

**Ideology and Socio-Political Change in
Modern Turkey**

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Preface

Modern Turkey presents a distinct model of relationship between ideology and socio-political change. The processes of modernization were initiated at the local plane in the nineteenth century; they still continue to be important in Turkey. So, the understanding of the transformation from a traditional to a modern society necessitates an analysis of the ideological and socio-political developments. This study attempts to answer some questions relating to ideological forces and socio-political change and reveal their real nature.

The study has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with antecedents of socio-political change in relation to ideology to provide a historical context to our study. An analysis of ^{Kemalism,} an important source of change, its implications and reappraisal during the 1940s appears in the second chapter. The major developments of the decade of Democratic rule such as ideological exposure and religious revival have been discussed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter gives an analysis of the military interventions and the multi-dimensional conflicts in the 1960s. Finally, our analysis has led us to arrive at certain conclusions which have been discussed in the fifth chapter.


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Basheer Ahmad Dabla

CHAPTER 1

Introduction - Historical Background

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Socio-political change in human societies is a process in continuity. Social change refers to "changes in the social structure i.e. the size of a society, the composition or balance of its parts or the types of its organisation".¹ It includes "attitudes and beliefs of individuals in so far as they sustain institutions".² While political change denotes "changes from absolutist institutions to responsible and representative governments and from a laissez-faire to a modern welfare state".³ Thus, socio-political change is directly related to the process of modernization which affects a wide range of individual experience and functional aspects of societies in the modern world. The change from tradition to modernity is a dominant feature of contemporary societies. Among other indigenous factors ideology, which refers to a patterned set of ideas and modes of thought relating to society in its entirety, plays a crucial role in this process as it impels its proponents to insist on the realization of the ideal

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1. Morris Ginsberg, Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy (Britain, 1968), p. 129.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Reinhard Bendix, "Industrialization, Modernization and Development", Peter Worsley (Ed.), Modern Sociology (Penguin Books, 1978), p. 137.

through a total transformation of society.⁴ Ideology as a social force and agent of change creates consciousness about the new situation which emerges after the breakdown of traditional system and often determines the nature of change. Ideology links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings.⁵ In the contemporary Afro-Asian societies, ideology has been a dominating factor in the transition from one stage to another.

Mannheim considers ideology as all thought which is "distorted by the desire to conserve the present social order or restore the past".⁶ To him ideology is the "manifestation of the vested interests or the programme of reaction".⁷ Sorel takes ideology in the sense of "a myth, for it declares the premises and circumstances on which a man will act, accept, reject, dispute or struggle".⁸ In actuality, ideology is one variant form of those comprehensive patterns of cognitive and moral beliefs about man, society and the universe in relation to man and society, which flourish in human societies.

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4. Edward Shils, "The Concept and Function of Ideology", David L. Shils (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. 7 (USA, 1968), p. 67.
 5. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), p. 314.
 6. Duncan G. Mitchell, A Dictionary of Sociology (London, 1968), p. 95.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Donald G. Macrae, Ideology and Society : Papers in Sociology and Politics (London, 1961), p. 65.

As compared with other patterns of beliefs like outlooks, creeds, systems and movements of thought, ideologies are relatively systematized or integrated around one or a few pre-eminent values, such as salvation, equality or ethnic purity.⁹ Since ideologies emerge in conditions of crisis and in sectors of society to whom the prevailing outlook has become unacceptable, they represent responses to insufficient regard for some particular element in the dominant outlook. So, ideologies attempt to place that neglected element in a more central position and to bring it into fulfilment.¹⁰ Since ideas (concepts and propositions capable of intelligible interpretation in relation to human interests, values and experience) do play an important part in the determination of action¹¹, the deterministic role of ideology in the broader social framework is revealed more or less in all definitions. Whatever its signals, the concept of ideology makes a direct reference to the role of ideas.¹² In this sense ideology is functional¹³ because it may help the social system to achieve

9. Shills, n. 4, p. 66.

10. Ibid., pp. 67-69.

11. Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (New Delhi, 1975), pp. 19-20.

12. Stuart Hall, "The Hinterland of Science : Ideology and the Sociology of Knowledge", Bill Schearcz (Ed.), On Ideology (London, 1977), p. 10.

13. Harry A. Johnson, "Ideology and the Social System", David A. Shills (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7 (USA, 1968), p. 83.

greater integration, adaptation or adaptive captivity. Although Marx and Engels succeeded in turning all thought into "a mechanical reflection of class interests" and ideology in a "passive mirror reflection of external economic phenomena"¹⁴, ideology in itself remains a highly potent source of political legitimacy and socio-political change in their writings. This is supported by the observation that with the development of capitalism, ideology becomes an increasingly important instrument in creating social forces for onward transition of the society. Thus capitalism itself "generates anti-capitalist social theories".¹⁵ In addition, the analysis of the development of capitalism in the West by Max Weber has confirmed that "ideas, ideology and religious consciousness exercise an important motivational and thus active factor in social change".¹⁶

Ideology is not the only determining factor in socio-political change. In fact, there is a reciprocal relationship between ideology and socio-political change. In this connection, Binder says that "the effectiveness of ideological appeals to legitimacy depends upon the distribution of existing values and notions of reality. Hence the effect of ideological

14. Alan Swingewood, Marx and Modern Social Theory (London, 1975), p. 59.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

perspective is reciprocal.¹⁷ While the universal phenomenon of socio-political change is guided or even determined by a particular ideology, an ideology in itself is the manifestation of a particular socio-political order. It absorbs the doctrinal content from its respective social milieu also. So, the existing modes of thought cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins remain obscure.¹⁸

Thus, some propositions as to the relationship between ideology and socio-political change can be formed:

- (a) Ideology, besides other factors, directs the socio-political change in the society.
- (b) Socio-political forces determine the theoretical formulations of ideology.
- (c) Ideology and socio-political change have reciprocal relationship and are inter-related.

These propositions about ideology and socio-political change can best be analysed in relation to the Turkish transformation from a traditional to a relatively modern society. Turkey provides a distinctive model in the West Asian region in the sense that socio-political processes involving peoples' broader participation were initiated earlier in the Ottoman

17. Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York, 1964), p. 12.

18. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London, 1968), p. 2.

empire. This gave rise to different ideas in response to different problems. In this way, ideology has remained dominant socio-political force in Turkey particularly since the Young Ottoman movement. This was mainly because of two reasons : the indigenous developments in the Ottoman empire and the impact of the contact with the outside world, mainly the west. Thus, ideological trends and forces created by them have contributed significantly to all major developments in the Ottoman empire and the Turkish Republic.

The sociological analysis of these developments, which we intend to undertake in this study, would reveal the real nature of socio-political change and the role of the ideological forces in Turkey. The theoretical complexities and distortions, created by partial-particularistic approaches, would undergo critical analysis to reveal their fallacies and shortcomings. In this way the reality of socio-political change in relation to ideological developments in Turkey would be dealt with objectively and scientifically. We would analyse problems through different dimensions to have a comprehensive understanding of the social, political and ideological developments in their totality. Thus the "integrated approach"¹⁹ would help us in the scientific analysis of ideology and socio-political change in modern Turkey.

19. Yogendra Singh, Modernization of Indian Tradition (Faridabad, 1977), p. 22.

Since the pattern of socio-political change and ideological development has retained the characteristic of continuity as well as change, a historical review of these processes and developments would provide a proper perspective for further analysis.

The Ottoman society was a highly conservative and traditional society with a legitimized hierarchy comprising the Sultan, the Ulema, the Army, and the Administrative elite. Occupational groups like peasants, craftsmen and tradesmen formed the lower stratum of the society. It had a totalitarian and centralized state which controlled the whole socio-economic and cultural-political life from above. Islam, the dominant religion, served as the collective ideology with full operation of its symbols. The aspects of conservation, ascription, stability, isolation and closeness were socially recognised ideals in comparison to innovation, achievement, flexibility, exposure and openness.

However, in the eighteenth century the old system began to disintegrate because of the social, political and economic compulsions and the impact of new developments in the West. The decline of the Ottoman empire, particularly in the economic field, brought about a new consciousness in the ruling class. They began to think in terms of "reforms" on the western model. Many observers, especially students, were sent to Europe by the sultans to know about the material progress there and

to find out solutions to Ottoman problems.²⁰ This initiative had a significant impact on the cultural and social life of the Ottomans. The French Revolution had a decisive impact on the Turkish intellectuals and affected to a greater or lesser degree every layer of Muslim society.²¹

The conscious efforts on the part of the ruling class resulted in some famous reforms in the Ottoman empire, particularly in the military field. Sultan Selim (1769-1808) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) attempted planned and large scale westernization in the administration, military, politics, judiciary and commerce. Those attempts were initial stages of the process of modernization on sound bases in the empire. Selim's successor Mahmud II was successful in destroying the Janissaries completely. This was a significant victory for the modernist intelligentsia against the conservative forces.

The earlier reforms prepared the ground for the important period of reforms, known as the Tanzimat. The "Gulhane Edict" (Decree) of A.D. 1839 and the "Islahat Fermani" of A.D. 1856 stipulated limitations on the Sultan's powers, equality and security of all citizens and improvement in all fields parti-

20. As early as A.D. 1720, Celebi Mehmet was sent to Europe by the Sultan to seek and adopt whatever was of utility to the Turks. Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-party System (Princeton, 1959), pp. 6-7.

21. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1966), p. 53.

cularly military, financial and judicial.²² In the Tanzimat period (A.D. 1839-1877) the Ottoman reformers attempted reforms and change on the western model but within the Ottoman framework. They were mentally a mixture of East and West.²³ In the spirit of liberal tradition they introduced modern schools, western literary and theatrical adaptations, scientific books and magazines and the concepts of individual freedom and participation in the Government. This process of change from above continued alongwith the old system²⁴ which created an institutional duality in the society.

However, this process of change lacked originality and realism primarily because the Tanzimatists were more idealistic than experimental in orientation.²⁵ Under the pressure of democratization and wider political and economic consequences of the contact with the West the Tanzimatists failed to pursue their programme of modernization. This resulted in mere imitation, opportunism and inconsistency among them. They were criticized mainly for following the western model which had given rise to the minority nationalisms in the Ottoman empire.

22. Karpas, n. 20, pp. 10-11.

23. Halide Adib Adivar, Conflict of East and West in Turkey (Delhi, n.d.), p. 56.

24. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Eds.), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East (Chicago, 1968), p. 3.

25. Halide Edib Adivar, Turkey Faces West (New York, 1973), p. 98.

Their western idealism was countered by Patriotism, which became the dominant ideological trend in the following period. In spite of its drawbacks, the Tanzimat period was a mighty attempt to reform and change the Ottoman empire,²⁶ systematically and consciously. Although partially successful²⁷ it made the way for future modernization.

This process of westernization of traditional society resulted in two major developments:

- (a) A new group of intellectuals called the Young Ottomans with liberal socio-political ideas emerged from the newly created educational institutions²⁸,
- (b) The introduction of western elements and ideas created conflicts and cleavages in the Ottoman society which eroded the foundations of the old order. Transplanted in a different context, they gradually acquired different meanings for different people.

The Young Ottoman ideology was the manifestation of a serious reaction to and deep protest against the traditional

26. Ibid., pp. 98-99.

27. Religious opposition, peasant conservatism and failure to understand the roots of European social reform and technology prevented a fundamental change in the Ottoman Empire.

28. The Young Ottoman movement started in 1865 when a political organisation was formed by a group of individuals who were united by a common dislike of the policies of the ruling elite. Andreas N. Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey (London, 1966), p. 75.

as well as western extremes. The Young Ottomans were the first ideologues of the Ottoman Empire in the sense that they tried to make the ideas of the enlightenment part of the Turkish reading public and to work out a synthesis between these ideas and Islam.²⁹ They observed that while extreme conservative order was detrimental to the progress of the Ottoman society, the Tanzimat reformers undermined or ignored the richness of traditional values and culture. The major components of the Young Ottoman ideology were patriotism, constitutionalism, nationalism (with Islamic orientation), liberalism, freedom and separation of state from religion.³⁰

According to Mardin, the Young Ottomans represented four main ideological streams³¹:

(a) Mehmed Bey, Halil Serif and Mustafa Fazil represented the "liberal ideal of progress through emancipation from all remnants of a bygone age".³² They were most universal, the closest to starting from the basic postulate of the brotherhood of humanity.

(b) Namik Kemal was the main ideologue of the Young

29. Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, 1962), p. 4.

30. Niyazi Berkers, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), p. 210.

31. Mardin, n. 29, p. 78.

32. *Ibid.*

Ottomans. He advocated the theory of natural rights³³ which gave rise to the idea of constitutional regime based on the rights of the people and in accordance with the shariah. His project, later on, became the basis for framing Turkey's first constitution promulgated in 1876. He was too immersed in the stream of liberal western ideas; but for him liberty and the nation were key ideals.³⁴ Observing the decline of the Ottoman empire and the ascendancy of the West, he opted for a programme of conscious change through modern technological advances which creates a new civilization. By civilization he meant western industry, technology, economy, the press and education.³⁵ But he opposed "the subservience of the Ottoman empire to European economic interests".³⁶ He upheld the Islamic and Ottoman ideals and evolved an Islamic-Ottoman approach. He took liberty and progress as articles of faith for the survival of the empire and Islam. Even his ideal of patriotism was Pan-Ottomanist with Islamic nationalism at its base. In reality his ideals were the means to realize two main objectives : the unification of the Ottoman individuals and millets and to challenge the political and economic supremacy of the West by a modernized and unified Ottoman empire.³⁷

33. According to this theory the normal condition of a state was to be based on the consent of its citizens who were endowed by nature with certain rights. Berkes, n. 30, p. 210.

34. Mardin, n. 29, p. 79.

35. Berkes, n. 30, pp. 215-16.

36. Lewis, n. 21, p. 450.

37. Berkes, n. 30, p. 221.

(c) Ali Suavi was the real representative of the people among the Young Ottomans. He expressed the hostility of the small man of the capital for a type of westernization of which the lower middle class had collected only fringe benefits.³⁸ He promoted the trend which aroused eagerness among lower classes to share the material blessings of progress.

(d) Ziya Pasha was a man of the palace whose basic quarrel was with the ministers of the Porte. His ideological contribution to the Young Ottoman movement was less significant, although he was affected by an ideological malaise.³⁹

The Young Ottomans and their ideas represent a stage in Ottoman society when ideology and ideological conflict started crystallizing. The political demands of wider significance, which were the emotional symbols of political modernization, got expression under different ideological outlooks. According to Mardin, their ideas may be considered to be the result of institutional change, the product of a psycho-social involvement in traditional values or the fruits of intellectual diffusion. They may also be examined in relation to the reshuffling of elites brought about by the Tanzimat or viewed as an illustration of changes wrought

38. Mardin, n. 29, p. 79.

39. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

by a general increase in communications.⁴⁰

The Young Ottoman ideology, in brief, represents the Ottoman response to the various social, political and economic problems which arose as a result of interaction between internal and external forces. In consequence this ideology led to multi-dimensional changes like the promulgation of the constitution of 1876 which granted certain rights to citizens and established a parliament.⁴¹ Although the constitution gave rise to totalitarianism, it was a positive step towards political modernization in the sense that the Sultan himself came under the purview of certain rules and regulations. Thus, the constitution encouraged political participation in the Ottoman society. However, Young Ottoman theoreticians could not maintain an impressive figure due to the impossibility of taking over the best of European political institutions and placing them on an Islamic sub-stratum. They ran into difficulties because "they had no room for atomistic individualism" and "did not dispose of a theory as to the corporate nature of the state".⁴²

In the late nineteenth century the governing elite had expanded beyond the dimensions of a family circle⁴³ and the

40. Ibid., p. 396.

41. Berkes, n. 30, pp. 246-47.

42. Mardin, n. 29, p. 399.

43. The new elements of the educated elite were officers, civil servants, lawyers, and journalists, Lewis, n. 21, p. 455.

change was reflected in sharper conflicts in the political life. The ideological polarization created antagonism between competing groups. The conservatives had dominated the scene under the Sultan's repressive state apparatus. Sultan Abdul Hamid II repudiated the tendency of westernisation. This was accomplished by replacing the symbols of western civilization by that of Arab civilization.⁴⁴ In this situation, Jamal-ud-din Afghani helped the Hamidian regime by contributing the ideology of Pan-Islamism. This meant the culmination of a reaction against the Tanzimat. But the absolute rule of the Sultan led to the strengthening of opposition groups resulting in the Young Turk revolution.

The Young Turk revolution of 1908 was a "derilium of the French revolution without its bloodshed".⁴⁵ The Young Turk ideological outlook represented a new phenomenon in Ottoman society. The Young Turks were the first group of people to approach the social, political and cultural transformation in the spirit of modern politics. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the Young Turk organisation, was the first political organisation to have a mass following.⁴⁶ The Young Turks came from diverse social groups representing the interests of rising native petti-bourgeoisie. They had

44. Berkes, n. 29, p. 263.

45. Adivar, n. 23, p. 70.

46. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks - The Committee of Union and Progress, 1908-1914 (London, 1969), p. 44.

too broad a social base and too heterogeneous a class structure to be elitist.⁴⁷ According to Karpaz, they usually came from middle class background and humble origin.⁴⁸ They became the representatives of the changing pattern of Ottoman society and the "agent of general will".⁴⁹ They stood for a comprehensive change to reach the level of progress of western societies. The earlier reformers had made the achievement of this ideal possible through the "training of certain social groups imbued with a sense of public service and dedication to modernization".⁵⁰ In addition, the CUP received its impetus from specific social processes which had been set in motion one generation earlier. At the time of revolution, the Young Turks had to deal with basic issues like the attainment of a total transformation from an oriental mode of polity and society to an European, western and liberal type of state and society.⁵¹ In an article entitled "our programme", published in the official organ of the Young Turks (Meshveret - the consultation), they emphasised some of their main principles which included

47. Ibid., pp. 161-62.

48. Karpaz, n. 20, p. 15.

49. Ahmad, n. 46, p. 157.

50. Suna Kili, Turkey : A Case Study of Political Development (Istanbul, 1968), p. 13.

51. Niyazi Berkes, "Two Facets of the Kemalist Revolution", Muslim World (Hartford), vol. LXIV, 1974, p. 300.

"the maintenance of good order, propagation of the notion of progress, reforms for the entire empire, advance in the path of civilization alongwith oriental originality, to overthrow the reigning dynasty and opposition to the substitution of direct intervention by the foreign powers".⁵²

In the early stages of westernization the Turkish socio-political thought developed the processes of assimilation, reconciliation and reinterpretation. But, during Abdul Hamid's despotism, this innovative process was halted which led to the conflicting situation in the early twentieth century. The Young Turks who emerged in this background represented three main ideological streams :

(a) Islam : Although with different orientations and emphasis, the Young Turks were committed to the ideal of Islam. To extreme conservatives it meant a state religion which would implement the Shariah law⁵³ and oppose western domination. For them the faith and religious law were the beginning and end of all wisdom, and deviation from them the "cause of all Turkey's troubles".⁵⁴ They believed in the universality and totality of Islam which was adaptable to science and technology. They advocated abolition of all

52. Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, The Young Turks - Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, 1957), p. 25.

53. Berkes, n. 30, pp. 337-46.

54. Lewis, n. 21, p. 229.

cultural reforms and opposed nationalism.

The moderate Islamists saw the need for some reforms in Islam and sought desperately for ways of achieving it without endangering the religious and cultural heritage of Islam. They insisted that "Islam is not an obstacle to modern civilization ... it is indeed the source and origin of European culture".⁵⁵ They refused to follow the western model in political and social matters for all the elements of political and social progress could be found in Islamic past. According to them, "science and technology could be taken from the West ... but in government, in law, in social usage, in education, in basic loyalty, Islam must remain dominant".⁵⁶ In view of the fact that Islam had evolved deep emotional involvement there was no significant opposition or rejection of it. However, Pan-Islamism, as a political force, was non-existent.⁵⁷

(b) Westernism : Westernism was taken as a cultural and moral issue⁵⁸ which stressed broadbased changes in the Ottoman society on the western model. The extreme westernists believed in complete acceptance of "European civilization - the incorporation of Turkey as part of civilized Europe."⁵⁹

55. Ibid., p. 230.

56. Ibid.

57. Berkes, n. 30, pp. 337-46.

58. Adıvar, n. 23, p. 84.

59. Lewis, n. 21, p. 231.

For them "Westernization was not a matter of choice but of survival".⁶⁰ Their main exponent, Abdullah Cevdet, argued that "there is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization and it must be imported with both its roses and its thorns".⁶¹ In this extreme form of westernism, Islam and nationalism remained insignificant. On the other hand moderate westernists "defended a selective adoption of western culture by respecting national values".⁶² According to them technical civilization could be transferred from one country to another, while real civilization could not be borrowed.⁶³ Although anti-clerical in nature, they believed in Islam as a faith and in its universal values. They accepted Ottomanism as a fundamental political principle in order to strengthen the multi-national state. They advocated the enlightenment through education as the chief method of modernization.

(c) Nationalism : Nationalism was still in the formative stage. It represented the notions of Turkishism which was in essence a response to the emergence of national sentiments among the Ottoman minorities, economic monopoly of the West in collaboration with the Ottoman minorities and consciousness

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Karpas, n. 20, pp. 20-21.

63. Lewis, n. 21, p. 230.

of the native culture. Nationalism primarily stressed Turkish domination, adaptation of native culture and a distinctive nationalist model. The nationalists emphasized broad based reform of the institutions of state, religion, family, economy, education, language, script, literature and art.⁶⁴ This nationalist concept was not in contradiction with either Islam or westernism. Many Young Turk nationalists shifted their loyalty from the Caliphate and Europe became their fountain-head at the cultural level.⁶⁵

This pattern of ideological debate failed to create cohesiveness among the Young Turks. So, it became necessary to evolve a broader outlook which would synthesize all major view points and unite the ruling class. Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) fulfilled this need by providing broader nationalist framework. As the nation⁶⁶ is the primary important unit in the contemporary society, the Turks must awake as a nation and adopt the contemporary western civilization. At the same time the Turks should retain the native culture. According to Gokalp civilization and culture, which occupied major

64. Berkes, n. 30, p. 347.

65. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Memories of N. Batzaric : The Young Turks and Nationalism", International Journal of Middle East Studies (California), vol. 6, 1975, p. 298.

66. For him the modern nation is a community in a unique complex of cultural values on the one hand and a society based on organic solidarity, division of labour and functional differentiation on the other. Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya Gokalp : His contribution to Turkish Nationalism", The Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. 8, 1954, pp. 375-79.

position in his thinking, do not represent antithetical entities but are two closely-related and complementary traits of the social reality.⁶⁷ Gokalp regarded as "part of culture all feelings, judgements and ideals" of a particular nation unique in nature, which constitute a system, while "rational-scientific knowledge, methods and technology" created by different ethnic groups and transmitted from one to another, belong to civilization.⁶⁸ Gokalp argued that modern nation was an independent cultural unit within the confines of contemporary civilization. While emphasizing the elements of this nationalist concept he referred to the "true native values" and the traditional heritage of Islam in the turkified and secularized form. But at the same time he demolished the theocratic conception of nationality.⁶⁹ Gokalp's ideology fulfilled the functional need and created an intellectual movement that provided inspiration to the people for a change from empire to nation, religions to lay and East to West. By applying the principle of sociology of culture, ^{he} concluded that three factors represented by three ideologies (Islam, westernism and Turkism) were not, in reality, incompatible with one another. So, he raised the slogan "we belong to the

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67. Niyazi Berkes (Tr. and Ed.), Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization - Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp (London, 1959), p. 23.
68. Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism : The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp (London, 1950), p. 63.
69. Berkes, n. 67, p. 24.

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Turkish nation, the Muslim religious community and the European civilization⁷⁰ which represented the synthesization of three ideologies. However, in his analysis he ignored or undermined the conflicts of economic nature to create a national consensus and solidarity through national economic structure and national occupational guilds.

The Young Turk period experienced social change with wider implications for politics, economy, society and culture. The Young Turks limited the powers of the monarch and increased that of the new ruling groups. Their regime provided a useful exposure to parliamentary government. Thus, peoples' participation was evolved through political freedom. This encouraged a serious ideological debate and increased the scope of the press.⁷¹ New ideologies, like socialism⁷² and labour movements⁷³ started emerging in the empire. The Young Turks succeeded in their policy of "reform from above" particularly in the fields of secularization, emancipation of

70. Heyd, n. 68, p. 63.

71. In 1911, 1912 and 1913 there were 20,228 and 389 newspapers and periodicals respectively in Turkey with a circulation ranging from 7,000 to 50,000. Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkey", Robert F. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), p. 268.

72. The first Socialist Organisation - Ottoman Socialist Party - was formed in 1910. Dogu Ergil, "Reassessment: The Young Turks, Their Political and anti-colonial struggle", Islamic Culture (Hyderabad), vol. XLIX, 1975, p. 135.

73. The Young Turk revolution unleashed a wave of strikes. Lewis, n. 21, p. 409.

women and creation of free environment for social mobility. They resented the economic penetration of the West and encouraged the local initiative and national economic activity through the abolition of capitulations, introducing Turkish hearths, consumer's cooperative movement, National Credit Bank and other enterprises. It is important to note that the adoption of the concept of Turkish nationalism lessened the significance of the empire itself.

The Young Turk movement had a specific elitist character which did not allow it to bridge the chasm between the masses and the elite. So, they had "no intention of altering the basic social structure".⁷⁴ They gave less attention to economic problems. In this way they could not achieve lasting and basic reform. Consequently, the changes during their period were largely limited to the upper layers of the Ottoman society. The peasantry and industrial working class were hardly influenced by their reforms. However, the Young Turk era proved a transitional period having characteristics of pre-capitalist stage with important social changes which, later on, culminated in the nationalist revolution.

The post-world war I Ottoman society was, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, different from the earlier one mainly because of the Arab revolt against the Turks and British

74. Ergil, n. 72, p. 82.

occupation of Turkey. The 'Ottoman totality' was now non-existent functionally. To the Turk in the street, the Treaty of Sevres seemed a death warrant, individually and nationally.⁷⁵ A new Turkish nationalism took shape under the clashing push and pull of imperialism, which was inspired by the October revolution in Russia. The Erzurum - Sivas Congresses (1919) and the National Pact (1920) which envisaged a government on the basis of national will, territorial integrity and complete independence,⁷⁶ showed the maturity of Turkish nationalist consciousness. This national solidarity made the war of liberation a great success.

The Turkish National Liberation movement represented the collective will of the Turks under the leadership of new "revolutionary elite". The revolutionary elite was in a sense a substitute for the Ottoman ruling institution and social structure.⁷⁷ During the liberation movement, nationalism was the main ideology of the Turks. This prepared them for future changes in the Turkish Republic. However, the nature of the movement gave rise to covert and sometimes overt,

75. Adivar, n. 23, p. 187.

76. Mohammad Sadiq, "Intellectual Origins of the Turkish National Liberation Movement", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 15, 1976, p. 521; Richard D. Robinson, "The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development" (Cambridge, 1965), p. 71.

77. Sadiq, n. 76, p. 524.

ideological conflict. The conservatives representing extreme religiosity and negation of westernization and the moderate modernists representing synthesization of tradition and modernity were systematically and completely dominated by the charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

After the successful war of liberation against Western imperialism, the Turks emerged as a new national entity, a logical culmination of the nationalist ideas of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks.

CHAPTER 2

Kemalist Heritage

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KEMALIST HERITAGE

The emergence of the Turkish Republic signified an end to the synthesizing process which had created a duality in the old system and finally led to its destruction. The Republic initiated a process of systematic modernization under the auspices of state power to reach the level of contemporary civilization. In the course of this process the Turkish society underwent a basic change; a new social structure came into being. The Turkish Republic represented a new national identity implying renunciation of international postures of the Ottoman Empire. The uniform cultural heritage, common language, and cohesiveness of the Turks and specific territorial boundaries helped in evolving an integrated 'national whole'.

Since the liberation struggle had given rise to the 'nationalism in consensus', the dominant nationalist ideological outlook was not disputed. In fact the war of national liberation "served as the melting pot for the Turkish nationalist ideology".¹ The religious, nationalist and secularist groups, irrespective of their ideologies, supported the national ideal. The argument that this was mainly due to the absolute

1. Mohammed Sadiq, "Intellectual Origins of the Turkish National Liberation Movement", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 15 (1976), p. 511.

nature of state ideology seems true because a deep socio-political conformity was evolved on the ideal of nationalism. However, the coercive nature of state ideology, projecting in mild repression, cannot be ignored. In fact, there appeared a paternalistic pattern, in which western thought dominated and no real interaction took place between different ideologies.² It was, in actuality, state-managed and state-planned change. In this situation, Turkey experienced a multi-dimensional change mainly through non-conventional methods. This pattern of socio-political change was more or less followed throughout the Republican period as an ideal and as such provided inspiration to the future developments.

Mustafa Kemal was the supreme commander and charismatic leader of the national liberation movement and the Turkish Republic. Since his consciousness had developed in the military environment, he thought in a mechanical way, talked in absolute terms and acted decisively. His personality and image "acquired somewhat sacred nature" and his sayings and pronouncements "assumed an aura of absolute truth".³ He formulated the state ideology according to his own ideals.

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2. A. Adivar has taken an extreme view saying that "the domination of western thought or positivism of the West was so intense that one can hardly call it thought", Abdullah Abdulhaq Adivar, in T. Cuyler Young, Near Eastern Culture and Society - A Symposium on the Meeting of East and West (Princeton, 1951), p. 128.
 3. Metin Tankoc, The Warrior Diplomats : Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Utah, 1976), p. 111.

This does not mean that his associates were denied a role in the formulation of state ideology. In fact, Mustafa Kemal had evolved the consensus about the national ideology to which the ruling class was committed for safeguarding its own interests. Thus, he institutionalized and legitimized new forms of change which aimed at preparing new and modern generation. Consequently this state-controlled transformation was not accompanied by traditional confusion or complexity in the elite as well as non-elite groups.

The Turkish Republic was an ideological state in the sense that it represented a particular ideology propagated and implemented through its various institutions. It was a "one party state"⁴ too, in which the party became the platform for the expression of ideological trends. But, it was qualitatively different from the Soviet model of ideological state where non-state ideology was non-existent. Although the Republic lacked the specificity and concreteness of ideological contents in the scientific sense at the initial stage, it was evolved in the following period. The ideology of the Turkish Republic was vaguely named as "Kemalism" or "Ataturkism" which signified a set of principles and objectives for Turkey's overall progress propounded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It is necessary to mention here that Kemal Ataturk

4. Robert G. Lenden, The Emergence of Modern Middle East - Selected Readings (New York, 1970), p. 238.

was not an ideological puritan nor was he devoid of any ideological outlook. Karpaz says that "Ataturk, though less believer in the absolute power of ideology ... used ideological appeals to enhance the feelings of Turkish national identity and solidarity".⁵ In reality, he was a true patriot and used all ideological means - capitalist, socialist, Islamic and secular - to integrate and develop his nation.

Broadly, the elements of Westernism, Modernism, Nationalism and Secularism contributed their share in determining the various features of Kemalist ideology. Yasar Nabi Nayir, a contemporary of Kemal Ataturk interpreted "Ataturkism" as "new system of thought and the new path brought about by Ataturk's words and reforms".⁶ Kemalism also showed progressive elements through emphasizing its aspects of anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, national independence and popular sovereignty.⁷ In fact, the theoretical formulations of Kemalism matured in the middle thirties. Subsequently a formal ideological framework with specific perspective was adopted in the form of "six fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic" at the Peoples Republican Party (FRP)⁸ Congress of 1936. The six

5. Kemal H. Karpaz (Ed.), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York, 1968), p. 298.

6. Ibid., p. 325.

7. Ibid., p. 327.

8. In the tradition of real nationalist political party in Turkey it propagated the ideals of national sovereignty, independent entity and national solidarity on the basis of the harmony of interests. London, n. 4, p. 238.

principles were : nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, revolutionism and republicanism. After one year these principles were incorporated in the Constitution.

Nationalism

Turkish nationalism was a deep rooted native sentiment with its particularistic orientation. In essence, it was an ideal stressing "special Turkish character"⁹, unification of Turkish population, national organic solidarity¹⁰ and strengthening of linguistic unity and cultural homogeneity.¹¹ It was extolled as a supreme and sacred ideal.

Turkish nationalism was identified with the form of political state which led to cultural and political absolutism in all spheres of society. All problems were viewed with a nationalist bias which had favourable effect on social integration and national consensus. Turkish nationalism adopted specificity and renounced the supra-national Islamic-Ottoman character and the aggressive-expansionist outlook to live peacefully in the community of modern nations.

9. Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75 (London, 1977), p. 4.
10. Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics : The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton, 1959), p. 257.
11. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey ; Reform, Revolution and Republic - The Rise of Modern Turkey - 1908-1975 (Cambridge, 1977), p. 376.

Though nationalism in Turkey was of western origin, the Turkish form differed substantially from the original model because of the modifications made to suit the modernist-secular views. In spite of the fact that Turkish nationalism represented broadly a consensus model, the conservatives used it as a "safe shield against unorthodox ideas".¹² So, the modernists tried to negate the impact of orthodoxy through the creation of a national culture and universal understanding. The socialist intellectuals on the other hand gave it the socialist-universal orientation.

Secularism

The main objective of secularism was to evolve a non-religious consciousness to replace the traditional concepts of loyalty viz., Islam, Ottomanism and Nationalism. According to Lewis the purpose of secularism "was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it - to end the power of religion and its exponents in political, social and cultural affairs, and limit it to matters of belief and worship."¹³ Secularism specifically referred to the separation of religion from politics, state and social life.¹⁴ Its multiple character implied creation of

12. Karpat, n. 10, p. 253.

13. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1966), p. 410.

14. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), p. 483; Ahmad, n. 9, p.5; and Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York, 1971), p. 163.

a modern nation state without emphasis on religion and a secular-modern individual. The Kemalist approach to secularism differed radically from the approaches of the Tanzimat and Mesrutiyet. In addition, the idea of rationality of religion became a deistic conviction of secular colouring. So the abolition of the Caliphate, according to the Kemalists, meant liberating Islam from its irrational traditional associates and preparing the ground for its emergence as a rational religion.¹⁵ However, this notion seemed highly idealistic and remained so because of the dominant role of religion in Turkish society, particularly in rural areas.

The Kemalist secularism "was not anti-religious"¹⁶ in the sense of liquidating religion systematically; it was rightly conveyed through the term "laicism"¹⁷ which stressed depoliticization of religion. It signified a rational approach to religion which stressed reason rather than tradition. In fact, it was an attempt to evolve a "rationalized-humanized" and "enlightened"¹⁸ Islam. Mustafa Kemal's understanding of Islam was purely logical. He said, "our religion is most rational and natural religion".¹⁹

15. Berkes, n. 14, p. 483.

16. Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization (London, 1963), p. 91.

17. Lewis, n. 13, p. 406.

18. Berkes, n. 14, p. 483.

19. Sadıq, n. 1, p. 515.

So, in the Kemalist secular framework "the believer had the ideal conditions for his religious expression".²⁰ The report prepared by the Faculty of Divinity in 1928 observed that religion was a social institution. It must meet the needs of social life and keep pace with change and development.²¹

Statism

The doctrine of "Statism" owed its emergence essentially to indigenous response to the problems of economic development of Turkey and not to any exogenous "ideological leanings to the Soviet Union or to Communism".²² However, the successful Russian model of state-controlled economy provided inspiration to Turkey. Although the Kemalists were impressed by socialism for its humanist orientation and revolutionary content they did not allow it to emerge as a significant socio-political force. So, statism does not imply attachment to socialism as an egalitarian ideal but the expectation that state capitalism would accelerate the pace of industrialization.²³

Statism refers to a system in which the state participates actively for general and vital economic interests of

20. Berkes, n. 14, p. 486.

21. Lewis, n. 13, p. 409.

22. Ibid., p. 280.

23. Edwin J. Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change - The Development of a More Prosperous and Open Society (New York, 1970), p. 12.

the nation, "though private work and activity a basic idea ... in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible".²⁴

Mustafa Kemal defined statism as follows:

"The statism that we are implementing is a system peculiar to Turkey, engendered by its own needs. It means that while recognizing private entrepreneurship as the main basis, but recognizing that many activities are not undertaken, the state must be given the control of the economy to face all the needs of a large country and of a great nation".²⁵

Thus it aimed at developing a real national economy through liberating it from foreign dependence and encouraging local enterprises under state supervision.

Statism was different from socialism in the sense that it allowed private enterprise to function with certain limitations. Thus, the ruling bourgeoisie helped the industrial bourgeoisie through official patronage and financial assistance. In essence, it meant state capitalism that in collaboration with private capital aimed at rapid industrialization of Turkey.

Populism

The underlying assumption of this doctrine was that all Turks formed a social whole, though with professional differen-

24. Ahmad, n. 9, p. 4.

25. Karpat, n. 5, pp. 330-31.

ciation but with non-class formation.²⁶ Accordingly, antagonism of the class society was not evident in the Turkish society. It was rather marked by consensus and conformity. In that situation a new social order, based on the national sovereignty, harmony of interests and absolute equality before law²⁷ could be created through the functioning of the "people's Government".²⁸ So, Populism became the manifestation of an urge for national-social solidarity through peoples rule. Populism recognized the validity of popular sovereignty to the degree set by the requirements of national unity and sovereignty. In this connection, Mustafa Kemal said that "the aim of a people's organization as a party is not the realization of the interests of certain classes over against those of other classes. The aim is rather to mobilize the entire nation, called people, by including all classes and excluding none, in common and united action towards genuine property which is the common objective for all".²⁹

Theoretically, populism, according to Mustafa Kemal, was "the social principle that seeks to rest the social order on its work and its laws ... and entitles (Turks) ... to struggle as a whole nation against the imperialism and the

26. Ahmad, n. 9, p. 4.

27. Ibid.

28. Lewis, n. 13, p. 458.

29. Barkes, n. 14, p. 463.

capitalism.³⁰ So, it was directly related to the "Government of the people and not of the ruling class"³¹ signifying popular bases of sovereignty. Essentially, this doctrine was evolved to promote an environment of openness, achievement, competition, upward mobility and altruism in Turkish society. However, it was highly theoretical and open for interpretation which distorted its comprehensive character.

Revolutionism

Revolutionism aimed at an overall change in the traditional social order, replacing it by a new and dynamic one. Thus, it attempted to revolutionize the Turkish way of life in its entirety on the bases of "progressive and evolutionary principles".³² Revolutionism stressed "incongruity of the traditional institutions with the implications of a secular polity and culture".³³ In this process "modernism was the goal and reformism the means"³⁴ and progressive-evolutionary principles guides to radical transformation. In 1925 Mustafa Kemal said that "the Turkish Revolution means replacing unity based on religion with nationality".³⁵ On the whole Revolutionism

30. Lewis, n. 13, p. 458.

31. Shaw and Shaw, n. 11, p. 378.

32. Ahmad, n. 9, pp. 4-5.

33. Berkes, n. 14, p. 465.

34. Karpas, n. 10, p. 324.

35. Berkes, n. 14, p. 470.

provided stimulus to social dynamism which was necessary for nation-building and modernization. Since the western civilization was accepted as the model, the emphasis on the native cultural heritage had to be minimized in the revolutionizing process.

Republicanism

Republicanism emerged primarily as a political system and as a strain of political culture in the Turkish Republic. It represented a system in which the government did not retain absolute authority and administer paternalistically but accepted the right of peoples participation at all levels. So, Republicanism stood for "the form of Government which represents and realizes the ideal of national sovereignty"³⁶ in the nationalist-modernist environment. Functionally, it led to the creation of a patterned set of modern procedures, institutions and processes for the running of political system alongwith raising the societal level of consciousness. In addition, the Republican set up provided sufficient stimulus to the process of modernization in all fields.

The theory of "Kemalism", propounded by the Kemalists during the first one and a half decade of the Republic, served as the sole legitimate ideology of Turkish nation. It was

36. Ahmad, n. 9, p. 4.

considered above criticism, particularly at the earlier stage, and was implemented "through state machinery by orders and sanctions".³⁷ However, very limited and insignificant debate about its elements took place. Actually there was hardly any free discussion and competition of ideas, with the result that even the glaring contradictions in Kemalism³⁸ could not be taken into consideration. The later developments confirmed those contradictions and attempts were made to remove them. Although "Kemalism", by and large, remained a dominant ideological force throughout, it failed to create an ideological consensus at the national level. The desire of the Kemalist elite to prevail over the ideological field and the forcible implementation of state policies prevented free interaction of ideas. However, the contradictions of Kemalism could no longer be sustained. Kemalist theories as much became the subject of ideological debates in the changed atmosphere of mid-forties.

Since the Turkish Republic had the ideological nature, it was oriented towards a fundamental socio-political change with radical measures. So the Turkish society experienced

37. L. Erven, "Turkey at Cross Roads", Review of International Affairs (Belgrad), vol. XVI, 1965, p. 25.

38. Like the adoption of Turkish Nationalism and Westernism simultaneously, secularism and the management of religion under state supervision and the theory of populism and the practice of authoritarianism. Cf. Burhan Belge, "Modern Turkey", International Affairs (London), vol. XVIII, 1939, pp. 745-56.

structural as well as functional changes in the first and a half decade of the "rigid, tightly controlled and seemingly omnipotent Republican regime".³⁹ The state policy of indoctrination had created an integrated movement of modernization which revolutionized major fields of Turkish society. The traditional social order was replaced by a modern one with new organizations, institutions, processes, attitudes, beliefs, roles, behaviours and relationships. The age old ascriptive-hierarchical system was abolished and a new, mobile and achievement-oriented system was under evolving process. The new set up gave rise to new groups with specific opinion about their status and interests which they demanded and defended. Two important social groups - the ruling elite and the rural elite⁴⁰ - emerged as national representatives who owed their legitimacy to the nationalist ideology.

The Republic experienced multi-dimensional change in the new political environment. The major political measures like the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, declaration of the Republic, introduction of the Constitution, Representative Assembly, the political party and the national political system had changed the world outlook and the functioning of individuals

39. Karpaz, n. 10, p. 76.

40. The ruling elite controlled the main centres (urban) and enjoyed a free access to political power. It was oriented towards cultural and political modernism. On the other hand, the rural elite was rural oriented and motivated by socio-economic considerations. Karpaz, n. 5, p. 297.

and groups. These changes led to mass political consciousness and participation through an institutionalized system which negated the old hierarchical notions of authority and rule. Thus a political community was created through the processes of national integration and nation-building. For the Turks, "the national state was a dynamic concept in political and social organization about their political and cultural identity".⁴¹

The new political system legitimized political parties which meant the involvement and participation of different groups in political life. The role of the ruling party and the experiment of two opposition political parties - Progressive Republican Party in 1925 and Liberal Party in 1930 - added to the democratic consciousness and political maturity. The Republican Peoples Party, which had identified itself with the state and its ideology, played the intermediary role between the ruling class and the masses. With the mass political participation the party, as a distinctive socio-political institution, became the centre of consciousness, activity and mobility in rural areas. It dismantled the structural roots of isolation and provided various forums where cross-interaction between groups and sub-groups took place. Thus, political functioning in the isolated rural areas really changed the traditional way of life of the local

41. Cohn, n. 23, p. 7.

inhabitants.

There are contrasting value judgements based on particularistic and extreme views about the nature and functioning of political system during Kemalist era. While Lewis and Adivar considered Turkey under Kemal as a "dictatorship"⁴² but "without monstrous apparatus of surveillance and repression"⁴³, Yalman observed that Mustafa Kemal tolerated bitter political criticism and did not silence his critics on any pretexts. However, the degree of tolerance declined after the Treaty of Lausanne.⁴⁴ In fact the state during Kemalist era was of absolute nature because the Kemalist elite carried out a patterned and controlled change through it. In a way it was the preparation for a democratic stage too. In addition, the Kemalist highhandedness to introduce reforms was usually to insure the success of westernization and to root out reactionary forces.⁴⁵ But the dictatorship, as a political theory, was never accepted; instead it was considered harmful to Turkey.⁴⁶

42. Bernard Lewis, "Democracy in Turkey", Middle Eastern Affairs (New York), vol. 10, 1959, p. 59; Halide Edib Adivar, Turkey Faces West (New York, 1973), p. 221.

43. Lewis, n. 42, p. 59.

44. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Turkey in My Time (Norman, 1956), p. 144.

45. Henry Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development (New York, 1968), p. 90.

46. Karpas, n. 10, p. 138.

The economic change, though not basic⁴⁷, led to crucial social changes. The abolition of capitulations⁴⁸ had led to the emergence of native petit-bourgeoisie while the adoption of statist economy had far reaching impact on the consolidation and strengthening of the national bourgeoisie. In this way Statism provided certain sections of population with additional income and employment possibilities.⁴⁹ Social classes like peasants, industrial workers, businessmen and intellectuals owed their existence mainly to Statism which created capital and allowed its accumulation with certain restrictions in private hands. In addition, the rational economic relations had a generalizing impact on social structure, unification of social groups with similar interests into larger classes and a rational understanding of their respective group positions and interests. The penetration of the money economy into rural areas changed the relatively self-sufficient primitive economy, relationships based on it and the pattern of urban-rural relations. In actuality, this economic system, semi-capitalist in orientation, fulfilled the wider needs of, and thus intensified, the broader process of modernization including industrialization.

47. ' Because of the fact that economic power continued to be with the old small commercial bourgeoisie.

48. The capitulations were regarded synonymous with surrender and intolerable infringement on national sovereignty. So, they were finally abolished by the Treaty of Ledsanne in 1923.

49. Karpas, n. 10, p. 89.

Secularism proved to be the main feature of modernization because of the religious-conservative character of society. The first one and a half decade of the Republic experienced a systematic reform in the religious structure through steps like the abolition of the Sultanate-Caliphate, Shariat laws, religious orders and the restriction of religious education. The transformation of cultural-social symbols and practices, removal of Islam from the constitution and finally change of Turkish script strengthened the trend of reform. The success in all these reforms signified a decisive victory of the secular-modernists over the religious-conservatives in a struggle which had started in the nineteenth century. The immediate influence of these reforms was the defunctionalization of the men of religion in the civil procedure and administration. Consequently the new generation lost the traditional relationship with the religious class.

In fact Islam was not defunctionalized but depoliticized at the social level. Kemalist reforms, according to Ellis, were not directed against religion but social and political institution that had developed as adjuncts to the Islamic faith.⁵⁰ There was an attempt at the state level to rid Islam of elements like dogmatism, exclusiveness and primitiveness which had made Turkish society static and fatalistic. So a purified and reformed Islam, that was modern as well as

50. Ellen Deborah Ellis, "Turkey, 1955", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 29, 1955, p. 92.

Turkish, was the ideal to attain. However, "there seems general agreement that the official neglect of religion went too far".⁵¹

Secularization in general had changed the beliefs, attitudes, orientations, socio-economic mores, cultural institutions and relationships between groups. It helped in the awareness of secular nationality. So Turkish nationalism had taken over from Islam some of its important social functions.⁵² Secularism also provided a set of myths and dogmas for the Turkification of Islam. It had significant impact on the emancipation of women, modernization of education and expansion of economy.⁵³ However, this impact was limited to the upper urban classes. Even the upper class people rejected secularism beyond a certain point.⁵⁴ Urban lower classes and rural peasants remained relatively less changed. Although a new institution - Peoples House⁵⁵ - was created to initiate

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51. Paul Stirling, "Religious Change in Republican Turkey", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XII, 1958, p. 29.
52. Haluk A. Ulman and Frank Tachau, "Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XIX, 1965, p. 28.
53. Eleanor Bisbee, The New Turks : Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-50 (Philadelphia, 1956). pp. 40-41
54. Lewis V. Thomas, "Recent developments in Turkish Islam", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. 6, 1952, p. 28.
55. Peoples Houses were started to raise the general cultural standard and to emancipate the rural people. Karpat, n. 10, p. 380.

the process of basic change in the villages, the target seemed unattainable. Various village studies⁵⁶ testified to the phenomenon of 'unchange'. According to Sherif the inhabitants in isolated villages lacked even the concept of time and distance.⁵⁷ In Erdemli village the social system was still the same old one. The leadership remained ascriptive and the primary tie was the lineage and community.⁵⁸

The secular attitude towards religion created two kinds of reaction :

- (1) A pathological phenomenon indicative of social and cultural disintegration and a need for new set of values and ideas.⁵⁹ In that situation religion became a matter of free discussion within a secularized state, but with three main limitations :
 - (a) legal prohibition of associations formed on the basis of sect or order;
 - (b) legal prohibition of political associations or parties seeking religious support;

56. Like those of Muzaffer Sherif, A Study of Five Isolated Villages in 1945; Mahmut Makal, A Village in Anatolia, tr. Sir Wyndham Deedes; and J.S. Szyliowicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey, Erdemli; n. 16, p. 63. (Eren)

57. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

58. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey, Erdemli (Hague, 1966), p. 200.

59. This consciousness got expression after three Muslim girls were converted to Christianity in 1928. Berkes, n. 14, p. 492.

(c) legal punishment for acts contrary to secularism.⁶⁰

In that situation the Kemalists lent cautious encouragement to moves which might produce a progressive and isolationist model of religion devoid of political implications. Subsequently religion was accepted as a social institution to meet the needs of social life and help the pace of change and development.⁶¹

(ii) Antagonism through violent and non-violent opposition to these reforms. The violent reaction, initiated with the religious orientation off and on, was suppressed forcefully. However, the non-violent reaction was serious because it argued about the futility and superficiality of some reforms like that of Hat Law. "The opposition to this law", according to Halide Edib, "had a note of wounded self-respect rather than of objection".⁶² Moreover, this law gave huge economic benefits to the western companies.

These social, political and economic developments contributed to a broader social transformation. It has been argued that this change was partial and limited to certain urban groups

60. Ibid., pp. 498-99.

61. It was on the basis of a preliminary report for religious reform prepared by the Committee of the Faculty of Divinity, Lewis, n. 15, p. 408.

62. Adivar, n. 42, p. 224.

only.⁶³ In actuality the process was initiated by the urban elite which, later on, spread to rural areas. The modernization efforts were carried out according to the conceptions, ideals and tastes of the middle class and affected social habits and appearances rather than substance and structure. So, the Kemalists did not attempt to dismantle the socio-economic edifice of the society with one forceful blow but preferred to achieve modernization gradually through a series of careful changes, altering first the superstructure.⁶⁴ In this way the Kemalists concentrated "upon an increase in the size of the elite and its transformation into a cohesive group".⁶⁵ Since the upholders of ideology were absolutely secular-modernist in outlook, they followed strictly the model of western capitalist society on the assumption that adoption of the western civilization and culture was a pre-requisite for the attainment of modernist societal level.⁶⁶ Taken into non-western Turkish environment, the western model was bound to stir up the conflict which was intensified by social

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63. Karpas, n. 10, p. 288; Walter D. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York, 1956), p. 252; Lewis, n. 13, p. 284.
64. Metin Tankoc, "Stable Instability of the Turkish Polity", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. 27, 1973, p. 323.
65. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Political Participation and Modernization in Turkey", Western Political Quarterly (Utah), vol. XIX, 1966, p. 271.
66. This idea was in direct contrast with Ziya Gokalp's theory of civilization and culture in which he stressed the primacy of native culture, a basic unit for national solidarity, in the adoption of western civilization.

political and economic developments. The conflict could be suppressed but could not be totally eliminated. The deeply felt reaction created groups of critics even in the FRP culminating in the formation of Progressive Republican Party in 1925. The Islamists and nationalists argued for retaining the national-traditional character. But the westernists adopted suppressive rather than reconciliatory attitude towards them. The westernists faced the extremist forces, particularly the communists, in the same way, with the result that the communist movement could not work openly. The communists were dubbed as the representatives of "illegitimate Soviet Bolshevism" which made them the discredited element of Turkish society. But the communist movement could not be liquidated; it functioned clandestinely.

It was in this situation that a new ideological trend appeared in Turkey. A periodical named Kadro which came out in 1932, began to advocate a new secularist-economic policy. The Kadroites argued that Turkey's main problem was not the reconciliation of economic interests but the creation of an advanced society without social contradictions.⁶⁷ It was the "duty of the state to accumulate and utilise capital and thus stall the emergence of a class struggle".⁶⁸ The Turkish state was mainly concerned with the creation of an advanced

67. Karpaz, n. 10, p. 72.

68. Lewis, n. 13, p. 464.

technology and developed economy with itself as a "supreme arbiter".⁶⁹ This new type of economic state would lead the advanced social classes to accumulate capital on behalf of the society and operate in a well planned way all economic activities.⁷⁰ On the whole the Kadro theory represented nationalist-progressive model based on the following theoretical propositions :

- (a) The Turkish revolution is a continuous process of action against Capitalism and Imperialism.⁷¹
- (b) The idea of planning should be applied to all fields of Turkish life particularly economic.⁷²
- (c) The Turkish state should avoid the class conflict and accumulate capital for the creation of advanced society, harmonious in relationships.⁷³

Although the Kadro theory seems a superficial combination of Marxism, Nationalism and Corporatism⁷⁴, it was the first serious and unorthodox attempt to analyse Turkey's problems in an ideological framework. According to Harris, Kadroists

69. Ibid.

70. Karpas, n. 10, pp. 70-71.

71. Lewis, n. 13, p. 464.

72. Osman Okyar, "The Concept of Etatism", The Economic Journal (London), vol. LXXV, 1965, p. 100.

73. Karpas, n. 10, p. 70; Lewis, n. 13, p. 464.

74. Ibid.

"attempted in systematic fashion to melt aspects of Soviet experience into Kemalist doctrine".⁷⁵ This objective analysis contributed significantly to the following ideological development. The "Kadro" attitude was accepted widely except by a small group of the ruling elite who opposed it to retain the traditional power, position and interests.

The descendents of Ataturk strictly followed his theoretical model of socio-political transformation. But this process was bound to face the challenges which were controlled earlier. Now, social, economic and political compulsions cleared the way for a free and open environment. New socio-economic formations and processes started to fulfill the functional needs. Debate on the nature, scope and utility of Kemalist doctrines became a normal feature. Some of the main principles like secularism and reformism became centres of debate between different groups with distinctive positions. The conservatives, who were critical of secular modernist reforms, objected to the undermining of traditional culture. They wanted to revive religion as a spiritual, cultural and educational institution because it (religion) "fulfills the inherent spiritual need of the individual (and provides basis for) an educational institution".⁷⁶ On the other hand, the secularists opposed "liberalization" of religion on the basis that it might reverse or

75. George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey (California, 1967), p. 10.

76. Karpat, n. 10, pp. 273-75.

distort the modernization process initiated by Ataturk. The moderates argued humanistically that the individual was politically and socially mature to consider religion as a part of life in an advanced society. So the individual right should not be interfered with by the state.⁷⁷ Meanwhile it should not become an obstacle in the process of modernization.

Similarly Statism also became the centre of controversy. Its protagonists argued on the basis of social justice and with nationalist bias while its opponents complained about the implications of "state capitalism" and lack of individual initiative. The latter view was held by the commercial classes which wanted to broaden and strengthen their base. The developments in the late forties provided these groups a chance to dominate socially and politically.

There was an obvious shift in emphasis on nationalism, but it still remained the supreme ideal. The Republicans considered language, culture and history as its bases and differentiated it from socialism and racialism. But the Democrats accepted it in the international sense regardless of race and religion.⁷⁸

The process of change matured in the post-world war II period and consequently the absolute position of the ruling

77. Karpat, n. 5, p. 299.

78. Karpat, n. 10, pp. 257-59.

elite was questioned. Lewis observes that "this change would not have been possible without a general change in the climate of opinion in Turkey".⁷⁹ This change may be attributed to the indigenous factors like strains of discontent arising from political, social and economic developments and the exogenous factors like destruction of fascism and rapprochement with the West. The degree of change can be ascertained by the increased rate of literacy which was 34.6 per cent in 1950 in comparison to 10.6 per cent in 1927.⁸⁰ Other indicators like the circulation of newspapers⁸¹, ownership of the wireless sets⁸², number of telephones, increased exchange of letters, increased publications⁸³, modernization of communication and social, physical and mental mobility⁸⁴ showed a high degree of social change.

79. Lewis, n. 13, p. 309.

80. Ibid., p. 304.

81. Which was ranging between 60,000 (Cumhuriyet) to 1,04,250 (Hurriyet). The average audience of the periodical (teachers, professionals, students, officers, literate peasants and workers) was between 50,000 and 60,000. R. Uguz Turkkan, "The Turkish Press", Middle Eastern Affairs (New York), vol. 1, 1950, pp. 146-47.

82. Which was 46,230; 1,76,262; 2,40,525 and 4,12,270 in 1938, 1945, 1948 and 1951 respectively. Lewis, n. 13, p. 305.

83. A good measure of Turkey's westernization in the last thirty years can be found in her literature, which accurately reflects the society's transformation. Karpas, n. 10, p. 327.

84. Lewis, n. 13, p. 305.

This change proved fundamental in orientations, ideals, institutions, organisations and processes which compelled the ruling group to adopt liberalization programme⁸⁵ and shun the rigidity, closeness and authoritarian set up. The liberalization had a wide impact on the relationships of individuals and groups in cities and villages. It provided the political security and respect for the individual, freedom from bureaucratic pressures and a sense of personal participation. It was the formal recognition of non-ruling groups and their ideology. As a result, new polarization emerged at social and political levels.

The adoption of multi-party system led to the mobilization of social groups and pressure on the state and its bureaucracy to give new roles to these groups. This situation of conflict ended the state domination, changed its role from governing institution to serving institution and started the process of "debureaucratization".⁸⁶ A complex society having logical relationship between the state and individuals and with rational social political attitudes, emerged which provided the basis

85. In this programme formation of associations, political parties, even on class bases, adoption of representative voting system, economic-religious liberty and educational autonomy were included. Karpaz, n. 10, pp. 157-58.

86. Leslie L. Roos, Jr. and Noralou P. Roos, Managers of Modernization : Organizations and Elites in Turkey (Cambridge, 1971), p. 7.

for a democratic environment in Turkey. The elections of 1946 provided a chance to people to participate in the new political process and system which had a universal impact on undermining rural isolation and encouraging healthy rural-urban relationships.

Religion was exposed to open controversy in the new environment. In the competitive situation each group and party - Peoples Republican Party (ERP), Democrat Party (DP) and National Party (NP) - used religion to gain popular support. This radical departure from the fundamental policy of secularism was formalized and legitimized by both dominant political parties - the ERP and the DP. Both parties debated the issue of religious education favourably in the Assembly in 1946. In addition, favourable religious debate took place in the ERP's Congress in 1947. DP's programme in 1946 negated secularism covertly and supported religious freedom overtly.⁸⁷ With the emergence of revivalist NP, the religious issue became prestigious and crucial. At the time of 1950 general elections both parties used religion for political gains unhesitatingly. In fact these parties competed with each other to give more and more religious concessions to rouse popular sympathy. When the DP came to power, it encouraged religious elements. The situation would have been the same if the Republicans had come to power.

87. Howard A. Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 32, 1957, p. 335.

In reality the last decade of the Republicans proved a transitional phase to a democratic stage mainly because of three factors :

- (a) the liberal environment in which new social groups, with specific ideological orientations, emerged and consolidated their positions.
- (b) the sustenance of ideological conflict between different groups which progressed, later on, towards doctrinal specificity and clarity.
- (c) the preparation of individuals as well as groups for the functioning of future and complex social order.

C H A P T E R 3

Ideological Conflict in the Democrat Era

Chapter 3

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRAT ERA

The conscious political participation in urban as well as rural areas in the general election of 1950 had raised the social tensions to a level where they could neither be suppressed nor controlled. The newly-emerged non-elite middle class groups like commercial-agricultural entrepreneurs, urban workers, peasants and non-establishment intellectuals had given expression to their grievances and interests in the Democrat Party's (DP) revolt against the elite domination, statist strains, political authoritarianism and non-religiosity of the Republican regime. That is why the DP had given a prominent place to the aspirations of those groups in its 1950 election manifesto.¹ Thus, the DP dominated the political scene, particularly in the rural areas, and got the large scale victory over the Republican Peoples Party. The victory of the Democrats variously interpreted as a "plebiscite"² or a "white revolution"³, represented a revolt of the materialist

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1. A pro-capitalist economic system, liberal political orientation, nationalist ideals with historic spiritual heritage and religious freedom were the main features of the manifesto. See, "The Democratic Party Election Manifesto - Excerpts", Middle Eastern Affairs (New York), vol. I, 1950, pp. 149-50.
 2. Bernard Lewis, "Democracy in Turkey", Middle Eastern Affairs (New York), vol. 10, 1959, p. 62.
 3. Which signified progress from the political revolution to a thorough going social and economic transformation. See, Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75 (London, 1977), pp. 38-39.

middle class against the rule of the idealistic intellectuals and military-minded administration.⁴ In essence it replaced the old, closed, controlled and rigid political system by a new, open, democratic and liberal one. The new situation deprived the traditional elite groups of power and high social status. New social groups attained relatively high power and position and adopted entirely new role which was in contrast to their earlier one.

The legitimization of different groups, with their respective ideological identifications, created a situation of exposure in Turkey and influenced all developments throughout the decade. Various groups started the debate on ideological inputs-outputs and distinctive elements of Kemalist ideology. This competitive environment led to many social and political struggles in the Turkish society. In this background, the remark that "there had been no ideological differences between the parties; only the difference of emphasis on how to implement the same ideology"⁵ seems simplistic because of the fact that concrete ideological conflict took place between different groups represented in the political parties. Although traditional legalistic consensus on broader ideals of nationalism, republicanism, revolutionism, secularism and

4. Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic : A Case Study in National Development (Cambridge, 1965), p. 146.

5. Ahmad, n. 3, p. 194.

antagonism to extreme right and left was maintained, the orientations and interpretations were entirely different, even contrasting and conflicting. That is why any non-secular act or non-statist measure was not considered as in contradiction with Kemalist secularism and statism by the Democrats. In fact, Kemalism had attained the symbolic status which was used to fulfil particularistic objectives. In a sense Kemalism had lost the functional vitality. On the other hand, socialist intellectual's criticism of apparent consensus on Kemalist ideals added to the intensity of the conflict. The ideological framework, thus, retained its traditional dominant position in the Turkish social order. Since the theoretical adaptation of the Democrats was, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, in contrast with that of the Republicans, the former attempted to bring about basic changes in the polity, economy, society, religion, education and rural-urban relationship. These changes ultimately created a new Turkish society based on social solidarity, division of labour, democratic processes, modern institutions, rational political system and open social environment.

The most significant feature of the Democratic era was the "religious revival" which signified the emergence of religion as a leading socio-political force with multi-dimensional implications. In fact, the religious revival cannot be analysed in isolation. It can be related to the development of the preceding period when conscious religious sentiments

were noted seriously and moderate-liberal religious policy was initiated by the Republicans. In essence, it represented the desire of people to retain their traditional cultural distinctiveness in spite of legal restraints. In other words, it meant a positive response of the ruling class to the problems of moral chaos, cultural crisis and social disintegration initiated by the harsh treatment of religion during the Republican era.

The religious revival was so dominant during the decade of the Democratic rule that it became relatively a normal feature of the Turkish society and attained wide social acceptance. With the restoration of freedom of opinion, Islam became a political issue. The political parties competed with one another in tolerating religious revival. The proponents of Kemalist laicism were no exception. Religious revival met the aspirations of different groups in different ways.

In fact, the religious revival was the logical culmination of the policy of liberalization in respect of religion in the late forties. The social forces compelled the ruling Democrats to adopt such measures as the restoration of ezan (call to prayer) in Arabic, recitation of the Quran and other religious programmes on the radio and introduction of religious lessons in the schools. The anti-Communist fetva⁶ of the

6. The fetva declared that Islam rejected communism and its practices in any form. Ahmad, n. 3, p. 366.

Director of Religious Affairs further added to the religiosity of the new order. Thus the DP continued the policies of its predecessor towards Islam. Adnan Menderes, the Democrat Prime Minister, promoted the new trend by emphasizing the notion of the "freedom of conscience" which assured the fundamental right of religious freedom in the secular framework.⁷ He said in December 1952 that

"the Turkish people are Muslims and will remain Muslims. No one has the right in this country to violate the freedom of conscience".⁸

The official encouragement of religion had a general impact on the Turkish society. The religious revival was obvious from the construction of mosques, private religious education, pilgrimage to Mecca and other shrines, public observance of the fast, crowded attendance in mosques and appearance of religious garb.⁹ In addition, increase in religious publications, press coverage to the Islamic world news¹⁰ and serious discussions about religious issues manifested the

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. "The most remarkable immediate consequence of the change of Government was an outbreak of fez and turban wearing in the eastern provinces". Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey (London, 1974), p. 143.

10. Ahmad Emin Yalman, Turkey in My Time (Norman, 1956), p. 248; Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey", International Affairs (London), vol. 28, 1952, p. 44.

religious revivalist trends.¹¹ These developments proved that the Turkish society had retained its inherent traditional character. Despite a century of westernization the Islamic roots were still alive and "the Muslim identity of Turks was unchallengeable".¹²

The process of religious revival was often exploited by the religious reactionaries. It was rather strange that even after thirty years of the Republic the forces of religious reaction were not dead.¹³ People as a whole strongly condemned religious violence when Ataturk's statues were vandalized in early 1951. This also made the government more vigilant regarding religious fanaticism. The government took steps such as the creation of the Clubs of Turkish Revolution to protect Kemalist traditions and reforms.¹⁴ However, the religious sentiment could not be checked; rather it was always intensified by the political parties to serve their own interests. In this situation the DP became identified with the resurgence of Islam particularly

11. Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", The Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. 8, 1954, pp. 274-75; John A.T. Kingsbury, "Observations on Turkish Islam Today", Muslim World (Hartford), vol. XLVII, 1957, p. 125.

12. Lewis, n. 10, p. 48.

13. Kasim Gulek, "Democracy Takes Root in Turkey", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 30, 1951, p. 143.

14. Ahmad, n. 3, p. 368.

after Menderes survived the air crash in 1959. The intelligentsia reacted "hysterically"¹⁵ to this because of their suspicion of any movement from below having popular character which might undermine their traditional status, position and power.

The religious revival in Turkey in the fifties has been generally related to the development of DP and its power position. This seems superficial and even misleading primarily because it lacks an understanding of the totality of the phenomenon. In fact, social conditions which gradually crystallized into social forces were more responsible for the religious revival. Naturally, any group would have been affected by the prevalent social forces. Menderes recognised this fact saying that

"true restoration of the freedom of conscience was long overdue and he was only continuing a process begun by Peoples' Republican Party (FRP)".¹⁶

In fact the approach of the FRP to and exploitation of religion during the fifties proved the primacy of social dominance of religion. In this way the religious revival was related to broader socio-economic and political factors rather than to mere rise of the Democrats to power.

15. Ibid., p. 373.

16. Ibid., p. 368.

However, the Democrats adopted a cautious approach towards religion so that the fundamental framework of the secular Republic would not be endangered. Although there were demands for the "abolition of secularism and restoration of Islam as the official religion"¹⁷ even within the Democratic ranks, the party leadership resisted these trends. The government remained vigilant against the revivalist trend which would seek to re-establish the sharia law. So, from 1950 to mid 1960s some five hundred persons were arrested in Turkey for religious offences.¹⁸ Menderes said in 1952 that

"to say that there is no danger of a reactionary revival in the country does not constitute a reason for giving free rein to efforts to create reactions...".¹⁹

In this way the Democrats encouraged Islam as a social rather than political institution. They wanted to evolve a national consensus regarding the religious policy. However, the dangerous religious reaction could not be checked and liberal religious policy suffered a set back due to deterioration in political culture. Thus both the DP and FRP exploited religion in their own fashion. In the 1950 general election the DP branded the FRP as against Islam²⁰ while in

17. Howard A. Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.190, 1957, p. 338.

18. Robinson, n. 4, p. 202.

19. Ahmad, n. 3, p. 370.

20. Ahmad, n.3, p. 61.

1959 the FRP tried to reply back in the same way.

Religion had undergone important legal and formal changes in the Republican era. However, these 'legalistic' and 'formalistic' changes lost their significance in the open and liberal socio-political environment of the Democratic era. It showed that the earlier legalistic reformation was not necessarily followed by social transformation. In a sense the conservative social milieu had resisted the antagonistic forms of change. The policy of liberalization initiated by the Democrats in the early fifties revived the element of traditionalism. However, the religious revival during the Democratic era has been rather exaggerated. The religious revival was not a backward turn but a positive reaction to the negative religious policy. It meant the adaptation of normalcy and selective change. It is important to note that Islam in Turkey retained throughout the characteristics of functional continuity. It was not made dysfunctional any time but was evolved, explained and interpreted differently in different social situations. W.C. Smith remarks that "there has never been any lapse in religion, hence there cannot be a revival. These new moves of the fifties are constructive stage in the continued process of renewal".²¹ So the extreme notions regarding the Turk exclusively either as religious or secular lack the concreteness of contents in the Turkish

21. Wilferd Centwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, 1957), pp. 188-89.

background. Thus, Turkey had been passing through a different type of religious experience comparatively different from the one the Republican era passed through. Now the reformer was engaged not only in rediscovering the original meaning of old symbols but also in finding new symbols to convey that meaning anew.²² Most Turks appeared "moderate"²³, synthetic and realistic in the new experience. Mumtaz Faik Fenik, a close aide of Menderes in reply to an allegation of the Dawn (Karachi) wrote in 1952 that "Islam is Turkey's religion and ever since the democratic freedoms were firmly founded here, the Islamic character has manifested itself more than ever before. However, religion has been completely isolated from political affairs."²⁴

The political modernization initiated by the Democrats led to the creation of liberal institutional system in which individuals and groups, in competition and cooperation, crystallized their positions and intensified the social transformation. The immediate impact was felt in the composition of the Parliament which shifted from members with military and official background to members with commercial and semi-professional background. The traditional-national political

22. Ibid., p. 182.

23. Reed, n. 11, p. 281.

24. Ahmad, n. 3, p. 368.

elite was replaced by the local or provincial elite.²⁵ The new political system created openness, dynamism and mobility at the social level particularly in the rural areas. The political dynamism led to higher political consciousness and political maturity. The political consciousness was evident from the election participation which was as high as 88.9 per cent in 1950, 80.9 per cent in 1954²⁶, 76.6 per cent in 1957 and 81.1 per cent in 1961.²⁷ The political maturity manifested itself in various conferences between the representatives of different political parties to reach a compromise particularly in 1955.²⁸ On the whole the new system sustained and strengthened the 'national consensus'. In a survey of political values of urban Turkish students in the late fifties by Frederick W. Frey it was revealed that there was general consensus on strong Turkish nationality-solidarity, democratic commitment, Ataturk as the hero, secularism and high optimism.²⁹ Turkish press and

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25. Frank Tachau and Mary J.D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change : Turkish Parties, Parliaments and Elections", Comparative Politics (New York), vol. 5, 1973, pp. 551-52.
26. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Modernizing the Middle East (New York, 1968), p. 126.
27. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, -1908-1975 (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 406-07.
28. Ellen Deborah Ellis, "Turkey : 1955", Current History, (Philadelphia), vol. 29, 1955, p. 94.
29. Frederick W. Frey, "Turkey", Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), pp. 224-26.

the public opinion had also evolved unanimity in opposing two main dangers - Communism and religious reaction - to Turkey on the assumption that those might undermine the unity and modernity of the nation.³⁰ The Communist activity further decreased in the countryside because of agrarian reforms which had improved the standard of life there. In this situation the communists had to change their strategy and depend mainly on the anti-American orientation.³¹ They functioned behind all kinds of reforms, trade unionism and new ideas.

The new political system widened conflict and bred discontent among various political groups. So, "inter-party strife, more and bitter, remained a constant factor" during the decade.³² The political ascendancy of economically powerful groups relegated the intelligentsia and the military to a secondary position and oriented them toward a new social and economic philosophy that gave a socialist interpretation to etatism.³³ A new polarization, intensified by the politicization of rural masses, developed at the social and political levels because of the severe clash of interests. As a result,

30. Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York, 1956), p. 254.

31. Ibid.

32. Ahmad, n.3, p. 40.

33. Kemal H. Karpat, "Society, Economy and Politics in Contemporary Turkey", World Politics (Princeton), vol. XVII, 1965, p. 60.

an active and organised opposition, though harassed, functioned throughout the decade.³⁴ The DP had become a mass party because of its grass-root strength in the rural areas.

The adoption of the 'liberal economic system' by the Democrats contributed significantly to the social transformation particularly in the rural areas. According to DP interpretation of "Kemalism", Ataturk aimed at westernization "within the capitalist system based on free enterprise",³⁵ and the active state intervention during his time was because of the then internal and external situations. The final aim was "to create a class of private entrepreneurs" and "a free market economy".³⁶ In its programme submitted to Grand National Assembly in May 1950 the DP expressed that -

"the aim and essence of our policies is to reduce to the minimum the interference of the state and to restrict the state sector in the economic field and to encourage the development of private enterprise to the utmost".³⁷

This ideological orientation was the direct and positive response to the demands of newly emerged classes because their interests were easily accommodated in the new economic system.

34. Robinson, n.4, p. 257.

35. Ahmad, n. 3, p. 43.

36. Ibid.

37. Leslie L. Roos (Jr.) and Noralou P. Roos, Managers of Modernization : Organizations and Elites in Turkey, 1950-1969 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 41-42.

The liberal experiment resulted in the rapid economic growth in the urban as well as rural areas.³⁸ The extensive economic measures like agrarian reforms, land distribution³⁹, agricultural credits, heavy subsidies and the mechanization of agriculture had a disturbing impact on the functioning of the social order in rural Turkey. These measures further led to the improvement in the standard of life, new agrarian relationships and rural-urban closeness. But the improvement was limited to a certain class because the Democrats did not change the existing structure of land ownership. The rate of economic growth between 1950 and 1955 was no more rapid than between 1935-39.⁴⁰ The government distributed about 1.8 million hectares of land to about 3,60,000 families

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38. The share of private enterprise in the total manufacturing production increased from 58% in 1950 to 65% in 1954; the number of joint stock companies increased from three in 1950 (with TL 1.4 million) to fifty six in 1954 (with TL 167.2 million). Rees and Rees, n. 27, p. 42. Bank credits increased from TL 1.275 billion in 1950 to TL 7.787 billion in 1957 and TL 9.522 in 1960; land cultivation rose from 14.5 billion hectares in 1940-1950 to 23.264 billion hectares in 1960; agricultural production rose from an index of one hundred in 1948 to two hundred fifty six in 1960; per capita income increased from TL 96 in 1938 to TL 428 in 1950 and to TL 1598 in 1960 and gross national product increased from TL 496 in 1950 to TL 1836 in 1960. Shaw and Shaw, n. 27, pp. 408-09.
39. Upto 1959 a total of 6,20,000 acres of tillable land and 3,00,000 acres of communal grazing land had been distributed to 3,65,000 families in 4,876 villages. Robinson, n.4, p. 211.
40. Dwight James Simpson, "Development as a Process : The Menderes Phase in Turkey", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XIX, 1965, p. 145.

between 1947 and 1962 but only 3,600 hectares were taken away from the private owners of land. The rest belonged to the state.⁴¹ The losers from this scheme were largely the landless or semi-landless who were using the communal grazing grounds. So the existing land-tenure system encouraged absentee landlordism, tenant-farming and finally inequality in the villages.

Farm mechanization, replacing traditional techniques by modern technology in agriculture⁴², resulted in increased production and prosperity. But it also resulted in rural unemployment and consequently bred poverty. In this situation migration from rural to urban areas could not be avoided⁴³ which implied increased holdings of landowners in villages and creation of multi-dimensional problems such as urban crimes, uneven urban growth and demand for non-technical jobs in the cities. All these developments gave economic content to all ideological trends.

The nineteen fifties experienced wider ideological and social transformation mainly because of the social, political

41. Ahmad, n. 3, p. 134.

42. The number of tractors increased from 3,000 in 1947 to 40,000 in 1955. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York, 1971), p. 182.

43. Migration to the cities between 1947 and 1955 led to a decline in peasant population from eighty three per cent to seventy one per cent at the national level. Peretz, n. 42, p. 182.

and economic liberality of the Democrats. The doctrinal bases of the democratic society generated a great momentum for change in individual, social groups, institutions, associations, organizations, processes, beliefs, roles, ideals and relationships. Thus the structural transformation proceeded on a course determined largely by institutional pattern and supported by technological forces.⁴⁴ The changing currents were too dominant to have any aspect without influence in Turkey. Consequently the "Republican Turk" had been transformed into a "Democratic Turk" in the process of democratic transition. More importantly a highly competitive social environment was created which guaranteed the constant upward mobility of individuals and groups.

According to Lerner's study, Turkish society in the late fifties was broadly divided into three functional categories of moderns, transitionals and traditionals. According to him, while the moderns had undergone complete modernization and constituted ten per cent of the whole population, the traditionals were in the process of modernization and constituted thirty per cent of the whole population. The traditionals were those who resisted the forces of modernization and constituted sixty per cent of the whole population.⁴⁵ The minority of moderns was highly creative

44. Edwin J. Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change - The Development of a More Prosperous and Open Society (New York, 1970), p. 46.

45. Lerner, pp. 26 and 172.

and of higher status. They maintained and provided a model of future for transitionals and traditionals. This class was undergoing a qualitative change as is shown in a study of a prominent family of Hassa village. Its findings are that :

- (a) the first generation of the family was of feudal lords and tribal leaders
- (b) the second generation continued the role and status of the first generation
- (c) the third generation consisted of governors, landlords and farmers
- (d) and the fourth generation produced colonels, officials and military-high school teachers.⁴⁶

This change was accompanied by change in attitudes, ideals and world view which was then indoctrinated among transitionals and traditionals through various channels of formal-informal educational means, communications and political platforms.

The new economic opportunities and political liberalization had boosted the self-confidence, with a new dynamism and aggressive sense of freedom, of the middle and lower classes. They stood opposed to the civil servants and became increasingly involved in party work at all levels.⁴⁷ The

46. Wolfram Ederhard, "Change in the Leading Families in Southern Turkey", Louise E. Sweat (ed.), Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East (New York, 1970), p. 253.

47. Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow : An Experiment in Westernization (London, 1963), p. 170.

extensive functioning in different fields created severe competition and antagonism between these classes. However, the upper middle classes retained their higher status on the basis of education and occupation which were prime determinants of social status.

The urbanization process⁴⁸, intensified by heavy city-ward migration, improvement in the means of communication and transportation, gave birth to the forces which challenged covertly the traditional beliefs, norms and values. The traditional family structure, roles and relationships of its members began to crumble and give way to new forms of social organisation. The role and status of women underwent a radical change, dependency ratio of children on parents decreased, new inter-generation relationships appeared and individualism in general got positive expression. The strong consciousness for upward mobility led to universal educational advancement among boys and girls in urban as well as rural areas. The modernization of urban women led to the removal of veil and increase in female literacy and employment. The literacy rate increased from 34.6 per cent in 1950-51 to 39.6 per cent in 1960-61.⁴⁹ According to a

48. Urban population swelled from eighteen per cent to thirty one per cent in one decade. Karpat, n. 33, p.59; In Turkey, cities with more than 50,000 population numbered eleven in 1950 and twenty seven in 1960. Alice Taylor (ed.), The Middle East (n.p., 1972), pp. 176-77.

49. Andreas M. Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey (London, 1966), p. 272.

survey the number of public library readers increased from 7,19,089 (male) and 53,466 (female) in 1936 to 772,963 (male) and 1,18,392 (female) in 1950.⁵⁰ In 1958-59 school year 2.4 million students attended 21,464 primary schools of which 19,379 were located in villages. While the girl ratio in general was forty two per cent, the girl ratio in the rural areas was thirty five per cent.⁵¹ This had many-sided impact like the increase in competition, decrease in ascription, changes in orientation, roles and behaviours and finally durability of the press which was highly expanding.⁵² The press and literature⁵³ manifested the dominant ideological trends made acceptable at national level. Contemporary literature provided deep insights into the nature of social problems and their material-economic causation. It stressed the integrated social development and selective modernization. The individual was urged "to understand the changing world and adjust to it according to the enlightened advance of intellectual leaders".⁵⁴

50. Lerner, n. 26, p. 125.

51. Robinson, n.4, p. 195.

52. The number of newspapers from 477 in 1950 rose to 1,758 in 1960. The circulation of the largest newspaper (Hurriyet) was between 2,50,000 and 3,00,000. Ward and Rustow, n. 29, pp. 279-82.

53. The number of the publication of books rose from 2,400 in 1950 to 4,195 in 1960. Rustow, n. 29, p. 279.

54. Kemal H. Karpat, "Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature", The Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XIV, 1960, p. 31.

Rural change was one of the major developments of the decade. In fact, during the decade the villager was more drawn into the social, economic, and political mainstream than ever before. Economic prosperity, political consciousness, educational advancement and social mobility had created new group formations and relationships in the villages. In a study of rural Turkey, Czyliowicz observed changes in the standard of living, inter-generational and inter-sex tensions, sex roles and marriage patterns, conflict between law and custom and consciousness about education.⁵⁵ The phenomenon of change and its awareness, according to Reed, was felt among Anatolian villagers also. He found important changes in the villages like common use of recreational means and a critical approach to government policies.⁵⁶ Muzaffer Sherif's findings also confirm systematic mobility in villages.⁵⁷

With these changes the Turkish society was progressing towards a pluralistic, complex and industrial society.⁵⁸ Popular participation had considerably reduced elite domination. This rather downward mobility was strongly resented by the traditional Kemalist elite. These social changes

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55. Joseph S. Czyliowicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey. Erdemli (The Hague, 1966), pp. 85-95.
56. Howard A. Reed, "A New Force at work in Democratic Turkey", The Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. VII, 1953, pp. 33-35.
57. Lerner, n. 26, p. 132.
58. Cohn, n. 44, p. 72.

were, however, directly or indirectly related with the ideological developments. New ideological orientations and patterns within the nationalist framework, emerged which took serious note of the problems of agrarian relationships, rural surplus labour, the increasing exploitation of the industrial workers, rural-urban tensions, law-custom contradiction and traditionalism. However, it would be simplistic to accept that social change in the absolute sense occurred during the Democratic decade. Despite rapid modernization, the age-old traditions were retained consciously, partially or fully, in the urban lower classes, conservative middle classes and peasant-rural communities. Sometimes even the mass media, as a social force, supported tradition.⁵⁹ According to Syzliowicz, the situation remained "unchanged" in rural Turkey in comparison with the changes in urban areas.⁶⁰

The Democrats essentially represented the agrarian interests.⁶¹ Bayar once said that "we shall always keep in mind that agriculture constitutes the foundation of our economy".⁶² So, an agrarian bias and non-utilist ideological

59. Robinson, n.4, p. 275.

60. Joseph S. Syzliowicz, "Political Participation and Modernization in Turkey", Western Political Quarterly (Utah), vol. XIX, 1966, p. 274.

61. Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkey", n. 29, p. 282.

62. Robinson, n. 4, p. 145.

approach dominated their functioning throughout the decade. They diverted most of the economic resources to rural development which was strongly resented by the urban folk. In the late fifties, the Democrats, in fulfilling the demands of agrarian and commercial groups, created "an oligarchy of wealth and power without the participation of old intellectual elite".⁶³ They repeated the mistake of the IRP to regard the state as an institution to serve the ruling party, particularly in the late fifties.⁶⁴ Thus, they failed to create an equilibrium in the emerging forces and to realize the growing alineation of elitist groups from the peasantry. The opposition parties also contributed to this dis-equilibrium by their "irresponsible behaviour".⁶⁵ Now nationalism became a "conservative ideology"⁶⁶ mainly based on traditional cultural heritage to meet the demands of the ruling class. So the liberal intellectuals demanded the establishment of parties on ideological lines to clarify the position of each group. In this situation the social structure became further differentiated and diversified.⁶⁷ Now Turkey seemed ripe for a change from within primarily because the Democrats

63. Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York, 1968), p. 300.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

65. Robinson, n. 4, p. 262.

66. Karpat, n. 63, p. 300.

67. *Ibid.*

could not accommodate the economic and political interests of various social groups. The preliminary report of the Professors Committee, charged with the draft of the new constitution, confirmed this by saying that "the state during the late fifties became a materialistic force representative of personal influence and ambition and class privilege".⁶⁸ So a regime that had come to office by free election had lost its legitimacy among the intelligentsia. This situation provided the bases for ideological reorientation of the secular modernist intelligentsia which adopted "socialism" as its new ideology. The grave reaction of the urban intelligentsia, especially the military and professional elites, to the Democrats' functioning culminated in the coup d'etat of May 1960.

68. Karpas, n. 63, p. 308.

CHAPTER 4

**Coup De'tat of 27th May 1960 and Its Aftermath
- Ideological Dimensions**

Chapter 4

THE COUP D'ETAT OF 27TH MAY 1960 AND ITS AFTERMATH - IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

The social, political and economic developments during the Democratic period created sharp ideological conflict that led to distrust and animosity among the competing groups. The rise of landowning and business groups to position of power threatened the interests of intellectuals and bureaucratic elite who had so far enjoyed high status and a near monopoly of political power. These developments further led to the breakdown of traditional patterns of organization and values thus necessitating reorganization of society in conformity with social change. Now the problem arose how to consolidate the internal structure and achieve a more equitable relationship between the various social groups and the government in order to restore internal balance and stability. In this situation the military and the urban intelligentsia felt obliged to resort to extra-constitutional means to get control of the changing social order. The collusion of the military and urban intelligentsia manifested itself in the Coup d'etat of 27 May 1960.

The so called revolution of 27 May 1960 set the tone for the following ideological developments in Turkey. The restoration of liberal atmosphere which had been extinct in the last days of the Democrats promoted new ideological

groupings. The new groups emerged with distinctive ideological leanings so as to reach a minimum degree of consensus needed for the functioning of the system. The outlook of the intellectuals reflected a strong economic content which culminated in the emergence of socialism as an ideology. The traditionalists, on the other hand, stressed the importance of religion to encounter the alien tone of the new ideological trend. This conflict eroded the base of broader national consensus. As a result, the following period was characterized by the politics of coalition governments, political uncertainty, ideological polarization, social complexities and economic deterioration. However, this also intensified the process of pluralization and secularization in Turkish society. Thus, the decade 1960-70 provides a case of relationship between ideology and socio-political change not witnessed before in Turkey. In a sense, the Turkish society had reached a level where a synthetic model of ideology could have been evolved. But it could not be evolved due to the complexity of prevailing social forces.

The military revolution of May 1960 occupies an important place in Turkish politics for its multifarious implications, particularly social and ideological. Formally the revolution represented an "initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen".¹

1. Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-61: Aspects of Military Politics (Washington, 1963), p. 20.

The Ankara communique² of the National Unity Committee (NUC) stressed national unity and non-partisan role of the military. But the revolution also implied reaction of a particular power group - the military - to another power group - the Democrats.³ The group motivation was manifest in the post-revolutionary behaviour of the military towards the Democrats and other groups sympathetic to them. So, the 1960 revolution should be regarded as an integral part of the developing struggle between the more traditional villagers-townsmen and the modernized urban elite.⁴ As the social status became closely related with economic power, the prestige of the bureaucrats, intellectuals and military had dropped significantly.⁵ So the military coup d'etat "reflected necessarily the official elites' response to its loss of power".⁶

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2. The Ankara Communique was issued by the Turkish Armed Forces following the take-over, and was printed in all Turkish newspapers. Its main stress was on national unity. It also claimed that the takeover was not directed against any particular group. Kemal H. Karpat (Ed.), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York, 1968), p. 306.
 3. Kemal H. Karpat, "Society, Economy and Politics in Contemporary Turkey", World Politics (Princeton), vol. XVII, 1964-65, p. 62.
 4. A. Haluk Ulman and Frank Tachan, "Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XIX, 1965, p. 162.
 5. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Political Participation and Modernization in Turkey", Western Political Quarterly (Utah), vol. XIX, 1966, p. 279.
 6. Leslie L. Roos Jr. and Noralou P. Roos, Managers of Modernization, Organizations and Elites in Turkey, (1950-1969), (Massachusetts, 1971), p. 7.
Cambridge

However, the military performed the function of checking diversion to the left or right extremes in the ideological conflict. In a sense the military emerged as the defender of traditional Kemalism and "the social conscience of Turkey".⁷ Essentially, factors like economic failures, acute social tensions, repression, violation of Ataturk's reforms and partisan use of the army⁸ contributed to the development of the revolution.

The NUC, which represented the military and other elite groups was not a cohesive group with unanimity of ideas. Ideologically and functionally the army was composed of three main groups : (a) The Pashas represented the old and senior officers of the NUC. They were ardent supporters of traditional Kemalism and its nationalist framework. They justified the military action for they thought that Turkey had deviated from the Kemalist path and so it had to be put back on proper ideological foundation. (b) The Senior Young officers were the vocal element of the military. They thought in terms of a particular form of "national socialism"⁹ which stood parallel to the totalitarian ideology and racist overtones. They argued for the competitive-democratic politics.

7. David Hotham, The Turks (London, 1972), p. 96.
8. Suna Kili, Turkey : A Case Study of Political Development (Istanbul, 1968), p. 24.
9. Alain Cuiney, "Turkey Faces a Dilemma", New Outlook (Tel Aviv), vol. 7, 1964, p. 40.

planned economic development and adoption of the idea of a welfare state.¹⁰ (c) The Junior Young officers showed an authoritarian outlook. They favoured speedy enforcement of social and economic reforms. They objected to the functioning of political parties for they thought that political parties might fail to bring about reforms and intensify ideological differences. They proposed to set up a National Culture Union to maintain social solidarity and save the nation from schism, sloth and ignorance.¹¹ Their views invited more criticism from the military junta. As a result some of them had to leave the government.

The army, the administration and other state institutions had lost their basic characteristics during the Democratic era. So, the military was compelled to reach a minimum consensus to establish a legitimate rule and redress the situation in which social institutions were rendered inoperative. The NUC attempted important measures like formation of the provisional government, preparation of the new constitution and drafting of an election law. The provisional government restored normalcy and balance to the political system through various measures like liberalization, equal representation to

10. C.H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey (Manchester, 1969), pp. 29-31.

11. Ismet Giritli, "Some Aspects of New Turkish Constitution", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XVI, 1962, pp. 7-15.

all groups and democratic functioning. The new constitution permitted all groups, including workers, and the radical intelligentsia, to function freely. The promulgation of the new constitution marked a departure from the past, particularly in its three significant provisions. The provisions were : (a) to make the state socially responsible to all members of society; (b) to check the violation of democratic-constitutional principles by political parties; and (c) to co-relate democracy with the process of economic development. Then the state would plan economic development in a way social justice was achieved.¹² The election law proposed for general election in 1961 through which each group legitimized its position by the participation process. In spite of these positive measures the military action overthrowing a legally elected government had a negative effect on the following period in respect of political stability. Moreover, changes through ordinances could not be made socially acceptable as the results of the referendum of July 1961 in respect of the new constitution showed.¹³ Thus, the problem of non-consensus could not be solved; rather it continued to exist with further implications.

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12. Ismet Giritli, "Some Aspects of New Turkish Constitution", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XVI, 1962, pp. 7-15.
13. 39.6 per cent of voters rejected the Constitution outright. Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic : A Case Study in National Development, (Cambridge, 1965), p. 260.

Although the military tried for consensus, the ideological dissension could not be avoided. In fact the revolution of 1960 destroyed the ideological shields of upper economic groups and permitted a free discussion. The military could hardly anticipate the ideological struggle which followed their action.¹⁴ As soon as the armed forces relinquished formal reins of power, the consensus among Turkish political groups, which was announced at various stages of the NUC period, was shown to be weak and transitory.¹⁵ There was a basic and qualitative change in the ideological development when socio-economic problems were given preference to nationalism, the only and unchallenged ideology of the past. Kemalism had also gone under radical change because of economic emphasis and priorities. Socialism got legitimate status primarily because of its expression at the official level. Similarly, Islam, the vital ingredient of Turkish character, was made to serve social change.¹⁶ In this situation the ideological struggle was given a concrete context and background. The struggle got intensified further by the repressive measures against the Democrats and their sympathisers.

In spite of the fact that the intelligentsia had adopted socialist orientation based on the concepts of a welfare state

14. Karpaz, n. 2, p. 302.

15. Weikør, n. 1, p. 157.

16. Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy : 1950-75 (London, 1977), p. 375.

and social justice, they could not motivate lower classes and the peasantry. The contradiction in their newly adopted theory namely socialism and social position could not make them acceptable to the masses. Consequently, the results of 1961 elections¹⁷ shattered the faith of the intelligentsia in democracy. The intellectuals considered the success of opposition parties established on the foundations of the Democrat Party as the "final proof of the peoples inherent antagonism to the programme of modernization and hence to Ataturk's reforms".¹⁸ But this notion seems baseless. In actuality, the election results were the manifestation of plurality of Turkish society, in which the intelligentsia could not monopolize power. Now the intelligentsia had to compete with other groups for higher position and power.

Thus political instability, social disequilibrium and inharmonious relationships dividing the Turkish society horizontally as well as vertically characterize the decade 1960-70. This led to broader ideological polarization between the Left and Right. The new system of proportional representation in the National Assembly also contributed to the

17. In this election the RPP got 36.7 per cent and other parties such as JP and NTP 48.5 per cent votes. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey : Reform, Revolution and Republic - The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1908-1975 (Cambridge, 1977), p. 406.

18. Kemal H. Karpat in Benjamin Rivlin and Joseph S. Szyliowicz (eds.), The Contemporary Middle East : Tradition and Innovation (New York, 1965), p. 485.

polarization. The coalitions proved simply a "political anomaly" which "survived through artificial combinations that produced stagnation and mistrust and prepared the way for extremist currents".¹⁹ It is important to note that the polarization took place at a time when an organized labour class under the leadership of intellectuals had emerged in Turkey. According to the Marxist theorists, Turkey in the sixties had entered the stage of capitalism. The growing consciousness about their rights was observed among the workers who numbered around two million. 550 trade unions with 3,50,000 members were functioning at the time.²⁰ So the polarization on class lines seemed inevitable.

Although the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) and the Justice Party (JP) had not taken extreme ideological positions, their particular orientations related them with one camp or the other. Their divergent positions were strengthened because the "difference on economic orientations was the dividing line between these two parties".²¹ The Justice Party which emerged as a "neo-Democrat Party"²², was liberal

19. Karpat, n. 3, p. 65.

20. Jakub Demir, "Turkey in the Grip of Reaction", Peace, Freedom and Socialism (Prague), vol. 6, 1963, pp. 24-25.

21. Karpat, n.3, p. 46.

22. Ahmad, n. 16, p. 188.

in ideological orientation. It was rooted in a social movement and was not "dependent on the presence of charismatic leader for its cohesion".²³ Since the JP's support came primarily from small peasants²⁴, it stood for distribution of land to landless peasants and small size farms for landowners. Its rightist inclination stems from its liberalism which meant freedom for commercial and industrial middle classes. That is why Demirel's economic policies looked after the interests of commercial classes and opposed statism.²⁵ The JP favoured private industry, foreign investment in collaboration with the local capital and lower wages to keep down the cost of industrialisation and provide the investor with a handsome margin of profit.²⁶ In this way it ignored or negated the basis of social justice. Religion remained a basic issue for the JP throughout the decade. So its attitude towards religion cannot be separated from its basic appeal to the peasantry. On the other hand the RFP was not a class party but accepted "socio-economic class conflict as the basic political fact of Turkish society".²⁷ In fact the RFP had shifted towards the left immediately after 1960 revolution under the influence of bureaucratic group.²⁸ Its

23. W.B. Sherwood, "The Rise of Justice Party in Turkey", World Politics (Princeton), vol. XX, 1967, p. 56.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Harry N. Howard, "Changes in Turkey", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 48, 1965, p. 298.

26. Ahmad, n.16, p. 198.

27. Dodd, n. 10, p. 140.

28. Karpas, n.3, p. 63.

partial success in 1961 election drew it more to radical ideological orientation. That is why the RPP emphasized state control of foreign and public investments, industrial revolution, land reforms and formation of agricultural cooperatives.²⁹ However, it had to modify its ideological outlook due to unfavourable social and political compulsions. Thus it came to represent the interests of all social classes within the broader democratic framework. This liberality, according to RPP, had to be necessarily related with economic realities of the Turkish society. The Republicans viewed the broader "national will" in relation to constitutional limitations in order to achieve the goals of social justice.

The ideological polarization took place specifically between the landowning-commercial classes represented by the JP, and intellectual-professional classes represented by the RPP. In a sense it was an "intra-elite conflict" to compete for more social, political and economic power that had penetrated the erstwhile areas of consensus.³⁰ The conflict had not debarred the upper and intellectual classes from the status of leadership. When the ideological consensus between dominant groups and parties could not be attained, it resulted in the emergence of sharp even violent conflict between the so called rightists and leftists at the lower level.

29. Jacob M. Landau, Middle Eastern Themes - Papers in History and Politics (London, 1973), p. 273.

30. Kili, n. 8, p. 26.

The rightist groups usually attracted the masses by appealing to their attachments to tradition, religion and the homeland.³¹ They became arch supporters of free enterprise, restrictions on state enterprises and full parliamentary control of civilian and military bureaucracies. The organised rightist group emerged as the National Action Party (NAP) under the leadership of Alparslan Turkes, which opposed all socialist measures vehemently. The theoretical bases of the NAP revolved round the programme known as "nine lights" which meant upholding of nine principles of nationalism, idealism, moralism, social-mindedness, scientific outlook, freedom, development, peasant progress and industrialization.³² The NAP concentrated on issues related, directly or indirectly, with Islam and wanted its (Islam's) domination in the political field. Even with its conservative idealism and extensive activities, the NAP could not attract large masses to its programme because of its extremist orientation and violent tactics.

The leftists, on the other hand, regarded socio-economic transformation as essential for modernization of Turkey. They attacked the functioning of parliamentary democracy for its failure to fulfill the expectations of working class. The attack was "coupled with even stronger condemnation of

31. Karpat, n.2, p. 365.

32. Landau, n. 29, p. 282.

the private enterprise".³³ Broadly speaking, three main socialist groups became active in the socio-political life of Turkey during the sixties. Those were : (a) a group, composed of teachers, government officials and intellectuals, representing moderate-socialist goals. It stressed equal distribution of wealth, mass literacy, cultural reforms and secularization. (b) Trade Unions which always talked about social legislation and industrial workers' rights like higher wages. (c) The Workers Party of Turkey (WPT) - by far the most important group. The WPT attempted extensive analysis of Turkey's social structure in order to dramatize the existing backwardness. It justified the need for radical reforms to solve the worst problems of working men.³⁴ The main solution to Turkey's problems, according to WPT, lay in the political field, namely in bringing the working men to power through political education.³⁵ According to Ahmad the

33. Karpas, n. 3, pp. 65-66.

34. The statistical data show a high degree of backwardness in Turkey in sixties. For example 69.9 per cent of Turkish villages had no electricity, seventy-five per cent villages no roads, and thirty-five per cent villages no drinking water. There were two and a half per cent tuberculosis patients of the total population in the country. There was one doctor for each 4,000 people and one teacher for sixty students. The level of illiteracy was fifty-two per cent in the adult population. There was a net increase of three per cent in population every year with high birth rate of 44 per 1000 and mortality rate of 165 per 1000. The mass unemployment of labour resulted in the migration of labourers (around 6,00,000) to European countries on cheaper wages. According to a United Nations report, Turkey was next in the list after Pakistan as a country faced by starvation. Hotham, n. 7, pp. 66-76; Sidney Lens, "Turkey's Internal Crisis", Commonweal (New York), vol. LXXX, 1964, p. 630.

35. Kemal H. Karpas, "Socialism and Labour Party of Turkey", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. 21, 1967, p. 162.

WPT represented "interests clashing directly with those of ruling classes".³⁶ However, the WPT avoided overt identification with communism. It rather stressed the traditional socialist ideals like nationalization of means of production and distribution of land among landless peasants. It also stressed "political democracy", "basic freedom of religion" and "limited private enterprise"³⁷ within the statist framework to get wider support among various groups of society.

The ideological polarization left a deep impact on traditional ideologies like nationalism and Islam. Simultaneously, the consequent ideological reorientation contributed significantly to the emergence of socialism. Although nationalism, which was in essence Islamic, moralistic and anti-communist, was still prevalent in the schools,³⁸ it had undergone drastic change. It was interpreted differently, particularly by socialist groups and leftists. They gave it a new form to bring it in conformity with new social and economic currents. They stressed anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist elements of nationalism. In this way nationalism lost the character of a determining force.

Islam retained the character of a vital social force especially in the rural society. So it was not challenged, at least overtly, by any group or party. Islam was widely

36. Ahmad, n. 16, p. 187.

37. Dadd, n. 10, p. 152.

38. Kaspat, n. 2, p. 367.

used during the sixties for gaining social prestige and political position, particularly at times of elections. The elections of 1965 and 1969 provide glaring examples of the dominance of religious sentiment. Thus the assumption that Islam was a source of cultural rather than political influence³⁹ seems partly true. However, Islam, according to Ahmad, "acquired the anti-liberal, anti-radical and anti-socialist dimension to combat the forces released by 1960 revolution and the Constitution of 1961".⁴⁰ But the modern-secularist interpretation of Islam by liberal elements of the intelligentsia saw Islam in a different role, a role to help in progress and development.

Socialism appeared in the early sixties "both as an ideology and a technique of action designed to achieve rapid modernization through the rational organization of economic life".⁴¹ The favourable environment created by social dissension, political stalemate and growing demands of economic benefits by lower income groups contributed to its speedy development. The official adoption of social approach gave socialism the formal acceptance denied before. The term socialism used publicly by General Cemal Gürsel⁴² got

39. Ibid., p. 304.

40. Ahmad, n. 16, p. 376.

41. Karpat, n. 35, p. 157.

42. M. Parimann, "Turkey on the Eve of 1961", Middle Eastern Affairs (New York), vol. XII, 1961, p. 3.

wide acceptance among the groups desiring rapid progress. Gursel also approved "the formation of a nucleus of a socialist party". Once the taboo was removed, the idea spread fastly among many groups particularly the urban intelligentsia, university professors, teachers and journalists. Even the influential newspapers like Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and Aksam advocated the aims of socialism.⁴³ Thus socialist ideas diffused in Turkish society at large. Socialism progressed towards becoming a formal doctrine through the declaration of five hundred intellectuals published in the "Yon".⁴⁴ Now, it became a symbol arousing deep political emotions and provided the "source for inter-elite conflict".⁴⁵ After the WPT got representation in the National Assembly in 1965, with three per cent of votes and fifteen members, socialism got formal recognition for the first time in Turkish history. Now, socialism as the social ideology generated currents of thought among the intellectuals for radical structural change. But it had lost its aggressive character in the existing social, political and economic situation. Socialist intellectuals like Sadun Aren argued that the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism had lost its violent character due to the change in economic conditions in Turkey. So a rigid doctrinaire struggle should

43. Karpat, n. 35, p. 157.

44. Ibid., p. 158.

45. Kili, n. 8, p. 26.

be avoided for smooth development of the Turkish society.⁴⁶ The intelligentsia used socialism not only for opening new horizons for social and economic modernization, but also to justify its own power. Though socialism faced tough resistance and severe condemnation, it flourished largely in the deteriorating economic conditions and played a significant role in the ideological conflict.

The ideological polarization had a decisive and far reaching impact on the society and stimulated a new awakening. But all major developments were primarily of economic nature. Karpaz observes that "the key ideological problem in Turkey after 1960 concerned the method achieving economic and social development".⁴⁷ Now the topics like socialism, capitalism, land reforms, foreign policy and economic development⁴⁸ were debated at length by a variety of parties particularly at the time of elections. A group of intellectuals, whose functioning changed qualitatively, started publishing a journal named "Yon" in 1961 "to express more cohesively their ideas about socialism, statism and social justice".⁴⁹ Similarly, an important declaration was signed by one hundred sixty academicians, journalists and writers in December 1961 to emphasize

46. Karpaz, n. 35, pp. 162-63.

47. Karpaz, n. 2, p. 302.

48. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Turkish Elections : 1965", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XX, 1966, p. 473.

49. Karpaz, n. 2, p. 303.

the solution of economic problems on the basis of social justice. Those intellectuals stressed new statism which meant the adoption of mixed economy, free labour unions, land reforms and large commercial-agricultural units. The factors responsible for the emergence of this situation can be traced in the contradictions in the economic system, growing class consciousness among workers and, consequently, increasing class conflict.

The formalization of the ideological conflict between diverse groups gave rise to the constant political instability. Turkey entered the coalitional stage in the political sphere after the 1961 elections because the groups-in-conflict had to compromise for the continuance of the system. The phenomenon of "coalition" confirmed the plurality of the Turkish society and added destabilizing factor to Turkish politics. It also gave permanence to the ideological conflict, political polarization, social disunity, inharmonious relationships and extremism of various forms. The consolidation of various groups with their distinctive social, political and economic positions aggravated the situation. According to Karpaz the political malaise was "the result of a malfunctioning traditionalist economy geared to serve a few upper groups".⁵⁰ In this situation the Turkish society failed to maintain the traditional pattern of formal consensus. This conflicting

50. Karpaz, n. 3, p. 68.

situation made the leadership vacuum felt seriously.⁵¹ The system of parliamentary democracy was thus discredited among the intellectuals. The socialist intellectuals attacked the democratic set up⁵² and some of them demanded the establishment of an "intellectual dictatorship"⁵³ to have a strong and cohesive government. This conflicting situation served as a constant temptation for renewed intervention by the military⁵⁴ which had attained the status of an "interest group".⁵⁵ In reality, some inherent traits of Turkish society like centralization of authority, lack of respect for individual rights, persistence of paternalism and particularistic approaches contributed significantly to this abnormal form of democracy in Turkey. The Turkish political culture became more complex. The main traits of political culture included high degree of individualism, formalism, pragmatism, national-religious primacy, distrust and cynicism between individuals, autocratic power structure, belief in authoritarian practices and moderation of political behaviour. The politician was viewed as ambitious and opportunistic. The elite groups retained the highest position and status. There appeared to be a basic agreement between the governing elite and

51. Robinson, n. 13, p. 268.

52. Karpas, n. 2, p. 303.

53. Karpas, n. 18, p. 485.

54. Ulman and Tachau, n. 4, p. 164.

55. Karpas, n. 3, p. 67.

the counter-elite to preserve democratic institutions and processes.⁵⁶

The process of political modernization in Turkey had the specific feature of "cyclical nature" which meant that whenever a major change occurred in the institution and leadership, a relative period of freedom followed a period of repression.⁵⁷ The political activity had spread in general from leaders to followers, from cities to towns-villages and from the elite to the masses. In the sixties this situation changed because of the change in the nature of paternalistic relationships. The deep social awakening made all groups, upper and lower, urban and rural, highly mobile and competitive. Now the countryside groups could accept the concept of nation-state and republicanism as long as the government was willing to respect their local supremacy.⁵⁸ The policies of political parties and their leaders reflected answers to the questions raised by the masses. Thus, all groups were engaged in a struggle for more power, position and status. As a result there was progressive enlargement of the number of groups which were taken into mainstream of national life. This situation led to an important change in

56. Metin Tankoc, "Stable Instability of the Turkish Polity", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. 27, 1973, pp. 331-37.

57. Arif T. Payaslioglu, "Turkey", Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), p. 431.

58. Karpat, n. 3, p. 52.

the meaning given to the state and the function of intelligentsia.

The growth of plurality divided the Turkish society in various strata often with conflicting relationships. The horizontal grouping of the parties, embracing a cross section of population, gradually gave way to vertical groupings.⁵⁹ The rapid modernization process intensified antagonism in nature as well as in content. Turkish social structure, according to Rustow, was divided broadly into three classes: the urban educated class, the rural lower class and the urban lower class.⁶⁰ The urban educated class was conscious of being the ruling elite. So it retained higher power in the political system. In spite of the fact that this class was more homogeneous, it could not avoid division in respect of theoretical orientation. So it was divided in the following factions : the moderate conservatives, moderate revisionists, militant conservatives and militant revisionists.⁶¹ This group had undergone the highest degree of change and provided inspiration to the lower groups. The important features of change observed among the urban class were optimism, logical approach, materialism, progressive outlook, less religiosity and preference for richness than pioussness.⁶² The urban

59. Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow : An Experiment in Westernization (London, 1963), p. 107.

60. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition", Luann W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965), p. 180.

61. Takcoc, n. 56, p. 330.

62. Eren, n. 59, pp. 161-62

and rural lower classes were neither cohesive political classes nor homogeneous in comparison to the upper class. While the upper educated class was committed to Turkish nationalism, urban-rural lower classes adhered to religious ideology.⁶³ In this social disequilibrium and highly individualistic environment the family emerged as a basic unit which generated internal solidarity and continuity. The family provided an integral primary unit which regulated the social, economic and political functioning at the local level. However, the forces of modernization like industrialization, urbanization, modern education and secularization had changed the structure and functioning of urban family. Thus, sex equality, joint (male and female) dining, equal women participation, teenager's free and frank discussion, domination of political issues in discussion and less seriousness about religion⁶⁴ were the changed features of an urban Turkish family during the sixties. However, these features are not found in some urban middle and lower classes.

Ideologically speaking the rural people changed less in comparison with urban dwellers during the sixties. The modernization process hardly affected the sense of patriotism of rural people who were fed by deep religious feelings.⁶⁵

63. Rustow, n. 60, p. 185.

64. Eren, n. 59, pp. 161-62.

65. Landau, n. 29, p. 277.

So religion continued to be a powerful force in regulating the activities of life and the system of belief in rural areas. This, however, does not mean that villagers remained unchanged. The deep economic penetration (which created the transition from partial self-sufficiency to commercialization) changed the entire agricultural scene, particularly agrarian relationship patterns. The forces of modernization gave birth to a conscious rural community. The peasants' participation in politics awakened in them a great awareness of their material needs. They supported or opposed political parties on ideological issues as well. The multi-dimensional changes like increase in productivity, technological development, new relationships of economic nature, village cooperatives, upward mobility, new household structure and out-migration⁶⁶ led to a significant change in rural social structure.

The late sixties are important in the ideological development of Turkey. The ideological discussion which revolved round economic development, equal distribution of wealth, social security and justice and religion⁶⁷ had two divergent effects : (a) rapid increase in the number of politically conscious citizens and strengthening of plural nature of Turkish society, and (b) culmination of conflicting

66. Deniz Kandiyoti, "Some Social-psychological Dimensions of Social Change in a Turkish Village", British Journal of Sociology (London), vol. 25, 1974, pp. 48-51.

67. Kili, n. 8, p. 34.

relationships with the subsequent emergence of violent groups. Although the dominant political parties - RPP and JP - avoided to take extreme positions, both were involved in the conflict situation internally as well as externally. Externally the RPP had overt conflicting relations with the JP. Internally, while the RPP was torn with dissension caused by the slight turn to the left, the JP leadership was occupied with pressures from the right faction. Thus, ideological polarization between extremist groups, which got indirect encouragement and support from major political parties, reached an extra-ordinary degree. In this background Demirel, the JP Premier, observed that "the polarization of ideological movements is a fact of life in our world".⁶⁸ What he was suggesting was his party's total involvement in the ideological struggle against the RPP and other leftist groups.

The extreme form of ideological polarization in the early seventies was concentrated mainly in the universities and factories and, on occasions, spilled out in to streets. This clearly showed the participation of younger elements on both sides, the right and the left. Young rightists, according to Ahmad, were not as organised as the leftists⁶⁹ because the latter had a tradition of underground and organised

68. Ahmad, n. 16, p. 199.

69. Ibid.

functioning in the Republic. The rightist groups opposed Communism which, according to them, was atheistic and alien. They emphasized extreme nationalism and veered toward fundamental religious doctrines.⁷⁰ On the other hand, the left wing extremist groups represented three main themes : socialist transformation, complete severance from the West and close relations with the Soviet Union and its block. It may be argued that the writers of the 1961 constitution, in their zeal to counteract the excesses of the previous regime, could not provide proper safeguards against abuses of constitutional rights and freedom. That is why even the constitution was objected to because of its closeness to socialism.⁷¹ The constitution created "autonomous institutions but without proper matching responsibilities".⁷² So the emergence of extremism could not be checked properly. As a result the parliamentary system was discredited, particularly among the intellectuals. The phenomenon of ideological extremism can primarily be related to economic factor. But other important socio-political factors like suppression and ban on free thought and non-performance of political parties, cannot be ignored. This point can be supported by the fact

70. Charles Wakebridge, "The Turkish Urban Guerrillas", New Middle East (London), vol. X, 1973, p. 54.

71. Ahmad, n. 16, p. 198.

72. Nihat Erim, "The Turkish Experience in the Light of Recent Developments", Middle East Journal (Washington), vol 6, 1972, p. 248.

that the "left militants" belonged to the same social background (middle and upper middle classes) as the rightists did. The poor performance of the Republicans and the WPY alined the radicals from the system⁷³ and stimulated left radicalism.

The ideological antagonism, intensified by industrial unrest, deteriorating economy, political instability, social diversification and politicization of universities, had created the explosive social environment in the early seventies. This threatened the normal functioning of the system. The left-wing extremism, in particular, created a situation of near anarchy. Although these developments appeared as the expression of increasingly pluralist order, the political system was exposed to destabilizing competition, which made formal consensus difficult to maintain. The ideological polarity, social disorder and political instability encouraged the military High Command to repeat its performance of 1961 to restore normalcy. The army memorandum of 12 March 1971 held the Assembly and the government responsible for driving the country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, social and economic unrest. After the intervention the military High Command waged an ideological struggle against the opponents of the regime, particularly against the socialist trends.⁷⁴

73. Ahmad, n. 16, p. 201.

74. Ahmad, n. 16, p. 195.

While the military suppressed the radical intellectuals and activists⁷⁵ it was sympathetic to the JP. In fact the military High Command emerged primarily as the defenders of Kemalism. Now, Kemalism appeared again as an independent value (end) and dependent value (means)⁷⁶ and its doctrinal bases were re-emphasised.

75. Feroz Ahmad, "Turkish Guerrillas : Symptom of a Deeper Malaise", New Middle East (London), vol. X, 1973, p. 16

76. Tankee, n. 56, p. 337.

C O N C L U S I O N

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages illustrate that there exists a reciprocal relationship between ideology and socio-political change in modern Turkey. The process of socio-political change stimulated new ideological orientations to meet the functional needs of Turkish society. Likewise, certain ideological perceptions provided stimulus to initiatives for socio-political change. In fact, the Young Ottomans, the Young Turk, or the Kemalist movements reflected an ideological outlook which became an integral part of Turkish life.

Thus, modern Turkey provides a distinctive non-western model of modernization in the West Asian region where societies have remained comparatively closed and stable. The distinctiveness of the Turkish model lies in its voluntaristic character according to which socio-political change occurred through established processes involving broader participation of the people. The socio-political developments in modern Turkey were primarily indigenous in nature. The entire range of changes during the present century represents an inherent need for transition to modernity to prepare the Turks for new situations through dissemination of new ideas. In this way, the Turkish society and politics followed a process of development initiated by the declaration of the Republic. No doubt, exogenous factors like relations with the super powers, foreign economic aid and the impact of

international situation left their mark on the developments in Turkey. But the external factors merely provided stimulus to change; local initiative and action achieved it. Thus, the internal societal dynamics remains basic to an understanding of the model of Turkish development.

The period under study represents three distinctive stages of development of modern Turkey in relation to ideology and socio-political change:

(a) The Stage of Nation Building (1923-1950)

The creation of a nation state made this stage a historical necessity. The Kemalists through various measures attempted to evolve a specific Turkish model on the basis of national cultural foundations. The theoretical formulations of Kemalism provided doctrinal content to the nationalist ideology which was upheld by and disseminated through the state and party. The upholders of Kemalism opted for systematic reforms for the realization of the ideals of contemporary civilization. However, they failed to evolve an ideological consensus at the national level. The various aspects of modernization intensified the divergent trends in Turkish society. As a result, the late forties experienced important socio-political changes which culminated in the transition from a one party to a multi party system and non-competitive to competitive society. Within two decades and a half new institutions, organizations and social groups came into being. The process

of change led to the emergence of a new institutional framework with its own theoretical formulations that shaped the basic structure of Turkish society.

(b) The Stage of Ideological Exposure (1950-1960)

The social, political and ideological predominance of the Kemalist elite could not continue beyond the nineteen forties. The emergence of new social groups and political parties led to the ideological exposure which meant free expression of ideological preferences. It also meant a logical culmination of the processes initiated by the Republicans. The Democrats, thus, emerged on the political scene against the background of a diversified ideological outlook. An emphasis on democratic framework, openness of society and overt religiosity characterized the various features of their ideological orientation. Their systematic programme of liberalization in political, social, economic and cultural fields created a new environment in Turkey. The programme legitimized the political processes, created social equilibrium and established national-cultural identity. Thus, the process of modernization, in form and content, continued during the Democrat era though with a shift in emphasis and priorities. As a whole the era represents an intensification of the social and political modernization as well as a particular emphasis on national-cultural symbols signifying a kind of Turkish model not devoid of religious contents.

(c) The Stage of Plurality (1960-1971)

The Turkish society attained a high degree of plurality during this stage characterized by political instability, social tensions and ideological conflicts. The pluralism got strengthened when social groups and political parties adopted antagonistic ideological approaches sometimes leading to violent conflicts. The emergence of political extremism in Turkey can be attributed to a tradition in the Republic according to which the political opponents were either banned or suppressed through state power. The plural nature of the Turkish society, was one of the manifestations of modernization. It had generated new ideas, processes and movements. Moreover, it provided an institutional framework for containing the ideological conflict. The violation of this framework by the extremist groups and sometimes by the major political parties, contributed to the perversion of democracy and reversal of national consensus. However, this stage experienced some significant changes in social and political fields.

Our analysis shows that the Turkish society underwent a radical transformation during the course of these three stages. Although the transformation was limited to metropolitan urban areas in the initial stages, it affected other areas later on. The process of change was initiated by the nationalist revolution. This revolution, involving all social groups, followed certain social, political, economic and cultural objectives. These objectives were pursued

vigorously in the post-revolutionary period. However, the Republicans failed to change the existing economic structure. The later period experienced such economic changes but only at the super-structural level.

The way the cultural reforms were implemented during the Kemalist period evoked adverse reaction among the people. The alien contents of the reforms, which negated the native cultural values were also rejected by the majority of the Turks. Accordingly, a broader consensus on certain reforms could not be evolved to facilitate change.

Islam continued to be a dynamic ideological and socio-political force in Turkey particularly after the 1950s. Increasing political polarization and social tensions in the Turkish society made Islam an important component of the socio-political controversies. Islam may also continue to occupy a dominant status in future.

The ideological and political extremism has become a fact of Turkish society. The political polarization, which involves the Turkish youth also, has divided the Turkish society at all levels. This conflict situation can be related to the inherent economic contradictions in the Turkish society. Other important social and political factors have equally contributed to this development. The solution to this problem does not lie in the military action or repressive measures. Rather, a just and equitable economic system, stable political

order and smooth process of change might create a collective consciousness based on consensus.

The Turkish army has retained the tradition of being the defender of nationalist ideology and social conscience which is evident from its role in 1960 and 1971. Although the army attained the status of a power group with the increasing politicization of Turkish society, it checked the acts of extremism, instability and disintegration. While the army acted decisively against the non-secular and non-statist policies in 1960, it initiated a movement against left extremism in 1971. So the army as the "conscience keeper" of Turkish society, may probably repeat its action if a situation similar to that of 1960 or 1971 arises in Turkey.

Our analysis has shown that there has been a close relationship between ideology and socio-political change in modern Turkey. With the development of Turkey as a nation state with a specific theoretical perspective, the overt ideological expression became necessary in order to pursue the socio-political goals. This expression continued in the later stages also. Thus, the ideology performed two main functions: it provided a legitimizing factor to the governing class and its power and it contributed to a broader change covering more or less all the classes. The dissemination of ideology was intensified through increasing

socialization and politicization. Thus, the Turkish thought in modern times developed complex features like conflict, consensus and synthesis.

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