonious relationship between these two varnas could lead to an ideal society and state. Religion and politics buttressed each other and one could not prosper or even survive without the other.

In ancient India there were principles applicable to all, principles which were of universal nature, They had to be respected by the mightiest of rulers. The purpose of politics and religion in ancient India can be summed up as the promotion of the excellence of human souls. The ultimate abject of life was salvation.

B. RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CHRISTIANITY

"Christianity was one of the several mystic faiths that, originated in the East swept through the Roman Empire".⁷ By the second century Christianity had become sufficiently strong to awaken government hostility and by the year 400 A.D. It had become the predominant religion of the Roman world.

To begin with, religion and politics were inseparable in the Christian world. As Christianity had won its great victories through the support of the state, it was inevitable that the Church should involve the state in its religious controversies. The head of the Christian community in each city was the bishop and it was the bishops who assembled in council and determined matters of doctrine. But it was the emperor who, from the time of Constantine summoned the councils of the whole Church and was by his authority and insistence that orthodox doctrine was defined and imposed. In fact the Church in so far as it remained orthodox, also remained effectively subordinate to the authority of the emperor.

7. Carl Stephenson, Medieval History, London, 1962, p. 66.

In the western part of the empire though, the development was more complex. Few effects of the political collapse of the Roman imperial authority in the west had such far reaching consequences as the virtually independent development of the Christian church there. "It was to create a dual power structure and a dual focus of loyalty for men, such as had never existed before in the Graeco-Roman world, or in any other civilisation. This dualism of Church and state, as so much else that had its origin in this period, was to prove one of the most dynamic elements of European society, a cause of strife and tragedy but also of a peculiarly fruitful and ongoing intellectual and political debate".⁸

As early as the middle of the fifth century Leo I spoke of St. Peter's princely authority and of the pope's right to 'rule all who are ruled in the first instance by Christ.' In 494 A.D. when Theodoric the Ostrogoth was ruler of Italy, Pope Gelasius drew a distinction between ecclesiastical and political power. "There are, your Majesty", he wrote to the emperor in Constantinople, "two things whereby this world is chiefly governed, the sacred

8. H.G.Koenigsberger, Medieval Europe 400-1500, Essex, 1987, p. 56.

authority of bishops and the imperial authority. Of them the burden of the priests is greater in that they must render account in the divine judgment for the king of men also'.⁹

However, the 'ideal' relationship between the spiritual and the temporal remained a matter of speculation. The 'City Of God' written in the 5th century A.D. By St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo in Africa was a fundamental attack on the still surviving paganism and a summary of his own thinking about the relation between heaven and earth. The glory of Rome, Sacked by the Visigoths in 410 A.D. was irrelevant to the glory which could be achieved only in the City Of God. This was Jerusalem, the spiritual city of all true Christians whether alive or dead, and of God's angels. "As against Jerusalem, Babylon was the city of this world. The earthly city which does not live by faith seeks an earthly peace and the end it proposes in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule; is the combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until 'this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away'. In this world the two

9. Ibid, pp 56-57.

cities were mixed together, but at the last judgment they would be separated.

"The profundities and subtleties of Augustine's thought were to nourish a thousand years of Catholic and, eventually also of Protestant theology. But for political ideas the basic concept came to be Augustine's acknowledgement that worldly, political government and authority were useful or even necessary for the pursuit of a Christian life here on earth. In practice this teaching meant a further strengthening of the tradition by which the Christian Church, ever since it had accepted the special favours bestowed on it by the emperor Constantine, had supported secular political authority. With only a few exceptions, the Catholic Church has since remained on the side of established authority; but it could question, and often has questioned, what was legitimate authority".¹⁰

"In the eleventh century, the rival powers of the emperor and the Pope came into a headlong clash which lasted two centuries."¹¹ From this the pope emerged victorious as the unquestioned head of western Christendom but the

10. Ibid, pp 51-52.

11. Golam W. Chaudhury, Pakistan Transition From Military To Civilian Rule, Essex, 1988, p. 78.



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contest was later taken up by the powerful monarchies of the upcoming nation-states such as England, France and Spain.

The struggle between the Church and the state dominated the Western Medieval political thought. By the end of the Medieval period the 'doctrine of two swords' was firmly established. It meant that society had two governments and the authority of the Pope was supreme in the matters of the spirit and that of the king in the worldly matters. There was to be no interference in each-other's sphere.

"During the Protestant Reformation Martin Luther elaborated the base of secular authority, the concept of two kingdoms and the extent of secular authority.... Christ himself, Luther concluded made this nice distinction and said 'Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's'.¹²

Given this background it is no surprise that the modern western political theories accept politics and religion as belonging to different spheres of human life.

12. Ibid.

C. RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISLAM"

Historically and socially the novel feature of the Muslim faith is the application of all obligations to all members of the community. This is itself an aspect of the doctrine that life cannot be divided into the spiritual and the worldly and good life is possible only if their unity is recognised. Islam "ordains that the religious and the worldly life should be organized on the basis of the same values, that equality before God should be given a social and political expression in the form of legal and political equality.... The integration of political and religious values was obvious in the life and thought of the Prophet himself..."¹³

"During his life-time Muhammad performed the functions of prophet, law-giver, arbiter, commander of the army and the head of the state.... His divine mission conveyed to him political power. There was no distinction between the temporal and the spiritual when it came to defining his authority."¹⁴

13. M.Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, London, 1967, p. 61.

14. Yusuf Husain, Indo Muslim Polity, Simla, 1971, p 1.

In the city-state of Medina, Muhammad moulded the Muslim society into a political organization. The old tribal units were abolished and the Arabs in the new Muslim state became politically and religiously united. "The new community of Islam owed its existence to the common bond of religion. as the Ummah or the congregation of god, upsetting all ancient tribal affiliations and loyalties. All Muslims were equal before God".¹⁵ "The Prophet established a theocratic state in which political authority was held by Allah or the Divine Law (the Shariah). In this state every one had individually to perform the duties which the Shariah enjoins".¹⁶

The Shariah has been provided in the Quran and supplemented by the Prophet in the body of teachings known as the Sunnah or the way of life of the Prophet.

The Quran does not lay down any specific form of state nor does it prescribe any pattern to which the Islamic state must conform. However leaving the government activity to the Ijtihad (interpretation) of the time concerned the Quran lays down three general principles which hold good for all times for the believers-

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 3.

1. "That when you are called upon to rule over people, rule with justice"(2:159).
2. "Decide your affairs by consultation" (3:159).
3. "Obey God, obey the Prophet and obey those with authority amongst you". (4:58).

The terms 'consultation' and 'those with authority amongst you' have been left vague allowing for flexibility in their interpretation. Politically, Islam does not lay down any particular form of sovereignty such as kingship, aristocracy or democracy. The supremacy of law (the Shariah) is the basic tenet of Islamic polity whatever its external political structure might be. The Islamic community (the Ummah) been the right to elect its own leader as evidenced from the fact that after the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D., Abu Bakr on the proposal of Omar was declared Caliph by popular consensus. Abut Bakr's address to the people of Medina after being elected is a constitutional document of great importance. It establishes that in Islam political authority is considered to be a trust and that obedience to the head of the state is conditional on his rule being just and beneficial. The right to resistance and revolution is conceded to the people if the ruler fails to observe the commands of God and the dictates of justice. "The most definite and encouraging authority for disobedience is the hadith 'the most excellent jihad (is performed by) one who declares the truth before an

unjust Sultan'....The traditions make it a religious obligation on the Muslims to judge the actions of the sultan, to make it clear that his obedience is conditional".¹⁷ Further, a ruler has to maintain the equality of all Muslims and the sacredness of their lives, liberty and property.

"In the ideal Islamic state, the government drew its inspiration from the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet, and obtained from the Shura or the Council of Elders the advice of the representatives of the Muslim community".¹⁸ However it is generally accepted that the teachings of the Prophet aimed at creating an ideal society and not simply an ideal state. Hence whatever form and shape of the state, if the Quranic society was realized in it, it might bear the designation of an Islamic state.

THE VIEWS OF MAULANA ABUL ALA MAUDUDI

A prominent modern orthodox Islamic scholar, Maulana Maududi is well known as the founder of the radical Jamat-i-Islami. His ideas which had influenced Gen. Zia's process

17. Mujeeb, no. 13, pp. 63-64.

18. Husain, no. 14, p. 13.

of Islamisation in Pakistan "are being propagated vigorously both in Pakistan and India".¹⁹

Maulana Maududi categorically rejected the Western view of life and the moral, political and social values represented by it. According to him "Islam embodies a framework for the conduct of whole human life. Each aspect of life is inseparable from the other. Religious and secular represent the two sides of the same coin".²⁰

To Maududi an Islamic state is neither a matter of choice nor of expediency. It is fundamental to the Islamic way of life. His state is theo-democratic with God as the sovereign. Maududi proclaims "the Islamic state cannot be delimited. It cannot have geographical frontiers. Any Muslim anywhere will be entitled to its citizenship".²¹

There seems to be a tendency amongst Muslims to organize in politics on the basis to their faith. In fact "the particular aspects of the Islamic tradition which bears on the tendencies of Muslims to organize on the basis of their faith in politics is the emphasis it places on the

19. Mujeeb, no. 13, p. 403.

20. M.Mujeeb, World History: Our Heritage, Bombay, 1960, p. 127.

21. Quoted, Mujeeb, no. 13, p.403.

idea of community. Being part of the Muslim community is a central part of being a Muslims".²² In the following chapters we would try to uncover the nexus of religion, politics and diplomacy vis-a-vis Pakistan's India policy.

For convenience, the instances of the diplomatic use of religion worldwide have been divided into two parts. The first part consists of five examples all dealing with the pre-second world war phase. The second part would have seven examples from the post-second world war period.

PART-I

- 1 Constantine, the first Roman Emperor, recognised Christianity as one of the religions of the Empire in 327 A.D. After this, he justified his policy of imperial annexation to secure Roman frontiers as a part of 'civilizing mission'. He declared that his raids were aimed at bringing the heathen Germanic tribals within the fold of Christianity.

2. Between 1095 and 1270 A.D. the Christians and the Muslims fought a total of eight major Crusades. The Crusades were roughly the Christian equivalent of the

22. Francis Robinson, "Islam And Muslims Separatism" in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (Ed.), Political Identity In South Asia, London, 1979, p. 83.

Islamic concept of Jihad and aimed at liberating Jerusalem from Muslims control. The Christian and the Muslim forces forgot all their internal dissensions to put up a unified front against each other.

3. After Babur's victory in the Battle of Panipat in 1526, the Rajputs under Rana Sanga emerged as the strongest challenge to the establishment of the Mughal Empire in India. To rally his forces Babur "declared a holy war (jihad) against the Rana and reminded his men that he was fighting for the glorification of his religion. The response was instantaneous and enthusiastic".²³ Thousands of Afghans who had earlier fought Babur, joined him and the Rajputs were defeated at the Battle of Khanua in 1527.
4. Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish king, invaded Germany during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). He argued to the princes of Europe that he was not annexing the sovereign German Empire but fighting the rotten Papal Christianity. Adolphus posed himself as the hero of the anti-Catholic Protestant Christianity. Both Lutheran and Calvinist Protestants supported Adolphus.
5. Czarist Russia always wanted a warm water port in the Black Sea and control over the Dardanelles, to secure net interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the 19th century, Russia was trying to undermine the Ottoman Empire in the Eastern Europe for the same reason.

23. A.L. Srivastava, The Mughal Empire, Agra, 1989, p. 26.

Whenever the Ottoman Balkan provinces revolted, Russia aided them by mobilizing her army on the Danube. Russia explained her policy to other western powers by insisting that she was not interested in annexing Eastern Europe, rather her aim was to liberate the Christian subjects of Eastern Europe from the Muslim rule.

Part-II

1. Libya and Chad - The history of Chad has been dominated by the religious and ethnic tensions between the people of the North who are predominantly Muslim sharing a common border with Libya and the people living in the Southern Chad who are animists or followers of Christianity. In 1965 rebellion broke out in Northern Chad with the help of Libya. In 1971 Chad suspended diplomatic relations with Libya on the question of military assistance to the Islamic rebels. "In 1973 Libya annexed the 'Aouzon Strip' in North Chad"²⁴ and in 1981 signed an Agreement with the Rebel leader Goukoun which provided for the political union of Chad and Libya. However due to the French opposition the designs of Col. Gaddafi could not bear fruit. But Libya has remained a major factor in the Chadian civil war with its troops skirmishing with the French troops.
2. Russia and Serbia - Russia and Serbia share ethnic and religious commonality with populations which are predominantly Slavic and following the Eastern orthodox

24. Survey on Africa: South of Sahara, London, 1993, p. 261.

Church. This fact has given Moscow a lot of leverage vis-a-vis Serbia following the break-up of Yugoslavia. No wonder, Russia remains a key factor in all negotiations aimed at bringing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. Israel - Israel has succeeded in creating a strong Jewish lobby in the US by projecting Judaism as a long persecuted religion. Besides Israel poses itself as 'the last non-Muslim bastion in a sea of Islam' in West Asia. The Jewish lobby in the US is carefully nurtured and funded by Israel.
4. Turkey and Cyprus - In the conflict between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, Turkey supported the Muslim Turkish Cypriots in the name of religion. In 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus and in 1984 recognised the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)' as representing the whole of Cyprus. However the UN has not recognised the TRNC.
5. Iran - Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 religion has been a major strand in Iran's foreign policy. Iran has been accused of funding militant Shia and other radical Muslim groups operating in various countries to carry out terrorist strikes. The US is quite categorical that Iran is the major inspirational force behind Islamic terrorism particularly targeting the US interests as witnessed is the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993.
6. Saddam Hussain and Iraq - Saddam Hussain tried to give a religious colour to the Gulf War in which Iraq was

fighting the US led UN troops. He called upon the Muslims to join the 'mother of all battles' and defeat the Christian forces once and for all.

7. Pakistan - Pakistan has used the concept of a single Islamic 'Ummah' to get military and economic aid from the OIC countries against 'Hindu' India. Islam is the primary basis of Pakistan's good relations with several Islamic countries. The following chapters will concentrate on the religious aspect of the Pakistani diplomacy and politics vis-a-vis India....And so on.

From the above account it is obvious that the use of religion in diplomacy has had an old and extensive history and even today a nation is likely to use it in order to promote its national interest. Besides, in the post-cold war phase the use of religion in diplomacy seems to be becoming widespread with the break-up of the USSR and end of communism in Eastern Europe. Religious tensions which are often linked to ethnic strife have provided a golden opportunity to several governments to meddle in other countries' internal affairs by exploiting the religious sentiments of the people.

CHAPTER 2

PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF RELIGION AS AN INSTRUMENT

This chapter would focus on Pakistan's perception of Islam and the factors behind such a perception. The genesis of the state of Pakistan was on the basis of religion itself in accordance with the Two-Nation theory. After discussing the creation of Pakistan, the chapter would go into the factors lying behind the inverse power relationship between Pakistan and its mother country India. Then the dynamics of Pakistan's accent on pan-Islamism in the global context would be detailed and lastly the three bases — ideological, domestic and realistic — of Pakistan's use of religion in diplomacy shall be discussed. These bases would be forming the crux of the next three chapters as well.

THE GENESIS OF PAKISTAN

The early seeds of the Two-Nation theory and the ultimate break up of India in August 1947 into India and Pakistan may be traced in the cataclysmic events to 1857 and its aftermath. The Revolt of 1857 was a last gasp attempt to revive the lost glory of the Mughal Empire by ousting the British from India. However, the Revolt which in many ways was a reactionary and backward-looking attempt could not withstand the sustained onslaught of an efficient British Indian army. "The events of 1857 have a two-fold significance in the history of modern Muslim India. They

dealt a final blow to the idea of the Mughal Empire and they put a seal on the decline of the Muslims in all walks of life".¹ The fall of the last Mughal Emperor who was a symbol of Muslim rule in the minds of the Indians was mourned by most of the Muslims.

"The British believed that the Muslims were responsible for the anti-British uprising of 1857 and, therefore, they were subjected to ruthless punishment and merciless vengeance. In every department of life where government patronage was essential, the doors were closed on Muslims. The Muslims were hounded out of employment and opportunities. The landed gentry were disinherited through large scale confiscation".²

Indeed between 1857 and 1870 nearly all British politicians, authors and administrators unhesitatingly blamed the Muslims for the 'Mutiny' of 1857. It was only in the 1870s that a change in the British opinion on the subject became visible with men like Sir Richard Temple, Sir John Strachey and W.H. Gregory arguing that the Muslims were

1. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, New Delhi: 1989, p.17.

2. Ibid, pp. 17-18.

not essentially disloyal to the crown and that the unpleasant past should be forgotten. This was in keeping with the 'divide and rule' policy.

Continuing with their previous 'divide and rule' policy, the British "Government cleverly used the attractions of government service to create a split along religious lines among the educated Indians.... the educated Indians depended almost entirely on government service. There were few other openings for them".³ The Government promised official favours on communal basis in return for loyalty and thus played the Hindus against the Muslims.

It was Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's [1817-1878] reformist zeal which rehabilitated the Muslims to a great extent and recovered for them their self-respect. He may be said to have unleashed the forces which ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan. Sir Sayyid left his strong impact on the Muslims in four different but inter-connected spheres — education, religion, social life and politics. He supported modern western education and held that it did not go against the traditional Islamic teachings.

3. Bipan Chandra, Modern India [NCERT], Delhi: 1971, p. 160.

In religion he stood for a rational approach and believed that any interpretation of Quran that conflicted with human reason, science or nature was in reality a misinterpretation. He struggled against obscurantism, ignorance and dependence on custom in religion.

In social life, Sir Sayyid stood for such traditional Islamic virtues as simplicity and honesty, but at the same time he taught the people to accept what was sound and attractive in the European social life.

In the political field, Sir Sayyid believed that [a] political awakening of the Muslims was a must; [b] the British should be cultivated as friends; and [c] it was not in the interest of the Muslims to join the Congress. In fact, he talked of Hindu domination to scare the Muslims away from the National Movement led by the Indian National Congress.

The partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon on October 16, 1905 was another milestone on road to India's partition. The reason given was 'administrative convenience' but in reality, the partition of Bengal was a result of the desire of the British to strike a nail in the rising tide of Bengali nationalism by dividing its forces. Risley, Home

Secretary to the Government of India wrote in an official note on December 6, 1904:

"Bengal united is a power. Bengal divided will pull several different ways.... One of our main objects is to split up and thereby to weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule"⁴

Lord Curzon himself wrote in February 1905:

"Calcutta is the centre from which the Congress Party is manipulated throughout the whole of Bengal and indeed the whole of India.... Any measure in consequence that would divide the Bengali speaking population... is intensely and hotly resented by them".⁵

The partition was another manipulation of the 'unholy alliance between two aggressors — the British Government and the separationists among the Muslims'.⁶ The breed of the native Indian Muslims loyal to the British was henceforth effectively utilized to weaken and counter the Indian National Movement. Unfortunately, the militant nationalism as propagated by the extremist leaders such as B.G. Tilak, B.C. Pal and Lala Lajpat Rai had a strong Hindu religious tinge. The ancient Indian culture and its glory was emphasised to the exclusion of medieval Indian culture. As a result of this and the policies of the British, the

4. Quoted, Chandra, no. 3, p. 160.

5. Ibid.

6. Lal Bahadur, Struggle for Pakistan, London: 1988, p. 47.

Muslim intelligentsia found it difficult to emotionally attach itself with the National Movement and increasingly viewed it as a 'Hindu' movement.

It was in this background that the Muslim communalism was given an organized form with the foundation of the All Indian Muslim League in December 1906 at Dacca under the leadership of the Aga Khan, Nawab Salim Ullah Khan of Dacca and Nawab Mohsin-Ul-Malik. Initially the League was a handmaid of a section of the educated Muslims and the big Muslim Nawabs and landlords who connived with the British in weakening the National Movement led by the Congress and in return hoped to safeguard the 'Muslim interests'. The Indian Councils Act of 1909, also known as the Morley-Minto Reforms was a clear reflection of the nexus between the Muslim communalists and the British. The Act had "two innovations: direct election for non-official seats and separate or communal representation for Muslims. This was the result of the formation of the Muslim League in 1906 as a counter to growing Hindu influence; the plea being that with a property franchise poverty would prevent Muslims from having an influence in general constituencies in proportion to their numbers".⁷

7. Percival Spear, A History of India, Vol.II, London: 1965, p. 178.

Separate electorate to the Muslims in effect meant that the Muslim community was recognized as a completely separate section of the Indian nation, Muslim members to the Legislative Councils were to be elected by the Muslim voters only and the number of such members was fixed.

Events from now on led relentlessly towards the partition of India. The Lucknow Pact [1916] between the League and the Congress was actuated by political opportunism and not by any genuine union of hearts and the acceptance of separate electorate by the Congress cut at the roots of nationalism and in the long run widened the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. The Hindu communalists got themselves organized in such groups as the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh [RSS] founded in 1917 and 1925 respectively. Hindu-Muslim riots became a common feature after 1922. The communal polarization increased with the emergence of Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the leader of the Muslim League. The Hindi-Urdu controversy had already been revived with the formation of the Muslim League.

The Congress leaders failed to fully understand the psychology of the minorities at that time, with the result that the Muslim League grew in strength even as the Congress chose to ignore it as far as possible. To the Muslim League

leaders, the British rule was no worse than the 'domination of the Hindu majority' in an independent but undivided India.

As early as 1915 Chaudhary Rahmat Ali had said "North of India is Muslim and we shall keep it Muslim. Not only that we will make it a Muslim State".⁸ The President of the Hindu Mahasabha, Savarkar often referred to the Hindus and the Muslims as two nations whereas Lala Lajpat Rai suggested the partition of India in 1924. But it was Sir Muhammad Iqbal who is generally credited with initiating the idea of separation, being the first important public figure to propose the idea from the platform of the Muslim League in 1930. In 1933 Chaudhary Rahmat Ali issued a pamphlet demanding a separate Muslim State in India comprising of the Punjab, the NWFP, Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan and to be called PAKISTAN. In its Lahore Session in 1940, the Muslim League formally adopted the Pakistan Resolution. During the closing years of the Second World War the League took full advantage of the suppression of the Congress to emerge stronger. At the Simla Conference [June-July 1945] called by Lord Wavell, the talks broke down because the Congress objected to what it felt was an attempt to reduce it to the status of a purely 'caste Hindu' party, insisting on its

8. Quoted, Qureshi, no. 1, p. 115.

right to include members of all communities amongst its nominees for the proposed Executive Council. Jinnah .lh 17 insisted that all the Muslim members to the Council should be nominated only by League.

The Cabinet Mission Plan [June 1946] and other attempts at conciliation between the Congress and the Muslim League so that a peaceful transfer of power could be achieved were overtaken by communal frenzy. The League declared August 16, 1946 as the Direct Action Day which resulted in mass killings in Calcutta and the riots spread like wildfire.

Left with no option, the Congress had to accept the Mountbatten Plan [June 3, 1947] for the partition of India and the British Parliament passed the independence of India Act on July 18, 1947. On August 13, Jinnah was sworn in as the Governor-General of Pakistan and Pakistan was inaugurated on August 14 by Mountbatten. India attained independence the next day with Mountbatten as Governor-General.

Earlier Bengal, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan had opted for Pakistan. Referendums were held in NWFP and Sylhet which also opted for Pakistan. Thus, the Two-Nation theory which propounded that the Hindus and the Muslims constituted two separate nations, triumphed and Pakistan even though 'moth-eaten' witnessed the light of the day.

THE INDO-PAK RELATIONS: A ZERO-SUM GAME

Due to a host of factors, the Indo-Pak relations have remained strained since 1947. So much so that the international community has come to identify India and Pakistan as arch-enemies of each other and perennial rivals in almost every field ranging from sports to politics. Most of the Indians and Pakistanis themselves believe in the stereotyped image of 'arch-enemy' churned out daily by the media of these countries.

In the absence of any credible conflict resolution mechanism, mutual faith, or goodwill, most of the Indo-Pak disputes have festered over the years. An inverse power equation has developed and the relationship between the two neighbours resembles a zero-sum game in which the loss of one rival automatically becomes the gain of the other and vice-versa. For example, the Indian military losses in Kashmir are welcomed in Pakistan whereas any criticism by the Amnesty International of Pakistan's human rights record is greeted in India. The ethnic strife in Karachi is seen both by Indians and Pakistanis as weakening Pakistan's case on Kashmir. Here we shall briefly discuss the factors behind the inverse power relationship between India and Pakistan:

[1] The Partition and Related Problems

The events leading to India's partition have already been traced. A fear persisted in Pakistan that India had accepted the partition under duress and that at the earliest opportunity, India would undo it. The utterances of some of the Congress leaders lent credence to this view. "In his broadcast of 3 June, Nehru said, 'It may be that in this way we shall reach that United India sooner than otherwise'.... Azad has written that Sardar Patel was 'convinced that the new state of Pakistan was not viable and could not last. He thought the acceptance of Pakistan would teach the Muslim League a bitter lesson. Pakistan would collapse in a short time'.

"Subsequently, both Nehru and Krishna Menon conceded that Congress had accepted partition to get rid of the British.... This deep-seated reluctance on the part of Hindu leaders to accept the separate existence of Pakistan has been a principle factor in hindering reconciliation between India and Pakistan".⁹

"Two parts of the subcontinent, which were economically complementary, became mutually exclusive and competitive in

9. S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring: Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Karachi, 1990, pp. 8-9.

world market with consequent economic loss to both. The process of partition itself left unresolved problems".¹⁰ The most important of them being Kashmir which has been dealt with separately. Of the other problems, the first related to the minorities and continuing communal riots. Responsible leaders on both sides accused each other of failing to protect the lives and property of the minorities who were crossing over the newly created border in droves. Since then the treatment of minorities has remained a problem between India and Pakistan as evident from Pakistan's reaction to the Babri Masjid demolition and the Bombay riots and India's response to the issuing of specific identity-cards to non-Muslims in Pakistan.

Soon after independence, Pakistan charged India of withholding Pakistan's share of military supplies. "The responsibility for the movement of ammunition, stores, equipment and installation from one dominion to the other had been entrusted to Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, erstwhile Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army, redesignated the Supreme Commander".¹¹ His command was intended to last till 1 April 1948 but it was closed down on

10. J. Bandhopadhyay, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, Bombay: 1970, p. 114.

11. Burke and Ziring, no. 9, p.10.

30 November 1947 with Auchinleck himself blaming the Indian leaders of trying "to obstruct the work of partition of the Armed Forces".¹²

Another problem resulting directly from the partition was that of evacuee property. In the opening years of the independence, with millions of distraught refugees on both sides pressing their respective governments hard, the differences over evacuee property generated much heat and ill will, but with the gradual settlement of the refugees on both sides, the excitement died down.

Another dispute related to the partition was that of sharing of the cash balances of undivided India which stood at 4,000 million rupees. In December 1947, Pakistan agreed to receive Rs.750 crore as her share. While Rs.200 crore was paid to Pakistan as an interim instalment, Rs. 550 crore remained outstanding. Sardar Patel threatened to link the payment of this amount with the settlement of the Kashmir issue. However, the dispute was resolved when Mahatama Gandhi went on an indefinite fast and intervened on Pakistan's behalf. Pakistan was given her due share of the cash balances.

The rivers water dispute between India and Pakistan was a direct result of the political division of a single

12. Ibid.

geographical unit. For Pakistan the question of sharing the waters of the Indus basin was crucial. According to David E. Lilienthal "no army with bombs and shell fire could devastate a land as thoroughly as [West] Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanent shutting off the sources of waters that keep the fields and the people of [West] Pakistan alive".¹³

In 1952, both India and Pakistan agreed to the good offices of Mr Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to resolve the dispute. On 19 September 1960, President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Nehru signed the Indus Waters Treaty and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement at Karachi. To ensure implementation of the terms, the Treaty set up an Indo-Pakistani Permanent Indus Commission composed of one nominee from each country.

[2] The Kashmir Dispute

Kashmir, which has bedeviled Indo-Pakistan relations since independence is probably the most important single factor in the foreign relations of both these countries. Pakistan considers itself 'incomplete' without Kashmir

¹³. Quoted, Burke and Ziring, no. 9, p. 11.

whereas for India it represents the 'success of the experiment of secularism' in a Hindu-majority country. Without Kashmir, Pakistan is "the husk, the mutilated, the truncated and moth-eaten"¹⁴, as described by Jinnah. India, on the other hand, is convinced of the legitimacy of Kashmir's accession to India once Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession.

Strategically located, Kashmir has a total area of 222,236 sq. km. and in 1947, it had a population of five million, 3.5 million of which was Muslim and the rest Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist. At the time of independence, Kashmir was one of the 600 odd Princely States which had the option of joining either India or Pakistan as per the Mountbatten Plan. While both India and Pakistan were keen that Kashmir should merge with them, for reasons best known to him, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir Hari Singh decided to wait and watch. Probably he had an independent Kashmir in mind. At this, Pakistan grew restless and resorted to first economic blockade [Sept 1947] and then a tribal invasion of Kashmir [October 1947] to force the issue. Left with no option in the face of blatant aggression by Pakistan, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with

14. Quoted, V.V. Nagarkar, Genesis of Pakistan, Bombay: 1975, p. 481.

India on October 26 paving the way for Indian military action against the Pakistan-backed infiltrators. India took the matter to the UN under Article 35 of the UN Charter [Chapter VI]. After prolonged wranglings a ceasefire came into force from January 1, 1949 and a UN military observation group was deployed to implement it. The resultant Ceasefire Line was converted into the Line of Actual Control [LOAC] by the Simla Agreement of 1972. The Indian argument now is that the UN Resolutions of 1948 and 1949 which talked of conditional plebiscite in Kashmir have been made redundant by the Simla Agreement which stated "that the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them".¹⁵

On the other hand, having failed to secure Kashmir by open war, Pakistan now has been waging a proxy war in Kashmir and stressing that the UN Resolutions are very much alive and a plebiscite should be held to determine the will of the Kashmiris. Kashmir is a singularly emotional issue both in India and Pakistan and has brought the two antagonists to the brink of nuclear war. India and Pakistan

15. The Simla Agreement Clause 1[b] as reproduced by K.V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish, New Delhi: 1990, p. 486.

keep on mobilizing all their resources to counter each other both militarily and diplomatically over the Kashmir dispute.

[3] The Cold War Dynamics

The Kashmir factor brought the Cold War to the Indian subcontinent and it was not long before both India and Pakistan found themselves deep in the vortex of the East-West confrontation. The US was disappointed with India's stand during the Korean Crisis whereas Pakistan grabbed the opportunity to come closer to the US. The US did not like India's moralistic and balanced posture on most of the Cold War issues whereas Pakistan took a decisive action in joining the Western Defence System. The South-East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] created in September 1954 included both Pakistan and the US as its members. In 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact which "was designed to counter the long-standing Russian policy of expansion southwards, in the direction of the Caspian and the Black Seas and into Central Asia where the absorption of the ancient Muslim Khanates had already brought Russia to the borders of Afghanistan, close to the historical gateway to the Indian sub-continent".¹⁶ As a reward Pakistan received

16. Burke and Ziring, no. 9, p. 169.

a good deal of economic and military aid from the USA which greatly contributed to Pakistan's war efforts against India in 1965 and 1971.

Nehru's idealism reflected in the Non-Aligned Movement of which India was a leading member. But Mrs Gandhi pursued a more realistic policy by aligning India to the Soviet Union in the wake of the Sino-USA detente and emergence of a sort of Washington-Islamabad-Beijing Axis. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971 had clear-cut military implications for the USA, China as well as Pakistan. For the next 20 years, India's allegiance to the USSR was clear even while paying lip service to Non-Alignment. India's low-key response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan [1979] is a good example of this double-policy.

However, though the Cold War buttressed the Indo-Pak hostility, the latter has outlived the former. While the world has witnessed momentous changes in the post cold war phase, India-Pakistan relations continue to be trapped in a time-warp.

[4] A Clash of Values

India and Pakistan represent not only conflicting political and military interests, but often they stand for

diametrically opposite values also. Pakistan is constitutionally and ideologically an Islamic State whereas India is secular, in the modern western sense of the term. Pakistan proudly proclaims that it stands for the preservation and propagation of the Islamic way of life. Even Jinnah, considered to be a 'progressive and modern Muslim' by many was categorical in stating in December 1947: "Let it be clear that Pakistan is going to be a Muslim State based on Islamic ideas The whole world even the UNO has characterized Pakistan as a Muslim State".¹⁷

While Pakistan was the 'promised land' for the Muslims of the subcontinent, it was essential for India to retain its secular character to prove the 'hollowness' of the Two-Nation theory. Similarly India is rightly proud of its 5000 years of glorious historical evolution which witnessed a commingling of several races, languages and religions into one another. In other words India has a history, a culture, and an identity to be proud of whereas Pakistan, having opted out of India suffers from an identity crisis. Pakistan has had to turn to West Asia in search of its 'roots and identity'. These supposedly remained obfuscated in the Hindu-dominated undivided India and after independence Pakistan is energetically trying to 'uncover' linkages

17. Nagarkar, no. 14, p. 483.

between the Pakistani and the West Asian history and culture.

At another level while India has been a functioning parliamentary democracy for much of its existence, Pakistan has been ruled by military dictators for long stretches. The Pakistani democratic experiences have been fitful and by and large a pale shadow of the vibrant Indian democracy. The fact that Islam does not lay down any specific form of state or government has resulted in an unstable system of governance and polity in Pakistan. While democracy has taken root in India and is a cherished value among Indians, the same is not the case in Pakistan.

At the international level, while Pakistan settled its priorities early and joined the USA side of the Cold War divide, India adopted a more balanced approach which culminated in its active espousal of the Non-Aligned Movement. In the typical Indian eyes, Pakistan had become a 'lackey' of the USA 'to pull one back' on India. However, when under Mrs Gandhi, the Indian foreign policy took a definite tilt towards the USSR both India and Pakistan emerged as classic proxies of the two super-powers. The clash of values between the USA and the USSR at the global level was replicated by India and Pakistan at the South-Asian level.

The above broad factors have produced the effect of a zero-sum game in the Indo-Pak relations. Michael Brecher has rightly observed: "India and Pakistan have been in a state of undeclared war, with varying degrees of intensity, throughout their brief history as independent states".¹⁸ This situation of undeclared war manifests itself in several other disputes which normally should have been resolved.

The disputes relating to the possession of the Sir Creek Island in the Gulf of Cambay and the Siachin Glacier have been hanging fire with no solution in sight. The problems relating to the Tulbul Navigation Project and harassment of each other's diplomats have also aroused passions. These seemingly minor problems become both a cause and an effect of worsening Indo-Pak relations in the long run. With Kashmir on the boil and the role of diplomacy severely curtailed, India and Pakistan seem destined to suffer each other in the foreseeable future.

PAKISTAN AND PAN-ISLAMISM

Accent on pan-Islamism has been a constant feature of Pakistan's interaction with the other Muslim states. "The term pan-Islamism gained currency in the last decades of the

18. Quoted, K. Raman Pillai, India's Foreign Policy, Meerut: 1969, p. 73.

nineteenth century and was applied to the efforts to forge worldwide Muslim solidarity against European colonial incursions into the West Asian regions".¹⁹ In India even during the freedom struggle, the Muslim League was fired by the zeal of pan-Islamism as is clear from its role in the Khilafat Movement. For the Congress, the movement was more an opportunity to cement Hindu-Muslim ties than a matter of faith.

However, instead of bringing the Muslims closer to the Hindus, the movement by inciting the pan-Islamic feeling of the Muslims served to widen the Hindu-Muslim gulf in the long run. By the middle of 1923, communal riots had become a common occurrence.

"The poet Iqbal said that the ultimate purpose of the prophetic mission of Muhammad was to create a form of society which followed that divine law which the Prophet Muhammad received from God. In other words, the object was to purify the nations of the world of the abuses which go by the name of time, place, land, nation, race, genealogy, country etc. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other.... These views led Iqbal to say in one of his poems: "*muslim*

19. M.S. Agwani, 'Pakistan and Pan Islamism' in Surendra Chopra [Ed.], Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Amritsar: 1983, p. 288.

hein hum wattan hai sara jehan hamara [We are Muslims, our motherland is the entire universe]".²⁰ After independence, a Pakistani writer Aslam Siddiqi while summing up Pakistan's conception of Islam in his book 'Pakistan Seeks Security' stated that 'Islam itself is a nationality'.

To the Pakistani leaders, the birth of Pakistan was simply a milestone on the journey towards the ultimate goal of universal Muslim solidarity. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, expressing the aspiration of all Pakistanis "stated that Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge of the Muslims of the subcontinent to secure territory where Islamic ideology could be practised and demonstrated to the world and, since a cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a reality, it was a part of her mission to do everything in her powers to promote fellowship and cooperation between Muslims countries".²¹

The sympathy of the Muslim League for other Muslim countries before the creation of Pakistan and its demand for the establishment of an Islamic state in the sub-continent led the Pakistani decision-makers to forge intimate ties with the Muslim countries. The creation of Pakistan itself was conceived by these Muslim countries as a symbol of pan-

20. Quoted, Burke and Ziring, no. 9, pp. 62-63.

21. Ibid., p. 65.

Islamic Unity. According to A.B. Rajput "with the birth of Pakistan the hope of pan-Islamic unity and brotherhood brightened afresh amongst the Islamic States of Asia".²² The concept of Pan-Islamism is also linked with Pakistan's search for an identity and provides a *raison d'être* for Pakistan's origin and existence. It is no surprise that pan-Islamism has been a major theme of Pakistan's leaders and policy-makers to this day and is likely to remain so in future.

It is in this context that the "Pakistanis retain an interest in the fate of the millions of Muslims in India [or under Indian control, as in Kashmir]. Early Pakistani hopes that these Muslims would somehow develop ties to Pakistan have been transformed by the fear that Pakistan would be swamped by refugees; this plus the fact that many millions of Muslims seem perfectly content to live in India, raises the basic question of the identity of Pakistan itself as a homeland for persecuted Indian Muslims.... Here, as in very few areas of the world, perceptions of the international system are directly related to national identity, and may

22. Quoted, D.C. Jha, "The Basic Foundations and Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" in Surendra Chopra [Ed.], Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Amritsar: 1983, p. 9.

lead one to question the very existence of the state".²³

At any rate, Pakistan has seldom missed an opportunity to weaken India by hitting at its secular roots. The Pakistani leaders and media try to project the impression that crores of Indian Muslims are living as 'second rate citizens' in 'Hindu India'. The Radio Pakistan broadcasts would lead one to believe that Muslims in India are discriminated against in every walk of life and not allowed even to practice their faith in peace. The aim is to foment discontent in India along communal lines and thus weaken its society and state system. Kashmir is a classic example where Indian Muslims have fallen prey to the Pakistani propaganda. It is significant that when somebody like Mr Salman Khursheed calls bluff to the Pakistani game he is dubbed as "a rented Muslim" by Pakistan's official spokesman on foreign affairs.²⁴

On the global scale, Pakistan has been among the leaders in attempts to forge Islamic solidarity. But in this Pakistan is guided to a great extent by its self-interests prompting some scholars to remark that

23. Stephen Philip Cohen, "Identity Survival, Security: Pakistan's Defense Policy" in Surendra Chopra [Ed.], Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Amritsar: 1983, p. 53.

24. POT, New Delhi, Pakistan Series, Vol.XXII, No.33, February 12, 1994, p. 318.

Pakistan's drive for pan-Islamism is in fact a drive for 'Pak-Islamism'. Pakistan seeks to establish 'special relationships' with other Muslim countries so as to acquire military and economic aid, diplomatic support against India, strategic depth for its defence purposes etc. Though Pakistan has achieved a certain degree of success in this aspect of its diplomacy of religion "it has often found out that the Islamic world is no less fickle than the West; in times of crisis some Islamic states have come to Pakistan's assistance — but usually in token fashion — while others have been neutral. Pakistan has developed substantial economic and cultural ties with some of the Gulf states..."²⁵ For all the emphasis that Pakistan places on pan-Islamism, it failed to prevent the break-up of Pakistan. Even in the truncated Pakistan strife between the Shia and the Sunni sects of Muslims is a common occurrence. "Pakistan's crisis of identity has continued and, if anything, been accentuated by the emergence of Bangladesh. [Z.A.] Bhutto tried to give Pakistan a new and radical direction by his espousal of Islamic socialism and by emphasizing the country's role in the Islamic world by

25. Ibid.

hosting the OIC Summit in Lahore".²⁶ Indeed over the years, Pakistan has become a prominent member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC], established in 1971. Some of the Charter objectives of the OIC are as follows:

- [i] "To promote Islamic solidarity among member states;
- [ii] "To consolidate cooperation among member states in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other vital fields, and to arrange consultations among member states;
- [iii]"To strengthen the struggle of all Muslim people with a view to guarding their dignity, independence and national rights"²⁷, etc.

Pakistan has been using the OIC as a forum to attack India diplomatically. Recently, the OIC has passed several anti-India resolutions at the initiative of Pakistan, including those relating to Kashmir and the 'poor treatment' in India of Muslims in general. However, those very states who dance to the Pakistani tune in the OIC are found to take a much more balanced stand in their bilateral negotiations with India thus proving that much of the international politics is still guided by Nation-States' national interests [as they perceive it] and not by such supra-

26. P. Rajan, "Secularism and Indo-Pakistan Relations", Mainstream, Vol. XXVIII, No. 32, New Delhi, June 2, 1990, p. 4.

27. The Europa World Year Book, Vol. I, London: 1994, p. 195.

national ideas as pan-Islamism and Islamic brotherhood. However, I very much doubt that this will remain the case in the coming years also. I am rather more inclined to see merit in Samuel Huntington's hypothesis: "The great divisions among human kind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilization will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future".²⁸

India must guard against the possibility of a coherent pan-Islamism becoming an antagonistic force and threat against an India which is fast losing its secular character and credentials with the upsurge of Hindu communalism. The answer to this threat lies more than anything else, in a militarily strong India which at the same time does not depend upon the support of the Islamic countries against Pakistan's diplomatic offensive. It can be predicted rather safely that Pakistan would keep on playing its Islamic card

28. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, New York, Summit 1993, p. 22.

in the coming years. India would ignore the warning given by Samuel Huntington at its own peril.

Pakistan's use of religion as a diplomatic instrument in its bilateral relations with India rests upon three solid bases which we shall discuss one by one.

[1] Ideology as a Basis

Pakistan is an ideological state based on the ideology of Islam. According to Snyder and Wilson: "An ideology is a cluster of ideas, about life, society or government, which originate in most cases as consciously advocated or dogmatically assisted social, political or religious slogans or battle cries and which through continuous usage and preachment gradually become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group party, or nationality".²⁹ An ideology is a system of ideas — usually a closed system — put together in some logical way.

Palmer and Perkins identify major religions such as Christianity and Islam as ideologies. Religion, like all other ideology, is a factor in national power. An ideology

29. Quoted by Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition, Calcutta: 1969, p. 73.

may be considered as 'good' if it gives strength to worthy causes or unity of nations and 'bad' if it leads to inter-state conflict.

The fact that Pakistan was created solely on the basis of Islam and is committed to the Islamic ideals of nationhood makes religion a part and parcel of Pakistan's overall foreign policy and diplomacy. This is reflected with particular acuteness in Pakistan's policies towards the other Islamic states as well as India. For practical reasons though, Pakistan tries to project a moderate image among the western countries.

Pakistan's Constitution of 1973 begins in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. "The Preamble reflects the sentiments expressed in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the first Constituent Assembly. It concedes the principle that 'sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone' and that 'the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan' is a sacred trust within the limits prescribed by God."³⁰

Referring to the Indo-Pakistani conflicts, Arif Hussain writes: "events indicated that it was the ideological factor which was brought into every dispute that turned these into

30. Dr Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, Delhi: 1984, p. 85.

conflicts".³¹ About the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, Josef Korbel writes: "the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organization that find themselves locked in deadly conflict in which Kashmir has become both a symbol and a battleground".³²

The nature of the interpretation of the Islamic religion is also partly responsible for Pakistan's hostile attitude towards India. "Islam too sets up a strong barrier of its own. It divides all humanity into two watertight compartments, Muslims and non-Muslims. All the Muslims, according to the *Quran*, belong to one 'brotherhood'. It follows, to use poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal's words that 'there is only one millat [community] confronting the main community, that of the non-Muslims taken collectively'. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah pointed out that Islam imposes a duty on its followers not to merge their identity and individuality in any alien society".³³

In short, Pakistan's use of religion in diplomacy vis-a-vis India has a strong ideological content.

31. Jha, no. 22, p. 11.

32. Ibid.

33. Burke and Ziring, no. 9, p. 5.

[2] Domestic Milieu as a Basis

No ideology can flourish in a vacuum. To practice an ideology, one has to have an abiding faith in it. The domestic milieu of Pakistan provides an indigenous backing for the use of the ideology of Islam in diplomacy and foreign policy.

Islam has played a political role in much of the contemporary Islamic world, let alone Pakistan. "Not that the Muslim masses everywhere turned into religious zealots overnight. The real issue revolved around the political expression of Islam especially because in Muslim societies, religious law even if neglected in practice remains the supreme reference in the eyes of the masses".³⁴

Domestic politics is a basic determinant of a nation's foreign policy. Z.A. Bhutto once said: "Foreign affairs and internal affairs are interconnected and...have a relationship of cause and effect".³⁵ Journalist Mushahid Hussain goes to the extent of claiming "foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and there are several factors included: history, national ideology, state

34. A.J. Siddiqi, quoted by Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State in Pakistan, Islamabad: 1994, pp. 376-77.

35. Quoted, D.C. Jha, no. 30, p. 15.

structure, ethos of the people, geographical location and quality of leadership".³⁶

"The development of religio-political thought in post-independence Pakistan has revolved around a conflict between the idealized model of an Islamic state and the reality of a secular state system. A four-fold typology has been suggested to cover the relationship between the sacred and the secular models of state as operative in the political thought of contemporary Pakistani intellectuals":³⁷

- [i] The sacred state excluding human will;
- [ii] The sacred state admitting human will;
- [iii] The secular state admitting divine will;
- [iv] The secular state excluding divine will.

The first category consists of the orthodox ulema and the Maududi variety of Islamic fundamentalists. This group is the most responsible for forcing the government to have a large religious content in Pakistan's foreign policy. The Jamiatul-ulema-i-Pakistan, the Jamiatul-ulema-i-Islam, the Ahl-i-Hadith, the Jamat-i-Islami etc. believe in the first model of government. They share the ideal of the revival of the Islamic state in both theory and practice. Inside

36. Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan and the Changing Regional Scenario, Lahore: 1988, p. 5.

37. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, Islamabad: 1994, p. 377.

Pakistan these religious organizations act as strong pressure groups and have a mass following rabid and fanatic in nature. "General Zia ul Haq had strong links with Jamat-i-Islami, whose leader and ideologue, Maulana Maududi had produced over the years voluminous arguments in favour of an absolute state under the name of 'Islamic Democracy'. Zia, having usurped power and executed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had little more than the army to back him. He harnessed Islamic revivalism, boon of a myriad causes, and the Jama'at organizational network to equate his military rule with Pakistan and with Islam. Political opposition, even on justifiable socio-economic grounds, could then be treated as religious heresy and treason against the state".³⁸

Indeed, the domestic pressure on the rulers of Pakistan has been so intense that they do not want to be seen as being 'soft' on India. This pressure has increased so much in recent years that it is difficult to imagine the Pakistani rulers settling their bilateral disputes [such as Kashmir] with India in a spirit of give and take which would entail 'concessions' from both the sides. The reality is that a Pakistani government which does not pursue a hostile

38. Surjit Man Singh, "State and Religion in South Asia: Some Reflections, South Asia", South Asia Journal, Vol. 4, No.3, Jan-March, 1991, New Delhi: 1991, p. 306.

anti-India policy [both in speech and action] is not likely to survive for long. We might as well say that Pakistan's policy has become a hostage to its domestic milieu which is getting more and more Islamized.

[3] Realpolitic As A Basis:

Pakistan's use of religion in diplomacy is based on the consideration of realpolitics and a realistic assessment of the situation as well. "It is especially obvious to any observer of contemporary South Asia that vexed problem of the appropriate or optimal relationship between religion and state has not yet been resolved"³⁹ in India and Pakistan. India has a significant minority problem as reflected in recurring communal clashes, overall socio-economic backwardness of the Muslim community and periodical exhortations of the Indian leaders calling upon the Muslim community to 'join the national mainstream'. In addition, the fact that several Indian Muslims have their relatives across the border and the feeling in a section of the Hindus that some of the Indian Muslims show pro-Pakistani tendencies also serve to estrange the communal relation in India. This provides Pakistan with a chance to meddle in the

39. Ibid.

internal affairs of India by inciting the Indian Muslims against their own state through propaganda, and indulging in blatant anti-Indian activities on the Indian soil itself, as witnessed in Kashmir and Bombay [the Bombay-blasts].

Pakistan's unstated aim is to weaken [and if possible, break-up] India its arch-enemy, and force the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. Pakistan would do everything possible to balkanize India so as to remove its permanent enemy for ever. It is a conflict between two antagonistic values, systems and ideologies in which no holds are barred as far as Pakistan is concerned.

All these years, Pakistan has tried to cobble together an alliance in its fight against India. This partly explains Pakistan's stress on the Islamic 'ummah' and 'brotherly' relations with other Islamic countries. Needless to say most of the Islamic countries have tilted in favour of Pakistan most of the time when an Indo-Pak issue has come up. This constitutes a major success of Pakistan's diplomacy. Pakistan has also succeeded in creating an impression across the world that India is a land where the human rights of the minorities are not safe. As a result even the western countries have been putting pressure on India to 'improve' its human rights record. The irony is that Pakistan's own human-rights record is much worse than India's.

Pakistan has been receiving a lot of economic and military aid from the other Islamic countries so as to be able to 'withstand Hindu India'. Volunteers from several Islamic countries have joined the 'Jihad' against the Indian rule in Kashmir, thanks to the Pakistani propaganda which equates the situations prevailing in Bosnia, West Asia and Kashmir. Several captured foreign mercenaries have told their interrogators in Kashmir that they were led to believe that the Muslims in Kashmir had no religious freedom whereas they found the reality to be its opposite. However, support for Pakistan's 'cause' in Kashmir remains widespread among the Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia is known to be aiding the Kashmiri militants financially and militarily.

Pakistan has been successfully 'bleeding India white' in Kashmir over the last six years. The aim is to turn Kashmir into India's Vietnam. The Indian losses in military, infrastructural, economic, diplomatic and moral terms have already been substantial. Pakistan hopes that at a particular point these losses would become unacceptable to India forcing it to withdraw from Kashmir. Thus Pakistan would avenge 1971 without a direct fight. As far as Pakistan is concerned a proxy war in Kashmir is both low-cost and sustainable over a long period without inviting a direct military retaliation. In any case a [perceived] nuclear balance of terror exists between India and Pakistan

thus reducing the chances of a direct confrontation between them.

In the 80s, Pakistan successfully exploited the religious feelings of a section of the Sikhs in the East Punjab who were demanding 'Khalistan' as a homeland for the Sikhs. In fact, 'Khalistan' might have been a Pakistani idea lapped up by the Sikh militants who depended on Pakistan for money, weapons and training. The Pakistani media went out of its way to 'prove' that the Sikhs were 'discriminated against' in India and that Hinduism and Sikhism were 'antagonistic' religions. At the same 'similarities' between Islam and Sikhism were highlighted. While the people of the Punjab have seen through the Pakistani game, the same cannot be said of a large section of the Kashmiris who continue to be gullible victims of the Pakistani propaganda and proxy war.

In the context of the above discussion, Pakistan's use of religion as a diplomatic device does not seem to be surprising at all.

CHAPTER 3

**DIPLOMACY OF RELIGION IN PRACTICE
IN PAKISTAN'S INDIA POLICY**

In the first two chapters, I have dwelt upon the theoretical aspect of Pakistan's use of religion in diplomacy. I have also set out Pakistan's aims, motives and compulsions in dealing with India. The present chapter will focus on the practice of Pakistan's diplomacy of religion vis-a-vis India. It would be shown how it is a matter of state policy for Pakistan to instigate India's religious minorities against the state and society in which they live.

Pakistan's well-oiled propaganda machinery aims at creating and strengthening an anti-Indian feeling among the Indian minorities. Here it is nobody's case that alienation against the Indian state in certain sections of the minorities has no indigenous roots and is wholly Pakistan-inspired. But the fact remains that Pakistan does not miss a single opportunity to propagate that [a] the Indian minorities are discriminated against; [b] they are justified in 'fighting their oppressors for liberation'; and [c] Pakistan would provide all the possible support to organizations seeking liberation from India.

Pakistan's support comes in various forms and shapes and includes diplomaic, moral, ideological and material back up to the insurgent groups fighting the Indian state. Much of the support is 'clandestine' and never officially admitted to by Pakistan even though the evidence of its involvement in terrorism in India has been well-documented

by the Indian security and intelligence agencies and presented by the Government to other countries like the US from time to time. The Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI], Pakistan's agency for external intelligence operations has a strong presence in India and is instrumental in carrying out the Pakistani schemes on Indian territory.

Pakistan realises that thanks to their relative numerical strength, only three Indian minorities could be of any significant 'use' to Pakistan in destabilizing India.

Only the Muslim, the Sikh and the Christian minorities of India constitute a majority in at least one Indian state which could be the basis of demand for separation. Pakistan believes that there is a good chance that a section of these minorities would be aggrieved with the Indian state and fall prey to the Pakistani propaganda to the effect that [a] there is discrimination against them in India; [b] their religious identities are in danger; and [c] they are numerically strong enough and well dispersed to carry out insurgency against the Indian state. Of course, Pakistan would help them in their 'struggle'.

Pakistan has mainly been successful in instigating sections of the Indian Sikh and the Muslim communities. Despite efforts Pakistan has by and large failed to incite the Indian Christians because [a] no Christian majority state of India borders Pakistan; and [b] Pakistan's shabby

treatment of its own Christian minority is well known as exemplified from the recent Salamat Masih incident. Consequently, the focus of this chapter is on Pakistan's diplomacy of religion vis-a-vis the Sikhs and the Muslims of India.

PAKISTAN, THE SIKHS AND 'KHALISTAN'

When India was being divided on the basis of the two nation theory, the Sikh communal leaders too raised the demand that since the Sikhs were a 'nation' they should also be given an 'independent homeland'. "The demand was formally put forward by the Akali Dal in a resolution passed on 22 March, 1946: 'whereas the Sikhs being attached to the Punjab by intimate bonds of holy shrines, property, language, tradition and history claim it as their homeland and holy land which the British had taken as a 'trust' from the last Sikh ruler...and whereas the community of the Sikhs is being threatened on account of the persistent demand of Pakistan by the Muslims on the one hand and face the danger of being absorbed by the Hindus on the other... the Akali Dal demands...the creation of a Sikh State'...".¹

1. Chopra, Mishra and Singh, Agony of Punjab, New Delhi, 1984, p. 98.

However, the demand for separation had little popular support among the Sikhs and it is no surprise that after the independence of India, the Akalies joined hands with the Congress to form the first government headed by Sardar Baldev Singh in East Punjab [new Punjab]. In November 1966 Punjab was reorganized and a Punjabi speaking state [Punjabi-Suba] in which the Sikhs were in a majority was achieved within the Indian Union. This satisfied the aspirations of the majority of the Sikhs.

However, the Akali Dal, whose politics has always been characterised by brinkmanship and internal squabbles went on to pass the Anandpur Sahib Resolution on 16-17 October 1973. The Resolution demanded a restructuring of the Centre-State relations and confinement of the central-authority only to the areas of defense, foreign relations, communications, railways and currency. Indeed, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution is the starting point for the secessionist movement that gripped the Punjab subsequently.

On October 13, 1971 Jagjit Singh Chauhan inserted a half-page advertisement in the New York Times detailing the reasons for establishing the 'sovereign Sikh state of Khalistan'. "On April 12, 1980, he announced the formation of 'National Council of Khalistan' with himself as President

and Shri Balbir Singh Sandhu as its Secretary General".² Three months later, the formation of the State of Khalistan was proclaimed simultaneously from India and London.

Meanwhile, the situation in Punjab became exceedingly fluid thanks to the interplay of a host of factors. The Prakash Singh Badal led Akali Government in Punjab found it difficult to deal firmly with the secessionist and communal elements. The Punjab was witnessing a revival of puritanical Sikhism; militant, communal and separatist in nature. The unemployed rural Sikh youth were easily drawn towards it as they were thoroughly disenchanted with the petty-politics of the Akali Dal and the state Congress. Before long, the Akali support base in the rural areas was decimated and it went over to the hard-line communal leaders like Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.

The so-called 'heretical sects' of Sikhism became the first target of the militants. In September 1978, Bhindranwale "banned" the Nirankaris from holding their weekly satsang in the Punjab and also their religious books — Yug Purush and Avtar Bani.³ The reaction of the

2. Ibid., p. 113.

3. The Times of India, New Delhi, September 20, 1978.

Badal government was that of meek surrender.⁴ The Akalis themselves were divided into 'extremist' and 'moderate' factions with the former marginalizing the latter. The Extremist Akalis were involved in bloody clashes with the Nirankaris which left 18 people dead in Amritsar⁵ and 26 in Kanpur.⁶ With the SGPC President, Mr G.S. Tohra coming out in open support of Bhindranwale, the Akali Dal headed towards a split.⁷

Besides the Nirankaris; the Sahejdhari and the Namdhari Sikhs also became victims of attacks led by communal Sikhs.⁸ The hand of Pakistan in fomenting communal disturbances in the Punjab became clear when Hindu-Sikh clashes erupted in April 1982 in Amritsar following the recovery of two cow-heads at two Shiva temples in the city.⁹ The cow is held sacred by both Hindus and the Sikhs and though the Dal Khalsa claimed responsibility for the incident the brain-

4. The Tribune, Chandigarh, September 23 & 28, 1978.

5. The Times of India, no. 3.

6. Patriot, New Delhi, September 29, 1978.

7. The Times of India, no. 3.

8. The Tribune, Chandigarh, September 16, 1978.

9. The Tribune, Chandigarh, April 27, 1982.

work for it was obviously done by Pakistan.¹⁰ The Home Minister, Mr. Zail Singh, blamed the "foreign powers"¹¹ for the incident and the Lok Sabha unanimously adopted a resolution moved by the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi 'expressing deep anguish and concern over the acts of sacrilege' in Punjab.¹² As a fall out of the incident the Dal Khalsa and the 'National Council of Khalistan' were banned.¹³

The militants banned smoking and the sale of cigarettes around the Golden Temple¹⁴ and burnt down several shops dealing in tobacco products. But the arrest of a Bangladeshi Muslim in the process of planting cigarette-bits in the Golden Temple once again exposed the Pakistani designs. The Bangladeshi was found to be working for the ISI.¹⁵

10. National Herald, New Delhi, April 29, 1982.

11. Organizer, New Delhi, May 9, 1982.

12. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 30, 1982.

13. Joga Rao in Blitz, Bombay, May 8, 1982.

14. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 28, 1982.

15. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 12, 1982.

In September 1981, five Dal Khalsa militants hijacked an Indian Airlines Boeing and took it to Lahore.¹⁶ Though the Pakistani securitymen arrested the hijackers, they are yet to be handed over to India despite persistent Indian requests.

Again in July 1984, Sikh militants hijacked another Indian Airlines Boeing and took it to Lahore. At the Lahore Airport they were provided with a pistol by a Pakistani security official.¹⁷ When the hijackers surrendered Pakistan refused not only to hand them over to India, but even delayed their trial. In sharp contrast to this, the Dubai-authorities extradited seven militants to India when yet another Indian Airlines Boeing was hijacked and taken to Dubai.¹⁸

Pakistan has not only provided the Sikh militants with sophisticated arms [such as Kalashnikov rifles] and money, but also ran training camps for them. Thousands of young Sikh militants who crossed over to Pakistan before and after

16. Satinder Singh, Khalistan: An Academic Analysis, New Delhi, 1982, p. 116.

17. India Today, New Delhi, September 30, 1984, p. 70.

18. Ibid.

the operation Bluestar in June 1984 were housed and trained near Attock. It was believed that Lt General A.K. Niazi who led the surrender of Pakistani troops in East-Pakistan in 1971, was in-charge of training the Sikh militants.¹⁹ Pakistan on the other hand has been denying the charge of training and arming the Sikh militants but admits that there are about 2000 Sikh 'refugees' in Pakistan.²⁰

After the completion of the operation Bluestar, it was found that among the killed were a few Pakistanis dressed up as Sikh militants. A powerful transmitter was recovered from the holy tank in the Golden Temple. The receiver was apparently used by Bhindranwale and his men for taking directions from Pakistan.

By referring to the Sikh militants simply as "the Sikhs", Radio Pakistan tries to create the impression that the entire Sikh community is waging a war against the Indian Government. The Radio presented the operation Bluestar as a 'serious affront to the Sikh community from the Brahmin dominated Indian Government'.²¹

19. India Today, New Delhi, May 31, 1985, p. 108.

20. Ibid.

21. Texts of Radio Pakistan News, Summary of World Broadcasts, Reading, Part 3, June, 1984.

It is no surprise that the Sikh militancy could be controlled only after the militants' supply lines were choked by erecting electrified barbed wire fencing along Punjab's Border with Pakistan. This also broke the nexus between smugglers, arms runners, boot-leggers and militants. In my opinion, fencing of Punjab's international border has been the single most important factor responsible for breaking the back of the militants.

I believe that under Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan was supporting the idea of 'Khalistan' because it would mean a buffer state between India and Pakistan. 'Khalistan' would obviously be friendlier towards Pakistan than India. On the other hand, creation of 'Khalistan' would in all probability start the process of disintegration of India which in turn would lead to Kashmir 'falling into the lap of Pakistan'. Some scholars are of the opinion that an independent Sikh state would be a threat to Pakistan's integrity also because several holy places of the Sikhs are in Pakistan — for example Nanakana Sahib, the birth-place of Guru Nanak. However, this logic is flawed. The birth-place of Guru Gobind Singh is in Patna, but the protagonists of an

independent Sikh state have never claimed patna as part of 'Khalistan'.

Beginning with the 'Operation Black Thunder' in 1987, the tide began to turn against the Khalistanis. The Indian army launched 'operations Rakshak I and II' [1990-1992] with the aim of "sealing the border, assisting the police in cordon and search, setting up check post and conducting night patrols".²² The operations were an unqualified success and created the conditions in which elections could be held in February 1992. The Beant Singh-led Congress Party came to the power which since has done a good of polishing off the remnants of militancy.

However, there are reports that the militants are trying to re-group with the aid of Pakistan. The Punjab Police Director General Mr D.S. Mangat, said that the militants were trying to infiltrate into India through the Pakistan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Jammu and Kashmir, Nepal and Bangladesh borders. He added that the top militant leaders

22. Frontline, Madras, November 20, 1992, p. 30.

were in Pakistan which was still aiding the militants.²³ In November 1980, the five member Panthic Committee led by Dr. Sohan Singh issued a "code of conduct" for the journalists in Punjab and among other things asked them not to refer to the Panthic Committee as "Pakistan based".²⁴

In October 1992, two ISI agents were killed alongwith four Sikh militants in an encounter with the Punjab Police in Taran Taran. It was found that the agents had entered India as "tourists" on fake passports.²⁵ The ISI is trying its best to coordinate the militant activity and restore the sagging moral of the 'Khalistanis'. The Indian authorities must ensure that the violence which killed more than 10,000 people in Punjab is not revived at any cost.

PAKISTAN AND THE INDIAN MUSLIMS

The Indian Muslims have been the primary target of Pakistan's diplomacy of religion. The reasons for this are

23. The Tribune, Chandigarh, July 14, 1991.

24. The Times of India, New Delhi, November 24, 1990.

25. Frontline, Madras, November 20, 1992, p. 32.

not for to seek.. The partition riots had left a psychological scar and feeling of insecurity in the minds of the Muslims who remained behind in India due to some reason or the other. Pakistan as a champion of the Two-Nation theory believed that the Muslims who remained behind still constituted a separate nation within India and had the potential of breaking up India once again if given proper backing. Pakistan felt that the Indian experiment in secularism was doomed to failure, that the Indian state had an inherent contradiction and that the feeling of insecurity among the Indian Muslims could be exploited. Besides, Pakistan took an active interest in the affairs of the Indian Muslims to show itself off as a champion of the cause of the Islamic Ummah and to emerge as the leader of the Islamic world.

Pakistan fervently hopes that the 900 million strong Islamic Ummah would become a powerful factor on the International scene. Pakistan keeps reminding the Indian Muslims that they are not 'alone' and have powerful friends outside India.

But Pakistan seems to have underestimated the heterogeneity of the 'Muslim world'. "Islam is not a

monolithic religion, it is a sectarian religion having 72 sub-sects. There are Shias, Sunnis, Bahais, Ismailis, Ahmadiyas and many others. They are spread in several countries of the world situated in various regions such as West Asia, North Africa, South and South-east Asia, Soviet Union and China. The varying social and cultural ethos of different regions makes them different from each other. Their way of thinking, way of living and even the very attitude about Islam is not the same. Islam alone cannot be a uniting force among the Muslims of the world".²⁶ The reality is that a Bengali Muslim has more in common with the Bengali Hindu than the Sindhi Muslim. It is no surprise that the extensive propaganda by the Pakistani media calling upon the Indian Muslims to fight for their 'rights' has had little impact. The propaganda became particularly intense during the Indo-Pak wars and the Indian Muslim soldiers were called upon to "desert their units".²⁷ Recently, the Babri

26. Sheel K. Asopa, "Islamic Revivalism And Its Implications for Pakistan" in Surendra Chopra (ed), Perspective on Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p.304.

27. Texts of Radio Pakistan News, Summary of World Broadcastes, Part 3, December 1971.

Mosque issue has provided Pakistan with a golden opportunity to incite the Indian Muslims.

PAKISTAN, THE BABRI-MOSQUE AND THE BOMBAY BLASTS

Ever since the Babri Mosque controversy acquired prominence in the 1980s, Pakistan took an active interest in it and tried to make it an issue concerning all the Muslims of the world.

Passions were aroused to such an extent in Pakistan that after demolition of the Babri Mosque on December 8, 1992, there was unprecedented violence against the Hindu minority. The Pakistani Government itself supported a nationwide strike against the demolition²⁸ and openly connived with the mobs attacking Hindus' property and temples. In Lahore a Lahore Development Authority bulldozer was used to demolish a Jaina temple over three days. A Federal Minister, Raja Nadir Parvez was photographed smashing the walls of a Faisalabad temple, a pick-axe in

28. The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, December 10, 1992.

hand.²⁹ The DIG Karachi was under strict instructions of the Chief Minister, Sindh "not to challenge those protesting against the demolition of the Babri-Mosque".³⁰ The "protests" were extremely violent and bloody. Even the Indian diplomatic buildings in Karachi and Islamabad were not spared. On the other hand, the OIC expressed outrage and demanded punishment to the guilty and restoration of the Mosque.³¹ At Pakistan's initiative the Karachi Summit of the OIC Foreign Ministers asked the Indian Government to rebuild the Mosque at the "Same Spot".³²

The Bombay blasts of March 12, 1993 were a sequel to the Babri Mosque demolition and completely master-minded by Pakistan. Over 200 persons were killed and 1100 wounded as a chain of six powerful bomb-blasts ripped through Bombay on a Friday afternoon. The targets included the Bombay Stock

29. Article by Aitzaz Ahsan, The News, Lahore, December 17, 1992.

30. Ibid.

31. The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, December 10, 1992.

32. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 30, 1993.

Exchange and the Air India Building.³³ The sophisticated level of the conspiracy immediately made the ISI a prime suspect.³⁴ The attackers used their targets both for maximum economic impact and greatest casualties. It was the first time in India that car-bombs made with top quality RDX explosives were used.³⁵ The timing of the attack [Friday: 1.20-2.50 PM] was planned so as to minimize Muslim casualties and send the message to the Indian Muslims that the attack was a revenge upon the Hindus for the destruction of the Babri-Mosque [the devout Muslims are busy in prayers on Friday afternoons]. The aim was clearly to spark-off Hindu-Muslim riots which, however, was not achieved due to the maturity of mind shown by the people of Bombay and elsewhere.

In April, 1993 the Indian Government passed on certain evidences of the Pakistani involvement in the blasts to the Western Governments.³⁶ It included the flight of the Memon

33. The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, March 13, 1993.

34. Christopher Walker in The Times, London, March 13, 1993.

35. The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, March 15, 1993.

36. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 4, 1993.

brothers [who carried out the attacks] to Karachi from Dubai and Pakistan's failure to explain the Memons' presence of the Pakistani soil.³⁷ The investigation by the Indian agencies have led to the arrest of about 200 persons involved in the blasts and has brought out the nexus between the Bombay underworld, militants and the ISI in carrying out the ghastly crime. Over 6000 Kg of RDX was subsequently recovered from the sea off the Konkan coast establishing Pakistan's design to destabilize India in a big way. The interrogation of Yakub Razak Memon arrested in New Delhi in August 1994 has also established the Pakistani role in the whole affair.³⁸ As early as April 1993, Union Home Minister Mr S.B. Chavan, accused Pakistan in the Lok Sabha of "hatching a conspiracy with Dawood Ibrahim and the Memons".³⁹ The investigations have proved him right.

37. The Statesman, Calcutta, May 18, 1993.

38. The Times of India, New Delhi, August 6, 1994.

39. Frontline, Madras, May 21, 1994, p.107.

PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR

Having failed to annex Kashmir through war, Pakistan is now waging a proxy-war against India to achieve Kashmir's merger with Pakistan. Certain events which alienated the people of Kashmir from the Indian Government also helped Pakistan's cause. These included the fall of the Farooq Abdulla Government in July 1984 thanks to horse-trading, rigging in the 1987 assembly elections which brought Farooq Abdulla back to power,⁴⁰ insensitivity of the administration towards the people and rampant corruption. The Madrasa culture, the rise of the fundamentalist Islamic parties and the Pakistani propaganda led to a situation where only 5% polling took place in the 1989 General Elections. The Rubiah Sayeed incident in which the Central Government released five JKLF militants to secure the release of the daughter of the Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed⁴¹ emboldened the secessionist elements of the valley to such

40. M.J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 210-214.

41. Ibid., p. 241.

an extent that the Farooq Abdulla Government had to resign and President's rule was imposed in Kashmir with Jagmohan as Governor.

The demand for "Azadi" in Kashmir has directly been fuelled by Pakistan with material and moral support to the militants. In this, certain religious parties are acting as fronts to the Pakistani Government. "Today, estimates available from the three major groups involved in the Kashmir conflict—JII, the JUI [Fazlur Rahman] and the Jamaiat-i-Ahl-Hadees put the total number of Pakistani Mujahideen fighting in Jammu and Kashmir at over 5000... the number of the Pakistanis killed in the Kashmir conflict since 1990 is 112...they consider jihad to be a matter of one's duty to God....⁴²

These religious parties channelized and train the Pakistanis eager to become "martyrs" in the cause of Kashmir's "liberation" and help them cross over into India held Kashmir with active support of the Pakistani border guards. The Pakistani Mujahideen come mostly from the middle class and are in the age group of 12 to 62. "It is

42. Herald, Karachi, November 1994, pp. 28-29.

impossible for our critiques to understand the level of our commitment"⁴³ says Malik Yakub Awan, the head of the JII's youth wing which acts as the main organizer of the party's war effort in Kashmir. The Jamat claims that it can "hide upto 100 people in the forests around Srinagar and regularly communicate with them.... Funds for these organizations are no problem as their donation-cells collect a lot of money".⁴⁴

In addition, Pakistan has mobilized other countries' Mujahideen also to fight in Kashmir. This has been brought out in detail in the next chapter. These Mujahideen [in fact, mercenaries] had been rendered 'jobless' following the end of jihad in Afghanistan.

There have been several cases of Pakistani troops opening fire to give cover to the militants entering India.⁴⁵ The Kashmir border is difficult to police due to mountainous terrain unlike Punjab and this facilitates the crossing over of the militants.

43. Quoted, Ibid., p. 28.

44. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

45. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, August 1, 1994.

The militants' stand off against the Security forces during the 32 day Hazratbal crisis in October-November 1983 was also monitored and controlled from Pakistan.⁴⁶ However, the successful end of the siege was a major diplomatic victory for India.

Pakistan has been pampering the pro-Pakistani militant outfits like the HM and the HUA at the cost of independence-seeking organizations like the JKLF. This became clear when the HUA condemned the JKLF 'politics of dharna and fasts' to force the removal of the BSF bunkers from around the Hazratbal shrine. On the other hand the HUA put a 'ban' on the annual Amarnath Yatra.⁴⁷ While the Yatra was completed successfully, the Government removed the bunkers and handed over the Hazratbal shrine to the Muslim Auqaf Trust.

The internecine warfare between rival militants seeking 'Azadi' and merger with Pakistan respectively has left hundreds of them dead. The HM accuses the JKLF of being 'Indian agents'.

46. The Times of India, New Delhi, October 29, 1993.

47. The Pioneer, New Delhi, August 8, 1994.

Recently militancy has spread to Jammu also. It has ruined Kashmir's economy which thrived on tourism. In August 1994, two British tourists were kidnapped and the kidnappers insisted that they would be released only in the presence of the UN observers.⁴⁸

On the international fora also, Pakistan is trying to internationalize the Kashmir dispute by asking the world community to implement the UN resolution and prevent the 'violation of human rights' in the valley. Pakistan's diplomacy of religion in the OIC will be discussed in the next chapter. Pakistan has not been very successful in the UN. At the UN Human Rights Commission Meet in Geneva in March 1994, Pakistan was forced to drop its anti-India resolution. It was a golden moment for the Indian diplomacy.⁴⁹

While trying to convince the world community of Pakistan's direct complicity in fomenting violence in Kashmir, India has begun preparations for holding elections in the state. But as the burning down of the Charar-e-

48. The Telegraph, Calcutta, August 12, 1994.

49. India Today, New Delhi, March 31, 1994.

Sharif shrine by the militants in May 1995 shows, Pakistan is hell-bent upon subverting the return of normalcy to the beleaguered state.⁵⁰

But it must be said that there have been certain positive developments recently. The international community seems to be getting sick of Pakistan's efforts on Kashmir. Ms Robin Raphael, the US Under Secretary had to disclaim her controversial statements over the status of Kashmir. Besides, Pakistan came close to being named as a 'terrorist state' by the US.

Within Kashmir, the militants are fast loosing popular sympathy thanks to their excesses on the peace-loving people.⁵¹ The security forces on the other hand have been made more accountable with the creation of the National Human Rights Commission. The government has released several Kashmiri leaders from jail so as to make the atmosphere conducive for holding elections. These leaders include Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the JII, Abdul Gani Lone of the APHC and Shabbir Shah of the Peoples' League. In

50. Ibid, New Delhi, May 31, 1995.

51. Pioneer, New Delhi, August 20, 1994.

addition, the Centre has announced a Rs.750 crore package for Jammu and Kashmir.⁵² Moreover, the Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao has taken direct charge of Kashmir affairs and created a separate department for Kashmir in the Prime Minister's Office.⁵³ Mr Farooq Abdulla has returned from London and is taking active interest in Kashmir politics.

However, Pakistan remains intransigent. In an interview to the BBC, Ms Benazir Bhutto opposed the "Third Option" and said that a solution to the problem had to be in line with the UN Resolutions. Foreign Minister, Sardar Assef Ali, stressed that by holding elections, India could not 'internalize an international problem'.⁵⁴

The Commission on International Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences said in a report that 'arms from Pakistan had a major impact on the scale and severity of the conflict in Kashmir'.⁵⁵ There have been

52. The Times of India, New Delhi, October 17, 1994.

53. Ibid, November 3, 1994.

54. Quoted, The Times of India, December 2, 1994.

55. Asian Recorder, Vol. XXXXI, no. 12, March 19-25, 1995, New Delhi, p. 24659.

many other independent proofs of Pakistan's involvement in the Kashmir crisis.

PAKISTANI SUBVERSION IN THE REST OF INDIA

The ISI has been implicated in several bomb blasts against specific targets in Madras. These include the blasts at the RSS Headquarters, the Hindu Munnani Office⁵⁶ and the residence of Mr Mani Ratnam, director of the film 'Bombay'.⁵⁷

In the insurgency in the North-east too, the ISI is directly involved. It is operating from Bangladesh with Sylhet as Headquarters. Five ISI operatives were reported to have entered Manipur and were functioning as the think-tank of the Muviah faction of the NSCN. The ISI is also trying to instigate the Muslim Youth in the communally-sensitive districts of Assam.⁵⁸

56. Frontline, Madras, May 5, 1995, p. 16.

57. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 9, 1995.

58. Sunday, Vol. 20, Issue 41, Calcutta, October 16, 1993, p. 14.

There are several such examples all of which need not be elaborated here.

From the above discussion, it is obvious that Pakistan is a major cause of several violent disturbances in India and it is also partly responsible for creating communal disharmony and social discord in this country. The 'Conclusions' section would analyse the impact of Pakistan's use of religion as a diplomatic instrument on the Indian society as well as the Pakistani society. Here we can end this chapter by observing that Pakistan has been successful in achieving its objective of destabilizing India but has so far failed to create 'Khalistan' and to annex Kashmir.

CHAPTER 4

**MOBILIZATION OF 'INTERNATIONAL
ISLAM' AGAINST INDIA**

Pakistan has always been trying to mobilize international opinion against India so as to put its neighbour at a diplomatic disadvantage. In its efforts, Pakistan has found that a large chunk of the international community represented by more than 70 Islamic countries is comparatively easily mobilized to toe the Pakistani line against India. This has the potential of putting India under considerable pressure.

In this chapter, we shall try to find out why Pakistan and the rest of the Islamic world are important to each other and how India's perception of the Islamic world is different from that of Pakistan. An idea of the extent of mobilization of 'international Islam' against India would be had from a discussion on the 'physical' international Islamic participation in the conflict in Kashmir and the India-related diplomatic maneuvers in the Islamic bodies such as the OIC.

"The Muslim world stretches over a vast area of the globe from Indonesia in the East to Morocco in the West".¹ Islam is almost the only binding force among the various

1. S.S. Bindra, Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1988, p. 300.

Muslim nations and ethnic groups. The Muslim world has a unique strategic location which is important to India and the other major global powers.

As Pakistan is an ideological state and its geo-strategic stature has come to occupy a position of prominence in the Muslim world's strategic thinking, it [Pakistan] is recognized as an 'earthenware pot squeezed among iron pots: [former] Soviet Union, India, China and America'. The Muslim nations are aware that Pakistan's location gives it an internationally important position among the Muslim nations as it is having links with the Muslim countries of the Middle-East having plenty of oil. Further in the west lie the Arab countries of North Africa. One can rightly say that Pakistan is like 'a bridge between the Middle East and South Asia' as well as a link from the North Arabian sea board to the heart of Russia and also the South Western part of the People's Republic of China.

If Pakistan is important for the Muslim countries, the latter are even more important to Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, started stressing the need for cohesion among the Muslim states and was keen to see a broad cooperation evolving among them inspired by a common identity. In an *Id* message to brother Muslim states in August 1948, he

categorically declared that "the drama of power politics that is being staged in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir should serve as an eye-opener to us.....it is only by putting up a united front that we can make our voice felt in the countries of the world".² Even in the pre-independence period, Jinnah had taken an active interest in the affairs of the Muslim countries. In September 1936, he demanded a clarification of the British policy towards Palestine. In August 1938, he instructed his partymen to hold meetings throughout India and demonstrate the solidarity of Indian Muslims with the 'struggling Arabs' by passing a resolution and to voice its deep concern and violent opposition to the proposed partitioning of Palestine. In other words, geographical barriers did not desist Jinnah from playing the role of an 'enlightened Muslim leader'.

The Indian Muslims not only helped and supported the cause of the Arabs through speeches and resolutions but also collected funds and sent delegations to Muslim countries and Europe so as to present the viewpoint of the Muslims of India on the issue of Palestine.

2. Quoted, *ibid*, p. 301.

But the process of taking interest in the international Muslim matters had been institutionalized even earlier when both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League participated in the Khilafat Movement. An event which had taken place in a distant land became a primary concern of the Indian Muslims and its impact was powerful enough to bring together the Congress and the League by the Lucknow Pact of 1916. That the Indian Muslims were over-exercised over the Khilafat question became obvious when Kamal Pasha, himself a Muslim abolished the institution of Khilafat in 1924 without eliciting much opposition.

After independence, it has always been the desire of political elites of both India and Pakistan to maintain close relations with the Muslim world. However in this, whereas India has been guided more by economic interests [oil politics], a feeling of Third Worldly brotherhood and appreciation of the need for a strong Afro-Asian interest group to counter-balance the western powers, Pakistan's prime consideration has been its commonality of religion with the other Islamic countries. Pakistan not only wants to harness economic, political and military benefits by maintaining brotherly relations with other Muslim countries but also desires that the same benefits should not accrue to India because it is a non-Islamic country.

It might be noted here that the Muslim world by and large supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971. On the issue of Kashmir also most of the Muslim countries have been supporting Pakistan.

Besides the Islamic world has played an important role in the economic and industrial development of Pakistan, particularly after 1973-74. By 1976, the Arab world had given loan and credits worth \$993 million or almost one-third of all the financial aid from foreign sources over the previous three years.³

Of all the Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia is Pakistan's closest ally. "Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were both created in the name of Islam and their people are consciously aware of the fact, comparing Saudi Arabia to the cradle of Islam and Pakistan to its citadel both committed to the unity of the Islamic ummah on the basis of Kalima-e-Tayyaba".⁴ They were brought even closer by certain developments in the 1970s in both South Asia and West Asia. Nasser of Egypt died in 1970 and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia emerged as a prominent Arab leader. Meanwhile Pakistan was

3. Ibid., p. 302.

4. Gulshan Dhanani, "Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: An Alliance for Survival" in Surendra Chopra [ed], Perspective on Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Amritsar, 1983, p. 347.

dismembered in December 1971 and the new leadership under Z.A. Bhutto was willing to make fresh moves on the world arena. On the other hand, Israel won the third Arab-Israel War against Egypt with the result that need was felt for greater mutual cooperation among the Islamic countries to fight the 'zionist forces aided by the west'. This had a salutary effect on the relationship of Pakistan with all the other Arab states.

Bhutto was particularly keen to have mutual respect, even affection with several Arab leaders, notably Muammar Gaddafi, Yasser Arafat, Sheikh Zayad [President of the UAE] and the king of Saudi Arabia. Bhutto won their confidence by offering them cooperation on their terms and for their good and by assuring them that Pakistan did not desire a hegemonic role, and that it did not see Iran or any Arab State in the area as a rival. "He supported Arab and Islamic causes in his meetings with these rulers and leaders and he articulated their concern eloquently in international forums. The Islamic Summit in Lahore in February 1977 had been a grand affair and so was an international conference on the Life of the Prophet two years later".⁵

5. Anwar H. Syed, The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, London, 1992, pp. 163-164.

King Khalid of Saudi Arabia paid a state visit to Pakistan in October 1976 during which he and Bhutto described Islam as the basis of their nationhoods and a base of unfailing strength and indestructible solidarity between their two countries. It was no surprise that the King called for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute according to the relevant UN resolutions while Z.A. Bhutto demanded Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories.

Pakistan received considerable financial assistance from Arab sources as shown below, when Bhutto was the Prime Minister.⁶

Source	Assistance	Purpose
Saudi Arabia	1974: \$100 million interest free loan	Project aid for one Fertilizer Plant, two Cement Plants, one Polyester Plant
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency	1975-6: \$30 million grant	Help Balance the Payments Deficit.
Saudi Development Fund	1976 : \$30 million loan at 4% interest	Fertilizer Plant
	1976 : \$10 million donation	Build Islamic Centre

6. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1977-78, pp. 123-29.

	1976 : \$20 million donation	"Social Programme"
Abu Dhabi [UAE]	1974-5: \$100 loan at 2.5% interest.	"General Purposes"
	\$31 million equity participation	Fertilizer Plant
	\$21.6 m. equity participation	Refinery
Kuwait [Fund for Arab Economic Development]	1977 : \$44.2 m. pledged loan at 4% interest	Power Transmission
	\$25 m pledged loan at 4% interest	Improvement of Pakistan railways
Qatar	1974:\$10 m. pledged loan at 3% interest	Open
Libya	1973-74:\$30 m.grant	BOP support
	1974-75 : \$50 m. Libyan 'deposit' with the State Bank of Pakistan	BOP support
OPEC Special Fund	\$21.45 m. interest free loan	BOP support

In return Pakistani pilots operated military and commercial aircraft in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya and numerous Pakistanis served as advisers in these countries. Pakistanis enlisted in the local military and

police forces in Oman. Citizens of Kuwait, the Emirates etc. attended Pakistani colleges and other institutions.

Bhutto opened the way for an increasing number of Pakistanis to find employment in the Middle East and by 1977 almost 700,000 Pakistanis worked in the region. In 1978, remittances sent by them which Pakistan received in foreign currency had reached \$1.5 billion.

Among the non-Arab States, Pakistan always had close relationship with Iran, with both the countries being allies of the US till the fall of the Shah. Iran gave loans of \$580 million in 1974 and \$ 110 million in 1976 to Pakistan and the two nations negotiated several joint ventures. There was political proximity also. In his public statements Bhutto applauded the cooperation between Pakistan and Iran, he even publicised the details of the assistance Iran had given to Pakistan during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. The Shah preferred to have Pakistan as a 'buffer state between India and Iran'.

The upshot of the above discussion is that Pakistan has been greatly strengthened vis-a-vis India thanks to its 'special' brotherly relationship with most of the Islamic countries. And this relationship has been built up painstakingly over a long period by Pakistan. One of the major objects of the Muslim League which brought Pakistan into existence was to cement and strengthen fraternal ties

between Muslims of the sub-continent and those of other parts of the world. In 1949, the World Muslim Conference met in Karachi and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan reaffirmed the desire for Muslim unity "to us in Pakistan, nothing is dearer than the prospect of strengthening the worldwide Muslim brotherhood".⁷ Pakistan was encouraged to seek improved relations with the Muslim world because it wanted to have as much support against India [over Kashmir] as possible.

In November 1949, the International Islamic Economic Conference was held in Karachi. The conference recommended the formation of a 'Commonwealth of Islamic Countries' to bring about economic cooperation etc. On diplomatic level, treaties of friendship were signed with a number of Muslim countries such as Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Soon the cooperation was extended to the military field. Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad Pact denounced by Nehru as 'worse than SEATO'.

"The Suez invasion brought deep and basic loyalties of Pakistan to the Islamic brotherhood to the surface. Never before in Pakistan's short history, except for the imminent threat to its own security from India, was such spontaneous

7. Quoted, Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-1958: A Historical Review, Islamabad, 1992, p. 187.

reaction shown by the people.... In response to Egyptian Government's appeal for 'volunteers and arms'; hundreds of Pakistanis offered their services to fight for Egypt".⁸

Besides the Suez crisis and the Arab-Israel wars, another event which cemented Pakistan's relations with most of the Muslim countries was the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan. India played into Pakistan's hands by failing to condemn the aggression outright and thus India lost a lot of sympathy in the Muslim capitals. For most of the Islamic countries, the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan became an emotive issue with security implications and Pakistan reaped a good harvest of international goodwill by emerging as a 'frontline state' and doing everything possible to check the further advance of the Russian bear. Pakistan became the spring-board of the guerrilla warfare that the Afghan Mujahideen launched against the Soviet backed Kabul Government with telling effect. Not only the US, but other Muslim countries also helped Pakistan both financially and militarily since it was Pakistan which was the actual sponsor of the 'jihad' in Afghanistan. The training camps located mostly in the NWFP of Pakistan were infested not only with Afghan but also Sudanese, Egyptian, Lebanese,

8. Ibid., p. 194.

Pakistani and many other Muslim countries' fighters who hoped to attain martyrdom in the cause of Islam. India as an ally of the 'puppet' Kabul government and the USSR, became an object of hatred for most of the hard-core Islamic elements across the world.

Following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Najibullah Government in Kabul, Pakistan successfully embarked upon the scheme of diverting the 'jihad spirit' towards Kashmir 'where the Muslims were fighting the infidels for liberation'. According to Malik Yakub Awan, the head of the Jamat-i-Islami's youth wing [of Pakistan], "A lot of our boys had fought the jihad in Afghanistan. You probably do not know this but jihad is an extremely addictive thing. If you are in it once, you are in it for life".⁹

It is no surprise that the 'Holy Warriors of Islam' who had come from distant lands and had nothing to do after the end of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan could easily be motivated by the Pakistani agencies to join the 'jihad' in Kashmir.

On May 22, 1992 the Statesman [New Delhi] reported "The State Government [of J&K] has begun investigations following

9. Quoted, Herald, November, 1994, Islamabad, p. 129.

reports that several hundred Afghan Mujahideen have sneaked in, to fight alongside Kashmiri insurgents for separation of Jammu and Kashmir from the Indian Union". On the same date UNI and PTI quoting Radio Pakistan reported that the new Government in Afghanistan would support the terrorists in the Kashmir Valley. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan told a press conference that Afghanistan had won its jihad and would now support all nations struggling for freedom.¹⁰

A fresh batch of 'over 200 highly trained and armed' Mujahideen was reported to have entered the Kashmir Valley in July 1992 "adding a new dimension to terrorist activities there".¹¹ The BSF Chief, Prakash Singh was quoted as saying that more than 2300 Pak-trained foreign mercenaries from at least six countries were fighting the Indian security forces in Kashmir. "They are equipped with heavy fire-power weapons that can even blow up helicopter and aircraft. They have been briefed, indoctrinated, armed

10. A.K. Ray, 'Afghan Factor in Central and South Asian Politics' in Trans Asia Informatics, New Delhi, 1994, p. 43.

11. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 23, 1992.

and trained by the ISI".¹² The mercenaries came mostly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Libya and Algeria.

There are eight major Afghan Mujahideen groups operating against the Indian security forces in Kashmir — Hezb-e-Islami [Hikmatyar and Khalis factions], Jamiat-i-Islami, Ittehad-i-Islami, Harkat-i-inquilabi-i-Islami, Mahaz-i-Milli, Hezb-i-Wahdat and Jabba-i-Nijat-i-Milli.¹³

Harkat-ul-Ansar is another powerful militant group based mostly on Pakistani, Afghan and Arab mercenaries. It is believed that the group is behind the recent kidnapping of four British and American tourists in Pahalgam even though the kidnappers have tried to hide their identity behind the hitherto unknown group Al Farhan.¹⁴ The Ansar has its fund headquarters in Pakistan and its fund collection centres 'for the ongoing jihad in Kashmir' can be spotted in all major Pakistani cities.

"The real purpose behind this move [induction of mercenaries] is two-fold, first to escalate the level of

12. The Kashmir Times, Srinagar, October 22, 1993.

13. Ray, n. 10, pp. 67-69.

14. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 7-8, 1995.

militancy in the Valley from the hit and run stage to that of defensive-offensive operations carried out from well protected bases and involving increasingly long engagements with the security forces and secondly, to use this stage to train and harden the local militants to go on the tactical offensive stage with better arms, logistics, fighting methods and experience in field command....the escalation will be presented as a new phase in the liberation struggle a la Afghanistan as well as an Islamic struggle against infidels — the latter for consumption in the Islamic countries".¹⁵

There is little doubt that whereas 'jihad' is concerned, Pakistan has been able to establish an emotional linkage of conflicts raging in Bosnia, Palestine and [earlier] Afghanistan with that of Kashmir, particularly in the minds of the ruling elites of the Islamic countries.

This is amply reflected in the stand taken by the Islamic states in various Islamic fora, most important of which is the OIC.

In May 1979, an international conference of 27 Islamic countries in London asked the UN to support the holding of a

15. Ray, no. 10, p. 46.

'free plebiscite' in 'India held Kashmir' and called for the liberation of all 'Muslim lands' from non-Muslim domination. The conference also sought the help of the OIC, the OAU and the NAM and set up an international secretariat in London to achieve its objective. India was firmly told not to 'tamper' with the demographic character of 'disputed territories'.¹⁶

The OIC Foreign Ministers' conference at Cairo in August 1990 urged India to 'abide by the commitment of self determination for the people of Kashmir' and to allow a fact-finding mission in Kashmir. India rejected the suggestion, made several times since without any better result. Even though over the last couple of years India has been pursuing a policy of 'transparency' vis-a-vis Kashmir, it has not allowed an OIC 'fact-finding' mission to visit Kashmir as the mission's findings are likely to be impartial and exaggerated. On the other hand, in a master-stroke of diplomacy India has allowed some other delegations to visit Kashmir — for example those from the European Union, the ICRC, the Amnesty International etc.

16. The Times of India and The Indian Express, New Delhi, May 29, 1979.

Pakistan believes that if properly mobilized, the Islamic bloc can force India to make concessions which in the end would benefit Pakistan. "OIC is the joint platform of the Muslim states of the world, with a membership little less than one-third of the UN General Assembly. Seventy per cent of Indian manufactures are imported and consumed by the Muslim world and a large number of Indians including non-Muslims are working and earning livelihood in the Gulf countries. A sister organization of the OIC, Rabita Alami-Islam said recently if India continued to deny...the Muslims of Kashmir and kept maltreating the Muslims of India, the Muslim States would be constrained to cut off trade relations with India, besides stopping the employment of Hindus in their lands".¹⁷

Pakistan is trying its best to prove to the Islamic Ummah that Indian secularism is a fraud and the Ummah must react suitably "when mosques in India and Kashmir are being desecrated and demolished by the Hindu zealots at will, when Muslim girls are being gang raped inside mosques and when murder is the order of the day in India"¹⁸ [of the Muslims].

17. Mir Abdul Aziz, "Indian Affront to the OIC", The Frontier Post, Peshawar, February 18, 1993.

18. Ibid.

Pakistan achieved considerable success when the OIC Foreign Ministers' conference in Karachi in April 1993 adopted strongly anti-Indian resolutions. Showing great satisfaction over this, acting foreign minister, Farooq Leghari of Pakistan said that a consensus had been reached on all the political issues confronting the OIC member states including Kashmir, Bosnia etc.¹⁹ For the first time on the Kashmir dispute, a resolution was adopted equating the 'atrocities and human rights violations' against the Kashmiri people by the Indian troops with the atrocities committed on Boanian and the Palestinian Muslims.

The recommendations of the conference included imposing trade and economic sanctions against India and restricting scientific, cultural, manpower and other exchanges with India. The member-states were called upon to 'mobilize funds and to contribute generously towards providing assistance to the Kashmiri people and to 'persuade India to abide by the UN resolutions on Kashmir'.

Most of the Islamic countries led by Pakistan condemned the demolition of the Babri-Mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992 by Hindu zealots and expressed apprehensions about the

19. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 30, 1993.

welfare of the Indian Muslims. In fact, the demolition of the mosque was a major victory for Pakistan whose argument had always been that the Indian secularism was no more than a facade for Hindu communalism. The Karachi summit passed a resolution on Ayodhya also; seeking 'safeguards for rights and welfare' of Muslims in India and urging the Indian government to rebuild the mosque at the 'same spot'. Decrying the Pakistani role in the adoption of such a resolution, Indian minister of state for external affairs, Mr Salman Khursheed said India was perfectly capable of looking after all its citizens without exception.²⁰

Pakistan frequently sends delegations from the POK to the OIC meetings in a bid to lend greater authenticity to its claims. For a change India allowed a delegation of the Hurriyat conference leaders to attend the Casablanca summit of the OIC in December 1994. But for India to defend itself in the OIC [the Indian delegation was not allowed to participate in the Rabat summit in 1969] without being a member is difficult, particularly when Pakistan is already an important member of the organization. Recently, a debate has been opened on whether India should seek the membership

20. Ibid.

of the OIC in order to counter Pakistan 'from within'.²¹ However, I do not think that opening another front against Pakistan would be of much use to India, particularly when the OIC is a 'lot of bark and no bite'. By giving undue importance to everything that Pakistan says, we shall be falling into its trap. Moreover, becoming a member of a religion-based organization would be inconsistent with our policy of secularism.

At the same time, in April 1994, India was obliged to send one of its top foreign officials, Mr Salman Hyder to the Jeddah headquarters of the OIC in an attempt to soften the OIC's hardline against India.²² Yet in the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers [ICFM] in Islamabad in September 1994, Pakistan succeeded in establishing an 'OIC Contact Group' on Kashmir in order to better coordinate the attempts at internationalizing the Kashmir issue in the UN. This was a result of the lesson that Pakistan had learnt following its failure to raise the Kashmir issue at the UN Human Rights Commission meet in Geneva in March 1994.

21. Dr Zafar Imam favours a positive Indian attitude towards the OIC. See The Times of India, New Delhi, Sept. 12, 1994.

22. The Hindu, Madras, April 22, 1994.

Subsequently, even in the UN General Assembly session Pakistan's anti-India resolution could not be passed.

From the above discussion the conclusion can be drawn that most of the Islamic countries adopt a dual policy with regard to Kashmir in particular and treatment of the Indian Muslims in general. While they take a strong stand against India in various Islamic fora such as the OIC, they are much softer when dealing with India bilaterally or in any secular forum such as the UN. The explanation for this dual behaviour lies in the demands of realpolitik and national interest which still is a prime consideration for most of the Islamic countries. From the economic point of view at least, India is more important to an average Muslim nation than Pakistan. It is no surprise that during his recent visit to India, President Hashmi Rafsanjani of Iran played down the Kashmir and the Babri Mosque issues. After all, as a sworn enemy of the USA, Iran can rely more on India than on Pakistan which has always been a 'US stooge'.

In this context, it is no surprise that the Pakistani agenda was up-staged at the Casablanca summit of the OIC. On the contrary, the OIC member states were called upon to 'refuse to finance or support terrorist acts and to make sure their territory was not used by violent groups to plan

or carry out attacks'. President Hosni Mubarak took the lead in denouncing religious extremism and its export, which he said had hurt the image of Islam.²³ Indeed states like Egypt and Algeria have been major victims of Islamic terrorism. Though the routine anti-India resolution on Kashmir was passed at Casablanca, Pakistan's discomfort was palpable at the independent stance adopted by the Hurriyat delegates.²⁴

Regarding the OIC and its anti-India pronouncements, India has three options to choose from. The first is to totally ignore the OIC like South Africa and Israel did to NAM. The second option is to cultivate to a point of steadfastness a small group of African and Arab nations who would support India's case. The third option is to take a tough stand against countries like Iran who keep a double face in order to enjoy double benefits. They must be told to choose between India and Pakistan. In addition, most of the OIC countries' anti-people policies can be exposed [like the number of Muslims killed by Muslims regimes] to prove that they hardly qualify to champion the cause of the Indian

23. The Bangkok Post, Bangkok, Dec. 12, 1994.

24. The Times of India, New Delhi, Dec. 17, 1994.

Muslims; who in any case enjoy more freedom than their Muslim brethren in most of the Islamic countries. I feel that a policy which is a judicious mixture of all the three options should be followed by India. Besides India should deal with each Islamic country separately and merit-wise and must not mistake all of them as homogeneous entities. The OIC suffers from a lot of intra-organizational infighting which can be exploited to good effect. Besides the governments in most of the OIC countries lack in popular legitimacy. It is significant that a conference of 8000 Muslims in London in August 1994; besides calling for the establishment of a 'global Islamic state' ominously noted, "All regimes in the Islamic world have no legitimacy in Islamic law".²⁵

The Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO], another Islamic body and smaller than the OIC, has also become a victim of internal pulls and pressures as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey carry out their diplomatic battles for its domination. A major aim of Pakistan is to incorporate the newly independent central Asian Republics into an anti-India grouping through the ECO.²⁶

25. The Bangkok Post, Bangkok, Aug. 9, 1994.

26. The Observer, New Delhi, May 3, 1993.

While it is not easy at this point of time to gauge the extent of the success of Pakistani efforts in mobilizing 'international Islam' against India, the present Pakistani government is not only claiming a great deal of success but also blaming the former regimes of not doing enough to pressurise India. While there seems to be an element of truth in the claim, the chest-thumping itself is a direct result of a certain sad reality of Pakistan's domestic politics in which the government and the opposition alike try to out-shout each other in India bashing and making tall anti-India claims and promises.

Nawabzada Nasrulla Khan, Chairman of the Kashmir Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan in an address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs remarked "our previous governments failed to arouse world public opinion on this [Kashmir] issue and they could also not impress upon the Muslim countries the seriousness of the problem.... In a summit of heads of Islamic countries in Lahore the only item on agenda was Palestine. Since the Balfour Declaration all the Muslim leaders of the sub-continent have opposed the claim of the Jews on Palestine. It pains one that our Arab brothers are now vying with each other to seek Israel's honour. Pakistan has not recognized Israel.... Israeli Commandos visited Srinagar to destroy Pakistan's nuclear plant at Kahuta....

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"Such was the pathetic condition when after the formation of the Kashmir Committee, the first step taken was to give a call for a general strike in Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and the occupied Kashmir".²⁷ Mr Khan then went on to give the details and achievements of the five delegations that had been sent to different countries by Pakistan to mobilize world opinion on Kashmir. Mr Khan lamented that in 1962 Pakistan lost an excellent opportunity of invading [and occupying] Kashmir during the Sino-Indian War.

The Benazir government has indeed succeeded in making Kashmir an emotive issue for most of the Muslim commoners the world over, but the limitation of the Pakistani diplomacy lies in the fact that for most of the Muslim governments; pragmatism and caution are still prime considerations and not religious sentimentality. Their support to the Kashmiri insurgents is confined by and large to lip-service and some form of financial aid. Of course, they do not discourage their nationals wanting to join the 'jihad' in Kashmir. Till now there is little indication that any Muslim country [other than Pakistan] would enter the conflict in Kashmir in a big way.

27. Text of the Address, Pakistan Horizon, Vol.47, No.3, July 1994, pp. 23-26.

On the condition of the Indian Muslims in general, the Islamic countries have continued to make irresponsible statements but they very well realize that [a] India is the country with the second largest Muslim population [b]. The Indian Muslims have no alternative but to live with the Hindus [c] Outside interference in 'favour' of the Indian Muslims could invite a Hindu backlash against them and [d] the 'Ummah' has too much cultural, racial and linguistic diversities and it is not possible to turn it into a single political entity.

Besides, India cannot be irritated beyond a point on the issue of the Indian Muslims. There are economic and other considerations. Pakistan cannot be an alternative to India even if it wanted to be.

The above are the considerations which hinder the formation of a monolithic 'international Islam' as an enemy to India, but it would be in India's interest to never drop its guard and pursue the right mix of diplomacy. Every Indian is aware that 'divided we fall' but 'united they win' is equally true. The Vijayanagara Empire fell the day the five Bahmani Kingdoms united. We must learn from history particularly at a time when Pakistan is doing everything fair and foul to subvert India and a clash of civilizations is being touted as the basis of most future international conflicts.

CONCLUSIONS

Having discussed the various aspects of Pakistan's use of religion as a diplomatic instrument, it is now time to take stock. In this section, the extent of the success or otherwise of Pakistan's diplomacy of religion and its impact on the Indian society would be discussed. The overall impact of the diplomacy of religion on Indo-Pak relations would be elaborated and in the light of broad generalisations an attempt would be made to visualise the Indo-Pak relations in the coming years and the likely role of religion in it.

It has been shown that Pakistan has a vested interest in keeping India weak and destabilized. An instable, insecure and weak India as per the zero-sum game that dominates the Pakistani policy makers' minds, is equivalent to an equally stable, secure and strong Pakistan. In Pakistan, there is a tendency to compare everything — from the per capita income to the level of violence, with India and a favourable comparison evokes a great deal of satisfaction and is seen as a sign of the country's progress. This, of course, is a result of the manner in which India and Pakistan were partitioned and the fact that they embarked upon separate careers as independent nations from the same starting block.

Over the last fifteen years, Pakistan has succeeded in destabilizing India to such an extent that our resources are stratched to the limit in preserving the unity and integrity of the country. This is a situation of proxy-war waged by Pakistan with deadly effect from the Punjab to Bombay to Kashmir. With the hand of the ISI becoming obvious in aiding the North-Eastern guerrilla outfits¹ and engineering bomb blasts on moving trains on the anniversary of the Babri Mosque demolition in 1993,² no part of India can be said to be safe from Pakistan's design to destablize it.

The worst feature of this proxy war from the Indian point of view is that not only it is being fought on the Indian territory, but also all the attendant losses in men and material are almost wholly Indian. At a very little cost of itself, Pakistan can sustain the proxy war indefinitely. On the other hand, irrespective of whether a militant, a civilian or a securityman is killed and whether a hospital or a bunker is destroyed — it is India which is invariable the loser.

1. The Sunday, Vol.20, Issue 41, Calcutta, 16 Oct. 1993, p. 14.

2. Ibid., Vol.20, Issue 49, Calcutta, 12 Dec 1993, p.27.

Pakistan has not only motivated and armed a section of the Indian Sikhs and the Muslims into waging wars for separation, it has also tried to provide a religious rationale for their activities. The rationale for the Bombay blasts of March 12, 1993 was the demolition of the Mosque in Ayodhya and the aim was to take revenge from the Hindus for the demolition and the post-demolition riots.³ Besides, the nexus of the ISI, the Bombay underworld and the militants was clever enough to carry out the bombings on a Friday afternoon [1.20-2.50 PM] when the devout Muslims were busy in prayers so as to minimise the Muslim casualties.⁴ The aim was clearly to incite communal feelings and to present the blasts as Muslims' revenge upon the Hindus. However, the perpetrators of the heinous crime must have been disappointed by the fact that the people of Bombay and elsewhere took the blasts in their stride with great forbearance and no major riots broke out anywhere in India as a response to it.

Similarly, separatist movements in the Punjab and Kashmir have had a definite communal tinge with the Punjab militants imposing 'dress codes' and banning the sale of

3. Christopher Walker in The Times, London, March 13, 1993.

4. The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, March 13, 1993.

tobacco, meat and liquor and seeking the establishment of the 'rule of Khalsa' whereas the Kashmiri militants are waging a 'jihad' to 'liberate' Islam in the valley. Religious bigotry has been a major sustaining force of militancy in these states.

Pakistan's success can be gauged from the fact that hundreds of thousands of Indian regular and paramilitary troops have had to be deployed in the Punjab and Kashmir to fight insurgency. The local police was under-equipped to fight the highly motivated and well armed militants and in many cases, the police connived with them out of fear or sympathy. The army whose primary task is to fight external aggression was deployed for "sealing the border, assisting the police in cordon and search, setting up checkpoints and conducting night patrols in the Punjab" during operations Rakshak I and II [1990 to 1992].⁵ Kashmir has been hotter with many more army casualties. As for the BSF whose main task is the protection of the borders, most of its total number of 147 battalions are deployed for 'internal security'. Other para military agencies such as the CRPF, the ITBP, the NSG and the Rashtriya Rifles are also fully

5. Frontline, Madras, November 20, 1992, p.30.

stretched with many of their units deployed for the security of the VIPs who live in constant fear of the military attack.

In other words, Pakistan has not only imposed a proxy war on India, it has left India in no position to retaliate militarily. Pakistan hopes that India would be forced to leave Kashmir if the level of military, economic and other losses become unacceptable to the people of the rest of India. Meanwhile, the nuclear balance of power in South Asia means that chances of open war between India and Pakistan are slim, whatever the provocation. Pakistan is already deploying the M II Missiles received from China. These missiles can carry nuclear warheads and Delhi and Bombay are well within their range.⁶ India's nuclear capability is also undoubted and it also has the delivery system in the form of Prithvi missiles.

BRUTALIZATION OF THE INDIAN SOCIETY

The impact of the practice of Pakistan's diplomacy of religion on the Indian society has been profound. With

6. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 11, 1995.

arson, violence and mayhem becoming the order of the day, the sensibilities of the Indians have been dulled and the society as a whole has been brutalized to a great extent. The newspapers' reports of militancy related violence does not attract more than a cursory glance from the readers. People are fast becoming immune from the disturbing psychological impact of such reports. On the other hand, the right wing parties like the BJP and the Shiv Sena have emerged stronger and as 'champions' of Indian nationalism, thanks to the other parties' perceived 'soft line' on external and internal threats to India's unity and integrity. The communal feelings have also been sharpened with a section of the Indian Muslims being accused of harbouring 'pro-Pakistani sentiments and loyalties'. On the other hand, a section of the Muslims feels that its religious and cultural identity is endangered in India. This is reflected in the call for boycott and censorship against the film 'Bombay' and the attack on its director Mani Ratnam in Madras.⁷

7. Ibid., July 11-12, 1995.

RELIGION AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS

India must realize that knee-jerk reactions cannot counter Pakistan's use of religion as a diplomatic device against India. Pakistan is neither the first nor the only country taking recourse to misuse of religion for political purposes. In the post-Cold War period, religious and ethnic identities have particularly been sharpened the world over and have led to conflicts as in Bosnia, Chechnya, Azerbaizan and Kashmir. In most of these cases, the neighbouring countries have been stoking the fires for their own purpose.

Besides, as mentioned in Chapter II, Pakistan's use of religion as a diplomatic instrument is based on solid foundations - ideological, domestic and realistic. Mobilization of 'international Islam' against India also is a part of the Pakistani policy for solid reasons. The Indian policy-makers and diplomats must be pragmatic and accept the facts as they are. Nobody can wish away the reality that religion-wise India is an extremely heterogeneous country and it can safely be predicted that in the coming years also Pakistan would continue to try and exploit this heterogeneity. The answer to this threat lies as much in social conciliation as in breaking the back of the

insurgents cutting off their supply routes and blunting Pakistan's diplomatic aggression in international fora.

Efforts by Pakistan to paint India as 'the sickman of Asia'⁸ and a violator of international norms must be countered at all levels. Pakistan is obviously trying to isolate India in the international community. To the western audience, Pakistan is trying to project India as a 'violator of human rights and international norms' whereas to the Islamic countries, it is being shown as an 'oppressor of Muslims'.

India should expose to the international community, the role of Pakistan in sponsoring and exporting fundamentalism and terrorism to India. Besides, the human rights violations by the militants should also be accounted for. There is a tendency in India and abroad among intellectuals to shed profuse tears on the alleged human rights violations of the terrorists to the exclusion of that of the security forces who have to work under tremendous constraint and pressure. Besides the violation of the human rights of the civilians by the securitymen is given a lot of publicity in the media

8. P.O.I., Pakistan Series, Vol.XXII, No.33, New Delhi, February 12, 1994, p. 317.

and in seminars whereas the same crime committed by the terrorists is hardly taken note of.

It is not that Pakistan is not suffering from the ill-effects of its own India [and earlier Afghanistan] policy. Drug and Kalashnikov cultures have spread across Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalism has emerged as a major threat to the government. Sectarian, ethnic and religious conflicts are taking a heavy toll as in Karachi. The violent Islamic insurgency in the Malakand sub-division of the NWFP in October 1994 has dangerous portends for the Pakistani government and the society. The insurgents were demanding the imposition of the Islamic sharia.⁹

Domestic politics always has a bearing on a nation's foreign policy but in the case of Pakistan, foreign policy [particularly India policy] is fast becoming a hostage of the domestic politics. Today no Pakistani leader or ruler can afford to be seen as 'being soft' on India — that will be tantamount to political harakiri. India-baiting for them has become both a habit and compulsion.

9. Zafar Abbas in Herald, Karachi, November 1994, p. 45.

In such a situation it is easy to see that irrespective of 'track 1, 2 or 3 diplomacy' Pakistani policies will continue to be hostile towards India, also because it has developed nuclear deterrence against a possible Indian invasion. Events like the Mosque demolition serve to provide Pakistan with opportunities which it grabs with both the hands. For India, it is going to be a long haul in Kashmir and elsewhere. The burning down of the Charar-i-Sharif Shrine [to prevent elections in Kashmir] goes to show the potency and commitment of the Pakistani involvement in destabilizing India.

Presently Indo-Pak relations are at such a low depth that diplomacy alone has little chance of improving them. The answer for India lies in improving the ground situation in Kashmir and putting its own house in order so as to give a clear message to Pakistan that its game is up. Pakistan will not agree to meaningful negotiations with India unless it becomes clear [to it] that it cannot win the proxy war in Kashmir, that the Indian Muslims do not look up to Pakistan as their 'saviour' and that the Indian minorities in general do not harbour separatist intentions. Only then peace and cooperation in South Asia can become a reality.

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