

**THE DEMOCRATIC ERA IN TURKEY
(1950-1960)**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of*
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
1992**



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20 July 1992.

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation
entitled "THE DEMOCRATIC ERA IN TURKEY (1950-1960)"
submitted by SANJAY BHARDWAJ in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF
PHILOSOPHY (M.Phil) of the University is, to the best
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PROF. MOHAMMAD SADIQ
CHAIRPERSON


PROF. MOHAMMAD SADIQ
SUPERVISOR

In The Loving Memory of My

Late Father

Whom

I Miss Very Much.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I express my gratefulness to my supervisor, Professor Mohammad Sadiq, Chairperson, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for his keen interest, scholarly guidance and thought provoking ideas, which inspired me throughout the course of this work. His valuable suggestions helped me in bringing it to the final shape. I can never forget his generosity and unflinching help.

I am thankful to Shri Aswini K. Mohapatra, Assistant Professor and Shri Arshi Khan, Research Scholar of the Centre who did more than teach me, how to tread the arduous ground of literary appreciation. They were the source of immense inspiration and always encouraged me to go ahead to complete this work.

However, mere lexical gestures cannot express one's feelings, especially, sense of indebtedness and gratitude, yet, I will be failing in my duty, if I do not formally offer my heartfelt gratitude to my parents and relatives who stood by me and gave moral and material support at times of need.

I must also extend my sincere thanks to all my friends who rendered substantial assistance in completing this dissertation. I specially want to thank, Mr. Lakhvinder, Ashok, Naushad, Joyti, Hari Chandan, Piyush Mathur, Sanjay Sharma, A.A. Mirza, Jogashankar, Naresh, Kishor, Prashan for their co-operation and constant encouragement.

My sincere thanks are also due to the staff of some libraries, especially of J.N.U., ICWA, USIS, Teen Murti House for their co-operation in procuring the relevant materials.

And finally, I would like to thank Mr. A.D. Bahuguna, for his promptness in typing out this dissertation within time.

Finally, I acknowledge the responsibilities for all errors and omissions, if any.

NEW DELHI
JULY, 1992.

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CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Turks are heirs to a rich tradition of state-craft and political culture, a tradition dating back in particular to the Seljuk and Ottoman periods. Later on, the French Revolution made an impact on Turkish mind and provided stimulus to the constitutional movement. Influence of the British Parliament system through diplomatic contacts gave a fillip to the constitutional movement. The Turks have also inherited from the highly bureaucratic Ottoman state a predisposition to respect laws and regulations. To crown them all, the key element of Turkish political culture is the tendency to perform the best under an authoritarian government. The government according to Karpaz "have been authoritarian only when their authority to maintain the law is challenge".¹

The Constitution from the Ottoman Empire to the sovereign nation-state of Turkey was a slow and difficult process. About four decades of intermittent reforms efforts known as the Tanzimat era (1839-1876) which normally curbed the absolutism

1. Kemal H. Karpaz, "Turkey's Politics - Transition to a Multi-party system", Princeton-New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1959, pp. 1-5.

provincial councils, amounted to the gestation period for the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire.²

Sultan Mahmud II opened the way for the age of reform inspired by the Western European model. The Sultan laid the foundation of a modern army and civil service. In the main, it was this new ruling coalition of the army officers and civil servants educated in the Western spirit which constituted an essential proof in the imperial administration. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk the founder of the modern Turkish Republic was a product of this class.

Their attempts to transform the Sultanate Khalifat into Western style constitutional Monarchy though failed in the short run conduced to the birth of a relatively progressive movement later known as the young Turk movement. By the Mid-1908, the Young Turk Movement had grown in strength, so much so that it forced the despotic Sultan Abdul Hamid II to restore the constitution of 1876.³

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2. Ersin Onulduran, Political Development And Political Parties in Turkey (Baslmevi, Ankara University, 1974), pp. 29-41.
 3. Kemal H. Karpat, Turkish Politics: Transition to a Multi Party System (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,), pp. 1-5.

It was in the period of the second constitution the Ottoman Empire entered the World War II as an ally of the axis power and suffered the severe defeat that virtually sealed the fate of the century-old Osmanli rule. Although the victory of entente signalled the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the aftermath of the war witnessed the emergence of the modern Turkish Republic.

After the Mudros armistice of 1918 when the dismemberment of the empire with the allied forces still occupying Turkish territories appeared.

Mustafa Kemal organised the Union for the defense of the rights of Anatolia which culminated in the successful. The war of independence, a prolonged National Liberation Struggle 1919-1923 not only freed Turkey from the alien occupation had also established a new regime in Turkey. From fighters for freedom against foreign occupation. The Turkish Revolution developed into a struggle for a new nation, a new state, a new nationality and above all a new way of life.⁴

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the leader of new Turkey and head of the government called for elections for a

4. Ersin Onulduran, n. 2, pp. 29-41.

new assembly with extraordinary powers were vested in the Assembly. In the fall of 1922, Mustafa Kemal founded the Republican People's Party (RPP) as based on populist principles. Commencing victory in the 1923 elections for the National Assembly. Turkey in October 1923 declared herself a republic. In fact, the goal of Mustafa Kemal was to establish a democratic regime under a single party transmissor belt in carrying out the sweeping reforms on the center periphery.

In 1930, for the first time in Turkish history nation were given the right to vote in elections to municipal councils and in 1934 it was extended to the National Assembly. No doubt the RPP pioneered the changes in almost all spheres but created diffections and middle spread resentment.⁵

During the years of World War II there was not much changes in the political fields in Turkey but the years 1946-50 saw a new phase, a new phase of transition from a monoparty system to pluralistic. In Turkey such a significant systemic change undoubtedly opened the floodgates for the diverse political

5. Kemal H. Karpat, n. 3, pp. 1-5.

process opposed to or authoritarian political dispensation. The emergence of Democratic Party after its electoral victory in 1946 reflected the groundswell of popular disillusionment with the ruling RPP representative of the part autocratic rule.⁶

Kemal formed the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) based on reformist ideas. After the RPP's concerning victory in the 1923 elections for the Assembly, Turkey developed herself a republic in the same year.

In the months following the victorious termination of the war of independence and to recognition of the newly proclaimed Republic Ataturk directed his efforts to a democratic foundation in still a feudal Turkish society. Consequently, what happened was that the democratic process was inhabited largely due to the political participation. Be that feldging Republic didn't start with the grandoise experiment with pluralism from Ataturks goal was to turn the RPP as the transmission belt to carry out the reform measures. Bereft of any serious hindrance.

Thus Turkey was ruled under a single party parliamentary system (1923-1950) of which the RPP

6. Ibid., pp. 1-5.

alone remained the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty. In addition, the stability of the state polity was singularly contingent upon the strength and disability of the party. Although the RPP pioneered the radical changes in almost all spheres of the nation's life, its hegemony gradually transformed the social as well as political power structure into highly autocratic. Not naturally the authorities' dispensation backed by coercive sanctions created the grounds well of popular disaffection and wide spread resentment.

In the inter war period Turkey barely experienced any striking change in the political field, except granting voting rights to the women in 1934. However, the years 1946-50, after the World War II saw the beginning of a new phase - a phase of transition from the monoparty to multiparty system in Turkey. With the switch over to the comparative party system in 1945, Turkey inevitably moved toward broader popular participation restricted till then by the very authoritarian structure of a single party dominant state.

Doubtless the historic shift to democratic pluralism that Turkey experienced in 1945-46 was essentially the outcome of a combination of indigenous

factors such as the rise of the intermediary class aspiring to become the part of ruling elite. Growing social mobilization along the masses apart from the ideological diversions and political divisions. All the same it was the external factor such as catalyst in precipitating the systemic transformation. In this context, it seems all the more important to highlight to external developments giving that period till than assess their impact on the domestic political forces in Turkey.

In External Scenario

At the end of the World War II Turkey put its peculiar geographical weather found herself exposed to serious external emanating from the expansionist policy of Soviet Union. After having denounce the 1945 treaty of neutrality and non-aggression with Turkey in August 1946, Kremlin demanded a joint Russo-Turkey control over the Black Sea Straits, which were unacceptable to Ankara. The territorial claims along with the demands remission of the Montreux Convention by Soviet Union laid to wreck the mutual confidence that had grown between Moscow and Ankara in the past years.⁷

7. Roodric H. Davison, Turkey (New Jersey: Printice Hall Inc., Englewood 1968), pp. 144-148.

These dramatic developments soon replace the non-aggressive and inward looking image of the youth full Soviet Union among the Turks that of an aggressive and expansionist great power. Although the Soviet demands were restricted formally. Turkey in the shadow of the hostile super power felt insecure. And it was thus sense of insecurity coupled with its own relative weakness to withstand the external pressures that brought about a conspicuous shift in Turkish security perceptions.⁸

In 1946 Turkey and Iraq signed a detailed treaty of friendship for joint controlled and development of the rivers and for the closer cultural relations.⁹ Moreover, Pakistan seemed to provide a growing market for Turkish exports. Despite all this friendly bilateral relations with the Western countries, Turkey was altogether averse to the idea of creating a broader Muslim Union. Transcending the national identities along the line of what was known of the past, the Umma.

On the contrary the Turks tried to forge institutional links with the West by the joining of

8. Ference A. Vali, Bridge Across The Besphoras, (Baltimore; John Hopkins University, 1971).

9. Roodric, n. 7, pp. 150-151.

Council of Europe at its meeting in Strasbourg in August 1949. In the background of the cold war Turkish close association with the West marked the significant departure from her earlier policy of neutrality. Suddenly maintained even of the height of the World War II. By September 1939 Turkey found herself aligned with England and France through a pact, signed in October 1939, which distinctly in no case would Turkey become a belligerent against the Soviet Union. The bilateral pact soon followed by the Turkish declaration war against Germany on 23 February 1945.¹⁰

The war years subjected Turkey to severe economic strain increased the government intervention economic life. The Second Five Years Plan, launched in 1939 was nullified by the high weight of military expenditure and the shortage of raw materials and even agricultural production was adversely affected by the maintenance of partial mobilization.

The war have not only slowed down the country's developments but also had adverse effects on the economy. Half a million men have been kept under arms shortages and mismanagement pushed up the cost of living

10. Lewis V. Thomas & Richard N. Prye; The United States, Turkey and Iran (Harvard University Press Cambridge Massachusetts, 1951).

to over three times its pre-war level. War times control worked badly. Foreign trade on the other hand flourished Turkish products were in high demand and were sold at strategic rather than commercial prices.¹¹

Despite the fact that Turkey derived considerable profits from the war as an exporter of agricultural products and minerals under competitive buying by the belligerent parties the rate of industrial growth diminished because of the supply and shipping difficulties. She was only able to increase her gold and foreign exchange reserves. The supply difficulties were aggravated by several poor crops and hoodings, the widespread speculation introduced and inflationary trend which culminated in almost six fold increase in the wholesale indirect and 4-5 fold increase in the cost of living. The descriptive war time hostility resulted in accumulation of large profits in commercial hands and discrimination buying power of those with fixed salaries and wages.¹²

All this resulted in the massive mobilization for labourer as well as deprived agricultural skilled

11. Ibid.

12. Osman, Okyar, "Industrialization in Turkey", The Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July 1953, pp.212-13.

labour from the industrial section. The state budget and the financial resources council in general severely strained by expenditures meet the imposition of the almost confiscatory taxes necessary. Post-war adjustment was impeded by the political situation. In view of Russian territorial demands Turkey had to keep her army alert even at the expense of the utilization of scarce resources for enhancing production. The Turkish economy couldn't stand the strains caused by the efforts of the war and its aftermath forcing her to look toward Washington. For financial assistance to rebuild the infrastructure undertaken during the war in an effort to keep the press in conformity with the government delicately ambidextrous policy, had intensified the liberals desire for loosening of the reins.¹³ The commercial class enlarge and enriched by Turkey's wartime neutrality demanded more outlets for investment that what the Turkish state under the policy of etatism had allowed the working class suffering from the infladed prices and forbidden by laws to strike were ready to support any party strong enough to challenge the government.

13. Ibid., pp. 213-14.

The minorities still reeling under the savage and unexpected blow of the Varlik law (capital tax), felt that the change of government possibly would improve their status. Whereas the fundamentalists were eager as ever to seize any opportunity to undo the Kemalist reforms especially the dis-establishment of Islam.¹⁴

The transition from authoritarianism to competitive politics in Turkey is highly exceptional in that it took place without a break, with the existing institutional arrangements. Moreover, the transition process was led and controlled by the power holders of the previous unauthoritarian regime.

The potentially democratic aspirations commitments to democratization provided the impetus for bringing about the steady transformation while sparing no effort to neutralize the opponents.¹⁵ In fact, relation between the RPP old guard and the DP opposition grew tense. İnönü intervened personally to ease the atmosphere and to reassure the opposition.

14. Geoffery Lewis, Modern Turkey (Ernest Benn Limited London, Toribridge, 1974) pp. 140-43.

15. Osman, n. 12, pp. 212-13.

The most significant of the all was his statement on 12 July 1947 after several rounds of talks with the hard line Prime Minister Recep Peker and the opposition leaders Celal Bayar. The statement included a promise by İnönü that the opposition party would enjoy the same privileges as the party in power and that İnönü himself would remain responsible to both parties as the head of state.¹⁶

After the second World War there came a sudden change in the process of parliamentary democracy in Turkey. The process began in 1945 when Turkey joined the United Nations. When the charter of the United Nation came for discussion in the National Assembly, Adnan Menderes, deputy for Aydin emphasized that Turkey by signing the Charter had definitely accustomed to the practice genuine democracy, Celal Bayar, the ex-Prime Minister, together with Fuat Koprulu, an authority of international standing on Turkish history Adnan Menderes and Refik Koraltan presented a joint motion which unambiguously stated for the Turkish constitution and promised to modify all laws of an unconstitutional and dictatorial charter.

16. Rooderic, n. 7, pp. 148-49.

Besides Fuat Koprulu and Adnan Menderes published articles, in an independent paper explaining their views. This was considered a breach of party discipline and on this ground both Fuat Koprulu and Adnan Menderes with a very limited number of associates set themselves to work to organize a new party. At the same time, President Ismet Inonus' speech at the opening of the National Assembly on November 2, 1945 encouraged them. Inonus recommended a change in the electoral system.

Among them most important was his sense for a direct and secret setting aside the two degree system provided by an electoral law originally adopted in 1876 and followed throughout with a few modifications. He also expressed in favour of the repeating the constitutional laws particularly those concerning the press associations and duties of the police. He especially deplored the absence of an opposition party to guard against the government excess and abuses of powers.

In the winter of 1945-1946 the Turkish press began to indulge in free criticism of the one party system. The people showed intense interest in the open discussion and expressed their views openly. Even the peasants of Anatolia started to show an unprecedented interest in politics and businessmen sought more

freedom for their activities.¹⁷

In the mean while the organizers of the Democratic Party took several months to prepare their programme and evolve the bases of the organization. In doing this, they had to avoid numerous pitfalls. The programme as finally drafted was not very different from that of the RPP. For the six fundamental principles had to be incorporated into the constitution. Between these were the ground party rules and disagreeing with them could be legally established. The Democratic Party was officially registered in January 1946.¹⁸

The DP accepted state ownership only for certain key industries which were to feed private enterprise.

The significance of the Democratic Party does not lie in the wording of its programme but in the fact its aims and objectives emerged from a sense of government's failure to apply various principles embodied in the constitution.

The men who formed the new party had had a close view of the governments shortcomings. The fiercer

17. Alferd Michaclis, "The Economy of Turkey", The Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July 1953, pp. 278-288.

18. Ahmet Emin Valman, "The Struggle for Multiparty Government in Turkey", The Middle East Journal 1947, vol. 1, pp. 46-58.

pressure from the vested interests of the former single party system forged solidarity among the Democratic Party leaders and strengthened their determination to avoid the risks inherent in over centralization and domination by a single individual.¹⁹

After the relatively stangant first three months the Democratic Party suddenly began to expand mainly because, the people became convinced of the genuine character of its opposition.²⁰ The spirit of openers and displayed by the organizers of the Democratic Party coupled with the strong support of a majority of the independent daily papers, created such a favourable atmosphere that branches of the party soon sprangout throughout the country, thus assuming it wide popular support.²¹

The leaders of the DP were the people who cherished new ideas and there was no longer an over-riding reason which could restrain them from putting their ideas to work openly. Many individuals embraced the democratic cause for basically personal reasons. They had been personally offended by President İnönü

19. Ibid., pp. 46-58.

20. İsmet Girtili, Fifty Years of Turkish Political Development 1919-1960, (Istanbul: Fakulterer Matbussı.

21. Ahmet Emin Yalman, n.18, pp. 46-58.

or by other leaders in the administration and the Turks are very prestige conscious people. And in political opposition that opportunity to maintain their might be found. Other individuals embraced the honour of the democratic cause from more idealistic motives. They believed that the Republicans professed ideals on paper. They should now be put into force, either as a matter of principle or expediency. Not all the Turks who felt their country's interests lay in more democratic practice joined the DP. Many preferred to stay in the Peoples Republican Party in order to influence its development in a more liberal way.²² There was a lack of popular participation in which, adoption of unfair methods by the ruling party and the insufficient mass base of the DP. However, the 1946 election was a turning point in the Turkish history. For it was the first direct election of deputies by the voters which provided a new test or rival campaigning freedom of the press and voting. By December İnönü's government gave official notice that the two party system had replaced the one-party system. In July 1948 the secret ballot and by December İnönü's government gave official notice that the two party system had replaced the one party system. In

22. Lewis V. Thomas & Richard N. Prye, n. 10.

July 1948, the secret ballot and the open count for the 1950 were made into law. It was becoming clear that the leaders on both sides were actually appealing to the electorate on the issue of opening up the political system with a view to governing their support. For instance general convention of the DP took place on June 20, 1949 insisted on the recognition of the elections guarantee the right to rebel in case 'the peoples will' was violated.

The struggle for a multiparty system in Turkey between 1946 and 1950 had two immediate goals. First to neutralize the ideology and the political means which favoured the establishment and maintenance of one party rule; second to ensure the free existence of opposition party and to devise an impartial election mechanism.²³ Added to this, there had been no real difference between the two parties on foreign policy before 1950. They unlike the Young Turks didn't involve the army in politics.²⁴

After the election of 1946 religion was exposed to open controversy in the new environment. In the competitive situation each group and party used religion to gain support. This radical departure from

23. Ibid.

24. Roodric, n. 7m oo, 149-150.


the fundamental policy of secularism was formalized and legitimized by both dominant political parties. Both the parties debated the issue of religious education favourably in the Assembly in 1946.

In addition, favourable religious debate took place in the RPP's Congress in 1947. DP's programme in 1946 negated secularism covertly and supported religious freedom overtly. With the emergence of revivalist NP, the religious issue became prestigious and crucial. At the time of 1950 general election both parties used religion for political gain unhesitatingly. In fact, these parties competed with each other to give more and more religious concessions to rouse popular sympathy.²⁵ The political parties during 1946-1950 adopted certain views on statism under the influence of internal and external factors. The DP was not opposed to statism as a whole, but was against its excesses and extremes in the form of state capitalism.

In the Republicans view statism in Turkey was not the result of any economic theory but the

25. Reed, Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics pp. 335-36.

outcome of historical circumstances and of the country's immediate needs. The RPP convention of 1947 debated and finally agreed to amend the principle of statism in its programme by limiting its scope in favour of private enterprise and private capital.²⁶



26. Feroz Ahmad, Turkey : Transition to Democracy (C. Hurt & Company, London) pp. 38-45.

CHAPTER - II

THE ELECTION OF 1950 AND ITS AFTERMATH

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This chapter deals with the political developments in Turkey in the aftermath and its transition to multi party system. After the electoral set back in 1946, Democrats did not take long time to recover from the political failures. By 1960 the Democrats had emerged from their political wilderness and were able to form a government. The electoral victory of Democrat's not only shattered the hopes of RPP leadership but also marked the beginning of the new era for Democracy in political life of the Republic.¹

Domestic politics during the 1950 were characterised by the struggle between the two largest parties, the DP and the RPP. There were some basic differences in the make-up and appeal of the RPP and the DP. First, the DP limited the RPP's earlier economic etatism and encouraged private enterprises at its expense, being also less strict and officious in its daily contacts with the population. Secondly, it took a less ardent attitude towards secularism, allowing, according to its rivals, even encouraging - an Islamic revival in

1. K.H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a multi party system (Princeton, N.J. 1959), pp. 408-430.

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Turkey. However, the DP successfully sought support among the large land owners and strove to ensure the village vote by the extensive development of the rural economy.²

In a way, the year 1950 was the turning point in Turkish political history. Because, the election brought the DP to office with an impressive majority thus upsetting 27 years of uninterrupted Republican Peoples Party rule. Participation in the voting was as high as 89% of the qualified electorate and the right to vote was limited only by age, citizenship and sanity. The regime in power refused to control the election so as to assure favourable results even though it possessed the power to do so. The army and police were loyal to it. President Inonu and his Republicans relinquished power without violence.³

The election of 1950 and the orderly transfer of power were taken as 'proof' that parliamentary democracy had grown solid roots in

2. Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden, E.J. Brill 1974), pp. 1-5.

3. Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Harvard University Press 1965), pp. 141-147.

Turkey and that her people and leaders were confirmed practitioners of that system.⁴

The calmness surpassed all expectations and can be credited to the high plane of courtesy to opponents on which the leaders of both parties campaigned. popular trust in the judiciary and the new electoral law's requirement of a three day cooling off period before the election day without campaign speeches or printed propaganda.

In that election Democrats secured 53.3% of the votes whereas the RPP got 39.9%, Nation Party 3% and various independents 3.8%. Because of the district electoral system then in use, the majority party received all the seats in each of a total of 487 Grand National Assembly seats. Celal Bayar was elected President and Adnan Menderes Prime Minister in the new government.⁵

The election victory was more than a change of party. It was a plebiscite and gave expression to change taking place in Turkish society. The reason for the DP success were not hard to find. Once Ismet Inonu had assured the electorate that there wasn't

4. Shaw & Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire And Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 373-436.

5. Ibid., pp. 373-436.

a catch on it, all the elements desirous of change hastened to strike their blow against the RPP.⁶

There were many other factors which were responsible for the formidable victory of DP and defeat of RPP. First of all, the decade prior to 1950 had been relatively barren of any significant economic expansion and development. Hence the Menderes regime took over at a time when the conditions and the mood of the country were right for change, particularly of economic change for better. In a bid to capture the careful mind of the people desirous for change, the DP had based its election campaign on selected attack against statism favoured by the RPP and advocations for free enterprise.⁷

In the light of the international politics of the period there was in Turkey high expectations of receiving massive amounts of American economic and technical aid.⁸ In his context the manifesto of DP was very appealing. The Democrats promised to stimulate private enterprise, increase agricultural credit encourage foreign capital, introduce tax reforms and minimize inflation.

6. Geoffery Lewis, Modern Turkey (London & Toribridge: Ernest Benn Limited, 1974), pp. 140-142.

7. Dwight J. Simpson, "Development As a Process" The Middle East Journal, 1965, vol. 19, pp. 141-168.

8. Ibid.

The manifesto also offered to create a senate to curb the majority in the Assembly and to eliminate the six principles of Kemalism from the constitution. The DP offered what the masses wanted - more schools, credit, farm equipments, seed and water in the country side, houses, roads, telephones and electricity in the towns. On top of all this the Democrats continued to concentrate on criticizing the RPP.⁹

Certain important interest groups played a role in the formation of the party and its policies. One of these were the country magnates, the larger and medium landowners, especially in Anatolia. Before the Republic, the landlords and rich peasants held a dominant positions in rural Anatolia. The Kemalist Revolution brought radical changes. Ataturk was a determined centralizer and he continued the policy of eliminating the privileges and autonomy of the great feudal families. The land reform - law did nothing to win "the goodwill of the peasantry. The peasants weary of years of chiwyng by peoples party (RPP) officials and seeing no obvious benefit in the new law, were ready to take their line from the landlords and rich peasants and to follow them in revolving against the RPP's regime".¹⁰

9. Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: Transition to Democracy (Istanbul: C. Hurt & Publishers), pp.35-48.

10. Ibid.

The new commercial and industrial middle class was increasingly under the pressure of etatist policies of the RPP against which they now revolted in the name of democracy and free enterprise. They rallied with enthusiasm behind a party which promised freedom of enterprise.

Some other peripheral but equally important contributed to the victory of DP were: the character of the leadership, increasing popular demand for greater participation in government by a growing middle class, the obvious growth of corruption within the RPP's and Inonu's personal reaction to this state of affairs.

Between 1946 and 1950, the RPP had adopted an increasingly lereant attitude towards the manifestations of religious revival in Turkey because the religious leaders had never forgiven the party of Ataturk for the enforced secularization of the 1920 and 1930s. When the opportunity came to turn against the RPP they gratefully seized it.¹¹

With sufficient majority in the Assembly and strong American economic-military support, the

11. Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic pp. 141-147.

new government seemed to have a promising future. Honest, real power and leadership went to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes instead of President Celal Bayar. Three major problems rose to bedevil the government that created tremendous hostility between it and the RPP now in opposition and eventually led it into the same kind of autocracy once it had so strongly criticized in the past.¹²

Apart from the economic dealt in the next chapter.

The second major area of difficulty was that of religion where the government was accused of trying to reverse the Kemalist secular policies. Actually it was the RPP that in 1949 as part of its liberalization efforts had allowed religious instructions to be provided to those students in the public schools on the request of the parents. What the DP government did was extend the religious instructions to all schools, and required all Muslim children to receive it unless their parents specifically requested exemption.¹³

12. Shaw & Shaw, n. 4, p 408.

13. Ibid., pp. 406-410.

The third major problem was political freedom. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans really understood how to oppose responsibly or to accept opposition fairly. The result was often harsh RPP criticism of the government's economic and religious policies to which the Democrats became excessively sensitive, and at times responded by suppressing the opposition. Much of the initial problem came from the universities. The university law of 1946 had organised the universities according to the German system. Since there were no retirement laws, and pensions were poor in comparison with salaries few left their chairs until they died.¹⁴

The Democratic Era (Domestic front) :

Having come to power with an overwhelming majority in the Assembly in the 1950 election the new government of Turkey and the new opposition party RPP's relations in the Assembly and articles in party periodicals revealed unresolved tensions. The first confrontation was evident on 29 May when Menderes presented his programme. The government, however, received a vote of confidence, in spite of 192^a abstentions.¹⁵

14. Shaw & Shaw, n. 4, pp. 406-410.

15. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 35-76.

In the election campaign of 1950, the Democrats had appealed not only to those who wanted economic liberalism, but also to those who wanted a greater freedom for religious practices. The first action of the Democrat-controlled National Assembly was to restore the right of giving the call to prayer in the traditional Arabic, instead of Turkish as had been required since 1933. From 17 June 1950 which was the first day of Ramadan, this decision was implemented. A slightly larger place was made for religious instruction in primary education, schools to train Muslim prayer leaders were started, and more foreign exchange was made available to those who wished to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. The new government also encouraged the Turks who felt burdened with the direct secularism or the RPP had always looked forward to the way of life, based on religion without from lebal restrictions.¹⁶

There were incidents of wearing the turban and the Fez in some parts of Turkey and the Government seemed to have ignored them. The Democrats were more tolerant than their predecessors of reversions to the old way of life and it is not unreasonable to conclude

16. Rooderic H. Davison, Turkey (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1968), pp. 152-153.

that this was based on the pre-election problems of Democrat canvassers.

The bulk of Turkish population was still in the villages, who had been far less touched by Ataturk's secularism. So after 1950 they simply continued, perhaps more openly in their beliefs and practices. In terms of real politik, the Democrats never took chances with the opposition regarding the issues concerning the statecraft or the social society.¹⁷

On 6 June 1950, the government purged the high command of the Turkish armed forces replacing the chief of the General Staff and senior officers who were according to them associated with the RPP. The DP was very keen or sensitive about the standing with the military.

In August 1951, the State Maritime Administration was handed over to a new Maritime Bank, 51 per cent of its capital being subscribed by the government and the remainder by private investors. Private firms were also allowed to

17. Geoffery Lewis, n.6, pp.140-144.

participate in the manufacture of wine.

On 16 December 1953 the permises and plant of the leading Republican newspaper Olus (Nation) which Mustafa Kemal had founded in 1920 under the title of Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National sovereignty) were taken over by the Government representatives.¹⁸

The leaders of the Nation Party had been brought to trial and on 27 January 1954 the party was dissolved and the leaders sentenced to one day's imprisonment and a nominal fine. They were understandably not deterred and on 10 February they founded a new party, the Republican National Party.¹⁹

The Democrats were not taking any chances with the opposition. On 8 March 1954, the government amended the press law and prescribed punishment for journalists whose writings were deemed harmful to the political and financial prestige of the state or invaded the private lives of citizens.²⁰

Turkey's import surplus jumped from 62.3 million lira's in 1950 to 246.4 million in 1951 and

18. Geoffery Lewis, n. 6, p. 144.

19. Roodric H. Davison, n.16, pp. 144-145.

20. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 38-74.

516.0 million in 1955. On September 12, 1955 Turkey suspended all registrations of 'free' import transactions. In 1953, the import surplus fell back to 382.2 million. Meanwhile, Turkey had become one of the largest debtor nations in respect to the European payments Union, with a deficit at the end of October 1952 at \$2239 million (654.9 million Lira).²¹

In 1950-51 however, the country enjoyed a bumper harvest boost in grain and cotton. Urban working class vote had been virtually secured by the passage of the 'paid weekly holiday'. In August 1951 Grand National Assembly (GNA) passed a bill to encourage foreign investment with these electoral successes aside from the increased majority Democrats tended to become more authoritarian government, even though there were objections from within the party.²² As early as 1951 the Halkevîs had been closed and their assets were confiscated to the Treasury. This meant a heavy loss to the Republican People's Party, both financially and in terms of its ability to influence the electorate.

21. Feroz Ahmad, n. 9, pp. 35-76.

22. Ibid., pp. 38-41.

The Democrats claimed that its rival had embezzled huge sums during its long monopoly of power. The Republicans argued not unreasonably, that all the leading Democrats had been members of the Republican Party in their time and bore their share of any guilt that might be.

The 1954 Election

In the election of 1954, largely free and fair the popularity of the DP yielded them 503 Assembly seats, while the People's Party (RPP) gained only 35 per cent of the votes and 31 seats.²³

The results showed the success of Menderes's policy of improving the lot of the Turkish villager at the expense of the British, French, West German, Italian and American tax payer.

The good harvests, foreign credits and the government's investment in public works gave an aid of prosperity to the country and contradicted the opposition propaganda. The average citizen felt freer in 1954 than he had done five years earlier.²⁴

23. Roodric H. Davison, n. 16, pp. 144-45.

24. Ibid., pp. 146-147.

With his mandate renewed, Menderes continued in his efforts to silence the opposition. Shortly after the election a Bill was introduced to change the constituency boundaries in such a way as to eliminate the province of Kirsehir.²⁵ All the same, the opposition certainly had a great deal to criticize.

The trade gap 382.1 million Liras in 1953, rose to 401.6 million in 1954. By exports alone owed \$15 million. According to the Istanbul chamber of Commerce, the city's cost-of-living index, on the basis of 100 in 1950 was 129 in 1954. By August 1955, it was 143. Newspapers were forbidden to publish photographs of queues outside shops. Tradesmen were forbidden to use the word Zam, 'Prime Increase'. Instead they had to use ayar, 'adjustment' when asked for goods which had vanished from the market, could they say Yok, 'there isn't any', the officially imposed substitute was gelecek, 'it'll be coming'. "The current name for Turkey was Yokistan. 'The Land of Not'.²⁶

The Marriage of grass-roots politicians and the intelligentsia could not last indefinitely. Many

25. Geoffery Lewis, n.6, pp. 146-147.

26. Ibid.,

academics thought that the Democrats were interested primarily in political liberalism, of which economic liberalism was seen as a logical extension. While in opposition, the Democrats had been sincere about liberalism, both political and economic. In power, however, their principal concern was the economy. In this respect they shared the aspirations of the Republicans; both wanted to achieve material progress that would transform Turkey into a little America.²⁷

On 13 November 1955, local elections were held. The RPP and National Party did not contested in protest against alleged malpractices in the 1954 general elections but independent opposition candidates won eight of the sixty-six provinces, while two went to the liberal led peasants' party. Several Democrats resigned to fight the election as independents, then rejoined the party when they had been elected. The nineteen rebels led by Fevzi Lutfi Karaosmanoglu, a former interior minister formed the Freedom Party (Hurriyet - Pastisi). Most of the cabinet resigned and ten days passed before Menderes could form another cabinet which won a vote of confidence on 16 December with at least fifty Democrats abstaining.

27. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 50-51.

On 28 June 1956, a new law virtually prohibited political meetings except for the forty-five days before an election.²⁸ On July 13, 1954 4 judges and 17 professors at the University of Ankara were retired. Before the year ended three newspapermen had been jailed and four others dismissed for similar reasons. In 1955 the RPP General Secretary, Kasim Gulek was jailed for insulting the government in a political speech.²⁹

In the Summer of 1955 the Cyprus question had come to dominate Turkish politics and the government exploited the issue to cover up its own deficiencies. The RPP all but gave up its function of opposition.³⁰ Five newspapers were suspended including the Ulus for violating censorship regulations.

The Istanbul riots of 6/7 September exposed the pent-up tensions in Turkish cities. It was rumoured that these riots were organised by the government to demonstrate to the London conference how strongly the Turkish People opposed enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. But this organized demonstration spontaneously degenerated into a riot.

28. Geoffery Lewis, n.6, pp. 147-148.

29. Shaw & Shaw, n.4, p. 411.

30. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 52-53.

This was the first mass reaction against the DP's increasingly authoritarian rule.³¹ Three thousand people were arrested but subsequently released. The government paid compensation, but the minorities faith in the Democrats was shaken and there were many resignations from local party branches.³² Menderes's pre-eminence within his party had been so much challenged that he was prepared to resign. But, he was persuaded to appear before the group and to offer the formula of seeking a vote of confidence for himself while his cabinet resigned. The Group accepted this compromise and Menderes survived the Cabinet crisis.

In the beginning of June 1956, the press law was strengthened a new amendment made it an offence to summarize or comment on any speech made in the Assembly.³³ On the very last day of DP's fourth convention, a proposal was introduced recommending that a law be submitted to the GNA to deprive of those deputies of their seats who had been expelled or who had resigned from the party. This proposal was a gross violation of the constitution and brought a wave of protest which convinced the party leaders of its unpopularity and not to submit it to the Assembly.

31. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

32. Geoffery Lewis, n.6, pp.147-149.

33. Rooderic H. Davison, n.16, pp. 154-5.

In the fall of 1956 at Ankara University political science faculty, Dean Turhan Feyzioglu was suspended for his speech in which he assaulted the government for refusal to approve the promotion of Aydin Yalsin, who was critical of government policy.

With the emergence of the Freedom Party as an important force, the political situation become more fluid. In spite of the burden of Legislative repression and restrictions on freedom of expression the opposition become more confident and aggressive.³⁴

THE ELECTION OF 1957 :

Through all the political turmoil, the DP's economic achievement continued to gain it the support of the mass. This was especially true in the country side, which had most of the votes where the government moved to satisfy the cultivators with new roads, irrigation, electricity, building schools and hospitals in the smaller towns and villages while the big cities struggled mainly to keep up with their rapidly rising populations.³⁵

34. Shaw and Shaw, n.4,p. 412.

35. Ibid., pp. 412-13.

The Democrats in the face of an aggressive propaganda by the opposition sought to strengthen its support bases in the rural Turkey by resorting to the populist policies. For instance, the buying price of grain was raised as a part of their electoral strategy which stimulated purchasing power in the countryside though it increased inflation. Moreover, the DP spared no attempt to draw sufficient political mileage on the issue of Cyprus by forcing the Turkish chauvanism. Because, the Soviet support to Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus and the grant of the left in the neighbouring Syria had already created to climate of fear and suspicions in Turkey. The ruling party justified the preponement of the general elections held on 27 October 1957 largely on this ground. Probably it was the first time in the post-Single Party phase, the party in power made the fullest use of the external danger either real or fabricated to serve its political end.³⁶

In the October 1957 elections, the DP again emerged victorious though with only a plurality of the votes, 47.2 per cent to 40.6 per cent for the RPP, 7 per cent for the Republican Nation Party, and 3.8

36. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 55-56.

for the Freedom Party. The Democrats got a higher percentage of the seats than their popular vote warranted because of the district representation rule, 70 per cent (424 seats) while the RPP increased to 29 per cent (178 seats) and the Nation Party to mix. The Freedom Party failed to win a single seat and soon merged with the RPP.³⁷

Menderes had held an early election in order to retrieve relative loss of his prestige as well as over all popularity of his Party. Ironically, the results produced only greater instability and tensions.

Menderes was unable to announce his new cabinet until 25th November, almost a month after the election. On 14 November the Group asked the government to take action against officials who had supported the opposition and proposed more stringent press laws which would forbid 'harmful articles and pictures' as well as take legal measures against the opposition. On 19 November, it voted unanimously to request the Assembly to investigate the opposition activities before and after the election to find out

37. Shaw and Shaw, n.4 pp. 412.

if they had been engaged in subversive activities.³⁸

These amendments marked the end of the freedom of speech, even in the Grand National Assembly (GNA), which triggered off bitter criticism against the DP government. But, when the opposition members saw that their arguments had no effect on the government, they decided to stage a walkout in protest on 25 December. Not even all Democrats were happy with these measures and many stayed away from the discussions. On the day of the vote only 381 out of 424 were present.

In this climate of political repression and increasing economic hardship, came the first hint of Military conspiracy against the government. On January 17, 1958 the press reported the arrest of nine officers in Istanbul on the charge of fermenting rebellion in the army.³⁹

Since the 1957 elections there had been a change in the nature of the Democrat membership of the Assembly. The party's constitution laid down that candidates should be chosen in local primaries, but that the leader of the Party could set aside

38. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 56-58.

39. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

these choices and nominate whom he wished. Menderes had exercised this power to such effect that the government benches were occupied almost exclusively by Yes-men. On February 17, Menderes survived in the air crash at Gatwin. While going to participate in the London Conference on Cyprus. On Menderes' return to Ankara, the yes-men of him told 'we are grateful to England, we sent her a Prime Minister, she sent us back a prophet'.⁴⁰

The election results of 1957 only led to further political tumult. The RPP thirst for victory and with an increased representation in the Assembly stepped up the violence and frequency of its attacks on Menderes and his associates. The government retaliated by continued acts of repression. As a result, violence mounted in and out of the Assembly, with all sides acting primarily for political advantage with very little responsibility.⁴¹

By the beginning of 1958 the government had become totally isolated from almost all the institutions of the state. First, it was the press, than the judiciary, followed by the civil bureaucracy in the

40. Geoffery Lewis, n.6, pp. 151-152.

41. Shaw & Shaw, n.4, p. 412.

1957 election and finally the army and the universities.

Despite the government's measures, the economic situation didn't improve in 1958 as Menderes had expected. Not only did the restrictive legislation fail to provide relief to the consumer, it had the effect of alienating important supporters of the government like the cotton farmers and the businessman.

Unable to cope with the economy, Menderes decided under foreign pressure, to introduce a stabilization programme on 4 August 1958. This involved the devaluation of the Turkish Lira from 2.80 to 9.025 to the US dollar. With this concession came the announcement of a \$359 million credit from Turkey's allies which bolstered the government's financial position and was described by the opposition as a 'life belt', thrown to Menderes by the Western power.⁴²

Menderes Balikesir speech of 6 September 1958 is considered by the Republicans as the beginning of a campaign of active repression against Inonu and

42. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 59-61.

his party. It was also the first occasion on which Menderes used the word 'revolution' in the context of Turkish politics. On 12 October Menderes appealed for the creation of a 'Fatherland Front' (vatancephesi) against the 'front of Malice and hostilities' being created by the Republicans.

In spite of the threats of repression the RPP was gaining confidence and assuming the offensive. The merger of Freedom Party gave her added strength. In April 1959 the Republicans launched a country wide propaganda offensive.⁴³

The year 1959 had been disastrous for democracy in Turkey. It was a year of trial and tribulation during which more newspapers were closed down and Journalists imprisoned. Political activity had become almost totally negative and non-productive, with the result that the average citizen was disillusioned and demoralized.⁴⁴

The RPP Chief Inonu visited Konya in February 1960 and the police used tear gas and trancheons to disperse the Republicans who turned out to meet him.

43. Ibid., pp. 59-63.

44. Ibid.,

The next month he was to visit Kayseri and the government misused its power to prevent this. The Governor of Kayseri had his train stopped but Inonu took no notice. The next day the governor called on the troops to prevent him from going on to Yesihsar, half way to Nigde, A colonel and two majors resigned from their commissions in protest against being ordered to deprive a citizen of his constitutional right to travel where ever he pleased. They were atonce arrested. General Gursel tried to secure their release but failed. He thereupon asked to be relieved of his duties. Pending his retirement under the age limit, on September.⁴⁵

An Assembly Committee of Investigation was set up on 18 April to investigate the Democrats charges that the opposition had transgressed legal limits. The Committee was given extraordinary powers which superseded those of the Assembly and the courts, thereby violating the constitution itself. On 27 April a Bill was passed empowering the Committee to censor the press, to suppress newspapers to issue subpoenas and to impose sentences of up to three years imprisonment on anyone who resisted or hampered its work.

45. Geoffery Lewis, n.6, pp. 151-153.

The creation of the Committee immediately sparked off a demonstration in Ankara on 19 April which was dispersed by the police. When the university professors led the students demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul, Martial law was proclaimed. In Istanbul the students fraternized with the army and hailed them as saviours. On 29 April all universities and institutions of higher education were closed. The next few weeks Istanbul saw sporadic student demonstrations, students arrested by the army were taken off to barracks, fed on steak and beer until they could barely stagger to bed and then sent home the next day.⁴⁶

On 21 May, Cadets of the war college in Ankara staged a silent protest march. That was a heavy blow to the prestige of the government. Some ministers were reportedly contemplating in terms of abolishing the military schools.

On May 27, a group of officers led by Gursel Commanding the key military units in Istanbul and Ankara and using the students of the war academics arrested Menderes, Bayar and most other members of the cabinet along with many Democrat deputies. Martial law was imposed throughout the country

46. Feroz Ahmad, n.9, pp. 64-65.

with very little opposition.⁴⁷

General Gursel became head of the State, Chief of government and chief of the general staff. Power resided with him and 37 other officers- most of them under 40 years of age. 'Young Turk' in a new setting who controlled an interim government and a non-political cabinet of technicians.

Meanwhile all party activity had been stopped. The Democratic Party was dissolved and the Democrat deputies as well as cabinet ministers were arrested and put on trial for violations of the constitution of 1924. A new constitution was drafted by a Committee of lawyers. On January 9, 1961 the constitution was submitted to a national referendum. Sixty two percent of the voters approved, 38 per cent voted against. Thus, it became the fifth in the series of Turkey's written constitutions since 1876.⁴⁸

The bloodless military coup of May 27, 1960 ended a decade of the DP's virtual monopoly of power.

47. Geoffery Lewis, n.6, pp. 154-155.

48. Rooderic H. Davison, n.16, pp. 156-157.

The DP started its rule with a big bang in 1950 but was removed without a whimper. The Democrats who had come to office through free elections is an outstanding example of the orderly transfer were caught up in the turbulent blow of events, largely of their own making.

CHAPTER - III

CHANGES DURING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE

Massive political participation in urban as well as rural areas in the general elections of 1950 had raised the social tension to a level where they could neither be suppressed nor controlled. The newly emerged non-elite middle class groups like commercial-agricultural entrepreneurs, urban workers, peasants and non-establishment intellectuals had given wide support to the DP to revolt against the elite domination, political authoritarianism of the Republican regime. Because the DP had promised to give a prominent place to the aspirations of these groups in its 1950 election manifesto.¹ Thus the DP dominated the political scene, particularly in the rural areas and got the large scale victory over the Republican People's Party. The Victory of the Democrats variously interpreted as a 'Plebiscite'² or a 'white revolution'³ was a revolt of the materialist emerging middle class against the rule of the RPP guided by idealistic intellectuals military and bureaucrats.⁴ In essence it replaced the old, closed,

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1. "The Democratic Party Election Manifesto - Excerpts", Middle Eastern Affairs (New York), vol.1, 1950, pp. 149-150.
 2. Bernhard Lewis, "Democracy in Turkey", Middle Eastern Affairs (New York), vol.10, 1959, p.62.
 3. Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75 (London, 1977), pp. 38-39.
 4. Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge, 1965), p. 146.

controlled and rigid political system by a new open democratic and liberal one. The new situation deprived the traditional elite groups of power and high social status. New social groups attained relatively high power and position and adopted entirely new role which was in contrast to their earlier one. The legitimization of different groups, with their respective ideological identifications created an open atmosphere in Turkey and influenced all developments throughout the decade. Various groups started the debate on ideological inputs-outputs and distinctive elements of Kemalist ideology. The competitive environment led to many social and political struggle in the Turkish society. In this background, the remark that 'there had been no ideological differences between the parties. Only the differences of emphasis on how to implement the same ideology⁵ seem simplistic because of the fact that concrete ideological conflict took place between different groups represented in the political parties. Although traditional legalistic consensus on broader ideals of nationalism, republicanism, revolutionism, secularism. That is why any non-western act or non-statist measure was not considered as in contradiction with Kemalist secularism and etatism

5. Feroz Ahmad, n.3, p. 194.

by the Democrats. In fact, Kemalism had attained the symbolic status which was used to fulfil particularistic objectives. In a sense Kemalism had lost the functional vitality.

The ideological framework, thus, retained its traditional dominant position in the Turkish social order. Since the theoretical adaptation of the Democrats was, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. In contrast with that of the Republicans, the former attempted to bring about basic changes in the polity, economy, society, religion, education and rural-urban relationship. These changes ultimately created a new Turkish society based on social solidarity, division of labour, democratic processes, modern institutions, rational political system and open social environment.⁶

The most significant feature of the 'Democratic Era' was the liberal attitude of the DP towards Islam.

Socio-Political and Ideological

Socio-political force with multidimensional implications have played an important role in Turkish Democratic political history. In fact, the religious revival cannot be analysed in isolation. It can be related to the development of the preceding period when conscious religious sentiments were noted seriously

6. Feroz Ahmad, n.3, p. 194.

and moderate-liberal religious policy was initiated by the Republicans. In essence, it represented the desire of people to retain their traditional cultural distinctiveness in spite of legal restraints. In other words, it meant a positive response of the ruling class to the problems of moral chaos, cultural crisis and social disintegration initiated by the harsh treatment of religion during the Republican era.⁷

The religious revival was so dominant during the decade of the Democratic rule that it became relatively a normal feature of the Turkish society and attained wide social acceptance. With the restoration of freedom of opinion, Islam became a political issue. The political parties competed with one another in tolerating religious revival. The proponents of Kemalist racism were no exception. Religious revival met the aspirations of different groups in difficult ways.

In fact, the religious revival was the logical culmination of the policy of liberalization in respect of religion in the late forties. The social forces compelled the ruling Democrats to adopt such measures as the restoration of ezan (call to prayer) in Arabic recitation of the quoran and other religious

7. Feroz Ahmad, n. 3. p. 194.

programmes on the radio and introduction of religious lesson in the schools. The anti-communist fetva⁸ of the Director of Religious affairs further added to the religiosity of the new order. Thus the DP continued the policies of its predecessor towards Islam. Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister, promoted the new trend by emphasizing the notion of the 'freedom of conscience' which assured the fundamental right of religious. Freedom in the secular framework.⁹ He said in December 1952 that 'The Turkish people are Muslims and will remain Muslims, no one has the right in this country to violate the freedom of conscience.'¹⁰

The official encouragement of religion had a general impact on the Turkish society. The religious revival was obvious from the construction of Mosques, private-religious education, pilgrimage to Mecca and other shrines, public observance of the fast, crowded attendance in Mosques and appearance of religious garb.¹¹ In addition, increase in religious publications press coverage to the Islamic world news.¹² and serious

8. The fetva declared that Islam rejected Communism and its practices in any form. Ahmad Feroz, n.3, p. 366.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Geoffery, Lewis, Modern Turkey (London 1974), p.143.

12. Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", The Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. 8, 1954 pp. 274-75.

discussions about religious issues manifested the religious revivalist trends.¹³ These developments proved that the Turkish society had retained its inherent traditional character. Despite a century of westernization the Islamic roots were still alive and 'the Muslim identity of Turks was unchallengeable'.¹⁴

The process of religious revival was often exploited by the religious reactionaries. It was rather strange that even after thirty years of the Republic the forces of religious reaction were not dead.¹⁵ People as a whole strongly condemned religious violence when Ataturk's statutes were vandalized in early 1951. This also made the government more vigilant regarding religious fanaticism.¹⁶ The religious sentiment could not be checked, rather it was always intensified by the political parties to serve their own interests. In this situation the DP became identified with the resurgence of Islam particularly after Menders survived the air crash in 1959. The intelligentsia reacted 'hysterically'¹⁷ to this because of their suspicion of any movement from below having popular character which might

13. Lewis, n. 10, p. 48.

14. Gulek, Kasim, "Democracy takes Root in Turkey", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 30, 1951, p. 143.

15. Feroz Ahmad, n.3, p. 373.

16. Ibid., p. 368.

17. Ibid., p. 368.

undermine their traditional status position and power.

The religious revival in Turkey in the fifties has been generally realated to the development of DP and its power position. This seems superficial and even misleading primarily because it locks an understanding of the totality of the phenomenon.

Infact social conditions which gradually crystallized into social forces were more responsible for the religious revival. Menderes recognised this fact saying that 'true restoration of the freedom of conscience was long overdue and he was only continuing a process began by Peoples Republican Party (RPP).¹⁸

In fact, the approach of the RPP to and exploitation of religion during the fifties proved the primacy of social dominance of religion. In this way the religious revival was related to broader socio-economic and political factors rather than to mere rise of the Democrats to power.

However, the Democrats adopted a cautious approach towards religion so that the fundamental framework of the secular Republic would not be endan-

18. Feroz Ahmad, n.3, p. 368.

gered. Although there were demands for the 'abolition of secularism and restoration of Islam as the official religion.¹⁹ Even within the Democratic ranks, the Party leadership resisted these trends. The government^{was}/vigilant against the revivalist trend which would seek to re-establish the Sharfa law. So from 1950 to mid 1960's some five hundred persons were arrested in Turkey for religious offences.²⁰ Menderes said in 1952 that - 'to say that there is no danger of a reactionary revival in the country does not constitute a reason for giving free rein to efforts to create reactions²¹ In this way the Democrats encouraged Islam as a social rather than political organization. Both the DP and RPP exploited religion in their own fashion. In the 1950 general election the DP branded the RPP as against Islam.²² While in 1959 the RPP tried to reply back in the same way.

Religion had undergone important legal and formal changes in the Republican era. However, these 'legalistic' and 'formalistic' changes lost their significance in the open liberal socio-political environment of the Democratic era. The policy of liberalization initiated by the Democrats in the early fifties revived

19. Howard A. Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 190, 1957, p. 338.

20. Robinson, n.4, p. 202.

21. Feroz Ahmad, n. 3, p. 370.

22. Ibid., p. 61.

the element of traditionalism. However the religious revival during the Democratic Era has been rather exaggerated. The religious revival was not a backward turn but a positive reaction to the negative religious policy. It meant the adoption of normalcy and relative change.²³ Most Turks appeared 'Moderate'²⁴ synthetic and realistic in the new experience. Mumtaz Faik Fenik, a close aide of Menderes in reply to an allegation of the Dawn (Karachi) wrote in 1952 that 'Islam is Turkey's religion and ever since the democratic freedom was firmly founded here. The Islamic character has manifested itself more than ever before. However, religion has been completely isolated from political affairs.'²⁵

The political modernization initiated by the Democrats led to the creation of liberal institutional system in which individual and groups, in competition and cooperation, crystallized their positions and intensified the social transformation. The immediate impact was felt in the composition of the Parliament which shifted from members with military and official background to members with commercial

23. Contwell Smith Wilferd, Islam in Modern History (Princeto , 1957), pp. 188-189.

24. Ibid., p. 182.

25. Reed, n.11, p. 281.

and semi-professional background. The traditional national political elite replaced by the local or provincial elite.²⁶ The new political system created openness, dynamism and mobility at the social level particularly in the rural areas. The political dynamism led to higher political consciousness and political maturity the political consciousness was evident from the election participation which was as high as 88.9 per cent in 1950, 80.9 per cent in 1954.²⁷ 76.6 per cent in 1957 and 81.1 per cent in 1961.²⁸ The political parties to reach a compromise particularly in 1955.²⁹ On the whole, the new system sustained and strengthened the 'national consensus'.

Turkish press and the public opinion had reaffirmed unanimity in opposing two main dangers - Communism and religious reaction - to Turkey on the assumption that these might undermine the unity and modernity of the nation.³⁰ In this situation the Communist had to

26. Frank Tachau and Marry, J.D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political and social change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments and Elections", Comparative Politics (New York), vol.5, 1973, pp. 551-552.

27. Daniel Lerner, "The Passing of Traditional Society Modernizing", The Middle East Journal (New York, 1968), p. 126.

28. Shaw & Shaw, "History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 1908-1975 (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 406-407.

29. Deborah Ellis Ellen, "Turkey : 1955", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.29, 1955, p. 94.

30. Frederick W. Frey, "Turkey" in Edward Robert & A. Rutow Dankwart (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton 1964), pp. 24-26.

change their strategy and depend mainly on the anti-American orientation.³¹

The new political system widened conflict and bred discontent among various political groups. So 'Inter party strife, more and bitter, remained a constant factor' during the decade.³² The political ascendancy of economically powerful groups relegated the intelligentsia and the military to a secondary position and oriented them towards a new social and economic philosophy that gave a socialist interpretation to etatism. The DP had become a mass party because of its grass-root strength in the rural areas.

The adoption of the 'liberal economic system' by the Democrats contributed significantly to the social transformation particularly in the rural areas. According to DP 'interpretation of 'Kemalism' Ataturk aimed at westernization within the capitalist system based on free enterprise.³³ In its programme submitted to Grand National Assembly in May 1950 the DP expressed that the aim and essence of our policies is to reduce to the

31. Walter Lequeur, Z., Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York, 1956), p. 254.

32. Feroz Ahmad, n.3, p.43.

33. Ibid.,

minimum the interference of the state and to restrict the state sector in the economic field and to encourage the development of the private enterprise to the utmost.³⁴

The ideological orientation was the direct and positive response to the demands of newly emerged classes because their interests were easily accommodated in the new economic system.

The nineteen fifties experienced wider ideological and social transformation mainly because of the social, political and economic liberality of the Democrats. The doctrinal bases of the democratic society generated a great momentum for change in individual, social groups, institutions, associations, organizations, processes, beliefs roles, ideals and relationships. Thus the structural transformation proceeded on a course determined largely by institutional pattern and supported by technological forces.³⁵ The changing currents were too dominant to have any aspect without influence in Turkey. Consequently the 'Republican Turk' had been transformed into 'Democratic Turk' had been transformed into 'Democratic Turk' in the

34. Leslie, L. Roos (Jr.) and Noralou R. Roos, Managers of Modernization Organisation and Elities in Turkey 1950-1967 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 41-42.

35. Edwin J. Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change - The Development of a More Prosperous and Open Society (New York, 1970), p. 46.

process of democratic transition.

According to Lerner's study, Turkish society in the late fifties was broadly divided into three functional categories of modern, transitional and traditionals.³⁶

The new economic opportunities and political liberalization had boosted the self-confidence, with a new dynamism and aggressive sense of freedom; or the middle and lower classes, they stood opposed to the civil servants and became increasingly involved in party work at all levels.³⁷ The extensive functioning in different fields created severe competition and antagonism between these classes.

The urbanization process³⁸, intensified by heavy cityward migration, important in the means of communication and transportation gave birth to the forces which challenged covertly the traditional beliefs, norms and values. The role and values, The role and status of women underwent a radical change, dependency-ratio of children on parents decreased, new inter-generation

36. Lerner, p. 26 and 172.

37. Nuri, Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization (London) 1963, p.170.

38. Taylor (ed.) Alice, The Middle East Journal (n.p. 1972), pp. 176-177.

relationships appeared and individualism in general got positive expression. The Modernization of urban women led to the removal of veil and increase in female literacy and employment. The literacy rate increased from 34.6 per cent in 1950-1951 to 39.6 per cent in 1960-1961.³⁹ According to a public survey the number of public library readers increased from 7,19,089 (male) and 1,18,392 (female) in 1950.⁴⁰ In 1958-59 school year 2.4 million students attended 21,464 primary schools of which 19,379 were located in villages. While the girl ratio in general was forty two per cent, the girl ratio in the rural areas was thirty five percent.⁴¹ This had many-sided impact like the increase in competition, decrease in ascription. Changes in orientation, roles and behaviours and finally durability of the press which was highly expanding. The press and literature⁴² manifested the dominant ideological trends made acceptable at national level.

Spectacular transformation of rural socio-political environment was one of the major developments

39. Andreas M Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey (London) 1966, p. 272.

40. Lerner, n.26, p. 125.

41. Robinson, n.4, p. 195.

42. Kamal H. Karpat, "Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature", The Middle East Journal (Washington) vol. XIV, 1960, p. 31.

in the decade dominated by the DP. In fact, during the decade the village was more drawn into the social, economic, and political mainstream than ever before. Economic prosperity, political consciousness, educational advancement and social mobility had created new group formations and relationships in the villages. In a study of rural Turkey Szyliowicz observed changes in the standard of living, inter-generational and inter-sex tensions, sex rates and marriage patterns, conflict between law and custom and consciousness about education.⁴³

With these changes the Turkish society was progressing towards a pluralistic, complex and industrial society; popular participation had considerably reduced elite domination. During the Democratic era despite rapid modernization, the age-old traditions were retained consciously, partially or fully, in the urban lower classes, conservative middle classes and peasant-rural communities. Sometimes even the mass media, as a social force, supported tradition.⁴⁴ According to Szyliowicz, the situation remained 'unchanged' in rural Turkey in comparison with the changes in urban areas.⁴⁵

43. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Political Change in Rural Turkey" Erdemli (The Hague, 1966), pp.85-95.

44. Robinson, n.4, p. 275.

45. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Political Participation and Modernization in Turkey", Western Political Quarterly (Utah), vol. XIX, 1966, p. 274.

The Democrats essentially perhaps primarily represented the agrarian interests.⁴⁶ Bayar once said that "We shall always keep in mind that agriculture constitutes the foundation of our economy."⁴⁷ So a pro-agrarian attitude and non-elitist ideological approach dominated their functioning throughout the decade. They diverted most of the economic resources to rural development which was strongly resented by the urban folk. In the late fifties,⁴⁸ the Democrats in fulfilling the demands of agrarian and commercial groups, created 'an oligarchy of wealth and power without the participation of old intellectual elite.'⁴⁹ They repeated the mistake of the RPP to regard the state as an institution to serve the ruling party, particularly in the late fifties.⁵⁰ Now nationalism became a 'conservative ideology'⁵¹ mainly based on traditional-cultural heritage to meet the demands of the ruling class. Now Turkey seemed ripe for a change from within primarily because the Democrats could not accommodate the economic and political interests of various social groups. The

46. Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey, n. 29, p. 282.

47. Robinson, n.4, p. 145.

48. Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle-East (New York, 1968), p. 300.

49. Ibid., p. 346.

50. Robinson, n.4, p. 262.

51. Kemal H. Karpat, n. 48, p. 300.

preliminary report of the Professors Committee charged with the draft of the new Constitution, confirmed this by saying that 'The State during the late fifties became a materialistic force representative of personal influence and ambition and class privilege.⁵²

So a regime that had come to office by free election had lost its legitimacy among the intelligentsia. This situation provided the bases for ideological reorientation of the secular modernist intelligentsia which adopted 'socialism' as its new ideology. The grave reaction of the Urban intelligentsia, especially the military and professional elites, to the Democrats functioning culminated in the Coup d'etat of May 1960.

Economy

Following world war II, the programme of the Kemalist movement westernization-plus-nationalism was revitalized and bold measures were taken to reshape Turkey's political, economic and social concepts and institutions. The years 1949 to 1953 witness an unusually high rate of economic productivity in Turkey. This was largely effected through United States government loans and grants coupled with local capital investments and

52. Karpat, n.63, p. 308.

altered economic policies.⁵³ Every segment of the economy received attention, including manufacturing; agriculture, power, mining and transportation. The emphasis was on industrialization with the objective of meeting Western European standards of production and on stimulation of agricultural productivity. The programme has been state directed and to a considerable degree publicly implemented but attention has also been directed towards stimulating private enterprise and private foreign investment.⁵⁴

Developments in Various fields:

(1) Public Investment: The 1950-1956 period was characterized by unprecedented public and private investment rate from an estimated 1,090 million lira in 1950 to 3,400 million in 1956 but as a percentage of gross national product. The increase was from 10.5 to 13.6 and in decade marked price increased from 496 T.L. to 1,836 T.L. The net national product had just increased by 50% in the Democratic decade. From 431-501 T.L. This means the percapita income rose by an average of 3.2 per annum. The increase in the National and per capita income is mainly the result of the two successive record crops in 1951 and 1952.⁵⁵

53. Harry J. Psomiadas, "Turkey Progress and Problems", The Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1957, Vol. VIII No. 3, pp. 1-14.

54. Morris, James A. "Recent Problems of Economic Development in Turkey", The Middle East Journal, vol. 14, Winter 1960, no. 1, pp. 1-3.

55. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

(2) Industrial Production And Mining: Industrial production increased from an index of 100 T.L. in 1948 to 256 T.L. in 1960 with the manufacturing portion upto 279 T.L. The food industry to 311 and electrical power to 390. Coal output doubled the number of factories, homes and other buildings increased tremendously, particularly roads extended from 9,093 km. in 1948 to 23,8266 km. In 1961 commercial vehicle in use from 14,100 to 68,400. Private cars from 8,000 to 45,800.

Noteworthy development results have also stemmed from the Industrial Development Bank. Major industrial projects which have come into being during the past few years, chiefly in connection with foreign interests.⁵⁶

(3) Agriculture : With 82 per cent of its population rural, Turkey has remained a predominantly agricultural countries. Agricultural products account for about 85 per cent of total exports.

The sharp increase in agricultural production in 1951 and 1952 was not because of better farming practices but due to expansion of the area under cultivation and favourable weather. The number of tractors

56. Osman Okyar, "Industrialization in Turkey", Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July 1953, pp. 212-217.

were increased (1,750 in the 1946, 30,000 in 1952, and with a further rise to 50,000 expected by the end of 1954.).⁵⁷

The DP remitted agricultural taxation, accelerated the phase of land reform and established a new system of agricultural credits. These moves were intended to give incentives to farmers for more and more production. A considerable amount of American aid money went for the purchase and distribution of capital intensive farm equipment (Tractors mechanical seeders, harvesters, etc.).⁵⁸

(4) Trade :

The general liberal policy adopted by the Democrats was extended to foreign trade, in the fall of 1950 Turkey had upon the American advisers and its colleagues in the organisation for European Economic Cooperation freed her imports from OEEL countries from quota restrictions extended it to 60% of the countries 1948 imports level while the deficit in the balance of trade declined from \$137 million in 1950 to \$68 million in 1958. Turkey's imports surplus jumped from 62.3 million liras in 1950 to 246.4 million in 1955. On

57. Alferd, Michaelis, "The Economy of Turkey", The Middle Eastern Affairs (June-July 1953, pp. 278-288.

58. Simpson J. Dwight, "Development As a Process", Middle East Journal, vol. 19, 1965.

September 22, 1955 Turkey suspended all registrations of free, transactions.

Despite a programme of export subsidies, it became more difficult to sell Turkish products in International Markets because of a disparity between internal and external prices and uncertainties as to the possibility of readjustment of official exchange rates. The natural stimulus to domestic industry producing import substitutes was nullified by shortages of critical materials and parts.⁵⁹

(5) Foreign Investment :

The amount of foreign investment in Turkey during 1951-63 stood at 1.9 billion T.L. and the US accounted for 64.5% of the total and Britain 24% petroleum investments alone during an even shorter time span (1954-63) totalled more than 1.5 billion T.L.

Despite strong opposition the DP regime continued to implement a policy of complete surrender to foreign capital not only in the Petroleum industry but also in a number of other key industries such as rubber and tyres, fertilizers, chemicals, electrical goods, food processing and assembly.⁶⁰

59. James A. Morris, "Recent Problems of Economic Development in Turkey", The Middle East Journal, Winter 1960, n. 1, vol. 14, pp. 9-10.

60. Ibid., pp. 9-11.

(6) Growth of the Working Class and The Unionization :

There were 643,000 industrial workers in Turkey in 1951 by 1960 this number had risen to 975,509 a 52% increase over the 10 year period. The proportion of industrial workers to the total labour force grew from 5.1% in 1950 to 7.5% in 1960. During the same period was 40.5% accordingly the percentage of unionized workers in Turkey.

(7) Electricity :

In 1950 the Radio's installed capacity (M.V.) was 408 and it rose to 1,272 the Energy production million (Kwh) were 790 and in 1960 to 2,8,15. There were 362 radios (100's) sets. In 1950 and in 1960 they were 1,341 in 1960 they transisters, radios and newspapers has contributed overnight to the ~~awaken~~ing of the peasantry.

(8) Demand for Books :

In 1950, number of libraries were 78 and the number of books (1,000's) 877 and in 1960 were 1,777. Numbers of readers (1,000's) 808 to 1,417, number of books published 2,363 to 4,195, number of newspapers and magazines published 647 to 1,658, number of printing establishments 547 to 1,258.

(9) Expansion of Credit And Money Supply :

The economy grew rapidly. Bank credits for example increased from 1,275 billion Turkish liras in

1950 to 7,787 billion TL, in 1960. With investment flowing into all sectors of the economy. In 1950 the money supply was 2,018 T.L. and it grew to 9,256 T.L. in 1960.

(10) Management Of The Economy :

The government management of the economy improved since the 1950s when it comes to using. The power of government to influence the course of economic affairs and to assure the realization servants and intellectuals still display a market preference for direct physical control in addition to making the economy more competitive with the outside world and earning more foreign exchange from the sale of goods and services abroad have not yet received from official quarters the priority treatment that they demand.⁶¹

Perhaps the most significant of the social overhead investment projects has been development of transportation facilities to include the construction of a national highway network the improvement and extention of railway lines to create a united system, the creation of an airways-system and the modernization of past facilities.⁶²

61. Haluk A. Ulman and Tachau, Frank, "Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization With Democracy", The Middle East Journal, vol.19, 1965, pp. 153-155.

62. James A. Morris, "Recent Problems of Economic Development in Turkey", The Middle East Journal, Winter 1960, vol.14, no.1, p. 14.

(11) Minerals :

Between 1948 and 1958 the value of mineral exports increased from 31 million Turkish Lira (TL) to 90 million TL. At the same time the domestic processing of minerals for home consumption was expanding.

Five modern meat peaking plants were built during this period many new textile plants were constructed and a nitrogen fixation plant was initiated.⁶³

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT :

Turkey's pattern of development since 1948 can be explained by no basic thesis such as a drive for self-sufficiency or balanced growth, nor can it be held that any overall plan has been adhered to. Growth has proceeded on all fronts in an un-coordinated manner, stimulated and directed by the compulsion to build factories to develop transportation and electric generation facilities and to improve productivity on the farm. This effort has been financed by compulsory saving to some degree but more directly by exhausting gold stocks and foreign exchanges reserves by extending national.⁶⁴

63. Alfered Michaelis, "The Economy of Turkey", Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July 1953, pp. 285-286.

64. James A. Morris, "Recent Problems of Economic Development in Turkey", The Middle East Journal Winter 1960, vol. 14, no.1, pp. 1-14.

The investment was far less productive. There was an insufficient amount of foreign aid as compared with the widely ambitious investment schemes. This caused disturbances in the actual carrying out of the schemes themselves, made the government increasingly dependent upon more expensive supply markets and, resultantly contributed to the higher costs of investments. And unfortunately there was the 'normal' amount of faulty allocation of resources and under utilization of extent capacity, important balancing point, more favourable to the DP overly ambitious development goals. The inability or unwillingness to establish clear investment priorities. The serious impingement of politics on investment decisions and a basic unrealism about amounts and continued availability of foreign aid - These Turkish mistakes are glaring obvious.⁶⁵

The sudden increase in urbanization and the apparent inability of the various municipalities cope with the problem so disturbed the government that

65. James A. Morris, "Recent Problems of Economic Development in Turkey", The Middle East Journal vol. 14, Winter 1960, No. 1, pp. 1-14.

legislation was enacted to curtail the flow of population from the countryside to the cities. Ankara's population had doubled in five years. Municipal and social services were on the verge of breaking down under the pressure, law enforcement agencies in the major cities were inadequate. The Istanbul Police force, numbered less than a thousand men.⁶⁶

Another very serious problem was housing. Inadequate housing facilities and prohibitive rentals compelled the homeless to improvise their own shelters. Small shack communities sprang up within the confines of many cities. They are forbidden by law and are legally without property rights. They are usually without water facilities, road, electricity or gas and they lack adequate sanitation safeguards. There are no outlets for excrement.

Instead of facing the danger of inflation the DP was busy playing politics which resulted in more misallocations of many government projects with a repetition of the cycle of result.⁶⁷

66. Harry J. Psomiades, "Turkey: Progress and Problems", Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1957, vol. VIII, no.3, pp. 90-96.

67. Ibid.

Additionally, there was an apparent misunderstanding of their balance of payment problem. The Turkish lira was far over valued and a devaluation would have improved their export-import problem and checked the rampant inflation probably rather quickly. But the DP was too concerned with the short run and feared the political impact of increased domestic prices that devaluation would bring about.

The DP continued to ignore certain economic realities, such as falling real income caused by inflation, and falling production caused by the inabilities to import because of the overvalued conditions of exports. The attempt by the government to control inflation through open market operations was doomed to failure because of the underdeveloped nature of Turkey's credit institutions and stock market.⁶⁸

Development of mineral resources on a systematic basis has been handicapped by lack of knowledge of resources, although production of known minerals has increased significantly.

68. Ulman A. Haluk & Frank Tachau, "Turkish Politics: The Attempt to recognize Rapid Modernization With Democracy", Middle Eastern Journal, 1965, vol. 19, pp. 153-176.

Despite a programme of export subsidies, it became more difficult to sell Turkish products in international markets. Because of a disparity between internal and external prices and uncertainties as to the possibility of readjustment of official exchange rates. At the same time a reduction in exports and increased reluctance by foreign suppliers to extend further credits to Turkey forced a downward scaling of imports. The natural stimulus to domestic industry producing import substitutes was nullified by shortages of critical materials and parts.⁶⁹

In order to encourage the agricultural sector, the government abandoned the tax on agricultural income in the 1954 budget. This was disastrous

By 1958 Turkey's economy was in an appalling condition. Agricultural productivity had not increased in relating to increase population and Turkey was once again become importer of agricultural products. There was a mounting foreign trade deficit which had increased total foreign indebtedness to nearly \$2 billion. In the late fifties no coherent plan was discernible with the predictable injurious

69. Morris, n. 65, pp. 1-14.

impact on investor confidence.

The economic-cum-political pressures which had built up inside Turkey had become so great that it was obvious that the DP had to change its ways. This attempted in a stabilization effort of 1958 when the party announced a substantial change in the economic policies it had pursued for the preceding eight years. Several factors underline this accelerated trend towards urbanization; among them are: The increasing share of national income going to the non-agricultural sector, and the failure to fully apply modern agricultural techniques due to excessive fragmentation of land holdings.⁷⁰

Although these landowners who operated either on a sharecropping or rental basis were able to expand their operations substantially and relatively quickly. The adoption of modern agricultural techniques such as the application of improved seeds, fertilizers irrigation and pesticides etc. developed more slowly. By contrast, the social effects of mechanization emerged rather suddenly.

70. Halak Ulman and Frank, Tachau, "Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey", The Middle East Journal, vol. 19, 1965, pp. 151-152.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF DP

There had been no basic difference between the two parties on foreign policy before 1950 and this continued to be so after the Democrats victory. Essentially the national policy was friendship with America and the Western powers, coolness toward Russia and the Communist bloc. Turkey responded at once to the 'United Nations' call for troops in Korea in 1950.

Turks, who value military qualities highly, felt in this common action a real partnership with the West and were therefore more aggrieved that their concurrent bid for membership in NATO was turned down.⁷¹ But the NATO powers reconsidered because Turkey's participation in the Korean war was much though it raised her reputation in Western eyes. On 18 July 1951 Britain announced that she now favoured Turkey's admission to NATO. In 1952, Turkey along with Greece, became a full member of the alliance.⁷² The Turkish port of Izmir became the headquarters of

71. Rooderic, H. Davison, Turkey (Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1968), p. 150.

72. Bullard, Middle East: A Political And Economic Survey (London : Oxford University Press 1958), pp. 498-499.

NATO's South-East Europe Command. Turkey had at last the specific assurance that the Western powers would go to war to defend her frontiers. Turkey had the additional satisfaction of being recognized as a member of the Western Family of nations.

On 28 February 1953 Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed a Tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. In April 1954, Turkey signed an 'Agreement for Friendly cooperation with Pakistan'. This treaty was also called 'North Tier' system of defense against Russia. The key to the new combination was a Turkish alliance of 1955 with Iraq. This Baghdad Pact was shortly after joined by Britain, Pakistan and Iran.⁷⁴

Syrian-Turkish relations were never good and most Arab governments expecting Iraq's (till 1958) tended to disapprove of Turkey, in part because it had recognised Israel. The disapproval was particularly strong in the case of Nasser's Egypt.

Turkey's friendly relationship with Greece also was soon disturbed by the Cyprus question. The terrorism of Greek-Cypriots against British rule, that

73. Roderic H. Davison, Turkey (Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1968), pp. 150-151.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

alarmed the Turks, it was not only a concern for the safety on the Turkish minority one-fifth of the island's population, which aroused the Turks; but even more so it was the potential threat to their own security. According to the Turkish views

Greece was internally unstable and may conceivably become communist, hence, she must not be allowed to control Cyprus. Cyprus was only forty-three miles from Turkey and would, in unfriendly hands, render Turkey's southern parts useless.⁷⁵

The first months of 1955 were marked in the near east by a crescendo of Turkey's diplomatic activity. On the last day of February the signatories of the Balkan Alliance met in Ankara. There were some complications. Greece found Ankara aligned against her in the Cyprus affair. Yugoslavia was limiting her exports to Turkey for financial reasons, is wary of Ankara's active NATO role, and perhaps of Turkey's intensified contact with Italy.

In the first week of February, Menderes and Koprulu visited Rome. It appears that Ankara

75. Sir Reader, Bullard; The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey, (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford)University Press, 1958), p. 501.

would like to see Italy become a member of the Balkan Alliance if Belgrade raised no objection.

President Bayar visited Pakistan while he took up question arising from his government's efforts to induce the Arab countries to join the Ankara-Karachi alliance.⁷⁶

The Egyptian envoy spoke in Ankara in 1955 that the two republics — Egypt and Turkey preparing to lay solid foundations for close collaborations. The Turks pleased that Egypt had come around, under the agreement on Suez to consider a threat to Turkey, like a threat to any Arab state, as a valid reason for activating the military clauses. (i.e. enabling the British to use Suez) urged upon Cairo the view that the Arabs interest now demanded the logical conclusion — the forging of a Middle East Defense alliance, with the West. The Prime Minister Menderes said that 'if today the region enjoys relative security, it owes it to the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Turkey is also a member'. He said that the report that 'Ankara was disturbed, least the Arabs believe their recent manifestations of

76. M. Perlmann, "Turkey's Diplomatic Offensive", Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1955, vol. VI, no.1, pp. 13-17.

friendship for Turkey may win them United States military and economic aid without their committing themselves to effective collaboration with the West.⁷⁷

The Lebanese Pan-Arabist deputy, Emir Bustani arrived in Cairo. He declared that it was in the interest of all the Arab states to cooperate with Turkey, and that he found the difference between Iraq's pro-western commitment and Egypt's evasion of such a commitment merely formal.

Egypt, which was trying to be a leader against Turkey, found its only supporter in King Saud. In Mid February 1955 Nehru who passing through Cairo, spoke against military alliances as fostering irritation and insecurity, i.e. defeating their purposes. The 'identity of views' or Nehru and Nasser was mentioned in a Communique: opposing military alliances and Power entanglements which increase tension and the race for armaments; in favour of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, For peace and human welfare.

Observers, however felt that Nehru was lashing out against Pakistan and CEATO and that Nasser was expressing his opposition to the Turkey-Iraq

77. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

pact and to any involvement with NATO.⁷⁸

The Turkish press countered by denouncing Saudi Arabian bribes to Arab politicians and even by alleging that Egypt was conducting conversation with the Russians. Ankara's leaders (especially President Bayar during his visit to Pakistan) perturbed by Egypt's unbending position, tried to find a formula that would give Egypt a prominent role in a Middle East Defence System that would include the Arab countries plus Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. On 7 November 1956 Turkey associated herself with the other members of the Baghdad Pact in condemning Israel's attack on Egypt, and in requesting Britain and France to end hostilities immediately, but Turkish opinion was very far from being pro-Egyptian.

Turkey was against the Soviet intervention in Hungary. She demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces and announced that 500 Hungarian refugees would be admitted to Turkey.⁷⁹

The Turkish-Iraqi treaty a rather loose affair was signed and ratified in the last week of

78. M. Perlmann, n.76, pp.13-17

79. Sir Reader, Bullard, n.75, pp. 502-3.

February by Nuri Said for Iraq and for Turkey by Menderes and Koprulu, who had come to Baghdad for the occasion. The New York Times wrote (February 27) that 'Iraq looks West'. But more likely 'Turkey was looking east'. Turkey's diplomatic offensive had not been undertaken without previous blessing from the West.⁸⁰ As event evolved, the Pact did not become a divisive influence and was a contributing factor in Iraq and Nuri Said Pasha's murder. The Baghdad Pact lost its only Arab member. The Organization, renamed (CENTO) (Central Treaty Organisation removed its headquarters from Baghdad to Ankara.

One could well have taken a rather dim view of the northern tier concept right from the start. The real value of these paper pacts were questionable. An effective military pact must rest upon mutual interest and mutual confidence. Details relating to defensive strategy codes, unit strengths, supply, disposition of men and equipment - information of a highly secret nature must be changed if not, a military Pact has little value. If the Baghdad Pact had been conceived right at the start as simply a regional economic development programme devoid of all military implications. It might have introduced an element of unity and stability

80. M. Perlmann, n. 76, pp. 13-17.

into the Middle East. But as it stands, the pact has thoroughly turned Turkey with the imperialist brush and no Arab state was a member.⁸¹

Curiously, the Baghdad Pact represented a Turkish departure from traditional policy of not committing itself irrevocably to any particular position in the Middle East.

For Turkey, Baghdad Pact was the break of tradition. Because this Pact was an effort on the part of Turkey to shore up the security of the Persian Gulf area. Consequently, the Turks stepped up improvement of their highway and railway lines in the direction of the Iraqi frontier and began talking of an oil pipe line to Iran's Qum field.

The Cyprus problem brings to mind the whole matter of the relationship of the Turkish republic to the Turkish speaking people outside its frontiers.

The Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, which kept relations between the two countries at fever pitch from mid 1955 to early 1959. Of such nature as to give both the Greek ethnic majority and the Turkish minority special status within an independent Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain have all guaranteed the

81. M. Perlmann, n. 76, pp. 13-15.

independence of the island.⁸²

During 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine established the policy of the USA was to aid the Middle Eastern countries against the expansionist policy of the Communist Soviet Union.

The close relations between the US and Turkey and the new economic climate in Turkey have had important by-products: these, in turn, have been instrumental in furthering economic development. Trade between the two countries, already considerable increased interest of many American private investors who established businesses in Turkey. New Turkish laws facilitate and guarantee their investments.

Turkish statesmen have repeatedly expressed their gratitude for American aid. Certain difficulties and misunderstanding in economic relations have never diminished this gratitude nor effected Turkey's political ties with America.⁸³

Since 1947, Turkish Foreign Policy has been based mainly on friendship and alliance with the US.

82. Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic Harvard University Press Cambridge Massachusetts, 1965, pp. 184-85.

83. Kilic Altemur, Turkey and the World (Washington, D.C), pp. 134-147.

The visit of President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes in January and June 1954 constituted the climax of the 'honeymoon period'. But in the beginning of 1954 the difficulties started US told that she would not continue to support the ambitious programme of the Turkish government. US also refused to give a long-term loan to Turkey, in the visit of Fatin Rustu Zorlu, then Minister of State. By 1955, the honeymoon was definitely over and official in Washington openly said no.⁸⁴ However, Turkey and the US remained interested in each other enhance their bilateral incooperations. They knew each other's geo-political and economic potentialities. Turkey's unique strategic location in the south of Europe and its border with the Communist Russia excited and motivated the US policy makers to maintain a harmonious relations to serve the US interest in the Mediterranean and the whole of West Asia.

84. Ibid., pp. 134-147.

CHAPTER - IV

A CRITIQUE OF THE ERA

Menderes, during his ten years in power, had failed to create a new balance within the ruling forces in Turkey. He had even failed to give his party a stable identity. He came to power firmly convinced that free competition without any restraints from the government would produce rapid economic growth. Within a few years he found that this policy benefited small groups rather than the country at large and he was forced to introduce measures controlling economic freedom. With the result that he alienated his own supporters.¹ He, the champion of a laissez-faire economy, was forced to reintroduce the National Defense Law, one of the many interventionist laws of the First Republic. Late in 1958, he reverted to laissez-faire* principles under the advice of American financiers. This zigzag policy left him without real support from any group except the land owners. His policy towards them having remained constant. By 1955 many businessmen had begun to support the opposition with the result that in 1960 not even the businessmen were sorry to see him go.²

1. Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: Transition to Democracy (C. Hurt Company, London 1972), pp. 66-67.

2. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

* Policy of freedom from government control especially for commercial interests.

In the Democratic decade a new revolution was launched. The rural revolution awaited the construction of a nation wide highway system which in fact came as part of the American aid programme during the Menderes administration. Opening up the hinterland helped integrate the peasant economy into the national economy. The Menderes government relieved the peasants of taxation, and granted special favors to those provinces whose peasants supported the government's policies. This all formed part of Menderes programme for rural modernization.³

The salaried class which ran the state apparatus also suffered from Menderes inflationary economic policy. This was especially true of the armed forces, with minimal opportunity to supplement their salaries. Most of the salaried class, suffered not only economically but also by loss of social status.⁴ Sky-rocketing inflationary trend weakened the purchasing power of the salaried people. Anti-bureaucratic gesture of the Menderes government and his bitterness towards Turkish military left a cross-section of society dissatisfied with the performance of the DP. Military in Turkey has a different status and

3. J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (Boulder Colorado), Westview Press, 1982.

4. Feroz Ahmad, n. 1, pp. 67-68.

style. They have been instrumental in protecting the edifice of secularism, democracy and national sovereignty. After the establishment of the First Republic, they remained vigilant in safeguarding democracy, secularism and Kemalism. After the death of Ataturk, the İnönü government made a consistent effort to respect the constitutional and conventional status of the armed forces.

The government which gained power because the autocratic RPP, allowed free elections and accepted their results, now had lost its ability to govern. Its efforts to suppress the opposition had led the army to intervene in Turkish politics for the first time since the Young Turk period. In the end the attempt to combine rapid economic development with political liberalization had created too many problems.⁵

In 1960, the country underwent a brief military intervention. This was not a coup d'etat by a group of military adventurers, but a temporary measure to safeguard Ataturk's principles and to restore the democratic regime. The government which came to power towards the later part of its ten years

5. Shaw & Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire And Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 114-115.

in office and was unable to manage the economic situation of the country which was leading to inflation. They lost a substantial amount of the vote in the subsequent elections and in effect attempted to establish a dictatorship of the slight majority. Without adequate checks and balance a dangerous situation developed. The armed forces intervened to prevent possible internal strife and to preserve the democratic regime in 1960. The fact that within a short time a new constitution was drafted and adopted by referendum and that the military willingly turned over the government to the elected representatives of the people was ample proof of the goodwill of the armed forces.⁶

The military coup of 1960 is widely interpreted as a reaction of the military bureaucratic elite to its decline in prestige and loss of power. Inflation eroded the purchasing power of state employees, military officers and government officers and they were no longer looked upon with awe. State funds were spent on numerous 'Pork barrel' projects that were popular with the people and helped local politicians but contributed

6. Nihat Erim, "The Turkish Experience in the light of Recent Developments," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 26, Summer 72 No. 3, pp. 246-247.

only marginally to the modernization of the economy. Local leaders with no more than a primary education now had more access to cabinet ministers than the University educated officials.⁷

Military had always played an important role in Turkish politics in 1919 General Mustafa Kemal took over the leadership of the nationalist insurrectional movement. Ataturk act exemplified an earlier military intervention into the politics of a dying empire, but the political revolution to which the intervention gave rise was a departure from empire.⁸

The roots of the movement which led to the coup d'etat of 27 May 1960 go back to late 1960 when ten staff colonels and majors decided that it was their duty to overthrow the government which had so shamelessly rigged the election that year. The honest election of 1950 caused them to relax and they prepared to enjoy the new era of liberal democracy.

But as time passed more and more officers became discontented with the DP regime. They knew

7. Ibid.

8. J.C. Hurewitz, n.3, pp. 213-214.

there was more to democracy than the name.⁹

The DP neglected to woo the officers who under the electoral laws of 1946 and 1950 didn't have the vote. A minority of officers believed sincerely that military discipline was the best instrument for governing a country. There was a strong undirected desire to do something. For the military there were rewards to members of the cliques which had supported the parties. The Chief of the General Staff was replaced only a few weeks after the elections and choice assignments were given to up and coming colonels like Cemal Tural.

Nevertheless the DP's interest in the military was neither deep nor abiding. Since 1948 US military aid both in modern weapons and in training was dramatically changing the Turkish military establishment. Thousands of young officers were sent abroad for training not only to the USA but to the European countries as well. A Turkish regiment fought in Korea, Turkish officers were assigned to NATO Commands and engaged to multi-national military maneuvers.¹⁰

9. Danial Lerner, "The Turkish Administration: A Cultural Survey", in Jerry R. Hooper (ed.), Public Administration, 1967.

10. Geoffery Lewis, Modern Turkey (London) Ernest Ben Limited, London & Torbridge 1974, pp. 150-51.

Nevertheless, the Turkish military was reluctant to meddle in politics — a tribute to the policy of depoliticization in the armed forces, energetically pursued by Ataturk, and after his death by İnönü. Ataturk's rule was a remarkable case of a military oligarchy contributing fundamentally to social modernization. He insisted, however, that this be done within a civilian framework and officers who wished to be active in politics had to resign from the armed forces. Indeed the military were precluded from voting. Menderes, however, increasingly drew the military towards politics, particularly in the late 1950's, when he sensed that his popularity was waning. His proteges were appointed to key positions. He was forcing the army willy-nilly into a political role.¹¹

The success of the military coup was due mainly to its brilliant execution, which forestalled resistance by the Democratic Party or by anyone else. Many who had reason to be dissatisfied with the rule of DP hailed the coup joyfully and expectantly.¹²

The year 1957 was a turning point for military. The bitter political strife culminating in the election

11. Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey Leiden E.J. Brill, 1974, Croom Helm, London Hoover Institution Press Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1980, pp. 5-6.

12. Ibid., pp.6-9

campaign of that fall and the severe economic crisis which was paralyzing the economy led some of the dissidents to conclude that military reform alone would not solve their basic problems. Thus from the Middle of 1957 they began to press seriously for a military coup. But they could not persuade their comrades.¹³

After the 1957 election the conspirators expanded their activity. Major Samet Küscü, who had become aware of the existence of the Istanbul group, was rejected when he attempted to join them, apparently fearing that he might have compromised himself. He decided to denounce the plotters. Kuscü and eight others were taken into custody. The accused were found innocent, while Küscü was convicted of making false denunciations.¹⁴

After the hatred and violence between the Republicans and Democrats displayed during İnönü's Aegean trip in the spring of 1959, all the conspirators come to the conclusion that civil war might ensue unless the DP left power. Thus they agreed to prepare

13. George S. Harris, The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics, The Middle East Journal Part II pp. 169-171.

14. Ibid., pp. 169-174.

to take over the government if honest elections were not held in 1960.

Meanwhile, the military was being drawn actively into the confrontation between the Republicans and Democrats. On April 2, 1960 troops were ordered to block İnönü from travelling to Kayseri, the soldiers did stop İnönü's train but when he thereupon dismounted and walked through their lines they fell back and after some negotiations İnönü reached Kayseri. In protest to the use of the military for political purposes, however, officers now began to resign from the army.¹⁵

On May 1960, tension had now reached the breaking point for the military officers were being arrested by the police for distributing İnönü's speech and reports were circulating of their ill treatment and even torture by the government. The Students of the Military Academy, who shared the attitudes of their civilian counterparts, could no longer be held in check. On May 21, 1960 the Military Academy cadets began a march on the Presidential Palace. They were only persuaded to turn back half way to the Palace.¹⁶

15. Roderic H. Davison, Turkey, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood 1968), pp. 154-156.

16. Weiker F. Walter, The Turkish Revolution 1960-61 Aspects of Military Politics (Washington 1963, p. 20).

The Ankara Communiqué¹⁷ of the National Unity Committee (NUC) stressed national unity and non-partisan role of the military. But the revolution also implied reaction of a particular power group, the military, to another power group, the Democrats.¹⁸ The group motivation was manifest in the post-revolutionary behaviour of the military towards the Democrats and other groups sympathetic to them. So the 1960 revolution should be regarded as an integral part of the developing struggle between the more traditional villagers - townsmen and the modernized urban elite.¹⁹ As the social status became closely related with economic power, the prestige of the bureaucrats intellectuals and military had dropped significantly.²⁰ So the military coup d'etat reflected necessarily the official elite's response to its loss of power.²¹

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17. Kemal H. Karpat, ed., Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York, 1968), p. 306.
 18. Kemal H. Karpat, "Society, Economy and Politics in the Contemporary Turkey", World Politics (Princeton) vol. XVII 1964-65, p. 62.
 19. Ulman A. Haluk and Frank Tachu, "Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Concile Rapid Modernization with Democracy" The Middle East Journal (Washington), vol. XIX, 1965, p. 162.
 20. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Political Participation and Modernization in Turkey", Western Political Quarterly (Utah), vol. XIX 1966, p. 229.
 21. Leslie L. Roos Jr. And Noraloo P. Roos, Managers of Modernization, Organization and Elites in Turkey, 1950-1969, Massachusetts (Cambridge, 1971) p. 7.

The revolution of 1960, destroyed the ideological shields of upper economic groups and permitted a free discussion. The military could hardly anticipate the ideological struggle which followed their action.²²

The social, political and economic development during the democratic period created animosity among the competing groups. The rise of landowning and business groups to position of power threatened the interests of intellectuals and bureaucratic elite who had so far enjoyed high status and a near monopoly of political power. In this situation the military and the urban intelligentsia felt obliged to resort to extra constitutional means to get control of the changing social order. The collusion of the military and urban intelligentsia manifested itself in the coup d'etat of 27 May 1960.²³ If we make an assessment of the election issues in the period 1950-60 we find that while emphasis did shift from one election to another most Turkish parties referred to in the election contest to foreign policy issues in one way

22. Karpat, n.2, p. 302.

23. Weiker F. Walter, n.16, p. 20.

or another even as their central theme namely anti-Americanism or Anti-Sovietism were brought up with varying frequency.²⁴

Socio-economic issues appear to predominate in electoral propaganda. The major concern of the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Party in the 1940s and 1950s often related to the village-city dichotomy housing conditions rising prices un-employment, speedy industrialization, rural development and economic growth. Although the solutions to these problems proposed by electoral rivals differed. They all recognised the existence of such socio-economic issues and their relevance and promised some way to make income once more overtake prices or in other words meet rising expectations. Ideological issues appear increasingly important in Turkey's parliamentary elections.

PARLIAMENTARY ELITES IN TURKEY

After the establishment of the First Republic Civil servants, mostly western-oriented, became instrumental in strengthening democratic government in Turkey.

24. Weiker F. Walter, n.16, pp. 97-98.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had faith in the efficiency of civil servants who were expected to overcome many domestic problems. In brief, they mastered the art of both civil administration and political affairs.

The member of civil servants in Turkish Parliament consistently declined from the year 1931 to 1961. The number of former military officers similarly declined from a high of 20 per cent in 1923 to a low of 4 per cent in 1954. In the 1960's this group rose to a new peak of 8.5 per cent. Educators who were 14 per cent in 1943, declined between 5 and 10 per cent in the period.²⁵

A second major occupational group in the Turkish parliament consisted of free professionals, lawyers, medical and health practitioners-doctors, dentists, pharmacists and veterinarians, engineers and architects. They accounted for nearly half of the membership in 1950's and 1960's. Among the professionals, lawyers have consistently dominated the Parliament. They have in fact, constituted the most numerous single occupational group since 1946

25. Frank Tachau, Electoral Politics in the Middle East ed. (California: Stanford University, Stanford), p. 207.

(with the exception of the 1957 session) Medical practitioners recorded a peak of 15 per cent in 1950, levelling off at approximately 7 per cent from 1965 on, engineers and architects on the other hand constituted an insignificant proportion of the membership in the years prior to 1950, and only a modest 4 per cent during the 1950s.²⁶

The predominance of professionals since the advent of multiparty politics thus symbolises the end of the tutelary hold over Turkish society and politics exercised by the previously dominant official elite. The emergence of lawyers as the single largest occupational group in the parliament brings Turkey in line with older Western democratic regimes.

A third major occupational group consists of those engaged in business, trade, banking and related 'economic' activities. In 1957, they peaked at just over 26 per cent of the membership; since 1961 their numbers have fluctuated between 16 and 21 per cent. Agriculturalist have never constituted more than 10 per cent of the membership of Parliament at any time.²⁷

26. Ibid., p. 207.

27. Ibid., pp. 207-208.

In terms of education two-thirds of the members of the Grand National Assembly have undergone University-level education in every session from 1920-1973.

Localism rose to a high level in the DP's era. Before the formation of the DP government, most of the deputies did not represent their own constituency. During the DP's regime, a large number of deputies represented localism. Some of the deputies came from the rural background. There was a steady rise in the proportion of locally rooted deputies.

Overwhelming majorities of the deputies have been married men from the beginning of the Turkish Republic. There was a slight increase in the proportion of married members in 1950, with the inauguration of the DP. This has been attributed to rising local influence with the advent of multiparty politics.

Family size, as indicated by average number of children per married member, may be more indicative of social and cultural conditions than marital status. Beginning at a level of 2.8 in the 1920's this figure declined until it reached a low

of 2.3 in 1957. The largest family prior to 1950 consisted of nine children. In 1950, three deputies appeared with larger families.²⁸

The advent of multi party policies in Turkey produced several significant changes in the Turkish Parliament. Locally rooted politicians became increasingly numerous. Although the proportion of University-educated members doesn't seem to have been affected by the change in the regime. There was an increase in the number of members with high school backgrounds. Probably reflecting rising levels of education in the society at large. Average age and family size also show the effects of the change of regime.

The RPP by contrast, elected a relatively experienced delegation in 1946. In 1950, with the dramatic decline in RPP members, almost half of the surviving RPP delegation had never served in Parliament. And in 1954, almost three fourths of the survivors had no previous Parliamentary experience. The high rate of turnover in 1957 is less surprising for the RPP delegation increased more than five fold from the previous session.

28. Frank Tachau, n. 25, pp. 210-211.

In the 1946 session, the RPP averaged 53 years of age as against 49 for the DP. In 1950 the RPP dropping to 52, the DP also dropped to 47. In 1957 the average age of the RPP dropped again to 44.4, clearly signifying a large inflation of younger deputies. The DP again remained at an average of about 47.

Characteristics of the Turkish political elite manifested distinct changes with the changes in regime, particularly in 1950 and 1961. As with changes in electoral behaviour, these shifts were in both cases foreshadowed in sessions, preceding the 'critical' election. Thus the 1946 Parliamentary sessions manifested changes in terms of localism, average age occupational backgrounds family size and turnover rates all of which were strongly confirmed in the election of 1950. The 1957 session doesn't clearly fit this pattern, perhaps because of the extra constitutional and abrupt manner of the change of the regime which occurred in 1960.

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CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The Democratic Era in Turkey (1950-1960) was the most important chapter in the history of political development of Turkey. The year 1950 saw not only the change of government but also the transition of Turkey from single party system to multiparty system. The period also witnessed liberalization of economy and the adoption of several liberal laws in various fields.

The DP era could be identified with the phenomena of multiparty system, competitive democratic government, liberal and non-western secularism in order to accommodate religious and conservative segment of Turkish society, economic liberalization, better relations with the western countries, mechanisation of agriculture, installation of sophisticated industries, expansion of banking and credit system, decline of bureaucracy, emergence of non-urban elite groups and political socialisation of rural masses in Turkey.

The roots of the struggle for a constitutional government and democracy in Turkey can be traced back to the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

The struggle has taken a more organized form in the 'Young Turk' movement, that culminated in the overthrow

of the despotic monarchy and the restoration of the 1876 constitution. The modern democratic regime was established, however, only after the foundation of the Republic in 1923. During the Ataturk period (1919-1923) Turkey was governed by one party. Religious, social and political reforms were achieved at the expense of political freedom. In the spring of 1945, President Ismet Inönü, the successor of Kemal Ataturk, decided to allow the multiparty system due to domestic and external pressures. A new phase in Turkish politics began when a new party, The Democratic Party was founded on January 7, 1946.

The authoritarian rule of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) created groundswell of disaffection and disillusionment among the masses. Soon, the masses began to protest for change both in the party in power as well as in the system itself.

The historic election of 1950 brought the DP to power. That was the first free election in the history of Turkey. The victory of DP in the election marked the surge of a new real class, largely consisting of the big bourgeoisie, who were disillusioned with the Kemalist principles of secularism,

statism or state control of economy and populism.

The factors which played an important role in the victory of the DP were the dynamic leadership of the DP, increasing popular demand for greater participation in government by a growing middle class, the obvious growth of corruption within the single party regime and Inónú's personal reaction to this state of affairs. Other factors can be cited as follows: prevailing American influence, better organisation of DP, the accumulated frustrations and hostilities of twenty-five years of RPP's rule, the democracy and people-oriented manifesto of the DP. Lastly, the minorities, mostly non-muslims, had supported DP because they did not like the RPP's policies.

The DP, after assuming power passed a number of laws which changed the direction of political and economic development of the country. Champions of the Democratic Party failed to reconcile with democratic trends. After having immense public support, they became autocrats. They misused their power and played havoc with democracy. The DP pushed through the legislature a succession of laws designed to stifle public criticism, cripple

the opposition parties and the administrative and judicial branches of government under the party's command. Civil servants became subject to dismissal without right of appeal, thus enabling the government to get rid of those who failed to toe the party line. The retirement of judges after 25 years' service became mandatory; making it possible to pack the courts with loyalists.

Progressively stringent press laws inhibited free discussion on public issues. University professors were deprived of the right of leadership roles in the political parties. As early as 1953 the government confiscated most of the assets of the RPP, its most formidable rival. Thereafter the DP made it almost impossible for the opposition parties to engage in free electioneering. They were for example, practically barred from access to the state radio, the only facility of the kind in the country. On the eve of the 1957 election, new electoral laws disallowed coalitions and stipulated that the party winning a plurality in any province would return all its deputies.

It also repealed some of the laws adopted by the RPP and adjusted its policies in such a way

that they could reflect the urges of the people.

The Democrats were conscious of the role of religion in society and its appeal to the masses. They tried to assign religion the place it deserved even at the cost of secularism. They exploited religion for political purpose.

The DP could count on the support of the urban masses in many places. It also won the endorsement of the new and growing class of entrepreneurs and merchants in the cities and towns by favouring private enterprise over state enterprise (etatisme), on which Atatürk had relied for industrial development. From Menderes' standpoint this was prudent politics, since in any freely competitive election the peasants and the urban masses assured a majority.

On these substantive issues most military officers tended to ally themselves with the Republicans. During the decade of DP rule the social and economic status of military officers in the country at large declined because as a fixed income group they were adversely affected by inflation, while that of the manufacturers and shopkeepers rose.

The combination of the DP's rural popularity the attempted suppression of the opposition, the subordination of the civil service and controls over the electoral system seemed to assure Minderes permanent entrenchment. In the absence of any ostensible, legitimate means of changing leaders and policies the military conspirators were persuaded that they had no choice but to intervene.

The Democratic rule ushered in a new era in the foreign relations of Turkey. Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and joined the Baghdad Pact under the leadership of the Democrats. Turkey's strategic importance whetted the appetite of the west particularly USA to perpetuate bilateral relations. As a result, Turkey received military aid from the United States under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The West European countries viewed the changes in Turkey with admiration and Turkey's credentials were considerably established.

Before 1950, when the DP was in opposition its basic theme was to blame the RPP for all the short comings, accumulated during the war years and

Kemalist period. The Republicans accused the opposition of talking about installing peoples' courts to sentence the oppressors and of spreading religious propaganda such as allowing the Ezan (call for prayer) in Arabic.

Liberalization of economy was the fulfillment of DP's promises in its manifesto. The Democrats supported free economy for the development of Turkey. They fulfilled their promise by handing over State Maritime Administration to a new Maritime Bank. Private firms were also allowed to participate in the manufacturing of wine and in May 1952 the state monopoly of the Match industry ended.

Between 1950 and 1954, Turkey enjoyed under the DP a relatively free democratic life. The period of military service was reduced. The attitude of the Democrats to opposition was somewhat different from that of the Republicans. Each electoral success made it even more difficult for the Democrats to accept and tolerate criticism.

The Democratic Party's government touched the heights of success on domestic and international fronts till 1957. After that efficiency and perfor-

mance rapidly declined to a great extent.

The Democrats won the 1957 election with reduced majority. After 1958 Turkey moved steadily towards the edge of violence. There were also major problems which occurred in the fields of education, religion, economy, agriculture, urbanization, industrialization, investment. Army officers were also dissatisfied with Menderes government because of its arbitrary order for promotion, demotion and transfer of the high ranking government officers. This led to political upheaval against the DP.

In the field of foreign policy there was a near consensus over developing special ties with America. Turkey became sole strategic satellite of the USA and the West in the Mediterranean. Turkey was made the centre for American military communication in the southern flank of Europe. Before 1945 Turkey had closed ties with Soviet Union, but the USSR's refusal in 1945 to renew the 1925 treaty of friendship without substantial reasons changed the nature of Turkish policy towards the Soviet Union. Turkish government's need for economic assistance and military support was met by Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine.

The Democrats accepted the invitation of the west willingly for help by sending their troops to South Korea, which subsequently made its entry into NATO possible. This was supplemented by moves to strengthen its ties with both Europe and the Balkans.

Prime Minister Menderes' personality was also a factor in the decline of the DP's popularity. He had failed to create a new balance within the ruling forces in Turkey and to give his party a stable identity. He failed to introduce measures restraining economic freedom. The greatest error of the Menderes' government was to bring the army to quell political disturbances. The Turkish armed forces refused to be used as the tool of the politicians. Menderes believed that he could win elections and retain power as long as he had the support of the traditionalist, peasants, who formed nearly 75% of the electorate but he failed to understand the potentiality of the urban elites and of the Military-bureaucracy combined. The leaders of the Turkish Armed forces were reluctant to overthrow the government and made all possible efforts to prevent a coup until it was absolutely necessary.

The military revolution of 1960 occupied an important place in Turkish politics for its multifarious implications. This was not a coup d'etat by a group of military adventurers but a temporary step to check the dictatorship of the DP. Nevertheless, the Turkish military were reluctant to take a hand in politics.

The primary purpose of the military revolution was the restoration of democratic political order. The armed forces were also concerned to retain secular character of Turkey and Kemalist principles to govern. DP's arbitrariness had brought Turkey on the verge of class-conflict and political chaos. Autocratic style of Menderes created an atmosphere of anarchy and antagonism. Confusion and conflict rose too high to hamper democracy, discipline; and law and order within Turkey.

Menderes, perhaps, failed to estimate the outcome of the misdeeds and mistakes committed by the DP government. Even after a number of warnings emanating from public's anger, the DP government refused to budge from its anti-democratic

and anti-system policies. Newspapers and other means of media bitterly criticised the savage style of the DP. Public in general and the elites in particular became aware of the dangers ahead. Viewing these negative trends, the armed forces intervened and helped Turkey to overcome political problems. Turkey was rescued by the army to restore its democratic image and personality. They took administration in their hands and soon announced the schedule for general election.

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