

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

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SAMBIT KUMAR PARIDA

DISARMAMENT STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI-110 067

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जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT.

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled, "CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES IN THE ASIA - PACIFIC REGION IN THE POST - COLD WAR PERIOD", submitted by Mr. Sambit Kumar Parida in partial fulfilment for the award of the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

PROF. M. ZUBERI
(Supervisor)

PROF. M. L. SONDHI
(Chairperson)

***** TO MY GRAND MOTHER

TO A SAFER WORLD FOR THIS AND FUTURE GENERATION.

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PREFACE

The post cold war world witnessed the emergence of the newly industrialised countries (South Korea, Hongkong, Singapore and Taiwan) and the subsequent shift in attention of the Super Powers towards these South-east Asian countries. The economic strength of these countries, growing up due to the free & 'entrepot' trade served as a major threat to the Super Power economic strength. Since the Europeans have understood the way they have been made pawns in the proxy war, this Asia-Pacific region became the play ground of Super Power military manoeuvres. The resulting militarization of the Asia-Pacific region made the concept of Confidence-Security Building Measures (CSBMs) more relevant here than in any other place.

The concept of CSBMs in the present day world politics prepares a strong counterforce to deal with the growing global militarization. CSBMs facilitate the scope of arms control and disarmament negotiations, pacific settlement of disputes in order to make the world a safer place to inhabit.

The purpose of the study of CSBMs, in the Asia-Pacific region after the post cold war, is to draw the attention of various scholars to the increasing economic strength and the geostrategic importance of this region and the subsequent militarization by the Great Powers and the role of CSBMs in minimising the resulting tension in this area. This work also studies the linkage between economic

strength and military power. In this context, studies have been made on account of the growing militarization of Peoples' Republic of China and a normally non-military country like Japan, who are regarded as economic giants.

The basic objective behind the study is to bring out an objective assesment of the compulsions behind and the constraints in the CSBMs process. It also seeks to make analytical assesment of the possible interlink, if any, between the varying threat perceptions of diferent countries in the Asia-Pacific region and its impact on the CSBMs.

The research work has been divided into the following chapters.

- Chapter 1 - Changing Global Trends and Their Impact on the Asia-Pacific Region- A Historical Review.
- Chapter 2 - Confidence and Security Building Measures: Their Aplicability outside the European Context.
- Chapter 3 - Intra State Confidence and Security Building Measures.
- Chapter 4 - Conclusion.

The first chapter deals with the conflicting Asia-Pacific region, because of its geopolitical importance, it has always been an arc of military conflict. This conflict ridden area, starting from the cold war has become a theatre of Super Power rivalry. However, with the disintegration of Soviet Union, there has been a marked improvement in the relationships between the different states,

which became evident in the upward swing of their bilateral relationship.

The second chapter deals with the CSBMs. The concept of CSBMs owes its origin to the Conference Security and Co-operation in Europe. However, with the proliferation of the nuclear arsenals and the emerging danger of the nuclear holocaust, the CSBMs process has become vital to avoid above circumstances.

The third chapter deals with the emerging bilateral relationship between the countries after the substantial withdrawal of Russian and US military forces in this region.

In the conclusion, the whole work has been summerised and the problems in the CSBMs process has been put forward. Certain suggestions which are essential in the realisation of the CSBMs process has been carefully noted down.

If we can dream of 'One European Home', then why not a 'Common Asia-Pacific House ?'

Methodology

Historic - analytical method is employed as principal tool of the research project. It takes a holistic approach, i.e. it has an analysis of the wider issues involved with an integral approach instead of examining various issues piecemeal. The research work has mainly depended upon secondary source materials apart from few

primary sources.

At the time of selecting the topic for research I did not have the confidence that I will be able to do justice to it. I am extremely thankful to Prof. M. Zuberi who created the confidence in me. He has been much more than a guide to me. He was like a father figure - loving, caring, sympathetic but at the same time stern and reprimanding when I played truant or failed to live upto his expectations. He is a task master and on many occasions I failed to come up to his expectations. However, he set aside several of his other commitments to go through my drafts and suggest improvements and modifications at very short notices. Working with Prof. Zuberi has been a rich and rewarding experience for me. Without for his ungrudging help and guidance I would not have been able to complete my dissertation today. I shall always remain obliged to him.

I owe a special debt to Tulika, Pinkoo Bhai, Santosh, Rajesh and Raja Bhai who acted as amanuensis during the final stages of writing my dissertation.

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I am also thankful to the staff of libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute of Defence Studies Analysis & American Centre who helped me in finding materials and assisted me in my research work.


Last but not the least, I am grateful to my

parents and my brother and sister for their inspiration and encouragement, without which this work would not have seen the light of the day.

I am also thankful to my typist Mr. Bhupendra Upadhyay who typed my dissertation error free and that to within a record time and I am also thankful to Sanjay Photostat for giving the final shape to my dissertation.

Lastly, there are bound to be many errors and shortcomings in the work for which I am alone responsible.


SAMBIT KUMAR PARIDA



The Asian-Pacific Region

Adapted from "The Nations of the Pacific," *Current History* 81, no. 474: 193.

CHAPTER - I

**"Changing Global Trends and Their Impact on the
Asia-Pacific Region" - A Historical Review.**

The Asia-Pacific area is one of the most heavily armed regions in the world, and regional peace and security are still marred by continuing political and military conflicts. The Pacific basin region, broadly includes countries bordering on the Pacific, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, the mini-states of the South Pacific, the Latin American states and the East Asian and the South-east Asian states. A sub-region in the Pacific basin is Asia-Pacific which mainly subsist with North-east, South-east Asia and Oceania.¹ The geo-strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region is based on two factors-location and economic potential. The Indonesian archipelago and Malaysia sit astride a series of relatively narrow straits, the control of which could monitor and to interdict ships moving between western Pacific and Indian oceans. And the most remarkable fact is that through the Malacca Straits pass twice the number of ships than Suez and Panama canals combined or about the world's 10% ocean-going cargo and by the beginning of the next century, the number of ships passing through Malacca Straits may go up to 1,10,000.

The Asia-Pacific Region (APR) is one of the most dynamic regions in the world. It is a conflict-ridden region both politically and militarily and continues to be in a geographic location where the interests of four major powers-the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan-intersect. The geographical distribution of the Islands

1. D. Banerjee, "Southeast Asian Security in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol, XII, No. 4, July 1989, pp. 366-389.

and their now extended maritime jurisdiction gives them a strategic value of considerable magnitude particularly since the nuclear arms race in this region is more and more forward-deployed and ocean-based. In making this point, Admiral William J. Crowe, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the Pacific as vital to the general health and stability of the West². It's also the site of the three major military conflicts in which the United States was involved-World War-II, Korean War (1950), Vietnam War(1960s).

The militarizations in the Asia-Pacific region is not the result of fate or human frailty but of oppressive relations in the social structure that gives a dominant few the power over the others. The number of military-dominated or military- controlled governments and military activities in the world particularly as in the Asia-Pacific region, has mushroomed to alarming proportions. In many instances, such governments in the third world continue to exist by virtue of political support from the industrialized nations and backed up by economic and military aid. The main pretext of militarizations is the achievement or maintenance of political stability, national security or other similar goals but whose real purpose is the maintenance of the regimes in power. The resources that fuel militarizations include not only domestic resources but international links among militarized regimes which exchange intelligence informations

2. J. M. Anthony, in, Asia-Militarization and Regional Conflicts, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., (New Jersey : The United Nations University, 1988), p. 59.

and aid, give shelter to foreign military bases and installations, trade in armaments and technology and conduct training, technical as well as strategic, in counter-insurgency, interrogations, torture, etc.

Military confrontations on the Asian continent and in the Indian and Pacific oceans rate below those on the European continent in respect to the numerical strength of opposing armed forces, the qualitative excellence and combat efficiency of the armaments, combat material involved, the mean area density, the ratio of nuclear weapons in the arsenals and the degree of probability of a direct armed conflict between the contending sides swiftly developing into a global nuclear war. For all that, the potential explosiveness of military confrontations in the Asia-Pacific region is much closer to flashpoint than in Europe. The relative explosive potential of APR region is determined by intensity of the local conflicts, by the military capabilities of the sides directly involved, and also by the degree of involvement and the clash of interests of nuclear powers. In the APR, the main zone of confrontation is of a multipolar character and has a specified T-shape configuration with different fighting forces massed in separate regions by opposing sides. Many of the nations are archipelagic states and essentially a gift of the sea. As such they remain sensitive to sea power at a time when the seas have become indivisible.³

3. Alexi Arbatov, in, Disarmament and Security Year Book, 1987, Yevgeny Parimakov, ed., (Moscow : Novosti Press, 1988), pp. 423-443.

Asia-Pacific is another part of the world which the United States has added to its list of areas vital to its strategic interests. Casper Weinberger, former U.S Defence Secretary, made the same point, five of the seven defence agreements to which the United State is signatory are located in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, a large volume of American commercial and military maritime traffic overseas is in the Pacific and proceeds beyond it into the Indian ocean and hence to the Middle East. With respect to the strategic situations, the larger Pacific region is littered with a wide range of American communications, military and nuclear facilities. These land based American facilities (located mostly on foreign soil) are supplemented, by significant naval buildup of surface and sub-surface nuclear weapons carrying ships and nuclear- powered vessels. The US naval arsenal is no longer deployed only as a part of her forward defensive posture. Under the Reagan administration, naval build-up was designed to defend the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) and to put maximum pressure on Soviet nuclear and other support facilities located on the North-west Pacific coast of the Russian main-land. Here at places like-Sovetskaya Gavan, Petropavlovsk, Vladdevostok, Belaya and Alexseyevka are some of the most sensitive military naval, communications and nuclear facilities. Hence what was once a forward defense posture has now become a forward offensive stance designed to keep constant pressure on these Soviet/Russian facilities which, by reason of their geographical location, possess special vulnerabilities of

supply and resupply and of naval forces having to pass through different 'Choke Points' monitored constantly by superior American and Japanese ASW forces.

For its part, the Soviet Union/Russia deploys a wide range of communications, military and naval, nuclear facilities at a number of her coastal cities, but principally at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. Soviet/Russia ground forces in this area are located along the Sino-Soviet/Russian border. These forces are now more and more preoccupied, according to a US Pacific Command (PACOM) briefing, with the growing Chinese nuclear capability. In Vietnam the Soviet Union established two major naval facilities, intelligence collection bases and rotational air fields,.....

Foreign military bases led to the militarization of both the host country and the country operating the bases. The pretext for such bases is mutual defence. This requires arms to be supplied to the host country and this, in turn, requires increased development and production of arms by the dominant country. As a result, the temptation is great to solve political, economic and social problems by military means rather than by democratic dialogue and consensus. In Japan, for example, military spending has increased greatly and the militarist mentality threatens to reemerge because of the pressure of the US government on Japanese governments to share the domination over Asia defence burden. In the Philippines there was a nationalist clamour in the early 1970s for the dismantling of the US military bases. To quell

these demands, martial law was imposed. After its imposition US military and economic aid to the Philippines was more than doubled. In the same way, the USSR, pumped a large amount of money and technological assistance to the communist block countries like North Korea and Vietnam. The US and France frequently use the Pacific area (Marshall Islands, Bulav's surrounding, Micronesia, Polynesia) for military purposes as well as for nuclear tests. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific regions like the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, etc., have signed pacts of mutual defence with the United States.

The fundamental point about all this is that the Pacific became the most militarized and nuclearized ocean in the world. The same process went on in Europe but with a significant difference. In Europe the military build-up was constrained by multilateral bargaining, co-operation and conflict. In addition, the military build-up on both sides was used framed as a means to facilitate arms control. There is not even the pretense of such an aim in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued unilateral objectives with as little regard for their allies as for their adversaries. These are some of the characteristics of the environment in which the arms race (the naval nuclear build-up in particular) in the Pacific has escalated.

The structure of military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific is a complicated problem. Mainland and Island states differ significantly in terms of economic development

and their involvement in the world and regional trade. A number of countries are separated from the Asian landmass by the Pacific ocean which provides basic lines of communications for them. There are also great differences in military strategic posture of Individual countries and their security perceptions diverge considerably.

With two-thirds of its landmass and the bulk of its mineral and energy resources in Asia, the USSR focusing increasingly on the security environment beyond its eastern borders. As Lenin pointed out geographically, economically and historically Russia belongs not only to Europe but also to Asia.⁴ The fact that the Soviet Union lacked a glacis of friendly and allied states along its Asian periphery contributed heavily to its sense of insecurity and vulnerability.

Logistical problems plague the Soviet/Russian military position in the East Asia-Pacific arena. Enormous distances separate the resource-rich but sparsely populated centers of European Russia. Soviet logistic vulnerabilities pertain on sea. Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, the two principal bases for the Soviet/Russian Pacific fleet, both suffer from highly unfavourable weather conditions. Vladivostok has no direct access to the open sea. Naval vessels based there must transit one of the three narrow choke points-the strait of Tsushima, Tsugaro or Soya - that

4. Robert C. Horn, in, Changing Pattern of Security and Stability in Asia, Sudarshan Chawla and A.R. Sardesai, eds., (New York : Praeger Publisher, 1980), p. 64.

provides ingress into and ingress from the sea of Japan. Soviet acquisition of a naval base in Vietnam and the construction of aircraft and helicopter carriers are helping to overcome these deficiencies. Unlike the 500,000 Soviet troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet frontier, troops equipped to wage a land war with China, the new deployment in Soviet Far East suggested acquisitions of a capability to take on US forces in the Pacific, neutralizing Japan in the process. A Soviet strategic bastion was developed north of Japan on the Sea of Okhotsh and the Kamchatka peninsula. The sea of Okhotsh, which was virtually encircled by Soviet territory, marked a natural strategic sanctuary and protective barrier for the USSR/Russian, Asian land mass. In addition, the Kremlin moved to transform the US-built naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, into the largest Soviet military installation outside the USSR. The USSR deployed on the Pacific coast naval aircraft capable of conducting anti-submarine operations mainly against strategic submarines. The functions of anti-submarine defence in coastal areas were to be performed by KA-25, KA-27, MI-14 helicopters and B-12 aircraft. The modernization of the Soviet Pacific fleet was started only in the 1970s and coincided with the deployment in the Far East of strategic nuclear-powered submarines (Yankee-and Delta Class). According to Jane's Defence Weekly (1987), the Pacific fleet had 70 nuclear-powered attack submarines, 237 surface combatants, 97 minesweepers,

51 landing craft and 525 aircraft and helicopters.⁵

Around 40 percent of all Soviet strategic submarines armed with various types of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) were deployed in the Pacific. Before the mid-seventies SLBM SS-N-6 with single warhead and range of about 2,000 km. fitted on the Yankee-class strategic submarines formed the core of the sea-based strategic forces deployed in the Pacific Ocean. The Soviets deployed in 1988-89 sea-launched cruise missile SS-N-21 as a retaliation against US deployment of Tomahawk (SLBM) in 1984. (According to US Naval Institution data, the Soviet Pacific fleet in the mid-1980s had two aircraft-carrying ships, 80 ships of main classes, 360 small ships and boats, 240 auxiliary ships and 500 naval aircraft. The air force deployed in the Far East, with 1,700 tactical aircrafts mainly of modern types (SU-24, MIG-23/27, MIG-31), had a direct responsibility to ensure the safety of strategic submarine bases and areas of their patrolling.⁶

Moscow used its military presence in South-east Asia for intimidation on other occasions as well. In 1980, for example, the aircraft carrier Minsk led a four-ship flotilla on a precedent-shattering cruise through the Gulf of Thailand. In February 1983, the Minsk, carrying vertical take-off Yak-36 fighter planes sailed virtually within sight of Singapore's water front business district.⁷

5. Marian Leighton, "Soviet Still Plays Dominoes in Asia", Wall Street Journal, op. ed. page, 14 October, 1983.

6. Jane's Defence Weekly (London), 27 June, 1987, p. 1383.

7. Glend. D. Camp, in, Asia and US Foreign Policy, James. C. Hsiung and Winberg Chai, eds., (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 84-85.

Moscow's chief concern was that closer military links between Japan, China and the United States would hasten the day when those potential threats would be transformed into actual ones. China, like Japan, seemed to be regarded by the USSR as a potential security threat. Moscow's concerns should be viewed against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which, in turn, evolved out of a long historical legacy.

Since the Soviet Union refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty in September 1951, peace did not officially exist between Japan and the Soviet/Russia. Soviet-Japan remained deadlocked because of the issue of the Kurile Islands, while the Soviets considered Kurile Islands strategically important for its national security, for the Japanese it was an issue which touched the core of the nation's sovereignty.

As far as Soviet relations with other Asia-Pacific nations were concerned, they were full of ups and downs but developed in a very linear process. With the opening of relations with Malaysia and Singapore in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had established formal diplomatic ties with all states of South-east Asia. Moscow-Manila ties were established during President Marcos' visit to the Soviet Union in May 1976. In the 1980s, the Soviets improved considerably its relations with the Southeast Asian States.

Since communist victory in Vietnam, in 1975, Moscow served as Hanoi's main supporter in every field. In late June 1978, Hanoi became a member of COMECON and in November Moscow

and Hanoi signed a 25 years 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation'. In the late seventies the Soviets constructed their biggest oversea naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. Relations remained cordial throughout the cold war period.

The Soviets no doubt, viewed the Korean issue as important but peripheral to the central concerns of Soviet relations with China and Japan. North Korea had a 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance' with the USSR dating from 1961. But Soviets could be hardly overjoyed at the gradual shift by pyongyang to a clearly pro-Chinese stance. In the 70s, Kim carefully kept his balance between the giant communist neighbours and Moscow maintained a cordial relationship with North Korea.

Australia and New Zealand have traditionally harboured vocal pro-Soviet minorities in communist and other leftist organisations. The Soviets evidently regarded New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy as the opening wedge in undermining of ANZUS pact. Soviet spokesman pressed for a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific, a topic on which they could draw support from a melange of nations that otherwise had little affinity with the USSR. The peace offensive occurred against a backdrop of growing Soviet military power in the Pacific.

US administrations acknowledged American dependence on countries in the Asia-Pacific region to help produce the combined economic-military diplomatic strength necessary to contain and deter the Soviets and their clients. US military assets in the region were being modernized in the late 80s at

a low level in comparison with Soviet modernisation. Thus more than before, the United States became dependent on its Asia-Pacific partners, to maintain security and balance of power in the region.

Japanese - American relationship since the end of World War II -- has evolved through the successive stages of occupation, tutelage, partnership and alliance. Edward Neilan rightly said that "American policy in Northeast Asia should be fundamentally based on a strong partnership with Japan and even-handed relations with even other nations in the region."⁸ The American - Japanese alliance remains the lynchpin as far as Washington's Asia - Pacific policy is concerned. Under constant US pressure, Japan continues to expand its, military presence in and around the Sea of Japan. However, the stumbling block in their relations is the huge trade imbalance. The extensive trade between the two countries was so unbalanced that the huge trade deficit with Japan, was a major part of the US overall unfavourable balance of trade. Americans are concerned about heavy Japanese investments in the United States and with the success of Japanese products in US markets. On the other hand, the two countries work closely in a number of international and regional economic organisations. Political relations are generally good but here too it is not difficult to find areas of divergence. Many Japanese feel that their country is still too heavily dominated by the United States.

8. Edwar Neilan, "American Policy and Northeast Asia", Policy Review (Washington), No. 6, Fall 1978, p. 105.

There is a growing evidence that Japan is working for a more independent position in international affairs. The most controversial irritant between America and Japan has been Japan's very low level of defence spending compared to its enormous GNP. Under Presidents Ford and Carter, defence spending was pushed and after that it remained constant in comparison to the increase of GNP. Dealing with the economic and security aspects of the relationship between Japan and the United States has not been easy for either Washington or Tokyo. However the US links with Japan is crucial to US security interest, in East Asia.⁹ China remained an object (as opposed to being a participant) in international politics and in US foreign policy until World War II. The communists take over in China upset the original US designs. The integration of Taiwan into America's interlocking web of mutual security pacts, created hurdles in US-Chinese reapproachment. The fundamental change in the US approach to the People's Republic of China in 1970s eventually led to the establishment of full diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. The change was initiated with Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Peking in July 1971 and President Nixon's visit in the following February. However, Sino-US relations were at a low ebb until the early 1980s. However, in November 1983, new guidelines on technological transfer allowed the Chinese access to computers, scientific instruments and so on. Reagan

9. Norman D. Palmer, in, Changing Pattern of Security and Stability in Asia, Sudershan Chawla and A.R. Sardesai, eds., (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 131.

trip to the PRC in April 1984 a nuclear cooperation accord. In due course of time China was given the most favoured nation (MFN) status. However, because of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and due to pressure from Congress, President Bush was forced to cancel the MFN Status. Communist China and the United States are far apart in many basic respects and they have many difference in outlook and objectives. But they also have many mutual interest. Presumably the mutual interests include an interest in the preservation of peace in East Asia based on the equilibrium existing there, and in the containment of expanding Soviet power and influence.

Korea existed as a homogenous and united political entity for over a thousand of years. However, during the heyday of international Social Darwinism and imperialist power play, Korea was inevitably transformed into a vortex of great power rivalries. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was established on August 15, 1948 and, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 9, 1948. The Korean war (1950) proved to be a blessing in disguise for US strategic planners because it legitimized fully the militarisation and globalization of US cold war geopolitics. South Korea was placed on US geo-political chess-board as an important pawn to be defended at any cost. The US has maintained a large contingent of its armed forces in South Korea since the Korean War. US military presence has since been justified and legitimized in the name of preserving peace and stability, that is, maintaining the status quo of a divided Korea. The

supremacy of geopolitical values in US-Korean policy has yielded a deceptive appearance of peace in the Korean peninsula.

Stresses and strains in US-Philippine relations have developed for some time, especially since President Marcos came to power in December 1965. The naval base at Subic Bay and the air base at Clark airfield became the main fulcrums of American strategic and tactical power in the entire region of the Southwestern Pacific and Indian Oceans.¹⁰ The importance of Australia and New Zealand to US's Asia-Pacific policies derives from shared democratic traditions, common ancestral roots, and the critical geopolitical positions of the above two nations in the South Pacific. Protected by the US nuclear guarantee, Australia and New Zealand, in turn, have permitted the United States access to important facilities, airfields and ports. The ANZUS treaty was signed in 1951. The New Zealand labour government's policy of banning US nuclear armed and powered vessels in its territorial water is a serious setback to the ANZUS treaty. The US has closer military and economic relations with Australia than New Zealand. It has a satellite reconnaissance center in Australia. New Zealand's anti-ANZUS and anti-nuclear stand is likely that the United States and Australia will insist on reducing security cooperation with the government of New Zealand. However both, Australia and New Zealand remain the central piece of Washington's South

10. Savita Datt, "A Just New World Order?", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 97-113.

Pacific strategy and for Asia - Pacific as a whole.

END OF THE COLD WAR :

At no time since the end of World War II has international change has been as rapid and momentous as that which has taken place over the past four years. As an American official put it towards the end of 1989, the prime reality of contemporary global politics is change in many areas and many dimensions.¹¹

The year 1989 is likely to be remembered as the year when the cold war ended. The pace of change has been dizzying, developments that seemed the stuff of fantasy have all come to pass in a bewildering and exhilarating series of political shockwaves. The implication is that there has been a fundamental shift in the nature of international politics.

Recent transformations in the global balance of power have generated extensive debate about how best to ensure international security beyond the Cold War. The London NATO summit in July 1990, a first step in this regard, conceded that it could no longer remain as an alliance directed against the USSR but must be engaged in the construction of a new security partnership with members of the defunct WARSAW pact.¹²

Although, massive changes in the strategic landscape

11. Christoph Blub, in, Year Book of Foreign Relation, 1991, Alex Pravda, ed., (London : I.B. Tauris and Colted Publications, 1991), p. 227.

12. Erandis Heisbourg, "The New Strategic Enviornment, Traditional Players and Emerging Regional Powers", Contemporary Southeast Asia (Singapore), Vol. 14, No. 1, June 1992, p. 2.

have occurred in the past, all of them were the direct result of wars, for example, the seven years of war in the mid-eighteenth century, the Napoleonic War and the two World Wars. The current and as yet essentially peaceful strategic revolution is far from having spent its course and shockwaves of events as powerful as the breakup of the former USSR will necessarily make themselves felt for many years to come.¹³

The implications of the rapidly changing global situations on the security of the Asia-Pacific region cannot readily be seen. However, the end of cold war has led to a reduction in conflicts and competitions in the region. Even though changes in the Asia-Pacific region are slower than in Europe, important changes are going in the whole region.

The US is likely to continue to reduce its military presence in the region because of the ending of cold war and its more limited financial capabilities. However, as a Pacific power and a maritime power, the US cannot but continue to have strong interests in the region as part of its continuing worldwide interests and strategy. The region is vitally important to US national interests, given its increasing economic and political dynamism, with a total two-way trans-Pacific trade exceeding \$300 billion annually, 50 percent more than its trans-Atlantic trade. Therefore, its role will remain one of regional balancer, honest broker and

13. Ernst - Otto Czempiel, "US-Japan Relations in a Post Cold War Context", Japan Review of International Affairs (Tokyo), Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1992, p. 301.

ultimately security guarantor with the same objectives as before, forward base strategy, overseas bases at a reduced level and bilateral security arrangement. As in the case of Europe, the US presence in the Asia-pacific region is still considered vital to the maintenance of regional peace and stability. In the changed global and regional environment of the 1990s, the US is indeed planning to reduce its force structure by 10 percent or 14,000 - 15,000 personnel, over the next three years, to be followed by a further reduction over the next 3-5 years.

American attitudes towards Japan are particularly complex, it seems, based, on a love and hate relationship. According to the former US Secretary of States James Baker, "security remains the basis of US-Japan relations", as he put it in a speech in Tokyo on November 11, 1991.¹⁴ By any measure, US relations with Japan are at the heart of American interests in Asia. Borrowing the words of Mike Mansfield, former Ambassador to Japan, Baker called the relation between US and Japan, as the most important bilateral association in the world. The bilateral trade imbalance between the US and Japan had dropped to about \$415 in 1990 from over \$565 in 1987 Japan's bilateral surplus with the United States was on the rise. US Congress threatened to reinstitute Super 301 sanctions and restricted automobile and auto parts imports and the Bush placed export promotion and jobs at the top of

14. Allan D. Romerg and Marshall M. Boutun, "The US and Asia in 1991", Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January 1992, p. 381.

his January 1992 agenda in Tokyo.¹⁵ There is also a widespread belief in the US that Washington has pulled its punches in economic negotiations over the years in order to protect the larger alliance relationship. Strong majorities in US see Japanese economic power as a major threat facing the United States in the world today. There is also increased tension in politico-security relations because Japan's involvement in and support of the Gulf War was considered inadequate. The Tokyo declaration on the US-Japan Global Partnership announced during Bush's visit to Tokyo in January 1992, committed both countries to forge a global partnership founded upon the 1960 treaty of mutual co-operation and security. The US is Japan's most important trading partner and absorbed 31.5% of its exports in 1990, while 22.3% of its imports over the same period stemmed from the United States. It is in the interest of Japan and of the region as a whole that the US maintains stable presence. This is because an isolationist US will be most disturbing for the region and for the world.

The security relationship between Washington and Seoul has been excellent, though ROK financial contributions to the upkeep of American forces do not remotely approach the amount provided by Japan, they are growing. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced a pause in US military drawdown after 1992 because of the American perception of a North Korean nuclear threat. US economic tension with South Korea

15. E. Samokeikin, in, The Soviet Union as an Asia-Pacific Power, Ramesh Thakur and Charlyle A. Thayer (Victoria : Western Press, 1987), p. 17.

over the contributions to the stationed military forces eased while President Roh Tae Woo visited Washington in October 1989, where he diplomatically announced that South Korea would increase its contribution for troops stationed on the South Korean soil.

The tone of the US-PRC relations became more confrontational after the end of the cold war. Americans abhor China's human right abuses. The US is concerned about the PRC's growing trade surplus and an increasing sense that China is pursuing illegal or unfair economic practices. China's abstention on the November 1990 UN resolutions authorising the use of force against Iraq seemed an unwelcome surprise to some in Washington, China's sale of ballistic missiles to Syria or help to Pakistan's, Iran's and Algeria's nuclear weapon programme created hurdles as far as bilateral relation between the US and China are concerned. Despite all these obstacles Washington still give Beijing the MFN status.

The US has a cordial realltion with Australia but relations with New Zealand are not so cordial. The US wants New Zealand to pull its weight and accept full ANZUS alliance responsibility. Despite an understandable and fully justified sense of national pride in countries throughout the region, there is still a call for American leadership. Only Washington commands the kind of diplomatic arsenal capable of pursuing a spoked wheel concept in the Pacific. Some kind of burden-sharing between the US and its friends and allies in

the region is necessary in order to maintain a sufficient US presence as a stabiliser in the region.

The May 1989 summit in Beijing, the first in 30 years, became the turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. In December 1988 China's foreign minister, Qian Qicun went to Moscow-the first such visit in 30 years. Edward Shevardnadze former Soviet foreign minister announced in February, 1989 during his Beijing visit, the decision to trim Soviet forces along the Sino Soviet frontier by some 2,50,000 troops. The improvement in Sino-Soviet relations had beneficial impact on the regional security environment.

With the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union, bankrupt Russia is now facing major problems in the Asia Pacific region. Russia is now interested to maintain closer bilateral relation with economic giants in the region.

The dismantling of the Iron curtain in Europe and reduced tension between US and Soviet/Russia, has brought a sea change in the national objectives of the states in APR.

In addition to their security implications, recent changes in the global environment also have political and economic implications for the region. The political implications of the dramatic development in Eastern Europe can be seen in the greater awareness globally of the concept of freedom, democracy, political pluralism, the role of law and human rights. These influences are immediately felt by the Socialist countries in the region namely, China, Vietnam and North Korea. In fact, popular movement in South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan began much earlier than in Eastern

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Europe. A cursory examination of the developments in these countries suggests that change is more rapid when a country faces grave economic difficulties.

The implication of global economic changes have made the economic element of national power increasing significance, since the Pacific rim has become an economic powerhouse. Japan's rapid rise to the rank of economic super power, the amazingly high growth rates of the "four tigers"- South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore - and rapid growth of all the ASEAN countries except the Philippines, far outstrip growth rates anywhere-else. The US intends to get directly involved in the region's economic dynamism through bilateral and multilateral approaches, such as the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation). China is now actively pursuing its industrialisation. It will also try its best to maintain open economic relations with the world. These developments should help transform the PRC from a revolutionary into a conventional power. There is a concern that China's industrialisation process could destabilise the region, especially if China is politically isolated. Thus, it should be in the interest of the world not to isolate China. China's economic relations with ASEAN contain strong elements of competition. However, in the interest of the region especially, China should be included in regional Co-operation schemes, such as APEC and PECC (Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference) process.

Bilateral and multilateral ties have assumed

greater importance. This economic upswing has resulted in greater trade between Asia-Pacific countries. In addition, the region continues to witness economic and trade friction between the two major regional economies, the US and Japan, which is a destabilising factor.

There is also a clear sign of multi-polarity as far as military scenario is concerned. In the era of uncertainty, developing Asia-Pacific countries have started flexing their military muscles. China, for example, is likely to be occupied with its own development and modernization efforts. As yet, Japan is politically not ready to increase its military capabilities substantially. However, its phenomenal economic power and recent decision to participate in the UN Peace Keeping operations, is likely to encounter much opposition from its neighbours because of trauma of the colonial period, Singapore's decision to allow the building of US installations caused concern among neighbouring countries about Singapore's future strategy.

In spite of the problem in unifications, the process is inevitable in the future. A United Korea eventually comparable in territory, populations and economic development to United Germany would be a new and important factor in regional balance of power. It will not be easy to establish satisfactory modus vivendi with Japan and China unless multilateral regional security structures have been built in the interval, which can help cushion the transitions and accommodate the new power, as has been the case of Germany in the European and Atlantic context.

The interaction between the US and Russia and their respective policies towards the region will have a great influence on the stability and security of the region. The Korean peninsula and the South China sea are the two potential flash points. Changes in generational leaderships will exacerbate political uncertainties. Political volatility and turbulence will characterise some countries, the China, some other countries as well with the military modernizations and possibilities of a future regional war, the CSBM process is perhaps the only way to maintain regional stability and peace. The end of Soviet presence in Cam Ranh, the reversion of Clark base and Subic Bay to the Philippines and conflicting claims by different states in the South-China sea islands, how to accomodate the Indochinese states moves from war to peace and inevitably from communism to capitalism and so on are concrete manifestation of problems. Hence a balanced presence of all powers in the region can be attained through the establishment of political and security dialogue. And one can see the process which has already started in APR in the form of ASEAN, APEC< PECC and so on. However, inspite of all that, CSBMs process is pivotal to make the above process more workable.

CHAPTER - II

**Confidence and Security Building Measures : Their
Applicability outside the European Context.**

Since the early 1970s, the concepts of confidence-building measures have increasingly attracted the attention of the international community. The general goal of such measures is to reduce or even eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, tensions and other factors contributing to the continuation of the international arms buildup. Another goal is to reinforce existing confidence between states. In this sense, confidence building is related to a wide spectrum of activities undertaken among states in political, military, economic, social and cultural fields.

Divergent opinions have been expressed concerning the specific nature of confidence-building measures. According to one view, they must incorporate largescale military and political agreements embracing both nuclear and conventional weapons, concerning for example, the prevention of nuclear war and non-first-use commitments. Another view holds that sustained, assessable actions are necessary and that declaration of policies cannot substitute for concrete measures. Varying views have also been held on the relative usefulness of precise definitions of confidence-building measures and on the value of transparency in the military sphere - such as the availability of reliable confirmations on military activities and expenditures. It is generally accepted that confidence-building measures should not be a substitute or a precondition for disarmament steps. Instead, such measures should facilitate and promote the process of

arms limitations and disarmament.¹

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of confidence-building measures are to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the development of confidence, better understanding and more stable relations between nations, thus creating and improving conditions for international co-operation. In other words, the goal of confidence-building measures is to reduce or, in some instances, even eliminate the causes for mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities. A second goal is to reinforce confidence where it already exists.

Confidence-building should facilitate the process of arms control and disarmament negotiations including verification, facilitate settlement of international disputes and conflicts and facilitate the strengthening of security of states. Measures pursuing these objectives will add to greater rationality and stability in international relations. In so doing, the nation states help to create a political and psychological climate in which the importance of the military element will be gradually diminished and finally eliminated. Thus, confidence-building measures will be conducive to reaching meaningful progress in the ongoing negotiations on the limitations and reductions of armaments and armed forces, ultimately aimed at general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Consequently, confidence-building measures are designed

1 Disarmament Fact Sheet 57, Confidence-building Measures (New York : UN Publications, n.d.), p. 1.

to reduce the element of fear and to achieve more accurate and more reliable reciprocal assessment of military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security.²

CHARACTERISTICS :-

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) should have those characteristics which are conducive to the objectives outlined above. The establishment of a basis for confidence and broadening of this basis can only be realised in a dynamic process of concrete measures taken step-by-step within the framework of appropriate policies and international commitments. Confidence-building is, by nature, a process in which previous measures form the basis for further measures which progressively and cumulatively consolidate and strengthen the building of confidence. States must, at each stage, be able to measure and assess the results achieved.

One of the main characteristics of CBMs must, therefore, be that they translate universally recognised principles, such as the renunciation of the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter, through the application of concrete, specific and verifiable measures. The effectiveness of measures to create confidence will increase more if they are adjusted to the specific perceptions of threat and requirements of a given situation. If a measure is unrelated or is only vaguely related to those elements of threat which are considered urgent, it will not only be of doubtful use, but it can discredit the

2. Disarmament Study Series 7, Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures (New York : UN Publications, 1982), pp. 6-7.

relevance and importance of the concept of CMBs and it may eventually even be used as an excuse for the lack of progress in the field of disarmament. Therefore, it should be stressed that CBMs, in order to be able to achieve their objectives, contribute to strengthening the security of states or to reduce those security problems which are of concern within the region concerned.

Obviously misconceptions and prejudices which may have developed over an extended period of time cannot be overcome by a single application of CBMs. The seriousness, credibility and reliability of a state's commitment to confidence-building can only be demonstrated by the continuous, regular and full implementation of such measures and policies. Rationality and stability in international relations as the main characteristic of the CBMs will be greatly enhanced by subjective factors which may account for misconceptions and are subject to sudden changes, are in the long run replaced by objective elements in other words, speculation is superseded by knowledge.

CBMs as a means of lessening tensions and strengthening international security and stability are particularly relevant and necessary among states having a large military build-up and following conflicting policies. Appropriate CBMs, such as adequate communication channels, including "hot lines" should be provided, especially in situations of crisis where they can be an important stabilizing factor and improve existing instruments of international crisis.

management.³

EVOLUTION

There is a long history behind measures designed to create, improve or increase confidence in international relations. There are many historical examples of symbolic gestures designed to prove peaceful intentions. CBMs were evolved in response to the consequence of the nuclear revolution. Avoidance of nuclear war between the two rival blocks was an absolute necessity. In the late 50s, there was a search for partial measures of arms control, which were designed to build the confidence indispensable to secure a lasting peace. However, it was not until 1963 that the first confidence building measure - the hot line agreement could be designed.

The formal concept of CBMs appeared only with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was intended to give CSCE a modest, not to say symbolic, degree of responsibility in the field of military security in Europe, a field which, as a result of American-Soviet arrangement made in 1972, was basically a matter of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) in Vienna.⁴

EUROPEAN SECURITY :-

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had drawn together the major political leaders from

3 Ibid., p. 13.

4 Victor - Yves Ghebali, Confidence-building Measures within the CSCE process, United Nation Research paper. No. 3, March 1989, p. 3.

eight socialist and twenty five capitalist countries of Europe and from the United States and Canada. The Vienna Congress of 1814-15, thus, appeared no more than a well addressed tea-party in comparison to the Helsinki Conference.⁵

The idea of CBMS was put forward by Belgium and Italy in 1973, on the occasion of the preparatory consultations, which were held to draw up the agenda for CSCE. The substantive provisions of the CBMS were the subject of difficult negotiations at the CSCE in Geneva in 1973-75, where three perspectives were articulated.

(i) The perspective of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries. It was based on the concept of openness of military activities in Europe and perceived CBMs essentially in political rather than in military terms.

(ii) The approach of the Warsaw Pact countries (other than Romania). These countries, in contrast, attached military significance essentially to the CBMS and objected to the goal of openness as a means of instituting a form of legal espionage.

(iii) The approach of the neutral and non-aligned countries - These countries considered CBMs from both, political and military view point. While endorsing the spirit of the Western initiative, they advocated other CBMs, in

⁵ R.K. Jain, Detente in Europe, Implications for Asia (New Delhi : Radiant Publishers, 1977), p. 1.

particular, the making of military budgeting public, the extension of these measures to the Mediterranean region as a whole, the imposition of constraints on military activities, the adoption of measures with a view to general disarmament under international control or the creation of an institutioned link between CSCE and MBFR, Romania broadly shared this approach.⁶

In the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975, the participating states declared that they would refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state as well as from any manifestations of force for the purpose of ensuring another participating state to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. In the context of security provisions, it drew attention to the need to reduce the degree of armed conflicts and of misunderstanding or miscalculations of military activities which could give rise to apprehensions, particularly in a situation where the participating states lacked clear and timely informations about the nature of such activities.

The CBMs adopted by the Helsinki Conference were --(a) notifications, 21 days in advance, of certain military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops, (b) invitation, on a voluntary basis, of observers to those manoeuvres, (c) voluntary notifications of small-scale exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops and (d) prior notifications of major

⁶ Victor - Yves Ghebali, op.cit., p. 3.

military movements. These measures were significant in that they set the first standard for CBMs.⁷

However, the basic principles written down in the Final Act, are not completely new. One can find them in the United Nations Charter and elsewhere. The Helsinki document is not a non-aggression treaty, although one of the ten principles deals with renunciation of the use or threat of force.

At the Belgrade follow-up meeting on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in 1977, all delegations acknowledged that no state had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Final Act concerning CBMs. The debate at this conference focused on the varying degrees to which states had chosen to complement the discretionary provisions contained in the documents. With regard to new CBMs several proposals were made which aimed at expanding the scope of the process.⁸

At its first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, the UN General Assembly endorsed the view that, in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it was necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among states. The Assembly believed that commitment to CBMs could significantly contribute to further progress towards disarmament.

A United Nation Study (Sales No E. 82. IX. 3, summarised in Fact Sheet No. 209, which was completed in

7. Fact sheet 57, op.cit., p. 3.

8. Study series 7, op.cit., p. 16.

1981) recognizes that CBMs of a military character are of primary importance but stresses that it is not sufficient to promote confidence by measures in the military field only. According to the study, the destabilisation caused by insufficient knowledge about opposing military forces is often aggravated by subjective misconceptions and a resulting lack of trust concerning the intentions of states. Consequently CBMs must be able to achieve a more accurate reciprocal assessment of apprehensions and the danger of conflict. The study states that regular personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision-making should be encouraged and promoted to achieve a better understanding of reciprocal concerns and to foster co-operations in the field of security-related communications. All measures enhancing communication and information assume a particularly important function at times of crisis.

Follow-up conferences to review progress in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act have been held in Belgrade (1977 to 78) and in Madrid (1980 to 1983). A third follow-up conference opened in Vienna in November 1987. The Stockholm Conference (January 1984-September 1986) was mandated to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in subsequently achieving lower levels of armaments in Europe. The mandate further stated that the Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) to be agreed upon would cover the whole of Europe as well as the

adjoining sea and air space. The Stockholm Document (19 September, 1986) has been characterized as extending to the military sphere the progress that had been achieved in the political field during the CSCE process. Like the Helsinki Final Act, the Stockholm Document is based on the principles of the non-use of force. The CSBMs agreed on by the Stockholm Conference pertain, among other things, to the modifications and observations of military activities as well as compliance and verification. The practical implementation of the Stockholm Documents began in early 1987. Since then, the military exercises by the CSCE states that are covered by the documents have been both notified and, in many instances, attended by observers from other participating states.⁹

The signing of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe (21 November 1990) proclaimed the end of the cold war and institutionalised the conference on security and co-operations in Europe (CSCE). After a year and a half of uncertainty and impotence, the CSCE now seems to be on the verge of political rebirth as a result of its fourth follow-up meeting and its third summit, held in Helsinki. The inclusion of peace-keeping in the political panoply of the Helsinki process is much more far-reaching, in the sense that it transforms it into a truly operational institution. The Helsinki Document's definition of peace-keeping operations in United Nations terms means, any dispatch of civilian and/or military personnel in whatever number and under whatever agreement (observer or monitoring missions and troop

9. Fact sheet 57, op.cit., p. 9.

deployment missions), with a view to supervising or ensuring the observance of a cease-fire, monitoring troops withdrawal, helping maintaining public order, providing humanitarian and medical assistance and aiding refugees. The salient fact to be underscored is that such operations can come into play following intra-state as well as inter-state conflicts occurring in the CSCE geopolitical area. Any CSCE state will have the right to take part in peace-keeping operations so long as its participation is not rejected by one of the parties concerned. The cost of the operations will be apportioned among all CSCE states according to the regular scale of assessments.¹⁰

The basic decision taken is the one to establish a forum of security cooperation in Vienna, beginning on 22 September 1992. Open to all CSCE states without distinction, the forum will under a programme for immediate actions, exercise three functions ; ongoing dialogue, reflections on the theme of conflict prevention, and negotiations.¹¹

"Security is not gained by erecting fences, security is gained by opening gates", Finland's President Urho Kekkonen said, at the first CSCE foreign ministerial meeting at Helsinki in June 1992. In Helsinki again, 20 years later and after the disappearance of the old barriers, the CSCE enters its more operational phase. As it did in its first phase, the CSCE , will play a unique and critical role in building a

10. Victor - Yves Ghebali, "Post- '92 Helsinki, Towards an Operational Institutions for Comprehensive Security", Disarmament, Vol. xv, No. 4, 1992, pp. 1-13.

11. Ibid.

durable peace and a just and equitable order in the new Europe.¹²

CBMs : Their Applicability Outside Europe

Maritime domain-

Eighty - five years ago, 'Jane's Fighting Ships' listed 44 navies of various shapes and sizes, now-a-days it lists over 150 navies and coast guards. This is essentially due to the sheer proliferations of sovereign states. The increased responsibilities that the evolution of the law of the sea places upon littoral states for the management of large areas of sea, ocean floor and continental shelf have also contributed to this growth.

CBMs at sea, whether maritime (MCBMS) or naval (NCBMS), should be viewed against the perspective of initiating naval arms control in general. The evolving international situation provides new evidence that the focus of arms control may, in the foreseeable future, be turned to naval forces and naval activities. There are certain objectives of Naval confidence - building measures (NCBMs) which have to be taken into account. Lowering the risks of naval incidents, ensuring safe access, safety of international lines of security communications, improving understanding of security concerns, increased openness and predictability, are some of these measures.¹³

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12. Pertti Torstila, "The Helsinki Process : A Success Story and New Challenges", Disarmament, Vol. XV, No.4, 1992, p.37.
13. Radosav Deyanov, "Confidence-building Measures in the Maritime Domain, the Role and Security Objectives of Confidence-building Measures at Sea", Disarmament, Vol. XIII, No. 4, 1990, pp. 77-94.

African Continent

The improvement of relations between the United States and the USSR/Russia has resulted in their mutual efforts towards finding political solution to regional conflicts in the world. However, there are many hurdles regarding CBMs such as tribal warfare, constant intra -state rivalries, and above all the South African racism which is the root cause of instability and conflict in the region. Taking note of the fact that some positive changes have taken place in South Africa, regional relations should be restructured.¹⁴

The confidence - building process has been developing in the framework of the Organisation of African States (OAU) as well as among the individual African States. It was already the underlying concept of the Lusaka Manifesto agreed upon in April 1964 by fourteen African States, that the problem of the continent can only be solved on the basis of mutual trust and confidence. To enlarge this basis, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was founded within the framework of OAU. The aim of enhancing stability and building confidence is presently being pursued within the framework of cooperation among several African states. Confidence- building activities have played a prominent part in rapproachment among several countries in Africa, for example, Zaire and Angola (1978).

¹⁴ Abbu Kianna, "The Relevance, of Confidence and Security Building Measures for Africa", Disarmament, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1991, pp. 99-100.

Latin America

A good part of the nineteenth century witnessed a very substantive political disintegration and a number of conflicts, mainly of a territorial character, throughout the region. With the conclusion of the second World War and the beginning of the cold war, Latin America countries were encompassed in the world-wide security situation established by the super-powers. The Intra-America Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) of 1947 formalised the adherence to the strategic system of world confrontations.

Latin America is not alien to arms control and disarmament. The Treaty of Tlateloco of 1967 was a pioneer in establishing a Nuclear-Free Zone in a populated area of the world. Also the Ayacucho Declarations of 1974 was followed by formal negotiations among the Andean countries to limit their armaments. More recently, the conflict situations in central America called for the confidence-building and disarmament measures that were eventually agreed upon in the Contadora Act and the Esquipulus agreements.

There have also been a number of political declarations which underline an increasing openness in the area of security concerns. Among the Acapulco and Galapagos declarations. In the former, the idea of common regional security was presented at the heads of state level of the mechanism of political consultations and concerted political Action (Rio Group), together with the call for increased co-operations against drug-trafficking and terrorism. In the

latter, possible orientations for CBMs and joint border commissions were set out by the Presidents, of the Andean Groups of the countries.¹⁵

The ongoing implementation of the integration process in Latin America is by its very nature capable of furthering the confidence - building process. The River Plate Basin Treaty was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in April 1969. Its aim is to develop, through infrastructural projects, the natural resources located in that vast region. There is the Treaty of Amazon co-operation concluded by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela in 1978. The contracting states agreed upon a series of concrete measures aimed at economic, scientific technological and ecological co-operation in the Amazon river basin. These steps also aim at the building of confidence. They reflect the decision of the contracting parties to co-operate and to consult on the development of the region.¹⁶

At the United Nations

In 1982, the General assembly requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of CBMs and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level. The commission began to study the question in 1983 and in 1988, it agreed on a consensus text.

15. Hugo Palma, "The Nature of Confidence-building in the Latin American Environment", Disarmament, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1991, pp. 104-113.

16. Ibid., p. 109.

In the commission's view, effective measures which directly limit or reduce military potential have particularly high confidence - building value and among these measures, those relating to nuclear disarmament are especially conducive to confidence - building. The Commission believed that confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character. A plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between states and to replace them by confidence. Among the principles relevant to CBMs, strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and fulfilment of the commitments contained in the 1978 Final Document are emphasised. The Commission pointed out that an important task of CBMs is to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities, to help to prevent military confrontation as well as covert preparations for the commencement of a war, and to reduce the risk of surprise attack and of the outbreak of a war by accident.

The Commission stressed that CBMs require consensus among the states participating in the process, which is considered to be a step-by-step process. At each of its stages, states must be able to measure and assess the results achieved. Verification of compliance with agreed provisions should be a continuing process. The exchange or provision of relevant information on armed forces and armaments as well as on pertinent military activities plays an important role. As a detailed universal model is considered impractical, CBMs

must be tailored to specific situations.¹⁷

Brazil and Argentina

It's clear, even from a superficial review of the history of the relations between Argentina and Brazil, that except in certain periods, they were never very cordial and that, on the contrary, they were frequently characterised by rivalry and distrust. Each saw the other as a competitor in "Leadership" of Latin America. This relationship lasted for a century and a half, from the time the two nations began to exist independently early in the nineteenth century.

However, by 1980s the situation had changed. Factors that called for cooperation rather than separation were becoming stronger and the obstacles of many years appeared less and less sound. The factors of reapproachment were becoming evident in various fields, starting from peaceful uses of nuclear energy (signed on 17 May 1980) to the Argentine-Brazilian integrations Act (signed on 31 July 1986). Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay drew up on 26 March 1991, a treaty for the constitution of a common market for South (MERCOSUR) to be established by 31 December 1994. Obviously, although no two situations in the world are the same and the similarities are not always notable, it has often been stressed that the activities carried out by Argentina and Brazil may very well set an example for other cases, not as a model to be copied - which is often neither good nor productive - but rather as a guide for efforts

17. Factsheet 57, op.cit., p. 12.

directed towards the same purpose.¹⁸

Asia - Pacific Region (APR)

In vast areas such as APR, regional confidence - building, security and disarmament issues cannot exist in isolation. On the contrary, they are closely linked to and influenced by, what is happening globally or in other areas. It is still necessary to contend with such things as the strong bullying the weak and the great harassing the small. One level of concern in South-east Asia has been the linkage with the great powers or their penetration into the security problem of the region. In the earlier bipolar world, the super power competition at the global level was projected onto the region. Whether it was the Vietnam War or the Cambodian conflict, South-east Asia provided the arena for great power conflict and competition.

In recent years, the most fundamental changes since the Second World War have been occurring in the international arena, with the old world order breaking up and the new not yet taking definite form. Characterised by a reduction in the East -West military confrontation and by the promising prospect of the achievement of political solutions to some regional conflicts, the overall international atmosphere today has improved considerably.

Diplomatically, there have been improvements in relations between the great powers and the regional states

18. Julio. C. Carasales, "Argentina and Brazil : Nuclear Non-Acquisition and Confidence-building", Disarmament, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1992, pp. 91-101.

across old adversarial boundaries. Most dramatic has been China's normalization of relations with Indonesia resulting in China having diplomatic relations with all member state of the Association of the South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN). China's relations with Laos have also been on the upswing.

Despite the waning of bipolarity, it is expected that South-east Asia will see a greater number of actors in the region, with uncertain security implications. Of the utmost concern for the South-east Asian countries is China, whose land and sea frontiers touch the region. China is without doubt a part of the South - east Asian security complex by reason of its close involvement in the Cambodian Conflict. With its evident readiness to enforce its claim by force and its formidable military capabilities in local offensive operations, as in the case of the Spratly, as a result of its navy's growing blue-water capability, China looms large in the threat perceptions of the countries of this region. While it can be expected that China will be militarily more assertive, she could be constrained in the short and the medium term by preoccupations with domestic problems and concern with improving political and economic relations, including those with ASEAN Countries.

Another major actor of note in South-east Asia is Japan, whose predominance in the economic realm is accompanied by a great readiness to play a political role commensurate with its economic status. However the possibility that Japan may play a military role is proving to

be of concern to most countries of the region. The major concern is not so much Japan's growing military capability but the possibility that Japan might take an independent military role outside the United States-Japanese security arrangement. This concern arises from growing tensions in United States-Japanese relations and widening debate in Japan regarding the validity of the United States-Japanese security pact.

The Asia-Pacific security issues are intra-regional, although external actors are also involved directly or indirectly in a number of issues. The most prominent has to do with disputes over boundaries, both land and sea, which have resulted in armed confrontations and conflicts. Most extensive disputes have to do with maritime boundaries. However, the dispute that has the greatest potential for armed conflict revolves around the conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands, which include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, all of which occupied a number of Islands. Following the violent eruption of conflict between Chinese and Vietnamese troops in March 1988, the disputants appear more ready to protect their claim against future intrusions. For domestic reasons already mentioned, nations are more determined than ever to guard their off-shore resources, which include hydrocarbon, minerals and fisheries. While off-shore resources and the conflict that they entail may be most threatening to the region's security, other resource related issues with potential for conflict, namely the use of the Mekong river and the exploitation of

timber on mainland South-east Asia, should also be taken into consideration.¹⁹

A potential intra-regional conflict relating to economic issues could arise from the emerging economics interdependence between the more advanced economies and less developed economies in the region. Conflict could arise if there was an unacceptable inequality in the relationship.

Another security issue at the intra-regional level has to do with external support or intervention in armed rebellions in regional countries for ethnic, religious or ideological reasons. Much concern has been expressed about the growth in arms procurement in ASEAN countries as a sign of a possible arms race, entailing greater tension and instability in the region. It is to be noted that the present trend in arms build-up in South-east Asia is characterised by a shift from a doctrine of counterinsurgency to one of conventional warfare. South China sea threat perception is the main reason for naval and air capabilities.²⁰

When discussing security issues at the intra-regional level, the existing suspicions that nations hold with regard to one another, derived from historical experience, of the distant or the recent past, will continue to figure in relations among them and shape their security perspectives.

19. Kusuma Snitwongse, "South-east Asian Security Issues and Confidence-building Measures", Disarmament, Vol. XIV, No. 3, 1991, pp. 131-146.

20. Ibid., p. 136.

However ASEAN, ZOPFAN (Zone for Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) etc, act as a binding force in the time of mistrust, suspicion and covert war period. While in Asia-Pacific region CSCE- style conference may not be feasible owing to the existing diversity of conflicts, a subregional conference on security and co-operation confined to South-east Asia may well be feasible.

If confidence -building is defined in a broad sense to mean any measure that builds confidence, then ASEAN has, for a long time, been a confidence -building regime. The formation of ASEAN itself, came about with the common realization that confrontation and conflicts that existed among the countries in the region in the past were counter-productive and that security could best be guaranteed by the establishment of a regional order which promoted conflict avoidance and positive co-operation.

The Bangkok Declarations (1967) may have declared the Association's main aim to be the promotion of economic growth, social progress and cultural development but as Frank Frost notes in the introduction chapter of the ASEAN into the 1990s, he also hinted at the underlying political purpose. The year of 1976 was that of the Bali summit, and the associated declaration of the ASEAN concord marked an attempted turning point in the field of economic co-operations. The declaration identified the area in which co-operation would take place and types of mechanism which were meant to facilitate this co-operation, foremost among these

being the establishment of preferential trading arrangement (PTA) and the ASEAN industrial plants. The Manila Summit was the stated intention to put half of the intra-ASEAN trade under the existing PTA after five years, with limits being placed on the current PTA exclusion lists.²¹

The drawing-down of the two superpower's military presence from the region and expected diminution of their linkage in the regions security problems can be seen as contributing to the realizations of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The prospect of the United States moving out of South-east Asia led to the idea of ZOPFAN, which would replace protection from an external power by the management of a regional order by the states themselves. Underpinning ZOPFAN would be political stability and internal security or national resilience, which would in turn, bring about regional resilience by pre-empting external powers from intervening in domestic or regional affairs.

ASEAN initially hoped to encourage external powers to follow a policy of self-abnegation towards the regional goal articulated in 1971 via the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 calling for the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).

The concept of ZOPFAN, as laid down in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration and developed further in the ASEAN Concord and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the first ASEAN summit in 1976 in Bali contains the following elements : (1) the

21. Mark G. Rolls, "ASEAN, Where from or Where to ?", Contemporary Southeast Asia (Singapore), Vol. 13, No. 3, Dec. 1991, pp. 315-333.

strengthening of relations amongst the ASEAN countries so that disputes can be settled in a peaceful manner and co-operations in many fields can be promoted (ii) the development of relations with other South-east Asian countries (three Indo-Chinese states and Myanmar) on the basis of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and ultimately brought membership in ASEAN (iii) the structuring of relations between the ASEAN countries and the major powers on the basis of the latter's recognitions of South-east Asia's regional order in which there is no hegemony of any of the major powers. This recognition is to be attained not through an international treaty but as a result of ASEAN'S own national and regional resilience.²²

The present evolving security environment both at the greatpower level and at the intra-regional level, the latter with the prospect of resolution of the Cambodian conflict and improving relations between ASEAN and the Indo-Chinese countries, appears to fit into the scheme of ZOPFAN. However, as ZOPFAN lies in abeyance, an attempt has been made to put a South-east Asian Nuclear Weapon Free-zone (SEANWFZ) into operation. Nevertheless, the idea of SEANWF2 was first introduced as a stopgap measure for the suspended ZOPFAN.

ASEAN'S political and security relations with the major powers will not be developed on the basis of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperations (TAC) in South-east Asia, since it

22. Jusuf Wanandi, "Peace and Security in South-east Asia", The Indonesian Quarterly (Jakarta), Vol. XIV, No.4, Fourth Quarterly 1991, p. 318.

primarily stresses the principles of non-intervention. In TAC it is stipulated that signatories to the treaty will constantly endeavour to resolve bilateral and multilateral conflicts in the region peacefully, without resorting to arms. The idea of expanding the number of signatories to TAC beyond the region according to the protocol amending the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-east Asia (Dec. 15, 1987) proposed by Thailand, was politically, not legally, unacceptable to ASEAN'S foreign mininsters, particularly to Indonesian Foreign Minister.²³

But then, ASEAN leaders are aware that time has come to re-evaluate the concept of ZOPFAN. Efforts to further negotiate the concept and produce an acceptable formula of ZOPFAN has been delayed by the Vietnam and Cambodian conflicts and major power rivalries in the region. Further efforts will be made shortly to re-evaluate the concept.

Meanwhile, opinions on security among ASEAN member countries still differ considerably for George Yeo, Singapore's Minister of Information and the Arts as well as second Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs, the prospect of Asia for the next 20 years without United States forces fighting, reflecting the general state of mind of Singaporeans. Thailand also supports US presence in South-east Asia, specially as a guarantor of continued stability and economic prosperity. However, Prime Minister Anand

23. C.P.F. Luhulima, "ASEAN, the South Pacific Forum and The Changing Strategic Enviornment", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 2, Second Quarter 1991, pp. 211.

Panyarachum of Thailand prior to the Singapore summit, said that the ASEAN countries should take responsibility for their own security and design a new regional security order without external assistance. Indonesia, as a tireless champion of ZOPFAN, is expected to take the initiative to start negotiations on ZOPFAN broken off after hostilities started in the region.²⁴

The major decision taken by ASEAN was the establishment of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) as its main instrument. For products not covered by CEPT the older ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) or other earlier devised mechanisms will apply. The AFTA is ASEAN'S response to economic regionalism with protective tendencies, such as the Europe of 1992 and NAFTA. Earlier, Malaysia proposed an East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) with Japan as the nub. However, the proposal did not meet with the approval of all other ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia. At the 23rd ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the idea of EAEG was formally modified into East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) to avoid the impression of being confrontations vis-a-vis countries outside the grouping, particularly the United States which vehemently protested against being excluded.

The top-level evaluation of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) occurred at the 22nd SPF meeting in Palikir, Pohnpei, capital of federated states of Micronesia on July 29-30,

24. Ibid.

1991. It may be difficult for the Pacific Island nations to look beyond their horizon at the new global relationships. Nevertheless the region's changed security perceptions following the end of the cold war were also discussed. Economic prospects and trade dominated the foreign ministers discussions. The SPF plans to continue its big profile on environmental issues. However, during President Bush's meeting with the Pacific Islanders in Hawaii in late 1990 no pledge was given that Washington would ratify the SPF'S South Pacific nuclear-free zone treaty.²⁵

The European Union has formally popularised trading blocs. The United States and Canada as well as Mexico are establishing the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in almost all products. A number of similar agreements have been signed by various states in Latin America and the Caribbean. Australia and New Zealand are integrated in Australia -New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreements (ANZCERTA). The South Pacific Forum established the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperations Agreement (SPARTECA) at its 11th Summit in 1980. ASEAN continues to agree in establishing a free trade area in fifteen years starting from January 1, 1993.²⁶

There are two possible obstacles to the establishment of an ASEAN defence cooperation. Firstly, there is the absence of a common perception. It appears, however, that the perceptions have become more common now, following

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

the reduction of the Soviet fleet, withdrawal of Vietnam forces from Cambodia and the normalisation of Sino-Indonesian relations. Second, there are a number of old disputes amongst the various ASEAN countries themselves that have not been resolved. The need for a multilateral defence co-operation is greatly felt by ASEAN. There are a number of developments in the Asia-Pacific region that could force ASEAN to seriously consider to promote defence cooperations. Such cooperation will be defensive in nature. The ultimate objective of ASEAN defence cooperation is to develop ASEAN's capabilities to secure its sea lanes and air, including blocs in the South-east Asian sub-region.

In the last ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1990, the Philippines Secretary of State, Raul Manglapus, proposed that ASEAN should begin to discuss and examine the security problem of South-east Asia in th light of changes in the global and Asia-Pacific enviornment. The AMM agreed to have a dialogue on security among ASEAN members. In the ASEAN - PMC (Post Meeting Conference) following the July 1990 AMM, both Australia and Canada also suggested the need for a dialogue on security issue in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The Australian Foreign Minister Garets Evan proposed a dialogue among Asia-pacific countries, similiar to the CSCE which could be named CSCA (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Asia-Pacific). The Canadian Foreign Minister Jor Clark, suggested that the ASEAN 'PMC' be transformed into a forum to discuss regional security issues. Similarly, former

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed a repetition of the Helsinki process for the Asia-Pacific region to be launched at a Foreign Minister's meeting in 1993.²⁷

As the cold war alliances in the region undergo reassessment, indigenous Asia-Pacific powers are gaining more confidence in their ability to define and promote independence from foreign tutelage. The practice of consultations and consensus-building has reinforced the process of conflict avoidance. Co-operative efforts in political, economic, social and cultural fields also help build a sense of community. All these add up to confidence-building in a comprehensive sense.

27. Jusuf Wanandi, "Global Changes and its Impact on the Asia-Pacific region : An ASEAN View", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Third Quarter 1991, p. 1.

CHAPTER III

Intra-State Confidence - Security Building Measures

History teaches that no effective disarmament can be achieved unless basic political obstacles are removed that have made nations arm themselves first.

-Paul Johnson-

The cold war had consumed enormous economic resources and had terrible social consequences. Its history is a tragic record of missed chances and wasted opportunities. Most people tend to think about national security in terms of governmental efforts directed towards military deterrence and territorial defence. Recent developments like the collapse of communist rule in the former USSR and Eastern Europe, military and ideological detente between Washington, and Moscow, emergent regional trading blocks in western Europe and North America certainly call into question the validity of this traditional concept.

With the end of the East-West confrontation and the general expectation of a peace that will persist, there is a widespread hope of converting "Swords into ploughshares". The world economy today is characterised by two main developments, namely increased interdependence and globalisation of economic activities. There is also a greater reliance on market forces in the management of economies.

Like Europe, economic considerations will determine international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries of the region will have to interlink bilaterally, regionally and globally simultaneously. Already over 55 percent of the capitalist world's industrial production take place in Asia Pacific region. Its contribution to the annual growth of capitalist industrial production is even more remarkable -

about 60 percent. One of the striking phenomenon in the region which bears upon the dominance of economics is the emergence of economic growthcentres that transcends politics, ideology and economic system. One of the most interesting aspects of the 1990s in the Asia-pacific region is the relation between the growthcentres and the political entities i.e., nation states.

The decline of ideological concerns in domestic and, more importantly, foreign policy formulations, is an inevitable consequence of the end of the Cold War (it can also be seen as one of its causes). In practical terms, a new realism based on profitability rather than ideological affinities now determines economic transactions between states across the old cold war divide. Perhaps, the ultimate human desire is hunger for a perpetual peace for the mankind. The implications of the rapidly changing global situation on the security of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole can be understood better if we explore the various sub-regions.

North East Sea

The north east sea, rightly called the second theatre of the cold war (after Europe) has been a place of superpower rivalry and there is a sea change in the attitude of the different states in this area. Due to her unique geographical location in East Asia, Korea has experienced numerous battles that neither it initiated nor desired. The division of Korea was originally proposed by the US during

the World War II as a convenient device to accept the surrender of Japanese military forces. This military expediency of the Allied powers led to the military occupation of Korea by the two contending powers under separate commands. This in turn eventually resulted in a permanent division of Korea.

The conflict between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea can be regarded as a surrogate of all Korea's historical difficulties - the economic and social injustice that the Korean people suffered at the hands of their own traditional aristocracy and then of Japan, the trauma in addition to that, the modern industrialised society, with values and styles that are perceived as uncomfortable and foreign, the humiliation of foreign invasion and domination and the split between the communist and capitalist-liberal approaches to nation-building intensified by the consequences of the Korean War.¹

Ever since the *de facto* division, the two Korea have had serious confrontations. One of the most serious confrontation between them was obviously the Korean war during the period of 1950-53. The war left both halves of Korea devastated and at least 3 million soldiers and civilians dead, not to speak of millions more mutilated and disabled. It reinforced the enmity between the North and South Korean regimes. For example, constant attempts have been made by North Korea to sabotage South Korean political

1. Donald S. Macdonald, "The Korean Conundrum : Prospects for Detente and Arms Control", Disarmament (New York), Vol. XV, No.3, 1992, pp. 66-67.

and economic system. One of the most dramatic events occurred on January 21, 1968, a North Korean commando unit composed of 24 men came within a mile of the presidential mansion (Blue House) in Seoul with the mission of assassinating South Korean President Chage-Hee-Park. North Korea attempted to assassinate South Korean President Chun-Doo-Whan in Rangoon, Burma on July 9, 1983. North Korean agents also blew up a Korean Airlines, on November 30, 1987.²

Although political and military confrontation between the two Koreas continues, the last few years have seen significant growth in the dialogue, if not in mutual understanding between them. There are many reasons for the present favourable situation on the Korean peninsula. The two sides have reached an understanding and have made concessions in favour of their national interests and the leadership has made reasonable decisions. Moreover people on both sides are fed up with military confrontation and the leaders have come to realise that neither side can prevail over or engulf the other.³

War and peace are alternative phases of the relationship in which independent states interact with each other violently or peacefully.⁴ *Nordpolitik* has promoted

2. Yong. Soon Yim, "The Normalization of South and North Korean Relation for the Peace Settlement in Korean Peninsula : A olitical Perspective", Korea Observer(Seoul), Vol.XXII, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 150.

3. Tao Bingwei, "The Korea Peninsula, Evolving from Antagonism and Danger to Reconciliations and Security", Disarmament, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1992,p.83.

4. Sung-Hack King, "Crisis Management Under a Armistice Structure in the Korean Peninsula", Korea Jurnal (Seoul), Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter 1991, pp.14-25.

Pyongyang to begin to adjust to the rapidly changing world. The admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations on 17 Sept., 1991 marked a thaw in the local 'Cold War' between the two countries. In particular, the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to join the United Nations signified a major departure from its long-held position on the issue and could signal other possible changes in the directions of North Korea's foreign policy. It could provide an impetus for normalisation of relations and possibly reunification of South and North Korea in the long run.

In his annual New Year's address of 1990, President Roh-Tai-Woo of the Republic of Korea, then in the middle of his term of office, stated that the 1990s would be a decade of hope, suggesting a bright outlook for the security environment of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korean relations. Indeed, there have been a series of positive development on the Korean peninsula over the past two years.⁵

South Korea's security interests lie in building peace, prosperity and unification on the peninsula.⁶ More concretely, it's in both the Korea's interest to strengthen CBM on the peninsula, non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and work for regional stability and economic interdependence in Asia-

5. Dong-Wonlim, "Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul's Perspective", Disarmament, Vol. XV, No. 8, 1992, p.55.

6. Byung-Joo Ahn, "South Korea's International relation :Quest for Security, Prosperity and Unification", Asian Update(New York), September 1991, pp. 55-59.

Pacific region and peaceful unification of Korea. Seoul has vigorously pursued inter-Korean rapprochement and endeavoured to convert the present armistice into durable peace.

South Korean defence minister has estimated that in case of war, there would be casualties of two million, four hundred thousand within a week from the outbreak of war, five million within a month and 90% destruction of all property. This realisation has had an impact on defence build up in the two Koreas. For the first time, in 1990 the South Korean defence budget fell below 30% of the total budget (29.1%) and below 5% of the total GNP. North Korea also announced a reduction of troops by 100,000 in 1987. ⁷

The domestic conditions of both South and North Korea dictate the arms control measures. In the case of North Korea, arms control is necessary because of her pressing economic problems and diplomatic isolation. In the case of South Korea, as defense minister Lee-Sang-Hoon pointed out, the arms reductions are essential for an improvement in their relationship. ⁸

Both North Korea and South Korea proposed arms control measures to each other on numerous occasions. North Korea made sixty-four proposals and South Korea twenty-four by 1988 according to the Board of Unifications, Rok. However, most of them were put forward and proposed for propaganda purposes.

North Korea has proposed two sets of measures to reduce

7. Hang-Yul-Rhee, "The Necessity of Arms Control for the Stability of the Korean Peninsula", Korean Observer, Vol. XXII, No. 4, Winter 1991, p.476.

8. Ibid, p.478.

military tension in the Korean peninsula. The first concerns limiting the scope of military actions by suspending military maneuvers and hostile military activities. The second measure involves proposal concerning the reduction or withdrawal of combat forces and military installations from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). North Korea has shown greater interest in conflict-regulation through realignment of external security environment than in bilateral tension-reduction measures. South Korea has shown a much more, incremental and defensive posture towards conflict-regulation. It has attempted to prevent conflict by focusing primarily on tension-reduction measures. Perceiving the DMZ as the focal point of inter-Korean conflict, South Korea proposed to further demilitarize the DMZ through the creation of a "peace city" and selected military buffer areas. Generally, the South Korean arms control proposal are based on the assumption that the North Korea government harbours aggressive designs and hence can not be trusted. All efforts of the communists to appear being reasonable and peaceful are simply tactical maneuvers.⁹ Table 1 (see Appendix) indicates the proposals and counter proposals offered by the two regimes.

Since the regimes have different perceptions about each other's military strength and neither trust the other, there is no incentive to slow down the arms race. Objectively speaking, it can be said that they have achieved a military

9. Ibid, p.482.

balance. The Prime Ministers of both the Koreas met in September 1990 for the first time since the Korean War of 1950-53. However, no major breakthrough could be achieved because Seoul identified North Korea's nuclear weapon programme as the greatest threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as in North-East Asia. On July 30, 1991 the DPRK minister of foreign affairs proposed a joint declaration to make Korea a Nuclear-free zone. The Roh government is more interested in denuclearisation, i.e. withdrawal of American nuclear weapons and pledge not to use nuclear weapons against the North. President Roh made a historical announcement on Korean denuclearisation on 8th Nov., 1991, 100 days after North Korea's proposal on nuclear weapon-free zone and President Bush's announcement on withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons. The crux of the announcement is that South Korea will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purpose, will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons etc. President Roh's announcement demonstrates South Korea's sincerity in initiating CBMs with North Korea. A mutual agreement on Korean denuclearisation was announced on December 13, 1991.¹⁰ South Korean government unofficially indicated on December 18, 1992 that US nuclear weapons had been removed from its territory. Only after an official announcement of non-existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, the North Korean regime

10. Young Sun Song, "North Korea's Nuclear Issue and its Relationship with US and Japan", Korean Observer, Vol.XXIII, No.1, Spring 1992, pp.79-101.

declared on December 22, 1992 that it will conclude the safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

However, inspite of these declarations, North Korea is suspected of developing nuclear weapons as a counter-weight to the growing conventional capabilities of South Korea and as a diplomatic card to extract maximum concessions from Japan and the US . After Lenonard Spector and Jacqueline Smith at the Carnegie Endowment published in March 1991, an article in 'Arms Control Today' titled, "North Korea - the next nuclear nightmare" gave a new warning to the world. The North Korea had obtained a small (probably four megawatt) research reactor from the USSR in 1964, it then built a 30 megawatt facility on the model of 1950s-era British gas graphite reactor. In 1989 satellites picked up apparent evidence of another reactor of 50 to 200 megawatt rating. Independent Japanese sources have purchased satellite photos of Yongbyon and more or less agreed with the Bush administration's public assessment that a clandestine nuclear weapon programme is under way. North Korean physicists apparently have been in residence for decades at a nuclear research centre at Dubna, north of Moscow and in 1976, the Chinese published details of a tour by North Korean physicists of their Lopp Nor facilities.¹¹

According to western intelligence sources, nuclear facilities are in operation in the Yongbyon area located

11. Bruce Cumings, "Spring Thaw for Koreas, Cold War ?", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist(Chicago), Vol. 48, No. 3, April 1992, pp.14-24.

about 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang. It is also no secret that South Korea had tried to develop its own nuclear weapon capability. Based on an assumption that the possession of nuclear arms would enhance South Korea's security postures, the late President Park chug-lee launched plans in the mid 1970s to acquire a spent fuel reprocessing plant from France. Even in former President Chun Doo-Hwan's fifth republic, Seoul had reportedly shown interest in obtaining reprocessing technology.¹²

North Korea surprised the international community in 1992 by concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it signed in 1985. It also provided the IAEA with an initial declaration of its nuclear materials and installations. After visiting North Korea in May 1992, IAEA Director General Hans Blix said North Korea had declared a "tiny quantity" of plutonium, far from what you need for a bomb. Blix, however didn't divulge the precise amount declared on grounds of confidentiality. It is plausible to believe that economic pressure had led North Korea to be flexible in its nuclear policy.¹³

North Korea always co-relates its nuclear weapon programme with the presence of American nuclear weapons in Kunsan air-base in South Korea. Infact, Admiral Willian Crowe

12. Tong Whan Parr, "Issues of Arms Control between the Two Koreas", Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol. XXXII, No. 4, April 1992, pp.350-326.

13. Rajaram Panda, "Detente in Korean Peninsula", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. XV, No. 11, Feb. 1993, p. 1078.

agreed that "the actual presence of any nuclear weapon in South Korea is not necessary to maintain a nuclear umbrella," and also advocated that US nuclear weapons be removed as part of an overall settlement with North Korea.¹⁴ Pyongyang should realize that elimination of its nuclear programme will promote peace on the Korean peninsula and North-east Asia as a whole. North Korea announced on March 13, 1993 that it was withdrawing from the nuclear Non-Proliferations Treaty (NPT) as a "defensive measure" against the Joint US-South Korean Team spirit military exercise.¹⁵ Until recently, North Korea has always demanded the elimination of United Nations forces as a precondition for discussions of arms control and other tension-reduction proposals. Pyongyang's decision to pull out from the NPT followed weeks of acrimonious exchanges between the communist regime of Kim II Sung and the IAEA which demanded inspections of two North Korean facilities.¹⁶ In response to President Kim Young Sam banned South Korean businessmen from traveling to and investment in North Korea until the North opens its nuclear programme to inspections again. Economic exchanges, business travel and other economic co-operation discussed between the South and the North could be allowed when North Korea retract from its decision to withdraw from the NPT and resolves the nuclear inspections problems.¹⁷ The communist North, in response, virtually

14. Hag Yul Rhee, op.cit., p. 495.

15. The Times of India(New Delhi), 13 March 1993.

16. Ibid.

17. The Times of India, 15 March 1993.

suspended talks with South Korea on June 26 and said South Korea would be blamed for any problem caused by the deadlock. North Korean premier Kang Sung-San said, "if things conflicting with the interests of our nation occurred on the Korean peninsula in the future, South side would have to bear responsibility for them."¹⁸ Minister Han Sung-Joo, as quoted by the domestic Yonhap news agency concedes that the (Seoul) government will not make proposals to Pyongyang any more, as the North has put a halt to the dialogue between the two countries.¹⁹ But nobody knows what the two Kims (Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II) are thinking and their decisions could gravely influence, the course of events in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

In the international environment of the cold war, Japan was able to reconstruct and further develop its economy and is now the second largest economic power in the world, next only to the United States. The gulf crisis and the war forced Japan to consider what its role should be in the post cold war era. During the Gulf-war, Japan was strongly criticised by the United States and West European countries for not making contributions, beyond financial support, to the restoration of peace in the Gulf. Japan has so far rejected any international co-operation involving a military involvement because of provisions in its constitution. The Gulf war taught the Japanese a lesson that Japan should

18. The Times of India, 27 June 1993.

19. The Times of India, 28 June 1993.

prepare to participate in peace-keeping efforts of the international community, if requested to do so.²⁰

The post-second world war era in Japan is characterized by strong pacifism that has severely restricted Japan's role in the international community and strong concern about Japan's future as a military power has remained among its neighbouring countries. At the regional level, Japan should become actively involved diplomatically and politically, in the search for solutions to regional conflicts and tensions as Japan is currently doing in the case of Cambodia.²¹

Japan has a vital interest in the stability of Southeast Asia because it procures most of its essential raw materials from this region. In addition, the water-ways of South-east Asia are vital for Japan's international transport system. About 60 percent of Japan's oil imports and 40 percent of its foreign trade are conducted via the Lombok straits and the Straits of Malacca. Not surprisingly, Japanese leaders take considerable interest, from both an economic and geo-political point of view, in maintaining stability and security in South-east Asia.²²

Since 1945, Japan had little choice but to pursue a foreign policy, particularly in South-east Asia, within the

20. Shigekatsu Kondo, "Japan's Security Interests and Role in the Pacific Rim Cooperation", Report of the Conference on Pacific Rim Security Cooperation (Seoul : Seoul Computer Press), 1992, pp. 40-42.

21. Bangkok post (Bangkok), 30 April 1991.

22. Chaiwat Khamchoo, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asia Security", Pacific Affairs (Canada), Vol. 64, No. 1, Spring 1991, p. 7.

framework of US-Asian diplomacy. After agreeing to pay war reparations to the countries of South-east Asia for human and material devastation resulting from its aggression and occupation between 1940 and 1945, Japan gradually began vigorously to pursue economic diplomacy. By early seventies, Japan's postwar diplomacy towards South-east Asia, as elsewhere, had been labelled as trader's diplomacy or "a diplomacy of the economy, by the economy and for the economy".²³

In an attempt to clarify Japan's intentions and role in post-Vietnam war phase in South-east Asia, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo announced the so called "Fukuda Doctrine" in mid-August, 1977 in Manila during the last stop of his tour of ASEAN countries. The doctrine expressed that Japan would promote closer economic, social, political and cultural ties with ASEAN members. He further emphasised that there would be no change in basic Japanese diplomacy. "Japan has always favoured extending aid to the ASEAN and Indochinese groups when they have difficulties. We have just stated it clearly this time", he explained.²⁴ The 'Fukuda Doctrine' recognised that Japan's growing economic interests and investment in ASEAN countries in the post-cold war period have grown.

The conventional wisdom is that economic power eventually gets translated into political and military power. The eighties saw a continuous rise in Japan's defence

23. Yonosuke Nagai, "End of Trader's diplomacy", Japan Economic Journal", 3 March 1981, p. 20.

24. Chaiwat Khamchoo, op.cit., p. 9.

expenditure. The US has been prodding Japan to assume a greater political and security role, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. However, Prime Minister Kaifu said in an interview that Japan would not attempt to develop an offensive capability.²⁵ ASEAN has no objection to a strengthening of Japan's military capability as long as a stronger Japan would contribute directly to ASEAN security. Some ASEAN leaders believed that if smooth relations between ASEAN and Japan were established, Japan's enlarged security role would not pose a threat to them.

The only real barrier (apart from a possible international uproar) against Japan becoming major international power, is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution which forbids it from raising and maintaining armed forces. But this didnot prevent Japan from raising the so-called Self-Defence Forces (SDF), albeit under American pressure.²⁶

Japan's neighbours have always harboured fears about that country's ultimate strategic intentions and potential military capability. The PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) bill and Japan's plutonium stockpile cause concern about Japan's urge to become a military power. The Japanese government explains that the constitution prohibits Japan from using military force except for self-defense and therefore that the dispatch of Japanese self- defense forces (JSDF) to

25. The Nation(Japan), 20 March 1990.

26. The Hindustan Times(New Delhi), 23 June 1993.

support UN mission is constitutional, as this dispatch is limited to non-combat duties only.²⁷

If one adds a nuclear dimension to Japan's military potential, the picture becomes even more grim. Japan followed a dual-track policy in pursuit of its nuclear objectives. It entered into 10 years reprocessing contracts with Britain and France, the two nuclear weapon states which had considerable experience of reprocessing plutonium for weapons purpose and had made heavy investments in order to capture the civilian global nuclear market. Japan also embarked upon the development of a reprocessing capability of its own. The 4,800 ton Japanese ship Akatsuki Maru embarked on its controversial voyage from Yokahama on August 24, 1992, bound for Charbourg (France) to transport a ton of plutonium reprocessed from Japanese spent reactor fuel. This created a suspicion among neighbours.²⁸

"The depth and speed of change in the Asian region and in the world in recent years have been unprecedented", commented the Philippine President Mr. Fidel Ramos, "because of growing rapport between China and Japan highlighted by the visit of the Japanese emperor to China. One may hope that this will not result in diminishing the interest of Japan in the economic development of the rest of Asia".²⁹

The international environment is much more favourable

27. Sankei Shinboun (Tokyo), Morning Edition, 15 March 1990.

28. M. Zuberi, "The Voyage of Akatsuki Maru and the Hazards of Nuclear Shipment", The Indian Ocean News and Views (New Delhi), Vol.3, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 11-12.

29. The Times of India, 3 Nov. 1992.

than ever before for Japan and China to consolidate their bilateral relationship on the basis of their interests and needs. Japan and China signed a long-term trade agreement in February 1978 and there is a constant rise of trade between the two countries. In the first seven months of 1991, the figure had already reached 5 billion dollars. In December 1990, a new agreement was signed covering the period 1991-95. The Japanese energy market will remain crucial to China from the point of view of raising hard currency required by it for implementing its modernisation programme. China, under the new trade agreement (1991-95), is to supply 8.8 - 9.3 million tons of petroleum and 3.9 - 5.3 million ton of coal to Japan every year.³⁰

Japan, even after the Tiananmen square massacre, continued to remain China's second largest trading partner, after Hongkong. China receives substantial financial co-operation from Japan by way of official yen credits and inter-bank commercial loans. Japan has also exported reactor components to China.³¹

A group of eight Islands lying between Okinawa and Taiwan has been a source of political friction between China, Japan and Taiwan. The Japanese call it Senkaku and Chinese describe it as Diaoyu. The disputes first surfaced in 1978. In October 1990, a Japanese right wing group set up a

30. PAN Murthy, "Japan and China in the Ninties-The Bumpy Road to Consolidation of Ties", China Report (Beijing), Vol. 27. Nov. 4, October-December 1991, pp. 275-299.

31. Bangkok post, 20 July 1992.

lighthouse on one of the Islands and the Japanese government wished to treat it as a navigational guide post. A group of Taiwanese athletes attempted to reach the Islands to dismantle the structure and assert Taiwan's claim to the entire group of Islands. China claimed that the Islands were indisputably Chinese territory while the Japanese said they were theirs. The Japanese government decided in October 1990 that it would not for the time being extend official recognition to the lighthouse as a navigational guide post. It remains as a stumbling block in their future relationship.³²

China's nuclear posture has raised doubts in the minds of the Japanese officials. However, China's announcement, during the Japanese Premier's visit to that country in August 1991, that it is willing to join the NPT without any preconditions has no doubt reduced Japanese anxieties. In April 1991, when Japan sent a few mine sweepers to the Gulf the first country it briefed was China. The Chinese also hope that Japanese restraint on the human rights question will influence American thinking as well. In mid- 1990, Priminister Toshiki Kaifu sent a mission to Beijing to formally notify China of Japanese resumption of economic and political ties which were affected by of the June 1989 Tiananmen square incident. He was rewarded by Chinese agreeing to arrange his visit to China. Relations between China and Japan are on the upswing economically and there are

32. PAN Murthy, op.cit., p.280.

firm signals that there is not to be any change in the course set by the leaders in Beijing. What worries the Japanese to some extent are the military intentions of the Chinese and the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, in the absence of a clearly defined threat or an enemy.³³ For a start, Japanese Emperor's visit in November 1992, itself brilliantly illustrated that any real Sino-Japanese entente is still a long way off.

In early 1989, a Japan-ASEAN investment company was set up to allow Japanese firms to invest about seven billion yen (around \$14 billion) in small and medium size businesses in ASEAN countries. They welcome the cheaper source of funds. At the ASEAN heads of government summit in Manila in December 1987, Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita announced a US \$25 ASEAN-Japan development fund to encourage the development of the private sector in ASEAN countries.³⁴

The Japanese diplomacy towards North Korea has been more ambiguous and altogether less successful. In September 1990, a powerful and senior liberal democratic party official Shin Kanemaro visited North Korea and signed an agreement appologising for atrocities committed by Japan during colonial days. The Japanese government also removed sanctions against North Korea that had been in effect since the KAL bombing in 1987. North Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT has set back the diplomatic process. The Japanese Prime Minister Kichi

33. The Hindu (Madras), 3 July 1992.

34. New Strait Times (Kuala Lumpur), 2 May 1989.

Miyazawa urged Pyongyang to reconsider its decision and said Japan would not normalise relations with Pyongyang until the communist half of the Korea satisfactorily settled the IAEA inspection problem.³⁵

Bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo have made steady progress in the political, economic and social fields since the normalisations of relations in 1965. Japan is the largest market for Seoul's imports of capital goods and technology.

Japan has from the very beginning maintained cordial relation with Thailand, which hosts the third Largest Japanese embassy in the world. Thailand was the seventh largest recipient of Japanese Official Development Assistant (ODA) contributions in the period 1960-79 but it moved upto the second place in cumulative terms between 1979 and 1986. A Japanese nuclear power industry group is looking into the possibility of exporting a reactor to Thailand.³⁶

Despite the pacifist sentiments of the Japanese public, drastic changes in Japan's international environment might trigger a reorientation of Japan's security policy. However, Japan will continue to be preoccupied with the economic aspect of its South-east Asia policy. Japanese Emperor Akihito toured South-east Asia in late 1991 and reassured leaders of the sub-region that Japan would not convert its economic and technological prowess into military power while the Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu was also

35. The Times of India, 13 March 1993.

36. Bangkok Post(Bangkok), 20 July 1992.

issuing similar guarantees in Tokyo. Japan is by far the biggest foreign investor in Asia and Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, its investments are nearly four times those of the United States. Japan would want to concentrate on the Asia-Pacific region for both investments and trade.

As a major power in the Asia-Pacific region that possess nuclear weapons, China has a unique and important position in the regional efforts to promote political dialogue, CBMs as well as arms control and disarmament. China's economic relations with ASEAN contain strong elements of competition. As a large developing country and permanent member of UN Security Council, China could play a leadership role in the efforts to structure new and healthy economic relations between the industrialised and the developing countries.

China's military power has been growing rapidly in both relative and absolute terms. The article captioned "Awakening Dragon" by Ross H. Munro, coordinator of the Asia programme at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, says that China seems firmly embarked on a course of explosive economic growth and military assertiveness that will indeed reverberate throughout Asia and the world."³⁷ There are clear signs of favourable development as far as China and ASEAN countries are concerned. In spite of temporary interruption following the Tiananmen square violence, negotiations on a number of projects resumed and Taiwan

37. The Times of India, 12 Nov. 1992.

announced its continued intention to take part in the 1990 Asian games in Beijing.

The dilemma of People's Republic of China was perhaps most acute in its relations with Thailand as the closeness of Sino-Thai relations has been a product primarily of their coincidental strategic interest in restricting vietnamese regional power. When the emphasis in Bangkok's Indo-China policy shifted in August 1988 towards commercial relations, Bijing initially indicated disapproval. However Beijing, after Vice-foreign minister Lim Shnging's visit to Bangkok in September 1978, was apparently satisfied that Bangkok would not sacrifice its interests on the altar of commerce. Moreover, in the '90s Sino-Thai trade has expanded and Thai investment in China has increased. China has become the largest purchaser of Thai rice. Trade relations between China and Thailand go back to 1978, when both countries signed a trade pact and an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation. China is now the sixth-largest trading partner of Thailand. The two-way trade in 1990 was worth 1.372 billion dollars. The Thai-Chinese joint economic committee has set a trade target of between 1 billion dollars and 1.2 billion dollars. Chinese conventional arms sales to Thailand and expanding military co-operation with Bangkok are expanding steadily. In June 1991, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, Xuwin, met the Commander-in-Chief of Thailand to discuss bilateral military ties. Thai king Yang said during his visit to China from June 5 to 15,

1991 that the relationship between Thailand and China are deep-rooted, dating back to ancient times. In September 1991, Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun visited Beijing and stressed that Sino-Thai relations had no negative factors despite political and economic changes that had occurred in the region.³⁸ With the end of cold war China and Taiwan have stopped shelling each other and both Xiaman and Jinmen (Quemoy) former targets of each other's artillery across the narrow strip of water, have become popular tourist sites. The mainland's coastal shipping in the strait has resumed and Taiwan's fishing boats frequently call at mainland ports. Beijing adopted the policy of three exchanges (mail, trade and shipping services) and relaxation of tension finally made it possible for people on each sides to renew contact with family members and relatives. In May 1989, an official delegation headed by Taiwan's Minister of Finance even participated in an Asian Development Bank (ADB) meeting held in Beijing. According to statistics released by Hongkong's Census and Statistics department, the value of transit trade between the mainland and Taiwan increased more than 74 times. Despite the world-wide sanctions against China in the wake of the Tiananmen suppression, the value of transit trade across the strait in 1990 exceeded 4 billion dollars and in 1991 the trade reached 5.79 billion dollars - 43.2% above the previous year. On May 1, 1991 Taiwan terminated the 42 years old declaration of the period of suppression of the communist

38. Yong Deng, "Sino-Thai Relations from Strategic Co-Operations to Economy Diplomacy", Contemporary Southeast Asia (Singapore), Vol. 13, No. 4, March 1992, pp.360-375.

rebellion. President Yang Shangkun told reporters of the Taiwan-based 'China Times' on September 24, 1990 that the situation in the relationship between the two sides of the strait was much better compared with the situation of several years ago.³⁹

Military relations between China and Myanmar had increased in recent past. Myanmar is building a new naval base at Hanggyi island at the mouth of the Bassein river. According to the Jane's Defence weekly, there have been persistent, though unconfirmed reports, which suggest that China might be providing technical assistance in building the Hanggyi island facility.⁴⁰

The Cambodian conflict has been the focal point of international politics in South-east Asia since December 1978. The escalating conflict between the radical nationalist Khmer Rouge and the socialist Vietnam during the period 1975-78 became enmeshed in the concurrently escalating Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet conflicts culminating in the Vietnamese invasions of Cambodia in December 1978 and the punitive Chinese attack on Vietnam in February-March 1979.⁴¹

The agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflicts signed in Paris on October 1991

39. Qingguo Jia, "Changing Relations Across Taiwan Strait, Beijing's Perception", Asia survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, March 1992, pp.277-289.

40. Times of India, 16 Sept.1992.

41. Muthian Alagappa, "The Cambodian Conflict, Prospects of Negotiated Settlement", Disarmament, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1990, p.59.

allowed China to claim victory in Indochina and beginning of a new era in which China could develop cooperative relations with its Southern neighbours in the context of both peace in Cambodia and uncontested Chinese regional authority⁴² Although China consistently expressed full support for a peaceful agreement, throughout the negotiations it failed to make any significant compromise. Among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia adopted the most activist positions in the negotiations to end the conflict. In 1988, Indonesia arranged for representatives of Hanoi, Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge and other resistance forces including Prince Sihanouk, to meet for discussions during a Jakarta "Cocktail Party" - later dubbed the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM). Japan has also worked with ASEAN to help resolve the Cambodian conflict. Tokyo has made several proposals regarding a peaceful solution to the Cambodian conflict, all closely linked with ASEAN positions. During his visit to the ASEAN region in May 1989, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru stated that Japan stood ready to strengthen its co-operation with the ASEAN countries to settle the decade-long conflict. The Japanese hosted a meeting in Tokyo between Prince Sihanouk, leader of the anti-Vietnamese resistance and the Vietnamese-backed Premier Hun Sen in early June 1990 at the request of Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan.

Inspite of the peace accord in October 1991 and

42. Robert S. Ross, "China and Cambodian Peace Process, the Value of Coercive Diplomacy", Asian survey, Vol. XXXI, No. XII, Dec. 1991, pp.1170-1185.

proposed elections in 1993, the situation in Cambodia remained as gloomy as it was before the signing of the accord. While the United Nations sought ways to salvage a 13 month peace keeping operations and coax the Khmer Rouge into Line, Pol Pot's guerillas ruthlessly exterminated their enemies as before⁴³ The UN troops and police forces are not empowered to suppress the Khmer Rouge now that they seem determined to dishonour the peace agreement of October 1991.⁴⁴ And this revived the prospect of Cambodia plunging into another civil war. However, elections in May 1993 have put a temporary end to the Cambodian conflict. The Royalist FUNCINPEC party scored an upset win over Hun Sen's Cambodian Peoples' Party.⁴⁵ The Khmer Rouge boycotted the UN-organised elections, which, it said, were rigged in favour of the Vietnamese-installed government . Prince Norodom Ranaridah, leader of Cambodia's newly elected ruling party, stressed that the Khmer Rouge guerrilla group prepared to return from self-imposed exile and establish relations with the new government.⁴⁶ However if the Khmer Rouge escalates the current low-level of it's hostility, Cambodia may again immerse into another civil war which will engulf China, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and so on and seriously endanger the emerging trend of a peaceful and cordial relationship between these countries.

43. The Times of India, 5 Dec. 1992.

44. The Times of India, 24 Nov. 1992.

45. The Times of India, 2 July 1993.

46. The Times of India, 30 June 1993.

South East Asia

Vietnam and Cambodia have a long historical relationship. Migration is the most important factor in their interactions. There are thousands of Cambodians in Vietnam and likewise many ethnic Vietnamese live in Cambodia. The workforce in Cambodian plantations constitute mainly the Vietnamese. According to Norodom Sihanouk, the genesis of solidarity between Cambodia and Vietnamese people is in their common struggle against French colonial rule. The Vietnamese-Cambodian relations have proceeded through five distinct phases in their antiimperialist stage - First, between the foundation of ICP to the Geneva conference on Indo-China (1954); second, between the Geneva conference and the US engineered overthrow of Prince Sihanouk (1970); Third, between the overthrow of Sihanouk to the overthrow of Lon Nol-Sirik Matak puppet regimes (1975), Fourth, between the overthrow of the Puppet regimes (1975) to overthrow of Pol-Pot-Leg Sary Clique, Fifth, between the overthrow of Pol Pot (1979) to the beginning of negotiations on Cambodia (1987). In September 1989, Vietnam virtually made a total withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia. In spite of Vietnamese withdrawal, Cambodia remained a central pawn in Vietnam's foreign policy.⁴⁷

With the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia, a new wave of relationship has started gaining ground between

47. Pratul Lahiri, "Vietnam and China", World Focus (New Delhi), Vol. II, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 14-18.

Vietnam and China. Vietnam cannot prosper under a state of siege. Moreover, recognition of the vulnerability arising from dependence on the Soviet Union and East European countries at a time of rapid changes in East-West and Sino-Soviet relations should induce Vietnam to improve relations with China. Its overtures to China include deleting an "enmity" reference to China in the Vietnamese constitution, withdrawal of troops from Laos and Cambodia, reduction of forces along the Sino-Vietnamese border and praising the Chinese model of development. Hanoi was one of the very few countries to support Chinese crackdown on prodemocracy movement in June 1990. At the end of September 1990, an informal Sino-Vietnamese Summit was held in the South China city of Chengshe. This was followed by General Giap's visit to Beijing as a guest of honour at the Asiad. In November 1991, Chinese leaders welcomed Vietnamese Communist party general secretary Do Muoi and Chairman of the council ministers Vovnkit to Beijing. Chinese and Vietnamese leaders announced that they had normalised relations and signed trade and border agreements, thus renewing ties after 13 years of unmitigated conflicts. Chinese Premier Lipeng visited Vietnam in November 1992, becoming the first Chinese Premier to visit Vietnam in 21 years. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman emphasised that the common ground between the two, was far more than differences or disputes and stressed that "China stands for settlement of the territorial issue (Spratly Island) through consultations" and that "the Vietnamese sides

hold the same view".⁴⁸ However the crux of the problem in Sino-Vietnamese relations is how to subordinate and overcome short-term conflicting demands in the interest of long-term considerations that are beneficial to both countries. This relationship is likely to work itself gradually.

South Korea normalised its diplomatic relations with Vietnam after a gap of 17 years with the South Korean foreign minister Lee Sang Ocki's visit to that country.⁴⁹

With the end of East-West confrontation, communist Laos has started developing formal relations with South-east Asian countries building upon the 1989 normalisation of relations. China has ventured into closer commercial, aid, diplomatic and party relation with Laos. Indeed, over the last two years, more than half of all foreign investment in Laos has come from China.⁵⁰

Thai-Laos relations continued their up-beat swing - the high point being the unprecedented visit to Laos by Thai Princess Maha Chakri Siridhorn. The year 1990 saw the resumption of posting of Thai and Laos military attaches in each other's capital as well as separate visits by both the Thai Prime Minister and foreign minister.

Japan is one of the largest investors in Laos. Its aid cases a hydro-power scheme, sewage and rubbish disposal, rural-development and the dispatch of volunteer workers and training of Laos personnel in Japan. Stemming from a visit in

48. The Times of India, 27 Nov. 1992.

49. The Times of India, 20 Dec. 1992.

50. Geoffrey C. Gunn, "Laos in 1990, a Wind of Change", Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Jan. 1991, pp. 90-91.

August 1990 by Japanese foreign minister Taro Nakayama, debt relief and new economic assistance were also pledged.

By the early 1990s, Japan was the largest donor of bilateral and multilateral official development assistance to Myanmar. Japanese economic co-operations with Myanmar began following the signing of a peace treaty and war reparations agreement by Rangoon and Tokyo in 1954. Japan provided more than two-thirds of all bilateral ODA disbursement to Burma between 1973 and 1988. Japan has traditionally viewed Myanmar as a country with great economic potential and its strategic location at the juncture of South, Southeast and East Asia makes it an ideal location for the export of cheap manufactured goods to those region. The cash-hungry State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime in 1990 sold a large portion of its embassy land in Tokyo to a Japanese corporation. Japanese aid in the form of fertilizers and pesticides played a role in increasing rice harvest. It seems that Myanmar regarded Japan as the least of many foreign evils and less threatening than its huge neighbours - India and China, whose nationals-layed a dominant role in the colonial economy of Myanmar. Hence Japan, still remains as the greatest donor to the Myanmar economy.⁵¹

Indonesia and Australia have a long history of bilateral ties. In the changing environment, trade and investment became the guiding factor in their bilateral

51. Donald M. Seekins, "Japans Relations with Military Regimes in Burma, 1962-1991, The Kokunaika Process," Assian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, March 1992, pp. 248-262.

relationship. In 1989, the Australia-Indonesia Institution (AII) was established, emulating the model of Australia-Japan Foundation and Australia-China Council, to promote people-to-people contact alongside the official relationship. Australia has been hosting 21 Indonesian officers at the staff colleges throughout the country. Australia and Indonesia have regular naval exercises. Indonesia regularly receives about A\$ 100 million per annum from Australia as development assistance programme particularly for the less developed eastern provinces. Bilateral trade has so far been in favour of Australia. For the last three years, Australian exports to Indonesia have almost doubled and Indonesia became Australia's eighth largest export market. Trade and investments are expected to give stability to Australia-Indonesian relations.

ASEAN and Indo-Chinese states continued to occupy the centre of attention in Thailand's foreign policy throughout 1991. Thailand's policy towards Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos did not basically depart from that of Chatichai's. Economic aid was given to Laos and Cambodia and several business enterprises prepared themselves to expand business with the above two countries. Vietnam was enthusiastic about opening up the country to more trade and economic relations with the outside world and the Thai government was ready to reciprocate. The end of the cold war, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Cambodian peace agreement have put South-east Asia into a new era of peace, co-operation and

economic development. Thailand's proposal to create an Asia trade area within the next 15 years to promote economic development was welcomed by all the other members of ASEAN. Economic aid and investment has become a major issue in Thailand's foreign policy towards the ASEAN countries.⁵²

Territorial disputes, accusations and counter-accusations are the two major hurdles in Philippines and Malaysia's emerging bilateral relationship. The major irritation between them is the Philippine claim on Sabah, one of Malaysia's 13 states. It is an issue that remained unsolved for nearly 30 years. They agreed that it should be finally settled through ASEAN. However, in more than 25 years since ASEAN's formation, the Sabah dispute has never been an important agenda item at any ASEAN conference or meeting. The genesis of the main impediment to the normal and steady growth of constructive relations started in June 1962 when Philippines officially staked its claim to Sabah. President Macapagal on April 20, 1963, wrote to President Kennedy stressing the vital importance of Sabah to the security of the Philippines. Another irritant in their relationship is the Spratly Island -involving claims of Malaysia, Philippines, China, Taiwan and Vietnam. The relationship between the two countries is further exacerbated by the Philippines' accusations of several intrusions by Malaysian naval vessels and aircrafts into Philippine airspace and territory, which led to an anti-Malaysian tirade in the press. However, the

52. Suchit Bunbongkorn, "Thailand-Coping with Military Guardia Ship", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 Feb. 1992, pp. 138-139.

advent of the Aquino administration in 1986 offered a fresh impetus for improvement of relations. Malaysia has indicated its readiness to extend the 1987 treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Philippines.⁵³ However, their cordial relationship is very much dependent upon the peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute.

In May, 1989, the former foreign minister of Malaysia Abu Hassan Omar called on the countries of the ASEAN to form a "defence community" which would take them to new heights of political and military cooperation⁵⁴ Malaysia has been more concerned with internal threats and has not totally ignored the need to develop a capacity to meet external threats. It has expressed disagreement, if not criticism, of Singapore's offer to the United States to use its facilities (especially naval facilities) for military purposes. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kua Yew has, on the other hand, openly advocated a multilateral navy task force for the region incorporating American, Japan, Australian and New Zealandian ships.⁵⁵ Malaysia objected to Singapore's proposal because it would conflict with the 1971 Kuala Lumpur declaration on ZOPFAN and recent proposal for the creation of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ). Beginning in 1984, there have been exchanges of officers for staff college training.

53. Paridah Abd Samad and Darusalam Abu Bakar, "Malaysia Philippines Relations, The Issue of Sabah", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, June 1992, pp. 554-568.

54. Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Security Community", or "Defence Community ?", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 159.

55. Sheldon W. Simon, " ASEAN Strategic Situations in the 1980s", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 60, Spring 1987, pp. 73-93.

In June of that year, Joint air exercises were held over Singapore for the first time since 1965 followed by a joint naval exercise in July. This can be perceived as a breakthrough in defence co-operation between the two countries. The idea of triangular economic co-operation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore was expressed by Goh Chok Tong, deputy prime minister of Singapore. However the disputes about Sipadan and Ligitan Islands and the economic zone nearby still haunt relations between the two countries. However Malaysia and Singapore have to solve the island dispute in order to push their cooperative relationship on to a sound footing.

Relations with Malaysia and Singapore remain a major element of Indonesian foreign policy. The death sentence applied to Besri Masse at the beginning of 1990 in Sabah, became an emotional issue in the Indonesian society. There is a conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia on sovereignty over the Sipada and Ligita islands in the border between Sabah and East Kalimantan. Indonesia and Malaysia seem to be engaged in a kind of economic competition, especially in exports. Even though Indonesia does not have a joint defence agreement with Malaysia, joint manoeuvres are taking place in all three divisions of armed forces, which is an indication that mutual trust in the military field is improving.⁵⁶

Joint military exercises are for confidence building measures. Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to use the latter's

56. A.R. Sutopo, "Relations Among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore", The Indonesian Quarterly (Jakarta), Vol. XIX, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1991, pp. 326-344.

Nautna Island as a base for joint exercises. Indonesia and Malaysia currently are strengthening their co-operation in economic, military and security fields. Singapore is highly interested in an ASEAN defence arrangement, particularly with its close neighbours. Singapore is the main beneficiary of Intra-ASEAN cooperation concerning military training. Apart from its two army camps in Thailand and its detachment of fighter aircraft at Clark air base, Singapore has developed training facilities in Brunei. A major breakthrough in Singapore's search for training facilities was its joint development with Indonesia of a 10,850 hectare air weapons testing range in Saibu in Sumatra. This facility has been made available to Malaysia as well. Singapore continues to maintain its special ties with Taiwan. Diplomatic relations between China and Singapore were established in October 1990. In bilateral economic field, traditionally Singapore has been Indonesia's largest trade partner among the South-east Asian countries. There is an economic agreement between Indonesia and Singapore in August 1990, emphasising the development of Kiau region.⁵⁷

There is a fairly large amount of military co-operation between ASEAN countries. Not only do ASEAN military forces exercise together regularly, they also exchange intelligence information and officers. The most common form of ASEAN military cooperation are air and sea exercises. Almost all ASEAN navies and most of their air

57. Amitav Acharya, op.cit., p. 160.

forces have bilateral or trilateral training arrangements. The exceptions are Malaysia and Philippines because of their unresolved dispute over Sabah. The Thai forces use the Crow Valley range in the Philippines for air weapon testing process, while Bangkok has offered military training facilities to Brunei. Participating in each other's officer education and training programmes has become increasingly common among ASEAN armed forces. Indonesia, for example, makes all three of its command staff colleges available to officers from other ASEAN countries. Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia have developed similar close and regular exchanges with other ASEAN countries. Malaysia, offered Brunei, in 1983, the fullest cooperation in providing training to officers in administrative, military, police, and other areas.⁵⁸

Since its inception, ASEAN's chief political goal has been to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region. In this respect, ASEAN's concept of regional order has centered around the creation of a South-east Asian "Security Community", which aims at bringing about a change in the member states' mutual relations and rule out the use of force as a means of problem solving. With the end of the cold war this objective is partially achieved, but has a long way to go to form a viable "defence community."

South Pacific

In the past when Australia looked at Northeast Asia its

58. Ibid., p. 164.

primary focus was on China, Japan, Korea and the other countries of the region with their different cultures and values. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, reduced Australian economic access to Europe and the rapid growth of trade with Japan encouraged a reassessment of Northeast Asia's importance to Australia. Some scholars have suggested that a trade, financial and economic association with Japan and the other fast-growing Asian countries as the best way of securing Australia's future, if the trend towards regionalising the global economy continues. Bernard Gordon has explored the potential for a Pacific Asia Free Trade Area (PAFTA) linking Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and the ASEAN Countries. There is a case for moving gradually to diversify and extend Australia's security contacts with several of the newly emerging Asia-Pacific powers, most notably, Japan, China, South Korea and some of the ASEAN countries. There could be substantial benefits in exploring the potential for more regular and largescale bilateral discussions on security, policy and intelligence matters.⁵⁹ In November 1989, the Australian government released an official report entitled "Australia and the Northeast Asian ascendancy", authored by Ross Garnanut, a former ambassador to China and economic advisor to the Prime Minister. The report constitute a wide-ranging assessment of economic, political and social development of the countries of the

59. Ross Babbage, "Change in the North Pacific, Implications for Australia's Security", Australian Outlook (Canberra Australia), Vol. 43, No. 3, Dec. 1989, pp. 1-16.

region and suggest initiatives that Australia should take to improve relations with countries of the region.⁶⁰

South-east Asia and the South Pacific are areas of principal and constant concern in what is clearly represented as the government's prime, although not sole, foreign policy objective of maintenance of a positive security and strategic environment in Australia's neighbourhood. Liberal Senator Teague and Independent senator Vallentine have stressed the need for a recognition of the importance of "second track" non-governmental relationships - a critical element in the South-Pacific. New Zealand is also committed to a positive role in the South Pacific.⁶¹

Australia and New Zealand have old cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties along with military and economic co-operation. There is a conflict between US and New Zealand about New Zealand's commitment to the ANZUS treaty. The US formally suspended ANZUS treaty obligation to New Zealand and because of New Zealand's point of not allowing ships carrying nuclear weapons in its territorial waters and air space. Former US Secretary of State George Shultz declared that New Zealand would hence forth be seen as a friend not an ally. New Zealand, on the other hand, sent a signal that it has not retreated into South-West Pacific nor opted out of the

60. James Cotton, "Australia Comes to Terms with the Northeast Asia, Political Institutions, Regional Order and the Garnaut Report", Pacific Focus (Seoul), Vol. VII, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 60-64.

61. John Piper, "Australian Policy Towards South Pacific", Australian Journal of International Affairs (Canberra), Vol. 44, No. 2, August 1990, pp. 119-131.

interdependence, that is an essential part of international security. Bolger wants to deepen political relations with Japan, the ASEAN, China and South Pacific partners. The Defence policy of New Zealand is now committed to maintain a blue water navy and compatibility with Australia. The Australian ministry of defence suggested for an even closer co-operation of the two armed forces.⁶²

The 1990s will be a decade of transition in the Asia-Pacific region with all its ramifications and implications. Political volatility and turbulence is the characteristic of some countries like China, North Korea, Cambodia, and the Philippines. With all uncertainties, the decade will present both opportunities and challenges to the Pacific rim countries. It will take vision, wisdom, cooperation and decisiveness on the part of leaders of these countries to be able to rise to the occasion and make the promise of an Asia-pacific century a reality.

62. Doras Alves, "US-New Zealand Relation, The National Government of New Zealand ", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXI, No. 11, Nov. 1991, pp. 1061-1079.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

Major turning points in history come but once in a few decades, or even a century. The disintegration of the Soviet empire and the end of the cold war is one such landmark. Even the nature of its arrival is new. It has come, not as the consequence of a global confrontation of arms and a subsequent peace conference. Instead it came stealthily, albeit dramatically, taking the world by surprise. Neither the Soviets nor the west was prepared for it.

The old world-order has gone but a new world-order is yet to be built. There is perhaps more disorder in the current arrangement of things than order. As the bipolar world ceased to exist, relations among countries have become much more complex and less stable. It is widely believed that in future, conflicts are more likely to be regional rather than global. Under such circumstance a regional initiative, which subsequently receives the support from the major powers and the UN, appears to be a more viable way of resolving conflicts.

The implications of the rapidly changing global situation on the security scenario of the Asia-Pacific region have been significant. The end of the cold war has led to reduced superpower conflicts and competition in the Asia-Pacific region. The drawing-down of the two super-powers military presence in the region and expected diminution of their linkage in the region's security problems can be seen as contributing to the realisation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), as laid down in the Kuala Lumpur declaration of 1971 and developed further in the ASEAN

Concord and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the first ASEAN summit in 1976 in Bali. With the advent of a new world order, there is increasing military cooperation among different Asia-Pacific countries. In spite of complexity of views, arms control efforts in the Asia-Pacific region must continue. The region should begin to think of new ways and approaches for establishment of political dialogues and CBMs which could ultimately lead towards arms control efforts.

A new wave of friendship and co-operation has already started between communist and non-communist regimes in this region, which was a daydream during the cold war period. A tendency towards normalization of relation is evident, between the two Koreas and between Japan and China. Most dramatic has been China's normalization of relations with Indonesia, which led to a breakthrough in China's relationship with the ASEAN countries. There has been a tentative improvement of relations between China and Vietnam. After the tactful apology of the Japanese government regarding the atrocities committed during colonial period, the relationship between Japan, Korea and China has been on an upswing. Joint military exercises, exchanges of military personnel and accessibility to the previously no-entry zones are on the increase among various ASEAN countries. In several cases, contacts between intelligence agencies were the crucial first step towards more comprehensive forms of defence and security cooperation. The most dramatic changes have been in the economic field shown by increased economic

interdependence among the countries of the region. The growing regional integration in manufacturing has been evident already in the form of non-governmental tripartite PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference) and the internal intergovernmental APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) process. The economic element is clearly of increasing significance since the Pacific region has increasingly grown into an economic powerhouse.

Growing interdependence in economic integration that is taking place in the region has led to a greater recognition of the need for consultations, cooperation and even coordination of policies, in the political field. Economic cooperation has enabled political dialogues among adversaries-between South Korea and Russia, between South Korea and China, between the two Koreas and between China and Taiwan. These dialogues have not yet led to the resolution of regional conflicts but at least they have prevented them from destabilising the region.

It is being suggested that if we can contemplate a "Common European Home" why not at least a "Common Pacific House"? Though usually brushed aside as naive, the question is central to the region's future. Europe's cultural unity apparently lends credence to the idea of a "Common European Home", underpinning a confidence to move beyond the cold war. The Pacific regions diversity, deep animosities and seeming lack of analogous compass to guide the region forward leave it stuck in the past and consign the notion of a "Pacific House" to that of an impossible dream.

Yet perceptions of a purposeful, constructive Europe contrasted with a motley, fractious Asia-Pacific, unable to build a common framework for security, could be misleading. The cold war curbs have helped mask Europe's considerable diversity and deep animosities. The break up of Yugoslavia has revealed some of these animosities. In contrast, parts of Asia-Pacific, less pressed by the demands of the central balance, were engaged in a constructive search for ways and means of prospering despite their differences. Provided the lessons already learnt can be built upon in a broader context and major powers commit themselves, as their mutual interest increasingly demand, to constructive engagement rather than sterile confrontation, a "Pacific House" need not be a far distant or improbable goal.

Vexation in the Asia-Pacific CSBMs Process

"Confidence-building measures" refer to the enhancing of confidence about military intentions. Security-building measures refer to the enhancing of military securities between parties involved. Confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) will, therefore be a combination of both, essentially pertaining to the military field. That is what is understood in the conventional, technical sense. The concept underlying the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), is of course, broader than confidence or security building measures.

Given the present stage of development of the Asia-Pacific region, it would appear much more profitable to talk,

not about the CSCE- type of military-related CSBMs but rather about the broader CSCE concept of confidence-building and cooperation, which applies to all spheres. This is because the potential for confidence and security building measures in the military environment *per se* seems rather limited.

The Asia-Pacific region is both diverse and complex, involving issues that are bilateral and some that are multilateral as well as some that relate both to the states of the region and to external factors. There are certain pivotal hurdles as far as CSBMs and CSCE-type of arrangement in the region is concerned.

First, it is a vast area, encompassing Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Indo-China, Australia, New Zealand and the Islands of the South Pacific Ocean. Europe, by comparison, is rather small. The sheer expanse of the area is a problem to have CSBMs or CSCE-type arrangements.

Secondly. the geographical, historical, political, cultural and social heterogeneity of the area has to be taken into account. Europe, comparatively, has much more homogeneity. However, there is a subregional consciousness among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. There is nothing comparable to the ongoing process of European regional integration. Instead, subregional organisations have been established. These arrangements, of course, have an impact on the prospects for CSBMs in the area and its respective subregions.

The great diversity that characterises the countries

is reflected in the diversity of their perceptions of threats to their security. This would limit any prospects for any application of CSCE concepts across the whole region. In term of security, the Pacific region is not so clearly demarcated as Europe, which since the end of cold war has been divided primarily between East and West or roughly between the forces of NATO and those of the WARSAW pact. There are great asymmetries of power across this vast region, which further complicate CSBMs and arms reduction efforts, whether these are on a regionwide, subregional or even bilateral basis and there is little room for reciprocity and little perception of shared benefits from the CSBMs in the area. The larger powers will in any case be left with a preponderance of military might over the smaller ones. And this particular aspect will have a crucial impact on any of the multilateral, particularly regionwide, CSBMs in the area.

Another problem is the trend constantly increasing arms expenditures aimed at maintaining and increasing military capabilities in many parts of the Asia-Pacific region. The highest level of expenditures on arms, next only to Europe, is in this region. Economic growth of this region is the main engine for military modernization. Yet another factor has been the extension of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) at sea, which have necessitated strengthening of naval strengths. A number of countries in the region, which traditionally concentrated upon internal disorder have now pacified their internal areas and are building up conventional force capabilities with an external orientation.

EEZs have the main factor of competition and the arms race among countries in the region. These developments will influence negotiation of CSBMs in the relevant subregions.

Past experience has shown that external interference, particularly by major powers, has always been invited or at least made possible by domestic or inter-state conflicts in the regions itself. Thus what was in effect a civil war in Vietnam involved United States that led to the Vietnam War which, in turn, indirectly involved the Soviet Union and China. The confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia and the recent Cambodia crisis also resulted in the involvement of powers.

Proposals for CSBMs

All these diverse factors might give the impression that the environment for CSBMs in the Asia-Pacific region is very unfavourable. However, there are also possibilities for such measures. Although, CSBMs are sometimes spoken of as something new for Asia-Pacific, various kinds have actually been applied in the region. Subregional approaches and bilateral CSBMs system would be more in tune with the prevailing situation in the region. There is a greater need to focus on political, economic, social and other forms of non-military cooperation than on military CSBM arrangement as such. This approach will provide greater potential for the reduction of tensions and conflicts in the area and eventually it could lead to military CSBMs as well.

Given the nature and problems of the area, CSBMs would

best be modest, incremental and not very detailed or advanced "hightech" types. The process could in fact start with very basic activities, such as consultations, dialogue, communication. Emphasis should first be laid on scholarly discussions and low-level official contacts, which will prepare the ground for high-level meetings, intensification of formal and informal consultations, both official and private, backed by improved mechanisms for decision-making and co-operation. This should include the institutionalization of the ASEAN summit, which serves not only as a symbol of ASEAN unity but as a forum that promotes better understanding and empathy for each other's interests and concerns.

The potential exists for new CSBMs or comprehensive security and co-operation types of arrangements in Asia-Pacific. However, these should be on a lesser, subregional level, which can then be gradually expanded to encompass larger areas.

Broadly speaking, the CSBMs can be divided into categories, military and non-military, which are complementary and promote each other. Given the situation in Asia-Pacific, it would seem that the first step should be taken in the non-military field. This will prepare the ground and lay the foundation for the establishment of CSBMs in the military field.

Political and diplomatic relations between countries should be established and developed on the basis of the

principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and peaceful co-existence.

The more urgent tasks facing the Asia-Pacific region today, are, for one thing, the solutions of the bilateral disputes, and for another, the strengthening of economic co-operation. The countries concerned should first advance their dialogue and consultations with one another and take practical measures to enhance trust, reduce tension, put an end to conflicts and strengthen security. On this basis, they could gradually establish and develop regional security mechanisms, first in small areas and then, gradually and as circumstances require, extend them into larger regions. The potentials for conflict are aplenty, but there is also possibility for co-operation. The exploitation of the enormous resources of the area definitely calls for cooperation, rather than confrontation. The progress that many states have now made in developing their economies and institutions provides a good foundation for building up of a multipolar security structure.

APPENDIX

Table 1

Proposals for Arms Control by South and North Korea

Category	South Korea	North Korea
Basic approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none">*Arms control through three stages-Political confidence building<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Military confidence building- Arms reduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none">*Precondition of Cessation of Team Spirit
Military Confidence building measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">*Mutual visits and exchanges of military personnel*Mutual disclosure and exchanges of military information*Notificaiton in advance of the movement and maneuvering of military units of certain size or larger, and invitation of observers-Beginning January 1, 1991-Brigade or larger units-Notification 45 days in advance-Establishment of hotline between Ministers of National Defence*Demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone and its use for peaceful purposes	<ul style="list-style-type: none">*Restriction of military excercises-Prohibition of combined, military excercises with foreign forces and military excercises of foreign forces in the territories-Ban of military excercises of division size or larger-Suspension of military excercises near the DMZ*Notification of military excercises in advance*Making a peace zone of the DMZ-Withdrawl of troops and weapons<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Tearing down military facilities-Use the DMZ for Peaceful purposes and open it to civilians*Preventive measures against accidental conflicts and subsequent escalation

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Establishment of hotline between high military authorities -Limit provocative military activities along the entire DMZ
Non-aggression pact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Declaration of non-aggression after restoration of politico-military confidence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Declaration of non-aggression concurrently with arms control measures
Arms reduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Transform offensive military structure into a defensive one *Initial balancing of military power -To possess equal numbers of troops and weapons the side with larger armed forces should first reduce them to the level of the other side *Progressively balanced force reduction thereafter to successively lower levels *Reduce the number of troops in accordance with reductions in arms *Reduce concurrently reserve and paramilitary forces *On-site verification and monitoring -Operate a joint verification group and permanent monitoring groups *Mutual consultation on the final reduced level of armed forces in consi- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Phased reduction of forces in three stages within three to Four years -Troops cut to 300,000 in the first stage, to 200,000 in the second, and to 100,000 in the last stage -Military equipment scaled down in proportion to troop cuts -Disbandment of militia in the initial stage *Restriction on military equipments -Cessation of import and development of military equipment -Suspension of import of military technologies *Mutual notification and verification -Notification of implementation of the arms cuts

deration of the military capabilities needed by a unified state

- On-site verification
- *Setting up a nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsula
- Pull out nuclear weapons out of South Korea
- Prohibition of production and purchase of nuclear weapons
- *Withdrawal of U.S. forces in step with the phased arms cuts

Peace-guarantee measures during and after arms reduction

- *Deploy observer troops composed of neutral nations
- *Establish a joint military committee to resolve possible military disputes

Source : Texts of proposals by South Korea and North Korean Prime Ministers at the first session of the Prime Minister's Conference held on September 5, 1990 in Seoul, Quoted from, Hang Yul Rhee, "The Necessity of Arms Control for the Stability of the Korean Peninsula", Korea Observer, Vol. XXII, No. 4, Winter 1991, pp. 479-480.

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