

GUERRILLA WARFARE : A THEORETICAL STUDY

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
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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled
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(MONA MEHTA)

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"These problems of (guerrilla warfare) are of very long standing, yet manifestly far from understood-especially in those countries where everything that can be called "guerrilla warfare" has become a new military fashion or craze".

- B.H. Liddell Hart,
Preface to the second edition of
Strategy, (New York, 1967.)

INTRODUCTION

Most of the change in human affairs has come about through wars, rebellions, and other forms of armed conflicts. In the past 5000 years, mankind has experienced only 292 years of peace and as many as 14,553 wars. Sir Liddell Hart has rightly put it: "If you wish for peace understand war." The mode and style of conflict as well as reason for it have changed continuously. Today the necessary amplification of the above maxim is, "If you wish for peace understand war especially guerrilla and subversive form of war."¹

Guerrilla warfare has become one of the major concerns of our times, Involving or affecting almost half the world's population, it has, more than anything, reshaped the map of the world. Under the shadow of nuclear deterrence and mutual terror of destruction on one hand and international organizations for peaceful resolution of conflicts, the future conflicts

1. Liddell Hart, "Foreward", in Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1961), p. ix

mainly lies in the spectrum of conventional wars of low intensity. A major component of these low intensity conflicts is guerrilla warfare.

(Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places. It is a method of warfare by which one of the adversaries avoids direct confrontation with the enemy's main forces. It is a method of warfare where operations are conducted in enemy controlled territory by relatively small forces which may be weak or where the guerrillas acquire a short -term advantage over a localized enemy force.)

Guerrilla method of warfare is characterized by use of terror. Terror is used to either focus world attention on the rebel cause, or to eliminate opposite leaders, to paralyze normal government activity, to intimidate the general populace, and to keep one's own guerrilla's from defecting. Whatever may be the

purpose, the indiscriminate application of this hideous feature of terrorism might not have a favorable impact on guerrilla cause.

Guerrilla warfare is a method of warfare also characterized by an absolute absence of the front as far as the guerrilla operations are concerned. It is only when guerrillas have been absorbed by a conventional forces that they appear in an order of battle.

To a highly disciplined mind of the military professional, guerrilla method of fighting appears unpredictable, illogical, promiscuous. One of the most distinctive features of guerrilla warfare is its lack of a logical procedure which can be anticipated and thwarted by the enemy. In this age of missiles and nuclear weapons, guerrilla warfare with its informality, loose formation and unique capabilities for independent action offer a most workable solution to the dilemma facing planning staffs of modern armies,

Another characteristic of a guerrilla warfare is that (guerrillas are usually indigenous to the general region of operation, though instances of external support and control of these guerrillas do exist. This gives guerrillas two advantages:

1. Being native to the area, they have an intimate knowledge of the terrain in which they operate.) This advantage reduces better trained and better armed regular forces, to a level where the guerrillas are its equal.
2. When not fighting, the guerrillas can blend in with the surrounding population also composed of the natives, giving them a perfect disguise. This lack of military formality is one of the main strengths of guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla armies have to be built up from amongst a people whose original military

organization proved inadequate or even non-existent. So the members have to be persuaded to fight rather than being coerced by existing administrative repressive structures. Guerrilla leaders, therefore, have to show clearly that it is in the people's interest actually to fight.) Sometimes potent sentiments like religion machismo², nationality or companerismo² can prove to be adequate motives but more frequently, however, the leadership has to base its appeal upon the possibility of thorough going social and economic changes after the war. Its program has to mesh with most basic aspirations of the people and adapt itself to the structural constraints of the particular society, in order to channel its ability to fight - this highlights another unique feature of guerrilla warfare.

(The unusual requirements of guerrilla warfare call for outstanding leadership. Guerrilla

2. Patrick O' Sullivan and Jesse W. Miller Jr., The Geography of Guerrilla Warfare (Kent, 1983), p.110.

warfare operations demand a leader endowed with extraordinary intelligence and courage but also buttressed by almost fanatic belief in himself and his cause. Trotsky, Lawrence, Mao, Tito, Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Castro, Guevara and many others have been unusual, unorthodox personalities, generally with civilian background.)

Guerrilla warfare as a method of warfare is never an end in itself. Guerrilla warfare, according to Prof. Samuel Huntington, is but one of the methods available for waging wars; therefore it is related to broader political or military objectives; "War" according to Clausewitz, "is the continuation of policy by other means," and there is no mode of military struggle of which this is so appropriate than guerrilla warfare. The logic of its very nature often means that it is as much a political activity as a military one.

There is a certain criteria meant to enhance the capability of carrying out guerrilla

warfare successfully. Of these immutable principles the most important, according to Charles Thayer, is "mobility and capacity for taking the enemy by surprise, what T.E. Lawrence called the 'irrational tenth, like a king fisher flashing across the pool.' Because the guerrilla is almost always outgunned and outnumbered he needs a hinterland in which he can operate and into which he can fade back when things get difficult for him."³

Against such a background the guerrilla must be what Lawrence called "an idea, a thing intangible invulnerable without a front or back drifting about like a gas."⁴ He must be on the move always, so as not to present a target. His must be a war of detachment. He must at all cost avoid the war of contact. 'An ability to run away,' according to Mao, 'is the greatest

3. Charles W. Thayer. Guerrilla (London, 1964), p.12.

4. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of wisdom (Harmondsworth, 1977 ed.), p.198.

characteristic of the guerrilla.) While the guerrilla is very likely from his nature to be strategically on the defensive, it is important that he should be tactically on the offensive; that when threatened with a pitched battle, he should extricate himself, but immediately afterwards take the enemy by surprise, hitting him where it hurts most.

(Guerrilla warfare can be classified into two parts on the basis of the types of men who wage such war. The first refers to the use of guerrilla method of warfare by regular soldiers in the rear of the enemy.) Known as commandos, these men satisfy four conditions of article nine of the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 as well as the Lieber's code. (The second type of men who wage such wars are those who do not belong to, according to Lieber, 'organized hostile army' and who wage war, 'without sharing continuously in the war...who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and vocations or with the occasional assumption of the

semblance of peaceful pursuits divesting themselves of the character appearance of soldiers... These guerrillas do not satisfy the four conditions of article nine of the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and of Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, but they have not been treated as criminals in any international treaty.⁵⁾

(However may the guerrillas be classified, to make resilience and endurance possible, leadership, discipline and morale of the highest importance is a necessary element. To achieve these, the guerrilla must be fortified, inspired by a strong idea, patriotic religious and political.] ("A province would be won", "wrote T.E. Lawrence, "when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom."⁶ This leads us to another principle, i.e. the guerrilla must be

5. Girish Bihari, Civil Insurgency and Intelligence Operations (New Delhi, 1982), PP.45-46.

6. T.E. Lawrence, cited in Thayer, Guerrilla (London, 1964), pp.13-14.

close to the local population. "We must", in the words of Mao, "live among the people as the fish lives in water."⁷⁾

The guerrilla forces must be lightly armed since cumbersome weapons reduce mobility. Mobility and ability to conduct operations which achieve surprise are most important factors contributing to success of guerrilla warfare. With a highly sensitive intelligence of the enemy's movements along with knowledge of the terrain, guerrillas can move rapidly to a point of concentration and just as rapidly disperse, achieving surprise.

Successful guerrilla operations demand a complex organization and division of functions along with unity of movement.

But the method of guerrilla warfare does have its limitations. When guerrilla forces

7. ibid.

spring from civilians population, sometimes these forces may be composed of individuals lacking in any formal military training. For such groups, to challenge a regular force in anything but a hit and run engagement would be to invite disaster.

Modern warfare requires employment of many tools which are not available to the partisan either because he cannot procure them or else because his kind of warfare precludes their use.

Another characteristic that limits the scope of his operation is his inability to concentrate a large force for extended periods of time. The guerrilla in massing his troop becomes a lucrative target for attack.

Guerrillas are truly volunteers who have joined because they want to fight and if they don't feel like fighting tomorrow, they may not be available. So the guerrilla commander, unless with unusually strong control, may find his rolls

vacillating with season and with the whims of his command.

The greatest of all limitations is the very nature of guerrilla warfare. It alone cannot be employed to defeat a regular army. It alone cannot force a decision unless guerrilla warfare is transformed into a regular one. (When the guerrilla does quit guerrilla practices and stands to fight, he no longer presents a special problem. He can then be easily defeated by regular forces much better trained, equipped and commanded. So, as Mao Tse-tung put it, "taking the war as a whole, regular warfare is undoubtedly the main and basic forum and its strategical role is decisive whereas guerrilla warfare is auxiliary."^{8/}

(Having considered the strengths and the weaknesses, what then is the guerrilla warfare

8. Mao Tse-tung, cited in F.M. Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare, (New York, 1962), p.22.

capable of accomplishing ? (According to Sollom,⁹ operations conducted by the guerrilla warfare can be placed into two major classifications:

Covert operations : Usually associated with guerrilla groups operating in cities or built up areas and are not really military in nature. These operations include the organisation and instigation of civil disturbances such as labor strikes, work slowdowns, protest meetings and riots.) Then under the shadow of confusion the guerrillas can employ the most effective weapon of covert variety - sabotage.

(The others are overt operations, generally associated with guerrilla forces organized along military lines and operating from suitable terrain in rural areas. Using direct and quasi-military action these guerrilla forces seek to cause harrassment and to interfere with

9. Lt. Col. A.H. Sollom, "Nowhere yet everywhere" in F.M. Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, (New York, 1962), p.22.

operations in the rear areas to such an extent that substantial forces to be utilized in the main battle have to be diverted to combating guerrillas, and protecting rear installations and lines of communication thus dividing the regular forces. The ambush, the sudden surprise attack from hiding upon a moving enemy are considered forte of guerrilla forces.) So are surprise raids - conducted with the object of destroying or capturing arms, equipment, supplies, personnel and installations of importance to the enemy.

(According to Klonis,¹⁰ guerrilla operations are conducted with the following purposes in mind:

1. Harassing the enemy sufficiently so that he may be forced to divert forces away from his main effort.
2. Harassing the enemy to the point where he

10. N.L. Klonis, Guerrilla Warfare: Analysis and Projections (New York, 1972), p.4.

concludes that territorial control is militarily too expensive and therefore undesirable. Consequently the enemy may have to evacuate the territory in question and leave it to the control of guerrillas or to conventional forces friendly to the guerrillas.

3. Making territorial control politically embarrassing to the enemy, thus forcing him to negotiate a political compromise favourable to the guerrillas,
4. Denying the enemy complete control of occupied territory thus interfering with his administration and uninterrupted exploitation of human and material resources.)

With such aims guerrilla warfare according to Gerard Chailand,¹¹ today encompasses

11. Gerard Chailand, ed., Guerrilla Strategies : An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan (California, 1982), p.11.

a varied range of activities including :

1. Very sophisticated popular wars that may well lead to military victory;
2. Armed national liberation movements conducted on a national or local level but controlling and organizing at least a significant part of the country;
3. Regionally isolated embryonic guerrilla movements that pose no direct threat to the established authorities and whose main problems are simple survival and preventing a lapse into mere banditism;
4. Commando actions launched from the neighbouring frontier at the behest of leadership in exile;.
5. Militarily important struggle amounting to little more than headline grabbing terrorism.

So guerrilla warfare has been employed in many ways throughout the ages; namely, as an internal rebellion against an established government; as an overt or covert aid to friendly forces engaged in a struggle with a potential enemy; as a subversive alien element in attempting to develop open rebellion in another nation; as an adjunct to the native conventional forces engaged in conflict with the enemy; and as the only means of fighting superior forces of an enemy after defeat of the regular armed forces. In peacetime also, it is being used as a potent weapon of statecraft. Regis Debray has lamented that guerrilla war is being used as a 'form of pressure on Bourgeoisie Government', 'a factor in political horsetrading, a trump card to be played in case of need.'¹² It is used by extremist political parties as a lever for bargaining in parliamentary politics in those countries where these parties have adopted parliamentarianism as an instrument

12. Bihari, n.5, p.13.

of politics. Guerrilla warfare is also used to bring about social reforms by radical groups.

Though the term guerrilla is of latin origin meaning little or small wars, this meaning unfortunately stands to be descriptively inaccurate. Today with innumerable aspects and facets it is not an absolutely discreet phenomenon making it difficult to propose a definition of the subject. Besides in performance of such sundry role it is paraded under the banner of a variety of names.) According to a study,¹³ some fifty seven expressions have been used to describe what amounts to guerrillas warfare, for example, lestrikos polemos, a little war, a war of detachment. Prior to 1945, guerrilla warfare was termed as partisan warfare and today it is referred to as modern revolutionary guerrilla warfare or an insurgency) - understood to be a new way of conducting unconventional war discovered by a stroke of genius by Mao in the Yen-an period

13. *ibid.*, p.13.

and later successfully applied to other parts of the world by left wing revolutionary movements. This however disguises the fact that guerrilla warfare is essentially only a tactical method which is applicable to many different forms of military conflict. Though guerrilla operations may not have any revolutionary aims, their revolutionary potential is never absent.

Revolutionary guerrilla warfare, according to John Baylis,¹⁴ actually refers to one of a number of techniques used to achieve revolutionary change which is characterized by guerrilla military tactics employed in conjunction with other political, social, economic and psychological instruments. Putting it in other

14. John Baylis, "Revolutionary Warfare" in John Baylis and others, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Concepts (London, 1975), vol.1, p.211.

words, modern revolutionary warfare, according to Ian Beckett,¹⁵ has merely added political, social, economic and psychological elements to traditional irregular military tactics.

15. Ian Beckett, "The Tradition", in John Pimlott, ed., Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1985), p.8.

CHAPTER I


DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE :
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO SECOND WORLD WAR.

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Dispelling the belief that the history of guerrilla warfare began with the Spanish insurrection against Napoleon - as if there had been no wars of liberation and wars of opinion throughout history or that prior to Mao Tse-tung no military thinker, with the exception of T.E. Lawrence, an amateur of genius, not really a military philosopher, had ever systematically studied guerrilla warfare - this dissertation intends to trace the development of guerrilla doctrine and the contributions of various military theorists or guerrilla leaders.

Guerrilla Warfare in its various forms and shapes, has invariably been adopted by human beings even before the birth of Christ. Ancient history is abound with examples of classical tactics of hit and run, i.e. guerrilla warfare understood as a purely military form of conflict, and employed by indigenous group in opposition to foreign occupation, independent of regular military campaign.

(For the first time in recorded history, irregular forces and guerrilla tactics are mentioned in the Anastas Papyarus of the fifteenth century B.C. Mursilis, the Hittite King, complained in a letter that, "the irregulars did not dare to attack him in the daylight and preferred to fall on him by the night." While peeved, Mursilis obviously lived to tell the tale.¹

In India, the manifestation of guerrilla warfare has been forthcoming from the very advent of civilization. According to Girish Bihari, epics like the Shrimad Bhagwada Mahapurana, Rig Veda, Manusmriti have referred to various aspects of guerrilla warfare.

In the Rajdharmanushashna Prakaran of Shanyati Parva in the Mahabharat, the method of dealing with a more powerful foe has been

1. Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical study (London, 1977), p.3.

described in the dialogue between Bhishima and Yudhishthira. The person who did not give way to a foe, superior in power, would be destroyed. While a wiseman, who acts after ascertaining fully the strengths and weakness of himself and his foe, will behave like a cane on the bank of a river. Knowing the virtue of time and opportunity, would bend with advancing current only to stand up once again when the current had passed.²

Kautilya's Arthashastra too has made a reference to the art of guerrilla warfare under the term "Kuta Yudh". Kautilya advocated, attack on the enemy's rear by auxillary forces. when in the forests, guerrillas should undertake sabotage; try to draw the enemy forces towards them and destroy them and their supplies.³

2. Girish Bihari, Civil Insurgency and Intelligence Operations (New Delhi, 1982,) pp.34.

3. idid., p.5.

As far as the western world is concerned the Bible is not short of refernces to some forms of guerrilla warfare, notably the irregular tactics utilized by the followere of Judas Maccabees against the Syrians in 166 B.C. (as described in the Book of Daniel in the Old Testament and in the first and second Books of Maccabees in Apocrypha).⁴ A lot of Roman military history has references of irregular warfare in North Africa, Spain, Britain, Germany and Gaul.

This ancient period produced a theoritical work of considerable importance to the students a long standing Chinese military tradition upon which the later Maoist dectrine was based - The Art of war by Sun Tzu, probably written between 400 and 320 B.C. The book, though written for the guidance of those commanding

4. Jim Pimlett, ed., Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1985), p.8.

regular armies, many of the strategic and tactical principles enunciated therein have had much in common with those later advanced by theorists of guerrilla warfare.⁵

The features of Sun Tzu's philosophy include:

1. Inseparability of military and political strategy i.e. to achieve political ends the way was to use politics and diplomacy with warfare, only as one of the many strategies to be used in the last resort, and that even after military action had begun, political, economic, diplomatic factors continued to have influence affecting the outcome of wars. These factors then are well beyond the considerations of field

5. John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1975), p.25

commanders, beyond pure military strategy, and belong therefore to the exercise of warfare related political maneuvers.

2. Avoid besieging cities - considered lowest strategy in offensive warfare. Hence the saying "the highest form of warfare is one of strategems, next that of diplomacy, next that of actually warring and last that of attacking cities." Furthermore a good military strategy is "to uproot the enemy's city' without attacking it."

3. Another crucial feature of Sun Tzu's philosophy of war was speedy and decisive offensive warfare. He saw no virtue in seeking out the opportunity for a large, bloody pitched battle. For him war was a matter of fighting as few battles as possible and then only when it was quite clear that the balance of forces was overwhelmingly in this favour. The essential purpose of any campaign to ensure that such a balance did

exist, primarily by misleading the enemy about one's disposition and strength:

"...the general must create situations which will contribute to....(the) accomplishment (of his plan). By situations I mean that he should act expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance, from incapacity, when active in inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him, feign disorder and strike him...When he concentrates, prepare against him, where he is strong avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him...pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance...keep him under a strain and wear him down...attack where he is unprepared, when he does not expect you."⁶ He further states:

6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, S.B. Griffith, trans. (Oxford, 1963), pp.66 -69.

"...the art of using troops is this: when ten to the enemy's one, surrounds him; when five times his strength, attack him...if double his strength divide him...if equally matched you may engage him...[But] in these circumstances only the able general can win. If weaker numerically be capable of withdrawing.... And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful."⁷

Sun Tzu also mentions another two precepts - concentration of troops strength and dissipating that of the enemy: "Unity for us and division for the enemy." This was possible through offensive which would help one gain initiatives and only the leisure of initiative would lead to the successful concentration of troop strength.

Selecting of the battle ground i.e. point of attack was to be the enemy's weakest or

7. ibid, pp.79-80.

most vital. The point of defense being where the enemy could not attack or reach.

Such precepts emphasizing upon conservation of men and resources and retention of the initiative, selection of battleground, concentration of troop strength have proved very useful for any leader fighting a guerrilla campaign in which his men are under-strained, under - equipped and numerically inferior. Such ideas are all bold departures from traditional assault strategies, but according to Lan Yongwei, were theoretical summations of "new strategems of times, were astute distillations of huge debates among military scholars."⁸

Yet Sun Tzu offered conclusions different from other guerrilla leaders. He pointed out:

8. Lan Yongwei, "Sun Tzu's Art of War." Social Sciences in China, Autum 88; vol.9/3.

"Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and moral depressed... When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the date will not suffice...While we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged...For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited."⁹

Such strictures may seem relevant to conventional warfare since for the incumbent regime it is disadvantageous for the war to go on for any length of time, as it acts as a drain on the economy and increasingly alienates the support of the people. But for the guerrilla, its protracted nature, according to John Ellis¹⁰ had two advantages:

9. *ibid*, p.73.

10. Ellis, n.5, p.26.

1. It undermined the position of the incumbent regime.
2. It allowed the guerrillas time in which to build up their forces, and slowly bring their troops up to an adequate level of combat efficiency. Certainly the length of war came to be a great burden on the guerrilla's and their supporters. However, there has never been a short successful guerrilla warfare. This was as true in the ancient world as was to be seen in succeeding centuries.

The Middle Ages saw further examples of guerrilla operations in different parts of the world.

INDIA: Large scale guerrilla operations pertain to the last quarter of sixteenth century when Maharana Pratap after the battle of Haldighati (1576), resorted to guerrilla warfare in the north western hills of Mewar. He mobilized the people with the help, of the remnants of his army and

carried on sporadic raids on the Mughal convoys and outposts. Due to the nature of the terrain and support of the people, he invariably caught the enemy unawares and disappeared after causing damage and confusion in his ranks. So he went on for twenty five years.

(Another example is that of the Marathas under the dynamic and inspiring leadership of Chattrapati Shivaji (1627-1689) and his successors, particularly Santanji...Chorpade and Dhanji Jadhav. The Marathas called the guerrilla "Gamini Kava"/ They took pride in being called the plunderers - gamins and developed their peculiar method of fighting which the Chronicler Chitnis thus described:

"The Mughal forces are huge in numbers standing firmly . Only on open ground the Marathas on the other hand suddenly erupted at one place today, tomorrow elsewhere some fifty miles away. Men they come round again and execute unexpected raids, making only a show of fight, plunder and fly away. They fall upon foraging parties, attack weakly held Mughal posts, capture strategic points and inspire confidence among the followers. They devastate Mughal territory ... in

carrying away pack animals, horses, elephants, creating confusion among the enemy remain concealed in unfrequented thickets widely apart and suddenly dash upon the proceeding Mughal armies... occasionally engaging in an open encounter and any how preventing them from reaching their destination. The emperor found himself nonplussed how to overcome these pests. They seemed ubiquitous and elusive like wind. When the attacking Mughal forces had gone back, the scattered Marathas like water parted by the oar, closed in again and resumed their attack as before."¹¹

The killing of the general of Bijapur, Afzal Khan, and then defeating his far superior army, the daring guerrilla raid on the Mughal general Shayista Khan camping at Poona, are few of the classic achievements of Marathas guerrilla warfare.

- (Punjab was another region where Sikhs resorted to 'Dhai Phat' - guerrilla warfare against foreign rule during 1716-68. The war began with a peasant revolt under the leadership of Banda Bahadur from 1708 to 1715./

11. Chitnis, cited in Sardesai, New History of the Marathas (Bombay, 1977), vol.1, p.348.

As far as the western world too is concerned, examples of use of guerrilla warfare are many.

The wars of the Welsh against the English, the harassing raids of the constables of France, Bertrand - du - Guesclin against the English in the closing stages of the Hundred Years War, or the numerous peasant uprisings of Central and Eastern Europe are some example of guerrilla warfare.) But it was the long period of guerrilla warfare of the Welsh against the English that prompted one scholar to attempt some theoretical formulations concerning this type of conflict and to suggest ways in which it could best be countered. In his description of Wales, written in 1194, Giraldus Cambrensis, also known as Gerald of Wales came up with an analysis which often has an astonishingly modern ring in it:

"This light armed people, relying more on their activity than on their strength, cannot struggle for the field of battle... [But] though defeated and put to flight one day, they are ready to resume the combat on the next, neither dejected by their loss nor their dishonor ... they harass the enemy by ambuscades and night sallies ... Bold, in the first onset, they cannot bear a repulse - [but] their courage manifests itself chiefly in retreat, when they frequently return, and, like the Parthians, about their arrows behind them... Neither oppressed by hunger or cold, nor fatigued by martial labours, nor despondent in adversity... they are as easy to overcome in a single battle, as difficult to subdue in a protracted war"¹²

This excerpt itself is a brilliant summation of the nature of guerrilla warfare. Giraldus Cambrensis's work on war in Wales still stands as a classic of counter-guerrilla warfare literature. He goes on to say,

"The prince who would wish to subdue this nation and govern it peaceably, must use this method... Let him divide their strength, and by bribes and promises

12. Cambrensis, cited in Lewis Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford, 1971), p.3.

endeavor to stir up one against the other--- In autumn let not only the marshes, but also the interior part of the country be strongly fortified with castles, provisions and confidential families. In the mean time the purchase of corn, cloth, and satt, with which they are supplied from England, should be strictly interdicted; and well - manned ships placed as a guard on the coast--- Afterwards, when the severity of winter approaches--- and the mountains no longer afford hope of pasturage--- let a body of light - armed infantry penetrate into their woody and mountainous retreats, and let these troops be supported and relieved by others; and thus by frequent changes, and replacing the men who are either farigued or slain in battle, this nation will be ultimately subdued."¹³

To a large extent irregular warfare was either the natural resort of primitive people faced with a more sophisticated opponent, or a resort of the weak against the strong. On occassions too, it was nerely brigandage which acquired a legedry status as in sagas of the Haikuds and the Klephs, both Balkan, Christian groups opposed to Turkish rule in the seventh^{teen} and

13. Ibid. pp.198-99.

eighteenth century or Robin Hood of medieval England.

Increasingly however it was being realised that guerrilla warfare might play a role in wider conventional conflicts. By the eighteenth century many European armies were experimenting with irregular troops and light infantry in the Americas and Eastern Europe. During the American Wars of Independence (1774 -1783) partisans operated successfully on both sides in support of conventional operations. This was especially true in the Southern states such as North and South Carolina and a number of talented partisan leaders emerged, such as the British, Banastre Tarleton and Patric Ferguson and Americans Thomas Sumter, Maurice Murphy, Andrews Pickens. But perhaps the most successful of them all was Francis Marion, an Indian fighter. He was known almost everywhere as the 'Swamp Fox' because it was in such areas that he made his base. He and his horsemen would emerge from their hideouts around sunset and ride swiftly towards their targets which they would

fall upon in the very early hours of the morning. Having accomplished their mission, they would ride back. When his men were acting as one unit, they would attack in three groups, one assaulting frontally only and one on each flank, after stealing upon their enemy. But at all times Marion kept some forces on the move, in groups of five to ten men who would gather information, comfort rebel families and harass isolated loyalists and English soldiers. If ever Marion's base was threatened by a powerful force of the enemy, he had no problem retreating to another base area.

Indeed the tactics utilised by partisans and light infantry in America spawned some of the first modern texts to deal specifically with the opportunities of guerrilla warfare. Thus two Hessians John-Von-Ewald and Andreas Emmerich the latter in his book The Partisan in War or The Use of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army, insisted at a wartime army could not exist without light troops. Each unit should consist of not less than

a thousand or more than seventeen hundred soldiers all of whom should be volunteers. They should constitute the 'avante garde' of an army on the march, covering its flanks and harassing the enemy rear guard. On the other hand when the main body of their own army was on the retreat, the light troops should cover the rear. Units should never, under any circumstances what so ever be taken by surprise. The main danger that faced a detachment of raiders was their own negligence and lack of caution. Emmerich analysed in considerable detail various situations the partisan was likely to face such as nightly marches and attacks and freely offered advice. Guides should be employed only if they volunteer. Emmerich layed a great stress on the point that a partisan officer needed special qualities, particularly the ability to act independently of his commanding powers, who could not personally give him orders covering all eventualities. He repeated his commanding generals useful advise before one of his first major raids: "two hundred miles into the enemy rear, never offend or mistreat civilians, do not permit

plunder, and treat prisoners of war decently."¹⁴

Ewald's contribution to the partisan warfare, according to Walter Laqueur¹⁵ was at least as important as Emmerich's. He was frequently quoted by Clausewitz and subsequent authors. One of the major points made by him was that, the officers especially young officers, all too often lacked even the rudiments of theoretical knowledge. An ideal officer was a combination of manly virtues -modesty, courage, humanness and intellectual curiosity. Like Emmerich, he stressed that there was no excuse whatsoever, for being taken by surprise but as officers were only human, he devoted several chapters to the techniques of surprise attack and ambushes. Some of them have become part and parcel of guerrilla practice in succeeding ages. For example, there were hardly

14. Emmerich, cited in Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (London, 1977), p.104.

15. *ibid.* pp.105,106.

any regions from which surprise attacks could be successfully launched, and that some succeeded precisely because they were carried out where least suspected, in open terrain from behind the fruit trees isolated houses, etc. Given the necessity of relying on population's goodwill, it was of utmost importance to punish marauders severely. He also recommended the study of psychology of the enemy leader.

These pioneering works were followed by still others which derived their experience from Europe. But what was noticeable was that the literature published before 1810 did not accord an independent role to guerrilla units. It was concerned with the operations of professional soldiers acting in close cooperation with the main body of the army, and preoccupied with surprise attacks, ambushes and other operations which by necessity had to be carried out by relatively small unit. A great many strategems were thus listed .

By the end of the eighteenth century the nature of warfare itself was literally transformed by the outbreak of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars 1792 - 1815.

A series of bitterly fought campaigns waged by irregular against French armies such as that of Toussaint L' Ouverture on Haiti (1791 - 1797), Royalists in the Vendee (1793 - 1796) and the Tyrolean nationalist, Andrias Hoffer (1809) followed. The best known and ultimately the most successful uprising was that in Spain from which the word 'guerrilla' derives literal meaning 'little war'. When the French invaded Spain, defeating Spanish regular troops they could never dominate the country side and soon the French began to suffer from the actions of irregular civilian bands. Spanish peasants gathered and attacked French forces through harsh means, like firing the cavalry patrols to death in the woods, ambushing a wagon train etc. These irregulars never offered to fight pitched battles. Soon the guerrilla leaders began cooperating with English

forces in Portugal and bands of other provinces. French forces were tied up in futile marches and searches. They incurred heavy losses in arms and equipments. Spanish bands meantime had begun training for combat as regular troops, and when the final battles were being fought, the Spanish guerrillas fought along with English through Spain into France. These campaigns showed that the guerrilla was as much a man for local fight as he was good enough for a tactical advantage and could be considered in strategic planning.

Prominent among the works devoted specifically to irregular warfare, were those of Grandmaison, de-Jeney, Baron Henri Jomini George Wilhelm Valentini. Grandmaison, a lieutenant - colonel in a Flanders Volunteer corps, was among the most influential early authors on small warfare. He recommended qualities necessary for soldiers engaged in partisan warfare. They ought to be robust, not too tall, and young enough to be able to endure fatigue and various privations. A great believer of night attacks, he noted that

ambushes at night were always successful, causing confusion out of all proportion to the effort required from the attackers.¹⁶

According to de Jeney one of the leading early small war theorists, guerrilla warfare had not been awarded enough attention inspite of the fact that it was the most dangerous of all military professions. According to him, a successful partisan needed an almost impossible combination of a fertile imagination, a penetrating and intrepid spirit, a firm countenance, a good memory, alertness, the gift to size up a situation etc. De Jeney was the first to write a book that included maps and sketches and even advice on first aid.

Contrary to the above views were those of another military theoritician George Wilhelm von Valentini, a Prussian lieutenant - general who believed that a small war could be decisive in the

16. ibid. pp.102,103.

last resort. He thought that mountaineers and hunters were the most likely candidates for partisan warfare and those without such natural training would need to be highly educated and young. Of great interest are Valentini's remarks on surprise attacks: "if surprise were complete the enemy would offer little resistance even though his forces might be numerically superior. However, well disciplined troops were needed for a surprise attack, infantry units should carry out night attacks holding a cavalry detachment in reserve to pursue the enemy troops in their flight."¹⁷

The Spanish experience was of great importance in that it prompted theoretical speculations about the nature of guerrilla warfare. It was in 1810 that the first serious attempt to synthesize the characteristics of irregular operations and to define their role in warfare was made, by Clausewitz in his On War.

17. ibid. P.107.

drawing heavily on contemporary studies of the subject by Ewald, Emmerich, Valentini. In the chapter titled 'Arming the Nation' Clausewitz was one of the first to note that guerrilla warfare was a unique means of harnessing the nationalistic fervors of the whole people, offering many inherent military advantages. It is this view that has, directly and indirectly provided basis for most subsequent theories of irregular warfare. According to Clausewitz, only popular wars could top a country's ideological potential. Leaving out the political problems created by arming civilians, he treated popular war solely on its operational merits as a means of fighting. Popular resistance wars were, according to Clausewitz unsuited to major actions,

"whose effect is concentrated in time and space. Like the process of evaporation in nature, its effect depends on the extent of its surface. The greater this is, and the greater its contact with the opposing army - in other words the more the enemy extends himself - the greater the effect of an armed populace. Like a slow, gradual fire it destroys the bases of the enemy force."¹⁸

18. Clausewitz, cited in Peter Faret and John Shy, Guerrillas in the Sixties (London, 1962), p.12.

Clausewitz never foresaw the possibility of guerrillas alone being able to bring any war to a decisive conclusion. For him too, they could never be more than an ancillary to the operations of regular troop, organized along conventional lines. Even if they were successful, they required much time to reach a point of culmination.

"For this crises to be produced by popular action alone presuppose... a degree of disproportion between the invader and the size of the country that does not occur in reality. Unless we wish to chase a mirage we must conceive of the people's war in coordination which operations carried out by a regular army, both acting according to an over-all plan."¹⁹

→ Clausewitz listed out five conditions for the successful pursuit of guerrilla warfare similar in many ways to Giraldus Cambrensis before him, according to Lewis Gann. He stressed that:

1. The war ought to be carried on in the heart of country,

19. ibid. pp.12-13.

2. It couldnot be decided by a single battle. Giraldus likewise emphasised the advantages which protracted war offered to Welsh mountaineers.
3. The theatre of war ought to extend over a considerable area of the country,
4. The national character being favourable to the measure,
5. The country was to be hard to traverse and inaccessible.

"Giraldus", according to Lewis Gann, "too, enlarged upon the harsh enviornment of Wales, on its inhospitable mountains and forlorn swampland where in time of peace, the youngmen, by penetrating the deep recesses of woods and climbing top of mountains, learn by practice to endure."²⁰

20. Gann, n.12, pp.22-23.

Clausewitz then rapidly sketched the operational limitations of the guerrillas. Militia and armed civilians ought not to be employed against the main force of the enemy, or even against sizable units. They were to avoid cracking the core, but only nibble along the surface and on the edges. They ought to rise in the provinces lying to one side of the main theatre of war, which the invader does not enter. The guerrilla surrounding his flanks were also to follow to the rear of his advance. And the enemy was left with no other means with which to oppose the actions of armed civilians than the dispatching of numerous detachments to escort his convoys, to occupy posts, defiles, bridges, etc. Just as the first escort of the people would be insignificant, so these detachments would be weak because of the fear of dividing the forces too much. It is on these small units that the spark of popular war would really catch fire; at some points, the enemy would be overpowered by their number, courage and enthusiasm would grow, and the intensity of the struggle increased until the

culmination comes which would decide the entire issue.

The psychological and organizational characteristics of armed civilian groups suggested to Clausewitz that although they formed a weapon of strategic defense, they generally or even always were to be tactically on the offensive. Their offensive actions were to comprise of pinpricks, raids, ambushes; although a favourable position ought to be defended, it was still preferable to break off the engagement and scatter, or withdraw for a subsequent counter-attack, than to make a last-ditch stand. Only rarely were the civilian levies to concentrate in mass - and take the risk of being destroyed at one blow.

Following Ewald and Sun Tzu, Clausewitz emphasized that secrecy was of paramount importance. Few people were to know about the intention and direction of the raid. In dealing

with specific assignments for the partisans Clausewitz singled out the following: to collect intelligence; to arrest enemy couriers, to kidnap enemy generals or other important persons, to destroy bridges and arms stores, to make roads impassable; to seize enemy funds and supplies. These operations would spread despondency in the enemy camp. Clausewitz strongly advised against a 'worst - case -exception' strategy. To take into account all possible dangers was tantamount to magnifying them. Clausewitz doubted whether once the commander took a decision, his junior officers were to be consulted since this would only make him waver. When facing capitulation the commander was to weigh up the alternatives of a last counterattack or an order to disperse, thus giving the officers and soldiers a chance to escape.

Though there seem to be some similarities between the Welsh scholar and the modern Prussian general, Clausewitz's thought on war was much broader in its sweep and more philosophical in its tenor than that of Giraldus. According to

Lewis Gann,²¹ unlike most earlier military writers in Europe, Clausewitz generalized on warfare as a whole. He interpreted war as the 'continuation of state policy by other means' a doctrine which Lenin later adapted to his purpose by describing war as 'revolution by other means.' But Clausewitz did not think of war as an instrument of popular revolution. Like Giraldu before him, he assumed that an invaded people would rally in a national union to expel an invader and that partisan warfare was a valuable adjunct to the operations of regular armies obedient to constituted authority. His theories looked into the past as much as into the future and above all summed up accumulated military experiences of the age preceding the industrial revolution.

Further, the experience of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the subsequent social, political and economic unrest did most to advance theoretical work on guerrilla

21. Gann, n.12, pp.23-24.

war. Authors included the Frenchman Le Miere de Corvey (1823), the Prussian, Carol von Decker (1823), and Polish theorists, Wojciech Chrzanowski (1835) and Karol Begumir Stolzman (1844) and Russian, Denis Davidov (1841).

According to Walter Laqueur,²² Le Miere de Corvey (1770 - 1832) worked on partisan warfare, relying on his experience in the Vendee and Spain. His work published in 1823 was in some respects the first truly modern work on the guerrilla. He traced partisan warfare through the ages and noted that while partisans were frequently used as a corollary to regular armies, they assumed far greater importance once the national armies had been destroyed. He concluded that it was not sufficient for an invader to seize the major towns, since his lines of communication would still remain open to attack. Traditional military doctrine was of little use in combating

22. Laqueur, n.1, pp.113, 114.

the partisans. He noted furthermore, that for obvious reasons the local populace would always be the most adapt at defending their native regions. He dealt with organization of guerrilla units, their tactics, their weapons, and even their uniforms in detail. Less doctrinaire than other authors, according to Laqueur,²³ de Corvey recognized that guerrilla units followed tactics essentially different from those of light units attached to regular armies. And unlike others, Le Miere put great stress on psychological factors. Since guerrilla warfare was a war of extermination, the enemy armies would use reprisals and treat the partisans as mere brigands. This change in the character of war; was to de Corvey, an unalterable historical fact.

Major Carl Von Decker (1821) presented useful and systematic summary of the topic which repeated much of the advice proffered by earlier authors. According to Walter Laqueur,²⁴ Decker

23. *ibid.* pp.113-114.

24. *ibid.* pp.114-115

stressed the importance of maintaining good relations with the local population, The partisan ought to be welcome everywhere, he was to be considered a liberator, not a pirate. To be thus considered entailed strict discipline and paying for supplies received - very much similar to what Mao Tse tung had to say, a century later.

Decker advised extreme prudence while enlisting new soldiers, and stressed the importance of having spies in all classes. Above all to him partisan warfare called for very special qualities.

Karol Begumir Stolzman (1793-1854) wrote a remarkable treatise that was a forerunner of a whole twentieth - century, "do it-yourself" literature. According to Laqueur,²⁵ it gave practical advice on how to produce explosives in a kitchen or gardenshed, it provided exact figures on how much powder was needed to produce land

25. ibid. pp.115-117.

mines and the required size of a mine for blowing up a wall or a bridge. Like other authors he referred to the historical predecessors of modern partisan warfare stressing on its popular character and national inspiration in a modern small war. Among the problems which preoccupied him was the question of maintenance of discipline in an irregular unit, and the advisability of awarding decorations for actions requiring special valor. He suggested that after termination of hostilities, a roll of honor should be published, listing those who had distinguished themselves. Much of his book was, according to Laqueur, devoted to practical advice.

Another Polish theorist was General Wojciech Chrzanowski (1793-1861). His observations on partisan warfare are of great interest because they, contain according to Laqueur,²⁶ in a nutshell most of the basic ideas of twentieth century guerrilla warfare. Some of the points were

26. ibid. pp.116-117.

later elaborated by Mao; namely, the importance of guerrilla bases, the concepts of protracted warfare and even the gradual transition from guerrilla to mobile warfare. Chrzanowski noted that guerrilla warfare could be successful only if the enemy army was not large enough to occupy the whole territory. But since this was not likely to happen, to be effective, partisan warfare had to be protracted. The longer it continued, the better the chances for victory, for while the guerrillas grew stronger, the enemy units became weaker and more demoralized. Guerrilla warfare, as envisaged by Chrzanowski, would at first be conducted against individual enemy soldiers, then against small units, and eventually against larger bodies. He emphasized the importance of attacking the enemy only from a position of marked superiority, if possible from the flanks.

A contemporary, the Cossack General, Denis Vasiliyevich Davidov, led a partisan force during Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. He too wrote later that this type of warfare "is

concerned with the entire area which separates the enemy from his operational base."²⁷ He delineated its objectives: cutting of communication lines, destroying all units and wagons wanting to join up with him, inflicting surprise blows on the enemy left without food and cartridges and at the same time blocking his retreat. This was the real meaning of partisan warfare.²⁸ Nearly a century later, T.E. Lawrence offered the world a dramatic demonstration of Davidov's definition.

Most of these works were concerned with the likely contribution of the irregulars, acting as partisans, on the flanks and rear of an opposing army, in support of conventional operations. Such partisans were mostly envisaged as detached regular troops. In the later years there were some further examples of guerrilla tactics being used in such struggles as the Greek War of Independence (1821-27), the Italian

27. Otto Heilbrunn, cited in, "Guerrilla Warfare", Encyclopedia Britannica, vol.8, 1977. p.460.

28. ibid.

Risorgimento (1848), and the American Civil War (1861-65) featuring notable cavalry leaders such as Confederates John Singleton Mosby and Nathan Bedford Forrest.

By the end of nineteenth century, though European main stream military thought was concerned only with conventional war in Europe, European armies on the other hand were increasingly confronted with irregular warfare in their expanding colonial empires. From the Sikh revolt (1845-46), (1848-49) and Egyptian uprising (1882), to disciplined but unsophisticated foes such as the Zulus (1879) Matabele (1893-96), the kind of opponents were varied in characteristics and methods. In addition there were genuine guerrilla opponents such as the dacoits of Burma (1885-1892) and the Maoris of New Zealand, the most important of these confrontation being that of the Boers War (1899-1903).

Many European armies evolved their own methods of dealing with colonial warfare. The

British, in particular, adopted a sophisticated pacification strategy against the Boers during the later stages of the South African War (1899-1902). According to Ian Beckett,²⁹ this involved the constant harrassment of Boer commandos by mobile British columns and the steady restriction of the Boer's ability to maneuver by the liberal use of barbed wire and blockhouses, allied to the systematic destruction of Boer farms and livestock and the detention of Boer families to deny support for those in the field.

However, experiences in the colonies were so diverse that little coherent doctrine developed. The most important work during this phase was the British manual by C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their principles and Practice (1896).

29. Ian Beckett, "Traditions", in John Pimlott, ed., Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1985), p.16.

Callwell, according to Laqueur,³⁰ presented what was definitely the fullest account of all unorthodox campaigns in the nineteenth century experience. He depicted guerrilla warfare as an unorthodox form of fighting resorted to by the colonial people against the western imperialist powers. Capt. Callwell saw the counter - guerrilla campaigns as an inevitable consequence of keeping order throughout the confines of the British empire. Far from romanticizing them. He emphasized the general rule that the "quelling of a rebellion in different colonies means a protracted, thankless invertebrate war."³¹ He warned that "guerrilla warfare, regular armies always have to dread, and when this is directed by a leader with a genius for war, an effective campaign becomes well nigh impossible."³²

30. Laqueur, n.1, pp.121-125.

31. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London, 1899), pp.8, 104.

32. *ibid.*

Callwell's work was eminently pragmatic, devoid of any ambition to develop a general theory of guerrilla warfare though here and there he did provide practical advice for counter-insurgency and speculated about its future. He emphasized that this form of warfare ought in fact to be met with a unique system of strategy and tactics. He was aware of the fact that, the more irregular and dispersed an enemy force, the more difficult it was to pursue once it had been defeated. On the other hand, the enemy always seemed to know the movements of the regular army. Hence he concluded that, it was always better to fight the irregulars than to maneuver against them—provided contact could be established. According to Laqueur, Callwell ruled out generalizations about effective counter-action to guerrilla warfare. To him guerrilla war was something to be avoided, it was a transient phenomenon that claimed more victims from disease and exhaustion than gunshot. It was demoralizing too, because of the futile marches involved. Only by adapting one's ways with that of the enemy and using 'flying columns'

- could guerrillas be dealt with. Concerning strategy, Callwell thought that it was dangerous to surround the enemy completely, since a "savage"³³ would fight to the end. It was more effective and less expensive to leave the enemy a line of retreat and engage in vigorous pursuit. Spelling out the essential elements for successful guerrilla warfare operation, Callwell stressed "surprise, followed by immediate retreat, before the opponent could recover. Operations were necessarily on a small scale since surprise would be difficult to achieve with large bodies of men."³⁴ Callwell dealt in depth with many aspects of the techniques of guerrilla and partisan warfare, such as attack tactics, weapons, the blockhouse system for counter-guerrilla operations, blowing up of railway bridges and viaducts, mountain and jungle warfare, but he totally left out the political aspects. To him

33. Referring to the native guerrillas.

34. Callwell, n.31, pp.108-109.

guerrilla warfare - "a harrassing form of warfare... most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion"³⁵ - was primarily military. He apparently believed that it was a transient phenomenon, encountered by Imperial powers in distant countries only.

Since the importance of guerrilla warfare has varied considerably throughout history, the days of the guerrilla wars seemed to be over as the nineteenth century drew to a close. Europe was engrossed with brief, unsuccessful urban insurrections such as the widespread uprisings which occurred in 1830 - 48 or short conventional wars eg. those fought by Prussia against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870). Though urban uprisings were taken note of by Marx and Engels and later Lenin, none of them appreciated its potential. As a result the concept of a People's war familiar to the twentieth century exponents of guerrilla warfare, was hardly

35. Callwell, n.4, p.16.

distinguishable in any earlier writings. Clausewitz too did not interpret guerrilla warfare as a means of popular revolution though he did allude briefly to the political implications of national resistance to an invader. Later the theorists of revolution such as Marx and Lenin undoubtedly inspired innumerable subsequent movements that practiced guerrilla warfare as revolutionary tactic, but neither actually contributed much to the theory of guerrilla warfare itself.

According to Laqueur,³⁶ both Marx and Engels wrote a great deal on military affairs, but, guerrilla warfare preoccupied them only rarely; they thought it on the whole to be of limited applicability. Though earlier Engels had written that a people who wanted to gain independence could not be restricted to conventional warfare. 'Levee -en -masse,' "revolutionary war, guerrillas everywhere these

36. Laqueur, n.1, pp.141 to 146.

were the only means by which a small people could defeat a bigger one, or army could resist its stronger and better organised opponent."³⁷ But later on Engels sadly concluded that, there really was not much hope for a people's war in Europe. "Such fanaticism and national enthusiasm is not customary among civilised nations..."³⁸ Engel's skepticism about the efficacy of guerrilla warfare was based, both on his own experiences of fighting in Baden in 1849, and on an analysis of historical precedents. Therefore, according to Laqueur, Engels view was that it could only succeed in Europe in conjunction with regular army units. Though outside Europe he saw conditions for guerrilla warfare as more propitious, Marx and Engels were not oversanguine with regard to the prospects of urban insurrection. Engels did not altogether rule out street fighting in a revolution, but "only if the unfavorable situation is compensated by other factors." The insurgents

37. ibid. p.143.

38. Lenin, Collected Works (New York, 1962), vol.XI, p.213.

were to be numerically stronger and would have to opt for attack rather than passive barricade tactics. The barricade was a mere symbol: only if the enemy forces yielded to moral (i.e. political and psychological) factors would the insurgents win. If on the other hand the self confidence of the ruling class remained unbroken, if it did not panic, the insurgents would easily suffer defeat, even if the military were in a minority. The insurgents would be victorious only if of the army joined them, and this could happen only in a grave crisis, may be after a defeat or a split in the ruling class, a loss of its self confidence, a failure of the ability and will to exercise the power in its hands. Marx and Engels were not opposed to guerrilla warfare but simply believed, like almost all military thinkers at the time, that it was not likely to be of great importance practically. Engels did not underestimate the importance of colonial wars, but according to Laqueur, "he found it difficult to accept that the fate of the world would be decided in the jungles of Asia or Africa. The revolution would occur in

the highly industrialised countries where he so did not visualize any scope for guerrilla warfare."³⁹

Although Lenin had much to say about revolutionary situations and the proper tactics to be employed in each, he certainly offered no new and startling advice on guerrilla warfare. In many volumes of his works there is just one short article on the subject and some occasional references in 1904-1906 and in 1918-1919.

After the insurrection in Russia in December 1905, Lenin directly addressed himself to a consideration of what guerrilla warfare was, its effectiveness and the role it could play. Lenin reasoned that guerrilla warfare was an "inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement had actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur

39. Laqueur, n.1, p.146.

between the big 'engagements' in the civil war."⁴⁰
It was not true that guerrilla warfare demoralized the revolutionary avante - grade, only the senseless methods of unorganised, irregular bands had that effect. The avante -grade party had to direct the masses not only in the major battles of the revolution but also in the lesser encounters. There is no gainsaying that guerrilla warfare brought the class-conscious proletarians into close contact with "degraded, drunken riff-raff". But this meant only that the Bolsheviks should not regard it as the sole, or even as the chief instrument of struggle, or ever anything but subordinate to other methods. But neither should guerrilla warfare be left to the riff raff.⁴¹

It was 1906 when Lenin claimed that partisan warfare in combination with uninterrupted strikes, attacks and street fighting throughout the country would effectively exhaust the enemy.

40. Lenin, n.38, p.213.

41. *ibid.*

No government could survive such a struggle in the long run, it was bound to destroy the industry, demoralise the bureaucracy and the army and create dissatisfaction among the people. This was the sum total of Lenin's prerevolutionary dicta on guerrilla warfare.

According to John Erickson, "guerrilla war and military freebooting held little appeal for Lenin, squeezed dry of any drop of romanticism...The republic could not defend itself with untrained mobs or be held together by wild-eyed guerrillas."⁴²

Lenin frequently referred to partisanshchina (guerrillaism) after 1917, but always in a derogatory vein. He advised avoidance of guerrillaism since arbitrary operations of individual detachments, and disobedience vis - a - vis the central power, lead to ruin.

42. John Erickson, "Lenin as Civil War Leader," in L. Schapiro and P. Reddaway, eds., Lenin, the Man, the Theorist, the Leader (London, 1967), 174.

Significantly, Trotsky, who became the first People's Commissar for War and Chairman of the Supreme Military Soviet in March 1915, moved swiftly to eliminate what was termed partizanshchina ('partisan spirit or guerrillaism') in the newly established Red Army in the belief that it represented a weapon of the weak rather than the strong, and that it encouraged attitudes subversive of centralized party authority. "Guerrilla Warfare" as Trotsky said, "was truly peasant form of war."⁴³ He saw it as a primitive form of warfare, inevitable perhaps in some cases but devoid of any specific revolutionary character. He made a fair assessment of the value of guerrilla warfare in the following words in 1923:

"The guerrilla movement had seen a necessary and adequate weapon in the early phase of the civil war. The revolution could not as yet put compact armed masses into the field it had to depend on small independent bodies of troops. This kind of warfare demanded self-sacrifice, initiative and independence. But as the war grew in

43. Leon Trotsky, Military Writings (New York, 1971) p.81.

scope it needed proper organization and discipline and the guerrilla movement then began to turn it negative pole to the revolution."⁴⁴

In the light of these facts, the emergence of a myth depicting Lenin and Trotsky as great guerrilla strategists is difficult to understand and impossible to justify.

In fact the only writers before the twentieth century who seem to have made any real direct connection between guerrilla warfare and revolution were Carlos Bianco and Johannes Most.

The earlier writings like those of Le Miere and Decker, were technical manuals devoid of direct political implications. But with the question of national independence and unification becoming issues of the day in Italy and Poland, a search was on, for an answer, as to which was the most effective military-political approach to liberate a country from foreign occupation. In

44. ibid. pp.81 - 82.

contrast to the early European theorists, the Polish and Italian strategists were deeply preoccupied with the political aims and context of a war of national liberation. It was for this reason that they were able to anticipate many of the twentieth century discussions on partisan warfare.

It was in the writing of Carlos Bianco (1795-1843) that the link between guerrilla warfare and radical politics was first established. Bianco, according to Laqueur,⁴⁵ began with the assumption that Napoleonic warfare was unsuitable for the liberation of Italy, since the insurgents would be unable to collect the money or mobilize armies. On the other hand, the country could easily be mobilised for a people's war, which a group of conspirators could organize. Such a war would be most cruel, even terrorist in character. It would be a war in which the sacred end would justify all means, including a

45. Laqueur, n.1, pp.131 - 132.

'scorched - earth policy,' and the evacuation of large parts of the population to the mountains.

A neo -Jacobin, Bianco emphasised the necessity of a transitional period of revolutionary terror; once a certain area was liberated, the internal enemy, too, would have to be purged and even exterminated. It was to be a war to the death. The prisoners were to be killed most of the time, since in a war of constant movement there would be no facility to detain them.

Bianco, according to Walter Laqueur,⁴⁶ proposed a system of "democratic centralism", for the purpose of organizing the conspiracy and conducting the war. The state was to be divided into four major province every province, into five cantons, and each canton into ten sub-districts. Elections were to be held on regional basis but the leadership would be appointed. The central

46. ibid. pp.130 - 132.

Junta would be responsible to the supreme commander and not to the nation, though during the war these leaders of guerrilla units would have maximum freedom of action. Size of these guerrilla units was to be kept small. Mobility was the essence of partisan warfare, sudden surprise attacks followed by quick retreat. Gradually a people's war would evolve, involving active participations of women, children and the elderly. In his work, Trattato, Bianco put forward some more new ideas. He suggested that volunteers from foreign countries, join in the war of liberation. During the later stages of the war, flying columns be formed and eventually a regular army may come into being. Being a realist he also suggested tactics like distribution of booty among the freedom fighters to reinforce patriotic fervour in them.

It is one of the ironies of history according to Laqueur,⁴⁷ that Marx and Engels, who

47. ibid. pp. 147 - 148.

showed little enthusiasm about the prospects of guerrilla warfare, nevertheless became the idols of subsequent generations of guerrillas, whereas Johannes Most, the nineteenth-century German socialist who provided an elaborate strategy for conducting "urban guerrilla" warfare, has been ignored. Settled in the United States, he wrote Science of Revolutionary Warfare in 1884 - published with the subtitle: "A hand book of instruction regarding the use and manufacture of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun-Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs Arsons, Poisons etc." Modern explosives, he predicted, were to be the decisive factor in future social revolution; therefore revolutionaries of all countries ought to acquire them and learn how to use them. Terrorist acts were to be carried out by individuals, or at most by small groups, so as not to endanger the entire organization. Bombs were to be placed in public places so that the whole "reptile brood" was exterminated with the aid of science. Besides the rulers, the nobility the minister's were all to be annihilated.

Murder, as Most noted, was defined as willful killing of a human being. He also pioneered the idea of a letter bomb. Most's propaganda for direct action was based on the assumption that more bombs would have to be thrown and more "reptiles" killed before the enemy would collapse. He was also not interested in mass action for he felt that the army and police would always prevail in a confrontation of this kind. Unlike other socialists, he thought that the development of modern science favoured the revolutionary terrorist, provided the fruits of science were correctly applied in the pursuit of "propaganda of the deed" i.e. terrorism.

In practice, however, guerrilla warfare continued to be waged along traditional lines, although some groups and individuals started to make use of guerrilla or terrorist tactics for the pursuit of overtly political ends. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (I.M.R.O) built an integrated military and political organization in its struggle against Turkish and

later Bulgarian domination. The forerunner of modern revolutionary groups was the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A), that politically inspired campaigns against the British authorities in Ireland in the years 1916 and 1920. Of the two another individuals who showed a thoroughly modern understanding of political and socio - economic potential of insurgency, one was the Ukrainian anarchist Nestor Makhno, who fought the Bolsheviks during the last stages of the Russian Civil War. The other was the Nicaraguan radical, Augusto Sandino, who waged a campaign against the Nicaraguan National Guards and U.S. Marine Allies between 1927 and 1933.

The static nature of the First world war prevented much guerrilla warfare on the western front. It was a subsidiary theatre that offered scope for guerrilla activity. In the middle East T.E. Lawrence led a revolt of Arab tribesmen in a prolonged guerrilla action that claimed the lives of some 35,000 Turkish soldiers and resulted in another 35,000 captured or wounded; the guerrillas

finished the war in control of about 1000.000 square miles - a significant contribution to British victory in Palestine. Based on his experiences (T.E.Lawrence, made an original contribution to the development of guerrilla doctrine in the war years. His works Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1935) and Revolt in the Desert (1927) were the first to clearly articulate principles of guerrilla warfare that transcended the purely tactical.) It must however be pointed out that as a guerrilla leader he was not the equal of general Paul von Lettow Vorbeck, who skillfully defended German East Africa against vastly superior political forces for four years since 1914, until he surrendered hearing of Germany's defeat in Europe.

(Nevertheless, Lawrence is known to be the first in the twentieth century to believe that guerrilla warfare could prove to be an exact science, granted certain factors, and if pursued along certain lines.) These factors were: an unassailable base, a regular army of limited

strength that has to control a wide territory and a sympathetic population . The guerrillas, Lawrence argued, were to have speed and endurance and be independent of lines of supply. They also needed the technical equipment to destroy or paralyze the enemy's supply lines and communications:

"In fifty words: granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means, and spirit struggle quite in vain."⁴⁸

Giving the most elegant and comprehensive definitions of guerrilla Warfare yet written; Lawrence wrote:

"....[taking] practical account of the area we wished to deliver ...I began idly to calculate how many square miles... And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we

48. Lawrence, cited in Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957), Vol. X, p.950

came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence as idea, a thing intangible invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants immobile, firm footed, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless, without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.⁴⁹

The enemy, again in terms of Lawrence's thesis, was to be encouraged to stay in harmless place in the largest members. Since range was more to strategy than force, guerrilla tactics were to be 'tip and run', 'not pushes but strikes.' The smallest force being used to reach the farthest place in the quickest time. He also stressed the moral and propaganda aspects of guerrilla war. Thus, 'we had won a province when we taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of

49. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (London, 1973), pp.193 - 202.

freedom. Printing press therefore was the greatest weapon in the armoury of modern commander.

Lawrence succeeded on a modest scale. He understood that he had to go for the main weaknesses of the enemy and that warfare had to be adapted to the local, human and geographical conditions. But his generalizations came to be of limited worth; based as they were, only on his experiences. However the lack of competition and his image of a romantic figure, helped his theories gain a wide currency and appeal.

During the Second World War guerrilla warfare came to be referred to as partisan warfare owing to the massive resistance movements that sprang up in the German-occupied countries, giving a new lease to the life of guerrilla warfare.

In Holland, Belgium and Norway this resistance was limited to the publication of

underground newspapers etc. and carrying out of isolated acts of sabotage. But in the other countries , notably Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Russia and Yugoslavia the emphasis was more upon the creation of secret armies and at one stage or another, the waging of guerrillas warfare.

In theory the most effective form of resistance was direct subversion. Varying widely, this could include use of explosives to destruction of enemy vital installations. Subversion could include attack on German troops—depending upon the terrain. In Yugoslavia, large-scale battles were fought but the partisan leader, Tito, was invariably able to withdraw the bulk of his forces from the seven separate German offensives launched against the partisans between November 1941 to September 1944. In the Soviet Union the initial resistance developed from Soviet troops cut off by the speed of the German advance in 1941 rather than from any spontaneous local resistance to occupation, and the Soviet partisans

became an integral part of the army. Subversion might also imply insurrection though with limited success.

Nevertheless by 1945 the pattern of guerrilla warfare was well established. It was a form of struggle that could be protracted through the ability of the guerrillas to evade much larger numbers of regular troops committed against them provided that the terrain was difficult enough to impede the mobility of the regulars. By contrast with regulars, the guerrillas would usually be lightly equipped and would enjoy greater local knowledge as well as greater mobility. To survive, however the guerrillas would probably require at least the acquiescence of the local population. Where guerrilla war was in any case of response to foreign invasion and occupation, this degree of support was almost automatic.

As well as being a resort of the weak, however, it had been increasingly recognised that guerrilla tactics might be employed in conjunction

with conventional operations, with guerrillas acting as auxiliaries to regular troops. This mode of guerrilla employment was likely to achieve greater success than isolated guerrilla activity since, in nearly all situations, guerrilla war could not succeed unless there was substantial external assistance or an external refuge from which guerrillas could operate. These basics had long been accepted without becoming a structured theory of guerrilla war. It was however becoming more than merely a tactical method. Some theorists and practitioners were already beginning to grasp the political implications of guerrilla struggle.

CHAPTER 2

PEOPLE'S WAR

In his writings in the thirties, Mao blended the teachings of the past theorists including Clausewitz and Sun Tzu together with his own experience against Chiang - Kai Shek and the invading armies and Marxist Leninist beliefs into a relatively coherent body of politico-military theory. It is this strategy for revolution that has become the basis of the writings of most contemporary revolutionary leaders from Vo Nguyen Giap to Che Guevara and Carlos Marighella.

To Mao, the struggle consisted of a precise compound of psychological, economic, regular military and guerrilla measures. This concept went beyond the definition of war given by Clausewitz, as the 'continuation... of policy by other means', and aimed, at nothing less than the total transformation of social and economic structures, not just of within China, but

throughout the world. In other words, while an adherent of Clausewitz aims to change the policy of another state, an adherent of Mao wishes to destroy imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism. To achieve such aims, the use of force was indispensable. A revolution could not be peaceful because it was basic, to Marxist thought that no one relinquished power voluntarily. The use of force, however, was to be carefully measured and controlled, since an excess of violence could be harmful. Guerrilla warfare was to be considered within this context.

Contrary to the writings of Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, who stressed ^{upon} speedy and decisive offensive warfare, Mao propagated the idea of protracted war. To him it was the sole means by which China could survive and defeat Japanese aggression. Such a protracted war was also a school for the masses as the predominantly rural, peasant society, was essentially conservative and parochial in outlook, the concept of protracted war was necessary in order to

mobilize popular support for the revolution. It helped the creation of an effective army out of the disordered elements who had survived the 'Long March' to the sanctuary of the Shensi and other mountainous regions in 1934-35. In Mao's own words, "...revolutionary war is an anti toxin which not only eliminates the enemy's poison, but also purges us of our own filth."

Protracted war was in itself a dynamic process whose very duration was the condition for the gradual emergence of an increasingly powerful communist political and military structure. The establishment of base areas was absolutely fundamental to this process. Only within such liberated areas could the peasantry begin the military and political education, ensuring that they transcended the stage of being mere roving guerrilla bands. It was here that series of socio-economic reforms could be introduced along with making political propaganda. This concept of base areas was perhaps a new element. Though the idea had been known and practiced before, Mao Tse-tung

put far greater emphasis on it.

The tactics, Mao chose were those of guerrilla warfare, designed to make the most of an army of badly trained, badly equipped and parochially minded peasants. "Guerrilla warfare," according to Mao,

"has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor...conditions terrain, climate and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him ... to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy."¹

In 1930 he further wrote:

"The tactics we derived from the struggle of the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics the masses can be aroused for struggle on an ever broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful can cope with us. Ours are guerrilla tactics mainly consist of the following points: Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy. The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harry; the

1. Mao Tse-tung, "Yu Chi Chan" in Mao Tse-tung and Che' Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1961), pp.31-32.

enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue. To extend stable areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around. Arouse the largest number of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible methods. These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy."²

Pertaining to tactics Mao drew heavily from Sun Tzu too, as he wrote in 1937, "In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow, attack; withdraw: deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flank, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla actions and coordination with the effort of the regular armies."³

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2. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings (Peking, 1967), p.72.
 3. Mao, 7.1, pp.34-35.

Though the essentially rural composition of Chinese society, and military and anthropological consequences of that fact, dictated a resort to a guerrilla mode of warfare, yet Mao's guerrilla doctrine was not purely a military response to the Chinese situation. Echoing Sun Tzu, Mao stated that the military demands of guerrilla warfare were always inseparable from the political. He realized that guerrillas must be the people in arms, fighting for their real economic and social interests, rather than just an autonomous armed organization claiming to have the people's interest at heart. Only if the guerrillas at all times and at all levels actually showed that they were fighting for people's interest would they be able to gain the necessary popular support to sustain guerrilla warfare as a dynamic force that could eventually attempt the seizure of state power. Only genuine and widespread popular support could sustain a commitment to the horror of protracted war. It was necessary to maintain and expand the base areas

and produce enough recruits actually willing to join the Red Army.

So the true people's army was to be seen as a logical extension of the most basic social and economic aspirations of the mass of the people and its existence was only functional to the pursuance of popular political objectives. In this subordination to grass-roots, political opinion expressed itself at the most basic levels. In 1928 - Mao further drew up 'Three ruler and Eight remarks' to govern the guerrilla forces relations with the civilian population.

The Rules were:

1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

The Remarks were:

1. Replace all doors when you leave a house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you sleep.

3. Be courteous.
4. Return what you borrow.
5. Replace all what you break.
6. Be honest in your transactions.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search those you arrest.⁴

According to Mao, political mobilization for the War of Resistance was to be continuous, for this, it had to be linked with the life of the soldiers and the people, to create conditions indispensable to victory. This required class unity, for class conflict would only sap the strength of the revolutionary base. He concluded that the immediate task was of a military nature, and everything else would have to be temporarily subordinated to that policy which came nearest guaranteeing a military success.

4. Mao Tse-tung, n.1, pp.66-67.

Therefore according to Mao, there was to be a steady attempt to include, as broad a spectrum of rural society as possible into the revolutionary movement. Here, Mao gave the Marxist strategy a new twist by reversing orthodox Marxist practice. He relied on the peasantry, the most backward section of the Chinese people instead of an urban proletariat favoured by Marx and his Russian disciples.

Mao's theory was also that of substitution, in which a revolutionary movement, recognizing the paucity of its material assists, has to rearrange the elements of war or else give up. In this sort of situation the Marxist materialist and determinist in Mao was forced to admit the virtue of voluntarism. Man's will can be made to supercede the material realities. The minds of men then become as important as the weapons they possess. A view of warfare which germinated in the daily practice of battle becomes, on contemplation, a systematic theory of

war for machines, space for technology, political mobilization for control of industry, and propaganda for ammunition.

Mao conceived of guerrilla forces as passing through a series of merging phases. He believed that a guerrilla army could not by itself actually defeat conventional army,

"the concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If we assume that guerrillas warfare does not progress from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war"⁵

Thus the guerrillas were the only type of troops that an insurgent people could put into the field in the first stages of their struggle. Though such troops would always form an important, and in numerical terms, predominant component of

5. ibid. P.41,

the fighting forces. It was itself a means to survive and to win the time deemed essential to effect the revolutionary process as a whole. Time, would be won by trading 'space' but this did not imply a passive defence and would enable the communists to build a determination among both the guerrillas and the population, upon whom the guerrillas were entirely dependent. So the revolutionaries were to be always ready to develop a proportion of their forces beyond the guerrilla stages and prepare them to meet the enemy in open battle. To attain the objective of destroying the enemy one ought to slowly build up regular forces. Mao discussed the requirements of this process in these following words:

"To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forces waging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary an increase in numbers, and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the people to join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating small units, while better quality depends on steeling the fighters and improving their weapons in the course of the war... To raise the quality of the guerrilla units it is imperative to raise their political and organizational level and

improve their equipment, military technique, tactics and discipline, so that they gradually pattern themselves on the regular forces and shed their guerrilla ways. Politically it is imperative to get both the commanders and the fighters to realise the necessity of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular forces, to encourage them to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its attainment by means of political work. Organizationally, it is imperative gradually to fulfill all the requirements of a regular formation in the following respects - military and political organs, staff and working methods, a regular supply system, a medical service, etc. In the matter of equipment, it is imperative to acquire better and more varied weapons and increase the supply of the necessary communications equipment. In the matter of military techniques and tactics, it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to the level required of a regular formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imperative to raise level so that uniform standards are observed, every order is executed without fail and all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish all these tasks requires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that is the direction in which we must develop."⁶

Such regular units would be capable of fighting mobile warfare. Though it demanded

6. Mao, n.2, pp.182 - 183.

troops trained to a much higher level than the ordinary guerrilla, it nevertheless retained many of the basic characteristics, particularly mobility and flexibility, of all type of guerrilla warfare.

This regularization demanded a high level of organization and centralization. Thus Mao always stressed the need for closest identification between the party and the army, and the aspirations of the rural masses. Echoing Clausewitz, Mao emphasized the essential relationship between politics and war, a relationship in which military operations must be subordinated to political direction. "War cannot for a single moment be separated from politics," says Mao, "politics is war without bloodshed."⁷ All operations undertaken by the revolutionary forces, and particularly those in the military field, had to be designed, Mao argued, to meet distinctly political objectives. In this way he

7. ibid. pp. 97 - 98.

stressed the fundamental importance of political control.

For continuous political mobilisation, to make the guerrillas themselves more effective and to facilitate the transformation to regular warfare - and later on to provide central control to the army to make it an effective revolutionary body Mao emphasised the need for strict party control. This was precisely Mao's greatest political breakthrough and an unexpected application of Lenin's theory of vanguard party to the peasantry.

Besides these basic features of the Maoist conception of guerrilla warfare. Maoist theory concluded that the process of guerrilla warfare would take place in the context of three phases of national war of liberation.⁸ The first

8. Mao, n.1, pp.18 - 20. &
Mao, Selected Military Writings (Peking, 1967).

phase - the preparatory phase has been variously described as that of 'strategic' defensive or even 'conspiracy'. The aim was to expand organization and to establish an infrastructure for the further development of the revolution. Cadres would be infiltrated into key positions and party workers recruited and trained to generate support for the revolutionary movement and to build up a momentum. Preparation would be both covert and lengthy; although limited force might be applied to intimidate and coerce the population before being directed more precisely at the institution of the opposing authority in order to create a climate of dissent, civil disobedience and economic unrest. Popular support would increase & opponents neutralized or eliminated, and authorities discredited.

The careful political preparation of the first phase would give way at the appropriate time to the second phase of 'strategic stalemate' or 'equilibrium', in which there was deemed to be sufficient popular support, sympathy or

acquiescence to allow the expansion of terrorism into guerrilla warfare. Bases would be established, the tempo of recruitment increased and regular units trained for future employment. Minor guerrilla actions would become widespread and a pattern would emerge in which revolutionary domination of a particular locality would result in the establishment of a revolutionary administration. This competition in government would demonstrate that the revolutionary movement was capable of providing an alternative and better administration than that of the existing authorities, who would be further weakened and disheartened.

Finally, in the third phase of 'strategic offensive' or 'decision', the balance would have clearly swung in favour of the revolutionary movement and the struggle would have assumed the characteristics of a people's war. Mobile warfare would now commence with the regular units being introduced in a near-conventional conflict, although retaining some of the

characteristics of guerrillas. The final phase would only occur after very careful deliberation and might not actually be required at all if the earlier phases had been successful.

The enemy base area was to be invaded and his forces eliminated. At that stage, the revolutionaries would be in a position to take over power in the state and to put into effect their social reforms.

Mao, like Lenin, conceived of revolutionary politics as a series of accelerating struggles to wipe out the class enemy and create a totalitarian state resting on the dictatorship of the ~~state~~ revolutionary vanguard.

The end result of all this would be the usurpation of political power and it is in this respect that Mao differed so much from the theorists and practitioners of traditional guerrilla war. They had seen guerrillas as representatives of military desperation when the

regular army had been defeated, or was not available. Then, the elements of the local population, desperate to fight the rule of an oppressive or alien ruler, would use the skills at their disposal to wear the enemy forces down preparatory to the reappearance of regular army. They never expected the small bands of partisans to achieve victory on their own. What Mao did was to take these principles and mould them into a revolutionary process, tying them to the political and ideological framework of a set of firm beliefs designed to replace those of the existing rulers of a state. Within this process the guerrillas had an integral part to play, protecting safe bases of revolution from attack and gradually wearing down the conventional armed forces of the ruling authorities. The aim was to cause such armed forces to stretch themselves thinly in protection of cities, towns and links of communication, for that would leave them vulnerable, not only to continued guerrilla pressure but also to more conventional attacks by the regular units of revolution.

Herein lies, the grand strategy which broke so conspicuously with previous communist thought - the concept of surrounding the cities from countryside and thereby isolating the enemy from the peasantry and from one another. This countryside strategy reversed the sequence of the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and enabled Mao to claim that he creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions.

So once under pressure, the armed forces would find it difficult to respond, being under attack at both guerrilla and conventional levels and would quickly become demoralized. Their defeat in open battle would leave the central body of state government exposed and enable the revolutionaries to assume the reins of power. It was a complex process dependent upon a number of intangible factors and an enormous amount of political as well as military effort. But it did provide a new role for the guerrilla, and once Mao had succeeded in China, an apparent 'model' for campaigns elsewhere. The marked feature which

distinguishes Mao Tse-tung from so many other guerrilla leaders is the thorough - going way in which he systematically put the purely military considerations within the correct social , economic and political contexts. As John Ellis puts it, "any fool can pick a gun and vanish into the jungle, mountains or whatever. The trick is to stay there, build up the size of one's force, get the enthusiastic support of the people, and eventually oneself take the offensive and crush ones' enemy. Very few guerrillas have succeeded in doing this Mao Tse-tung was one who did, because he realized that military activity, particularly revolutionary military activity, is a political act."⁹

Through tremendous intellectual effort and realistic application, Mao could turn his strategic formulae into actual victory.

9. John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1975), p.169.

According to John Shy and T.W. Collier¹⁰ classic Western theorists of strategy, notably Jomini and Clausewitz addressed the problem of closing the gap between theory and its application. Clausewitz stressed keeping theory close to its empirical roots, "not letting the logic, language and polemics of theoretical discourse break away from the untidy, multifarious reality of actual warfare", Jomini while accepting this dichotomy, "had no hesitation in pushing theory towards its - most abstract, simplified form." For him closing the gap between theory and practices was the leader's problem. He warned them true how ever scientific maxims of strategy might be, the key lay in their correct application." Mao in this respect was closer to Jomini. Unlike Clausewitz, who worried about the existence and nature of a true theory strategy Mao and Jomini's

10. John Shy and T.W. Collier, "Revolutionary war" in Peter Paret, ed, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Nuclear Age (Oxford, 1986), pp. 843-844.

concern, once theory was understood, was in applying it. "For Jomini strategy theory could be grasped by any intelligent person but only 'genius' could apply it consistently," Mao too agreed so far, but "for Mao, 'genius' was himself and others could not do better than listen and follow where he led."¹¹

Superficially, Mao looked like an "Asian Jomini," Both Shy and Collier found, similar maxims, ... same deliberate compounding of analysis and prescription, the same didactic drive, the same invocation of the "genius" - romanticized Napoleon for Jomini, and himself for Mao—who can turn strategic theory into victory.¹²

Mao went further and tried to explain how victory grew out of theory. To him there was no dichotomy between theory and practice.

11. ibid. p.843.

12. ibid. p.844.

Unlike the western conception that assigns theory the main intellectual effort, leaving to practice such quite different qualities as courage, luck, and intuition, Mao assigned equal or greater intellectual effort to the application of theory.

With Mao's success in China, his theory became a model for campaigns elsewhere. Since the Maoist theory of revolutionary guerrilla warfare allowed even the most primitive of societies to adopt a militant political stand a form of military and political resistance it could prevail against a vastly superior enemy. As such it became a formula widely copied, after the success of the Chinese Communists in 1949. In Indo-China the works of two principal Vietnamese theorists of revolutionary war, Truong Chinh and Vo-Nguyen Giap were heavily based on Mao.

The first to provide, a more or less, systematic outline of Indo-Chinese guerrilla doctrine was Truong Chinh, Secretary general of

the party in 1946-1947 and the chief spokesman of neo-revolutionary guerrilla warfare, Truong Chinh envisaged a protracted struggle as one of the opposing strengths prevailing over French military and technological strengths in the first Indo-Chinese war between the Vietnamese and The French 1946-1954. It was to be a war without fronts carried out simultaneously by guerrilla, militia and regular army units. "The people were the water; the people's army the fish; partisans and small army units would disguise themselves as civilians and thus become inv^oriable."¹³

Altering Mao's theory of a three phased protracted war, Tr^uong Chinh extended the process over four separate phases. In the first stage, guerrilla warfare by tying down enemy forces would be of decisive importance. But with a major effort and good leadership it might be possible to win the war during the second stage by using guerrilla

13. Bernard B. Fall, Truong Chinh (New York, 1963), p.74.

and paramilitary forces with forces without a big regular army. Here again he alters the Maoist view of regularisation of guerrilla forces to bring the protracted war to a successful end.

Food, money and shelter could be commandeered from the villagers. It was desirable to have the good will of the population but not indispensable. This was contrary to Maoist theory which held popular support to be essential for the success of revolutionary endeavour. Vo Nguyen Giap, another prominent Vietnamese guerrilla strategy theorist, did not basically differ from Mao's; people's war in backward colonial countries is "essentially a peasant war under the leadership of the working class." According to Laqueur,¹⁴ Giap meant the working class in the abstract because there were hardly any working class cadres in the top echelons of the communist political military leadership. Guerrilla warfare was needed especially at the outset of the struggle because

14. Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla (London, 1977), pp. 268-269.

it could be practiced in the mountains as well as in the Delta and could be practiced with mediocre as well as good material.

Giap fully accepted the Maoist concept of protracted warfare. He wrote in his book, People's war, People's Army:

"All the conceptions born of impatience and aimed at obtaining speedy victory could only be gross errors. It was necessary to grasp firmly the strategy by long term resistance, and to exalt will to be self supporting in order to maintain and gradually augment our forces, while nibbling at and progressively destroying those of the enemy; it was necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories to turn them into a greater success, thus gradually altering the balance of forces, in transforming our weakness into power and carrying off final victory."¹⁵

This protracted war was to be fought in three stages. Giap - relabeled Mao's three stages of protracted war and stated:

The general law of long revolutionary war is usually to go through three stages: defensive equilibrium and offensive

15. V.N. Giap, People War, People's Army (New York, 1967), p.48

...[In the first stage] in the armed bases... Self-defense groups [to fight in the last extremity only] and armed self-defence groups [to fight the enemy as soon as he arrives at the village] were set up which swelled afterwards to local armed groups, or armed platoons freed or partially freed from production...

These groups then became capable of mobile guerrilla operations which consisted of:

"Concentration of troops to realise an overwhelming superiority over the enemy where he is sufficiently exposed in order to destroy his manpower; initiative, suppleness, rapidity, surprise, suddenness in attack and retreat. As long as the strategic balance of forces remains disadvantageous, resolutely to muster troops to obtain absolute superiority in combat in a given place, and at a given time. To exhaust little by little by small victories the enemy forces and at the same time to maintain and increase ours. In these concrete conditions it proves

absolutely necessary not to lose sight of the main objective of the fighting, that is the destruction of the enemy manpower. Therefore losses must be avoided even at the cost of losing ground."

Then the struggle gradually moves to the final stage:

This guerrilla warfare developed progressively into a form of mobile war that daily increased in scale. While retaining certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare, it involved regular campaigns with greater attacks on fortified positions. Starting from small operations with the strength of a platoon or a company to annihilate a few men... our army went over, later, to work to more important combats with a battalion or regiments to cut one or several enemy companies to pieces, finally coming to greater campaigns bringing into play regiments, then many divisions to and in Dien Bien Phu'.¹⁶

Giap placed less emphasis on mass support and more on the role of conventional military operations, being a notable exponent of 'the bloody blow to break the opponent's will'. Consequently in practice, Giap sought to achieve a

shortcut in the protracted struggle by moving too early into the third phase in his war against the French in Red River Delta in 1950-51 and against the United States forces and their South Vietnamese allies in the Tet offensive of 1968. On both occasions Giap suffered heavy military defeat, although this did not prevent his ultimate victory. ^{The establishment} of liberated popular bases was also accorded the highest priority. He also agreed with Mao that political activities were more important than military operations and that fighting was less important than propaganda, especially at an early stage: "Underground operating cadre teams, underground militarized teams, armed shock teams and local armed groups and platoons gradually appeared. The most appropriate principle for activities was armed propaganda, political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda... Once the political basis were consolidated and developed we proceeded one step further to the consolidation and development of the semi-armed and armed

forces.¹⁷

Then as one base became relatively secure, the guerrillas could move forward to a kind of 'beehive' growth. At all times political activity was seen as a vital component of the guerrilla's task. Giap's chief extension to the theory of guerrilla warfare sought to render Mao's doctrines more useful in dealing with revolutions against colonial powers that were essentially democratic in the metropole, rather than against invading armies or an indigenous force or government. Giap sensed some crucial political and psychological shortcomings that weaken a democratic system involved in a protracted, inconclusive military operation. Based on a correct analysis of American weaknesses, Giap generalised that public opinion in a democratic state will not easily accept senseless bloodshed or escalating military budgets without clear cut purpose or the prospect of genuine victory. In the end, says Giap, - "democracy and politics are forced to compromise rather than take the

17. *ibid.*, p.79.

unpopular course of sustaining a semi-permanent anti-guerrilla war". So Vo Nguyen Giap emphasised the mobilization of international opinion in support of revolution. The war in Vietnam was thus a struggle to influence American public opinion against the policies of the American government.

With the profound global shifts in the post second World War balance of power, guerrilla warfare received a galvanic fresh impetus. Three historical forces according to Chailand¹⁸ helped shape guerrilla warfare in the contemporary period: The first was the emergence on a national scale of the participation of peasants in armed struggle. A vanguard organization leads the struggle, and elicits a spirit of self-sacrifice, discipline, and cohesion through its 'mobilizatory ideology.' Such an organization

18. Gerard Chailand, ed, Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan (California, 1982), pp. 8-9.

tends to ensure that it enjoys substantial support among the population by a process of education /politicisation and selective use of terror. The second major influence was that of the Second World War. Japanese and German attempts at securing world hegemony broke the international equilibrium and opened the way for the many guerrilla campaigns.

Thirdly European colonial powers could no longer resist the rising tides of nationalism in both Asia and Africa. The breaking of 'colonial yoke' did not inaugurate a new era of peace and stability, for there were many contenders for dominance in the newly established states. Radicals fought conservatives, national minorities pursued separatist policies and conflicts frequently took the form of guerrilla or quasi-guerrilla base. Many of them were inspired by Maoist example, though with mixed results.

According to Nigel De Lee,¹⁹ though Mao believed that his basic principles of struggle could be applied to all levels of conflict in all parts of the world, he applied his doctrine by supporting national liberation in the third world. According to Mao, the developed industrial countries corresponded to the cities, dependant for their survival on the ruthless and unjust exploitation of the surrounding countryside. The third world countries, primary producers of food and raw materials, resembled the countryside and could, led by Socialists and anti-imperialist guerrillas, blockade and bring down the developed countries. The guerrillas could not be defeated by the chosen weapons of the developed powers—nuclear missiles. These freedom fighters were bound to succeed in the long run, imposing a new world order founded on international social justice. It seemed a convincing and attractive case, particularly to those nationalists in many

19. Nigel De Lee, "Southeast Asia: The impact of Mao Tse-tung" in John Pimlott, ed., Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1985), p.48.

Third World states who were fighting for their freedom against imperial powers or the apparently pro-imperialists government left behind after decolonization.

In Malaya (1948-1960), for example, having already fought the Japanese, the communist went to war again in 1948 and it took the British eight years to defeat them. Here, too,²⁰ the colonial authority had been weakened by Japanese occupations. But the mainly Chinese insurgents operated within a bi-ethnic society, and the British were able to quell this rebellion with support of the Malaya muslims and the feudal class, in general.

In the Philippines, which had been an American colony until 1946, the Huk communist forces fighting the Japanese since 1942, decided to resume the armed struggle, even though the United States had granted them a potentially

20. Chailand, n.18, p.19.

immobilising independence. The struggle was initially successful (1948-50) but it remained regionally circumscribed (regionalism is endemic to the Philippines). Isolated and on the defensive, the movement crumbled under the blows of a re-organised counter-insurgency, which promised amnesty to defectors and mollified the population by offering agrarian reforms.²¹

These two major failures in Asia revealed that Mao's pattern of revolutionary warfare, within which guerrillas tactics played an integral part, was by no means universally applicable. This has not altered the fact that the pattern affected the way in which people have responded to the challenges of nationalism and it was enough to alter the role of guerrilla in the history of warfare—it now came to be known as 'People's War'.

This was reflected in the emerging Third

21. *ibid.* ,pp.19-20.



World, especially Africa during the turbulent years of de-colonization - in Algeria (1954-62), Angola (1962-74), Rhodesia (1972-1980) and Dhofar region of Oman (1965-1975). It was in Africa particularly that the Maoist influence became evident, in case of Amilcar Cabral, who led the Partido Africano Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde (P.A.I.G.E.) movement against Portuguese authorities in Guinea Bissau between 1956-1973.

In the works of Amilcar Cabral one sees the traces of Marxist Leninist and Maoist influence. Like Mao, he agreed to the necessity of an armed struggle. Violence was important for national liberation, but he was not engaged in the fetishization of violence. Similarly, his stress was on economic development and mobilisation of peasantry. Giving political party an important part to play in the struggle, such a party was organised according to the Leninist principles of democratic centralism and collective leadership. All important decisions were taken by Cabral himself. Towards the end, Cabral came to a

conclusion that social and national liberation were not for export. There was a need for conducting policy and warfare according to widely varying local and national conditions.

Another African exponent of guerrilla warfare, although without any actual experience of it, was the first post-independence head of state in Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah. In his book of Handbook of Revolutionary warfare, on the basis of various diagrams, he explained that colonialism was 'primitive imperialism'. 'Fascism was extreme capitalism' that revolutionary warfare was the key to African freedom, and that a new African nation ought to be established within the continental framework. His blueprint envisaged the establishment of an All African Peoples Revolutionary Army (A.A.P.R.A.) under the command of All African Peoples Revolutionary Party, the main enemy being new neo-colonialism. In this context he borrowed heavily from Mao, the idea of liberated zones.

Due to lack of practical experience of guerrilla warfare the military sections of his book were not original according to Laqueur,²². Borrowing heavily from Mao, Castro and others - the resultant mixture was a vague theory applicable to all or none. His logical pretensions to have established an original system - 'Nkrumahism' dismayed the communists too, though they appreciated his attempt to apply Marxist-Leninist ideas to Africa. Also, there were differences on matters of substance, for example, neocolonialism was for Nkrumah 'collective imperialism,' whereas the communist always emphasised the contradictions between various imperialist powers.

Further afield, the Indonesian nationalist, Abdul Harris Nasution produced his book on guerrilla warfare, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, largely independent of Maoist thought, but according to Walter Laqueur²³ still

22. Laqueur, n.14, pp.367-368.

23. *ibid.*, p.367-369.

bearing striking resemblance to Mao's thought with politics left out. As a precondition of success in guerrilla warfare, according to Nasution, the guerrilla's roots lie in the people. The counter guerrilla had to try to sever the guerrilla from this base, not only by military operations but by politico-psychological and socio-economic actions. He was aware of the limitations of guerrilla warfare too. "How great were the setbacks and how great the amount of confusion and difficulty that befell us because we played the role of the guerrilla too long."²⁴ To him, the guerrilla - mania (the lack of discipline, planning, the belief that every one could fight as he wished) was the most dangerous enemy of the guerrilla movement. Like Mao, Nasution accepted the general fact that guerrilla warfare alone could not ensure victory; - hopefully it weakened the enemy by draining his resources. Final victory must be achieved by a regular army in a conventional war.²⁵

24. A.H.Nasution, n.23, p.73.

25. *ibid.*, p.17.

A concept based on rural action was thus increasingly less relevant even in many parts of the Third World because of the growth of urbanisation. A clear example of the changes that would be forced upon the modern guerrilla according to Ian Beckett,²⁶ was the failure of the so called 'foco' theory of guerrilla warfare which was developed in Latin America in the early 1960s as an alternative model for rural revolution by an Argentinian Ernesto Che Guevara, the conspiratorial and peasant aspects of whose theories were exaggerated to an absurd degree by French Marxist, Regis Debray in his book Revolution in the Revolution.²⁷

The 'foco' theory was based upon the success of a relatively small group of revolutionaries - initially just eighty one

26. Ian Beckett, "Guerrilla Warfare: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency since 1945" in C. McInnes and G.D. Sheffield, eds., Warfare in the Twentieth Century (London, 1988, p.201 - 202.
27. Robert Moss, Urban Guerrilla: The New Face of Political Violence (London, 1972), p.146.

strong, soon reduced to twenty two effectives - in topping the Batists regime in Cuba between 1956-59 It is noted by observers that to a great extent Field Castro's victory against Batista was fortuitous. Batista's regime was hopelessly corrupt, unpopular, and inefficient, the Cuban army contriving to lose a war in which it apparently suffered only two hundred dead in three years. Moreover, Batista also lost support of the united States through his lamentable human rights record.

From this success of castroist revolution against a regime ripe for defeat, Debray and Guevara evolved a model for revolution which they believed could be reproduced as a matter of course throughout Latin America, if not the entire Third World.

The essence, the fundamental lessons of the Cuban revolution as Guevara saw it, are presented in his book, La Guerra de Guerrillas (1959) These lessons are:

1. Popular forces could win a war against the army.
2. It was not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution existed the insurrection could create them.
3. In the underdeveloped America, the countryside was the basic area for armed fighting.

These statements summed up both Guevara's voluntarism and his view of the guerrilla as an agrarian rebel. According to Guevara, since imperialism and the bourgeoisie tried to keep themselves in power without using sensible violence, the revolutionaries had to compel them to remove their mask, to expose them in their real Gestalt as a violent dictatorship of the ruling classes, thereby intensifying the revolutionary struggle. In other words, a democratically elected constitutional government had to be compelled by provocative guerrilla attacks into using its inherently dictatorial

powers. Thus, according to Robert Moss,²⁸ developed the elitist thesis that revolution could be built from the apex down rather than base upward.

He regarded armed insurrection not as the final crowning phase of the political struggle but that the armed conflict would trigger off, or at least give decisive impetus, to the political campaign. Though the guerrilla must be a social reformer, according to Guevara the revolutionary spirit was somehow taken for granted and so was the support by the people. Debray maintained that a successful military operation was the best propaganda. Expressing his contempt for all the normal forms of political agitation, Debray said that military operations were the best propaganda and there was no need for party based political mobilization. The guerrilla force itself was the party in embryo. In contrast to Mao, who stressed the organization of parallel political and

28. Moss, n.28, p.147.

military structures and the primacy of the political, Guevara and Debray argued that the guerrillas themselves were a revolutionary fusion of political and military authority. Instead of the vanguard party creating a popular army, it would be for the popular army to create the political vanguard.²⁹ Debray based himself on Castro, who declared on one occasion, "Who will make the revolution in Latin America? The people the revolutionaries, with or without a party."³⁰ According to Robert Moss, Debray contradicted the Leninist principle that revolution is impossible without a vanguard party which must retain control over the combat organization; he forgot the basic rule of all guerrilla warfare that, a guerrilla fighter was a political partisan as much as a soldier and that he battled with his mind and his real battle is for minds.³¹ Guevara too argued

29. Regis Debray, Revolution in Revolution (New York, 1967), pp.104-106.

30. F.Castro, cited in Laqueur, n.14, p.331.

31. Moss, n.28, p.147.

that the guerrilla was to triumph because of his moral superiority over the enemy and because to the mass support he enjoyed; being inferior to the army in firepower was of no great consequence.

Guevara, like Mao regarded guerrilla operations as the initial phase of warfare, the guerrilla army would systematically grow and develop until it acquired the characteristics of a regular army. The aim was victory, annihilation of the enemy. This could be achieved only by a regular army, even though its origin lay in a guerrilla band.

Like many guerrilla leaders, Guevara-Debray also assumed that the people could defeat a regular army; but the novelty was in the concept that 'thirty to fifty dedicated revolutionaries were sufficient to launch an armed struggle in any Latin American country'. Debray further limited the size to just ten to thirty professional revolutionaries who would pave the way, preparing the masses, an idea similar to what Blanqui had

to say a hundred years ago the only difference being that the revolutionaries did not want to seize power for themselves nor did they aim at a lightning victory ³². Guevara argued that the foco (insurrectional focus) could polarize society and guarantee revolutionary success. In arguing so elitist a view, Guevara overturned basic revolutionary orthodoxy.

The strategic concept of Guevara Debray was contrary to most militant communists as well. According to Laqueur, ³³ Trotskyites and Maoists belittled revolutionary spontaneity and discounted the self-defense units of the workers and peasants, while Debray thought that the peasant syndicates struggle was essentially defensive in character, and did not aim at seizing political power.

32. Regis Debray, Strategy for Revolution (London, 1973), pp. 46-47.

33. Laqueur, n. 14, pp. 331-332.

Secure bases for guerrillas as Chinese communist model, were not suitable for Latin America. According to Debray, Latin American 'foci' - the centre of insurrection, had to be of military character rather than territorial. By itself a 'foco' could not overthrow the system, it was merely a detonator planted in the most exposed enemy position, timed to produce an explosion at the moment of choice. Latin American guerrillas would not survive the early stages of armed struggle if they were to engage in static defense, so they would have to carry their foci with themselves. Establishing territorial foci at the very beginning of the struggle was not to be a strategic aim. In other words according to Moss,³⁴ Debray swung over to the coldly mechanistic view that a guerrilla force without a political base, neither explaining its motive nor protecting its peasant sympathizers, could develop sufficient military power to topple a government.

34. Moss, no.28, p.147

Castro and Guevara believed in the absolute supremacy of the armed struggle. After the Cuban experience, they maintained that the struggle would have to incorporate many Latin American countries, since the chances of success existed almost everywhere if only there was enough revolutionary enthusiasm. Also in view of the growing pressures of the imperialist forces, it would be difficult to defeat the enemy and stay in power in a single country.

Yet again, this 'foco' strategy came in conflict with Marxist -Leninist beliefs. The Cubans insisted that the rural areas were to be the main battlefields. They reasoned that the countryside was more favourable from military point of view due to its inaccessibility and also because the revolutionary potential of the peasantry that had hitherto been virtually untapped.

Given the Cuban example, an urban guerrilla movement could not develop into a

revolutionary force capable of seizing power. It was, according to Guevara and Debray, at best an instrument for agitation, a tool for political maneuvers, a means for political negotiation.³⁵ The city, as Fidel put it, was the "grave of the guerrilla". He reasoned that in the towns, lack of single command and centralized leadership would force guerrillas to disperse and this would weaken the insurgents. War would be a revolutionary partisan one, supported and gradually joined by the peasants. Debray favoured waging war in the countryside, a war which would be expanded to the small cities and in the end, be carried to the metropolitan cities - also because, "the city can bourgeoisify the proletariat and the mountains proletarianizes the bourgeois."³⁶ According to Moss,³⁷ Debray's view of guerrilla warfare

35. Speech at the University of Havana, cited in Laqueur, Guerrillas (London 1977) p.333.

36. Debray, n.30, p.26.

37. Moss. n.28, p.147.

reflected an unreasoning lust for action and a bourgeois radical view of 'sierra' - describing the cities as a luke warm incubators where no important political struggle could take place.

In this book Guerrilla Warfare Guevara mainly concerned with the minutiae of guerrilla tactics. He emphasised the subjective factors: the importance of rebel motivation and disciplined conduct towards the civilian populations. "The guerrilla fighter, as a person conscious ~~of~~ of a role as the vanguard of the people", he observed, "must a moral conduct that shows him to be a true priest of the reform to which he aspires".³⁸ He also emphasised the importance of hatred in sustaining guerrilla over a long campaign - the need to 'burn all emotional boats.'

Guevara emphasised the Maoist principle of a three-^{stage} struggle though with a difference.

38. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Harmondsworth, 1969), p.45.

First, the nomadic stage or that of tactical defense, lasting for the first six months, when the small guerrilla force, always on the move, would be hunted by superior enemy forces. During the second stage,

"little by little as the peasants come to recognize the invincibility of guerrilla and long duration of the struggle, they began responding and joining our army as fighters. From that moment on, not only they join our ranks but they provided supportive action. After that the guerrilla army was strongly entrenched in the countryside. This is what we call "dressing the guerrillas in palm leaves"... This was "a period of consolidation for our army---It was characterised by deadlock: we were unable to attack the enemy's fortified and relatively easily defended positions while they did not advance on us."³⁹

And in the third stage: "We then have the beehive effect. One of the leaders, an outstanding guerrilla fighter, jumps off to another region and repeats the chain of

39. Che Guevara, Reminiscences of the Cuban War, (Harmondsworth, 1969), pp.185 - 186, 188.

development of guerrilla warfare - subject, of course, to central command...The final stage is reached with the inundation of the repressive which leads to the seizure of the great cities, the great decisive battles, and the total annihilation of the adversary."⁴⁰

For the collapse of the incumbent army two basic stratagems existed - one was the ambush, the other according to Guevara was, that "it was easy... to attack enemy columns on the march. We realised the advantages of firing upon the head of the columns and of trying to kill the leading men, immobilizing the rest of them. We continued this practice until it became an established system, so efficient that the soldiers stopped coming to Sierra Maestra and even refused to be part of the advance guard."⁴¹ After the troops had refused to venture into rebel territory they simply sat

40. J. Gerassi, ed., Venceremos: The Speeches and Writings of Che Guevara, (London, 1972), pp.389 - 90.

41. *ibid.* p.135.

tight in their blockhouses in the populated areas. These the guerrillas reduced by assault. But according John Ellis, the fact remains that no enemy retaining the least amount of central coordination or respect for authority could have been defeated by such tactics.⁴²

The critical period, as Guevara saw it, was the very early one and he posited three preconditions for the guerrilla's survival - constant mobility, constant vigilance, and constant distrust. It is at the first stage that Guevara and Debray depart from that of Mao and Giap. According to latter the first phase of revolutionary war was to be that of political mobilisation, the lengthy painstaking process of recruiting and organizing popular support and building a dedicated and disciplined revolutionary cadre at the village level. During this first phase, only the most limited and selective use of violence was to be permissible. Overt military

42. J.Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1975), p.187.

action was better avoided altogether because it risked awakening the government to its peril and brought armed repression down on an unready revolutionary organization. But no such "first phase preparation had taken place in Cuba. The Cuban variant was that of 'focoism', that is, "a small revolutionary force, by using violence, could mobilize much more popular support instead of political mobilization leading eventually to violence that transforms the political situation".

"Awakened and excited by foco attacks angered and encouraged by the brutality and ineptitude of governmental response, alienated if the government seeks help from a foreign power, people will be mobilized for revolution in a process in which violence itself is the catalyst."⁴³

Through experience it soon became evident that focoism, however plausible was not effective, and results from revolutionary point

43. J. Shy and T.W. Collier, "Revolutionary War", in Peter Faret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Oxford, 1986), p.850.

of view, were disastrous. It exposed the revolutionary movement at its weak moment to a crushing counter - attack, as happened in Bolivia. The most serious flaw of focoism according to J. Shy and Collier was that it neglected the reciprocal nature of the orthodox first phase of revolutionary war, the long hard work of political preparation not only organized the peasantry and proletariat, but also taught the revolutionary activists, about the people, the villages, the attitudes and grievances, even the physical terrain on which revolutionary war was to be based. Sheer ignorance of local conditions played a major part in failure of focoism in other Latin American countries, especially Bolivia. Guevara's boldly asserted that: "It was not necessary to wait till all conditions for making revolution exist, insurrection can create them", or as mentioned in another text as "the insurrectionary nucleus can create them." ⁴⁴ This idea of insurrectionary nucleus was taken up by

44. Gerassi, ed., n.41, p.375.

Regis Debray and expanded into a guerrilla strategy - the core of which was that of foco, the guerrilla force itself, that remained apart from the people and concentrated on offensive military activity:

"By restricting itself to the task of protecting civilians or passive self defense, the guerrilla unit ceases to be vanguard of the people as a whole and deprives itself of a national perspective. By going over to the counter -attack, on the other hand, it catalyses the people's energy and transforms the 'foco' into a pole of attraction for the whole country."⁴⁵

Debray's emphasis upon the initial primacy of autonomous military action, not linked to organizations within the people at large, according to Ellis, was fraught with dangers.⁴⁶ Unlike Mao and Giap, says Moss,⁴⁷ Debray stood for a coldly mechanised view that a guerrilla force

45. R. Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.45.

46. Ellis, n.43, p.188.

47. Moss, n.28, p.147.

without a political base, neither explaining its motives nor protecting its peasants sympathizers, could develop sufficient military power to topple a government. A successful guerrilla force could not ~~not~~ assume that popular discontent would lead to mass support for armed operations. The popular base had to be there at all stages of the guerrilla struggle. Without it, and opposed by a merely average incumbent army, the guerrillas faced constant pursuit, encirclement and annihilation. Guevara himself died in Bolivia, whilst discovering the fallacies inherent in his theory of 'nuclear' revolution.

Foco proved attractive, through its reduced emphasis on lengthy preparation, but it was a manifest failure in Colombia (1961), Guatemala and Ecuador (1962) and Peru (1963), the greatest failure of all being in Bolivia in 1966-67.

Bolivia had actually enjoyed a measure of land reform in the fifties, sufficient to

deprive any 'foco' of even that minimum level of discontent required by Debray and Guevara. The terrain, too, was not suitable for hard hitting mobile warfare. Also Guevara's band of twenty seven men and women of assorted, nationalities none of whom spoke the native language of local Indian of Nancahuazu region, where the foco was launched, were regarded as aliens by the natives. The Bolivian communist party did not agree to Guevara's emphasis on military control of revolution, nor was there any attempt to mobilize the radical tin mining community. Having spent much of its time lost in the jungle between November 1966 - October 1967, the guerrilla foco was wrapped and eliminated by The Bolivian Rangers trained by The United States.

So it became apparent that the reasons for the failure of foco strategy lay in the strategy itself. It was founded on an erroneous image of the Cuban revolution. According to Robert Moss, the heady romanticism of middle class intellectuals who hoped to find the certainty and

conviction that was lacking in their city lives among an unknown peasantry.⁴⁸ Castro and The Cuban leadership forced upon Latin American revolutionaries a partial view of Cuban struggle that was represented as comprehensive and applicable to the continental mainland. To an audience all too willing to be convinced, Ernesto Guevara and his book provided a call to action, and a do - it - yourself guide to the would be insurgents that was gathered from the three fundamental lessons of The Cuban War.

It was compounded with a kind of revolutionary meachismo: the desire to prove oneself a man by running the gauntlet of hunger and armed combat. Instead the many guerrillas got bogged down by petty bickerings.

Finally according to Richard Clutterbuck,⁴⁹ guerrilla operations failed in

48. Moss, n.28, p.158.

49. Richard Clutterbuck, Protest and Urban Guerrilla (London, 1973), p.167.

Latin America in the sixties because the guerrillas, like Guevara failed to organise adequate popular support. Guevara turned his back on the basic Leninist tactics and the concepts of Mao Tse-tung's protracted warfare, and set out conclusions supported by evidence from the Cuban struggle. An uncritical acceptance of these conclusions compounded the revolutionary's problems. A concept that in reality had never worked in Cuba, had no chance of success in the totally different conditions of the Latin American mainland.

CHAPTER - 3
URBAN GUERRILLAS

The discrediting of foco was partly responsible for the development in Latin America of the theory and practice of urban guerrilla warfare. Although Fidel Castro had described urban areas as 'graveyards of revolutionaries', nevertheless in the late sixties there was a drift back to the towns on the part of defeated rural insurgents. The insurgents were leaving behind Guevara's ideas of rural insurgency as Latin America became increasingly urban. In the mid sixties Latin American population became more than fifty percent urban. Moreover this urbanization was not the result of industrialization but due to population explosion and flight from the countryside. As a result, it was marked by high unemployment, high inflation and concentration of a large proportion of a relatively young population in slums and shanties--the 'misery belts'. A wide sense of deprivation appeared ready for exploitation.

Moreover, by now urban terror had been attempted in other guerrilla campaigns such as

those of Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou Agoniston (E.O.K.A). against the British authorities in Cyprus between 1955 and 1959. The Fronte de Liberation Nationale (F.L.N.) against the French in Algeria between 1954 - 1962 and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (F.A.L.N.) in Venezuela between 1962 - 1965.

A conservative nationalist, the military leader of E.O.K.A. George Grivas (1898 - 1974) wrote an account of his campaign as a primer for western governments faced with communist insurgency. Contrary to the classics of guerrilla warfare, Cyprus gave proof that a handful of combatants, from sixties to two hundred, with never more than a hundred automatic weapons and five hundred to six hundred shotguns between them could sustain a fight against several divisions of British soldiers for four years and eventually oust them.¹

1. General Grivas, Guerrilla Warfare Eoka's Struggle (London, 1964), p.73.

Like Guevara , Grivas believed that independent military action by guerrillas alone could succeed without the necessity of forging a Maoist conventional army. On the basis of his experience, Grivas wrote that leadership was more important than terrain. His use of terror, by letter and parcel bomb, ambush and execution squad, and stress on youthful participation all were ideally suited for imitation by later urban guerrillas. But unlike Guevara, he did not neglect either careful preparation before the opening of his campaign or cultivation of popular support.

Inspite of the unsuccessful results of urban action for guerrilla movements by the Front in Algeria between 1954 and 1962, and in Venezuela between 1962 and 1965, that could serve warning of its inherent dangers, urban guerrilla warfare gained considerable popularity.

The sixties were marked by ascendancy of youth in the West. It was becoming widely politicized and radicalised through

disillusionment with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the drugs cult and black radicalism in the United States. Other alternatives to violence also appeared unlikely to succeed in view of U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic (1965) and its involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende's radical socialist government in Chile (1973).

Thus the recasting of insurgency concepts came at a time when American and West European societies were receptive to dissent and fresh revolutionary ideas. According to Peter Reed,² in the course of the sixties political philosophers from the New Left taught the burgeoning student population of Western societies, that the youth was the instrument of revolutionary change in an increasingly materialistic society. Marcuse, Reich, Adorno, Venegim and Debord were just some of the more

2. Peter Reed, "Latin America: The move to the cities", in John Pimlott, ed., Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1985), pp.119 - 120.

influential writers who convinced a rising generation of radical students that the society in which they lived was as much an instrument of class oppression as it ever had been, and that society had deliberately set about drawing the fangs of protest and change by presenting its members with a new set of worldly goods in place of fervour, commitment and spiritual values. The New Left believed that the old Jewish concept, that the individual was obliged to try to leave society better than he found it, was dead, trampled to death in the stampede for consumer goods, automobiles and package holidays. Marcuse and others of similar persuasion believed that man in the western capitalist society was every bit as enslaved as his counterpart in the Soviet bloc. Rejecting both Western capitalism and Soviet-style communism, the New Left taught that established authority sought to control and manipulate individuals and to enforce their conformity and that it did so by alienating man from everything that was real, as a result, man is reduced to a cipher, conditioned to accept an ordained role

accommodating him within the system. Marcuse and the New Left were convinced that the most privileged elements within society were in reality the most oppressed, their very privilege and awareness of fortunate status being the instruments of guilt and enslavement. The state maintained a dominant class interest through violence, sometimes mental and psychological and on other occasions physical. This institutionalised violence on the part of the state was justification for the use of violence against it.³ This point of view was also preached by Franz Fanon, one of the major cult figures of the sixties. A psychologist from Martinique, Fanon provided a new ideology on the cathartic role of violence. Violence as he saw it, was a cleansing force liberating man from his **inferiority complex**, his despair. In action it made him fearless and restored self - respect and united him with the society. Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence

3. *ibid.*, p.120.

organised and educated by the leader, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them.⁴

The idealised, ennobling and morally cleansing form of revolutionary violence preached by radical authors such as Marcuse and Franz Fanon contributed to the emergence of urban guerrilla and terrorist groups. The theory of urban guerrilla warfare itself found expression in the writings of new theorists.

The first, but according Laqueur,⁵ also the least known advocates, of the strategy was Abraham Guillen, an anarcho - Marxist of Spanish origin, who settled in Uruguay after spending many years in Argentina. He maintained that in highly urbanised countries revolutionary battles ought to

4. Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London, 1967), p.64.

5. Laqueur, Guerrilla (London, 1977), pp.344 - 346.

be waged in the urban areas, without excluding cooperation with the rural milizias, "for the revolutionary potential is, where the population is".⁶ To endure the struggle, the small armed minority would have to lead a consistently clandestine existence with the support of the population. Their basic principle should be to live separately and fight together. Urban guerrillas should use light arms, but machine guns and bazookas would have to be employed as to give them the advantages enjoyed by a highly mobile infantry. They should not try to seize large objectives but concentrate on small successive actions. As a result, the police have to cede terrain, especially at night: "If at night the city belongs to the guerrilla and, in part, to the police by day, then in the end the war will be won by who ever endures longest."⁷

6. A. Guillen, cited in Donald C. Hodges, ed., Philosophy of Urban Guerrilla (New York, 1973), P.236.

7. *ibid*, p.241

Guillen attributed a leading role in the revolutionary process to the students. He was one of the few Latin America guerrilla strategists to give them first place in the list of revolutionary forces. The support of eighty percent of the population was needed, according to Guillen. If they received such support the guerrillas could win the war even though imperialism held an overall superiority of a thousand to one; for at a given place and time guerrillas could be superior to the enemy in numbers and firepower by five to one. Guillen agreed with the Guevara - Debray thesis about the role of the vanguard.

Guillen had considerable influence on the Uruguay Movimiento de Liberation National (M.L.N - the Tupamaros) movement led by students. Tupamaros, according to Guillen, were the first to operate in the 'cement jungles' of a capitalist metropolis. They believed in the power of a determined band of guerrillas to create conditions for revolution like Guevara and Debray. But as the movement evolved and the Tupamaros saw the

possibility of increasing their following among the trade unions they began to talk more of political goals: like those of nationalization, worker's control in factories, student control in universities and redistribution of land.

Guillen was by no means an uncritical admirer of the Tupamaros. Analysing the success and failures of movement of national liberation in an article entitled "Urban Guerrilla Strategy",⁸ Guillen summarised:

- 1 To avoid encirclement and annihilation through house to house searches, the guerrillas could best survive by not establishing fixed urban bases but by living apart and fighting together.

8. Abraham Guillen, "Urban Guerrilla Strategy" in Gerard Chailand, ed., Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from Long March to Afghanistan (California, 1982), pp.317-323.

2. Mobility and security: to retain their mobility and a high margin of security they must spread out among a favorable population. Guerrillas who fight together and dispersed throughout a great city could not be easily detected by the police. When dragnets are applied to one neighborhood or zone, guerrillas without a fixed base can shift to another neighbourhood. Such mobility is precluded by reliance on rented houses or hide-outs in the homes of sympathizers.

3. According to Guillen, urban guerrillas, who develop a heavy infrastructure in many rented houses commit not only a military error, but also an economic and logistic one. A large heavy rearguard requires large budget in which economic and financial motives tend to overshadow political considerations. Lacking enough houses, the guerrillas tend to ungrade to positions of command, those willing to lend their own. This open the guerrilla to

bourgeoisie tendency... By relying for cover not on a people in arms, but on people of property, the urban guerrilla warfare would become a business of armed minority never succeeding in mass mobilisation.

4. Logical infrastructures: In case fixed fronts become indispensable, these fronts must be commanded by the guerrillas themselves and known only to a few who work there to avoid discovery by repressive forces. For arms, the parts manufactured in legal establishments ought to be assembled in secret workshops of the guerrillas. Guillen also added that if urban guerrillas continuously disappeared and reappeared among the population of a great city, then they would lack the political perquisites for making a revolution, for creating the condition of a social crises through the breakdown of "law and order".

5. Heroes, martyrs and avengers: In a

revolutionary war any guerrilla action ought to be meaningful and convincing by itself. Guillen was opposed to senseless violence. It was far better to create a martyr and thereby attract mass sympathy than to lose or neutralise popular support by senseless killing without an evident political goal. To be victorious in a peoples' war, one had to act in conformity with the interests, sentiments and will of the people. A military victory is worthless if it failed to be politically convincing. In a country where death penalty had been abolished it was self-defeating to condemn to death even the most hated enemies of the people. A popular army that was not a symbol of justice, equality, liberty and security could not win popular support in the struggle against a dehumanized tyranny. Hence, he was opposed to the Tupamaros "prisons of the people", opposed to indiscriminate execution of hostages and to the use of violence against subordinates. There seemed a little point in defeating the

despotism only to erect another in its place.

6. Delegated commands: Guillen was opposed to the cult of leadership and he complained about its ideological shortcomings. In a guerrilla organization, the leaders emerged in actual revolutionary struggles, elected because of their capacity, responsibility, combativeness, initiative, political understanding and deeds rather than words. The command, too was to be delegated. The responsibility of subordinates was to discuss in advance each operation and to make recommendations etc. But once the discussion was over, the supreme command assumed responsibility for the outcome of an engagement. If it made a mistake in its judgement, resulting in a defeat, it would have to resign.
7. Strategies, tactics and politics: If the tactics adopted were successful but the corresponding strategy and politics mistaken,

the guerrillas could not win. Had a succession of tactical victories encouraged a strategical objective that was impossible to attain, their great victory could culminate in an even greater strategical defeat.

Another advocate of this urban guerrilla warfare strategy; that is, a strategy based on the recognition of the fact that the political - military - economic center of power lay in the great conurbation, that it could and should be attacked there, not from the periphery; was Carlos Marighella who came close to playing role of a revolutionary theorist of a real intellectual stature. His main theoretical work is the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. Radical by orientation, Marighella spurned, bourgeois ideology and electoral illusions of the Brazilian and Communist Party and fell into an opposite trap of an unreasoning faith in the efficacy of violence.⁹ Although he did not favour tactics advocated by Debray, he did agree that guerrilla action in itself, detached from a popular movement

9. Robert Moss, Urban Guerrilla (London, :1972), p.195.

and unrelated to the social situation in the country, could create the conditions for revolution. Hence his writings failed to touch upon political goals, and political agitations.

Marighella gave a chilling technical definition of the urban guerrilla. He wrote that, "the urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic condition in which he acts and survives is to shoot"¹⁰. For him the terrorist was above all, a man with a gun, i.e., a light automatic rifle - easy to carry and manufacture as well.

Marighella's approach was one of provocation, compelling the enemy to "transform the political situation into a military one." Echoing Guevara, he assumed that in the process, the government would alienate large sections of the population, particularly the intelligentsia

10 ibid.

and the clergy. Foreign powers would have to be called for help and this would add to the popularity of the insurgents' struggle, further triggering an internal crisis in the regime. But Unlike the Cuban revolutionaries the fundamental objective for Marighella was to shake the basis upon which the system rested, where the economic political and military power was concentrated in the cities.

In Marighella's scheme, a great freedom of action was left to the small units. They were to decide whether to launch an attack, without the reference of the high command. Expressing views similar to Guillen', Marighella wrote that through delegated command these were perfectly entitled not just to assassinate commanders of security forces but also low ranking "agents".

The struggle would proceed on three fronts: the guerrilla front, the mass front, and support network. Ideally, all these fronts ought to be equally effective, but Marighella realized

that the revolutionary movement was bound to develop unevenly. So he insisted that the constantly expanding guerrilla front carry out a scorched earth policy to create alarm among the oppressive rulers

In the revolutionary organisation only missions and operations were to be prized, not rank and position. Only those prepared to participate actively in the struggle and bear the sacrifices had the right to be leaders. No complex change of command, no political commissars or supervisors were to be set up. Strategic command and regional coordination groups would direct the military organisation. The regional command in Marighella's scheme just like in Guillen's was not to be allowed permanent contact with the mobile units. No one was to know everything and everybody. Like many other guerrilla leaders before him, Marighella pressed the importance of training. He underlined the personal qualities needed for an urban guerrilla, for example, initiative, unlimited patience and fortitude in

adversity.

The basic unit in the 'urban guerrilla army' was "the firing group", consisting of four to five people led by the best shot amongst them. A "firing team" constituted two such group operating separately, though this could lead to contradictory techniques. Motorization was absolutely essential in the logistics of urban terrorism.

The great advantages for the urban guerrilla were: surprise in attack, better knowledge of terrain, greater mobility and speed and a better information network. Though Marighella, according to Moss,¹¹ conceded that the urban guerrilla was at a clear disadvantage in many ways, the only hope of success was to keep up a constant attack, as defensive action meant death. Basic tactics always employed the 'hit and run' principle to attack and to get away. Attacks

11. *ibid* p.196

were to be launched from all directions, in an endless series of unforeseeable operation, thereby preventing the enemy from concentrating his apparatus of repression. Contact and decisive battles always had to be avoided. Amongst other techniques of guerrilla warfare, like ambushes, occupations of schools, factories, radio stations, the most popular form of action was bank raids. "We have made them a kind of entrance exam for apprenticeship in the technique of revolutionary war,"¹² noted Marighella.

The list of revolutionary assignments according to Marighella included tasks like defending popular demonstrations, liberating prisoners, seizing weapons from army barracks, executing agents of the government, kidnapping policemen, keeping in mind that public opinion favours such action. Transport could be sabotaged, oil pipelines cut, food stocks systematically depleted. Spreading baseless rumors was a part of

12. Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual", For the Liberation of Brazil (London, 1971), p. 81.

their job and so was handing over information to foreign embassies, the United Nations, human rights committees and other such bodies. Bombs could be used, disregarding the fact that they destroyed human life.

So, the fundamental objective was to pose a threat to the urban industrial triangle so that security forces be placed on the defensive and tied up in penny packets in their attempt to track down a thoroughly fragmented organisation and to stand guard over the multitude of targets that the modern city presented to terrorists determined to overthrow the system. Other tactical goals were: Demoralising the forces of order, by selective terrorism and by demonstrating their incapacity to track the guerrillas down.

Planning to set an example that would win new recruits and persuade the people that the government was vulnerable to attack and unable even to protect its friends.

For Marighella, urban terrorism was only one element in a broader strategy. He outlined three phases for revolutionary warfare in Brazil—starting with the formation of cadres and the collection of supplies, passing through the stage of guerrilla operations and culminating with a war of movement in which the countryside would encircle the towns.

According to Walter Laqueur,¹³ towards the end of his treatise, Marighella reflected on the political outcome of urban guerrilla war too. He wrote that the people would blame the government and not the terrorists for the various calamities that befell them. He hoped that in the chaos brought by the urban guerrillas war, democratic institutions including legislatures elections and political parties would be discredited. The future society would be built by those who participated in the struggle, an armed alliance of workers, peasants and students with

13. Laqueur, n.6, p.349.

the support of the clergy. The latter's support was of great importance keeping in view the problem of communication with the mass of the people.

But, writes Robert Moss,¹⁴ the cards did not always fall Marighella's way. On the one hand, increased repression failed to arouse a broad based militant opposition to the regime. It alienated liberal opinion and important sectors of the middle class too. On the one hand, it also provided the regime with the pretext for sweeping curbs on personal liberties and limited the options for a reformist opposition without increasing the chances of a revolution from below. In theory, urban terror was only one element in a broader revolutionary strategy but, in the view of Laqueur,¹⁵ Marighella was not prepared to wait in vain for the rural guerrilla 'foci' to emerge. So great was his preoccupation with his spectacular

14. Moss, n.11 p.209

15. Laqueur, n.6, pp.349-350

exploits in the towns that he had no time left to promote insurgency in the countryside.

Nevertheless Marighella's fanatical dedication to the cause, and the burning fervour pervading all his writings attracted many young followers willing to engage in suicidal operations.

At the initial stages, urban guerrilla warfare proved to be an astounding success. The slums of the big cities and even the upper class residential areas provided far better cover for operations than the countryside. It was easier to get money and weapons in the city than in the countryside, and to collect information about the targets for attack. Urban guerrilla warfare was not limited to Latin America alone, it reached far beyond to the United States, Canada and even to some European countries. If the old style guerrilla tactics had been applicable only to backward countries, the new urban guerrilla warfare seemed to offer immense possibilities to

almost ~~with~~ every country in the world, including the most developed ones. Nevertheless the startling success of the first years were again followed by grave setbacks and in some cases, by total collapse. Unable at first to cope with this new danger, the forces of order were learning quickly.

Though urban guerrillas would get more publicity in a day than rural ones in year, as far as media were concerned, their exploits were far more newsworthy, but with repetition, interest inevitably diminished. They had to think of new sensational and even bizzare exploits, yet there was a limit to human imagination, and in any case publicity could not in the long run replace an overall policy. It was one thing to appear as the spearhead of a national movement against a hated foreigner; it was another and an infinitely more difficult task to compete with other native political parties in the struggle for power.

Marighella himself attempted to paralyse

Brazil by concentrating attacks in the three main cities of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte, before his death in 1969. Largely devoid of any wider political strategy and, like many other urban guerrilla groups that emerged in the late sixties and early seventies, Marighella's Ascao Libertadora Nacional (A.L.N) movement soon degenerated into unbridled violence, regardless of the apparent likelihood of popular support.

As a result, a degree of popular welcome was given at least at the initial stages to the counter terrorist policies adopted in many Latin American states in the face of the challenge of urban guerrilla warfare. Consequently, democracy was sacrificed and institutionalized counter-terror by the state ensured that few, if any, of the urban guerrillas survived to exploit the situation they had brought about.

The shift from rural guerrilla warfare to operations in the city was by no means limited to Latin America. There had been many guerrilla

wars taking place in West Asia and North Africa in the post-war period from Algeria to Kurdistan, from Southern Sudan to Dhofar in Southern Arabia. But only the Palestinians in their struggle against the state of Israel developed a more or less coherent strategic doctrine the - Fatah doctrine.

Since it was skeptical of the Arab government's adherence to conventional warfare, this strategy favoured violence for its therapeutic effect, inculcating courage, purifying the individual, and forging a nation.¹⁶ The insurrection was to be prepared from outside the borders of the state. Palestinian Arab doctrine frequently referred to the formation of "a revolutionary vanguard," to "revolution explosion," to various stages in the struggle for liberation. It envisaged a number of small battles to wear down the Israeli army. The army would constantly, have to deploy strong forces against

16. Y. Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy (London 1968) p.14

the fedayeen. The financial burden would become intolerable, foreign investment would cease, immigration would be discouraged, and there would be growing political polarization within Israel. The rise in casualties would create a climate of confusion and fear, "the grievance community" would widen and eventually the Israelis would be crushed by it.¹⁷

Though the Palestinian 'Fatah' doctrine was inspired by the urban experience, it failed to create a united and independent national movement of Arab states. One major success that this doctrine could claim was that it simultaneously returned to the Palestinians their sense of national identity and showed the world that the Palestinian question lay at the core of the Arab Israeli conflict.¹⁸

17. Hisham Sharabi, Palestine Guerrilla: Their Credibility and Effectiveness (Beruit 1970) p.36

18. G. Chailand, ed., Guerrilla Strategies (California, 1992), p.25.

On the whole, once again the process of urban guerrilla warfare, was difficult to put into effect. Targets in the cities may have been easier to find and initially to hit but they elicited the sort of response that, as Castro had predicted in the early sixties, the city in many cases became the 'graveyard of the revolutionaries' and resources. It was another blind alley.¹⁹

The deep sense of frustration which resulted must be seen as one of the root causes of the spread of terrorism as an alternative technique. In the late sixties, the rural guerrilla gave way to urban terrorism in many parts of the world. In most cases in Latin America and in West Asia terrorism has ^{be}come a substitute for classical guerrilla operations. In the industrialized countries, such as the United States, Canada, Germany and Italy, it has been a futile attempt to destabilize the state and sensitise public opinion, to some real or assumed oppression.

19. John Pimlott, ed., n.3 p.189

Terrorism was by no means a novel development. It could be detected in the distant past. Urban terrorism, as such had been a tactic of political persuasion for centuries and found a place in most guerrilla writings. According to Ian Beckett,²⁰ the zealot sect of the sicarii active in Palestine in the first century A.D. and the Muslim Assassins sect of the eleventh-thirteenth centuries were clearly highly organized terrorist group. In the nineteenth century Johannes Most very vehemently provided an elaborate strategy for conducting terrorism through his emphasis on the systematic use of terror by a small group of activists utilizing the most modern technology available in the pursuit of 'propaganda of the deed'.

Bakunin, a Russian anarchist, also advocated terrorist violence perpetuated by secret revolutionary cells. His theory too was of

20. Ian Beckett, "Guerrilla Warfare and COIN" in McInnes and Sheffield, eds., Warfare in the Twentieth Century (London, 1988) P.205

"propaganda by action," as the only way to revolutionise the masses. He glorified the 'lumpenproletariat' and bandits as the social elements most likely to overthrow the existing order. Apart from these references, leaders of urban terrorist groups attempted to provide with a new doctrine, though most were ready to furnish personal accounts of impressions and explanations, And inspite of the fact that what [terrorism] was only a last resort, has now systematically been adopted as a means of expression today.

Terrorism was not central to either Leninist or Maoist thought. It was also rejected by the Guevara. However, Debray had unreasoning faith in the efficacy of violence and a contempt for all the normal forms of political agitation.

During the past decade became more frequent than rural guerrilla warfare as a central feature of revolution partly because in the late sixties and seventies other alternatives had failed. Terrorism - the attempt to affect

people's attitudes, actions and allegiance through the imposition of deep fear in their minds - was a relatively easy option, for once a terrorist made the necessary moral adjustment he enjoyed a sense of freedom particularly in the liberal democracies of the West, that allowed him to perpetrate acts that would normally be constrained by the limits of civilized behaviour.²¹

The planting of bombs in public places, hijacking of aircraft or trains, the kidnapping and murdering of selected victims were techniques that required little preparation and did not depend for success upon the sort of sophisticated political infrastructures advocated by Mao.²²

In many respects, the distinction made between the urban guerrilla and urban terrorism appears to be that of terminology only since the

21. John Pimlott, n.3, pp.189-190.

22. *ibid.* p.190

methods are strikingly similar. But whereas guerrilla operations are mainly directed against the armed forces of the enemy and security services, as well as installations of strategic importance, modern urban terror is less discriminate in the choice of targets. Operations such as bank robberies, hijackings, kidnappings and, of course, assassinations, all are expected to create a general climate of insecurity.²³ Urban terrorism is far more vulnerable than rural guerrillas under torture and other counter-terror measures and once a link of the organizational chain is broken they suffer irreparable losses. Such measures evoke much protest and do not provide new recruits. Consequently, the terrorists become more and more isolated.

In a very real sense terrorism has become a threat, designed to present society with

23. Laqueur, 1.6 p.403

such shocking and seemingly irrational acts that it will be forced to take notice, blaming the government for allowing them to occur and gradually preparing the way for a climate of collapse out of which the new society of revolutionaries will eventually emerge.

Numerous such groups came up and cultivated links with each other. So urban terrorism acquired an international character. The links between all three trances of terrorism - the revolutionaries of Latin America, the nationalists like the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P) I.R.A. and the New Left represented by group, such as Baaden Meinhoff Red Army, served to increase their impact although not necessarily their effectiveness. Terrorism even came to be sponsored by states like Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria. Cuba too continued to contribute to various Latin-American terrorist groups even though in principle it was in favour of rural guerrillas. Terrorism soon came to

resemble the working of a multinational corporation. An operation would be planned in West Germany by Palestine Arabs, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan with weapons acquired in Italy but manufactured in Japan supplied by an Algerian diplomat and financed by Libyan money.²⁴

With the improvement and greater accessibility of modern technology, the potential for destruction for small groups became much larger. As technical progress continued, the international community became more vulnerable to destruction. A single individual could spread alarm and confusion even by means of a telephone call about a bomb that had allegedly been placed in some vital place.

This new power acquired by a few, however, had its limits. Urban terrorism had a

24. D.V. Segri and J.M. Adler, "The Ecology of Terrorism," Survival, (London,) July-August 1973, p.8-0

limited interest in political philosophy. The deed was more important than the thought and too many terrorist groups raised indiscriminate violence itself to a strategy without any wider political aims. As a result it could paralyse the state apparatus but could not take over. Urban terrorism could undermine a weak government or even act as a catalyst of general insurgency, but it was not an instrument for seizure of power, unlike urban guerrilla warfare.²⁵

Urban terrorism faced its practitioners with an insoluble dilemma. To reduce the risk of discovery, they had to be few in number. And the political impact of a small anonymous group was bound to be insignificant. They were not serious contenders for power. Once the foreign enemy withdrew, they dropped out of the picture. Since they were few they could not normally establish a liberated zone. Their operations did catch

25. Laqueur, n.6 pp.403-404.

headlines but they could not conduct mass propaganda nor build up a political organisation. Urban terrorism was far more vulnerable than rural guerrillas. Once the link of the organizational chain was broken they suffered irreparable losses.

So despite the fact that modern society, too, has become more vulnerable than in the past, to attacks and disruptions of this kind of terrorism, it remains politically ineffective except when carried out in the framework of an overall strategy of a political movement, usually sectarian or separatist in character, with an existing mass base, or as the military wing of a political movement. In the latter case there was always the potential of conflict between the military and the political leadership of the movement. Terrorism stands justified when the discontented groups meet cynicism or indifference and when legitimate channels of political pressure are closed to them. It has worked in a narrow sense of achieving its declared objectives and in several other cases, it held the group together or

sustained its pride and dignity or kept its demands on the political agenda. But it loses any justification so long as the established authority is willing to negotiate and political processes are open and available. It is not only irrational but becomes an unacceptable form of political blackmail. "it arouses far stronger passions, though feeling even shallower. Than other forms of crime."²⁶

COUNTER INSURGENCY THEORIES

Insurgency in its various forms and international terrorism have posed serious threats to many governments the world over. Since 1945 few have fought conventional wars but all armies have , at one time or another, waged campaigns against guerrillas and terrorists.²⁷

The spread of guerrilla warfare after 1945 and the many setbacks suffered by western

26. Bhikhu Parekh, The Times of India (New Delhi), 26 May 1991

27. Beckett, n.22, p.206.

armies and local government forces against insurgents caused much heart searching among political leaders and military commanders. It precipitated the emergence of new doctrines of counter-guerrilla warfare. The expansion of colonial empires in the nineteenth century provided these doctrines with adequate experience, acquired through colonial expansion. But due to the easy victories over the native adversaries and stress on its conventional roles not much coherent doctrine emerged.

The British colonial experience of "Imperial policing", except the Irish Campaign of 1919-21, did not refer to the emergence of the political dimensions to guerrilla warfare. The French planned a slow expansion of French administration with simultaneous military presence, along with pacification engulfing the population like an oil slick. It proved to be a successful policy for the French who made use of

it in 1946 and 1954, during the Indo - China campaign before 1945. Before 1945, the United States Marine Corps too - took serious account of counter - insurgency doctrine but with exception of French none of the armed forces were prepared to deal with the kind of guerrilla warfare as it emerged after 1945. The the 'oil slick' policy of the French could not hold longer against the onslaught of maoist -style tactics. In the post 1945 era the theorists undertook to studying maoist strategy and tactics comprehensively and based on this was the counter-insurgency response, of theorists like Sir Robert Thompson, Brigadier Frank Kitson, John Pustay, John J. McCuen

John McCuen in particular developed a theory of counter-revolution. He identified five strategic principles equally applicable to the revolutionary and counter revolutionary forces. These were: preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy, establishing strategic bases, mobilising the masses seeking outside support, and

unifying the effort.²⁸

Much of the doctrine that emerged, was based on early Maoist insurgency as experienced by the United States in the Philippines, the French in Indo-China and the most important experience of The British in Malaya.

Based on this experience, Robert Thompson developed his five principles of counter insurgency.²⁹ According to him the first requirement was that the government should have a clear political aim to defeat insurgency. Secondly, the government and security forces should always act within the law. Thirdly, there should be an overall plan according to which the responsibilities of all sections agencies involved in counter insurgency should be defined and all... of administration, military and police properly co-ordinated. Fourthly, priority should be given to the defeat of political subversion rather than

28. J.J McCuen, The Art of Counter-revolutionary War (London, 1966) pp.50-73

29. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London , 1966), pp.50-58.

to that of the guerrillas in the field. And finally, the government should ensure that its own base areas were secure before mounting military campaigns. So in operational terms, Thompson envisaged four stages, those of clearing an area of insurgent activity, holding it for the government, winning its inhabitants, then moving on to another area. These four principles were practical in nature, reflecting the acceptance of insurgency as requiring an adequate political and military response on the part of the security forces.

The emerging pattern in the British counter-insurgency comprised of unity and coordination of efforts at all levels, with the emphasis firmly upon the political aspects as the authorities engaged in a competition with the insurgents. The contribution of the military would be in the context of civil political control and the primacy of the police,

while there would be a retention of the rule of law and the application of minimum force and minimum numbers.

Inspite the fact that this pattern has not be universally successful or applicable, it has been more consistently successful than most other counter-insurgency doctrines. The same cannot be said for querre revolutionnaire.

As a result of the French defeat in Indo-China, the theorists like Lacheroy and Trinquier started to assume that the defeat was due to both a global communist conspiracy and also to the efforts of dedicated revolutionaries who utilized a new cocktail of military and psychological methods. George Bonnet simplified this to an equation of partisan (guerrilla) warfare + psychological warfare = revolutionary warfare.³⁰ Aiming at the vulnerability detected at

30. -G.Bonnet, Cited in Sheffield and McInnes, eds., Warfare in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1988), p.208.

the initial stages of the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, French theorists assembled a counter-revolutionary doctrine. It was envisaged that the insurgent would be isolated from the population through such methods as resettlement and erection of physical barriers to infiltration accompanied by military action against insurgents in the field, and a determined psychological warfare campaign. It also required an ideological strength of purpose equal to that of the insurgent and an absolute commitment by the authorities to the support of army in its campaign. Gallieni and Lyautey further advocated pacification with political implications.³¹ They even suggested that the army might be required to regenerate French society itself - a combination of political and military action, well established in tache-d'huile. However guerre revolutionary posed a far greater challenge, to the authorities due to the army's implied involvement in the political sphere through psychological action.

31. Beckett, n.22,p.209

The counter-insurgency doctrines of other armed forces, since 1945, have not been codified to the same extent but the principles outlined by Thompson and McCuen have remained central to the continuing debate on appropriate response to insurgency.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

Guerrilla wars have been fought throughout history by peoples against invading or occupying armies, by regular soldiers operating in the enemy's rear, by peasants rising against landlords, by bandits both 'social' and asocial. The tactics of guerrilla warfare are not very complicated and are more or less the same, with slight variations, since times immemorial. Typical guerrilla operations include harassment of the enemy, evasion of decisive battles, cutting lines of communication and carrying out surprise attacks. Guerrilla tactics are based on common sense and imagination; they vary from country to country, are affected by geographical conditions by social and political processes, and also change as a result of technological innovation.¹

1. Laqueur, Guerrilla (London, 1977), p.VI - VII.

(According to a widespread belief, guerrilla warfare is a new way of conducting unconventional war, discovered by Mao in the Yen-an period, later successfully applied to other parts of the world by left-wing revolutionary movements. To others, T.E. Lawrence was the great pioneer of modern guerrilla warfare and to still others guerrilla warfare developed with the Spanish resistance against Napoleon.)

In actual fact guerrilla warfare has not only been practiced since times immemorial, its doctrine too is by no means of a recent date. As a tactical method the earliest documented reference is found in the Hittite Anastas Papyrus dating from fifteenth century B.C. Similarly, the guerrilla tactics, portrayed in Mao Tse-tung's work, On Protracted War, first published in 1937 are not any different from those described by a Chinese theorist Sun Tzu in his work The Art of War, written sometime in the fifth century. Indian epics, too are not short of references to guerrilla warfare. Much of the Roman history is a

catalogue of irregular warfare in North Africa, Spain, Britain, Germany and Gaul. The Middle Ages come with still further examples including wars of the Welsh against the English so vividly described in the work of a twelfth century scholar, Giraldus Cambrensis, the harassing raids of Constables of France against the English in the closing stages of The Hundred Years Wars; or the numerous peasant uprisings of Central and Eastern Europe.

By and large, such irregular warfare was a natural response of primitive peoples faced with a more sophisticated militarily stronger opponent, or a resort of the weak against the strong, independent of regular military campaign.

By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries however, it was felt that guerrilla warfare might play a role in wider conventional conflicts. Major military theorists - Jomini and Marshal de-Saxe devoted at least a passing reference to irregular warfare. European armies had started to experiment with irregular troops

and light infantry and soon in the American War of Independence, this aspect was proved useful. Both sides made use of partisans in support of conventional operations.

The tactics utilized by partisans and light infantry in America spawned some of the first modern texts to deal specifically with opportunities for irregular warfare. Thus two Hessians, Johann Von Ewald and Andreas Emmerich published works in 1785 and 1789 respectively along with the Frenchmen, Grandimason and de Jeney (1759). What marked the writings of these theorists before 1810 was that they did not accord an independent role to the irregular units and were exclusively concerned with the operations of professional soldiers acting in close cooperation with the main body of the army. Eighteenth century military thinkers were very much preoccupied with surprise attacks, ambushes, and other operations which had to be carried out by relatively small units. A great many strategies were thus listed,

distilling some lessons of irregular warfare in the New World.²

European experience at the close of the eighteenth century, following The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars together with national uprisings in Spain and Tyrol and successes of Russian irregulars in harassing the French armies in 1812, brought further contributions to the theory of irregular warfare. Among those who devoted volumes specifically to irregular warfare were the Prussians George Wilhelm von Valentini, Carl von Decker (1821), The Frenchman, Le Miere de Corvey (1823), The Russian, Denis Davidov (1841), and the Polish theorists, Chrzanowski (1835) and Stolzman (1844), their writings covered all problems that were to preoccupy twentieth century writers on guerrilla warfare, for example, the importance of base and sanctuaries and the duration of the war. Even the

2. Laqueur, no.1, p.101. &
Pimlott, Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1985), pp.8,15

relationship between the guerrilla forces and political movement supporting it was discussed in the writings of Carlos Blanco and Mazzini. But most these precursors fell into oblivion. The twentieth century theorists Mao, Giap, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Debray, discovered their strategy quite independently, based on their own experiences, instinct and traditions of guerrilla war.³

As Erick Hobsbawm has noted, there is nothing in the purely military pages of Mao, Giap or Che Guevara which a traditional guerrilla or band leader would regard as other than simple common sense.⁴ The novelty of twentieth century guerrilla warfare lay in the political field rather than the military one.

It is commonly believed that revolutionary guerrilla was evolved out of

3. Laqueur, no.1, p.384.

4. E.J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries, London, 1973, p.165.

Marxist-Leninist modes of political behaviour and organizational principles on one the hand and out of the exigences of anti -western revolt in predominantly agrarian societies on the other.⁵ Though the character of guerrilla warfare has changed greatly over the ages, partly due to technological developments and partly as a result of changing political and social conditions, the guerrilla wars were not entirely political or parochial. Too much importance has been attributed to Leninist doctrine in the guerrilla context, too little to the nationalist - populist component, in motivation and ideology of these movements. Many twentieth century guerrilla wars from the Mau Mau to the IRA, owe little to the Marxist - Leninist thought. Neither the Algerians in 1954, nor the Cubans in 1958 were influenced by this doctrine and even in China and Vietnam guerrilla warfare evolved more contrary to classical Marxism than in keeping with its basic principles. The impact of Marxism - Leninism among

5. G.Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1974), p.16.

contemporary guerrilla movements has been prominent with regard to the role of the political party in mobilizing the masses, the function of propaganda in the struggle, and the emphasis placed on organization. To the traditional motives for popular action, patriotism and self-interest, communism joined an aggressive international political theory incorporating a view of history that claimed inevitable success for its policies. This combination provided popular discontent the world over with an effective and flexible ideological framework for violent action.

In the long run, however, it was not the obedience to an abstract ideological doctrine but the practical understanding of the relations between war and politics that payed off. This happened to be precisely the main lesson derived from the failure of the foco theory of guerrilla warfare.

Designed in most cases to ensure the

development of guerrilla operations regardless of the level of preparation, it seemed to work in Cuba between 1956 and 1959. But this approach of totally doing away with the safe bases concept once the guerrillas survived government's attack proved to be a failure for other campaigns. Che Guevara went a step further arguing that revolutionary cadre, acting as focus for all the discontent of society, could actually create a revolutionary cadre even where it did not exist before. Needless to say, the theory proved a failure throughout Latin America.

Impelled by this failure and changing conditions of the society search was on for a new formula, which was to be that of urban warfare. However the aim remained that of Mao: the usurpation of political power through gradual wearing down of security forces and government support. Once again the process was difficult to put into practice since by now it bore little resemblance to the original Maoist pattern. The kind of response the state came out with

rendered the city in many cases, a graveyard for the guerrillas. And urban guerrilla warfare degenerated into terrorism that presented itself as an alternative technique, soon to become an international phenomenon.

So, although the application of guerrilla technique has changed since the middle of the twentieth century, the fundamental role of the guerrilla has still remained the same. Besides, although guerrilla warfare has largely been discredited, due to failure in the rural areas, then in the cities and now due its appearance in the form of terrorism, it should not mean that guerrillas warfare is going to wither away.

Guerrillas are still around. There may be a change in the causes of their emergence, the demands on the methods employed, but the basic principles of guerrilla remain attractive especially to a minority within a state which decides to confront the conventional strengths of

established military forces . Perhaps that is why guerrilla groups like the I.R.A. in Northern Ireland and in West Asia, the ones in which the desire for national self - determination is strong, have survived. To these groups, guerrilla techniques are of second nature. Though such groups have adopted the tactics of terrorism to gain instant public recognition and even have foreign links, they are fighting a low level military response to alien rule, designed to wear down resolve rather than defeat the enemy in an open battle. Since there does not exist any universally applicable guerrilla warfare doctrine, these groups have adopted the best techniques experimented with elsewhere: an amalgamation of Maoist strategy, Cuban strategy or urban strategy. This may be the trend in future.

A P P E N D I X

APPENDIX

Chronology of Notable Guerrilla Wars

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Insurgents</i> | <i>Incumbents</i> | <i>Place</i> | <i>Leaders</i> |
|-------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 516BC. | Scythians | Persians | Scythia | |
| 389-338 | Volsci | Romans | n. Italy | |
| 195-138 | Celubertians | Romans | Spain | |
| 166-160 | Jews | Syrians | Israel | Judas and Jonathan Maccabeus |
| 154-138 | Lusitanians | Romans | Spain | Viriathus |
| 80-72 | Celubertians | | | |
| | Lusitanians | Romans | Spain | Sertorius |
| 54 | Britons | Romans | England | Cassivellaunus |
| 54-51 | Gauls | Romans | France | Vercingetorix, Commius |
| 15-16AD | Chatti | Romans | Germany | Arminius |
| 17-24 | Numidians | Romans | Africa | Tacfarinas |
| 36 | Cietae | Romans | Anatolia | |
| 43 | Britons | Romans | England Wales | Caractacus |
| 355-57 | Alamanni | Romans | France | |
| 378 | Visigoths | Romans | Italy | |
| 900-950 | Magyars | Raids throughout Europe | | |
| 1070 | Saxons | Holy Roman Empire | Saxony | Otto of Nordheim |
| 1070 | Anglo-Saxons | Normans | The Fens | Hereward the Wake |
| 1094-5 | | | | |
| 1114 | Welsh | English | Snowdonia | Gruffydd ap Cynan |
| 1143 | English rebels | Normans | The Fens | Mandeville, Earl of Essex |
| 1282 | Welsh | English | Snowdonia | Llewelyn ap Gruffydd |
| 1287-92 | Welsh | English | Snowdonia | Rhys ap Maredudd |
| 1296-1328 | Scots | English | Scotland | William Wallace, Robert Bruce |
| 1363-84 | Tuchins | English | Auvergne | |
| 1418-50 | French | English | Normandy Maine | Ambroise de Loré |
| 1550 | Estonians | Russians | | |
| 1576-1601 | Muslims | Knights of the Teutonic Order | Reval | Ivo Schenkenberg |
| 1597-1694 | African slaves | Moghuls | Mewar | Maharana Partap |
| 1604-5 | Hungarians | Portuguese | Brazil | |
| 1627-80 | Marathas | Turks, Austrians | Slovakia | Stephen Boeskar |
| 1655-83 | African slaves | | | Shiva Ji |
| 1686-1708 | Javanese | English | Jamaica | Juan Bolas |
| 1690-1720 | African slaves | Dutch | Java | Surapati |
| 1703-11 | Camisards | English | Jamaica | Cudjoe |
| 1716-68 | Sikhs | French | Cevennes | |
| 1740-43 | Hungarians | Persians | Punjab | |
| | | Prussians | | |
| 1772 | Caribs | French | Bohemia | |
| 1773-74 | Bulgarians | English | St Vincent | |
| 1780-83 | Americans | Turks | Bulgaria | |
| | | English | Carolinas | Francis Marion |
| 1791-97 | African slaves | French | Haiti | Thomas Sumter Loussaint L'Ouverture |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Insurgents</i> | <i>Incumbents</i> | <i>Place</i> | <i>Leaders</i> |
|-------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| 1793 | French Royalists | French Republicans | Vendée | Charette Henri de la Rochefoucauld Fabrizio Ruffo |
| 1799 | Italians | French | Naples | |
| 1806-10 | Italians | French | Calabria | |
| 1808-13 | Spanish | French | Spain | Espoz y Mina |
| 1809 | Austrians | French | Tyrol | Andreas Hofer |
| 1809-16 | Peruvians | Spanish | n. Peru | Miguel Lanza |
| 1810-21 | Mexicans | Spanish | Mexico | Vincente Guerrero |
| 1812-13 | Russians | French | Russia | |
| 1817-28 | Uruguayans | Portugese Argentiniens | Uruguay | Jose Artigas Fructuoso Rivera |
| 1821-9 | Greeks | Turks | Greece | |
| 1825 | Javanese | Dutch | Java | |
| 1832-47 | Arabs | French | Algeria | Abd el Kader |
| 1833-39 | Carlists | Spanish | Spain | Lomas Zumalacarregui |
| 1835-42 | Seminoles | Americans | Florida | Osecola |
| 1836-59 | Murids | Russians | Caucasus | Imam Shamvl |
| 1846-49 | Carlists | Spanish | Catalonia | |
| 1847-1900 | Mayas | Mexicans | Yucatan | |
| 1849-55 | Hungarians | Austrians | Hungary | Sandor Rosza |
| 1853-68 | Nien | Manchus | n. China | Chang Lo Hsing |
| 1855-72 | Miao | Manchus | Kweichow | Chiang Hsu-mei |
| 1858-61 | Liberals | Clericals | Mexico | Benito Juarez |
| 1860-66 | Neapolitans | Piedmontese | Naples | Carmine Donatelli |
| 1860-86 | Apaches | Americans Mexicans | Arizona n. Mexico | Cochise Geronimo |
| 1861-65 | Confederates | Union | Missouri Kansas Virginia | William Clarke Quantrill John S. Mosby |
| 1863 | Poles | Russians | Poland | |
| 1863-67 | Mexicans | French | Mexico | Porfirio Diaz Benito Juarez |
| 1866-69 | Cretans | Turks | Crete | |
| 1868-78 | Cubans | Spanish | Cuba | Antomo Maceo Maximo Gomez |
| 1870-71 | Franc-tireurs | Prussians | France | |
| 1878-81 | Bosnian Moslems | Austrians | Bosnia- Herzegovinia | |
| 1880-98 | Vietnamese | French | Annam Tonking | Thon That Thuyet Nguyen Thien Thuat |
| 1882-98 | Malinke | French | w. Sudan | Samori Toure |
| 1885-86 | Cambodians | French | Cambodia | Si Votha |
| 1886-87 | Sarrakole | French | Senegal Gambia | Mahmadou Lamine |
| 1886-98 | Kachins, Chins | British | n. Burma | |
| 1887-95 | Yaos | British | Malawi | Mlozi |
| 1894-95 | Red Beards | Russians | Manchuria | |
| 1894-1911 | Senussi | French | Libya | |
| 1896-97 | Brazilian Indians | Brazilians | Canudos | |
| 1896-1908 | IMRO | Greeks, Turks Bulgarians | Macedonia | Gotze Delchev Damian Gruev |
| 1897-1902 | Filipinos | Spanish Americans | Philippines | Emilio Aguinaldo |
| 1897-98 | Pathans | British | N.W. Frontier | |

| Date | Insurgents | Incumbents | Place | Leaders |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| 1898 1900-02 | Temne Boers | British British | Sierra Leone S. Africa | Louis Botha C. de Wet |
| 1904-7 1910-20 | Nama | Germans Mexican Revolution | Tanganyika Mexico | Jacob Morenga Emiliano Zapata Pancho Villa |
| 1910-34 1914-18 | Arabs, Berbers Germans | French, Spanish British | Morocco Tanganyika | Abd-el Krim von Lettow Vorbeck |
| 1916-18 1916-21 | Arabs IRA | Turks British | Arabia Ireland | T. E. Lawrence Michael Collins Tom Barry |
| 1918-21 1919-34 | Ukrainians IMRO | Bolsheviks Greeks, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians | Ukraine Macedonia | Nestor Mahkno Todor Alexandroff Ivan Michailoff |
| 1922-32 1926-49 | Arabs Chinese Communists | Italians Chinese Nationalists, Japanese | Cyrenaica China | Omar Mukhtar Mao Tse tung, Lin Piao |
| 1927-33 1935-41 1941 | Nicaraguans Ethiopians Partisans, Cetniks | Americans Italians Germans, Italians | Nicaragua Ethiopia Yugoslavia | Augusto Sandino Orde Wingate Josip Tito |
| 1945-49 1946-47 | Indonesians Jews | Dutch British, Arabs | Indonesia Palestine | |
| 1946-49 1946-54 1946-54 1948-60 1949 | Greek Communists Hukbalahaps Viet-minh Malayan Communists Indian Communists | Greeks, British Filipino Govt French British Indian Govt | Greece Philippines Vietnam Malaya Telingana | Luis Taruc Vo Nguyen Giap Chin Peng |
| 1951-55 1954-59 1954-62 1956-59 | Mau-Mau EOKA FLN | British British French | Kenya Cyprus Algeria | George Givras |
| 1958-72 | NLF (Viet Cong) North Vietnamese | Cuban Civil War S. Vietnamese Govt Americans | Cuba South Vietnam | Fidel Castro Ernesto Guevara |
| 1960-62 1965-74 1961-? | Pathet Lao MPLA | Laotian Govt | Laos Angola | |
| 1963-? | PAIGC | Portugese | Guine | |
| 1964-? | FRELIMO | | Mozambique | Eduardo Mondlane |
| 1961-? | Kurds | Iraqi Govt | North Iraq | Mustafa al-Barzani |
| 1962-? | Eritreans | Ethiopian Govt | Eritrea | |
| 1963-67 | Indonesians | Malaysians British | Borneo Sarawak | |
| 1965-? | Arabs (PFLOAG) | British | Dhofar Oman | |
| 1967 | FLOSY, NLF | British | Aden | |
| 1967-? | El Fatah | Israelis | Palestine | |
| 1969-? | Naxaltes | Indian Govt | Bengal | |
| 1970-? | Cambodian Communists North Vietnamese | Cambodian Govt | Cambodia | Samphan Khieu |

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