Dispersion of Small Arms As A Factor in Civil Violence With Special Reference to South Asian Region

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DEDICATED

TO

MY FATHER AND GRANDFATHER

15 July, 1992

C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled "DISPERSION OF SMALL ARMS AS A FACTOR IN CIVIL VIOLENCE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOUTH ASIAN REGION", submitted by JAGAT BALLAV PATTANAIK in partial fulfilment of the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.Phil) in Jawaharlal Nehru University, is a product of the student's own work, carried out by him under my supervision and guidance.

It is hereby certified that this work has not been presented for the award of any other degree or diploma by this University or any other University and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

M.L. SONDHI

(Chairperson)

SUSHIL KUMAR

(Supervisor)

C O N T E N T S

PREFACE

The later half of twentieth century has seen
lot of civil violence in the South Asian region.
The problem of civil violence has become intractable
because of inability of State power to handle the
problem of arms dispersal in the region effectively.
There always remain crevices in defence security
structure of the state; howsoever strong it might be;
through which arms pedlars can sneak in. And the
resulting 'arms dispersal' often-times provokes
disaffected ethnic, religious and caste groups to
take up arms under favourable conditions, bypassing
other shock-management organs of the state. This is
what sustains such violence which, in turn, vitiates
social harmony further contributing to the overall
destabilisation of the State in an unending spiral.
As such effective handling of the question of 'arms
dispersal' has been a point of crucial importance
these days. Against this backdrop my effort at
analysing the role of 'arms dispersal' in the South
Asian region in this present dissertation would seem
rather natural.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters. Each chapter is further subdivided to do justice to the discussion covering every possible aspect of the problem of arms dispersal and its role in precipitating civil violence. The first chapter opens up with the question of arms dispersal. It seeks to define 'arms dispersal' and 'civil violence' in separate headings and tries to discover the possible links between them. The second chapter takes special care to investigate into the causes that encourage arms dispersal. The question of 'arms bazaar', 'Afghan Mujahideen', 'drug mafia' and 'overseas remittances' as factors, that make the atmosphere conducive to suppliers or even manufacturers of small arms, have been dealt with sufficient care in this chapter.

The third chapter is devoted to the discussion of civil violence in South Asia. The discussion goes back to history to check if there was any causal link between civil violence and the process of historical growth in South Asia keeping its colonial roots in particular focus. Various theories of violence; psychological, socio-economic, ecological; have been

critically dealt with. Then the discussion switches over its attention to the factors that make civil violence possible in South Asia; ethnic, communal and caste disharmony and finds different theories inadequate to explain the fact of transnational dispersion of small arms as the chief factor in escalating civil violence in South Asia.

In the conclusion part the overall assessment of the findings of the work has been done with particular care.

I would be really happy if my study can contribute to the mainstream discussion on 'civil violence' in South Asia, where a great amount of state's resources is wasted upon the management of such violence, squeezing the scope of socio-economic and political development as a whole.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At the outset I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Sushil Kumar, who suggested this topic to me and indicated the lines of which I should work, and who supervised the study thoroughly. Without his guidance and encouragement this work could not have been completed.

I am deeply indebted to all my family members for their affection and constant encouragement.

During the course of my research, I was assisted by several friends. My special thanks are due to Allu bhai, Vijaya bhai, Ramesh, Swarabji, Bibhu, Binod, Rajendra, Manoranjan, Hruda, Bapuni, Ashok, Pradeep, Srinivas, Sridhar bhai, Dhawan and Rupa.

I have completed this study with the help of the material available in various libraries in New Delhi. In this connection, special mention may be made to the libraries of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Indian Council of World Affairs (Sapru House), Nehru Memorial Museum Library (Teen Murti House), and Central Secretariat Library. I am thankful to the staffs of all these libraries for their assistance they had extended to me.

Finally, I would like to thank Mr. P.S. Chahar who typed this dissertation with utmost dedication.

The responsibility for any errors in this work, however, is mine.

Jagat Ballav Pattanaik.

JAGAT BALLAV PATTANAIK

15 July 1992

CHAPTER I

ARMS DISPERSAL AND CIVIL VIOLENCE:
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

The post Second World War era has witnessed dramatic changes in international relations. The most significant aspect of these changing structures of international relations has been the emergence of newly independent states which, after throwing off the yoke of colonialism, are today playing an important role in the international relations. This role is being undermined during recent years by the civil violence within these nations and the "transnational linkages"[1] among groups of people, seeking political or economic advantage only, intensify such violence. South Asia is a case in point. "Intra-regional conflicts and disputes have erupted on several occasions since 1947, and relations between the South Asian States, more often than not, have been marked by deep suspicions and antagonism even during periods of comparatively normal interaction".[2]

The conflicts in the region may be developed at the four levels of interlinkages.[3] Firstly, in the

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1   Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vayrynen, eds., Militariaation and Arms Production(London, 1983), p.172.

2   Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd, eds.,Comparative Regional System(New York, 1980), p.238.

3   Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., Asia:Militarisation and Regional Conflict(Tokyo, 1988), See Preface P.XIV.

interlinking dimension, there is the complex interplay
between 'peace and security' at home on the one hand,
and that abroad on the other. Secondly, there is the
structural interlinkage between development and peace
or maldevelopment and violence. So 'domestic socio-
economic inequity and external dependency or dependent
development tend to give rise to frustrations, violence
and repression'.[4] Thirdly, the non-State actors play
an important role, particularly popular movements, in
counteracting militarisation in pursuit of peace and
security, and in transforming the domestic political
configuration of each society. Finally, the region is
so vast that it comprises a variety of countries
characterised by a legacy of different civilisations,
imperial rules, cold war settings and so forth. As a
consequence of the linkages between these developments
there arises the global phenomenon of interdependence.

The compulsion of interdependence and inter-
dependent co-existence have drawn states and people into
much closer and more complex patterns of internationalism.
But "the feelings of insecurity derive mainly from mutual
distrust based on perceptions of behavioural patterns
and basic attitudes".[5] As Kenneth Waltz puts it, "States,

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4   ibid. .

5   Feld and Boyd, n.2, p.246.

like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted".[6] Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities, and the two cannot meaningfully be separated. When a State has the misfortune to be both a small power and a weak state, its vulnerability is almost unlimited. In addition, if it possesses some attributes of importance to others, be it a natural resource or a strategic position like Afghanistan, then external pressures on these vulnerabilities is bound to occur. By contrast, States which are strong both as states and as powers suffer for fewer vulnerabilities.

What constitutes a threat to national security? The differential character of the components which make up the State suggest that threats to the state can come in a variety of ways - military, political and economic.

"Military threats occupy the traditional heart of national security concerns".[7] It subjects the state to strain, damage and dismemberment. "Military actions

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6   Kenneth Waltz, Quoted in Barry Buzan, <u>People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations</u>(Sussex, 1983), p.20.

7   Barry Buzan, <u>People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations</u>(Sussex, 1983), p.75.

not only strike at the very essence of the State's
basic protective functions, but also threaten damage
deep down through the layers of social and individual
interest which underlie, and are more permanent than
the State's superstructures".[8] The level of military
threats vary greatly. At the most extreme end, at the
direct level, are the threats of invasion and occupation
aimed at overpowering the State. Military threats can
also be indirect in the sense of being directed at
external interests. Threats to allies, shipping lanes
or strategically placed territories would all come
under this category.

Since the State is essentially a political
entity, it may face severe political threats as much as
military ones. This is particularly so where "the ideas
and institutions are internally contested, for in such
cases the state is likely to be highly vulnerable to
political penetration".[9] On the other hand, structural
political threats also arise when the two states contradict
each other on the basis of organising principles and
they simply can not ignore each others existence. The
tragic case of India and Pakistan is a clear example
of this. The historical, geographic and cultural ties

8   ibid.

9   ibid, pp.76-77.

do not allow them to ignore each other, but the organising principles pose a permanent threat to each other; a threat amplified by the fact that both states are politically vulnerable.

Moreover, the economic expansion of a rival power might be seen as a broad spectrum threat to the whole national security position. Military capability rests on economic performance, as the threats to the security of supply of key strategic materials can be classified as a national security concern. There is also a link between economic threats and domestic stability. These occur when states pursue economic strategies based on maximisation of welfare through extensive trade. Over a period of time, such policies result in high levels of dependence on trade in order to sustain the social structures that have grown up with increasing prosperity. "Where such complex patterns of interdependence exist, many states will be vulnerable to disruptions in the pattern of trade".[10]

More importantly, security complexes emphasise the external influences tending to amplify local problems, and local problems shaping and constraining external entanglements and influences. Such types of threats

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10   ibid, p.81.

and vulnerability lead to militarisation. "Militari-
sation is the result of oppressive relations in the
social structures which give a dominant few the power
over the many. And there exists a supporting network
of political economic, social and cultural relations
that reinforces military power".[11] The resources that
fuel militarisation include not only domestic resources
but also international links among militarised regimes
which exchange intelligence information and aid, give
shelter to foreign military bases and installations,
trade in armaments and technology and conduct training,
tactical as well as strategic in counter-insurgency,
interrogation, torture etc. Foreign military bases lead
to the militarisation of the societies of both the host
country and the country operating the bases. The
pretext of such bases is mutual defence. This requires
that arms be supplied to the host country and this, in
turn, requires increased development and production
of arms by the dominant country. Hence the transnational
dispersion of arms takes place to escalate such conflict.
"Arms supplies played an obvious role in hardening and
intensifying the local disputes, and the linking together
of local and external patterns of hostility amplified
insecurities all round".[12]

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11   Sakamoto, n.3, p.37.

12   Barry Buzan, n.7, p.111.

DEFINING ARMS DISPERSAL

In a thoroughly crisis ridden world conflicts occur at global level and also at local level. As long as there are rivalries among the nations or within the nations, there will be a demand for weapons, sensitive to requirements of warfare. Arms dispersal is an important instrument in this context. It is now a major strand in the warp and woof of world politics. Arms dispersal is a process through which arms are distributed from a main source or centre to different directions. Arms dispersal can also be "a form of transfer of technology; an increasing number of states do not want the weapons fresh out of the crate but the technology that will enable them to build, or 'co-produce' them at home".[13] The arms dispersed feed local arms races, create or enhance regional instabilities, make any war that occurs more violent or destructive, and increase the tendency for outside powers to be drawn in. The dispersal of arms is not a new phenomenon. It "began the very moment people realised that it could either help their friends in need, or yield financial profit - or ideally, do both things at the same time".[14]

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13   Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (New Jersey, 1982), p.4.

14   Curt Gasteyger, Searching for World Security: Understanding Global Armament and Disarmament (London, 1985), p.103.

In the light of the rate at which militarisation of
nation-states is taking place, arms industry has
become one of the fastest growing sectors of world
economy.

Arms dispersal may take place in two ways -
arms trade and arms aid.

Arms trade can be defined as "the process
through which manufacturers sell their weapons in the
international arms market".[15] There is a strong
competition among different producers of arms for
markets in the non-producing regions of the world. On
the interaction level, the process of arms trade may be
described as : (a) primary-producer-turned consumer
relationship; (b) primary-producer-consumer relationship;
and (c) consumer-turned-secondary-producer and consumer
relationship.[16] First, between the developed countries
both allied and friendly, primarily because of inadequate
domestic production. Second, between developed and
developing countries as the latter lack an industrial
base, modern technology and capital. Third, among the
developing countries as some of them have established
indigenous arms industries and supply to lesser
developed countries.

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15   Harpreet Mahajan, Arms Transfer to India,
      Pakistan and the Third World(New Delhi, 1982),
      pp.1-2.

16   ibid, p.2.

There are various ways of arms trade. First, licenced sale of arms with or without conditions. Second, supplies of arms to bloc or alliance members. Third, disposal of surplus or obsolescent weapons. Fourth, pre-emptive setting to maintain an equilibrium within a given region. Fifth, sale of arms through private suppliers which is important during the civil violence. Sixth, acquisition of arms through contraband or stolen shipments which is mostly used by rebel groups to acquire weapons. Finally, many weapons are captured during wars and then sold to the interested parties.

Curt Gasteyger, in his book 'Searching for World Security', distinguished three categories of arms sellers: (a) Those countries which manufacture and export weapons for political and/or economic reasons. To this group belong most industrialised nations and a growing number of Third World countries; (b) Those countries which re-export older weapons which they have acquired elsewhere; and (c) Private arm dealers who furnish a wide range of weapons and ammunition to anyone who wants to buy them. Further, on the 'receiving end' he outlines several reasons why countries want to buy weapons: (1) they are in the process of building up or modernising their armed forces; (ii) they want to make up for losses

either suffered in a war or caused by lack of maintenance;

(iii) they are concerned about their security because

of either internal unrest or external turbulences; and

(iv) they desire arms for reasons of prestige and

status.[17]

The second mode of arms dispersal is arms

aid. Arms aid means transfer of resources - weapons,

technology and finances - from the donor country to the

recipient.[18] It is usually associated with developing

countries. Arms aid also operates at various levels

and through various ways. To enable the recipient

country to get military aid, military grants are

sanctioned, subsidies or sale of arms at discount prices,

or on credits are given. Military equipment are given

as gifts also. Supplies on a no-loss basis or at market

rates are also made. Further, the sales could be strictly

against cash payment or on a deferred payment arrangement.

Military assistance also includes lending or leasing of

equipments. Training military personnels of the aid

receiving country is another kind of military aid. The

donor country may also establish training centres in the

recipient country. The donor country, in turn, helps the

recipient in building military-administrative infrastructures

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17   Curt Gasteyger, n.14, p.104.
18   Mahajan, n.15, p.3.

Rivalries between nations or groups definitely get accelerated by arms trade and aid and produces many consequent reactions. Arms acquisition by a particular country or organisations acts as a catalyst in increasing suspicions and tensions among its rivalries. Then it becomes imperative for the opposite parties to go for arms import and the final result leads to a bitter arms race. Constant arms acquisition keeps alive the anachronistic idea that wars (are) inevitable.[19]

The motivating factors in arms dispersal to a particular region can be one or more of the following:

- Create an imbalance that upsets an existing balance,

- Start or exacerbate a local arms race,

- Foster instability because of the sudden acquisition of new arms,

- Provide incentives for preemptive action,

- Quicken the pace and scale of escalation,

- Provide incentives for a surprise attack,

- Introduce starkly inhumane weapons into a region.[20]

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19   Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London, 1958), p.74.

20   Andrew J. Pierre, n.13, pp.293-4.

The diversification of arms dispersal, with regard both to the variety of weapons offered and sold, is a major factor in international relations and a dangerous link between conflicts among the nations in the South Asian region. The influx of large number of arms raises the risks of war. Inter-State or internal war can dramatically influence demand for weapons as the experience of the conflict sheds light on the type of new weapons required.

DEFINING CIVIL VIOLENCE

In the contemporary world civil violence have become a focal point of international relations. It would seem imperative at the very outset to identify the criteria by which a particular intra-state conflict can be classified as a civil violence. The task of defining the term 'civil violence' is a highly complex one. It has been used differently by different scholars. Many of them have preferred to use the term 'civil war', internal war, internal conflicts or local war instead of using the term 'civil violence'.

Civil violence means the violence that occur in the internal affairs of the body politic. It also means "a war fought between different geographical areas, political divisions or ideological factions within the

same country. It may involve a struggle between an

established government and anti-government forces, or

it may develop during an interregnum period between

groups contesting for power and legitimacy as the new

government".[21]

> Myres Mc. Dougal defined civil war thus:
>
> A genuinely internal conflict within a
> nation-state in which a counter-elite
> group seeks forcibly to organise a new
> political unit separate from the old
> body politic, or to capture effective
> control of existing governmental structures.[22]

Richard Falk would understand by 'civil war',

"sustained large scale violence between two or more

factions seeking to challenge in whole or in part the

maintenance of governmental authority in a particular

state".[23] Falk lists some criteria which account for

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21   Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International
      Relations Dictionary(Oxford, 1982), p.164.

22   Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds.,
      The Future of Legal Order: Conflict Management
      (Princeton, 1971), vol.III, p.99.

23   Richard Falk, ed., The International Law of
      Civil War(Baltimore, American Society of
      International Law, 1971), See Introduction,
      p.18.

the civil violence situation:

- The existence of a large number of unstable
  governments incapable of consistently
  providing either internal or external
  security for their national society.

- The apparent absence of adequate alternatives
  to political violence in many of those
  countries in the world that are experiencing
  rising popular demands for social and
  economic justice.

- The continuation of an intense ideological
  struggle between the world's most powerful
  states as to the philosophy, structure and
  priorities that should govern the process
  of building a modern state.

- The natural and unavoidable links of
  solidarity and support between the adverse
  internal factions and their principle
  external counterparts, inducing temptations,
  opportunities, expectations, and requests
  for competitive intervention.[24]

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24   ibid, see Preface, p.xii.

Further, Falk distinguished several varieties of civil war in the light of his definitions, standard civil war, war of hegemony, war of autonomy, war of separation and war of reunion.[25] Harry Eckstein defined internal wars "as attempts to change by violence, or threat of violence, a government's policies, rulers, or organisations".[26]

Furthermore, civil violence has been defined as "a form of armed violence within a nation state. It may be a war between the government forces and a secessionist group seeking either political autonomy within the state or a separate state, or a war between two elements of the armed forces, with civilian involvement, over the composition and form of the government".[27]

There are some setting variables which have been described by various scholars as crucial to questions about internal war.[28] Andrew C. Janos defined very well

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25   ibid, pp.18-19.

26   Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems
            and Approaches(New York, 1964), p.1.

27   Robin Higham, ed., Civil Wars in the Twentieth
            Century(Lexington, 1972), p.203.

28   Harry Eckstein, n.26, p.32.

the political framework of civil violence. To him internal war is a violent conflict between two competing parties subject to a common authority and of such dimensions that its incidence will affect the exercise or structure of authority in society.[29] Sometimes the struggle for authority arises when the violence involves a new set of social objectives. Authority is related to two distinct elements: force and legitimacy. In terms of this framework the struggle for authority involves a struggle for legitimacy and the instruments of force in society. Here to win legitimacy is an important characteristic of internal conflicts. Janos lists several techniques of internal war - strikes, demonstrations, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, civil war, insurrection and coup-de-force.

Arnold S. Feldman discusses the degree and rate of social differentiation which intensifies civil violence. Societies, undergoing fragmentation, are likely to be rife with status inconsistency among individuals or groups. The "order" characteristic of any social system consists of both of regularized patterns of action and of institutions that control,

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29   ibid, p.130.

ameliorate, and canalize the conflicts produced by persistent social strains.[30] To Feldman, violence is conceived as being incidental to the basic character of social structures and processes.

Lucian W. Pye is of the view that a violence takes place due to three factors.[31] First, there is the matter of the organisation of the general society in which internal war occurs, in particular the extent to which its political and social spheres are integrated. Second, the types of violence can best be distinguished by their goals, their methods of recruitment and indoctrination, their organisational characteristics, and their properties in decision-making and action. Third, the character of the government, against which the violence is aimed, determines both the range of effective counterpolicies and many of the advantages that the violent groups may exploit.

The concern of most theories of development is to describe the changing environment within which these phenomena (civil violence) occur. Samuel P. Huntington says: "It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political

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30   ibid, p.117.

31   ibid, p.163.

disorder... It is precisely the devolution of
modernisation throughout the world which increased
the prevalence of violence about the world."[32] In
other words, the faster the rate of change towards
modernisation, the greater the political instability.

Further, the elements of domestic strife and
of external intervention are intermingled in varying
proportions. In a number of cases, domestic disturbances
and violence stem from one of the three crises of identity,
stability and legitimacy and then sometimes spill over to
neighbouring states, upsetting inter-state equations and
harmony.[33] Thus the concern centres around the possible
escalation of these wars into full scale international
wars through a combination of intervention and counter-
intervention by outside or external powers.

Following from the above discussion we can
distinguish some features which account for a civil-
violence situation. First, a civil war is the most
overt indication of a societal schism. It is organised
by a socially cohesive class seeking to protect arbitrary
freedoms, which makes the conflict an essentially

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32   Eric A. Nordlinger, ed., Politics and Society
            (New Jersey, 1970), p.319.

33   Sakamoto, n.3, p.18.

negative response. "Civil War", as a concept, falls within a taxonomy of intrasocietal conflict. It is a form of internecine conflict within a society. At one level, all wars and all conflicts are intrasocietal. Given the wide interpretation of 'society', from the whole human race at one end of the spectrum to small communities at the other, the notion of intra-societal conflict serves little more than to denote conflicts between human beings living within an identifiable, structured group. This would, of course, apply also to wars between states".[34] Second, civil violence is an overt internal conflict with international overtones. An external power may nudge for involvement in the affairs of another state by inciting and aiding dissenting groups and political opposition of that state, only to lead them astray to create internal troubles. Third, civil violence are extra-legal, for during a civil violence, the rule of law within the society as a whole can be considered to have broken down or to have no foundation. Fourth, an extralegal government is created which possesses not only economic self-sufficiency but also the loyalty of a sufficient part of the regular armed forces to defy the rest of the country. Finally,

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34   Robin Higham, n.27, p.15.

this government's action will be a mixture of professional governance, aristocratic or gentlemanly standards, and cruelty mixed with great humanity. Above all, the root causes behind such civil violence are of three types - Ethnic, communal and caste factors.

Factors Behind Civil Violence

1. ~Ethnic: In most states in the contemporary times, more particularly in the Third World, the social fabric is shattered by the pervasive phenomenon of multi-ethnicity. Ethnic group is commonly defined as "a collectivity within a larger society that claims common ancestry, a shared past, and shared subjective cultural identifications".[35] The inter-ethnic competition is structured by the interaction of relatively advantaged and relatively disadvantaged ethnic groups. The former wish to maintain their relative advantage, the latter want to redress their relative disadvantage. The period of calmness is shattered when relatively disadvantaged groups discover their disadvantages and take steps to redress their grievances.

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[35]   Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy, eds.,
        Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in
        Developing States (Colorado, U.S.A., 1986),
        p.2.

The major violence-producing situations among the ethnic groups are:

- General: identity crisis; communications revolution; social mobilisation; fragility of political institutions.

- Hegemony: fear of minority status; negative remembrances and images; sense of superiority; breakdown in stratification patterns; collective sense of relative deprivation; fear of state disintegration.

- Hegemonial exchange: ineffective norms of reciprocity, disparities in recruitment, inequitable resource allocations; disproportionate political power; highly visible eth-class differences; lack of adequate constitutional protections.[36]

The civil violence in Sri Lanka and Pakistan are bright examples to such type of conflict.

II. **Communal**: The extent of religious pluralism and the political importance of the religious minorities are questions of major importance in attempting to study any political system. Religion has played a significant role

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36   ibid, p.26.

not only in anti-colonial nationalist movements, but also

in internal revolts against leadership, a sense of group

identity, legitimacy, symbols and techniques.[37]

Communalism is a perception of religious communities

as inimical entities within a polity and within a nation,

arranged in an unfriendly, antagonistic and belligerent

equations of one to another.[38]

In any communal conflict there are macro as

well as micro-level factors involved. "Whereas macro-

level factors are mostly ideologically oriented, the

micro-level factors tend to be local issue-oriented.

Both these factors are also integrally connected with

socio-economic development taking place in the country."[39]

Underdevelopment of the economy often results

in uneven development in the community. The uneven

development in terms of the community leads a situation

where an inter-communal cohesive class structure does not

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37   Donald Eugene Smith, ed., Religion, Politics and
            Social Change in the Third World (New York, 1971),
            p.121.

38   Rasheeduddin Khan, "Challenges of Communalism",
            World Focus (New Delhi), vol.10, Nos.11-12,
            November-December 1990, p.30.

39   Asghar Ali Engineer, "Towards a Materialist
            Explanation of Communal Violence", South Asia
            Bulletin (New York), vol.7, Nos.1 & 2, 1987, p.50.

develop. Thus the upper classes of the less developed community feel a strong sense of rivalry vis-a-vis their counterparts in the other community who have gained an upper hand. And, in such a situation, in order to win the support of the masses of one's own community grievances are formulated. This can best be done by adding a few religio-cultural demands. Further, communal conflict is integrally connected with the dynamics of social change in the country. "Socio-economic changes, especially, in a tradition-bound society, bring about a deep sense of insecurity among those strata of society which are adversely affected by it".[40] The Hindu-Sikh and Hindu-Muslim conflict in India is sometimes described in these terms. Whatever may be the nature of the conflict, it, certainly, is a factor in intensifying civil violence in the country.

III. **Caste:** The caste system is a special type of social stratification found in various parts of the world. E.A. H. Blunt describes the caste system as "an endogamous group, or collection of endogamous groups, bearing a common name, membership of which is hereditary; imposing on its members certain restrictions on the matter of social intercourse; either following a common traditional

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40   ibid, p.51.

occupation or claiming a common origin; and generally
regarded as forming a single homogenous community".[41]

There is a deep cleavage within the caste system.
Lower castes are becoming increasingly disillusioned
because of the attitude of the higher castes. They demand
equality of opportunity and equality in all spheres of
life. They are becoming conscious and organised and in
many cases put up a fight in defence of their human,
legal and social rights and in support of their demands
for minimum wages, civil rights, protection from atrocities,
abolition of bonded labour and so on. On the other hand,
this provokes more violence from the upper castes who see
threat to their own privileges. So this differences in
attitude takes the shape of civil violence. "The struggle
of the deprived and disadvantaged takes many shapes.
Sometimes losing all hopes for justice, people turn
violent. In some parts the aggrieved demand a separate
State within the Republic so that they may have some power".[42]

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41   E.A.H. Blunt, Quoted in Pascual Gisbert,
        Fundamentals of Sociology (Bombay, 1973),
        p.377.

42   Bhagwan Das, "Minorities and their problems",
        Social Action (New Delhi), vol.38, No.4,
        October-December 1988, p.371.

In South Asia, India is more prone to such type of violence. In India, lower castes are regarded as lowly degraded creatures. The combination of economic crisis of various forms, political gangsterism and upper caste intolerance of lower caste self assertion can be seen behind every incident of 'atrocities on lower castes'. It is evident from various instance. The ugly agitation against the Mandal Commission broke out like a rash all over India. In the State of Bihar in India it has been an everyday affair. The Chundur caste violence in Andhra Pradesh, July 1991, caught the attention of the whole country. The most recent case of June 1992 was at Kumher in Rajasthan. Here the conflict was between the Jats, belonging to the upper caste, and the Jatavs, belonging to the lower caste. Today, caste continues to be an important part of India's landscape and there is no dearth of evidence of the continued presence of civil violence arising out of caste factor.

Thus these are the major factors in international society which give rise to civil violence in a country.

ARMS DISPERSAL AND CIVIL VIOLENCE: AN INTERLINKAGE

The subject of civil violence is   prominent
at the present time because many states are vulnerable
to domestic violence and because many other states have
the motivation to promote or exploit this vulnerability.
"The interrelatedness of world economic and political
life is such that governments are often deeply concerned
with the official policies of and changes of regimes in
foreign states; hence the impulse to intervene, where
the capability exists, is often strong, especially where
the alternative is to acquiesce in intervention by rivals
or in an outcome that brings a hostile elite to power in
a strategic state".[43]

External support in an internal conflict varies
according to the nature of the conflict, the parties
involved and the objectives of the antagonists. Arms
dispersal to parties engaged in civil violence come in
many forms with many variables. The principal distinction
is whether the support is active or passive. Active
support requires the direct involvement of the supplier.
On the other hand, passive support is merely the provision
or sale of material or facilities to either side to enable

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43   Richard A. Falk, ed., n.23, p.1.

it to continue the violence. Although these two categories appear to be distinct there is an ill-defined area between them. This is where external states provide men and material to enable a party to a civil violence to continue the struggle, and yet at the same time are immediately involved in the struggle.

What is more mysterious or more complex is the interaction between the dispersal of weapons and international relations in the midst of this cauldron of complexity. Karl Von Clausewitz clearly understood the relationship between weapons and the way in which they were used: war in literal meaning is fighting..... Fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment, and these in turn modify the mode of fighting; there is, therefore, a reciprocity of action between the two".[44] The way in which war is conducted, depends in large part on how quickly certain kinds of weapons are getting dispersed among nations.

The point is that civil violence is often fought with a wide variety of weapons from innumerable sources gathered over a long period. The source of weapons

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44   Karl V. Clauswitz, Quoted in Lewis A Frank,
        The Arms Trade In International Relations
        (New York, 1969), p.187.

is three-fold.[45] The first source is traditional external
arms suppliers who are sympathetic to the violent groups
or organisations. The second source of arms supply is
non-governmental agencies. These private sources deal
mainly in the surplus from advanced industrial states,
including former colonial powers. Because civil wars
in the 'Third World' tend to be fought with small,
unsophisticated arms, private dealers can and have on
occasion played significant roles as suppliers.[46] The
last source of supply, especially for secessionists, has
been arms captured from the enemy or from any other
expedient source.

Mainly, the dispersion of small arms and
ammunitions across the border of a country is a major
factor in escalating civil violence. Since the 1870s
small arms have been produced at the same time in different
countries.[47] As Anthony Sampson, an expert on the small
arms trade, observes, "it is the small
arms which have been the instrument of most of the
hundred wars since the Second World War ... and which
have been the cause of most loss of life".[48] Small arms

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45   Robin Higham, n.27, p.207.

46   ibid, p.208.

47   Lewis Frank, The Arms Trade in International
          Relations(New York, 1969), p.6.

48   Anthony Sampson, Quoted in Curt Gasteyger,
          Searching for World Security: Understanding
          Global Armament and Disarmament(London, 1985),
          p.111.

are vital to most violent and terrorist activities.
They are essential in most guerrilla wars, revolts and
insurrections. These are easy to hide and transport.
In many civil violence small arms have been as
decisive as tanks and supersonic aircrafts. In case
of South Asia, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are most
impressive proof of this.

Thus, arms dispersal can be viewed as an
extension of the foreign policy of a nation, for most
local conflicts are fought primarily with imported
weapons. Besides, covert transfers are used for
furthering the national interest of the donor nation by
instigating unrest and insurgency/terrorist activities
within the regions of the enemy nation. These arms
enhance regional instabilities by increasing the destructive
capacities of recalcitrant terrorist or rebel organisations.

CHAPTER II

FACTORS IN ARMS DISPERSAL

INTRODUCTION

Civil violence is an everyday phenomenon in the South Asian region. Arms dispersal is a significant contributing factor in this situation. Arms dispersal is only one part of the overall arms acquisition. Availability of modern weapons, communication systems and financiers has made it easier for civil violence to thrive. Civil violence is characterised by the use of small arms. The grey market, which supplies them, is much too large and dispersed to make any meaningful action feasible.[1]

Earlier, the hand guns made of poor materials were not capable of withstanding substantial pressure of the government. Later on more sophisticated small arms were manufactured. The flow of sophisticated weapons and ammunition is assured through open purchase in various arms bazaars. No arms licence is needed, as it was. Weapons meant for Mujahideen during the Afghan crisis made the enroute to South Asia. Nacro-terrorism is on the increase. Drug-mafias supply arms and money

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1   Times of India (New Delhi), 3 February 1992.

to the terrorist groups. Also, various foreign assistance increase the intensity of civil violence. So we find that there are four factors in arms dispersal to South Asian region which escalates violence. These factors are the following:

ARMS BAZAAR

The question of **civil** violence is closely linked to the procurement of weapons. Once violence begins, sophisticated weapons considerably increase its level and intensity.[2] Today these small arms are easily available from the international open arms bazaars. Anybody can go and purchase these arms and ammunition against payment. Due to these open markets arms are flooded in South Asia and there is the easy accessibility of arms to the terrorist groups.

Arms Bazaar in Pakistan

During the Afghan war and in its aftermath Pakistan has been turned into one vast ammunition dump. AK-47 assault rifles and automatic of various brands, rockets, explosives and some anti-tank weapons are available in the booming arms bazaars of Peshawar and

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[2]   Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar: The Companies, The Dealers, The Bribes: From Vickers to Lockheed (London, 1977), p.24.

its suburbs, North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) in general and in some locations inside Baluchistan. The tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan have traditionally been involved in arms manufacture since the early years of the 20th Century.....but the Afghan war brought radical change in the quality and quantity of the arms and ammunition produced in these areas, in their trade and their broader implications.[3] With the sharp increase in quality and quantity of small arms, the prices reduced significantly which became helpful to the buyers. These markets operate beyond the control of the Pakistani authorities. Anyone with purchasing power can obtain any weapon system.

In Pakistan arms bazaars are located at Darra Adam Khel. It is fifty kilometres south of the Pakistani frontier city of Peshawar. It is mainly governed by tribal laws where Pakistan authorities have no control. "Buying a gun is not such a problem in Pakistan. All it needs is a short trip from Peshawar down the scenic and historic highway to Kohat, through the Afridi country that once saw so much bloodshed between the proud, unrelenting tribes and the invading British armies. Midway through, just before the bend in the highway

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3   A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Pakistan: Ethnic Conflict
           and the Question of National Integration",
           Bliss Journal (Bangladesh), vol.2, No.4, October
           1990, p.507.

climbing steeply on the Sikh Kamar (the Sikh Hills) lies

the shanty town of Darra Adam Khel".[4] Though the town

is spread randomly along the highway its main centre is

the bazaar which lies along the highway. This bazaar

consists of more than a dozen shopping centres. Most of

the gun factories, here, are run by Punjabis and even the

smallest among them produces, on an average, 100 guns

daily. The sellers and manufacturers sell every lethal

weapon any individual or private army could ask for as

openly as shoes and toileteries would be sold elsewhere

in the world.[5]

Traditionally these tribals were selling only

the most popular hand guns and rifles. It was famous

at that time as Darra-made. But as the Soviets entered

Afghanistan, along with the subcontinent's politics they

also changed the fate of Darra.[6] The markets were

suddenly started flooding with better and good quality

arms. Along with abudnance of arms supply, the demand

for it also increased. New markets came into existence

to meet the buyer's demand. Also "the enormous volumes

4   Shekhar Gupta, "Darra Adam Khel: Arms for the
         Asking", India Today(New Delhi), vol.14, No.14,
         31 July 1989, p.58.

5   ibid, p.58.

6   ibid, p.60.

of "junk" discarded following the catas :ophic blast in Pakistan's Ojheri ammunition dump outside Rawalpindi are still trickling into the market, upsetting old equations".[7] Though the Ojheri ammunitions were damaged and written off, the Darra experts in repairing arms shape up these again into the deadly weapon. In this arms bazaar no one asks the buyer's address and intentions, what matters is the bulge in the pocket. They sell almost any small weapon except perhaps the stinger missiles.

Further, Sohrab Goth, a Afghan-dominated Karachi slum, is one of the biggest dens of arms. The smugglers' den is Bara Bazaar in Sohrab Goth where they openly trade in contraband arms like AK-47 rifles, rocket launchers etc.[8] Sohrab Goth is said to be linked with over sixty international smuggling rings.

"Some sources also maintain that Gulistan in Pishin along with the Surkhab camp in the Pir Alizai jungle form the biggest arms and drugs market. People can buy any kind of arms from here with total impunity undeterred by the law-enforcing agencies".[9] Also, the

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7   ibid, p.61.

8   Ameneh Azam Ali, "Pakistan: Ethnic Strife",
            India Today, vol.12, No.1, 15 January 1987,
            p.95.

9   Mohammad Riaz, "Black to Business", Newsline
            (Karachi), vol.1, No.2, May 1990, p.39.

Quetta-Chaman road, the Chagai district and the Girdi jungle are the major areas of arms production.

Recently Sind emerged one of the world's largest underground arms market.[10] Prior to Afghan war gun was unknown to Sindh campuses. Now it is a part of campus life. Firearms are plentifully available. This market is mostly dominated by the students and young political activists.

The extent to which buying and selling is taking place can be gauged from the prevailing price of one of the hottest selling commodities today: Kalashnikovs. As the world's most unusual arms bazaar lies in Pakistan it is frequented by the subcontinent's various extremist and violent groups.

Arms Bazaar in Tamil Nadu

Tamil Nadu is the cheapest place to buy arms such as the AK-47.[11] The seeming transformation of the industrial city of Coimbatore into a major weapon manufacturing base is a clear indication of the inroads of Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu. First evidence of this came in June 1989 when, with the state under President's rule, the security forces raided an arms manufacturing unit

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10   The Hindu (Madras), 14 September 1990.

11   B. Muralidhar Reddy, "A Close Call", Frontline
        (Madras), vol.8, No.3, 2-15 February 1991, p.30.

at Avarampalayam in Coimbatore, run by the activists of
a breakaway faction of the Dravida Kazhagam who were
staunch supporters of Tamil militant groups.[12] The
Tamil militants also preferred this place only because
of the availability of skilled technical labour capable
of precision work.

The militants have converted nine districts
of Tamil Nadu into bases for war supplies. They are
Coimbatore, Periyar (Erode), Salem, Dharmapuri, Tiruchi,
Thanjavur, Pudukottai, Madurai and Ramanathapuram. The
arms manufacturing factories in Coimbatore churn out
thousands of grenades and detonators a day. "The task
cut out for Coimbatore was manufacturing guns and grenades
and getting spares for AK-47 assault rifles".[13] Tamil
militants also set up an automatic unit at Ganapathy in
Coimbatore under Gowrishankar apart from three manually
operated units in the name of Ravichandran.[14] Tiruchi was
the main source of detonators which came from licenced

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12   V. Padmanabhan, "LTTE: The Arms Base", Frontline
        vol.8, No.17, 17-30 August 1991, p.110.

13   Vincent D'Souza, "Tracking the Tigers", The Week
        (Kerala), vol.9, No.34, 18 August 1991, p.33.

14   ibid, p.34.

local dealers in explosives, who obtain the components

from multinational companies like ICI India Ltd. at

its Gomia factory in Bihar.[15] Also various explosive

inputs come from Erode, Salem, Dharampuri and North Arcot.

Various missiles like Arul-89 and Arul-90 are manufactured

in ordinary factory units.

Further, the Tamil extremist groups openly

sale arms at Muthupettai town.[16] Here also they impart

training in the use of these arms where the security

forces can not reach easily. Whenever the militants face

security danger they hide the boxes full of arms and

ammunition in swamps. In Tamil Nadu, LTTE of Sri Lanka,

Punjab extremists and ULFA militants are regular customers.

Arms Bazaar in Other Places

There have been clandestine shipment of arms and

ammunitions from open arms market in Singapore and Bangkok.

It became evident when the militants were nabbed by the

Indian Navy and Coastguard in the 10 nautical miles east

of Karaikol coast in Pondicherry very recently. "The

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15   ibid, p.33.

16   India Speaks(New Delhi), vol.3, No.31, 31 July
        1990, p.19.

seized ship had a stockpile of explosive materials,

which make up the lethal devices that the LTTE has

now become notorious for. The inventory of items seized

by the "Q" branch of the Tamil Nadu police included

loads of nails and studs, 26 cases of 1.5 volt battery

cells, 24 cans of fine aluminium powder, 24 bottles of

sulphur, two bottles of potassium nitrate and two bottles

of activated charcoal from the boat. A combination of

these provides the trade mark 'Improvised Explosive

Devices' of the LTTE".[17] Also, a precious diary and

incriminating documents were seized from the ship.

"The diary was a veritable inventory of all the arms

and ammunition smuggled by the vessel since March 21,

1991. The list of articles included Surface to Air

Missiles (SAMs) and RPG to conventional weapons such as

rifles and stocks of explosives".[18] Further, intelligence

reports also indicated that the militants used ships

that brought in arms from the arms bazaars of Jakarta,

Indonesia.[19]

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17   The Hindu (Gurgaon), 17 November 1991.

18   ibid, 11 November 1991.

19   T.S. Subramanian, "Sri Lanka: The Unsung Heroes",
        Frontline, 15-28 April 1989, p.103.

Now the leading industrial city of Uttar Pradesh
Kanpur, is being flooded by arms manufactured in the
factories of Pakistan. It is learnt that these weapons
have been stocked in various godowns for weapons from
which militants buy arms and disperse it to other
extremist groups. Such weapons have been stocked in
Chauraganj, Basonganj, Colonelganj, Chakeri and
Railbazar.[20] Also, huge amounts of explosives have
been supplied to the ULFA extremists of Assam from the
Badbil mines of Keonjhar, Orissa.[21]

A list of small arms generally used in civil violence

The terrorist groups are known to possess an
assortment of weapons which they purchase from the
open arms bazaar. The array of the weapons the militants
purchase from the arms bazaar are the following:

- AK-47
- AK-74
- AK-54
- AK-96
- Thompson sub-machine gun
- Sten sub-machine gun
- M1 Carbine

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20   India Speaks, Vol.3, No.18, 1 May 1990, p.27.

21   ibid, vol.4, No.37 & 38, 24 September 1991, p.14.

- Uzi Firearms

- M 52 pistol

- Makarvo pistol

- Tokarev (TT-33) pistol

- RGD-5 Anti-Personnel Hand Grenade

- SAM-7 Strela (Arrow)

- M 26 Grenade

- RPG 7 Portable Rocket Launcher

- M-20 pistol

- G-4 LMG

- G-3 Machine gun

- G-2 Machine gun

- M-46 Grenade

- M-21 rifle

- M-16 rifle

- M-22 rifle

- .12 bore gun

- .32 revolver

- .22 country made pistol

- Self loading rifle

- Airgun

- G-1 rifle

- 9mm pistol

- .455 revolver

- M-9 rifle

- M-11 rifle

- T-56 assault rifle

- AR-15 automatic rifle

- AR-16 automatic rifle

- AKSU-74 sub-machine gun

- RPG-2

- RPG-7

- HE-36 hand made grenade

- Dragunov rifles and explosives

- Pasilon 2000, a mortar

- RDX, Petn and Semtex plastic explosives

- Chinese BM-1 Rocket launcher

- .30 pistol

- Kenpro KT-ZZ frequency synthesiser used for internal communication.

"The mainstay of the militants is, of course, the AK-47 rifle, which is light, handy and automatic firearm with a foldable butt and a fantastic rate of fire. It is a three-in-one weapon as it can be used as a rifle, a carbine and a machine gun".[22]

Approximate price of different small arms

Arms	Rupees
- Kalashnikov rifle (Russian)	13,000
- Kalashnikov rifle (Chinese)	10,000
- Kalashnikov rifle (local remake)	3,000

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22   Times of India, 10 February 1992.

– RPG-7 Rocket launcher	20,000
– Anti aircraft gun	45,000
– Stalin's organ multi barrel rocket launcher	55,000
– Chinese BM-1 rocket launcher	28,000
– Anti Personnel mines (per dozen)	1,000
– Anti Tank mines (per dozen)	5,000
– Mine sweeping equipment	10,000
– Gas Mask	500
– Kalashnikov Bullets (local per hundred)	60
– Kalashnikov Bullets (Soviet per hundred)	90
– Sten gun	12,000
– Hand Grenade	1,400
– Rockets	3,800
– Incendiary Bomb	3,500
– Explosive charges	3,500
– .30 pistol	7,000
– 9mm Amn	15
– .30 Amn	8
– G-3 rifle	7,000
– G-3 Amn	27
– Dragunov	1,00,000
– AR-15	30 to 40 thousand
– RDX	80 thousand to 2 lakhs per kg.
– A night vision goggle which has a range about 50 metres.	4 lakhs

Source: <u>India Today</u>, vol.14, No.14, 31 July 1989, p.60.
<u>Mainstream</u>(New Delhi),vol.26,No.39, 9 July 1988,p.32.

So as arms are plentifully available at will, it creates social and political turmoil in the region as a whole. It poses a great threat to the civil order of the country as the militants use these arms against the governmental authority. Martin Luther King said it rightly, "By our readiness to allow arms to be purchased at will and fired at whim, we have created an atmosphere in which violence and hatred have become popular pastimes".[23]

THE MUJAHIDEEN FACTOR

The 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the Soviet military presence across the sensitive Khyber Pass aggravated the South Asia's security problems. This intervention lent greater legitimacy to the "Xenophobic Afghans"[24] by giving them the role of fighters for the liberation of their homeland and foreign occupation. Then a resistance movement by the mujahideen began building up in the name of Islam and national sovereignty against the Soviet troops and Soviet supported Afghanistan government. Furthermore it invited United States response in the form of massive aid to the Afghan

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23   Martin Luther King, Quoted in M.H. Askari,
      "Pakistan's Security and Drugs/Arms Mafia",
      Strategic Digest(New Delhi), vol.17, No.12,
      December 1987, p.2304.
24   Nasrullah Safi, "Soviet Military Tactics in
      Afghanistan", Central Asian Survey(London),
      vol.5, No.2, 1986, p.103.

Mujahideen in terms of sophisticated arms and money channelised through Pakistan. Thus Pakistan was inexorably drawn into the vortex of Afghan crisis. This trauma emanated from both the huge inflow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and the Kalashnikov culture of the gun-totting Mujahideen that affected large parts of the territory. In subsequent years the rapidly changing scenario in Afghanistan loomed large over the South Asian horizon. And in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 the Mujahideen organisation were freed to push the countries of South Asia down the steep slope toward civil violence by dispersing their small arms to various violent organisations.

Before we delve into the discussion of dispersal of arms by Mujahideen group to the various areas in South Asia, we must know who are the Mujahideens?

Mujahideen Organisation

The resistance in Afghanistan is led by a large number of local groups, large and small, active on scattered warfronts inside the country often isolated from each other. There is no homogeneous military structure in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, village is the base for any military organisation. In a village the people have lived together and know each other's habits. Loyalties forged are very

deep, so it is rare that a government can infiltrate such a system. The dependence is totally on an efficient leader within the tribe. Panjshir, Mazar and Herat are three examples of this area in which the villages are engaged in resistance movements.[25]

These voluntary recruited resistance fighters are known as Mujahideen or "Holy Warriors". Mujahideens are the armed resistance men who have enrolled permanently for the whole of Afghanistan.[26] But in a traditional bound country like Afghanistan it is very difficult to organise along these lines, for here the people have always lived free and away from the government's influence. As the war developed the Mujahideen crossed the boundaries of villages, districts and provinces and tried their best to form organisation around regional bases. Many of the Mujahideen groups are affiliated to Afghan parties based in exile in Pakistan and Iran. The leading political parties have their headquarters in Peshawar.

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25   Mohammad Es' Haq, "The present situation in Afghanistan", Central Asian Survey, vol.6, No.1, 1987, pp.125-6.

26   Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, 1986), p.172.

There have been two forms of resistance in Afghanistan: one is spontaneous, unorganised and un-cordinated; the other is organised into certain established groups.[27] The unorganised form of resistance draws on primordial loyalties - family, kinship, subtribe, tribe and region. The organised resistance, on the other hand, draws on the educated middle class for its leadership and seeks support from ethnic groups as well as across ethnic lines. The active members of the resistance are always organised.

The Mujahideens have combined into two major alliances: Islamic fundamentalists and moderate nationalists or traditionalists. The Islamic fundamenta-lists want basic changes in the old institutions under which they lived, by force if need be. Others, the traditionalists, essentially want to bring back the institution overthrown by the Soviets.

The schisms within the Mujahideen groups reflect the myriad divisions characterising the Afghan society which consists of a number of major linguistic and ethnic groups. But since the Mujahideen believes in

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27   Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present and future", Asian Survey(California), vol.24, No.4, April 1984, p.380.

the justice of their cause, the general morale within
these resistance groups was always high. They further
realise that the 'Jihad' or 'Holy war' in Afghanistan
like any other war of liberation would be a military-
political engagement. So after several attempts all
the parties, irrespective of internal rife and petty
ambitions, were able to form a coalition to fight against
the Soviet invaders. Seven major parties formed a
coalition. According to agreed constitution each party
would retain its independent activities but try and
coordinate them with the rest. And with this began the
genesis of arms transfer to the Mujahideen rebel group
and the concomitant dispersal of these arms within the
South Asian subcontinent.

Arms Shipment to the Mujahideen

Initially the Mujahideen fought the war in the
traditional tribal style. However, with the passage of
time the arrival of sophisticated weapons, and the training
of substantial number of guerrillas, they have become
refined in their tactics. The new weapons mainly came
from two sources: some have been captured from the enemy
and others have come from outside the country. Outside
assistance remains vital, however, if the resistance is
to survive.

"The external flow of covert arms began as a
trickle in those first months following the Soviet
incursion, but by October 1980 the Carter administration
and key Muslim states committed themselves to a substantial
increase in aid levels. The arms' passage through several
hands can obscure or erase the supplier countries of
origin especially when that is the very aim of covert
operations. Arms passed out in Mujahideen camps are
usually said to have come from defectors when in reality
at last some of them have moved through the pipeline
established for such clandestine purposes".[28] The main
sources of supply are China, the USA, Gulf States, Egypt
and Iran, all of which have funded or provided sophisticated
infantry weapons, mainly small arms, mines and ammunition.

China effected major arms supplies to the
Afghan rebels both immediately through its common border
with Afghanistan called the 'Wakhan Corridor', and via
Pakistan. Chinese weapons, particularly rockets and anti-
aircraft guns, were known to be available to the Mujahideen.
"In January 1980 ... US Defence Secretary Harold Brown,
then visiting in China, obtained an agreement with their

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28   Carl Bernstein, Quoted in Grant M. Farr and
        John G. Merriam, ed., Afghan Resistance: The
        Politics of Survival (Boulder, USA, 1987), p.73.

government which permitted overflights of Chinese territory
for planes carrying arms destined for the resistance.
The People's Republic of China would supply SAM-7s and
RPG anti-tank rockets".[29]   Apart from arming the
Mujahideens with modern weapons, China set up some
training bases in the province of Xinjiang.

United States unstintingly gave arms and
diplomatic support to this war of national liberation.
"US policy portrays the Afghan war as a continuing battle
between Najibullah's small, unrepresentative, foreign
guided, foreign armed party and a US-backed mass movement
of patriots intent on throwing out foreign influence".[30]
There seems little doubt that a considerable portion of
the military aid making its way into Afghanistan
Mujahideen has been procured by American help. The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of USA was running a
highly effective and daring military assistance programme
to the resistance. Media reports have often claimed that
the US provided more than $ 230 million or more every year
for one of the most ambitious CIA master plans for this
sensitive region.[31]

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29   Farr and Merriam, ed., n.28, p.74.

30   James Rupert, "Afghanistan's slide toward civil
        war", World Policy Journal (New York), vol.6,
        No.4, Fall 1989, p.760.

31   Patriot(New Delhi), 24 September 1991.

Egypt has been a major source of weapons.
Egypt is capable of manufacturing increasingly sophisticated
weapons which were finding their way into the hands of the
Afghan resistance. Large quantities of Soviet made weapons
were brought from the Egyptians and shipped to the
resistance group. "The United States sent the airplanes
and told me, please open your stores for us so that we can
give the Afghans the armaments they used to fight and I
gave the armaments".[32] President Anwar Sadat of Egypt
confirmed that this operation began days after the Soviet
intervention.

It is also believed that the countries like
Iran, Saudi Arabia, West European States, Israel, Libya
and North Korea were also involved. Some weapons destined
primarily for the Khomeinist Shiite groups entered Afghanistan
from Iran. Britain was supplying sophisticated surface to
air missiles to the Afghan rebels in collaboration with
the US, the cost and scope of which would make it one of
the biggest covert arms trade in recent decades.[33] Further,
several private organisations, sympathetic to the
Mujahideen cause, raised funds from various sources and
purchased weapons on the international market for the
Mujahideen.

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32   Urban Mark, War in Afghanistan(London, 1988)
        p. 57.

33   Indian Express(New Delhi), 18 June 1987.

Even though it is three years since Moscow withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, "the war in this benighted country drags on because of continued external support by way of cash and military supplies to the combatants".[34] Rich Arab countries are replacing the US as financiers. The rebel groups are also recruiting volunteers from Arab countries to fulfill their dream of an Islamic state. "The 'Islamic Victory', in turn, is attracting new funds through a 'shadowy network' of wealthy Arab donors. These private backers are now bankrolling specific battles and supporting an influx of non-Afghan Muslim volunteers ready to martyr themselves for the rebel cause".[35] Further the Mujahideen also gained from the recent Gulf War. Deliveries of the weapons commenced earlier the month of September 1991, and the bulk of it has been delivered to the Mujahideen. "Soviet-made T-62 tanks and other weaponry captured by the allied forces from the Iraqis during the Gulf War has been gifted to the Afghan Mujahideen.... It includes apart from the tanks, four barrel ZK-1, anti aircraft guns, 120 M.VC and 130 mm artillery prices and hand guns".[36]

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34   Times of India, 17 April 1991.

35   The Hindu (Madras), 3 December 1991.

36   Times of India, 24 September 1991.

Hence, Mujahideen's military capability has substantially improved with the inflow of sophisticated weapons from a number of sources. They now possess different quality of weapons like individual weapons, collective weapons and heavy weapons.[37]

The example of individual weapons are the English Lee-Enfield 303, its American equivalent the Garant, the Simon of rifle made in China, American rifle M-1, Kalashnikovs, PPsh (a somewhat rough and ready sub-machine gun), G-3 assault rifles, grenades like F-1, RDG-5, RG-42, RKG-3M, finally revolvers like Makarov and the Takarev. The collective weapons are like machine guns of 7.62 calibre: RPK, RPD, Goryunnov, rocket-launcher RPG-7 and the simplified version of RPG-2. Mujahideens also use heavy weapons such as 12.7 machine gun Dshk (known as dashaka), heavy 14.5 mm KPV/ZPU anti-aircraft machine guns with one, two or four barrels, 82 mm or 81 mm mortars, 75 mm Chinese, 7.3 and 82 mm Soviet recoilless guns, SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles and 120 mm mortars etc.

As substantial quantities of these arms and ammunition come in via Pakistan from various outside backers, notably US, China, Gulf countries etc., it is pertinent to

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37   Olivier Roy, n.26, p.185.

discuss here about Pakistan's middleman role in regulating the deliveries of arms to the Mujahideen group.

Pakistan's Middleman Role

Pakistan's role in the Afghan struggle has been the subject of bitter polemics. The 1,200 mile border Pakistan shares with Afghanistan became increasingly vulnerable to Afghan government and Soviet incursions. So as a key actor in the area, Pakistan has been the beneficiary of generous attention. As such its stability has become central to Western strategy and there has been an international response to provide military and economic support for a beleaguered Pakistan. Then Pakistan has been subjected to some pressure from a number of countries to support Afghan civil war and act as a conduit for material to the resistance movement.

"Arms deliveries to Afghan mercenaries are directed by a special coordinating committee of the council led by Mr. Brezezinski, and approved by President Carter. The arms are channelled through Pakistan. This is the most important effort of its kind...since the operation that aided the mercenaries fighting against the Afghan people".[38]

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38   The Undeclared War: Imperialism vs Afghanistan,
            cited in L Humanite(Moscow, 1980), 18 February
            1980, p.51.

Pakistan had profited enormously by being a major arms conduit. Weapons, thus, poured steadily. "They were shipped to Karachi and then loaded into heavy trucks which carried them to the Afghan frontier. Next, these arms were distributed among the Mujahideen's armies and units on Afghan territory. Weapons flooded and still flood in Afghanistan. They are delivered by caravans of as many as 600 camels, groups of two or three camels, donkeys, small Toyotas crossing into the country over the mountains or smuggled in over open roads".[39] The first ship carrying arms and ammunition for Peshawar arrived in Karachi from Britain in June 1979. These weapons, mostly Soviet made were bought by the CIA for the Mujahideen in the open market.

Pakistan has provided sanctuary to Afghan rebels and has become an accomplice in Western anti-Kabul schemes. Pakistani authorities prefer aiding Afghans who champion Pan-Islamic views to those parties emphasising nationalism and liable to revive the dream of an independent Pathan State.[40] An important role was assigned by the CIA of the

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39   Alexander Prokhanov, "Afghanistan", International Affairs(Moscow), No.8, August 1988, p.17.

40   Marvin G. Weinbaum,"The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation", Asian Survey, vol.29, No.3, March 1989, p.300.

US to Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) set
up by the then General Zia. Its work was liaison with
Afghan resistance groups and funnelling arms supplies to
them as well as for coordination of the armed units of
the resistance in Afghanistan territory. The ISI branch
is widely believed to micromanage the Mujahideen in
Peshawar.[41] The ISI routinly gives the Mujahideen weapons
only on the condition that they be used at particular
times and places, thereby seeking in this way to maintain
close control over guerrilla's political and military
activities. The ISI wants the turmoil to continue with
the hope that a pro-Pakistani regime might be installed
in Afghanistan giving Pakistan the foothold in central
Asia.

Further, Pakistan allows training facilities for
counter-revolutionaries in camps set up on its soil where
American and Chinese experts train rebels in guerrilla
warfare. These training centres were set up in order to
impart expertise in the handling of sophisticated weapons.
"According to a report by Pravda, there are interventionist
training centres in the areas of Peshawar, near the towns

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41   ibid, p.299.

of Miram Sahn, Bannu, Chitral Parachinar, Kohat and Yasin
in the NWFP, near Quetta, Pishin and Nushki in Baluchistan
and elsewhere".[42] On an average between 4,000 to 5,200
Afghans were being trained in Pakistan every year in the
techniques of guerrilla warfare.[43]

The Pakistani authorities not only permitted
foreign aids for the Mujahideen to be channelled through
Pakistan, but also organised their distribution to them.
In due course the arms, channelled through Pakistan for
the Mujahideen, started dispersing to the adjoining areas
of South Asian countries; thereby increased the potentiality
of civil violence.

Impact upon Pakistan:

For Pakistan, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan
presented a unique opportunity to closely link itself with
the foreign countries in order to get massive doses of
military and economic aid. But Pakistan's security
environment worsened and became more complex. Pakistan now
faces the socio-economic and political strains, being caused
by the presence of a large number of Afghan refugees on
its territory. And the frequency of the acts of civil
violence and terrorism within Pakistan has accelerated to
an alarming level.

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42   Perala Ratnam, Afghanistan's Uncertain Future
        (New Delhi, 1981), p.73.
43   Patriot, 18 January 1980.

Afghan refugees constitute a potentially destabilising nation within Pakistan. "A very small number of these refugees, estimated by the Government of Pakistan at around 1500, fled Afghanistan between 1973 to 1978 as political exiles from the Daoud regime. The vast majority, however, entered Pakistan in consequence of the coup d' etat on 27-28 April 1978, the subsequent Soviet invasion in late December of 1979, and the estimated escalation of hostilities between the Soviet-controlled Kabul government and resistance fighters. The bulk of these refugees live in official refugee camps located in NWFP and Baluchistan, both bordering Afghanistan. Several newer camps have been opened in the Punjab. Significant numbers of Afghan refugees also live outside refugee camps, either in the villages or the cities of Pakistan. The largest number of non-camp refugees are found in the city of Peshawar, located less than 40 km. from the Afghan border".[44]

Because of the presence of Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil and the continuing resistance inside Afghanistan, Pakistan was being drawn to the edge of civil violence. Refugees are regularly blamed for civil

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[44]   Farr and Merriam, ed., n.29, pp.160-3.

disorder. The refugees over the years developed vested interests. They got absolute freedom to move freely. With their free movement and because of their eagerness for money they started a traffic in arms. An increasing number of Afghans stationed in Pakistan were getting equipped with sophisticated arms out of the supplies meant for the rebels. Most of the Afghan refugees ask for arms rather than food.[45] These armed Afghans lead to civil war with the Punjabis and the Sindhis on one side, and the Pathan, both Pakistani and Afghan, on the other.[46] US weapons supplied to the Afghan Mujahideen are being freely used by the leaders of the Mohajir movement and Afghans in Karachi and Hyderabad.[47] The refugees also upset the existing sectarian balance in Pakistan. For example, the refugees settlements in Kurram Agency not only altered the existing sectarian but also increased the tensions between two sects.

Further, the agents of Afghan Intelligence Service, Khad, have been extremely active in creating riots in refugee villages and generating antagonism

45   The Hindu, 23 January 1983.

46   P.B. Sinha, "The Afghan Problem", IDSA Journal (New Delhi), vol.16, No.2, Oct-Dec. 1983, p.127.

47   Patriot, 10 November 1986.

between the refugees and locals. They come into Pakistan
in the guise of refugees with the object of spying and
creating tensions. Khad works in close collaboration
with KGB, the Russian intelligence agency. Also, both
have been responsible for periodic bomb blasts in areas
of civilian concentration. "More air raids take place
now than before. Bombs are planted by KGB agents in
public places, especially Peshawar, where a large number
of refugees are living".[48]

In the present days there is the easy availability
of large quantities of smuggled and unauthorised weapons
and ammunition in Pakistan. The Afghan rulers have
continuously supplied arms to certain tribes in Pakistani
territory with a view to establish a sympathetic tribal
militia. Further, since both Pakistani officials involved
as well as Afghan leaders are serving as conduit for the
weapon supplies to the resistance groups, it is alleged
that much of these arms are siphoned off by them and sold
on the black market for personal profit.

"The arms supplied by the U.S. to the rebels
might find their way to illegal markets like the Sohrab
Goth market in the outskirts of Karachi in Pakistan which

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48   Mohammad Es' Haq, n.25, p.129.

sparked-off ethnic riots and civil violence.

It now appears that "Bara" market in Pakistan have reached a saturation point".[49] "While accusing the CIA of gross mismanagement of the arms pipeline to Mujahideen the US Congressmen emphasised that 40 percent of the total arms aid is siphoned off along the way by corrupt officials, Afghan leaders and Mujahideen".[50]

Thus the anarchy of the Afghan conflict threatened to engulf Pakistan, where arms are plentiful and civil violence and riots are now commonplace.

Repercussions on India:

The arms and ammunition , reportedly being shipped across Pakistani rugged 1200 mile frontier with Afghanistan, do not necessarily find their way to Afghanistan. A large part of the weapons, now, find its way into the hands of the anti-India extremist groups operating from Pakistan. The India-Pakistan border from Kashmir to Kutch is as porous as it has always been.

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49   Syed Ziaullah, "The Afghan Accord-Dangerous
        Implications", Democratic World (New Delhi),
        vol.17, No.17, 24 April 1988, p.10.

50   Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan
        War on Pakistan", Strategic Digest, vol.18,
        No.4, 1988, p.533.

A grim reality facing India is the backwash of the Afghan conflict, represented by weapons getting through to terrorist groups here in India.[51] Even, the Indian terrorists are being given training in the use of these weapons in camps outside Peshawar.

The weapons, acquired by the Mujahideen from foreign countries, have found their way into the hands of the Punjab terrorists. After the arms reach the Pakistan border couriers are responsible for delivering the cache to Punjab. There are already reports of the stinger missiles and rockets supplied by the U.S. to Mujahideen, being used in strife-torn Punjab. Also, numerous weapons recovered from the Khalistani extremists which bore the Chinese and Russian marking, the same as the weapons with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. It is generally felt that the rockets, rocket-launchers and AK-47 rifles that the Punjab militants have acquired may have come from the Afghan refugees. Mujahideen with their huge stockpile of arms may introduce an entirely new element to the Punjab tangle.[52] In the training bases for the Mujahideen also Khalistani Commando Force (KCF) activists get training.

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51   Times of India, 3 February 1992.

52   Ash Narain Roy, "Soviet Pull-out: Implications
        for the Region", Link(New Delhi), vol.30, No.39,
        1 May 1988, p.19.

Our ex-Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, had rightly
warned that this U.S. arms to Mujahideen posed a great
threat to India as "he was not sure that all the weapons
being supplied to the rebels were reaching them. His
implication was that much of these were falling into the
hands of the terrorists operating in Punjab".[53]

There is also the increasing role of Afghan
Mujahideen in the other parts of India. The Afghans
are believed to be training Kashmiris from the valley.
They are also sending arms and ammunition to the
terrorists and brainwashing them with anti-India Islamic
fundamentalism. Afghan Mujahideen are better trained in
sophisticated arms and guerrilla warfare than the
Kashmiri militants to suit Pakistan's purposes in Jammu
and Kashmir. Afghans because of their complexion and
appearance can easily pass off as Kashmiris which factor,
apart from the factor of their intensive training and
easy availability, may be the primary reason for Pakistan's
preference for them.[54] Pakistan's plans to smuggle in
10,000 armed subversives acquires considerable significance

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53   Patriot, 22 April 1988.

54   Blitz (Bombay), 7 July, 1990.

when viewed from the angle that the plan could well be to

infiltrate Afghans posing as Kashmiris, in batches, on a

large scale.[55] Dr. Najibullah, ex-President of Afghanistan,

made a pointed reference that a close linkage is now

being knitted between the Kashmiri terrorists and a section

of Afghan Mujahideen through the good offices of Pakistan.[56]

Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)

acts as a coordinator of any links among the Afghan

Mujahideen and violent groups in Punjab and Jammu and

Kashmir. B.R. Bhagat, a former Parliament Member, said,

"there is a nexus between Afghan rebels, Jammu and Kashmir

Liberation Front, Punjab terrorists and the ISI of Pakistan".[57]

It is learnt that the arms meant for Mujahideen

are now getting dispersed by them to the violent groups

within India. Till now 30 percent of the arms meant for

the Afghan rebels have entered Punjab. And it aggravates

the tension of civil violence inside the country. Thus the

rush of more weapon dispersals to the rebels, though it is

through Pakistan, is fraught with grave consequences.

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55   ibid, 30 June 1990.

56   National Herald (New Delhi), 6 September 1990.

57   ibid, 6 April 1989.

A perusal of the above description shows that South Asia, more particularly Pakistan and India, is the worst affected area in this context. Since the Soviet invasion large quantities of small arms and ammunition have flooded in South Asia, which have been available against cash payment or for services rendered. Here, Mujahideen embarked upon a course of action which resulted in the horizontal proliferation of weapons in South Asia. Thus the Mujahideen is very much responsible in dispersing small arms and training facilities to the various secessionist movements in the adjoining areas of the region which sparks off intra-state and inter-state civil violence.

THE DRUG MAFIA

South Asia is a major region where drug production, trafficking, insurgency and terrorism go hand in hand. In South Asia drugs have permeated every layer of society and increasingly the social and political structures are getting dominated by the drug mafia. The unique geographical frontiers of this subcontinent is very much prone to subversion. The long open border, both on the east and west, provides an unlimited scope to the drug mafia to carry on its nefarious operation rather freely. Drug trafficking is a transnational phenomenon, for their operations involve transactions that regularly flow across

national boundaries. And the transnational drug 'cartels' pose severe threat to national and international security.

The illegal drug production and drug trafficking are linked closely to the illegal arms trade and international terrorism. Since militants need a lot of money to buy arms, they find drug smuggling the best way to make money. Side by side, the drug smugglers sell arms to the extremist groups. "The clandestine arms market and the drug mafia both travel along the same route and sustain each other in causing havoc and destruction".[58] This has been amply proved time and again in South Asian region which have been the victims of civil violence. As the drug mafia is too well organised for this job, it would be evident from the following narrative.

Drug Trafficking Network in South Asia:

The cultivation and refinement of drugs, enmeshed with drug trafficking, has profoundly affected the basic social and political structure of South Asian region. The first group of drug traffickers in a world map were perhaps the Chinese and Arab traders who carried on the trade of opium some 3000 years ago along the Silk Route, connecting the Far Eastern Chinese city of Sanghai to Turkish town of

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58   M.H. Askari, "Pakistan's Security and Drugs/ Arms Mafia", Strategic Digest, vol.17, No.12, December 1987, p.2304.

Constantinople. Drug trafficking was not a major concern then. But at the turn of this century it poses a serious problem. And the drug production and trafficking are major concern in the Continent of Asia.

In the continent of Asia two major drug production and trafficking routes operate. The first one is the Golden Triangle, comprising of Myanmar (previous Burma), Laos and Thailand. "The Golden Triangle is bounded by the Mae Sai and Mekong rivers at the point where the borders of Laos, Thailand and Burma meet, creating a virtually unpoliced territory of about 75,000 sq. miles. Here the topographical and climatic conditions are ideal for the cultivation of opium".[59]

On the other hand, the 'Golden Crescent', which cuts across Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, have been the world's major producing area. The geopolitical environment of the Golden Crescent is largely similar to that of the Golden Triangle. "The region has been traditionally autonomous with a tribal system of government prevailing in most parts whether it be eastern Afghanistan or Western Pakistan. These tribes have been

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59   Ravi Shastri, "Insurgency and Drugs: The Deadly
        Alliance", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.12,
        No.1, April 1987, p.41.

virtually independent. Opium cultivation and use has been an ancient custom of the region. Moreover, most poppy growers in the Golden Crescent, as in the Golden Triangle, have realised that larger profits are to be made by refining opium themselves. Thus heroin laboratories have sprung upon both in the Crescent as they did earlier in the Triangle".[60]

When the Golden Triangle was the nerve centre of the narcotics trade, it was also bedevilled by a series of insurgencies. The "Golden Triangle" connection gradually weakened in the early 1970s.[61] But, quite clearly, in the late 1970s there developed a sudden increase in drug trafficking from the "Golden Crescent" area. "The only significant development in the area in the middle of 1978 - when the reported spurt in drug trafficking from the Pak-Afghan border started - was the beginning of the Afghan insurgency in the wake of the 'Saur revolution' of April 1978".[62] The aid and support being extended by various countries to the rebel groups in Afghanistan have been contributing indirectly to the increase in drug trade. Further, since the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the closure of the westward shipping route, Pakistan and India

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60   ibid, pp.42-43.

61   Times of India, 18 June 1982.

62   ibid.

of South Asian region have become major transhipment points
for Golden Crescent heroin.[63]

The Case of Pakistan:

In South Asian region, Pakistan is one of the
worst victims of the drug mafias' operation. The illicit
trafic in drugs is Pakistan's most profitable business today.
Pakistan with their penetration of state institutions and
the economy, the drug mafia today are the most formidable
force threatening the very roots of Pakistan society. A
new drug culture emerged leaving its deep imprint on the
national fabric. The international drug dealers have turned
Pakistan into their main "laboratory" (for processing their
raw materials into heroin).

There were three factors which contributed to this
development.[64] Firstly, with the downfall of the Shah of
Iran, heavy penalties were imposed on those engaged in
drug production and sale. Secondly, "with the continued
statement on the Afghan warfront, the Pak-Afghan border
region is turning into the world's largest and most access-
ible heroin and hashish market".[65] As the Mujahideen
organised their holy war from Pakistan, they looked for

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63   Ravi Shastri, n.59, p.50.

64   M.H. Askari, n.58, p.2304.

65   Ahmed Rashid, "Drug Bazaars", Herald(Karachi),
        vol.2.1, No.4, April 1990, p.68.

possible source of funding. The rebels make their money
of the sale of drugs. So the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
became the likely spot for large scale drug production.
The Afghan war resulted in the influx of three million
refugees which encouraged drug production. Afghanistan
has traditionally been the largest cultivation of poppy
in the region. In certain areas of Afghanistan opium
cultivation is flourishing. Many of the refugees streaming
into Pakistan have brought opium seed with them.[66] The
region along the Afghanistan-Pak border has long been
settled by Nomadic tribes, "where due to a complex
combination of factors like the tribal code of honour,
inefficiency of Islamabad's writ over these areas and the
generation of high profits that new high value narcotic
substances like heroin bring, the refining process continues
without any disturbance".[67] Thirdly, United States mainly
under the pressure from its NATO allies began to offer
heavy subsidies to Turkey as an inducement for eradicating
poppy cultivation. Until then Turkey had been the major
producer of poppy which in fact was one of its major cash
crops.

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66   New York Times, 31 July 1980.

67   Aabha Dixit, "Narcotics Plague Pak Society",
        Prout(New Delhi), vol.3, No.17, 8-14 June 1991,
        p.32.

As a consequent to these factors the drug produced in Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey began to be pushed into the tribal region along Pakistan's NWFP. The NWFP is the heartland of the Golden Crescent, an opium-growing area stretching across Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Dozens of small drug markets have sprung up just inside the tribal belt.

The narcotic is now produced in Baluchistan, Peshawar and Karachi for sale in the international market. In the Chagai district of Baluchistan at least 12 refineries now operate.[68] In Chagai district the town of Dalbandin is considered the largest trading point for most of the heroin produced in the border areas of Afghanistan like Wilayat district in Hilmand valley.[69] The Girdi jungle, where the Afghan refugees have been settling, is also mentioned as another major heroin processing and storage point.[70] "Other areas detected include Okar Camp, Posti Camp and Barabachah. Another major area stretches from Anam Bostai to Malik Siah Koh on the border with Iran. In the NWFP, the main areas of drug cultivation are the

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68   Nirmal Mitra, "The Heroin Highway", Sunday (Calcutta), vol.16, No.19, 9-15 April 1989, p.30.

69   Aabha Dixit, "Narco-Power: Threatening the very roots of Pak Society", Strategic Analysis, vol.14, No.2, May 1991, p.195.

70   ibid, p.195.

Golden Area. Bannu Malakand Agency and Dir and the major
heroin laboratories are located in Khyber Agency".[71]
Sohrab Goth, Shah Faisal Colony, Natha Khan Goth and
Malir have become centres for drug trade. "Most of the
drugs reaching Lahore come principally through two
routes - Bannu-Kohat-Di Khan-Mianwali-Sargodha-Faisalabad-
Bhai Peru and the GT Road-Narang Mandi-Kalakhatai-Balkey
routes".[72] In Peshawar powerful drug mafias frequently
deposit money in various banks of Europe and write to
the bank to wire funds to their accounts in Pakistan in
order to avoid moving cash in bulk. Further, the involve-
ment of politicians and senior military officers in drug
business reveals the extent to which the drug mafia has
entrenched itself into Pakistan.

Thus the establishment of heroin laboratories
in Pakistan sparked a productivity explosion which flooded
world markets with relatively inexpensive and high quality
heroin. And if this is so, perhaps Pakistan shall one
day have the dubious distinction of becoming the Panama
of the east where the rulers will dance to the tune of
the narco mafias.[73]

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71   ibid, p.195.

72   Aabha Dixit, n.67, p.33.

73   Zahid Hussain, "Narco Power: Pakistan's Parallel
        Government", Strategic Digest, vol.20, No.6,
        June 1990, p.2515.

India: A Transit Point:

The decade of the eighties saw the emergence
of India as a major transit point for the trafficking
of illicit heroin. The reasons for India becoming a
major point in the trafficking route are obvious. India
is flanked on either side by the world's largest illicit
hereoin producing countries. To its West lies the
Golden Crescent, and on the east lies the Golden Triangle.
Such close proximity to the producing areas   means drugs
cannot help but pass through India. As a result of this,
New Delhi, Bombay and Madras became major trans-shipment
points for illicit drugs. Hereoin was brought to these
centres by road and then moved to the West by air and sea.

Most of the hereoin and opium seized in India
has been flowing from Northern Pakistan across the Indo-
Pakistan bordern in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan
and the Gujrat region. "The main route now is Peshawar
to Lahore to Amritsar to New Delhi to Bombay. The drug
mafia have taken to this route after the Khomeini
regime's crackdown in Iran, strict control of poppy
cultivation in Turkey and the civil war in Afghanistan".[74]

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74   Democratic World, vol.15, No.35, 31 August 1986,
      p.8.

Drug is cultivated in class one agricultural fields of South Kashmir particularly in some pockets of Anantnag and Pulwama districts.[75]

There have been an alarming rise in the cultivation of opium and in the smuggling of heroin and brown sugar in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Opium is cultivated in Kalrayanmali, Kollimald, Kumbakkalmalai in Tamil Nadu and in the Idukki district of Kerala.[76] Also, drugs produced in Kumbakkalmalai near Munnar reach international markets through two routes. One is via Manjappatty, Amaravaty, Udumalpet to Coimbatore and the other is through Vattavada, Kodaikkanal and Rameswaram. Sri Lankan Tamils also were responsible for the rise in the illegal business of drug peddling.

The India-Myanmar border in the north-east has long been a transit point for drug trafficking. Heroin and opium are known to flow from Myanmar to India periodically along the jungle routes. Much of the border between Myanmar and four north-east Indian states of Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh passes through deep jungle and hilly terrain which makes patrolling extremely

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75   India Speaks, vol.2, No.41, 9 October 1989, p.22.

76   ibid, vol.13, No.38, 18 September 1990, p.23.

difficult. "The north-east customs collection Ramesh
Bhattacharji has identified a few major transit points:
Moreh, Behang and Churachandpur in Manipur; Tamu and
Tiddim on the opposite side of the border in Burma; Champai
in Mizoram; Phek in Nagaland; and Lekhapani Lido near
Dibrugarh (Upper Assam). From these towns Burmese heroin
is couriered to Calcutta, New Delhi, Bombay and Siliguri.
A major chunk of Burmese white sugar passes via Siliguri
to a town called Darrang in Nepal and from there to
Kathamandu and foreign destinations".[77]

Of late, Manipur has developed into a nerve
centre for smuggling, a conduit for the movement of drugs
and contraband across the border. The enforcement agencies
point out four major routes through which heroin pours into
Manipur from Myanmar.[78] The oldest and most commonly used
route is National Highway No.39 which passes through Imphal-
Pallel-Tengnoupal and stops at Moreh, the infamous town of
Manipur. The second route is Tiddim road which enters
South Manipur through Behiang village near Boundary Pillar
No.64 and comes to Imphal via Churachandpur. The third
route is along the banks of Manipur river through Chingnun-
ghoot and comes to Imphal via Seron-Sugnu and Mayang Imphal.

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77   Indranil Banerjie, "Target: Narco-Terrorism",
        Sunday, vol.15, No.23, 1-7 May 1988, p.75.

78   Arun Irengbam, "Manipur: Outpost of Drug
        Corruption", Link, vol.32, No.43, 3 June 1990, p.5.

The fourth route is through the new Somtal village and comes upto Imphal via Zoupi-Mombi-Chakpikarong-Seron-Churachandpur. The drug mafias of India and Myanmar take the advantage of an international law which allows tribals living within the 20km belt on both sides of the Indo-Myanmar border to travel freely without permits.

Hence the conduit for drug supply to India has been increasing and attempts to plug the inflow have been conspicuous failures. Also,there have been increasing the linkages between drug mafias and various separatist and secessionist groups.

The drug production and drug trafficking have been so rampant that the huge quantities of drugs passing through South Asian region have had a spill over effect. The drug mafias represent a strong organisation which has the money and arms to strike whenever and wherever it wants to. Thus develops 'narco-terrorism' which is very much prevalent in South Asian region and giving rise to civil violence.

Drug Mafias and Dispersal of Arms:

In South Asia there have been a close nexus between drugs and terrorists. The extremist groups are believed to be indulging in a two-way trade involving drugs

and arms. The development of the arms-trafficker-drug
peddler nexus is further strengthened by the political
linkages. South Asia's problem of narco-terrorism is
directly linked to the Afghan war. This civil war in
Afghanistan transformed the entire scenario of South
Asia, as a result the drug mafia emerged strong and
developed close connections with the arms dealer.

The violence in Pakistan are mainly the product
of the arms-traffickers-drug mafia nexus. The drug culture
in Pakistan could not have flourished had it not been in
league with the arms trade that got a tremendous spurt
during the Afghan war.[79] The easy availability of weapons
to the drug mafias has made the culture of Kalashnikovs
take firm root in Pakistan. An illicit drug trafficking
also requires illegal armed protection. This provided
incentive to increase illegal arms production in NWFP and
Baluchistan area of Pakistan. Sohrab Goth, a suburb in
Karachi, has become an Afghan smugglers' bazaar, notorious
for gun-running and dope peddling. Sohrab Goth is a
strategic staging post on the road that brings both arms
and drugs to Karachi - the mafia that controls the arms
bazaar and the drug trade that controls the transporters,

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79   Aabha Dixit, n.69, p.190.

land grabbers, the slum dwellers as well as the garganthuan job market of Karachi. In fact, dozens of small markets had sprung up in the tribal areas, where the writ of the Pakistan government law still does not extend.[80] Pathan tribesmen openly sold drugs side by side with AK-47 and other weapons. Proliferation of drug laboratories in Pakistan also marked the proliferation of trade in clandestine arms in the country. The clandestine arms bazaar and drug mafia is no longer confined to Pakistan. It has also spread to other parts of South Asia.

India is directly affected by the situation in Afghanistan that has led to increased drug production coupled with the flow of sophisticated small arms, missiles and explosives into the hands of irresponsible people and terrorists. Drug peddlers provide funds and arms to various violent groups in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and North-east part of India. The heroin boom in the Golden Crescent Zone is closely linked with the escalation of violence in Punjab. Drugs and arms link the Punjab terrorists to the Mujahideen of Afghanistan and their link-men in Afghanistan. In these drugs for arms deals, they reportedly convey drugs in return for arms.[81] Further, Indian insurgents have been persuaded to courier heroin along with arms and ammunition into the North-east.

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80   Ahmed Rashid, n.65, p.68.

81   Patriot, 21 January 1987.

The most disturbing feature of the drug business
in Tamil Nadu and Kerala is the involvement of the LTTE
of Sri Lanka. The LTTE is interested in the drug business
in Kerala for two reasons: Firstly, for illegal pipe
money i.e. the local expression for foreign exchange
smuggled into the State by the Gulf Malayalees and
secondly, for the availability of large areas for opium
cultivation.[82] The LTTE militants buy the Gulf currencies
from the Malayalees working in the Arab countries in
exchange of Indian currency to finance their arms purchased
abroad. As the LTTE and other Sri Lankan Tamil militants
need a lot of money to buy arms they find drug smuggling
the best way to make money. Sri Lankan Tamils were
responsible for the rise in the illegal business of drug
peddling.

Thus the production and processing of narcotic
drugs, rampant drug trafficking and the dispersal of arms
by drug mafias pose a formidable challenge to the South
Asian security. The cultivation and refinement of drugs,
enmeshed as it is with the ever strengthening linkage with
the illegal arms dispersal to various militant groups, has
profoundly affected the basic structure of South Asian

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82   India Speaks, vol.3, No.38, 18 September 1990,
            p.22.

countries. The arms dispersal by trannational drug
'cartels' have become such a powerful force in South
Asian politics that it has been primarily responsible
for the development of the virus of civil violence into
a full blown epidemic.

OVERSEAS REMITTANCES.

The aim of the country which sponsores and
abets violent groups can range from destabilisation
and weakening of a governmental authority to the break
up of the existing social and political order in the
target country. On the other hand, the violent groups or
organisations require external resources to carry on
their activities. External support has frequently been
demonstrated as a crucial factor for the survival of the
terrorist groups. Modern weapons are expensive so the
rebel organisations need friendly outside help. The
outside country provides financial help, often through
voluntary organisations or emigrants, weapons, trainings,
safe sanctuaries and other facilities. In this respect,
the situation in South Asia is relevant where the terrorist
organisations have a close relationship with foreign
countries and the overseas remittance plays a significant
role in escalating civil violence in the region.

Overseas Remittance and Arms Dispersal:

The overseas remittance to the various rebel groups inside South Asia create a major threat to the civil order of the region. In India, the violent organisations have developed an excellent rapport with foreign-based organisations and government. The core of the situation in India is that the foreign countries are providing funds, sophisticated weapons, safe sanctuaries to the militants without any hesitation.

The violent groups functioning inside India are "homo fighters"[83] of a kind who have been motivated and sponsored for an armed struggle from outside. Pakistan is getting more deeply involved in the Punjab region of India. Sophisticated weapons are channelised from across the Pakistan border. Couriers are responsible for delivering the cache to Punjab rebel groups from Pakistan. The couriers receive Rs.2000/- for every Chinese rifle smuggled into Punjab. Militants were given proper and advanced training in preparing and handling of sophisticated arms and explosives . "There are two Sikh organisations which are now in operation in Pakistan: the Watan Dead Company and the Punjab Company.... It is also

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83   Illustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 3-9 August
            1991, p.7.

known that along with Field Intelligence Unit (FIU), the
apex Pakistani intelligence body, the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI), is also being utilised for the arms
training and control these two companies".[84]

The problem in the State of Punjab has gone
much beyond Pakistani involvement. The rebel groups
get substantial financial support from the United Kingdom,
the U.S.A. and Canada based organisations. The U.K.-
based Bhai Amrik Singh Shahidi Jatha,affiliated with this
organisation,has been sending financial assistance to
Sikh militants, their family members and army deserters.[85]

American CIA and Pakistan ISI have close ties with
Punjab separatists. The ISI of Pakistan plays an active
role in distributing funds to the violent groups. Surinder
Singh Bhinder, an extremist, had been frequently visiting
Pakistan for handing over to the Sikh extremists, based in
Pakistan, the funds collected by Sikh organisations based
in West Europe for the purchase of arms and ammunition.[86]

The most revealing testimony is that of Mohan
Inder Singh Sachdev alias Pushpinder Singh, who was
affiliated to International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF),

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84   Ritu Sarin, "The Pakistan Connection", Sunday, vol.
            15, No.19, 3-9 April 1988, p.60.

85   Times of India, 15 March 1992.

86   ibid, 16 October 1991.

Canada.[87] This youngman travelled to Nepal, Thailand,
the USA, Canada and Pakistan to scheme and plot against
India, collect funds and arrange arms supplies. Under
interrogation he disclosed that a consignment of arms
worth US $ 2.5 lakhs was sent to Pakistan by ISYF for
onward trans-shipment to Punjab. He also gave the
details of a quarter million dollars collected in the
USA to purchase the most sophisticated weapons from UK.

The splendid valley of Kashmir is a hotbed of
conspiracies and intrigues now. The present form of
Pakistani intervention in Kashmir has been unprecedented.
The Islamic factor has been considerable in swaying the
Kashmiris in their quest for a separate identity. "It is
reported that some $ 300 million worth of foreign currency
is brought into Pak-Occupied Kashmir (POK) from West Asia
every year. Most of which is used by Pakistanis. Though
they have earlier been financing the militants and
separatists throughout covertly. It is understood that
three fourths of the ISI budget has been diverted to the
cause of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir recently".[88]

Pakistan is being supported by the countries of the
organisation of Islamic countries. Iran and Saudi Arabia

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87   Mainstream, vol.26, No.39, 9 July 1988.

88   Chandra B. Khanduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir
        Problem and An Approach to Solution", Strategic
        Analysis, vol.13, No.6, September 1990, p.641.

supported the Pakistani propaganda of the so-called war of independence in Jammu and Kashmir. Their involvement is deeper in fomenting trouble by way of providing funds and arms to the rebel groups. Foreign-based organizations such as World Kashmir Freedom Movement (WKFM), the Kashmir American Council (KAC) and the Kashmir Association of North America, place resources at their disposal ranging from weapons to intelligence to money.

Money and arms began to flow into the sensitive area of North-eastern part of India, thereby created civil violence. China remits funds and supply weapons to the violent groups. Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and some foreign based organisations provide adequate help to such groups. The Naga rebels have their bases in northern and Western part of Myanmar. They procure funds and arms from abroad through Bangladesh. They have established a permanent liaison post in Bangladesh from where they receive arms consignments procurred from various Kampuchean outfits and shipped in from Thailand.[89]

Pakistan's involvement in arming and funding the People's Liberation Army of Manipur has come to notice. Due to financial help given by Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka the insurgents are now equipped with rocket launchers, AK-47s and other sophisticated arms.[90]

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89   Times of India, 7 July 1991.

90   ibid, 3 September 1991.

A "foreign hand" in United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA) activities is evident. ULFA cadres cross
into China via Myanmar for training and equipments,
Chinese have been supplying funds and selling arms like
M-16 and AK-47 assault rifles to them at rock-bottom prices.
Pakistan's embassy in Dhaka has apparently been providing
arms and funds to the Front. Also, the improvised explosive
devices captured by the army from ULFA camps are mostly
those made by LTTE. Besides, ULFA cadres have close nexus
with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Britain and USA.

Over the last few years Tamil rebel groups
have indeed become a fearful proposition in Sri Lanka.
Since colossal amounts of money is needed to better arm
and train the extremists, Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) developed overseas contacts.

The LTTE are well funded by expatriate Tamils.
The sources of finance are Tamil businessmen in Singapore
and those running tin business and rubber plantations in
Malaysia.[91] The Tamils of USA, in particular those in
Boston, began funnelling money to young Tamil leaders in
Jaffna to demand a separate country, Eelam.[92] They, also,
received funds from non-resident Tamils in Canada, the UK

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91   Times of India, 9 June 1991.

92   Sunday, vol.14, No.24, 3-9 May 1987, p.15.

and Australia. This remittance of funds made it possible
for the Tamil violent groups to travel world over to
purchase small arms and to obtain military training.
India remained a big source of money for the LTTE. The
State of Tamil Nadu, India, has been used by the LTTE to
raise money through a variety of means, especially ransom,
bank robberies and cultural programmes.

The violent groups in Sri Lanka are accused of
using sophisticated weapons. The arms, having North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Israeli mark, have
been shipped to the LTTE via Singapore. "Arms are often
bought in Europe, through Taiwan or Hong-Kong-based
traders, then shipped to Singapore where bills of loading
and containers are changed and are then transferred to
smaller boats on high seas near Sri Lanka".[93] Traditionally
fishermen formed an important groups of couriers. Now the
LTTE uses the fast-moving boats that covers the distance
between Point Calimere and Sri Lanka in less than 30 minutes.
LTTE consolidated itself militarily using Tamil Nadu as a
conduit for smuggling arms obtained from sources abroad.

For the self-taught in the use of sophisticated
weapons, LTTE cadres were sent abroad. They were sent to
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and to mercenary

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93   Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.14, No.5, 1 July
        1991, p.11.

outfits in the USA for training in guerrilla warfare.
"Tigers had carefully cultivated links with Arab extremist
groups in Lebanon and at least 200 Tigers had been trained
by Palestine splinter groups".[94] Tamil Nadu, also,
harbours many rebel camps in which the Tamil militants
are undergoing training.

Of late, Pakistan has become a hospitable
environment for civil violence. And overseas remittance
intensify such violence. Afghan government and its
intelligence agency, Khad, was sometimes involved. Khad
was involved in dispersing funds and weapons to such
groups only for the reason of Pakistan's involvement in
fomenting civil war in Afghanistan. A lot of weapons are
a fall out of the Afghan war. A large number of sophisticated
weapons passed into the hands of the rebel groups in Sindh
and Karachi area. Further Russia had been involved in
supplying funds and small arms to the violent groups.
Iran, also, supply arms to Shias in Pakistan. Secret
camps are run by proclaimed offenders to train people in
handling such sophisticated arms.

"Sheikh Rashid, the Information Advisor to the
Prime Minister of Pakistan, attributed the spurt in violence
to the Al Zulfiqar, purported a Pakistani Afghanistan-based

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94   <u>Times of India</u>, 3 June 1991.

terrorist organization and also to India's RAW and the
Afghanistan's Khad ..... the RAW and Khad have been
frequent whipping boys of Pakistan in relation to its
frequently erupting internal situation".[95]

Bangladesh has been very often preoccupied with
civil violence. There have been continuous fighting
between the Bangladesh army and the Shanti Bahini, the
armed wing of the Chakmas. Shanti Bahini activists are
based in Tripura and Mizoram.

It is evident from the above account that
overseas remittance plays an important role in arms
dispersal in South Asian region. The violent groups,
basking under the patronage of foreign countries, have
converted the State into their fiefdom showing scant
regard for the local populace or the law and thereby
create civil disorder in the region as a whole.

Thus the above four factors in arms dispersal
constitute an extreme challenge to national security in
the South Asian region.

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95   Major General M.L. Popli, "Will Sindh go the
          Bangladesh ways", Link(New Delhi), vol.33,
          No.49, 14 July 1991, p.5.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

South Asia includes seven states - India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and
Maldives. Most of the countries in South Asia have
been facing acute crises of nation building which
have far-reaching repercussions for the region as a
whole. "A peculiar characteristic of the Southern
Asian region is the manner in which the intra-regional
and domestic dimensions of regional conflict have become
inextricably linked".[1] India is facing major problems
with nation building in such areas as Punjab, Kashmir
and Assam. Pakistan has been contending with Sindhi,
Baluch and Pathan subnationalism. The conflict between
the Sinhalese and the Tamils continues in Sri Lanka.
Bangladesh is under the threat of the Chakmas. Thus
civil violence is the order of the day in South Asian
region. The present situation is partially a legacy
of the past. And a future cannot be called-into-being
bereft of linkages with the past heritage.[2]

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1   Alka Acharya, "Regional Conflict and Security in
     the 1990s: The Case of South Asia", Strategic
     Analysis (New Delhi), vol.13, No.11, February 1991,
     p.1254.

2   Rasheeduddin Khan, "Challenges of Communalism",
     World Focus (New Delhi), vol.10, No.11-12, 1990,
     p.29.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

"Most South Asians had a common historical experience for several hundred years under the Muslim Mughal dynasty and then under the British, which, in turn, had been both superimposed on and influenced by the dominant Hindu Indo-Aryan culture that has thrived in the subcontinent for at least three millennia".[3]

Mughal rule began when Babur defeated a declining Delhi Sultanate in 1526 at Panipat. But the empire began to decline after the death of the sixth emperor Aurangzeb in 1707. Notwithstanding, it was Mughals who set up a major aspect of the administrative system that the British would follow later: the division of the territory into provinces and districts.

In the meantime, the British were rapidly consolidating their position. "Unlike the earlier situation the Western (particularly the British) colonial era was far more pervasive and penetrative, not merely in terms of institutional structures but also in the

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3   Werner J. Feld, and Gavin Boyd, ed., Comparative
        Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North
        America, The Middle East, and Developing Countries
        (New York, 1980), p.237.

realm of ideas and ideologies".[4] For almost two
centuries South Asia was under the domination of Great
Britain, as the Indian empire, the crown colony of
Ceylone (now Sri Lanka) and the protectorates over
Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives.

The struggle for liberation from British colonial
rule promoted nationalism as a major stream of conscious-
ness. This was later shot to be weakened and subverted
by communalism. Hence nationalism and communalism were
pitted against each other and interacted one with the
other during the different phases of the freedom struggle.
The first half of the twentieth century was characterised
by a powerful anti-imperialist movement in the territories.
The British policy of 'Divide and Rule' strengthened
communalism to counterbalance the nationalist demands.

In 1905, the British administration, under Lord
Curzon, partitioned the province of Bengal of the Indian
Empire into two provinces. The ostensible reason for the
division was administrative convenience. The partition
was opposed by the Hindus, whereas the Muslims praised
the step. In 1911, under the mounting pressure of Hindu
agitation, the Bengal partition was annuled. In 1906,

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4   Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-building in
     South Asia(New Delhi, 1990), p.31.

the Muslim League Party was founded at Dacca. "This
Muslim political body was later to articulate Muslim
separatist sentiment into a concrete and coherent
movement for a separate Muslim homeland in India and
thus successfully challenge the Congress claim to be
the sole representative political organisation of all
Indian people".[5] In the year 1909 Marley-Minto Reforms
was delivered by the British rulers which granted separate
electorates. Thus, Muslims voted for and were represented
by Muslims and Sikhs for and by Sikhs. Further, the
collapse of the Khilafat agitation was followed by
renewed Hindu-Muslim misgivings. "From this point once
again the communal tension hightened, resulting in a
marked increase in Hindu-Mulsim riots. Dr. Ambedkar,
the maker of India's post-independence constitution, in
a published analysis of communal disturbances between
1920 and 1930, described the period as one of 'civil war
between Hindus and Muslims, interrupted by brief intervals
of armed peace'".[6]

A "communal award" made by the then British Prime
Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, in 1932 continued the system
of separate electorates and set the ratios of seats for
each community at the centre and in each province. The

5   Khoo Kay Kim, ed., The History of South-East, South
     and East Asia: Essays and Documents (Kuala Lumpur,
     1977), p.283.
6   ibid.

development of 1937 caused Hindus and Muslims to move
still further apart. This was the general election for
provincial legislatives held under the Government of
India Act of 1935. The Congress won a clear majority.
In 1939, when the Congress cabinets resigned en-masse
on the issue of India's participation in the Second
World War, the Muslim League observed a 'day of deliver-
ance'. At the Lahore session in March 1940, the League
passed its famous 'Pakistan Resolution' which settled
the issue of India's independence, as far at least as
Muslims were concerned, namely, that an independent
India had to be an India divided between Hindus and
Muslims.[7] Taking its stance on a separatist plank, the
League was able to capture an overwhelming majority of
the seats reserved for Muslim candidates in the election
of 1946. "The communal polarization reflected in the
election of 1946 constituted the backdrop to the tripartite
negotiations between the British government, the Congress
and the League about the modalities of imperial with-
drawal from India; and the emergence of (an) independent
polity/polities in the region".[8] At last in 1947 the
British left India after dividing India into two sovereign
states, namely, India (Hindu dominated country) and
Pakistan (the Muslim nation).

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7   ibid, p.285.

8   Ravinder Kumar, "India, Pakistan and Bangladesh:
        An Overview", (1947-1990), Mainstream(New Delhi),
        vol.30, No.12, 26 January 1991, p.16.

"After the achievement of independence accompanied
by the partition of the country, two formations emerged
in the subcontinent. In India triumphant nationalism,
with secular overtones, continues to battle against
irrepressible communalism - Hindu, Muslim and Sikh; while
in Pakistan triumphant communalism, with Islamic orient-
ation, has choked the prospects of secular nationalism.
In India dominant secular nationalism is besieged by
unreconciled communal forces, in Pakistan entrenched
Muslim communalism subverts sporadic assertions of
democratic secular aspirations. The continuing tussle
between nationalism and communalism remains a major
challenge in the process of secular nation-building in
the subcontinent".[9] Thus the bonds of religion appear
brittle and fragile when countered by the basic demands
of group life in modern times, like the demand for
autonomy of a region and the rights of a language
community as was conclusively proved by the dismember-
ment of Pakistan, whose eastern wing was detached from
its western wing and proclaimed a sovereign nation, named
Bangladesh.[10]

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9   Rasheeduddin Khan, "Problems of Nation Building",
        World Focus, vol.4, No.11-12, (1983), p.12.

10   ibid, pp.12-13.

In the case of Sri Lanka, although the framework
for Ceylone was parallel to that of India in certain
respects, the island was governed by the British as a
separate entity. The British arrived and with some
difficulty eventually established the coastal areas as
a Crown colony in 1802. This development was confirmed
by the settlements at Vienna in 1815. The local Ceylonese
kingdom of Kandy continued to exist until it was defeated
by the British in 1818. From then until independence
in 1948, all of Ceylone was a British crown colony.
"Consequently, if the strategy of coping with multi-
ethnic India was that of divide et impera, in the Sri
Lankan context it was through the co-option of the elites
of both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities".[11] Sri
Lanka's ethnic structures have been dominantly influenced
by the processes of colonisation, conquests and conver-
sions from India in the north, spanning several centuries.

Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives were not British
colonies as such, but they were protected by the British
in the sense that their foreign relations were under
British control. Great Britain recognised the complete
independence of Nepal by the Treaty of 1923. Although

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11   Urmila Phadnis, n.5, p.32.

a degree of tutelage by Britain continued until 1947,
Nepal was free to act in its own interests. Bhutan
escaped the same fate although its status as a
protectorate was continued by India after 1947. But
Indian control of foreign affairs gradually decreased,
and Bhutan was admitted to the United Nations in 1971.
Then, the Maldives island gained sovereignty in the year
1965.

In terms of sheer number, size and gradation
of groups in South Asia, the range of ethnic, communal
and caste divergence is vast. "A country like Bangladesh
has a large group facing the community of numerically
small tribal groups. In Pakistan, alongside the majority
group of Punjabis are the Pathans, Sindhis and Baluchis.
In Sri Lanka, the majority Sinhalese need to cope with
the largest minority of Tamils, as well as the smaller
groups of Mulsims and Burghers. In the case of Nepal,
the majority, though not very large in numerical terms,
has a plethora of minor groups. And finally, one has the
situation in India in which there is a relatively even
gradation of groups in importance, from several large
ones through several medium sized ones, to a number of
smaller ones".[12]

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12   ibid, p.44.

The overview of divergent groups and communities in South Asia indicates that these categories are diffused or differentiated depending upon internal convergence or divergence. But the more the interaction among them the greater is the propensity for inter-group conflict and civil violence. So now we must understand the various theories which urge the people to become violent and which also increase the intensity of civil violence.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

This theory "refers to the relationship among forces, conscious and unconscious, internal and external, present and past, which influence or determine behaviour".[13] Some psychologists think that there is an instinct in man which forces him to fight, kill and destroy. Instinct implies a set, inborn pattern of behaviour that is complete and automatic in response to a given stimulus. William James argued that in men there is a desire for activity, adventure, for overcoming resistance by strong action. "Men do not want to be creatures of unexampled insipidity, leading contented and inoffensive lives. In this craving for activity, this need for finding an

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13   David N. Daniels, and others, ed., Violence and the Struggle for Existence (London, 1970), p.48.

outlet for vital energy, James saw the causes of all wars".[14]

J.C. Flugel supported James' view. He thinks that the psychological appeal of violence is based on: (1) Man's zest for adventure; (2) his need to have a feeling of harmony and cooperation with his fellow-men; (3) the desire for freedom from personal worries and moral restrictions; and (4) the need of an outlet for man's aggression i.e., for finding an object on which his vices can be projected.[15]

Mc Dougall defined an instinct as "a psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement, of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least, to experience an impulse to such action".[16] He considers pugnacity as one of the principal instincts. He observes that pugnacity is excited when the free exercise of any other instint is obstructed. Hence to him, this pugnacity leads to violence.

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14   K.S. Murty and A.C. Bouquet, Studies in the
      Problems of Peace (Bombay, 1960), p.281.

15   ibid, p.282.

16   ibid, pp.285-6.

Sigmund Freud conceives society and civilization as arising out of man's inherent weakness. To him, civilization aims at building up group-solidarity based on love, while man as an individual wants to live a free life in accordance with his instincts.[17] Freud believed that civilised man's increasing need to repress his destructive instincts leads to outbreaks of ever more violent wars.[18]

However, the major psychological roots of violence lie in J. Dollard's 'frustration-aggression' theory and Ted Robert Gurr's 'Relative Deprivation' theory.

Violence is viewed as a consequence of various kinds of frustration endured by individuals and groups. J. Dollard viewed that aggression is not inborn, but arises out of frustration. To him, frustration is regarded as an inevitable antecedent of aggression.[19] "Frustration may take highly varied and complicated forms. It may stem from a threat to one's life or to the thwarting of a basic or important individual need. It may also arise from competition. Conflict within or among an

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17   Murty and Bouquet, n.15, p.288.

18   Daniels and others, ed., n.14, p.55.

19   ibid, p.86.

individual's different roles in society breeds frustration. Too little or too much social control engenders frustration".[20] Hence frustration results from an interfernece with ongoing,goal-directed activity, which later leads to aggression.

Further, the most important theoretical contribution was the general theory of political violence put forward by Ted Robert Gurr.[21] Basing himself on J. Dollard's frustration-aggression theory, Ted Gurr finds that the roots of violence lie in relative deprivation of a particular group of people in the total set up of the nation-state. According to Gurr, the potential for collective violence in a nation or smaller community varies with the intensity and scope (i.e. extent) of socially induced discontent among its members.[22] Gurr defines civil strife to mean all collective non-governmental attacks on persons or property, that occur within a political system, but not individual crimes.[23] He then finds that "the extent and intensity of relative deprivation, and justificatory attitudes about protest and violence are psychological determinants for civil

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20   ibid.

21   Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Violence in America: Protest, Rebellion, Reform,vol.2,(California, 1989), p.308.

22   Ted Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife" in Hugh David Graham and Gurr, ed., Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives(New York, 1969), pp.573-4.

23   ibid.

strife".[24] Gurr conceives of 'relative deprivation'

as the predictable outcome of a widening gap between a

group's 'value-expectations' and the political system's

'value capabilities'.[25] This theory of relative

deprivation was well documanted on a transnational basis.

In Gurr's opinion, therefore, relative deprivation lie

where there is a discrepancy between the expectations

and perceived capabilities of a person vis-a-vis his

economic situation, political power and social status

in relation to others. And the induced discontent provides

the impulse to action. Thus as a predictor of violence,

relative deprivation seemed a useful theory.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC APPROACH

There is a certain degree of restlessness in

almost all the countries of South Asia because of the

growing inequality both at the core of the social system

and in the economic field.

A social system can be conceived of as being

structured by three sets of asymmetrical relations:

discrimination, exploitation and oppression.[26]

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24   ibid, p.607.

25   Gurr, ed., n.22, p.309.

26   Urmila Phadnis and others, ed., Domestic Conflicts
        in South Asia: Political Dimension, vol.1(New Delhi,
        1986), p.50.

Discrimination conveys the context of social relation-
ship which is asymmetrical and normatively legitimated
by societal norm. These are conditioned by the inter-
nationalisations that take place in the member of the
society from birth and through family and childhood
socialisation. These strengthened primordial loyalties.
Exploitation is best applied to the context of economic
exchanges, resulting in the differential distribution of
materials and resources. Finally, oppression is the
process or means by which the dominated group or individual
is able to impose its conditions on those who are weak
and unwilling or are deviants.

"Lewis A. Coser perceptively observes that constant
strains between those with a vested interest in the status
quo and those who seek to increase their share of authority,
income, possessions and honour, do not necessarily lead
to conflict as 'feelings of deprivation are relative to
institutionalised expectations'. He, however, goes
further to state that if there exists no instituionalised
provisions for the expression of such discontents,
departures from what is required by the norms of the
social system may occur".[27]

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27   Lewis A. Coser, quoted in Urmila Phadnis and
        others, ed., n.27, p.26.

"The kinds of violence, prevalent in the societies, are the violence that reacts to change, violence that attempts to force change, violence that reacts to the lack of change without any positive programme, and violence that attempts to prevent change".[28] Many communal clashes are examples of the first type. Liberation movements and revolutionary movements are instances of the second type. Common urban criminality typifies the third type, which is nourished by hopelessness and despair among the youth. The fourth type is typified by repressive regimes that violate the human rights of their citizens and subject them to arbitrary rule for the sake of preserving an existing order.

Civil violence in South Asian region can be traced to lack of adequate economic growth and maldistribution of resources. One major feature, of late, has been the growing self-assertiveness of poor and traditionally powerless groups. In some cases, groups of people have managed to move up the economic ladder, though many have met with violent resistance on the way. It is not the poverty but the attempt to break out of poverty that

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28   Raimo Vayrynen and others, ed., The Quest for
      Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War
      among Societies, Cultures and States (London, 1987),
      p.293.

generates violence both as a tactic and as a response. The process of development is always a source of turbulence and often a source of violence. Developmental success inevitably brings about structural change, upsetting traditional hierarchies and often generating violent reaction. The failures of development lead to even greater strains on the social fabric. "The root cause is economy and not political: the young are in revolt against the state because it has failed in its fundamental duty towards them. Since the independence of India the economy has created far too few jobs leading to a feeling of insecurity among the youth and making them revolt".[29]

Thus societies are beginning to come apart at the seams as the despair, frustration and rage of the 'have nots' clashes with the fear, reluctance or intransigence of the 'haves' and erupts into religious, ethnic, tribal, racial and class violence.[30]

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29   The Hindu, 2 January 1991.

30   Vayrynen and others, ed., n.29, p.291.

CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC BASE

As most of the South Asian nations are ascriptive,
most of their regional policies are naturally influenced
by their cultural and linguistic traditions. The
scattered distribution of major cultural groups all over
the subcontinent has had multiple and contradictory
implications for the development of a regional system.
The distribution of cultural communities on a transnational
basis has also promoted interaction between the people of
South Asia on a massive scale. This interaction occurs
because of family ties between people from the same
cultural community living in neighbouring countries.
"Anthony Smith's theory of cultural pluralism encompasses
within a single society the co-existence of various groups
having institutional systems (i.e. social structures,
value systems, belief patterns) which are 'mutually
incompatible'. In such a culturally divergent situation
the structural requisites of a political order lead to
the subordination of one groups by the other. In the
process, characterised as these societies are by domina-
tion, separation and instability, they are defined by
dissensus and pregnant with conflict".[31]

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31   Anthony Smith, quoted in Urmila Phadnis, ed.,
      no.5, p.17.

"Language is another very important element

in the geo-cultural component...Linguistic unity can be

exploited for imparting aggressive overtones to

regionalism when the dominant linguistic group is also

imbued with some sort of psychic deprivation or its

possibility".[32] The relevance of language in the intra-

regional relations in South Asia lies in the fact that

a number of languages are either spoken or understood

in more than one country in the region. For instance,

Urdu is spoken by a large number of North Indians, but

in Pakistan it is recognised as the official language.

Bengali is the official language of Bangladesh and is

one of the regional languages in India. Nepali, the

official language of Nepal, is largely spoken in the

Darjeeling district of West Bengal in India. Tamil, one

of the regional languages in India, has been recognised

in Sri Lanka as a second language. Because of the

overlapping of some languages in the South Asian States,

one often notices concern of the leaders of one nation

for the recognition and upliftment of a particular language

in the neighbouring country, provided that it is also

largely spoken or used as an official language in their

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32   P.C. Mathur, ed., Government and Politics in South
      Asia: The Domestic Scene, vol.1, (Jaipur, 1985),
      p.81.

own country.[33] This is nothing but just likely to intervene in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country. Also, on the other hand, the people of the same language-speaking area develop a feeling of regionalism and often go to the extent of demanding state autonomy. Ultimately, this linguistic friction creates civil violence.

ECOLOGICAL THEORY

Possibilities of violence might also come in ecological forms, in the sense of environmental events. It may be both inter-state and intra-state violence. With increases in the scale, diversity and pace of human activity, ecological threats to one state might stem identifiably from activities within another. Of late, the water dispute is a major ecological threat. As William J. Barnds has noted with reference to the post-1947 period. In contrast with South Asia's external boundaries, the political geography within the region follows no neat pattern. The three most important river systems - the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra - cut across

33   Promod Kumar Mishra, "Determinants of Intra-Regional Relations in South Asia", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol.36, No.1, (January-March 1980), p.72.

the boundaries of the principal countries in a way that has exacerbated the disputes between them".[34] The distribution of the waters of the Gangetic and Brahmaputra river systems between India and Bangladesh has absorbed the attention of both the government. The dispute over the Farakka barrage in India has yet to be resolved. The Indus water Treaty was generally acclaimed, but it was predicated on the presumption of permanent hostility, or at least the impossibility of co-operation between India and Pakistan, even with respect to resources that neither can exploit unilaterally.[35]

Also, water disputes between the states in a country create civil violence. For instance, in India, the disputes over the distribution over river water create a feeling of regionalism according to which the states demand more state autonomy. Very recently, the case of Cauvery water dispute between the states Tamil Nadu and Karnataka is an example. In this case the state governments behave like spokesmen of independent nations and endeavoured to obtain the maximum for the own state.

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34   William J. Barnds, quoted in Feld and Boyd, ed.,
      no.4, p.238.

35   Stephen Philip Cohen, ed., The Security of South
      Asia: American and Asian Perspectives (New Delhi,
      1987), p.196.

Thus the ecological approach to civil violence reveal the fact that, like military and economic ones, it can damage the physical base of the state by escalating both inter-state and intra-state violence.

JOHAN GALTUNG'S THEORY OF VIOLENCE

Johan Galtung offers a format of three inter-related elements of violence, which are a specific violent situation, motives and the parties' cognitive structure, and the behavioural-attitudinal dynamics of a violent process.[36] A conflict or violent situation refers to a situation which generates incompatible goals or values among different parties. Violent attitudes are consisting of the psychological and cognitive processes which engender violence or are consequent to it. And conflict behaviour consists of aggressive activities undertaken by one party and designed to injure, thwart, or eliminate its opponent. Galtung discussed six important dimensions of violence which are as follows:[37]

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36 Jacob Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution (Colorado, USA, 1984), p.6.

37 Ghanshyam Pardesi, ed., Contemporary Peace Research (New Delhi, 1982), p.97.

First, the distinction is between physical and psychological violence. Under physical violence human beings are hurt somatically, to the point of killing. It increases the constraint on human movements. On the other hand, psychological violence includes lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats etc. that serve to decrease mental potentialities.

The second distinction is between the negative and positive approach to influence. If a person is punished and not given rewards for his action, then he will become more violent. Instead of increasing the constraints on his movement the constraints may be decreased, instead of increased. On the positive side, if the system or action is reward-oriented, then it narrows down a person's range of action.

The third dimension is on the object side: whether there is an object that is hurt or not. When a person, a group, a nation is displaying the means of physical violence, there may not be violence in the sense that anyone is hit or hurt. But, nevertheless, there is the threat of physical violence and indirect threat of mental violence, for it constrains human action.

Fourthly, the distinction to be made is on the subject side: whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts. Where there is an actor that commits the violence is known as personal or direct violence. And if there is no such actor then it is called as structural or indirect violence. In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt and manipulated. But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. Galtung has called structural violence as that veiled violence latent in all social structures based on inequality.[38] Hence structural violence is inbuilt in an unequal society. Because a society which is divided within itself is a society in tension, a society in perpetual tussle between its affluent and impoverished parts.

The fifth distinction is between violence that is intended and unintended. This distinction is important when guilt is to be decided, since the concept of guilt has been tied more to intention.

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38   ibid, p.135.

Finally, there is also a distinction between two levels of violence: the manifest and the latent, Manifest violence, whether personal or structural, is observable. Latent violence is something which is not there, yet might easily come about.

These are the various dimensions of violence as discussed by Johan Galtung, which are very much interlinked to our concept of civil violence in South Asia.

FACTORS OF CIVIL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH ASIA:

There are various factors of civil violence endemic to South Asian region. These factors very well depict the above discussed theories which urge people to become violent. South Asia is characterised by multiplicity and variety in all walks of life. It is a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-system society. As South Asia is comprised of a rich mosaic of pluralism, its national societies are deeply divided vertically and laterally, by linguistic, ethnic, cultural, religious and class or caste cleavages.

"A salient feature of recent political developments in South Asia is the frequent occurence of incidents of collective violence. These incidents result from conflicts between religious groups, ethnic communities,

or caste agglomerations and threaten the existence

and cohesion of a country. Though most of the sources

of conflict are embedded in the historical development

of each society, these conflicts have sharpened in the

recent past after the state began to intervene more

actively to initiate social and economic changes".[39]

Of late, the whole of South Asia has been

engulfed with civil violence. Such credibility of

civil violence is very much salient in case of India.

It has become clear from the number and frequency of

riots over the years in the country as a whole. The

following table 3.1 highlights the incidence and volume

of cognizable crimes occurred during the years from

1979 to 1989.

Table 3.1

INCIDENCE AND VOLUME OF COGNIZABLE CRIMES
IN INDIA RELATING TO RIOTS

Years	Crimes Relating to Riots
1979	98896 (15.2)
1980	106957 (16.1)
1981	110361 (16.1)
1982	106511 (15.1)
1983	108101 (15.0)
1984	101460 (13.8)
1985	99757 (13.3)
1986	94197 (12.3)
1987	90789 (11.6)
1988	94587 (11.9)
1989	98943 (12.2)

Source: Crime in India, National Crime
Record Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs,
GOI, 1989.

Note:1. Figures in brackets indicate
volume per lakh of population.
2. Percentage less than 0.05 is
also shown as 0.0.

Table 3.1 shows that in 1979, the incidence and volume of crimes relating to riots taking place in India were 98896. Further, in 1989 it increased to 98943. The quinquential average of riots during the year 1984 to 1988 was 96158. And the incidence and volume of crimes, relating to riots, over these five years was 13.2 per lakh of population.

Out of these riots, the major incidents of extremists violence over the years were recorded as such:

Table   3.2

EXTREMISTS VIOLENCE IN INDIA

Year	Incidents
1983	408
1984	512
1985	551
1986	408
1988	718
1989	901
1990	1570

Source: Annual Report, Ministry of Home Arfairs, Government of India, 1983-84 to 1990-91.

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39   James Warner Bjorkman, ed., Fundamentalism, Revivalists and Violence in South Asia(New Delhi, 1988), p.159.

Table 3.2 shows that in 1983 there were 408
incidents of extremists violence. Further, it
reached an alarming proportion in 1990 resulting
in 1570 incidents of extremists violence. It is,
also, evident that the incidents of extremists
violence have been increasing vertically over the
years with the exception to the year 1986.

The people involved in such type of violence
have been arrested under the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985. In 1988, 763
people were held, whereas 1773 persons were held in
1989.[40] The percentage change over these two years
was 132.4.[41]

Over the years, civil violence has engulfed
India as a whole. Not only India, but also the
whole of South Asian region has been experiencing
the tremors of civil violence. The various factors
of civil violence and how do they affect most of the
countries of the contemporary South Asian region
have been discussed in the following sections:

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40   Crime in India, National Crime Record Bureau,
      Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
      1989.

41   ibid.

ETHNICITY

As most of the states in the world are multi-ethnic, the phenomenon of ethnicity has been with us for long. And yet, in the second half of this century it seems to have assumed a marked significance. In this context, the experiences of the South Asian states are instructive as well as illuminating. These polyethnic societies are characterised by greater ethnic diversity than perhaps any other region in the world. The greater is the concentration of an ethnic group within a territorial confine, the greater is its potential for demand articulation and aggregation. "In the multi-ethnic kaleidoscope of ethnic interaction in the civil societies of South Asia, the issue that needs attention is not the significance of ethnicity but an assessment of the factors which keep it latent in the case of some groups and overt in others".[42] Inter-group conflicts based on ethnic identities quite often take place in a South Asian society simply because these groups perceive and persue seemingly conflicting values and goals. That ethnic and minority groups

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42   Urmila Phadnis, "Ethnic Dynamics in South Asian States", South Asia Journal (New Delhi), vol.3, No.3, (January-March 1990), p.261.

develop strong tendencies to preserve their identities
and value system because they perceive unnecessary
pressures from the majority groups to mould their
behaviour patterns. In such a situation, the ethnic
and minority groups tend to become rather aggressive
in their behaviour to preserve their identity in
terms of culture, religious and social norms. The
South Asian experience indicates that "in the
evocation of ethnicity, ethnic chauvinism and populism
of both the majority and minority groups contain
tremendous potential to turn explosive. In such a
situation the transnational aspects of ethno-nationalism
also surface".[43] In effect, the separatist movements
in South Asia have been sustained to a large extent
by external sources and supports. As a consequence
of these developments, the process of nation-building
in most of the countries of South Asia has got
entangled with ethnic violence. And the case of Sri
Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh are most prominent
which are fraught with such type of violence.

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43   ibid, p.270.

Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka

More complex and compelling is the case of
Sri Lanka where the records of maintaining multi-
ethnic societies have been very badly tarnished by
rising curves of ethnic violence. The ethnic
movement in Sri Lanka underlines the stridence of
two competing nationalisms - the Sinhalese and the
Tamil. As the demands by the Tamils were drowned out
by Sinhalese nationalism, the Tamil movement was
isolated from the political mainstream. The isolation,
in turn, radicalised the Tamil population to the
extent that a guerrilla movement began to arrest
itself in the Jaffna Peninsula.

The seeds of the ethnic divide between the
Tamils and the Sinhalese lie embedded in ancient
history when these two communities emigrated to the
island. But the political spill over of this ethnic
chasm has been a 20th century phenomenon. "It was
the post-independence milieu which reinforced each
communitys sense of ethnic consciousness and self-
identity. Subjugated and hitherto repressed under
the colonial masters, both the Sinhala majority and
the Tamil minority rose upto new levels of self-

assertion while the Sinhalese opted for a Buddhist
Sri Lanka, and developed a peculiar siege mentality
despite being a majority, the Tamils as a numerical
minority felt increasingly discriminated and
persecuted in all walks of life".[44] The Tamil problem
stems primarily from the fact that with the growth
of education and political socialisation of the majority
Sinhalese, later are no longer willing to allow the
minority Tamils to continue with their numerically
disproportionate dominance over the country's education,
bureaucracy and economy, however deserving they may
be otherwise.[45] The result is a violent situation in
which the entire Tamil community find themselves at
great risk.[46]

While ethnic violence had erupted earlier in
1956, 1958 and 1961, the insurgency of the Tamil youth
had occured since the 1970s. "The origin and develop-
ment of extremism among Tamil youth can be traced, on
the one hand, to the effects of discrimination in

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44   Spotlight on Regional Affairs, vol.5, No.8,
      August 1986, p.1.

45   S. Arasaratnam, "Nationalism, Communalism, and
      National Unity in Ceylone" in Philip Mason, ed.,
      India and Ceylone: Unity and Diversity: A
      Symposium(London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
      pp.260-78, cited in Conflict Studies(London),
      No.178, p.8.

46   Partha S. Ghosh, "Ethnic and Religious Conflicts
      in South Asia", Conflict Studies, No.178, p.8.

language, education and employment which got compounded
by state violence and, on the other hand, to growing
disenchantment with the established Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) leadership and their forms of
parliamentary struggle".[47] The 1970s saw the TULF
coming into prominence, which for the first time spoke
of a separate homeland or "Eelam" for TULF for the
Tamils. The TULF got widespread support after
measures such as the Tamil standardisation rules were
passed, which restricted entry of Tamil students into
Ceylonese Universities despite their getting higher
marks than the Sinhalese. In the 1977 elections, the
bulk of the Tamil vote went to the TULF and its new
leader A. Amrithalingam.

Further, Amrithalingam's acceptance of the
district council scheme led to a split in the TULF,
with a faction breaking away in November 1980 to form
the Tamil Eelam Liberation Front. It was from this
more radical group that younger elements drifted
towards armed groups - Tamil Eelam Liberation Organi-
zation (TELO), The Eelam People's Revolutionary Front

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47   Urmila Phadnis and others, ed., Domestic Conflicts
      in South Asia: Economic and Ethnic Dimensions,
      vol.2 (New Delhi, 1986), pp.142-3.

(the EPRLF), People's Liberation of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE) and of course, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE). And thus began the armed struggle for
a separate homeland, a struggle that rages in the
hapless island to this day. Today, LTTE, better
known as 'Tamil Tigers' is the oldest, largest and
militarily the best organised violent group fighting
for a separate 'Eelam' state. It is led by Velupillai
Prabhakaran. The psoition as of now is that the
Tamil extremists led by the LTTE have taken control
of vast areas in the north-east which they claim as
traditional Tamil homelands, despite all efforts of
the government's security forces in the past decade
to dislodge them. Hence now this movement, spearheaded
by militant groups, have transformed this hitherto
idyllic 'pearl island', of infinite charm and serenity
into a 'tear-shaped' island convulsing with terrorism
and violence.[48] Thus an ethnically disturbed and
divided Sri Lanka continues to pose a potential
source of threat to peace in the region.

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48   Spotlight on Regional Affairs, vol.5, No.8,
      August 1986, p.1.

Ethnic Groups and the Incidence of
Civil Violence in Pakistan:

The social fabric of Pakistan is badly shaken
by internal violence along regional-ethnic identities.
The Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baluchis constitute
important elements in Pakistan's ethnic mosaic. "The
perennial problem in Pakistan has been the inability
and lack of willingness of the rulers to accommodate
the regional and political claims of the different
ethnic groups within a flexible federal framework.
The problem was intertwined with historical, political,
economic and socio-psychological factors.... All the
major ethnic groups have been harbouring the belief
that their way of life and particularly their
distinctive cultures are in jeopardy. The more the
government makes efforts to eliminate separatist
tendencies, the deeper the fissures grow in the
Pakistani society".[49]

At the heart of ethno-regional sentiment in
Pakistan is the perception by Punjabis and non-Punjabis
alike that the Punjabi community dominates the
politics and society of the State.[50] Punjabis

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[49]   Phadnis and others, ed., n.51, pp.150-51.

[50]   Baxter. and others, Government and Politics in
        South Asia(Colorado, 1987), p.179.

constitute a majority of the population. They dominate membership in the government offices. The Punjab is also by far the wealthiest and most developed province in the state. In the face of such facts, nationals of the smaller provinces perceive themselves as under-represented or even dominated by the larger ethno-regional group. Also, all legitimate grievances of the lesser privileged and lesser developed ethnic groups were dubbed as anti-national. This "led to "us" and "them" syndrome symptomatic of the ethnic cleavages and the ethnic groups in Pakistan began to press their legitimate claims for the protection of their way of life, for a redefinition of the relation-ship between their own peripheral society and the centre".[51]

Further, "Sind has been a province of permanent crisis. There has been complex web of ethnic hostility which frequently erupted into orgies of violence".[52] There have been three waves of migration that have produced a sub-terrestrial change in the demographic

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51   Asaf Hussain, "Ethnicity, National Identity and
      Praetorianism", Asian Survey, vol.16, No.10,
      October 1976, p.910.

52   The Hindu, 14 September 1990.

composition. The first wave was co-terminus with the partition of the sub-continent. The second migration began in the late fifties and was focussed on Upper Sind. A smaller number percolated into Karachi, where they began to dominate the city's economy. The third wave occured as a result of the Afghan crises that saw thousands of Pathans and Afghan refugees move to Karachi in search of greener pastures. It produced the first serious ethnic outbreak of violence in 1983 that soon polarised the Punjabi-Pathans, the Mohajirs (refugees from India), and the Sindhis along ethnic lines. Since then violence has been the expression of the increasing ethnic divide. "The major reason for the Sindhi resentment can be traced to the execution of Bhutto.... It resulted in intense violence and manifested strong ethnic sentiments".[53] The ethnic divide was widened by General Zia who split the fundamentalist parties to create the Mohajir Quami Mahaz (MQM).[54] The Mohajirs have increasingly stressed for their acceptance as the fifth nationality. They have demanded the area stretching from Pasni to Mirpurkhas in Sind province.

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52   The Hindu, 14 September 1990.

53   Phadnis and others, ed., n.51, p.156.

54   The Hindu, 14 September 1990.

This, in turn, spurred the ethnic Sindhis. As a
result of the uneasy amalgam between the Mohajirs who
have settled in Sind in large numbers and the Sindhis
who are chafing under the dominance of the Punjabi-
Pathan combine, there has been a revival of ethnicity.
This group of people are suffering from an identity
crisis....[55] While, on the other hand, ethnic
consciousness among the Sindhis ranges from diehard
unitary models for the state of Pakistan to total
independence for Sind.[56] Thus the present ethnic
conflict in Sind is reflective of the deep-rooted sense
of deprivation among the Sindhis.

The tribes of the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) pose special problems and creates ethnic tension.
In the NWFP the call for an independent entity of
"Pakhtunistan" predates independence. Pakhtunistan
means different things to different people, ranging
from the demand for the formation of a new state
incorporating Pathan areas on both sides of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border to a mere change of nomen-
clature for the NWFP. The Soviet intervention in

55   Aabha Dixit,"Ethnic and Regional Tensions in
      Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, vol.12, No.12,
      March 1989, p.1472.

56   POT(New Delhi), 2 March, vol.16, No.34, 1988,
      p.722.

Afghanistan qualitatively changed the situation and also complicated the question of Pathan separatism. Afghanistan has never accepted the validity of the Durand line, which demarcates the Afghan-Pakistan border. The migration of the tribesmen from across the border over the years created serious differences and escalated tensions, which have been erupting violently and with increasing frequency. The use of the NWPP to aid the Mujahideen, while serving the purpose of helping the United States, allowed the area to be infested with sophisticated arms, which further escalates violence.

The problem facing Baluchistan, now, is complex. "Since the birth of Pakistan, the ethno-nationalist movement of the Baluch has been fairly volatile. In terms of ideology and goals, the Baluch movement has been marked by a multiplicity of streams - coalescing,

competing and at times conflicting with each other..... The goals of the Baluch national movement range from autonomy, confederation secession to irredentism".[57] Baluchistan is Pakistan's largest , poorest and most sparsely settled province. A majority

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57   Urmila Phadnis, ed., n.5, p.175.

of Baluchistan's population is non-Baluch. These
people have a primitive tribal system and suffer from
a sense of economic deprivation and political isolation.
The more intense the perceptions of repression and
deprivation, the stronger the desire to assert their
political and economic rights. The Soviet invasion
increased the problems of ethnic and tribal diversity.
The militant Baluch organisations joined a pro-Soviet
group. These groups have been living on the hope that
Afghanistan would support their demand for an independent
'Greater Baluchistan' comprising territories within
Pakistan. To add to the simmering tensions, the
arrival of Afghan refugees - all of whom are Pushtuns -
have inflamed the smouldering Baluch-Pushtun tension.[58]
Thus a civil violence-like situation grips Baluchistan
which pose a severe threat to the integrity of Pakistan
as a nation-state.

A perusal of the ethnic consciousness of the Punjabis,
Pathans, Baluchis and Sindhis indicate that the feeling
of relative deprivation has existed all along among all
these groups.[59] As a result, internal opposition, mani-
fested through sustained violence and afflicting all the
provinces of Pakistan, poses a threat to the nation.

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58   Salamat Ali, "Baluchistan, An Upheaval is Forecast",
      Far Eastern Economic Review(Hongkong), vol.106,
      No.41, 19 October 1979, p.42.

59   Phadnis and others, ed., n.51, p.151.

Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Violence in Bangladesh

As far as Bangladesh is concerned, its society has remained ethnically diverse. The insurgency and violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the South-eastern border of Bangladesh is one such ethnic problem arising out of primordial attachments of at least three ethnic minorities - Chakma, Marma and Tippera tribes. While the majority groups have mounted agitations for the restoration of democracy. Others like the militant tribals in Chittagong Hill Tracts have agitated against the increasing encroachment of the majority community in their areas. They have perceived the majority dominated state as the symbol as well as instrument of their oppression. Hence issues of legitimacy, integration and secession continue to challenge the state system.

The CHT violence is a response to the violation of the cultural cores and cultural peripherals by the intruding actors.[60] Since 1972, the Chakmas began demanding self-government. In the same year they pressed for administrative autonomy and the formation

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60   Syed Anwar Husain, "Insurgency in the Chittagong
      Hill Tracts: Problem of Ethnic Minorities in
      Bangladesh", Asian Studies (Calcutta), vol. 4, No.1,
      1986, p.35.

of a special legislative body. Further, with the
settlement of non-tribal families, the situation in
the CHT began worsening as the government was distri-
buting agricultural lands among them. The relation-
ship between the tribals and non-tribals have ever
since remained tense due to their dispute over
agricultural lands. And the tribals also regarded
this influx of non-tribals into their ancestral
territories as an evil machination to swamp them.
Finally, the military wing Shanti Bahini was added
to the political organisation of Chakmas in 1972. It
was an off shoot of the Jana Sanhati Samiti, the first
organised political party of the tribal Chakmas, Marmas
and Tipperas. Hence the Chakmas have been fighting for
their lands which ultimately creates civil violence in
Bangladesh.

Thus South Asia is a kaleidoscope of latent,
overt and explosive ethnicity. And, the interplay of
ethnicity and ethnic movements indicates the competitive-
turned-conflictual assertion of ethnic nationalism
against state-centric nationalism. Also, it provides
an impetus to increasing militarisation of the state,
enhancing in the process its political as well as
economic vulnerability vis-a-vis the external pulls

and pressures. Hence, in its militancy, ethnic separatism is a serious threat to the nation-building, as it escalates tension and violence.

COMMUNAL HOSTILITIES AND THE INCIDENCE OF CIVIL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

South Asia is a unique region in the sense that it is a home of a variety of religious followers. There is no denying the fact that the strikingly different social values, institutions and patterns of behaviour of different nations in South Asia are rooted in their diverse religious traditions.[61] Besides, what is equally striking is that one can trace religious pluralism both at the regional as well as at the national level. The net result is that the religious majority in one nation becomes a religious minority in the neighbouring one. So logically, the ruling elites in one nation feel concerned for the socio-political status of their fellow-religionists across the border.

While analysing the relevance of religion in the intra-regional relations in South Asia, its three aspects have been focussed which are as follows: (a) religion as

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61   Donald Eugene Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion(Princeton, 1966), pp.21-22.

a great ideal; (b) religion as a national identity;
and (c) religion as a communal irritant.[62] The
second and the third aspect together are a source of
conflict and tensions among religious communities in
South Asia. While religion as a source of national
identity plays a unifying role in countries like
Pakistan and Bangladesh, but in international and
inter-community relations it leads to conflict. It is
an irritant in regional peace and stability.

Communal Conflict and Civil Violence in India

Today, communalism in its varied shapes has
acquired a most dangerous form and an alarming propor-
tion. It is a multi-pronged challenge that seeks to
disrupt India's multi-religious society. In India, it
has become an endemic problem. Some of the more rabid
communal elements present in India are Hindu, Mulsim
and Sikh. Here, the position of religious minorities
are threatened, for a minority position involves, or
is believed to have involved, some kind of deprivation
and discrimination in either of the four areas of life:
economic, social, political and legal.

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62   S.P. Varma and K.P. Misra, ed., Foreign Policies in
      South Asia (Bombay, 1969), pp.95-6.

Examining the implication of what is called

communal consciousness, Richard D. Lambert writes:

"The term 'community' as used in India is one of

those conveniently vague words so helpful in the

designation of heterogeneous social units -

The adjective form 'communal' is one of the most

negatively weighted terms in the Indian political

vocabulary. It is used to describe an organisation

that seeks to promote the interests of a section of

the population presumably to the detriment of the society

as a whole or in the name of religion or tradition

opposes a social change. It is thus an epithet implying

anti-social greed and a reactionary social outlook...".[63]

Prabha Dixit in a study of the development of

communalism in India observes: "It is only when a

deliberate choice is made by a community to initiate

political demands on the basis of religio-cultural

differences, that communal awareness turns into communa-

lism in the form of a political doctrine".[64] Further,

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63   Richard D. Lambert, Hindu Communal Groups in Indian
      Politics, in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker,
      Leadership and Political Institutions in India
      (Madras, 1960), p.211. Cited in Rasheeduddin Khan,
      "Problems and Prospects of Modernisation of Muslims
      in India", Seminar(New Delhi), No.106, June 1968,
      p.29.

64   Prabha Dixit, Communalism: A Struggle for Power
      (New Delhi, 1974), p.17.

for D.E. Smith communalism in India is "the functioning

of religious communities or organisations which claim

to represent them, in a way which is considered

detrimental to the interests of other groups or of

the nation as a whole".[65]

India being a socially diverse and regionally

imbalanced country, the emergence of political parties

is marked by the enveloping of all the economic,

political, linguistic and cultural disparities under

the banner of religion. This provided the impetus for

certain communities to mobilise masses on religious

lines, for their own political and economic gain.

This has given rise to a new phenomenon of communalism.

A communal political party also promotes sectarian

interests of that particular community. Harold A.

Gould describes that party as communical which "explains

in some fashion the parochial sensibilities of any

group in Indian society whose identity is determined

not by economic interests or secular, ideological

criteria but by caste, religious or ethno-linguistic

background".[66]

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65   Donald Eugene Smith, India as a Secular State
      (Princeton, 1963), p.454.

66   Harold A. Gould, "Religion and Politics in a UP
      Constituency" in D.E. Smith, ed., South Asian
      Politics and Relgion(Princeton, 1966), p.51.

Of late, in India the religious communities like Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs operate at different levels of segmentation. "Since Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs are different religious entities, their social, economic, cultural and political interests are also dissimilar and divergent. As such, the loss of one religious group is the gain of another group and vice-versa. If a particular community seeks to better its social and economic situation, it is doing at the expense of other".[67]

Hindu-Muslim communal violence have been a frequent occurrence in India and have usually had a negative impact on her relation with the neighbouring countries. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the Muslim population is predominant. The Islamic factor has been considerable in swaying the Kashmiris in their quest for a separate identity. Then their attitude became secessionist and fundamentalistic. The politics of Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim majority state in India, is characterised by two parallel and equally strong elements: one is its demand for autonomy and the

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67   Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India, ed.2, (New Delhi, 1987), p.2.

other its pro-Pakistanism. The latter is largely

influenced by the fact that Pakistan is a Muslim

state. The autonomy and the pro-Pakistanism put

together have serious implications for Hindu-Muslim

communal harmony. The anti-Hindu upsurge in the

Kashmir Valley followed the execution in February 1984

of Maqbool Butt, a Kashmiri terrorist who vowed to

liberate Kashmir from the Indian rule. Later, the

younger lots of militants under designations and

splinter groupings followed Butt's footsteps. The

anti-Hindu and anti-Indian sentiments expressed by

Kashmiri-Muslims gave rise to various militant and

violent organisations. Among them the Jammu and

Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hizbul Mujahideen

are most powerful groups operating in the valley. And

the "fundamentalists exhorted the Kashmiris to resort

to the Palestinian type of low level of violence in

the form of Intefada and the terrorism of the Sikh

militants".[68] This splendid valley has been a hotbed

of conspiracies and intrigues now. Further, the religious

sentiments of Kashmiri Muslims is being fully exploited

by our neighbours in Pakistan. Pakistan, in the name of

religious brotherhood, highlights the present state of

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68   Chandra B. Khanduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir
      Problem and an Approach to Solution", Strategic
      Analysis, vol.13, No.6, September 1990, p.626.

affairs, the communal tension prevailing in different parts of the country, and diverts their outrage into anti-India feelings. Thus the "decades of ineptitude, of petty politicking, of sheer cynicism of the powers that have sapped the valley of its inherited vitality, transformed the paradise on earth into a cesspool of discontent".[69]

People in the valley are being held to ransom by the cult of violence. In the continuing communal violence in Kashmir, a great many people have been killed and the macabre dance of death takes its toll , big or small, practically everyday.[70] Bigger consignment of weaponry have been inducted into the State either through larger groups of returning militants or hired couriers belonging to the border villages. Because of the easy availability of small arms, it becomes easier for the violent groups to create terror in the region. The killing spree increases with incidents of kidnappings and extortions growing everyday. From January 1990 to the middle of May 1991, the militants killed 581 civilians

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69   Satish K. Dwivedi, "1990s: the Dawn of Terror",
      Surya India(New Delhi), vol.14, No.4, January
      1990, p.17.

70   National Herald(New Delhi), 11 June 1991.

and 215 security personnel.[71] Official reports, also,
say that about 60 Kashmir militants are killed every
month and 200 arrested.[72] This communal violence has
cost the valley dearly in terms of human losses and
property damage.

Further, Hindu-Muslim communal riot is virulent
and destructive in other parts of the State. In 1989,
40 major incidents of communal riots were recorded.[73]
In northern region of the country, it took more than
400 lives. The Ramajanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue has
been creating a lot of complications since the year
1990. The communal conflagration in Ayodhya over this
issue started when a group of people attempted to
construct Rama temple by demolishing the mosque. The
recent example of communal riot was in Orissa. In the
month of March 1991, people belonging to two different
communities clashed with each other at Bhadrak town in
coastal Balasore district of Orissa. The clash took
place when a Ram Navami procession was passing through
the streets of the town. Communal tension once again
gripped the State following a clash in Cuttack city
during Durga Puja in October 1991.

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71   Tribune (Chandigarh), 5 August 1991.

72   Times of India, 30 November 1991.

73   Annual Report , Ministry of Home Affairs, Govern-
     ment of India, 1989-90.

Next, the resurgence of Sikh consciousness,
culminating in separatist demands during recent years,
may be quoted as a case in point. The real problem in
Punjab is the rise of Sikh fundamentalism partly as a
backlash against the modern life style brought in by
prosperity, and partly in response to demographic
changes which threaten to make the Sikhs a minority in
the State.[74] "The campaign run by some Hindu communal
forces to deny the emergence of Sikhism as an independent
religion led to a growing fear amongst the Sikh elite
that the Sikhs might be absorbed in the Hindu social
system and might thus lose their distinct communal
(religious) identity".[75] The conflict of interests
between the Hindu and the Sikh assumes communàl colour-
ings. And the Sikhs have gone to the extent of demanding
a separate nation and political identity known as
'Khalistan'.

Communal situation in Punjab has been quite alarming
in recent years. People are being killed, maimed and
terrorised. Small arms flow steadily into the hands
of the separatists and communal groups. The level of

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74   Indian Express (New Delhi), 19 March 1984.

75   Satyapal Dang, Genesis of terrorism: An Analytical
      Study of Punjab Terrorists (New Delhi, 1988), p.2.

violence has been increasing. Infiltration continues across the border on a large scale. Arms and ammunition have been stockpiled. These small arms intensify civil disorder in the state. People have been under the shadow of death. In the last ten years, over 10,000 innocent people have been murdered: the figures for the just concluded year are higher than of years before, approximating 3,000.[76] In recent months, Punjab has been in the most critical stage of civil violence. The following table indicates the killings of innocent people in Punjab during the first half of the year 1991:

Table 3.3

KILLINGS IN PUNJAB : 1991

Months in the year 1991	No. of killings in Punjab
January	246
February	169
March	217
April	237
May	241
June	245
July	203

Source: Times of India, 4 August 1991.

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76   The Telegraph(Calcutta), 6 January 1992.

The above table shows that an uneasy stalemate
continues to prevail in Punjab and there are numerous
casualties. Hence, Sikh and Hindu communalism flared
dangerously in Punjab as elements in both communities
acted and reacted from perceived positions as threatened
minorities.

Communal Hostilities and Incidence of Civil Violence in Bangladesh

The problem in Bangladesh has its origin in the
Hindu-Muslim division. Before the secession of
Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, the politics and
pronouncements of the Pakistani government often led
to communal violence in that country causing the
exodus of many Hindus to India. And once these people
were in India there was a Hindu backlash against Muslims.
But since the creation of Bangladesh, sometimes there
have been a sudden deterioration in communal balance.
It often drives hundreds of thousands of Bengali Hindus
to the adjoining Indian states like West Bengal, Tripura,
Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya, causing enormous
tension and civil violence there.

Thus since religion has such entrenched roots
in the subcontinent, nationalists have regularly
appealed to religion to mobilise support for the

nation-state. As intricate relationships exist between religious identity and social purpose in South Asia, the religious differences translate into civil strife under some conditions. Religion provides a cause for division among the South Asian people as adherents of one faith have a natural affinity with their co-religionists which they can not extend towards believers in other faiths. And frequently the religious dissent manifests itself in communal violence.

CASTE-BASED HOSTILITIES AND INCIDENCE OF CIVIL VIOLENCE

The caste system has been a fundamental feature of South Asian social life. The societies has for centuries been horizontally split and stratified on the basis of caste. People are born into a caste or sub-caste, many of which have traditionally suffered from various kinds of social discrimination and dis-abilities. These traditionally backward and deprived sections of society are so weak that they have not been able to take equal advantage of equal opportunities compared to the educationally and socially stronger castes or classes. Sometimes out of frustration and deprivation these lower caste groups turn violent. Also, because of threat to their social status the higher caste people become violent. However, among the

caste systems that have survived till today, caste
system in India is usually depicted as the most
perfect instance. And Hinduism retains the South
Asia's most highly structured and stratified social
orders, the caste system.

India

The Indian caste system is closely intertwined
with religion. Unlike in Europe where slave society
succeeded barbarism, in India the ruin and disruption
of pre-historic tribal society led to the creation of
a society consisting of a large number of social
groups or castes, each with its own sense of solidarity.[77]

"Traditionally, caste groups in India can be
classified into three main categories - high castes,
low castes and untouchables. Members of the high castes
enjoyed high ritual status, social prestige and access
to and control of resources, economic and non-economic.
The low caste groups had low ritual status and generally
provided skilled labour and services. The untouchables
were a class apart and suffered the maximum social and

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77   E.M.S. Namboodiripad, "Caste Conflicts vs. Growing
      Unity of Popular Democratic Forces", Economic and
      Political Weekly (Bombay), vol.14, No. 7 & 8, Annual
      Number 1979, p.330.

ritual disabilities..... The constitution of India gave
recognition to the existing social reality and provided
special safeguards to the deprived and backward
categories. There are three main categories of them –
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward
classes".[78]

An important aspect of current Indian social
reality, which powerfully illustrated the contradictions
of Indian development and the need for the adoption of
new approaches towards the understanding of them, is the
violence that is systematically inflicted against the
lower and backward castes by the more powerful caste.[79]
In 1989, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Maharastra, Uttar Pradesh,
Andhra Pradesh, Gujrat and Karnataka were considerably
affected by caste conflicts accounting for 90 percent of
caste conflicts during the year.[80] During the early
1990s the caste conflicts surfaced prominently in India.
During the anti-reservation agitation of 1990, 7700
incidents of violence were reported affecting 18 states/
Union Territories.[81]

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78   Hindustan Times, 17 October 1990.

79   K. Subrahmaniyam, "Violence against Scheduled
     Castes in India", Man and Development (Chandigarh),
     vol.9, No.1, March 1987, p.27.

80   Annual Report, Ministry of Home Affairs,
     Government of India, 1989-90.

81   ibid.

In Chundur, Andhra Pradesh, the upper castes vent to their seething anger over the self assertion of lower castes followed an incident at the theatre on 7 July 1991. This led to the social boycotts of lower castes and culminated in the August 6, 1991 carnage. The upper castes people were well armed. In this ghastly incident, around 20 lower castes men were killed in a mass assault by forward castes men of six nearby villages.

The index of the caste riot in Bihar is high. The gruesome massacre of 37 people in Bara village of Gaya district was the recent example. The killing was made by extremists of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). The Bara carnage of February 1992 appears to be in retaliation of the murder of 10 lower castes supporters of the MCC by the so called Sawarna Liberation Front (SLF) activists in the district last December 1991. Whereas the MCC is dominated by the increasingly assertive intermediary castes and lower castes, the SLF is an outfit of the upper caste landlords. Armed clashes have increased in the district as a result of the running battle between various Naxalite outfits and the mercenary armies of the landowning classes. As a result, the manufacture of illegal arms and their use is also quite common in the region.[82]

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82   Hindustan Times, 15 February 1992.

The most recent example of caste violence was in Kumher, near Bharatpur in Rajasthan. Here, the helpless Jatavs, belonging to the lower caste, were brutally murdered by the feudal jats. The Jats of Bharatpur, who have prospered a lot, could not tolerate even the small improvement in the status of the Jatavs. The Jatavs were oppressed socially, economically and politically. This riot in Kumher originated from a minor incident on 1 June 1992. It culminated on the 6 June. "On June 6 when thousands of Jats from the nearby villages and Govardhan Gate poured into Bada Mohalla the Jatavs had no place to run away to. The Poddars (as the local Jats are known) were armed to the teeth with spears, knives, hocky sticks and firearms".[83] As a result, 14 of the Jatavs were brutally massacred and 25 injured.

Further, since independence in 1947, some castes have become highly politicised as political parties use the existing caste associations to mobilise the voters. "The price for an uncertain and short term political gain may well be immediate civil disorder, the hardening of caste divisions and the weakening of our major institutions".[84]

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83   Anjali Deshpande, "Report from Kumher: Portrait of Agony", Mainstream,vol.30, No.35, 20 June 1992, p.3.

84   Times of India, 9 August 1990.

Pakistan

In Pakistan, sectarian differences within the two
unequal Islamic groups-Shia and Sunni-reflect an
antagonistic contradiction. The Shia-Sunni rift has
resulted in numerous disturbances. The intensity and
frequency of such disturbances have increased since
the 1979 revolution in Iran, which installed a chauvi-
nistic Shiite regime.[85] Shia Muslims do not believe
in the first three caliph successors to the Prophet
Mohammed and venerate only the fourth successor Hazrat
Ali. On the other hand, the Sunni counterparts accept
all four Caliphs as true successors. In Pakistan, the
presence of the large Shia minority community has caused
violence in order to curb the power and influence of the
Sunni majority.

Thus civil violence in South Asia has indeed
been on the rise in recent years because of the above
three factors--ethnicity, religion and caste. As South
Asian nations are ascriptive, most of their regional
policies are naturally influenced by these traditions.
The following table shows the motives of murder and
culpable homicide not amounting to murder over such

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85   Baxter and others, n.54, p.176.

issues of civil violence in India.

Table 3.4

Motives of Murder and Culpable Homicide
(CH) not amounting to murder in India

Types of violence	1988	1989
Communal Violence	72 CH-17	171 CH-19
Caste Violence	69 CH-1	45 CH-2
Class Conflict	159 CH-7	138 CH-33

Source: Crime in India, National Crime Record
Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, 1989.

Table 3.4 indicates that there are various
motives behind the murder and killings of the people.
The motives have been communal, caste and class
factors.

Violent organisations emerge from a variety of reasons. Each needs its own special cause to justify it. The above discussed theories of civil violence emphasise on psychological, social, economic, cultural, linguistic and ecological factors. They point to deprivation, exploitation, discrimination, injustice etc. as the main causes leading to civil violence. But these factors in themselves cannot lead to the nature of civil violence as it is there in the region today. Violent individuals and groups have now become very sophisticated in their operations and tactics. The battle experiences and new operational concepts have led many violent organisations to keep on developing very highly sophisticated and reliable small arms system. Hence the use of small arms is a major factor in the escalation of civil violence. The easy availability of small arms is a factor in the intensification of such violence.

Further, civil violence is not confined to the nation only. It has been internationalised. The rebel groups develop links with the outside countries so that they can have easy accessibility to arms.

Outside countries, also, supply weapons to their surro-
gate warriors. The advantage of such a supply route
is that once the supporting country has decided to send
arms, the rebel groups do not need to go through any
risky process to obtain them. Improved techniques of
manufacture are also being made available in reducing
the cost and weight of the weapon but maintaining the
quality of product. Hence the transnational dispersion
of small arms make civil violence considerably more
violent, and more likely.

The recovery of small arms from the violent
groups has been on the rise during the last few years.
In Kashmir, as many as 1,800 Kalashnikov rifles have
been recovered so far this year against a total of
2,200 in 1991 and 1,400 in 1990.[86] The table below
shows the number of small arms seized in India over
the years:

Table 3.5

Seizure of arms under Arms Act in India

Year	Seizure of Arms in number
1984	59205
1985	61987
1986	56954
1987	53577
1988	52601
1989	54637

Source: Crime in India, National Crime Record
Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, GOI, 1989.

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86   Times of India, 30 June 1992.

Table 3.5 shows that small arms are plentifully available to the rebel groups. And the seizure of the arms over the years indicate that violent organisations use such arms indiscriminately to achieve their demands. The killing of the innocent people by one of the violent secessionist organisations in India, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is an example of this. Because of the easy availability of small arms from across the border, it becomes easier on the part of ULFA to create terror and violence. The following table (3.6) clearly shows the increasing rate of violent incidents by ULFA, over the years.

Table 3.6

Violent Incidents by United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA)

year	Violent incidents
1987	11
1988	19
1989	42
1990	137

Source: Annual Report, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govenment of India, 1989-90, and 1990-91.

Hence, the alarming increase of the dispersal of small arms intensify civil violence in the South Asian region in recent years. Had the factors behind the rising intensity of civil violence been exclusively based on the above discussed theories, it could have been easily controlled by the legal authorities. But an ample arsenal of sophisticated weaponry have made a concerted effort to paralyse the Government and the controlling authority. The arms and ammunition have a stopping power, for it is dangerous to allow a man to remain capable of firing back. One lucky bullet could wreck the whole operation. No doubt, these theories seemed useful. But these theories are not adequate in describing the emerging reality in the international scenario, that is, the transnational dispersion of small arms as a major factor in escalating civil violence in the region. So, in the light of the present context, the dispersion of small arms from across the international borders in South Asia is to be regarded as a major factor in civil violence in the region.

CHAPTER   IV

CONCLUSION

Throughout this study, it is evident that
civil violence has been the most disturbing trend.
Civil violence is a conflict within a society resulting
from an attempt to seize or maintain authority and
symbols of legitimacy by extra-legal means. It is
civil because civilians are engaged in it. It is
intra-societal and take place within a group, who
desire to maintain or wish to initiate separate
identity or wish to change the government.

The source of civil violence is the deprivation
of the large masses of the people. A social system is
being structured by three sets of asymmetrical relations:
discrimination, exploitation and oppression, which
creates consciousness among the suffered groups.
Economic growth and other forms of development are
benefiting only a handful of the elite leaving the
vast majority underdeveloped or maldeveloped. People,
out of deprivation in various fields, become violent.

If the motives behind civil violence are
exclusively based on deprivation then it could have
been easily suppressed by the legal authority.

In the present context, the easy availability of small arms to the violent groups intensify such violence. The earliest hand guns made of poor materials were not capable of withstanding in the present warfare. With the evolution of modern science and technology, improved techniques of manufacture are also being made available. Because of the drastic changes in war tactics, the ideal concept of multi-role capability on a single weapon with continuous supply of ammunition to achieve a very high cyclic rate of fire has become of paramount importance. Hence, the perfect weapon of terror emerges. The case of contemporary South Asian region is an example to this where civil violence is interlinked with the use of small arms.

Civil violence has engulfed almost the whole of South Asian region. It has become an integral part of today's political development in South Asia. Most of the countries in South Asia are in the throes of acute social and political convulsions which have far reaching ramifications for the region as a whole. Further, the use of sophisticated

small arms by the violent groups and the dispersal
of arms throughout the region add a new dimension
to civil violence in the region.

In the South Asian region the extremely
complex ethnic, religious and caste factors
strongly influence the sense of identity among
social groups. This plural societies of South Asia
get affected more, partly because of an action-
reaction phenomenon which starts cascading towards
increasing civil violence. This has in many cases
generated an ideology of sub-national separatism.

In the South Asian context, the challenges of
ethnicity in the processes of nation and state-
building often escalate tension. Ethnic conflict
is one of the manifestations of social conflicts
within the region. South Asia is a poly-ethnic society.
Here, ethnicity has remained latent in some cases and
strident in others. Evolving out of a nexus of social,
political and economic formations, its latency or
overtness reflects the dynamics of such structural

formations on the one hand and the management as well as manipulation of ethnicity by various groups. Ethnic overlapping in the region has shown tremendous potential for intra-regional dissonance particularly for Sri Lanka, it is between Sinhalese and Tamil groups. Pakistan is under the threat of Sindhi, Baluch and Pathan subnationalism. Bangladesh has been contending with Chakmas.

Civil violence and the application of modern sophisticated small arms in South Asia has increased markedly. The hidden arms trade with its covert and illegal transactions also started. Here in South Asia, the violent groups or organisations get easy access to small arms.

There are international open arms bazaar where small arms are plentifully available. The rebel forces purchase arms and ammunition easily against cash payment. Because of the Afghanistan war, the arms bazaar in Pakistan became a vast ammunition dump. Besides Pakistan, arms are also available in India, Singapore, Bangkok and Indonesia from where

the violent and secessionist groups buy arms.
Violent groups are known to possess an assortment
of small arms like AK-47 assault rifles and its
improved versions, bombs, grenades, pistols etc.
These arms are available in the booming international
open arms bazaar. Because of the open arms bazaar,
arms started flowing into the hands of terrorist
groups operating in South Asia.

Further, the presence of Soviet army in
Afghanistan from late 1979 to early 1989 aggravated
the South Asia's security problems. The Mujahideen
rebel groups in Afghanistan raised their head to
counter the Soviet army. As the cold war was on
at that time between the two 'Super Powers', U.S.A.
and its supporters started giving aid, both in terms
of sophisticated arms and money, to the Mujahideen
rebel groups. Pakistan became a conduit pipe of
supplying arms to the Mujahideen. Pakistan profited
enormously by being a major shipping lane. It started
using the weapons for her selfish interest. The
transfer of these arms, in due course of time, made
their way to India. These arms are being used by the

anti-Indian extremist and secessionist groups. Also,
the Mujahideens are believed to be training the militants
in handling sophisticated arms. In short, external
support and factors leading to dispersion of arms
intensify subnational separatism and accompanying
militancy and violence which threaten the very fabric
of society and structure of the state. The violent
groups are better financed, better equipped and
more sophisticated than in the past. They develop
a close relationship with foreign countries and foreign
based organisations to achieve their demands. They
get both moral and material support of the external
forces.

Meanwhile, the ties between rebel groups and
drug peddlers would appear to be mutually beneficial--
gun-for-dope relationship. Damage to political
institutions, the proliferation of sophisticated
weaponry among non-governmental actors and the link
between traditional insurgent and drug traffickers
are all features of the narco-terrorism in South Asia
today. Smuggling of high grade narcotics from
neighbouring states become the financial mainstay of
most of the terrorist groups. The "Golden Triangle"

in Indo-China and the 'Golden Crescent' of South-West Asia came into prominence. Such drug empires acquire an autonomous existence that outlasts the wars they were supposed to finance. An illegal transaction of drug trafficking also requires an armed protection which the violent groups can only provide. So, they developed nexus with such groups. The drug mafias, also, controlled arms bazaar by supplying huge sums of money. This unholy alliance between the terrorists and the drug smugglers in the region is largely responsible for the flow of sophisticated weapons to the violence-ridden parts.

The net result is an alarming situation in which the countries of South Asia are caught in a vicious cycle, arresting the process of economic growth and socio-political stability.

TABLE-1 Arms Shipment to Afghanistan

Recipient(R) No Supplier(s) order- ed	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of order licence	Years or deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	Comments
R:Afghanistan						
S: China –	Type.63 107mm	Multiple Rocket Launcher(MRL)	(1982)	1982-89	350	For Mujahidden 122mm rockets without launchers supplied from February 1988.
–	Hong-Ying-5	Portable surface-to- air missile	(1982)	1982-89	850	SA-7 Copy For Mujahidden.
Egypt –	Sakr-18 122mm	MRL	(1988)	1988-90	30	For Mujahidden; with large quantities by artillery rocket.
–	SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	.1984	1985-89	250	For Mujahidden; unconfirmed.
USSR –	MI 24 Hind-D	Helicopter	1984	1984-90	56	
	MIG-23	Fighter/ interceptor	1988	1988-90	53	
	MIG-29	Fighter	1989	–	–	Unconfirmed
	Su-22 Fighter-J	Fighter/grd attack	1979	1979-90	56	
	Su-25 Frogfoot	-Do-	1986	1986-90	60	
	BM-27 220mm	MRL	1989	1989	12	
	BMP-1	MICV	1979	1979-90	266	May include Czechoslovakia Built BMPs.
	BTR-70	Armoured personnel carrier	1988	1988-90	360	
	D-1 152mm	Towed howitzer	1987	1988-90	147	
	D-30 122mm	-Do-	1978	1978-90	458	
	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	1979	1979-90	161	
	T-55	Main Battle Tank	1978	1978-90	660	
	T-62	-Do-	1979	1979-90	130	
	Scud-B Launcher	Mobile SSm (Surface to Surface missile) System	1988	1988	3	
	AA-2 Atoll	Air to air Missile	1979	1979-90	336	Arming Su-22 fighters
	Scud-B	SSM	1988	1988-90	822	

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Year Book, 1991

TABLE-2 The Terrorist Arsenal in Punjab

Weapons	Make	Range/power	Ammunition	No. of Weapons with Terrorist in Punjab*	No. of Weapons Recovered by the police*	Availabilty
AK-47 Assault Rifles	Chinese Duplicate also available	300 metres effectively can fire upto 800mts	303 type with better charge	200	70-80	Purchased from Afghan rebels and supplied through Pakistani Smugglers.
Thomson Sub-Machine Guns	US/ Western	50 metres effectively	9mm	Above 1000	12	Mainly smuggled from Pakistan Through Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujrat borders.
Sten-Guns	-do-	-do-	-do-	Above 1200	200	-do-
Self-Loading Rifles	Indian/ Western	800 mts	Improvised version of 303	Above 48	12	Snatched from Defence, BSF personnel. Also acquired illegally from ordnance factory.
Light-machine Guns	-do-	1 km	303	Above 10	2	From ordnance factory, Also smuggled from Pakistan.
Spring Field/ Enfield Rifles	Indian/ English	300 metres effectively. can fire upto 1 km.	-do-	15(not effective use)	25	Snatched from Punjab Police GRP and CRPF. Also available With local arms dealers.
Improvised version of Enfield Rifles	-do-	150 metres	303	200	100	Smuggled from Pakistan and also country made.
.38 pistol revolvers	Indian/ Western	20/25 mts (rapid fire with pistol)	38 bullets	Above 400	150	Smugglers snatched from licence holders and service personnel.
.455 revolvers	-do-	25 to 40 metres	.455 bullets	Above 500	150	Smugglers, service personnel.
H.E.Hand Grenades	Indian	10 metres diametre	Nil	Above 100	50	From Ordnance Factory and country-made variety also available.

Plate 1
Kalashnikov or AK 47

Weight	9.5 lb (unloaded) 11.31 lb (loaded with full magazine) Later models, unloaded, weigh just over 6.5 lb
Length	34.2 in 27.5 in, with butt folded
Magazine	Curved metal box holding 30 rounds
Cartridge	7.62 mm. Steel core gives penetrating power to short bullet
Muzzle velocity	2330 ft/sec
Rate of fire	100 rounds a minute automatic 40 rounds a minute single shot
Maximum effective range	330 yd

Plate 8
M1 Carbine

| Weight | 5.19 lb (unloaded) |
	5.80 lb (loaded with full magazine)
Length	35.58 in
Magazine	Straight metal box holding 15 rounds
Cartridge	.30 short rifle
Muzzle velocity	1970 ft/sec
Rate of fire	40 rounds a minute single shot
Maximum effective range	330 yd

Plate 7
Sten Sub-machine-gun

Weight	6.65 lb (unloaded) 8.05 lb (loaded with full magazine)
Length	30 in
Magazine	Straight metal box holding 32 rounds feeding horizontally into left of gun
Cartridge	9 mm Parabellum
Muzzle velocity	1200 ft/sec
Rate of fire	128 rounds a minute automatic 40 rounds a minute single shot
Maximum effective range	200 yd

Plate 6
Thompson Sub-machine-gun

Weight	10.5 lb (unloaded)
	12.1 lb (loaded with full 30-round magazine)
Length	32 in
Magazine	Straight metal box holding 20 or 30 rounds
Cartridge	.45 automatic pistol cartridge
Muzzle velocity	920 ft/sec
Rate of fire	120 rounds a minute automatic
	40 rounds a minute single shot
Maximum effective range	220 yd

| Weight of launcher | 15.4 lb |
Weight of grenade	4.95 lb
Length of launcher	39 in
Calibre of launcher	1.5 in
Calibre of projectile	3.3 in
Range, static target	555 yd
Range, moving target	330 yd
Penetration of armour	12.6 in

Plate 20
RPG-7 Portable Rocket-launcher

Plate 14
Tokarev (TT-33)

Weight	1.88 lb (unloaded)
Length	7.7 in
Magazine	Metal box holding 8 rounds and sliding into pistol grip
Cartridge	7.62 mm Tokarev 9 mm Tokagypt
Muzzle velocity	1378 ft/sec
Rate of fire	32 rounds a minute
Maximum effective range	55 yd

Plate 13
Makarov Pistol

|	
Weight	1.46 lb (unloaded)
Length	6.3 in
Magazine	Metal box holding 8 rounds and sliding into pistol grip
Cartridge	9 mm
Muzzle velocity	1023 ft/sec
Rate of fire	35 rounds a minute
Maximum effective range	54 yd

Plate 11
M52 Pistol

|	
Weight	2.11 lb (unloaded) 2.44 lb (loaded with full magazine)
Length	8.25 in
Magazine	Metal box holding 8 rounds and sliding into pistol grip
Cartridge	7.62 bottleneck cartridge with unusually powerful charge
Muzzle velocity	1600 ft/sec
Rate of fire	32 rounds a minute
Maximum effective range	70 yd

Plate 17
RGD-5 Anti-personnel Hand Grenade

Weight	0.69 lb
Length	4.5 in
Diameter	2.25 in
Colour	Apple green with RGD-5 (in Cyrillic) written on body
Explosive	110 grams of TNT
Fuse	Percussion with delay of 3.2 to 4.2 seconds

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