

**SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE:
PROSPECTS IN NINETIES**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY*

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Dedicated

to

My Family



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
DECLARATION

This dissertation entitled " South Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone : Prospects in Nineties " submitted by Niraj Kumar Vishwakarma in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Philosophy , has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any university. We recommend that this dissertation should be placed before examiners for their consideration for the award of M.Phil degree.


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
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CHAPTER I

**Introduction : Prospects of A
Nuclear Weapon Free World**

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Devastation caused in both the world wars, especially in the second, led some thinkers to think over that if the third world war comes, then it will be a war in which most people may die from silent, insidious, anti-human weapons that make no sound, give no warning, destroy no forests or ships or cities but can wipe out human beings by millions. Strategists thought of war fighting in order to arrive at peace. This led to the proliferation of nuclear war fighting doctrines and nuclear weapons. This work is an attempt to look at the limitations of this strategic approach. Further it is aimed to show that a world free of nuclear weapons-U.N., Gorbachov, Gandhi's dream is more a metaphysical scenario rather than a realistic possibility.

In order to analyze this issue, we examine below nuclear geography, industrial infrastructure, nuclear targeting, threshold nuclear powers, limitations of nuclear control treaties and doctrine of nuclear deterrence. We conclude to say that nuclear weapon free world is not feasible in the next twenty years or more.

NUCLEAR GEOGRAPHY:-Now every minute to every day at thousands of locations around the world - from the plains of North Dakota and Montana, from the Ukraine and Siberia, from Southern France and Central China to beneath Artic icepack to the sea of Okhotsk to the Yellow sea - nuclear missiles

sits ready to be launched. In western Europe nuclear aircraft, have an alert status on and under the high seas - nuclear armed ships and nuclear patrol, waiting for their day to go into the battle. Nuclear war plans are continuously tested, revised and updated. In the air, endless streams of dispatches fly back and forth between bureaucracies, naval vessels and military forces dispersed around the globe. Spy, satellites, ships and airplanes keep a close watch covertly intercepting, recording and photographing the five nuclear powers and many military alliances work in rhythm fading off each others actions. " It is a world that is ^{only nominally} at peace, says Admiral James Watkins, U.S. Chief of Naval operation. Peace, crisis and conflict, often in today's world, there are no clear demarcations."¹

NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE :- This huge nuclear arsenals and warplans are supported by global infrastructure, which includes hundreds of laboratories, testing sites and electronics support facilities. It encompasses the factories, military bases, transportation network, command centers, computers and satellites. These are the lifeblood of a system. The infrastructure knows no boundaries and observes no borders, the battlefield is virtually every where. Scores of nations are linked wittingly or unwittingly and all of them are on the front lines. Just as the distinction between peace and war is blurred, so is the distinction between civilian and military.

The level of peacetime military preparedness has reached wartime dimensions. Even during the peacetime period the nuclear powers are engaged all around the world, as in war. Now the five nuclear powers have spread their arms race beyond their own soil by placing nuclear related facilities in sixty five countries and territories. The infrastructure extends underground and into the ocean, across the land and into the atmosphere and space. " No Continent, no border, river or mountain range or political boundaries divides one battlefield from another. Now the *entire* globe is a battlefield".²

The nuclear powers have divided the continent, oceans, seas into military theatres. Each has special command and structures and represents special interests. Nuclear weapons are divided not only by strategic theatres and tactical categories but are allocated to military services, regional command. Geography is the military's domain. The land, water and the surface of the globe are potential battlefields.

Many countries though have long standing non-nuclear policies barring nuclear weapons from their soils and water. Yet at the same time a new type of military facilities for research, testing, training, intelligence, communications and space surveillance has emerged in many ways, more important than a base of harboring nuclear weapons. More than 3000 military bases circle the globe. It is often impossible for

the host countries to determine what advantages accrue to it from hoisting these technical and electronic facilities. The countries hoisting for such nuclear power unknowingly end up accepting war making, machinery. The special features of this new geography are that it is helpful for the military for their heightened awareness of exactness of area, physical characteristics of land water areas and also for air and space.

The global nature of arms race which is susceptible for the outbreak of war at any place may meet the required situation. These areas can be called as strategic importance. Again the new demands for infrastructure require that all resources of a society be available to support war plans, the distinction between civil and military's is blurred.

Territorial disputes have greatly diminished in importance in this nuclear era. Geographic conquest has been a minor feature of this nuclear era. Nations are no more secured because of their geographic locations. Now the major threat to peace in this nuclear era is not where national boundary ends or international space begins, but from demonstration to the access of those areas, where they have interest self defined as everywhere.

Space has many features similar to oceans. Space after completion of the range of national territory is an ocean like zone of international free passage. Space being nearer

and favorable for military's exploitation has developed quickly. Space through Satellite is an ideal vantage point for communicating and navigating and is one of the key means for nuclear infrastructure. War has begun in space in which planners seek to outmanoeuvre the enemy orbit. Similarly the globalisation of military power first began in the Oceans with their huge boarderless expanses. Nuclear weapons are also here in included. This is a sign of link between *naval* warfare and global nuclear warfare. The Oceans are peacetime battlefield for super powers. The military importance of the Ocean geography is significant. Earlier Oceans had granted us a sense for distance and chance for reflection and psychological buffer zone between us and the world and have little relevance in the nuclear era. Nuclear warfare in sea is closely linked with the nuclear warfare on land and in space.

Two kinds of nuclear links exists today in the nuclear infrastructure. First kind is an relatively open and obvious set of military alliances, base agreements, joint exercises and planning and programs of nuclear co-operations. The second is more subtle indirect and obscure. It includes the mobilization of science and technology and use of civilian resources for military preparedness (purposes) that relate to nuclear weapons.

First kind of nuclear links involve the deployment of nuclear weapons though it is done with higher degree of

secrecy. However the second type is the civilian link is used for civilian communications through commercial carriers, supporting nuclear infrastructure.

In the entire globe the nuclear weapons are so widely dispersed, U.S.A was the first country to send its nuclear forces abroad. Within the U.S. it has kept permanently the nuclear warheads in 28(twenty eight) states, overseas they are in Guam and eight foreign countries Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherland Turkey, South Korea, U.K West Germany. Erstwhile Soviet Union, like U.S.A had deployed nuclear warheads on foreign soils in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. There were probably about thirty soviet nuclear storage sites in Eastern Europe.

NUCLEAR TARGETING :- The growth of the nuclear arsenals has led to the identification and categorization of a vast number of targets called target complex. Nuclear war planners spend most of their times, selecting, examining and ranking each potential targets. These targets include major cities, bomber base to military base, economic and industrial facilities natural features and the centers of government. The decision makers are interested in maximum damage to the enemies and avoidance of a collateral damage to themselves. Nuclear war planning is now a self deception in a sense that it wants to have a limited nuclear warfare. But the targets are intermingled with urban areas that it seems impossible to achieve its objective. Nuclear power projection in the third world started while west-

ern countries have assumed the Soviet threat. Since 1960's military analysts have set their sights on the third world, following the independence of scores of former colonies, Arab Israel war, the oil embargo virtually every commentator recognizes the increasing likelihood of super power conflict in the third world, because of the designation of U.S-Soviet battlefield.

The belief that the third world is a superpower battlefield elevates every region to strategic status. Military planners make the third world part of nuclear infrastructure, forcing European land warfare doctrine, nuclear balances and counterbalances and nuclear theories to fit into new military Terrain. Four of the five nuclear powers have earmarked nuclear weapons as many as 3000 warheads for use outside of Europe and North Asia. Naval weapons are most numerous and include land and carrier based aircraft and a vast array of anti-air, anti-ship and anti submarine weapons. The aircraft is prominent means of nuclear attack to western powers with its long range capability to strike virtually at any target.

The long range sea launched Cruise missiles (SLCM) is emerging an important new weapon for nuclear warfare in the third world. The Naval forces that operate around third world routinely carry nuclear arms. On a typical day some two thousand non-strategic warheads are aboard ships and submarines at Sea. These include regular nuclear patrol

ships and submarines at sea. These include regular nuclear patrol in north western Indian Ocean, Eastern Mediterranean, Caribbean, south China Sea and Gulf of Guinea. Britain and France also deploy their nuclear capable carriers and other ships in third world.

The ground forces are also nuclear equipped. Hundreds of warheads are estimated to be stockpiled in the United States and the Soviet Union for the use of intervention troops in conflicts outside Europe and Asia. The structure of each side forces keeps the nuclear option open at all times. However the role of battlefield nuclear weapon in third world is not as clear as that of naval or air weapons.

No area of globe has received a more high level military attention than the Persian Gulf. Potential instability in the middle east has led the military to increase preparations for war between superpowers in the region. These plans are affected less by regional roots of war between Iran and Iraq than Soviet role in Afghanistan crisis.

The U.S. response includes the strengthening the infrastructure of U.S. bases in middle east, increasing the number of exercises there and keeping large Naval presence in Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean sometime back had become fastest growing area of military competitions between the United States and Soviet Union.

The U.S. and Soviet Union maintain permanent Naval forces in the region and France keeps about twenty ships

based in Djibouti and Reunion. Partly because of political crises in the areas and partly because of insecurity about oil supplies, the United States elevate this region to the second ranked theatre of war.

NUCLEAR THRESHOLD POWERS:- "Like the build up of super power's nuclear arsenals the continuing spread of nuclear weapons to additional nation poses incalculable risk to the humanity. Many believe that a nuclear confrontation involving one of the emerging nation is the most likely catalyst of a future nuclear holocaust."³

The number of countries able to manufacture nuclear weapons and apparently ready to do so in response to regional pressures has mounted easily. Israel apparently achieved this status in the late sixties. India did so by 1974 when it conducted its first and only nuclear explosion, something which no other nations beyond the five declared nuclear power did. South Africa became a de facto nuclear state in 1980- or 1981 as it gained the capability to produce nuclear weapons material . Pakistan stands at this threshold today. Argentina, Brazil, South Africa have all taken steps in this direction. New information systems that the scale of proliferation is increasing instead coming to a halt.

Asia, North Korea, though ratified NPT, has a large unsafeguarded research reactor at Yong Byon. Recently it has denied I.A.E.A duty to inspect saying that I.A.E.A is politicised and as U.S. secret spy agency. However this research

reactor is unusually large well suited to clandestine nuclear weapons development efforts.

South Korea ratified the treaty in 1976 after abandoning the nuclear weapons programme begun early in that decade. The position of Taiwan becomes clear when we go through the remark made by the Taiwanese President Chiang Chiang Kuo in German weekly *Der spiegel* in May 1985 that his nation would not build atomic powers although it had the scientific and technological capacity to do so.

Japan unquestionably has the capacity to produce the nuclear weapon and is developing sizeable reprocessing and enrichment capacities. The decision of Japan, however, going non-nuclear may have a shift, if North Korea, South Korea, or Taiwan goes nuclear.

The dynamics of Indo-Pak revolves around the backdrop of intense mutual suspicion and domestic political consideration as well as in relation to specific developments in nuclear programme of the two countries. Prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, following the defeat in Indo-Pak war in 1971 is believed to have taken Pak in nuclear arms race.

Indian position regarding this is of ambiguity. It means that after 1974 PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion). India has exercised restraint, while Pakistan has gone ahead to acquire nuclear weapons. Western scholars are of the opinion that both nations have continued to advance their

nuclear weapons capability and further reducing the chances of arresting a regional nuclear arms race. India which conducted a single nuclear test in 1974 for the first time obtained weapons usable plutonium un-encumbered by any non-proliferation controls. While Pakistan appears to have acquired its first stockpiles highly enriched (the alternative nuclear weapons material) which it would be similarly free to use for nuclear arms race. If Pakistan has really arrived at this threshold and if both nations have taken place to prepare others needed components as some reports suggests. Latest revelation suggest that Pakistan was prepared to launch a nuclear attack recently.

MIDDLE EAST :- Israel as per a detailed posture of Israeli nuclear programme published in 1986 has more than (Hundred) 100 nuclear weapons some of them may employ nuclear fission, the principle of hydrogen bomb which would make them ten times more powerful bomb than bomb dropped in Hiroshima. Israel is not a party to NPT.

"Other regional states Libya, Iran and Iraq their intention of harboring nuclear weapons become clear with report of their unsuccessful attempt to purchase nuclear weapon from other nation or international black market".⁴ Iraq though is a party to NPT, but its continuous violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol against using lethal Chemical weapons to which it had agreed raise fundamental question as to the strength of its other arms control agreements.

Iran's investment on costly nuclear research programme, despite economic hardship gives reason to speculate that at least a portion of Iran's nuclear action are for military purpose.

LATIN AMERICA :- In this zone Brazil and Argentina are the nuclear threshold competing each other for regional pre eminance in which neither could afford to fall behind.

The two indigenous nuclear plant along with nuclear productions and nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities gave Argentina increasing dependence for outside nuclear supplies. Argentina has several lines of advanced combat aircraft able to deliver atomic bomb assumed to weigh 13000 pounds. Brazil posses two types of aircraft able to deliver early generation nuclear weapon, the U.S supplied A-4G Skyhawk and French supplied Mirage 3EBR. Brazils continued pursuit of technologies that can lead to the production of unsafeguarded nuclear weapons material remain a cause for concern.

SOUTH AFRICA :- The only Sub-Saharan African nation posing a significant threat proliferation risk today is South Africa whose ability to produce nuclear arms and apparent interest in acquiring them may have led it to build a small, slowly expanding nuclear arsenals of 15 bombs. No other country in the region has more than the rudimentary nuclear programme. Other African nations have however begun to discuss the desirability of obtaining nuclear arms. "In April 1986, for

e.g. Nigerian foreign minister Bolaji Akinyemi replied for Nigerian nuclear programme that "I can't give a direct answer, but I'll say that a country the size of Nigeria with its role and status can't be ruled out any option".⁵

DENUCLEARISING - The Nuclear non proliferation regime:- a constellation of international treaties, institutions and codes and bilateral trade arrangements is a major restraint of the spread of nuclear arms. However all these restraints have worked under its own limitations.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:- A Vienna based U.N affiliated organization created in 1957 with a programme of site inspections, audits and inventory material controls in order to deter the diversion nuclear materials from peaceful uses to military purposes.

I.A.E.A, however, has been charged of being politicized, lack of manpower and experts. The key nuclear installations are outside the scope of I.A.E.A. Thus Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, South Africa, Pak are remained free to use unsafeguarded installations to manufacture material for nuclear weapons.

THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND NUCLEAR THRESHOLD :- In 1970's principally the industrialized nuclear supplier countries of the west and Soviet bloc have applied a set of standards i.e. a set of uniform export controls over their nuclear transfer to ensure that they are not being used for military purposes by their recipient. Loopholes of this organization

have been exploited severely. A detailed 1985 analysis of the eight prosecutions in the western Europe and North America from nuclear smuggling to Pakistan and Israel moreover revealed that convictions were rare and those found guilty were treated with surprising leniency. Several reports of clandestine nuclear trade appeared during the last few years, these reports highlight the shortcomings of international nuclear control.

For the purpose of denuclearising the world, citizen campaigns are challenging the nuclear system linking local concerns to the issue of international conflicts and arms race.

The government of Greece pledged to remove American bases and by 1989 with all nuclear weapons. In 1989, the Canadian govt. removed the last American nuclear warhead from its soil. The most serious impediments, however, to the citizen's participants has been the secrecy over the nuclear arms. Secrecy is a prime weapon in a calculated effort to discourage public opinion.

Number of nuclear arms treaties have come out, important of them are T.T.B.T (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) NPT (Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty), Treaty of Tlatelolco, INF, and Start I and II, out of that TTBT, PNE'S have not been yet ratified by U.S senate. Nuclear test ban treaty in 1963, prohibiting the state from carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other explosion at any place

under their jurisdiction or control (a) in the atmosphere including outer space and under water including territorial water or high seas. However this treaty has been violated by number of times by both superpowers itself, no provision was under the treaty for control through posts, spot inspections, or international bodies.

Various arms control treaties apparently cast the impression that we are making a headway towards a nuclear weapon free world, but the fact is of the 225 nations those have signed NPT, 14 plays important role in nuclear arms, they host nuclear weapon under foreign control, some can even use those weapon when released by controlling nations. "NPT does not proscribe nuclear alliances or nuclear delivery system, only warheads. The NPT signatories can be intimately involved in nuclear weapon planning and preparation even to the point of having its delivery system certified to five nuclear warheads. The signatories having such a status are Belgium Czechoslovakia, Greece Hungary, Italy, Netherland Poland, Turkey and west Germany."⁶

The arrangements of this nuclear infrastructure are so obscure that most countries do not understand their own contribution to the arms race. Members of the nuclear alliances often do not know the world wide strategic role of facilities on their own soil. The U.S. permanently stores nuclear warheads in eight foreign countries and Soviet Union in four and Britain in one. Most of the time, the host

country has non-nuclear status like Denmark , Finland, Norway, Sweden, Newzealand, which in addition to prohibiting peace time deployment of nuclear warheads on the soil, all are actively pursuing the Nuclear free zone.

Puerto Rico, though a U.S. territory falls under the scope of treaty of Tlatelolco, and there it maintains a specially certified advanced under water weapons shop at the Roosevelt Roads Naval station to receive nuclear depths bombs in wartime. The Bar association of Puerto Rico has declared that these preparations along with other parts of nuclear infrastructure on the island violate the treaty. Beyond the facilities in Puerto Rico activity in other parts of Latin America make the mockery of the treaty.

In Japan, another non-nuclear country, the system of U.S. bases serve the preparation for nuclear war. Japan is also the headquarter of the U.S. navy's seventh fleet, which has nuclear war plans for the entire western and northern Pacific.

The extension of nuclear infrastructure into nuclear free area demonstrates how secrecy hides nuclear war preparations from citizenry. It also shows that arms control if it is to be effective, the flows in the nuclear free policies of Japan and Iceland, in the treaty of Tlateloloco, and in most proposals for new nuclear weapons free zone is that they set up a system where non-nuclear means nothing but the absence of nuclear warheads, the infrastructure is ignored.

The technical facilities of the nuclear infrastructure do not at first sight appear to be provocative but they are as deadly as the nuclear arsenals.

THE INF TREATY :- This treaty is more of value for political reason than military one. The INF treaty is bilateral one. It requires the elimination of their intermediate and shorter range missile both by U.S.A and U.S.S.R. Though the treaty rules out the right to produce, flight test or launch any intermediate range missiles any shorter range missiles on any stage of missiles still it neither prohibits research or development. Thus on this point, INF treaty is not comprehensive and radical.

START I (1991) was one of the major step towards denuclearising according to which 49% of the U.S. ballistic missiles were to be cut. 50% of Soviet ballistic missiles were to be reduced.

Despite imposing cuts of Soviet ICBM, these cuts were not sufficient to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. ICBM forces. Treaty's provision address accountable warheads and delivery not actual existing nuclear system potential thus the size of post strategic forces is obscured.

With regard to strategic forces modernization, the treaty permits both sides to continue with modernization currently under way. In effect both sides are permitted to replace ageing forces with more modern and more lethal system, which implementing start mandated forces cuts by retir-

ing older, less capable forces.

Though old ICBM, SLCM, and SSBMs nuclear power strategic missile submarines are being retired in favor of more capable modern missiles. When the number of warheads will go down, their accuracy will increase.

START II :- Jan 3rd 1993, at MOSCOW, marks an important milestone in the direction of elimination of nuclear weapons. START II is an improvement upon the START I. START II calls for the elimination of about two third of strategic weapons of the U.S. and RUSSIA by the year 2003. Under the treaty Russia and U.S. will abolish all their land based missiles with multiple warheads and reduce other components of the nuclear arsenals to about 3500 warheads for the U.S. and 3000 for Russia. However the United States would retain its sea-borne multiple warheads missiles ensuring its nuclear supremacy. The treaty is subject to ratification by the Senate and Russian Parliament.

START II leaves many issues unattended. START II has reduced only that which was dispensable. France, Britain and China is yet to debate such moves. The threshold power will become even more sceptical about disarmament effort.

Preparing for the next war means preparing to fight it any second and every second anywhere and everywhere. Behind every move links the threat of hair trigger annihilation. Computers simulations training manoeuvres and war games act

out every war that planners can imagine. Both sides are already fighting the next war with every thing but the warheads. Plotting targets, chasing submarines, testing missiles, collecting intelligence and positioning forces all could be figment or fact of superiority.

DETERRENCE :- The main reason of proliferation of nuclear weapon is the belief in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The desire to have a nuclear weapon free world is very old one. Nuclear deterrence was aimed at preventing a nuclear war.

The most appropriate device for deterring the employment of a nuclear weapon by one state was the threat of counter employment. Thus in the early period, immediately after the world war II "eye for an eye" concept was strong. General Arnold offered a formula that has lasted till this date " our first line of defense is ability to retaliate even after receiving the hardest blow from the enemy. The professional military readily accepted the importance of threat of retaliation to deter atomic aggression".

In 1960's the formula of assured destruction came. An assured destruction capability was defined as the ability to deter a deliberate attack upon the U.S. or its allies by maintaining at all time a clear and unmistakable degree of damage upon the aggression - even after absorbing first strike rate. Here injury was both to Soviet industries and civilians.

MAD ("Mutual Assured Destruction") further replaced the assured destruction and continued till 1974. It tried for certain ability to inflict massive destruction of the enemy's population and industry in retaliatory attack, following a massive nuclear attack by the enemy. Both the super powers had these capacities in the sixties.

Ikle, the then head of U.S. arms control and disarmament agency in 1973, targeted his criticism against MAD saying that it disregards the very significant possibility of war breaking out by any accident or miscalculation. He further suggested for a new strategy in which the potential accuracy of the smart bombs and missiles and current choices in weapon effect should be used to enable both sides to avoid the killing of millions of civilians and yet to inflict assured destruction of the military and industrial targets. He however accepted that the avoidance of killings would not make nuclear war more acceptable and deterrence will still continue to hold.

Pafonsky objects Ikle concluding that there is no technological way of escaping the evil dilemma that the strategic forces on both sides either must be designed to kill people or else, jeopardize the opponents confidence in his deterrent.

York observed that the best that is claimed for nuclear deterrence is that it works and is stable, but these are speculative and unprovable claims. In his opinion, " If

nuclear deterrence fails then the physical, biological and social consequences would be completely out of line. He stressed that deterrence is a terrible strategy and our highest priority should be to get rid of it.

These doctrines of nuclear deterrence has severely affected the third world. The deterrence also affects the willingness and ability of super powers to intervene in national and regional political crises, revolutions, boarders, regional conflicts. The balance of deterrence can destroy a generation of third world developmental effort or social and political progress. Almost all the country believe that deterrence has not provided peace but tensions and competitions. Hence the expenditure for armament is increasing day by day.

Any nuclear war between super power will never be localized and the continuance of nuclear weapon and risk of outbreak of war will always keep the third world in domain of insecurity and threat.


The doctrine of nuclear deterrence demands a first strike capacity, which eliminates from outset any possibility of retaliation or tolerable retaliation by the enemy and "deciding when a country has acquired a first strike capacity is one of the most complex problem in the military field that can never be known with any certainty."⁷

Nuclear deterrence is one of the greatest impediment in

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achieving a nuclear weapon free world since the basic security policy is based on this strategy.

The viable alternative to nuclear deterrence will be destruction of nuclear weapons, effective machinery for collective security but in realistic terms there seems to be no chance for its establishments in near future.

MASS (Mutual Assured Survival Strategy): This doctrine was suggested by Collin S. Gray to Ronald Reagan. It was orchestrated by Keith V. Paine. It relies on new generation weapon system both nuclear and conventional - it is the strategic rationale for current deployment and future procurement and deployment of space weapons. SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) must be seen and nuclear freeze movement of Europe and America. It offered the vision of Reagan's message to the U.S. Congress. Consciously it was a critic of nuclear deterrence. It was however not a full critic, nor was it an honest one. In the new weapon system, nuclear power was to be utilized, X-ray beams and kinetic energy weapons. The post cold war scenario suggests a world of strategy based on offensive and defensive weapons. Offensive weapon will mark the continuation of the nuclear weapon world.

CONCLUSION :- After analysis of the nuclear geography, nuclear control and safeguards agencies, military strategy, nuclear threshold powers, various treaties for arms control, nuclear weapon free world is still a remote possibility.

None of the treaties have been without short comings, and those loopholes have been severely exploited, by all whoever got the opportunity to do so.

Now, there is no ban on research and laboratories works for the manufacturing of the nuclear weapons. We find day by day modernization of the nuclear weapons. Days have come out of X-rays and Laser beam methods of war which involves nuclear in it. Again the gap between the conventional and nuclear weapon are fading away. Smart bombs and such other conventional arms after modernization has an equal capacity as with nuclear weapons for mass destruction. Thus there is less chances of a world free of nuclear weapons in forthcoming twenty thirty years or more.

Footnotes

(Quoted in)

- 1 Arkin, William M. and Fieldhouse, Richard W. "Nuclear battlefield - Global links in arms race". (Ballinger Publishing Company) Massachusetts, 1985, pp. 1-2.
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- 3 Spector, Leonard. "Going nuclear" (Ballinger Publishing Company) Massachusetts, 1987. p. 3.
- 4 Ibid. pp. 127-128.
- 5 Ibid. p. 217.
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CHAPTER II

History of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Nuclear Question in South Asia

CHAPTER - II

Ever since the development of science and technology has taken place, the world has reduced into a global village. There seems to be no signs of reversal of this trend in the near future. These developments have changed the entire notion of security, which is no more now confined to the policy of a particular nation concerned, but lots of other factors have started counting into that. In this nuclear age, the role of outside or extra regional factors have started playing so dominant role that while analyzing the security framework, it has become difficult to demarcate the line as where to begin and where to end. The role of this extra regional factors have overshadowed the politics of every region. Policies of super powers, have mainly been responsible for letting the non-nuclear states to change their status as Nuclear Weapon State. However the nuclear club has always been in double trap. While they have tried to manipulate the politics of other states so as to suit their own strategic advantages but at the same time, they were very much concerned about maintenance of their status quo. The reason for super power concerned that these weapons should not spread may have much to do with their respective perceptions of their dominant role in international system. Caroline Thomas believes that 'the super power perceived a mutual interest in establishing common rules to govern a particular aspect of international relations that was considered to be of utmost importance to both'.

Fear of destructive weapon may not necessarily play the major role since if it were considered to be overwhelming importance the super powers could surely check their own proliferation . The U.S. advocacy of the treaty is a product of its own perception which closely bound up with the vision of its dominant role in the world affairs and its desire to be the manager of those affairs. The desire of retaining of monopoly has led them to propose various arms control agreements. Nuclear weapon free zone, being one of them.

The entire world community feels nothing wrong in the principle for the attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons. A world free of nuclear weapon is difficult, but a desirable option because, "there is growing understanding all over the world that a nuclear world would be pointless, indeed, irrational, because there would be neither victors nor vanquished since it would mean the end of human civilization."¹

A number of people suppose that "Nuclear weapon free zone" can be a stepping stone towards a world free of nuclear weapons, as it is an important vehicle for enhancing public awareness of the persistent and even present nuclear catastrophe.

Literally understood the concept of NWFZ means that countries constituting a region in the non-nuclear world should agree not to resort to nuclear proliferation and declare their region free from nuclear weapons. Such coun-

tries by denying themselves in return, get from a nuclear weapon power a guarantee as regards to non resort to nuclear threats. Nuclear weapon powers contend NWFZ plan and non-proliferation treaty if implemented properly, can ensure world peace by halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

They believe that such zones by reinforcing NPT, becomes an important way to regulate arms control and confidence building measures due to the establishment of NWFZ which represents an obstacle to the aspiration of the state involved in regional conflicts to obtain nuclear weapons. Regional disputes, if solved peacefully by political means would show that NWFZ are effective in regional conflict and crisis management, thereby it provides stability.

There exists a link between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. Emergence of nuclear weapons leads to modernisation of conventional arms. Similarly, highly sophisticated conventional arms can also lead towards emergence of nuclear weapons. It was because of Soviet's superiority in conventional arms, U.S. devised and modernised nuclear weapons. Emergence of nuclear weapons leads to modernisation of both conventional and nuclearweapons. In such a situation NWFZ seems to be quite essential as by reducing all fears of nuclear war would provide first step towards conventional arms control. If the nuclear weapons are once eliminated from the face of the earth - sea, air and space - then mankind will be saved. The crucial issue

of any arms control measure is the verification of the concluded arguments. NWFZ can be healthy if there is reliable verification by international agencies, like U.N, I.A.E.A. and non-nuclear countries. This will promote trust, which is essential for the furtherance of nuclear free regime.

NWFZ can also be helpful for overcoming the underdevelopment and material security of the people. High expenditure on armaments is one of the major cause of economic and social underdevelopment in the world. Lowering the expenditure on armaments and to redirect resources to economic and social development would be beneficial for entire mankind. The Delhi declaration on the principle of a world without nuclear weapons and violence signed by Mikhael Gorbachov and Rajiv Gandhi on 27 November 1986 says: "only disarmament can release tremendous additional resources needed to combat economic backwardness and poverty."²

Agreeing on the inevitable requirement of NWFZ the opinion of the international community as a whole found expression in the final document unanimously endorsed by the first special session of U.N. General assembly devoted to Disarmament and now known as the Disarmament Charter. It says that the establishment of NWFZ should be promoted to attain final goal, the creation of a world free of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned countries reaffirmed in their Harare declaration of 1986 that establishment of NWFZ marks an important step on the road to disarmament.³

The NPT signed in 1968, has come out with certain rights and duties for both nuclear haves and have not countries. It prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever of nuclear weapons or by other nuclear explosive devices or of control over them. The treaty also prohibits the receipt by non-nuclear weapon state from any transfer whatsoever as well as the manufacture and acquisition by those states of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states also undertook to conclude safeguard agreements with the I.A.E.A with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to other nuclear explosives. In addition, the nuclear weapon powers are not allowed to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire the devices in question. The idea was that NPT should become a transitional stage in the process of nuclear disarmament.

According to the 1968 U.N. Security Council resolution No. 255, the states foregoing the acquisition of nuclear weapons under the NPT received a pledge of immediate assistance in conformity with U.N. charter in the event, they become a victim of aggression in which a nuclear powers are involved.

There is no doubt that arguments given in favour of NWFZ are true. However an analysis into the context in which the concept emerged, its working shows that sponsors of these plan have certain deeper motivations. It also shows

the conceptual linkages between NPT and NWFZ concept. NWFZ and NPT together shows the motivations of nuclear weapons powers that they are basically interested in retaining their monopoly over nuclear weapons".⁴ "Denuclearisation and non-nuclearisation are two facets of NWFZ."⁵ When ever the need be, the Nuclear weapon powers have used either of these facts, as a shield to protect their own strategic needs.

In order to counter American nuclear monopoly in 1956, Soviet Union (when itself was non-nuclear) was the first country to propose a nuclear weapon free zone and in particular a ban on the stationing of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any kind in that zone, since then every nuclear free zone concerning Europe was either inspired or supported by the Soviet Union. Immediately after the Cuban missile episode and testing of ICBM when Soviet Union rose to strategic parity with that of United States than it started supporting the other facet of NWFZ i.e. non-nuclearisation.

American's interest in the NWFZ was the germane of the arms control doctrine. When U.S. was convinced, after Soviet's purity in strategic terms that there is no escape from nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race, they started supporting nuclear weapon free zone as an essential ingredient to arms control doctrine. "The United States being seriously concerned about the preservation of nuclear status quo, did not want to encourage a sixth nuclear power to come into being as she was convinced that one way of realiz-

ing this goal was through creation of nuclear free zone."⁶

Thus being the context in which the concept emerged, it seems that their central objective is to prevent the expansion of nuclear club. The nuclear family do not want to increase its members. Signatories of NPT agree to deny to themselves nuclear weapon status and thus foreclose nuclear weapons option." "Ipso Facto, the treaty legitimizes the nuclear weapons in the hands of Nuclear Weapon powers."⁷ The NWFZ which is an extension and variant of NPT, by denying the signatories to such proposal the right to manufacture or station nuclear weapons in their territories makes them dependent on nuclear weapon powers as guarantors of their security from nuclear threats. By implication the NWFZ concept also legitimised nuclear weapons in the hands of nuclear weapon powers.

Dr. Subramanyam compares the NWFZ plan in the system of subsidiary alliances prevailing during the days of East India Company. He says "The NWFZ creates a protectorate in which the non-nuclear weapon state seek joint protection of nuclear weapon countries. The NWFZ is somewhat analogous to bond Wellesley's subsidiary alliances system during the days of East India Company. The Indian Princes were told that they could leave their Security in the hands of British and reduce their forces the nuclear weapon free zone similarly envisages leaving nuclear security in the hands of nuclear powers in exchange for accepting safeguard against a

pledge on non nuclear status."8

We can also see that the concept of NWFZ has been used either to keep certain region under respective sphere of influence and if possible to prevent their adversaries from entering into their domain. "Whereas NPT reflects the convergence of interest on the part of the Nuclear Powers about their intention to retain and perpetuate nuclear hegemony, NWFZ Plans besides subscribing to this continuance of hegemonic position also points to the tendency to serve the particular political interest of nuclear weapon powers."9

Contradiction comes out to surface when we see that Europe which is the home of four out of five nuclear weapon powers, proposal regarding European NWFZ has always been turned down on the plea of deterrence, but at the same time those European powers have been advocating NWFZ in other parts of the world.

CENTRAL EUROPE: On 2nd Oct. 1957, the Polish foreign minister Adam Rapacki for the first time came out with a plan for denuclearisation of Central Europe, "If the two German States agree to impose a ban on the production and stockpiling of atomic and the nuclear weapons on their territory. The Polish People's Republic is prepared simultaneously to impose a similar ban on its own territory. [Rapacki Plan]"10 The Plan got the support of the Soviet block but could not get the support of the western bloc, since they believed that the Plan would tilt the balance of power in Soviet's

favour.

"Without withdrawing the Rapacki Plan for the creation of nuclear weapon free zone, Poland launched a new and in its opinion less complicated plan which offered better chances of realisation. The proposal was put forward by Polish party Secretary "Wladislaw Gomulka" popularly known as Gomulka Plan."¹¹ This plan had the same fate, as it was specific on nuclear and thermo nuclear weapons, and on the plea of deterrence, and inability of verification. In the meantime, Polish government continued its attempt for the same. In 1982, the independent commission on Disarmament and Security, so called Palme Commission put forward a plan providing for the establishment of a zone free of any kind of nuclear weapon in Central Europe - on a strip of land 150 k.m. wide on each side of West Germany boarder with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The term commonly used to describe the proposed plan is nuclear weapon free corridor. In addition to the prohibition on deployment and storage of nuclear munitions, there would be a ban on the corridor on manoeuvres stimulating nuclear operations. The denuclearized areas could be subsequently extended to reach ultimately from the North to the southern flanks of the two military alliances - NATO and Warsaw organisations.

The Palme's Commission proposal was submitted by Swedish government got support of many neutral non-aligned and Warsaw Pact countries, but NATO criticized it saying this proposal would not bring about a decrease in the number of

operational nuclear weapons in Europe, not prevent nuclear weapons being reintroduced in at the time of crisis. Moreover the proposal does not take into account the fact that nuclear weapons stationed in the vicinity of the corridor could reach targets within the corridor. Though these criticisms have certain weight but the Palme's commission proposal need not be conceived as a disarmament measure rather it could be seen as a confidence building measure.

BALKAN, ADRIATIC AND MEDITERRANEAN - "There was an early proposal by Romanian Prime Minister Chiru Stoika, in September 1957, suggesting a conference with the aim of converting the Balkan into peace zone but a nuclear free zone was not explicitly mentioned in the proposal.¹²

He first explicitly raised the subject of denuclearisation of Balkan on 6th June 1959, this was closely followed by Soviet Union statement which referred to Romanian declaration on 25th June 1959, the Soviet initiative was motivated by the fear that NATO would be stationing nuclear weapons in Italy and Greece. Looking at the adverse role being played in the region, by the U.S. and NATO Soviet leader Khrushchev proposed creating a zone free from missiles and atomic weapons covering the Balkan's and the region of Adriatic. The proposal was formally conveyed by the Soviet Government on 25th June in notes to France, Greece and Italy, Turkey, the U.K. and U.S.A.

The proposal received an immediate endorsement by

Warsaw treaties countries concerned. Yugoslav President Tito, expressed the view that an atom free zone should include Italy, Greece and whole of Balkan region. The six NATO countries however rejected the proposal. They emphasized that range of weapons at the disposal of U.S.S.R. makes the concept of an atom free Balkan zone meaningless as far as the security of free nation in that area is concerned.

However, the Soviet Union did not stop supporting atom free zone in Balkans. In 1963, the Soviet Government received its initiative for creating a denuclearized zone in Europe enlarging it to yet another area - Mediterranean. This move followed the 24th January announcement, U.S. missile bases in Italy and Turkey would be replaced by Polaris atomic submarines in the Mediterranean. The Soviet denouncing the stationing of Polaris submarine in Mediterranean, submitted proposal for creation of a denuclearized zone on 20th May to Govt. of U.S.A, U.K., and respective Mediterranean countries.

The Soviet proposal was rejected by the Western countries. The U.S. note of 24th January stated that the Soviet proposal seems to be designed precisely and solely to change the existing military balance at the expense of United States and its allies.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE BALTIC : - The initiative for the denuclearisation for this region was taken by U.S.S.R. in

1959. "Khrushchev first made the proposal on 11th June 1959, in a speech at RIGA saying that Soviet Union supports the idea of setting up a rocket and atom free zone in the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Baltic area."¹³ Khrushchev repeated his proposal expressing that three suggesting zones Scandinavian, Baltic, Central European and Balkan - Adriatic should be connected into one nuclear free zone. This proposal was of scientific interest to west because it included part of the Soviet territory. However Soviet made it clear that until the western nuclear and rocket weapons are not liquidated which are situated near Soviet frontiers, the Soviet Government would not be able to include any region of its territory. The Scandinavian countries did not accept this explanation and rejected the Soviet proposal.

Efforts, however did not stop here. The Swedish Foreign Minister Mr. Uden and Finnish president Mr. Urho Kekkonen with their own plan, the "Uden plan" and "Kekkonen plan" tried to influence the proposal but they could not succeed. All the countries of the region have signed the NPT.

TREATY OF TLATELOLCO (1967) : - The 1967 treaty of Tlate-lolco prohibits the testing, use and manufacture, production or acquisition by any means as well as receipt, storage, installations, deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons in Latin America.¹⁴

The treaty for the first time created a NWFZ in a place

where human being was suppose to live without nuclear weapons. But there are certain ambiguous point which have weakened the arms control impact under this treaty. Peaceful Nuclear Explosion(PNE) has been allowed. The U.K. and U.S.A. have reserved all the rights to consider with regard to a state in the nuclear free zone, in the event of any aggression or armed attack by the state which is carried out with the support or assistance of a nuclear weapon power. The U.S.S.R. made similar reservation with regard to party to the treaty committing an act of aggression.

The treaty for some, was motivated Cuba's role in Cuban missile episode and intended to prevent the emergence of a nuclear armed Latin America. Writing of this treaty Mr. Subramanyam says, "The Tlatelolco Treaty covers the area which used to be within the scope of Monroe doctrine of which U.S.A. was the guarantor. The doctrine designed to exclude the European powers from encroaching upon South America and the Tlatelolco treaty is designed to exclude the Soviet Union from nuclear weapons in South America as did it in Cuba in 1962."¹⁵

THE TREATY OF RAROTONGA :- "In August 1985, the South Pacific became the second populated region after Latin America to establish a nuclear weapon free zone. The 13 member countries of the South Pacific forum are Australia, the Cook Island, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Newzealand, Nine Papua Guina, the Solomon Island, Tongu, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Samoa.¹⁶ The document expresses a political exercise

within Australia. The Labour Government came to office with commitments to both the security relationship with the U.S. (The ANZUS pact treaty between Australia New Zealand and U.S.A) and to a nuclear free Pacific. Its subsequent partial nuclear free zone initiative was an attempt to balance these two contradictory objectives."¹⁷

The treaty specifically allows each state to make an exception for nuclear weapons that may be aboard ships, that are visiting its ports or navigating its territorial sea or archipelagic waters and for weapons that may be aboard aircraft that are visiting its airfields or which are transiting its airspace.

There is no attempt to control nuclear weapons or ships outside the territorial limits of South Pacific states or control weapons or aircraft flying in international airspace. Both are beyond the jurisdiction of South Pacific States and are, in any case, activities which are protected by international law.

However in order to strengthen the treaty "on 5th June 1987, the parliament of New Zealand passed a bill on the declaration of New Zealand nuclear free zone. Disarmament and arms control which bans not only the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the country but also visits by nuclear powered ship or ships with nuclear weapon on board to its port. Thereby New Zealand dissociated itself from participation in the nuclear deterrence strategy imposed by

United States on its ANZUS allies." 18

As for the U.S., France and U.K., the Govt. of these states ignored the call made by signatories to RAROTONGA treaty to observe its position and did not sign the protocol to the treaty. The U.S. administration stated by way of explaining its decision that the treaty was at variance with the U.S. interest and commitments in the field of global security. The negative stand of France is largely determined by its plan for continuing the nuclear tests on Murorou Atoll in South pacific. The Govt. of U.K. declared that it would not sign referring to its obligation before other NATO countries. Only U.S.S.R and China have signed additional protocol to the treaty.

If the two successful treaties on NWFZ are compared then the scope of treaty of RAROTONGA seems to be broader than that of Tiatelolco treaty, the latter allows explosion of nuclear device for peaceful purposes, while the former prohibits the testing of any nuclear explosive device. Unlike the treaty of Tiatelolco the treaty of RAROTONGA prohibits the dumping of radioactive material at sea. This measure however belongs to the body of law for the protection of environment rather than to arms control. The geographical range of Latin America is larger than that of South pacific, since it bans the presence of nuclear weapons only within the territories of South Pacific States up to 12 mile territorial sea limit.

NORTH EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE - In 1987, the countries of Northern Europe took new steps towards establishing a nuclear free zone in that region. In June 1987, the Commission on the parliamentarians of the Nordic countries on establishing a nuclear free zone in the region approved its report which was the result of nearly year long work of commission."¹⁹ Under this document, the participants in the zone, must pledge not to deploy, accept, possess, test or produce nuclear weapons and not to any out corresponding preparatory work. The zone is to embrace Denmark, Norway, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and also Greenland. Furore Island and Finland's Aland Island. "It should however be noted that position some of the nordic countries are not constructive. Thus, the stand point of Government of Iceland according to which the nuclear free zone should embrace an area from Greenland to Urals can't be considered justified. It envisages the inclusion in the zone of a substantial part of the territory of only one nuclear powers, the U.S.S.R. which in addition is an area where strategic nuclear weapons that are an element of Soviet strategic balance on global level are stationed. Obviously such weapons can not be subject to negotiation within the framework of limitation of strategic arms of U.S.S.R. and U.S.A and not in the context of regional measures. By demanding that U.S.S.R. should take step that can upset strategic parity and give unilateral advantage to U.S.A., the advocate of this is complicate rather than facilitate the solution of the question relating to the

establishment of NWFZ in Northern Europe."²⁰

AFRICA - The issue of denuclearisation of Africa dates back to early sixties. "A stimulus to take activity in this direction was provided by the starting of nuclear tests in Sahara, by France."²¹ A declaration on the issue was adopted at OAU conference in Cairo at July 1967 with the participation of 34 heads of states and Government. "In the following year delegation of African countries submitted to the 20th UN General Assembly session a draft resolution concerning the proclamation of Africa as an atom free zone."²² Africa there after technically became an atom weapon free zone. Regretably after so many years have elapsed, still South Africa pursues nuclear research and which according to reliable sources possess nuclear weapon capacity.

SOUTH EAST ASIA - In the early seventies, five countries belonging to the association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) advanced proposal to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the part of Asia. The intra - regional conflict complicated the situation and hampered possibility if taking practical steps in this field, though the very idea remained alive. In 1984, ASEAN advanced an interesting proposal to supplement the concept of zone of peace in South East Asia, by suggesting that it should become a NWFZ. The ASEAN countries reaffirmed it during their foreign minister's conference in June 1987 recommending that the work on concept of zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) be continued with a view to drafting as

soon as possible a treaty taking into account all its implications.

"The U.S administration takes negative view of the idea of establishing a NWFZ in south East Asia¹ due to strategic consideration. "As for the U.S.S.R. , it attaches great importance to the non build up and non proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asian region and supports the efforts for creating NWFZ and building a regional security system".²³

KOREAN PENINSULA :- A proposal to set up an atom weapon free zone in the region was advanced by Democratic people's Republic of Korea in june 1986. It was expected that apart from excluding the Korean peninsula from nuclear theatre, the proposal could contribute to resolving other complex Korean problems.

But this objective could not be successful as stressing the military strategic position of south Korea, U.S. has increased her armed forces in South Korea, brought a large number of nuclear weapons there and turned the whole of South Korea into a nuclear base.

MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN :- has also been subject of debate for being made an atom weapon free zone. The people of this region believe that there can be no real security for them, with Israel having nuclear weapons, and nuclear armed forces of various countries keeps on cruising the water of Mediterranean. For them hence "denuclearisation of

Middle East region will not only mean that non-nuclear states should keep out of this arms race but first and foremost all existing nuclear armaments in the region should be eliminated."²⁴

THE INDIAN OCEAN:- The proposal to establish a peace zone in Indian ocean was advocated in 1970 by Sri Lanka which was concerned over the growing presence of super power naval forces in the region and over the construction of U.S military base in Diego Garcia. On Sri Lanka initiative, the non-aligned meeting in Lusaka in Sept. 1970 adopted a declaration in that spirit. In 1971 the issue was included on the agenda of 26th U.N. General assembly session in which it was passed with favour. In Nov. 1987, reaffirming the importance on the creation of peace zone in Indian ocean the U.N. General assembly called on adhoc committee to finish preparatory work on the convening of the conference to enable it to convene at an early date but not later than 1990 in consultation with host countries.

Apart from the above stated proposal, we can recall three other important treaties in which attempts were made to make certain geographical areas nuclear free. They are not the NWFZ in the strict strategic sense as their creation was even more guided by the question of environment. Those are the Antartica treaty (1959), the outer space (1967) Sea bed (1971)

ANTARCTICA TREATY 1959 :- " The Antarctica treaty declared that the area south of 60 degree Latitude including all Ice shelves shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The treaty prohibits any measure of military nature such as the establishment of military bases for fortification, the carrying out of military manouvres or testing of any type weapon. There is also a ban on nuclear explosion in Antarctic whatever their nature, as well as radioactive waste material subject to possible future international agreements on those subjects."²⁵

The arms control purpose of Antarctica treaty was derived from its other three main objective. Firstly to establish a foundation for international cooperation in scientific investigation , secondly to protect unique Antarctica environment, and thirdly to avert discord over territorial claims."²⁶

OUTER SPACE TREATY 1967 :- This treaty laid down the principle governing peaceful activities of the states in outer space and there is only one clause to this treaty which is related to arms control. Elaborating on a General assembly resolution unanimously adopted in 1963 " it prohibits the placing in orbit around the earth of any objects carrying any nuclear weapon or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies or the stationing of them in outer space in any other manner. The establishment of military bases, installations

and fortifications, the testing of any types of weapons and a conduct of military manoeuvre on celestial bodies have also been forbidden.²⁷

SEA BED TREATY 1971 :- The treaty prohibits emplanting or emplacing on to the sea bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of sea bed zone by any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well the structure launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons".²⁸

The treaty suffered major setback in all the conferences because of lack of relevant informations supplied by the great powers which are only one to possess both sophisticated underwater technology as well as military sources.

Thus, such is the history and working of successful, unsuccessful, debated attempts of NWFZ in various parts of the world. Among all, the treaty of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga are supposed to be two such treaties which has created a NWFZ in some parts of the world. However practical experiences have shown that the two treaties could not be able to provide a nuclear weapon free zone in the strict sense of the term. The treaty of Tlatelolco for instance does not contain binding provision as regards the transport of nuclear weapons, while the treaty of Rarotonga leaves major nuclear powers such as France, U.S.A and U.K out of consideration. As per Olivio Dutra, Chairman of the party of

working people of Brazil " Latin America has not abandoned the old and ill famed military traditions. In Brazil which uses nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, efforts are being made to acquire nuclear weapon and initiate nuclear armament".

The principle of verification of NWFZ embodied as the fifth principle in the U.N. study also merits serious attention. The verification proposal does not envisage verification of arsenals - only nuclear installations, Israel is now believed to have nuclear arsenal and it is now impossible that neighboring Arab countries would be ready to accept Israel as a member of NWFZ with its nuclear arsenals. Secondly NWFZ will mean verification of only those nuclear facilities which are registered with IAEA. If a country has separate program under its defense administration to manufacture weapons outside NWFZ and starts building up an arsenal, NWFZ proposal would not be able to prevent it.

The link between the regional arms control measure and the global efforts at arms control is one of the major hindrance for ramification and success of NWFZ."-----
During the arms race, in order to save itself and its allies, the superpowers by making use of loopholes of NPT, perhaps, deliberately created, are known to have transferred, physical possession of the nuclear weapons (retaining their right to ownership) to certain non-nuclear state, such nuclear states since they themselves have not carried

out any explosion according to NPT can still become part of NWFZ and such acts make the mockery of the concept of NWFZ and unworkability of the proposal."²⁹

We have seen that principle wise entire world finds nothing wrong in promoting a nuclear weapon free zone in any part of the world if the idea is to make a world free of nuclear weapons. " What needs to be done however is to remove the gaps which lie between different approaches and divergent perceptions. There is no clear definition of nuclear free zone .Is it an area with defined geographical parameters or whether it takes into account the reach of nuclear weapons? What are the nuclear weapons - are they only warheads or they comprise of delivery vehicle's also? Nuclear weapons are absolute weapons. They are capable of being delivered by aircraft even. The concept of Nuclear weapon free zone needs to defined properly. The terms like ownership, construction or acquisition or even use need to clarified."³⁰

Now nuclear powers have reduced the entire globe into single military theatre. The nuclear fighting machinery of the super powers extends to all the regions and corners of globe. They are now threatening to reach celestial heights, with the development of the so called star wars or the new space weapons system. Moreover the findings on " nuclear winter have shown that no area or the region of the world remain free from the consequences of nuclear effects even it involves the use of a fraction of existing arsenals."³¹

In such a security environment it is unrealistic to expect that the countries of the region ever be able to feel secure from the threat of nuclear weapons through agreements among themselves alone. The idea of NWFZ in such a situation is viable only if it covers the entire globe.

THE SOUTH ASIA'S NUCLEAR QUESTION :- The South Asian nuclear question is much more a product of ambiguous concept of security. " While security is narrowly understood and analyzed in terms of armaments and defense expenditure, security alliances and arrangements, these are mainly manifestations of geo-political realities and underlying historical processes. Security in wider sense, is the result of complex interplay of internal political situation and international posture dictated by domestic, political compulsion, of a particular regime, the economic situation the degree and nature of independence on foreign assistance, historical legacies, which cannot be transcend overnight and the global situation which both politically and economically, ^{is, today,} showing signs of increasing stress."³²

Kodikara, one of the experts of the India's foreign policy described in South Asian context as "while India perceives neighbor as being integral to its security, the neighbour perceive India as a threat against which security is necessary."³³ Thus such dilemma can come out of divergent perception of security due to complex interplay of regional and external forces. Such a situation in South Asia

is due to the security complex as described by Barry Buzan.

“Security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities can't realistically be considered apart from one another.”³⁴ Security complex is generally tied of in a variety of way, may be sometime geographical, political, strategic, historical, economic, cultural or so on. Again the state outside the complex may play a major role within it, without the complex itself being central to their security concerns. Security complex tends to be durable, best they are neither permanent nor internally rigid.

Barry Buzan feels that the heart of South Asia security complex is rivalry between India and Pakistan whose national securities can't be separately studied. A number of much less powerful states are bound together due to geographical reasons into the complex like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, provides a neutral buffer between south Asia and quite distinct complex of security concerns in South East Asia. The states of China, Iran and Afghanistan are the important actor of the complex, but has main centre of security concern outside it.³⁵

The dominant role of the local issues have great bearing in defining the national security priorities. These local rivalry and hostilities especially between India and Pakistan not only define South Asia security complex, but also set the *mould* for its relation with larger complex which

surround it.

However major U.S. studies on South Asian security issues have always tried to highlight that South Asian security issues are largely a consequence of regional Indo - Pakistan rivalry. They believe that Pakistan's nuclear development points to the prospect of a regional nuclear arms race, that is a consequence of persisting mistrust, regional rivalry, historical dispute and irreconcilable differences between India and Pakistan. They are sure that the clashes between India and west Pakistan do not appear to make a foreign policy of subordinate reconciliation. Because of this reason, the two great countries of South Asia will remain divided on the line of cold war.

"In 1972, William J.Brands spoke about the dramatic and unfavorable effect of an Indian nuclear weapon program on Pakistan. He outlined four options for Pakistan :-(i) To accept Indian hegemony (ii) To seek guarantee from U.K. and U.S.A (iii) To get Chinese nuclear protection and finally (iv) To develop its own nuclear weapons. Brands predicted that the first was intolerable, the second was impossible and third and fourth seems to be the most likely course of action, even though may be unsatisfactory."³⁶

Similarly a study conducted by E.W. Lefever, in nuclear arms in third world, Washington D.C., Brookings institutions, 1979 came out with a conclusion in which regional dimensions are over emphasized. The pattern of interaction,

as per him, between India and Pakistan is that of action-reaction in which India Challenges and Pakistan reacts. And Pakistan's reacts, and Pakistan's reaction to India largely explains Pakistan's nuclear behavior-past, present and future.

However, an analysis of Indo-Pak nuclear policy made by Ashok Kapur does not support this action-reaction pattern of E.W. Lefever. The mid sixties situation show that Pakistan media presumably with the Govt.'s explicit or tacit support highlighted the danger of Indian nuclear perfidy. Pakistan's official speeches in international forum in Geneva were also anti-India. But the interesting point here is that contrast existed between verbal external diplomacy and quiet domestic decision making. Even during this period Pakistan's Atomic energy existed mostly on paper. Bhutto in his 'Myth of independence' revealed the mixture of constraint and pressure for and against nuclear proliferation. This shows that in the late sixties Bhutto was not really convinced about the utility of Pakistani nuclear program.

Ayub Khan and there after Yahya Khan were keen on conventional armament than nuclear armaments. About Bhutto it is generally said, he did not really want to utilize nuclear issue to build his nationalist credentials. The point here is that atomic constituency was weakest during 50's and 60's in intra elite politics. This background suggests that 'India challenges and Pakistan reacts' hypoth-

esis is of limited use.

This can further be understood from the Indian context. The early 1964 (Nehru) and in the late 1965 (Shastri) Indian decision moved closer to bomb decision. If it is assumed that Pakistan's decision to launch a war against India in 1965 could have been motivated by a fear that India was likely to outstrip Pakistan militarily, so Pakistani's military over reaction in the area of conventional arms should or could led to an interaction in the nuclear area also. But this did not happen.

In the late seventies the action- reaction (in the sense of regional arms race) gains some credibility. The 1971-72 period after (Bangladesh crisis) may be viewed as the dividing line and 1974 (after the Indian nuclear explosion) may be viewed as the line after which acceleration in the Pakistan's nuclear activities became clear.

Some of Pakistan's response to India's 1974 test lend some credence to the theory of South Asian nuclear blackmail to western powers, but the evidence is mixed. Bhutto complained of Indian nuclear blackmail to western powers but always wanted to acquire more sophisticated conventional arms and secondly Pakistan strengthened its nuclear diplomacy by arguing a South Asian nuclear weapon free zone and Iranian and Pakistani diplomacy worked in tandem on this point. Had there been too much truth in the action-reaction thesis Pakistan would not have ever gone for nuclear weapon

free zone diplomacy.

Thus the western and U.S. studies overstates the regional dimension of nuclear proliferation. Whether proliferation is defined as "going nuclear" (that is the elites are thinking about it) or exploding a bomb (like India's single test in 1974) or deciding through appropriate bureaucratic and budgetary behavior to test and to make nuclear weapons (plural) and to deploy a limited or strategic nuclear forces. Furthermore by overstating the regional interstate dimension, the study of the influence of domestic Politics on the foreign policy making is neglected. If the interplay between International regional and domestic influence is empirically studied, the picture of the nuclear behavior of the potential third world nuclear proliferation is one of the pressures for bomb making (as a diplomatic and military resources) on the one hand, of constraints against doing so for a different set of diplomatic security and domestic political reasons.

Hence the South Asian nuclear question and South Asian security behavior can only be understood keeping in view with role being played by extra-regional factors in the region.

"Two major external patterns cut through the South Asian complex, one generated by Sino-Soviet dispute and other arising from the rivalry between the U.S and Soviet Union."³⁷

India and Pakistan, says Barry Buzan, immediately after independence grew close to either bloc because of their own policies. India by NAM, got alienated of U.S. and Pakistan by contrast saw American containment policies against the Soviet Union as an opportunity to increase its military strength against India and so joined in the net work of anti-Soviet alliances. The flow of cheap or free American arms to Pakistan between 1954 to 1965 had much more impact within Pakistan and on relations between Pakistan and India as than it did on Soviet Union. It also opened the door to Soviet wooing of India, resulting in large flow of Soviet arms in the territory.

American interest in the South Asia declined in the sixties being preoccupied with its mounting disaster in Vietnam. The psychological gearing up by arms supply by extra regional factors led to the 1965 Indo-Pak wars.

China, after 1962 war was to be seen in India as a looming threat along its northern boarder. The Soviet, Chinese and American influence on South Asian region have virtually all been in the context of their rivalry with each other. India's defeat in this war caused the U.S. Britain and Soviet Union to rush military aid to Delhi, the odd combination of East West reflecting western slowness to register the significance of Sino-Soviet split. It also transformed India's attitude towards military defense resulting in a rapid doubling of man power and expenditure.

With the adoption of serious long term plans for upgrading domestic defense production and permanent policy, Pakistan, with whom India has a boundary dispute got alarmed. And because of this transformation of Indian military as it threatened to push Pakistan into permanent inferiority in the sub-continent, a classic security dilemma was clearly in the making here with outside powers amplifying local patterns of insecurity. Thus the sixties Sino-Soviet split using South Asia as forum for their dispute.

"By the early 1970's the geo-politics of south Asia had undergone a significant change with American starting to woo China. India was less than a marginal factor in the US calculations of costs and benefits of establishing closer relations with China. In Indian calculation however, this event created serious geo-political issue; with Pakistan acting as the "go: between in the efforts leading to sino-American detente, at a time of growing tension in the region, based on the upheaval in former East Pakistan, Analyst in New Delhi could not ignore the apparent emergence of U.S. China and Pakistan axis."³⁸ Washington was so occupied with its global competition that the regional implications of U.S move towards China in the early 1970's were practically ignored.

It was this geo-political change that pushed India towards the former Soviet Union to chagrin of U.S. policy makers. " Richard Nixon, who during his presidency, initiat-

ed the process of normalization of relations with Beijing ironically argued later that democratic India's closer relation with former Soviet Union was one of the geopolitical paradoxes of 20th century."³⁹

His administration tilt towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 was moreover beyond doubt. The psychological pressure on India put by the U.S by dispatching the task force led by aircraft carrier USSR enterprise to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war was one of the concrete disincentives for countries with political capability to refrain from advanced undertaking on nuclear materials.

In less than three years the U.S task force visited the Bay of Bengal. India conducted its so called peaceful nuclear explosion. It would be naive to say that this was aimed at U.S. action. But there is little doubt that U.S. policies towards the countries in the region did precious little to discourage nuclear proliferation.

Five years later the Indian nuclear explosion, the world witness the second round of intense cold war between United states and former Soviet Union. This time cold war passionately fought at South Asia's door step. In the hindsight, one may conclude that the war in Afghanistan if not encouraged, at least, led to the inaction on the part of the U.S. policy makers which in turn allowed Pakistan to receive a large amount of U.S. military and economic assistance and simultaneously engaged in a clandestine nuclear

weapon program. Though America's had sufficient information about the happenings in Pakistan But the U.S Govt. did not take the desired steps to halt Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs. According to Stephen p. Cohen, a South Asia specialists of the U.S. when Pakistan's role in countering the Soviet presence in Afghanistan became important, and more high level attention was diverted to the region, that issue tended to override proliferation concerns in the United States".⁴⁰

So when it would be unreasonable proposition to make that the U.S favored the emergence of a nuclear Pakistan, there was noticeable soft corner for Pakistan in the hearts of quite a few members of Washinton's policy analyzing community. At a time, when India was partly close to Soviet union in its strategic equation and was apparently growing stronger in military terms, Pakistan found itself convenient to make itself available to participate in American's cold war against the Soviet so that it could bolster its military strength vis-a-vis India and simultaneously minimize opposition to its nuclear weapon program in the western countries.

Things suddenly changed with the unexpected end of cold war which got further reinforced by the virtual disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the Soviet troops pull out from Afghanistan and amidst unprecedented co-operation between the U.S and the former Soviet Union , the U.S Pakistan alliance entered into the period of political flux, culminating in the suspension of all U.S assist-

ance to Pakistan under Pressler amendment in Oct. 1992. "It appeared as if containment of communism in the U.S foreign policy gave way to containment of nuclear proliferation in post cold war period."⁴¹

China, in the words of C.I.A chief Woolsey "has consistently regarded a nuclear armed Pakistan as crucial regional ally and as a vital counter weight to India's growing military capability. Beijing prior to joining the NPT in 1992, probably provided some nuclear weapons related assistance to Islamabad that may have included training, equipments. Based on long standing links with Islamabad it is unclear whether Beijing has broken off contact elements associated with Pakistan's program.

Thus being the situation, the South Asia nuclear question can only be understood with the study of global situation and its impact on regional behaviour.

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CHAPTER III

**South Asia Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone, Attempts and Responses**

CHAPTER III

The right to peace and security is the most fundamental rights of all nations. It is implicit, if not explicit, in nearly all declarations, conventions, treaties and laws governing the conduct of relations.¹ South Asian region is not an exception to this general rule.

One of the such measure adopted in this region for the purpose was the "no war pact" designed to bring peace between the two significant countries India and Pakistan, whose relations have rarely been tension free since their birth in 1947.

The "no war pact" declaration was first mooted in Nov. 1949, when Girija Shanker Bajpai, Secretary General of ministry of foreign affairs, of India suggested such a declaration to Md. Ismail the-then Pakistan High Commissioner in India. The proposal meant that "all outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan should be settled by peaceful means and not by war."² The proposal did not work owing to the hostile attitude of Pakistan, at that time. Thereafter, number of times there have been exchanged offer of this proposal in a fashionable manner but nothing concrete yet emerged. The proposal in tune with India's foreign policy which has always sought peaceful solutions to any the problems among the nations. However, "Now and then,

in the affairs of the nations there comes a moment when the basic assumptions underlying its foreign policy are put to test of proof.³ For India the first Chinese explosion was such an important development which pressurized the Govt. of India to change its policy of peaceful nuclear energy. It provided a great security threat to India and evoked a national debate in the country.

The loss of a part of Indian territory in India China war in 1962. was not a issue to be forgotten and so the furious controversy whether India should match a Chinese atom bomb with a nuclear deterrent of her own cut across political party lines. Even the Congress Party which was sworn to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes seemed to be divided, while the Jansangh unanimously advocated for going nuclear militarily. The Swatantra party reflected two different opinion that India should produce her own nuclear deterrent and that the country should come to protective arrangement with America and Britain. The Socialist party was also divided. All Communists leaders both of the right and left factions were strongly opposed to India's manufacturing of nuclear options on asking for protection by western powers.

But doubtless, Indian public opinion failed to be reassured. Prime minister Shastri, so, in visit to U.K on Dec.1964 for the first time mooted the subject of an explicit and effective guarantee. Shastri stated at a press

conference in London on 4th Dec 1964 "that it was for the nuclear powers to discuss some of guarantee which was not needed by India, but by all non - nuclear countries. He further stated that he does not want to use such terms such as Joint shield or Joint sword. "The quest for a guarantee had come a long way since Dec.1964. First it was left to the nuclear powers to consider and if they wished India not to join their club next advocated in U.N. attenuated to be fit in with the Kosygin formula (not to attack NNWS). It was discussed in various platforms and then taken out of the U.N. and feverishly openly questioned." 4

On 18th May 1974 India exploded a plutonium device in 10-15 kiloton range in Rajasthan, what it termed as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Pakistan had a sharp reaction. Mr. Bhutto stated: "Testing a nuclear device denotes that a country has acquired a nuclear weapon capability. But a nuclear weapon is not like conventional military weapons. It is primarily an instrument of pressure and co-ercion against non- nuclear powers, ----- we are determined not to be *intimidated* by this threat". 5

But such statement on the part of Bhutto is nothing but a part of peace offensive because, " any one who has observed progress of Pakistan's dedicated nuclear weapon program over the years would not have failed to notice that reports have persisted that China provided Pakistan with nuclear weapon design (of its fourth test, with a 20kt uranium device in 1966), that Pakistan went on its nuclear weapon program in

full earnest in Jan, 1972".⁶

The purpose of such offensive was to halt India from its ambitious nuclear program, and divert international attention from its own nuclear weapon program and establish Pakistan image in international forum as Messiah of peace.

The first proposal with regard to NWFZ in South Asia come from Pakistan. In the 16th annual session of U.N. atomic energy conference held in Mexico in Sept. 1972.

Pakistan put forward the proposal to denuclearise South Asia. Introducing this proposal Pakistan representative Munir Ahmad Khan called for a treaty between South Asian countries similar to that of Tlatelolco treaty for denuclearisation.

It is important to note here that the idea was launched a few month after a decision to make the nuclear bomb was taken at Multan. So says Ashok Kapur, "Pakistan strengthened its international nuclear diplomacy by arguing for a South Asia nuclear free zone. He further said, "Bhutto's peace offensive was a consequence of bomb decision---- it gave Pakistan and Bhutto a diplomatic initiative, it helped Pakistan's ^{international} image as peace makers. Although the aim was to mask the bomb decision with peace offensive an opportunist's and instrumental action in our opinion, vintage Bhutto, given his belief in the theory of calculated deceptions."⁷

One year after this Bhutto's announcement in Mexico, we

find Nepalese peace zone proposal of 1973, with king Birendra's statement at NAM summit in Algeria. The king stated, Nepal situated between the two most populous countries of the world wishes her frontier's to be declared as a zone of peace. Further "The king's overriding desire to immunize Nepal against the periodic ups and downs and the worst possible form of deterioration in the state of relationship between its neighbours leads one to believe that what he has in mind is the international guarantee (more or less on the swiss model, of Nepal's Independence, sovereignty and neutrality in the event of war in the region." 8

Nepal proposal was intended to strengthen its role as a balancer between India and China and get more economic and political concessions from New Delhi.

Responses were obvious. China declared, " we firmly support the just stand taken by His Majesty the king of Nepal. We are ready to assume appropriate commitment aiming therefrom." 9 Its consistent support to the proposal was to embarrass India. Pakistan went a step further pledging its further support for the implementation of this proposal. Among other South Asian countries Srilanka, and Bangladesh supported the proposal.

Besides the South Asian countries, Japan Burma, Singapore, Malaysia and some other countries in West Asia also extended their full support to the proposal.

Super powers gave cautious response. Soviet Union believed a greater Asian collective security system will be better and Nepal proposal could form a part of it. U.S. evidently wanted to wait and watch the Indian reaction.

Indian reaction was that India feels that it is firmly committed to Nepal's territorial integrity and stability through the treaty of 1950 and there is no need for additional guarantee.

After this peace zone proposal of Nepal, immediately after Indian explosion in 1974, another proposal by Pakistan was presented in United Nation. As there was anti - Indian wave after the explosion, the Pakistani proposal got much international support. The ASEAN members through Malaysian Foreign Ministry spokesman announce its support for the same. Pakistan declared that henceforth it will not abide by the rules of I.A.E.A safeguard, and requested for a nuclear umbrella, perceiving Indian nuclear threat. 10

Ashok Kapur believes that this was yet another diplomatic move to strengthen the conventional military mechanism against Indian threat perception. Because "After 1974, Bhutto complained about the problem of Indian 'nuclear blackmail', but in his meeting with U.S. leaders he wanted to acquire ^{more} sophisticated conventional arms". 11

The Pakistani initiated proposal considered that "Since all the countries of the south Asian had proclaimed

their opposition to acquisition and introduction of such weapons in the region, there existed a common denominator for the agreement establishing a nuclear free zone in the area. " Pakistan suggested that the U.N. General Assembly should proclaim South Asia a NWFZ, that consultations be held as soon as possible among the countries of the region and at appropriate stage with the nuclear weapon powers, to give @practical shape to this proclamation that the U.N. Secy. General be authorized to invite the countries of the region to begin consultations and that the assembly lay down the guidelines to facilitate the process of negotiation. ^{»12} No objection was expressed if more countries were to be included in the zone.

Indian response was negative. Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, permanent representative to U.N. came out in strong opposition stating, that "It would not be desirable to declare a particular area as nuclear free zone, without the prior consensus of regional countries. The Pak proposal..is neither expressly defined nor has it been arrived at ----- as a result of discussion among the countries concerned. He pointed out that south Asia is an integral part of the continent of Asia and Indian ocean as a whole."¹³

This view of India was supported by both the super powers, and Sweden, Japan and Canada. Pakistani view was supported by a number of countries Muslim world including

Aghanistan, Iran and some of the African and Latin American countries, Among the only nuclear power which supported Pakistani proposal was China.

To contain the Indian Criticism Pakistan came out with a revised draft which merely sought the general assembly endorsement of the concept of nuclear free South Asia to be followed by consultations among the regional countries at the invitation of U.N. Secretary General.

This draft was not supported by India again. "Since no prior consultations had taken place among the regional countries before the prescription of the item on U.N. agenda, it would be premature, indeed, ^{it would be} prejudicial to future consultations to declare South Asia as a NWFZ or even endorse the concept.¹⁴

Differences between India and Pak were tried to be solved out at foreign secy. level but no concurrence came out. So both of them tabled separate draft.

The revised Pakistani draft was passed by 96 votes to two against and 36 abstentions. China and Sri Lanka voted for Pakistani draft. Sri Lankan delegate criticizing Indian draft described inadequate and India and Bhutan maintained that NWFZ would be useful only along with the simultaneous nuclear disarmament, should come voluntarily from the local states of the region and would make sense only in a well defined geographical and political unit. Soviet supported

the Indian draft and abstained on Pakistani draft, China abstained in Indian draft. U.S. abstained on both the draft saying lack of unanimity about goal and condition for such a zone. Since then, NWFZ concept for the South Asian context, is being discussed in U.N. and various other platforms. During various Islamic Summit pursuance of bilateral negotiations Viz. with Canada and France, Pakistan has discussed the issue to improve upon its image.

In 1979, Pak proposal for full scope safeguards of nuclear facilities of India and Pakistan and a SANWFZ was turned down by India. India could not accept Zia's proposal about denuclearisation of South Asia, because the problem of nuclear non-proliferation is wider question and is not solely between India and Pakistan. If the NWS deployed weapons in South Asia what is the use of having a NWFZSA.

During Zia's regime Pak offered a wide range of arms control proposal such as; the creation of NWFZSA (which was carried forward from Bhutto era), simultaneous signature of NPT, mutual acceptance of IAEA safeguards, bilateral inspection of each other's nuclear facilities, joint declarations to remove the development of Nuclear weapons and signing a regional test ban treaty. In 1981, Zia offered a proposal for mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities, to the then Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The proposal was well responded by succeeding Prime

Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi on 17 Dec. 1985.

The mutual regional test ban treaty offered by Prime Minister Mr. Junejo in 1986 was turned down by India, as it believed that the proposal fails to address its perception of Chinese threat. India also believed that these proposals are a part of Pakistan's insincere diplomatic offensive which were meant to divert India from its goal of a comprehensive test ban.

Instead of focusing on bilateral proposals, Indian Prime Minister suggested an Action Plan " with three tier approach in U.N. special session on disarmament, 1988. The action plan called for a three stage comprehensive global disarmament by 2010. The first step would be a fifty percent reduction of all production of nuclear weapons and weapons grade fissionable material by both the super powers an international convention to outlaw the threat or use of nuclear weapons. At the second stage, the same to be done by great powers, such as France, U.K and China, to be followed by near-nuclear countries at the third stage. There is no further evidence of India's interest in the proposal after Mr. Gandhi's tenure ended in 1989.

Indian nuclear diplomacy focused on drawing global attention on the issue of nuclear non - proliferation through a five continent peace initiative. This initiative was jointly proposed by India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece, which entailed periodic summit, experts

meetings, and publicity efforts. The proposal got cold response by western arms control experts. They believed, "Until the near-nuclear countries do not stop their nuclear weapon program such a proposal would be a mere eyewash."

In order to incorporate the Indian perception of Chinese and Indian Ocean threat a Greater South Asian nuclear weapon free zone proposal was discussed between India, Pakistan, China and U.S. non - proliferation experts the official response of which was never made public for analysis.

Efforts taken at international level, through partial test ban treaty, Non - proliferation treaty and MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), also has certain bearing on the question of NWFZ in South Asia.

PTBT :- With regard to PTBT the only difference India and Pakistan had was that India with U.S.S.R., demanded an early and separate agreement on banning of all nuclear tests without testing since it believed that no significant testing could go undetected, while Pakistan in line with the western powers regarded limiting nuclear tests as a part of comprehensive disarmament Plan. This deadlock was resolved when Soviet Union expressed its willingness to sign a limited treaty banning tests in three non - controversial environments in atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The treaty was signed on 5th August 1963 after comprehensive

negotiations in MOSCOW.

When the treaty came up for signing, both India and Pakistan signed it, but Pakistan did not ratify it. India believed that the treaty would substantially reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the underground testing is a complicated procedure beyond the reach of many countries.

Despite reservation, though Pakistan signed the treaty but the Pakistani representative explaining his country's stand on PTBT added in 1974," Pakistani willingness to accede to PTBT and other international agreement on nuclear disarmament had obviously been affected by the knowledge that India had embarked on the course of a nuclear armament. In these circumstances, Pakistan could not be expected to legally foreclose its options."

But this statement of Pak does not seem logical. In 1963, when PTBT was formulated, Pakistan no doubt, had certain reservations about it Viz. no mention of underground test and missing of inspection clause, despite that it signed. But immediately after Indian explosion, it thought of leaving its option on the same ground. This is nothing but a beautiful display of Pakistani hypocrisy.

A recent Carnegie endowment report says that the Pakistan ratified the PTBT in 1987 which brought it in the line with that of India. But what's the use of such ratification, when weapons and such components have already

been brought through clandestine means and heavily stockpiled. The arms control objective of the treaty have not even been partially achieved.

The non - proliferation treaty (1968):- " The NPT has ever since it was signed in 1968 been in the news. Its a constant source of inspiration for the supporters as well as the opponents of ^{nuclear} non - proliferation. Both are divided as they were in the beginning. The treaty admirers see nothing wrong with it and efforts have already started to extend it beyond 1995 when it is due for extension. Similarly its critics regard it to be a monumental fraud designed to perpetuate the hegemony of nuclear powers. Newspapers in the world still write editorials either praising or denouncing it. A plethora of literature has *been produced on the subject. Suffice it to say that NPT has* proved to be the legendary phoenix which dies and comes out of its own ashes. Its success or lack of it is a matter of perception: a tumbler can both be half empty and half full." 15

This draft treaty was jointly submitted by U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. on 31st. May 1968. When it was put for voting before General Assembly, 95 countries supported it. Among the twenty one countries which abstained, India was also there to show its dissatisfaction. India formulated its criticism of the draft on the basis of important issues like the problem of security of non-nuclear state and peaceful use of energy and devices.

To contain this criticism of security of NNWS, "...the Soviet Union, U.K, and U.S. submitted to the Security Council ^{on the same day} a resolution on the question ^{of} dealing with nuclear aggression or threat of aggression against the ^{non-nuclear states.} The Security Council ~~accepted~~ it on 19th June 1968 by a vote of ten to nil with five abstention. The resolution expressed the intention of the nuclear powers to provide immediate assistance, in accordance with the U.N. charter, to any non-nuclear states party to the treaty, ^{on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons} which was a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons." 16

India was, however, not satisfied with such assurances. India criticize the treaty on the question of nuclear disarmament, security and nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. Indian objection on the ground of nuclear disarmament was expressed by the- then Minister for External affairs Mr.Dinesh singh. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly he stated, " The treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot contribute in any way to a balance process of disarmament. It seeks to bind the hands of powerless- and to license further accumulation of armaments ----- which threaten our very existence. It is for this reason we are unable to sign the treaty. The treaty in fact does not do any thing for the existing stockpiles, what it actually does is to restrict the entry of a new member to the club, so it is at best a non-armament measure and not disarmament measure".

Article one while calling upon the NWS not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear power to manufacture or acquiring nuclear powers, it does not prohibit the nuclear powers from deploying nuclear weapons on the NWS and it also does not ban on training of the armed forces of NWS by any of the nuclear power in the use of nuclear weapon.

Comparison between Article II and VI projects the discriminatory nature of the treaty. While Article VI gives only moral obligation i.e. cessation of arms race by NWS in good faith, Article II binds the non-nuclear weapon states with legal obligation. This projects the discriminatory aspect of the treaty.

The treaty has further been criticized from the point of view of security of NNWS. National security consists in the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat. This could have been possible if the very first article of the treaty had prohibited the production of fissile materials for weapons purpose to all countries alike with the principle of mutuality. Then there would not have been any need for such a declaration by NWS against nuclear blackmail to NNWS. By providing control and safeguard in NPT, in respect of non-nuclear states under " international cooperation and safeguard", the security of NNWS has been further endangered.

With regard to the question of nuclear explosion, the

nuclear-haves intention of maintaining their monopoly is further exposed. Article II prohibited the non-nuclear powers from acquiring and manufacturing nuclear explosive devices. It did not impose any such restriction on the nuclear weapon states. By denying access to the technology of peaceful nuclear explosives to the vast majority of NNWS, aimed at stopping the proliferation of the science and technology would not be conducive to the development of harmonious relations among the nations.

The nuclear powers after being successful in strengthening their monopoly over the technology of making peaceful nuclear devices, decided to make application. This technology available to NNS freely or at economically attractive cost. Article V of the NPT contained an assurance to this effect. India objected to such provisions.

Pakistan's response to NPT:- Pakistan's response to NPT was quite different from that of India. It was first conveyed to the first Committee in General Assembly in May 1968 by Agha Shahi. It praised U.S.A., U.K, and U.S.S.R. and described the treaty as a landmark in the history of negotiations of arms control and disarmament measure.

Pakistan supported almost all the articles of NPT with a view that imposition of equal obligation on both (NWS+NNWS) was possible only when the stage could be set for total nuclear arms control.

However expressing support for the objectives of NPT,

Islamabad refused to sign it once it was open for signature. The official Pakistani expression did not link its action to the Indian posture, but the press was more explicit in saying that Pakistan had not signed the NPT, because India did not.

It was only after Indian explosion that Pakistani statements linked signing of NPT by Pakistan essentially to India's signing it, the change in its perception of other provision of the treaty notwithstanding.

Thus from 1975 onwards there was a distinct change in Pakistani attitude to NPT. It decided not to participate in the second review conference held in Geneva in May 1975.

Now Pakistan also questioned the discriminatory aspect of the treaty. In 1978 at the 21st. Plenary session, the Pakistani representative said, "----- if non-proliferation regime is to be fully developed and ^{truly} strengthened ----- a more equitable balance between the rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states ^{is} needed."

In Dec. 1984 Shaharyar Khan, then Pakistan's additional secretary said, "Pakistan position is clear --- we support the ideals of the treaty but we are against the discriminatory aspect. He said Pakistan will sign the treaty if India does." 18

Punitive Sanctions of the treaty :- The treaty, in fact, does not contain any clause for punishing the culprits

i.e. those NNWs trying to become NWSs. But other components of the regime provide room for punishment e.g., the U.S. non-proliferation act, and various amendments to the foreign assistance act especially that of Symington, Glenn, and Solarz prescribe the suspension of the U.S. assistance to those with bad credentials. However these punitive sanctions reflects the positive evidence of America's strategic opportunism and habit to ditch friends once they are no longer needed.

MTCR (1987) :- In response to the spread of ballistic missile technology in the third world during the 1980's and the dedicated development and intensive use of such missiles during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. took the lead to establish the missile technology control regime in 1987 along with U.K., Canada, Spain, Italy, Japan, Germany, France. Although the former Soviet Union was not a member, it has been securing the missiles guidelines.

Indian response to MTCR was on traditional line that non-proliferation should not be used as an excuse to deny technology transfers. Dr.Chidambaram, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, while addressing the annual conference of the international atomic energy commission in Vienna on Sept. 28, called for the IAEA ^{to take} Initiative for a corrective action that growing list of items should not be subjected to restrictions for the developing countries not only in the field of nuclear energy but in other vital fields for

development.

India's opposition stems not from the objectives of MTCR but from the attempt to choke technology flowing to nations outside the regime.

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CHAPTER IV
Nineties and After

CHAPTER IV

The year 1990 dawned with massive magical changes - leading to end of cold war and bipolarity in international relations - the prominent cause being the disintegration of Soviet empire. Strategists all over the world were seen adjusting their relations among the nations, as not a single area in the world which remained untouched of this development. South Asia, was also not an exception. This shows the significance of 1990 in the international relations.

Describing about the collapse Mr. D. Banerjee said, "Major turning points in history comes but once in a few decades or even a century. The disintegration of the Soviet empire and the end of cold war is one such landmark. It is not quite the end of history. For it has not resulted in the total victory of liberal democracy as Francis Fukuyama had predicted. Rather it is the return of the history in a diversity of a new and emerging developments. Even the nature of its coming is new. It has not come as a result of global confrontation of arms and subsequent peace conferences. Instead it came stealthily, albeit dramatically, taking the world by surprise. Neither the west nor the Soviet Union was prepared for it,"¹

The year was important for South Asian region because of added reason - "Despite apprehensions the year

well for Pakistan's political future. For although the faltering government of Benazir Bhutto fell, democracy survived. Interestingly duplicating the fate of the "Son of the dynasty" in India, Pakistani daughter of the east too found herself voted out of power on charges of corruption.. Political accountability suddenly seemed in vogue in South Asia."² Thus the year was a year of political flux for South Asia, - in which the Sub Continent has been like a tasseled pavement without cement.

These developments generated lot of hope for nuclear non-proliferation regime to be successful. However things went different with Iraqi war against Kuwait (1990 - 91) and its ending by intervention of the so called multinationals force led by the United States covered by the figleaf of U.N. legitimacy which initiated a new phase of international relations, the propaganda for a new world order was in the air. President Bush of United States described " **A New World Order**----- a new era-----free from the threat of terror, stronger in pursuit of ^{the} justice and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world can prosper and live in harmony."³

The truth of the matter is that the post cold war years have not altogether brought a beneficent new world order. "The end of the cold war and the bi-polar world have brought in even more unprecedented (that is compared to ~~the~~ bipolar world) Unipolar world dominated by the sole super power left after the collapse of former U.S.S.R. If the bipolar world

and the end of cold war between the two sets of cold warriors were bad, the present unipolar world is worse in some respects for the rest of the world community."⁴

This has revived the arrogance of U.S. further Politicisation of international organizations and devaluing of the sovereign equality of the states and the concept of human rights. The U.S. role in Latin American affairs (for example Panama) U.S. bombing of Libya and U.S. inspired idea of creation of a security zone in northern Iraq and no fly zone in southern Iraq shows the lack of consideration (if not contempt) for sovereign equality of the states with little or no challenge by other great powers. In the context of imperial way in which the super power dominated world is already in operation against certain third world states. These developments show that the world is in a new disorder, than a new order.

The end of cold war as in other fields has highlighted serious contradictions, in nuclear field too. The altered political and economic relationship between the U.S. (and west Europe) and former U.S.S.R. has undermined the very rationale of nuclear weapons. The logic of nuclear weapons having kept the world in peace is no longer valid after Yugoslavian crisis. And yet the U.S.A. and Russia even after the START II is fully implemented by 2003, would possess 6,500 strategic and unspecified non-strategic warheads. There can be cold comfort in the knowledge that the world

can be destroyed only twenty times as compared to the capacity to destroy it sixty times over at the peak of the cold war.

Speculation of further Balkanisation of Russia is also in the air. "In this state of flux, the uncertain fate of vast Soviet nuclear arsenals has rivetted the attention of the entire world. The prospects of their spread among the former Soviet Republics and the third world has been described as a terrifying nightmare with catastrophic implications for regional nuclear non proliferation regime."⁵

Regional conflicts are now decoupled from the earlier super power confrontation. It is as if the lid has been suddenly removed from cauldron allowing the witched brew to boil over. This is what seemed to have happened in Yugoslavia and may be well replicated elsewhere. With all these facts before hand, it seems unrealistic that a regional nuclear non - proliferation is workable in South Asia. Describing about the South Asian security case Thomas G.V.C. Raju said "In the past South Asian security revolved around the nature of Indo - Pakistani and Sino - Indian conflict relations, the effects of super power intrusion into south Asian region and resulting conventional and potential nuclear arms races there. Concerns about these issues appears to be out of date as changes in the global and regional political situations have affected both the nature of threats in south Asia and responses to manage them. problems of internal security including armed separatists movements and

domestic ethnic strife have further altered the strategic environment of the sub continent. In particular confronting the enemy within has complicated the business of confronting without. This is compounded when the two enemies are acting in tandem. Such external and political changes not only add a new layer of conflict to the old one but significantly attend the nature of regional security".⁶

While unstable states in south Asia or any other part of the world are of concern to the international community, such problems assume greater significance when domestic political instabilities are perceived as likely cause of international conflict. Kashmir issue is one such issue, because of which two important countries of South Asia India and Pakistan had far from cordial relationship. At the same time there never had been a complete break up. This shows how a love - hate relationship has existed since the beginning between them. On the one hand we find three full fledged wars and further continuance of proxy wars, on the other hand we find various confidence building measures marching its own way between them.

Before going into the details of those measures it is worthwhile to notice that the domestic politics, regional problems and foreign policies outside the subcontinent has a crucial bearing on the politics within it. The fear of Islamic bomb is also a nightmare to Indian decision makers. The loss of United States as an ally has prompted Pakistan

to step up its efforts to seek allies on the basis of Islamic solidarity. Indian fear of Islamic bomb is as old as the Pakistani attempt for an Islamic defense pact in the seventies. Though unsuccessful, Pakistan's further trial for arrangement for economic cooperation organization in (1986) and creation of Islamic common market in 1991 has added to the Indian fear. One Pakistani analyst projected the eventual formation a United states of Hilal, a large Muslim confederation that would stretch from Pakistan to Turkey. This can with some military Co-operation and arms transfer could undo Indian military balance in south Asia.

The coming of Nawaz Sharif to power in a democratic manner in 1990 had generated hope for peace in the region. However, the nuclear issue presents a difficult policy dilemma for regimes dependent upon external support, Pakistan being no exception to the rule. the clash between domestic legitimacy, nationalism being attached to it and the U.S aversion has made things difficult for successive regimes in Pakistan. The task of these control measures or the peace initiative, therefore needs to be taken into account. This also explains the linking of Kashmir issue to non-proliferation. A non-issue in the 1970's and early 80's Kashmir has become in Pakistani perspective, a determinant of Indo-Pak relations generally and the nuclear issue particularly.

The various peace initiative moves give Pakistan breathing space also and demonstrate its dubious sincerity

in seeking nuclear peace in south Asia. The issue of denuclearisation of south Asia received a fresh lease of life when Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, called for a five nations (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, India and Pakistan) Conference to discuss the prospects converting South Asia a nuclear weapon free zone. He made this proposal on 6th June 1991 while addressing the national defence college in Rawal Pindi. However this proposal had intended something more than arms control. Two reasons make us to think so, firstly the timing of the proposal coincided with the visit of a high level delegation to Washington headed by Mr. Wassim Sajjad, the chairman of the Pakistani senate. The presence of Pakistani delegations in Washington was meant to persuade the U.S. administration to change its policy towards Pakistani nuclear program and allow renewal of stalled U.S. aid to Pakistan. Secondly, the proposal was sounded much before to China and U.S., while the most crucial for its viability was informed a couple of days before it was made public. Some non-Indian sources went to the extent of saying that the proposal was U.S. inspired.

Though despite efforts the aid was not resumed, but at the same time Bush administration welcomed the proposal. The U.S. under secretary of State for security assistance Mr. Ronald Bartholomew, described the proposal "constructive and containing a positive element!"⁷

The Indian response was obvious. It "considered the

proposal nothing but a 'propaganda exercise,' a 'rehash of well known Pakistani posture that has been adopted for past several years' and a 'ploy' to get the ban lifted on economic and military aid imposed by U.S administration under the Pressler amendment."⁸ However this proposal initiated a new phase of bilateral and Tripartite talks between India, Pakistan and U.S.A. During these talks, U,S, has been trying to apply any of the measures of arms control prevailing in the post cold war era.

There are a variety of arms control measures in post cold war era. There is arms control by diktat - The Security Council resolution 687 which dealt with Iraqi nuclear and chemical resolution 687. There is arms control by unilateral initiatives, there is arms control by assistance. Arms control by assistance is coupled with arms control by political pressure, the three non-Russian republic are promised assistance and are prescribed to give up nuclear weapons located on their territories and subscribe to arms accord establishing their non-nuclear weapon states. A form of sanctions, arms control by economic sanctions is being evolved. The international monetary institutions are insisting on reductions of defense expenditure as one of the conditionalities for economic assistance. Arms control by publicity is to be achieved through proposed united nations register of all arms transfer. The most persistent and politically sensitive forms of arms control are maintained by non-proliferation regime and more recent missile technol-

ogy control regime (MTCR).

People insisting on arms control want any of the measures to work out in south Asian region because they believe that developing countries are more prone to go to war with each other and wars between two developing countries armed with nuclear weapons are bound to escalate to a nuclear level. In their eyes it is more likely to happen in south Asian region because they believe both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and given the animosity between the two countries engineered by Kashmir disputes, there is a high risk of proliferation and consequent use of nuclear weapons.

Though U.S sincerely tried some times to stop clandestine transfer of technology under MTCR, but most of the times U.S has opposed any transfer of technology as such. Again there is high level of contradiction in its implementation, depending upon U.S bilateral relations with culprit, or the degree of strategic advantages it can provide to U.S. These factors have negative impact on arms control measures.

In Feb. 1989, Pakistan army after testing surface to surface missiles (ssms) successfully HALF -I AT 80K.M and Half -II at 300k.m claimed that these ssms had achieved their predicted range and accuracy. The then army chief, General Mir Aslam Beg, declared that missiles were developed locally including the guidance system. Pakistan's claim were

however disputed by the SIPRI 1990 Yearbook which stated missiles were based on French supplied rockets. Earlier reports of Chinese assistance, however appeared confirmed when Abdul Qadir Khan later disclosed that Pakistan was seeking help from China which also assisted Pakistan's ballistic missile program. In 1991, the countries China and Pakistan after China agreed to obscure the MTCR regime, the Bush administration waived the sanctions.

These developments strengthens one important point that China an extra - regional factor continues to affect much of the nuclear question of the south Asian region. No solution in the region is possible without including China. China is feared by India, and India is feared by Pakistan. All three countries justify their present nuclear policies as a solution to their security problems - a full declared arsenal in China, a nuclear weapon option in India, and now in Pakistan an ability to assemble as the equalizing the deterrent. Mr. Jasjit Singh believes U.S has always sought monopoly over technology. It has opposed any space technology control act of 1990 (MTCR) as part of the National defense authorization act, (NDAA) passed on Nov. 19, 1990. Cryogenic engine deal between India and Russia concluded in the year Jan.1991 was for a peaceful civilian space technology program. the U.S has imposed sanctions for a two year period commencing May 1992 on Indian space research organization (ISRO) and the Russian space organization Glavkosmos on the grounds that contract between them violate MTCR and

U.S laws.

Describing the imposition of sanctions over cryogenic deal, Mr. Jasjit Singh wrote " the U.S strategic aim requires the whitting down of other countries space program. Washington does not wish to see a rival power becoming emerging in future". There is great paradox in implementation also. pressure is being added to the ban on ISRO for pursuing a patently civilian program, but the ban of China and Pakistan has been lifted in spite of continuing evidence that it is pursuing a military ballistic missile program.

The Clinton foreign policy has marked as a qualitative shift towards south Asia. The intemperate and ill considered remarks by Robin Raphael, a U.S assistant secy. of state and a close confidante of president Bill Clinton casting aspersions on India's territorial integrity has been retaliated in very strong terms by india. External affairs Minister Mr. Dinesh Singh of India categorically stated that India will not brookdown any outside interference on kashmir. kashmir was, is and shall remain a integral part of India."⁹ Robin Raphael later backtraced of her stand, while India remained adamant on her stand. This statement was made at the time when Indian govt., was busy in flushing out "terrorist from Hazratbal shrine (a Mosque in Jammu Kashmir) who had captured almost 50 people inside for a separate homeland. Such a remark about India's territorial integrity was meant to persuade India to sign NPT or go into some other sort of non

- proliferation regime.

Human rights has also been a part of the manipulative strategy of U.S for arms control. Washington has been highly selective in its interpretation of human rights. The hidden agenda of Washington is playing crucial role in dismembering sovereign states. U.S.S.R. is not the only precedent. In Africa going against the stated objective of organization of African Unity, the U.S. has been playing crucial role in dismembering sovereign states. American duplicity is evident in the partition of Ethiopia, formalized in 1993. Efforts are underway to split up states such as Sudan, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Angola. Big oil companies would like areas containing big deposits like Cabinda enclave in Angola and the coastal areas in Nigeria to secede. "Washington and the big financial institutions and multinationals evidently feel that smaller states are easier to manipulate."¹⁰

The hypocrisy of successive administration on the issue of national self determination became more evident as the U.S continues to ride rough roughshod over nations in Latin America and the Caribbean. Even today the U.S countenance the idea of allowing Puerto Ricans to go free. Washington has been issuing strong arms methods to refuse its people the right of self determination. Cuba's refusal to capitulate to Washington has led to the most inhuman economic blockade aimed at depriving the Cuban people their right to livelihood. The U.N. General assembly has been passing resolutions regularly on American blockade.

But despite U.N. and international protests, the U.S. feels free to intervene whenever it chooses in the internal affairs of neighboring countries.

The Kashmir issue was brought again in the Geneva conference on human rights, in March 1994, but Pakistan was forced to drop the resolution as China and Iran the closest ally of Pakistan showed reluctance in favoring the resolution. Had the resolution on Kashmir issue been in Pakistan favour, this could have had strong negative impact upon the nuclear issue in South Asia, because Pakistan has linked up this issue with Kashmir.

In early April 1994, Mr. Talbott U.S. Deputy Secretary of States in his trip to South Asia, invited the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rao for a talk with U.S. President Mr. Bill Clinton on the issue of approaching a nuclear non proliferation regime, in May to be held in London.

Washington is offering a whole set of incentives to both the countries - India and Pakistan to make this non proliferation regime. It is providing with F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan and willing to provide one time exception to the Pressler amendment.

Pakistan however has not agreed to this proposal. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto declared that it would not do it unless India also did so.

Talbott also offered India certain incentives for the same - membership of United Nations Security Council. As far as Pakistan is concerned U.S. administration hopes to get its aim achieved by capping its nuclear program by offering a bevy of modern weaponry, not only the F-16s but much more. Talbott stated that once Pakistan capped its nuclear program, India had nothing to be afraid of its defense matter and hence there will be no resultant arms race.

It is already agreed that Pakistan has at least some nuclear bombs capping doesn't take them away from it. And U.S. is giving them the vehicles in form of the F-16s and still claim that it would not lead to any arms race. Hypocrisy should have some limit. Besides this F-16s, Pakistan has already paid to U.S. for the build up of air force by U.S.A., and training of Pakistan's armed forces.

The U.S. administration proposal to re-establish wholesale military collaboration with Pakistan in the guise of seeking nuclear non proliferation has invited fire from Larry Pressler, the author of the Pressler Amendment, who termed it conducting a package sales of military hardware and spare parts."¹¹

He said it is bad enough that the administration wants to sell a war plane capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to a volatile region. Now it is seeming to rebuild entire Pakistani air force.

If the Clinton administration wants another global

hotspot, it will get it in spaces if it continues to pursue its irresponsible policy in South Asia," said Senator Pressler.¹²

He added that the proposal to supply military hardware and training assistance to Pakistan could destabilise the South Asian region and escalate the arms - race between the two countries that have been at war on three occasions.

There is no justification for a regional cut off agreement now, when the entire world is ready to negotiate a global treaty to end the production of nuclear materials for weapon purpose. In the meantime, what has been found worthy is the CBM - (confidence building measures).

CBM IN SOUTH ASIA:- Though there is a section among the third world experts who don not believe in the CBMS, however Mr. T.T.Poulose says that the recurring cycle of armed conflicts numbering 140 in the third world after the second world war and conditions for the potential conflicts still prevailing in the post - cold war period are compelling reasons for the advocates of CBMS to find them usefulness beyond Europe.

The basic assumptions of the European model of CBMS is that it provides a framework of security and stability for post cold war Europe. Actions and measures which contribute to peace by reducing the levels of mistrusts, misunderstanding or uncertainty which often endanger or sustain war or

other forms of international hostility, are treated as the CBMs .

India and Pakistan the two known enemies sundered by historical rivalries have been mainly responsible for the insecurity in South Asia. They have fought a few wars, built up considerable conventional might and are engaged in a nuclear arms race. They accuse each other of aiding and abetting terrorism and secessionists movements undermining the unity and territorial integrity of India and Pakistan. If these trends are not reversed, by evolving an indigenous mechanisms of restraint, they will be condemned to fight till eternity.

The CBM in the South Asian region is existing since the beginning. The Panchsheel agreement the no war pact, Tashkent agreement and Simla agreement contained elements of CBMS to resolve some of the disputes bilateral through peaceful means.

There is already existing some CBM, in conventional military field. Both countries have agreed to give an advanced warning of their military exercises to each others. A hotline between directors of military operations in their respective GHOS is already operational to eliminate the chances of misunderstanding of each other military intrusion and manouvers. An agreement not to violate each other's air space is also functional. In August 1992, both countries renounced the use of chemical weapon through a joint decla-

ration. Various proposals from both sides to cut down the military expenditure and initiate mutual and balanced force reductions are in circulation.

In nuclear field the first ever confidence building measure was undertaken in December 1988 which became effective in the year 1991.

The agreement signed, spoke :- Each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of or damage to any nuclear installations or facility in the other country".

Recently the idea of 'nuclear safe zone' (NSZ) has become prominent because the strategic elites of both the countries are finding it difficult to implement other denuclearisation processes.

There are no definite formal or a blue print agreed upon the Indo Pak strategic elite. General (retd.) Arif from Pak has proposed some line of legitimisation of the existing nuclear weapon capability of India and Pakistan of each other as well as by other great powers before instituting a mutually acceptable restraint regime.

Mr. Subramanyam believed NSZ in South Asia is not only a stepping stone to nuclear disarmament but would be a stepping stone to the confidence building nuclear restraint and subsequently to arms control and capping. General Sun-

derji says declared nuclear weapons status would prevent nuclear war between India and Pakistan through miscalculation and possibly lead to a no first use policy. Both the countries would undertake not to assemble their nuclear components into deployable weapons.

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CHAPTER V

Conclusion

CHAPTER V

The discussion in the previous four chapters has amply demonstrated that nuclear question in any region is not an independent one. Its solution lies in conscious exercise of reason, while analyzing all such factors which have a direct and indirect bearing on it. Due to various scientific developments, while the world is reduced into one political unit, this has at the same time made it clear that no region can be immune from the impact of any major development, in any part of the world. Nuclear devices are not an exception to it. Strategic doctrines as yet formulated leave no area of world unaffected. The vulnerability of any region from any quarter of the world is no more beyond reach of super powers. Nuclear weapons are instruments of genocide. Their existence, let alone the threat to use them, is morally unacceptable under any circumstances. But still nuclear weapons exist. But what will be their position in the near future has been discussed in CHAPTER-I Titled "*Prospects of a Nuclear Weapon Free World*". This chapter has analyzed nuclear geography, nuclear infrastructure, threshold nuclear powers, limitations of nuclear arms control treaties and doctrine of nuclear deterrence and finally has come out to the conclusion that a nuclear weapon free world is still a remote possibility.

The nuclear geography is such that the entire globe has become a nuclear battle field. No part of the environ-

ment, be it land, high seas or even space is untouched of nuclear menace. Missiles are ready every where to go in for battle. Spies, spy satellites, ships and aeroplanes are recording and photographing without stoppage. With new reports daily coming in about nuclear developments, strategists are seeing busy in continuously testing, revising and updating their war plans. This led admiral James Watkins to remark "It is a world that is nominally at peace. Peace, crisis and conflict often in today's world, there are no clear demarcations.¹

The nuclear infrastructure for the purpose of nuclear warfare has virtually left no countries immune of it. Countries are willingly and sometimes unwillingly linked to this plan. The nuclear infrastructures which includes laboratories, testing sites, electronic support facilities, military bases, transportation network, command centers, computers and satellites are not confined to any particular national boundary, but the battle field is everywhere. Though many countries have long standing non-nuclear policies barring nuclear weapons from their soil or water but such infrastructural links have frustrated their non-nuclear policies. Its nature is of such type that the distinction between the civilian and military is difficult to be made. The country is hoisting for such nuclear powers unknowingly end up with such war making machinery.

In this nuclear age demonstration to the access of any area by rival nuclear power immediately leads to devise such

plans so as to outmanoeuvre the enemy from there. The peace time naval arrangements are made such that they can play a decisive role in case of global nuclear warfare. Again, under the military alliances and pacts, the five nuclear powers have not only sent their infrastructural links to other countries separately but even the warheads, bombs and missiles openly. And so, while technically there are only five nuclear weapon powers, factually, it does not seem to be so. In fact, nuclear powers are all around.

The nuclear targets have left no civilians because targeting is made on all major cities, economic and industrial facilities, natural features and centers of government. With the increasing Soviet threat, the Third World became a super power battle field. Military planners made the Third World a part of nuclear infrastructure, forcing European land warfare doctrines, nuclear balances and counter balances and nuclear theories to fit into the new military terrain. Again, they have dispersed their technical knowhow, arms and ammunitions to their allies in Third World countries.

Today, apart from the five declared nuclear weapon powers, there are number of such countries in various parts of the globe which are prepared with necessary arrangements, if need be, to declare themselves 'nuclear haves' in few hours, weeks or months. Such countries are called the nuclear threshold countries or near nuclear countries. Some such countries have acquired this ability as a by product of

nuclear energy programme like India, while some have achieved this status through clandestine method like that of Pakistan in collaboration with China in South Asian region. The present nuclear status after START II treaty is sufficient enough to destroy the world twenty times, no one can now predict what will happen if the countries in queue acquire this ability. Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, South Korea are such countries which have supposedly crossed the threshold level. Japan and India with their level of technical capability have unquestionably this ability. There are countries which have acquired this status through clandestine means, suggesting the futility of various treaties yet concluded.

Though there are nuclear non proliferation regime - a constellation of international treaties, institutions and codes and bilateral arrangements - but all have worked under certain limitations. That is why Jasjit Singh believes that these apparent arms control measures are in the nature of management of arms race rather than a genuine move towards disarmament. Other mechanism like I.A.E.A, a Vienna based UN affiliated organisation created with an objective to deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful use to military purposes, has been charged of being politicized, lack of manpower and experts having major defects of leaving key installations outside its scope. Similarly, 'nuclear suppliers group' have not served the purpose of denuclearizing or as there has been continuous violation of norms by

one or the other. Similarly, the number of treaties yet signed have been unable to achieve their objective of arms control. The nuclear test ban treaty prohibited the state from carrying out any nuclear test explosion or any other explosion at any other place under their jurisdiction or control - in the atmosphere including underwater and outer space, including territorial water or high seas. However, this treaty has been violated by all the members of the nuclear club. Similarly, NPT is not without loopholes. "While a majority of Third World states have accepted the regime developed by great powers of both east and west, their reasons for this do not always stem from the belief in its inherent worth. They may be the product of a realistic assessment price to be paid for the defiance of the wishes of super powers or conversely the spin-off benefits to be gained from compliances".² Similarly, other major treaties, like INF, START-I and START-II leave major issues unattended. There is still the scope of research and development, besides these measures are bilateral in nature and need to include all the rest of the members of the nuclear club, with the near nuclear countries at the same time.

The proliferation in the Third World must be seen in the context of Cold War. Strategists thought of their defence through deterrence. "For the past 40 years, the globe has seen the most massive arms race undertaken in human history whereby two systems have distorted their national research and development agendas, devoured the

world's natural resources and done irreparable damage to their own and the entire global environment in search for security. This double devotion to the doctrine of deterrence has not only been costly, but most importantly it has failed".³ Henry Kissinger said once, "the search for absolute security has led the entire mankind into absolute insecurity".

The doctrine of counter employment, assured destruction, mutual assured destruction, mutual assured survival strategy, are such jargons of nuclear age and a part of charade which attempts to explain the inexplicable, defend the indefensible and justify the insane. This has led for further proliferation.

There is no moral sanction to nuclear weapons because of its destructive potential. Various techniques devised yet are far away from being put honestly Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), one such denuclearization measure, means nuclear weapons are to be excluded from such a zone. In this strictest and comprehensive interpretation, it should not only imply the very exclusion of the presence of nuclear weapons from such a zone but also keeping the zone free of nuclear weapons launched/delivered from outside the weapon free zone.

The findings of Chapter II titled 'History of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Nuclear Question in South Asia' have shown that this factor of range, reach and action of nuclear

weapon system has unfortunately not received serious consideration so far. The NWFZ tried or debated in various parts of the world like Middle East, South Asia, South-East Asia, Balkan, Adriatic, Mediterranean, and Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaty have shown that nuclear weapon free zones are not a guaranteed measure for denuclearization. Again the entire concept as a tool has been manipulated by super powers in such a way so as to protect their own strategic needs. Guided by their own considerations, both the super powers have supported the nuclear weapon free zone with high spirit and in return provided the non-nuclear country or countries on subscribing to nuclear weapon free zone concept, the security assurances. Subscriber to NPT are given similar security assurances in exchange of surrendering their rights of nuclear options. Finding a conceptual linkage between NPT and NWFZ, the critics have vehemently come out against this. K. Subramanyam stated that the treaty legitimizes nuclear weapon in the hands of nuclear weapons powers and compared it with Wellesley's subsidiary alliance during East India rule in India.

Other serious technical and geographical problems also show the futility of existing nuclear weapon free zones. The problem of verification is an important one. It generates confidence among other parties. Since there is only the provision for verification of nuclear installations and not arsenals - this loophole can be well extracted by aligning its nuclear programme with some other friendly countries

falling outside the NWFZ. History has shown that the super powers during the Cold War days have secretly transferred the war fighting machinery to here and there. Similarly, by making use of the 'Universal Law of Seas', which is in contradiction with NWFZ principles, the nuclear weapon powers have devalued the substantive effect of the concept. That is why Jasjit Singh stated "It would appear that nuclear weapon nations rate both their sovereign rights and the use of nuclear weapon as currency of power higher than the sanctity of NWFZ agreements".⁴ The geographical problem with regard to the concept is that in the days of ICBMs, and SLBMs where no area of globe is beyond its reach, the efficacy of the concept is farce. Again the existing NWFZ suffers from the shortcoming of the artificial territorial delimitation. The classic example is of South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone which deviates from the South Pacific community region to exclude Guam where the US stores nuclear weapon and Kwajateen nuclear weapon test facilities of US. Again the nuclear weapon powers have conditional assurances with regard to use of nuclear weapon. While UK gives negative assurance, promising not to use nuclear weapon except in case of an attack on UK or its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a state in association with a nuclear weapon state. Such ambiguous assurances are far from generating confidence.

The findings of Chapter II has also added to our knowledge as to how the policy of 'interventionism', during

last 40 years has negatively affected the success of NWFZ. Such policy of 'interventionism' has aggravated the local regional problems instead of solving it. Consequently, there has been arms race at that level. During the Cold War days the super powers chose either of the two regional conflict- ing parties, supporting their strategic needs, fuelled them with massive arms supply. In the light of such policy of 'interventionism' and coercive diplomacy, some countries of various regions felt that their security will be best achieved by preparing themselves with sophisticated modern weaponry including nuclear arms. The demonstrative use of force without war by the super powers can be seen from the record of Jasjit Singh. As "The two super powers, in fact, have resorted to demonstrative use of force without war on over 426 occasions since world war II, while the number of similar incidents attributable to other developed countries (like France and Britain, with a declining trend in respect of latter) has been considerable once again, the target and focus have mostly been developing countries. Nearly, 80 per cent of the Soviet use of threat of force were directed at countries bordering the Soviet Union and West Asia. On the other, 98 per cent of US employment of threat of force was directed at countries well away from its borders. There were also a perceptible resort to coercive diplomacy since the onset of cold war in 1978. The pattern may be observed from the US employment of force without war as coercive diplomacy in the Indian ocean and its littoral countries".⁵

which represents developing

Due to this, he further added the vast majority of Third World states were conscripted into the global alliances system by the two super powers who insisted that non-nuclear states could only have a meaningful role, if they aligned themselves with one of the bloc. "As the political rhetoric on both sides became increasingly volatile, the theatre of the Cold War was the Third World. The most immediate consequence was the absorption of internal, local and regional differences of newly independent small and medium sized states into East West competition. Domestic and regional conflicts within the third world were interpreted by the major powers as integral to competition between the two alliance system and therefore to national security of their states."...In the process, ^{two systems devised a global} the security system which exported the national security ^{state} into third world creating a new international garrison order. Hence, the security system that emerged with the Cold War was responsible for absorbing the nation state system ^{into the orbit of the nuclear power system} and the arms race. As new states entered the global system, they were confined by the security doctrine of nuclear powers. Third world security was defined as an extension of alliance system. Consequently, the world has witnessed the four decades of international 'garrisonization'.⁶

Barry Buzan feels that this linkage of regional problem with that of extra regional factors has created what he called the "security complex". He defined "security complex" as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link

together so closely that their national security cannot be realistically understood apart from one another". Analyzing the role of India, China and Pakistan in South Asian Region we can see here the security complex depicted by Barry Buzan.

Most of the western scholars have advanced action-reaction thesis under which India challenges and Pakistan reacts is in fact a mistaken view for arms race in South Asia. The supporters of this view fail to recognize the role of extra-regional factors working in it or they try to hide their role in aggravating the arms race in the region. In fact any study of the South Asian Region is incomplete if they fail to recognize the role of China, US and USSR. Two major external patterns cut through their South Asian security complex, one generated by Sino-Soviet dispute and the other arising from the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. These patterns have dominated the region throughout since the beginning.

The Sino-Soviet dispute, though an independent global development had much effect in the regional arms politics of South Asia. The dramatic opening of Mr Kissinger towards China in 1971 perpetuated the Sino-Soviet rivalry. In the meantime, Indo-Pak War in 1971 which coincided with this global development a link between the two produced new regional alignments. To these Chinese-American rapprochement India responded with the treaty of peace and friend-

ship with USSR. China supposed to be an enemy because of its fulfilled involvement with military war against India, strengthened its relations with Pakistan, another enemy of India. The new Chinese-Pakistani-American nexus alarmed India with new security challenges to meet and the consequence was further arms race. The Indian ocean problem also increased registering its impact on local politics.

The second development—the Cold War—both old and new have significant bearing in the regional security posture. With Indian independence, the two major countries India and Pakistan opted for divergent foreign policies. India by its heavy emphasis on decolonization and NAM, gave a bit anti-imperialist posture because of that it was viewed much closer to USSR. Pakistan, the smaller country which had border disputes with India, tried to solve out its inferiority complex by aligning itself with one of the two super powers and chose US for the purpose. USA itself was interested in countering Soviet influence in the region and so willingly aligned with Pakistan. During this period, with cold war dynamics the region also got affected and each side fuelled each other with massive arms. The cheap flow of American arms to Pakistan, believes Ashok Kapur, as one of the important reason for 1965 Indo-Pak War as it gave a psychological gearing up to Pakistan.

In 1979, with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the status of Pakistan as strategically important country got elevated in American strategic doctrine. Pakistan became the

frontline state against Soviet Union and received massive arms from USA in lieu of that. Pakistan took this opportunity to use against India and tried to internationalize the Kashmir issue violating Shimla Agreement and started supporting terrorism in Indian territories. It further wanted to strengthen its military posture by maturing its nuclear position through clandestine means with the help of China. This explains why China should be considered as part of South Asia, because Chinese role as South Asian neighbour has influenced the behaviour of the countries of the region. Besides, Chinese involvement leaves one pertinent question in our mind specially in the context of nuclear developments, i.e., how to define South Asia? Is the traditional geographical definition any more sufficient for demarcating a region?

Such questions also hampered the attempt of making South Asia nuclear weapon free zone (SANWFZ). Again these developments has also shown the linkages of global and regional problems. During the debate, some countries have reflected this kind of view which is mentioned in Chapter III under the title "SANWFZ: Attempts and Responses". Again this chapter has found after analysis that the concept, in fact, never remain sacred, instead it has been well manipulated by the super powers in order to embarrass the opponents and extract maximum strategic advantage out of it. The concept of NWFZ has been similarly manipulated by regional countries like Pakistan. It has been a part of Pakis-

tani peace offensive foreign policy, to improve upon its international image of a peace loving country. Measures to solve dispute peacefully were also undertaken in the form of "no war pact" between India and Pakistan. In 1949, Indian Prime Minister, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru offered Pakistan a 'no war pact' which it declined unless its conditions were met. Now and then this proposal was made in fashionable manner. In 1982, reversing its dogged refusal for long 32 years Pakistan offered to sign one, but was turned down by the Indian Prime Minister by saying that "Pakistan statement about non-aggression pact has come after acquiring arms in a big way".⁷ Thereafter this proposal was dropped out, but at the same time, other confidence building measures started taking its place.

Nepal's peace zone proposal in 1973 was also intended with some other purpose than arms control as such. It was a reflection of internal politics based on assertive Nepalism and Nepal's overwhelming desire to enhance its role as a strategic balancer between China and India and at the same time as a political measure to extract maximum benefit from both Beijing and New Delhi.

In the 16th annual session of the UN atomic energy conference held in Mexico in September 1972, the first ever proposal for South Asia NWFZ came out from the Pakistani quarter. But even this proposal was not a genuine attempt towards denuclearization since it was made few months after

the bomb decision was already taken by Pakistan. The peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 by India gave legitimacy to further proposals made by Pakistan with regard to NWFZ in S.A. It also sought a nuclear umbrella for its own security. The contradiction comes to limelight when Ashok Kapur traced out that though Pakistan immediately after ~~the~~ nuclear explosion complained of nuclear blackmail, however, it tried to accumulate conventional arms for its own security. The proposal for a NWFZ in S.A. was brought before UN since there was no regional consensus, India objected on it. A revised draft was presented by Pakistan which merely sought the General Assembly endorsement of the concept of nuclear free South Asia to be followed by consultations among the regional countries at the invitation of the UN Secretary General.

This draft was not supported by India again saying that there is no regional consensus for prescription of the item on UN agenda. Since then the concept has been discussed in various meets but anything concrete is yet to emerge. Pakistan however never sat cool. During various Islamic summits and in course of pursuance of bilateral negotiations viz, with Canada and France, Pakistan raised the issue to improve upon its image.

In the meantime, we find number of confidence building measures making its way in the region, between the two near nuclear countries India and Pakistan. During Zia's regime Pakistan offered a wide range of arms control proposal such

as the creation of NWFZ in SA (which was carried forward from Bhutto era). Simultaneous signing of NPT, mutual acceptance to I.A.E.A. safeguard, joint declarations to remove the development of NW and signing a regional test ban treaty. Though some of the proposal has been accepted, but India's focus has mainly been at global level to save the entire humanity. In this context, we have seen the "action plan" suggested by Mr Rajiv Gandhi which seeks a three stage comprehensive global disarmament by 2010, (with 50% reduction) to be taken respectively, by super powers, great powers and near nuclear powers.

Efforts taken at international level through PTBT, NPT and MTCR, could not do much for the betterment of the situation especially NPT and MTCR has been very much criticized. NPT has been criticised on various grounds like problems of security of non-nuclear state and peaceful use for energy and the question of nuclear disarmament. Pakistan has linked its signing of NPT with that of India, however, Pakistan's stand seems to be changing. As when it was open for signature, Pakistan's appreciated it, but sometimes it has also highlighted the discriminatory aspect of the treaty. Indian objection to MTCR does not stem from its objectives but from an attempt to choke flow of technology outside the regime. Again the selective composition of MTCR regulation has been highly objectionable.

Chapter IV titled "Ninties and After" deal with the

changing world scenario which produced a new world order and further attempts for nuclear arms control in the South Asian region. Although the collapse of the Soviet empire had generated new hopes for a peaceful world, but it got immediately shattered with decoupling of regional conflicts like Yugoslavia and Gulf war. Further disintegration of the Soviet empire caused an increase in the number of nuclear weapon members. Besides in this new world order in which USA emerged as the sole super power the arrogance of USA revived in absence of opposition. Prof.M.S. Rajan believes that there is further politicization of the international organisations, devaluing of the sovereign equality of states and the concept of human rights.

Again in this post cold war period, the nature, methods and techniques of arms control also changed. Prof M. Zuberi described that there are varieties of arms control measures by unilateral initiatives, arms control by diktat, arms control by assistance, by incentives, and pressures - through international organisations, human rights and MTCR. Most of the time, these measures have not been universally forced. There is selective procedure for checking proliferation. Those states are pressurized which do not suit the interest of big powers. Robin Raphael's visit and further Talbott's offer must be seen in this context of arms control.

PART-B

The contemporary factors viz, the end of cold war, the collapse of Soviet empire with further disintegration of Soviet Union, emergence of new ethnic conflicts with secessionist trends, and finally linking of non-proliferation with that of regional questions like Kashmir are some features, which contrary to popular western belief have adversely affected the nuclear question, and arms control process in the post cold war days.

END OF COLD WAR:- The characteristic feature of cold war - the ideological rivalry, permanent mistrust and tension - in which each side was pursuing such policies so as to strengthen itself and weaken others seemed to suddenly vanish with the collapse of Soviet empire, preceded by German unification and with certain other evidences of detente. The cold war divided the world into two military halves, each side being backed by either of the super power. Each side wasted a lot of money for armament and further rearmaments at the costs of developmental programme. The collapse generated hope for disappearance of old conditions, but practical experience showed soon that the world has stepped from bipolar order to new disorder in which the policy of interventionism and use of ethnic conflict in various parts of the world became the characteristic feature. In this new world disorder, the world seems to be unable to decide how to react to severe ethnic conflicts at the door steps of the West as in Bosnia or erstwhile Soviet

Republics.

Some of the Western world scholars like Samuel P. Huntington are coming forward with the thesis of "clash of Civilization" in which he claims that the fault lines between civilization will be the battle line of future. This implies not ideology but civilization as the basis in the latest phase, of the evolution of conflict in the modern world. He goes on to describe civilization as western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-orthodox, Latin American and possibly African.

However, such a thesis tends to ignore that it is difficult to demarcate the civilisational line. "In India, we find it difficult to locate a Hindu civilization, even though at one level there may be a limited Hindu renaissance in line with rising global religious revivalism. This is instead a larger Indian civilization that transcends religion. Conflict would arise only when there are external interventions and efforts are made to undermine historic socio cultural ethos through naked power politics and narrow chauvinism".⁸

One of the reasons why scenario is being propagated in the west is because we have not yet seen the end of ideological struggle. The cold war has ended only in Europe with the dissolution of Soviet empire. The entire east European and Soviet bloc of nations could not withstand the western ideological onslaught. That is far from the situation in

Asia-Pacific. Here the dynamism of Asian resurgence had successfully resisted the western ideas and is not only standing up to them, but laying the framework of new civilizational values.

In fact, in the new post cold war period, few new factors have place to determine the global security problem.

These are pulls and pressures of economic forces leading to the emergence of regional economic groupings and tensions in developing world due to unfulfilment of rising expectations. Further, there is decentralization of economy, with which power is also being decentralized at regional centers with credible military capability, this will be a factor in shaping the global security scenario. In such a fluid international situation their role is yet to be defined precisely. Post cold war days are also witnessing the rise of ethnicity and assertion of political identity. Now these forces want new political institutions so as to create fresh political structures for they will not mind using force. Such forces have reduced the power of the state and government and group assertion and sometimes terrorism have become important factors in determining the new world order. The new world order which was hoped by George Bush as a new era of peace and justice, free from the threat of terror, has become, more complicated, more volatile and less predictable than in the past. James Woolsey the new Director of CIA described "Yes, we have slain a large dragon, but we

now live in a jungle filled with a variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways the dragon was easier to keep track of".⁹

Though there are variety of ways in which the end of cold war has been described, however, one has to be very clear that the end of cold war does not even mean the end of war or conflict. Now power equation or structure has changed. To some it looks like a unipolar world with American monopoly, some suggest tripolarity with USA, EC, and Japan are significant. Some also qualify CIS and United Germany as dominant power centers in world politics. Such changes in power equation and forming of a multipolar world will not be without turbulence. Any change in the relative power equation always creates a number of problems in adjusting to a changed environment and today's world is no different. The nature of turbulence in present day will not be a world war or even a major war between two significant nations. Conflicts of future will be on over assertion of ethnic identities, religious activism problems arising out of border issue in sea and land, terrorism and its state sponsored variety across borders. Maritime boundaries will acquire strategic significance. Any security mechanism hence must try to address these problems.

DISINTEGRATION OF SOVIET UNION:- By December 1991, the USSR the largest country in the world, ceased to exist as a geographical and political reality giving rise to twelve

independent nations under the umbrella of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The nuclear weapons inherited by some of the newly born nations like Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia were described as a matter of terrifying nightmare with catastrophic implication for nuclear non-proliferation regime. Some reports have come that Kazakhstan, has willingly transferred two nuclear warheads to Iran one of the Islamic countries, in lieu of economic assistance. If this transfer to Iran is true then this is an indication that "an Islamic bomb is not beyond the bounds of possibility".¹⁰

In South Asia, India has already expressed the fear of Islamic bomb. So such developments are likely to aggravate the nuclear problem in this region. West along with the US is now prepared to champion the goal of non-proliferation especially in some parts of globe like Third World (although they themselves are well armed) is applying all sort of techniques - pressure, assistance, incentive to achieve its goal in CIS. The west along with US prefers to transfer nuclear weapon from rest three to one Russia, because they firmly believe it is easier to deal with one than four.

Only Belarus opted immediately to unconditionally relinquish its nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan after creating lot of confusions has recently signed NPT in December 1993. It has preferred US security umbrella under Moscow declarations. "As far as Ukraine is concerned, the problem ranges from uncertainties with respect to the schedule for with-

drawal of tactical nuclear weapons, apprehension concerning Ukrainian "administrative control" over units of CIS strategic forces, insistence on participating in the process of dismantling of nuclear weapons, demand for special guarantees against nuclear attack, request for funds to cover the expenses associated with nuclear disarmament and claims for ownership of fissionable material extracted from nuclear warheads." Although Ukraine is now prepared for ratification of START I but it has postponed its adherence to NPT. By delinking START I from NPT, Ukraine theoretically has the option to retain the 41 strategic bombers. Again not that everybody in Ukraine is thinking in terms of dismantling. Some argued for keeping the nuclear weapons for an unstable period, some argued nuclear weapon status in Ukraine. To some, major threat to Ukraine is mainly from regional quarters - from Russia and Romania. Hence, the chances of arms race cannot be ruled out. Thus, the situation in CIS is still in constant flux. We are yet to determine perfectly what course would the nuclear situation take place there. Thus, the Ukrainian position shows a difficulty in the attainment of a nuclear weapon free world and also raises doubt in NPT as a viable measure for regional security problem.

THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHT AND NPT:- In post cold war days both are linked with too much of emphasis. In this context, we can analyze the Indo-US relations in post cold war days because USA has been most vocal to project its image as the

ardent supporter of human rights and non-proliferation regime and for attainment of its goal it has employed all sorts of techniques by linking regional problems with that of nuclear question. In this context, in South Asia, India has been a sufferer, since its territory Kashmir has been linked to that and because of this, the nuclear question has got adversely affected.

The Clinton administration agenda, "economic restructuring of US" requires a peaceful world. Countries like India being a huge market could provide a better opportunity for the purpose. But, destabilizing South Asian region would not suit American business interests. Hence to attain control of this highly amorphous situation the Clinton administration attempted to fashion some policy precepts - nuclear non-proliferation and enforcement of human rights were two such precepts.

The major plank of this US initiative was the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. On the top of the US agenda was the task of making all those truant countries - who were yet to sign the treaty - signatories to NPT.

1/ To achieve these objectives, the Americans produced a two tiered diplomatic plan for diplomatic arm twisting. On ~~the~~ one level, the American government agencies began to take a tough line with non-signatories countries; On another level, Washington made Britain, France, Germany and Japan do the same on their respective bilateral levels.^{'12}

With American manipulation of human rights issue on the South Asian region, the arms control situation further got setback. American decided to balance India's view on NPT with Pakistan's wishes of continuing its own nuclear weapons programme. Islamabad's argument was at first based on its sense of regional insecurity stemming from the Indian military superiority. But when their argument failed to cut much ice with international community, it decided to play on the American fear psychosis of getting embroiled in a South Asian War. Pakistan projected the Kashmir problem as having the potential for blowing up into a shooting war nuclear ramifications.

So once this linkage of Kashmir with nuclear issue was established, the Americans at the beginning decided to bring around the still pliant Indian policy makers to sign the NPT by creating pressure from below through their own policy formulations, human rights.

While this was the status of American government till about the middle of 1993, it went through a radical shift after the Clinton administration completed its task of putting its own personnel in the key areas of state and defense department. Wishing to gain lasting control on the politically volatile region, the personnel suddenly began viewing the spectre of an independent Kashmir as a plausible foreign policy gambit. There can be no better example than the questioning of instrument of accession made by US

Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael. Americans also made it known that they plan to override the Pressler Amendment which legislated the requirement of Presidential annual certification of Pakistan's nuclear status for continued aid flow to the country. But in the process, Americans by showing their hand, a little too soon, have delinked the nuclear issue from the highly emotive Kashmir tangle.

Thus, the Clinton administration has been displaying an amazing lack of coherent thinking and mature understanding of the impact of its politics on South Asia. Deputy Secretary, Talbott's visit has been rather a pedestrian exercise without indication of any fresh thinking on South Asia. Talbott's visit has been no path breaking achievement. He came, saw, but hardly conquered.

The US has made it amply clear that its policy with regard to the South Asia nuclear issue is to cap, to reduce, and finally to eliminate nuclear weapon capability. With regard to offering F-16s to Pakistan, in order to cap its nuclear programme, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao made it politely clear that such measures would compel the government to join for counter measures that would be a back breaking on the economy of India.

The reason for so much importance to Pakistan is because of the strategic importance of Pakistan in the Pentagon's future projections in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf zone which has hardly gone down even after the end

of cold war. The crescent of political turbulence that stretches from Sinkiang to India calls for an American foothold in this region, and that is precisely what Pakistan alone can provide. And within Pakistan it is the military junta which in Washington's perception provides both stability and reliability. The offer to release a fresh fleet of F-16s along with other equipment upgrade the Pak airforce serves the double purpose of placating America's most trusted and durable element within Pakistan and also strengthening a very important watchover for the US strategy in this important region.

However, skillfully Talbott presented his concept of nine power formula five plus two plus two (5+2+2) assembling and taking a collective view regarding South Asian security. The five constituted of the permanent members of the United Nations, India and Pakistan and two other economic giants Japan and Germany. Earlier the Indian stand was to include some more countries like Ukraine and Iran to this formula, however, later in Secret London talk held the in last week of April 1994, it outrightly rejected this programme of multilateral talks for discussing such vital issues of India's security such as capping of nuclear programme in India and Pakistan, ending missile deployment and development technology transfers, export control and conventional arms control etc.

The differences between India and US seem to be irre-

conciliable at least for now. There are a number of areas of divergence between the two like:- the first is on the negotiating format. While US favours a multilateral discussion forum India favours a global non-discriminatory approach within which it could consider constraint on its nuclear programme. The US argues that a regional negotiation between India and Pakistan could positively feed into global process. Washington is loath to give up its tendency to equate India and Pakistan on nuclear question and its persistence in locking India into a discriminatory regional nuclear arms control process.

The second problem is with regard to the roles of other nuclear powers in particular of China. New Delhi has argued that an Indo-Pakistani negotiating framework is inadequate, given the fact that the neighbouring China has nuclear weapons and missiles. Under the American Plan China is to be brought to facilitate the regional arms control between India and Pakistan and not to join them as equal partner in negotiating arms control. In short, Washington's readiness to accept China as a legitimate nuclear power and its treatment of Indian technological aspirations as a problem of proliferation remains fundamentally unacceptable to India.

The third divergence relates to the nature of nuclear self-restraint being proposed by the US. The US is calling for capping of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes. India has been urging for a number of years a global negoti-

ation on ending the production of nuclear material for weapon purposes. A global negotiation for capping makes the American proposal for regional capping largely irrelevant. India has a little reason to hustle into a regional capping when a non-discriminatory solution could be worked out in the near future.

Fourthly, the American determination to nip Indian missile development in the bud is a major irritant in the Indo-US nuclear dialogue. Just as the Indian space and missile capabilities began to mature in late 1980s, the US began imposing sanctions on the Indian space programmes and pressurizing India not to deploy the short range Prithvi missile and end the development of medium range missile Agni. India views missile development as essential for its security.

Fifth, the American offer to resume arms sales to Pakistan, in particular of the F-16 fighter aircraft as a part of its new non-proliferation initiative in the subcontinent has been vigorously protested by New Delhi. The US arms sales are being vigorously prosecuted as an incentive for Pakistan to agree to verifiable cap on its nuclear programme. The US is suggesting that India could live with F-16 sale since a capping of nuclear programme is in New Delhi's interest.

India, however, sees the arms sales as undermining the current military balance between New Delhi and Islamabad and

more dangerously implying a resurrection of the strategic cooperation between US and Pakistan that could have a negative effect on Indian security over the long term.

Scholars like Muchkund Dubey believe that recent US proposal (5+2+2) is a new trap for India. "The sole purpose of this proposal is to subject ^{US}(India) to institutionalized, continuous, sustained and massive pressure to dismantle ~~our~~ (her) nuclear and missile capability...The presence of Japan and Germany in the proposed talks would ensure that any economic sanctions clamped on India is really effective".¹⁴ Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a critical element of the United States' vision of a new world order in which possession of such weapons is the sole prerogative of the existing nuclear weapon powers so that they can have unchallenged hegemony over the world power structures. The US and its allies have convinced them that the hegemony of this new alliance is the only means for ensuring international peace and stability. The US also perhaps perceives a potential threat to its own security stemming from India's emergence as a fulfilled nuclear weapon and missile power.

With so much diversity of opinion between the two countries, and amidst that invitation by Mr Talbott to the Indian Prime Minister to the US had put India in predicament. Since central to India's foreign policy objective in the new world order was to put in place a non-hostile, if not cooperative relationship with the existing super power.

Thus, the Prime Minister's visit to the US on 19th May was an important development in the context of Indo-US relations and disarmament. However, the meeting was termed successful, as Rao-Clinton Summit came out as a summit which was "an agree to disagree one" on the key issue like Kashmir and non-proliferation.

While emphasizing the areas of agreement on non-proliferation, the two sides made no attempt to hide their continuing differences on the issue. Clinton made it clear that he prefers to see India opt for a non-nuclear route to its security. The essence of Rao's utterances on the subject in US was the continuing insistence that India will not give up its nuclear weapon option and will constrain its nuclear programme only within a framework of global non-discriminatory arrangements.

How the India and US will share the circle of non-proliferation in South Asia is a question that remain to be answered. Senior administration officials have reiterated that the recent American initiative for non proliferation in South Asia remains on the table and Washington would take it up with India as a part of continuing dialogue. The manner in which India and the US carry on their bilateral nuclear dialogue in the next few months will provide a test case on how they will manage their differences in a constructive manner.

The US and such other protagonists of a partial ap-

proach to disarmament just try to evaluate the Indian position consciously as this one is more logical, based on sound and moral principles of universal brotherhood. It maintains its great tradition of universal peace commitment, by providing solutions for the emancipation of mankind from nuclear menace.

Its position seems to be logical because it takes a global view on nuclearisation, role of extra regional factors, power dynamics and on that it bases the futility of zonal solutions to global problem.

Nuclear problem is no more a zonal problem, it is a global problem. The first tangible step towards denuclearization therefore needs to be based on the changes in ideas and attitudes by declaring nuclear weapon as illegitimate and crime against humanity. What is lacking for this is the political will. Efforts must be made to generate the political will for the purpose.

It must be clearly understood that a simple approach to perceive non proliferation in terms of NPT is no longer adequate. The issues related to nuclear weapons and proliferation have become increasingly complex. At the same time nuclear weapon states show little signs of altering the existing imbalances in the nuclear equation where a few powers are holding on to a nuclear weapon on highly questionable grounds, and working energetically to perpetuate disarmament of the unarmed. Instead of using a unique his-

torical opportunity (after the end of cold war) to alter fundamentally the very role and existence of nuclear weapon, few states especially U.S. are focussing. New ways and means are being devised to achieve the goal of sustaining the monopoly of the nuclear haves over the have nots.

India is well aware of the consequences of nuclearization and various arms control measures. That is why any zonal solution to global problem has not been acceptable to India.

India and Pakistan now openly acknowledge that they have nuclear weapon capability, although neither admits of any nuclear bombs.¹¹ (However the then Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto after her ouster in 1990 stated that although she was aware that Pakistan has crossed the nuclear threshold, she was kept in dark about the details of its programme by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the country's powerful military).^{11/15} An implicit system of deterrence has already been there into South Asia. Here India fears Pakistan, Pakistan fears India, India fears China.

South Asia thus stands out as the only region in the world in which three rival nations sharing disputed frontiers and torn by deep rooted animosities face each other with nuclear capabilities. With both India and Pakistan in possession of weapons grade fissile materials and the means of delivering nuclear arms, further China with a declared nuclear weapon status, the region has reached the post-

proliferation stage.¹⁶

Domestic politics and regional security threat perceptions make it unlikely that either government will abandon the weapons option or cap nuclear efforts at present level.

So, the establishment of NWFZ in South Asia is no longer possible - the reason lies in its current post proliferation phase. The necessary and technical condition do not exist for developing such a zone in the region. In addition a significant problem would lie is simply accounting for all the weapons grade fissile already produced by Pakistan and India. Some of the plutonium, uranium, and tritium produced may not be declared and at present there are no verifiable means of ensuring that stockpiles of the fissile materials are not hidden away. Unless all weapons are accounted for and brought under bilateral or international safeguards, neither party can feel confident about denuclearization arrangements, because a small nuclear force could be build on a sly. In addition, no technical solution appears to redress this problem.

Again there are additional problems of political disputes in the South Asian region. All the three important countries India, Pakistan and China (China though geographically do not fall in the South Asian Region, but its political role shows that it cannot be left out) have border disputes. Unless these disputes are solved, there is least chances of solving the nuclear issues in the region. The region requires additional confidence degree, because the

region has faced four fulfilled wars and lost territories to one of them. A higher degree of confidence level is required to solve all the problems of the region.

The countries of the South Asia should work together to achieve a NFW. India has a special reason to do so, because the strategic interest of India will be served better by the establishment of nuclear weapon free world (NFW). Hence, any non-proliferation measure must be conceived only as a part leading to the process of complete disarmament.

However, India's national policy must also deal with the reality that nuclear weapons exist in the world, in Asia, with India's neighbours. Even in the worst scenario maximum capability that would be required for India's defense is that of minimum deterrence. What is critical is the assured availability of an option to move towards the minimum deterrence posture in tune with the rise in threat levels.

Countries like Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, Belgium have capability to weaponize themselves at a short notice. India too has that capability. Such situation is called that of a recessed deterrence. Recessed deterrence requires an aggressor to take into account the capability of these countries while holding out the threat of nuclear coercion or weapon employment.

With this position, India must work for a complete nuclear test ban, a universal ban on fissile material cut off for weapons purposes, an interim measure for elimination of non-strategic weapons, total elimination and prohibition of ballistic missiles, and delegitimation of nuclear weapons. Indian stands seems to be perfectly right that nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) must mean a nuclear weapon free world (NFW) as no state in the world is immune from this danger.

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