

**A STUDY OF YUGOSLAV CRISIS SINCE  
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the Dissertation entitled "A Study of Yugoslav Crisis Since 1991", submitted by Mr. Amitabh Singh is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University, or any other University and is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROFESSOR R.R.SHARMA  
(Chairperson)

DR.SHASHI KANT JHA  
(Supervisor)

## PREFACE

Disintegration of Yugoslavia was preceded in the background by developments in Eastern Europe. The Socialist countries were opening up slowly with impetus provided by the new thinking on socialism by Mikhail Gorbachev's emphasis on 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika'. Yugoslavia and to an extent Czechoslovakia presented an altogether a unique approach to socialism among the countries of East Europe. They had formed a nation bound by socialist ideology having multi-ethnic population, and having conflicting interests.

In the following pages an attempt has been made to study the developments in Yugoslavia after 1991. The approach followed is mainly historical and analytical emphasizing on the current developments. In the Introduction, development of Yugoslavia since the First World War has been discussed briefly. The second chapter provides an insight into the Croatian and Slovenian elections which precipitated the disintegration process. The third chapter discusses Bosnia-Herzegovina which is at present the main centre of conflict. The fourth chapter discusses the overall international mediation in Yugoslavia.

In the conclusion the whole notion of having a multi-ethnic population in a democratic society and its alternative mechanisms have been studied.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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
I am also thankful to Mr. T.M. Varghese for typing this dissertation.

*Amitabh Singh*

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## CHAPTER I

### HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS

#### Introduction

With the end of the cold war the world seemed to heave a sigh of relief as if the end of cold war was the panacea of all evils confronting the humanity. To those in the West, it brought relief and satisfaction while to the people of the East it meant economic prosperity and political pluralism. Yet, it immediately started becoming clear that the former communist countries transition to market economy and democracy was to be a long and tortuous experience. What was, however, not immediately apparent was the unravelling of the geo-political solutions in Europe as they had been imposed by the Treaty of Versailles at the close of the First World War. That was followed by a slow meltdown of European institutions and security arrangements and an almost total lack of ideas for dealing with the rise of ethnic hatreds throughout the former communist world. Yugoslavia's implosion also serves as a catalyst to them.

Yugoslavia has a history of hatred. In recent history,<sup>1</sup> instability and violence in Bosnia led the

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1 See I. Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Origins, History and Politics (Ithaca, NY, 1984).

European great powers to expel the Turks and place the province under the administration of the Habsburgs. But that decision of the Berlin Congress in 1878 was undone by the Habsburgs themselves, who annexed Bosnia thirty years later. The Habsburg rule provoked a new cycle of unrest and violence that culminated, in 1914, in the assassination in Sarajevo of the heir to the Habsburgs throne.

The concept behind Yugoslavia originated in the 19th century thinking. The term Yugoslavia literally means the land of the south Slavs who wanted to have a sovereign state of their own. Such a state, however, could not be realized until the various Yugoslavs united against their oppressors, e.g., the Austrians, Hungarians, and the Ottoman Turks, etc. By the early 20th century, the word Yugoslavia became a rallying cry.

With the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles tore the south Slav lands away from those dying empires. The international community assumed that the Yugoslavs were tribes of single people and if united forge a common national existence. Enchanted by dreams of Slavic harmony Yugoslav nationalists ignored the historical and religious differences among them. Though originating from a common Slavic background, the Yugoslavs spoke different dialects or languages, used different scripts and had never lived in a common state before 1918. Their history has been one of



suffering and humiliation. The Croats lost their state in 1102, the Serbs theirs in the mid-15th century. The north western part of Yugoslavia had been under the domination of Austria, Hungary and Venice while the south east half was ruled by Ottoman Turks.

### **Origins of the Ethnic Trouble**

Despite of a history of shared suffering, the region's core groups have been divided along more profound lines. While the Slovenes and Croats are Roman Catholics, the Serbs and Macedonians are eastern orthodox.<sup>2</sup> Most Roman Catholic Yugoslavs lived under the rule of Austria-Hungary or Venice, which belonged to the world of European civilization. In contrast most orthodox Yugoslavs became subjects of conquering Ottomans. At the beginning of the 19th century the Serbs rebelled against the Turks and won first political autonomy and then their independence. Their success inspired the suppressed Slavic peasantry in Bosnia and Croatia. In Croatia itself, an increasingly harsh Hungarian rule sowed political division. One side led by Ante Starcevic advocated the creation of Greater Croatia from the Alps to Bulgaria, the racist ideology of the movement has plagued Croat politics ever since. The Yugoslav idea,

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2 F.D.Singleton, Yugoslavia: The Country and Its People (Sendon, 1970), pp:14-15.

meanwhile, was championed by Roman Catholic Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer,<sup>3</sup> who was imbued with tremendous spirit. With Starvevic's death, his party of right declined and a new generation of Croat intellectuals embraced Strossmayer's concept of forming a Croatian Serbian coalition in 1905 in which they triumphed easily in the first election for the local legislature. The Croats warmed to the idea of union with other Yugoslavs meaning primarily the kingdom of Serbia for several reasons, but chiefly because alone they were powerless to wrest independence from Austria-Hungary.

It is significant that leading politicians in the kingdom of Serbia were apathetic or rejected the Yugoslav idea. The most senior among them, Nicola Pasic, was one of the strongest of the opponents. Having fought on the side of victorious allies in World War I, Pasic felt that Serbia could achieve its strategic objectives without entering into a marriage with Roman Catholic Croats and Slovans. Serbia's goal was to expand its territory to the west and north, incorporating areas in Bosnia, Croatia and Vojvodina that were home to nearly as many Serbs as lived in the Serb kingdoms. Serbs resented the very name Yugoslavia, because it obscured Serbia's preeminence in the new state. Serbia's royal family favoured the new state, however, and it

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3 Ibid, p.46.

prevailed over the opponents.

The first Yugoslavia was problematic right from the very start. The crux of the problem was the relationship between the two largest ethnic groups - the Serbs and the Croats. The Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians and Slovenes were too small in number and too weak politically to do more than shift alliances and manoeuvre between the two dominant groups. In fact, until its collapse in 1991, Yugoslavia was in essence the unhappy union of its two largest nationalities.

The Serbs looked upon the new territory as an extension of their former territory as they had sacrificed too much in the two Balkan Wars and the First World War. Roughly one-third of the Serbs perished in those conflicts.<sup>4</sup>

At the unification ceremony held on 1st December 1918, Alexander I the King of newly formed Yugoslavian kingdom declared that the three Yugoslav peoples in his new kingdom were one nation under three tribal names. The Croat representatives did not object to that formulation. Only one prominent Croat politician, Stepan Radic, refused to travel to Belgrade, declaring that his travel was acting

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4 Tara Kartha, "Rest of the World and Erstwhile Yugoslavia", Strategic Analysis, vol.15, no.10, January 1993.

like "drunken geese in a fog".<sup>5</sup>

The sense of betrayal soon filled Croats' hearts. Instead of Hungarian overlords, they had a Serbian king, his army, police, administration, and the orthodox church. For a Roman Catholic this was tantamount to submission to an inferior oriental culture and civilization. Yugoslav politics soon degenerated into tribalism, political parties were soon formed around ethnic blocs. In Parliament Stepan Radic and two other Croat deputies were assassinated by a Serb deputy in 1928. Six years later, Croat nationalists organized the assassination of King Alexander I during a visit to France. Croat politicians discussed plans to break Yugoslavia with foreign leaders much as they did in seeking support from Germany and Italy in 1990-91. Prince Paul, the regent of Yugoslavia, also flirted politically with Hitler and in 1941 joined the tripartite pact, only to be deposed two days later in a military coup. Germany then attacked Yugoslavia, leading to its dismemberment.

What followed can only be described as a savage religious and tribal war similar to the one being fought now-a-days. Ante Pavelic was placed at the head of government of separate Croatian state and the form of Croatian fascists was known as Utshasis. Though most

5 Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War Old Hatreds", Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, p.10.

established Croat politicians refused to join Pavelic, leader of the fascists. These fascists perpetrated genocide against Serbs, Jews, Gypsies in Krajina and Bosnia.

Serb nationalists, Chetniks as they were known, retaliated by killing Croats and Muslims most of whom had joined the Utshasis. Acting in the name of preserving their nations and faiths, Serbs and Croats conducted a holy war trying to exterminate each other. Lower clergy on both sides had sanctioned their crimes.

#### **Yugoslavia in the Post-Second World War Period**

The Yugoslav idea seemed dead at the close of the Second World War. In fact President Franklin Roosevelt entertained the idea of dismembering Yugoslavia after the war's conclusion, but found Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin unreceptive.<sup>6</sup>

The idea of Yugoslavia, however, received a shot in the arm in the immediate aftermath of the war. Marshal Josip Broz Tito or Tito as he was popularly known, a communist leader had become popular earlier in the early 20th century by leading a guerrilla uprising, this time he rose up against the Germans and emerged victorious from World War II. He proclaimed the "fraternity and unity of the south

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6 S.Chirsod, A Short History of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, 1966).

Slavs".<sup>7</sup> Following Lenin's formula in the USSR he contrived a federation of six national republics. In this Leninist arrangement the republics were given fictional sovereignty fully complemented by cultural and political institutions. In return, they ceded political power to Tito and his party. Tito, a Croat, believed that balance was crucial to keep Yugoslavia together.

However, Tito's scheme went beyond balance and that forms the core of Serb grievances today. Given Serbian domination in Alexander's Yugoslavia, Tito sought to weaken the Serbs by dividing them internally. In addition to the three constituent nations of Alexander's Yugoslavia Serbs, Croats and Slovans Tito turned pre-war "Southern Serbia" into the former Serb kingdom of Montenegro a nation in its own right, and created two federal units within Serbia itself - "the autonomous regions" of Kosovo, with its sizable Albanian population and Vajvodina, where many Hungarians, Rumanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks and other minorities lived.

The largest obstacle to Tito's plan lay in the region between Serbia and Croatia, where a mixed population lived. This region known as Bosnia was one of the major problems of Yugoslavia. Conscious that both Croatia and Serbia laid

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7 See, J.K.Pavlovitch, The Probable Survivors, Yugoslavia and Its Problem 1918-1988 (Soudan Blurst, 1988).

historical claim to Bosnia, Tito declared even during the war that its future would be "neither Serbian or Croatian or Muslim but rather Serbian and Croatian and Muslim."<sup>8</sup> As his Yugoslavia was to be a multinational socialist state, Bosnia would be its most genuine portion. As the cradle of the revived Yugoslavian idea it would become republic in its own right.

There were serious concerns being expressed by people about the viability of Yugoslavia as a single nation state. Novelist Andric had serious doubts and came close to saying that the whole multinational enterprise was impossible. Born in violence, Yugoslavia could only be maintained by force and by stymieing its democratic development.<sup>9</sup>

Tito's party formally adopted the concept of a single Yugoslavia nation in 1958, or just about the time when he began to abandon Soviet style politics at home and opened up Yugoslavia to the outside world. Seeking to reinforce the Bosnian balance, Tito in 1964 created yet another nation Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Bosnian Muslims.

The language declaration endorsed by leading Croat nationalists in 1964 demanding full constitutional recognition for four instead of three Yugoslav languages:

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8 Ibid, pp.127-8.

9 Doder, n.5, p.13.

Croatian was to join Serbian, Slovenes and Macedonians. the language declaration initiated a mass Croat nationalist movement embraced by those voicing separation, spite and national exclusivity.

### **The Post-1974 Constitution Scenario**

The 1974-Constitution marked the climax of Tito's decentralisation. It proclaimed the Yugoslav federation would be a state community of voluntarily united nations and their socialist republics and accorded sovereign rights to "nation and nationalities" in their respective and autonomous regions.<sup>10</sup>

For the Bosnian Muslims, the new constitution opened the prospects of a future embryonic nation state.<sup>11</sup> Nation to Bosnian Muslims ten years earlier meant that the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had a nation of its own, just like Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The 1974 Constitution became the departure point for the Bosnian Muslims assertiveness which in Post-Tito period provoked an adverse reaction among the Bosnian Serbs. Their loss of ethnic domination coupled with political liberalisation marked a decline in the Serbian's share of -----

10 Constitution of Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974.

11. See R. Blackburn, Break up of Yugoslavia and the Fate of Bosnia. New Left Review, May-June 1993, pp.23-24.



political and economic power in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The increased Muslim assertiveness in Bosnia-Herzegovina and with the leadership of Alija Izetogovic left out of sizable number of Muslim population which lived in the Kosovo area of Serbia.

Tito's formula for unity could not survive without him and his charisma.<sup>12</sup> It was only within months of his death in 1980 that the Yugoslav federation began to unravel. The glue that held the federation was gone. The reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev accelerated the disintegration process in Yugoslavia, too.

The events in neighbouring countries acted as safety valve but that had been too late for the leaders of Yugoslav federation and in the absence of a charismatic leadership like Tito, Yugoslav federation seemed to be falling apart. The regional Yugoslav leaders began to look to nationalism as a new force of legitimacy to maintain their power bases. Nationalism gained strength naturally as the republic had to defend their own interests. The crisis of the early 1990s resembled the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1940s.

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12. See A. Boroviec, *Yugoslavia after Tito*: Praeger, New York, 1981.

## The Onset of the Present Crisis

A majority of non-Serbian republics began to advocate radical constitutional changes, saying that the federal system created by Tito was no longer functional. Slovenia and Croatia gingerly advocated greater autonomy and floated a proposal for the creation of a confederate state. The Serbs were suspicious of this move as another twist in the long running conspiracy against them purportedly masterminded by the Croat Tito and his first lieutenant, the Slovene Edward Kardelj.<sup>13</sup> Serbian communist strongman Slobodan Milosevic rode to power in 1988 on the crest of a powerful nationalist wave. In fact, nationalist parties were swept into power in all republics in the first free post-cold war elections in 1990. Supranationalist parties were sent into political oblivion.

Milosevic's coalition consisted of Communist Party Apparatchiks, army, administration and police who sought to protect their positions and embraced nationalism as the new religion. More important was the crucial participation of Serb nationalists of many anti-communists who saw Serbia threatened by the prospective disintegration of the federation.

Serbs resentment set the stage for Milosevic's  
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13. See A.N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia, Harcourt Brace Jovanjorich, New York, 1982.

manoeuvres in 1989 to revoke the autonomy of Serbia's two special regions Vojvodina and Kosovo. The sense of victimization also partially explains the absence of strong public reaction to outrages committed by Serb forces fighting in Croatia and Bosnia.

The genius of Milosevic is his ability to mould medieval myth of Serb identity to his political purposes today. For centuries the 'myth of Kosovo' has been the banner of Serb national pride and justification for the Serbs miserable condition.<sup>14</sup> This myth reminds the Serbs of their suppression of by Turkish rulers and this suppression of Serbians by Turkish rulers has been handed through the generation in the form of popular ballads. Milosevic became the most popular post war leader of Serbia when, on the 600th anniversary of the battle, he went to the field of blackbirds and promised half a million people that "nobody will beat you again". He also said that the Serbs "throughout their history never conquered or exploited anybody else."<sup>15</sup>

The Serbs have a strong argument. One of their historical objectives was the unification of Serb lands. They live in Croatia and Bosnia not only in Serbia, and  
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14 Bibraz, Elez, "Kosovo: The Balkan Powder Keg", Conflict Studies, no.258, February 1993, pp.13-14.

15 Ibid, pp.27-28.

Montenegro. They accounted for 32 percent of Bosnia's population before this war and 12-14 percent of Croatia's. If the Slovans and Croats wanted to secede from Yugoslavia Serbs had also the right to form a separate state and more so when every one know that the Yugoslav experiment has failed.

Thus, we see that idea of a Yugoslavia has existed right from the 20th century. But the Yugoslavia that was created both during the First World War and again after Second World War was like fixing a map with cartographic finesse but lacking a homogeneity. This was very successfully manipulated by present leaders who have made the things to come to such a pass. Understandably nobody matched the charisma of Tito or an ideology which would hold Yugoslavian identity intact and hence the rise of narrow nationalistic passions as being witnessed presently. This will be analysed in the case of Croatia and Slovenia where popular emotions were raised on narrow nationalistic feelings which war clearly manifested in their elections.

## CHAPTER II

### CROATIAN SLOVENIAN CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES

The formal disintegration process of Federal structure of Yugoslavia was accelerated by the elections held in Slovenia and Croatia in late 1990. This elections acted as referendum for secession and spurred the process of disintegration. The Croatian and Slovenian elections and its fallout on armed forces is discussed in this chapter.

By the mid-1970s, Yugoslavia had become a highly decentralized federation in which the constituent republics dominated the central government. Regional leadership carefully protected the interests of their territorial constituencies at the expense of other regions and the federation. The regional leaders shared a common interest in preserving the communist political order that shielded them from responsibility and popular accountability but little else. Ethnic and political process had only modest impact. The proportion of the population that declared itself to be "Yugoslav" rather than an ethnic identity in national census, for example, increased from 1.3 percent in 1971 to 5.4 percent in 1981.<sup>1</sup> For the vast majority of the

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1. S.L.Burg, "Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart", Current History, November 1993, pp.357-63.

population, distinct ethnic or national identities continued to command emotional loyalties and provide the most powerful bases for political mobilization.

The ethnically defined territorial structures of the Yugoslav system reinforced the political strength of ethnic identities and intensified political divisions in the leadership. Federal political bodies, including the collective state presidency and the Communist Party leadership were composed of representatives of the republics and provinces. Selected by the regional leadership individual position in these bodies, including the country's Prime Ministership and Presidency, rotated among the regions according to an explicit agreement. Only the army remained a unified, all-Yugoslav organisation.

While the political regions of Yugoslavia were defined in ethnic terms in most cases they were not ethnically homogeneous, with the exception of Slovenia. Thus their leadership could not mobilize ethnic nationalism in support of their political ambitions and fulfill the nationalist aspirations of their ethnic majorities without alienating substantial minority population and raising the prospect of severe ethnic conflict. The Slovenian scene was, however, different from this general pattern. The vast majority of ethnic Slovians were concentrated in Slovenia and made up the majority of the population. Efforts by ethnic Slovene

regional leaders to advance Slovene national cultural interests and to strengthen Slovenian autonomy effectively encompassed all Slovenes. At the same time, these efforts neither threatened the status of large minority inside Slovenia nor challenged the power of any group over its own republic by encouraging large Slovene minority population outside the republic to demand autonomy.

In Croatia, on the contrary, Serbs constituted a large minority or even a majority of the population in several areas of the republic. Croat leaders thus could not pursue exclusively nationalist ambitions inside the Croatian state without risking the alienation of a large and territorially compact population of ethnic Croats in adjacent areas of neighbouring Bosnia Herzegovina.

No single group could claim the overall majority in Bosnia - Herzegovina. While Muslims constituted the largest group (about 40 percent of the population in the 1991 census) they did not represent an absolute majority. Serbs (over 33 percent) and Croats (more than 18 percent) and others (9 percent) constituted large minorities in the republic's population.<sup>2</sup> In many areas of Bosnia there was no single ethnic majority. In the larger cities, those who took the non-ethnic "Yugoslav" identity constituted from 20-

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2. The Times (London), 14 October 1991.

25 percent of the population.<sup>3</sup> Thus the pattern of ethnic settlement in Bosnia was highly complex. No ethnic leadership could advance exclusively nationalist ambitions on behalf of its ethnic constituency without alienating vast portions of the population including substantial numbers of its own group who had adopted the multiethnic civic culture associated with "Yugoslavism".<sup>4</sup>

By the mid-1980s, the collective leadership of the country even were divided between those who supported a looser association among the regions and those who continued to support a strengthened federal government. This division was reinforced by difference over the scope and pace of further economic and political reform. The Yugoslav economy had gone into sharp decline in the 1980s. Living standards fell and regional economic differences further widened.

Now, to discuss the Slovenian election and its aftermath.

### **Slovenia**

It may be argued that Slovenia was in many ways perhaps the least Yugoslav and certainly the least Balkan republic in the federation. Due largely to its typical geographical location it remained thoroughly Roman Catholic and its

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3.    ibid.

4.    ibid.



social and political culture was basically Central European in nature.

Throughout its history Slovenia never had any separatist tendencies. Starting, however, from 1918 when it joined the new Yugoslav state till the late 1980s after seeing the Serbian attitude towards the Yugoslav federation its attitude underwent a dramatic change. Slovenia was the first republic which spearheaded the Yugoslav return to multiparty elections in April 1990 when the centre-right DEMOS (democratic opposition) coalition beat the reformed communists into second place.<sup>5</sup> Although highly critical of the Milosevic regime in Serbia, the Slovene communists did not advocate outright independence. The wider sense of Slovene separation rested on the assumption that Slovenia's development had been impeded by its memberships of an economically weak and crisis ridden Yugoslavia.

On 2 July 1990 the national assembly adopted a declaration on sovereignty which stipulated that the federal constitution would apply only if it did not conflict with Slovene laws, and announced that Slovenia would develop its own foreign and defence policies. Indeed in September 1990 the republic brought under its own peacetime control the territorial defence force. But the most important Slovene

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5. See D.Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatred", Foreign Policy, Spring 1993, pp.3-23.

step in 1990 was the December referendum in which an overwhelming majority voted for an independent and sovereign state.

In October 1990 Slovenia along with Croatia adopted a "Model of Confederation in Yugoslavia",<sup>6</sup> described as a discussion document, its principal assumptions were nevertheless those on which Slovenia would not easily compromise: the proposed confederation should be an alliance of sovereign states. Functioning as an international organization, quite in the style of the European Community, its member states would have their own currencies, armed forces and diplomatic representation in third states,<sup>7</sup> thus each member would be an individual subject of international law.<sup>8</sup>

However, Serbian (and Montenegrin) insistence on the continuation of the federal principles ensured that no meaningful progress was made in the negotiation among the Presidents of the six republics in the course of 1990-91. Slovenia's lack of faith in the possibility of an all

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6. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York, 1992), pp.249-50.

7. Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia and Presidency of the Republic of Croatia 'Model of Confederation in Yugoslavia', Ljubljana; Zagreb, 4 October 1990. Quoted from Adelphi Papers, 270, Summer 1992, p.14.


8. *ibid*, p.14.

Yugoslav agreement on the future shape of the country was underlined in February 1991 with a resolution on "the proposal for the dissolution of Yugoslavia into several sovereign and independent states". The documents referred to was the result of December 1990 referendum in Slovenia and notified the federal assembly that the process of dissolution began with the resolution.<sup>9</sup> Since the Slovene government insisted on an agreed solution between the republics for a dissolution of Yugoslavia it claimed, ingeniously, that this process should be called dissociation rather than secession.

Seen from outside, Yugoslavia would have no problem if Slovenia left the federation but the problem arose from the fact that secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia would set a bad precedent and quite possibly generate a chain repercussion of secessions.

When Slovenia declared itself independent on 25 June 1991 there followed a brief war. In a conflict of about 10 days Slovene territorial defence and police units suffered 19 dead (the federal army had 45 dead). Thus it was not an all out war. The Brioni Agreement on July 7 was mediated by the European Community. The situation was resolved dramatically on July 18, when the Presidency in Belgrade

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9. ibid, pp.14-15.



unilaterally took the decision to withdraw all the federal forces from Slovenia. That announcement in effect signalled the end of Yugoslavia. The move of the Army High Command which had ordered for a complete military crackdown in Slovenia was rejected.<sup>10</sup> In December 1991, caving in to heavy German pressure, the EC finally decided to recognize Slovenia along with Croatia, thereby providing international legitimacy to the process of the Yugoslav disintegration. The problem of Croatia was also more or less the same it differed only in degrees and not in kind from the problem of Slovenia.

### **Croatia**

Two distinctive streams can be identified in the Croatian politics. The first stream, being pro-Yugoslavian and having which has its roots in the first half of the 19th century, had always been strong among the intelligentsia and it prevailed in 1918 when as a unified state Yugoslavia was created. The Anti-Yugoslavian current, on the other hand, had its roots in the Croatian independence movement, producing the success of a kind in the Second World War and asserting itself again in the early 1990s. By comparison with Slovene nationalism, Croatian nationalism has been much

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10. *ibid.*

older, militant and embittered.

Like Slovenia Croatia, too, is largely Roman Catholic and culturally Central European in its outlook. For the larger part of its history Croatia has remained independent and maintained a constitutional autonomy.

Contemporary Croatian nationalism has certainly been the result, though not to the same extent as in Slovenia, of the policies of Milosevic's regime in Serbia. Since Tito repressed the nationalist movement in 1970s Croatia enjoyed the reputation of the silent republic. The republic's first free post-war elections in April 1990 ended all these speculations. This produced a dramatic and convincing victory for the right wing Hrvastaka Demokrastka Zajednica (HDZ) or 'Croatian Democratic Union'. As in Slovenia, a relatively cautious position on the national issue proved fatal for the reformed communists.

The outstanding effect of HDZ rule since May 1990 has been the alienation of the 60,000 strong (12.5 percent) Serbian community in Croatia. The HDZ was swept into power on a wave of nationalism and indeed revisionism; Dr.Franjo Tudjman, the ex-Communist leader of the party, had gone to extent of indirectly suggesting that the ethnically mixed Bosnia Herzegovina be included in Croatia.<sup>11</sup>

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11. Summary of World Broadcast, BBC, 28 February 1991.

Tudjman's party HDZ had very clearly ruled out the involvement of Croatian Serbs in Croatia affairs. This conflict between the concept of sovereignty and the concept of self-determination for the Serbian community had no wish to live in an independent Croatia, democratic or not, confederal or completely separated from Yugoslavia. In February 1991 Tudjman stated that Yugoslavia should be organized on the model of EC, with a single market, defence and armed forces, though the republics would also have their own forces. Simultaneously with Slovenia, the Croatian assembly adopted, on February 21, a "Resolution on the Procedure for the Separation of the SFRY and on Possible Association in an Alliance of Sovereign Republics".<sup>12</sup> Later that month in Krajina, where the Serbs were in majority, rejected the Croatian resolution and declared that they had no wish to leave Yugoslavia as part of Croatia and, in effect, proclaimed their separation. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia was truly embattled, with armed incidents involving ethnic Serbs becoming a regular feature across the republic. Amidst the spreading chaos, on May 19, the Croats staged a referendum on independence and voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence.

Meanwhile Franjo Tudjman, facing strong pressures from  
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12. John Zametica , "The Yugoslav Conflict", Adelphi Papers, no.12 (Summer 1992), p.20.

the radical nationalist wing in his own party, staked everything on gaining international recognition. Croatia certainly needed this badly to retain its existing frontiers for during July and August almost a third of its territory fell to the Serbs, who had often been assisted by the federal army.

In September 1991 the EC sponsored peace conference on Yugoslavia made a conditional offer of recognition to all the republics that desired it. The peace conference subsequently collapsed and the fighting continued. However, the destruction of Vukovar where the Croats had put up stiff resistance and the siege of Dubrovnik had paid heavy dividends. In December 1991 the members of the EC who were reluctant to extend recognition to Croatia relented under pressure from Germany and Croatia was recognised in mid-January 1992. The aim of reimposing Croatian sovereignty over the Serbian enclaves, however, was not achieved. By this time Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had agreed to the deployment of 14,000 UN peacekeeping troops in the disputed areas.<sup>13</sup> Cyrus Vance, the UN special envoy who had negotiated the first effective cease fire in Croatia, had argued against recognition since it would hamper his efforts. The United States took particular notice of his

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13. Andrea Nativi, "The Yugoslavian Tragedy", Military Technology, vol.15, issue 12, 1991, pp. 13-25.

recommendation and waited until April 12, 1991 before recognizing Croatia. Keen to present himself as a man of peace, and keener still to obtain US backing, Tudjman went along with the UN plan.

By the Spring of 1992 the position of Croatia was in reality much worse than what it appeared in the light of international recognition. The war had resulted in widespread destruction and mass exodus of Croats from the battle zones. Most important, the Serbs had through their control of Krajina, practically cut Croatia into two, and they were busy establishing their grip on large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The period of UN deployment, which Tudjman insisted, not to exceed one year period, could extend indefinitely in the absence of Serbo-Croat political agreement. Further the chances of such an agreement appeared slim, given the determination of the Serbs not to live in an independent Croatia under any circumstances. In the medium term, Croatian independence looked as if it would be continuously threatened by the dissenting Serbian community. Moreover, Croatia's domestic political orientation was moving markedly to the right. Prominent on the extreme right was Dobrosolav Paraga's Party of Croatian Historic Right, which insisted on the inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Serbia into Croatia. Tudjman's own HDZ is a nationalist coalition, in which the extreme



elements have so far been restrained by the President himself. In fact, Tudjman displayed a steady nerve in tough situations which threatened him domestically.

In a somewhat hurried development Croat nationalists living in Bosnia declared an independent state that included almost one third of the territory of Bosnia; Mate Boban, head of the 30,000 strong Croatian defense council militia, said that the name of the new republic is Herzeg-Bosna<sup>14</sup> and on 3 November 1992, the New York Times reported that the Serbian dominated Yugoslavian army had quit the siege of Dubrovnik, Croatia and had withdrawn its forces from the surrounding areas. Now, the role of armed forcer was also very uninspiring for the soldiers at the bottom of the hierarchy.

#### **The Role of the Armed Forces**

Long before the eruption of large scale violence in June 1991, the People's Army of Yugoslavia, the Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (JNA), was widely regarded as central player in the Yugoslav crisis. Its domestic role was further emphasized by the revolution of 1989, the ensuing Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe and thus the disappearance of the only serious external threat. Against the background of raging nationalism across the country, the

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14. The New York Times, 4 September 1992.

JNA stood apart as a supranational factor. It was genuinely Yugoslav, both in its manpower make up and its ideology. The most important component of its ideology was the communist orientation of its officer corps. Here, too, the JNA was out of tune with political developments as the party's monopoly of power gave way to political pluralism during 1990.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time, the emergence of embryo national armies in several republics represented a development which it could not view with equanimity. In short, the onset of nationalist politics in Yugoslavia, operating on republican multiparty systems, had one overwhelming consequence for the JNA, its most important battle was going to be the battle for institution survival.

The JNA grew out of Tito's communist guerrilla movement in the Second World War. Its legitimacy complete with a great deal of mythology was firmly rooted in wartime experience. As such, however, it was an implicitly political organization. Constitutionally, the JNA was responsible for the maintenance of Yugoslavian territorial integrity, but Tito also viewed it as the ultimate guarantor of his personal dictatorship and the political system he had created. On another level of internal politics, the

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15. Aaron Karp, "Arming Ethnic Conflict", Arms Control Today, vol.23, no.7, September 1993, pp.72-85.

multinational JNA was meant to be the living embodiment of the concept of 'Brotherhood and Unity', a meeting point for all the Yugoslavs, brothers united in the defence of their socialist federation. It was thus one of the instruments employed to address the national question.

Tito's JNA was the most pampered organization consuming about 5 percent of the total GNP which was over the fact that Serbian component constituted 60 percent of the army's strength though Serbs were roughly 39.7 percent of the total population of Yugoslavia. Thus contrasted with the Slovenes who with 8.2 percent of the population supplied only 2.8 percent of the armed forces, or the Croats, where the figures were 22.1 percent and 12.6 percent respectively. But the upper echelons of the army were drawn by giving proper representation to most of the republics.<sup>16</sup>

JNA was a strong bastion of Tito's socialist ideology and Tito's party's monopoly over power was maintained to a large extent through the instrumentality of JNA. Even after Tito's death in 1980, the JNA was determined to uphold these principles. However, the departure from the scene of a personality like Tito deprived the JNA of its idol and supreme commander-in-chief. His successor in that role was the impersonal collective presidency, rotating annually in

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16. *ibid.*

the strict order of the six republics and two autonomous provinces. The loyalty of the JNA was thus transferred from the personality of Tito to the constitutional arrangements of the Yugoslav federation.

Paradoxically, however, the JNA was supposed to uphold the de-facto 1994 Federal Constitution, the political consequences of which were gradually beginning to tear the country apart. Moreover, as the seclusion between the republics deepened in the course of the 1980s the influence of the party declined.

Towards the end of 1990, the JNA was being distinctly and openly nervous. The Defence Minister, General Velyko Kadijevic, who enjoyed the reputation of being a fanatical Yugoslav, threatened that the JNA would disarm all the military and paramilitary units in the country. He was particularly resentful of the formation of various 'National Armies'. Earlier a group of influential retired officers led by Admiral Branko Mamula and General Stevan Mirkovic, founded a new political party which they named rather ominously, "The League of Communists Movement for Yugoslavia".<sup>17</sup>

In general, the JNA's political involvement in the Yugoslav crisis displayed inaptitude and a mass of

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17. John Zametica, n.12, p.26.

contradictory signals. The speed of the turn of events left the JNA dumbfounded and the kind of training that they had undergone naturally found an ally in the form of Slobodan Milosevic who it seemed was eager to save Yugoslavia from falling apart.

In spite of all these developments, on 17 January 1992 Serbian President declared in Presidential address to Serbian Republic Federation of Yugoslavian Parliament that the "approach that Yugoslavia exists no more i.e., only republics exist and that possible solutions could be found only through multilateral and bilateral talks in unacceptable to us. On the contrary, Yugoslavia does exist. It has its institutions and changes should be carried out in legal manner, through Yugoslav institution in which republics are free to act in line with their stands so sensible person has ever questioned this."<sup>18</sup> He was apparently reacting to the Croatian President who asked his people of Croatia to give their country "all the attributes of sovereignty including separate army" on 4 January 1992.<sup>19</sup> They could not believe that Milosevic was a genuine Yugoslav when overwhelming evidence indicated that the bases of his power and popularity was Serbian nationalism.

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18. Summary of World Broadcast, BBC, 25 January 1992.

19 Ibid, 11 January 1992.

By the Spring of 1991, Croatia and Slovenia were hostile territories and, in spite of insult and provocations JNA showed extreme patience but in May 1991, in Split a soldier died at the hands of mob. The Chief of Army reported to the collective presidency that civil war had begun. But both in Slovenia and Croatia the army was not welcome. But with JNA already confiscating around 60 percent of Slovene territory and almost whole of the territory in Croatia both having republican armed forces. Now the JNA had also come to point when the top brass of the military leadership had begun to see their manipulation by the Serbian leadership. The time for military intervention in these republics had passed. The truth was that the army generals had no friends but only formidable enemies with all the major powers in Europe, Germany and France, unwilling to come to rescue of tottering Yugoslavia. They were in charge of an army without a country. This was the unhappy position of the JNA immediately before the outbreak of hostilities in Slovenia.<sup>20</sup>

The short conflict in Slovenia, which the JNA had not planned for and from which it retired within three weeks, resulted in many desertion of non-Serbs. This was the start of a significant trend. The JNA increasingly was facing a -----

20. S. Drakulic, The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War (New York, 1993).

crisis of identity. Soon after the war spread to Croatia, some 7,000 officers of Croatian nationality switched sides. Moreover both Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina stopped sending recruits and reservists with only the Serbs responding to the call-up in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 'Serb-dominated army' became a reality. By the Spring of 1992, some 90 per cent of the JNA officers and men were either Serb or Montenegrin.

In spite of all this, the political calculation of Slobodan Milosevic said that having an all out Serbian army would send wrong signals to the other republics, wherein, they would demand share in the armoury and moreover there would be no morality in showing to the world that it was only the Serbian nationalism writ large that had some status in maintaining Yugoslavia with the Serbs leaving the majority population. Undoubtedly then Serbia and JNA needed each other.

Thus, we see that the Croatian and Slovenian elections precipitated the on going crisis. The international recognition perhaps sounded the death-knell of Yugoslav federation. The army was in disarray, the lack of proper leadership with the death of Marshall Tito and its socialist ideology which bound the army together also lost its relevance with more of nationalist and supranationalist parties. This also led to the accentuation of the Bosnian crisis which is discussed in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER III

### THE PROBLEM OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

As we have discussed in the preceding chapter the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began with the declaration of the independence of the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991. The birth of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been more sadistically painful though it started peaceably. To begin with, Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbian communities sought to remain within the Yugoslav federation, while its Muslim and Croatian communities demanded independence. At the beginning of March 1992, open conflict flared up, when a referendum supported by the Muslim and Croat communities, but largely boycotted by Serbs who favoured independence for the republic. By mid-March, serious fighting had broken out.

On 7 April 1992 the European Community and the USA recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence. On the same day, the Serbian political leaders proclaimed the independence of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' (areas of the republic under Serbian control). In April, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was accepted as a participatory state in the Conference of Security and



Cooperation in Europe and, in May, it became a member of the UN. It was this significant recognition which enraged the Bosnian Serbs and their ethnic kinsfolk in neighbouring Serbia.

Ethnic tensions increased in Bosnia-Herzegovina and as a result civil war of horrific proportions ensued. Numerous members of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) of Bosnian origin, as well as their supplies of arms and ammunitions, remained in the republic after the official withdrawal of the J.N.A., in May. By December 1992, together with the mobilised local Serbian reservists and Serbian irregulars, Serbs had occupied some 70 percent of the republic's territory, though Serbs comprised only 31 percent of the population before the war.

Local Croatian forces, aided by the forces of the Croatian army and Croatian irregulars from the republic of Croatia proclaimed "the Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia" in total disregard of the fact that the Muslims and Croats were supposedly allied. The area of the republic, over which the Bosnian government had effective control, declined considerably throughout the year. In early July, a demographer estimated that half of Bosnia Herzegovina's Muslim population, one fifth of its Croats and something less than one tenth of its Serbs had been displaced. The republic of Bosnia Herzegovina represented the ideal of

Tito's often cited euphemism "Yugoslavia is a country with six republics, five peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one Yugoslav." - Tito.<sup>1</sup>

#### POST CROATIAN-SLOVENIAN ELECTION SCENARIO

Since the outcome of the Serbo-Croat question was likely to decide the fate of Yugoslavia, the republic of Bosnia-Hezegovina was caught hopelessly and literally in the middle of that dispute. Separating the central part of Serbia from the central and southern parts of Croatia, it has a mixed ethnic make up of Serbs, Croats and Serb-Croat speaking Muslim Serbs, Muslims being the most numerous national component (43 percent) and also the most loyal to the republic, for they have no other dwelling place. But the Serbs (32 percent) and Croats (17 percent) of Bosnia Hezegovina<sup>2</sup> who potentially have decisive political voice because they identify themselves with their ethnic brothers elsewhere.

Bosnia as opposed to Herzegovina, produced a short lived medieval realm and subsequently, together with the latter, had a centuries long identity as one of the  
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1 Gary K.Bertsch, "Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1977, p.92.

2 Tara Kartha, "Rest of the World and Erstwhile Yugoslavia", Strategic Analysis, vol.15, no.10, January 1993, pp.961-90.

provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Then and even in recent times, it was known as 'dark Vilayet'. Its annexation by the Habsburg Empire in 1908 deeply antagonised the Serbs, the radical nationalist element of which carried out the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. During the Second World War, it was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting against the Germans and the Italians, but also the main battleground in the Yugoslav civil war and its bloody massacres of civilians. The fact that the Serbs no longer comprise the largest nation is mainly due to these massacres. After the war Bosnia-Herzegovina became one of the six republics, and its border reflected those dating from the Turkish period.

This republic provided the most blatant example of ethnic identity determining political identity. In the free elections that took place in November 1990, the most successful political parties had organized themselves firmly along ethnic lines. The Muslim party of Democratic Action gained 86 seats in the 270 seat National Assembly, the Serbian Democratic Party took 72 seats, and the Croatian Democratic Union 14. This roughly reflected the ethnic composition of the republic.<sup>3</sup> But the Croatian party was really a branch of Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union which

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3 John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi papers, vol. 270, no.12, Summer 1992, pp.37-38.

had earlier triumphed in Croatian election.

The Serbian party began as an extension of Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia but subsequently gravitated towards Belgrade to the point where its leaders came to be seen as the executors of Milosevic's policy. Finally, the Muslim party, led by the former dissident and later the President of the republic, Alija Izetbegovic, was probably Muslim in more sense than one, containing as it did a strong streak of clericalism. Indeed so much so that there occurred split in its rank, with a more liberal and certainly entirely secular wing led by Adil Zulfikarpasic establishing its own Muslim party, though gaining little electoral support.

In other words, three main political protagonists on the Bosnian scene set out to pursue the national interests of ethnic groups they were elected to represent. The three national groups embarked on the experiment of power sharing after the elections. The Muslims, being the largest group, obtained the most important posts including the Presidency for Izetbegovic. But Izetbegovic was no more than President of a collective presidency, made up of representatives of Muslims, Serbs, Croats and Yugoslavs.

The assumption, however, was that no far reaching decisions could be taken without the consent of all three ethnic groups. Any attempt to upset this delicate balance

was certain to have tragic consequences. Yet this was precisely what was attempted in Spring 1992.

The final unfolding of the events that forced the thing to take shape was the Hague Peace Conference in Yugoslavia, in October 1991, its conditional offer of recognition to any republic that wished it, the Croats and particularly the Muslims, were under enormous pressure to seek it. The former admittedly, had little loyalty to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Situated mostly in Western Herzegovina, adjacent to central Dalmatia, they formed the overwhelming majority there. The population of this region, traditionally a hotbed of Croatian nationalism, wished above all to be governed by Zagreb (capital of the Croatian republic). Tudjman had talked often enough of partitioning Bosnia. Herzegovina (with Western Herzegovina going to Croatia), and this had of course, alarmed the Muslims. However, they saw the main threats in the Serbs, not in the Croats. A makeshift Muslim-Croat alliance was formed, the principal aim of which was to resist any Serb led attempts to include Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia.

In this scenario, the relationship between the Serbs and the Muslims was of crucial importance. Serb wanted to integrate Bosnia-Hezegovina into greater Serbia which was naturally opposed by Muslim and Croats who were not ready to loose their identities in a Serbian domination. Moreover the

constitution's recognition of Muslims as ethnic minority had rekindled the faith in the Bosnian Muslims a hope of maintaining a separate identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslims and Croats formed a bloc in Bosnian parliament which was naturally opposed by the Bosnian Serb leadership. Beneath this surface lay the deeper level of their antagonism towards the Muslims. They took along with many Croats, a dim view of the Muslims status as a nation, stressing in private that it was absurd to identify religion with nationhood. They were even more concerned about the general Islamic rather than national aspirations of the Muslims.

Moreover, with the past actions of the Muslim leader Radovan Karajdic there was enough ground to be opposed by the Serbs. However, in their opposition to the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Badinter Arbitration Commission attached to the EC Peace Conference recommended in January 1992 a referendum of all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina without distinction to take place before any further consideration could be given to extending recognition.<sup>4</sup> This step led directly to the breakdown of the constitutional arrangements in the republic. All the citizens did not take part in the referendum since the

4 John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi Paper, vol. 270, no. 12, January 1992, p.39.

Serbs stayed away. The Muslim-Croat coalition forming an automatic majority, duly voted in February 1992 for independence, the Croats for the simple reason of not wishing to stay in any remnant of Yugoslavia. This arrangement thus collapsed. By this time the EC had set up a separate peace conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina to assist the negotiations on the future constitutional shape of the republic. Under much pressure, and against their instincts, the Serbs made a major concession in agreeing that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be preserved as a single entity. In return the Muslim agreement that there would be an internal division of power based as a single entity. In return, they extracted the Muslim agreement that there would be an internal division of power based on ethnic territory the so called 'cantonization'. No sooner had this breakthrough been achieved than the Muslims began to have second thoughts, directing their energies towards obtaining international recognition. As with the Croats during 1991, recognition was for the Muslims by far the most important political objective, for they could then wield the weapon of legitimacy against internal opponents. The EC together with US duly recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina which, however, had already sunk into chaos and war, with the Serbs staging a series of military actions. Strangely, the EC had assumed at least since the Autumn of 1991 that Yugoslavia was in the

process of disintegration, but did not apply this assessment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was a Yugoslavia in miniature, and which was hardly a sustainable proposition outside a Yugoslav framework.

In late May 1992, as hundreds of thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were fleeing the war, the future appeared to contain little hope for the young state. Yet this had all been utterly predictable, and to some extent, preventable. Once the Muslim-Croat coalition made an effective attempt to hijack Bosnia-Herzegovina through the dubious legitimacy of a referendum, followed by international recognition, it brushed aside to its own peril - the only people which to in the past held the republic together; the constitutional equality of all three constituent nations.

#### **BOSNIA AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION**

After International recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 25 March 1992 fighting broke out between the Serb-militants-backed by the federal army and the Bosnian government troops. The first major attack on Sarajevo was on 5 April 1992 when after the Bosnian government refused to rescind a call-up of the national guard, Serb guerrillas



shelled Sarajevo.<sup>5</sup> On May 19, at a news conference in Washington D.C., Harris Silajdic, the foreign minister of Bosnia, for the first time in an official announcement said that his country was being subjected to "ethnic cleansing" by the Serb forces.<sup>6</sup>

The nationalist war in rump Yugoslavia seemed to have taken a new turn on May 24, in an election in Kosovo termed illegal by Belgrade ethnic Albanians vote overwhelmingly to secede from the rump Yugoslav state.

On 2 July 1992 Croat nationalists living in Bosnia declare an independent state that included almost the one-third of territory of Bosnia; Mate Boban, head of the 30,000 strong Croatian defence Council militia said that the name of the new republic is Herzeg Bosna.

At the Palais des Nations in Geneva the international conference for Yugoslavia, co-chaired by former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance (representing UN) and former UK foreign secretary Lord David Owen (representing EC), pondered peace and the acceptance of what was considered as the last possible non-military solution for peace in Bosnia. But, as in Croatia, fighting in Bosnia continued. This was only another proof of the fact that the problems in the

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5 S.L.Burg, "Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart", Current History, November 1993, p.359.

6 Summary of World Broadcast, 25 May 1992.

Balkans cannot have had fragmentary solutions; redrawing borders and "peacekeeping" are not even medium term solutions for a problem that western governments can claim to understand. The unending war was evidence of the limitations of the international community's efforts and that the fact that priorities they have lined up may have been in the wrong order.

In their effort to be seen to be doing something, the Western government jumped the gun quite literally. French and then British forces were rushed in as "United Nations Missions" to keep peace where there was no peace to keep, an ineffective buffer between warring groups. Just how much they did achieve is revealed by the resurgence of fighting in Croatia. Over the last one year, the UN has tried to force ceasefires and create a sense of achievement for itself. At the end of the day it has lost its credibility, its reason for being there and possibly very soon its mandate to be there (its assistance to United Nations High Commission for refugees (UNHCR) and Red Cross Convoys notwithstanding). What the UN and its chief protagonists are seeking to do is to keep the warring factions apart, policed by the UN and somewhat deprived of their arms.

In the peace proposal for Bosnia, the chief aim of the Geneva Conference, it is reality that was being given short shift. The UN negotiators may complained that the renewed

fighting in Croatia is destroying any chances for peace, but they fail to realise that solution is a formula for extended chaos. Their proposal that centres on the division of Bosnia into ten largely-autonomous provinces, nine of which were to be controlled variously by Serbs, Croats and Muslims. The tenth region, Sarajevo, was envisaged as a demilitarised 'open city'. According to the plan, the provinces will be linked by a UN patrolled highway along which no transportation of military forces or war equipment will be permitted. The Vance-Owen map was based on ethnicity, geography, economics and transport, and a definite 'lack of foresight'. As the Bosnian, Serb and Croat leaders gathered in Geneva knew, any peace they agree to there will not be accepted at home. They stayed on, each unwilling to be the first to break the talks.

Soon after the talks Bosnian President Alija Tzetebegovic was the first to articulate his criticism of the plan. He said Bosnian Muslims would "not accept the constitutional institutionalisation of ethnic divisions in Bosnia.... This approach lies at the foundation of aggression and ethnic cleansing and will not stop but only generate war."<sup>7</sup>

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7 Quoted in Frontline, 26 February 1993 in an article by Anjali Mody, "Balkanisation Moves and Unending Border Battles".

The Serbs have also the most to gain from a peaceful settlement. If they had accepted the Vance-Owen cartographic gift for Bosnia they would have controlled the largest chunk of territory legitimately controlling what they have illegitimately taken, this despite the fact that they would have had to relinquish 40 percent of what they currently hold. The only obstacle that the Serbs had was creating a land corridor linking non-contiguous Serb inhabited areas that will become one province, which in the Vance-Owen plan would have gone to the Croats.

On 16 May 1993 in Bosnian town of Pale, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic announces that in a 2-day referendum at least 90 percent of the Serbs rejected the provisional peace plan put forward by UN mediator Cyrus Vance and EC Mediator Lord Owen. Karadzic further said that the world should now recognize that a new state, Republika Sryska, exists in the Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia.<sup>8</sup>

On 28 August 1993, the mainly Muslim Bosnian parliament voted 65 to 0 to reject the peace plan devised by the UN and the EC that would divide the country into three separate republics based on ethnicity. In the mountain town of Grude, the parliament of the self declared Croat state approved the plan and officially declares the Croat republic

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8     ibid, p.359.

of Herzeg-Bosna, the self-declared Bosnian parliament also accepted the plan.

On 29 September 1992 the predominantly Muslim Bosnian Parliament rejected a recent UN/EC peace plan agreed to by President Alija Tzetebegovic in August by a 65 to 4 vote; seven legislators rejected the plan outright and 58 requested it to be returned to UN and EC negotiators.

Meanwhile the UN started war trials, in principle, to establish a tribunal to try war criminals in the former Yugoslavia, in first such step since the end of the Second World War. But not surprisingly, there are several obvious problems with this tribunal; first, it can possibly begin to function whilst a war is still going on and war crimes continue to be committed. Secondly, and more crucially, the UN cannot simultaneously try individuals for war crimes while negotiating settlements with them. High on the list of alleged war criminals are the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karajdic and Serb President Slobodan Milosevic; the UN and its peacemakers, apart from negotiating with these men they have often been commended for their efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.<sup>9</sup>

Added to this the arms embargo on erstwhile Yugoslavia

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9 Anjali Mody, "Caught in the Crossfire: The UN and the Balkan Crisis", Frontline, vol.10, no.6, 13-26 March 1993.

had its most telling effect on the Bosnian Crisis. Bosnian Serb militias who had retained the bulk of the war weapons and covertly aided and abetted by the Serbian army was waging an unequal war on the Muslims. The request for arms supply by Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) was also opposed by Western Block countries in the UN Security Council.

#### **UN AND WORLD RESPONSE TO THE BOSNIAN CRISIS**

Attending a meeting with senior North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military officials in Brussels on April 27, Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, reportedly made it clear that the US government would not contemplate military action without specific authority from the UN Field Marshall Sir Richard Vincent, Chairman of NATO's military committee, who made a scathing attack on Western politicians and insisted that they should first specify what they wanted to achieve in Bosnia before advocating any kind of military action, stated that there had been "great unanimity of views" at the meeting.

The UN Security Council's approval on 31 March 1993 of a 'no fly zone' over Bosnian airspace had been endorsed by NATO in April. Moreover, reflecting apprehensiveness about the long term implications of Confronting Bosnian Serbs with force, NATO had laid down strict guidelines for engagement with Serbian military aircraft, providing that those

violating the ban would be the first to be warned off and only if the warning were ignored would they then be shot at. Serbian ground forces could not be attacked.

On April 12, NATO fighters drawn from the French and the Dutch and US airforces had begun to enforce the 'no fly zone'. The UK and Turkey confirmed that they would also be sending squadrons.<sup>10</sup>

On May 22, the USA, Russia, the UK, France and Spain agreed at a meeting of foreign ministers in Washington on a joint strategy to contain the fighting in Bosnia and to guard UN safe areas for Muslim civilians besieged by Serb forces.

The UN Security Council had on May 6, unanimously adopted resolution 824 declaring Sarajevo and the towns of Tapa, Gorazde, Bihac and Serberinica to be 'safe areas' and ordering all parties concerned that they were free from armed attacks or any other hostile act and that UN military observers were allowed to access and monitor their security.

But this enforcement of 'no fly zone' over Bosnia-Herzegovina did not mean that these ministers had abandoned the Vance-Owen peace plan.

The Washington agreement followed strenuous Russian diplomatic efforts in mid-May to rescue the Vance-Owen plan

10 Keesings' Record of World Events, vol.39, no.4, April 1993, p.39426.

and to enable its "progressive implementation" and the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, on a series of visits in early May to discuss the situation with European governments had failed them to reconsider their opposition to US proposals to arm Bosnian Muslims and mount air strikes against Bosnian Serb position.

Conflicting opinions were received Bosnian Muslim President Alija Tzetebegovic stated that the Washington plan was totally unacceptable. He vowed that Muslims were consigned to UN "reservations". He vowed that Bosnian Muslim forces would fight to defend the country's sovereignty. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karazdic welcomed the proposal. He further pledged that there would be no surrender of the two thirds of Bosnia.

As fighting continued during June with little clear outcome and despite a ceasefire agreed on June 15, a provisional agreement was reached in Geneva on a three-way division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Muslim, Serb and Croats areas. This effectively ended any prospect of implementing the Vance-Owen peace proposals for the establishment of ten autonomous provinces (nine of them with clear ethnic majority).

The UN Security Council, in its Resolution 836 adopted on June 4, by 13 votes to none and with two abstentions (Pakistan and Venezuela) agreed to allow the UN Protection



Force (UNPROFOR) to use force, including air power in reply to attacks against the six "temporary" safe areas in Bosnia established under the joint action programme the previous month or in reply to obstruction of humanitarian convoys.

Meanwhile UN representative Cyrus Vance was replaced by Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg who at the Geneva Conference of 16 June 1993, co-chaired the meeting with Lord David Owen who represents the EC nations in the negotiations.

At the Geneva conference held on June 16, under the joint Chairmanship of Owen and Stoltenberg, and attended by Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, Albanian President Sali Berisha and President Monur Bulatovic of Montenegro and Croatian President, Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and President Alija Tzebebegovic of Bosnia, announced an agreement on the establishment of a new Bosnia comprising three ethnically based states with a federal or confederal constitution. Tzetebegovic firmly rejected the plan which was however accepted and welcomed by Radovan Karazdic.<sup>11</sup>

During June intense fighting continued especially around Gorazde, the "safe area" south-east of Sarajevo which was beset by Serb forces but where no final action had been taken by the end of the month; around Travink in Central

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11 Summary of World Broadcast (BBC), 21 June 1993.

Bosnia; and around Mostar in the south.

At the end of May and through June a number of members of the UN forces were reported to be killed in Bosnia, together with certain civilian relief workers and journalists. The close nature of fighting between different sides in the conflict made it difficult to determine in most cases those responsible.

During July there were a number of attacks on UN troops, and what is described as illustrations of 'UN impotence and of the local forces' "increasing contempt for its international authority",<sup>12</sup> fueling calls for western countries to mount air strikes in support of UNPROFOR and its humanitarian objectives.

Situation, meanwhile, in the besieged Bosnian capital of Sarajivo deteriorated further during July as even minimal relief supplies of water gas, electricity and food often so failed to reach inhabitants.

On December 21, Alija Izetebegovic, President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, rejected a deal under which one third of Bosnia-Hezegovnia's territory would have been allocated to a Muslim dominated republics as part of a partition into a "Union of three republics." The proposal drafted by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President

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12 Independent (London), 6 July 1993.

Slobodan Milosevic in talks in Geneva on December 20-21, had envisaged a Croat republic occupying some 17.5 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Serbs taking the remaining 49 percent.

Thus, it is seen that Bosnian quagmire has been perpetuated with numerous proposals and counter proposals and no concrete solution has come to the fore. Not only the international community is to be blamed but also the Bosnians themselves who do not see themselves to be serious about any of the above proposals. The result is the ever advancing Serb militias who are always eager to grab more and more land and have in the process grabbed a substantial proportion of the territory. Each time a new proposal comes up the Serbs share of the land area has already gone up and they are increasingly unwilling to surrender the portion of land which they occupy. Perhaps every international conferences that are held only to decide when and where will the next meeting take place which in the process has been making telling effect on the besieged Muslim population of Bosnia Herzegovina.

After discussing the Bosnian issue and the international mediation focus now will turned towards the Yugoslav Crisis as a whole in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER IV

### INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

So far in the preceding chapters we have discussed international mediation in different contexts such as in Croatian and Slovenian election as UN sent its election observers or in Bosnia-Herzegovina which has now occupied the focus of attention of international mediators. In this chapter an attempt has been made to discuss the International mediation in overall context of Yugoslavia.

In the 80s, whole problem of Yugoslavia was seen as an internal problem of the country but things changed after the Croatian and Slovenian elections. The international community in general and the European Community (henceforth E.C.) in particular were waiting for the Yugoslavs themselves to solve their problem and they increasingly viewed it as an 'internal affair' of a sovereign country.

#### **Role of E.C.**

Things, however, changed after 25 June 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. On the June 26, a column of 50 tanks, 20 Armoured Personnel Carriers and troops rolled into and secured Brnik Airport. This overkill brought the E.C. rushing into mediate. Germany denounced the use of force and Italy, Luxembourg and

the Netherlands sent their ministers to negotiate a ceasefire. This they did in three interlocking moves: immediate return of federal troops to barracks; a 3 month suspension of independence of Croatia and Slovenia; and Stipe Mesic (Croat) to be confirmed as President of SFRY (henceforth, Socialist Republic Federal of Yugoslavia). They had failed to realise that they were trying to revive an idea (of Yugoslavia) which was itself on an artificial respiration. The two republics anxious perhaps not to offend future business partners and creditors, agreed. But the Yugoslavian Army appeared to be out of the control of the federal government. Indeed, the chief of staff said, "There is war in Slovenia... we will establish control and bring matters to an end."<sup>1</sup> The prospect of a free-wheeling Yugoslav Army prompted the E.C. to convene a conference at Dubrovnik. An agreement was hammered out to the relief of mediators. The Yugoslav army agreed to pull out 13000 troops out of Slovenia. Croatia feared these were used to reinforce the firepower in Croatia. The Croats believing in the power of E.C. adopted a policy of passive defence. This they had to abandon in a hurry, when they realised that there was little the E.C. could or would do to restrain

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1. Tara Kartha, "Yugoslavia: The Rise of Nationalism and the European Response", Strategic Analysis, no.8, August 1992, pp.456-7.

Serbia.

The tangle of Yugoslav policy was being monitored with alarm from European capitals. The U.S. had been firm in refusing to deal with dismembered Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev had promised non-interference. The events there at any rate were moving too fast for any coherent policy on the issue. But, without doubt, Serbian militancy derived encouragement from these two factors. Undoubtedly, the U.S. and the E.C. were constrained by the fact that recognition of legitimacy of separatist movements like the I.R.A., the Basques, etc. The West was interested in propping Gorbachev up, and thus any recognition of nationalism as a legitimate force would dismember the very monolith (the U.S.S.R.) they were trying to hold together.

Tudjman expecting the help of the U.S. complained, "We shall not permit Croatia and Slovenia to be blackmailed by the federal government... many people feel the change in your policy encourage the latter... we're perplexed...."<sup>2</sup> However, Warren Zimmerman (U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia) had maintained, "The US is strongly opposed to the separation of Yugoslavia."<sup>3</sup>

This policy of ambiguity cost heavily in terms of lives

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2. Summary of World Broadcast (BBC), 8 August 1992.

3. Ibid.

lost and this gave ample psychological support to Slovenian Milosevic the President of Serbia to keep the country together by any means. But the rampant aggression of Serbia led to a threat by the international community for sanctions. This threat worked and Serbia was brought to the negotiating table. It was the growing power of Germany in Yugoslav affairs that put U.S. into intervening in what she felt was essentially an European mess. Secondly, the media also played an important role, by bringing the horrors of war to American home. Particularly, the picture which played an important role in depicting the horrors of the war was the cover photograph of the Time<sup>4</sup> magazine in which a thin man without any cloth was standing at the wire-mesh of the concentration camp in Serbia. It is also worthy to note that Kosovo with no powerful patron was not invited to the conference and Serbs merely got a homily that maximum autonomy should be assured to the region.

In the order of things, the E.C. became the natural arbiter in the Yugoslav crisis. The E.C. itself had no mandate, but it received the go-ahead from CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe). While the CSCE has a mandate for the preservation of peace in Europe, it lacks

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4. See Time (New York), 7-13 August 1992, which was responsible for bringing the horrors of war in American Print Media for the first time.

teeth. The CSCE's policy of decision by consensus has not made it particularly effective so far. The possibility of this being replaced by a majority decision is remote since it would add up to a loss of sovereignty. In the present system, any member, by exercising his veto, can block any concerted action. It has, however, time and again, backed the E.C.'s decision. Thus, E.C. moved from initial mediation to arbitration in bringing the warring sides to table, but none of the ceasefires thus negotiated had much of a chance. In fact, after the Igalo conference, Tudjman fired his Defence Minister for carrying out the ceasefire terms prematurely. The fifteenth ceasefire, negotiated by Cyrus Vance, former US Secretary of State who was sent in as UN's representation in Yugoslavia, held to implement recognition of the breakaway republics if they could satisfy the following conditions:

- respect for democracy and minority rights;
- acceptance of UN and E.C. peace efforts.

The Brussels conference on 10 January 1992 had as its main sticking point the question of a successor state.

#### **UN's Role in the Yugoslav Crisis**

The disintegration of Yugoslavia proceeded further in march with constitutional moves within the central republic of Bosnia Herzegovina towards independence. Fighting erupted between rival Moslem and Croatian irregulars on the



one hand and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) troops and Serb irregulars on the other in Bosnia. Herzegovina, ethnically the most complex republic within the old federation, after a popular vote for independence - a development which mirrored the outbreak of war between Serbs and Croats following Croatia's declaration of independence in June 1991.

Meanwhile, in a referendum held in Bosnia-Herzegovina on February 29-March 1, 99.4 percent of these voting opted for full independence. The turnout was 63 percent. This referendum was boycotted by Serbs who constituted about 31 percent of the population.<sup>5</sup> This referendum was rejected by the leader of main Serbian Party in Bosnia, Radovan Karajdic, a close ally of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic who declared that "we are not going to accept an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina."<sup>6</sup>

President Alija Izetbegovic on March 3 proclaimed the republic's independence from Yugoslavia. In the wake of referendum, tension between Serbs and Moslems in particular increased sharply. There were clashes in Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital and surrounding areas and in the north western region around Bosanski Brod. The U.N. special envoy

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5 Keesing's record of World Events, vol.38, no.3,p.38832.

6 Ibid., p.38833.

Cyrus Vance also arrived in Sarajevo on March 5 to try to secure a commitment from political leaders to find a peaceful settlement.

Leaders of the three main ethnic groups on March 18 signed an agreement, negotiated under the auspices of the E.C. on the future of the republic which provided for its division into three autonomous units along ethnic lines. The territory of each unit would be based on the "national absolute or relative majority" in each municipality.

It was acknowledged, however, not least by the participants, that the agreement was primarily regarded as a measure of diffusing ethnic tensions and possibility of civil war rather than as concrete proposal to accommodate the political aspirations of Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Many of the details of the division were not worked out. It was generally agreed that in any case it would be very difficult to achieve because very few areas were in fact exclusively inhabited by one of the three communities.

But soon this was rejected by the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic of Democratic Action Party (SDA) who on March 25, called on all citizens to reject the division of the republic along the ethnic lines alone and to accept the concept of unitary State.

The Serb leaders on March 27 proclaimed the Serbian republic of 'Bosnia Herzegovina' and declared its loyalty to

the "all Serb state of Yugoslavia."<sup>7</sup>

The UN protection forces for Yugoslavia arrived in Yugoslavia on 9 March 1992, under the command of Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, accompanied by the first advance party of the peacekeeping force agreed by the security council in February. Military, police and reconnaissance experts immediately began to prepare for the arrival of the 14,000 strong force in the U.N. protected areas of Eastern and Western Slovenia and Krajina and the three Serb-held enclave in East and Southern Croatia.

As war continued in Bosnia Herzegovina Serbian-dominated new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was internationally ostracised culminating in UN imposed sanctions. The authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina repeatedly requested foreign military aid and there were warning that a flood of refugee, both Moslems and ethnic Croats, could pose a serious problem for neighbouring countries. Islamic countries put particular pressure of FRY to halt the attack on Bosnian Muslims.

U.N. under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding visited former Yugoslav republics from May 5 to assess the possibility of sending UN troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On

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7 W.H.Critchley, "The failure of Federation in Yugoslavia", International Journal, no.48, Summer 1993, pp.433-7.

May 12 the U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, made recommendations, based on Goulding's report, to the Security Council that (i) UNPROFOR headquarters should no longer be in Sarajevo for the safety of its own personnel; (ii) no U.N. peacekeeping force should be sent to Bosnia Herzegovina and (iii) the UN peace plan for Croatia was in jeopardy from the failure of Serbs in Croatia to demobilize.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were accepted as members of the UN on May 22 by decision of the General Assembly. Resolution 757 of the UN Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions on the FRY<sup>9</sup> on May 30. These included (i) severing of trade links; (ii) freezing government assets abroad; (iii) an oil embargo (iv) a sporting and cultural ban and (v) cutting air links (already severed by Canada, Germany, Italy and the U.S.A.).

E.C. Foreign Ministers, meeting in Guimaraes (Portugal) on May 2, accepted a French package of proposals for action which included humanitarian aid and collaborating with any UN action to separate the warring parties and reinforced

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8. Keesing's Record of World Events, May 1992, vol.38, no.5, p.38918.
9. After the recognition by the UN of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia was not recognised as yet.

diplomatic efforts.

Three E.C. Forums were in place to solve the Yugoslav crisis; the E.C. peace Conference chaired by Lord Carrington bringing together representatives of the former Yugoslav states, the Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina under Portuguese E.C. envoy Jose Cutilheiro, and the Arbitration Commission by Robert Badinter.

An E.C. declaration on Bosnia Herzegovina of May 11, following a Foreign Ministers meeting said that although all parties in the conflict bore responsibility, "by far the greatest share of the blame falls on J.N.A." The E.C. demanded J.N.A. withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the reopening of Sarajevo Airport, and threatened the international isolation of, and sanctions against Yugoslavia.

On 20 June 1992, the Bosnian Presidency declared a state of war and a general mobilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, it said 7,200 people had been killed since the start of fighting, more than 30,000 were missing presumed dead and there were 1,303,469 refugees.

French President Francois Mitterand, immediately after the E.C. summit in Lisbon, unexpectedly paid a six-hour visit to Sarajevo, where he met Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Radovan Karajdic, leader of Bosnian Serbian democratic party (SDS). By June 29 the U.N. had achieved a

sufficient lull in the fighting to allow in five flights with relief supplies, but on June 30, as artillery attacks intensified, the airports closed again.

Lord Carrington, Chair of the European Communities conference on Yugoslavia declared himself 'disappointed' and 'concerned' after separate talks with the Croatian and Serbian Presidents and the Bosnian Foreign Minister on June 25, in Strasbourg failed to restart the negotiations.<sup>10</sup>

At meeting of senior officials of the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe on June 29 in Helsinki, Yugoslav ambassador Vladimir Pavicevic announced that the FRY would not be participating in the summit, scheduled for July 9, complaining of a one sided and arbitrary approach by the CSCE.

At an emergency meeting of the Organisation of Islamic countries convened on June 17 to discuss the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdic called for military intervention and asked OIC member states to sever diplomatic links with Yugoslavia. Turkey and Egypt expressed readiness to participate in a UN peacekeeping force.

#### **International Efforts Towards Refugee Settlement**

In July 1992 the escalating refugees crisis in former  
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10. Summary of World Broadcast (BBC), 1 July 1992.

Yugoslavia became a major focus of European and worldwide concern. The fighting in Bosnia Herzegovina coupled with the forced expulsions of one ethnic group by another (in particular of Muslims by Serb forces) - a practice widely referred to as "ethnic cleansing", precipitated by rapes by one ethnic group to women from another groups, forced a major increase in numbers of people fleeing their homes in July and June. This crisis was described as the worst of its kind in Europe since the end of Second World War.

According to estimates from the office of the UN high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) and local red cross committees, some 2,500,000 from the former Yugoslavia were displaced by the end of July, and some 10,000 people from Bosnia were joining them everyday. The total included around 600,000 people who had been displaced during the war between Serbia and Croatia in 1991. The majority of the refugees, 1,885,000, remained the former Yugoslav republics: 681,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina 672,000 in Croatia (including the Serb occupied zones), 383,000 in Serbia, 70,000 in Slovenia, 49,000 in Montenegro and 31,000 in Macedonia. Among neighbouring countries, Germany had taken around 200,000 refugees, Hungary and Austria around 50,000 each and Sweden 44,000; smaller members were accepted in other

European countries.<sup>11</sup>

In mid-July the Croatian authorities announced that they did not have the resources to cope with any more refugees unless substantial help from abroad was forthcoming. They proceeded to close border with Bosnia (although refugees were allowed to pass through Croatia on their way to other countries). Slovenia and Hungary took similar action. Diplomatic efforts to deal with the refugee crisis were complicated by lack of consensus among the countries most directly affected.

Germany proposed the adoption by the European Community (E.C.) countries of a quota system for accepting refugees. This gained the backing of Austria, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, but found no support from E.C. countries apart from Germany itself. The U.K. and France in particular argued that refugees should be accommodated and given appropriate assistance as near as possible to their place of origin. Proposals by the neighbouring countries for the establishment of so-called safe havens (similar to those set up for Kurdish civilians after the Gulf-war) were not taken up either, largely because they required the deployment of ground troops, for which there was no consensus.

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11. See Report of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees submitted to UN Secretary General, UN Press, New York, 1993.



A UNHCR-sponsored emergency conference was held in Geneva on July 29 to formulate a response to the crisis. The UNHCR submitted a seven point plan to the conference which among other things called for Firstly, an increased international presence in Bosnia to provide relief and to encourage people not to flee: Secondly, the maintenance of open borders and thirdly, the granting of "temporary protection" to all refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

Participating countries pledged US \$152 million as well as logistical support to build winter housing for the refugees and to maintain humanitarian road convoys inside Bosnia (to relieve besieged cities such as Sarajevo and Gorazde). A standing committee was set up to coordinate the international relief effort. The conference failed to reach agreement, however, on the unrestricted granting of asylum to refugees.

All speakers at the conference strongly condemned the practise of "ethnic cleansing". Serb forces were considered the main culprits although Croats and Muslims were not exempted from criticism.

The problems being faced by relief convoys in reaching the affected areas as it happened with the UN aid efforts which was severely hampered by Serb forces in February. In protest at the UN's failure to supply aid to Muslim towns such as Cerska, Kamenica, Gorazde and Seberinica in eastern

Bosnia which were under protracted siege, and to show solidarity with them, the Bosnian government refused to allow the distribution of supplies to Sarajevo.

On February 17, Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in protest at the "failure of all parties" to respect humanitarian principles, ordered the suspension of relief operations in Serb controlled Bosnia and Sarajevo and the withdrawal of most UNHCR staff from the city. Her decision was overruled, however, by the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali on February 19. Serb forces allowed an aid convoy to reach Zepa in Eastern Bosnia on February 21. The Sarajevo aid boycott was lifted on February 22 on the recommendation of Izetbegovic who at the same time ordered a unilateral ceasefire for Bosnian forces.

**International Efforts After Recognition by UN to Croatia Slovenia and Bosnia**

International efforts in the September month continued with every attack on the above mentioned countries was seen as an attack on an independent sovereign country and hence it was considered as such by the international mediators.

The decision of UN General Assembly not to accept the delegation of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia<sup>13</sup> as the natural successor to the UN seat formerly held by -----

13. FRY as an entity was created in April as a 'rump' federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Yugoslavia, compounded an internal power struggle between Serbian and FRY leaders inclined towards compromise and those advocating a military policy.

The permanent conference on Yugoslavia opened in Geneva on September 3, co-chaired by Lord Owen for the E.C. and Cyrus Vance for the UN. Negotiations were attended by the leaders of three ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina on September 18-21, although they refused to meet jointly.

A communique issued by the Geneva conference on September 6 announced that the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina were by September 12, to place under UN supervision their heavy weaponry (artillery over 100 mm calibre, 82 mm mortars, tanks and rocket launcher) deployed around Sarajevo, Gorazde, Bihac and Jajce.<sup>14</sup>

President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and President Dobrica Cosic of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia signed an eight point declaration in Geneva on September 30 after talks chaired by Cyrus Vance for the UN and Lord Owen for the E.C. They agreed to withdraw forces from Dubrovnik under supervision of the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).<sup>15</sup>

However, in a very interesting development UN appointed  
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14. The Times (London), 7 September 1992.

15. ibid, 1 October 1992.

unanimously to create a war crime commission to examine evidence of "grave breaches of international humanitarian law" in former Yugoslavia. Surprisingly it made no provision for further action. It was a unique development after Second World War.<sup>16</sup> But irony of the situation was that here the war criminals were themselves a party to the ongoing talks by various international organizations and countries.

The UN Security Council on October 9 adopted by 14 votes with China abstaining a resolution to ban military fights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina and calling on UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban.

On October 28, in a landmark achievement, the Geneva negotiators formally rejected the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three 'ethnic based republics' and presented constitutional proposals for a decentralised Bosnia-Herzegovina aimed at preserving its territorial integrity. The reshaped republic, it was proposed, would be based on seven to ten provincial governments with substantial power and autonomy to control education police, health and law enforcement. The border of provinces

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16. Earlier war crime tribunal was set up in Nuremberg (Germany) and Tokyo to try the Second World War Crimes. Recently a war crime tribunal has also been set up in Rwanda which also lacks a mandate for action.

remained to be negotiated. A central government would remain in Sarajevo with responsibility for defence, foreign policy and trade. The largely ceremonial Presidency would rotate among major groups. Elections to a lower house of Parliament would be by proportional representation and an upper house would be appointed by provincial governments. There would be extensive international involvement in the affairs of state especially as regards human rights.

Meanwhile, in a very important development in an election held in Serbia in December replaced Serbian President Milan Panic and put Slobodan Milosevic as the President of Serbia.

The reelection of Milosevic to the Serbian Presidency disappointed Western hopes, for the election of a leader more disposed to compromise over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meanwhile Western countries remained divided over whether to intervene militarily in the conflict.

At the Geneva Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, leaders of the three warring factions in Bosnia presented on December 8 maps for the "cantonization" of the republic along ethnic lines. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karajdic claimed that his proposal giving Serbs 60 percent of Bosnian territory, was based on the situation in 1931 when Bosnia contained greater number of Serbs.

A special meeting of the Geneva conference was convened

on December 16 under the continued co-chairmanship of Cyrus Vance for the UN and Lord Owen for the European Community (E.C.) to review the situation; it brought together foreign ministers from the Western and Islamic world. The proposals were presented at the beginning of January. This plan in three sections, provided for firstly, the reorganization of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 provinces, these proposals were embodied in a map, secondly, constitutional principles for the republic, allowing a large measure of autonomy for the provinces. Within a decentralised state; and thirdly ceasefire and demilitarization arrangements to end the current conflict.

Each of the three main groups would dominate in three of the ten provinces. Sarajevo was to remain an open city. The central government and all provinces would have separate elected legislatures, elected chief executives and independent judiciaries. Bosnia-Herzegovina would be demilitarized under UN-EC supervision. Five major corridors were to be established between the provinces, policed by UN or other international forces.

The three parties to the dispute were present at the talks Serb and Muslim leadership refused to sign whereas only the Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban was able to sign it. The Serb and Bosnian leaders had their own reservations.

## **U.S. Role in Solving the Dispute**

The U.S.A. had upto now kept off its hand from directly coming into the scene. By now it had been indulging on the side of UN or NATO of which she was a member. She had refused to send troops to Yugoslavia so that it might not become another Vietnam. But US administration in February 1993 offered to become "actively and directly engaged" in peace efforts in Bosnia Herzegovina and clarified its policy on the former Yugoslavia with a series of proposals announced by Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Clinton administration had expressed serious reservations about certain aspects of the Geneva peace plan drafted in January by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, which it maintained rewarded ethnic cleansing.

The U.S. administration proposed that first, any peace plan had to be accepted by all parties rather than imposed, secondly sanctions should be tightened against Serbia, which had to be dissuaded from spreading the war from Kosovo to Macedonia, thirdly, the no fly zone over Bosnia had to be enforced by a security council resolution, fourthly, the USA would support moves to set up war crimes tribunal, fifthly, if there were a 'viable' agreement on Bosnia the USA would join with "the UN, NATO and others" to enforce it, if necessary by military force and sixthly, Russia should become more involved in negotiating a solution.

Peace talks, meanwhile had shifted to New York from Geneva and was deadlocked for most of February.

Attending a meeting with senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military officials in Brussels on April 27, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly made it clear that the US government would not contemplate military action without specific authority from the UN.<sup>17</sup>

The UN Security Council's approval of March 31 of a no fly zone over Bosnian airspace had been endorsed by NATO and in mid-April, NATO fighters drawn from the French and Netherlands and US-air forces had begun to enforce the "no-fly zone".

U.S. was in favour of lifting arms embargo on Bosnia, lacked consensus in US about appropriate response. But when this was put to vote UN Security Council it failed to approve a draft resolution on exemption of Bosnia from UN arms embargo due to lack of support for US supported move. This move was also opposed by Boutros-Boutros Ghali, U.N. Secretary-General.

The U.S.A., Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Spain agreed at a meeting of Foreign ministers in Washington on May 22 on a joint strategy to contain the fighting in -----

17. Summary of World Broadcast (BBC), 4 May 1993.



Bosnia and to guard UN safe areas for Muslim civilians besieged by Serb forces in what came to be known as the Washington Plan.

### **The Proposed Three Way Division of Bosnia**

As fighting continued during June with little clear outcome and despite a ceasefire agreed on June 15, a provisional agreement was reached in Geneva on a three way division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Muslim Croat and Serb areas. This effectively ended any prospect of implementing the Vance-Owen peace proposals for the establishment of ten autonomous provinces, which had hitherto been broadly accepted by the Muslim led Bosnian government and by the Bosnian Croat side but not by the Bosnian Serbs.

At the Geneva Conference held on June 16 under the joint chairmanship of Owen and Stoltenberg<sup>18</sup> which was ratified by Serb and Croatian Presidents but was firmly rejected by Bosnian President.

But eventually Geneva Conference on July 30 secured reluctant acceptance from Izetbegovic for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three constituent republics within a demilitarized Union of republics of Bosnia Herzegovina.  
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18. In May 1993 Cyrus Vance stepped down and Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg was confirmed to become special UN representative in the Balkan crisis by the UN Secretary-General.



Above: Territories under Serbian control in Bosnia and Croatia.

Left: Bosnia divided into 10 provinces.

In this proposed division, the federal government's role would be limited to foreign policy and foreign trade. The Union would have a rotating three-member presidency, and a 120 member Assembly (delegated equally from the parliaments of the three constituent republics, for which the first elections would be carried out under UN auspices). Citizens would have the right to settle in any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Geneva negotiations resumed on August 16, discussing proposals for the administration of Sarajevo and for territorial divisions. On August 20 the Geneva talks were adjourned for ten days to allow participants to present proposals for the territorial division of Bosnia Herzegovina (the "Owen-Stoltenberg Plan") to their respective parliaments.

The Bosnian Serb parliament and Croat Parliament (of Bosnia) accepted the plan but was very cautiously rejected by mainly Muslim Bosnian Parliament.

An international conference on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was held on November 29, in Geneva, attended by President of Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia together with Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and Serb leader Radovan Karajdic, the foreign Ministers of the 12 member states of European Union, the co-Chairman of the International Conference on

the Former Yugoslavia Lord Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg and Charles Redman of US and Vitaly Churkin of Russia.

The conference and subsequent negotiations revived the plan for a "Union of three republics" discussed in the previous round of negotiations which had ended without agreement on 20 September 1993. The meeting was the result of a new strategy adopted by a meeting European Union foreign ministers in Luxembourg on November 22 which had settled on a "Carrot and Stick" approach to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to compromise on a peace agreement.

Hopes for an agreement were diminished when on November 25, Owen himself expressed doubt over the viability of the plan for a "Union of three republics".

Apparently running counter to any Serb commitment to the idea of "Union of three republics" Karadzic had called on 14 November 1993 for an immediate currency to remain between Serbia and Serb held territories in Bosnia and Croatia, implying that this would be the first step towards the political unification of Serb lands and noting, "an increasing conviction (in the world community) that the Serbs have the right to self-determinations".<sup>19</sup>

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19. Summary of World Broadcast (BBC), 19 November 1993.

The 'carrot and stick' policy was seen in the pressure to compromise at Geneva following suggestions that humanitarian aid might not continue and that UN forces might pull out.

#### **Shape of Negotiations in Recent Months (Till February 1994)**

In recent months the futility of negotiations over the proposed three way partition has been stressed. This was expressed openly by Lord Owen who had his doubts over the proposed partition.

In December, President of Bosnia rejected a deal under which one third of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory would have been allocated to a Muslim dominated republic as part of a partition into a 'union of three republics'. The proposal drafted by Croatian and Serbian President had envisaged a Croat republic occupying some 17.5 percent of Bosnia Herzegovina, with the Serbs taking the remaining 49 percent. Pressure on Bosnian Serbs and Croats to concede more land for a Muslim dominated republic had been a central feature of the peace strategy of the European Union.

Meanwhile, General Assembly passed in December a resolution to consider lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina by Security Council and requested Security Council to prevent supply of arms to Serbs by Serbian republic.

In January, a Brussels summit of leaders of the sixteen

NATO member states which had been attended by Clinton, had agreed to reaffirm their readiness "to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia Herzegovina. The warring reiterated a threat to use air strikes authorized by UN and NATO in August 1993.

Perhaps the most outstanding achievement of the recent developments has been the signing of an accord between Muslims of Bosnia and Croats (also from Bosnia) of a federation, at a ceremony in Washington hosted by US President Bill Clinton on March 18 and a further "preliminary agreement on the establishment of a confederation" linking this new planned Bosnian federation to Croatia in a loose confederation and the federation would be based on Swiss style Cantons. This was supplemented by constitution (a 52 page document) drafted by the US diplomats. The accord was also approved by Bosnian Croat assembly based in Mostar and also by Assembly (legislature) of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Thus, the talks are still undergoing but the agreement between Croats and Muslims for a federation (and a confederation is perhaps the landmark achievement in all these 'agreements', 'plans' and 'summits'.

## CONCLUSION

The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation and its descent into atavistic interethnic violence cannot be attributed to any single factor. Internal political conflicts in the 1980s, and the effort by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to mobilize Serb nationalism on behalf of a strengthened federation, destroyed the cohesion of a country's regional communist leaderships and weakened their control over society. Deteriorating economic condition, especially plummeting living standards, eroded the benefits of sustaining the Yugoslav state and stimulated the rise of mass nationalisms and interethnic hostilities. The conflicting nationalist aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples and their leaders efforts to maximize power, led to conflict over the control of disputed territories.

The end of the cold-war left both Soviet and Western policy makers believing that Yugoslavia no longer held the strategic significance or merited the attention it had enjoyed in a world divided between East and West. This mistaken belief, as well as the attention commanded by the Persian Gulf war, led to neglect of the brewing crisis in Yugoslavia until the cost of meaningful action had risen beyond the point acceptable to western policy makers and their public. Even when less costly but still effective

action remained possible. Western policy makers were deterred from acting by the fear that the dissolution of Yugoslavia, even if achieved through peaceful negotiation, would hasten the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The examination of events in Yugoslavia can thus be basically attributed to two factors: the internal conflict and international community's failure to respond to the crisis effectively. However, forceful action by either Yugoslav leaders or American and European administrations would have required innovative thinking about some of the most basic principles of the international system and the post cold war security framework in the Euro-Atlantic community. No political leadership-Yugoslav, American or European was then ready to confront these tasks. The only positive outcome of the Yugoslav debacle, therefore, may be the stimulus it has provided for such new thinking.

In searching for a new thinking, the world must recognize that, in regions with multi-ethnic population e.g., Yugoslavia or the parts of former Soviet Union it is facing the kind of crisis for which it never had a satisfactory answer. In this century, when two or more communities have been reluctant to live with one another in a single state, the options open to the international community have turned out to be either unconscionable or unpalatable. Ethnic cleansing, repression, partition or



power sharing.

Repression has been another answer to ethnic conflict. This was the answer throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself. It is the answer what Israel had been following in occupied areas of Gaza Strip. It is an answer that provides a temporary solution today but prepares the way for a political explosion tomorrow. Those repressed only await the day when they can rise up.

Partition was the world's solution in Palestine and also of India. The difficulty with partition is that a line cannot be drawn with any exactitude. Significant minorities will be left behind. This is also the problem being faced today in Bosnia Herzegovina where the Croatian, Muslim and Serbian populations have been so mixed up.

Power sharing is the most humane approach to the problem of ethnic conflict but that is not to deny its unusual political difficulty. As J.S. Mill in his 'Representative Government'<sup>1</sup> said that democracy is "next to impossible" in a country with multi-ethnic population. The authorities in ethnically divided Bosnia-Herzegovina at first sought a unified state. The Serbs feared they would be permanently outvoted.

For power sharing to work in some of the ethnic  
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1 Quoted in C.L.Wayper, Political Thought (New Delhi, 1989), p.111.

conflicts that now trouble world peace, however, much more needs to be known about how different societies have attempted to resolve their ethnic conflicts.

Eric Nordlinger<sup>2</sup> did identify several key principles: agreed outcomes, proportionality, mutual vetoes and "purposive depoliticisation". Thus, conflicts are often reduced when party leaders make pre or post election deals (or agreed outcomes) that accord the defeated parties a place at the table. Societies as different as Austria and Malaysia have reduced bitter ethnic or religious conflicts through a political process of negotiated outcomes. Regardless of election results, the numerically weaker party knows it would still have a voice in national politics.

Frightened minorities may also be reassured by a system of mutual vetoes. Both Austria and Belgium have sought civil peace through such a system. No decision can be made without all key parties agreeing. "Purposive depoliticisation" involves an agreement among all parties that certain subjects are outside politics, for example, religion. States that have followed that path include Belgium, Lebanon and the Netherlands.

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2. See Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, 1972).

## **An Inept International Response**

Western states remained firmly committed to the status quo in Yugoslavia. No effort was made to encourage Yugoslav leaders to hold the federation together by devising new political arrangements that addressed the special interests and concerns of the territorially compact communities of ethnic minorities in the republics. Even more important, in an unprecedented and ill advised extension of the Helsinki principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders, the West extended its political support to the borders between the republics of the Yugoslav federation. Neither the United States nor its European partners acknowledged that the growing nationalism of various peoples of Yugoslavia not only called into question the survival of the federation, they also raised doubts about the political viability of mutli-ethnic republics. They also failed to address the growing probability that the Serbian leadership in Belgrade to justify defending the integrity of the former Yugoslavia. International actors made no attempt, however, to confront these issues. They failed to address the growing probability that the Serbian leadership in Belgrade and its Serb allies in the military would use the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) either to prevent the secession of Slovenia and Croatia or to detach Serb-

populated territories of Croatia and Bosnia and to annex them to Serbia.

The Yugoslavian history as has been discussed in the first chapter has shown that even in Kingdom of Yugoslavia that had been formed in the First World War period was also an entity that had conflicting national interests. After the Second World it has also been seen that it was Tito's charisma that had bound the people together and he was tactful enough to create a state system and army which was bound by an ideology. He never played any one ethnic group against the other. He had his respects for all the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. He also did not belong to the Serb majority (Tito himself was a Croat) which is now trying to monopolize the power in Yugoslavia and which is still cherishing an utopia of a united Yugoslavia as had been existing since the First World War.

The multiethnic question was not solved by the socialist federal experiment. On the contrary it remained subdued under an authoritarian political system symbolised by Tito at the helm of the state of affairs. This question was only waiting for an opportunity to explode to which the death of Tito in 1980 contributed abundantly.

The events in East Europe which unfolded after mid-80s gave oxygen to an already existing inferno. The authoritarian regimes of neighbouring countries gave way to

the emergence of pluralist societies with an emphasis on the free market economy. The wave of consumerism in the relatively better developed parts of Yugoslavia (i.e. Croatia and Slovenia) started asserting themselves and increasingly started exerting themselves on the political scene which was increasingly being opposed by the rest of the nationalities.

The disintegration of Soviet Union which perhaps had its underpinnings in the opening up of Soviet Union as a result of measures initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev through his often known policies of Glasnost and Perestroika had its effect on Yugoslavia also. The ethno-nationalist leadership were convinced that world community should have no objection in recognising the independence of their ethnic regions.

The lack of coordination among the world community, especially among the Western powers has been quite conspicuous, who, it seems, have been feeling shy to interfere in the Yugoslav crisis. Now that fighting and international mediation has shifted to Bosnia-Herzegovina international coordination among the countries are lacking result is the increasing casualties on the Muslim side. This has also been emboldened by the intransigent attitude of the Muslim leadership of Bosnia Herzegovina who are waiting that Western countries will intervene in this dispute in their favour. In the meantime the Serbians have

been consolidating their position over 70 percent of the land which they now occupy at present.

Added to this is the arms embargo put on the erstwhile Yugoslavian states by the Security Council which is also a handicap for the Muslims. The Serbs of Bosnia are getting their regular supply from Serbia. Of late there has been some rigid posture by the international mediators where they have called the warring parties to agree to 51-49 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina (51 percent of the land to the Muslim-Croat federation and 49 percent of the land to Serbs of Bosnia) or they will have to take recourse to direct action to enforce this. A very recent development has been that Iran is supplying arms clandestinely to the Muslim fighters of Bosnia thereby they have been turning their tables to the Serbs.

The wars in former Yugoslavia have made it clear that the principles and practices that provided a stable for international security in the era of the cold war are no longer sufficient to preserve the peace. The principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and self-determination embedded in details in the document of the CSCE, have provided contradictory, or a least subject to contradictory interpretation. Moreover, the mounting human tragedy in Bosnia has revealed the inadequacies of the decision making principles, operational guidelines and

conflict management capabilities of Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the CSCE, NATO and the European Community, and also of the UN.

New diplomatic and political mechanisms must be developed to cope with demands for self-determination in ways that do not undermine the basic foundations of international stability - the system of sovereign states. The development of such mechanisms requires reconsideration of the meaning of self-determination in the contemporary era and the careful reconsideration of the indivisibility of state sovereignty. At the very least, it requires limiting the ability of states to use their claim to sovereignty to shield abuses from international inquiry. For any mechanism to be effective, however, individual states and international organisations alike must become proactive, undertaking preventive diplomatic and political efforts to solve interethnic and other conflicts before they threaten international peace any further.

Table 1: Overall Ethnic Population, Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia 1991

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|              |     |               |    |
|--------------|-----|---------------|----|
| Serbs        | 36% | Macedib-uabs  | 6% |
| Croats       | 20% | Montengegrins | 3% |
| Muslim Slavs | 9%  | Hungarians    | 2% |
| Shovenes     | 8%  | Others        | 9% |
| Albanians    | 8%  |               |    |

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Source: Compiled in part from G.Englefield, Territory Briefing--Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia: Reemerging Boundaries, Territory Briefing 3 (Durham: International Boundaries do not add to 100 due to rounding



Table 2: Ethnic Population by Federal Sub-unit,  
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1991

| Republic           | Population  | Ethnic composition                                  |
|--------------------|-------------|---|
| Slovenia           | 2.0 million | 90.0% Slovene<br>2.9% Croat<br>2.2% Serb            |
| Croatia            | 4.6 million | 70.0% Croat<br>11.0% Serb                           |
| Bosnia-Hercegovina | 4.4 million | 32.0% Serb<br>18.0% Croat<br>43.0% Muslims          |
| Montenegro         | 0.6 million | 62.0% Montenegrin<br>13.5% Muslim Slav<br>9.2% Serb |
| Macedonia          | 2.0 million | 68.0% Montenegrin<br>20.0% Albanian                 |
| Serbia             | 5.8 million | 66.0% Serb<br>14.0% Albanian<br>2.3% Muslim Slav    |
| Kosovo             | 1.7 million | 85.0% Albanian<br>13.0% Serb                        |
| Vojvodina          | 1.8 million | 54.0% Serb<br>19.0% Hungarian                       |

Source: Compiled in part from G. Englefield, Territory Briefing - Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia: Re-emerging Boundaries, Territory Briefing 3 (Durham, 1992). Percentages do not add to 100 because of the existence of other minorities in each sub-unit which have not been included in these figures.

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