

**UNITED NATIONS
AND
THE CONFLICT SITUATION IN CYPRUS, 1974-84**

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C O N T E N T S

	<u>Pages</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
INTRODUCTION	i - iii
CHAPTER I DEVELOPMENTS UP TO 1974: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	1 - 24
CHAPTER II TURKISH INTERVENTION IN 1974 AND THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE	25 - 52
CHAPTER III 1983 UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE	53 - 63
CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION	64 - 69
BIBLIOGRAPHY	70 - 79
MAPS	

INTRODUCTION

The Cyprus conflict is among the few politico-security questions before the United Nations for more than twenty five years. And certainly it has been one of the most frustrating tasks the United Nations has been assigned because of the complex nature of the problem.

Developments in Cyprus since early 1960s signify a conflict situation have mainly characterized by the legacy of colonial rule ethnic diversities, socio-economic disparities and their impact on the post-independent political system, intervention of outside interests and last the role of international organizations like the United Nations in managing the conflict.

Indeed, there are some of the features, it may be argued, of most of the international conflicts involving a number of newly independent members countries of the United Nations.

An ethnic, intercommunal conflict in Cyprus, intervention which was sought to be prevented in 1964, had actively taken place in 1974, why? What has activity of the nature of the United Nations' response? What are the limitations of that response what extent could the United Nations be accountable for the 1974 intervention?

Or is it that situation by itself worsen the call for a precipitate action by foreign powers? How did the United Nations rise to the challenges of the change of the situation?

Again ten years later in 1983 a part of the Republic of Cyprus unilateral declared its independence. What were the implications of this development to the Republic of Cyprus, to the members of the community of sovereign states as organized in the name of the United Nations? How effectively then did the United Nations respond? How could one take stock of the role of the United Nations to restore, Cyprus to remove the routes of the problems by means of mediation all these years? What about prospects in the years to come to end stalemate in Cyprus?

This study seeks to examine these and related questions.

The first chapter attempts a historical background up to 1974. It examines the legacy of the British colonial rule, the structure of the Cyprus society characterized and ethnic differences, the paradoxes in the constitutional framework of the polity of independent Cyprus, the developments in 1964 and the response of the United Nations to defuse the tensions till 1974.

The second chapter seeks to analyse the immediate background of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July 1974, the problems it posed to the ongoing activity of the United Nations, the international responses as the United Nations Security Council, the manner in which the United Nations presence adapted itself to the new situation of the continued efforts of mediation under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The third chapter seeks the Turkish-Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence and the United Nations responses.

The fourth and final chapter attempts an overall assessment and a few concluding observations.

CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENTS UP TO 1974: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The developments in Cyprus during years 1974-84 caused a great deal of concern to the international community no doubt. But to understand the importance and implications of those developments, it is necessary to look into historical background of the conflict, colonial heritage, socio-politico-religious discard, the fragile political system in the post-independence years, the developments 1964 and international responses. This would be what the present chapter seeks to examine.

Although Cyprus, on the face of it, does not appear to be important in territorial terms, it must be noted that its geographical location¹ has played a major role in shaping its history.

British Colonial Rule:

For reason of strategic importance Cyprus has been a attraction for all the imperial powers in the region

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1. The island of the Cyprus, with an area of 9251 square kilometres, is situated in the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea. Closest to Turkey, but also less than 160 kilometres from the Syrian Coast. Its greatest length is 225 kilometres. See Richard A.Patric, Political Geography and Cyprus Conflict: 1963-71, Series No.4 (Waterloo, 1976), p.3.

including Assyria, Persia, Macedonia, Egypt etc.

The Turks conquered Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571 in order to end the piracy on the Eastern Mediterranean trade routes and to eliminate the danger to Ottoman interests posed by the foreign possession of this land which commanded strategically important trade routes in area. The Turks terminated the Latin persecution of Greek speaking Christians in the island and reactivated the Greek orthodox church with all its rights and privileges. Turkish rule continued until 1878. In that year through a bilateral treaty Ottoman Empire allowed to Great Britain to take over the administration of the island while it continued to retain sovereignty over it in return for a British promise to support Turkey in the event of a Russian attack on Turkey.

The island was annexed by Great Britain in 1914, however Turkey did not recognise this until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and two years later Cyprus became crown colony.

In the period since 1931 the desire to achieve self-government within the commonwealth grew stronger, but the movement for Enosis² remained a strong influence

2. Enosis, a Greek word, means union with Greece. It gained strength against the British rule. From childhood the Greek is conditioned in church and school to believe that fullness of time all Greek speaking areas must be united with the frontiers

in the political life of island. The British resolutely resisted any demand which threatened their control over Cyprus. Especially since 1954, the importance of Cyprus to British strategic thinking was apparent as its general headquarters for the Middle East was shifted in 1954 to Cyprus from Egypt and the convenient transit it provided between the British far east colonial possessions and the Mediterranean. Britain opposed the demand for crisis, on the ground that it would lead to communal divide; therefore it favoured status quo maintenance. When the enosis demand took the militant form under the auspices of the National Organization of Cyprus Fighters (EOKA), Britain offered self-government under British sovereignty. When the offer did not find favour, the colonial administration deported Cypriot leaders, and outlawed EOKA. Only

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Motherland. Most Greek Cypriots favoured return of Constantinople and the 'last land of Anetolia' and recall the Treaty of Severes with Nostalgia (This agreement provided for territorial changes which brought closer the realisation of the 'Great Idea'. However the Treaty of Severes, a casualty of Revolution of Mustapha Kamal, was not implemented). The concept of a 'Greater Greece' which has inspired the nationalism of the mainland has, nevertheless made less impact in Cyprus where the advocates of Enosis have in their parochialism shown little concern for the fate of Greek communities elsewhere and pressed their claim to a degree which on occasions seriously embarrassed the Motherland. See Nancy Crashaw, The Cyprus Revolt (London, 1978), p.18.

on realization that Britain rule could not continue, they mellowed to abandon their sovereignty, provide only their strategic interests were statutorily protected.³

Demand for Freedom:

The cause of Cypriot independence was not helped by divisions between the Greek, Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots either -- the two main communities constituting Cyprus society. The British administration took advantage of these divisions. For instance, Turkey-Cypriots into demanded partition to oppose enosis got sympathy from British colonial administration this act of colonial policy of Divide and Rule could be interpreted as a way of intimidating Greek-Cypriots. Communities grew during the 1950s. A violent consequence of this policy was witnessed in 1958, when intercommunal violence erupted for the first time on a massive scale and 127 people were reportedly killed in these clashes. Census diversities created many problems in Cyprus. In this violence Greek Cypriots were dominant because they have a large

3. See, for details, M.D. Donelan and M.J. Grieve, International Disputes - Case Histories, 1945-1970 (London, 1973), pp.116-18.

population.⁴

Around the same time Greece made several attempts particularly during 1954-58 at the United Nations General Assembly to secure support to the cause of the "application of the principle of equal rights and Self-Determination" in the case of Cyprus. But Greece could not secure the desired endorsement from the General Assembly. What the General Assembly desired was a peaceful, democratic and just solution to the Cyprus problem.⁵

Then followed a series of diplomatic contacts at the United Nations and within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) between United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the leaders of the two major communities, Archbishop Makarios (the Greek Cypriot leader) and the Turkish Cypriot leader Fazil Katchuk; The London Zurich Agreement was concluded on 11 February 1959.

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4. According to the Census of 1973, the Greek Cypriots are 74.7 per cent and Turkish Cypriots are 24.6 per cent. Greek Cypriots belong to the Greek orthodox church and speak Greek, Turkish Cypriots are Sunni Muslims and speak Turkish. Each community has its own education system conducted in its own language and there is no intermarriage between the two communities who have maintained their respective cultural heritage despite four centuries of co-existence in the island.
 5. General Assembly Resolution 1287(XIII), 5 December 1958, K.P. Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security, A Historical Analysis (New Delhi, 1974), p.284.

The Agreement comprised three treaties and a constitution - the Treaty of Establishment which declared Cyprus a sovereign republic save for two base areas retained under British sovereignty; the treaty of alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey; the treaty of guarantee gave Greece, Turkey and Britain the right to act singly or collectively to prevent either enosis or partition.

Under the constitution, there was to be a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, each with a veto power. They were to be elected separately by the respective communities and so were the members of the legislature. All ministerial, bureaucratic jobs would be filled by following a quota system (70 per cent to Greek Cypriot and 30 per cent Turkish-Cypriot). Further provided were a Supreme Constitutional court and High Court composed by Greeks and Turkish Judges, to be presided over in each case by a neutral judge the creation of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in five largest towns, with the condition that the President and Vice-President should examine within five years whether the arrangement should continue a Cypriot army of 2,000 which must be composed 60 per cent of Greeks and 40 per cent Turks security forces with a complement of 2,000 men in a ratio of 70 per cent Greek to 30 per cent Turkish.

In other words, the Zurich-London Agreement apparently followed the principle of political equality

and administrative partnership of the two communities who were given full autonomy in what were strictly defined as a communal affairs and the settlement thus established was to be guaranteed by Turkey, Greece and Britain thus ensuring the permanence of the Cyprus republic and assuring both sides that peace would be maintained in the island.⁶

Unworkable Political System:

The Agreement came into effect on 16 August 1960, by which time Archbishop Makarios was elected President and Fazil Kutchuk Vice President.⁷ Cyprus became a member of the United Nations in September 1960.

No sooner than the Republic was born, did the power sharing arrangement under the Constitution became so fragile and unworkable. Turkish minority greater strength than strictly proportionate to their population ratio. But these minority safeguards were regarded by (the Turkish community as essential in

6. See Necti Munir Ertecum, In Search of A Negotiated Cyprus Settlement (Lefkosa, 1981), pp.7-8.

7. It was believed that Archbishop Makarios accepted the agreement under pressure. At the dawn of independence there were no celebrations. The Republic of Cyprus was in fact a reluctant Republic.

order to secure its basic rights. In the case of certain non-political posts, the holder of the office and deputy had to be from different communities. Both the President and Vice-President had the right to delay some decisions and to veto others. The general effect of these devices was to make most of the major affairs of the state subject to the agreement of both the Greek and Turkish communities. As one observer summarised the main features of the constitution as strong bicomunalism, artificial fragmentation of the functions and unprecedented constitutional rigidity, thus providing a fertile ground for friction.⁸

In the House of Representatives, the Turks though less than 20 per cent of population, were given 30 per cent of the seats and their representatives selected separately by their co-racialists. In the civil services the ratio between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and was to be 7:3 and in the army 6:4. The house could not modify the constitution at all, in so far as it concerned its basic articles, and any other modification was to require a separate majority comprising two-thirds of Greek members and two-thirds of Turkish members. The Turks were also granted complete autonomy, legislative

8. Sydney D. Bailey, How Wars End (Oxford, 1982), p.668.

and administrative, in relation to educational, religious-cultural, sporting and charitable matters.

Naturally, therefore there occurred serious differences Aros over the interpretation and working of the constitution. There was divergence of opinion between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, for instance, over formation of national army, as laid down in the Zurich Agreement of 1959 (2,000 men, 60 per cent Greek, 40 per cent Turkish), the main point of dispute being the degree of integration to be established between the two racial components. In October 1961 Turkish Vice President, Faizal Kutchuk, used his power of veto to prevent full integration, which President Makarios favoured at all levels of the armed forces.⁹ Again, difficulties arose also over the implementation of the 70:30 ratio of Greek Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot personnel in the public services. There was a friction too in House of Representatives about financial affairs, such as customs duties and income tax laws. The situation took yet another turn with differences over the system of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five main towns of Cyprus-Nicasia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos.¹⁰

9. W.B. Fisher, The Middle East and North Africa 1989 (London, 1988), p.340.

10. Ibid., p.341. In December 1962 the Turkish communal chamber passed a law maintaining the Turkish Municipalities in the five towns. President Makarios issued a decree stating that, government appointed bodies would control municipal organizations throughout the island - a decree which Turkish Cypriot denounced as an infringement of the constitution.

The Turkish Cypriots insisted on interpreting the constitution as a federation though the term was carefully avoided in the document itself. Makarios feared that it left the door open to partition through the creation of Turkish Cyprus cantons built round the separate municipal authorities. He claimed that what had been created was a state but not a nation. Certainly the complex of associated treaties severely constrained the sovereignty of the state and did not so much end colonial status as prepared it wider through the guarantee of three NATO Nations.

Because of the lack of the cooperation between two communities, the constitution was a recipe for a legal paralysis given the years of strife which have preceded independence such cooperation was not forthcoming. The structure of the army was created but disputes about its composition remained unsettled. As a result irregular troops on both sides began to rearm. Perpetual friction in Government, coupled with intense pressures on Makarios from disappointed unionists, prompted the Archbishop in November 1963 to propose expensive constitutional amendments which would have removed all Turkish-Cypriots safeguards against domination by the Greek-Cypriots and reduced them virtually to status of a minority with adequate safeguards.

Archbishop Makarios put forward a number of reforms that the President and Vice President of Cyprus should lose their right of veto over certain types of legislation, that separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot majorities in the House of Representatives should not be required for financial legislation, and that single municipal council with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot members, should replace the separate municipalities in the five towns of Cyprus. These proposals proved to be unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots.¹¹

The conference was held in London on 15 January 1964 to find a way out, but to no avail. However, a practical outcome was the decision to bring in a British Peace Force to facilitate temporary truce, between the two communities. Now that Turkish military intervention would not be possible in view of the ceasefire, Archbishop Makarios began to implement his earlier plan to abrogate the 1960 Agreement. Clashes again broke out. The British Peace Force was not very effective. Britain attempted to bring in a NATO force to beef up its own presence. But neither Greece nor President Makarios agreed. For Cyprus, its nonaligned status was not to

11. Robert MacDonald
(Adelphi Paper No.234) (London, 1988), p.10.

dangers in the situation in Cyprus on the creation of United Nations Force in Cyprus and on legal questions linked to independence of Cyprus.

In the course of the Security Council meetings, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus stated that Turkey was pursuing a policy of provocation towards Cyprus, based on a well prepared plan to advance further the idea of communal separation with the ultimate aim of partition. He asked whether the governments of United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey maintained that they had a right of military intervention under the treaty of guarantee and the treaty of alliance had been concluded in circumstances which had precluded a free choice of Cyprus and the constitution has been foisted on the Republic. He charged that efforts had been made at the London Conference to prevent Cyprus from bringing the question before to the Council. He requested that an international peacekeeping force in Cyprus should be under control of the Council and that its terms of references should also provide for assistance to the government of Cyprus in the restoration of law and order and the protection of the integrity and independence of the Republic.¹⁴

14. United Nations Yearbook, 1964 (New York, 1964), p.152.

The representative Greece maintained that the treaty of guarantee had not given to the signatory powers the right of unilateral intervention. If the need arose for an interpretation of the treaties, only the international court of justice could give it authoritatively. His government had accepted the principle of an international force on the condition that its terms of reference would safeguard the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.¹⁵

The representative of Turkey noted that Greek Cypriot representative had requested for the meeting of the Council in December 1963 on the unsubstantiated claim that there was a threat of an imminent attack from Turkey. The purpose of Zurich London Agreements he said had been to ensure full harmony between the two main communities, to safeguard the interests of the guarantors powers and to bring peace to the area. The treaties and the constitution were in complete accord with the resolution 1287(XIII) which the General Assembly unanimously adopted on 5 December 1958.¹⁶ The Greek Cypriot leaders wished to obtain through

15. Ibid., p.153.

16. Where the Assembly expressed its confidence that the continued efforts would be made by the parties involved in the Cyprus question to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the United Nations Charter. For detail, see the United Nations Yearbook, 1958, p.75.

the United Nations, abrogation of the treaties. In that connection, he recalled that in November 1963 the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, submitted to the Vice-President Dr. Kuchuck and to the three guarantor powers, a memorandum containing 13 proposals for amending the basic features of the constitution so, as to take away from the Turkish community the right which had been considered as essential for its protection. The proposal has been rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community and by Turkish. Could the Council, he asked, suspend or amend an international treaty which had been duly negotiated signed and ratified? Peace and stability, he declared, could best be maintained in Cyprus through the peaceful co-existence of the two main communities, each master of its own affairs.¹⁷

The United Kingdom representative again stressed the link between the basic articles of the Cyprus constitution, the provision of the Treaty of Guarantee and the establishment of an independence Cyprus in 1960. The principal purpose of these agreements, it was pointed out, was to safeguard the rights and interests of both, Greece and Turkish Cypriot communities. The right reserved to the guarantor powers under Treaty of Guarantee was not an unlimited right of unilateral action but right to

17. Ibid., pp.152-53.

take action to reestablish the state of affairs created by the treaty. Cyprus had thereby undertaken certain obligation; as long as it carried them out there would be no question of intervention. The British government accepted the principle of an international force under the control of the Council.¹⁸

The United States representative observed that the treaty of Guarantee formed an integral part of the agreements which had created the Republic of Cyprus. He stressed that the Council could not abrogate nullify or modify, either in fact or effect, the treaty of guarantee or any international treaty. At the moment no country was threatening the independence of Cyprus. What was however possible, in accordance with the treaty, was an action for re-establishment of the state of affairs created by a treaty. He requested the Council to bring about prompt agreement on an international peace-keeping force and contribute to re-establishment of conditions in which a long term political solution could be sought by the United Nations mediator with due regard to the interests of all parties concerned.¹⁹

18. Ibid., p.153.

19. Ibid.

In the opinion of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic representative, the problem before the Council was one of a threat of direct military aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus in violation of Article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. The Council had a right to expect from United Kingdom and Turkey a direct assurance the military force would not be used against Cyprus. As a result of the unequal treaties, he added the British and military forces of the three members of NATO had been placed in Cyprus, designed to destroy the independence of Republic. The U.S.S.R. spokesman urged all states concerned to exercise restraint and to consider realistically all possible consequences of an armed invasion of Cyprus. Only the people of Cyprus, he said had the right to decide how to solve their domestic problems.²⁰

On 4 March Security Council, in a unanimous resolution, noted that the situation in Cyprus was likely to threaten to international peace and security and created a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with the consent of Cyprus.²¹ The details in regard to

20. Ibid., p.153.

21. Security Council Resolution 186(1964), was adopted by 8 votes to zero with three abstentions (Czechoslovakia, France, the U.S.S.R.). The Security Council's action is particularly notable for the fact that, in spite of a controversy going on then about peacekeeping operations and its favouring the Security Council took the desired and timely conta...

mandate, composition, appointment of chief, procedures of financing were to be worked out by the Secretary-General in consultation with various member states. These were to be finally approved by the Security Council above.

Secretary General reported the appointment of General P.S. Gyani of India, as Commander of UNFICYP and referred to his approaches to several governments about the provision of contingents. Negotiations with prospective troop contributing governments encountered certain delays, relating to as well as financial aspects of the operation.

The situation in Cyprus deteriorated again the Secretary General on 9 March addressed messages to the President of Cyprus and to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, appealing for restraint and cessation of violence. The government of Turkey sent messages to President Makarios on 12 March and to Secretary General on 13 March, stating that unless assaults on the Turkish Cypriots ceased, Turkey would act unilaterally under the Treaty of Guarantee to send a Turkish force to Cyprus until the United Nations Force, which should include Turkish units, effectively performed its functions. The Secretary General replied immediately that measures to

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action. For details, see Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: A Documentary and Commentary Vol.4 (Oxford, 1981), p.96.

establish the United Nations Force were under way and making progress, and he appealed to Turkey to retrain from action that would worsen the situation.²²

At the request of the representative of Cyprus, the Security Council held an emergency meeting on 13 March and adopted resolution 187(1964).²³ The Resolution called on member states to refrain from action or threats likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus or endanger in international, as requested to Secretary General to press on with his efforts to implement resolution 186.

Upon arrival of the troops of the Canadian contingent on 13 March, the Secretary General reported that the force was in being. However it did not become established operationally until 27 March when sufficient troops were available to it in Cyprus to enable it to discharge its functions effectively. The three month duration of the mandate, as defined in resolution 186(1964), began as of that date. This development marked a new phase in the Cyprus situation. The operational mandate of the force included: (a) to prevent a recurrence of fighting, (b) to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of

22. United Nations, The Blue Helmets (New York, 1985), p.266.

23. Rosalyn Higgins, n.21, p.98.

law and order and (c) a return to normal conditions. The Secretary General noted that UNFICYP was a United Nations Force, operating exclusively under the mandate given to it by the Security Council and within that mandate under the instructions given by the Secretary General. It was an impartial, objective body which had no responsibility for political solutions and would not try to influence them one way or another.²⁴

UNFICYP was thus established in 1964, with military contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom, and civilian police units from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden with a total strength of roughly 6,300. This national composition has remained largely unchanged.²⁵

For extension of UNFICYP for three months Council adopted Resolution 194 (1964).²⁶ Further three months extensions followed and later the Council began extending

24. The Blue Helmets, n.22, p.267. The forces of a permanent member (Britain) in a United Nations peacekeeping operation was without precedent. It was done, in view of the preferences of the countries concerned and the fact that British troops were already there doing some peacekeeping job. See K.P. Saksena, n.5, p.289.

25. However exception included reauction of the Irish and Finnish contingents to be taken units in 1973 and 1977 respectively and the withurawal of the New Zealand, Danish and Austrian police units in 1967, 1975 and 1977 respectively. Ibid., p.278.

26. For text of the Resolution see Rosalyn Higgins, n.21, p.99.

the mandate by six month periods, with the Council in 1967 adopting a practice of expressing the hope that by the end of the period of extension, sufficient progress towards a solution would have been achieved so as to render possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the force.

Secretary General authorized by the Resolution 186 (1964) of the Security Council for peaceful settlement of disputes with the consent of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and U.K. on these bases Secretary General appointed Sakari S. Tuomioga, a Finnish diplomat as a mediator. Tuomioga died on 9 September 1964. After one week Secretary General appointed second mediator to Galo Plaza Lasso, of Ecuador. After consultations of all parties mediator submitted his report to Secretary General in March 1965 and in which analysed the situation in the island and recommended that the parties concerned, and in the first instance, the representatives of the two communities, should meet together for discussions. Turkey rejected this report claiming that it is total in favour of Cyprus. Plaza resigned and the mission could not be successful.

Subsequently Secretary General appointed Carlos A. Bernardes as a successor. Although the special representative was not given the powers of mediator, he was given enlarged powers to use his good offices. In exercising



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them he remained directly responsible to Secretary General.²⁷ Bernardes recommended that the problem can be solved at any level either local or broader nature. This effort also did not succeed. On 5 January 1967 Bernardes resigned and Pier Spenelli, head of the United Nations office in Geneva, acted temporarily as special representative in Cyprus.²⁸ On 20 February 1967 Mr. Bibano Osario-Tofall of Mexico began an extended period of service as the Secretary General's special representative in Cyprus.

In December 1965 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution which appeared to support the claim of Cyprus for unfettered independence and to discount the Turkish claim to the right of intervention based on Zurich Agreement. It also called upon states to respect the sovereignty, unity and independence of Cyprus. This position was maintained by the United Nations in 1967 crisis also.

A third crisis began in 1967 when armed conflict broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As in 1964 Turks threatened to invade issue an ultimatum demanding withdrawal of mainland Greek forces and dissolution of Cypriot National Guard. Washington again intervened to

27. Rosalyn Higgins, n.21 pp.147-48.

28. Ibid., p.148.

prevent such a precipitate development it did not do in 1974. An agreement according to Turkish demands was signed by Greece and Turkey and communicated to Nicosia by Cyrus Vance, the President Johnson's special representative and later President Carter's Secretary of State in 1977-79. Although Makarios strongly opposed dissolution of the National Guard, Popandopoulos (Colonel George Popandopoulos, Greek Dictator) ordered his forces back to Greece. As Kronidiotis observes, it was the extreme nationalist Greek dictator who was thus responsible for "leaving Cyprus undefended in case Turkey should invade,"²⁹ as it did in 1974.

Popandopoulos was overthrown on the somewhat unpersuasive grounds of "excessive leniency" towards the revolting students of Athens Polytechnic institute. He was replaced by a political General, Dimitrios Ionnides, Chief of Greek Military Police (E.S.A.).

Meanwhile, General Grivas³⁰ died on 27 January 1974 and Nikas Sampson a Cypriot newspaper publisher

29. Clan D. Camp, "Conflict over Cyprus", Political Science Quarterly (New York), Vol.95, No.1, Spring 1980, p.55.

30. General Grivas, former Head of E.O.K.A. (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

and personal friend of Ionnides, took over as leader of the entire Greek anti Makarios ultranationalist faction: Cyprus, leaving the Archbishop with only his police and intelligence services.

It was this new EOKA-B under Ionnides's control and led by the reputed "Turke killer" and assassin Nikos Sampson, which carried out the July 15 coup code-named "Aphrodite" which ushereu in July 1974.

CHAPTER II

TURKISH INTERVENTION IN 1974 AND THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE

Turkish Military Intervention Background:

The indications of the deepening of crisis in Cyprus began to appear some time in 1973. The church claimed that Makarios had violated religious laws and demanded his resignation. The EOKA guerilla group led by Grivas who returned to Cyprus with the help of Greece, indulged in violent activities to oppose intercommunal talks and demanded referendum on enosis. Both guaranters apparently worked with an objective of toppling Makarios government. But the chances of dislodging Makarios by lawful means were slender. Since no one dared to stand against him in presidential elections he was automatically re-elected in February 1974. Moreover, the military regime in Greece did not look at Makarios government in Cyprus favourably and considered Makarios as an obstacle to achieve enosis. Furthermore, the plans of President Makarios to revamp the pro-Greek National Guard promoted a guide preemptive action. Accordingly, on 15 July 1974 the National Guard, led by Greek officers overthrew the Makarios government and installed an ex-EOKA leader, Nikos Sampson, in power. Serious fighting broke out between the National Guard on

the one hand the Tacticle Reserve and the various groups on the other loyal to Makarios. The Nicosia Broadcasting station was seized, the presidential palace destroyed and Makarios fled to safety.

Turkey immediate held consultations with United Kingdom on a joint military operation under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee. But the British Government was not prepared to send its troops to Cyprus. Turkish intervention which was narrowly averted in the past, now seemed inevitable not in the wake of Greek Cypriot attack against Turkish cypriots, but in the light of the conflict within the Greek cypriot community. It was not certain whether the National Guard either to attack the Turks or to seize the whole island. But Turkey was not prepared to take a chance. On 20 July 1974 the Turkish armed forces launched a sea and air-borne operation against the island.

United Nations Security Council Meets and Immediate Response:

The Security Council met on 19 July 1974 to continue its considerations of the situation in Cyprus on the request of Cyprus Government.

Archbishop Makarios came to New York to take part in the Security Council debate. He urged restoration by all means of constitutional order and the democratic rights of the cypriot people could be without delay. He

also reminded that it is possible for the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus to be effective under conditions of military coup, therefore, the Council, in his view, should call upon the military regime of Greece to withdraw its armed personnel in the National Guard and put an end to its invasion of Cyprus.

The representative of Greece denied any involvement in the coup which had led to the overthrow Archbishop Makarios. He said the Cypriot armed forces had been acting on their own. He expressed the opinion that Archbishop Makarios had outlived his usefulness in Cyprus.

The Turkish representative said the coup seemed to have eliminated every appearances of legitimacy on the Greek Cypriot side in the circumstances, the only legitimate constitutional institution in Cyprus was the Turkish Cypriot administration under the Vice-President of Cyprus. It was the duty of the world community to restore the status quo ante. For its part Turkey considered its duty to make use of the rights conferred on it by international treaties.

The representative of the United States said that "Enôsis could not be considered an acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem nor was military intervention by any party justified in the current situation."¹ According

1. For detail, see the United Nations Year Book, 1974, p.264.

to U.S. representative the Cyprus crisis demanded a peaceful and constitutional solution and underlined need for negotiations between Turkey, U.K. and United States in London.

The Greek representative said that Turkey had launched a full scale aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and its attacks were obviously aimed at permanent occupation of large portion of Cypriot territory - a prelude to the creation of the infrastructure for partition, which was Turkey's permanent and final target. Greece, he said, would take appropriate counter-measures in self-defence and in defence of its national interests, and was demanding that the invading Turkish enclaves pending a resolution of the situation.

According to the spokesman for Cyprus, the sad reality was that intervention and aggression had now been committed by two of the countries which were guarantors of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. He said it was important that the United Kingdom had said it would keep in contact with President Makarios on the progress of the negotiations between the three guarantors - Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom's representative joined the United States in urging restoration all concerned so that a peaceful solution could be found.

Soviet Union while condemning the Greece's assistance in the coup, sought to present it as an excess of NATO against Non-Aligned policy of Cyprus. Representative said it is violation of the United Nations Charter because it is interference in domestic affairs of Cyprus.

It may be noted that the Turkish military intervention of 20 July took place before in Security Council expressed a formal conclusion in the events in Cyprus on 15 July. And in the Security Council debates before 20 July, Turkey did not drop a hint about it plans to intervene following the Turkish action, Greece and Cyprus requested for urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the developments. Obviously there has been a quantitative change in the situation: prior to July 20 the developments were apparently internal with alleged covert or involvement. Now there is an open military intervention which had serious implications for the charter purposes and privileges as also the franchise of the Security Council.

In the meeting of the Security Council on 20 July, the Secretary General appealed to the parties to immediately stop fighting and cooperate with UNFICYP's efforts

with view to protecting civilian population.²

Text called upon all parties to cease-fire and demanded an immediate end of the foreign military intervention which by implication was addressed to both Greece and Turkey, requested the withdrawal of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements and called on Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom to enter into negotiations without delay for restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus. The Council also called on all parties to cooperate fully with UNFICYP to enable to carry out its mandate - thus indicating that UNFICYP was expected to continue to function despite the radically changed circumstances.

UN Activities to Restore Peace:

The cease-fire initially came into effect from 22 July, but reports of violations of it continued to pour in. The Council as such had to reiterate its call for cease-fire in yet another resolution. Urgent consultations before Britain, Greece and Turkey led to an agreement on a security zone to be centralized between the

2. S.C.O.R., S/11348, Twenty Ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974.

frontline of the opposing armies in Cyprus.³

The UN Security Council, which had met in emergency session on 20 July 1974, adopted Resolution No.353⁴ which called upon three guarantor powers, Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom, "to enter into negotiations without delay for restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus" and "having regard to the international agreements signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960." Pursuant to this Security Council Resolution the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Greece, United Kingdom held a conference in Geneva from 25 to 30 July 1974 and discussed the matter. At the end of the conference the Foreign Ministers issued the Geneva Declaration⁵ of 30 July 1974, in which they declared that

- (a) a security zone should be set up,
- (b) all Turkish Cypriot enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately evacuated,
- (c) detained military personnel and civilian should be exchanged or released,

3. For details, see M. Necti Munir, In Search of Negotiated Cyprus Settlement (Lefkosa, 1981), p.32.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

- (d) negotiations should be carried on to secure the restoration of peace in the area "the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus."

The Second Geneva Conference was held from 9 to 13 August 1974 with the participation of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot delegations.

After the breakdown of the second round talks, the Turks began large scale invasion that transformed the entire strategic situation and violated Article 4⁶ of the Treaty of Guarantee. Yet the official U.S. reaction signalled to Turks that Washington was not opposed to their invasion and perhaps even supported Ankara in altering the strategic situation.

The mandate with which it had been equipped could not be said to have envisaged the new situation, notwithstanding the fact that some of the mandate's original words could still be seen as relevant. Thus one possible and legitimate response would have been for the United Nations' Secretary General to declare that the force had

6. According to Article 4, in event of the breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. For detail, see the United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.382(1960), No.5475.

no authority to operate in the new circumstances, and to ask the Security Council whether it wished to give UNFICYP new mandate.

This however hardly improved United Nations' public image. And there was also the very real possibility that the Security Council would have been unable to agree on a changed mandate, for the usual hazards of that enterprise would have been compounded by the political passions which the Turkish action had aroused. Accordingly, after the first bout of fighting, and in the absence of a 'clear directive' from the Council, the Secretary General 'took it upon (him)self' as cautiously as possible, to extend the very narrow mandate of UNFICYP in order to mitigate as far as possible the hardships of a conflict it was unable to prevent.⁷

The extension of UNFICYP mandate was not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots so in this situation it was difficult to preserve the peace in island.

The task to supervise observance of ceasefire control the above referred Security zone was to be performed by the UNFICYP. It may be recalled that the original mandate of the UNFICYP was aimed at preventing a recurrence of fighting between the communities in Cyprus and it did

7. See Alan James, "The UN Force in Cyprus", International Affairs (London), Vol.65, 1989, p.484.

not envisage the interposition of UNFICYP between the armed forces another member state and the armed forces of Cyprus. To rise to need of the changed situation the Secretary General through his representative sought cooperation of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom in limiting further hostilities and ceasefire violations.

But in the light of a number of breaches of ceasefire agreement the strength of UNFICYP was not sufficient effectively to ensure the maintenance of the ceasefire. The Secretary General proposed to reinforce the strength of UNFICYP.⁸

The UNFICYP continues to supervise the lines of National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, which since August 1974 extended across the island from Kato Pyrgos in the west to Dherenia in the east to length of some 180 kilometres. The area between the lines, which is under exclusive UNFICYP control, varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres. Following the transfer of Turkish Cypriots to the north in 1975, UNFICYP, which had been stationed in sensitive areas throughout the island was

8. Official Records of the Security Council, 29th year, 1782 meeting. As a result of the Secretary General's request, the strength of the UNFICYP was increased from 25000 to 40000.

redeployed along the ceasefire lines.

The Functions of the UNFICYP:

To contribute to the maintenance a recurrence fighting, of law and order, and to restore normal conditions of law and order gave room for conflicts examples. For instance, the Greek Cypriots contended that the United Nations Force should act as an arm of the Cyprus government in putting down the rebellious Turkish community. To the Turks and the Turkish Cypriot community, UNFICYP tasks mean enforcement of the 1960 Constitution. Whereas, Secretary General believed that UNFICYP could prevent the initiation of force by anyone on Cyprus for any purpose and restore stability and normalcy in the daily life of the island.⁹

Efforts to Implement Security Council Resolution 355, 1 August 1974:

Insofar as control over the security (buffer) zone, as envisaged by the guarantor powers in Geneva, the necessary authorization was given by the Security Council on 1 August. The Charter and size of zone where no forces other than those of UNFICYP would be allowed to enter were finalised later. The zone runs roughly east to west for a distance of 180 kilometres. In width it varies between twenty metres and seven kilometres and in all

9. David W. Wainhouse, Informational Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (London, 1973), p.350 and Edward Fursdon, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Cyprus", Conflict Studies (London), No.232, June 1990, p.11.

covers roughly three per cent of the land, including the Nicosia airport. The United Nations force acted as a buffer in the zone between the two sides by keeping a watch from observation posts and undertaking regular patrols.^{9a}

Refugee Relief:

As regards the refugee relief Security Council met at the request of the Cyprus to consider the grave situation in Cyprus, including the refugee problem. In that connection the representative of Turkey transmitted a letter from Vice-President of Cyprus, Mr. Denktash contesting the right of permanent representative of Cyprus to call for a meeting of the Security Council without consulting him. The Council adopted unanimously resolution 361 (1974) in which it warmly welcomed the talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash brought about with the assistance of Secretary General, expressed its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other displaced persons and called upon the parties to do everything in their power to alleviate human suffering requested the Secretary General to continue provide the emergency United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population in need of such assistance, and called upon all

9a. Alan James, "The United Nations Force in Cyprus", International Affairs, Vol. , 1989, p.493.
See Security Council Resolution 355(1974).

parties to take all steps which might promote comprehensive and successful negotiations.¹⁰

After the second round of the fighting, necessitate turning UNFICYP from a force spread through the island into one which interposed itself along and watched over the demarcation line called Attila Line, which was now drawn across the island.

The UNFICYP took in his hand the work of Refugee Relief which was directed by Security Council. For assistance to refugees, a special council had been set up at the UNFICYP Headquarters Nicosia. Every step was made to protect the civilian population caught up in the hostilities - including both Cypriots and foreigners. With the help of ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross) in large scale relief assistance was arranged for Greek and Turkish Cypriots because about the one-third population of the island had become homeless. On 20 August the Secretary General appointed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Co-ordinator of the United Nations Humanitarian assistance for Cyprus.¹¹ Secretary General requested that humanitarian assistance must be provided

10. SCOR, 29 Year, 1795 meeting, 30 August 1974 and see the 29th year supplement.

11. The Blue Helmets (New York, 1985), p.288.

to the refugees as may be possible soon because there is need of assistance.

Talks under the United Nations Auspices:

The world wide impression that the Turks were not really interested in negotiation was further strengthened by the lack of progress in subsequent Vienna talks held on 28 April to 2 May 1975, 5 June to 7 June 1975, 31 July to 2 August 1975, 8 September to 10 September 17-21 February 1975. It was strengthened even more by the announcement in Ankara on 13 February 1975 of the installation of a so-called Federated Turkish-Cypriot state and by the colonization by the Greek Cypriot lands of by Farmers imported from Turkey. Kranidiotis seems correct in asserting that by importing some 30,000 colonists into the Famagusta, Kyrenia and Morphou areas, the Turks were attempting to change, change by force, the demographic character of the island. The Turkish colonization of occupied areas both contravened international law and more importantly, erected new obstacles to resolution of the Cyprus problem.

With the advantage of Turkish military presence with a view to influence the course of negotiations under the auspices, the Turkish Cypriot community proclaimed in February 1975 the Turkish Federated State of Kibris which would form an equal part of the Federated Republic of Cyprus.

After the proclamation of Turkish Federated State, the Greek Cypriot side rushed to the United Nations Security Council with a view to obtaining resolution condemning inescapable Turkish Cypriot action and its interim nature were fully explained in the Security Council and although many delegates including British representative emphasized that such proclamation was not a 'unilateral Declaration of independence' and that it ruled out partition, the Security Council in a resolution 367¹² regretted the unilateral move and affirmed that decision did not prejudge the final political settlement. It called for a new political settlement. It called for a new efforts to assist the resumption of negotiations, asking the Secretary General to undertake a new mission of good offices and to convene the representative of two communities under his auspices and with his direction as appropriate.

Initial Rounds of Talks in Stalemate:

After preliminary discussion in Nicosia, it was agreed to resume the talks in Vienna on 28 April 1975 under the auspices of the United Nations Security General. The first round of talks lasted up to 3 May and was mainly

12. For detail, see the Security Council Resolution 367 (1974).

devoted to 'an exchange of views on the powers and the function of the central government'. A committee was established to facilitate further consideration of issue. The second round of talks was held on 5 June and continued for two days during which the central government issue was more extensively discussed. A new proposal for the establishment of a transitional government was introduced by the Turkish side.¹³ The third round of talks from 31 July to 2 August was very important one. During this period the question of the transfer of population was tackled and settled. The Greek side agreed to transfer of Turks from the south to north and Turks agreed to allow Greeks living in Turkish controlled areas to move to the Greek controlled south. Until then, the Greek Cypriot leaders had been preventing the movement of the Turks to the north and refusing to receive Greeks coming from the north.^{13a}

The fourth round of talks was held in New York from 8-10 September 1975, but Mr. Clerides (Representative of Cyprus) refused to continue the talks on the grounds that the Turkish side had not submitted concrete

13. R.R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle (London, 1982), pp.80-81.

13a. Ibid., p.81.

proposal on territorial issue and meeting was adjourned. It was obvious that Mr. Clerides was acting on orders from Nicosia.¹⁴ After five months, the fifth round of talks was held in Vienna on 17 February 1976 as a result of an agreement reached between the Greek Foreign Ministers and Turkish in Brussels on 12 December 1975. During this round extensive discussion took place on both the territorial and constitutional issues. It was also agreed that an exchange of written proposals should take place through the United Nations Secretary General's special representative in Cyprus within six weeks.

Sixth round of talks took place in Vienna under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General between 31 March and 7 April in 1977.¹⁵ However joint communique issued at the end of these talks stated that it had not been possible to bridge the considerable gap between two sides. The new Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Umit Suleman Onan, told reports at the end of the talks that Greek Cypriot proposal on the territorial issue were not consistent with realities. He added, however despite differences of concept and approach on both

14. Ibid., pp.81-82.

15. M. Neçti Munir Erteçum, n.3, p.51.

territorial and constitutional aspects, the Turkish side found the talks very useful. The two sides had an opportunity to get a better understanding of each other's way of thinking and views. The Greek Cypriot interlocutor Mr. Tassas Paponopolous in contrast was totally negative. He blamed on Turkish for failure of talks.

After returning to Nicosia, the interlocutors met on a number of occasions in May and June to overcome their differences and to prepare the ground for Seventh Round of talks. But these meetings were held in a somewhat strained atmosphere because the Greek Cypriots had yet again stepped up their anti-Turkish propaganda and were waging an economic war against the Turkish Cypriots. In any case the projected seventh round of Vienna talks was torpedoed by sudden death of Makarios on 3 August 1977.

The two summits were held for intercommunal talks, first on 27 January 1977 and 12 February 1977. First meeting created environment for second meeting. In second summit meeting, in the presence of the United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim some guidelines were agreed upon to steer guidelines are following:¹⁶

- (a) an independent non-aligned, bicomunal Federal Republic,

16. Report of the Secretary General, 30 April 1977, p.2. para 5.

- (b) the territorial jurisdiction administration of each unit to be decided taking into account economic viability productivity and land ownership.
- (c) principles of freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property etc. or subject to the bicomunal federal character of the Republic and any practical difficulties which might arise for the Turkish community.
- (d) The powers and functions of the central federal governments would be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bicomunal character of the state.

Waldhiem's Attempt to Solve the Problem:

Simultaneously with the task of UNFICYP's observance of ceasefire, the Secretary General and his special representative pursued the objective of holding talks between the concerned parties to adhere to the issues that gave rise to the conflict. Indeed it is a process that has been going on since 1960s, now with the 1974 developments it assumed added complexity and therefore urgency. The issues before it broadly are: the withdrawal of all foreign powers, restoration of normal conditions between the two main communities in the republic retention of United independent and non-aligned republic.

Talks based on the guidelines began in Vienna on 31 March 1977 under the Secretary General's auspices and

further meetings followed under Perez de Culler's direction. The Greek Cypriots offered a detailed territorial proposal including a map to which they added a statement of general principles. They did not table a detailed constitutional proposal, however. The Turkish Cyprus reserved this process by offering a detailed constitutional proposal but detailed territorial proposal and no map. The Greek Cypriot responded that Turkish plan envisaged "confederal system without (central) power which would evolve, if at all, in the direction of the complete separation". The Turks still refused to submit any territorial counter-proposal or draw lines on any map. They also rejected the Greek-Cypriot proposal as creating unit not a federal state.¹⁷ After the rejection of the Turkish proposal of April 1977, the Greek Cypriot submitted a detailed constitutional proposal of their own which the Turks in turn rejected, quite accurately noting that it provided for a unitary and federal polity. This stalemate continued for nearly one year despite urging from the United Nations and western countries.

The Turkish Cypriots tabled both detailed constitutional and territorial proposals on 13 April 1978. These

17. Glend D. Camp, "Greek Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", Political Science Quarterly, Vol.95, No.1 (New York, Spring 1980), p.63.

1978 proposals were the most expensive and precise guide to Turkish thinking on the future of the Cyprus over published, they also amounted to complete rejection of all obligations imposed by Zurich-London Accords.

Secretary General Waldhjem tried to salvage some modest agreement on "partial measures" to move the talks into more constructive channels. In his Famagusta (name of a city) suggestion of 31 May 1978. Waldhjem urged resettlement of Varosha (a suburb of Famagusta occupied by the Turks but kept uninhabited since the flight of Greek Cypriot population) and reopening of the Nicosia international airport. Since both Varosha and airport were under UNFICYP observation, Waldhjem hoped this would ease United Nations administration. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Raul J. Denktash picked up the Secretary General's suggestion on 20 July 1978 and in a letter proposed resettlement of the Varosha under United Nations auspices simultaneously with the resumption of intercommunal talks. This proposal was supported by the Turkish P.M. Ecevit but was immediately rejected by Greek Cypriot President Kyprianou for reasons which remain obscure to most observers to this day but which are rumoured to have mostly to do with Kyprianou's coalition of Greek Cypriot political support. Kyprianou also demanded that Varosha be returned to his governments

control rather than be placed under interim United Nations control. Finally in his rejection, Kyprianou demanded that a plan for 'true' federation be accepted by Turkish Cypriots.¹⁸

Talks About Talks:

The situation remained stalemated from July through the end of 1978. The Turks insisting on their 13 April 1978 proposals and Greeks using the United National General Assembly as their preferred forum for appealing to world public opinion. In December 1978, however Cypriot Foreign Minister Nicos A. Rolandis came to New York at the suggestion of President Kyprianou and urged Waldhies to develop a basis an agenda for renewed intercommunal talks. From 14 to 18 December 1978 Rolandis and Waldhies discussed the Cyprus problem. On 19 December Secretary General Waldhies submitted to both sides the first of the series of tentative working papers on the resumption of intercommunal talks.¹⁹ The first draft of first paper was a shorter paraphrase of the U.S. Nimitz plan with Varosha annex incorporated in toto from the U.S. proposal. A

18. Ibid., pp.64-65.

19. United Nations, Secretariat Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly (A/34/620), 8 November 1979, p.3, para 5.

later draft dropped the Nimitz constitutional proposals added the idea of mutual ending of economic and trade restrictions and kept the plan for Varosha resettlement.

On 4 April 1979 Rolandis, in a memorandum given to Waldhiem in Geneva, urged a high level meeting between President Kyprianou and Denktash to break the impasse that had developed. On 9 April Kenon Atakol, the Turkish Cypriot foreign affairs spokesman, met Waldhiem in Zurich and reaffirmed his community's position in favour of a high level meeting.²⁰ On 30 April Perez de Culler, the United Nations under secretary for special political affairs, went to Cyprus for preliminary talks with both sides. Both parties reaffirmed the role of the Secretary General as well as Makarios-Denktash Four Points Guidelines of 12 February 1977.

Ten Point Agreement, 1979:

The top level meeting which was held at UNFICYP Headquarters in Nicosia under Waldhiem's personal auspices on 18 May 1979. After intensive negotiations, accord was reached on 19 May 1979 on a ten point agreement (19 May Accord) which incorporated the earlier Makarios-Denktash four points guidelines of 12 February 1977 as well as

20. Ibid., para 6.

previous United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.²¹ The agreement envisaged

- (a) Resumption of the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979,
- (b) the Makarios-Denktash Four point guidelines of 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question as the basis for talks,
- (c) respect for human rights and fundamental freedom of all citizens of the Republic,
- (d) that the talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects,
- (e) priority to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under the United Nations auspices simultaneously with beginning of consideration by the interlocutors of constitutional and territorial aspects of comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem,
- (f) all parties to refrain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks and special importance will be given to initial practical measures

21. See United Nations Secretariat, Report by the Secretary General on United Nations operation in Cyprus (for the period 1 Dec. 1978 to 31 May 1979), 31 May 1979, p.13, para 51.

- by both sides to promote goodwill mutual confidence and the return to the normal conditions,
- (g) discussion about demilitarization of Cyprus a related matters,
 - (h) guarantee of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignments of Republic against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession,
 - (i) the intercommunal talks in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding and delay,
 - (j) Nicosia as for venue the intercommunal talks.

In compliance with agreement intercommunal talks resumed in Nicosia on 15 June 1979, under the auspices of Mr. Perez de Cuellar, United Nations under Secretary General for special political affairs, after a break of just over two years. Four sessions of talks were held on 15, 18, 20 and 22 June 1979 and the talks were then 'recessed' sine die.

In these talks the Greek Cypriot representative urged priority for resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices. The Turkish Cypriot representative Umit Suleyman Onan, urged that before taking up Varosha, agreement should be reached on principles of the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977 and United Nations

resolution on Cyprus. He also asked the Greek representative to acknowledge that the 1977 guidelines in addition to their published text also included the two concepts of 'bizonality' and security of the Turkish Cypriot community.²² Since agreement on these points was evidently not achieved, de Cullar recessed the talks 22 June until the Secretary General could assess the situation. On 30 July 1979 Denktash put forward a proposal for resuming them, but he also asked the Greek side to reconfirm publicly the statement made in the United Security Council on 31 August 1977 by then Cypriot Foreign Minister Christophides that the Greek-Cypriot proposals of April 1977 were based on a bizonal solution of the Cyprus Republic's territory. Denktash further called for intercommunal talks to establish four committees on Varosha, on point six of the 19 May agreement, on a constitution and on territory. On 2 August Denktash reconfirmed his support for the validity of the 19 May accord and suggested that his proposal was in arrangement with it.

It is perhaps not accidental that the Kyprianou was in New York to address the United Nations General Assembly at the time he made his negative assessment, for it was at the 34 session of the General Assembly on 27 November 1979

22. United Nations Document A/34/620, p.3, para 7.

that resolution 34/30 passed, a sixteen point statement that reiterated previous United Nations resolutions and demanded "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence from the Republic of Cyprus", namely Turkish Troops. Resolution 34/30 also put pressure on both sides by requesting in point 12 that the Secretary General report to the General Assembly by 31 March 1980 on progress achieved in intercommunal negotiations, failing which the President of the General Assembly was to appoint an ad hoc committee of up to seven member states to recommend steps for implementation of the previous Assembly resolutions on Cyprus. Resolution 34/30 also requested the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of the resolution, that is to offer his assessment as to who was blocking progress.²³

In short some real pressure exerted for the parties at least to appear to resume negotiations by 31 March 1980, lest a General Assembly Committee be created to be intervened in the negotiations, a supervision not to linking of the Turkish side. It is rumoured that the Secretary General has a package of proposals to help break the deadlock,

23. United Nations General Assembly Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/34/30), 27 Nov. 1979, p.2, Point 5.

yet the fact is that the talks have not begun again. Waldhiem is prepared to clearly to resume the talk early in 1980, he remains convinced that the intercommunal talks under his auspices "represent the best available method for negotiating a just and lasting political settlement of Cyprus problem based on the legitimate rights of the two communities. Waldhiem has been forced to face the fact that "after nearly five years of intermittant talks, the credibility of this negotiating method hangs in the balance."²⁴

Substantive intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot representative were reserved in September 1980, after setting out the agenda. The talks, which were held initially on a weekly basis but latterly rather less frequently, during the year 1981-83.

24. Camp, n.17, p.68.

CHAPTER III

1983 UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE

On 1st November 1983 the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state. The event came as a new turning point to the twenty years long of inter-communal strife in Cyprus.

The socialist government under Andreas Papandreu as Prime Minister in Greece, which came into power in 1981. The Cyprus question a great deals in its foreign policy framework about the usefulness of intercommunal talks, Papandreu government advocates mobilization of world opinion for securing the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus as a prerequisite to a negotiated settlement. The Papandreu line has been welcomed by the Kyprianou government of Cyprus¹. Cyprus desired to raise the matter at the United Nations General Assembly particularly in view of the fact that the United Nations sponsored talks during 1981-82 made little progress on vital issues of territory and constitution. Moreover Cyprus encouraged by the support it received at the New Delhi Non-Aligned

1. Nancy Crashaw, "Cyprus: A Failure in Western Diplomacy", The World Today, October 1984, p.73.

Summit held in 1983. Accordingly despite the risks and involved, the Cyprus made a new appeal to the United Nations General Assembly in 1983 May.

United Nations Resolution 37/253 (13 May 1983):

A Non-aligned draft was adopted by the General Assembly demanding immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces and the voluntary return of the refugees in safety to their former homes. Also calls for an international conference on Cyprus and demilitarization of the whole island were renewed. The draft sponsored by Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, Mali, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. Restore 37/253, 13 May 1983. Turkey voted against opposing the text vehements, Turkey observed that it could support only the reaffirmation of the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, and stressed that it forces in Cyprus were not of occupation but of protection. Turkey explained in detail why the text was unacceptable to Turkish Cypriot community and why, if adopted, it could not be taken into consideration in the intercommunal negotiations and would lead to a revolution of the community's position.² Turkey pointed out the draft

2. Turkey's main objections were that: implementation of paragraph two could result in the annihilation of Turkish Cypriot community, paragraph 3,4 and 11 were incompatible with provisions of the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements. Paragraph seven could be interpreted as making troops withdrawal a condition

was totally defective of the intercommunal talks a sovereign, independent, territorial integrated and non-aligned Republic of Cyprus, which should also bicomunal, bizonal and federal, as specified in the high-level agreements and in the Secretary General's 1980 statement.

Perhaps the United Nations General Assembly's resolution was an important factor that led to the unilateral declaration of independence on 15th November 1983. However it was to be noted that declaration left the door wide open to the eventual formation of a federation with the Greek Cypriot sector and for the continuation of the negotiations under the auspices of United Nations Secretary General Mr. Perez de Culler.

Perez de Culler served for two years in Cyprus as the United Nations special representative. He returned to the island briefly 1980 on an abortive mission to break

conta...
for continuing the negotiations, thereby offering the Greek Cypriot community and Greece opportunity to sabotage or prolong those negotiations, the Secretary General's opening statement at the formal resumption of intercommunal talks in 1980 and the 1981 "evaluation paper" were not cited as part of the basis for negotiations, paragraph 9 contradicted the Secretary General's evaluation of the talks. Paragraph 13 did not correspond entirely to legal realities - the Secretary General's mission of good office had been interested to him by a council resolution and not also by Assembly resolutions, a mission which paragraph 16, owing to its ambiguity, was liable to prejudice, and paragraph 15 contained an inopportune recommendation. See, United Nations Document A 37/253, May 1983.

one of the numerous deadlocks which have beset the intercommunal talks since they first started in June 1968. His latest initiative, first mooted last spring, was complicated from the outset by the sharp deterioration in Greek-Turkish relation since Andreas Papandreou's Socialist Movement.

International Reactions:

Reactions to the unilateral declaration from different quarters of the international covenant were critical of the action. There only one exception, Turkey recognised the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), since a just and lasting through the intercommunal negotiations was not forthcoming. President Kypreanou appealed to the international community exert its influence with Turkey to rescind the illegal actions by Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and "to face the Cyprus issue with a different perspective, in accordance with international law."

Greece described the declaration of independence and recognition of the TRNC by Turkey as a flagrant violation of all agreements and the United Nations resolutions and stated that Greece, as a guarantor power was proceeding with all necessary actions to preserve the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and restore the unity of the Republic of Cyprus within the framework of the United

Nations resolutions.

The United States also expressed its dismay at the move by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and its regret that the Turkish government had recognized this new policy, and urged that no further international recognition be granted to the self-declared country.

The Response of the United Nations:

The United Nations Security Council debated the situation in Cyprus on 17-18 November at the formal request of the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Greece. The Greek Foreign Minister and Rauf Denktash took part in the deliberations. Turkish representative maintained that the proclamation of independence was not contrary to 1960 treaties, since the bicommunal constitutional order established by those treaties had been destroyed by the Greek Cypriot community, he said, the right of self-determination had been recreated for the Turkish Cypriot community which had now exercised that right. Nevertheless Denktash expressed readiness ready to negotiate to establish a bizonal federal system.³ He asked

"If the Security Council decides not only that we should be condemned but that we should not be recognised at all, who is going to benefit from that? Will the

3. Kissinger's Contemporary Archives, January 1984.

Council be helping the negotiations process by coming out with such a declaration? Do members think that we shall negotiate with people who have called themselves the Government of Cyprus for 20 years without our participation in any of the organs of the state, who robbed us of all our rights and of all our liberties and who tried to destroy us in Cyprus. Do members think that they can give them the mandate to continue to slaughter and then we will meet around the table and negotiate."

Pakistan expressed it had consistently emphasized the need for promoting confidence between the two communities to ensure progress in the intercommunal talks. It deeply regretted that Assembly resolution continued to remain intensive to those concerns, widening the rift between the communities and deepening the Turkish Cypriot's frustration. Pakistan cautioned against adopting a resolution condemning the Turkish Cypriot community whose cooperation was "a sine qua non for reestablishing the unity of Cyprus".⁴ Such a resolution was more likely to exacerbate bad feelings and aggravate the situation it sought to cure.

The present text had been modified to exclude any reference to the intercommunal negotiations, thus robbing the resolution of any explicit mandate for Secretary-General to promote conciliation between the two communities. For that reason, it was unacceptable to Pakistan.

4. See the United Nations Chronicle, January 1984, p.76.

Jordan affirmed its full commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-aligned status of Cyprus and expressed satisfaction that no delegation had expressed objections to that stand, which had been the "point of the departure" for all concerned since the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Jordan disapproved of the recent developments in Cyprus as a means of solving the Cyprus problem. While the Council and Assembly had dealt appropriately with the regional aspect of the question there was a kind of "Lacuna" in the treatment of the internal aspect.⁵

There was much in the draft resolution to which Jordan did not object in principle. Unfortunately, it failed to take into account the international problem of Cyprus. Jordan felt the provisional version of the draft would have provided a better basis for solution, since it emphasized the Secretary-General's role.

The Security Council on 18 November adopted resolution 541⁶ (1983) submitted by 13 votes to one abstention.

5. Ibid., pp.77-78.

6. China, France, Guyana, Malta, Netherland, Nicaragua, Poland, Togo, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Zaire, and Zimbabwe voted in favour, while Pakistan voted against and Jordan abstained. See the Security Council Resolution 541 (1983).

The resolution deemed the declaration of Turkish Cypriot authorities which purport to create an independent state in Northern Cyprus, to be incompatible with the 1960 treaties of establishment and guarantee stated that the attempt to create a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was invalid and would contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus, deplored the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of the part of Republic of Cyprus, considered the declaration legally invalid and called for its withdrawal, called for urgent and effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions of 1974 and 1975, requested the United Nations Secretary General to pursue his mission of good offices and called upon the parties to co-operate fully with him in this respect, called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Republic of Cyprus and not to recognize any other Cypriot state, and called upon states and two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation.

The Secretary General, in the follow-up efforts, pointed out both to Denktash and Turkey's Foreign Minister, that initial steps in respect of Varosha could be worked out between the United Nations and Turkish Cypriots, since they involved making territory currently under Turkish Cypriot control part of the UNFICYP, buffer zone. Following

encouraging signals from the Turkish Government to the effect inter alia, that the designated area of Varosha would be placed under provisional United Nations administrations by the United Nations Secretary General's Acting Special Representative expressed the hope that the area west of Dherinia Avenue would be placed under United Nations administration and settled by Greek Cypriots in two or more successive phase.

On 2 January 1984 Mr. Denktash transmitted his proposals made to the Greek Cypriot side on the resettlement of Varosha, the opening of Nicosia international airport, missing persons, and general framework of relations between the two sides for progress towards a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. On 11 January, Cyprus transmitted Government's official comments on 9 January on those proposals, also calling for the withdrawal of the 'declaration of independence' in the north. Also on 11 January 1984 Cyprus drew attention to President Kyprianou's statement on his submission to the Secretary General of a framework for a settlement of the Cyprus problem.⁷ On 20 January Cyprus protested and drew attention to extensive military exercises by Turkey in the north, alleging repeated violations of Cyprus airspace. On the other hand, Turkey stated that the exercises had taken place within the

7. See, The United Nations Year Book 1984, p.241.

boundaries of northern 'Republic' and added that prior written notification had been made to UNFICYP.

Nonetheless Cyprus requested that the Security Council meet to consider the grave situation in Cyprus caused by the actions of Turkey and take effective measures in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the full implementation of the Council resolution regarding Cyprus. The council met between 3 and 11 May and the council adopted resolution 550(1984).⁸ Pakistan explaining its negative vote, said what was required was the giving of an open mandate to Secretary-General to bring about conciliation of the two communities and to restart the intercommunal talks, the only credible process for a just settlement. The text made no mention of such resumption and was one-sided, it hoped that despite the flawed mandate, the Secretary-General would be able to renew his contact.

Secretary General in his 1 June 1984 report to the Security Council on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covering 1 December 1983 to May 1984, the Secretary-General updated UNFICYP activities and his good offices mission. Secretary General reported that, since the adoption of

8. For detail, see the Security Council Official Records, S/16550.

the resolution 550(1984) on 11 May, he had held meeting with President Kyprianou on 12 May and Mr. Denktash on 14 May. Regrettably the period under review did not record any progress but, if his mandate were continued by the council, he would again consult the parties. It would not have been unreasonable to ask them to avoid actions that prejudiced the agreed basis for a settlement and to proceed without further delay to seek solution on that basis, aimed at establishment of a federal state.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Conflict situation in Cyprus it has remained one of the most challenging tasks before the United Nations for more than twenty five years -- particularly it is so during the years 1974-84.

The developments associated with the period, 1974-84, viz. The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the Unilateral proclamation of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, were part and product of the complicated history of modern Cyprus. In other words Turkish action which was contrary to the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter had a background. Cyprus as a society was vertical divided mainly by a majority community which spoke Greek and the minority community which spoke Turkish language. Besides the differences in religious belief between the two communities they had almost irreconcilable differences as the future ~~shape~~ and status after the end of the British colonial rule. The Greek Cypriot community demanded enosis - unification with Greece, while Turkey community strongly opposed the demand and favour partition of the island. As a natural corollary, Greece supported the Greek Cypriot views whereas Turkey had sympathy with the Turkish community of Cyprus. The British on their

part took full advantage their unfuelled suspicions. British neither continue its colonial rule nor bridge the intercommunal gulf before they left the island. As a result what had emerged in the form of an independent, sovereign republic of Cyprus in August 1960 was a mere state and not a nation. The constitution which embodied a unrealistic scheme of power-sharing resulted in complete collapse of the functioning of the government. While the majority community intended to abrogate the 1960 agreements, the minority community threaten to bring Turkish military troops in the land for the protection of their rights. The problem became compounded by the fact that both the contenders for influence in Cyprus namely Greece and Turkey - along with Britain were key members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But the problem could not be treated entirely as an intra-alliance matter because of the resistance effort by Cyprus which belonged to the Non-Aligned Movement as its original member. Moreover the ideological adversary of NATO alliance the Soviet Union vociferously warned against any NATO action imposed against the will of Cyprus.

It is in the context of every rare combination of internal and international factors (and the interaction between these factors too) that the United Nations remain the only viable and acceptable instrument for resolving the conflict in Cyprus. When the conflict was brought before the United Nations in 1964 in wake of intercommunal

clashes and the threat of Turkish military intervention, the United Nations had responded in its a characteristic way: by sending a United Nations peace-keeping operation known as United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

An overall assessment of the United Nations role in Cyprus could be made at three levels in terms of the contribution of (a) the deliberative organs like Security Council, (b) operational activities like those of the UNFICYP and (c) the mediation effort undertaken by Secretary General. These aspects remain relevant analysis of developments of 1964, 1974 and 1983. The United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly had through debates and resolutions on the problem exercise moderating influence throughout the years.

They appealed to both the contending communities of the Cyprus to remain clam in 1964, called upon Turkey in 1974 to end this military intervention against Cyprus, and deplore the unilateral declaration of independence of Northern Turkish Cyprus. In other words the United Nations bodies have consistently reaffirmed the charters, principles of respect to sovereignty and territorial integrity which Cyprus is entitled to as the member of the United Nations. The same time Security Council had envisaged a peaceful solution on the lines of a single federal, bicomunal, independent, non-aligned country.

At the operational level, the UNFICYP, which was a United Nations peace-keeping operation was non-fighting and impartial in character, strove to create a climate suitable to a negotiated settlement by way of keeping communal peace all these years by way of preventing military confrontation between the Turkish troops on the one hand, and the Cyprus National Guard on the other since 1974. In fact the United Nations Force had exhibited both tact and toughness in the years during 1974-84, for example as a force which was originally mandated to keep internal peace had effortlessly transformed itself into a buffer separating forces of the two countries since 1974. When in July-August 1974 Turkey threatened to use force to drive the United Nations forces out of the strategic Nicosia Airport. The United Nations Force became tough and was ready to battle it out. Again even after the 1983 the unilateral declaration by North Cyprus which was unequivocally condemned by the United Nations, the United Nations force had no problem of access to areas in Northern Cyprus and no problem of contact with the leaders of Northern Cyprus. A remarkable example of the tact! Yet critics may deplore the United Nations' failure to prevent the Turkish military intervention in 1974 or secure Turkish withdrawals thereafter. This criticism arises from mainly lack of proper understanding of the potentials and the limitations of the

UNFICYP. As already mentioned United Nations force was not equipped to fight a war, it is a non-fighting force. Turkey in 1974 was determined to rush in and present a fait accompli. The United Nations force again could not be expected to use force to prevent foreign military intervention. Nor had United Nations force the authority to use force to evict Turkish troops out of the Cyprus. That is why the UNFICYP was a peace-keeping force. It would work with consent and cooperation of the states concerned. Its aim is limited to the extent of maintaining truce along the buffer zone across the country so as to create an environment in which the countries concern themselves may work for a solution.

At the third level of mediation efforts, no one could criticise the United Nations for the lack of efforts. The Secretary General and several of his special representatives to Cyprus held course of rounds of negotiations over the years to help narrowing of differences. There were times when prospects for a settlement seemed round the corner and disappeared soon. However the patient efforts resulted in modest break through such as the 1977 four points guidelines and 1979 ten point agreement. And yet a settlement eludes.

In other words in concrete terms the United Nations role in Cyprus since 1974-84 was marked by its effort to

avert further outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Cyprus (possibly even Greece) judged in this light the United Nations efforts have hardly been wasteful.

True, the maintenance of status quo cannot be presented as a solution; it is only a necessary pre-requisite. A solution depended on the will of the Turkish Cypriot and Greece Cypriot community and a helpful international environment. It is particularly the latter factor which this study wishes to stress as a stimulant.

Reference here is to the new international climate which is characterized by the end of the Cold War, revival of the United Nations as an instrument in resolving a variety of complicated regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Southern Africa, Central America etc. Cyprus is no less complicated than the ones mentioned above. One would hope that the super powers include Cyprus in their agenda and pressurise parties concerned to agree on a solution on the lines of a united, federal independent Cyprus with the necessary guarantees by the United Nations. In any case, the sooner a solution the better.

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Abbreviations used in Text

ACL	American Confederation of Labour
AHEPA	American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association
BIS	British Information Services
CBS	Cyprus Broadcasting Station
CMC	Cyprus Mines Corporation
EXCO	Executive Council
GAOR	General Assembly Official Records [UN]
H.C. Deb.	House of Commons Debates
H.L. Deb.	House of Lords Debates
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
JCC	Joint Constitutional Commission
MELF	Middle East Land Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PTUC	Pancyprian Trade Union Committee
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNSCOB	United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans
USIS	United States Information Services

GREEK AND TURKISH


AKEL	<i>Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou</i> Reform Party of the Working People
ANE	<i>Alkimos Neolaia Tis EOKA</i> Valiant Youth of EOKA
AOY	<i>Anorthotiki Organosis Neolaias</i> Reform Youth Organisation
EAM	<i>Ethnikon Apelefsitherotikon Metopon</i> National Liberation Front
EAS	<i>Ethnikos Apelefsitherotikos Synaspismos</i> National Liberation Coalition
EDEK	<i>Ethniki Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou</i> National Democratic Union of Cyprus
EDMA	<i>Eniaion Dimokratikon Metopon Anadimiurgias</i> United Democratic Reconstruction Front


400 *Appendices*

ELAS	<i>Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos</i> People's National Liberation Army
EMAK	<i>Ethnikon Metapon Apeleftheroseos Kyprou</i> Cyprus National Liberation Front
EOKA	<i>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston</i> National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
EPEK	<i>Ethniki Proodeftiki Enosis Kentrou</i> National Progressive Union of the Centre (Greece)
GSEL	<i>Yeniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ellados</i>
GGCL	Greek General Confederation of Labour
KATAK	<i>Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu</i> Association of the Turkish Cypriot Minority
KEM	<i>Kypriakon Enotikon Metapon</i> Cyprus Enosis Front
KEM	<i>Kypriaki Etairia Metaphoron</i>
CTC	Cyprus Transport Company
KKE	<i>Kommunistikon Komma Tis Ellados</i> The Communist Party of Greece
KTP	<i>Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi</i> Cyprus is Turkish Party
OAE	<i>Organosis Aristeron Ethnikophronon</i> Left-wing Nationalists' Organisation
OAP	<i>Organosis Aristeron Patrioton</i> Left-wing Patriots' Organisation
OHEN	<i>Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon</i> Orthodox Christian Union of Youth
PEAEK	<i>Panellinikos Epitropi Agonos Enoseos Kyprou</i> Panhellenic Committee for the Struggle for the Union of Cyprus
PEK	<i>Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou</i> Panagrarian Union of Cyprus
PEKA	<i>Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos</i> Political Committee of the Cyprus Struggle
PEO	<i>Pankyprios Ergatiki Omospondia</i> Pancyprian Federation of Labour (Old Trade Unions)
PEOM	<i>Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Mathiton</i> Pancyprian National Organisation of Pupils
PEON	<i>Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neolaias</i> Pancyprian National Organisation of Youth
SEK	<i>Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprou</i> Confederation of Cypriot Workers (New Trade Unions)
SEKA	<i>Syndonistiki Epitropi Kypriakos Agonos</i> Coordination Committee for the Cyprus Struggle
TMT	<i>Türk Mukavemet Teshkilati</i> Turkish Resistance Organisation



C. IS – Distribution of Population by Ethnic Group (1960 census) and Turkish occupied area on and after 16 August 1974 based on information provided by the map prepared by the Department of Lands and Surveys, Cyprus, May 1975





CYPRUS - Principal Features and Mediterranean Context



— District boundaries



1817

