

# ETHNO - NATIONALISM IN SINDH : THE ZIA PERIOD

RAMAN REET SINGH

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the award of the degree of  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY*

CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH-EAST ASIAN  
AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110 067

INDIA

1994



CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL SOUTH EAST  
ASIAN AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

5 JANUARY, 1994

**DECLARATION**

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, "ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN SINDH: THE ZIA PERIOD", submitted by Mr. Ramanreet Singh in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.), has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University. This is student's own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. KALIM BAHADUR  
CHAIRPERSON

PROF. KALIM BAHADUR  
SUPERVISOR

## CONTENTS

		<u>Page No.</u>
	PREFACE	i - v
CHAPTER I	ETHNO NATIONALISM - A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE	1 - 24
CHAPTER II	SINDHI ETHNO NATIONALISM: PROCESS OF IDENTITY FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENTS (TILL 1977)	25 - 53
CHAPTER III	SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE ZIA REGIME	54 - 88
CHAPTER IV	ETHNO NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN THE ZIA PERIOD	89 - 124
CHAPTER V	CONCLUSION	125 - 133
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	134 - 144

## PREFACE

The development of nation states and the expansion of Europe beginning in the fifteenth century produced for the first time societies made up of distinct racial and ethnic groups living within a common political and economic system. The emergence of contemporary multi ethnic societies, however, is a more recent historical phenomenon, arising from several global currents. Primary among these are large scale immigrations throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the creation of new states in the Third World following the post-Second World War break up of European colonialism.

Since then, the world witnessed the revival, intensification and stubborn persistence of ethnicity as an issue in politics, as a focal point of popular mobilization, and as a source of domestic and interstate conflict. The political salience of ethnicity has endured not just in former colonial territories, of the Third World but also in post Industrial democracies of Europe and America as well as in major communist countries such as China and Soviet Union. The structural conditions that give rise to ethnic demands, the immediate causes that catalyse ethnic conflict, and the

forms that ethnic conflict assumes is largely context specific.

The ethnic conflicts seem to have increased as a consequence of diffusion of 'modernity'. What is perhaps more striking about ethno politics is that the resurgence of ethnicity as a political force has been all but ignored by mainstream literature. To some extent, the relegation of ethnicity to the theoretical periphery of contemporary social science is attributable to the paradigmatic competition between modernisation and Marxist schools of social development. Both had portrayed ethnic identity as a primordial sentiment whose relevance would diminish with the expansion and penetration of modern industrial society. Contrary to the expectations of both the schools the rise of ethno-nationalism at a point in time when the global political economy and the diffusion of the modern culture into all corners of the globe has taken them by surprise.

Thus we are presented with the questions that will serve as a focus of this study: why has ethno nationalism remained such a powerful issue in the modern world? Why have ethnic identities not declined despite modernisation? What are the structural, cultural and individual factors which are responsible for the rise and persistence of ethno

nationalist movements. How have these movements been characterised and what are the basis of ethno nationalist movements.

A theoretical account of ethno nationalism is given. It is treated as a politically mobilised ethnic consciousness. A thorough examination of its premises and linkages is carried out by tracing its relationship with 'ethnicity', identity, 'modernity' and the modern state. The purpose of this exercise is to devise a framework which avoids the pitfalls of western theoretical paradigms which are unable to comprehend non western realities.

This is done to examine the growth and intensification of ethno nationalist movement in Sindh which has roughly existed for the past seventy years. The study follows a methodology where it first traces the formation of Sindhi identity. This is done for the 'instrumentalists' view case study approach as dependent merely on certain variables such as race, language or economic deprivation at the expense of history. They fail to take into account the historical processes of identity formation mainly cultural which influence the course of ethno nationalist movements. It also takes into account the processes of state formation and socio-economic basis of a society, which are likely to influ-

ence the demands on the state and the resulting ethnic policy of the state which might lead to intensification of a movement as in the case of Sindh .

The state's socio-economic policies and the basis of the state during the Zia period are assessed to see the impact on ethno nationalist movement in Sindh. The state's political, social, economic and cultural policies are critically examined to derive if there exists any linkage between the Zia regime's policies and the ethno nationalist in Sindh.

The course of the ethno nationalist movement is traced and the positions of various groups and important agitations and events are analysed. The influence and role of transnational factors on state's policy and on the ethno nationalist movement are examined. The conclusions are thus drawn on the basis of the study and are presented in brief, for analysis of the issue is *given* in each chapter. By describing the theoretical principles on which this body of research is grounded these arguments can perhaps best illustrate the extent to which this research is in fact integrated theoretically into the broader paradigmatic terrain of ethno nationalism and its various aspects. In this manner probably I will be able to highlight the basis on which

ethno nationalist movement in Sindh is based.

For this study I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Prof. Kalim Bahadur for his invaluable advice and guidance, unfailing patience, critical observation and support without which this study could not have been completed.

I take this opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude to P.V. Rammana, Jibby Thomas, Uday Pratap Singh and Deepak Mehta who proofread my draft and made corrections on it.

I am thankful to the staff members and libraries of Teen Murti, IDSA and JNU, who facilitated the completion of this work.

Finally I would to thank Mr. Om Prakash who completed my work on time. Any errors and omissions that remain are my responsibility alone.

*Raman reet Singh.*

Dated: 5 January, 1994

**RAMANREET SINGH**



## CHAPTER I

### ETHNO NATIONALISM - A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

With the coming to an end of, what Anderson in his inimitable style calls, the "last wave of nationalism most of them in Asia and Africa..."<sup>1</sup> began the era of ethnic nationalism. It began first in the West especially with the Basque, Quebecois ethnic movements. A survey of states in armed conflict in 1988 said that out of "111 such conflicts 63 were internal and 36 were described as the wars of 'state formations' that is conflict involving one government and an opposition group demanding autonomy or secession for a particular 'ethnie' or region."<sup>2</sup>

Ethno nationalist movements today constitute one of the most widespread, protracted and violent forms of 'domestic' conflict in the modern world. Ethnonationalist movements need to be seen as transitory movements towards full scale nationalism. This would mean that any analysis of ethno-nationalist movements would require that they be conceptualised in the framework of nationalisms. National politics

---

1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983), p.127.
2. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on International Society", International Social Science Journal (Paris), No.127, February, 1991, p.117.

in most states, old and new, has experienced divisive conflicts over the terms of incorporation for ethnic minorities, religious sects and ethno-nationalists. Studies on ethno-nationalism fall into two major categories - primordialist and instrumentalist, "the first treats ethnic nationalism as a manifestation of persisting cultural identity based on a primordial sense of ethnic identity; the second regards ethnicity as an exercise in "boundary maintenance".<sup>3</sup> But one fundamental question is left unanswered by both the schools. How does culture, which forms the core of 'ethnie' according to primordialists seemingly begin to metamorphose into a conscious group demanding a nation? Similar is the case with the instrumentalists who are unable to explain as to how certain cultural variables become autonomous agents for political transformation at such a large scale. Therefore the broad theoretical issues on ethno-nationalism need to be reexamined before going into a case study analysis as to why the ethno-nationalist movement in Sindh took an activist turn during the Zia period. What follows is a critical examination of the major issues in ethno-nationalism. The following section would involve us with an exami-

---

3. Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945", International Political Science Review (Washington D.C.), Vol.14, No.2, 1993, p.167.

nation of the relationship between ethnic groups and nationalism. It would inquire into the relationship between ethnic identity and the modern state, role of the integrative processes and the relationship of modernity to ethnic groups. An attempt will be made to conceptualise ethno-nationalism and trace the social basis for its existence which becomes essential for an enquiry into any Third World ethno-nationalism.

#### **ETHNIC GROUPS AND NATIONALISM**

Ethno nationalism can be defined "as that politicized social consciousness centred upon an ethnic identity born out of shared commonalities, seeking to achieve unity, autonomy and group interest by mobilizing ethnic-based constituencies."<sup>4</sup> This definition of ethno nationalism lays emphasis on the ethnic identity which may be defined as a composition of ethnic variables such race, common history, culture, society, language and so on by which an ethnic group distinguishes itself from other groups. At a particular point in time an ethnic group might use a particular feature or features of its identity to distinguish itself from other groups.

---

4. Dawa Norbu, Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism, (London, 1992), p.181. ✓

The nationalism exhibited by ethnic groups does not differ much in actual form from the nationalism which was responsible for the origin of nations. It exhibits the characteristic features of many ideal-type nationalisms though there exist certain differences between nationalisms and ethnic nationalisms. The only significant difference between ethno-national movements and national movements is in the main, is in the magnitude of these movements and the historical context in which those movements are rooted. The title of Anthony Smith's book Ethnic Origins of Nations speaks of the ethnic content in the idea of nation. Both nationalism and ethnic nationalism have primordial basis rooted in culture. "Since culture is nothing but a way to describe human behaviour, it would follow that there are discrete groups of people i.e. ethnic units, to correspond to each culture."<sup>5</sup>

What differentiates broad based nationalist anti-colonial movements from these ethnic nationalisms is that, while the former are based on the stimulus of colonial state and its administration, the latter start from a pre-existent homogeneous identity, a recognisable cultural unit. "The

---

5. Frederik Barth, Process and Form in Social Life, Vol.1 (London, 1981), p.190.

primary concern, therefore of 'ethnic' nationalists is to ensure the survival of the group's cultural identity. That entails ensuring the political survival of the group and physical protection of its members. "The only insurance of political survival under modern conditions is protection from hostile outsiders in a separate political organisation, or State. Hence for this type of nationalism, independence is more of a means for cultural ends."<sup>6</sup>

And if "culture bearing aspect of ethnic groups," is taken as "their primary characteristic"<sup>7</sup> it means that any study of ethnic nationalism has to be located in culture. What follows from this is that ethnic too like nationalism has to be understood, by aligning it not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which - as well as against which - it came into being."<sup>8</sup> This means that besides a study of the process of identity formation and transformation of a group into a politically conscious community the culture based core of ethno-nationalism needs

---

6. Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London, ✓ 1971), pp.216-217.

7. Barth, n.5, pp.200-1.

8. Anderson, n.1, p.19.

to be given primacy in any study of ethno-nationalism. A corollary of this would suggest that nationalism is not open solely to a standard class analysis as neither does it follow distinctive class lines nor national boundaries but follows ethnic lines in opposition to the other.

Thus it means that "ethnic nationalism must involve a nation, which in turn must possess ethnic and cultural components."<sup>9</sup> This primacy to the 'ethnie' calls for an ethnicity specific approach to ethno-nationalist movements. Though in modern social sciences, as a scholar has put it, ethnic nationalism is "too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, customs, economic inequality or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is the basic identity which manifests itself in the us - them syndrome."<sup>10</sup> In fact as Gramsci remarked in another context, "It may well be that nobody has the courage to pose the question exhaustively because it was feared that vital dangers for the unified life of the *nation* would immediately result from such a rigorously critical and consequential

---

9. Norbu, n.4; p.183.

10. Walker O'Connor, "Nation building or Nation Destroying", World Politics, (Princeton, N.J.), Vol.XXIV, No.3, April 1972, No.3, p.341.

formulations"<sup>11</sup> is also apt for ethno nationalism.

Thus ethnic studies has tried to locate ethnic movements as reactionary backlashes, primordial movements, tribalism, secessionist or separatist movements. The reasons for this are not difficult to see. They lie in the complex relationship between state and ethnic identity.

The term ethnic group as used by Smith is summed up as follows, "The nearest we get in modern language to the common denominator of Greek usages" of the term ethnos, "is the French term 'ethnie', which, unites an emphasis upon cultural differences with the sense of a historical community. It is this sense of history and the perceptions of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders."<sup>12</sup> Smith ascribes six attributes to 'ethnie' - "collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity."<sup>13</sup>

---

11. David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Cultural Writings (London, 1985), p.199. (emphasis added)

12. Anthony D. Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations (London, 1986), pp.21-22.

13. ibid., pp.22-31.

What needs to be emphasised is not these factors, but above them a complex set of processes as to how these factors have evolved, how they are inter-related to one another and their relation to the whole. This must then constitute the universe of analysis.

The problem which one encounters is that in most of the societies it is difficult to delineate the complex historical processes and to reach the roots of ethnic identity formation. Therefore the majority of definitions see ethnicity as an aggregation of ethnic variables by which the group differentiates itself and perceives itself as a sum total of certain variables. It is "the result of membership in a specific group based on a number of criteria including culture, history, language religion and geographic location."<sup>14</sup> State, region, tribe, caste, language groups "all have features that make them potentially adequate primary ethnic identity for group reference."<sup>15</sup> But the primacy of culture is also highlighted by Barth when he argues that "ethnic identity is associated with a culturally

---

14. Raymond Hall, ed., Ethnic Autonomy - Comparative Dynamics (New York, 1978), p.3.

15. Barth, n.5, p.223.



specific set of value standard."<sup>16</sup> Anthony Smith argues that "Ethnic movements make their claims in virtue of an alleged 'community of culture', in which the members are both united with each other by a shared culture and differentiated from others by the possession of that culture."<sup>17</sup> The ethnic markers are defined more clearly in cases of an ethnic conflict and take the shape of a political category. This change is the result of politics of mass mobilisation and processes of social communication. Ethnic nationalism "strives to turn the ethnic group into that more abstract and politicized category, the 'nation' and then to establish the latter as the sole criterion of statehood".<sup>18</sup> It can be argued that the process of ethnic identity formation, is "the transformation of passive, often isolated and politically excluded communities into potential or actual "nations", active participant and self-conscious in their historic identities."<sup>19</sup>

But ethnic groups are pitted against the state which is strongly interventionist in post-colonial societies in which

---

16. *ibid.*, p.214.

17. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (London, 1981), p.13.

18. *ibid.*, p.xi.

19. *ibid.*, p.24.

the task of nationbuilding and state building are merged in the process of nation building. The rhetoric of secular ideology articulated by the modern liberal State, with its liberal and individualist values and vision of modern enlightenment, is strongly at odds with the sub-nationalist group claims of a heterogeneous and plural society. It is also at odds with the growing perception of failed promises among the oppressed, who increasingly resort their self validation in religion and ethnicity. In many of the post colonial states, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial ideologies were replaced by hegemonic assertions, providing an ideological impetus towards majority rule.

"When each community... group interprets its insecurity as a result of the privileges of a competing group gained through 'favours' and 'patronage' from the state, ...new insecurities are generated in people's minds new fears that the state is biased against them - and for a contending faction or group."<sup>20</sup> This results in, increased intolerance and suspicion where ethnic claims are interpreted as security threats. The results often are that states then use authoritarian strategies for resolution of ethnic conflicts. The militarization of society and militarization of ethnic

---

20. Rajni Kothari, Rethinking Development: In Search of Humane Alternatives (New Delhi, 1988), p.200.

conflict often become features of societies having strong ethno-national movements. In Sri Lanka, the military response to an ethnic conflict led to a 500% growth in military expenditure in real terms since 1981. It needs to be noted that the military budget of Pakistan in 1986 was 38.5% of the total government expenditure, i.e. more than the combined allocations for rural development and education.<sup>21</sup> As a result of institutional breakdown and the incapacity of the system to handle the demands, further 'mercenaryization' of society takes place. By this is meant, the militarization of society and spread of 'private armies', terrorism and state terrorism. This leads to reinforcement of existing ethnic boundaries and also, the state and its institutions get further ethnicised. These activities generally further deepen the divides in fractured societies. The basis for discrimination which are at times the cause of ethno national movements vary from society to society and is based on those ascriptive ethnic variables which most critically differentiate the dominant group from the non-dominant one. But the fluidity of ethnic identity formation needs to be taken into account. This would mean that identity formation is more context oriented and groups behave through

---

21. SIPRI Yearbook (New York, 1987), pp.138-141✓

historical experience and interpret and reinterpret their history on the basis of experience.

In modern democratic states, legitimisation is brought about by the democratic governments which operate through electoral majorities. The majorities thus feel an axiomatic right to dominate the power structure. But what they fail to appreciate at times, is that what they perceive as a subculture is in fact a different socio-cultural world with its own consciousness. This is one of the reasons why minority ethnic groups develop conflicting perceptions vis-a-vis the state.

The argument that the post-colonial state developed along ethnic lines dilutes but does not negate the role of class analysis in inter-ethnic relations. At times in these states certain groups secure a comparative advantage as a part of a systematic colonial policy which creates stereotypes about communities which are left behind on the socio-economic scale. These groups behave as a class and here ethnic and class lines converge in such cases. The groups higher in the hierarchy both who are ethnically and economically pre-dominant maintain and derive their legitimacy from their own ethnic group and partly because of the nature of the statist imperative which virtually creates a national

security state. Coupled with the forces of market, ethnic nationalism takes in deep roots. What provides salience to ethnic conflict however, is the uneven development of capitalism in the periphery. To date, all people have not been incorporated in the capitalist project. There exists an informal sector and vast social formations which are different in nature. "They are often pre-capitalist in origin and have unique language, shared symbols and often a shared economic life." The undifferentiated 'spread of capitalism',<sup>22</sup> fails to account for the resistance and strength of such social formations. Neither is capital interested in dissolving these formations, if they can be retained to the advantage of capital, and it is precisely in this articulation and disarticulation between capital, the state and social formations that ethnic mobilization has to be traced.

Another important facet of ethnic nationalism lies in the fact that ethnic conflict is "a revolt against the state and its power structure at various levels"<sup>23</sup> and which is rarely recognised. The reasons for this are clear. The statist nationalism with its capacity to churn propaganda

---

22. Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London, 1980), p.249.

23. Urmila Phadnis, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asian Studies" in Urmila Phadnis, S.D. Muni and Kalim Bahadur, eds., Domesatic Conflicts in South Asia, Vol.II (New Delhi, 1986), p.101.

and influence the nature of political discourse colours these movements in a manner in which its interests are served best.

Ethnic nationalisms are faced with the power of the scientifically-rationalised centralised and coercively empowered state which ensures both cultural and ideological hegemony and blunts the cutting edge of ethnonationalist movements. Ethnic nationalism perceives the multinational state as an empire controlling the various nationalities within it. Though most ethnic movements aspire for statehood but the dominant group, the international community, and the small support base impede these movements from acquiring legitimacy. The reasons for lack of desire for independence is not because they do not want it, rather it is because of the impossibility of the international situation. This was best revealed during the Iraq conflict when almost no major leader castigated Bush for failing to support the Kurdish claims for self-determination. Analysing the statist perspective on the Kurdish question Weiner argues that "Real politik not idealism about self-determination for small peoples who happen to be outnumbered and overwhelmed, apparently governed Mr. Bush's new world order, just as much as it usually ran the old world

orders."<sup>24</sup> Thus the modern states equipped with legitimate use of force under law negate the ethno-nationalist question or tend to resolve it by use of violence. The complex processes of integration carried out by states are also responsible for the rise of ethno nationalist movements.

### INTEGRATIVE PROCESSES AND THE RISE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM

The domination of state power by certain ethnic groups explains partly the rise of ethnic nationalism. Once the state is achieved by the dominant group, the allocation of scarce resources becomes its responsibility and here begins the struggle for resources which has led to ethnic conflict. Even in societies where there do exist constitutional safeguards for minorities attempts are made through gradualist methods to impose the language and culture of the dominant group on the ethnic groups. In his classic study carried out in 1972 Walker O' Connor found a "remarkable lack of coincidence that exists between ethnic and political border." Of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 9.1% were essentially homogeneous, 18.9% contain an ethnic group accounting for 90% of the state's total population and in another 25 states the largest elements accounts for between 75 and 80

---

24. Myron Weiner, "People and States in a New Ethnic Order?" Third World Quarterly (London), Vol.13, No.2, 1992, p.326.

per cent of the population. But in 31 states the largest ethnic elements represents only 50 to 74% of the population, and in 39 cases (29.5% of the states) the largest group fails to account for even half of the state's population."<sup>25</sup>

Thus the proposition that ethnic nationalism is likely to exist in the coming decades because of the multi-ethnic character of nation states seems to be valid. Thus majority of the states are likely to face a crises of legitimacy at one point of time or the other. Any analysis of state nationalism has to take into account three major factors. (1) The activities of post-colonial state which destroy traditional structures of authority; (2) The nationalism churned out by the state which negates and denies particular ethnic identities; (3) The inherent contribution between the state and the multiethnic society.

The modern state penetrates every aspect of life. Its expanding power penetrates almost every vital sphere of social life including education, media, and culture which are of immediate interest to state nationalism. The impact of this nationalism on ethnic identities is that they feel at loss and incipient ethno-nationalist tendencies can be

---

25. Connor, n.10,. p.320.



traced to it. The process of nation building involves two processes which work together: (a) Political centralization, (b) national unification. Both these processes disturb the life processes of groups who reside in peripheral regions, by creating new roads and communication networks and by introducing norms of an all encompassing homogenising global culture. This has an impact on the power structures within these communities and it creates a crisis of legitimacy in the periphery. The process of centralization entails a position of subordination to groups in the centre. This clear cut subordination and domination within the countries in which they live, a situation which may be defined as internal colonialism, leads to political consciousness over a period of time. National unification involves processes whereby a national culture policy, and control of the various ethnic groups in the state becomes essential. But in the true sense this control can only become viable if the issues of language, culture and economics are resolved. One of the most interesting examples is the ex-Soviet Union where 'Russification' through promotion of Russian language and culture sharpened animosities which came out very sharply leading to its virtual disintegration. The point is that measures which states take to ensure their existence are seldom culturally neutral and thus leave an

impression upon ethnic groups which also began to demand ethnic states.

### **Modernity and Ethnic Groups:**

It is argued that ethnic revival is "closely bound up with the rise of nationalism."<sup>26</sup> The incongruency which exists between the state and its ethnic boundary is one of the major causes of ethnic movements. But above all certain trends in world cultures are the causes of ethno-nationalism. For decades the modernization paradigm dominated thinking in the social sciences, and according to this point of view the process of societal change leads from the traditional to the modern, from the simple to the complex, from particularism to universalism to use concepts developed by Parsons in the Weberian tradition. Within this framework ethnic issues pertain to the particularistic or pre-modern world and are swept aside by the modernization process. Ethno nationalism is a reaction "to the exercises of the modern project of shaping the whole of humanity around the three pivots of world capitalism, the state system and a 'world culture' based on modern technology, a pervasive communications and information order and a 'uni-

---

26. Smith, n.17, p.23.

versalising' educational system."<sup>27</sup> This particular project expects the rest of the world to accept its viewpoint, it intends to carve out a world from a secular and temporal space. It rejects all other universals and castigates them as anachronistic, expects them to conform to its more 'scientific' and 'rational' and hence superior universal. "Every other entity or belief system is by definition illegitimate. There is only one legitimate structure of power morality and truth. All others are invalid."<sup>28</sup> Ethnicity represents a powerful rebuttal to this paranoid drive of the modern project of fashioning the world after the idea of a world as emanated from the west. Ethno nationalism represents a potent challenge and is a result against these hegemonies. Ethno consciousness is a search for the civic and sacred space which has been lost to modernity. Modernisation and development which are two manifestations of this ideology. Both aimed to take the people towards a post-ethnic consciousness. The paradox of these ideologies have been that they have reinforced the ethnic-consciousness. Social communication in any society is pre-determined in the sense that traditional channels of religion, myths and folklore structure it. Therefore messages carrying cultural

---

27. Kothari, n.20, p.192.

28. *ibid.*, p.193.

or ethnic appeals travel faster and thus we witness so many fervent appeals in the name ethno on which ethno nationalism movements get organised.

The modernist principles of equality, justice and liberty which are a part of the ideology of nationalism do impinge on the traditional core of 'ethnic'. In absence of proclaimed equality, justice and liberty ethnicists implore the members for separate state for unless they do not have a separate state these political principles cannot be realised. The result is that loyalty to the state and to one's ethnic group becomes a dilemma. In cases of acute crises the loyalty to the ethnic group gains pre-eminence. The product is a legitimation crises that the mono-ethnic state faces for there exists an "indissociable relationship between ethnicity and political legitimacy."<sup>29</sup> The universalisation of the ideal of popular democracy and the claims that it exists in a homeland, common culture, a comprehensive social communication network, a social organisation that forms the structural framework for socio-political life give the ideological core to the 'modern' ethno-nationalism. The role of democracy as a political doctrine with its

---

29. Walker O'Connor, "The Politics of Ethno-Nationalism", Journal of International Affairs (New York), Vol.27, No.1, 1973, p.2.

emphasis on popular will "make ethnicity the ultimate measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any self-differentiating people, simply because it is a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself."<sup>30</sup> To clarify his point he goes on to argue that "what we have thus been calling self-differentiating ethnic groups are in fact nations."<sup>31</sup> This is the one of the reasons why ethno nationalist movements strive for the establishment of nation states. For lack of congruency between a state and a nation causes severe anomalies in nation states.

#### **Social basis of Ethno Nationalism:**

Dr. Norbu underlines five characteristics which are essential for any nationalism. Its basic features are (a) a complex yet unfragmented society that provides the social basis for national unity. (b) Socially shared fundamental cultural values that form the psychological basis of general will. (c) A common language or system wide symbols that facilitate social communication. (d) Considerable stratification and literacy rate so that nationalist leadership may emerge. (e) A pan-ethnic identity that transcends tribal or

---

30. Connor, n.10, p.331.

31. *ibid.*, p.334.

DISS

320.5405491

Si646 Et



TH4908

TH-4908

other particularistic identities."<sup>32</sup>

Ethno nationalism possesses most of these features, rather it can be said that it has most of the requirements for nation formation. But as ethno nationalist movements are pitted against the nation state whose "resources generally are far greater than those of their challenges within opposition movements....", they keep hammering within the existing states and bargain for concessions.<sup>33</sup>

Last but not the least one of the important factors in ethnic nationalism is the role of internal colonialism. It argued that the "market's accentuation of regional differences can create national differences, thereby not only leading to competition, but also actually generating the drive toward independence as the only solution to the perceived inequities of capitalist relations"<sup>34</sup> and that nationalism has re-emerged in the celtic periphery largely as a reaction to this failure of regional development. Though most of ethnic groups are located in peripheral areas it

---

32. Norbu, n.4, p.205.

33. Alexander Motyl, "The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation States in the Contemporary World", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.45, No.2, Winter 1992, p.318.

34. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-1866 (California, 1977), pp.265-266.

does not explain why ethno-national movements largely took root in the sixties. Causes of ethno-nationalism are far more complex than any Marxist interpretation of internal colonialism suggests. Smith argues that "political and status deprivation"<sup>35</sup> are much more important causes than economic needs. They are "likely to come a poor second when competing with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism."<sup>36</sup> The causes of ethno-nationalist movements are many and varied. Any single framework which takes the nation building perspective, or purely statist, or cultural or economic is incomplete.

To sum up it can be argued that generally the studies of ethno nationalism suffer from major weaknesses. They tend to ignore the socio-cultural developments and overemphasise certain variables to which the ethno-nationalist movement is attributed. The variables need to be put in a historical analytical context. Ethno nationalism needs to be seen through the broad parameters of historical development of capitalism, the power of modernity and as to how it impinges on local cultures, the process of integration which is a part of the ideology of nation state and in the context

---

35. Smith, n.17, p.28.

36. Connor, n.10, p.341.

of a global homogenising culture. This framework would try to avoid the pitfalls of previous studies by going into the process of identity formation and linking it up the study with earlier socio-political developments.

It will examine as to why during the Zia period the ethno nationalist movement in Sindh intensified and why has it continued for such a long time.



## CHAPTER II

### **SINDHI ETHNO NATIONALISM: PROCESS OF IDENTITY FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENTS (TILL 1977)**

Ethno-nationalism in Sindh can be traced at different levels. It has to be traced at the level of formation of the Sindhi identity. It needs to be seen in the context of the political decisions taken regarding the status of the sub-continent by the colonial administration and in the nature and role of the freedom movement which was carried against the colonial administration.

Sindh has existed as a separate entity in history. The Aryans called the whole of present day Pakistan, Kashmir, and East Afghanistan 'Sapt Sindhu' - the land of seven rivers. In the Rigveda it is referred to as 'Supta-Sindhwa' whereas India is called the Bharat Varta (the land of the sons of Bharat, the legendary Emperor).<sup>1</sup>

Even during the period of the Aryans there existed two separate countries Bharata Varta and Supta Sindhua. The Assyrians in the seventh century B.C. knew the North-western

---

1. A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India (New Delhi, 1980), p.1.

part of the subcontinent as Sindh.<sup>2</sup> When the Persians and Arabs began coming to India they began to refer to India as 'Hind'. In the period following Alexander's invasion, the Greeks began referring to India as 'Ind'. The inhabitants of the country continued referring to their country as Sindh. These differences continued for centuries in the writings of historians, geographers and travellers and the area from Kashmir to the Arabian sea was referred to as Sindh. Later, during tenth century A.D. the distinctions became clear, so much so that two countries existed in the subcontinent - Sindh and Hind.

The etymology of the word Sindh can be traced to the Sanskrit word 'Sindhu' which means 'River', when used otherwise it meant the river Indus. 'Sindhu' literally meant an ocean, or a vast collection of water.<sup>3</sup> In ancient times, 'Sindhu' covered the area i.e. the lower part of the Indus valley. The territory which now falls in northern Sindh and Southern Punjab. It was around first century A.D. that Sindhu came to include, the alluvial plains of the Indus.

---

2. Y.U.V. Ganjovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History, (Moscow, 1971), p.15.

3. *ibid.*, p.20.

Evidence from Indus valley sites indicates that human beings had inhabited the territory to the North West part of the subcontinent as "early as the close of the first interglacial period."<sup>4</sup> But it is difficult to conclusively trace out the ethnographic profile of Sindhi culture from that period. Indus valley sites and the Harappan Civilisation which extended from Shivaliks in the North to Tapti in the South and from Quetta in the West to Alamgirpur in the Ganga-Jamuna Doab show certain similar characteristics. But it is argued that the civilisation was not uniform or stagnant, although it had a closely knit unity. Local cultures and peculiarities existed.<sup>5</sup>

Various theories exist on the origin of Indus valley civilisation. Different scholars have held different views about it. The sources of the civilisation have been traced to Indo-European people, as well as the Aryan tribes who came to India. But "whatever their original composition the population at these sites belonged each to a single group.... It is therefore inferred that the population in India during the Harappan times descended from earlier

---

4. *ibid.*, p.23.

5. *ibid.*, p.28.

populations in the same region, and perhaps the Harappan culture or civilisation is autochthonous."<sup>6</sup> This theory which is accepted by most of the historians brings to light the fact that the civilisation was the product of local cultures of Sindh and Baluchistan. Though they belonged to different stocks such as Southern Europoid, Proto-Austroloid, as well as the Mongoloids, the language they spoke belonged to, presumably one group, i.e. the Dravidians. There exists evidence of similarity in languages between those of the Dravidians and ancient languages of West Asia and archaeological evidence also hints that relations existed between these two civilisations.

With the fall of the Indus valley civilisation which is attributed to either floods, disease or the invasion of new tribes, local cultures did survive. The generally accepted view is that the advent of the Aryans was not responsible for the destruction of the Harappan culture. However, no drastic change took place and it was a process of assimilation. Harappan culture continued in various forms. This shows that the coming of the Aryans did not always take the form of military inroads in which the original inhabitants

---

6. P.N. Chopra, ed., The Gazetteer of India. History and Culture (New Delhi, 1990)

were driven out.<sup>7</sup> The Aryan civilisation does not show that they had the potential to eliminate such a vastly populated territory with well constructed cities which could be easily fortified. Rather it was the successive wars of Indo-European invaders from the north western part of the subcontinent which began around 2000 B.C. and lasted till about 1000 B.C.

Indo-Aryan tribes entered India into Indus valley through Khyber and Bolan passes which brought them into North West India. With the movement towards the interior they lost touch with their kin the Indo-Iranian tribes. With time these tribes and communities grew up as local cultures. Conflicts were natural between people of different cultures where land and subsistence was the primary question. Some groups adopted the customs of the Aryans while others maintained their exclusive organisation. The result of the diverse social, cultural-historical contacts was that a neo Indo-Aryan ethnic community began to emerge in Sindh and Baluchistan. The formation of this Indo-Aryan ethnic community smothered out the differences between different tribes which comprised it. A number of dialects began to emerge as a result of this intermixing from which

---

7. S. Piggot, "Pre-historic India", in Gankovsky, n.2, p.223.

the modern Indo-Aryan languages grew.

In the first half of the first millenium B.C. major shifts took place in the ethnic profile of the region "though there is a lack of sufficient social material regarding the ethno-genetic processes underway".<sup>8</sup> Over a period of time genetic and cultural ties emerged among the nationalities and tribes comprising these groups. The emergence of basic linguistic and cultural affinity was an important factor in the process of identity formation.

In ancient India especially in Punjab and other parts there existed a few dozen political units - "Janapads" - which had distinct cultures, customs and beliefs and local dieties. "Ancient Indian sources"<sup>9</sup> speak of these Republics having emerged around the first millenium B.C. Alexander's invasion is an important benchmark in the history of India. He divided his dominions in India into three parts and left governors behind. Chandra Gupta Maurya overthrew the Greek rule on both sides of the Indus. The Greek influence was more on art and craftsmanship and was limited to the major trade and politico-administrative structures, while the

---

8. Gankovsky, n.2, p.57.

9. *ibid.*, n.2. p.57.

local people continued to speak the vernacular and follow their own cultural traditions.

The invasion by the Sakyas was not of much consequence except that a few tribes did settle in North West India. With the fall of the Kurhan empire Ephtalites, came into power. By the end of the fifth century Torman<sup>(a)</sup> Ephthalite ruler had occupied Sind, Panjab, parts of Rajasthan and some areas in the Gangetic plain. The settlement of three East Iranian tribes did influence the ethnic character of the region. The ethnogenesis of Sindh can be traced to these Indo-Aryan nationalities and tribal unions. Mahabarta gives a description of Jaydrath as the King of Sind around 12th century B.C. The next historical mention of Sindh is found in about 575 B.C. during the time of Archaemenian dynasty, and the Alexanderian period - during both of which times, Sindh was considered rich and prosperous.

With the fall of Ephtalites the next important rulers of Sindh were the Rajputs whose rule lasted till seventh century A.D. With the coming of Mohamad Bin Qasim begins the independent history of Sindh. Before the latter's arrival Dahir was the ruler in 711 A.D. For forty years after the invasion, the vice-regents of the Omod Caliphs ruled the country until the Abbasids ousted them in 750 A.D. By tenth

century independent feudal principalities came into existence with Multan as its capital.

A major impact of the Arab invasion on Sindh was that as the population was largely Buddhist and was persecuted by Dahir it took to Islam eagerly. Arabs also brought in their own language and method of administration. It also brought into the fore the process of feudalisation of the Sindhi society. The rulers of Sindh gave land to military commanders, Muslim theologians and administrators. With the passage of time the ruling class of Arabs merged with the emerging feudal class which further strengthened the process of feudalisation of the Sindhi society. The rule of Islam in promoting a feudal society cannot be underestimated for religion served as a binding force on the feudal class. The development and spread of Arabic as a language of the ruling class further reinforced the feudal relations in Sindh.

It is argued that "at the end of the eighth century A.D. 1200 years ago, the population of Sindh was understood in the other areas of the subcontinent as a united whole, possessing its own peculiar anthropological character,



spiritual make up and language."<sup>10</sup> Sindh remained independent up to 1591 A.D. except for a few years of Ghaznavid rule in the second half of the eleventh century. However by 1054 the Sumrah dynasty had restored the sovereignty of Sindh. The settled farming economy helped the Sindhi ethnic community to come into its own quite rapidly. In the feudalization of society lay the roots of the Sindhi state and incipient consolidation of Sindhis took place. The Indus delta, southern parts of the Indus valley and the major administrative, economic and cultural centres were areas of consolidation. Sindh was recognised as a separate cultural entity in Muslim writings of the tenth and eleventh century. They referred to the distinctive language and culture of Sindh as compared to that of other parts of India. Al Istakhri wrote, "The language of the inhabitants of Manserah and Multan and the areas adjacent to them is Arabi and sindhi, and the language of the inhabitants of Makram is Persian."<sup>11</sup> Other writers like Nizam-ul-Mulk (Siasat Namah p.167): Abul Fazal Beihagi (Tarikh-Musudi, pp.9, 46, 47 and 57); Ibn Hauqual (Kitab-al Masalikwa-i-Manalik, p.155); all

---

10. V.N. Gankovsky, "Sindhi Ethnic Community at the end of the Colonial Era" in Hamida Khuro, ed., Sindh Through the Centuries - Proceedings of a Seminar held in Karachi in Spring 1975 by the Department of Culture, Government of Sind (Karachi, 1981), p.180.

11. Al Istabkhri, "Kitab Masalik Al-Moniulik", p.177 in Gonkovsky, n.2, p.95.

distinguish between Sindh and India when listing the individual countries of South Asia.

In the later part of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries the Sindhis incorporated Baluch tribes who had come from the West and the North West, and also some clans from South Panjab. This assimilation had to reinforce the clan life as Baluch's and Jats both had a strong clan organisation. The role of caste-system and its rigidities in strengthening this close knit clan organisations cannot be underestimated. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Sindhis were divided into about two hundred clans.

Sindh was annexed by Akbar in 1591 A.D. but with the decline of Mughal power Sindh fell into ruin. The invasion of Nadir Shah and later on the dispute between the Afghans and Baluchs over the control of Sindh led to constant warfare. Internal war and strife led to the collapse of the agricultural economy. Despite this urban arts and crafts flourished and external trade continued. Muslims controlled the major art and craft work while the financial control lay with the Hindu trading classes.

Islam virtually came to be recognised as the state religion. Sufism flourished and was stimulated by political

disorder and chaos which prevailed in Sindh. Development of Sindhi language, which derives itself from Prakrit Vradaha, was enriched by the incorporation of words from Arabic and Persian which took place rapidly in this period. The development of language and literature was a manipulation of the desire of Sindhi intellectuals to strengthen the basis of their identity. 'Lari' a dialect of the most developed section of a dialect of the most developed section of the country 'Lar' constituted the basis of literary Sindhi. Shah Abdul and Latif Nariyawaro were the prominent literary figures of the time.

Sindh was annexed by Sir Charles Napier in 1843 A.D. and made a part of the Bombay Presidency. Sindh had a vibrant culture, and a distinct geographical identity at the time of annexation. The issue of separation of Sindh was raised by two different people one was Harchandai Vishindas who raised the issue at the Karachi session of the Congress. Another person who fought for the separation of Sindh was Bhutto's father Shahnama who argued that the "cultural character of Sindh differed greatly from Bombay."<sup>12</sup> However it was only in 1936, that Sindh came to exist as a separate province. Sindhi was declared by the British as the lan-

---

12. Surendra Nath Kaushik, Pakistan under Bhutto's Leadership (New Delhi, 1985), p.152.

guage to be used in local courts and local administration. A standard script had emerged. At the time of independence Sindh had all the elements of incipient nationalism. But the complications within the freedom movement which led to the demand for a separate state for Muslims closed the question of separate Sindhi state for the future.

The demand which was first mooted by Iqbal in his address to All India muslim League in 1930 in which he said that 'self government within the British empire or without the British empire' and "the formation of a consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North West India."<sup>13</sup> Muslim league passed the Lahore resolution in 1940 in which the demand for 'Independent states in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.'<sup>14</sup>

The two Nation theory under which the Muslims constituted a separate Nation was developed by Jinnah. With the partition of the country under the Mountbatten plan Pakistan came into existence. In the west it comprised of

- 
13. Jamil-uddin Ahmed and others, Historic documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Karachi, 1970), pp.121-137.
  14. "Pakistan 'Resolution" in Manzoorudin Ahmed, ed., Contemporary Pakistan: Politics Economy and Society (Durham North Carolina, 1980), p.5.

four nationalities the Panjabis, Sindhis, Baluchs and Pakhtoons. The Eastern wing was composed mainly of the Bengalis. With the incorporation of Sindh in Pakistan began the movement for a separate identity for Sindh

### **State Formation in Pakistan and its Impact on Ethno Nationalism in Sindh**

The formation of the state in Pakistan was such that it would ferment ethnic nationalism. The roots of Sindhi nationalism lay in the larger Muslim nationalism. The concept of Muslim nationalism as propounded by Jinnah and Muslim League was never intended to be a unifying force that would give the state a political base. "Rather, it was an emotional call for all Muslims, regardless of other differences, to assert themselves as a critical mass in the division of colonial India."<sup>15</sup> The establishment of Pakistan robbed the Muslim League of its *raison de etre* and other identities began to come to the fore. The coming to the forefront of these identities especially Sindhi identity can be traced to the composition of the class which was at the basis of the Pakistan movement.

---

15. John P. Hutchinson, Inertial Conflict and Pakistan's Nationalism, vol.IV, South and South West Asia, Proceedings of First International Symposium on Asian Studies, (Hong Kong, 1979), p.873.

In fact as pointed out by a scholar "there was one particular social group, more than any other for whom the conception of Muslim nationhood was particularly meaningful. That class was a product of the colonial transformation of Indian social structure in the nineteenth century...."<sup>16</sup> This class comprising of the educated and intelligentsia which form the core group of Muslim nationalists demanding Pakistan is termed as salariat. Using certain tabulated data it is possible to draw certain conclusions about the composition of this class.

Table 1.1

Relative Size of Total Muslim Population

	U.P.	Bengal	Punjab	Sindh	Population in millions
Total	48.4	51	28.5	3.9	
	7.2	27.8	14.9	2.8	
	(15%)	(54.5%)	(52%)	(73%)	

contd...

16. Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity Society and Ideology" in Anita Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan - The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State (Lahore, 1981), p.24.

Table 1.1...contd...

---

Literates in English aged 20 or more				
	U.P.	Bengal	Punjab	Sind
Total	266,000	722,435	185,000	33,450
	49,400	175,600	58,800	4,900
	(19%)	(24%)	(32%)	(14.5%)

---

Based on Census of India, 1931.<sup>17</sup>

The figures indicate that Muslim salariat in Punjab was the largest in size and had the largest percentage share. While the relative size of the Muslim salariat in U.P. was quite large but it was in Bengal that the Muslim salariat was largest in absolute size. The figures for Sindh show "how small the ethnic salariat was - even these figures probably give a somewhat inflated picture of its size because there were considerable numbers of non-Sindhi Muslims employed in Sind."<sup>18</sup>

Thus by virtue of its much greater size and development the Punjabi salariat group began to occupy a much greater say in the affairs of the state. The weaker groups resented Punjabi domination and demanded a fair share for themselves. The military which was politically paramount was largely

---

17. *ibid.*, p.26.

18. *ibid.*, p.26.

drawn from the Punjab province. The industrial capitalist class consisted entirely of Punjabis and Gujarati immigrants settled in Karachi itself. "In order to operate as cohesive groups, the military and the bureaucracy pursued policies which kept the Sindhis, the Baluchs, the Pathans away from influential positions in the military and the bureaucracy. Likewise the business entrepreneurs from the minority province found it exceedingly difficult to obtain business and industrial business."<sup>19</sup> Thus was born a fractured state with a pre-dominance of one group leading to a strong ethno-nationalist movement in the culturally rich Sindh. The feeling of denial of their rightful share led to ethnic tensions and mal development. It is pointed out that the state when it emerged took parallel responsibility of the state alongside the three economically dominant classes of the relatively weak indigenous bourgeoisie, the influential metropolitan bourgeoisie of 'Peripheral capitalism', which imposed a 'structural imperative' on the actions undertaken by the guardians of the state and the individualist capital-

---

19. Feroz Ahmed, "Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan" in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (New York, 1973), p.180.



ists.<sup>20</sup> Though many of the demands of the masses and regions were denied by the military oligarchs, landowners, and the bureaucrats the state developed its autonomous interests, thus becoming more insulated from the society and less capable of performing the input-output functions. But this does not wholly explain the basis of Sindhi nationalism. Rather ethnic consolidation had not taken place and the emergence of capitalism was too weak to dissolve the traditional social formations. Therefore it entered into a symbiotic relationship with them. The nature of these social formations goes a long way in exploring the nature of the ethnic movement.

#### **Socio-Economic basis of the Movement**

The economy of Sindh was primarily based on agriculture at the time of independence. The society was feudal in nature and economy of rural Sindh was more dependent on the vagaries of weather than on irrigated canal networks. Except for the urban centres of Karachi, Jacobabad and Hyderabad which flourished, for the general masses the question was primarily of subsistence. In a society which

---

20. Hamza Alavi, "Class and State in Pakistan", Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, eds., The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State (London, 1983), pp.63-65.

was poor and a victim of colonialism, with lopsided industrial development and oppressive land relations the characteristics for an anti-state movement existed.

### **Agrarian Relations in Sindh**

At the time of independence of the state of Pakistan in Sind there existed a perfect symmetry between economic and political power. Sind's Muslim landlords were well placed to perpetuate a tyrannical form of domination. "About 8% had holdings over 100 acres which accounted for 55% of the total area, while those in the possession of 500 acres or more constituted less than one per cent of all the owners and controlled 29% of the land."<sup>21</sup> As much as two third of the peasantry was Hari's - share croppers with no occupancy rights or who were still landless labourers.

The power of the feudal lords or 'waderhas' was all pervasive. As there existed strong dependency relations between the landlord and the share croppers could not develop horizontal relationships on class lines in the early period. Sindhi Hari committee in the post-1947 period began pressing for agrarian reforms. But a comparative analysis

---

21. Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule - The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (London, 1980), p.87.

of the 1960 Census of Agriculture revealed that land reforms of 1959 were ineffective. "Tenant farms represented 72 and 71 per cent of all operational holding in Khairpur and Hyderabad divisions respectively when compared with West Pakistan where only 42% for West Pakistan or 41% for Lahore division in the irrigated zone of Punjab."<sup>22</sup> Similar was the case with the land reforms provisions of 1972 under which the land ceiling was fixed to 150 crores of irrigated or 300 acres of unirrigated land. But there, reforms initiated by Bhutto were minimal and that he had not instituted revolutionary changes but had simply restructured the status quo."<sup>23</sup> With increased mechanisation and the movement of the landed gentry into industry, unemployment increased and conditions of share croppers worsened. This led to the growth of an anti-land lord movement and the rise of the peasant movement with left leanings.

#### **Inequitable Economic Development and Aggregation of Sindhi Grievances:**

The roots of crises of the Pakistan state and its failure to resolve the issue of ethnic nationalism lies

---

22. P. Bukhari, "Sharing in the development of Sindh, Some Problems of the Institutional Framework 1959-1975", in Hamida Khuro, ed., Sindh Through the Countries (Karachi, 1981), p.191.
23. Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol.98, Oct. 14, 1977, p.10.

partly in the development strategies followed by the various governments. The composition of the ruling class and the device to maintain a military parity with India dominated the development strategy so much so that "defence was not only the largest item in capital expenditure but also swallowed as much as 68% of the centre's revenue."<sup>24</sup>

A policy of capitalist development autarchic in nature which benefited the nascent capitalist class and served the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie was followed. With the business in the hands of the Muhajirs and the Punjabi regional differences were accentuated. Moreover the state entrusted at this stage the entire task of industrialisation to the private sector. As a result of a low saving rate the country was dependent for capital development on foreign aid and income redistribution in favour of agricultural development. In what was termed as the development decades the government gave top priority to economic development. So much so that during the Ayub period it was argued that the road to eventual equalities may inevitably lie through initial inequalities.

---

24. Ayesha Jalal, "State building in Post War World Britain's Colonial Legacy: American Futures and Pakistan", in Sugta Bose, ed., South Asia and World Capitalism, (Delhi, 1981), p.274.

It was believed that programme of speedy economic development such as building of roads and bridges and spread of education would lead to the emergence of a strong middle class. The formation of one unit aroused fears in Sind that the centre wanted to destroy their separate cultural identity. "The military government contrary to its promises of the parliamentary government distributed the best of the land (in Sind) among the senior military and civilian bureaucrats and local peasants were totally ignored."<sup>25</sup> This led to the belief among the Sindhis that they virtually had no say in economic development. The Sindhis felt deprived on the issue of distribution of water and felt strongly disenchanted with both the Ayub and Yahya regimes.

#### **Political Development in Pakistan and the Growth of Ethno-Nationalist Movement in Sindh;**

The creation of a separate Sind in 1936 with Karachi as its capital gave the Sindhi Muslim's hope for a majority in their province, but the Sindhi Hindus continued to control the business. Thus in 1939 Sindhi supported the League demand for Pakistan, hoping to extend their power by driving out the Hindus. By 1945 G.M. Sayed who was later to lead

---

25. Tahir Amin, Ethno-national Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors, (Islamabad, 1988), p.86.

the Jiye Sind movement left the Muslim League on the ground that it was working for a highly unitary and a "dictatorial type of policy with no autonomy."<sup>26</sup> It is argued that Syed was asking for an independent republic of Sindh when the British forces withdrew from the subcontinent.<sup>27</sup>

The perceptions of Sindhi elites were further crystallised by some actions of the new Pakistani government. First was the detachment of Karachi and its surrounding areas from Sindh and creation of a federal district out of it. In fact in the eyes of Sindhi Muslims this dismemberment of the province symbolized the advent of Punjabi-Mohajir dominance at the expense of the minorities. The separation of Karachi had immediate repercussions such as abolition of Sindhi in local city politics, replacement of Sindhis in city jobs and the shut down of Sindhi department of Karachi university and a ban on the use of Sindhi in the University as a medium of examination. In fact the Sindhi anguish and its articulation "can be traced to Pakistan's early days when Karachi was separated from Sindh."<sup>28</sup>

---

26. *ibid.*, p.70.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Dawn*, 22 November, 1978.

The second development which antagonised Sind was federal intervention in provincial politics which, was in part the product of factionalism. The dismissal of Khuro in 1948 on the Karachi issue and of Abdul Sattar on the issue of opposition to one unit system turned the Sindhis against the central government.

The third major development in the post partition years was the change in the demographic matrix of Sindh. The departure of one million Hindu Sindhis and the resettlement of more than one million Urdu speaking Sindhis changed the character of Sindh to the disadvantage of the old Sindhis. "As a highly literate group which more than any other group, recognized the value of education as a ladder to social success, the Muhajirs subscribed to an ethos which was dominated by middle class values."<sup>29</sup> Thus there developed conflicting interests between Sindhis and Muhajir over resources and jobs. These developments further reinforced Sindhi grievances.

The Pakistani state at its inception had made it clear that provincial autonomy as promised by the Muslim League was a difficult proposition. To counter the state and to

---

29. Feroz Ahmed, "The Rise of Mohajir Separatism", South Asia Bulletin (California), vol.8, No.92, Spring Fall 1988, p.34.

articulate Sindhi demands G.M. Syed had established the Sind Progressive Party in 1947. In 1953 a coalition of four parties Sind Awami Jannat, Sind Jinnah Awami League, Dastoor Party and Sind Hari Committee was formed under G.M. Sayed's leadership and named the Sind Awami Mahaaz. The movement at this stage struggled only for provincial autonomy.

#### **Development of Ethno-Nationalist Movement in the Ayub period**

The Ayub period marked a centralisation of the Pakistan polity. The state apparatus became increasingly bureaucratized. He doubted politicians and instituted a system where they were not allowed a playing field. He is said to have remarked that because of the corrupt politicians Pakistan needed a "controlled form of democracy with checks and counter checks."<sup>30</sup> He regarded ethnic sentiment and provincial autonomy as a danger. The state elite in this period came mostly from the Punjabis, Mohajirs and Pushtuns. Sindhis were grossly under represented in this period. The colonial policy of recruitment to the army had not been altered and this was a grouse in the Sindhi society.

The one unit system under which West Pakistan gained

---

30. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, (London, 1967), p.187.



numerical parity with East Pakistan was instituted by Ayub in 1955 to counter the Bengalis in the East. But in the provinces it was perceived as an attack on their ethnic identity. An indirect system which deliberately underrepresented the growing middle class and an articulate working class was put in place. "Basic democracies provided the ideal framework within which the Mohajir-Punjabi alliance could press on with their particular construction of a strong Pakistani state...."<sup>31</sup> This policy denied any entry point for Sindhi elite in the services. Ayub also took measures such as the Education Commission of 1958 under which Urdu was made the medium of instruction and regional languages were banned. As a reaction to the state's policies a variety of cultural organizations such as Bazam Soofiyan Sindh, Sind Adahi Sangat, Sind Students Cultural Organization and Sind Azad Students Organisation came up. The Jiye Sind Students Federation came up in 1966. While the peasants of Sind came to be organised under Haider Bux Jatoi. The word Jiye Sind which meant long live Sindh was first used by Haider Bux Jatoi in one of his poems.

Sindhis, argued G.M. Syed, could not get their share

---

31. Vernon Marston Hewitt, The International Politics of South Asia (Manchester, 1992), p.115.

for "they are unrepresented in the two key institutions the army and the bureaucracy."<sup>32</sup> He argued during this phase that Sindhis are a separate nation with a rich language and culture. The emphasis of the Jiye Sindh Movement was on the dissolution of one unit system and the restoration of Sindhi as an official language. The activities of the movement was seen by the state elites as secessionist while the Jiye Sindh Movement viewed the state as a coloniser and an exploiter.

#### **Development of Ethno Nationalist Movement in the Bhutto period**

The formation of Bangladesh in 1971 gave an impetus to the Jiye Sindh Movement in Pakistan. The movement was greatly influenced by the Marxists Leninist tactics in this period. Due to a strong protest movement the Ayub regime had lost its legitimacy and in the brief Yahya period the one unit system was dissolved and general elections were held. The movement in Sind declined during the early seventies and G.M. Syed supported PPP in its election campaign. The military rule came to an end with the emergence of Bangladesh in the wake of Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.

---

32. G.M. Syed as quoted in Tahir Amin, n.24, p.93.

G.M. Syed put forward a demand for declaration of 'Sindhi' as the state language and preparation of voters lists in 'Sindhi' along with 'Urdu'. He also put forward a demand for regional autonomy. The NAP of Sindh also supported his demand for the "autonomy to provincial government as envisaged in the Pakistan resolution of the Muslim League adopted in Lahore in 1940."<sup>33</sup>

The Jiye Sind movement which was operating as Sindh United Front split into Jiye Sind Mahaz led by G.M. Syed and a radical faction i.e. the Sindh Aulmi Tehrik led by Rasul Bux Palejo on ideological differences. The Jiye Sind Tehrik was a successor of the Hari party of Haider Bux Jatui. Its programme in the Seventies was distribution of land to the landless and eviction of non-Sindhi land lords from Sind. It preached Maoist socialism while its three sections worked separately among farmers, students and labourers.

The movement was to a large extent overshadowed by the position of Pakistan's People's Party in Sindh. Mumtaz Bhutto the then Chief Minister adopted the 'Sindhi only Bill' and patronised the moderate sections of the PPP and some members of Syed's faction were taken in the government.

---

33. G.M. Syed as quoted in Kaushik, n.12, p.152.

The passage of the language Bill on July 8, 1972 under which Sindhi was made the official language of the Province led to riots between Sindhis and Mohajirs. An ordinance had to be passed to prevent civil strife that no person could be removed, refused appointment or promotion in any service on the ground of lack of knowledge of Urdu or Sindhi.

G.M. Syed came to the conclusion that the promised autonomy under Bhutto was unlikely. He began advocating a hard line position in which he presented a 63 point programme for the formation of Sindhu Desh. Jiye Sind ~~disap~~proved the repatriation of Biharis from Bangladesh. The ideological difference with Sindh Awami Tehrik was not sorted out and Tehrik gave priority "to the liberation of Sindhi nation from the oppression of other nations."<sup>34</sup>

But this was a period of decline for the movement. The reasons are many. One of the major reasons was that under the Bhutto regime the Sindhis were accommodated in the government jobs. Secondly Bhutto's policies of development succeeded in substantially raising the development level in Sindh.

In brief, this sums up the construction of Sindhi identity. The process of identity formation involves con-

---

34. The Muslim (Islamabad), 4 July, 1986.

flicts amongst contending groups. Sindhis suffered as a result of colonial policy. The Punjabi 'salarial' was the largest and came to dominate the Pakistani state. The Sindhi elites were much less in number. The state began to follow policies which were detrimental to their interest. In the birth of a fractured state lay the seeds of the Sindhi ethno-nationalist movement. The unitary policies followed by the military oligarchy hurt the interests and the Sindhis were marginalised. The result was a strong ethno-nationalist movement during the Ayub period. It lost its momentum during the Bhutto regime but intensified as result of the socio-economic policies of General Zia.

## CHAPTER III

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE ZIA REGIME

In May 1977, Prime Minister Bhutto called for a general election when the support base of his government had weakened. The election in which the PPP faced a combined opposition under the PNA, was marred by violence, especially in the cities, and the electoral verdict in favour of Bhutto was attributed to rigging and widespread corruption. Bhutto's refusal for a fresh poll led to an agitation in the major cities. When negotiations with PNA were about to be concluded successfully the military, under the leadership of General Zia-ul Haq, deposed Prime Minister Bhutto and took over the country on 5th July, 1977. "This *coup d'état* brought back the same pattern of military bureaucratic rule which Pakistan had experienced under the Ayub regime (1958-69)."<sup>1</sup> Zia brought about many changes in the social, political and economic policies of Pakistan. In some cases he completely altered the existing institutions to suit the needs of the new regime.

The social and economic policies of General Zia were

---

1. Tahir Amin, Ethno National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors (Islamabad, 1988), p.169.

closely intertwined with the political structure that he put in place. Any analysis of Zia's policies would also require a parallel review of the regime's social basis and political institutions. For, it is these political institutions built by Zia which acted as instruments to implement his socio-economic policies.

### **Social basis of Zia's regime**

Zia's main constituency from which he had drawn his authority had been the civil military bureaucracy. This military bureaucratic elite a "product of incomplete transition from pre-capitalist modes of production to peripheral capitalism",<sup>2</sup> wielding disproportionate degree of power was the base on which rested Zia's regime. Zia was well aware of the causes of the fall of Ayub and Bhutto governments. They had fallen because they had failed to address the issues of urban middle class. He realised that if he had to succeed he would have to broaden the base of his polity. The disenchantment of the urban middle classes, only, had led to the vociferous opposition to these regimes in which the 'urban marginals'<sup>3</sup> played a key role. Thus the junta which, in the early stages of power, depended upon the military bureaucra-

---

2. UCLA, "The Post Colonial State in South Asia: The Case of Pakistan", Hasan N. Gardezi, South Asia Bulletin, (California), vol.V, No.2, Fall 1985, p.1.

3. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto. 1971-77 (London, 1980), p.193.

cy began a process of 'Civilinisation'<sup>4</sup> of the regime. This meant co-option of the members of the middle class and the upper middle class into the polity. This could only be done by putting in place institutions which presented a facade of democracy and which in the process would also act as safety valves to check dissent. The urban middle classes supported General Zia, but did not associate with the regime in large numbers. The limited role given to them in the political process was also in a large measure unacceptable to them. But still, the strength to the regime was provided inadvertently by their middle class which had developed a stake in the status quo. With economic development from 1960 to 1982 the urban areas acquired greater importance. A marked shift from agriculture which accounted for 46% of GDP in 1960 was visible in the 1980's. In 1982 the share of agriculture was 31%. During the same period, the share of industry and manufacturing rose from 28% of the GDP to 42%.<sup>5</sup> Thus these classes acquired a greater stake in the stability of the system. Zia cultivated these classes assiduously by co-opting members of this class in the consultative assembly (*majlis-e-shoora*), which gave him a semblance of civilian

---

4. Veena Kukreja, Civil Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (New Delhi, 1991), p.96.

5. World Development Report, 1984 (New York), p.260.



backing from 1981 to 1985. In the rural areas he maintained the status quo by not carrying out any far reaching reforms which would hurt the landed gentry. The landlords had acquired considerable economic and social power in the post-green revolution phase in the rural areas. Their support was necessary also because the middle peasant and the rural labour did not support the regime. The middle peasant felt slighted for he did not have political status power commensurate with his newly acquired economic status. The regime was not supported by the landless and the rural poor for they were now worse off as a result of increased mechanisation.

But outside the sphere of social classes another area from which he secured support was from his own caste 'arain'. General Zia successfully enlisted the support of several 'arain' professionals and politicians, as his advisors, confidants, cabinet ministers and image builders. But General Zia had understood that these measures would sustain his regime but to acquire legitimacy and check dissent he would have to alter the pre-existing nature of Pakistan's political structures.

#### Political measures for Regime sustenance

The measures which General Zia undertook can be put in

three phases. The first phase was 1977-79 when the regime consolidated its position and outmanoeuvred the civilian opposition. From 1979 to 1983 the regime tightened its control depoliticised the state structures and smothered opposition under martial law. The third period began in 1983 with attempts to introduce civilian elements when the regime felt threatened and ostracised from the political groups and masses in the country.

The army under Zia had justified its intervention in the democratic state by claiming that Pakistan was on the verge of civil war.<sup>6</sup> But Zia declared that this would not deter him from holding elections within 90 days. General Zia declared: "My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections, which would be held in October (1977) this year. Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule. During the next three months my total attention will be concentrated on the holding of elections and I would not like to dissipate my powers and energies as the Chief Martial Law administrator on anything else."<sup>7</sup> But it became

---

6. Dawn (Karachi), 7 July 1977.

7. Dawn, July 10, 1977.

clear that the policy measures which he undertook were not those of an interim regime. Long term economic changes were incorporated in the Five Year Plan. The Fifth Plan (1978-83) emphasised the pre-dominance of the private sector. This secured him acquiescence of the local bourgeoisie to the regime. Zia immediately began to hob-nob with the rightist elements in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) which had led the movement against Bhutto. Zia wanted the Jamiat coalition which consisted of parties as the Pagaro Muslim League, Jamiaat-e-ulam-e-Pakistan (JUP), the Jamiaat-e-ulam-e Islam (JUI) and Jama'at-i-Islami to form a government. But this attempt did not materialise. In fact the PNA was split. The Islamic parties and the Muslim League in the beginning joined the government. But after the execution of Bhutto, the Islamic parties felt bypassed by the civil-military bureaucracy and withdrew from the government. Another threat to him was from the PPP. As the period between Bhutto's first arrest and the second incarceration revealed, Bhutto's PPP still had a considerable support base. "The army and the United States intelligence sources reported to the authorities that Bhutto might have lost the battle of the streets but he was headed for another victory

via the ballot box."<sup>8</sup> Therefore, Bhutto was re-arrested with tacit approval from the PNA leadership and charged for involvement in an old murder case. With the 'discovery' of Bhutto's misdeeds a massive propaganda campaign was launched against him and his ousted regime. These was taken as a pretext to postpone the elections.

The date of elections was again fixed on 17th November 1979. The government changed the rules and regulations for elections causing acute political confusion. In the meantime Zia started a new system similar to that of Ayub, at the local level, i.e. he gave directions for elections to local bodies on the lines of 'basic democracy' of Ayub Khan. But the system had fallen to so much disrepute that Zia tried to distance his system from basic democracy....<sup>9</sup> The aim of these elections was to build a rural constituency, secure the regime from rural unrest and to build an electoral college for constituting the National Assembly. A large number of people "with ties to the political parties, and especially the PPP, were elected."<sup>10</sup> The success of the PPP candidates alarmed the military and it postponed the elections for a

---

8. Gardezi, n.2, p.5.

9. Kukreja, n.4, p.96.

10. Hassan Azkari Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan" in Asian Survey (California), vol.XXIV, No.5, May 1983, p.541.

second time. Through these measures enforced between 1977 and 1979, the army consolidated its position vis-a-vis other groups and increased state power. But this process of centralization and insulation of the government alienated the different ethnic groups as the system became less and less responsive to the demands of the people.

In contrast to the first phase, in the second phase the army made its intentions very clear. Zia warned that "I will neither leave the scene nor allow any one else to rise."<sup>11</sup> Internally the state was gradually being transformed into a theocracy. During this period i.e. from November 1979 to August 1983, the promise to hold elections was often repeated. The reasons for not holding elections were couched in ambiguous terms whereby the military called the people to work for the "welfare and good" of everybody. At times the need for establishment of an "Islamic system of democracy" was cited as a higher priority. In an address to the federal council on August 12, 1983 General Zia declared that he would hold elections to the provincial assemblies sometime in late 1984, followed by elections to the National Assembly. This process, the General maintained, was to be

---

11. Quoted in The Quarterly Report on Pakistan, Economic Intelligence Unit (London), second quarter, 1984, p.6.

completed by March 23, 1985, and would make the withdrawal of martial law possible.<sup>12</sup> In the same period the regime set up military courts with comprehensive powers. With no judicial check on them, these courts served as an instrument to bludgeon any voice of dissent against the regime. These military courts operated in a framework of absolute power, defined by a decree empowering the government to detain any person acting against the government. Political activity itself was punishable by a seven years rigorous imprisonment. Punishments such as public lashes were first introduced as a part of martial rule regulations and were only later on incorporated as punishments under Islamisation. The power of judicial review of the legality and constitutionality of executive decisions was removed, and, "the judiciary was deprived of the authority to protect civil rights."<sup>13</sup> In 1979 the Constitution was amended suitably to create a parallel structure of courts with civil courts. The military extended the jurisdiction of military tribunals, at the expense of the judiciary. The same order barred the higher courts from reviewing the actions of military courts. The process of depriving the rights of

---

12. Pakistan Times (Lahore), August 13.

13. Omar Noman, "Pakistan under General Zia", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.1, No.1, Jan. 1989, p.34.

people continued, when under the provisional constitutional order of 24th March 1981 the judicial scrutiny of executive actions was banned. Judicial protections against arbitrary arrest was eliminated by the removal of the right of a prisoner to *habeas corpus*. It was for the first time that this right had been denied in Pakistan.

Political parties, especially the PPP, were threatened with dire consequences and in fact Zia "threatened to take much more drastic actions than simply having it (PPP) banned."<sup>14</sup> For, the threat from the PPP instead of decreasing had increased as the disgruntled masses saw in Bhutto's trial a 'judicial murder' and increasingly began identifying with the PPP in Sindh. Zia banned the student unions and activities of students in politics. By 1983 Zia had successfully contained the major threats to the regime. Political parties had been banned, judiciary and press marginalised and coup attempts from within the army checked successfully. The process of deinstitutionalisation of the political structures had been complete. The unintended consequence was that a strong opposition to the regime was being built up in the masses. A wider social and political base was still proving elusive. To break the ostracisation

---

14. Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol.99, Jan. 6, 1978, pp.20-21.

of the regime Zia took measures by announcing a schedule for the intake of civilians through a controlled system of elections. Zia knew that military governments have to contend with demands for general democratic participation and have to give in to some extent to maintain themselves in power. An inability to meet popular demands leads to increased coercion by the military government which further aggravates the military's isolation. He knew that military regimes "are inherently unstable".<sup>15</sup> Keeping this in mind, on 12th August 1983, he announced a detailed framework whereby civilians were to be inducted into the administration. The MRD agitation against the regime was a manifestation of the growing dissent against Zia's misrule.

Zia held elections to local bodies in 1983 and to the Provincial and National Assembly on 28th and 25th February. He banned political parties from elections and ordered the press not to make any mention of the parties in the elections. The MRD meeting at Abbottabad decided not to participate in the elections if they were not held according to the 1973 Constitution. The 1985 elections had a large turnout of 52%. The large turnout indicated people's faith in

---

15. Eric A. Nordlinger, Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977), p.139.



any electoral process which would delimit the power of the army. But doubts about the role which was envisaged for the legislature by the army came out to be true when Zia announced amendments to the 1973 Constitution without consultation with or requiring the satisfaction of the legislature. No provision of any of the laws passed under the martial law could be amended without the President's permission. The President could dissolve the National Assembly without the Prime Minister's consent. The constitutional changes further centralized the polity. Thus there emerged a contradiction between the legislature which saw itself as a predecessor to a fully democratic government and the military which had no intention of loosening the reins of power.

The controlled system of democracy gave a semblance of power to the Parliament and Junejo gave a lot more freedom to other political parties; press censorship was lifted and professional politicians were inducted in the posts held previously by technocrats. Junejo tried to "assert the supremacy of the civilian government over the civil military bureaucracy."<sup>16</sup> Junejo had become critical of the military on issues of economic spending, law and order and Afghani-

---

16. Rasul B. Roy, "Pakistan in 1987 Transition to Democracy", Asian Survey, vol.XXVII, No.2, February 1988, p.132.

stan. Consequently, Zia dismissed him and it is argued that at this point "Zia's military theocracy had arrived at another end of a cul de sac."<sup>17</sup>

Even before, Zia's Islam served as a policy of national integration vis-a-vis regional and ethnic separatism. Zia needed an ideology to legitimise and build a cohesive polity. He therefore carried out certain changes for building an Islamic State. Under him Islam and the national question was again raised strongly, though earlier, the "integrative power of Islam had failed to overcome nationalism to which the creation of Bangladesh was an ample proof."<sup>18</sup> Zia died but it was clear that if he lived he would have only allowed a controlled form of democracy in which the military had the last word. Thus by the end of his rule Zia had largely alienated other nationalities, carried out repressive policies, and pursued and drafted undemocratic and draconian laws thereby turning more and more people against the regime. This especially had an impact on groups which earlier also were aggrieved. The result of militarisation of society and polity meant that these groups felt more at

---

17. Vernmon M. Hewitt, The International Politics of South Asia (Manchester, 1992), p.122.

18. Asaf Husain, "Ethnicity, National Identity and Practorian: The Case of Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol.XVI, No.10, October 1976, p.925.

loss than before.

### The Policy of Islamisation

Despite the failure of Islam in keeping Pakistan together, Zia came to power promising Nizami-i-Mustafa -- the system of Islam. He said in an interview that he was the "first who was serious about the implementation of the tenets of Islam."<sup>19</sup> They were to serve as a reliable orientation for the whole of society to reunite it on a political and ideological ground. He reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology and broadened its scope so as to serve as a guide to the President on Islamic system of government. In December 1978 the President proclaimed Pakistan's new beginning in which he announced the creation of 'Shariat benches' to determine whether the existing laws were repugnant to Islam or not. In February 1979 as the Chief Martial Law administrator, Zia formalized the commitment of his government to establish an Islamic way of life and a series of reforms were announced in the legal, economic and educational system. In 1981 the Council of Islamic Ideology was told to reconsider the basis of Pakistan's system of governance. But before its final report came out President Zia had

---

19. Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 21 February 1979.

already appointed a Majlis-a-Shoora or a Federal Advisory Council with an "aim to help the government accelerate the process of Islamisation, to create conditions congenial for establishment of Islamic democracy, to apprise the government with views on international issues; to assist the government in overcoming social and economic difficulties faced by the people."<sup>20</sup> To review the basis of Islamisation Zia called for a referendum on December 28, 1984. The referendum was meant as an indicator to check the support of the people for his policies. Under its terms Zia could continue as President till 1990. As a part of his drive to Islamise the society, a federal shariat court was established. Interest free-banking and a compulsory tax - zakat - (2.5% of annual deduction from saving accounts and other investments) was introduced. The most important areas of legal reform was in the implementation of the hudood punishments, for drinking, theft, adultery and false accusations etc. regarding sexual crimes. The penal code stipulated severe punishments such as lashes, stoning and amputation: The overall impact of Zia's Islamisation programme was not positive. The regime lost the support of the liberal and

---

20. John L. Esposito, "Islam Ideology and Politics in Pakistan" in Banuzizi, Ali and Myron Weiner, eds., The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, (Karachi, 1987), p.346.

secular intelligentsia. The provinces regarded the process of Islamisation as an attack on their identity. Religious groups other than the Sunnis felt strongly about the imposition of Sunni Islam. But Zia strengthened the position of the army and dominant groups to stay in power as the ideology of Islam had a appeal in the lower middle classes and the rural poor.

### **Recruitment and Quota Policies under Zia**

General Zia leaned heavily on the military for power. This prompted him to distribute the material rewards in a more consistent and extensive manner than his predecessor Ayub Khan. The higher echelons of the military thus emerged as the most privileged caste in Pakistan. The state elite of the regime came from a background similar to that of the Ayub era.<sup>21</sup> It is said that under Zia "there had been pressure to make the military more representative ethnically but they met with little success."<sup>22</sup> The character of the top military bureaucratic elite also remained mainly Punjabi and Mohajir dominated. Zia did not make any changes in the

---

21. Cohen indicates that in 1978 class of students admitted to Pakistan Military Academy was about 70% Punjabi, 14% from NWFP, 8% from Sind, 3% from Baluchistan and 1.3 % from Azad Kashmir. See Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley, CA, 1984), p.44.

22. Banuzizi, Ali and Myron Weiner, eds., n.20, p.14.

recruitment policies of the military or bureaucracy as the data below depicts.

Table 3.1

**Ethnic Origins of Top Military Elite**

Punjab	20	40%
Pushtu	17	34%
Mohajir	10	20%
Sindhi	1	2%
Baluch	0	0%
Others	2	4%
<hr/>		
Total	50	100%

Source: Adapted from Amin, Regional Representation in Pakistan Army, An unpublished report, 1981, p.175.

Table 3.2

**Ethnic Origins of the Top Bureaucratic Elite  
(Class 1 Officers)**

	Number	Per cent
Punjabis	6590	47.94
Pushtoons	1638	11.91
Mohajirs	2382	17.32
Sindhis	601	4.37
Baluchis	103	.74
Others	2438	17.72
<hr/>		
Total	13752	100.00

Source: Federal Government Civil Servant Census Report, January 1983, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1984). Adapted from Tahir Amin, p.174.

The above tabulated data depicts a Punjabi-Mohajir dominance in the bureaucracy despite the working of an extensive quota system. The quota system which was put into place in 1949 was meant to achieve balanced levels of institutional development. But due to regional disparities within the system and nationalisation carried out by Prime Minister Bhutto federal and provincial quotas had to be expanded. The quota systems working shows that over a period of time it had decreased the disparities. "That is, the quota had made the bureaucracy demonstrably more representative, or the quota had lessened the over-representation of urban Sind and perhaps the Punjab, while increasing the representation of other provinces."<sup>23</sup>

But Zia altered this system of quotas. "Since 1979 10% of the vacancies in the competitive entry examination conducted at the federal and provincial levels has been reserved for former military officers."<sup>24</sup> This has had a long term impact of increasing the Punjabi-Mohajir domination in the civilian bureaucracy, education and public sector units.

---

23. Charles H. Kennedy, "Politics of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan" in Asian Survey, vol.XXIV, No.6, June 1984, p.699.

24. Charles H. Kennedy, "Ethnic Preference in Pakistan" in Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy, eds., The Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States, (Boulder, Colorado, 1986), p.73.

These policies have exacerbated the perceptions of inequities amongst people. Another aspect of his recruitment policy had been the appointment of military officers to top civil jobs leading to the "military colonization of other institutions" whereby as in all praetorian regimes "the military acts as a reservoir or core of personnel for the sensitive institutions of the state."<sup>25</sup>

**Table 3.3**  
**Regional Representation in the Federal bureaucracy of Pakistan**

Region	Quota (per cent)	Secretariat (1980)	
		Grades 16-22	Grades 20-22
Punjab	50	5,839(55.1%)	325(57.0%)
Urban Sind	7.6	2,461(23.2)	124(21.8)
Rural Sind	11.4	525(5.0)	21(3.7)
NWFP	11.5	1,189(11.2)	71(12.5)
Baluchistan	3.5	325(3.1)	23(4.0)
Northern Areas	4	208(2.0)	2(0.4)
Azad Kashmir	2	58(0.5)	4(0.7)

Adapted from Charles H. Kennedy.

Policies of Ethnic Preference, p.689.  
Asian Survey, vol.XXIV, No.6, June 1984.

25. S.E. Finer, "The Military and Politics in Third World" in W. Scott Thompson, ed., The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy (San Francisco, 1978), p.84.



The military government officers were assigned for jobs in civil administration and in semi-government and autonomous corporations. Retired officers of the ranks of Brigadier and above held the positions of federal or provincial Secretaries and were also inducted into the central superior services. Army personnel were appointed in the foreign service and the police service of Pakistan. In actual practice the military appointments in the civilian bureaucracy were higher than the reserved quota for "e.g. in mid-1982, 18 of the 42 Pakistani ambassadors posted abroad came from the military."<sup>26</sup> It is argued that military preferences proliferated pertaining to the admissions of sons and daughters of military personnel to medical, engineering and law schools. Most of the military officers who benefited from these preferences were Punjabis or Pathans as these two groups dominated the military. This led to a sense of discrimination in Sindh and Baluchistan which were otherwise also grossly underrepresented. The Mohajir Punjabi axis became stronger. It aroused strong anti Mohajir and anti Punjabi feelings in Sindh.

---

26. Rizvi, n.10, p.550.

### Culture Policy of the Zia regime

The Zia government changed the previous culture policy of the regime and took measures to 'integrate' the country. The 'integrative' measures could be seen in the official emphasis on Pakistani nationalism with an Islamic outlook. The Independence Day was celebrated with great fervour and unitary aspects of the Islamic culture were emphasised. The motto 'Faith, Discipline, Unity' was displayed at public buildings and the birth and death anniversaries of Iqbal and Jinnah were celebrated with more than usual fanfare. The regime launched campaigns to popularize the waving of the national flags.

"The emphasis on one language i.e. Urdu and its primacy over the other regional languages returned."<sup>27</sup> The role of regional languages was marginalised so much so that the Urdu and Sindhi languages bill of 1972 which allowed for the use of Sindhi in Sindh and would have made Sindhi an essential requirement for jobs after 1984 was revoked, i.e. the provision for the enforcement of Sindhi was not enforced. Organisations except for the ones which had pro-Zia government credentials were not allowed to publish in Sindhi. 'Soneh' a magazine in Sindhi edited by Feroz Ahmad a well known

---

27. Tahir Amin, n.1, p.178.

intellectual was banned. Urdu was promoted and cultural exchanges of Urdu poets and writers with India were encouraged. The Sindhi cultural groups were denied visas as a part of government policy to unify Pakistan on the basis of Urdu language. Similarly it was announced that Urdu would replace English at the matriculation by 1989."<sup>28</sup> Media including the "television, which has become the dominant mass medium and principal cultural influence has only a token place for the national languages of Pakistan."<sup>29</sup> During the entire week the Karachi television station, the only one in Sindh, telecast not more than one hour of a programme in Sindhi. Similarly radio programmes in Sindhi were limited. The national dress of Pakistan was declared as salwar kameez and it was made the official dress. But when there were protests in the provinces the regime gave in and made it a policy that it could alternate with the provincial dresses. This stress on statist nationalism and promotion of a homogenising culture and nationalism was taken as an affront to their identity by the other provinces. This culture policy was seen as a mere extension of Punjabi-

---

28. Kennedy, n.24, p.63.

29. Feroz Ahmad, "Pakistan's Problems of National Integration" in Asghar Khan, ed., Islam Politics and the State. The Pakistan Experience, (London, 1985), p.239.

Mohajir nationalism.

### Economic Policies of the Zia regime

Pakistan's economic development can be divided into four phases. The first phase was a period of low rate of growth with GNP increasing annually by 3.1% during the 1949-58 period. It was a formative period of low economic development, marked by weak governments. The 1958-71 was a period of high rate of growth with large scale development and inequitous growth but the rate of growth was around 5.7%. The third phase was the period of egalitarian development when Bhutto tried to remove certain inequities within the system especially in the context of the provinces. The Zia period was a phase of regime consolidation and uneven development where power lobbies and interest groups which were central for the survival of the regime were accommodated. It was a period of high growth with GNP averaging between 6 to 7% during 1977 and 1988. The regime during this period followed a vigorous development strategy. It accorded highest priority to building infrastructure, roads, electricity and improving the means of communication. The regime harped on equitable and balanced provinces. It also led to increase in a sharp increase in inequalities within the provinces.

In fact, a comparative study of Sindh and Punjab in different fields during this period would show that the regimes policies, though promising equitable development, lead to wide gaps in growth.

*Table 3.4*

A Comparison of Industries between Sind and Punjab, 1971-81

		1971	1981	
No. of large scale manufacturing industries	Sindh	386	312	Decline in the absolute number of industries in Sindh
	Punjab	1907	2070	In Punjab the number of industries went up
(a) Food manufacture and beverages	Sindh	177	118	Net decline in Sindh
	Punjab	184	238	Punjab registers a rise
(b) Chemical Industries	Sindh	12	12	Sindh has a constant number
	Punjab	78	82	Punjab registers a rise
(c) Textile and Weaving	Sindh	89	47	A massive fall in Sindh
	Punjab	353	464	A large rise in Punjab
(d) Manufacture of fabricated metals	Sindh	11	6	Fall in Sindh sharper
	Punjab	264	183	than in Punjab

Adapted from Regional Imbalances and National Questions in Pakistan some indicators.

S. Akbar Saidi, Economic and Political Weekly, vol.XXIV, No.6, February 11, 1989.

Karachi in this study is not taken as a part of Sindh though it lies in the administrative region of the province of Sindh and is for all practical purposes a part of Sindh. But if Karachi is included as a part of Sindh the figures would show a quantum jump and would distort the real conditions in Sindh. Secondly the ownership of industry and transfer of profits from Karachi by Pathans, Mohajirs and Punjabis hides the actual development status of the rest of Sindh.

The industrial development between the two periods shows only an increase in disparities and does not in any way depict an improvement in the condition of the province of Sindh. Social indicators of Sindh and Punjab also present a picture of unequal growth.

This underdevelopment has persisted because of certain socio-economic factors in the province which are often accentuated by the policies of military regimes. According to a study "In the federal government secretariat and related departments Punjab has 56% posts, rural Sindh 3%, NWFP 11%, Baluchis 2.5% while urban Sindh (Karachi and Hyderabad) comprising mainly under Urdu speaking Mohajirs and Punjabis i.e. non Sindhis has 25% representation. In the government sector corporations Punjab has 41% of the middle and senior

level posts, urban Sindh 47%, rural Sindh 4.5%, NWFP 6%, Baluchistan 1%."30 As this data is based on domicile and not ethnic groups they show less representation of Mohajir and Punjabis than their actual number.

*Table 3.5*

**Social Indicators depicting Provincial Inequality**

		1972	1981	Conclusion
% of total population	Sindh	10.5	13.7	Rate of population increased in Sindh
	Punjab	5.8	5.6	Decline in the case of Punjab
Literacy	Sindh	22.5	21.0	In Sindh literacy rate went down
	Punjab	20.7	24.0	Marginal improvement in literacy rate in Punjab
Primary school enrolment rate	Sindh	39	35	In Sindh enrolment took a downward turn
	Punjab	31.5	33	In Punjab it increased marginally
Secondary school enrolment rate	Sindh	35	13	Very sharp fall in the case of Sindh
	Punjab	33	32.8	Marginal fall in the case of Punjab

Adapted from S. Akbar Zaidi, *EPW*, vol.XXIV, No.6, Feb. 11, 1989. "Regional Imbalances and National Question in Pakistan, Some Indicators".

30. Shahid Kardar, *The Political Economy of Pakistan*, (Lahore, 1987), p.42.

Moreover the jobs held by Sindhis were low ranking and lowly paid. People's Party government gave some jobs in the nationalised sector; but the military regime purged tens of thousands of Sindhis from government service and public sector enterprises. It banned strikes as part of its pro-capitalist bias.

The regime paid only lip service to equitable distribution of wealth. The financial powers of the provinces were limited and policy implementation at the provincial level was further circumscribed by the usurpation of power of provincial bureaucrats. This was done by regulating the power of transfer and appointment by the federal government. As a result of these measures policy planning at the local level suffered and economic grievances at the grass root level were not addressed.

The financial powers of the provinces were limited and central allocation saw a decline. "In 1971-72 the provinces investment expenditure constituted 70% of the central government's investment finances. By 1980-81 the provincial investment proportion decreased to 26.2% of



central investment finance."<sup>31</sup>

In the 1981-82 to 1983-84 period, Punjab received 57.58% of the central tax transfer, while Sindh received only 22.58% of the total share. Agrarian capitalism flourished and Punjab benefited at the expense of other provinces, thereby leading to a sense of relative deprivation. The benefits of government's agricultural policy, whereby sector-wise allocation of inputs and credits was done, accrued to Punjab which in any case had better access to power, fertilisers and water. Between 1981-82 and 1983-84, the Agricultural Development Bank gave 72% of its loans in Punjab and only 18% in Sindh. The growth which took place, was not accompanied by equitable distribution as corroborated by the budgetary allocations of the regime. There also existed an urban bias in the policies during this period. "A high proportion of government development expenditure was concentrated in major urban areas."<sup>32</sup>

The government failed to address certain contentious issues. The Mangla and Tarbela dam had resolved the water

---

31. Dietrich Reetz, "National Consolidation or Fragmentation of Pakistan" in Carlyle A. Thayer, ed., Trends and Strains. Pakistan, India, Vietnam, Japan, (New Delhi, 1990, p.91.

32. Kardar, n.30, p.44.

supply to Sindh. The Chasma/Jhelum link canal which would decrease the water supply to Sindh was met with strong opposition. It was seen as a development, at the expense of Sindh by a Punjabi dominated state. The government continued the policy of the previous military regime of allocating land to military officers. It is said that "thirty eight thousand acres of highly productive land in Thatta district was leased out to civil military officials at the rate of Rs.7 an acre for 30 years."<sup>33</sup> Those officers who secured this land were refugee settlers from India or mostly Punjabis who had got themselves registered as Haris. In Sindh, Feroz Ahmed argues that, "forty per cent"<sup>34</sup> of the agricultural land is owned by the non-Sindhis mostly Punjabi landlords. He argues that "economic development of Sindh has largely meant the de-Sindhisation of Sind."<sup>35</sup>

In 1980's due to the global economic boom a large scale international demand for labour was created. But most of the people who migrated were from Punjab. The Sindhis did not share the Gulf bonanza. The level of unemployment was very high in Sindh. In 1987 Sindh had 13,700 unemployed

---

33. Muslim (Islamabad), 3 May 1984.

34. Feroz Ahmed, n.27, p.240.

35. ibid.

graduates which included doctors, engineers and other professionals. The intra provincial comparison between the three provincial universities for jobs is in favour of Karachi. The Sindhi students from Jamshoro and Tando Jam have a difficulty in competing with students from Karachi who are not only better placed, location wise but are also mostly non-Sindhis.

In terms of employment policy the government did not take any affirmative action to remove inequalities. Kardar argues that industrial units within Sindh are "almost manned by non Sindhis."<sup>36</sup> Within rural Sindh out of every hundred workers in military farms and individual units 70 are non-Sindhis. Thus within this period the Sindhi participation in economic growth declined and the chasm between Sindhi and non Sindhi residents widened.

Thus it can be concluded that the regime's emphasis was more on economic efficiency and growth than on distributive policies for the eradication of persisting regional economic disparities. These policies further alienated the Sindhis.

### Consequences

Policy measures such as the postponement of elections

---

36. Kardar, n.30, p.45.

and reliance on a military bureaucratic oligarchy reduced the support base of the regime. It could only cater to powerful interest groups to ensure its survival. The political institutions were further depoliticised. The result of these measures was that the interests of the weaker groups were overlooked. Apart from Baluchistan, it was the province of Sindh which was to suffer the most because of military rule. The Sindhi demands could only be articulated in a democratic system. The loss of political space to the military meant Mohajir-Punjabi domination. This led to the increase in the demands by Sindhis ranging from autonomy to outright secession. The movements such as 'Jiye Sindh' led by G.M. Syed and the leftist organisation Sindh Awami Tehrik of Rasul Bux Palejo became very active as a result of the failure of the system to address the issues of immediate concern. The policies of the government contributed to greater political controversies and polarisation in Pakistan. The identification of the regime with the 'political right' and its tampering with the 1973 Constitution compromised the credibility of the regime. This also undermined the ability of military rulers to find viable solutions to the intricate problems confronted by them. The deepening participatory crises, the lack of consensus on operational norms and the fragile base of civil institutions accentuated

the ethnic movements in Sindh and the anti-regime protests. The Punjabis continued to dominate in a variety of sectors, and particularly the civil and military sectors. The preponderant position of the Punjabi provided grounds for regional claims.

The policy of Islamisation which emphasised the importance of Islam as an identity that could override the feelings of attachment to ethno linguistic claims did influence the ethno-nationalist movement in Sindh. The Sindhis perceived the Islamisation measures not as an overarching ideology for national unity but as a facade for Punjabi Mohajir domination. Moreover, the response of Islam to ethnicity, in actual practice is assimilative in nature with its stress on the unity of the Ummah and on egalitarianism. It is argued that "President Zia took such assimilative tendencies a step further by pursuing a strategy of avoidance, (of resolving ethnic conflict) duly buttressed by Islamic precedence to justify the banning of political parties (many regionally banned) in the federal council election of March 1985. His argument was that partisan divisions are not countenanced by Islam."<sup>37</sup> These measures alienated the Sindhis, as they saw in them, denial of their

---

37. Charles Kennedy, n.24, pp.63-4.

political and cultural rights. The influence of sufism on Islam had infused liberal values in the society and the imposition of Hanafi Islam was not welcomed by the Muslims in Sindh. In fact "victimized were also the Shia Muslims; about 10 to 15% of the population of Pakistan in particular by Zakat legislation and the implementation of special Ersatz measures. Sindh contains the largest concentration of Shi'ites and it was in Sindh that the chief opposition to Zia's Islamic measures developed."<sup>38</sup> Thus as argued above the compulsory payment of Zakat, led to the alienation of the Shias, for it went against their practice of giving alms as recommended by Shia jurisprudence. Shia protests which ultimately led to revocation of this tax for them led to widespread clashes and sharpened Shia-Sunni divide in a already polarized society. The implementation of Hudood ordinances which recommended medieval punishment for crimes such as adultery and theft left a negative impression on the masses. For "those accused of Hudood ordinance crimes, those victimised by such crimes are disproportionately drawn from Pakistan's under class."<sup>39</sup> As the incidence of poverty

---

38. Andre Wink, "The Islamisation of Pakistan and its International Context" in Andre Wink, ed., Islam, Politics and Society in South Asia, (New Delhi, 1991).

39. Charles Kennedy, "Islamization in Pakistan Implementation of the Hudood Ordinance", Asian Survey, vol. XXVII, No.3, March 1988, p.314.

was very high in rural Sindh it was the rural poor who were hurt by such measures. To conclude it can be argued that the processes of Islamisation widened the differences between different nationalities and gave support to ethno-nationalist movement in Sindh. It is argued that "General Zia was not able to 'Islamise' Pakistan."<sup>40</sup> Pakistan is essentially a plural and multiethnic society. When the culture and ideology of one group (essentially the Punjabis) was firmly and forcibly thrust upon other groups there was a natural and historic reaction against that particular ideology." Thus this process encouraged the anti Zia movements. These socio-cultural processes encouraged ethno nationalist movement in Sindh.

The quota and recruitment policies of the regime led to the militarization of the society and economy of the state. The denial of avenues for jobs in a province like Sindh where state was the main employer led to disenchantment with the regime. The unitary policies of the regime were regarded as an attempt at cultural assimilation and destruction of the separate identity of the provinces. The economic policy of the regime was meant to cater to the Punjabi Mohajir

---

40. Akbar S. Ahmed, "Identity and Policy in Pakistan", Third World Quarterly, vol.1, No.4, Oct. 1989.

ruling elite. It led to an increase in the regional imbalances and a sense of frustration in the Sindhis. To conclude it can be argued that the state failed to integrate the different ethnic groups. It rather ensured its survival by relying on the dominant Punjabi Mohajir elite group. In fact its policies led to a deepening of the ethnic consciousness and consequently ethnic conflict increased. The ethno nationalist movement in Sindh was intensified as a result of the warped social and economic policies of the regime.



## CHAPTER IV

### ETHNO-NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN THE ZIA PERIOD

The policies of the Zia regime had alienated the Sindhis. Broadly three major policy outlines had a negative fall out. The subordination of regional ruling groups to the whims of a centralised bureaucratic military oligarchy, disparities in regional development, job discrimination against the native Sindhis and the suppression of a regional culture constituted one set of causes. The second lay in Zia's method of validation of state power through Islamic ideology. It lacked legitimacy as politics of Islamic ideology were recognized by the Sindhis as a "caveat for Punjabi domination".<sup>1</sup> But above all what emerged as an immediate cause was the execution of Bhutto. For Bhutto was a scion of a prominent family who, "during his regime, encouraged Sindhi sentiments by emphathising, at least rhetorically, with their grievances, and by promising to rectify past injustices. Among the policies undertaken by his government were land reforms, which were interpreted in Sind both as weakening the power of land lord and as ending non-

---

1. Charles H. Kennedy, "Rural Groups and the Stability of the Zia Regime" in Craig Baxter, ed., Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State (Lahore, 1985), p.41.

Sindhi ownership of agricultural land in Sindh."<sup>2</sup> Bhutto also had nationalised heavy industry, banks and insurance, and these actions were perceived in Sindh as a challenge to the interest of mohajirs; similarly, his civil and military reforms were perceived as detrimental to non-Sindhi interests. Therefore with Bhutto's ouster and eventual execution by the Zia regime a Sindhi martyr was created.

The socio-economic policies of the Zia government increased Sindhi frustration. Political parties and other organisations played a key role in the spread of the ethno-nationalist movement. The movement though rooted in its socio-cultural milieu was also affected by the global situation and major powers, who had their interests to defend in the region.

Sindhi nationalism thus proliferated in three directions after Zia's accession to power. "First, the 'separatists' still lead by the indefatigable G.M. Syed advocated secession from the union and the formation of an independent 'Sindhu desh'. The "autonomists" including the Sindh Awami Tehrik of Rasul Baksh Palejo and the Sindhi-Baloch Pushtun

---

2. Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Society, Ideology" in Anita Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan. The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State, (Lahore, 1987), p.27.

Front (SBPF) of Mumtaz Bhutto, advocated significant devolution of authority to Sindh province. The "gradualists", led by the mainstream PPP under the nominal control of Benazir Bhutto, argued that the rights of Sindhis could only be served through an end to martial law and the restoration of the 1973 Constitution."<sup>3</sup> This three fold division would be used to study the broad positions of the major parties in the Sindhi ethno-nationalist movement.

### Demand for Independence

The demand for a separate state was the long term position of the Jiye Sindh Mahaz of G.M. Syed. He continued to "maintain his position that he had little to do with any movement for the restoration of democracy within the framework of United Pakistan."<sup>4</sup> He believed that the spell of martial law was good for the Sindhis. The premises of argument was that the continued martial law would lead to the virtual break-up of Pakistan thus creating conditions favourable for the formation of 'Sindh desh'. During this period there was a shift in the position of Jiye Sindh

---

3. Charles H. Kennedy, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh", Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol.XXXI, No.10, Oct. 1991, p.947.

4. Tahir Amin, Ethno-national Movement in Pakistan. Domestic and International Factors. (Islamabad, 1988), p.194.

Mahaz. The grand old man of the movement kept on articulating his position and demand for Sindhudesh. The change of guard at the top i.e. the replacement of G.M. Syed by Hamida Khuro as the chairperson of the movement lead to a shift in position of the Jiye Sindh Mahaz. She argued for drafting a new constitution of Pakistan which would give greater autonomy to the provinces. She was of the view that the centre should only retain defence, currency, communication and foreign affairs. She demanded that the rightful share of the Sindhis in the bureaucracy and army should be given.<sup>5</sup> Her position was that the demand for 'Sindu desh' though important was too inflexible a position and the immediate concerns of the Sindhis needed to be addressed.

The ban clamped by the martial law regime had a substantial influence on the Jiye Sindh Mahaz. The organisation activated its sister body the Sindh Graduate Association (SGA), whose role previously was confined to minor demonstrations and reports. It emerged as a principal front organisation for the activities of Jiye Sindh Mahaz. Under non-political acts the SGA began monitoring government policy and worked for the interests of Sindhis in the government and in autonomous and semi-autonomous government

---

5. The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), 1 June 1985.

organisations. The SGA had 42 branches throughout Sindh and had an estimated membership between 4,000 and 6,000. The government banned the SGA in 1983 and government officials were ordered not to acquire its membership.<sup>6</sup>

The strategy of the Jiye Sindh Mahaz was one of wait and watch. G.M. Syed had "advised his followers to do nothing as a policy of confrontation would be 'suicidal'."<sup>7</sup> His views though considered extremist did not necessarily indicate a militant political line. In fact he clearly stated when questioned as to the nature of work which Jiye Sindh Mahaz and the Jiye Sindh Students Federation were doing during the Zia period. He said that "he had advised them to do intellectual work.... May be the time will come, they are waiting and watching." The Jiye Sindh Mahaz followed a strategy of partial confrontation and cooperation with the martial law regime. The Zia regime followed a soft line on a section of the Jiye Sindh Mahaz whose demands included more autonomy for the provinces. The hardline faction i.e. the G.M. Syed faction and his followers were incarcerated at the same time. This was done for both PPP and Jiye Sindh Mahaz were addressing the same constituency.

---

6. Amin, n.4, p.193.

7. Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics. The Zia years, (Delhi, 1983), p.44.

The regime's policy was of divide and rule particularly to secure itself from PPP and more secessionist elements. Jiye Sindh leadership also supported the confederation proposals advanced by SBPF. Its members actively participated in the 1983 and 1986 movements which are described below in detail. The Jiye Sind Mahaza also advocated cooperation with Mohajir Quami Mahazan Karachi based organisation fighting for rights of the Mohajirs. The details of the relations between the Jiye Sindh Mahaz and MQM are discussed in one of the following sections. But G.M. Syed and his followers publicly never backed out from their demand of 'Sindhu desh'.<sup>8</sup> In the early eighties the Jiye Sindh Mahaz had toned down its position due to the repressive policies of the Zia regime. The position of Jiye Sindh Mahaz began to harden in the post-M.R.D. agitation phase of 1983. G.M. Syed stridently began to articulate his demand for 'Sindhu desh'. He reiterated his demand for 'Sindhu desh' at a public celebration of his eighty fourth birthday. In an interview in June 1988 he said that the "existence of Pakistan is a poison for Sindhis," and that he wanted its "dismemberment".<sup>9</sup> The argument of G.M. Syed is that Sindhis' can only end their

---

8. G.M. Syed in Mushahid Hussain, *ibid.*, p.45.

9. Telegraph, June 1988, Calcutta.

economic exploitation after they gain independence. Sindh's economic potential can be developed only after the Punjabi Mohajir dominance is overthrown. G.M. Syed favoured taking help from both India and Soviet Union to achieve his objectives. One of the more concrete arguments advanced by the Jiye Sindh Mahaz for independence is that Sindh would gain increased bargaining power in dealing with Punjab over the key issue of the Indus river water. As a part of Pakistan it is argued that Sindh has been cheated of its fair share of the Indus waters, while as a sovereign state, controlling Punjab's outlet to the sea, it would be able to insist on its rights more effectively. G.M. Syed maintained a more or less consistent position though the organisation was much more reticent and less forthright about "Sindhu desh" during the Zia period.

Another pro-independence organisation which came up during the 1980's in Sindh was the Al-Zulfikar Organisation (AZO). It was begun by Murtaza Bhutto, the eldest son of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. AZO men hijacked a PIA Boeing 727 on 2nd March 1981 and secured the release of fifty four political prisoners. Zia accused PPP of complicity with AZO. The People's party denied it. AZO was also accused of a sabotage of another PIA D.C.10 aircraft. Later on the Pakistan government alleged that AZO was sponsored by Afghan and the

Soviet intelligence agencies. The size and influence of AZO is not very clear and "its links with Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto are even less clear." The AZO was never consistent in its stand except that it was opposed to the Zia regime. The group had no clear cut political programme.<sup>10</sup>

Apart from the two organisations no other political organizations demanded a separate state. Increase in federal interference in provided administrative and lopsided development led to the demand for greater autonomy from the centre.

#### Demands for Autonomy

Ethno nationalist movement in the Zia period were largely based on demands for provincial autonomy. The M.R.D. agitation, Mohajir separatism and the demands by various groups such as SBPF, ANP, and SAT were manifestations of these demands. The positions, ideologies and strategies of these organisations and groups are discussed in accordance with their importance and emergence in the politics of Sindh. Sindh Awami Tehrik of Rasul Bux Palejo,

---

10. G.C. Raju Thomas, South Asian Security Adelphi Paper, International Institute of Strategic Studies, (London), No.278, July 1993, p.28.



a successor to the Hari party was one of the most important Maoist organisations opposed not only to the military regime but also to the 'waderas' of Sindh. In fact the break of Palejo in the earlier period from G.M. Syed was due to the latter's association with the 'waderas'. The Tehrik emphasised on building a multinational socialist state in alliance with other leftist parties. During the eighties it was so well organised that it was said that Tehrik is "even better organised than the Jamiat-e-Islami."<sup>11</sup> It established a number of affiliate bodies such as Sind Hari Committee, Sindhi Shagird Tehrik, Sindhi Porhiat Sangat and Sindhiani Women Tehrik representing peasants, students, labourers and women.<sup>12</sup> These organisations played a key role in mobilising people for the 1983 and 1986 anti-regime movements.

The SAT differed from both the traditional left and the Sindhi nationalists lead by G.M. Syed. The SAT believed "that 'waderas' and the Sindhi nationalists are pro American and do not desire any change in the system."<sup>13</sup> As opposed to the slogan of the Jiye Sindh Mahaz that 'land should be

---

11. Hussein, n.7, p.48.

12. The Muslim (Islamabad), July 4, 1986.

13. Ibid.

free' the Tehrik responded with the line that 'people should be free'. Palejo said in an interview that "In my view, Sindh has been the most oppressed province of Pakistan...."<sup>14</sup> Therefore central to the SAT's demands was the liberation of Sindh from the yoke of other provinces but in a united multinational Pakistan. The differences of the SAT from the old left lay in the old left's interpretation of Marxism with its mechanical working class solidarity. Palejo's differed from the old left and he moaned "the non Sindhi character of the industrial work force in Sind...."<sup>15</sup> He believed that the absence of a national proletariat is a structural peculiarity of Sindhi society which is one of the causes that Sindhi national liberation struggle has not been successful.

The Tehrik joined the MRD and was one of key players in the anti-government unrest in 1983 and 1986. It also campaigned for the recognition of the Karmal government in Afghanistan. Its workers played a key role in coordinating and conducting the ethno-nationalist movement in rural

---

14. ibid.

15. Selig S. Harrison, "Ethnicity and the Political Stalemate in Pakistan" in Banuazizi, Ali and Weiner Myron, eds., The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan (Lahore, 1987), p.282.

areas. The Tehrik's position on autonomy was outlined by Rasul Bux Palejo in an interview to The Telegraph. The Tehrik demanded iron clad guarantees of provincial autonomy. It asked for the return of army to the barracks and the conduct of a free and fair elections under the 1973 Constitution. The Tehrik demand was that except for four subjects i.e. defence, currency, foreign and communication the rest should be given to the provinces.<sup>16</sup>

But after the failure of the MRD agitation of 1983 to reach any fruitful conclusion the Sindh Awami Tehrik changed its position. Tehrik interpreted the failure of the MRD and the PPP affiliates in Punjab to join it in its assault on the Zia administration as a sell out to the Punjabis and the Mohajirs. As a consequence the SAT demand for provincial autonomy developed into a more determined demand for separation. But this was a temporary phase and the Tehrik by 1988 had withdrawn to its position of more autonomy in a united Pakistan. The demand for a more federal set up was also put forward by other political parties who came to form a loose

---

16. Telegraph, 9 Sept. 1987.

coalition the M.R.D.<sup>17</sup> The M.R.D. came into existence on February 6, 1981. In its first joint statement issued in February 1981 the movement demanded the withdrawal of martial law and that "free, fair and impartial elections... be held... in accordance with the Constitution of 1973... and the interests of the four federating units be fully restored and protected."<sup>18</sup> The movement as is clear from the above statement aimed at democratising the political process and restoration of the interests of the provinces. But in the early stages the movement did not spread. The foreign remittances had stabilised the economic condition in Punjab and there was no incentive to join the movement. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was used by the military to divert people's attention. The regime pursued a policy of selective suppression of political leaders and did not allow any large scale movement to emerge till August 1983.

The catalyst to the M.R.D. movement of 1983 was Zia's

---

17. The MRD included the following groups: (i) the PPP, (ii) the N.D.P. (National Democratic Party), (iii) the P.D.P. (Pakistan Democratic Party), (iv) Tehrik-i-Istaqlal, (v) the Q.MN.A. (Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi), (vi) the P.M.K.P. (Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party), (vii) the J.U.I. (Jamait-i-Ulema-i-Islam) subsequently split on issue of participation in MRD, (viii) Pakistan Muslim League (Khairuddin-Qasim group), (ix) the P.N.P. (Pakistan National Party).

18. Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol.XXIV, No.5, May 1984, p.551.

decision to hold local bodies elections and his constitutional proposals whereby the President emerged as more powerful than the Prime Minister. The precipitating factor was Zia's speech of August 12, 1983 in which he outlined the government's plan to hold partyless elections. The movement for restoration of democracy spread very quickly in Sindh for the grievances of Sindhis were longstanding. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and PPP leaders of Talpur and Chandio families courted arrested. The unrest was mainly restricted to the interior of Sindh such as Dadu, Hala, Nawabshah, Khairpur and Larkana. Mass demonstrations took place and symbols of government authority such as post offices, police stations, railway lines and government buildings were destroyed. "Initially the central government left it to the provincial police to deal with the unrest; however, once the movement developed into a large scale uprising, and threatened economic prosperity of Punjab..."<sup>19</sup> by disrupting railway traffic on the western Punjab route Zia took sterner measures. Army used helicopters to strafe villages and nearly 400 people were killed.<sup>20</sup> By mid November the gov-

---

19. C.G.P. Rakisits, "Centre Province Relations in Pakistan under President Zia: The Government's and Opposition's Approaches", Pacific Affairs (Canada), vol.61, No.1, January 1988, p.947.

20. Mahanaz, Ispahani, "Pakistan Dimension of Insecurity", Adelphi Papers, Winter 1989/90, No.246, p.24.

ernment by repressive tactics had managed to cap the movement and declared that the "Sindh situation was well under control."<sup>21</sup>

The sudden spread of the movement in Sindh was due to deep rooted causes which had been exacerbated by government policies during Zia period. The movement also developed a momentum for it was launched by PPP and supported by the Pirs of Hala and Rampur who were opposed to the imposition of unitary Islam. Other than the PPP which had a mass base the organisational depth to the movement was provided by the Sindh Awami Tehrik. The Tehrik, though not a part of the central M.R.D. committee, organised peasants, workers and labourers in Sindh. An analysis of arrests made in Sindh during the period shows that 72% of the arrested came from PPP while the Sindh Awami Tehrik and Jiye Sindh Mahaz were 13% and 10% respectively. While PPP spearheaded the campaign in Punjab and Sindh it was the N.D.P. which was active in N.W.F.P.

The M.R.D.'s demand was lifting of the martial law and revival of democracy. It made a tactical mistake by not gauging the mood of the other provinces correctly. Sufficient pressure was neither built to topple Zia or make him

---

21. The Pakistan Times, 14 November 1983.

relinquish power. The Punjabis did not join in for the three reasons. One was the failure of the PPP to channelise Punjabis as a political force and build grass root institutions. Secondly, the general standard of economic development had improved in Punjab over the past decade. The issues which had been raised were of interest to Sindh. Punjab did not suffer a sense of relative deprivation as was the case with Sindh. Similar factors played a role in NWFP where the government did not interfere with the affairs of the province. The Baluchis, too, also did not join for they had not forgotten the excesses of the PPP which was the most important party in the M.R.D. Thus the movement collapses but it yielded certain important results. Zia realised that the problems of Sindh could not be ignored. He appointed more Sindhis to the Majlis-a-Shoora. He selected Mohammed Khan Junejo a Sindhi to be his prime minister. As a movement the M.R.D. became ineffective after 1983. Ideological disharmony, organisational weakness and pathological mistrust characterised the constituent units and this is why it failed to launch a second movement in December 1985. It could not ensure a boycott of the 1985 elections and made a tactical mistake by not contesting them.

But on the issue of provincial autonomy M.R.D. managed

to evolve a consensus. The parties to M.R.D. put forward a demand for secular identity of Pakistan in 1985. Within M.R.D. there were strong disagreements on the issue of provincial autonomy. The reasons lay in the poor track record of the PPP on provincial relations. PPP wanted to recommend the 1973 constitution as sufficient for provincial autonomy. Tehrik-i-Istaqalal demanded complete provincial autonomy, failing which Asghar Khan argued, Pakistan could break up.<sup>22</sup> This demand strained relations within the M.R.D. Ghous Baksh Bizenjo also went a step further and put forward the idea of a "loose" federation.<sup>23</sup> The basis of his argument was that Pakistan is a union of different nationalities and that the provinces had come together on the basis of Lahore Resolution of 1940. The National Democratic Party and the Mazdoor Kisan Party also took a similar position. They argued that the constitution had "ceased to exist and now there should be fresh polls to elect a new constituent assembly."<sup>24</sup> This pressure from different parties led to a shift in the PPP's position and it agreed to commit itself to the resolution on provincial autonomy which was adopted

---

22. The Muslim, 13 July 1985.

23. S.S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (New York, 1978), p.55.

24. Viewpoint (Lahore), 7 August 1986.



unanimously by the M.R.D. on 2nd August 1986.

The declaration which was adopted by the M.R.D.'s action committee stated that except for four subjects i.e. foreign policy, economy, communication and defence all other matters were to be dealt with by the provinces. The declaration includes a clause that any party which is a signatory to the declaration will implement it once it comes to power. The declaration was in line with the autonomists' views on provinces. It stated that federal authorities should be empowered to interfere in a province under special circumstances, but if the Senate fails to ratify this intervention within thirty days it would be illegal. Similarly in the case of an emergency the declaration would be valid for three months and senate's satisfaction would be required for an extension after the said period of three months. After six months either (a) the suspended provincial legislature had to be revived, (b) or a referendum to be held in the province for further extension of emergency, (c) or fresh elections were to be conducted. During the emergency the legislative authority of the province was to be vested with a committee of senators from the affected province. M.R.D. also expressed a commitment to have the armed forces re-structured to reflect a truly federal character. The withdrawal of Tehrik-i-Istaqalal party towards the end of 1986

from the alliance weakened it. M.R.D. found it more difficult to enforce its agenda after the election of Junejo as prime Minister. Zia's attempts to 'civilianise' the regime had taken the wind out of M.R.D.'s sails. It was a weak coalition of leftist, rightist and fundamentalist parties which had come together with a single point programme i.e. opposition to Zia. Except for the provincial autonomy declaration M.R.D. could not sustain itself and collapsed into different units.

Another important development which took place in Sindh and which was partly a product of Sindhi nationalism and partly of Punjabi domination was the emergence of M.Q.M. as a political force. Its sudden rise to prominence led to a widespread speculation that "this party was launched by the military government of General Zia ul Haq...." A variant of this etiology credits the Muhajir wing of the civilian bureaucracy to have outsmarted the Punjabi military and bureaucracy by engineering the emergence of MQM as a potent nationalist force."<sup>25</sup> But other than these conjectures, whose truth will never be known, the rise of M.Q.M. is the result of the policies of General Zia-ul Haq.

---

25. Feroz Ahmed, "Ethnicity and Politics, The Rise of Muhajir Separatism", South Asia Bulletin (Albany), vol.8, No.1, January-March 1988, p.33.

The gradual awareness of the peripheralization of the Muhajirs from an increasingly Punjabi-dominated Pakistan was propagated by the youth, particularly those from the lower middle class. Bhutto's award of job quotas to Sindhis and Zia's martial law regime, which inevitably favoured Punjabis began to constrict the job prospects of young educated Mohajirs, especially after the decline of the opportunities in the Arab Gulf states. At the domestic level Mohajirs who felt secure in Karachi started feeling a sense of insecurity with the arrival of Afghan refugees. The Pathans had already monopolized the road traffic in Karachi and the death of a Muhajir student led to the first Pathan Mohajir riot in 1985. The Islamic parties lost the support of Muhajirs as they stressed on the issue of Islam and failed to articulate the day to day problems.

Consequently in 1979 Altaf Hussain founded the All Pakistan Muhajir Students Organisation (A.P.M.S.O.) to compete with other groups. In March 1984 Altaf Hussain founded the Muhajir Quami Mahaj (MQM). The party remained small and its activities were limited before the ethnic riots of 1985-86. During the 1983 anti-government uprising the mohajirs had not participated but a liaison had existed

in the name of "new Sindhi national front"<sup>26</sup> which emphasised the solidarity between the old Sindhis and the Muhajirs. The rioting in Karachi in May 1985 and more bloody clashes in 1986 catalysed the MQM. Its appeal amongst the Muhajirs grew and in 1987 Altaf Hussain issued the MQM's charter of resolutions (Qarardad-i-Maqasid) the foundation document of the party. The demands were, "(1) Adequate representation in provincial as well as federal government departments on the basis of population; (2) Only those persons should be treated as domiciled (in Sind) who have been living (there) for the last twenty years and who spent their earnings in the Province; (3) Only the real Sindhis, including Muhajirs should be given the right to voting; non-Sindhis (including non-domiciled and non-Muhajirs) should not be given business permits and licences in Sindh; (4) seat reservation for Muhajir students in the colleges should be on the basis of their population; (5) Pakistanis from Bangladesh should be allowed to settle in Pakistan; (6) outsiders should not be allowed to buy any property in Sind; allotments already made should be cancelled; (7) Afghan refugees should be shifted to their camps; properties acquired by them should be taken over by the government; (8) local bus services should be run by the municipal commit-

---

26. Dawn (Karachi), 8 November 1983.

tees; this means that Karachi bus service owned by Pathans should be nationalized; (9) police officers mostly Punjabis and others accused of persecution of Muhajirs should be arrested."<sup>27</sup>

Although not as a part of the original resolution Altaf Hussain introduced the concept of a fifth nationality. He went to argue that as "All nationalities are asserting their identities. The Muhajirs have been forced to think in terms of a fifth nationality because objective conditions so dictate. Everywhere the Muhajirs find the doors of employment, education and other opportunities closed. All that MQM has done is to give them a sense of direction and leadership."<sup>28</sup> This led to a polarisation between Sindhi nationalists and the MQM. The responses to Altaf's statement varied. Ghous Bux Bizenjo president of PNP urged the Muhajirs not to ask for a fifth nationality status. Hamida Khuro the chairperson of Jiye Sindh Tehrik condemned the concept saying that, "we provided them shelter here, and they have usurped our properties and now they are talking of

---

27. Theodore P. Wright, "Centre-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan, Sindhis, Muhajirs and Punjabis", Comparative Politics (New York), vol.23, No.3, April 1991, p.305.

28. Quoted in Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, "Altaf Explains MQM Objectives" in A. Ali Engineer (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in South Asia (Delhi, 1987), p.159.

a Muhajir nation in our land, which will not be tolerated."<sup>29</sup> G.M. Syed read in Altaf Hussain's charter of demands a shift in Muhajir antipathy from Sindhis to Punjabis. G.M. Syed perceived in this a commonality of interest as both the Muhajirs and Sindhis were victims of Punjabi domination. After his release by prime Minister Junejo, G.M. Syed offered an olive branch to Altaf Hussain despite the Sindhi-Muhajir animosity being the primary contradiction in ethnic relations in Sindh. An alliance was worked out following which MQM scaled down its demand from nationality to a subnationality. This alliance "could not survive in the absence of a counterpoint".<sup>30</sup> It collapsed informally with the PPP-MQM accord which contained certain resolutions on which the Sindhi nationalists did not see eye to an eye with MQM. Rasul Bux Palejo differed from G.M. Syed. He was not prepared to have any truck with Punjabis and "rootless Hindustanis". The hardline nationalist factions in the Sindhi movement who believed in the 'sons of the soil' theory were not ready to accommodate MQM. In fact they saw the demands of MQM as a means to strengthen Muhajir position

---

29. Pakistan Times, 18 Jan. 1987.

30. A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Pakistan: Ethnic Conflict and the Question of National Integration", BISS Journal, (Dhaka), vol.II, No.4, October 1990, p.520.

within Sindh, and not demands for provincial autonomy<sup>31</sup> which would benefit the Sindhis.

Out of all the groups asking for provincial autonomy the most radical position was taken by the London based Sindhi Baluch Pushtun front, which was formed on 18th April 1986. It was launched by the ex-governor and chief Minister of Sindh Mumtaz Bhutto, former PPP law minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Baluch leader Ataullah Mengal and Afzal Bengash of Mazdoor Kisan Party. The SBPF called for further decentralization of the Pakistani union into a loose confederation of sovereign units. The MRD and the PPP publicly rejected this position. As given in the SBPF's, "Constitutional arrangement in a confederal structure for Pakistan"<sup>31</sup> the centre was to have control over defence, foreign affairs, communications and adjudication of disputes between the states. However the states could recruit and maintain their own militias for maintaining law and order. The provinces in this scheme had the right to secede but only, in case of federal interference beyond what was specified in law and not otherwise. The president would be elected for a four year term by rotation in an alphabetical order. In the senate all states had equal membership and the prime minister

---

31. Viewpoint, 18 August 1985.

was to be elected from it by a majority vote. The SBPF also promised to reduce defence expenditure to 3% of the GDP. The proposals secured the support of Sindhi nationalists but were unacceptable to the Zia regime.

Opposed to the SBPF ideologically the ANP was (formed in 1985) comprising of the National Democratic Party of Wali Khan, the Sindh Awami Tehrik of Rasul Bux Palejo and the Mazdoor Kisan Party of Afzal Bangash. Bangash died after first convention of this party. "The ANP was heralded by leftists as the beginning of a concerted effort aimed at dislodging the ruling junta."<sup>32</sup> It was Sindh Awami Tehrik which influenced the ANP's agenda on Sindh. ANP's position on provincial autonomy was closer to that of G.M. Syed. Its demands included bringing to an end the exploitation of Sindhis at the hands of the Punjabis and provision of constitutional safeguards for protection of interests of the provinces. ANP had warned that the politics of Pakistan were increasingly ethnicised. As long as the issues such as land colonisation by the Punjabis, the recruitment of Sindhis to jobs, construction of cantonments at Pannu, and Aqil and a dam at Kalabagh were not addressed the ethnic conflict in

---

32. Lawrence Ziring, "Domestic Politics and Regional Security Perspective of Pakistan", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), July 1988, vol.XII, No.4, p.343.



Pakistan could not be resolved. ANP could not carry the other left parties with it and thus could not launch an effective movement. Its support of the Afghan regime and its criticism of Afghan guerillas lost it considerable support. The ethnic polarisation in Pakistan had increased around 1985. As a response to this situation different parties began making appeals and suggesting formulas which would decrease some of the frustration in Sindh if implemented. The dimensions of ethnic conflict had become acute. Conflicts ranged virtually amongst all major groups. Push-tuns and Muhajirs clashed on one or the other pretext in this period. The conflict on political issues between Sindhis, Punjabis and Muhajirs was aggravated. Thus as pointed out before, political parties suggested frameworks for provincial autonomy to safeguard Sindhi interests.

Pakistan National Party (PNP) headed by Ghous Bux Bizenjo held a conclave in 1987 open to other parties to discuss the problems facing Sindh. There was a consensus on the issue that the problems of the province could be resolved if the M.R.D. declaration on provincial autonomy is implemented. The leader of the Quami-Mahaz-i-Azadi Mairaj Muhammad Khan, proposed that except for defence, foreign affairs, finance and communications the rest of the subjects

should be given to the provinces.<sup>33</sup> PNP also came out with a charter of demands similar to that of MQM. They included limiting the number of migrants to Sindh, increasing employment avenues in other provinces to check the pressure on Sindh and removal of all unregistered outsiders. It demanded that jobs be given on the basis of a domicile and through employment exchanges. Districts should be so reorganised that native Sindhis are not in minority. It also asked for legislation to check the purchase of land and setting up of business by outsiders.

G.M. Syed the grand old man of Sindhi nationalism set up the Sindhi national alliance S.N.A. on 20th May 1988. This time the struggle G.M. Syed planned was for the protection of the right of Sindhis. It was to be a peaceful struggle with a focus on checking migration to Sindh. S.N.A. opposed the construction of cantonments at Pannu, Afil, Bedin and Khesar. Its demands included the release of political prisoners, increase in employment facilities to Sindhis, increase in royalty on minerals, oil and declaration of Sindhi as a national language. G.M. Syed commenting on the formation of S.N.A. said that it symbolised "the

---

33. Sabur, n.30, p.515.

frustrations and aspirations of the Sindhis."<sup>34</sup> The death of General Zia and triumph of PPP again marginalised Syed and his followers. These positions represent a broad series of development in the development of Sindhi nationalism.

### The Gradualist View

PPP represents the moderate view on the issue of nationalities in Pakistan. The standard position of PPP has been that the 1973 Constitution is sufficient enough to deal with the problems of provinces. PPP was opposed in the beginning to the position of other parties in the M.R.D. but finally went along with them. PPP's position is the result of its support base. "Unlike any other party in Pakistan, the PPP... has significant popular followings in all four provinces."<sup>35</sup> And therefore PPP has to go slow on the issue of provincial autonomy as it has to take into account the interests of other provinces. The PPP has a large support base in Punjab and 'the Punjab is the hub of Pakistani politics.' A political party can ignore the interests of Punjab only at its own peril. No political party can succeed by

---

34. Ziaullah and Baid, Pakistan: An end Without Beginning (New Delhi, 1985), p.5.

35. Robert G. Wirsing, "Ethnicity and Political Reform in Pakistan", Asian Affairs An American Review (Washington D.C.), vol.15, No.2, Summer 1988.

appealing to regional sentiments and yet aspire for national status. This is a paradox which the PPP faced. The party followed a dual policy and tried to balance the interests of the Sindhis while making sure that it did not ignore the Punjabis. It articulated Sindhi demands at the local level and demanded a reform of the political system. While at the centre it asked for a return to the 1973 constitution which the PPP claimed was an effective instrument to resolve the question of nationalities.

#### Zia's views on Nationalities

General Zia was of the view that ethnic identities were divisive and should be downplayed. In 1978 Zia confessed to Harrison that he would break Pakistan into 53 small units thus erasing ethnic identities. He considered President Ayub Khan's one unit system a valid one and called it unfortunate for the country that Yahya Khan "surrendered to pressures" and created the existing provinces.<sup>36</sup> Zia appointed the Ansari commission to go into the structural problems of Pakistan's federal system. The commission suggested that the current federal system be abolished and replaced with one in which the current 21 administrative divisions would serve as newly constituted provinces. The

---

36. Harrison, n.23, p.151.

rationale was that such a restructuring would dilute the perceived domination of Punjab and check interprovincial rivalries and ethnic politics. "Along the same lines, in early 1988 the government was working on the formulation of a policy that would have decentralized Pakistan into eight administrative units. Punjab would have been carved into three units (two Punjabi and one Siraiki dominant) and Sindh into two (one Muhajir and one Sindhi dominant)."<sup>37</sup> Zia had thought of introducing this measure after he dissolved the National Assembly in 1988. He could not do so probably since he never had the time. Thus we can conclude that Zia wanted a powerful unitary state devoid of any ethnic content but in actual practice the policies which he followed increased polarization in society and left deep schisms.

#### **Transnational Influences on Ethno-nationalist Movement in Sindh**

The linkage between the state and its external relations has serious portents for ethnic movements and the case of the behaviour of Pakistani state to ethnic movement is no different. Transnational movements and changes also have an impact on the movements. Sindhi ethno-nationalist movement had been influenced and accentuated by international devel-

---

37. Charles H. Kennedy, n.3, pp.954-955.

opments in the 1980's.

The Pakistani state which had emerged after the departure of the British had weak political parties and federal institutions. The only organised structure apart from the bureaucracy was the military. In the face of competing interests between the competing classes the military acquired "a relatively autonomous role."<sup>38</sup> The thrust of the American policy, in the changed global security environment, was the containment of the Soviet Union, in which Pakistan emerged as a major component in South Asia.

The Americans forged an alliance with the military bureaucratic state in Pakistan which would serve as a bulwark to the Soviet drive towards the warm water ports. The United States tended to ignore the ethno-nationalist movement in Pakistan for it was in collusion with the Punjabi dominated military oligarchy which was opposed to the Soviet Union. The onset of the second cold war in the Zia period and the Afghan war made it imperative for the United States to support Zia. The United States did not oppose the repression let loose in Sindh even when helicopter gunships

---

38. Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post Colonial Societies, Pakistan & Bangladesh" in Kathleen Gough and Hari D. Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (London, 1973), p.145.

were used and hundreds were killed. The support of U.S. advisors on the 'one unit scheme' that eliminated ethnic identities of all member nationalities of the Pakistan federation in 1955, is another example...."<sup>39</sup> which supports the nexus theory between the Punjabi dominated Pakistani army and the United States. The United States required facilities in Baluchistan and Sindh to counter the threat posed by the Soviet navy to South Asia. Therefore it supported the Pakistan state in its ethnic conflict management approach which was repressive in nature. Sindhi nationalism was perceived as 'opposed to U.S. interests'.<sup>40</sup>

The Soviets followed a cautious policy in the issue of nationalities in South Asia. The Jiye Sindh movement expected support for its campaign against Punjabi domination. The Soviet Union's support during the Zia period to the ethno nationalist movement did exist but was minimal. The Soviet model of multi ethnic states served as a model to many proposals put forward by the different groups. The Soviet Union maintained close contacts with the leaders of the movement by inviting them to Soviet Union. It provided

---

39. Aftab A. Kazi, "Ethnic Nationalism and Super Powers in South Asia: Sindhis and Baluchis", Strategic Analysis, vol.XII, No.1, April 1988, p.42.

40. Ibid.

monetary support through cultural and friendship groups. It also encouraged Sindhi students to study in the Soviet Union and also offered scholarships.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was perceived by the Sindhi ethno nationalists as the opportune time to shake off the Punjabi hegemony. It gave a fillip to G.M. Syed and other radical elements to agitate more vociferously for 'Sindhu desh'. The landed elite in Sindh did not react positively for they feared a loss of privileges in case the Soviets advanced further.

The Iranian revolution of 1978 also had a impact of radicalizing the ethno nationalist movement because of its anti-capitalist orientation. But the Marxists in Sindh became sceptical of the Iranian revolution when it began to suppress its own nationalities.<sup>41</sup>

The Sindhi nationalists had always looked upon India with hope because of historical ties with Sindhis in India. India's support to the movement in Sindh was considered crucial by Sindhi nationalists. Mrs. Gandhi's statement when the movement for restoration of democracy had gained

---

41. Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan in 1983 Internal Stresses More Serious Than External Problems", Asian Survey, vol.XXIV, No.2, February 1984, p.223.



momentum that "Indians would support all democratic movements" in fact shattered the movement. It gave a handle to the anti-democratic forces to argue that it was a India backed movement. The Sindhi nationalists led by G.M. Syed were not given the adequate diplomatic support which they had asked for. G.M. Syed had time and again reiterated his position of establishing close ties with India. But as G.M. Syed put it succinctly in an interview, "India's silence is disappointing".<sup>42</sup> Except for diplomatic support India, kept out of the ethno nationalist movement in Sindh.

The Marxist revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan was a major development. The Khalqi regime began following the Soviet nationality model after assuming power. The Jiye Sindh movement was greatly encouraged by these developments. The Soviet invasion, as pointed out earlier, encouraged the movement. Afghanistan provided shelter to Sindhi ethno nationalists who had escaped to save themselves from the repressive policies of the Zia regime. AZO a violently pro-independent group led by Murtaza Bhutto had its headquarters in Kabul during the Zia period. The Afghans provided help to the ethno-nationalist movement in Sindh. But another dimension of the Afghan problem which sharpened ethno-na-

---

42. Telegraph, 2 June 1988.

tionalist demands was the war and its fallout. The Afghan refugees exacerbated the ethnic tensions in Sindh. "At the economic level of manual labour and street hawking, Afghan refugees after the beginning of the Afghan war in 1979 flooded into Karachi slums (Kachibadis) and competed with the poverty stricken Bihari Muhajirs."<sup>43</sup> It was estimated in 1987 that over hundred thousands Afghan refugees were living in Karachi.<sup>44</sup> This altered the demographic matrix against the native Sindhis and brought about a three way conflict amongst Sindhis, Muhajirs and Afghans.

The ethno nationalist movement became more violent as a result of the militarisation of society. What came into existence was termed as the 'Kalashnikov culture' whereby ethnic groups used sophisticated weapons in rioting. The illicit trade in drugs especially in cities like Karachi increased the incidence of violence and virtually created a parallel drug economy with annual estimated revenues of about \$ eight billion. Drug running was mainly carried out by the Afghans but spread to other sections of the society so much so that drug mafia infiltrated the army and other institutions of the state. Drug trafficking flourished on

---

43. Wright, n.27, p.305.

44. Dawn, Feb. 27, 1987.

the Peshawar Karachi route. As a result of massive inflows of drug money and the Afghan war, Sindh had one of the largest underground market of weapons. Zia further complicated the ethnic situation in Sindh by encouraging Sindhi landlords to form private armies to assert control over rural areas. Thus to conclude, the influence of Afghan war distorted the goals of the ethno nationalist movement by introducing multiple conflicts. During Zia regime the ethno nationalist movement in Sindh grew stronger. This was manifested in the various groups who made demands on the political system ranging from separation to autonomy in Sindh. The province felt exploited its identity trampled with. The native Sindhis felt submerged by the migrants who outnumbered them demographically in urban Sindh and also outdid them economically. The Sindhi nationalist movement was too divided in this period to draw any valuable concessions from the regime. Moreover the external element i.e. the Afghan war complicated the picture and the movement did not have clear goals. External support to the movement was not up to the level to which could be of consequence in the anti-Zia struggle. The view of MQM and emergence of Sindhi Mohajir conflict, Mohajir Punjabi conflict, and Mohajir Pushtun created too many rival grouping where a consistent struggle against the state could not be waged. The ethno

nationalist movement has accelerated as a result of Zia's policies.

The element of sectarianism which was a manifestation of Zia's misrule would continue to haunt Sindh. The ethno nationalist movement in Sindh is too divided to get a breakthrough or any significant concessions in the future.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The ethno nationalist movement in Sindh is the result of a complex set of factors and is multidimensional in nature. As this study shows it is not a simple political problem but it owes its existence to a variety of factors. Its origins are to be found partly in structural inequalities, such as tenuous land relations and for instance in the colonial policy of recruitment to the army. They are to be found in the demographic trends including the spectacular rate of growth of country's population. "They are also to be found in the general paralysis of political institution-building on at least in part by long years under military rule...."<sup>1</sup> These "factors provided the basis for regional claims and outright independence to dissatisfied groups."<sup>2</sup>

Broad generalisations as to how ethno nationalist movements emerge can be drawn from this study. This study shows that the existing paradigms in social sciences are unable to explain the nature of South Asian ethno national-

- 
1. Robert G. Wirsing, "Ethnicity and Political Reform in Pakistan", Asian Affairs, An American Review (New York), vol.15, No.2, Summer 1988, p.81.
  2. Hafeez Mali, "Nationalism and the Quest for Ideology", in Pakistan: The Long View (Durham, North Carolina, 1977), p.287.

ist movements and conflicts. In Sindh, for example neither the theory of 'internal colonialism' as proposed by Michael Hechter (an excepted position in Marxist theory) nor the theory of 'competitive ethnicity' (an excepted position in liberal theory) explains the situation completely. Hechter had argued that in ranked ethnic groups where there exists a cultural division of labour, class and ethnic lines coincide and relations of subordination and supraordination emerge amongst communities.<sup>3</sup> From this perspective, the structure of relations between superordinate and subordinate ethnic groups corresponds to the sort of exploitation that characterizes relations between peripheral and core-nations in neo-colonial patterns of international relations.<sup>4</sup> The argument is that ethnic boundaries coincide with lines of structural differentiation and as a consequence ethnic solidarity is intensified. In Sindh where the stratification system partially links ethnic identity and economic status it confers a meaning to ethnic identity. Ethnic solidarity is reinforced as a reaction of the culturally distinct periphery against exploitation. This phenomenon is explained as 'reactive ethnicity' which forms the basis of

---

3. D. Horowitz, Ethnic Politics (Berkeley, California, 1985), p.26.

4. Ibid., pp.23-25.

ethno nationalist movements, whereby ethnic solidarity is reinforced by the perceived sense of exploitation of the subordinate by the superordinate. This leads to the reinforcement of ethnic solidarity and collective actions (for e.g. an ethno nationalist movement) by members of the peripheral communities against the core community because ethnic identity cannot be detached from one's political and economic interests.

In Sindh the class differences are not so well demarcated nor are the core and peripheral communities clearly identified. At times feudal class and peasants form one group against the economically pre-dominant Punjabis and Mohajirs. The feudal landlords and Haris allied together against the Muhajirs and Punjabis at times when the level of perception of state's discriminatory policies is very high as for example during the Zia period. Otherwise the feudal class also collaborates against the 'Haris' that is the small land owners and landless labourers by aligning itself with the 'economically pre-dominant' Punjabi Muhajir combine. Many cleavages exist within the society and except for a perceived sense of inequality and exploitation in all the major groups their working does not show that purely 'exploitative relations' as posed by 'internal colonialism'

can explain the Sindhi ethno nationalist movement. The society cannot be termed as 'ranked'<sup>5</sup> for the class and ethnic lines are not all that clear.

The Sindhi society cannot be called as 'unranked' for as pointed out earlier certain distinctions on feudal lines do exist, traditional categories have not been obfuscated, by the development of market nor are the members competing for the same resources, though the competition is for scarce resources between the 'natives' and the 'outsiders'. Thus the Sindhi situation defies any clear cut analysis based on western theoretical models. In fact the features of both the 'models' the 'competitive ethnicity' and the 'internal colonialism' are present in Sindh.

Ethno nationalism is a result of the flawed 'Pakistan ideology' which tried to unify Pakistan in the name of Islam.<sup>6</sup> Islam was acceptable to the Sindhis as long as it did not impinge on their socio-economic condition. When the

---

5. 'Ranked' systems are there in which the stratification is synonymous with ethnicity in the sense that the social structure is characterized by one ethnic group being subordinate to the other. In 'unranked' systems each ethnic group has its own stratification system internal to it and is distinct from other ethnic groups though it exists with other ethnic groups.

6. Andre Wink, "Islamisation of Pakistan and its International Context" in Andre Wink, ed., Islam, Politics and Society in South Asia (New Delhi, 1991).



pre-dominantly Punjabi dominated Pakistani state began to implement Islam to further its interests the Sindhis began to equate the Islamic nationalism of the state with Punjabi domination. This intensified the movement during the Zia period. The flaw that exists in the nationalism of the Pakistani state is that it approximates more to Punjabi Muhajir nationalism rather than a 'national ideology' which could include all identities within Pakistan in a larger framework. During both the Ayub and Zia spells of the army rule ethnic conflict and ethno nationalist movement was exacerbated because of the implementation of unitary and homogenising policies of the state. The state disturbed the existing structures of power by its policy of lopsided development. The state could not satisfy the socio-economic needs by concentrating on infrastructural development rather its policies alienated the masses further. Its promotion of powerful interest groups such as the army, the Punjabis and Mohajirs intensified the ethno nationalist movement as it left out the other groups.

A principal reason of the rise of ethno nationalist movement in Sindh during Zia regime lay in the legitimacy of state. As in all military oligarchies the base of the state is narrow and it is insulated from democratic demands. The state has to use coercion to sustain itself. The legit-

imacy of a state is inversely proportional to the coercion used by the state. If a state is broad based and legitimate it can exist on less coercion but if it is narrow and an 'interest group' based state it has to carry out repressive policies for regime sustenance. The repressive policies of the Zia government for e.g. Thori incident of 1983 and use of helicopters to strafe Sindhi villages are representative examples of a state which tried to suppress the genuine demands of the people through the bullet than through the ballot.<sup>7</sup>

The ethnic policies of the state i.e. its encouragement of Muhajir political groups to counter PPP and led to a further polarisation of society. The native Sindhis began to perceive Muhajirs along with the Punjabis as their primary opposition. This led to slogans and demands similar in nature to that of 'sons of the soil' movement in Maharashtra. 'Sindh for the Sindhis' was a slogan which was put forward by a number of groups during the 1980's, especially the Sindh Awami Tehrik. The sense of economic deprivation which was felt by Sindhis as a result of the recruitment policies of the state increased during the Zia period. The regime gave special representation and quotas to the army

---

7. Viewpoint (Lahore), 25 Oct. 1984.

for jobs in the civilian sector. This had no benefits for the Sindhis for their representation in the army was negligible. The militarization of the civilian sectors and reservation for the kith and kin of military officials forced the Sindhis to agitate for protection of their interests.

The economic and cultural policies such as allocation of land to Punjabis in Sindh, and no check on refugee migration to a province where natives were not getting jobs increased the pressure on Sindhis. The Zia government attempts to integrate Pakistan on the basis of Islam lead to protests in Sindh whose sufi traditions were opposed to the imposition of Sunni Hanafi Islamic practices and codes. The regimes emphasise on shariat law and cultural policies such as the implementation of a single dress code was felt by the Sindhis as an attack on their culture.

The process of modernisation created an articulate middle class of professionals, lawyers, doctors etc. which made demands on the system for political and economic rights. The province was undergoing rapid social and economic transformation. Increased mechanisation led to increase in unemployment during this period. The process of modernisation created new schism and movement for Sindhu-

desh' and demands for a confederal structure were thus put forward. The native Sindhis begins to increasingly claim first right on the land and economic resources of the province for they felt threatened by outsiders mainly Muhajirs, Sindhis and Afghan refugees.

External influences such as the Afghan war which lead to large scale migrations of refugees into Pakistan, introduced sophisticated arms created a 'narcotic economy' further complicated the problems of Sindhi society. Afghans, Pushtuns involved in the drug trade and other criminal activities lead to a 'criminalisation' of Sindh province. The impact of these factors was that the ethnic identities were sharpened. It brought about a 'culture of violence' in the province. The goals of the Sindhi ethno nationalist movement were thus lost in the process. It brought about a number of minor contradiction within the province to the fore and the issues of Punjabi Mohajir domination were left aside. The state began to use more repression and even genuine demands were suppressed in the name of law and order.

The ethno nationalist movement in Sindh is largely dependent on the leadership of G.M. Syed. The chances of it achieving its goals are not very bright. The different

interests such as Mohajirs and Punjabis are too deeply entrenched in the province to give in to Sindhi demands even for provincial autonomy. The economic interests of these two dominant groups would not let the Sindhis to secure their interests by force against a centralised state. The only alternative open is a movement to ensure certain constitutional safeguards which would secure the Sindhis from further domination. The ethno nationalist movement is too divided with G.M. Syed asking for a separate state while the PPP harping on the 1973 constitution which it argues is more than enough for resolving the demands of the provinces. The ethno nationalist movement though based on genuine demands is faced by the impossibility of the situation due to lack of its own coherence and the power of the state. Unless and until the goals of the movement are not clearly laid out, the Sindhi demands are unlikely to be met by a state which has been unable to resolve its ethnic problems right from its inception.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### PRIMARY SOURCES:

Ayub Khan, Mohammad, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Chopra, P.N., ed., The Gazetteer of India: History and Culture Vol. II (New Delhi, 1990).

SIPRI Yearbook 1987, World Armament and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

World Development Report, 1984 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

### SECONDARY SOURCES:

#### Books:

Abdullah Ahmed, Historical Background of Pakistan and its People (Karachi: Tanzeem Publishers, 1973).

Ahmad, Feroz, Sindhi National and Democratic Struggle (New York: Pakistani Democratic Forum, 1984)

Ahmad, Manzoorudin, Contemporary Pakistan. Politics, Economy and Society (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980).

Ahmed, Jamil-ul-din and others, Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970).

Ali Tariq, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1983).

Amin Tahir, Ethno-national Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988).

- Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
- Banuazizi, Ali and Wenier Myron, eds., The State Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran Afghanistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt., 1987).
- Barth, Fredrik, Process and Form in Social Life, Vol.I (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1981).
- Basham, A.L., The Wonder That Was India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1991).
- Baxter, Craig, ed., Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985).
- Bertelsen, Judy S., ed., Non-State Nations in International Politics: A Comparative Analysis (U.S.A.: Praeger, 1977).
- Bose, Sugata, ed., South Asia and World Capitalism (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- Burki, Shahid Javed, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77 (London: Macmillan, 1980).
- \_\_\_\_\_, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making (London: Boulder Westview Press, 1986).
- Burton, Richard F., Sind and the Races that Inhabit the Valley of Indus (Karachi: OUP, 1983).
- Callard, Keith, Pakistan A Political Study (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957).
- Cohen, Stephen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley, California: UCLA Press, 1984).
- Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and its Alternative (USA: Alfred A Knopf Inc., 1969).
- \_\_\_\_\_, Nationalism and Social Communication (U.S.A.: Nology Press of M.I.T., Wiley, 1953).

- Emerson, Rupert, From Empire to Nation (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1970).
- Engineer, Ali Asghar, ed., Ethnic Conflict in South Asia (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1987).
- Forbes, H.D., Nationalism Ethnocentrism and Personality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
- Forgacs, David and Smith, Geoffrey Nowell, eds., Antonio Gramsci's Selections from Cultural Writings (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985).
- Gangkovsky, Y.U.V., Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History, translated from Russian by Igor Garilov (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1971).
- Gardezi, Hassan and Rashid, Jamil, eds., The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State (London: Zed Press, 1983).
- Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (New Delhi: Select Book Service, 1986).
- Gough, Kathleen and Sharma, Hari P., eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (London: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
- Hall, Raymond, ed., Ethnic Autonomy - Comparative Dynamics (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).
- Harrison, S.S., In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1978).
- Hayes, Louis D., Politics in Pakistan: A Struggle for Legitimacy (London: Boulder Westview Press, 1984).
- Hechtar, Michael, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-1966 (California: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1977).



- Hewitt, Vernon Marston, The International Politics of South Asia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).
- Horowitz, D., Ethnic Politics (Berkeley, California: UCLA, 1985).
- Jahan, Raunaq, Pakistan: A Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
- Jalal, Ayesha, The State of Martial Rule - The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (London: OUP, 1990).
- Kardar, Shahid, The Political Economy of Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987).
- Kaushik, Surendranath, Pakistan under Bhutto's Leadership (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing, 1985).
- Kennedy, Charles H. and Nevitte, Neil, eds., The Ethnic Preferences and Public Policy in Developing States (Boulder, Colorado: Hynes Reinner Publishers, Inc., 1986).
- Khan, Asghar Khan, ed., Islam Politics and the State. The Pakistan Experience (London: Third World Books, Zed Press, 1985).
- Khuro, Hamida, ed., Sindh Through the Centuries - Proceedings of a Seminar held in Karachi Spring 1975 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1981).
- Kothari, Rajni, Rethinking Development: In Search of Humane Alternatives (New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1988).
- Kukreja, Veena, Civil Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan Bangladesh and India (New Delhi: Sage, 1991).
- Kumar, Satish, The New Pakistan (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1973).

- Lambrick, H.T., Sind: A General Introduction (Hyderabad: Pakistan Sind Adabi Board, 1964).
- Malkani, K.R., The Sind Story (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984).
- Mehkri, G.M., Sorrows of Sind (Hyderabad, Pakistan: Ibadullah Rashid, 1987).
- Mehta, Jamshed N.R., Separation of Sind (Karachi: Union Press, 1985).
- Nayak, Pandav, ed., Pakistan: Society and Politics (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985).
- Norbu, Dawa, Culture and Politics of Third World Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1992).
- Nordlinger, Eric A., Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977).
- Phadnis, Urmila, Ethnicity and Nation Building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage, 1989).
- \_\_\_\_\_ and others, Domestic Conflicts in South Asia, vols. I & II (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1986).
- Proceedings of First International Symposium on Asian Studies, 1979, vol. IV, South & South West Asia (Hong Kong: Asian Research Division, Asian Research Service, 1979).
- Quddus, Mohammad A., Pakistan: A Case Study of a Plural Society (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1981).
- Rothschild, Joseph, Ethno Politics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, Politics in Pakistan - The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).
- Smith, Anthony, The Ethnic Revival (New York: CUP, 1981).

- Smith, Anthony D., Ethnic Origin of Nations (London; Basil Blackwell, 1986).
- \_\_\_\_\_, Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth, 1971).
- Syed, G.M., A Case for Sindhudesh (Bombay: Sorath Publishers, 1985).
- Thayer, Carlyle A. and others, eds., Trends and Strains. Pakistan. India. Vietnam. Japan (New Delhi: International Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Continental Publishing House, 1990).
- Thompson, W. Scott, ed., The Third World: Premises of US Policy (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1987).
- Warren, Bill, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1980).
- Weiss, Anita, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan = The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987).
- Wilson, J.A. and Dalton, D., The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1982).
- Wink, Andre, ed., Islam. Politics and Society in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991).
- Ziaullah, S. and Baid, S., Pakistan: An End Without a Beginning (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1985).
- Ziring, L., ed., Subcontinent in World Politics - India its Neighbours and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978).
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984).

**Articles:**

- Ahmed, Akbar S., "Identity and Ideology in Pakistan: An Interview", Third World Quarterly (London), Oct. 1989, pp.54-69.
- Ahmed, Feroz, "Ethnicity and Politics: The Rise of Mohajir Separatism", South Asia Bulletin (New York), 8(1-2), Spring Fall 1988, pp.33-45.
- Alavi, Hamza, "Nationhood and Communal Violence", Journal of Contemporary Asia (Manila), vol.21, No.2, 1991, pp.152-78.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Pakistan and Islam: Its Ethnicity and Ideology", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), vol.17, No.8, August 1987, pp.1514-40.
- Ayoob, Mohammed, "Dateline Pakistan: A Passage to Anarchy", Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.), Summer 1985, pp.154-73.
- Burki, Shahid Javed, "Pakistan's Sixth Plan, Helping a Country Climb Out of Poverty", Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol.24, No.4, April 1984, pp.400-22.
- Conner, Walker, "Politics of Ethno-Nationalism", Journal of International Affairs (New York), vol.27, No.1, 1973, pp.1-21.
- Dixit, Abha, "Ethnic and Regional Tensions in Pakistan", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.12, No.12, March 1989, pp.1457-78.
- Gardezi, Hassan, "Post Colonial State in South Asia: The Case of Pakistan", South Asia Bulletin (Albany, N.Y.), No.2, 1985, pp.1-7.
- Gurr, Tedd, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilisation and Conflict since 1945", IPSR, (Washington D.C.), 1993, vo.14, No.2, 1993, pp.161-201.

- Hasan, Ashraful, "Pattern of Political Development Pakistan, Malaysia and India: A Comparative Study of the Impact of Institutional Varieties on National Integration/Disintegration in Developing Countries", Asian Profile (Hong Kong), vol.12, No.6, Dec. 1984.
- Hollen, Van, "Pakistan in '86", Asian Survey, vol.XXVII, No.2, February 1987, pp.143-55.
- Hussain, Ahmed, "Charismatic Leadership and Pakistan's Politics", E.P.W., (Bombay), vol.13, No.2, June 21, 1989, 136-37.
- Husain, Asaf, "Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan", Asian Survey, vo.XVI, No.10, October 1976, pp.918-30.
- Isaphani, Mahanaz, "Pakistan, Dimensions of Insecurity", Adelphi Paper (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London), Winter 1989/90, no.246.
- Kazi, Aftab A., "Education, Ethnicity and Political Socialisation in Pakistan", Asian Profile, vol.14, No.4, August 1986, pp.349-60.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Ethnic Nationalities, Education and Problems of National Integration in Pakistan", Asian Profile, vol.16, No.2, April 1988, pp.147-61.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Ethnic Nationalism and Super Powers in South Asia: Sindhis & Baluchis", Strategic Analysis, vol.12, No.1, April 1988, pp.31-50.
- Kennedy, Charles, "Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh", Asian Survey, vol.31, No.10, Oct. 1991, pp.938-55.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Islamization in Pakistan Implementation of the Hudood Ordinance", Asian Survey, vol.XXVII, No.3, March 1988, pp.307-16.

- \_\_\_\_\_, "Politics of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol.24, No.6, June 1984, pp.688-703.
- Majib and Naidu, "Agrarian Transition", Pakistan Development Review (Islamabad), vol.26, No.24, Winter 1987, pp.433-44.
- Motyl, Alexander, "The Modernity of Nationalism: Nation, States and Nation States in the Contemporary World", Journal of International Affairs (New York), vol.45, No.2, Winter 1992, pp.307-23.
- Muni, S.D., "Internal Political Problems", World Focus (New Delhi), 715, July 1989, pp.6-19.
- Noman, Omar, "Pakistan Under General Zia", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.1, No.1, January 1989, pp.28-54.
- O'Connor, Walker, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying", World Politics (Princeton, N.J.), Vol.XXIV, No.3, April 1972, pp.319-355.
- Rais, Rasul B., "Pakistan in 1987 Transition to Democracy", Asian Survey, vol.XXXVII, No.2, February 1988, pp.126-136.
- Rakisits, C.G.P., "Centre Province Relations in Pakistan under President Zia: The Government's and Opposition's Approaches", Pacific Affairs (Canada), vol.61, No.1, January 1988, pp.78-97.
- Rizvi, Hassan Askari, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey (California), vol.XXXIV, No.5, May 1983, pp.534-55.
- Sabherwal, Satish, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia", Contemporary South Asia, vol.2, No.10, Jan. 1993, pp.1-17.
- Salur, A.K.M., "Pakistan, Ethnic Conflict and the Question of National Integration", BISS Journal (Dhaka), vol.11, No.4, October 1990, pp.482-541.

- Sayeed, Bin Khaleed, "Pakistan in 1983. Internal Stresses more serious than external problems", Asian Survey, vol.XXIV, No.2, February 1984, pp.219-28.
- Singh, Uma, "Ethnic Conflict", World Focus, July 1982, pp.17-20.
- Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, "Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on International Society", International Social Sciences Journal (Paris), No.127, February 1991, pp.117-36.
- Thomas, G.C. Raju, "South Asian Security", Adelphi Paper, No.278, July 1993.
- Weiner, Myron, "People and States in a New Ethnic Order", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.13, No.2, 1992, pp.317-33.
- Winsing, Robert, "Ethnicity and Political Reform in Pakistan", Asian Affairs: An American Review (New York), vol.13, No.12, Summer 1988, pp.67-83.
- Wright, Theodore, "Centre Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan", Comparative Politics (New York), April 1991, pp.299-3128.
- Zaidi, S. Akbar, "Sindhi vs Mohajir", EPW, vol.26, No.20, May 18, 1991, pp.1295-1303.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan: Some Indicators", EPW, vol.24, No.6, Feb. 11, 1989, pp.300-314.
- Ziring, Lawrence, "Politics and the regional security perspective of Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, vol.XII, No.4, July 1988, pp.,331-57.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Public Policy Dilemma and Pakistan's Nationality Problem", Strategic Digest, vol.19, No.4, April 1989, pp.389-399.

**Newspapers/Periodicals:**

Dawn (Karachi).

Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong).

Pakistan Times (Lahore).

The Muslim (Islamabad).

The Telegraph (Calcutta).

Times of India (New Delhi).

Viewpoint (Lahore).