FRENCH POLICY OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE : ITS REAPPRAISAL IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the present dissertation on "French Policy of National Nuclear Independence: Its Reappraisal in the Post Cold-War Era" being submitted by Ms. Raka Arya, is worthy of consideration for the award of M.Phil. degree of the Jawaharlal Nehru University. This is her own work and has not been published or presented for the award of any degree of any other University in India.

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PREFACE

Since the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French have suffered continuously from insecurity complex. Their fear emanated from the Germans having excelled them in industrial competitiveness by about the first decade of the twentieth century. Demographically, they were far ahead of the French. And, then, geostrategically, Germany located in the heart of Europe, known as *Mitteleuropa*, wielded enormous political clout both in the East and the West. Thus, a combination of these multiple factors which further compounded the enemy image on reciprocal basis of the two nations, became productive of a conflictual framework that made utterly difficult reconciliation between the two. With the result, as the time passed, credibility gap became hardened, leading them from one war to another bigger war.

Indisputably, the French victory in the First World War was the finest hour for them, for since their defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, it is under their leadership in this war that the Allied Powers emerged victorious over the Germans. They also recovered the territories (Alsace and Lorraine) lost in the 1870 War. Furthermore, it is their

concept of the nation state which helped reshape the post-war Europe following the liquidation of the imperial systems (Habsburgs, Ottomans and Romanovs) in Europe.

However, this "finest hour" proved to be short-lived. Soon the French quest for security against Germany's revanchism began. However, all the steps (*viz.*, modernization of national defence, reshuffling of alliances, setting up of the League of Nations, and also initiation of the movement for European unification) taken to strengthen their position *vis-a-vis* Germany proved to be ineffective. Germany re-emerged as a major threat to European security. Worse still, Russia, having gone "Bolshevik", ceased to be available for renewing *Entente Cordiale*.

It is during the inter-war period that Charles de Gaulle, then a young military *aide-de-Camp* to Marshal Petain, had realized grave danger from Germany's militaristic aggressivity, and also defensive/reactive character of the French defence. He rejected the French military strategy based upon the Maginot Line, and argued in favour of offensive strategy against Germany. But then ironically enough his ideas which could not be acceptable to the French top-brass military elite, came to be incorporated

in Nazi Germany's military strategy designed by General Heinz Guderian, which led to Germany's *Blitzkrieg* and stunning victories in the early years of the Second World War.

However, as Nazi Germany suffered decisive defeat in the Second World War, France under de Gaulle, particularly under the Fifth Republic, laid secure foundations for modernization of national defence, which in policy terms meant National Nuclear Independence, for it was then believed that nuclear weapons formed a critical part of national defence, and in their absence, the French were in danger of losing their political survival. Whether a small or medium ranking nuclear power could deter aggression from a mighty nuclear power such as the USSR, then, became a subject of debate, and this question was answered competently by General Pierre Gallois in his work "Balance of Terror", published in the late 1950s. Indeed, his doctrine became basic to de Gaulle's formulation of the French national strategic force.

De Gaulle's successors made no significant departure from his nuclear policy, even though they had to effect minor changes in the strategic doctrine to suit the changing needs of the national security. In the last year of de

Gaulle's presidency, his chief of the Army Staff, General Ailleret formulated the French strategic doctrine of *Tous Azimuts* in response to the US strategy of "Flexible Response". But then, as soon as his successor, Georges Pompidou took over, the focus of the new regime was shifted to the management of the domestic political and economic issues. And the French security doctrine was modified by General Fourquet from *Tous Azimuts* to "Graduated Response".

With Georges Pompidou's demise in 1974, the French Presidency passed over to Giscard D'Estaing, during whose tenure, the concept of "Sanctuarization Elargi", became basic to the French strategy.

With the dawn of the 1980s, there came about a tumultous change in the French political establishment. Francois Mitterrand, Chief of the French Socialist Party took over as the French President, and French Socialist Party acquired the status of the ruling party in the French National Assembly. With this change, there were high expectations that there would be a major change in the French Socialist regime's approach to European security. It is well known that the "Left Unity Programme" had become nearly ineffective towards the end of the 1970s. Yet, at the time of the Presidential elections in France in 1981, the

U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, and the CPSU General-Secretary, Leonoid Brezhnev expressed support to Giscard d'Estaing and opposition to Francois Mitterrand for their own widely differing reasons.

In any case, the French political power structure underwent change with a big bang in 1981. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the French Socialists principally on their own found themselves in full command of the political power, Francois Mitterand as the French President, Pierre Mauroy as the French Prime Minister, and one of the extreme-left Socialists Charles Hernu as defence minister, known for his anti-Americanism.

The Socialist regime has continued to reign supreme (with a break for two years from 1986 to 1988, when the Centre-right wing parties held majority in the National Assembly) until 1993, and the French nuclear policy continued to be pursued uninterruptedly. Indeed, as may be explained later in this thesis, despite the French cooperation with the Germans in setting up European Armed Corps, there seems to have evolved over the preceeding three decades a consensus among the various segments of the French political class on the need for the French policy of nuclear independence, of which major stands are: (a) France

continues to be a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, but would not return to the integrated military mechanism of the NATO; (b) The French strategic force forms an integral part of the French national defence, and will as such remain under the supreme command of the French President, and will be used only in the interests of the French security; and (c) There could be cooperation between the French strategic force and the NATO strategic commands, but on terms mutually agreed to. There is no automaticity involved in it in in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the tragic experiences that it had to face.

Now, with the systemic change and disintegration of the USSR and Eastern Europe, Cold War has ended, once and for all, and now there is no well-targetted adversary neither for the NATO nor for the French and the British. Nonetheless, nuclear deterrence has not been given up as yet by any of the nuclear powers. Only reduction in the strategic arms is being negotiated between the two mighty nuclear powers.

As such, there has come about a change in the objective reality in Europe. The descent of the USSR and then its demise synchronized with the ascendance of united Germany. It is the latter power that is destined to fill the power

vacuum in Central Eastern Europe. Naturally, much to the dismay of the French, Germany has already started asserting itself in shaping up the policies and approaches of the European Community to suit its interests (e.g., recognition of Croatia and Slovania).

In the light of these basic changes in the European power configuration, what role the French strategic force will play, and with what objectives, in all-European security, form the core of this study. This work has been divided into four chapters, with the fifth comprising the Conclusions.

In the first chapter, an attempt has been made to analyze the socio-psychological as well as the political and strategic factors, which, in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the tragic experiences that France had to face in the decade that followed the war, took shape and led the French to devise their own policy of nuclear independence.

In the second chapter, analysis has been made as to how the French socialists (co-authors alongwith the Communists' of the Left Unity Programme in 1972) who were in the forefront in expressing their opposition to the French

strategic force for more than one-and-a-half decades since its inception, became its principal votaries in the late 1970s, and they have been pursuing and strengthening it uninterruptedly ever since their assumption of power in 1981.

In the third chapter, the French response to the strategic arms reductions and control, especially in the context of the INF, and then in the conventional field, particularly the CFE accords, has been discussed in detail.

In the fourth chapter, an attempt has been made to understand the rationale underlying the continuance of the French strategic force, particularly since the disappearance of the bipolar conflictual global order, and also the French reaction to the presence of the NATO as the principal mechanism ensuring post-Cold War security in Europe.

Finally, an overview of the French nuclear independence has been attempted, examining relevance of the French strategic force in the wake of the fast changing political conjuncture in Europe.

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Chapter - I

THE FRENCH STRATEGIC FORCE: ITS INCEPTION AND EVOLUTION THROUGH THE 1960s AND THE 1970s

RATIONALE FOR THE FRENCH NATIONAL NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE

Over the past several centuries France has played a key role in the politics of European security. However, it has to be acknowledged that its basic tenets of the Republicanism -- Liberty, Equality and Fraternity -- became the theme song in the freedom struggle of several erstwhile colonized Third World countries against their European imperial masters. But France, in the first three quarters of the nineteenth century projected a different image in Europe, atleast with the ruling establishments of major European imperial powers. It was considered as a turbulent state, to be kept under strict vigil by the other European powers. This latter role ended with the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. As a result, the gravitational centre of European politics also shifted from Paris to Berlin, owing particularly to the emergence of united Germany. Since then Germany has been the major source of apprehension to European peace and security. From among the European powers, France has felt affected the most, for its

soil had been trampled over thrice by the German forces between 1870 and 1945. Therefore, there has continued to prevail a kind of Germanophobia until recently in France. Taking into account the demographic factor as well as industrial capability of Germany, the German fear seems to have been further deepened into the contemporary French psyche. Its evidence is provided by an eminent French politicologue, Francois Mauriac, who, in the late 1950s had remarked that with divided Germany, French have to sleep with one eye open, and with United Germany, they will have to sleep with both eyes open.

Understandably, implications of the French threat perception from Germany had to be grievous. The former French President General de Gaulle had no difficulty in grasping clearly as to where the French weakness lies.

Owing to its humiliating set backs caused in the three wars with Germany, France not only lost its national morale and self-esteem, but also its colonies. France felt betrayed by its own allies, who were supposed to help it. France which had glorious past, seemed to have fallen flat after the two world wars. General de Gaulle, himself, was a witness to all the misery inflicted upon France in this century. More than that, he himself felt betrayed by allies

during the Second World War, which made him think that nobody stands with the vanquished and the hapless. That is why he was determined to restore the lost glory to France after its liberation from Nazi-Germany in the Second World War.

General de Gaulle "the illustrious French man" who had an idyllic image of France, could neither forget nor forgive the allies for having kept France out of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences held in February and July-August 1945 respectively, which without consultation with the affected European nations, gave shape to post-war European settlements. He knew how hard he had to fight against his own allies during the last phase of the Second World War for regaining national sovereignty for France.

As it came to be known in the mid-1945 that the U.S. had acquired atomic weapons, he also aspired for France to equip itself with it. For, without it, its defence would not be complete. After the war, but in the thick of the Cold War in the 1950s, he needed it urgently to improve its standing with its principal alliance partners -- the U.S., the U.K. and West Germany within the Atlantic Alliance. For it may be recalled that after the Second World War, the issue of developing nuclear power was clouded by effects of the war. The unhappy experiences of war had left two distinct and

contradictory impressions on the French. They were all too aware that they depended on others for their defence against powerful enemy. Yet they could not trust the intentions and capabilities of their allies for their defence.[1]

The events of the war years had clearly demonstrated that France was no longer mistress of its destiny. Therefore, since the mid-fifties onwards a small group of technicians, of whom the most remarkable was General Charles Ailleret, published articles arguing in favour of French strategic defence.[2] Earlier in the late 1940s, Professor Frédéric Joliot had declared that, "France can legitimately claim the knowledge of the secret of atomic energy, because she is the country which has given birth to developed nuclear physics."

Professor Joliot, was then, head of *Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique*, set up by General de Gaulle, President of the French Provisional Republic, vide his official ordinance of 18 October 1945. But in 1947 he was made to leave under American pressure as it was thought that he had communist connection. In an article he criticized the U.S. secrecy of

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1 Wolf Mendle, Deterrence and Persuasion: French Nuclear Armament in the Context of National Policy, 1945-1968 (London, 1970), p.69.

2 Ibid., p.73.

'know-how.[3]

> "I consider as very dangerous, as I already said, the position taken by the U.S. during recent talks, because keeping the secret of the atomic bomb appears as means of pressure."

French interest in the possession of nuclear weapons was readily comprehensible. What was less easily understood was the manner in which France decided to produce the bomb. For it was not a single decision but a clear-cut long range policy cautiously planned and executed but rather a series of events and decisions, which led to the Sahara test in February 1960. Francois de Rose, a ranking member of *Quai d' Orsay* and of the Atomic Energy Committee said:[4] "On political level there had been no doctrine of French nuclear armament." The CEA has always been marginally associated with national defence. The ordinance of 18 October 1945, charged the CEA with conducting "scientific and technical research with a view to the utilization of atomic energy in the various fields of science, industry and national defence".

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3 H.S. Chopra, De Gaulle and European Unity (New Delhi, 1974), pp.223-224.

4 Rose as quoted in Wolf Mendl, op.cit., n.1, p.84. Also see, *Ordonnance* No.45-2563, *France Journal Officiel, Lois et Décret*, 31 October 1945, p.7,065, cited in Wolf Mendl, ibid., n.1, p.86.

The possibility of military application had been introduced into the CEA by the Secretary-General, René Lescop, who was instrumental in the decision to construct plutonium reactors.

Certain elements in the military also were instrumental in military atomic development. Only a limited number of military officers were dedicated to the proposition that France must become an atomic military power in its own right. This attitude, however, changed under political pressures. As a result until late 1956, the French military authority could not be explicitly supportive to an atomic weapons programme.

On the other hand as the effect of the Indo-China war, an atmosphere favorable to an atomic military programme was also considered. In the midst of the crisis surrounding the attack on Dien Bien Phu by Communist Viet-minh forces, the French government had sought American military aid in the form of air support. Admiral Radford, head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were favourable to this support, but negotiations fell through and Indo-China was lost to France.[5]

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5 George Kelly, "The Political Background of the French A-Bomb", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.4, no.3, Fall, 1960), p.287.

American reluctance to intervene in the French cause raised the question of the extent to which France could rely on allied support when particularly French national security interests were at stake. After the Suez incident in 1956, many political groupings in France supported forcefully the development of independent French nuclear force because American support could not be counted upon in a situation in which the vital interests of the U.S. were not at stake.[6] The experience of Suez thus reinforced the misgivings which were born at Dien bien Phu. These perceptions may not have been based on a very profound analysis of the crisis.

It was then impossible to gauge the catalyzing effect of the Suez crisis on the French nuclear policy but a historian asserted that American reluctance to support allies in this crisis was one of the principal reasons why the French military staff recommended and the *Comité de Défense Nationale* formulated the creation of a national nuclear striking force within its *plan de politique Militaire à long Terme*.

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6 Wolf Mendl, op.cit., n.1, p.103. Also see, Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France, Troubled Ally (New York, 1960), p.280.

On the other hand an excessive preoccupation with subversive warfare in general and the Algerian conflict in particular, weakened the military demand for French atomic weapons.

In a debate on the military budget which took place in 1954 publicized the incipient concern of certain parliamentarians and the Government about the application of atomic energy to military ends. Spokesmen for the Finance and National Defence Committees alluded to the absence of provisions in the budget for even the study of atomic weapons which, all agreed, were the arms of future.[7]

The most eloquent appeal for atomic weapons, however, came from Pierre André, *rapporteur* for National Defense Committee of the National Assembly, during the general debate. He asked Mr. Pleven that:

> "What is an army worth today which does not possess the atomic weapons?
>
> Without atomic weapons a country does not count because its defence is out of date and a nation without atomic weapons...is at the mercy of those who possess this weapon. A national defence without atomic weapons is incomplete and unavailing...."[8]

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7 *Journal Officiel, débates Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale*, n.21, 17 March 1954, pp.877-88 cited in Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (New Jersey, 1965), p.106.

8 Ibid.

Then he urged upon the French Minister of National Defence to equip France with national nuclear defence so that it recovers its status in the world comity of nations, and also contributes to global peace and security.

In the mid-1950s, the French felt convinced that their defence without atomic weapons was incomplete. It is for two reasons that France under Pierre Mendes-France decided clandestinely to proceed with the manufacture of atomic weapons. This fact was not publicized. It is only in early 1958, that during the tenure of Felix Gaillard as the French Prime Minister, the French plans for atomic weapons came to be known unofficially. By this time, a profound pro-atomic weapon lobby had emerged in the French political circles, and in the *avante-garde* of the military circles, this view came to be reinforced through articles publicized in Military journals, that,

> "atomic weapons are the weapons of future and those nations which lacked atomic military capability would be relegated to the status of satellites."[8]

Colonel Ailleret wrote in an article, "*L'Armée Atomique Ultima Ratio des Peuples*" in *Revue de Defense Nationale*, December 1954, that:

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8 Captain Pierre, J.P. Maurin, "Perspectives Atomique I", *Revue de Defense Nationale* (Paris), June, 1954, p.706.

"An army without atomic weapons would be powerless in the face of an adversary who possessed these weapons, lacking atomic fire-power, an army relying upon classic arms would be subjected to virtual annihilation."

The foregoing statements seemed to have neutralized the anti-nuclear lobby led by the former French socialist Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, who believed that:[10]

"We will ask that the member states of EURATOM take a solemn engagement to renounce the use of atom for military purposes..."

But then the vote that was cast for EURATOM authorized Government to continue its negotiations, but only on terms which would ensure France's autonomy in both peaceful and military atomic atmosphere.

In 1957, the launching of Sputnik by Russia raised the question of validity of the American assurance of defending Europe. For, with this development Russia projected it's new image of having scored over the United States in space conquest. In consequence, the French were left only to wonder if the U.S. was really working fast enough to catch

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10 Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under Fourth Republic (Princeton, 1965), p.107.

up with the USSR. They needed a deterrent to hedge against lowered credibility of American assurance that it could defend Europe against Soviet aggression with its nuclear capability.

Doubtlessly, the decision to test the bomb by 1960, was taken under the Gaillard administration shortly before the fall of the Fourth Republic. But it was the characteristic of that Republic that Governments vacillated, hesitated and were unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of underwriting an atomic military programme for France.[11] In contrast thereto, under the Fifth Republic, there was no confusion left about it, and the new leadership made it clear soon after assumption of power in mid 1958 that it believed in the updatedness of national defence, which clearly meant that France would exercise its option in favour of national strategic defence. And the French Strategic defence would include a national nuclear striking force,[12] a panoply of strategic and tactical atomic weapons

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11 Ciro Zoppo, "France as a Nuclear Power", in Rich and Rosecrance, eds. The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp.126-56.

12 Raymond Aron, in *Le Figaro* (Paris), 14 August 1959.

complete with delivery system. In a sense, this one could say that the Fifth Republic was the executor of the policy which was initiated by its predecessor.[13]

In the fifth Republic French doctrine rested on the proposition that nuclear powers dispose of two types of armaments which may be described as conventional and strategic. The latter weapons impose a strategy of deterrence in which their use may be more of psychological and political and less of military nature.

Since the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were in a state of nuclear balance, it follows that neither would use its full might except in defence of its heartland. Thus, France cannot rely upon American protection against the political and military pressures of another nuclear power.

One way of dealing with the assumed unreliability of the American nuclear guarantee was to think in terms of developing a European nuclear force,[14] presumably through a combination of French and British enterprises in the field.

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13 Ibid.

14 Wolf Mendl, op.cit., n.1, p.79.

On 15-16 December 1962, President Charles de Gaulle received the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan at Rambouillet. That was the only moment when General de Gaulle hoped for a while that he might succeed in settling up a common Franco-British front against American hegemony. The USA had announced six months before the French explosion of its first atomic device in February 1960, that it had discontinued production of skybolt rockets with which British had hoped to build up their nuclear forces, for they did not have enough nuclear delivery vehicles of their own. As such, General de Gaulle then put forward a plan for building up the French "striking force" intended to ensure French military independence. Given the limitations of French resources, the implementation of that plan was extremely difficult. But if Britain and France joined their efforts, the situation would become different. Should such a difficult situation materialize, American alliance would then suffice, and its "protection" would be rendered unnecessary. Soon after the British Prime Minister's visit to France, the US-UK summit took place in Nassau. During the negotiations, the U.S. President John F. Kennedy offered the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, Polaris missiles on conditions that Britain would take part in the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF).

This plan, when offered to France, as it will be explained a bit later, was rejected by the French President de Gaulle as it was unsuited to the French nuclear force.[15]

In any case Macmillan's "betrayal" triggered off the transition to the next stage in de Gaulle's policy. The ending of the Algerian war and the success of referendum in late 1962 consolidated de Gaulle's position and at his press conference on 14th January 1963, he exploded two bombshells that stunned his Western allies.

He declared that Britain would not be a member of the European community because its entry would lead to the emergence of a colossal Atlantic Community dependent and subordinate to the Americans."[16]

The second bomb-shell concerned the MLF. Almost at the same time, the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) was floated, which was approved at the afore-cited U.S.-U.K. summit. The British Prime Minister succeeded in persuading the U.S. President to agree to extend the same rights to

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15 David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings, 1983), p.101.

16 Nikolai Molchanov, General de Gaulle: His Life and Works (Moscow, 1988), p.360.

France as for Britain under the Nassau agreement. If France participated in the MLF, her submarines would remain under French command, they would have Polaris missiles[17] with French warheads, and they could be withdrawn in the event of supreme national danger.

It was clear that President Kennedy, with his characteristic energy and initiative endeavored to maintain American hegemony through the aforecited plan. In the Western bloc, the West European countries' dependence on the USA was to be increased through adoption of the MLF, comprising a fleet of 25 warships under mixed command for which Americans were ready to provide Polaris missiles.[18]

But General Charles de Gaulle argued that the MLF merely camouflaged the American monopoly of nuclear strategy in Western Europe. The MLF would not increase the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee because it would merely subjugate European nuclear forces to American strategic direction and simultaneously declared that France

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17 The Times (London), 26 January 1963.

18 C.L. Sulzberger reported in New York Times, 17 January 1962.

would build its independent nuclear striking force.[19]

General Charles de Gaulle stepped up the building of the independent French "strike force." In the autumn he himself inspected the nuclear plants in Pierrelatte. At the end of that year, the French armed forces were provided with 50 kiloton atomic bombs, and in January 1964 production of the Mirage-IV planes intended to carry those bombs to the target was begun.[20] For de Gaulle the "striking force had diplomatic significance, but it was heavy burden on French economy. To complete the development of nuclear weapons, tests were carried out one after another. But he refused to join the Moscow treaty on the banning of nuclear tests.

As early as in 1958 he began his efforts to carve out a place for France in the "Club of the great" nuclear powers

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19 Nikolai Molchanov, op.cit., n.16, p.80. For details on MLF see John Newhouse, "An Appraisal of the Multilateral Force", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), September 1964, pp.13-17. Also see, John Silard, "The Case Against Multilateral Forces", ibid., pp.18-20.

20 Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General de Gaulle, 19 May 1958-31 January 1964 (New York, *Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'information*, 1964), pp.27-28.

and to attain this objective he wrote on 24 September 1958 to the U.S. President Eisenhower and the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a secret memorandum demanding that a system of trilateral consultations, within the Atlantic Alliance, be instituted among France, the U.S. and the U.K., for working out and formulating strategic decisions. General de Gaulle says in his *memoirs*:

> "As I had expected, both addressees gave an evasive reply to my memorandum. Nothing was left to us but action."[21]

NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DISAPPROVED -- FRENCH ADOPTION OF THE POLICY OF *TOUS AZIMUTS*

In March 1959, General de Gaulle ordered withdrawal of the French Fleet from the Atlantic Mediterranean command.[22] He then forbade the American forces from locating atomic bombs in France or to construct launching pads on French territory. Air defence units were soon returned under French command and a system of control overflights of military

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21 In his Press Conference on October 23, 1958. Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, pp.27-28.

22 U.S. Congress, JCAE, Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, Agreements for Cooperation for Mutual Defence Purposes, 86th Congress, First Session, 1959, p.9.

planes on French territory was established.[23] In contravention of previous agreements, de Gaulle refused to hand over to NATO commanders the French units returning from North Africa. In short French participation in the NATO alliance was steadily reduced and it meant a tangible departure from the earlier situation in which all the governments of Fourth Republic (before de Gaulle's accession to power) had regarded Atlantic alliance as of an absolute value, the basis of their entire foreign policy. On 16 September 1959, President de Gaulle visited the High Military School, and in his speech he expounded his new policy of national defence.

> "The defence of France must be French... If a nation like France has to go to war, it must be its own...without doubt, our defence can be coordinated in case of need with the defence of another country...But France's defence must be her own, she must defend herself on her own and in her own way."[24]

But Americans were sure of French cooperation as at the height of Caribbean crisis, which brought world to the brink of war, de Gaulle let Kennedy know at the Paris Summit that France would be on the side of the USA

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23 New York Times, 9 and 21 June 1959.

24 Text of speech released later in *Le Monde* (Paris), 6 November 1959.

De Gaulle looked to western Europe for a basis of France's independence. Indeed, the heritage left here by the Fourth Republic suited him even less than France's miserable position in NATO. Earlier, French policy had been mostly oriented towards various forms of European alliance of six member-states of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), EEC (European Economic Community), and the EURATOM. Once in 1950, it had been suggested to complement them with a "European Army", to which de Gaulle had expressed his opposition not without success.[25]

The organizations already in existence contained supranational elements that threatened the independence of France. Plan for European Political Community was worked out which was to supplement and not supplant the existing structures of its independent member states. But this plan also fell through.

And to form an independent Western European bloc he looked towards Germany for help, the very country France always feared, as her arch rival. At the time de Gaulle realized that although Germany was economically twice as strong as France, but it badly needed political support. A

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25 Walter Hallstein, The European Community as the Foundation of the Political Union of Europe (London), 22 October 1962, pp.11-12.

joint declaration was worked out, solemnly announcing end of the traditional hostility between the two countries. Cooperation between France and the FRG, the statement said, was "the basis of any constructive undertaking in Europe." General de Gaulle and German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer struck a secret bargain in their meeting in Paris in January 1963,[26] while the French President promised not to conclude any agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the German question that would be unacceptable to the FRG the latter undertook to support de Gaulle in his quest for leadership of Western Europe.[27] But in May 1963 during the ratification of the treaty, the pedantic Germans, contrary to all rules of International law, added to the text a political preamble in which they stated the basis of the FRG policy to be close alliance with the USA, military integration within NATO, "Supranational Europe", and Britain's participation in the common Market, the last one de Gaulle had already rejected.[28]

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26 See the text of the Treaty in *Les Documents Communaute Europeene, Le Dossier de L'Union Politique* (*Bureau d'Information des Communautes Europeennes*, Paris, 1964), pp.47-50 as cited in H.S. Chopra, op.cit., n.3, p.143.

27 The Franco-German Cooperation Treaty came into force on 2 July 1963.

28 The Times, 17 May 1963; and Le Monde, 20 November 1963.

After the conclusion of the Treaty, the relations between France and West Germany deteriorated rapidly and abruptly. New Federal Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, was more worried about concrete economic problems like the improvement of the German balance of payments.[29] Erhard who had replaced Adenauer as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, could not forgive de Gaulle for his categorical refusal to consider West Germany's state in nuclear armaments. Contradictions between Bonn and Paris increased with growth of de Gaulle's assertion of independence in French foreign policy.

The ever increasing panoply and growing sophistication of nuclear weapons systems as well as developing French capabilities in this field, introduced a new dimension in the field, of European security. Large number of tactical nuclear weapons available to both sides raised the spectre of limited nuclear war in Europe which would devastate the continent but spare Russia and the United States. As far as France was concerned, once the preliminary encounter in Germany had been lost, she would become a corridor for *'bataille des restes'* based on Spain, as stated by Eric

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29 Ernst Majonica, East-West Relations: A German View (Praeger, 1969), p.192.

Muraise, in an article published in *Revue de défense Nationale*,[30]

The scale of American nuclear armament and the context of American global strategy indicated that greatest danger of nuclear war in Europe came from American side, for Americans would be least able to sustain a conventional war and most tempted to resort to tactical nuclear weapons first in order to halt the enemy's advance. The French nuclear force therefore became an instrument for lessening French dependence on defence by the United States -- a policy based on assumption that the global strategic balance, weighted as it appeared to be in America's favour, would suffice to protect Europe against inordinate Russian pressure.

French nuclear strategy was predicated on the instantaneous and total use of national nuclear armoury once a serious aggression has been initiated. This adaptation of a doctrine of massive retaliation -- purer in its implications than the one associated with John Foster Dulles was first slightly modified by the plans for producing French tactical nuclear weapons. It was agreed that such weapons would permit a delay between the identification of aggression and the use of strategic weapons directed against

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30 Wolf Mendl, op.cit., n.1, p.81.

the opponents' cities. The deployment of conventional forces backed by threatened or actual use of tactical nuclear weapons might force the invader to pause in face of this earnest of French intentions. However, such a delay could only be for a few hours before France would unleash the whole panoply of its atomic arsenal that it may have at a given critical juncture. There seemed no other way in which to deal with the hypothetically dreaded effects of limited war in Europe.[31]

In an article on *"Défense Dirigée ou Défense Tous Azimuts,* in *Revue de Défense Nationale* in December 1967, General Charles Ailleret aroused a great deal of speculation inside and outside France about a new departure in the French strategic doctrine.[32]

He threw light on "new enemy" theory of France. Wolf Mendl, a well known expert, delineates it as follows:

> "According to him, France has always had a "favourite enemy". The role has fallen successively on Britain, Germany and Russia. Now that threat from Russia had almost disappeared, there was no specific

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31 Jolyon Howorth, "Consensus and Mythology: Security Alternatives in Post-Gaullist France" in Robert Aldrich and John Counell, eds., France in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1989).

32 Wolf Mendl, op.cit., n.1, p.83.

> enemy. Nonetheless, as a consequence of progress in weapons technology, a threat in future could come from any direction in the world. France might be attacked by nations which were at war with other states. The attack might be launched because one of the parties wanted to control French territory and resources or because it wanted to deny them to opponent."

As such he expounded his new strategy of *Tous Azimuts*, which meant that the French nuclear strategy is not specifically targeted against the U.S.S.R., but it is designed to face aggression from no matter which quarter. The French adoption of this strategy also meant rejection of the new U.S. strategy of "Flexible Response". Even though, the strategy was modified by General Ailleret's successors, yet one element enshrined in this strategy, which has survived until now is that there is no automaticity in the French involvement in any conflict that may get triggered between the two power blocs. This, however, does not suggest that the French could turn anti-West. Rather it means that in the event of the outbreak of conflict between the two power blocs, France could join only on terms mutually agreed to between the contradicting allied powers.

Some critics have gone to the extent of describing the aforesaid scenario, as one of paranoid. Others, somewhat

charitable, may dub it as belonging to the realm of fiction. Let us not forget that since in its past history, "unthinkable" tragic events have taken place, which make it imperative for France to be prepared for its defence in all situations. Therefore, under the then prevailing circumstances the new French strategy seemed not to be inappropriate.

But soon after untimely demise of General Ailleret, his successor, General Michel Fourquet had the courage to reject the strategy of *Tous Azimuts* in March 1969, i.e., a month before General de Gaulle relinquished the French Presidency.[33] He also disapproved the doctrine of "Massive Retaliations" or *Tout ou Rien*, as well as the American strategy of "Flexible Response", meeting aggression in force at all levels. He advocated, instead, a strategy of "graduated response" in which tactical nuclear weapons would play their part independent of the strategic nuclear force and thus raise the threshold beyond which the latter would come into play.[34]

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33 H.S. Chopra, op.cit., n.3, pp.253-254.

34 Wolf Mendl, op.cit., n.1, p.84.

FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NATO MILITARY APPARATUS

"Everything I do is for the grandeur of France",[35] these are the words of General de Gaulle. He said: "Character is above all the ability to ignore the abuse and desertion by one's allies." He knew it very well that in taking independent decision, he has no rival. So he claimed proudly that: "Only we can say no to American protection."

Before he came to power, France was in his view, verily an American satellite. The resolution to put an end to this state of dependence formed a key element in de Gaulle's foreign policy. Once, his foreign minister, Couve de Murville spoke of "States friendly towards France" at an official sitting. De Gaulle cut him short: "A state worthy of name has no friends."[36] At first sight, the foregoing dictum appeared to be a sheer paradox. But its meaning became clear when de Gaulle's actual harsh experiences during the war were kept in mind. For, he believed that "our allies are also our adversaries." "War is against our

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35 Wilfrid Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (New Jersey: Princeton, 1971), pp.134-37.

36 Nikolai Molchanov, op.cit., n.19, pp.346-47.

enemies, peace is against our friends." Allies are foreigners. Tommorrow they may become enemies." This shows how vulnerable he felt after the war when he did not get expected cooperation from his own so-called allies in war, and whose moves were very calculated in view of being allies.

Those war experiences taught him to go alone. De Gaulle thus took the principle of national independence, the most important of all principles to him, to its logical conclusion.

In summer of 1963, de Gaulle withdrew the French Atlantic Fleet from the NATO command. Only two French divisions remained under American command instead of the 14 originally stipulated apart from several airforce units.[37] The alliance with Bonn proved unavailing principally owing to the on-going political unification of Western Europe emerging independent of the U.S.A. De Gaulle got no support for his efforts to transform the NATO alliance either. Moreover, West German representatives in the organs of that bloc openly condemned the reduction of France's participation in the system of military integration in

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37 Le Monde, 18 February 1964.

Atlantic alliance.

On 9 September 1965, de Gaulle held a press conference highlighting critical aspects of Atlantic alliance.[38]

> "Our country will remain an ally of our allies but on expire of the term of our commitments, that is, no later than 1969, our subordinate status, in other words, the integration envisaged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which places our future in alien hands, will come to an end...we shall see to it that this organization does not deprive us of our freedom of action."[39]

On 21 February 1966, at his regular press conference, he announced that France, intending to restore her sovereignty, had decided to withdraw from NATO military alliance, and demanded that all the bases, headquarters, etc., not under French command, be pulled out from France. Shortly, afterwards, a note to the fourteen members states of the NATO declared that all French units, were henceforth withdrawn from the NATO headquarters, and that all foreign bases, airfields, depots, etc., were to be removed from French territory. France presented a schedule

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38 Gen de Gaulle quoted in Nikolai Molchanov, op.cit., n.19, p.363.

39 Charles de Gaulle, Speeches and Press Conferences, no.228 (New York: *Ambassade de France. Service de Press et d'Information*), 1965.

for evacuation of 28 U.S. bases with 33,000 officers and men.[40]

General de Gaulle's nuclear policy as well as foreign policy were subjected to unprecedented criticism both within and outside France. The French President was successful in invalidating a major objection that the French nuclear force would be insignificant *vis-a-vis* the colossal nuclear might of the U.S.S.R.. The central target in his nuclear planning was not always necessarily the Soviet Union, but German problem, for the French fear of a possible German resurrection has never been completely allayed. In fact, the one thing on which de Gaulle had throughout his political career, maintained consistency was his concept of a united Europe from "Atlantic to the Urals."

Since from among the European powers, the U.S.S.R., being also a Super Power, had been a party to the partition of Europe, de Gaulle believed that France was morally bound to fulfill the mission of restoring unity to divided Europe,

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40 W.W. Kulski, DeGaulle and the World (Syracuse, 1966), pp.176-88; Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain (New York, 1970), pp.100-109 and Francis A. Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO (Ohio, 1969), pp.85-92.

and for which he considered France cannot defend Europe being dependent on others for its security. Therefore, only by pursuing a policy of nuclear independence could France emerge as a European power that has the means and responsibility for securing future and stability in the continent.[41]

"CONTINUITY AND CHANGE" FRENCH NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE 1970s:

Following the resignation of General Charles de Gaulle from the French Presidency in April 1969, Georges Pompidou succeeded him in the Elysee Palace. The latter inherited three major issues from the legacy of General de Gaulle: One, British exclusion from the EEC; second, French withdrawal from the NATO military command and continuance of French nuclear independence; and a weak economy to carry the foregoing expensive programmes.

As such during Pompidou's new five-year French Presidency, French policy of nuclear independence continued more or less along the Gaullist lines. There were, however, slight deviations from major Gaullists security policies, such as under the changed scenario marked by East West

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41 H.S. Chopra, op.cit., n.3, pp.279-80.

détente, he was no longer concentrating on further strengthening of the French strategic systems, and also *Tous Azimuts* strategy was gradually being replaced by "Graduated Response", in a way bringing the French strategic thinking close to the NATO's.[42]

In summer of 1969 Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas declared that French nuclear policy was both *irreversible et orientable*. Continuity in this regard was emphasized by the appointment of Gaullist leader Michel Debre' as Minister of Defence. The term *orientable* implied two things: first, that the French nuclear efforts would be cut back in view of pressing domestic economic and social needs and great care would be taken to avoid unnecessary public expenditure; and second, that Franco-British cooperation in the nuclear-strategic domain may become feasible, provided Britain enters the EC, as its full fledged member.[43]

Under Pompidou's regime the French relations with the NATO remained unchanged. However, owing to economic crunch, he had to tighten budgetary allocations in the fiscal year 1970-71 for national defence. In his budget for 1970 he

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42 Wilfrid Kohl, op.cit., n.35, p.372.

43 Le Monde, 7, 11, 12, 14 & 19 November 1969. See also Le Monde 22 April 1969 and 28 January 1970.

declared scaling down of missile programme.[44] The previously announced goal of twenty-seven-land-based missiles were reduced to eighteen. Nuclear tests were continued but launching of fourth nuclear submarine was postponed. Tactical nuclear arms and small tactical bombs to be carried by air force's Jaguar were the main vignette of Pompidou's nuclear policy. Nuclear missiles equipped submarines were also an agenda for the purpose of constant patrolling. Further progress or decrease in emphasis upon nuclear-strategic-defence depended upon the results of the on-going Super Power negotiations for reductions in their strategic systems.

He concentrated more on an active middle-power role for France in two key areas: Europe, and the Mediterranean.

His most remarkable departure from Gaullist policy was his role in Europe. He gave up de Gaulle's most sought after idea of "Europe of Fatherlands" and Europe "from Atlantic to Urals". Pompidou stressed more on the idea of strong western Europe so that she could resist threat from the East.[45] After playing a leading role in the Hague Summit of the European

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44 Le Monde, 29-30 June 1969.

45 Wilfrid Kohl, op.cit., n.35, p.378.

Community held in December 1969, Pompidou reached a compromise with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in early 1971 on the basis for launching the first stage of European economic and monetary union, which was to be achieved by 1980.

The other major change in his policy related to enlargement of the EC. France agreed with her partners at the Hague conference to open negotiations with the British government in July 1970. Assenting to participate in European economic and monetary union, Britain accepted the principle of EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and gave France assurance on the future role of the Sterling. Defence and nuclear matters appear not to have been part of the bargain. This was a step taken by him to counter rising influence of Germany in the EC. Germany and France were on the same footing though in different areas, such as France predominated in matters relating to foreign policy as did the FRG in the economic domain. New hopes were expressed for military cooperation between two countries, as well as cooperation in industrial projects and civilian nuclear technology.[46] Neither Paris nor Bonn was pressing for

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46 Pompidou's Press Conference, 21 January 1971, No.71/9 (New York) and also his 24 June 1971, television interview reprinted in Le Monde, 26 June 1971.

supranational integration in Western Europe and French Government in principle declared its support for Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

On east, Pompidou's policies were in conformity with those of General de Gaulle. France supported the Soviet proposed European Security Conference but expressed its desire to remain with Atlantic alliance and simultaneously asserted that France wants U.S. troops to remain in Europe, which was an about-turn from the Gaullist idea.[47] France allowed NATO continued use of a pipeline and certain communication facilities located in France, and also granted rights for military overflights of French territories. They participated in NADGE early-warning system and in limited fashion in NATO air-defence planning and some NATO exercises, including naval exercises.

Furthermore, Pompidou restored French economic and cultural interests in the Mediterranean and North African states, with a view first to increasing military influence in the region; and secondly to prevent further Super Power penetration in the area, as these countries possessed oil of vital importance to France.

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47 New York Times, 25 February 1970.

Without doubt, owing to domestic constraints, Pompidou appeared to be soft in his dealings both with the U.K. and the U.S., but then like his predecessor, he declined to fall in for any compromise on the French policy of nuclear independence. He was aware of the receding Soviet threat to European security, but he could not get rid of the fear of the growing power and influence of Germany. His still greater fear was that Germany might one day on account of its national question veer closer to the Soviet Union and perhaps become a victim of Finlandization.

In the last days of his presidency he gave evidence of his reduced credibility of the U.S., particularly in regard to its commitment to European security.[48]

> "In 1973 he declared that American-Russian talks as well as the MBFR negotiations, would not be understood to imply the slightest control over our own military capacity, and that France intended by the increased effort to finish herself both conventional and a nuclear deterrent that she needs in the interest of world peace."[49]

In 1974, Giscard d'Estaing succeeded Georges Pompidou as the new French President. Even though the new incumbent

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48 Marc Ullmann, "Security Aspects in French Foreign Policy", Survival (London), vol.15, no.6, 1973, p.265.

49 Wilfrid Kohl, op.cit., n.35, p.266.

in the Elysée Palace was non-Gaullist, yet his nuclear policy made qualitatively no departure from the major guidelines of the French strategic policies, as enunciated by his Gaullist predecessor. For, for his own political survival, he depended upon the support of different Gaullist factions.

However, General Méry averred that a policy of 'total reliance' on nuclear weapons does not give France sufficient flexibility to react to the diverse threats of the era. So he outlined a strategy of 'extended sanctuarization', which called upon France to play a larger role in conventional deterrence of Europe, but also allowed it to maintain total control over her decisions of when and how to use nuclear weapons.[50] His remarks in this regard are self-explanatory:

> "I doubt, whether in an extreme case when everything in Europe had collapsed about us, the national will would survive recourse to the threat of massive destruction, even to ensure our continued existence."

President Giscard d'Estaing in a press conference on 1 June 1976 declared that he would completely abide by General de Gaulle's ideas in regard to the French strategic defence.

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50 General Guy Mery's address reported in Survival (London), vol.18, no.5, 1976, p.226; and Leon V. Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects (Washington, 1984), p.142.

"This at present time is nuclear arms...because possession of these most advanced arms is a major defence necessity; also because its nature, which is a new one in military history, is to make an almost unprecedented rift between the aggressor's hopes of a victory and the risks of losses he might suffer as a result of his aggression. This rift forms the basis of dissuasion. Decisions which have been made, enable France to possess weapons and utilizable nuclear weapons."[51]

He further added:

> "For nuclear power is not merely a question of clumsily and slowly manufacturing a nuclear arm: It is above all a question of being able to use it, which presupposes victors and the whole infrastructure with which you are familiar." Thus, France was able to become a nuclear power, she must continue her pursuit of technological, scientific and industrial efforts...in order to become world's third nuclear military power."[52]

As far as his security policy and programme were concerned he developed a mobile land army whose organization was based on big units available for combat. Navy, in his view, must once again be endowed with nuclear submarines to patrol in Mediterranean, which can also launch rockets.

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51 President Giscard d'Estaing's address on 1 June 1976, published in Survival (London), ibid., n.34, p.228.

52 Ibid., p.229.

The French fighter plane, which was to be well advanced was baptized as Mirage 2000. But he completely rejected General Ailleret's idea of 'all or nothing'. For he did not regard that kind of defence credible. He said France cannot do without tactical weapons, and how these weapons be launched whether by rockets or planes, comes under the authority of the President of the Republic but it is not only an instrument of dissuasion but also an instrument of battle. Its utilization is a possibility in the dissuasion range of possibilities. It is the opposite of 'all or nothing.'

Secondly, presence of American conventional troops in Europe was essential in maintaining the East-West military balance and dissuasive factor in the event of the possibility of a conflict.'[53]

In regard to Germany, he was not different from his predecessors, as his fear found expression in his statement in 1976 before the French National Assembly.

> I consider it is important that military balance of our continent should not be inferior in number to those of the other continental military power, namely Germany."[54]

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53 Ibid., pp.229-230.

54 Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier", Survival, vol.26, no.4, 1984, p.178.

In terms of basic nuclear strategy and development Giscard d'Estaing continued along the path trod by his predecessors. The originality of his policies was in redefinition of France's role regarding NATO in a world which is very unstable.[55]

French Parliament approved a Defence Programme Law which committed the armed forces to the mission, as a result of which French - NATO relations became smoother than before. France was to take part in the independent Programme Group but would not have any access to NATO targeting.

Having surveyed the evolution of the French strategic force during the 1980s and 1970s, certain conclusions seem to be permissible:

First, the confusion writ large during the Fourth Republic on the question whether or not to opt for nuclear weapons had ended once and for all. Implementation of the nuclear option, however, made it clear that France would not depend upon external support, whether in its financing or in responding to the needs of technological import. In other words, the whole nuclear enterprise had to be built through

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55 J.R. Frears, France in Giscard Presidency, (London, 1981), p.80.

the French initiative, and made operational with the means that it itself could muster up through whatever means available at its command.

Secondly, there is no gainsaying the fact that the French experiment with its nuclear option exalted its stature in the world comity of nations. Perhaps, it turned out to be an effective instrument of diplomacy. As a result France ceased to be the "sickman of Europe," and emerged as a vibrating factor endowed with new dynamism both in European and global politics. Also, it responded to the principal -- socio-economic poser that nuclear defence was less expensive than its conventional counterpart. In any case, of immense value was the self-confidence regained by France after more than a century that it was equipped with the most advanced means of defence. And it did not have to fear any more its immediate eastern neighbour particularly because the latter was inhibited under Paris Treaty of 1954 from possessing or manufacturing or borrowing ABC weapons. More than anything else, it led France to explore into newer areas of dual use - high technologies, which ensured its speedy modernization of its industrial system, thereby enabling it to compete even in this field with its neighbour

across the Rhine.[56]

Thirdly, until the late 1970s, there was considerable opposition to the French nuclear independence expressed particularly in the left circles. In the "left unity programme" drafted by Mitterrand in 1972, the major objective enunciated was to dismantle the French nuclear deterrent as and when the left Parties came to power. We will see a bit later that there has been no reversal of de Gaulle's policy of nuclear independence. The French Socialists (in power since the early 1980s) have pursued it with equal gusto and efficacity uptil now.

Finally, in the late 1970s, it became clear increasingly that with the installation of SS-20 missiles targeted on Western Europe, the U.S.S.R. had gained strategic superiority over the West. Already,e the Soviet superiority in the conventional field over the West was an established fact. Under the circumstances, even if correcting the balance with the Soviet Union was a prime concern of the NATO, yet it was also of an equal concern to the French. This debate than continues when the Socialists assume power in the early 1980s.[57]

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56 Marc Ullmann, op.cit., n.48, pp.263-64.

57 Josef Joffe, op.cit., n.54.

Chapter-II

THE FRENCH NUCLEAR POLICY UNDER FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

THE FRENCH 'LEFT UNITY' PROGRAMME OF 1972 AND FRENCH NUCLEAR DEFENCE:

After the return of de Gaulle to power, the Socialists soon went into opposition under the fifth Republic, objecting to de Gaulle's extension of presidential powers, his right wing economic policy, and his grandiose plan for *Force de Frappe*, which could not become operational even until late in the 1960s. They feared his "militarism", some socialists even poured scorn on de Gaulle's "bombinette" and the Party adopted a non-nuclear defence policy. They also denounced de Gaulle's obsession with out of proportion national independence, which as was being applied in relation to the EEC and or the NATO could result in making France dangerously isolated. In 1966, some socialists voted against the French leaving the NATO and the Party's foreign policy emphasized a need to have close relations with neighbours and allies.[1]

In 1971 the newly organized *Parti Socialiste* (PS)

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1 Sonia Masey and Michael Newman, (eds.), Mitterrand's France, (London, 1987), p.6, and Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier", Survival (London), vol.26, no.4, pp.176-80.

adopted a non-nuclear foreign and defence policy, which expressed vehement opposition to the continuation of the Gaullist nuclear policy under Georges Pompidou's Presidency.[2]

Since the inception of the Fifth Republic, parties of the left had been united in their criticism of General de Gaulle's nuclear strike force, dismissing it as both useless and dangerous. The leftists' attack, however did not postulate any coherent or united policy of substitution. Many socialists, although obviously not communists, attacked Gaullism from Euro-Atlantic viewpoint. However, when the left came closer to the corridors of power, they accepted the military nuclear legacy, first as inescapable fact, and then as an instrument that must be preferred and kept upto date.[3] The communists shifted first in May 1977, realising in the Gaullist strategy a potential weapon against American domination. Different socialist factions extended support to it in varying degrees and also for varying reasons. To illustrate, the socialists of CERES group under the leadership of Jean Pierre Chevenement, and Jacobinist associates of Charles Hernu approved it, owing primarily to

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2 Ibid., p.6.

3 Daniel Singer, Is Socialism Doomed? The Meaning of Mitterrand (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.228.

their known anti-American bias., Such partial and qualified conversion of the left only helped confound the matters, for it, in any case, caused a serious setback to the Left's anti-nuclear movement in France.[4]

In the early 1980s, when intense debate within the Western bloc on deployment of Euro-missiles in Germany and other West European member states of the NATO was taking place, and peace movements had gathered momentum in several European countries, in France only the PCF came out in opposition to the said measure, which, in their view, was bound to exacerbate confrontation with the Soviet bloc. Yet they did not withdraw their support to the nuclear arms. Perhaps, they found themselves in a state of predicament: they could not denounce deployment of Euromissiles without viewing disapprovingly the SS-20 missiles. But since they had no intention to be tough with the U.S.S.R. they limited their campaign to a general waffle about the horrors of war and desirability of peace.[5]

But the most striking development was that the Socialists and Communists after having condemned the

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4 Ibid., p.228. and see also P.J. Freidrich, "Defence and the French Political Left, Survival (London), vol.16, no.4, 1974, p.170.

5 Ibid., p.229.

"Bombinette" for many years, had in turn discovered that the doctrine of dissuasion, as Raymond Aron had expounded, is the best method of remaining within the Atlantic Alliance without committing the mortal sin of being Atlanticist.

The Communist position regarding defence and nuclear weapons represented a sudden doctrinal reversal. This involved officially abandoning the principle of global renunciation of nuclear armaments, which was being asserted until the early 1970s. In 1976, the Communist Deputy, Louis Baillot recognized the importance of nuclear weapons in a speech to the *Fondation pour les etudes de Défense Nationale*. On 11 June 1977, the Central Committee of the French Communist Party accepted that nuclear weapons "would remain only efficient method of defence, which country has available for some time."[6] Nevertheless, the Communist position included serious reservations which strictly limited its scope. Those conditions included the construction of warning system independent from that of NATO,[7] the non-participation of France in the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) talks in Vienna, and the signing

6 Josef Joffe, "German Defence Policy: Novel Solutions and Ending Dilemmas," in Gregory Flynn, (eds.), The Internal Fabric of Western Security (New Jersey, 1981), p.118, and also P.J. Friedrich, op.cit., n.4.

7 Ibid., p.118, and see also Samuel F. Wells, Jr.,The US and European Defence Cooperation", Survival (London), vol.27, no.4, 1985, p.158.

of treaty of non-aggression with the U.S.S.R.. They were of the opinion that decision to use nuclear arms should be made by a group of representatives from all the political parties. Soon it became clear that these "additional factors" caused split of Communists with Socialists and tore asunder the *Union de la Gauche* on defence issues.

Somewhat paradoxically, the socialist party at first found itself behind the Communist Party, to the extent that the acceptance of nuclear weapons took place much later and with greater nuance. The route followed by the Socialist Party since the Presidential campaign of 1965, when Francois Mitterrand (himself a Presidential candidate against de Gaulle) demanded immediate abandonment of the *force de frappe*, was a long and arduous one. In 1973, Mitterrand deplored the fact that the position of the Party on defence issues amounted to a total negation (total repudiation of the professional army, of European Army, of nuclear arms, and of the one year military service). Finally in 1974, during the Presidential campaign Mitterrand gave his approval to the existence of the French atomic arsenal, although doubting its credibility as a deterrent. Any how, Socialists were pacifist by tradition in contrast to the communist party. Jean-Pierre Chevénement created confusion

on the position of Socialist Party as he demanded autonomy in French defence matters which has earned him the reputation of a nationalist, who was more responsive to rapprochement with France's allies.[8]

In Jean Kanapa's report, differences between Socialists and communists about German question[9] were shown. He proposed to retarget the missiles located in Plateau d'Albion, so that German cooperation in this regard could be enlisted, to which however the Communists were opposed. The Kanapa report further envisaged construction of collective European defence based upon participation of France's European allied partners.[10]

As a result, Charles Hernu was pressed by the PS leadership to restrain his pro-nuclear polemics with a view to avoiding split in the Party. As a result, the CERES faction lost support at the PAU conference in 1975. But CERES played a key role in ensuring Mitterrand's continued Party leadership.[11] Mitterrand himself tried to paper over

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8 Ibid.

9 Jean Kanapa, French Communist Central Committee member, in a report published in Survival (London), vol.19, no.5, 16 May 1977, pp.228-29.

10 Sonia Mazey and Michael Newman, op.cit., n.1, p.199.

11 Ibid., p.200.

cracks within the PS by proposing that the Party might reconsider its position on nuclear defence: Such a stance was meant to goad the Party to move close to Hernu's views in the matter.

In a special Socialist convention on defence in January 1978, a balanced approach was suggested. Increased cooperation with the European and trans-Atlantic allies, while maintaining autonomy of the French decisions on defence. Reduction of strategic forces on land, air, and sea had to be in conformity with multilateral disarmament, without however, weakening the French capacity for intervention, and also its independence (on national defence) from the super powers. Worth noting is the fact that the PS wanted naval forces to be retained and modernized to ensure credibility of the French strategic defence, unless however, other nuclear powers reached agreement on substantial disarmament.[12]

Owing to two oil crises in the 1970s, revolution in Iran, and Arab-Israel conflict, French defence policy found itself at the crossroads, for conflicts in West Asia seemed

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12 Sir John Hackett *et al*, The Third World War, August 1985 (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1978) as cited in Sonia Mazey and Michael Newman, op.cit., n.1, p.200.

to threaten French defence programme. The French position became further confounded owing to the U.S. military intervention in El Salvador, Grenada, and Nicaragua on the one hand and Soviet military invasion in Afghanistan, and its threat to intervene militarily in Poland on the other. Furthermore, the French Socialists also felt concerned on Soviet edge over American strategic weapon potential, particularly owing to Soviet deployment of highly accurate and mobile SS-20 ground to ground missiles capable of "clinical" strikes on West European missile bases and command centres. The SPD Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Schmidt feared that a Soviet surprise strike in Europe might confront the Americans with the choice between accepting Soviet control over there or committing suicide.[13] Therefore, plan to decouple American weapons from Western Europe was feared. Also the French felt that the Soviet "clinical" strikes in Europe could decouple or undermine the submarine based *force de dissuasion*. As a result of this growing crisis, NATO leaders agreed in 1979 on a two-track policy of disarmament and rearmament: to persuade the U.S.S.R. either to withdraw SS-20 missiles or else to

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13 Analysis in the press such as dossier on the danger of nuclear war in Newsweek (New York), 22 June 1981 and 5 December 1983, and see also, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., op.cit., n.7.

counter them by installing U.S. Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe by 1983.[14]

FRANCOIS MITTERRAND'S ASSUMPTION OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY: REVERSAL OF THE 'LEFT UNITY' APPROACH TO NUCLEAR DEFENCE:

When Francois Mitterrand assumed the leadership of the Left, Mitterrand became an occasional critic of American imperialism and also in due course he got converted to the Gaullist doctrine of national deterrence.[15] Europe however remained close to his heart and figured high on his agenda when he was elected President of France in 1981.

Mitterrand in his presidential campaign criticized Giscard d'Estaing, the defeated French President, because Giscard remained non-committal about the European need for Cruise and Pershing missiles, and at the same time maintained dialogue with Soviet Union. But Mitterrand unlike his predecessor supported NATO policy on INF missiles, considering East-West balance essential to the integrity of the Western alliance and for the security of France. However, Charles Hernu, the French Defence Minister, had somewhat different views. He felt that France need not

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14 S. Mazey and M. Newman, op.cit., n.1, p.204.

15 Daniel Singer, op.cit., n.2, p.242, and see also Francois de Rose, "Nuclear Forces and Alliance Relations", Survival (London), vol.24, no.1, 1982, pp.19-23.

concern itself with Euromissile crisis because its submarine-based *force de dissuasion* remained invulnerable to new INF weapons such as SS-20s. Hernu even suggested that the Americans might have ulterior motives in the crisis because their nuclear submarines were also invulnerable, and that their real objective was to lighten their grip over NATO allies in Europe.

On SS-20 missile crisis Mitterrand argued that whatever ulterior motives the U.S. may have in exploiting the crisis, the threat posed by the Soviet missiles and also its invasion of Afghanistan was intolerable to France as well as to its allies. Sanctuarized role of France was not accepted as it was considered a temptation for France to slide into neutralism. Zero-option was sought by President Mitterrand as he demanded a nuclear missile-free Europe, which meant no SS-20 and Pershing missiles on European soil.

In the early years of his presidency Mitterrand created some confusion over the nuclear weapons, neutron bomb and pending decisions about future developments. As for the role of conventional forces, its role was degraded by deterrence principle and "no war" policy as Socialists rejected graduated response and battle fighting strategy.

The former French President, Giscard d'Estaing had reached an agreement with the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter on building the sixth French nuclear submarine 'l'Inflexible' to be new type, equipped with 16 missiles, each carrying six hydrogen warheads. The technical difficulties had to be overcome with the American help in the form of Super Computers. In return Giscard assured increased French cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance. But the aforecited technical aid was stopped by President Reagan after his assumption of Power as American President, because the French Socialist government included four Communist ministers. But President Mitterrand soon projected a new image of his government by extending greater support to modernization of the NATO, without however (like General de Gaulle) expressing any intention to return to NATO.[16]

Therefore, in August 1982, President Ronald Reagan reactivated the secret agreement and first of eight Crayon I Super Computers, worth eighteen million dollars was sent to help French scientists, to solve hydrogen warhead problems. Additional super computers were delivered at a later date to help the French with new land, sea and air launched nuclear

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16 Sonia Mazey and M. Newman, op.cit., n.1, p.205, and see also Josef Joffe, op.cit., n.1.

weapons.[17]

It is noteworthy that France by 1984, was selling 180 million dollars worth of such equipment in a year and earning a net surplus. In 1985, France sold huge GTE Thomson RITA mobile subscriber equipment communications system to the American forces, and in return seemed likely to buy Boeing's E-3A AWACS for vital radar purposes. The SNECMA company was in the forefront of many other contracts within the U.S., thus underlining the French socialists' achievement in establishing the best defence relations with the U.S. for many years.[18]

Doctrinal commitment to build a seventh nuclear submarine as of priority for the strategic nuclear *force de dissuasion* bore significant change in the French Socialist policy. This programme was reaffirmed in the new programme

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17 Details of the Secret Computer were reported two months before launching of *l'Inflexible* in April 1985 at Cherbourg, Guardian (London), 5 February 1985.

18 R. Marshall, "France: The Problems, The Prospects," Defence and Foreign Affairs (London), May 1985, p.17.

law for the period 1984-8. L'Inflexible[19] was initially planned for 1985, but in actual practice, it went into operation in 1988. Already existing submarines were planned to be re-equipped with M-4 missiles developed for *L'Inflexible*. *Hadés* missiles were planned to replace controversial tactical nuclear missile, *Pluton* in 1992. Pluton and all subsequent tactical weapons were renamed pre-strategic weapons and were to be based on national territory for use as ultimate warning, according to the deterrence doctrine rather than for battlefield purposes. They were placed directly under the control of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces in order to maximize efficiency and flexibility of Presidential decision making.[20]

The second major change concerned the conventional *Forces d' Action Rapide* (FAR) comprising five varied and

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19 According to the new programme law for 1984-8, a new submarine *L'Inflexible* has since been launched in 1988. It is equipped with M-4 missiles and TN-70 war heads. Besides, five other nuclear submarines had been operationalized. But from among them, *Le Redoubtable* was the first to have been launched in 1967. It has since been withdrawn in 1991. The remaining four are *Le Terrible*, *Le Foudroyant*, *L'Indomitable*, and *Le Tonnant*. They have been retrofitted with M-4 missiles, and improved lighter-weight TN-71 warheads, as cited in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol.46, December 1990, p.57. See also Annexure-I.

20 S. Massey and M. Newman, op.cit., n.1, p.208, and see also,. Philippe G. Prestre, French Security Policy in an Disarming World: Domestic Challenges and International Constraints (London, 1989).

highly mobile divisions equipped with helicopters and anti-tank weapons. These 47,000 men with headquarters at Maison-Laffitte outside Paris, would be available for autonomous action in Europe or overseas, according to Presidential directives. The emphasis of the 830 b. Francs programme was on equipment, 30 per cent of equipment credits being designated for nuclear weapons. On the conventional level, the second army corps at Baden-Oos would get 100 extra tanks, and half of all existing AMX-30 tanks were planned to be replaced by improved AMX-30 B2 versions by 1988. It was decided that the French air force may be provided with Mirage 2000 equipped with medium range missiles for a theatre role, in 1989 and an order was planned to be placed for an air borne early warning system, (probably American AWACS). For Navy, re-equipment of nuclear powered aircraft carriers was planned.[21]

The Gaullist theorist, General Pierre Gallois, was not alone in calling for much smaller army. Many officers applauded the extra flexibility and mobility brought to the Army by the FAR, but the retired General Méry bemoaned the

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21 David Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe", Adelphi Papers (London) 194 and 195, 1984, pp.26-32, and see also Phillip Preetre, op.cit., n.20.

removal of helicopters from the Second Army Corps to FAR. The official role of army was decided to test the scale of enemy intention and to demonstrate French will to resist. The FAR was considered more able to serve those purposes at a chosen time and place than the forces stationed at Baden or Strasbourg.[22]

But these strategic plans were marred by economic crisis, that at times, made it difficult for France to carry on its nuclear strategic plan.[23]

The Socialist government had undertaken to manage various strategic nuclear forces on land, sea and air. It had also kept up various tactical nuclear weapons totalling several hundred, and it was committed to various conventional forces including the FAR. This variety was intended to permit flexible response to complex and varied threats, and to allow technical obsolescence while asserting primacy of strategic deterrence.

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22 Ibid., p.28.

23 J. Howorth, "Resources and Strategic Choices: French Defence Policy at the Crossroads", World Today, (London), May, 1986, pp.77-80, and see also Samuel F. Wells, Jr., op.cit., n.7.

The ultimate explanation for the government's strategic decisions lies in the politics of defence policy which were primarily international until after 1983. This time Mitterrand feared that the Europe-missiles crisis might decouple France from its allies, the U.S. reverting to isolationism or West Germany turning to neutralism. By 1981, new INF missiles were earmarked for bases in Europe and President Reagan was committed to maintaining a world role. In West Germany, the ruling coalition SPD/FDP under the leadership of Helmut Schmidt found itself in a state of disarray, particularly made somewhat dysfunctional by vigorous peace movement and also resistance offered by the newly emerging Green Party against Euromissiles installation in that country. In late 1982, the coalition broke down, and new CDU-CSU/FDP coalition under the leadership of Helmut Kohl took over, and supported deployment of Euromissiles as scheduled.

A sanctuarized France with only strategic nuclear weapons held no attraction to West Germany. To maintain West German confidence in allied support in 1983, when elections in Germany were held just before delivery of Cruise and Pershing II missiles, France created the FAR in West Germany in a matter of a few hours. Mitterrand's visit in 1983 not

only contributed to the election victory of Helmut Kohl but also to the installation of Euro-missiles in FRG. It also led to the reactivation of the 1963 Franco-German treaty, particularly in the field of defence. This involved joint research and production in conventional weapons but also consultation bout the use of French nuclear weapons. This policy of tightening links with West Germany led to one of increased European cooperation. Mitterrand was less convinced than his colleagues such as Pierre Mauroy, Prime Minister, Claude Cheysson, Minister for External relations or Lemoine, the state secretary for defence of, possibility of developing Western European Union into a basis for an integrated European defence. But he encouraged speculations with speeches about new initiatives in the EEC for defence and advanced technology. A Franco-German agreement to produce a new military helicopter was hoped to be followed by prospects for fighter aircraft and even space reconnaissance satellites.[24]

INTER-PARTY CONSENSUS ON NATIONAL NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE

On the point of European cooperation, PS gave a

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24 Discussion of French views on European Defence Problems and Cooperation is penetratingly developed by Diana Gedees in Times (London), 28 January 1985. See also, Julius W. Friend, The Linchpin--French-German Relations, 1950-1990 (New York, 1991).

statement on European security in June 1985, which emphasized a possible European Alliance rather than Atlanticism, inspite of CERES's feare to the contrary. There was a public opinion poll on the issue of making a demilitarised corridor through West Germany, which was taken without consultation with West Germany's SPD. In opinion poll, 57 per cent French believed that France should intervene in case of any threat to German security, 19 per cent were in opposition, 40 per cent believed that France should identify its vital interests with West Germany and extend nuclear support, while 24 per cent were in opposition. In a statement Charles Hernu interpreted French defence policy as the one extended to cover upto West Germany's eastern frontier at the Elbe.[25]

Categorisation of factions within the Left parties normally followed a continuum from revolution to reform, from left to right, and which on domestic political and economic issues often create cross-currents. This was particularly true of French PS because of the importance of defence culture in France which has created a distinctive

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25 Opinion poll in *Le Monde* (Paris), 28 June 1985, Hernu's Statement reported in Financial Times (London), 28 June 1985.

internationalist continuum on which the far left CERES faction was ironically close to the classical Gaullists.

Towards the late 1970s, the PS contained five tendencies on defence policy, apart from the individual mavericks.[26]

The far left CERES, in the first place led by Jean-Pierre Chevenement and Motachane, sought security for France by creating national sanctuary defended from external threats by *force de dissuasion*, i.e., strategic nuclear weapons capable of massive retaliation against any aggressor. Defence against internal subversion would be provided by small local militias making up a *force de mobilization populaire* (FMP) rather than by classical army formations. Secondly, the 'Jacobin' tendency led by Charles Hernu who had always taken a special interest in defence, also sought security of national sanctuary by means of strategic nuclear force, but its less radical economic policy made him less worried about internal subversion than CERES, and therefore, more adaptable to classical army, navy

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26 J. Howorth, "Consensus of Silence: The French Socialist Party and Defence Policy under Francois Mitterrand", International Affairs (London), vol.60, no.4, Autumn 1984, pp.579-600.

and airforce. Thirdly, the "European tendency",led by Mauroy supported the nuclear *force de dissuasion* to keep peace, but in case of a war France and its allies would need an effective conventional and nuclear strategy without depending on the U.S., to ensure defence without suicide. According to its analysis, France alone could not provide for economically and militarily sound defence system and would find European neighbours more reliable allies than the U.S.. Fourthly, 'the Western tendency' led by Robert Pontillon and Jacques Huntzinger including the P.S. Chief Francois Mitterrand believed that French Security depended on a balance of power between East and West, and that so long as divisions into blocs persisted France and Europe would need support from the U.S., whether in the form of strategic nuclear deterrence or tactical nuclear theatre weapons or large conventional military formations, depending on the nature of any threat of aggression that might arise. Fifthly, there was a complex non-nuclear tendency ranging from those who opposed the French Nuclear force on political, economic or military grounds to those who opposed all nuclear weapons on various grounds.

Early in the 1970s the PS had a non-nuclear defence policy seeking closer cooperation with allied conventional

forces. The other remaining tendencies were deriving great satisfaction and CERES was quiet because it backed an alliance with the Communist Party which had a non-nuclear policy. The Jacobin tendency was in the most difficult position because it was not prepared to follow the communist party line and was unhappy with the majority PS policy. But its leader Charles Hernu coped skillfully and energetically with the problem in the public debates by letting the communists take the lead in opposing strategic nuclear weapons which he believed were a liability in encouraging deviation from the doctrine of massive retaliation.[27] At the same time in private PS discussions, Hernu used his Chairmanship of the PS *Commission de défense*, created early in 1973 to formulate a defence policy acceptable to various tendencies within the Party while taking into account military opinion, both professional and conscript, to cultivate support for retention of nuclear force.

From 1979 to 1983, spanning the Left's accession to power in France, international development in increasing East and West tension to bring a new Cold War served to reinforce acceptance of a nuclear defence policy. From 1983

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27 An example was in the Senate defence budget debate in 1975 when the totally anti nuclear PC amendment was rejected by a show of hands and the PS amendment against tactical nuclear weapons was rejected by 190 to 89, reported in *Le Monde* (Paris), 27 November 1975, p.8.

to 1986 stabilization and renewed dialogue in East-West relations created conditions that allowed domestic politics once again to become a prime influence on French defence policy.

Notwithstanding widely varying approaches of various factions within the Left, the official defence doctrine of General de Gaulle formulated in the 1960s continued to be the most authoritative on France's security.[28]

Charges of the Presidential arbitrariness particularly in regard to the French nuclear defence frequently levelled by the leftist forces in the 1960s were no longer being voiced. Now when the Socialists were in Power, their position, as noted earlier, had undergone sea-change. The Socialist President, Francois Mitterrand himself, in an interview on Television on 16 November 1983 said that the keystone of deterrence strategy in France was the head of state himself.[29]

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28 S. Mazey and M. Newman, op.cit., n.1, p.196, and see also Stephen F. Szabo, "European Opinion After the Missiles", Survival (London), vol.27, no.6, 1985, pp.266-73.

29 Cl.Manceron et B. Pingaud, Francois Mitterrand (Paris: Flammarion, 1981). See also David Yost, "The French Debate", Survival (London), vol.28, no.1, 1981, pp.19-27.

It would thus seem that the Socialist France, particularly in the realm of national defence, continued to be under the shadow of the Gaullist France. The new regime thus remained uncompromising on the French national nuclear independence, and also its own status outside the military command of the NATO.

Interesting enough, it may be recalled that the French socialists (then divided into various factions), like the other Right-wing and Centrist political forces, such as the MRP, had denounced throughout the 1960s de Gaulle for his obstruction to progression of the European Community into supranational European Union, his withdrawal from the military command of the NATO, his attack on the U.S. military intervention whether in Vietnam or Dominican Republic, or on role of the U.S. dollar, or support to the Arabs in the Arab-Israel conflict, his initiative at *detente* with the Soviet Union.[30]

The new Socialist Party, which emerged as a result of merger of various leftist parties and groups in 1970s, had

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30 Stanley Hoffmann, "Mitterrand's Foreign Policy or Gaullism by any other Name", as in George Ross and others, (eds.), The Mitterrand Experiment: Continuity and Change in Modern France (Oxford, 1987), p.294.

rejected the Gaullist principles especially in regard to the French Nuclear force. Faithful to Socialist tradition the Party asked for general disarmament and dissolution of military blocs as well as for radical changes in France's arms sales and African policies. But Socialist Party was having trouble within its own ranks on how to formulate a common position. As seen earlier, there were Atlanticist or Europe-oriented socialists as were the CERES and Jacobinist groups supportive of *detente* with the U.S.S.R. but staunchly opposed to the U.S. hegemony over Europe.

But communists in a spectacular shift in 1977, endorsed the French Nuclear Force, whose destruction they had long advocated. Since then Socialists also saw *force de frappe* as their symbol of national independence and remained outside NATO's military command and prevented establishment of West European defence system, which was disapproved by Moscow. They accepted French Nuclear programme and stopped supporting their unilateral disarmament.[31] In regard to the major powers, General de Gaulle's policy had meant resistance to American "hegemony" and a mix of containment

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31 Jolyon Howorth, "Defence and the Mitterrand Government", in Jolyon Howorth and Patricia Chilton, eds., Defence and Dissent in Contemporary France, (London, 1984), pp.94-134. See also, Phillip Preetre, op.cit., n.1.

and cooperation with the U.S.S.R.. Towards Germany, his policy consisted of a combination of reconciliation, close cooperation and preservation of superiority of French military.

The socialist regime under Francois Mitterrand reasserted French sovereignty in the nuclear field, and also reiterated its position that the French nuclear force was directly under the French Presidents' command. And it expressed its firm opposition to inclusion of the French nuclear deterrent in the Super Power negotiations on reduction of their strategic systems.

France's decision to equip its nuclear missiles with multiple warheads and to build a new mobile intermediate range missiles gave its deterrent much greater power.

While Francois Mitterrand had supported modernization of the NATO, he rejected outrightly President Reagan's SDI, as well as Reagonomics, which were seen by him as injurious to the French interests. In his well-articulated response to the new U.S. initiatives, Mitterrand left no one in doubt that the French could not be counted among docile clients of the U.S.[32]

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32 Stanley Hoffmann, op.cit., n.30, p.296, and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., op.cit., n.7 .

The Socialist President was deeply worried about Soviet political blackmail should the SS-20s remain unmatched by NATO in Europe. He was also perturbed by growth of peace movement in the FRG. He saw in them both evidence of Soviet success and risk of the West German drift toward neutralism or toward Pan-German nationalism. Hence there seemed to be emerging in somewhat indirect form a Franco-American rapprochement, derived in particular from common sense of shock.[33]

The French stand on the NATO decision weakened Paris's arguments that France's nuclear force being purely national and independent, should not be included in US-Soviet talks on intermediate range nuclear forces. French willingness to preach Atlanticism to Bonn came out from two facts -- one was French anxiety about the global balance of power, they thought that the biggest peril to world peace and stability was indeed United States' weakness or inability during the 1970s to keep up with Soviet military build up. The second was shift of West Germany's SDP on the Euro-missile issue.[34]

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33 Raymond Aron, Les Dernières Années du Siécle (Paris, 1984), as cited in Stanley Hoffman and others, (eds.), op.cit., n.30, p.299.

34 Stephen F. Szabo, op.cit., n.28.

The French remained convinced that the threat of nuclear response to any aggression from the U.S.S.R. remained the only credible deterrent. Right or wrong they believed that combination of nuclear weapons of any kind and a will to use them if needed ensues restraint on the part of the potential aggressor.[35]

But the French also realized that the credibility of their nuclear deterrent is greatest only against the least likely Soviet threat -- a nuclear attack on France -- and that too in an age of nuclear plenty and parity. Deterrence in Europe requires combining the residual risk of a conflict becoming nuclear with conventional forces strong enough to deny a quick victory to the Soviets. Indeed what most Germans wanted from France was not a nuclear guarantee as many a critic have raised the basic question: If the U.S. nuclear guarantee is not credible, how credible would France's be? The Germans wanted French contribution in the conventional realm. French understood the German concern, and responded to it by creating a non-nuclear Rapid Deployment Force that could be sent quickly to central Europe. Tactical weapons were preserved only for defence of

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35 Samuel F. Wells, Jr., op.cit., n.7.

France in case of an attack.[36]

In Western Europe's defence programme, France remained uncertain and undependable ally, for, for the most part, its defence remained credible only through the NATO nuclear deterrent. The French and British nuclear deterrents have not succeeded in arriving a common platform to set up a European nuclear deterrent. The French would also not be willing to make Germany share in the French President's decision on use of the French nuclear strike force in the event of a conflict breaking out. Nor would France be willing to abandon its priority on nuclear spending, and on allocating more funds to conventional forces for their greater role in combination with those of the NATO.[37]

Francois Mitterrand has by now, been President of France for nearly 12 years, and despite major set-back to the Socialists in the general elections held in 1993, he is likely to complete the remaining two years of his second term. Thus he would be the first French President since the inception of the Fifth Republic to have completed two terms

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36 Marco Carnovale, "Why Europe Needs A Trigger"?, Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.35, no.2, Spring 1991, pp.223-34, and see also Stanley Hoffman, op.cit., n.29.

37 Caroline Wells, "France Fears Germany May Call the Shots", The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 12 March 1992.

somewhat successfully. This remark seems to be appropriate, particularly because he himself had been critical of 7-year long President's term, and accordingly in the Left Unity Programme of 1972, he had himself envisaged reducing it to five-year term, as and when the left forces came to power. But then he did nothing during his two-term long Presidency, during which period, his popularity has nose-dived to the lowest. With the result, despite powers of his Presidency, but then now hindered by the fourth-fifths majority held by the opposition centrist and right-wing parties in the National Assembly, he is verily a handicapped, lame-duck President. During the next two years, unless he decides to step down from the French Presidency, France would remain absorbed more increasingly in political, social, and constitutional debate on the domestic front, and its role in the fast changing European/global dynamics is bound to get circumscribed.[38]

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38 The Economist (London), 27 March 1993, and The Economist (London), 3 April 1993. See also Alistair Cole, ed., French Political Parties in Transition (Dartmouth, 1990).

Chapter-III

THE FRENCH RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

FRENCH REACTION TO THE INF AND CFE ACCORDS

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)

When Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany declared removal of 72 ageing Pershing IA missiles equipped with American warheads, he, at once, dissolved one of the chief obstacles in the way of long-awaited Soviet-American agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).[1]

The U.S. negotiators in Geneva had taken an equally important step to remove another hurdle in the way of INF talks i.e., they softened on their demand for strict on-site inspection checks to ensure compliance with the treaty.[2]

The proposed treaty reminded Europeans that the United States and the U.S.S.R. bear responsibility for global security. European partners of the NATO were taken aback

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1 Clay Clemens, "Beyond INF: West Germany's Centre-Right Party and Arms Control in the 1990s", International Affairs (London), vol.65, no.1, Winter 1988/9, pp.55-74.

2 Time (New York), 7 September 1987, pp.22-23.

when in Reykjavik summit, President Reagan anxious to furnish his arms-control credentials, became ready to trade deep missile cuts with the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev. Europeans reacted critically to such an initiative on the part of the U.S. showing disregard for NATO defence and European security, heavily dependent on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.[3]

It was the West European allies in the late 1970s which asked for deployment of Euro-missiles. At the time Soviet Union had pulled even with the U.S. in strategic nuclear weapons, and doubts had arisen about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Some NATO strategists even argued that the U.S. might be reluctant to punish Soviet aggression,[4] in Europe with a nuclear strategic strike, out of fear of a Soviet riposte against targets in the United States. For strategic deterrent the allies urged deployment of intermediate-range American missiles capable of hitting Soviet targets from their own territory. They also wanted weapons to counter the threat posed by powerful new Soviet mobile missile SS-20s.

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3 Ibid., 28 September 1987, pp.18-19.

4 Bruce D. Berkowitz, "An INF Treaty Discredits Arms, Control and Promotes Conflict", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.32, no.1, Winter 1988, p.119.

The logic behind Euro-missile solution to Europe's security dilemma was never totally foolproof since it assumed that Soviets would draw a distinction between the U.S. warheads launched from submarines and silos. But the missiles were deployed despite wide spread public protest. The weapons provided visible evidence of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe.[5]

INF treaty which was signed between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. eliminated nearly 2,000 Europe based nuclear warheads[6] whose combined and destructive potential exceeded that of all wars ever-fought on the continent's troubled

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5 Time, op.cit., n.3, and see also Francois de Rose, "Nuclear Forces and Alliance Relations", Survival (London), vol.24, no.1, 1982, pp.19-23.

6 INF's proposed arms cut --

Range - from 500 to 1000 km., and from 1000 to 5500 km.

USSR - 470 long range INF missiles (SS-20s, SS-4s & SS-5s)

387 - shorter range INF missiles (SS-23s, SS-12s).

US - 429 - Pershing IIs, BGM-109Gs, Pershing IA and Pershing IB missiles.

Figures as produced by H.S. Chopra, "The U.S. - U.S.S.R. INF Accord and Debate on European Security", in R.P. Kaushik, ed., Super Power Stances: U.S.-Soviet Relations (New Delhi, 1990), p.93. For details see Annexure-II).

soil.[7] Europe deterred Soviet aggression by hiding under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and saying, "threat and risk nuclear holocaust."[8]

Europeans prepared themselves for a reduced U.S. presence. On bilateral level, Britain and France held secret talks for greater coordination of their respective nuclear deterrents. France also sought closer ties in the field of defence with West Germany, where the bulk of NATO's remaining battlefield nukes were to be based and about which nervousness in Germany was growing. In Germany a consensus was formed in favour of total nuclear withdrawal, and French who opposed denuclearization, believed that they must show solidarity in order to head off any move on the part of FRG to abandon NATO.[9]

France had also accepted the need to become involved in arms control after standing on the side-lines for more than two decades. A senior diplomat in Brussels explained French position:[10]

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7 Time (New York), 7 December 1987, pp.24-25.

8 Ibid.

9 Clay Clemens, op.cit., n.1, p.56.

10 Time, 24 October 1988, pp.22-23.

"The INF treaty showed that arms control is no longer a political exercise but can lead to real disarmament. So France now needs a full fledged arms control policy".

Conceding on the need for a concrete French policy, President Mitterrand spoke of France's becoming "intellectually, psychologically and morally" associated with East-West arms control endeavours.[11]

In an interview Jacques Chirac, the then Premier of France, said,

"We would like any agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to take Europe's security interests into account. For us the "Zero-option", the withdrawal and destruction of Soviet SS-20s and of US Pershing-II and Cruise Missiles, could be positive elements as long as there existed a parallel basis, the broad outlines of agreement in principle on equilibrium in short-range missiles, and on the means of verification".[12]

As for other political leaders in France they vehemently opposed INF treaty as Foreign Minister, Jean Bernard Raimond urged caution, Defence Minister André, Giraud widely denounced the treaty as a "Nuclear Munich" for Europe. But President Mitterrand welcomed "Zero Option" proposal and he was adequately supported in the Cabinet by

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11 Ibid.

12 Jacques Chirac in an interview with Time, 6 April 1988.

his Prime Minister.[13] Only the Communist Party was openly enthusiastic. The Socialist Party, whose two ministers Charles Hernu and Paul Quiles, were expressing serious misgivings about INF, put together a text welcoming the spirit behind the agreement but calling for strict verification procedures. An opinion poll conducted for *Le Figaro* and published on 21 April 1987, revealed that 45 per cent of response felt INF to be "trap" as opposed to only 35 per cent, who were in favour, and 20 per cent being "don't knows".

The defence Minister Giraud continued to categorize INF as a major threat to security of Western Europe. Raymond Barre repeatedly criticized Francois Mitterrand for having formulated the slogan "neither SS-20s nor Pershings". He took this position despite the fact that former President Giscard d'Estaing, who hosted the 1979 Gaudeloupe summit at which the NATO's two-track decision had been worked out, was known to be in favour of INF, even though he was not prepared to

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13 *Le Monde* (Paris), 6 March 1987; and Jolyon Howarth, "France and Gorbachev: Old Problems, New Questions and the Quest for Correct Answers", in Jolyon Howarth and George Ross eds., Contemporary France: A Review of Interdisciplinary Studies (London, 1988). See also, George Fricaued Chagnaud, "The French Foundation of Nuclear Security", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol.44, no.2, March 1988, pp.24-25.

accept it in public. In the early months of 1987, President Mitterrand was something of a lonely figure in voicing consistent support for the treaty. When he was re-elected in 1988, he responded to a question about US troops withdrawal from Europe, that[14]--

> "In maintaining its armed forces in Europe, the US is keeping its commitment to NATO and protecting its global interests. The progress of European cooperation in defence will not erase the reason for the US presence in Europe".

The difference of opinion within France's political class created conflicts in crucial areas of defence debate, reactivated by INF agreement. The first was future functions of strategic arsenal, second most complex was France's primarily conventional contribution to the defence of West Germany in the "forward battle". The third and most difficult was the role of France's 'pre-strategic' (tactical) weapons in any integrated European security system. The whole process of INF treaty made French to think the nature and relevance of their 'deterrent'.[15]

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14 President Mitterrand in an interview with Time, 16 May 1988, pp.8-9.

15 Jolyon Howorth, "French Defence: Disarmament and Deterrence", World Today (London), vol.44, no.6, June 1988, pp.103-04.

From the original Gaullist pronouncements, through defence, White Paper of 1972, to official speeches of all Prime Ministers, and Defence-Ministers until the present day, there has been total consensus on this issue: The Mirage IV Bombers; the ICBM based on *Plateau d'Albion* and their equivalent based on France's six-nuclear submarines (SNLEs) were for the "sanctuarisation" of France's own national territory, often referred as the "Hexagon". Despite solidarity through the foregoing consensus, authentic voices on both sides of the Rhine -- including those of Helmut Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Laurent Fabius and Jean-Pierre Chevénement -- had been advocating extension of France's deterrent capability to cover the territory of West Germany.[16]

At the centre of the controversy was growing conflict over the nature of deterrence. The Ottawa declaration of 1974[17] which held that multiplication of the 'decision

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16 Ibid. See also, Annexure-III for the firsts of and present French nuclear force, and of other major nuclear powers.

17 In the Ottawa Declaration of 1974, the NATO allies acknowledged the contribution to Western deterrence made by the French and British nuclear forces, and see also Francois de Rose, op.cit., n.5.

centres' (Washington, London, Paris), reinforced by increasing the level of uncertainty, overall deterrence, had been interpreted by France as justification of its independent stance. The opponents of the Ottawa Declaration wished to move beyond Gaullism by hinting that deterrence is best served by a clear statement of the precise circumstances in which the country would consider its "vital interests" to be at stake. But at the time President Mitterrand dominated security policy and ensured its implementation.[18]

In early 1986, Mitterrand had already made a major concession to German sensitivities about short-range nuclear weapons, by offering to consult with Bonn before ordering the firing of a Pluton or Hadés missile. (The Pluton was with a range of 120 kms and could only explode inside FRG, but Hadés with a range of 350 kms., could be targetted in East Germany only if they were based near the central front). During his state visit to Germany in October 1987, President Mitterrand went very much further in stating

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18 In an interview in the *Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), December 1987, President Mitterrand reiterated their could be no question of spelling out in advance what those "vital interests" are.

relatively unambiguously that "France has no intention of exploding a nuclear device on German soil." It was very well known that President Mitterrand himself never favoured tactical weapons. From his statement some observers deduced whether this is an implication of stationing new generation Hadés missiles as close to the frontline as possible. In *Nouvel Observateur*, in the interview already referred to, he made clear his doubt about short-range weapons. He argued that such weapons had only been introduced under the doctrine of 'flexible response', because of a 'hesitation to give deterrence its true and full meaning' and concurred in the proposition that 'anything short of global response is weakening of deterrence'. Moreover, for those, who had misunderstood his remarks in FRG, he stressed that 'the final warning shot is not appropriate function for short range weapons".[19]

In 1989 President Mitterrand opposed any decision on dismantling NATO's tactical nuclear weapons till 1992, at the same time he declared that France would continue to develop its medium range system, called Hadés. His position ran counter to Germany, which was at the time insisting on

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19 Ibid.

abandoning NATO's modernization plan. Mitterrand blamed Germany for moving faster than necessary in judging evolution of Gorbachev's policies.[20] He also clarified that there is no time for a 'third zero-option' on nuclear missiles. Even after siding with the United States and Britain on NATO's modernization plan against Germany, France confirmed to maintain its independent policy on nuclear plan had affected Franco-German defence cooperation.[21]

With the fate of France's nuclear deterrent clearly in his mind, he said,

> "I am one of those who think that time is not right for a 'third zero-option'...for...'that would mean the disappearance of all alliance's nuclear forces from Central Europe".

For him SNF talks at that stage were premature as there was still a very pronounced imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conventional arms. On SNF he further said,

> "We ought to wait for two or three years to see how the Vienna talks on conventional weapons progressed, and judge Soviet goodwill. Priority should accordingly

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20 *Le Monde*, 28 May 1988.

21 Clay Clemens, op.cit., n.1.

be given to these negotiations, for if Soviets sought to do a deal on tactical weapons, they would have to prove their good faith by agreeing to cut a large part of their conventional forces".[22]

French nuclear and political developments were based on the international political and nuclear scenario which was mutual stabilization of the two military alliances in conjunction with a strategic dominance of the USA *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union. A certain stalemate in relations between these two main rivals in the mid-1960s allowed France to pursue its own political strategic course, without having to consider the possibility of military conflict.[23]

CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS (CFE)

With the INF treaty having been signed and sealed and the process of dismantling Euro-missiles underway, the arms control focus shifted to Vienna where for the past fifteen years negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact member states have been continuing with a view to reaching an agreement on conventional force reductions. But these

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22 *Le Monde*, op.cit., n.20.

23 Michael Meimeth, "France and European Security", Aussenpolitik (Hamburg), editorial, vol.42, no.2, 1991.

negotiations were marked by different problems.[24]

In the CFE talks, 23 participants were included and they were to cover the entire territory between "the Atlantic to the Urals. The issue was, disposition of more than 5 million troops, 75,000 tanks, 50,000 artillery pieces, rockets and anti-tank weapons and 10,000 combat aircraft. The objective was to reduce the threat of surprise attack or large-scale offensive operations by East and West.[25]

No state in Europe, signing the CFE treaty was allowed to stations more than 4,500 battle tanks, 4,000 artillery pieces, 7,500 armoured combat vehicles, 600 combat helicopters and 1,200 tactical combat aircraft.

The USSR and the US were ready for mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe, upto 185,000 men excluding 35,000 American soldiers in other European regions. This reduction leaves disparity in favour of the US troops present in

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24 Time, 24 October 1988, pp.22-23.

25 Time, 30 January 1989, pp.20-21. See also annexure-IV for Warsaw Pact and NATO forces.

Britain and Southern troops including Turkey.[26]

The French political opinion, Left or Right, demonstrated solidarity in the field of conventional weapons. And it was stressed that French conventional forces form an integral part of deterrence together with the pre-strategic and strategic-nuclear components.

The French feared that cuts in conventional forces, as stipulated by CFE treaty, may eventually affect France's nuclear systems, many of which could be used, with non-atomic warheads, for conventional objectives.

During political discussions about security policy in France, it was pointed out that the 'availability' of their own nuclear forces for the security of Western Europe would also presuppose the success of disarmament talks in Europe with respect to the conventional stability.[27] An alliance policy designed to guarantee stability was to be complemented or supported by constructive efforts to achieve

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26 Lothar Ruehl, "The Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe: Culmination and End of European Arms Control?", Aussenpolitik (Hamburg), 2/1991, vol.42, no.2, pp.116-27. See Annexure-IV.

27 Michael Meimeth, op.cit., n.23. Also see, Stephen J. Ledogar, "CFE: New Talks Commence Amid Renewed Hopes", Arms Control Update (Washington, D.C.: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), no.12, March 1989, pp.3-6.

arms control or even disarmament at the conventional level. This approach was already prevalent in French politics at the end of the 1970s. French officials at the same time were confronted by a situation in which -- given the mutual neutralization of nuclear potentials in East and West and disparities in the conventional field in favour of the USSR -- there was a risk that their own nuclear deterrence might be undermined, thus turning a military conflict into a distinct possibility.[28]

In this sense, the French proposal in May 1978 for European Disarmament Conference (CDE) was primarily an end of stabilization policy and only secondarily an expression of détente. In order to rule out the possibility of surprise attack, confidence-building measures (CBMs) were to be agreed to and conventional imbalance, removed in an area stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals". This geographical formula was not only an attempt to take into account the geo-strategic asymmetries in Europe, but also to

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28 Michael Meimeth, op.cit., n.23, p.155, and also Manfred R. Hamm and Harmut Pohlman, "Military Doctrine and Strategies: The Missing Keys to Success in Conventional Arms Control?" Aussenpolitik (Hamburg), vol.41, no.1, Quarterly Edition, 1990, pp.52-72.

prevent a critical risk of the MBFR (from the French point of view) of being turned into a neutralized central European corridor".[29]

In early 1988, a *Quai d'Orsay* official in the Department of Disarmament and Arms Control already pointed out that even under the conditions of an asymmetrical reduction the destabilizing conventional imbalances in central Europe would not be eliminated unless the mobility of the armed forces was significantly reduced, i.e., if the Soviet Union retained the opportunity to transfer troops from rear to forward areas after the envisaged reduction had taken place.[30] Numerical parity alone was not a sufficient criterion for stability. This was one of the reasons why since 1986 France has persistently sought to introduce guidelines, regulating the numerical ratio of foreign and indigenous troops along the border between East and West. Consequently this ratio approach and rules relating to deployment were included in the official proposal of the

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29 Ibid.

30 Benoit d'Aboville, "The French Approach to Arms Control", in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds., Conventional Arms Control and Security of Europe (London, 1988), p.156.

NATO made to Warsaw Pact at the beginning of the negotiations on Conventional Force Reduction in Europe (CFE).[31]

With regard to the aim of military stabilization in Europe, France strictly rejected any linkage of conventional and nuclear Disarmament. It argued that, even if Vienna negotiations were to be successful the West should not dispense with nuclear weapons. It was politically wise and conducive for deterrence to continue to modernize the weapons wherever and whenever necessary. This corresponded to the traditional French view that in principle nuclear weapons help prevent war. Their existence, therefore, cannot be justified by merely pointing to superiority of the Warsaw Pact in the conventional field. This explained the dogged French refusal to add their own pre-strategic potential in negotiations on conventional disarmament. Only with great reservations did the French accept the decision taken at the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May 1987 to also include fighter aircraft and combat helicopters in future CFE negotiations. As France was worried that its own dual capable systems might be subject to reductions, it

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31 Ibid.

stipulated that:

> "it reserves the complete freedom of evaluation and decision-making with regard to the potentials which contribute to the implementation of its independent deterrence strategy, since the mandate of the Vienna negotiations excluded nuclear weapons".[32]

Finally, despite fears of France or any other country, party to the conventional force reductions, the CFE treaty, which was signed on 19 November 1990 in Paris, invoked abolition of 100,000 heavy weapon systems of the conventional ground and air forces between the Atlantic and the Urals." This treaty seems to have been circumscribed by the former USSR, which transferred beyond the Urals, especially in Western Siberia, out of heavy weapons between 70,000 and 80,000 battle tanks at least 20,000, and artillery pieces 28,000 and still a larger number of combat aircraft.

But though the treaty was signed by all the parties to it, it fell victim to the Soviet collapse. Even though signed in November 1990, the treaty could not be enforced because of the emergence of twelve independent Republics, consequent upon the dismantling of the USSR. Therefore, now

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32 Michael Meimeth, op.cit., n.23, p.158.

under the changed circumstances, signatures of these aforecited independent states were also required for finalization and implementation of the treaty.[33] In passing, it may be remarked that at the conclusion of the Treaty in Paris in 1990, the Soviet Union was the only signatory to the CFE treaty.

The Treaty came into effect in July 1992. And as stipulated in the Treaty different teams of inspectors from the countries of NATO, and now-defunct Warsaw Pact began their first inspection in the series of military inspections that would be continued till turn of the present century. They are to check that none of the signatory countries is cheating on the agreement. The first inspections are to see that the holdings of treaty-limited tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and helicopters were correctly reported by each country. These inspections must be completed within 120 days. These inspections will be followed by routine inspections of declared military installations, short-notice inspections of any suspicious sites and visits to witness the destruction of surplus stocks.

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33 The Economist (London), 30 May 1992, p.60. See also Lothar Ruehl, op.cit., n.26.

The hardest part for any signatory country would be destruction of the afore-cited weapon systems, which would be done according to a rigorous set of rules, and everything above the limits has to be disposed off within 40 months.

Britain is obliged to get rid of only 173 tanks and 15 armoured personnel carriers.

Germany, on the other hand, has to scrap the equipment of its eastern part (formally GDR), totalling 11,500 pieces of its NATO total of some 16,000. It started on 3 August 1992 by turning a pile of 1,481 East German armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and 54 tanks into scrap metal. The estimated cost of each destroyed tank will be $8,300 dollar and of each ACV $3,500.

The countries of old Warsaw Pact have to get rid of around 30,000 pieces of equipment. As far as CIS are concerned the question of authority regarding their possession of conventional weapons has yet to be decided (who owns what?). Ukraine, the most problematic state of the former Soviet Union, has on its soil several thousand tanks It would like Russia to take surplus ones off its hands.[34]

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34 The Economist, 8 August 1992, p.38. Also see, Annexure-V for CIS conventional weapons' record.

In Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), in June 1992 in Oslo, on the issue of current political developments and to contribute as an Alliance to the fostering of a new and more peaceful order, the foreign ministers of NAC held:

> "The CFE treaty will put in place the cornerstone of a transformed European Security structure, and will open the way to future arms control within the CSCE and to cooperative security in Europe".[35]

They further added:

> "The CFE treaty is an important milestone in the enhancement of security and stability in Europe. We thus welcome the agreement among the States of the former Soviet Union, setting out their individual rights and obligations under the Treaty, as a major step towards the full implementation of the Treaty".[36]

DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR: NEW POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONJECTURES

For more than 40 years the clearly perceived danger to Western Europe from the Soviet Union rendered possible

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35 Communique of Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June 1992, NATO Review (Brussels), vol.40, no.1, February 1992, pp.28-29.

36 Ibid. See also Amedio de Franchis, Deputy Secretary General of NATO, "The CFE Treaty - the Role of the Higher Level Working Group", NATO Review, vol.40, no.5, October 1992, pp.12-16.

simplicity of aim to the Western military alliance, the NATO. Its job was to meet a geographically well-defined and politically unquestioned threat.

That is now absent. In 1989-91 the biggest peacetime confrontation ever between two standing armed forces came to a sudden and unexpected end. All units of the once mighty Soviet army left Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Those still on the former East German territory, Poland and Baltic states are expected to be pulled out by 1994 at the latest.

In August-December 1991, the Red flag over the Kremlin was pulled down, marking the end of the "Evil Empire" Soviet Union.[37]

Both sides in the Cold War saw an interest, all the same, in slowing down the nuclear arms-race and where possible, limiting the zones of conflict between them in the world. Ties of chill alternated with periods of détente. Detente in the early 1970s led to the creation in 1975 of the CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[38]

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37 The Economist (London), 15 February 1992, p.52.

38 Christopher Anstis, "CSCE Mark-II: Back to Helsinki from Paris via Berlin and Prague", NATO Review, vol.40, no.2, April 1992, pp.18-23.

Since 1985, the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reorientate the U.S.S.R. to democratization as well as economic reforms through his concepts of openness and economic restricting, which, in practical terms meant destruction of the political framework with which the USSR had emerged as a Super Power during more than 30 years.

In 1988, he agreed to scrap the offending medium range missiles and for the first time accepted the idea of on the spot checks ("intrusive verification") by the other side's disarmament inspectors. He agreed to cut the number of strategic weapons and with the NATO allies as a group to give up the Soviet Union's heavy numerical superiority in most categories of non-nuclear weaponry.[39]

More than any other Western nation, France has been shaken by the break-up of the old world order. The collapse of the Soviet Empire has robbed it of its self-appointed role as an independent force between the two Super Powers. The emergence of a united Germany has awakened old fears anew and has put a question-mark over the driving force in the Community. The Germans are already showing signs of

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39 Andrew Goldman, "NATO Needs a New Missile", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.32, no.4, Fall, 1988, pp.501-40.

going off and doing things on their own.[40]

The end of the Cold War led to much talk in some European capitals about continuance of the American presence in Europe. In the NATO meeting held at Copenhagen in June 1991, it was decided that the US would continue to take care of European security for the time being.[41] This declaration was contrary to the decision by France and Germany to develop a parallel European network for defence which had provoked Washington to threaten that it would withdraw from Europe for which Britain and Denmark were not ready. Both France and Germany are working for the promotion of nine nation-Western European Union (WEU) which they consider could take place of the Common Security of members of EC. But there were problems such as security against what? (in the absence of Soviet Union).[42]

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40 Jochen Thiers, "German Unification: Opportunity or Setback for Europe?", World Today (London), vol.47, no.1, January 1991, pp.8-10.

41 Text of Copenhagen Communiqué and other documents, see NATO Review (Brussels), vol.39, no.3, June 1991, pp.28-33.

42 Christopher Hill, "The EC: Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?", World Today, vol.47, no.11, November 1991, pp.189-192, and The Economist (London), 24 October 1991, p.50.

In an opening session of NATO, French President Mitterrand told his fellow leaders [about a future meeting of foreign ministers of Western countries and ex-Warsaw nations "for a new era of partnership"] that -- "the alliance is good (but) it is not sacred alliance". Mitterrand proposed that West Europe should organize a defence force independent of the United States.

In December 1991, when Maastricht treaty was approved by European leaders, French President Mitterrand got the Germans to commit themselves to a single currency and also to a common foreign and defence policy. Germans who are the monetary leader of Europe had no objection. It seems that France is still worried about its status and position in European and world politics.

Though France did not respond explicitly to the August 1991 coup after which USSR disintegrated, and its heartland resumed its traditional nomenclature, Russia. On 7 February 1992, France and Russia, with new leader Boris Yeltsin (in place of Gorbachev) signed a landmark treaty undertaking to consult each other on crisis situation, and work for collective European Security pact.[43]

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43 The Times of India (New Delhi), 8 February 1992, p.8.

This treaty was the first between Russia and France, which was the first Western nation to sign a treaty with Russian confederation, since the collapse of the USSR. It called for sharp cuts in the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and for "moderate" policies governing French independent nuclear deterrent. French assured Russia to moderate its missile programme.

After a shuffle in his ministry, Mitterrand appointed Pierre Bérégovoy as his new Prime Minister. He, in his first address in front of National assembly, in April 1992, declared a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing in the Pacific. This ban was extended to one year end was expected to affect underwater nuclear tests in Muraroa Atoll in the South Pacific, which was thought that it would also reduce tension between New Zealand and France at the behest of French President Mitterrand.[44]

After the fall of the Berlin wall, the Gulf war and the implosion of the USSR, the political consensus that supported the French nuclear force had already begun to crumble. Over the past several months, several presidential

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44 The Bulletin for the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), September, 1992, p.23.

decisions have suggested further doubts about the future of *force de frappe*, once considered the "priority of priorities" in matters of strategy.

In 1990, number of tests was decreased from 8 to 6 a year, and at the end of 1991, a further cut was announced. A short-range land-to-land nuclear missile, *Hadés* was cancelled, which was being regarded as the replacement of *Pluton* when Soviet Union was intact, although the 11b. Franc programme had been completed. With a maximum range of 480 kms (first it was 350 kms), the *Hadés* was no longer considered of much use targeting, as it would, France's German allies. The result of these decisions was the level of funding for nuclear forces declined for the first time since 1975.

But in his announcement of 8 April 1991, Prime Minister Bérégovoy also declared that "France will not renounce nuclear deterrence, which constitutes the "keystone of its defence policy".[45]

France's 3 June 1991 declaration of its intention to sign the NPT must be interpreted within this context. By

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45 Ibid., See Annexure-VI.

signing the treaty, the French Government hopes to lessen risk that nuclear weapons will spread among the nations of the South. Even non-pacifist members of Parliament not adherence of Britain, Soviet Union and the US could not prevent these nations from pursuing underground nuclear tests, though these nations signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. They believe that France should adhere to NPT to cut short any possible recrimination from non-nuclear states at the 1995, conference on the treaty's renewal.[46]

On going Super Power Strategic Arms Reductions

As a Western democratic state, France has traditionally been both a conflicting party and a part of the conflict structure in East-West relations. Its specific position in this context conditions and limits its security and arms control policy decisions. The fact that it had its own nuclear force did not change the situations, even if these forces were set up with the declared objective of guaranteeing the country's independent security and

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46 French Senate, *Rapport No.295 sur le project de loi autorisant l'adhésion au traite, sur la non-proliferation des armées nucléaires*, 15 April 1982, pp.48-50 as cited in The Bulletin, ibid., n.40, pp.24-25.

overcoming the political *status quo* in Europe. It was mutual stabilization of the new military alliances in conjunction with a strategic dominance of the USA *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union and a certain stalemate in relations between these two main rivals in the mid-1960s which allowed France to pursue its own political strategic course, without having to consider the possibility of military conflict. The beginning of American-Soviet arms control negotiations and the new German Ostpolitik put an end to this security policy idyll a short while later.[47]

The first phase of American-Soviet SALT process, which was concluded by the SALT-I agreement signed in 1972, did not question the traditional structure of European security. Even then the political and military leaders in France already realized that this was the starting point for a long-term disengagement of the USA. Simultaneously, France was unable and unwilling to do without military presence of the USA in Europe. This prompted President Pompidou to emphasize during his visit to the USA in 1970 that the American military presence in Western Europe was not only

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47 Ibid., and also see, Trevor Taylor, "What sort of security for Europe?" World Today, vol.47, no.8/9, August-September 1991, pp.138-141.

useful but also indispensable and that it should be retained at any cost. Following unsuccessful tentative attempts at the beginning of the 1970s to gain greater security policy independence via Anglo-French nuclear cooperation and reactivation of WEU, the preamble of the *Loi de programmation* 1977-1982 stated that:[48]

> "It would indeed be an illusion to hope that France could be able to preserve more than a reduced sovereignty if its neighbours were occupied or even merely subjected to the influence of enemy power. The security of the whole Europe, therefore is vital for France."

The real significance of French *force de frappe* was rooted in its functions as a multiplier of the overall deterrence of the Western alliance as stated in the Declaration of Ottawa in 1975. The existence of an independent nuclear decision making centre in Europe was designed to increase the risk calculation of Soviet Union and put it in a position of qualitative inferiority *vis-a-vis* the USA in the event of military conflict due to the additional damage which could be inflicted by the French

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48 Jean-Louis Gregorin, *"Les Negotiation SALT et la defense de l'Europe"*, Defense Nationale (Paris), June 1978, p.56 as cited in Michael Meimeth, ibid., n.23, p.157.

system.[49]

The implications of American-Soviet talks on limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT), therefore, were also a critical factor for French security. In SALT-II agreement, France saw risks rather than opportunities which could result from this process for military stability in Europe. One of the main reasons for the extremely skeptical response to the SALT-II was the underlying principle of numerical parity.[50] It was claimed that this principle of numerical parity was incompatible with the concept of dominance of escalation that lay at the heart of the "flexible response" doctrine. The US had only been in a position to maintain effective deterrence in Europe if it had certain additional capacity for its protection. Furthermore, French contended that the principle of parity had far reaching consequences for envisaged modernization of NATO's "Euro-strategic" potential, since it was hardly conceivable that given the agreed regime of parity, the Soviet Union would have tolerated a situation in which more American nuclear

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49 Francois de Rose, Le Monde (Paris), 21 and 22/23 November 1981.

50 For details see Annexures-VII.

weapons could reach Soviet territory than *vice-versa*.[51] For this reason France was extremely concerned about the subsequent follow-on negotiations on limitation of this category of weapons. It was feared that the USSR might then oppose every new deployment of far-reaching medium-range missiles by pointing to the SALT II agreement.

It seemed unlikely that the USA would then maintain its military presence in Western Europe. At the same time, neither French experts nor politicians doubted that the perceived weakening of the American security guarantee was a major reason for the neutralist tendencies in West German politics. The links between arms control and German uncertainties induced France to refuse to participate in the talks on troop reductions in Central Europe (MBFR). France regarded the evolution of a neutralized "Central European Corridor" as the most probable out come of such negotiations. This made it easier to understand the apparently paradoxical behaviour at the end of the 1970s: On the one hand, France secretly rejected the SALT-II agreement due to its possible adverse effects on Western deterrence, on

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51 Michael Meimeth, op.cit., n.23. Also see, Francoise de Rose, "Nuclear Forces and Alliance Relations", Survival (London), vol.24, no.1, 1982, pp.19-23.

the other hand, if officially continued to insist on the American nuclear guarantee and criticized West Germany due to its pessimistic evaluation of American arms control policy.[52]

Deployment did not bring about a solution to the critical problem of coupling Europe with American security. It was at best a mitigation of the problem since there was always a consensus in France that the former American security guarantees had turned into mere probabilities under the conditions of strategic parity between the Super Powers. This raised the question of how such engagement was to fill the vacuum left on the European continent by the development in the strategic relationship between the USA and the USSR. On the other hand, France wanted to ensure that the necessary military ties with the USA could not be jeopardized by such move.[53]

Following the lead of changing scenario of the world politics, France took opportunity to take appropriate

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52 Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "The United States and European Defence Cooperation", Survival, vol.27, no.4, 1985, pp.158-67.

53 Michael Meimeth, op.cit., n.23.

decision by announcing one year suspension of nuclear testing in April 1992, French President said:

> "France would continue to take steps to reduce its nuclear forces if other nuclear powers responded positively to the moratorium".[54]

From the time of announcement Mitterrand was pessimistic about the future of his moratorium as he said:

> "If that fails that is to say, if other nuclear powers are stubborn, France will have to continue to assume its defence. It will regret the lost opportunity. It will have done its duty".[55]

The INF accord between the US and the erstwhile USSR concluded on 8 December 1987, which set out a concrete programme for dismantling the much-dreaded Euro-missiles (intermediate range nuclear devices) from European soil,was a major positive step towards metamorphosing the conflictual dynamics into a peace order in Europe. This treaty dispelled the West European alliance partners' psychological fears and apprehensions by taking a giant stride towards nuclear disarmament, and giving evidence of their readiness to do likewise in all subsequent disarmament measures, whether in

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54 The Bulletin..., ibid., n.44. Also see, Annexure-VIII.

55 *Le Monde*, 14 April 1992, pp.12-13.

the strategic or conventional fields. Also the imaginary fear of the Soviet inspired decoupling of the U.S. from its European allies turned out to be unfounded.[56]

The INF treaty which was for the most part a result of the former Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev's Glasnost sought not only to dismantle the theatre nuclear weapons, but also to pull down the 'iron-curtain' between the two adversarial blocs in Europe. It seems that as a result of the on-going arms reductions in Europe, and speedier movement towards European Union de Gaulle's frame of European unity "from the Atlantic to the Urals" and his mode of regional integration in accord with *"Europe des Patries"*, are turning out to be realistic, and therefore gaining increasing acceptance both in the West and the East.

Indeed, the movement for deepening of European integration has received stimulus with a view principally to induce the member states to compete collectively with the world's two other giants, *viz.*, Japan and the United States in the high-tech domain; and enable the EC to overcome its

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56 H.S. Chopra, "US-USSR INF Accord and Debate on European Security", in Kaushik, R.P., ed., Super Power Stances: US-Soviet Relations (New Delhi, 1990).

perception of Eurosclerosis.[57]

Furthermore, let it be stated that there was something more impelling than anything else: Europe was passing through its most unusual historic phase (described by Francis Fukuyama as 'End of History'), and this needed more than ever before greater cohesiveness and solidarity among the member states of the European Community, to respond collectively and effectively, in particular to the new challenges posed and opportunities made available to them consequent upon the systemic change in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

After INF treaty was signed and sealed, talks in Vienna were resumed between the two parties to the MBFR, its nomenclature having been changed to CFE (Conventional Force Reduction) only recently with a view to reinforcing Gorbachev's efforts to strengthen peace process in Europe. CFE negotiations started in March 1989. But atmosphere for the CFE treaty was not as pleasant as in the case of the INF treaty. After signing the CFE treaty, in November 1990, in Paris, the Soviet empire fell prey to a coup in August

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57 Ibid., and see also Wettig, Gerhard, "Europe After the INF Treaty", *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), vol.39, no.1, 1/88.

1991. Mighty Soviet empire disintegrated completely in December 1991. French government was taken by surprise. For, disintegration of the Soviet Union affected the French deterrent in two ways: First, it has meant that its principal target had disappeared; and secondly, it had removed major obstacle to agreements between the two blocs on disarmament. In the past, French position regarding disarmament was quite straightforward : the French nuclear arsenal was not to be affected by the arms reduction treaties as long as a vast disparity existed between the capabilities of the two Super Powers and the French. Now the so-called disparity is beginning to seem less marked, and furthermore, in the midst of recession it is increasingly becoming difficult to find funds for a deterrent force particularly when the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. started making deep cuts in their armouries.[58]

There is no gainsaying the fact that with the demise of the Soviet Union, there has occurred a basic change in the objective reality in Europe. France, like other West European nations, feels relieved at least on one account

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58 Daniel Vernet, "The Dilemma of French Foreign Policy, International Affairs, vol.68, no.4, 1992. Also see Annexures-IX, IX-A.

that its security is no longer under threat from a formidable foe in the East. Yet, the fall of the Soviet empire has not been without implications for France. First and foremost is the question: What would be the French approach in the post-Cold War period to the NATO-managed security of Europe. In any case, the implicit basis for the French strategic force continues to be, as in the past, to ensure balance against the growing economic and political prowess of unified Germany. This factor is now to receive greater consideration than ever before, and this also provides further justification for the French nuclear deterrent. The French are also trying to knit up the Germans into the European fabric.[59] In collaboration with the Germans, they have set up the European Armoured Corps, which is open for membership to other European countries as well. Still further, the French and Germans have sought to strengthen the Western European Union. But it is on the Germans' insistence that the WEU has to be dovetailed to the NATO, which means that European security continues to be the prime responsibility of the NATO. In any case, under the changed European scenario, the French do not find any good ground to weaken their commitment to their independent nuclear deterrent.

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59 Ronald Tiersky, "France in the New Europe", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.71, no.2, Spring 1992.

Chapter - IV

END OF THE COLD WAR : REAPPRAISAL OF THE FRENCH STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

FROM BIPOLARITY TO UNIPOLARITY IN THE GLOBAL ORDER:

Systemic change and disintegration of the U.S.S.R., and the resultant political change in Central-Eastern Europe and above all German unification have profoundly altered the scenario of European continent. The Warsaw Pact has since been wound up, and therefore the threat posed by the former Eurasian colossus, Soviet Union has disappeared. As such, under the altered conditions, it is difficult for NATO to continue in its present form. There are indications that the U.S.A. will in the not too distant future reduce its forces in Europe to well below the officially planned level of 195,000 men. Therefore as a result of disappearance of the Soviet Union, it has become imperative for Europeans to have their own pan-European security system, for they could not depend for their security upon the U.S., as they did during the Cold War period.[1]

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1 Michael Meimeth, "France and European Security", *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), no.2/1991, vol.42, pp.152-53. See also Henry Brandon and others, eds., In Search of a New World Order: The Future of US-European Relations (Washington, D.C.; 1992).

The bipolar system that ensured European security during the Cold War period, was structurally more efficient. It was essentially governed by the logic that the two-adversarial blocs balanced each other's war-waging potential. Either side sought to deny the other the prospect of both being successful and having to face only minimal risks. On this basis, the two blocs managed to make the contingency of war unattractive for each other and prevent potential opponent from having to resort to strategic devices. In this context nuclear weapons had a crucial function. This system of mutual deterrence from war, successful as it was under the condition of East-West confrontation, could not be continued once the objective situation has changed. Its basis does not exist any longer.[2] The two blocs which managed conflicts within their own boundaries and concentrated their military efforts against the other side are gone irrevocably. The old system of war prevention is no longer applicable when conditions of its functioning are missing. Its tasks are now being taken over by a new set of organizations which have their own methods of dealing with them.[3]

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2 Gerhard Wettig, "Security in Europe: A Challenging Task", *Aussenpolitik*, 1/1992, vol.43, p.5.

3 Ibid., p.6.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, old security structure has also been dissolved. Now question regarding relevance of the NATO was being raised. Even though now there was no fear of Soviet nuclear attack against Europe, yet it was hard to consider European security without NATO. It was thought that even if communist threat has gone, world has not become out-rightly a place safer than it was earlier. It could not even be clear that Russia will continue to be a friendly neighbour as it is now. Its size and the pulls of its eastern and western interests could make an economically successful Russia as awkward to live with as it was to live with failed Russia. Either would have nuclear weapons.[4]

But NATO's role which means American presence in Europe, militarily became quite unclear. The front line in central Europe has gone. By the end of 1990s there could be well under 100,000 American troops in Europe.

The Gulf war postponed the "peace divided" which was anticipated in the wake of Soviet force reductions and dismantling of the communist bloc.

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4 The Economist (London), vol.323, no.7760, 23 May 1992, p.16.

The Gulf crisis revived European interest in WEU for the security of Europe, which also undermined NATO. WEU was planned to coordinate European response to an "out of area" threat to its security.

However, the US warned its NATO allies that plans to bring the EC and WEU closer together would risk accelerating a US withdrawal from Europe.

In the event of the American withdrawal, its nuclear protection provided to Europe might also have to go. Then Europe may have to be protected by modest British and French nuclear forces as available deterrent or may have to accept a much greater military roll for Germany.[5]

In Rome summit of the NATO held in November 1991, it was agreed that NATO's role in Europe would have to diminish. And invitation to its former foes Soviet Union and its allies aimed at lasting order of peace in Europe was regarded logical.[6]

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5 The Hindu (Madras), 7 May 1991. See also, Gebhardt G. Von Moltke, "NATO takes up its New Agenda", NATO Review (Brussels), vol.40, no.1, February 1992.

6 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 13 November 1991, p.12.

Despite the threats of withdrawing from Europe, the USA has done nothing in this regard for it feared a united trading Europe which meant that it has to maintain its role in the NATO defence of Europe if it has to ensure its influence in the continents.

In the aforecited Summit it also became clear that future European security through WEU could only complement NATO, as a junior partner, while exercising limited autonomy and keeping close with both the alliance as well as the EC. Britain and the Netherlands acquiesced into this plan, which, it was felt in certain quarters, was at variance with the Franco-German plan. The latter aimed at transforming over a certain period of time, The security aim of WEU into the security arm of the EC[7] The end of Cold War also ended the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, the two regional bodies that had kept Eastern Europe under Soviet control.[8] But Western organizations, such as the NATO, EEC and WEU, have to stay not only because there is a consensus among the member states of the Western bloc, but also because the former member states of the Warsaw Pact need both the NATO to

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7 Ibid. See also, Gerhard Wettig, op.cit., n.2, and Dr. Willem Van Eckelen, "WEU's Post-Maastricht Agenda", NATO Review (Brussels), vol.40, no.2, April 1992.

8 The Economist (London), 9 November 1991, p.67.

ensure security in the post-Cold War period, and the European Community of which they aspire to become members in due course of time. In November 1990, the Charter of Paris was signed, which also signified end of the division of Europe. With the disintegration of the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, the number of members of the CSCE has gone up to 52.[9]

The new institutional roles agreed to for the CSCE at the Rome Summit of the NATO also reflected diminishing US role, although Washington is also a member of this organization. Americans have realized their dwindling role in European security, and have agreed to augment the CSCE powers for the prevention of conflicts and crises management something they were opposed to earlier.[10]

Franco-German strategy for increased European role in their own security is bound to be accepted in due course. Germany's dominance in Europe is being perceived with some uneasiness. The NATO's decision to stay out of the Civil War in Yugoslavia, leaving the crisis to be handled by the EC,

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9 Ibid., and see also Victor Yves Ghebali, "The July CSCE Helsinki Decision a Step in right direction", NATO Review (Brussels), vol.40, no.4, August 1992.

10 The Hindustan Times, op.cit., n.6.

signified the growing European role in their own crisis management. All that NATO did was to endorse the EC's policy and line of action to deal with the Yugoslav crisis. There lies the dichotomy in NATO's role in the post Cold-War period and the US refusal to involve itself in the European crisis.[11]

The former Communist Europe is today one of the least stable regions in the world. This instability is turning the successor regimes in that region to their West European neighbours to help them in their security, and America expects Western Europe to provide them with it.

But when it comes to using force, European morale is sapped by never ending argument between the Eurocentrists and Atlanticists among them. NATO remains congenitally handicapped for want of a broader mandate to deal with threats to America's and Europe's joint interests outside the NATO area.[12] The French resist such broadening and Germany's constitution makes it hard for it to send troops abroad. Nor can NATO extend its military shield to include

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11 Ibid., and see also Trevor C. Salmon, "Tests for European Cooperation", International Affairs (London), vol.68, no.2, April 1992.

12 The Economist, 11 July 1992, pp.25-26.

the Central European countries. American public opinion would not accept any Ukrainian foray in Poland as an attack on America. Lacking a clear opponent or a fresh military strategy NATO, too, has gone in therapy business. Its North-Atlantic Cooperation Council[13] seems to be duplicating the CSCE as another vast forum of nations. Now it is exploring how it might provide peace-keeping forces, at the behest of the CSCE.[14]

In CSCE, United States is one among equals. In NATO, it has its last word. As the former German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher felt, the United States' pre-eminence in Europe is over. Genscher was in any case regarded as a Francophile.[15]

After the fall of Soviet Union, the United States felt concerned about its role in Europe. Its perspective relating

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13 This North Atlantic Cooperation Council was formed by Germany and America to extend their support towards East Europeans including Russia and its Republics. This Organization is like CSCE. It was set up at the initiative of German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and American Foreign-Secretary for State, James Baker on 2 October 1991.

14 The Economist, op.cit., n.12.

15 The Economist, 15 February 1992, p.51.

security was based on classic balance of power in that the "smaller powers" like Germany and Japan may provide countervailing force against the U.S.A., as a larger power after the demise of the bipolar structure of power in the international system. The US not only feared economic rivalry with them (as reflected in the GATT conflict), but also their gradually working for nuclear power status.[16]

But Germany has once again forsaken programme for nuclear weapons. The Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, after the newly reunified Germany came into existence said, that Germany has no desire to become a nuclear power, but it wants to be an economic power.[17] The American perception was based on the idea that a European defence community must necessarily be developed into a rival enterprise to NATO or into a European military lever *vis-a-vis* American interests.

A rational analysis of interests and positions within the Western alliance shows that assessment on both sides of the Atlantic is based ion misunderestandings. In the current phase of role seeking and international reorientation, the

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16 International Herald Tribune (Paris), 9 March 1992.

17 Time (New York), 25 June 1990, p.49.

security was based on classic balance of power in that the traditional ambivalence of American foreign policy once again manifests itself in the question of isolationism or internationalism?"

In the U.S.A., when the Cold War ended, it was hoped that its interests in Europe would be preserved by European allies themselves within the framework of continued alliance despite reduced military presence. Europeans do not seem to have responded the way they were expected. Rather, they did their own rationalization of their security interests after the Cold War.

During the past decade, there was a feeling of neglect in America. End of the Cold War further added to the feeling of its diminishing importance in Europe, as less regard was being shown by its European allies to it.[18] The future role of Germany and Japan formed a picture of disillusionment and embitterment, which triggered the aforecited extreme position of "American dominance in unipolar world" on the one hand "withdrawal into isolation on the other."

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18 The Washington Quarterly (Washington), 1/1991, pp.51-60 as cited in Reinhard Meirwalser, "Germany, France and Britain on the Threshold to a New Europe", *Aussenpolitik*, 4/1992, vol.43, p.340.

The end of the Cold War is apparently being followed by the "infirmity" of the alliance, a condition which completely contradicts the constellation of interests on both sides of Atlantic. Although for an American perspective, the three most important western European countries -- France, Germany, Britain -- have differing ideas on whether Europe's defence should be organized within NATO. They at least by and large concur with the USA on the need for the continuation of a constructive transatlantic cooperation.[19]

Search for a satisfactory answer to the question of security in Europe consequent upon withdrawal of the Soviet troops behind the newly formed CIS frontiers, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, emergence of unified Germany as an independent actor in the post-Cold War epoch, and the CFE (Conventional force reductions) proved to be a challenging test. In this regard, attempts have been made at increased institutionalization of the CSCE; North Atlantic Cooperation

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19 Ibid., and see also Dr. Klaus Kinkel, "NATO's Enduring Role in European Security", NATO Review (Brussels), vol.40, no.5, October 1992, and Johan Jorgen Holst, "Pursuing a Durable Peace in the Aftermath of the Cold War", NATO Review (Brussels), vol.40, no.4, August 1992.

Council has been set up, and Central-East European states have been admitted as associate members of the EC. The stabilizing effect on systemic transformation in East European states, however, has been impaired gravely by the fact that internal stability of the former socialist countries has been jeopardized by ethnic and nationalistic conflicts which often also possess a potential threat to European security.[20]

The end of Cold War did not mark the beginning of an era of harmony and freedom from conflict in international relations. The process of systemic transformation became manifest in a fundamental shift in sources of threat. While on the one hand, relevance of trans-atlantic security relations has been stressed, on the other, the disintegration of the Soviet Union affected the *raison d'etre* of the NATO. The discussion on both sides of the Atlantic on new forms and content for the alliance did not

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20 See this aspect -- Magarditech Hatschikjan, "Eastern Europe - Nationalist Pandemonium?", *Aussenpolitik*, 3/1991, vol.42, pp.211-220 and John Orme, "Security in East Central Europe: Seven Features", in The Washington Quarterly, Summer, 1991, pp.91-105, as cited in Heinz Kramer, "The EC and the Stabilization of Europe", *Aussenpolitik*, 1/1992, vol.43, pp.13-14.

lead to a convergence of views. Paradoxically, there was growing mutual mistrust. Whereas the USA feared that Franco-German initiatives for revival of the WEU nd its operationalization as the military arms of the EC might led to its exclusion from Europe, European allies were worried about the -- equally detrimental-eventualities of an American hegemonic position and of a withdrawal of the US into isolationism.[21]

GERMAN UNIFICATION AND ITS ROLE IN FILLING UP THE POWER VACUUM IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE -- NEW SECURITY PERCEPTIONS:

The Second World War left Germany and Europe divided into a communist East and democratic/pluralist West. In the late 1980s, owing to the systemic change Soviet Union loosened its grip over East Germany and Eastern Europe. As a result, on a November 1989, Berlin wall fell and Germany became unified. The issue of border between Poland and Germany got settled and marked the retreat of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe. This closed the European chapter of the Soviet-American struggle known as the Cold War.[22]

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21 Reinhard Meierwalser, op.cit., n.10.

22 The Economist, op.cit., n.15, p.52.

The emergence of larger Germany as a result of German unification aroused concern and hopes that in future being located in the heart of Europe, it will exert more influence and play a greater leadership role.[23]

Germany is no longer the EC's and NATO's eastern frontier and frontline state. That is why its neighbours cannot be indifferent in future towards how it conducts itself in and outside of Europe.[24] Germany's role becomes most apparent in its world-wide engagement. This reflects definitely in financial matters. But, then, recently a controversy has arisen whether or not Germany under the Basic Law, could contribute to the UN-initiated peace-keeping missions, disaster operations, and conflicts outside of Europe. Attempts are being made through constitutional amendment of the Basic Law to facilitate Germany's role in this behalf.

Germans are lending substantial support for economic reconstruction and development of Central-Eastern and South-

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23 Reinhard Stuth, "Germany's New Role in Changing Europe", *Aussenpolitik*, 1/1992, vol.43, pp.23-24.

24 Ibid., and see also Andrew A. Michta, East-Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in 1990s (Greenwood, 1992).

Eastern Europe. This might help their integration eventually into the EC, and its future defence and security arrangements.[25] That is why Germany is supporting firmly the on-going processes of European integration. With a view to filling the security vacuum in Central Eastern Europe the former Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, has been urging upon the Germans as well as their West European partners to let these newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe join the NATO.[26]

Even though, ending of the Cold War brought about unification of Germany and also ended partition of Europe, but then simultaneously with it there reappeared a "new German question", as to how will united Germany play its role in the reshaping of the peace framework in Europe as well as at the international plane. The Gulf crisis of 1990-91 placed "the new German question" in the forefront of the foreign policy debate in Germany as well as in other West European countries and the United States.

Now question arises whether world is ready to accept a more active German role in the world politics, particularly

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25 Ibid., p.32.

26 Ibid.

in military crises?

Most of the restrictions which govern Germany's military non-participation outside Europe are the result of agreements made between FRG and the Western allies prior to Germany's entry into the NATO in 1955. Under a series of agreements, the allies ended their post war occupation and control of West Germany and gave their approval to its establishing a force of half a million men for defending its territory.[27]

The aim of German rearmament within the European framework, such as of the European Defence Community was to absorb the German army within its fold, so as to strengthen European solidarity, not only against an outside aggression, but also to prevent recurrence of internecine feuds. The EDC plan could not take off owing to the French refusal to ratify it. But then there were opponents to it within the FRG, who did not stop short of making a constitutional restraint on the use of the German Bundeswehr in the external conflicts. Also FRG, through statutory enactments, ensured civilian control over military institutions.

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27 David S. Germroth/Rebecca J. Hudson, "German-American Relations and the Post Cold War World", *Aussenpolitik*, 1/1992, vol.43, pp.33-35.

For the United States, rearmament of Germany meant effective containment of Soviet expansion in Europe, and also stationing of American troops in the NATO area. This helped provide balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and it allowed the USA to divert some of its military resources away from Europe towards other parts of the world.

The afore-cited constitutional restraint on German army restricted it to fight only for the NATO in defence of its national territory or other territories of the NATO region against any attack by the Soviet bloc. In 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resultant Gulf war stimulated domestic debate in Germany on whether this constitutional restriction should be dropped or amended in such a way as to allow German troops to participate in the UN initiated military coalitions, with a view to peace-keeping or peace-enforcing in the embattled areas, such as the one formed against Iraq in 1991. An amendment of this type requires two-third majority in both the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*, which would be difficult to materialize without the support of the opposition, the Social Democrats (SPD) who were openly opposed to such a measure.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself feels that Germany must

partake in global responsibility for ensuring peace. His party CDU/CSU advocate constitutional amendment in order to put clarity into disputed circles and forge a new political consensus. Karsten Voigt, SPD expert on military affairs, reflecting the opinion of his party, argues that Germany does not need a constitutional change because there is a political consensus against expeditionary deployment of German troops.[28] The *Bundeswehr*, the German army in question is also experiencing fundamental change. Justification for its existence is no longer viewed in the context of an identifiable enemy, but first and foremost in its engagement for values such as peace, democracy, freedom and security. Its binding limitation to 370,000 men in the whole of Germany, as compared to the previous figure of 490,000 soldiers on the West German side alone, is considered adequate.[29]

But financial burden for keeping a big army is becoming difficult for Germany. That is why its defence minister, Volker Rühe declared cut in the size of German army. The cut will be to reduce the number of troops to 370,000, the

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28 Ibid.

29 Reinhard Stuth, op.cit., n.23, p.32.

number now planned for the end of 1994.

The German army is presently in the midst of reorganizing itself after the upheaval of its national unity.[30] It is absorbing the East German army in its ranks, sacking most of its officers, and bringing down the combined force from nearly 600,000 to present figure of 420,000.[31]

But German allies do not approve such German moves. French and British critical negative responses thereto worried German minister Mr Rühe. As France, Britain and Canada are carrying the main NATO burden in the former Yugoslavia. Officials in Paris and London are watching anxiously at the slow pace at which constitutional debate is taking place in Bonn about letting German troops participate in the UN military operations outside the NATO area. Besides, there is the old worry about American troops in Germany. Big cuts in German troops may encourage Americans to leave only token presence in Europe.

Understandably Germany's armed forces are tightly

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30 The Economist, 13 February 1993, p.50.

31 Ibid.

controlled by Government and Parliament.[32] The German government called for gradual inclusion of defence matters into the common foreign and security policy. An organic link may be established with West European Union (WEU) and lay down a military assistance commitment. A changed role could be visualized for Germany in the field of European and global-security and defence.[33] The German government insists not always to the delight of Washington -- more strongly than others on further steps towards disarmament, specially of short-range-nuclear missiles. Furthermore, the former German foreign minister Genscher tried to strengthen the CSCE and its institutions -- one major reason being to offset the partial decline in the significance of these institutions resulting from the overcoming of division of Europe.[34]

The end of Cold War has produced conditions favourable to the re-emergence of Germany as a hegemonic power in Europe. West Germany had emerged by the late 1960s as the strongest, largest and most competitive economy in Western

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32 Ibid.

33 Reinhard Stuth, op.cit., n.23, pp.26-31.

34 Ibid.

Europe, and as the 'pay master' of the EC. Furthermore, if the two Super Powers are discounted and their regulatory mechanism are disbanded, German *Bundeswehr* would be the largest national army[35] in Western Europe, perhaps after the U.S.A. and Russia.[36]

After the collapse of Soviet Union, Central-East Europeans looked around for the new security guarantee, which they thought they could obtain from NATO. NATO membership was not being offered to them. Even Germany which was deeply sympathetic to its eastern neighbours showed no inclination to plead for their inclusion under NATO's defence guarantee.

But to achieve more peace and stability in the world as well as Europe, NATO extended its involvement towards ex-Warsaw countries.[37]

After termination of the Warsaw Pact, Eastern Europe faces a problem of security. What kind of "new security

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35 Now, the Russian army is the biggest in Europe with 900,000 men.

36 Edward Mortier, "European Security After Cold-War", Adelphi Papers (London), no.271, Summer, 1992, p.10.

37 The Economist, 12 October 1991, pp.67-68.

structure" should it be?[38] Finally, Europe's starkest security problem involves not only the countries of ex-Soviet Union but thin Eastern neighbours as well. There is a big economic gap between the two halves of the continent. Unless economies of the East start improving discernibly soon, three dangers seem to loom large: threats to democracy, risks of ethnic conflict, and unwanted pressure of immigrants from Central-Eastern Europe to settle in the West. For the foreseeable future the keystone to Europe's security is economic recovery in the East.[39] In it Germany can play a very vital role.

In American view Germans are the best option to fill the Security vacuum created by the extinction of Warsaw Pact, for Germans with their economic and political clout will be capable of maintaining some form of order until the politico-economic situation stabilises in the region.[40]

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38 The Economist, op.cit., n.15, and Trevor Taylor, "What sort of Security for Europe?", World Today (London), vol.47, no.8/9, August-September 1991.

39 The Economist, op.cit., n.15, p.52, and see Heinz Kramer, op.cit., n.20.

40 David S. Germroth and Rebecca J. Hudson, op.cit., n.27, pp.40-41.

FRANCO-GERMAN SECURITY ACCORDS

For the importance of Franco-German relations General de Gaulle had observed some 30 years ago:

> "You only have to look at the map to see interdependence between Germany and France, on which depends any hope of uniting Europe in the political field as also in the defence or economic fields. So on that interdependence depends the destiny of Europe as a whole."[41]

How true is the former French President's statement! After the collapse of Soviet Union, France and Germany are together framing security plans for Europe against internal as well as external threat, though there is less of clarity in regard to defending collectively the allied interests outside of Europe. But then there has been little success on engagement of the intra-European feuds. On the Yugoslav question, Germany and France diverged from each other on the question of its break-up. In other words, the two have not as yet evolved any joint formula in how to protect Europe from the Europeans themselves.

Nonetheless, the French cooperation with the enlarged Federal Republic of Germany the fields of security and

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41 The Economist, 23 May 1992, p.50.

defence is of primordial importance. The French objective has not been to create an alternative to NATO, but to contribute to institutionalization of a "European pillar" in the alliance through a military "alliance within alliance" in order to reinforce Western Europe's influence. At the same time this policy was designed to forge stronger links between NATO and the French military potential with the aim of enhancing deterrence of the alliance in Central Europe in the fields of both conventional and nuclear weapons. French politicians had left no doubt about their interest in a common foreign and security policy.[42]

The most visible proof of the solidarity was the formation of FAR (*Force d'Action Rapide*) in 1983. The FAR enabled France and to immediately contribute to multinational forward defence and thus actively demonstrate its engagement in the security of the FRG, without questioning the previously reserve function of the second French corps. This deployment was impressively demonstrated in practice during the joint Bold Sparrow (*Moineau Hardi*)

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42 Speech given by Jacques Chirac, 12 December 1987. Reprinted in *Europa Archiv*, 2/1988, p.D-42, and interview of President Mitterrand supplementary to the speech in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 18-24 December 1987, p.26, as cited in Michael Meimeth, op.cit., n.1, p.155.

manoeuvre in September 1987.[43]

It was thought that INF, which contributed to the riddance of long-range nuclear weapons from Europe, was not responsible for this close cooperation between France and Germany, which was initiated by Mitterrand and Kohl in 1982-83. What INF did was intensifying Franco-German cooperation. Any European Pillar was inconceivable without close Franco-German cooperation. Yet the legacy of history is such that these two countries very often find themselves in opposite camps on major issues such as 'military and strategic aspects of Atlanticism', *Ostpolitik*, 'reunification', 'pacifism', etc. Above all fundamental dichotomy between war preventions (deterrence) and war fighting (flexible response) has lain at the heart of Franco-German differences for quarter of a century.

In June 1988, French public opinion was also completely in favour of a defence cooperation with Bonn, but this was not possible then as there were certain security arrangements, and resource issues were involved. Bonn was

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43 Ibid., pp.155-56. See also David G. Haglund, Alliance Within the Alliance: Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defence (Oxford: Westview, 1991).

looking for a totally unambiguous statement from Paris on automatic and immediate conventional solidarity on the central front in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. But Paris's preference for weapons of deterrence over its conventional arsenal made cooperation difficult in military field and onerous on medium terms.[44] In view of these problems, Mitterrand sought out a way to solve them. The *Force d'Action Rapide*, created in 1983 was a political gesture to the German requests for guaranteed French participation in the "forward battle". Similarly, the joint military manoeuvres of October 1987, codenamed "Bold Sparrow" as well as the establishment of a Franco-German Defence Commission at the beginning of the 1988, were essentially intended as token of France's determination eventually to overcome so many obstacles and to unlock the gates of cooperation. But so far, Mitterrand had stated openly that France will not be in there fighting on central front from the first moment.

In early 1986, Mitterrand has already made a major concession to German sensitivities by offering to consult

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44 Jolyon Howorth, "French Defence: Disarmament and Deterrence", World Today (London), vol.44, no.6, June 1988, pp.105-6.

with Bonn before ordering the firing of a *Pluton* or *Hadés* missile. In his state visit in 1987 President Mitterrand stated that "France has no intention of exploding a nuclear device on German soil." For those who could not understand his statement he clarified that "the final warning shot is not appropriate function for short range weapons.[45] With the Soviet threat gone the European countries feel they can manage to be on their own without the overweening shadow of the American power.

According to the French, both proposed European military force and NATO force would be assigned to defend European interests within and outside Europe, taking part in everything from peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to direct military action against nuisance creating nations such as Iraq.

The French proposal reflects an intensifying effort by some Europeans to shift military influence away from Washington and towards European capitals. France put the idea forward just as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Europe began to unravel a long standing Western consensus

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45 Ibid.

about NATO's military aims.[46]

Ambassador Giles Curien, a former French representative to NATO's ruling group North Atlantic Council told reporters that the French idea "is not demonic".[47]

Further, he said, "it is not against NATO" but rather away to circumvent "apathy" within the Western alliance to get Europe to assume more responsibilities for its own defence".[48]

In May 1992, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl signed an agreement at *La Rochelle*, creating a joint French German army corps[49] of 35,000 men which will become operational in 1995. The leaders called on other countries to join them. The first elements of a military staff will be set up in Strasbourg. The *La Rochelle* agreement covered several other areas as well as including transport, urban research and enlargement of the EC.

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46 The Hindustan Times, 27 May 1991.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid. See Frank Costigliola, France and the US: The Cold-War Alliance Since World War II (New York, 1992).

49 It was first adopted on 16/17 October 1991.

In three years, Europe's military picture will be changed. The Franco-German summit at *La Rochelle* in its own way testified to this prospect. The remaining elements of the Red Army on the territory of the GDR are in principal expected to be withdrawn by the end of 1994 at the very latest. By then there will probably be some 150,000 American troops -- half as many as there are today -- left in Europe.[50] One year later, the European Corps will become operational on the basis of nucleus of French and German troops provided for it today, who could in the meantime be augmented by the addition of contingents from Belgium, Luxembourg and perhaps Spain.

Though nobody is pressurizing on American troops being withdrawn, people are rather in favour as in Germany, of a significant armed American presence in Europe.

One direct consequence of the emergence of the European military corps is that it provides France's first armoured division in Germany with its own political and legal framework. The Germans themselves wanted it this way. Reciprocally, *La Rochelle* agreements opens the way

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50 *Le Monde* (Paris), 24/25 May 1991, p.13.

permitting the *Bundeswehr* to have at its disposal, initially the elements of staff office on the French territory.[51]

But this plan of Euro Corps was not approved by everyone. The British and Dutch disagree with it. They insisted, like Americans, that proposed Euro Corps should be subordinate to NATO, which in their opinion should remain the primary defender of European security in order to keep the US involved in maintaining peace on the continent.[52]

At first glance Eurocorps planned by Germans and French seems to sketch out the future role for European defence which was to be operated through WEU. Open to others and due to reach full strength in 1995, it is supposed to have three broad tasks: first -- to support NATO within NATO area, thus Germany trying to bring France closer to the military structure of the alliance that it left in 1966; second, to back the WEU in non-NATO areas of Europe; and third, to take part in peace-keeping or peace-restoring mission outside of Europe, possibly under the UN command.

But this plan has some loose points such as Franco-

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51 Ibid.

52 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 19 October 1991.

German accord makes clear although the Corps, with its own Strasbourg-based-command "can" be used to back NATO, its "foremost" role is in a WEU context. This could embitter relationship between NATO and Germany. But Germans have answer to this poser: they say that if a NATO emergency arises in which France does not want its Euro Corp forces to get involved, the German components would be available in the way they have always been to the NATO command.[53] But Americans are still suspicious as the wordings of agreement play into the hands of France, which can blur the direct links that now exist between NATO command and the German forces to be involved in the Euro Corps.

The other problem is regarding the Euro Corps' operational plan as it has its role outside of Europe as well. As despite repeated bids to find compromise when agreement was being drawn up, the Germans stick to their view that their forces should not be used outside of the NATO without a constitutional change, needing as stated earlier a two-third majority in Parliament, as they are still touchy about their "out of the area" military role.

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53 The Economist, 23 May 1992, p.49.

Some German officials hope that participation in the Franco-German Corps might help speed up the change in German attitudes.[54]

NEW RATIONALE FOR THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DEFENCE:

It was the nuclear weapons that made the Cold War unique. The confrontation between the two Super Powers, unlike all previous ones, threatened not only destruction of armies and cities but human species itself. In other words, nuclear conflagration could lead to the destruction of human civilization. Thank Heavens! The Cold War is over without any serious holocaust.

The changed pattern of military cooperation between France and Germany could once again bring up the question of French nuclear deterrence but this has been tactfully avoided. Establishment of European Corps makes a symbolic shift in French nuclear doctrine, though the change had begun discreetly before now. For a long time, French forces deployed in a way had the protection of a nuclear force,

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54 Ibid., pp.50-52. See also William M. Taft, "The NATO Role in Europe and the US Role in NATO", NATO Review (Brussels), vol.40, no.4, August 1992.

whose key elements, based in France took part, if needed in the manoeuvres of the whole defence unit. In theory, therefore, there was no "decoupling" of the conventional forces from a possible protection provided by mobile "vectors".

That concept has undergone a change today. For one thing France now accepts the prospects of such multinational units, which it had previously opposed. And for another, the very notion of deterrence is changing. The *Pluton* missiles will be phased out this year. The *Hadès* missiles, which were to replace them, will not be deployed and reduced to the minimum. Even few remaining pre-strategic airborne nuclear resources have been brought under a single command separate from the army staff responsible for the conduct of the ground forces.

This decoupling of the conventional forces, from nuclear arsenal in France became a fact two or three years ago. The change could also explain why President Mitterrand himself talked of the day, when it would be possible to invest deterrence with a European vocation in a form that has yet to be imagined.[55]

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55 *Le Monde*, op.cit., n.50.

In the beginning of the year 1991, French President inspired French Prime Minister Bérégovoy to declare French ban on nuclear tests. For senior military officials and nuclear industry staff in France this was the end of the French nuclear weapons, if the President declared it permanently.

"A definitive halt to tests means the abandonment of France's nuclear force" according to Jean Lichere, civilian head of the military application section of France's Atomic Energy Commission.

He said France's nuclear weapons would become obsolete in about ten years if testing was abandoned.[56]

General Michel Pineau, Paris based director of the Centre of Nuclear Experimentation (DIRCEN), told in Mururoa:

> "It really would be premature to abandon our nuclear potential....The international situation has changed, but not as much as press says".

According to official statistics made available France carried out around 200 nuclear tests -- more than opposition groups had estimated -- since the first experiment in the

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56 Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 3 August 1992.

Algerian desert carried out in 1960.[57]

After the collapse of the USSR, there was the need felt to re-examine some of the arguments traditionally used by nuclear weapon states, particularly the United Kingdom and France, to justify their continued possession of these weapons. For example, it is virtually axiomatic in British politics that the United Kingdom should not remove its national nuclear deterrent so long as Russia has nuclear weapons. But such a stance will make it hard to convince Ukraine or Kazakhstan, which are far more likely to find themselves in conflict with Russia than the United Kingdom is, that they should sign and implement the NPT as non-nuclear states.[58] Similarly the allegation that in the late 1970s Saddam Hussein, studied the writing of General Pierre Gallois, theoretician of France's nuclear *force de frappe*, about the sanctuarization of national territory is one that merits profound reflection.

This reflection may be one thing which compelled

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57 Ibid. See Annexures-III and VIII.

58 *Le Monde*, 12-13 January 1992. See also Joachim Krause, "Risks of Nuclear Proliferation Following the Dissolution of the Soviet Union", *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), vol.43, no.4, 1992.

President Mitterrand to question, whether it is 'possible to conceive European doctrine' on nuclear weapons, and to assert that the "issue will very soon become one of the major questions in the building of a Common European Defence".[59]

Jacques Delors, President of the EEC Commission, has gone further asking why, "if one day the EC has a very strong political union, nuclear weapons should not be 'transferred' to it". (Speaking in the same meeting before as Mitterrand - at *Rencontre Nationale Pour L'Europe*, 10 January 1992). If the United Kingdom and France are not ready to renounce their national deterrents, they should develop a doctrine linking them as clearly as possible to the security of Europe as a whole.[60]

The role of nuclear weapons is being reviewed as France revises its post-Cold War strategy. Some new priorities have already been announced. "Same reason that led France to endow itself with an autonomous tool for nuclear deterrence

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59 Ibid.

60 Adelphi Papers, op.cit., n.36.

must lead us to develop an autonomous capacity for observation from space", Defence Minister Pierre Joxe declared in May 1991 (Speech before the *Institut des Hautes études de Défense*, 6 May 1991).[61] Additional funds were immediately allocated to the space programme to develop exclusively military observation satellite and telecommunications system, in the 1992 defence budget: financial allocation under this category increased by 17.6%. (The Hélios, a French-Italian-Spanish military observation satellite scheduled to enter in service in 1994 and Syracuse II, a military communication satellite programme, co-financed by the state-owned France-télécome, had launched one satellite in December 1991, and another in mid-1992). Research on "smart weapons" will increase as far as possible within European framework of the EUCLID programme, which is financed by Governments and by weapon industries.[62] The most important aspect of French national nuclear policy is that in the absence of enemy who can attack France or its "vital

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61 As cited in *Sirpa Actualité*, n.18, 17 May 1991, p.20 -- as cited in Bruno Barrillot, "French Finesse Nuclear future", The Bulletin for Atomic Scientists (Chicago), September 1992, p.24.

62 EUCLID is European Cooperation for Long-term In Defence, an accord was signed in November 1990 by the defence ministers of France and 12 European members of NATO.

interests". Since 1945, France has devoted lot of money and energy, building its strike force and hoisting itself into the elite club of nuclear powers that the nation is not about to abandon this place in the emerging world order. It is essential for France to have a nuclear arsenal -- and to develop a space system that includes reconnaissance, communications and anti-missile missiles, which will again limit the number of members of club of the technological high class, enabling France to remain among the world's "greatest powers" and to keep its place as permanent member of the UN Security Council. Bearing this goal in mind, French nuclear forces are destined to evolve in response to budgetary constraints. The Chief of Staff of Armed Forces has announced his position:[63]

> "Submarines will always constitute the backbone of our deterrent but it is necessary, to envisage the deployment by the year 2000, of a second component, also of indisputable credibility."

In fact, the future of only undersea leg of current French nuclear triad (submarines, land-to-land missiles, and planes) is assured. And even the size of the submarine force may be reduced -- from 6 to 4. French military programme

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63 The Bulletin for Atomic Scientists, op.cit., n.61.

laws cover 3-year periods. The draft of military programme law for 1993-95, which would have been decided by Parliament for construction of four "new generation" strategic submarines. The first, *Le Triomphant*, is scheduled to go into service in July 1995. These ships are planned to go in service at intervals of 36 rather than 30 months as were originally planned. The number of submarines on the simultaneous patrol for three days -- are to be reduced and number of missiles they carry out too reduces. The new M5 missile which can be armed with upto a dozen nuclear warheads with a range of 8,000 kms., is rescheduled for deployment in 2005.

Though French government has already spent about 200m. France on M5 programme and its discontinuance will cost French government a billion Francs a year by 1997, but the decision will be taken soon. The full programme of developing M5 missiles will increase the number of warheads on submarine from 384 in 1992 to about 640 at the beginning of the 21st century."[64]

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64 Bruno Barillot, "*Nucléaire, un Arsenal sans Mode d'Emploi*", *Democles* (Lyons), no.51, December 1991-January 1992, p.8, Air and Cosmos, 25 May 1992, p.7 as cited in The Bulletin, op.cit., n.61, and see Annexure-VI.

The fate of M5 programme depends upon the two other legs of the French nuclear triad: long-range land-based missiles. Currently, 18 Intermediate Range S3-D Missiles are deployed at the *Plateau d'Albion*. The S3-D missile has a single one-megaton warhead and a range of a 3,000 kms. These missiles are scheduled for retirement in 1996.

In July 1991, Mitterrand cancelled a project that would have installed mobile land-to-land missiles at Albion, replacing the S3-Ds. Jean-Michel Boucheron, a Socialist and President of National Assembly's Defence Commission, saw using the M5 for the two components as a practical -- and cheaper solution. But the critics in opposition thought that the cost adapting the M5 would be ever higher than the cost of developing a mobile missile, because it would mean enlarging the silos at an estimated cost of 10 billion Francs. But an Accord between Russia and the U.S.A. limiting land-based missiles in their own countries to one nuclear warhead each, lessened the impact of M5.

As for the third leg of the triad, a supersonic air-launched missile, the *Air-Sol longue Portee* (ASLP), which has a range of 1,500 kms., that schedule is to replace Mirage IV, 300 kms., range *Air sol Moyenne Portee* (ASMP) is

supposed to start in 1996. The ASLP is planned to be deployed as a future combat plane, the Rafael, manufactured by Dassault Industries, (which is marred by financial crisis and whose future is uncertain). Its estimate cost is 20b. France for 60 missiles (exclusive of the cost of the Rafael planes which would bring price to 37 billion France).[65] In draft of 1993 military programme law funds for development of ASLP were not recommended, which seems that if a choice is made between long-range air-based or long-range-based-mobile, than latter will be chosen and the French nuclear arsenal will eventually be reduced from three to two components. But the new right-centre political regime in power led by Edouard Balladur, French Prime Minister, may take steps in due course, to reverse some of the decisions taken by the French Socialist regime in power until recently.

JUSTIFICATION ? FOR DETERRENT

The end of the bipolar system and disappearance of Eastern enemy seem to have orphaned the French deterrent.

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65 France. Senate. Avis no.95, *Loi de Finance pour 1992*, vol.4, Common section by Xavier de Villepin, p.79. Cited as such, op.cit., n.61.

Though some may search for new enemy but the threat of French nuclear reappraisals, once intended to deter Soviet Union, is not easily re-oriented against South. Using the threat of nuclear attack against a non-nuclear armed country of South would be contrary to France's vision of its place in the global order. President Mitterrand said as much publicly when announcing the engagement of France in the coalition against Iraq.[66]

Others suggest putting the French nuclear arsenal into the hands of a unified Europe. Having long insisted on nuclear autonomy, would France be ready to hand-over its nuclear forces to European Authority? The answer will be difficult to come by. In January 1992, President raised these questions, "Is it possible to conceive a European nuclear doctrine?" This will very quickly become one of the major questions about the construction of a Common European defence. But the process of forming common defence is still going on. But it is possible that the U.S.A. may exert all its influence it can muster to avoid the construction of common independent European defence, endowed with nuclear

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66 Ronald Tiersky, "France in the New Europe", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.71, no.2, Spring 1992.

weapons outside the NATO.

Meanwhile, France may return to its original "Gaullist" nuclear strategy of *Tous Azimuts* -- deterrence without a designated enemy.[67]

Having examined the shift from Bipolarity to unipolarity, the emergence of unified Germany and its role in filling the power vacuum in Central-Eastern Europe, the new Franco-German security accords, and then the new rationale for independent French nuclear force, certain conclusions seem to be permissible.

One single momentous development that took place in the midst of the systemic shake-up in the former Soviet bloc is the emergence of unified Germany as an independent actor in the fast changing European political dynamics, and its courageous drive at filling the power vacuum, in Central-Eastern Europe, which, as a consequence, seem to have brought about a shift of the gravitational centre of European politics from Paris/Brussels to Bonn/Berlin. In a way, this becomes clear from the general acceptance of DM as

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67 Ibid., and see also Marco Carnovale, "Why Europe Needs a Nuclear Trigger", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.35, no.2, Spring 1991, and Bruno Barrilot, op.cit., n.61.

a currency of exchange for other currencies with the European Community and its predominance in the European Economic Area as well as in Central-Eastern Europe.[68] Furthermore, even though, unified Germany has acquiesced in its conventional arms reduction on reciprocal basis as well as continuance of the ban imposed since the mid 1950s on its manufacturing, possessing, and or borrowing ABC weapons, yet there exists an inexplicable fear psychosis in France as well as in many other European countries that in due course, a powerful economic hegemon located in the heart of Europe is likely to build its own matching politico-military muscle power.

Significance of the fast changing political configuration in Europe in the post-Cold War period has to be evaluated in relation to a position of manifold supremacy that the French came to enjoy over the FRG in the aftermath of the Second World War. First, as one of the four allied powers, it bore responsibility on the German question. Now that status disappears with the resolution of the German question. Secondly, it was the only nuclear power in the

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68 Robert Jackson, ed., Europe in Transition: The Management of Security After the Cold War (New York, 1992), and Ronald Tiersky, op.cit., n.66.

continental Western Europe. And thirdly, it was one of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the French superiority on all the afore-cited grounds seems to be wearing out. Therefore, they find themselves in a state of dilemma on how to counter-balance the growing power of Germany in Europe. For, now the basic rationale, as ever in the bye-gone times, continues to be the "balance of power". As Russia (now in a state of systemic turmoil) could no longer be counted to provide effectively counterweight against the ascendant Germany,France depends upon the deepening of European integration to keep unified Germany firmly anchored into European Union. To a large extent, it was with this objective that the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was concluded in 1991.[69] But then, it seems that the obstacles raised by Britain and Denmark have slowed down the movement towards actualization of European Union. Already, fears are being expressed that if European political union does not materialize, Germany may also grow cold feet on European monetary union. Should the latter development take place,

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68 Jochen Thiers, "German Unification. Opportunity or Set-back for Europe", World Today (London), vol.47, no.1, January 1991, and see also Walter Goldstein, "Europe After Maastricht", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.71, no.5, Winter 1992/93.

Europe might find itself back-tracking to the pre-First World War situation. Hopefully, such a grave retrogression in the movement for European integration may not take place, owing to their awareness of the damages (Lecchini Report on "Non-Europe Costs") that its non-fulfillment is likely to cause to each member of the European Community. But, then, sadly enough, politics in the past, has not been governed by logic and in the near future, there is no likelihood of its turning into a room in the European syndrome.

Finally, in that midst of the present on-going critical transitional phase, the only country, which despite its grave liability on account of reconstruction of economy of its eastern part, and also deep economic and industrial engagements in Central-Eastern Europe, enjoys super-confidence about its future prospects of emerging as the number one power in Europe is Germany. To a certain extent, this point seems to have been corroborated by the offer that the former US President George Bush had made to Germany for "co-partnership in leadership". Germany kept silent. But the message seemed to have had registered a deep impact upon the German mind:

> This became evident from how Germany asserted itself on extending recognition to Croatia and Slovania, despite

reservations expressed on this issue by the French and the British. Rather, the EC, under German pressure, had to accord recognition to these two break-away states from Yugoslavia in the "higher interests of the European Community."[70]

The foregoing analysis would show that in the light of the emergence of the German factor in the post-Cold War epoch, and its potentialities of growing out of proportions, the French have to keep themselves in a state of high vigil, particularly in the security field. Furthermore, as at the present moment, even though the Soviet threat does not exist, but then in place of one, now there have appeared four nuclear powers in the former Soviet bloc, which means that the threat may have become diffused, but then it has turned into a manifaceted and manifold threat from the eastern side. If the present process of democratization in the former Soviet bloc succeeds, that would be one of the rarest occurrences in human history. And this possibility is not to be ruled out. But if it does not happen the way it is envisaged, France has to remain prepared to face the resultant eventualities. And it is to face the unforeseeable and uncertain source of threat that the French are provided

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70 Christopher Daase/Michael Jochum, "Partners in Leadership"? United Germany in the Eyes of the USA", *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), vol.40, no.2, April 1992.

a new rationale for continuance of their independent strategic force.[71]

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71 Ronald Tiersky, op.cit., n.66.

CONCLUSIONS

The post-Cold War scenario, which ended the bipolar conflictual system bears special significance for France, particularly for its nuclear force, which was initiated somewhat clandestinely in the mid-1950s during the Fourth Republic. But it is only with the resumption to power of General de Gaulle in the late 1950s that the French nuclear policy came to be pursued rigorously, and became as subject of intense debate both in Europe and the United States. But then de Gaulle did not relent on it, and succeeded in establishing it, demonstrating the French determination to assert its independence in its foreign as well as security policies.

During the Fourth Republic, France had learnt bitter lessons. The United States had refused to salvage France from its humiliating defeat at *Dien Bien Phu* in 1954, and then again in 1956, France along with Britain suffered diplomatic debacle on the Suez issue. This was also the time when France was confronted with the Algerian crisis, and its morale had reached its lowest ebb. While the United States had renewed its special relationship with Britain,

its attitude towards France was no more than that of indifference. De Gaulle had disapproved the U.S. policy of dominating over Europe through the instrumentalities of the NATO in the security field and the MNCs in the economic domain. By the late 1950s, it had become apparent that France under the IV Republic had been reduced to the status of a satellite. Therefore, it became one of his prime policy goals to help France recover its status as a great power with its own global interests. And this could be possible only if France asserted its independence in the field of national security. After all, de Gaulle believed it firmly that none of the allies, howsoever powerful and wealthy they may be, would consider it politically realistic to come to the rescue of others, if in so doing their own political survival falls into jeopardy. That is how he expressed his opposition to France being absorbed into a militarily integrated defence system dominated by the United States and the United Kingdom,. whose past record in terms of solidarity and material support actually extended to France in times of grave crisis, whether in the First or the Second World War, had been of dubious nature. It is for this reason that he could not depend for the French security upon the external support of any of the allies, much less of the

Anglo-Saxons, which, he described as *L'Albion Perfide*. Hence the rationale for the French policy of nuclear independence. France moved out of the eighteen-nation disarmament conference in 1962, refused to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as also subsequently the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And, in the early 1960s, when the United States (after reaching an agreement with the United Kingdom at Nassau in 1962 on the Polaris missiles project) insisted the Gaullist France to join the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF Plan), he not only declined it, but also denounced it as a US-UK ploy to drive a wedge between the major members of the European Community. De Gaulle retaliated by keeping Britain (a "Trojan Horse") outside of the EC in 1963, and also concluding a bilateral friendship treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) -- these developments indicated in a big way that France was capable of playing its own game of *realpolitik vis-a-vis* the United States and the United Kingdom. In the mid 1960s, France not only moved out of the NATO military apparatus, but also asked for the exit of the NATO military establishment from the Fontain bleu. More than that, France disapproved of the new strategy of "Flexible Response" adopted by the United States in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. France moved closer to the USSR,

and became the first Western power to have approved in 1966 the Soviet proposal at convening the European Conference for Security and Cooperation. Initially, the intention was that this institution would focus only on all-European security. It is subsequently that under pressure from within Europe and also the United States that its canvas was expanded to include the United States and Canada as well, and its nomenclature was then changed to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which gets institutionalized in 1975 through the conclusion of the Helsinki Accord. In any case, France under de Gaulle had already shaped up its policy on national nuclear defence, and had also moved out of the US-UK dominance on the strategic positioning of the NATO, and made it as a preserve under the supreme command of the French President. France, in response to "Flexible Response" had its own strategy of *Tous Azimats*, and then after de Gaulle, this strategy was modified into one of Graduated Response. In any case, France always kept open the scope for deep cooperation with the NATO on mutually agreed to terms in the event of a conflict breaking out.

During the presidency of Georges Pompidou (1969 to 1974) and of Giscard D'Estaing (1974 to 1981), the French nuclear policy continued to be followed more or less in

accord with the principle of "more of continuity and less of change". In a small way, changes occurred, such as through the concept of *Sanctuarization Elargie*, but there was no major change. Indeed, it may be remarked that while the 1960s was truly speaking the Gaullist decade, the 1970s (notwithstanding a few ripples of discord and dissent between the two Super Powers) was one of *detente*. In the 1970s, it seems that *detente* ran into two streams: first of the unremitting conflictual positioning of the two Super Powers, and second of reduced tensions between the two halves of Europe, made possible through FRG's *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschland Politik*. It is for this reason that *detente* came to be considered as divisible, particularly because the two Super Powers could not reconcile their differences on their global strategic interests, while the European interests could be best served only if tensions between the two halves of Europe could be reduced.

Also then, owing to various peace initiatives taken by the major European powers, the United States became somewhat apprehensive lest its European allies loosen their intra-NATO ties and solidarity, and fall into the new *detente* trappings of the adversarial bloc. France kept its national nuclear independence more or less intact, but there was also

the fear lest FRG move too close (in search of an answer to its national question) to the USSR, and goes neutral, perhaps becomes Finlandized. Moreover, it is also in this decade that Europe becomes conscious of its weakness in the field of industrial competitiveness, and suffers from what came to be known as "Eurosclerosis". To overcome this malady, France (in cooperation with the FRG and other members of the EC) had taken a lead in further deepening European integration, and also expanding it to include Spain and Portugal within its fold. This phenomenon also explains how France under the leadership of Francois Mitterrand provided driving impulse in transforming the European Community into European Union by 1992. In passing it may be remarked that FRG's response in the first half of the 1980s was not encouraging, as is clear from an article published in *Der Spiegel* by its Foreign Editor, Romain Leick, on "Germany -- the European Egotist" in European Affairs, 1/87 that Germany was becoming more and more nationalistic, and was wondering if the move towards European Union would not have damaging effect upon the superior industrial standards, already set by Germany. Also in the light of the debate on the intensity of regional integration, Germany we letting out its innermost

sensitivities on the question of its borders. Germany had already recognized its border with Poland at Oder Neisse twice (GDR did it in 1950), and then FRG repeated it in 1970). Yet, it was then being stated that while European integration may lead to the softening of the frontiers in Europe, but this norm would not be applicable in the case of the disputed borders. In other words, there was an indirect reference to a question mark on the Oder Neisse frontier. And this question came up in a big way during the four-plus-two negotiations on German unification. The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl was interested in extracting assurance from the Poles on the issue of war reparations in return for recognition by unified Germany to the Oder Neisse frontier. But then the four allied powers emphasized upon Germany the need for its unconditional recognition of its border with Poland. Thus, on such a security-sensitive issue, Germany had to acquiesce into it as a first major step towards its credibility-building in its new status of a Unified Germany. It is only then that the four Allied Powers gave approval to German unification.

But since the actualizationi of German unification on 3 October 1990, it has become clear that Germany would gradually assume its role as a key power, *Mitteleuropa*,

exerting its influence both in the East and the West. Without doubt, the increasing political clout of unified Germany would not be to the liking of the French. Now that the Soviet Union has been torn asunder, France cannot defend upon any of its successor states to join with it i providing counter-balance against the growing strength of unified Germany. It is a matter of coincidence that the descent and disintegration of the USSR synchronized with the ascent of unified Germany. As such, unified Germany, notwithstanding its enormous liabilities on account of economic reconstruction of its eastern part and its deep commitments to Central Eastern Europe, emerges as the only major power whose potentialities of turning out eventually as the Number One power in Europe are not discounted. In other words, unified Germany, alone from among the big powers today, enjoys bright prospects about its future role in the changing European politico-economic dynamics. Already Germany has shown in the late 1991 that it is no longer a political dwarf -- rather commensurate with its status as an economic giant, it is emerging as a political power to be reckoned with. Was it not due to this fact that under its pressure, the EC had to accord recognition hurriedly to Croatia and Slovania on 15 January 1992, notwithstanding the

contrary recommendations of the Badinter Commission. There were murmurs of disapproval. But then, the "higher interests" of the European Community could be best safeguarded only by pursuing the German path. Even if reluctantly all the member states of European Community gave approval to this development they could not prevent Yugoslavia from breaking up. And its tragic effects are still being felt all over Europe.

With Germany's decisive manifest role in the Balkans, and of its preponderance in Central-Eastern Europe, and also its key role in the transformation of the EC into European Union, particularly of Economic and Monetary Union, what options France would have to ensure its own role as an equal power? In the strategic-military field, owing to its nuclear status it has remained far ahead of Germany, and as a result it seemed to have turned into a constant factor in the French security policy. But, now, as it appeared from the recent currencies crisis, which led the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, showed how skillfully Germany was playing its role in orientating European economies in a way that suited its larger political interests. Indeed, it is well known that it is the German factor that led to Britain's exit from the ERM. Somewhat in

the same tune, Ferry Hoogendijk, Editor of European Affairs had remarked editorially:*

> With its 80 million inhabitants and strong economy (certainly in three of four years time when the *Wirtschaftswunder* has worked its magic on Eastern Germany), Germany will be lord and master in Europe."

Furthermore, it is a common knowledge that with the break-up of the USSR, the nuclear threat from the East has not as yet disappeared completely. Rather, now in place of one, there exist four nuclear powers, whose strategic arms control and disarmament may pose problems of different variety and also of grave magnitude. For, now it is clearly seen that there has come about a basic change in the objective reality in Europe, of which manifested implications are difficult to be gauged owing to the critical nature of the transitional phase through which Europe seem to be currently passing through. In other words, there is the element of uncertainty, which seems to have taken on the complexion of a political doctrine, which is bound to have bearing upon the behaviour of the major as well as medium-sized powers in Europe. The most mind-boggling problem and prospects relate to the democratization

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*Ferry Hoogerdijk, "Europe Doesn't Exist", European Affairs (Amsterdam), December 1991, no.6, p.5.

of the CIS as well as the newly emerged independent states in Central-Eastern Europe. Indeed, the success of this on-going exercise may in real sense be a question worth sixtyfour million dollars. The present virulent on-going struggles for power in Russia and other CIS states as well as in Central Europe do not seem to mark out an easy path-way for political democracy to move in in full swing. The gravest difficult for political democracy to succeed in this region as at present arises owing to the absence of democratic political culture. The same kind of socio-political setting in the Weimar Republic during the inter-war period had destroyed political democracy *ab initio* in that country. The same danger of nationalistic and egoistic endeavours degenerating into fascist regimes (as it happened in the inter-war period) looms large in this region.

It would thus seem that the prospects of Europe turning itself soon into a zone of peace and political stability do not seem to be overwhelming so as to convince the French that that historic phase has dawned now when they could safely turn their nuclear weapons into plough-shares, for, in the changing new global order, military strategic factors have already started yielding place of primacy to economic-technological factors. The latter idyllic historic

phase may perhaps come about early in the 21st century, but it is not round the corner. In the midst of increasing uncertainty on the changing power equations within Europe and around it, it would be highly naive to expect that France gives up its nuclear independence, and then gropes into darkness as to how it has to ensure in future its political identity as well as its survival.

ANNEXURE – I

FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Existing Nuclear Forces

pon	*Number of Weapon*	*Number of Warheads*
ɔtegic		
Ms	*18*	*18*
Ms	*96*	*256*
ɔraft	*18*	*18*
-Strategic		
ɔraft	*75*	*75*
ls	*44*	*70*
ɔier Aircraft	*36*	*36*
il Warheads		*473*
il Megatonnage		*121 mt.*

ɔons under development

ɔons	*Date to be deployed*	*Comments*
RBM (Mobile)	*1996*	*Replaces and/or Supplements S3D Silo-based IRBM and Mirage 4P*
-generation "SSBN	*1994*	*Replaces Redoutable class, to carry M4 or M5 SLBMS*
LBM Modifications	*1987/1994*	*New TN-71 warhead (1987); new TN-75 warhead (1994)*
LBM	*Late 1990s*	*Replaces all M4, uses TN-76 warhead.*
3 SRBM	*1992*	*Replaces Pluton, equipped with enhanced-radiation (neutron) warhead.*
les de Gaulle CVN	*1996*	*Replaces Clemenceau class, two planned.*
el	*1998*	*Replaces current nuclear-capable tactical aircraft.*

- Nuclear-powered carrier, IRBM – intermediate-range ballistic missile, SLBM – urine – launched ballistic missile, SRBM – Short-range ballistic missiles range to 960 kilometers; SSBN – ballistic-missile-submarine.

e : Nuclear Data Book Staff, "Nuclear Weapons", SIPRI 1987 Year Book (London and New York, 1987).

ANNEXURE – II

U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, end of 1987

United States

Type	Name	Launchers		Year deployed	Warheads x yield (megatons) per launcher	Warheads		Total megatons	
ICBMs									
LGM-30F	Minuteman II	450		1966	1 x 1.200	450		540.0	
LGM-30G	Minuteman III								
	Mk-12	220		1970	3 x 0.170 (MIRV)	660		112.2	
	Mk-12A	300		1979	3 x 0.335 (MIRV)	900		301.5	
LGM-118A	MX/Peacekeeper	30		1986	10 x 0.300 (MIRV)	300		90	
Total		1,000	(50%)			2,310	(18%)	1,043.7	(34%)
SLBMs									
UGM-73A	Poseidon C-3			1971	10 x 0.040 (MIRV)	2,560		102.4	
UGM-96A	Trident I C-4	364		1979	8 x 0.100 (MIRV)	3,072		307.2	
Total		640	(32%)			5,632	(43%)	409.6	(14%)
Bombers/weapons									
B-1B		64		1986	ALCM 0.050–0.150	1,614		242.1	
B-52G/H		241		1958/61	SRAM 0.170	1,140		193.8	
FB-111A		56		1969	Bombs 0.500	2,316		1,158.0	
Total		361	(18%)			5,070	(39%)	1,593.9	(52%)
Grand total		**2,001**				**13,012**		**3,047.2**	

Soviet Union

ICBMs									
SS-11	Sego								
M2		184		1973	1 x 0.950–1.100	184		202.4	
M3		210		1973	3 x 0.100–0.350 (MRV)	630		220.5	
SS-13 M2	Savage	60		1973	1 x 0.600–0.750	60		45	
SS-17 M3	Spanker	139		1979	4 x 0.750 (MIRV)	556		417	
SS-18 M4	Satan	308		1979	10 x 0.500–0.550 (MIRV)	3,080		1,694	
SS-19 M3	Stiletto	360		1979	6 x 0.550 (MIRV)	2,160		1,188	
SS-24	Scalpel	5		1987	10 x 0.100 (MIRV)	50		5	
SS-25	Sickle	126		1985	1 x 0.550	126		69.3	
Total		1,392	(56%)			6,846	(61%)	3,841.2	(60%)
SLBMs									
SS-N-6 M3	Serb	272		1973	2 x 0.375–1 (MRV)	544		544	
SS-N-8 M1/M2	Sawfly	292		1973	1 x 1–1.500	292		438	
SS-N-17	Snipe	12		1980	1 x 0.500–1	12		12	
SS-N-18 M1-3	Stingray	224		1978	6 x 0.200–0.500 (MIRV)	1,344		672	
SS-N-20	Sturgeon	80		1983	7 x 0.100 (MIRV)	560		56	
SS-N-23	Skiff	48		1986	10 x 0.100 (MIRV)	480		48	
Total		928	(37%)			3,232	(29%)	1,770	(28%)
Bombers/weapons									
Tu-95	Bear A	30		1956	4 bombs x 1	120		120	
Tu-95	Bear B/C	30		1962	5 bombs or 1 AS-3 x 3	150		150	
Tu-95	Bear G	40		1984	4 bombs and 2 AS-4 x 0.6	240		208	
Tu-95	Bear H	55		1984	8 AS-15 ALCMs x 0.25 and 4 bombs	660		330	
Total		155	(6%)			1,170	(10%)	808	(12%)
Grand total		**2,475**				**11,248**		**6,419.2**	

ALCM—air-launched cruise missile; AS—air-to-surface missile; ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile, range of 5,760–15,360 kilometers; MIRV—multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles; MRV—multiple reentry vehicles; SLBM—submarine-launched ballistic missile; SRAM—short-range attack missile. Names of Soviet weapons are codenames assigned by NATO.

During 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union deployed about 1,250 new strategic weapons: almost 700 for the United States and over 550 for the Soviet Union. These included 90 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), which are now operational on B-52G/Hs at six Strategic Air Command bases; 20 MX missiles carrying 200 warheads at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming; and approximately 400 new B83 gravity bombs for the 50 B-1B bombers delivered during the year. The ballistic-missile submarine force remained the same size—the next Trident submarine is scheduled for deployment in 1989. The United States removed about 20 Minuteman III missiles from silos so it could deploy MX missiles. The most dramatic recent U.S. trend has been an increase in bomber weapons, with the introduction of ALCMs for a portion of the B-52 force and new gravity bombs for the B-1B bomber.

The Soviet Union deployed new weapons in all three "legs" of its triad. Approximately 50 SS-25s were deployed, and the first few rail-mobile SS-24s were fielded. The fourth Typhoon and third Delta IV ballistic-missile submarines became operational, while the next units of each model were launched. Bear bombers continued to be converted to the G model and new H models were produced. About 20 Bear Hs armed with 160 new AS-15 long-range ALCMs were deployed during the year. The Soviet Union continued to retire SS-11s under SALT, and began withdrawing SS-17s as the SS-24 was fielded. The last 15 Bison bombers were removed from service during 1987. A recent Soviet trend is the fitting of the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine force with multiple, independently targetable nuclear warheads. The Soviets may field a larger number of bombers and bomber weapons when one takes into account the Bear H and the soon-to-be-deployed Blackjack bombers.

U.S. strategic forces have grown by over 5,400 warheads since the signing of the SALT I Treaty in 1972, including the 2,400 warheads added since 1981 under the Reagan administration. Soviet strategic forces have grown by almost 7,800 warheads since the signing of the SALT I Treaty, with over 3,100 warheads added during the Reagan administration.

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 44, no. 1, January/February 1988, p. 56.*

ANNEXURE-III

	United States	Soviet Union	Britain	France	China
First airdrop explosion of nuclear weapon/aircraft used	Aug. 6, 1945 B-29	Nov. 6, 1955 Bear ?	Oct. 11, 1956 Valiant	July 19, 1966 Mirage IV-A	May 14, 1965 Hong 6
Known atmospheric tests (includes underwater)	217	214	21	50	23
Largest atmospheric test	Feb. 28, 1954 15 mt.	Oct. 30, 1961 50 mt.	Sept. 1958 2.5–3 mt.	Aug. 24, 1968 2.6 mt.	Nov. 17, 1976 4 mt.
Last atmospheric test	Nov. 4, 1962	Dec. 25, 1962	Sept. 23, 1958	Sept. 15, 1974	Oct. 16, 1980
First underground test	July 26, 1957	Oct. 11, 1961	March 1, 1962	Nov. 7, 1961	Sept. 23, 1969
Largest underground test	Nov. 6, 1971 5 mt.	Oct. 27, 1973 2.8–4 mt.	Dec. 5, 1985 <150 kt.	July 25, 1979 120 kt.	May 21, 1992 660 kt.
Current test sites	Nevada	Semipalatinsk*, Novaya Zemlya	Nevada	Moruroa atoll, Fangataufa	Lop Nur (Malan)
The nuclear infrastructure					
Assembly and disassembly plants	Pantex near Amarillo, Texas	Nizhnyaya Tura (Sverdlovsk-45), Yuryuzan (Zlatoust-36), Penza (Penza-19)	Burghfield Royal Ordnance near Reading	Centre d' Etudes de Valduc (Côte-d'Or)	Subei (Gansu), Guangyuan (Sichuan)
Plutonium production/ number of reactors	Hanford*/9 Savannah River*/5	Chelyabinsk-65*/6 Tomsk-7/5 Krasnoyarsk-26/3	Calder Hall/4 Chapelcross/4 Windscale*/2	Marcoule*/3 Chinon-2*,-3*/2 Bugey-1/1 Phénix /1 Celestin-1,-2/2	Jiuquan (Gansu)/1 Guangyuan (Sichuan)/1
Uranium enrichment plants	Oak Ridge,* Portsmouth, Paducah	Verkni-Neyvinsky, Krasnoyarsk, Angarsk, Tomsk	Capenhurst	Pierrelatte	Lanzhou, Heping (Sichuan)
Chief design labs	Los Alamos, New Mexico; Lawrence Livermore, California	Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70	Aldermaston near Reading	Limeil-Valenton in Val-de-Marne	Ninth Academy Mianyang (Sichuan)
Current directors and administrators	Hazel O'Leary, Energy Secretary; Siegfried Hecker, dir., Los Alamos; John Nuckolls, dir., Livermore	Viktor Mikhailov, Minister of Atomic Energy and, dir., Arzamas-16; Evgeni Avrorin, Scientific dir., Chelyabinsk-70	Donald Spiers, Controller of Establishments, Research and Nuclear; Brian Richards, dir., Aldermaston	Roger Baléras, dir., Direction des Applications Militaires	Hu Renyu, dir., Ninth Academy; Hu Side, Deputy dir.

*No longer operational. **"Boosted":** small quantities of tritium and deuterium incorporated in fission weapon to increase efficiency of yield; **kt.:** kilotons; **mt.:** megatons; **ICBM:** intercontinental ballistic missile; **IRBM:** intermediate-range ballistic missile; **SSN:** nuclear-powered submarine; **SSBN:** nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; **SLBM:** submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 49, no. 4, May 1993, pp. 48–49.*

	United States	Soviet Union	Britain	France	China
Warheads					
Warheads in stockpile	10,500 active, 6,000 awaiting disassembly	15,000 active, 18,000 awaiting disassembly	200	540	450
Peak number of warheads/year	32,500/1967	45,000/1986	410/1969	540/1993	450/1993
Total number of warheads built/year	70,000 1945–1992	55,000 1949–1992	915 1952–1992	1,150 1960–1992	600 1964–1992
Number of known test explosions (end of 1992)	942	715	44	210	38
Weapon development milestones					
Atomic bomb developers	J. Robert Oppenheimer, Gen. Leslie Groves	Igor V. Kurchatov	William G. Penney	Gen. Charles Ailleret, Pierre Guillaumat	Nie Rongzhen, Liu Jie, Deng Jiaxian
Hydrogen bomb developers	Stanislaw Ulam, Edward Teller	Andrei Sakharov, Yuli B. Khariton, Yakov B. Zeldovich	William Cook Keith Roberts Brian Taylor	Robert Dautray	Deng Jiaxian, Yu Min, Peng Huanwu
First operational ICBM	Oct. 31, 1959 Atlas D	1960 SS-6	none	Aug. 2, 1971 S-2 IRBM	Aug. 1981 Dong Feng-5
First nuclear-powered naval SSN enters service/vessel	Jan. 1955 *Nautilus*	Aug. 1958 *November*	1963 *Dreadnought*	Jan. 1971 *Le Redoutable*	1974 *Han*
First SSBN patrol with Polaris-type SLBM/ vessel/missile	Nov. 15, 1960 *Washington* Polaris A1	1968 *Yankee* SS-N-6	June 1968 *Resolution* Polaris A3	Jan. 28, 1972 *Le Redoutable* M1	1986 *Xia* Julang-1
First MIRVed missile deployed	Aug. 19, 1970 Minuteman III	1974 SS-18 or -19 ?	1994–1995 Trident II	April 1985 M-4A SLBM	none
Testing milestones					
First fission test, type/yield	July 16, 1945 Plutonium/23 kt.	Aug. 29, 1949 Plutonium/20 kt.	Oct. 3, 1952 Plutonium/25 kt.	Feb. 13, 1960 Plutonium/60–70 kt.	Oct. 16, 1964 U-235/20 kt.
First test of boosted fission weapon/yield	May 8, 1951 Item/46 kt.	Aug. 12, 1953 Joe 4/400 kt.	May 15, 1957 ? Short Granite/ 150 kt. ?	Sept. 24, 1966 Rigel/150 kt.	May 9, 1966 ~ 200 kt.
First multistage thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) test/yield	Oct. 31, 1952 10.4 mt.	Nov. 22, 1955 1.6 mt.	April 28, 1958 2 mt. ?	Aug. 24, 1968 2.6 mt.	June 17, 1967 3 mt.
Number of months, first fission bomb to first multi-stage thermonuclear	87	75	66	102	32

ANNEXURE - IV

BEFORE AND AFTER

Weapon	Alliance/ country	Current holdings	Holdings after CFE
Tanks	**NATO**	**23,700**	**20,000**
	United States	5,900	4,000
	Other NATO	17,800	16,000
	Warsaw Pact	**33,200**	**20,000**
	Soviet Union	20,700	13,150
	Other Warsaw	12,500	6,850
Armored combat vehicles	**NATO**	**30,000**	**30,000**
	United States	5,700	5,700
	Other NATO	24,300	24,300
	Warsaw Pact	**42,900**	**30,000**
	Soviet Union	29,300	20,000
	Other Warsaw	13,600	10,000
Artillery	**NATO**	**19,000**	**19,000**
	United States	2,600	2,600
	Other NATO	16,400	16,400
	Warsaw Pact	**29,200**	**20,000**
	Soviet Union	13,800	13,175
	Other Warsaw	15,400	6,825
Combat aircraft	**NATO**	**5,500**	**5,500**
	United States	700	700
	Other NATO	4,800	4,800
	Warsaw Pact	**8,500**	**6,800**
	Soviet Union	6,500	5,150
	Other Warsaw	2,000	1,650
Helicopters	**NATO**	**1,700**	**1,700**
	United States	300	300
	Other NATO	1,400	1,400
	Warsaw Pact	**1,600**	**1,600**
	Soviet Union	1,300	1,300
	Other Warsaw	300	300

Figures on current holdings were released at the time of the treaty signing. The parties have 90 days to review and amend these declarations. East German equipment turned over to the unified German government (2,300 tanks, 6,500 armored combat vehicles, 2,200 artillery pieces, 100 aircraft, and 100 helicopters) is not included above.

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 47, no. 1, January/February 1991, p. 32.*

ANNEXURE – V

Maximum Levels for Holdings of Treaty Limited Equipment of the States of the CIS and Georgia

Countries	Tanks	A C V	Artillery Pieces	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopers
Russia	6400	11480	6415	3450	890
Ukraine	4080	5050	4040	1090	330
Belarus	1800	2600	1615	260	80
Moldova	210	210	250	50	50
Georgia	220	220	285	100	50
Armenia	220	220	285	100	50
Azerbaijan	220	220	285	100	50
	13,150	20,000	13,175	5,150	1,500

(Kazakhastan have agreed to have no holdings in the CFE area of applications).

Sources : The Economist (London), 8 August 1992, p. 38.
and NATO Review (Brussels), vol. 40, No. 5, October 1992, p. 16.

LESSER NUCLEAR POWERS: FRANCE

In comparison to U.S. and Soviet stockpiles, the British, French, and Chinese nuclear arsenals are relatively small, but still capable of causing mass destruction. The table below describes the French nuclear arsenal. (For British and Chinese estimated arsenals, see the November 1990 *Bulletin*.)

With over 600 nuclear weapons, the French arsenal is about twice as large as that of the British or Chinese. Total French megatonnage is estimated at 135, a fraction of the U.S.-Soviet total of some 15,000 megatons. But the French arsenal is a miniature version of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear triads, with strategic bombers, silo-based ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Manned bombers and land-based ballistic missiles are controlled by the Commandement des Forces Aériennes Stratégiques (FAS). Since 1986, Mirage IV-P bombers have been outfitted with a supersonic air-to-ground missile with a 100–300 kilometer range, the Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP), which is similar to the U.S. SRAM II. FAS also deploys S-3D ballistic missiles in hardened underground silos on the Plateau d'Albion in southeastern France, near Apt.

The Force Océanique Stratégique (FOS) operates six ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), five of which are being upgraded with new missiles and warheads. The first French submarine, *L'Inflexible*, is the only SSBN with M-4 missiles with TN-70 warheads. The M-4 missiles carried by *Le Tonnant*, *L'Indomitable*, and *Le Terrible* have been retrofitted with an improved, lighter-weight TN-71 warhead. A retrofit of *Le Foudroyant* will be completed in 1993. *Le Redoutable*, scheduled for a 1991 retirement, will not be retrofitted.

France also maintains several types of what it calls "prestrategic" nuclear forces: aircraft and short-range missiles linked to the strategic deterrent forces. The Mirage 2000N/ASMP ("N" for *nucléaire*) has assumed the tactical nuclear role from the Mirage III-E and Jaguar A squadron. A total of 75 Mirage 2000N aircraft are planned, the last to be delivered by the end of 1992. ASMPs were first placed on the Mirage 2000N in 1988. Recently the Super Etendard strike aircraft on French aircraft carriers have also been outfitted with ASMPs.

Unlike the British nuclear forces, French forces are not integrated in the U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) or the NATO General Strike Plan.

Weapons under development: Development of the **S-4 IRBM (mobile)**, a three-warhead MIRV designed to replace or supplement French silo-based missiles, has involved a four-year delay, and its status is unclear. The missile may be cancelled. Six new **Triomphant-class submarines** are planned to enter service from 1994 to 2008. The first three will carry an **improved M-4 missile** with greater range, penetration aids, and the **TN-75 lighter warhead**. After 2005, the remaining three will be equipped with the **M-5, a 12-warhead, MIRVed missile** with a **TN-76 warhead**. The **Hadès**, a short-range ballistic missile (350–480 kilometers) with variable yield (up to 80 kilotons), originally designed to replace the Pluton, will enter service in 1992, but the program may be cut from 90 to 30 missiles. Two **Charles de Gaulle-class aircraft carriers** designed to replace the Clemenceau class are planned, with sea trials to begin in 1996 and full operations in 1998. The **Rafale D/M** is designed to replace the Mirage IV-P, beginning in 1998. Its first test flight is scheduled for February 1991. The French air force wants 250 of these planes and the navy plans to buy an additional 86. The first deliveries should begin in 1996. The Rafale will initially carry the ASMP, which is scheduled to be replaced or supplemented by the **Air-Sol Longue Portée**, a longer-range missile (1,500 km.) that may be jointly developed with the British.

FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, 1990

Delivery vehicle	Year deployed	Number	Range* (kilometers)	Warhead x yield	Type	Total warheads in stockpile
Strategic forces						
Submarine-based missiles						
M-20 MSBS	1977	32	3,000	1 x 1 mt	TN-61	32
M-4A MSBS	1985	16	4,000–5,000	MIRV 6 x 150 kt	TN-70	96
M-4B MSBS	1987	48	5,000	MIRV 6 x 150 kt	TN-71	288
Land-based missiles						
S-3D SSBS/IRBM	1980	18	3,500	1 x 1 mt	TN-61	18
Aircraft						
Mirage IV-P	1986	18	1,500	1 ASMP x 300 kt	TN-80	18
Prestrategic forces						
Jaguar A	1973***	30	750	1 x 6–8/25 kt††	AN-52	30
Pluton SRBM	1974	44	120	1 x 20/25 kt	AN-51†††	70
Super Etendard	1978†††	36	650	1 ASMP x 300 kt	TN-81	24
Mirage 2000N	1988	45	1,570	1 ASMP x 300 kt	TN-81**	45
					Total	**621**

*Range for aircraft indicates combat radius without refuelling. **The TN-81 is an improved TN-80. ***The Jaguar was first deployed in 1973 but did not carry the AN-52 nuclear bomb until 1974. †Two-thirds of the AN-52 stockpile reportedly consists of a low-yield version, and one-third a high-yield version. ††The same basic device/design is used for the AN-52 gravity bomb and the AN-51 Pluton warhead. †††Though first deployed in 1978, the Super Etendard did not carry the AN-52 until 1981. Twenty-four ASMP are assigned to two squadrons.

AN: *arme nucléaire* (fission weapon); **ASMP:** *air-sol moyenne portée*; **IRBM:** intermediate-range ballistic missile; **MSBS:** *mer-sol balistique stratégique*; **SRBM:** short-range ballistic missile; **SSBS:** *sol-sol-ballistique-stratégique*; **TN:** *thermonucléaire*.

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago) vol. 46, no. 11, December 1990, p. 57.*

ANNEXURE – VII

U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, 1972-1987

	ICBMs				SLBMs				Bombers				Totals			
	Launchers		Warheads		Launchers		Warheads		Launchers		Warheads		Launchers		Warheads	
	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR
1972	1,054	1,547	1,644	1,647	656	503	2,384	458	457	157	3,573	703	2,167	2,207	7,601	2,808
1973	1,054	1,587	1,844	1,862	656	595	3,536	556	423	157	3,505	703	2,133	2,339	8,885	3,121
1974	1,054	1,587	1,944	1,987	656	679	3,824	680	396	157	3,556	703	2,106	2,423	9,324	3,378
1975	1,054	1,587	2,144	2,467	656	771	3,968	828	396	157	3,716	703	2,106	2,515	9,828	3,998
1976	1,054	1,539	2,144	2,719	656	849	4,688	954	382	157	3,604	703	2,092	2,545	10,436	4,376
1977	1,054	1,433	2,144	2,983	656	972	4,832	1,503	382	157	3,604	703	2,092	2,562	10,580	5,189
1978	1,054	1,398	2,144	3,738	656	1,002	5,120	1,970	376	157	3,568	703	2,086	2,557	10,832	6,411
1979	1,054	1,398	2,144	4,656	656	993	5,088	2,105	376	157	3,568	703	2,086	2,548	10 800	7,464
1980	1,054	1,398	2,144	5,422	592	990	4,896	2,198	376	157	3,568	703	2,022	2,545	10,608	8,323
1981	1,054	1,398	2,154	5,722	536	1,038	4,976	2,714	376	157	3,568	703	1,966	2,593	10,688	9,139
1982	1,049	1,398	2,149	6,282	544	990	4,992	2,762	328	157	3,384	703	1,921	2,545	10,515	9,747
1983	1,040	1,398	2,140	6,690	568	978	5,152	2,750	297	167	3,520	703	1,905	2,543	10,802	10,143
1984	1,030	1,398	2,130	6,840	616	982	5,536	2,934	297	160	3,844	685	1,943	2,540	11,500	10,459
1985	1,020	1,398	2,120	6,840	648	980	5,760	3,160	297	160	4,104	935	1,965	2,538	11,974	10,935
1986	1,005	1,398	2,175	6,840	640	948	5,632	3,176	312	160	4,589	1,065	1,957	2,506	12,386	11,081
1987	1,000	1,392	2,390	6,846	640	948	5,632	3,408	361	155	5,070	1,170	2,001	2,515	13,002	11,424

Since the signing of the SALT I Treaty in May 1972 the superpowers together have added over 14,000 strategic warheads to the approximately 10,400 they had at that time. Approximately 6,360 have been added since SALT II was signed in June 1979.

The United States has always had more strategic warheads than the Soviet Union. This continues to be so even though the Soviet Union had a net increase of 8,600 warheads while the United States added 5,400 since 1972. The U.S. increase is due primarily to MIRVing the submarine fleet and adding air-launched cruise missiles to the bomber fleet. The Soviet rise is caused by the extensive MIRVing of its ICBMs and SLBMs.

The SALT treaties did not limit warheads as such, but rather focused on launchers. Launcher limits were set largely to accommodate future programs and did not radically alter the relationship of the different components of each nation's forces. On May 27, 1986, President Reagan announced that his administration would no longer be bound by the unratified SALT II Treaty. In November of that year a SALT II limit was broken and the United States remains above that ceiling. While the Soviet Union has stayed within SALT II limits, the CIA concludes: "In the absence of arms control constraints the Soviets clearly have the capability for further expansion to between 16,000 and 21,000 deployed warheads by the mid-1990s."



Informational graphics: Michael Yanoff

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 44, no.4, May 1988, p. 56.*

ANNEXURE-VIII

KNOWN NUCLEAR TESTS WORLDWIDE, 1945 TO DECEMBER 31, 1992

Year	U.S.	S.U.	U.K.	FR	CH	Total
1945	3	0	0	0	0	3
1946	2	0	0	0	0	2
1947	0	0	0	0	0	0
1948	3	0	0	0	0	3
1949	0	1	0	0	0	1
1950	0	0	0	0	0	0
1951	16	2	0	0	0	18
1952	10	0	1	0	0	11
1953	11	4	2	0	0	17
1954	6	7	0	0	0	13
1955	18	5	0	0	0	23
1956	18	9	6	0	0	33
1957	32	15	7	0	0	54
1958	77	29	5	0	0	111
1959	0	0	0	0	0	0
1960	0	0	0	3	0	3
1961	10	50	0	2	0	62
1962	96	44	2	1	0	143
1963	44	0	0	3	0	47
1964	38	6	1	3	1	49
1965	36	10	1	4	1	52
1966	43	15	0	7	3	68
1967	34	17	0	3	2	56
1968	45	15	0	5	1	66
1969	38	16	0	0	2	56
1970	35	17	0	8	1	61
1971	17	19	0	6	1	43
1972	18	22	0	3	2	45
1973	16	14	0	5	1	36
1974	14	18	1	8	1	42
1975	20	15	0	2	1	38
1976	18	17	1	4	4	44
1977	19	18	0	6	1	44
1978	17	27	2	8	3	57
1979	15	29	1	9	1	55
1980	14	21	3	13	1	52
1981	16	22	1	12	0	51
1982	18	32	1	9	1	61
1983	17	27	1	9	2	56
1984	17	29	2	8	2	58
1985	17	9	1	8	0	35
1986	14	0	1	8	0	23
1987	14	23	1	8	1	47
1988	14	17	0	8	1	40
1989	11	7	1	8	0	27
1990	8	1	1	6	2	18
1991	7	0	1	6	0	14
1992	6	0	0	0	2	8
	942	715*	44	210*	38	1,950*

*Totals include 86 Soviet and 17 French tests not identified by date, and one 1974 underground explosion by India.

Eight tests were conducted in 1992, six by the United States and two by China. None of the other three declared nuclear weapons states tested. It is possible that there will be no tests in 1993. The United States has no new warhead programs under development. Russian and French challenge moratoria in 1992 led the U.S. Congress to call for a testing halt until July 1993.

Since 1945, at least 1,950 known nuclear test explosions have been conducted, about 85 percent of them by the United States and the Soviet Union. About 27 percent of all tests were atmospheric. The United States conducted 217 atmospheric tests, the Soviet Union 214, Britain 21, France 50, and China 23, for a total of 525. The United States conducted its last atmospheric test on November 4, 1962; the Soviet Union, December 25, 1962; the United Kingdom, September 23, 1958; France, September 15, 1974; and China, October 16, 1980.

For the entire period the average has been one nuclear test every nine days. Dating from each country's first explosion, the rate for the United States is one test every 18 days; the Soviet Union, one test every 22 days; France, one test every 57 days; China, one test every 279 days; and the United Kingdom, one test every 340 days.

The United States does not announce all of its tests. The U.S. total includes 116 unannounced tests, the most recent of which was conducted on April 6, 1990. It is likely that several dozen more remain to be discovered and the true U.S. total is close to 1,000. Twenty-seven peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), conducted between 1961–1973, are included in the U.S. total. In recent years, the annual Energy Department testing budget has been approximately $600 million. Vertical shaft tests cost around $30 million each, and the more complicated horizontal-tunnel weapons-effects tests, paid for by the Defense Department's Defense Nuclear Agency, $50–60 million each.

Russia was unable to test during 1992 and may not test again anytime soon. President Mikhail Gorbachev announced on October 5, 1991, that a unilateral one-year moratorium would take effect. On October 19, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin extended the moratorium to July 1, 1993—reaffirming his October 26, 1991, decree "On Halting Nuclear Weapon Tests on the Novaya Zemlya Proving Ground."

Beginning in 1962, the United Kingdom conducted 23 of its 44 tests jointly with the United States at the Nevada Test Site.

According to a reliable source, the total number of French nuclear tests is 210. We are not able to identify 17 of these by date, but we calculate that two were atmospheric, probably safety tests between 1972–74; two between 1975–77; 11 between November 1981 and October 1986; and two from October 1986 to the end of 1991. Precise dating is difficult because a test may not produce an explosive yield with a seismic signature, either because it is a dud or because it is not intended to.

The precise dates of all 38 Chinese tests are now known. The overall total includes one Indian underground test on May 18, 1974.

Negotiations for a comprehensive test ban may include a requirement that the five declared nuclear powers divulge a complete list of their tests.

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 49, no. 3, April 1993, p. 49.*

ANNEXURE–IX

RUSSIAN (C.I.S.) STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, END OF 1992

Russian (C.I.S.) strategic nuclear forces are approximately the same size as a year ago. The SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is the only weapon system in production; it continues to be fielded. There are still approximately 3,100 warheads deployed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

The terms of the START II Treaty, signed in Moscow on January 3, 1993, will facilitate the Russians reducing to a level of relative parity—the 3,000–3,500 warhead range that each side is permitted. They will be allowed to retain some ICBM silos that would otherwise have had to be destroyed. These include 90 SS-18 silos, which will be reconfigured to hold single-warhead SS-25s, which thus far have been mobile. If all goes well after ratification and implementation of the START I Treaty, the 104 SS-18 silos at two fields in Kazakhstan (and at the remaining fields in Russia) will be destroyed. A notable feature of the START II Treaty is that all SS-18s must be destroyed. Russia recently began deactivating the first few SS-18s.

The Russians will be allowed to keep 105 SS-19 ICBMs, but these must be "downloaded" from six to one warhead each. Earlier plans were to retire all SS-19s. After ratification and implementation of the START I Treaty, the 130 SS-19s at two fields in Ukraine will be removed, and the 105 SS-19s allowed under the treaty will be located at one or both of the Russian fields. The treaty calls for the destruction of all remaining silos. Theoretically, all other missiles could be retained—with the exception of the SS-18—and all Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could also be retained, but they would not have launchers (either silos or submarines).

The Russians plan to retire 14 Delta I and four Delta II submarines, probably by the end of 1993. The table below assumes that the last Yankee Is were withdrawn during 1992, and that half of the Delta Is have already been deactivated. By 1994 the Russians will have 27 nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBNs). As recently as 1990 there were 62 SSBNs, 38 in the Northern Fleet, and 24 in the Pacific Fleet. There were reports in 1992 that a Delta IV was nearly finished at the Severodvinsk shipyard, but Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates told the Senate in January 1992 that "we see for the first time in decades the total absence of any SSBN under construction." The CIA also reported that work was proceeding on a new SLBM to replace the SS-N-20 on Typhoon-class submarines, and a new solid-propellant SLBM may be deployed on a new class of SSBN after 2000.

The Russian bomber force is practically immobile, and reportedly at low rates of readiness. A small number of Bear H bombers are operational, but most Blackjack bombers are not. The Blackjacks at the Priluki Air Base in Ukraine are reportedly poorly maintained, and their crews are in Russia.

Type	Name	Launchers	Year deployed	Warheads x yield (megaton)	Total warheads	Total megatons
ICBMs						
SS-18 M4/M5/M6	Satan	308	1979	10 x .550/.750(MIRV)	3,080*	1,688
SS-19 M3	Stiletto	225	1979	6 x .550 (MIRV)	1,350	743
SS-24 M1/M2	Scalpel	36/56	1987	10 x .550 (MIRV)	920	506
SS-25	Sickle	378	1985	1 x .550	378	208
Total		1,003			5,728	3,145
SLBMs						
SS-N-8 M2	Sawfly	172 (13)†	1973	1 x 1.5	172	258
SS-N-18 M1	Stingray	224 (14)	1978	3 x .500 (MIRV)	672**	336
SS-N-20 M1/M2	Sturgeon	120 (6)	1983	10 x .200 (MIRV)	1,200	240
SS-N-23	Skiff	112 (7)	1986	4 x .100 (MIRV)	448	45
Total		628			2,492	879
Bomber/weapons						
Tu-95MS6	Bear H6	25	1984	6 AS-15A ALCMs or bombs	150	38
Tu-95MS16	Bear H16	50		16 AS-15A ALCMs or bombs	800	200
Tu-160	Blackjack	25	1987	12 AS-15B ALCMs or 12 AS-16 SRAMs, or 12 bombs	300	75
Total		100			1,250	313
GRAND TOTAL		1,731			9,470	~4,350

*Some SS-18s carry a single warhead, although under START all will be counted as carrying ten. **Under START, the number of warheads on the SS-N-18 will be counted as three. †Numbers in parentheses refer to submarines. **ALCM**—air-launched cruise missile; **AS**—air-to-surface missile; **ICBM**—intercontinental ballistic missile, range greater than 5,500 kilometers; **MIRV**—multiple-independently targetable reentry vehicles; **SLBM**—submarine-launched ballistic missile; **SRAM**—short-range attack missile; **SSBN**—nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 49, no. 2, March 1993, p. 49.*

ANNEXURE - IX (A)

U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, END OF 1992

As a result of submarine and bomber retirements, and a new emphasis on conventional missions for the bomber force, the number of strategic weapons decreased slightly over the past year.

Minuteman II ICBMs were taken off alert in September 1991 and are no longer considered part of the operational U.S. strategic forces. By the end of the year, about 90 missiles had been removed from Ellsworth, Malmstrom, and Whiteman air force bases. All 450 will be removed from their silos by November 1995. The air force has not announced its plan to consolidate the remaining 500 Minuteman IIIs at three bases instead of the current four.

The last Poseidon C-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was removed from the U.S.S. *Tecumseh* at the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in August 1992. Poseidon deployment peaked in 1978 with 31 submarines carrying 496 missiles with close to 5,000 warheads. One Ohio-class submarine, the U.S.S. *Maryland*, joined the fleet during the year as the thirteenth (out of an eventual 18 of its class, and it is scheduled to go on its first patrol in 1993.

To supply the Atlantic based submarines with warheads, and to meet lower START Treaty limits, the navy plans to decommission (by January 1995) the 12 submarines carrying Trident I SLBMs. As of this printing, four submarines (the U.S.S. *James Madison*, the U.S.S. *Benjamin Franklin*, the U.S.S. *Henry Stimson*, and the U.S.S. *Francis Scott Key*) have been removed from service. The Trident I's W76 warheads will be used on the Trident IIs homeported at Kings Bay, Georgia, supplemented by 400 W88s (the number built before production was halted). When START II is implemented, the number of warheads per missile could be reduced to as few as four, to meet START II's 3,500 warhead limit.

Of the original 100 B-1B bombers, four have crashed (the most recent on December 1, 1992), and one is considered a test plane and not a part of the Strategic Command's operational inventory. All B-52G bombers ceased nuclear missions by the end of 1992 and have been removed from the table below. About 40 remain for conventional missions, but those will also be retired. The B-2 is scheduled for delivery in 1993. The advanced cruise missile (ACM) program has been cut to 460 missiles, with production scheduled to be completed by July 1993. The W80-1 warheads for the ACM are presumably coming from ALCM reserve stocks. The table below shows a reduced number of ALCMs to reflect the smaller bomber force and the conversion of a portion of the total to conventional versions (known as the ALCM-C), 35 of which were fired in the Gulf War.

Type	Name	Launchers/ SSBNs	Year deployed	Warheads x yield (megaton)	Total warheads	Total megatons*
ICBMs						
LGM-30G	Minuteman III:	500			1,500	404
	Mk-12	(200)	1970	3 W62 x .170 (MIRV)	(600)	(102)
	Mk-12A	(300)	1979	3 W78 x .335 (MIRV)	(900)	(302)
LGM-118A	MX/Peacekeeper	50	1986	10 W87 x .300 (MIRV)	500	150
Total		550			2,000	554
SLBMs						
UGM-96A	Trident I C-4	320/16	1979	8 W76 x .100 (MIRV)	2,560	256
UGM-133A	Trident II D-5	120/5	1992	8 W76 x .100 (MIRV)	560	56
UGM-133A	Trident II D-5		1990	8 W88 x .475 (MIRV)	400	190
Total		440/21			3,520	502
Bomber/weapons**						
B-1B	Lancer	95	1986	ALCM .05–.150	1,200	180
				B53/61/83 bombs	1,400	1,580
B-52H	Stratofortress	95	1961	ACM .05–.150	300	45
Total		190			2,900	1,805
GRAND TOTAL		1,180			8,420	~2,900

*Numbers may not add due to rounding. **Bomber numbers reflect total inventory. Bombers are loaded in a variety of ways depending on mission. B-1Bs do not carry ALCMs or ACMs. **ACM**—advanced cruise missile; **ALCM**—air-launched cruise missile; **ICBM**—intercontinental ballistic missile, range greater than 5,500 kilometers; **MIRV**—multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; **SLBM**—submarine-launched ballistic missile; **SRAM**—short-range attack missile; **SSBN**—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

Source : *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 49, no. 1, January/February 1993, p. 49.*

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