

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFERS TO SOUTH-ASIAN COUNTRIES.

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DEDICATED

TO

BABA & MAA

(TO WHOM I OWE EVERYTHING IN MY LIFE)




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
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Certified that the dissertation entitled
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and quality of which he himself is solely responsible.
This work may be placed before the examiners for
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PREFACE

Apart from the superpowers, China also impinges upon the South-Asian security environment. In fact it is the third most important player in the South-Asian geopolitics. Due to its close contiguity with China and its strategic location, South-Asia occupies a core position in Chinese strategic thinking. Due to a variety of geopolitical and strategic reasons, China has a deep and abiding interest in the developments taking place in the South-Asian region. The strategic importance of the South Asian region has increased sharply in Chinese strategic thinking after the gradual deterioration of Sino-Soviet and Indo-Soviet relations in the late fifties and early sixties. Besides that, India's growing importance in the Third World, NAM and its impressive development in the field of science and technology were matters of concern to China. China was particularly worried about the possible consequences of India's emergence as the major power in South-Asia, because India stood as an obstacle to the path of China's long cherished aspirations for achieving the status of undisputed great Asian power. And in India, China found its only competitor. Moreover, China was also worried about the growing influence of Soviet Union in the South Asian region due to its close friendship with India.

Therefore, the basic thrust of the Chinese policies in this region have been to cut down Indian and soviet spheres and levels of influence.

China's counter strategy assumed various forms. Firstly, it took upon itself the task of strengthening Pakistani armed forces and set it on a collision course with India. Secondly, China started forming closer ties with India's neighbours and to wean them away from India. This was part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy of isolating India by forming independent centres of power around India, viz-Pakistan, Bangladesh, SriLanka and Nepal. It is in this backdrop that China uses military and economic aid to the various South-Asian countries as an instrument of diplomacy and a means to strengthen it's position vis-a-vis India.

The basic objectives behind this study is to bring out an objective assessment of the compulsions behind and constraints on the Chinese arms transfers/aid to the various South-Asian countries and also to examine the role of arms transfers as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy and to study the underlying strategic and commercial considerations.

This study also seeks to make an analytical study of the possible interlink, if any, between the prevailing political situation and regime in a country in particular

and the region in general and the amount/level of Chinese assistance/response to the situation.

An attempt is also made to make a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the varied Indian responses to the Chinese arms transfers to different countries in the region and to make a futuristic assessment of the continuing Chinese arms transfers to the countries of the region in view of the changed global and regional scenario, based on past experience.

The research work has been divided into the following chapters -

- Chapter 1 - Introduction and China's policy towards South Asia.
- Chapter 2 - Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan.
- Chapter 3 - Chinese arms transfers to Bangladesh.
- Chapter 4 - Chinese arms transfers to Sri Lanka.
- Chapter 5 - Chinese arms transfers to Nepal.
- Chapter 6 - Conclusion.

The first Chapter explicates the topic and discusses briefly the objectives, motivations and successes or failures of the Chinese policy. It also examines the importance of South-Asia in China's strategic thinking, China as a factor in Indian foreign policy and finally arms transfers as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy.

Chapter No. 2 to 5 examine the motivations, amount, levels, types and successes and failures of Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Srilanka and Nepal.

Chapter 6, which is the conclusion, summarises the major findings of the research project and examine the future prospects and likely trends in continuing Chinese association in the region. It also provides a picture of Chinese arms sale qualities, quantities, terms and conditions, social, political and economic implications on recipient countries, technology levels etc. in the South-Asian context.

Methodology

Historic - analytical method is employed as principal tool of the research project. It takes a holistic approach, i.e. it has an analysis of the wider issues involved with an integral approach instead of examining various issues piecemeal. The research work has mainly depended upon secondary source materials. But China being a communist country, there is no free and reliable flow of information as such and when it comes to the military aspects, the information available is almost non-existent and shrouded in secrecy. This has been a major handicap faced by the researcher while undertaking the research work. Whatever information or material is available are second

hand and based primarily on western sources. Besides that, the available information and materials are highly diffused and unsystematic.

Lastly it needs to be mentioned that for the purpose of this research, the meaning and scope of ^{arms} transfers is as follows -

"Arms transfer represents the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit or cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as "conventional", including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunitions, support equipment and other commodities considered primarily economic in nature. Among the items included are tactical guided missiles and rockets, military air-craft, naval vessel, armoured and non-armoured military vehicles, communication and electronic equipments, artillery, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition, other ordnance parachutes and uniforms. Also included are transfers of equipment for defence industries. Excluded by definition are nuclear, chemical & biological weapons and strategic missile systems. Also excluded are food stuffs, medical equipment and other items potentially useful to the military but with alternative civilian uses."¹

1. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers (ACDA), 1971-80, p.106)

At the time of selecting the topic for research I did not have the confidence that I will be able to do justice to it. I am extremely thankful to Prof. S.D. Muni who created the confidence in me. He has been much more than a guide to me. He was like a father figure - loving, caring, sympathetic but at the same time stern and reprimanding when I played truant or failed to live upto his expectations. He is a task master and on many occasions I failed to come up to his expectations. However, he set aside several of his other commitments to go through my drafts and suggest improvements and modifications at very short notices. Working with Prof. Muni has been a rich and rewarding experience for me as I discovered the soft and sympathetic heart concealed behind the facade of his stern looks. Without for his ungrudging help and guidance I would not have been able to complete my dissertation today. I shall always remain obliged to him.

I owe a special debt to Badri, who acted as a amanuensis during the final stages of writing my dissertation as I was badly injured in an accident. He wrote the complete final draft of my dissertation and also did the proof-reading. Besides that he has been a constant source of inspiration to me during my troubled days.

I am grateful to Murli Bhai for his help and guidance in preparing my dissertation and providing me with useful materials, data and preparing the tables etc.

I am also thankful to Ashok Bhai, Tony, Devesh, Ravishekhar, Kulu Bhai, Sahadevan, Biplab, Samiran da, Dilip, Debasis and a host of other friends and well wishers for their help and encouragement during the various stages of my work.

I am also thankful to the staff of libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute of Defence Studies Analysis & American Centre who helped me in finding materials and assisted me in my research work.

Last but not the least, I am grateful to my parents and my brother and sisters for their inspiration and encouragement, without which this work would not have seen the light of the day.

I am also thankful to my typist M/s Sharma Photostat who typed my dissertation error free and that too within a record time.

Lastly, there are bound to be many errors and shortcomings in the work for which I am alone responsible.

Himansu Kumar Bose
HIMANSU KUMAR BOSE

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

AND

CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH-ASIA

The region called South-Asia comprises of seven countries, viz. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, SriLanka and Maldives. The unified India under the British empire was partitioned in 1947 and Pakistan came into existence as an independent State. Again in 1971, Pakistan was vivisected to give birth to independent Bangladesh. With the exception of Nepal and Bhutan, the remaining five countries were colonies and part of the British Indian Empire at one point of time or other. The South-Asian region being Indo-Centric, it was quite normal and expected that India would play a dominant role in the South-Asian affairs. But mutual distrusts, cold-war rivalries between two power blocs and the emergence of China as a major power after the cultural revolution have resulted in a very complex scenario in the South-Asian region. The geostrategic significance of the South-Asian region is increasing day by day in the arena of international politics. It figures prominently in the geo-strategic calculations of the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China (P.R.C). While the global

interests of the Soviet Union and the United States are well-known in this region, China's interests being more direct and persistent are of greater importance.

Importance of South-Asia in China's Strategic Thinking:-

Unlike the two super powers, China has normally treated itself not as an intrusive power but as a part of the South-Asian region. The reasons advanced by Beijing are - historical linkage, geographical contiguity, common heredity with the mongoloid group of people in India, Nepal and Bhutan etc. ¹

The logical conclusion of such a policy perception is that China assumes that it is its natural right to get involved in the intra-regional affairs of South-Asia.

"China's strategic threat assessment and security conceptions move along two interrelated lines of thought. The first is its assessment of the direct threat from its most powerful neighbours like U.S.S.R, Japan, India and Vietnam. The other is its fear of isolation and encirclement by the two super powers through their network of allies and bases." ² These precepts have led to the

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1. Pramod K.Mishra, "China and South-Asia", China Report, Vol.21, No.5, Sept-Oct. 1985, p.406.
 2. Y.Vertberzer, "China and South-Asia", Strategic Digest, July - 87.

recognition of the importance of the South-Asian region as a whole and also various individual states to China's strategic interests. The South-Asian region occupies a very important position in Chinese strategic thinking due to its close proximity with China and increasing Soviet influence. Besides that, China is constantly bothered by the existence of hostile minority races like Tibetans and Muslims in Xinjiang province and regions bordering Soviet Union, asking for greater autonomy and seeking outside support. Moreover, the super powers have extended their sphere of influence in this strategic region. Chinese efforts in this region have been directed to countervail the forces of distabilisation by minimising the sources of threat. With the deterioration of Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet Relations, the Chinese perceived that the principal threat in the region was "Soviet Social Imperialism"³ and hence, the Chinese foreign policy endeavours have been geared towards containing the Soviet influence in the region which according to them, was necessitated by the Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1971. Moreover, the growing power potential of India after the 1971 war with Pakistan and the restoration of India's status among the developing nations have also been an important consideration in China's South-Asian

3. Beijing review, 30 april 1969.

perspective. This combined with the emerging Indo-Soviet axis in the region, has been the major variable impinging upon Chinese policy towards smaller states of the region.⁴ So, the general orientation of Chinese diplomacy in order to curb the growing influence of India and the Soviet Union, has been to provide alternative forces and to cultivate friendship with powers hostile to their dominance in the region. It is in this context of counter strategy that Beijing has realised that Pakistan in particular and the South-Asian countries in general can play an important role in Chinese relationship with not only India, but also with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the third world at large.

India stands as the major obstacle in the path of Chinese progress towards acquiring the status of undisputed great power in Asia. China felt concerned with the growing role and power of India within the region and outside. India's growing importance in the third world, Non-Alignment Movement and its impressive development in the field of

4. For an excellent analysis on Chinese Foreign Policy see - Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (London : CroomHelm, 1978) and Michael Yahuda, *China's Foreign Policy After Mao* (London: Macmillan, 1983). Also See - Joseph Cheng, "China's Foreign Policy in the 80's", *China Report*, May-June 1985, pp.197-222; *World Focus*, "China's Foreign Policy: National Interest before Ideology", June-84, pp.3-30; G.W.Choudhury, "China's Policy towards South-Asia", *Problems of Communism*, vol.26, no.6, Nov-Dec.1977.

science and technology as well as its military potential were matters of concern to China. China was particularly worried about the possible consequences of India's emergence as the major power in South Asia. In the words of a political commentator, China considered this to be - "A Soviet plan to foster India and turn it into a sub-superpower in the South-Asian subcontinent as its assistant and partner in committing an aggression against Asia. Thus, it believed that the Soviet Union had come a step closer to the fulfillment of its aspirations for world hegemony through -

- (i) expansion by proxy and
- (ii) the establishment of an Asian Collective Security System."⁵

China also feared that India could become the common ground where the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would form a bridgehead in Asia to contain the spread of Chinese influence. That, this fear of China was totally unfounded and never materialised is another matter.

So naturally, the first task before China was to restore atleast a semblance of balance to the regional power structure. For that purpose, China took upon itself the

5. Vertberzer, No.1.

task of strengthening Pakistani armed forces agreeing to replenish them without cost. Therefore, it is quite evident that the Chinese actions have been primarily designed at curtailing Indian and Soviet influence in the South Asian region, making it a Zero-sum-game where one's loss is another's gain. Chinese actions were based on the premise that it could make things difficult for India by forming closer ties with Pakistan - India's main rival in the region. This could be part of a more comprehensive Chinese strategy of isolating India by forming closer ties of friendship with India's neighbours, viz. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh (after 1975).

China as a factor in Indian Foreign Policy :-

For over three decades, China has been a critical factor in Indian foreign policy, nearly as problematic as Pakistan. Yet the Chinese dimension is qualitatively different from that of India's western neighbour. The Sino-Soviet rift, the uprising of Tibet, the granting of political asylum to Dalai Lama by India, the Sino-Indian border dispute and the growing friendship between India and the Soviet Union led to a gradual divergence of opinion and interests between the two countries. After the debacle of the 1962 war, Indian security planners started thinking in terms of modernising Indian armed forces and to develop a

technological infrastructure to counter the Chinese designs. Since then, both India and China have been modernising their armed forces.⁶ Moreover, China's political and military role in Islamabad, Dhaka, Kathmandu and Colombo have made India suspicious and uneasy given the propensity of these regimes to play the China Card against India. China, is a significant supplier of economic and military aid to these regimes, none of which are very friendly towards India. According to a political commentator "Inspite of the humiliating border defeat by China and her continuing policy of creating dissidence in the North Eastern region, providing arms and training facilities to rebel Nagas and Mizos, acquiring a part of occupied Kashmir as a gift after a border agreement with it, somehow, China has never been perceived as a security problem by many people in India. Chinese technological advances, her increasing status as a nuclear power was never received with the same degree of concern by Indian masses as is generally ascribed to the advances made by Pakistan".⁷

Both India and China are ancient civilizations and have a rich cultural history. But ironically that makes

6. Pradyot Pradhan, "People's Republic of China: A Security threat to India", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.11, No.10, January 1988, p.1195.

7. *ibid.*

them enemies instead of friends as both vie for a position of pre-eminence in the Asian region. The problem between India and China is not rooted entirely in history either, despite the fact that China has described India as the legacy of British colonialism immediately after independence. According to one school of thought, contemporary Chinese foreign policy can be linked to a traditional self assertion of moral and cultural superiority based on an extension of hierarchial domestic order. Such persistence of cultural attitudes, images and perceptions have made the Chinese leaders reject the modern nation-state system and continue to seek dominance. Moreover, "The dramatic retrogression of Chinese foreign policy into a xenophobic, narrow nationalist, ultra-left mould in the post-1957 era coupled with it's propensity to turn political differences into territorial and other national issues, the border war, the strategic alliance with Pakistan and the political backing to even the genocide committed by Pakistani armed forces in Bangladesh, the scathing attack on the Tashkent agreement as a Soviet-Indian ploy, the support to ultra-left and secessionist groups in India and the constant military pressure and threatening language have all contributed for the worsening Sino-Indian relations and the resultant Chinese drive to cut down Indian levels and

spheres of influence".⁸

It is in this backdrop that China uses military and economic aid to various South-Asian countries as an instrument of diplomacy and a means to strengthen its position vis-a-vis India. But no assessment of China's policies and their future course would be complete without a reference to the weakening political and economic structures in South Asia and the role of Tibet, not only in the Sino-Indian relations, but also in Chinese relations with other countries. China opened communication and transportation links between Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Xinjiang on the one hand and between Nepal and Tibet on the other, ultimately linking Nepal and Pakistan. The dependence on passage through Indian territory was thus reduced and cooperation was enhanced among the region's smaller states. But most importantly, it is the contradictions within the region which would matter most for the furtherance of Chinese interests in this region. There are many contradictions in the area - the principal being the one between India and Pakistan. And China is sucked into the vortex of subcontinental politics due to the inner contradictions existing in the South-Asian region.

8. Sujit Dutta, "Sino-Indian Relations : Some Issues", **Strategic Analysis**, Vol.11, No.11, February 1988, pp.1239-64.

Arms Transfers as an Instrument of Chinese Foreign Policy :

"Arms transfers are an essential component of contemporary international affairs. Arms transfer and trade describe the transactions and movement of weapons between various countries either in the form of aid or trade".⁹ Arms transfers have become an important sub-system in the existing state of multiple relations among states. An amalgamation of politico-strategic and economic factors determine the decisions of a sale or transfer of arms.¹⁰ "Military aid, like war, is a continuation of foreign policy by other means. Chinese aid is no exception. Between the two dimensions of Chinese foreign policy - the political and the military - there lies the link of military aid".¹¹

Some important motivations for arms transfers are :

(i) Influence and Leverage :-

A major rationale for the arms transfer has been the influence the supplier gains over the recipient nation. As an announced objective, regime support would

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9. S.D.Muni, **Arms Build-up and Development: Linkages in the Third World**, Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence No.22 (Heritage Publishers, 1983), p.5.
 10. For a detailed analysis of arms sales, see - Andrew J. Pierre, **The Global Politics of Arms Sales**, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982).
 11. Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, **China and the Arms Trade**, (Sydney: Croom Helm Australia Private Ltd., 1985), p.1.

appear to be one of the most pervasive motives underlying arms transfer behaviour of large and small suppliers. Also, arms can provide ways and means of influence political and military elites.

(ii) Economic Benefits :-

Economic benefits are accorded growing importance while explaining motives for arms transfers. Arms sale have come to be viewed as an earner of foreign exchange and contributor to the balance of payments. In addition, the export of arms is seen as an excellent way to create economies of scale, thereby reducing the per unit costs of R&D.

While there are many arms transfer decisions which can be classified as belonging to purely one or the other of the headings above - the majority of arms transfer decisions do not lend themselves to such easy and pure classification. "The objectives of arms transfers could be pure (Either foreign policy or economic objective) or mixed with one objective predominant (Again either foreign policy or economic) or mixed with the predominant objective not clearly distinguishable".¹² In other words, a significant

12. Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Evolving Patterns of the International Arms Trade with the Third World", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.11, No.11, February 1988, p.1300.

proportion of arms transfers, particularly in case of China, are in pursuit of strategic policy and not for monetary gains. A crucial characteristic of the Chinese supplies in the early days had been their non-commercial nature. Unlike other small arms supplier nations, nearly all Chinese weapons were delivered as fraternal gifts.

But a recent study reveals that China has come a long way from it's earlier ideological stance of not wanting to be a 'Merchant of Death'. The previous perception of China offering special and self-less military assistance seems no longer accurate. The nature of Chinese aid, like much of its foreign policy, have undergone several changes and now appears more complex and contradictory. It began first by giving gifts of arms and then making supplies without any profits to tide over it's foreign exchange shortage. "The post-Mao China has gone the whole hog with vigorous sales promotion drive, including issuing advertisements, high profile participation in defence exhibitions and third party transfers".¹³ The significant aspect of Chinese arms sales is that among the major recipients are India's neighbours - Pakistan, Bangladesh and SriLanka. In the seventies, Pakistan emerged as number one

13. _____, "China and the Arms Trade", **Strategic Analysis**, May 1986.

recipient of Chinese arms supplies. Supplies to Pakistan were increasingly made on commercial basis and less on fraternal. "This includes some concessions like a merchant concedes to a new customer to attract him in future".¹⁴ Bangladesh has also entered as a new member of arms buyer from China during this period.

China already ranks among the top ten arms exporters and was placed seventh on the basis of it's export performance during the 1964-83 period according to the SIPRI statistics.¹⁵ According to some recent estimates, China ranked as the fifth largest exporter of major weapons to third world countries in the 1982-86 period. That means approximately on par with West-Germany, UK and Italy.¹⁶ It's annual earnings from arms markets have been estimated to be well above \$ 1000 million during 1983-84, according to SIPRI statistics.¹⁷ The five years - from 1976 to 1980 - shows a major break with past practices of arms supplies. Pakistan and Egypt emerged as commercial recipients of Chinese arms supplies of 58 per cent of the total. If one

14. Jai Bhagwan, "Chinese Arms Transfers to the Third World: Emerging Patterns of commercialisation", **Strategic Analysis**, September 1988.

15. SIPRI Year Book, 1984.

16. SIPRI Year Book, 1987, p.196.

17. SIPRI Year Book, 1985.

adds Bangladesh as another buyer from China, then there emerges a clear cut trend towards commercialisation of Chinese arms transfers.

However, there are certain distinguishing factors of Chinese arms transfers. Along with the military aid, the training and infrastructure building was quite significant for the recipient countries. In the Chinese policy, a special emphasis was put on training and infra-structure assistance.¹⁸

Secondly, China had no qualms about supplying arms to both the adversaries engaged in armed conflict in the past. For example - China supplied arms and ammunition to both Iran and Iraq when they were fighting the eight year long Gulf-War.¹⁹

Thirdly, China being a Communist country, it is not bothered or constrained by domestic public opinion against any arms sales or transfers and, therefore, it has proved to be a more dependably ally of the various South-Asian states as an arms supplier, unlike the superpowers. The Chinese policy in the region has a continuity without much ups and downs and has been more or less consistent over

18. Bhagwan, no.14, p.636.

19. Gilks and Segal, no.11, p.3.

the years. This is illustrated from the fact that, after the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, the USA put an arms embargo on arms sales to both India and Pakistan. While India had alternative sources of arms supplies, Pakistan was severely handicapped due to the embargo as it depended solely on U.S. supplies. But China came to Pakistan's rescue at that critical moment and till today China has lived up to its reputation as being a dependable arms supplier not only to Pakistan but also other South-Asian countries as well.

This continuity in Chinese arms supplies to India's South-Asian neighbours may also be explained by the fact that curtailing of Indian spheres and levels of influence by creating independent centres of power on India's borders have been the prime objective of Chinese policy in this region. China's supply of military aid and reiteration of co-operation with various South-Asian countries was based on the assumption that it has continuing validity as a constraining influence on India's efforts to seek an overwhelming regional pre-eminence.

CHAPTER-2

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFERS TO PAKISTAN

Although there is an inherent assymetry in resource base, ideological outlook and a divergent socio-political framework, the Sino-Pakistani relations over the last four decades symbolizes continuity and stability within the vortex of international politics. The alliance has survived and prospered through numerous changes in domestic regimes and amidst varying international circumstances. Strategic and political considerations did more to influence the course of relations between Pakistan and China than any other factor. The Sino-Pakistan partnership is of course, rooted in the mutual self interest derived from geopolitics- the desire to contain India and suspicion of the Soviet role in South Asia. On the other hand, China's reiteration of co-operation with Pakistan was based on the premise that it has a continuing validity as a constraining influence on India's efforts to secure an overwhelming regional pre-eminence. Both the parties are aware of the limits of their partnership in strategic terms, yet continue to view the partnership as useful.¹ Here an attempt is made to examine and highlight the growing Sino-Pakistani military

1. Steven I. Levine, "China and South Asia" **Strategic Analysis**, Vol. 12, no. 10, January 1989, P. 1116.

collaboration and its place in china's foreign policy since 1965.

South Asia from the very beginning was a complex challenge to the Chinese foreign policy. With the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations in the late fifties and early sixties, China's south Asian strategy became a function of its longterm pre-occupation with a perceived Soviet threat. Beijing attempted to counter Moscow's strategy by striking at New Delhi. Thus, in the words of a political analyst, "relations between china and India became a hostage to the state of both Sino-Soviet and Indo-Soviet relations. China's counter containment strategy took several forms. The PRC greatly strengthened its ties with Pakistan, elevating the relationship to the status of a de facto alliance. Beijing became the major supplier of military equipment and technology to Islamabad as well as a significant contributor to development assistance".²

Pakistan came to be cultivated by China, mainly for two reasons: "Firstly, in the conduct of Chinese global policies, Pakistan was seen as a link to the middle-east and secondly, in the regional initiatives, Chinese strategy was to forge closer links with South-Asian countries to create

2. Ibid, P. 1110.

a sub-regional balance to counter the Indian pre-eminence in South-Asia."³

The first sign of co-operation between the two countries came to light in 1952 when a barter agreement was signed under which Pakistan exported Rs 97.2 million worth of cotton in return for coal and jute.⁴ The following year a wide ranging agreement on trade was signed between the two countries.

Border negotiations between the two countries started in January 1961 and in December 1962 a joint Sino-Pak communique clearly expressed that "an agreement in principle has been reached on the location and alignment of the boundary actually existing between the two countries."⁵ Under the border agreement Pakistan reportedly ceded to China 10,000 sq.km. of Indian territory in Pakistan. Occupied Kashmir (POK). In return, China is said to have surrendered 1800 sq.km of area containing grazing lands and salt mines.⁶ India vehemently protested the border agreement, calling it a violation of Indian territory.

3. Abha Dixit,, Enduring Sino-Pak Relations: The Military Dimension", **Strategic Analysis**, vol. 12, no.9, P.983.

4. Abha Dixit, "Sino-Pak Relations and Their Implications for India", **Strtategic Analysis**, vol.11, no.9. December 1987, P. 1067.

5. **Pakistan Horizon** (Karachi), First Quarter 1963, P. 82.

6. Mohammed Ahsen Choudhury, "Strategic and Military Dimensions of Pakistand - China Relations", **Pakistan Horizon**, vol.39, no.4, Fourth Quarter 1986, PP. 15-28.

The border agreement was followed by an airline agreement by which PIA became the first foreign airline to have landing facilities in China. A commercial agreement providing each other the Most Favoured Nation treatment in trade, commerce and shipping was also concluded between the two countries.

SINO-PAK MILITARY CO-OPERATION

Although the Chinese established their first high level contact with Pakistan in the early fifties, a very cordial Sino-Indian relationship had prevented the Sino-Pak relations from acquiring a military dimension. However, it was only after Sino-Indian relations deteriorated that China began cultivating Pakistan. Chinese Premier Zhou-en-Lai visited Pakistan in 1964 and voiced strong support for Pakistan's case on Kashmir. The earlier neutrality, which had called for India and Pakistan to resolve the problem bilaterally was given up and the Pakistani position was supported. China expressed the hope that - "The Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan".⁷

After the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Pakistan was disappointed by the U.S. arms embargo on the sub-continent

7. Peking Review, no. 9, 28 February 1964, P. 9.

and began to seek active military co-operation with the Chinese. The realignment of forces in South-Asia forced the Chinese to support Pakistan's rearmament programme. Zhou-en-Lai told a Pakistani group paying a goodwill visit to China that his country would defend Pakistan throughout the world.⁸

The possibility of a Sino-Pak military alliance came to light when President Ayub said in an interview to The Washington Post that, if the threat from India reached such a degree as to threaten the territorial integrity of Pakistan, then Pakistan would be compelled to go into a military alliance with China.⁹

"During the 1965 war, there was considerable speculation about a secret agreement between Pakistan and China. This persistent doubt was somewhat cleared when Bhutto disclosed that he had gone to Beijing during the height of tensions. He was able to gain some armaments and assurance of a certain degree of Chinese support during the Indo-Pak war.¹⁰ China was also concerned about the outcome of the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Because China feared that any shift in the balance of power in the region would be

8. The Observer(London), 21 July 1963.

9. The Washington Post,12 September 1963.

10. Dixit, ibid no. 4, P. 1071.

exploited by the Superpowers to gain a foothold in the region. So, to put pressure on India during the height of tensions, it issued an ultimatum to India to dismantle all military installations on and over China-Sikkim border within three days or face grave consequences. That this threat never materialised is another matter.

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China vehemently opposed the Tashkent agreement as a Superpower, particularly Soviet, conspiracy against it and was highly dissatisfied with the Pakistani participation in the agreement, which it described as a 'dirty trick'. Not prepared to accept the loss of face, it then sought to disrupt the conference. After the ceasefire, China continued with its accusations against India and border provocations and kept alive the military pressure. Between December 1965 and January 1966, China committed 27 border violations- 19 in Ladakh, 4 in NEFA, 1 in UP and 3 in Sikkim.¹¹

Soon after the Tashkent agreement, China began its military supplies to Pakistan. China sent \$ 28 million worth of emergency arms supplies which included T-55 tanks, F-6 fighters and ammunitions to circumvent the U.S. embargo which was still operative. In July 1966, the first agreement between China and Pakistan valued at \$ 120 million was signed which covered the cost of 100 T-59 tanks, 80 F-6's

11. Nancy Jetley, *India-China Relations: 1947-77*, (New Delhi, 1979), P. 237.

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(Mig-19) and 10 IL-28 bombers.¹² Besides that the Chinese also agreed to equip three infantry divisions and helped to build an ammunition factory near Dhaka.¹³

Besides replenishing the severely battered Pakistani armed forces, the Chinese move was also aimed at preventing an improvement in Soviet relations with Pakistan which in turn could have led to some relaxation in Indo-Pak tensions as well.

The reopening of the Silk route linking Xinjiang with the Hunza valley in Pakistan to traders in 1967 was a very important development in Sino-Pak relations both from commercial and military point of view. About a year and half later, work on the all weather Karakoram Highway was started jointly by the Pakistani and Chinese engineers. It provided an all weather motorable link between the two neighbouring countries. It also gave China greater influence in Pakistan and an access to the Arabian sea port of Karachi.¹⁴ Apart from this, the Karakoram Highway has got obvious strategic importance. It links Xinjiang with Tibet through the Aksai

12. **Military Balance** (IISS) 1967-68, P. 49.

13. Y. Vertberzer, "The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pak Relations 1960-80", **The Washington Paper** No. 95, 1983 (Praeger, N.Y.), P. 88.

14. G.W. Choudhury, "China's Policy Towards Pakistan", **Current History**, April 1979, P. 181.

Chin area. In case of an attack on Pakistan by Sea, military aid from China can reach Pakistan through this route.

"Another significant contribution of China to Pakistan's defence needs has been the establishment of a heavy mechanical complex (HMC) at Taxila at a cost of about \$ 7 million. This was the first industrial complex of its kind established by China in a non-communist country".¹⁵ With the setting up of the HMC, Pakistan acquired the capability to overhaul and rebuild T-59 tanks and to produce ammunition and spares for Chinese equipment. It had also facilities to manufacture T-69 tanks and Pakistan tried to manufacture the indigenous Main Battle Tank (MBT) there with Chinese assistance.

The Chinese also helped in establishing the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra with facilities to rebuild F-6 fighter planes and spares including air-frame etc. There was remarkable progress in the development of the K-8 jet trainers and the top of the line F-7 Xian fighters.

The foundation stone of the heavy electrical complex to be built with Chinese financial and technical assistance was laid down in April 1986 at Hatter in NWFP. It was to produce 500 KV power transformers and associated equipments.

15. Chaudhury, Ibid. No. 6.

Besides that, "the Chinese have been sending experts to Pakistan on training mission and a few licenses have been granted for the production of Chinese weapons. These are some very important steps taken by China to make Pakistan self-sufficient in defence products".¹⁶

China had also been a very vocal supporter of Pakistan on the Afghanistan question. It not only insisted on a complete and rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces, but also on a political solution in Kabul that would enable the safe return of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.¹⁷ Beijing perceived the events in Afghanistan as not only a threat to the security of neighbouring countries, but also a threat to the peace and stability of the whole region.

Since 1979, both Pakistan and China have exchanged a large number of top level military delegates for lengthy visits and strategic co-operation. Pakistan kept China informed about the progress of the UN sponsored talks on Afghanistan on a regular basis. In May 1987, the Chinese Premier Zhao-Ziyang paid a four day state visit to Pakistan when he remarked that the existing Sino-Pak relations is "the ideal that PRC has always sought". In February 1988, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain

16. Ibid.

17. China Daily, 23 February 1988.

Noorani, reportedly visited Beijing to secure China's support for his country's position on Afghanistan.¹⁸ The Sino-Pak strategic co-operation included support for the Afghan rebels and a joint planning for the defence of the Indo-Pak border.¹⁹

China has also urged Pakistan to play a more active role in the Indian Ocean region - a proposal which is in line with Pakistan's own strategic thinking.²⁰ But the most important thing to note is that although General Zia was able to procure massive military and economic aid from the United States during the Afghan crisis, that did not reduce the quality or quantity of the Chinese military assistance. In fact, China increased its military assistance to Pakistan soon after the Soviet army entered Afghanistan.²¹

CHINESE ARMS AID/TRANSFER TO PAKISTAN

Till July 1966, Pakistan and China did not have a formal military agreement. But in 1963, a statement by

18. Levine, *ibid* no. 1, P. 1116.

19. Y. Vertberzer, "China's Diplomacy and Strategy in South Asia : From Benign Neglect to Prominence" *Strategic Digest* vol. 17, no. 7, July 1987, PP 1300-1320.

20. Sujit Dutta, "Sino-Indian Relations: Some Issues", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 11. no. 11, February 1988, P 1257

21. See appendics.

Bhutto in Pakistan National Assembly gave the first indication that Pakistan could rely on Chinese support in the eventuality of a war with India. Bhutto said, "An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia... I would not at this stage wish to elucidate any further on this issue, but suffice is to say that the national interest of another state would be involved in an attack on Pakistan".²²

Although there were reports that Pakistan received military aid from China in the early sixties, the first Sino-Pak military agreement was signed in July 1966 for \$ 120 million worth of military assistance. On 23rd March 1966, Pakistan for the first time revealed that she was receiving Chinese military aid when Chinese Mig 19 led the flypast in Rawalpindi and T-59 tanks took part in military parade.²³

It may be recalled here that, after the 1965 Indo-Pak war the U.S.A. had imposed an arms embargo both on India and Pakistan. India was not very much affected because it had alternative sources of supply - most notably the Soviet Union. But Pakistan was seriously handicapped due to it's

22. K. Arif, **China-Pakistan Relations: 1947 - 86**, (Lahore, 1984), PP 44-45.

23. Hasan Aksari Rizvi, **Military and Politics in Pakistan**, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976), P. 168.

sole dependence on American arms till that day. Pakistan rued this American decision as a betrayal of a loyal ally. In this backdrop, after the Tashkent agreement the Soviet Union agreed to supply arms to Pakistan in addition to India. The growing Indo-Soviet bonhomie was already a cause of headache for the Chinese and that threatened to become a nightmare with the growing prospect of a Soviet-Pakistan entente. But much to the delight of China, the Soviet-Pak arms deal did not go through due to a variety of reasons.

At this juncture China, which had assiduously courted Pakistan ever since the outbreak of Sino-Indian hostilities in 1962, decided to supply arms to Pakistan. Since then China has remained a source of constant, credible and uninterupted supply of weapons, technology and aid to Pakistan.

Under the 1966 agreement, by July 1968, China pledged to supply 80 Mig 19 (F-6) fighters, 100 T-59 tanks, 10 IL-28 bombers and other equipments²⁴. Since 1965, all the three arms of the Pakistani defence forces have acquired weapons and other related equipment from China. By 1970, "The tanks supplied by China constituted 25 percent of the entire tank force at Pakistan's disposal, 33 percent of Pakistani Air-Force, 65 percent of all interceptor bombers

24. Ibid, no. 12.

and 99 percent of all its first line modern fighter planes".²⁵

During the seventies just over 40 percent of Pakistani imports of major weapons came from China. Deliveries included all sorts of weapons, but the emphasis was on battle tanks and fighter aircraft, such as T-59 and the F-6 (Mig-19).

For the decade 1960-70, the Chinese granted aid worth \$ 106.4 million and again in 1971 another loan of \$ 217.4 million was given. After the 1971 war, when Pakistan lost much of its military hardware, China came to its rescue and rebuilt the Pakistani army, equipping it with its latest weapons. "In 1971 Pakistan received apart from tanks and guns, nine Shanghai class motor boats of which four could be easily converted for firing missiles".²⁶

"However, although China was eager to restate its commitment to an important ally (Pakistan), its aid was essentially defensive. It paralleled Soviet aid to India without giving Pakistan an offensive edge, which in China's opinion, might precipitate a potentially dangerous

25. Yacov Vertberzer, "The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistan Relations: Trade and Aid 1968-82", *Asian Survey*, May 1983, P. 647.

26. Anne Gilks and Gerrald Segal, *China and the Arms Trade*, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), P. 70.

crisis".²⁷ So it appears that China's motives were to keep the regional balance from tilting in India's favour without appearing to tilt it towards Pakistan.

Again after the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the Chinese aid was defensive in nature. It barely replenished Pakistan's losses without increasing its offensive capability. Pakistan received just 60 F-6 and 100 T-59 tanks, having lost 75-85 aircraft and 200-220 tanks in the war.²⁸

For the period 1966-70, total Chinese military sales to Pakistan constituted 31 percent of the \$ 1.079 billion arms purchase programme of Pakistan in which the USA contributed just 1 percent.²⁹ In the 1965-74 period, the Chinese and American assistance to Pakistan was almost equal and during this period, the Chinese reportedly gave \$ 1.5 billion of military aid to Pakistan.³⁰

"Despite Yahya Khan's mediating efforts in bringing Washington and Beijing together in an anti Soviet Cordon and Nixon's pro-Pakistan tilt, U.S. arms supply between 1971 and 1975 contributed only 5 percent of Pakistan's total military^{aid} worth about \$ 1.28 billion. The

27. Ibid P. 129.

28. SIPRI - 1973, P. 303.

29. Michael Brozka and Thomas Ohlson, **Arms Transfers to the Third World : 1971-85**, (SIPRI, OUP, N.Y.), P. 347.

30. Rashid Ahmed Khan, Quoted in Dixit, Ibid. No. 2, P. 986.

Chinese, in a short span of time has dominated these arms transfers capturing over 58 percent of the Pakistani requirements.³¹

In 1970, the Pakistani army acquired 50 T-55 and 200 T-59 tanks. It got another 300 T-59's in 1973-74 and 100 more by 1974-75. By 1977 there were 700 T-59's. From 1982 to 1986 approximately 75 T-59's were delivered annually and by 1987 the Pakistani army was in possession of 51 T-54, T-55 and 1100 T-59's.³² "Since the late seventies, Pakistan has received from China 85 mm anti-tank field guns, 100 mm and 130 mm field guns, 107 mm multiple rocket launcher system, 67 mm and 87 mm mortars and a limited number of surface to surface missiles".³³

The above figures show the rise in Chinese weapons supply to Pakistan after the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the most notable aspect of them is that they were given on highly concessional terms.

After the 1971 war, the Pakistani Navy has acquired quite a lot of Chinese naval equipment. Apart from 9 Shanghai class motor boats in 1971, Pakistan acquired an

31. Dixit, Ibid No. 3, P. 986.

32. **Military Balance**, 1966-67, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1977-78, 1978-79. Also SIPRI, 1981-1987.

33. Gilks and Segal, Ibid No. 26, P. 26.

additional 2 Shanghai class 6 Hu-Chawn boats in 1975-76. Two more Shanghai class boats were added in 1976-77. In 1978-79, three large patrol boats were acquired out of which two were ex-Chinese Hainan Class, 12 FPB and 4 Hu-Chawn hydrofoils. By 1987, the Pakistani Navy also had 4 Huangfen (4 HY - 255 M), 4 HOKU (2HY-2) and 12 Shanghai-II fast attack crafts (FAC) from China.³⁴

While China has extended military aid in the form of patrol boats to a number of states, submarines have only been supplied to a very few. Again, this is due to China's own limited stock of patrol submarines.³⁵ In response to the increasing threat posed by the Soviet Navy by 1969-70, Beijing gave Pakistan two 'W' class submarines, before the task of expanding its own navy had begun.³⁶

Although the Chinese navy badly needed these submarines at that time, most probably their supply to Pakistan was prompted by the perception of the broader Soviet threat. Both these submarines were given to Pakistan by China as 'Grant aid'. A small number of 'Romeo' class submarines were supplied to Pakistan in 1976. But is not clearly known whether those were gifts or sale.³⁷ In 1980

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid, P. 71.

36. Ibid, P. 138.

37. SIPRI, 1977.

Pakistan acquired 2 more 'Romeo' class submarines from China.³⁸

Till mid eighties, Pakistan was the only country to receive Chinese destroyers - one or two were given in 1976.³⁹ This supply of exclusive naval items to Pakistan shows the strategic importance of Pakistan in Chinese strategic thinking. Recently, there were speculations about the Chinese lending of a nuclear propelled submarine to Pakistan after India got one on lease from Soviet Union.

Chinese supplies for the Pakistani Air-Force were 160 F-6's (Mig-19) from 1966-68, 112 in 1973-74, 28 in 74-75, 26 in 1978 followed by 65 more in 1979. In 1980 China supplied A-5 Fantan air-craft to Pakistan on order. Sixty F-7 fighter aircraft ordered in 1983 were delivered in 1986. In 1981, China delivered 25 F-6 bis to Pakistan and by the end of 1982, the total number of planes delivered to Pakistan rose to 300. The F-6 bis aircraft was specially built to meet PAF requirements. In 1985 China supplied 50 Q-5/A-5 fighters to Pakistan and this was in addition to the 60 which were already in service. The Q-5 fantan/A-5 were first supplied to Pakistan in 1978 and their deliveries continued at the rate of 50 per year.⁴⁰ The PAF is also in

38. SIPRI, 1981.

39. SIPRI, 1977, Also Ibid, No. 26, P. 71.

40. SIPRI, 1985.

possession of 170 Shengyang J-6, 45 Shengyang JJ-5 (Mig-17U) and 12 Shengyang CJ-6 aircrafts.⁴¹

Despite a major induction of U.S. arms since 1983, China still remains the main military supplier to all the three branches of Pakistani defence forces.⁴² Pakistan was the top arms importer from China during the 1971-75 period importing 45 percent of total Chinese arms exports. Pakistan maintained the top position in the 1976-80 period although its total share came down to 32 percent. In the 1981-85 period, Pakistan came down to the third position as Chinese arms importer with a total share of 18 percent, Egypt and Iran were the first two.⁴³

Until the 1983 aid package to Pakistan, the United States was only third in terms of total military supplies to Pakistan. China and France were the first two, with Chinese aid constituting over one third of the value of arms transfers to Pakistan. By 1982, 75 percent of the Pak tank force, and 65 percent of the Pak air force was China supplied. Between 1966 and 1980, the total value of Chinese military aid to Pakistan was estimated at about \$ 630 million.⁴⁴

41. Ibid, No. 32.

42. **Military Balance**, 1972-73, P.78.

43. Brozka and Ohlson, Ibid No. 29, P. 84.

44. **World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers (ACDA)**, 1966-75 and 1970-75.

Apart from planes, the Chinese military aid to Pakistan from 1970 to 1985 included, almost 1000 tanks, more than 30 naval vessels, SAM's, batteries, gun boats, light weapons and ammunition.⁴⁵

China's aid has covered the entire spectrum of arms-starting from small arms to major weapons including missiles and submarines. Chinese arms has serviced all the three branches of Pakistan armed forces. But quantitatively speaking - china's weapons were almost all copies of Soviet designs which were given to China by the Soviet Union during the fifties. Thus most of them were outdated compared with the more advanced and sophisticated Soviet and Western weaponry. But the Chinese models are more suited for rugged third world conditions, where the latest gadgets are not absolutely necessary. Another aspect of the Chinese weapons is their relative simplicity and longer service life. In addition to this tangible aid, China provides military technicians and advisors.⁴⁶

China also equipped the Pakistan constabulary and the NWFP police with the latest weapons to cope with the anti-social activities.⁴⁷

45. Gilks and Segal, Ibid. No. 26.

46. Ibid. P. 29.

47. Pakistan Times (Karchi), 28 April 1983, P.1.

It was also reported that Pakistan had been evaluating the Chinese Xian J-7 fighters - the Chinese version of Soviet Mig-22 - as a possible replacement for about 150 Shengyang F-6's which form part of the PAF inventory. China had reportedly offered an updated version of the J-7 (J-7M) with improved avionics and probably with a western radar and weapon aiming system as well as a GEC head-up display. The armament of the J-7M comprises two canons mounted internally on the nose and four hard points plus one under the fuselage for various types of radar homing air-to-air missiles including the Chinese PL-7 missile which is said to be similar to the Matra Magic Dogfight missile.⁴⁸

Although China is the principal arms supplier to Pakistan, there has not been many instances of licensed production of Chinese arms in Pakistan. There was no license production of arms in the 1950-71 period in Pakistan either from USA or China- its two two major arms suppliers.⁴⁹ There have also been no licensed production of arms from China or USA during the 1971-85 period also.⁵⁰

However, there were certain reports which indicated that in 1973, negotiations for the production of

48. **Strategic Digest**, "Arms Transfers", April 1985, P.462.

49. SIPRI, 1973.

50. Brozka and Ohlson, No. 29, P. 84.

the SAM-6 system were at an advanced stage under license from China. But almost after a decade, it was reported that the Chinese were developing more modern SAM system. So, even if a license had been granted to Pakistan, production is unlikely to have gone ahead.⁵¹ In 1980, there were negotiations for granting licensed production of anti-tank missiles in Pakistan, but by 1980 production had not started.⁵²

The USA licensed to produce model 500C helicopters and T-41D mescabero Trainer in 1976 at the rate of 50 per year. In 1978 China granted license to produce anti-tank missiles in Pakistan. But no further details like number produced, year of production etc. are available.⁵³

In 1986, Pakistan took a decision to produce its own plane by mounting a US engine (GE 404) on the Chinese F-7 air-frame. But cost and equipment problems have delayed the project.⁵⁴

The relatively lower number of licensed production of Chinese arms in Pakistan is not due to the Chinese unwillingness to transfer technology and knowhow like the

51. Gilks and Segal, Ibid. No. 26.

52. SIPRI, 1980.

53. SIPRI, 1980.

54. Strategic Digest, "Arms Transfers", August 1987, P.1557.

Americans or other western countries. On the contrary, China is only too willing to grant license production in recipient countries to ease the burden on its own domestic production capacity. The real problem lies in the relatively outdated models offered by China for licensed production which would become almost obsolete when the actual production starts in the recipient country.

SINO-PAK NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION

Another very important dimension of the increasing Sino-Pak friendship is their mutual co-operation in the nuclear field. Indian concern about this has grown after US intelligence reports indicated that there has been a certain extent of nuclear collaboration between the two countries since 1965. There were reports that the Chinese had supplied the designs of their fourth atomic test to Pakistan. Furthermore, the development of the ultra-centrifuge technology at Kahuta also has Chinese scientific and technical assistance.

The first hint of Sino-Pak nuclear co-operation came to light when Pakistan's Commerce Minister Ghulam Tariq told reporters in 1966 that, "An atomic power station would be built at Rupur in Panna district of East-Pakistan with Chinese help".⁵⁵

55. Dixit, Ibid. No. 4, P. 1076.

But the main architect of Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration was Bhutto. During his visit to China in 1976, two agreements for scientific and military cooperation were signed and for the first time a joint Sino-Pak military committee was established under the agreement. China also agreed to supply heavy water to Pakistan and there was cooperation between the two countries in Plutonium reprocessing and Uranium enrichment through the centrifuge method. China also came to Pakistan's rescue in 1978, when the French government terminated the contract for the 'Chasma' nuclear plant.

According to reports appearing in a section of the press, Pakistan has clandestinely obtained 'Krytrons', the electronic triggering device for nuclear warheads from the United States and has successfully tested it.⁵⁶ Recently, a Pakistan delegation to Beijing, headed by External Affairs Minister Sahebzada Yakub Khan, signed an agreement with China on mutual cooperation in nuclear technology.⁵⁷

This gives credibility to the reports that Pakistan has perfected a nuclear device which it may or may not test. There was also another report suggesting that Pakistan may test its nuclear bomb in China to avoid

56. **Times of India**, 17 September 1986.

57. **Times of India**, 7 November 1986.

detection and disqualification under the Symington Amendment for obtaining U.S. economic and military assistance.

While China wanted a nuclear Pakistan for a nuclear encirclement of Soviet Union, Pakistan considers it's nuclear capability of vital importance and necessary for three reasons, according to a political analyst. "First, it can regain the prestige lost during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. Second, it would neutralise Indian nuclear potential and would serve as a deterrent in any future conflict with India and Islamabad envisions that in that way it can defeat the Indian army in a limited war. Last, but most important, President Zia thought that with a weak Indian leadership, Pakistan may, by a swift pre-emptive action, decouple Kashmir valley from India to complete it's identity. In this endeavour, Islamabad's special relationship with Beijing and the strategic importance of the Karakoram Highway through Kunjerab and Mintaka passes could well play a significant role".⁵⁸

China's firm support to Pakistan's nuclear programme went a long way in cementing the already deep Sino-Pak relations. Also, the degree of Chinese participation in Pakistan's nuclear programme is an

58. Pradyot Pradhan, "Indian Security Environment in the 1990's : External Dimensions", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 12, No. 6, September 1989, P. 660.

indication of the degree of it's commitment to Pakistan's security.⁵⁹

CONCLUSION

There are certain distinguishing features and uniqueness in Chinese strategy and arms aid/transfer to Pakistan and other countries. Firstly, despite it's own domestic difficulties and inadequate production facilities, China has never failed to keep it's commitment in supplying arms and ammunitions. On the other hand, it had come to Pakistan's rescue when the United States and France let it down in supplying arms and nuclear technology respectively. This has proved the dependability of China as an ally and has placed it in good stead not only in Pakistan but also in other third world countries.

Secondly, the money value of the Chinese military aid to Pakistan is misleading because they were given either free of cost (as fraternal gifts) or on extremely concessional terms. But recently China started selling arms for making profits. Still, the Chinese prices were low compared to other similar weapons from the West. Although Pakistan paid for it's specially modified A-5 Fantan aircraft in 1983, it paid only half as much as a comparable aircraft would have cost from the West.⁶⁰

59. Dixit, Ibid. No.4, P. 1076.

60. Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 April 1983.

The terms on which Chinese weapons were made available to Pakistan was not clear. But some available reports indicate that initially they were supplied on favourable prices and on easy credit terms. But subsequent reports revealed that all previous Chinese loans to Pakistan were converted to grants and Pakistan, in fact, paid nothing for the weapons it acquired from China.⁶¹ When Bhutto visited China in January-February 1972, both countries signed an agreement for the supply of large quantities of tanks and air-crafts worth \$ 300 million and China further converted all previous interest free loans to Pakistan into outright grants.⁶²

Among the various arms supplier countries to Pakistan, the Chinese have been the most willing proponents of military collaboration and technology transfers. They had three reasons to do so :

- "1. Military collaboration would allow development of greater links with Pakistan.
2. The arms supply to Pakistan could become a show case for potential exports to other third world countries.
3. It would help them to subsidise their own R&D programme."⁶³

61. Anwar Hussain Sayed, **China and Pakistan : Diplomacy of Entente Cordial** (London : University of Masachu - Setts Press, 1974), PP. 140-41.

62. Ibid.

63. Dixit, Ibid., No.3, P. 987.

Although China was Pakistan's principal arms supplier, it could not acquire much political influence in Pakistan. This was borne out in 1971 when China, although being the prime if not sole arms supplier to Pakistan, could not exert pressure or leverage to moderate Pakistan's policies in the then East-Pakistan. It was also apprehensive to use the ultimate sanction of reducing supplies for fear of losing influence and endangering its ally's security.⁶⁴

The Chinese military and economic aid to Pakistan before 1971 helped in strengthening the military-bureaucratic apparatus of West-Pakistan at the cost of East-Pakistan. Most of the Chinese projects were constructed and commissioned in West-Pakistan and that only accentuated the already widening gap between the two wings of Pakistan. However, for this, the then Pakistani political leadership were more to be blamed than the Chinese. The Chinese aid, both military and economic, after 1971, have enhanced the prestige of China in the eyes of general Pakistani public and political leadership, apparently due to its selfless, but more importantly, anti-Indian character. The Chinese aid has also not created any dependence in Pakistan because most of it was either outright grants or with nominal

64. Gilks and Segal, Ibid., No.26, P. 129.

interest rate with a long repayment period. In some occasions, the aid was converted into barter agreements.

Relations between Pakistan and China are built on the basis of enlightened self-interest. The contingencies of international politics and geo-political compulsions have brought China and Pakistan closer to each other. The growing Sino-Pak military collaboration also points to the identical perception of these two countries about India's position and role in South-Asia.

The Sino-Pak entente serves China's strategic and political interests in the South-Asian region. This also gives China the necessary leverage to act as a counterforce to the USSR and enhances the Chinese position in the essentially Indo-centric South-Asian region. China also feels that its friendship with Pakistan would go a long way in countering the Indian dominance in the region and thereby facilitating the Chinese march towards acquiring the status of a undisputed great Asian power.

The most important part of the evergrowing Sino-Pak friendship is that Pakistan could contribute to the global designs of China against USA, USSR, India and other potential threats from third world countries. China hoped that its Pakistan connections would serve as an important

linchpin on which it can base it's foreign policy in West-Asia due to the strategic contiguity of Pakistan to the West-Asian countries and oil-wells.⁶⁵ On it's part, Pakistan sought Chinese friendship as a counter balance to the overwhelming Indian influence in the region.

In this backdrop, any dramatic or drastic change in the Sino-Pak relations would depend on a fundamental and substantial improvement in both Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations. Although there are signs of improvement in Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations, it is too early to predict it's definite impact on the future of Sino-Pak relations.

65. R.R. Subramaniam, "South-Asian Security : The China-Pakistan-India Triangle", **Strategic Analysis**, Vol. 12, No. 7, October 1988, P. 735.

CHAPTER-3

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFER TO BANGLADESH

On December 16, 1971, Bangladesh took birth as an independent nation in South Asia. The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was an eventful development in the Indian subcontinent. Bangladesh was an integral part of Pakistan in 1947, but the subsequent disintegration of Pakistan was neither unexpected nor an accident of history. The incompatibilities between the two wings of Pakistan in terms of culture, language, social composition and the politico-economic set up were so diverse and so glaring that the alienation and subsequent disintegration started sooner than expected. Although the causes of disintegration were inherent in the state structure of Pakistan when it came to existence in 1947, the configuration of various forces inside and outside the country acted as a catalyst for its dismemberment in 1971.

Soon after independence, Bangladesh started getting recognition from various countries and established diplomatic relations with them. But China's attitude to the Bangladesh question has evoked a great deal of interest among China watchers due to its inherent intricacies.

To understand the rationale behind the Chinese actions on the Bangladesh issue, one has to go a little back into history. In the late fifties and early sixties China suffered a great setback in international politics and diplomacy due to its self-imposed isolation. After the cultural revolution, its political intricacies with third world countries began to increase with the growing emphasis on pragmatism by Chinese policy makers. During that period, Soviet Union was dominating the South Asian political scene with its closer ties with India. And that was anathema to China as it could not reconcile to any attempt designed to increase the Soviet sphere of influence, particularly in a contiguous region. The move of Brezhnev's "Collective Security System" in Asia and Kosygin's proposal for closer economic cooperation among India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Soviet Union only helped in accentuating Chinese irritations. China perceived Soviet strategy as being directed against its desired role in the region. India, along with Soviet Union, stood as a major obstacle in the road of Chinese progress towards the undisputed dominant power in Asia. Thus, as has been described earlier, China started courting Pakistan and supplied it with arms and ammunition with the hope that a militarily rejuvenated Pakistan can act as a counterbalance to the growing Indo-Soviet influence in the region. So, in this backdrop, the

emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation dealt a severe blow to the Chinese efforts to curtail Indian and Soviet influence. "China had to helplessly watch the inevitable division of its neighboring ally. Beijing viewed the crisis in the then East-Pakistan in terms of its cold-war rivalry with the Soviet Union and its traditional animosity with India. And thus it had to pay a price".¹ More than anything else, the emergence of Bangladesh exposed the hollowness of the Chinese claim and self-assumed image of Saviour of the small nations against the hegemonism and expansionism of big powers. And this explains, to a large extent, the Chinese volteface when it came to the question of granting recognition to Bangladesh. China described the nationalist leaders of Bangladesh as Pakistani "National Outcasts" and the Bangladesh government as a "Puppet of Indian reactionaries". It closed down its diplomatic mission in Dhaka on January 13, 1972.²

However, the Chinese leadership did not take long to realise the geopolitical implications of the emergence of a new nation in South-Asia and attempted to adopt appropriate policies to face the new reality. Diplomats of the two countries met and exchanged views on various

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1. Chintamani Mahapatra, "Implications of Increasing Sino-Bangladesh Relations", **Strategic Analysis**, vol.11, no.12, March 1988, p. 1415.
 2. Ibid.

national and international issues. Such meetings, however, took place in the capitals of third countries.³ In May 1975, a remarkable development took place when China went ahead to cooperate with Bangladesh in the field of economic development. It shows that China was interested in an immediate breakthrough in bilateral trade, although de jure recognition was yet to be decided upon.⁴

The subsequent foreign policy endeavours of China in South-Asia aimed at bringing about a rapprochement with Bangladesh, ensure a Pakistan-Bangladesh detente and create a rift between India and Bangladesh.

China's policy towards Bangladesh may be termed as power-oriented and one which was dictated by real politik and bereft of any ideological content or hang-ups. China refused to recognise the Dhaka regime under Mujibur Rehman mainly due to two reasons. "One, Beijing wanted to demonstrate that it valued the friendly relations with Islamabad in the hour of crisis and disaster. Two, Beijing used this recognition issue as a persuading factor for Dhaka not to align her foreign policy with that of New Delhi".⁵

3. For instance the Chinese Vice-Premier Chin Xilian met Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.R. Mallick in Kathmandu. See, **Hindustan Times**, 28 February 1975.

4. J.N. Mohanty, "China in the Third World: A Case Study of Bangladesh", **China Report**, vol.20, no.2, March-April 1984, P.7.

5. Pradyot Pradhan, "Indian Security Environment in the 1990s: External Dimensions", **Strategic Analysis**, vol.12, no.6, September 1989, p.665.

The assassination of Mujib and change of leadership in Bangladesh provided the opportunity to China. The new regime, unlike its predecessor that leaned towards India and Soviet Union, was more pro-China and pro-Pakistan. China perceived the swift military coup as a great setback to the Soviet and Indian influence there. "Infact, China seemed to be looking forward to such hostile environment, detrimental to the interests of India and the Soviet Union."⁶ What prompted the Chinese policy makers most was the new regime's pro-Pakistan attitude and lesser intimacy with India and the Soviet Union.⁷

The Chinese position on Bangladesh question has been succintly summed up by a scholar in following words.

"Chinese failure to forestall the birth of Bangladesh forced it initially to fabricate a fake rationale and finally to reverse, through quick recognition, a hostile population into a friendly nation. History ends where politics begins; history however explains the present South-Asian political scenario - the emerging triangle of China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, favourably disposed towards the United Staes, while fetching sustenance from an anti-Indian prejudice."⁸

Chinese foreign policy strategy in South-Asia is primarily aimed at containing India by establishing closer

6. Mohanty, *ibid.* no.4, p.8.

7. *Ibid.*

8. J.N. Mohanty, "China and the Emergence of Bangladesh: Role of Great Power Global Perceptions", *India Quarterly*, vol.39, no.2, April-June 1983, p.137-58.

relations with India's neighbours and exploiting their bilateral problems with India to the maximum possible extent. China strives hard to impress upon the smaller South Asian countries that India is an expansionist power and an interloper and at the same time projects itself as their protector and saviour. Most unfortunately, Bangladesh has readily subscribed to this theory presented by China. It harbours an unfounded Indophobia while accepting the Chinese Dragon as the saviour of the smaller nations in danger.⁹

Bangladeshi newspaper Ittefaque which often reflects the official thinking, wrote after the 1975 coup: ".....it needs no mention that China can play a significant role in protecting the independence and sovereignty of the smaller countries of the region against the aggressive designs of an up and coming power in the neighbourhood."¹⁰

With the rapid improvement in Sino-Bangladesh relations, there was almost a simultaneous deterioration of Indo-Bangladesh relations. There was a marked increase in the tension between India and Bangladesh on the question of construction of the Farrakka Barrage. China was very prompt to exploit this schism. On 10th June, 1974, China decided

9. Mahapatra, *ibid.*, no.1, p.1423.

10. Quoted in Mahapatra, *ibid.*, no.1, p.1423.

to reverse it's earlier stand on the question of admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations. Chuang Yen, the Chinese representative in the Security Council stated, "The Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the people of South Asia in their struggle against hagemonism and expansionism."¹¹

After Pakistan, Bangladesh has been the secondmost important security liability for India among the South Asian neighbours until now. Since 1975, after the brutal assassination of Mujibur Rehman, relations between the two countries have been on a downhill track. The reasons for Bangladesh's hostility towards India are manyfold. A part of it may be due to the legacy of Pakistan of which it was a part from 1947 to 1971. The illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals to the Indian North-East, the Chakma refugee problem, the problem of sharing of river waters, the delimitation of maritime boundary between the two countries, and above all, the Indian suspicion of Bangladesh's help to insurgents in the North-East India have all contributed to the worsening of Indo-Bangladesh relations.

But the most important factor in the worsening of Indo-Bangladesh relations, and which remains unstated most of the time, is the role of China in the internal politics

11. Quoted in V.K. Tyagi, "China's Bangladesh Policy", **China Report**, vol.26, no.4, July-August 1980, pp.22-23.

of Bangladesh and their repercussions or impacts on India. Since 1962, China has been a critical factor in Indian security planning and India, despite its large size and military potentials, remains very sensitive and apprehensive of the moves by its neighbours and the presence of any external power in the region. China has been playing a very important and active role in Bangladesh since 1975. China publicly defines its relationship with Bangladesh as a successful example of South-South cooperation and praises Dhaka's initiatory role in SAARC. Although left unstated, of course, the cooperation between the two states is grounded on a desire to contain Indian influence.¹²

Beijing's policy towards Bangladesh in the South-Asian context could essentially be seen as one contributing to strengthen the confidence in managing its relations with India. This is part of Beijing's design of fostering independent centres of power on India's borders. Such a policy of political support and modest economic assistance and military aid could be utilised for furthering China's causes vis-a-vis India, if and when found necessary.

In March 1978, for the first time a highpowered Chinese delegation led by Vice-Premier Li Xianian paid a four day official visit to Dhaka and his talks with

12. Nikhil Chakravarty, "Bangladesh", in U.S. Bajpai, ed. **India and Its Neighbours.**

President Zia paved the way for greater economic cooperation.¹³

The tangible outcomes of the discussion between the two leaders were the scientific and technical cooperation accord by which China provided a 50 million dollar interest free loan to Bangladesh.¹⁴

Besides Zia's pro-China leaning was reciprocated by the Chinese. During the Presidential election of June 1978, the pro-Beijing elements supported the "Jativotabadi Front" - an electoral alliance of six political parties led by Zia-Ur-Rehman.¹⁵

According to one agreement, China was to purchase jute worth Rs10,000 from Bangladesh and was to supply 20,000 tons of cement at \$15 per ton when the prevailing rate in the international market was between \$28 to \$30 per ton. Under this agreement, Bangladesh was expected to import, among other things, coal, cement, electrical equipment and stationary goods. China in return was to buy hides and other leather products, jute and jute goods and other commodities.¹⁶

13. **The Statesman** (New Delhi), 20 March 1978.

14. **Bangladesh Times**, 22 March 1978.

15. M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh 1978: Search for a Political Party", **Asian Survey**, vol.19, no.2, February 1979, pp.191-97.

16. **Patriot** (New Delhi), 3 June 1975.

Another facet of Sino-Bangladesh cooperation is the construction of projects in Bangladesh with Chinese engineering and technical assistance. China has maintained bilateral technical cooperation with more than 80 developing countries and has despatched more than 400,000 engineers and technicians to work in the recipient countries.¹⁷

From the mid seventies, China's interest and influence in Bangladesh increased considerably. When the Soviet Union in 1976 refused to supply some spare parts for military equipment, China was only too glad to accommodate Bangladesh. Between 1975 and 1979, China supplied 78 percent of Bangladesh's arms exports.¹⁸

The expansion of Chinese influence at the expense of Soviet Union is further demonstrated by the fact that Chinese military technicians outnumbered Soviets in 1977. Once the mission is accomplished, the Chinese technicians returned home, unlike the Soviets, who try to control their clients through such aid.¹⁹

Given the nature of Chinese diplomacy in South Asia, any kind of technical cooperation by Beijing with the countries of the region will have security implications for

17. **Asian Recorder**, 1987.

18. **Communist Aid**, 1978, p.38; Also SIPRI-1980, p.97.

19. Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, "**China and the Arms Trade**, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), p.116.

India. About 200 Chinese engineers and technicians are at present stationed in Bangladesh for the construction of a much publicised Bangladesh - China "Friendship Bridge" over the Buriganga river near Postogola. China is contributing 580 million Taka out of an estimated expenditure of 1890 million Taka.²⁰

Strategically also Bangladesh is important for China. China, therefore, is interested in keeping Bangladesh dependent on her for the supply of military hardware, China is one of the main suppliers of armaments to Bangladesh. Although Bangladesh imports much of its arms from China, trade between the two countries is otherwise quite limited. Bangladesh runs an annual trade deficit with China.²¹

During 1976-77, China transferred 50 F-9 fighters to Bangladesh. In 1978-79, Bangladesh again acquired 36 F-6 fighter aircraft from China.²² At present, China supplies military weapons and is engaged in training Bangladeshi troops. In 1981, Bangladesh received one squadron of Chinese built Mig-21's, transport planes and a squadron of -----
20. Quoted in no.1

21. For details see - **Direction of Trade Statics Year Book, 1986.**

22. SIPRI - 1980.

Chinese made T-59 tanks. Besides, attempts are made by the Chinese to modernise naval dockyards and to set up arms factories.²³

Cost factor goes a long way towards explaining the limited role of commercially oriented West-European arms suppliers in arms transfers to Bangladesh. The bulk of Bangladesh's major weapon imports is for the navy.

The Bangladesh army possess 20 Chinese made T-59 tanks, the airforce has 18 Shenyang J-6 Fighter Ground Attack Planes and CJ-6 training aircraft and the Bangladesh Navy is equipped with 14 Chinese built "Fast Attack Craft Patrol", 6 Hainan and 8 Shanghai-II and 4 Chinese made "Fast Attack Craft Gun" - O-24 Hegu with 2 HY-2 surface to surface missiles.²⁴

Another sign of military cooperation between the two countries was PLA Chief-of-Staff Yang Dezhi's visit to Dhaka in January, 1987. But Bangladesh tries to downplay the significance of this link. In June 1987, the Chinese Vice-Premier, Qiao Shi, during his visit to Dhaka, reportedly asked for an assurance that Bangladesh would not allow India to move military supplies across it's territory to the North-Eastern sector in the event of Sino-Indian

23. **The Statesman** (New Delhi), 12 December 1978.

24. **ASIA YEAR BOOK**, 1987.

hostility. The following month, when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was on an official visit to Moscow, President Ershad was in Beijing and reportedly gave the desired assurance.²⁵

"It is upto the military strategists to determine the geostrategic importance of the narrow stretch of Indian territory that separates Bangladesh from China. But by assuring the Chinese that in the event of Sino-Indian hostilities, Bangladesh would not allow India to move supplies to this area across its territory, Dhaka is slowly moving away from the commitment it made in the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty signed way back in 1972, which obliges the two countries to assist each other in the event of either country being involved in armed conflict with a third party. Dhaka seems to be giving indications on Chinese persuasion that it would be neutral at best and pro-Chinese at worst in the event of a Sino-Indian armed conflict."²⁶

In the first week of April 1988, a few Chinese air-force officials paid a visit to Islamabad. The following week the Pakistani Naval Chief left for the Chinese capital. And the following week, Bangladesh Army Chief left for the Chinese capital. This top level exchange of visits to one another's capital is just not a symbolic gesture of international relations; they constitute a significant aspect of security cooperation among the countries concerned. While the years long military cooperation between China and Pakistan is a well-known fact, the recent spurt in Sino-Bangladesh cooperation in the

25. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 July 1987.

26. Mahapatra, *ibid.*, no.1, p.1224.

politico-security field is noteworthy. On May 28, 1988, Dhaka and Beijing signed a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation in the shipping sector.²⁷ Although, the details are not known, there seem to be security dimensions of the MOU.

In January 1987, the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA headed a delegation to Dhaka with a view to holding talks on strengthening the strategic cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries. In 1988, the Bangladesh Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sultan Ahmed visited Beijing at the invitation of the PLA Commander Admiral Liu Hua Qing. Admiral Ahmed visited the North China Sea and East China Sea fleet headquarters and held detailed discussions on improving the naval cooperation between Dhaka and Beijing.

As China appears desirous of playing a role in the Indian Ocean region and beyond, both Pakistan and Bangladesh may now be figuring in the Chinese calculations to make their useful contributions to the Chinese efforts.

China needs long term facilities of various kinds for it's Indian Ocean fleet as and when it becomes operational. The visit of China's Naval Squadron to Bangladesh, SriLanka and Pakistan for the first time

27. **Bangladesh Times**, 31 May 1988.

indicated China's willingness and aspirations to acquire a blue water capability and a presence in the Indian Ocean region. China's current capabilities are negligible, but it indeed demonstrated long term plans.

Another dimension of Sino-Bangladesh cooperation is the Chinese designs to undermine India's political unity by capitalizing on potential separatist trends in the Indian federation, especially in the north-eastern India. Bangladesh is geographically optimally situated for this purpose. This is evident from the Sino-Bangladesh discreet cooperation in providing training, logistic support and a safe haven for India's insurgents from the north-east. But, of late, this assistance by China to the insurgents has gradually declined due to a gradual normalisation of Sino-Indian relations and also due to the Chinese realisation of the futility of such costly help in the face of a determined onslaught on the insurgents by Indian security forces.

There is a growing propensity on the part of Bangladesh to play the China card against India. On one occasion, it even went to the extent of siding with China on India's border dispute with that country. On 17th June 1987, the 'Bangladesh Observer' published a map showing certain areas belonging to India on the Indo-China border as disputed areas and showing Sikkim with prominent boundary

lines that was bound to suggest something other than the fact that Sikkim is a state of the Indian Union. The Indian Embassy in Dhaka immediately issued a protest note to the newspaper. The publication of this letter was followed by a letter from the Chinese Embassy countering Indian objections and reiterating the traditional Chinese position.²⁸

New Delhi felt increasingly concerned about the involvement of outside powers meaning Pakistan, China and the USA. As former Foreign Minister Swaran Singh said, "We have contributed to the freedom of Bangladesh, we will be happy to see it managing it's own affairs. But, we will not like any power, be it the United States, China or Pakistan, to make it a base for creating problems for India. Diego Gancia is thousands of miles away, but Bangladesh is next door. We have a long land border with it."²⁹

A pro-Chinese communist in Bangladesh had suggested the formation of a regional security system in which the South-Asian countries minus India would be members and in which China would play a central role. Although support to this idea by other South-Asian countries seems improbable because that would in effect mean isolating India in the region which is essentially Indo-centric. But the

28. POT, Bangladesh Series, 25 June 1987.

29. Times of India, 31 December 1975.

very existence of such an idea gives rise to a suspicion regarding the actual Chinese motivation behind encouraging SAARC. SAARC is not a security association and all the South-Asian countries including India are it's members. As it does not allow other extra-regional countries even an observer status, much less membership in the organisation, China cannot play a direct role in SAARC. Thus, "The Chinese objective may be to befriend other member nations of SAARC to the disadvantage of India within limits of a not so friendly association and marginalising it."³⁰

While playing host to President Ershad on four separate occasions between 1982 and 1987, the Chinese leadership seemed to be aware of the considerable domestic opposition to his regime and the mounting pressure on him to bring about democratic reforms in the political structure of Bangladesh. As a result, the Chinese were apprehensive about the prospects of it's growing military and economic cooperation with Bangladesh. As is well known, an influential external power favours political stability and status quo in a friendly country, if the person in power seems to be amenable to it's influence. In case of instability, the pros and cons, costs and benefits of opening links with the alternative forces are weighed. The -----
30. Mahapatra, *ibid.*, no.1, p.1423.

PRC has given enough indications that it is prepared to deal with any successor regime in Dhaka on the same basis as it does wish the current power holders. This action reflects the increasing pragmatism of Chinese foreign policy and also the continuing Chinese desire to play an active role, both in Bangladesh and in the affairs of the sub-continent in future also.

CHAPTER - 4

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFERS TO SRILANKA

Sri Lanka, a small island country near the southernmost tip of the Indian peninsula, has traditionally been a connecting link between the Eastern and Western trade routes. Strategically located in the heart of the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka is almost midway between the Red Sea and the Straights of Malacca on the East and also between the Southern continents of Africa and Australia. Her strategic location in the Indian Ocean and close proximity to India made China interested in the island. The Sino-Sri Lanka relations were shaped mainly by the economic problems of a developing island country and the changing currents of world forces in general and Asian resurgence in particular.

Sri Lanka recognised China on 5th January 1950 under the regime of Mr. D. S. Senanayake who was the first Prime Minister of independent Sri Lanka. Simultaneously, Sri Lanka terminated her relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government.¹

1. Shelton U. Kodikara, **Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka : A Third World Perspective**, (New Delhi, 1982), p.59.

In October 1952, SriLanka and China entered into a contract (popularly known as the Rice-Rubber deal) under which China agreed to supply SriLanka with 80,000 tons of rice in exchange for rubber and other products from SriLanka.² Having granted recognition, however, UNP governments appeared reluctant to follow up with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China. P.M.Dudley Senanayake said that SriLanka's financial position did not permit the opening of an embassy in Beijing (then Peking).³

This SriLankan action can partly be explained by it's pro-Western stand during the early years of it's independence and also it's close relationship with Great Britain. SriLanka recognised China only when Great Britain did so.⁴

Also SriLanka was wary of communist influence in the island republic. Prime Minister Kotelawala even refused to permit the visit of a Chinese goodwill mission, explaining that he was concerned about communist infiltration in neighbouring Asian countries and considered that Cylon's (SriLanka's) interest with Communist China

2. **The Times** (London), 22 December 1952, p.4.

3. Kodikara, *ibid* no.1.

4. *ibid*

should only be related to trade alone.⁵

China and SriLanka established diplomatic relations only in February 1957. The relations between the two countries have been cordial and trouble-free except for minor strains during cultural revolution. Commenting on the good Sino-SriLankan relations, one SriLankan commentator said on the occasion of the silver jubilee celebrations of Sino-SriLankan relations, "We were one of the first non-communist countries at that time to do so (to recognise China). Our decision was the outcome of our mutual recognition of and respect for the five principles of peaceful coexistence."⁶

Formal Chinese relations with SriLanka took off with the signing of a trade agreement in the fifties which was renewed regularly till recently. A maritime agreement concluded in 1983 only helped in cementing the existing good relations. In 1971, SriLanka took it's own time to recognise independent Bangladesh, evidently to ensure that China and Pakistan were not annoyed.⁷ Political relations

5. **New York Times**, 14 December 1953, and 28 January, 1954.
6. A.T.Ariyaratne, **Ceylone Daily News** (Colombo), 16 February 1982.
7. John Keniyalil, "The Pak-Lanka Connection", **Strategic Analysis**, Vol.9, no.11, Feb.1986, p.1071.

also steadily grew between the two countries, particularly during the reign of Mrs. Bandaranaike who even took an initiative in 1962 to resolve the Sino-Indian conflict. Later, faced with the JVP insurgency at home, Sri Lanka had in April 1971, asked for military supplies from friendly countries to reinforce her small armed force. Although China was suspected to be providing moral and material support to the JVP insurgents, an offer of military aid was made by the Chinese Premier Zhou-en-Lai. China subsequently made a gift of 5 high speed "Shanghai" class gun boats worth Rs.30 million and equipment worth Rs.22.5 million.⁸

In the initial years, the Sino-SriLankan relations grew without any prejudice towards India primarily due to the excellent Indo-SriLankan relations and also due to the Chinese inability to project power at a distant land. So, unlike in contiguous Pakistan, China could not play an important or dominating role in Sri Lanka. But the scenario changed drastically when the Indo-SriLankan relations deteriorated to the extent of estrangement in the eighties over the Tamil question. The ethnic conflict of the Sinhalese and Tamils had brought Sri Lanka to the brink of a civil war situation which not only generated tensions

8. Srikanta Mohapatra, *Arms Build-up in South-Asia* M.Phil Dissertation, J.N.U.

between India and Sri Lanka, but also threatened to blow up the harmonious framework of bilateral relationship that had been nurtured carefully over the past three decades.

SINO-SRILANKA MILITARY COOPERATION :-

The first Chinese military assistance to Sri Lanka came to light in 1971, when China sent arms and ammunition besides five Shanghai-II inshore patrol boats following an appeal by the Sri Lankan government to various friendly countries for military assistance to combat internal insurgency. Sri Lanka received a "gift" of 2 Shanghai class motor gun boats from China in 1980 and five more at a later stage.⁹

In 1980, Sri Lanka signed a pact with China to launch a Sino-Sri Lankan joint shipping service between China and West-African ports. The agreement was signed between Sri Lankan Shipping Corporation and China's National Shipping Lines - "China Ocean Steam Shipping Corporation" (COSSC). Under the agreement, which was signed in Beijing (then Peking), the Sri Lankan Shipping Corporation can utilise the COSSC's 500 strong fleet to ship tea, spice, rubber and other general produce to ports in the Western coast of Africa. At that point of time Sri Lanka had no direct link

9. Asian Defence Journal, July 1985, p.11.

with West African ports. The Sino-SriLankan joint shipping service benefited SriLanka as she could exploit the tremendous market available in the African countries.¹⁰

The SriLankan Shipping Corporation had agreed to make available its ships to carry Chinese goods to Western ports. The corporation had regular services between SriLanka and West-European markets. The agreement also provided for China's participation in the development of SriLanka's regional ports. A delegation from "China Harbour Engineering Corporation" arrived in SriLanka to study the regional ports development programme to determine the areas in which China could help. Financial and technical participation had been promised by the Chinese who pledged to develop SriLanka's ports, shipping service and trade.¹¹

And in November 1985, two Chinese vessels, a missile destroyer and a supply ship visited the ports of SriLanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh and in a way that displayed the Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean region.¹²

But the most important Chinese presence in the island republic came about with the eruption of ethnic

10. T. Sabaratnam, *Ceylon Daily News*, 8 October 1980.

11. *ibid.*

12. *Defence and Foreign Affairs Weekly*, 16-22 May, 1988.

violence in SriLanka between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. There was also a corresponding increase in the supply of arms and ammunition and other military hardware during this period. China is the major supplier of arms and it's share of the total arms and ammunition, that had already reached SriLanka during this period is approximately fifty per cent.¹³

SriLanka was engulfed in a very serious ethnic crisis during the early eighties which threatened to assume the dimensions of a full fledged civil war. Although the issue was essentially of a political nature, the then SriLankan President Mr. J. Jayawardane went in for a military solution. This issue had it's obvious repercussions on India, which has a sizable Tamil population. The SriLankan Tamils fled to Indian territory to escape torture and anihilation in the hands of the SriLankan Security forces & also to sustain their struggle for a separate "Eelam". SriLanka also alleged that India was providing military training and economic assistance to the Tamil militants fighting the security forces.

There were also reports that SriLanka was handing over the Trincomalee Oil Tanks to U.S.companies and

13. S.D.Muni, "SriLanka's Ethnic Convulsions", **Mainstream Annual Number** (New Delhi), 1984, p.52.

providing transmission facilities to Voice of America (VOA). SriLanka's receipt of anti-terrorist assistance from Israeli Mossad and British SAS and also military equipment from China and Pakistan, generated new tensions in the already wavering Indo-SriLanka relations. Due to its close proximity to India and due to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, SriLanka is strategically very important to India. Commenting on the Strategic importance of SriLanka, a former Commander of Indian Navy wrote in 1974 ,

"SriLanka is strategically very important to India as Eire is to United Kingdom or Taiwan to China . . . As long as SriLanka is friendly or neutral, India has nothing to worry about. But if there be any danger of the island falling under the dominance of powers hostile to India, India can not tolerate such a situation endangering her territorial integrity".¹⁴

China on its part was very prompt to exploit SriLanka's apprehensions about India and to build another "point of pressure" against India. So, in 1983, when Hector Jayawardane, the special envoy of the SriLankan President, went to Beijing, the Chinese Premier Zhao-Zhiyang said, without mentioning India by name, "The big should not bully the small".¹⁵ He cautioned the third world countries to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs as

14. Ravi Kaul, "The Indian Ocean: A Strategic Posture for India", in T.T. Poulouse, *Indian Ocean Power Rivalry*, (New Delhi, 1974), p.66.
15. Quoted in, Rita Manchanda, _____, *Strategic Analysis*, August 1986, pp.571-90.

that would only pave the way for superpower intervention. This tacit support to SriLanka against India was again repeated in 1984 when President Jayawardane went to Beijing in May. There were speculations about a military deal during this visit. But Jayawardane denied that he was seeking arms from China. However, he praised the useful role played by the patrol boats earlier given by China.

But according to Jane's Defence Weekly, an agreement was concluded for the supply of 5 Shanghai class patrol boats by the end of 1984. Besides that SriLanka has also purchased an undisclosed quantity of Type-56 assault rifle, the Chinese version of Soviet AK-47's and 4 inshore patrol crafts from China.¹⁶

There were also reports that China offered training facilities to the SriLankan air-force personnel.¹⁷ During the visit of a high-powered Chinese defence delegation to Colombo in July 1984, arrangements were made for Chinese training of SriLankan armed forces and future supply of military equipments including the sophisticated night surveillance equipments.¹⁸

16. **Jane's Defence Weekly**, Vol.3, No.5, 2 February, 1985, p.166.

17. **The Hindu**, 7 July 1984.

18. Muni, *ibid* no.13.

SriLanka also purchased three Chinese transport aircraft and Israeli fast patrol craft to bolster the fight against Tamil separatists.¹⁹ SriLanka also purchased three YB-12 Chinese turbo-prop troop carrying and cargo planes at a very cheap rate - less than one million dollar each.²⁰ These air-crafts, which have a short-take off-and-landing (STOL) capability were to be used mainly for carrying troops and were expected to be in SriLanka by 1987.²¹

Colombo has been buying small arms and ammunition from China for several years. In the 1979-83 period, SriLanka purchased \$5 million worth of arms from China.²² On the eve of the visit of China's Air-force Commander Zhang Tingfe to SriLanka in July 1984, London's "Daily Mirror" wrote that nearly fifty percent of SriLanka's arms ammunition came from China.²³ According to one writer, "China's arms supplies to Colombo are more to be seen as a small part of it's expanded arms export drive and not an indication of a massive political or material commitment to assisting SriLanka".²⁴

19. Deccan Herald, 30 October 1986.

20. Indian Express (New Delhi), 31 October 1986.

21. ibid, No.19.

22. SIPRI, 1985.

23. Manchanda, ibid no.15.19. Deccan Herald, 30 October 1986.

24. ibid.

The nascent Chinese military presence ^{/in SriLanka} received a setback with the signing of the Indo-SriLanka accord in July 1987. The accord, apart from striving for a solution to the vexed ethnic problem, also helped in preventing and eliminating undesirable external powers from gaining a foothold in SriLanka. The accord also projected the Indian sensitivities towards it's security interests in SriLanka and the Indian Ocean region.

Although the Chinese media have criticised the Indo-SriLanka accord and termed it as a failure, the Chinese made a tactical retreat when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) landed in SriLanka to enforce the provisions of the accord. This apparently contradictory behaviour is typical of Chinese double-speak. This also shows that the Chinese were keeping their options open in SriLanka for any future involvement. Just prior to the signing of the accord and thereafter, the Chinese leadership maintained a somewhat neutral position and reportedly advised the SriLankan leadership to find a political solution to the ethnic problem instead of a military one. The Chinese also reportedly refused to supply more arms to SriLanka.²⁵

25. Subramanyan Swamy, "Super Power Game in SriLanka", *Outlook*, 16-30 June 1986, p.48, and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 April, 1986, p.15.

The Indo-SriLankan accord ran into rough waters from the very beginning. The IPKF got bogged down in a hit and run guerrilla warfare. But India succeeded in keeping the foreign powers out of SriLanka as long as the IPKF was present. But after the withdrawal of the IPKF from SriLanka, things seem to have returned back to square-one. The ethnic conflict is raging in SriLanka with full force and the foreign forces are again trying to gain a foothold in SriLanka. China has also stepped up it's activities in SriLanka and recently some unconfirmed reports suggested that the Chinese were supplying fighter planes and other arms and ammunitions to SriLanka to fight against the Tamil militants.

CHAPTER - 5

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFERS TO NEPAL

In this chapter an attempt is being made to examine China's strategy and tactics towards Nepal since 1950 with an emphasis on transfer of arms and ammunitions as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese policy towards Nepal has been decisively influenced by Kathmandu's anti-Indian posture and the fear of Nepali monarchy that New Delhi is determined to intervene on behalf of it's domestic political adversary. Therefore, the Chinese approach towards Nepal has been influenced to a very large extent by Nepal's attitude towards India. Thus a discussion of Sino-Nepal relations will be incomplete if it is not compared and contrasted with India's relations with the Himalayan Kingdom.

"China has been playing upon Nepal very patiently since a long time. It has exploited every emerging difference between Nepal and India so as to wean Nepal away from India. In fact, China loves to play King Mahendra's game of countering India in Nepal".¹ China's wooing of Nepal and courting other South Asian neighbours of India was part

1. Parminder S. Bhogal, "India's Security Environment in the 1990's: The South-Asian Factor", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.12, no.7, October 1989, pp. 767-80.

of its larger goal and strategy of competing with India for the leadership of the third world. China followed a three pronged strategy to achieve its goal, viz. building closer relations with the Afro-Asian countries, looking for nations that could be set against India sooner or later and loosening of ties between India and its close allies that would serve Chinese interests. In accordance with the above objectives, China began to establish economic relationship with the developing countries, befriend Pakistan and work for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Nepal.

China's diplomacy in Nepal is quite different due to known historical, geographical and political reasons. Unlike Sino-Pak relationship, Sino-Nepalese cooperation is marked by many ups and downs. Moreover, India as a factor in Sino-Pak and Sino-Nepal relations is not the same, because Indo-Pak relations were marked by hostility from the very inception of Pakistan, whereas Indo-Nepal relations had been more or less cordial. And thus, the Chinese ambition in Nepal is to wean it away from India rather than to set it against India. In order to achieve this objective, the best way was to approach Nepal through India. The Nehru administration did not seem to have harboured any suspicion of the long term Chinese motivations and thus New Delhi was

almost instrumental in bringing Nepal and China together.²

Despite its small size, Nepal occupies a key position between India and China. Its strategic location has made it an important buffer between India and China. After the loss of Tibet as a buffer state, Nepal's importance has enhanced in Indian strategic calculations. India's relations with Nepal have thus been governed mainly by security considerations and for this reason both the security and friendship of Nepal are of paramount importance to India. Historically and geographically both India and Nepal share very intimate and extensive ties between them and have more than 1,700 kms. of completely open and easily accessible border. Therefore,

"soon after the emergence of an independent and democratic India in 1947, its shared security concerns, cultural values and historical experiences with Nepal were re-defined in the traditional mould, taking into account significant developments unfolding in the north of Himalayas i.e. the victory of Communist Revolution₃ in China and the Chinese military assertion in Tibet."³

Accordingly both India and Nepal signed a new Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1950. The 1950 treaty had two

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2. T.R. Ghoble, **China-Nepal Relations and India**, (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1986), p. 146.
 3. S.D. Muni, "India and Nepal: Erosion of a Relationship", **Strategic Analysis**, vol.12, no.4, July 1989, p.342.

major dimensions. One was regarding the mutual security concerns of India and Nepal and the other regarding the socio-cultural and economic interaction between the people of the two countries. More than any thing else the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty underlined the basically inter dependent nature of Indo-Nepal relations. Nepal is a small, underdeveloped and land locked country and depends entirely on India for it's trade and transit facilities. Although both India and Nepal were developing countries, India had a better infrastructural development and a large industrial and agricultural sector which were fairly developed. Therefore, Nepal looked towards India for assistance in it's economic and political modernisation besides trade and transit facilities. On it's part, India expected Nepal to be sensitive and cooperative towards it's security concerns, particularly with respect to China, as a quid pro-quo.

Until recently Indo-Nepal relations were more or less normal. But of late they have changed. The strong historical bonds between India and Nepal, in the words of a political analyst,"are often tempered and twisted by the imperatives of their mutual political interactions. Such interactions are essentially a product of two diverse factors i.e. India's concern for security and Nepal's preoccupation with it's internal (i.e. regime's)

stability."⁴ Of these two factors, the latter one has been impinging more and more over Indo-Nepal relations in recent years. In fact, Nepal has all along been the focus of both India and China. The Nepali leadership being well aware of this fact, leaves no conceivable opportunity to exploit this factor to increase their maneuverability. But the Nepali leadership have used the China card against India more often due to a variety of factors.

There was a certain resistance to widespread Indian presence in the Himalayan Kingdom since mid-fifties and a gradual hardening of anti-Indian sentiments which became apparent from 1956 itself, after the death of King Tribhuvan in 1955. Nehru's deep concern and open resentment over the dismissal of the duly elected government by King Mahendra, at a time when the Sino-Indian relations were rapidly deteriorating, only helped in irritating the king further. Nepal's relations with India have since been characterised by persisting anti-Indian feelings, which have, to a large extent, been sustained by Nepal's discontentment with India's extension of moral and material support to the dissident Nepali Congress leaders.

4. S.D. Muni, "Nepal", *World Focus*, vol.6, no. 11-12, December 1989, p.24.

There was a sharp deterioration in the regional security environment by the beginning of the sixties. The Sino-Indian tensions and border skirmishes culminated in a bloody war in 1962 and the Indo-Pak conflict precipitated the 1965 Indo-Pak war. So, both Pakistan and China were delighted at the prospect of weaning away Nepal from India and develop schism in the traditional Indo-Nepal friendly relations. On the other hand, King Mahendra perceiving India to be an ally of his domestic political adversary, ie. the Nepali Congress, was more than willing to use the China card against India. After the death of King Tribhuvan, China had established its diplomatic relations with Nepal. By late fifties, China was one of the major foreign aid donors to the Himalayan Kingdom along with India. King Mahendra, by establishing closer relations with China had hit three birds with one stone. One, he succeeded in his new approach of distancing Nepal from India, two, he sent clear signals to India to reconsider its stand towards the Nepali Congress elements operating from Indian soil, three, he hoped to mobilize the support of Communist groups in his domestic political conflict with the Nepali Congress by warming up his approach towards China.

Against this background King Mahendra's visit to China from 26th September to 19th October 1961 was very important as far as his regional approach towards India and

China was concerned. Among the notable achievements of the three week long visit of King Mahendra was the conclusion of Nepal's boundary agreement with China, an agreement on the construction of the Kathmandu-Kodari highway with Chinese assistance and finally King Mahendra was able to extract an assurance from the Chinese leadership for his domestic leadership and foreign policies, particularly towards India. The Chinese Vice Premier Chien-Yi stated on October 4, 1962 "I assure His Majesty King Mahendra, His Majesty's government and the people of Nepal that if any foreign forces attack Nepal, we (the) Chinese people will stand on your side".⁵ Another test of Sino-Nepal friendship came to light in 1962 when Chien-Yi stated in Beijing on October 5 that "In case any foreign army makes any foolhardy attempt to attack Nepal... Chinese will side with the Nepalese people".⁶

This statement of the Chinese Foreign Minister was significant in many ways. Neither did Nepal react to this statement by saying that China should not bother about Nepal's defence nor did it do anything to dispel the misapprehensions that it's security and sovereignty may be

5. Quoted in Muni, *ibid.*, no.3, p.346.

6. Leo. E. Rose, Quoted in, Parmanand, "Whither Indo-Nepal Relations?", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.12, no.8, November 1989, pp. 841-852.

compromised in this manner. This silence on Nepal's part assumed importance because when Jawaharlal Nehru said in November 1959 that "any aggression on Bhutan or Nepal would be considered by us as an aggression on India",⁷ the then Nepali Prime Minister B.P. Koirala had responded by saying that, "it could never be taken as suggesting that India would take unilateral action".⁸

King Mahendra also approached China and the Western powers for supplies of arms as he did not find India very forthcoming. India was apprehensive that the arms may be used for suppressing the democratic forces in Nepal. Being disappointed, King Mahendra started drifting away from India. He attempted to diversify Nepal's trade, aid and economic relations with India. He secured loans from various international sources including China, for road construction and other projects in the Terai region. This worried India because a Chinese presence so close to Indian borders had obvious adverse security implications. There was a large scale Chinese involvement in various developmental projects in the Nepali Terai region during the last months of King Mahendra's rule. Again in 1985 King Birendra tried to involve China in a bridge construction

7. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, **India's Foreign Policy and Relations**, (New Delhi: south-Asian Publishers, 1985), p.165.

8. Ibid.

project in the Terai region which was very near to the strategically sensitive common border area of Nepal, India and China. "India resisted the grant of this project to China and eventually succeeded in this objective, but only at the cost of offering a Rs 50 crores (US \$ 50 M) grant to Nepal".⁹ Under the 1950 treaty of Peace and Friendship and the subsequent exchange of letters (most notably the letter of March 26, 1965), Nepal agreed to take all its military supplies including arms and ammunitions from India and not from any other country. It was made explicitly clear in these documents that if, in any case, India fails to meet the Nepalese requirements for whatever reasons, then Nepal can import arms and ammunitions from third countries.

It was made clear in these instruments that Nepal should import arms from other countries through Indian territory only and that Indian can inspect the cargo to satisfy itself, if necessary. Nepal also agreed to take arms supplies from UK and USA to supplement assistance from India. From all these documents and agreements, China was deliberately kept out due to the simple reason that any Chinese presence in Nepal would have serious security implications for India.

9. . . Quoted in Muni, *ibid.*, no.3, p.352.

The effort by successive Nepali Monarchs since King Mahendra to get Nepal declared as a Zone of Peace (ZOP) essentially aims at distancing Nepal from India. Also, the ZOP proposal was a subtle way of playing the China card against India by Nepal. While addressing the Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers in September 1973, King Birendra said - "If our relations with India have been deep and extensive, our relationship with China have been equally close and friendly, consistently marked by understanding of each other's problems and aspirations.... As a matter of fact, Nepal in the past have signed formal Peace and Friendship treaties with both our friendly neighbours¹⁰.

China has been a very prompt and vocal supporter of this Nepalese ZOP proposal. While on the other hand India considers this to be against the spirit of the 1950 treaty and which does not take into account the legitimate Indian security interests in Nepal. Another aspect of the Nepali move to distance itself from India was the sending of senior Nepali military officers for training in the Chinese and Pakistani military institutions since the early eighties. Obviously this had caused considerable concern in India because - "Nepali officers not only occupy important ranks in the Indian army (under the Gorkha recruitment

10. Ibid., p.349.

agreement) but those from Nepali army are also admitted into special and exclusive military training establishments dealing with high mountain warfare and counter-insurgency operations. Thus, indirectly, Nepal's decision provides a potential chink in Indian defence preparedness".¹¹

Sino-Nepal relations have grown tremendously since then. It was not unnatural in the sense that, this friendship has helped the Nepali ruling elite to perpetuate themselves in power, oblivious to the demands of democratisation and human rights. After getting various kinds of help and support from China since 1962, in June 1988, some 300-500 military trucks carried sensitive cargo from the Tibetan town of Kodari to Kathmandu. Available reports indicate that these military supplies included anti air-craft guns, medium range missiles, AK-47 rifles, huge quantities of ammunition, uniforms and boots etc. Reportedly, civilian traffic was restricted on the Arnico Highway (Kathmandu-Kodari road) to facilitate the movement of the Chinese trucks. Some of the anti air-craft guns and missiles were paraded on Kathmandu streets on July 18, to display the Nepali regime's prowess. These arms were supplied to Nepal by the Chinese at throw away prices".¹²

11. Ibid.,p.351.

12. S.D. Muni, "Chinese Arms Pour into Nepal" **Times of India** (New Delhi) 1 September 1988.

The official confirmation about the procurement of Chinese arms by Nepal came from the Nepalese Prime Minister Mr. Marich Mansingh Srestha, who also held the defence portfolio, when he said in the National Panchayat that - "Necessary defence equipment and instruments for improving the efficiency of the Royal Nepal army had been coming from ^friendly countries'. Light anti-aircraft equipment of general use were procured this year from China as in the past".¹³

When confronted by India with irrefutable evidence, there was no satisfactory explanation forthcoming from the Nepalese side regarding the actual security need and urgency behind such imports. The prevailing and possible internal and external threat scenarios in Nepal did not warrant such an import. The argument of internal security, anti-terrorism and measures against possible hijacking, which were extended by Nepal, does not hold water on close scrutiny. This arms import by Nepal came exactly a year after the Indian para-dropping of supplies in SriLanka. And there were reports in sections of the Press that the real motive behind Nepal's purchase of the anti-aircraft guns was to deter any similar Indian action in Nepal in future. But this argument also seems ludicrous in

13. *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 10 September 1988.

view of the vast power difference between India and Nepal.

Therefore, in essence it seems that, it was merely a symbolic act on Nepal's part. Through this action Nepal wanted to subvert the 1950 treaty of Peace and Friendship and to undermine the 1965 agreement on import of arms. The Nepali decision makers might also have decided to ruffle India's security sensitivities by this gesture. But the actual causes and motives for such an action is still unclear.

This event precipitated a controversy between the two governments and the already wavering Indo-Nepal relations got further embittered. A section of people in Nepal believe that, Nepal being a sovereign country, was within its rights to procure arms from China. When India complained bitterly about this Nepali action, a Nepalese news paper wrote on 11th April 1989.

"This Indian behaviour would have been understandable if these weapons constituted any threat to India. But since it is far from that, it is bound to be viewed as highly offending and objectionable, whereas it needs to be repeated here that, this transaction came years after India simply ignored a Nepalese request for such purchases. It will stand to reason if one were to point out that it is none of the business of India to take interest in others' matters as long as they do not affect her one way or the other".

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14. Commoner (Kathmandu), 11 April 1989.

While another section suggest that the agreement of 1965 had become invalid after the declaration to this effect by the then Nepali Prime Minister, Kirti Nidhi Bishta, through an interview to the government controlled daily - "Rising Nepal".¹⁵

This Nepali action caused much concern in India not because the imported arms posed any threat to India's immediate security, but because the liberal availability of Chinese arms in the hands of Nepalese security personnel might clandestinely find their way into the hands of terrorists and Naxalites operating in India. In this context, the then external affairs minister P.V. Narasimha Rao said in Parliament that the government would continue to remain vigilant against any transfer of arms from across its borders to terrorists operating in India".¹⁶

Whatever might be the actual position and compulsion behind the Nepalese move to procure arms from China, it (Nepal) can not and should not remain oblivious to the genuine Indian security perceptions. Nepal is heavily dependent upon India for its trade and transit facilities and Nepal's dependence on India both as a market and source

15. D.P. Kumar, "Chinese Anti-Aircraft Guns: Nepal Violated Secret Agreement with India", *The Statesman* 27 May 1989; and "Arms Pact Not Valid: Nepal", *ibid.*, 7 June 1989.

16. *The Statesman* (New Delhi, 10 September 1988).

of essential commodities, is greater now than any time in the past. To drive home this point to the Nepalese side a bit more clearly and precisely, the Indian government indulged in a bit of coercive diplomacy when the trade and transit treaty came up for renewal in 1989. India refused to renew the two treaties so long as Nepal did not make suitable amends in it's actions in harmony with Indian needs and security compulsions and the result was simply disastrous for Nepal.

Although the arms imported by Nepal from China are negligible in quantity, what worried the Indian security planners was the possibility of these arms finding there way into India. The terrorists in Punjab are already using Chinese weapons (Procured via Pakistan) and there were earlier reports about the Chinese help to the Naga and Mizo rebellions through Bangladesh. So, obviously India did not want to open a third front via Nepal for supply of arms to the hotter spots in India. Besides that, this expansion of military supply coupled with the training relationship, although nascent, among China, Pakistan and Nepal may have serious long term security implications for India.

The foregoing account shows that the Sino-Nepal relations have come a long way since it's beginning in the fifties. China has assiduously courted Nepal to wean it away

from Indian sphere of influence. With that end in view, the Chinese began to support the monarchy and the vested interests in Nepal and after King Mahendra's coronation, China started playing a high profile role in Nepal. "The Chinese have extended unreserved support to Nepal's anti-Indian posture and encouraged the monarchy to reduce Indian presence in the Himalayan Kingdom".¹⁷

But, as the Indo-Nepal treaty of 1950 is still operative, the Chinese have failed to project themselves as an effective counter-balance to India. On the other hand, Nepal's efforts to reduce it's economic dependence on India through diversification of trade, have not produced the desired results despite massive Chinese economic aid to Nepal on very concessional terms. To sum up, in the words of a writer,

"Nepal has also failed to get China's firm commitment required to play the balance of power game effectively. Beijing has encouraged Nepal to assume an independent posture and has given some assistance to make it feasible. But China has not made any concrete commitment, either formal or implicit, to protect the royal regime against a real prospect of India's intervention. The Chinese support to Nepal has only limited success in terms of Nepali foreign policy objectives".¹⁸

17. Heman Ray, Nepal, (ND), p.1.

18. Ibid., p.2.

CHAPTER-6

CONCLUSION

Apart from the superpowers, China also impinges upon the South-Asian security environment. It occupies the entire northern fringe of the Indian sub-continent. China shares border with four of the seven countries of the South-Asian region. Bangladesh is separated from China by a 80 Km stretch of Indian territory and is in very close proximity to China. As a result, China has a very deep and abiding interest in the developments taking place in the South-Asian region. South-Asia, as has been described earlier, occupies a very significant position in the Chinese strategic thinking. China has interests in the region relating to security, status and regional and global roles. Except with India, China has good relations with all the other countries of South-Asia, although none enjoys the strength of Sino-Pak ties. Nevertheless, the smaller South-Asian countries had always welcomed a Chinese role in South-Asia because that enhanced their own freedom of manoeuvre, reduced their dependence on India and undermined India's preferred role of hegemon in the south-Asian regional sub-system. Besides that, they also benefited from Chinese aid and military supplies and when occasion demanded, rhetorical or even diplomatic support.

China is not a superpower² lies in between the superpowers and the medium powers. But, like the superpowers, most of the Chinese aid have been politically motivated and it's military aid is also no exception. China gives military aid to its friends and allies not for economic gains like France or Britain but in pursuit of strategic policies. However, since the very beginning, China's military aid programme has been limited by the constraints of China's fragile economy and limitations of its production capacity.

From 1964 onwards, the number of countries receiving Chinese arms has grown substantially. Also, the quality and variety of weapons supplied by China have become more extensive. "The range of products in China's military aid catalogue is not very different from the superpowers. China has exported everything from grenades and rifles to jet aircraft and submarines".¹ However, there are certain distinctive qualities to the Chinese aid package.

Firstly, the state and movements that benefit from Chinese aid have been singled out for a variety of reasons. An analysis of the aid patterns indicate the changing priorities of Beijing's policies. China started its military aid programme by sending arms to its neighbours like Vietnam

1. Gerald Segal and Anne Gilks, "China and the Arms Trade", *Arms Control*, Vol.6, No.3, December 1985, P. 258.

and Kampuchea for what it conceived as a fight against capitalist and imperial domination. With the deterioration of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations in the late fifties and early sixties, China began arming Pakistan as a countervailing force to India. Again, with the gradual increase in India's power and influence in the South-Asian region and a growing Soviet presence, China started giving military aid to South-Asian countries around India as a policy of containment. Lastly, there have been an increasing sale of Chinese arms to the Middle-East countries for profits. Of late there has also been a gradual but slow decline in arms sale to the various South-Asian countries due to normalization of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations.

Secondly, the quality of the Chinese weapons have been far more consistent than that of the Soviets or the Western countries. In part this is due to the relative backwardness of the Chinese economy. But mainly, the earlier Chinese weapons were variations of the Soviet models of the 1950s and thus most of them were outdated and lagged behind western and Soviet products. But that does not mean that the Chinese weapons were useless. On the contrary, the Chinese weapons were more suitable for the rugged third world conditions, where the most modern, state-of-the-art equipments are not absolutely necessary. To overcome the

handicap in quality and relative unsophistication of their weapons, the Chinese resorted to producing greater numbers.

The third dimension of Chinese aid is the terms of transfer which is a distinctive aspect of the Chinese programme. Until recently, all of China's military aid was free - either direct grants or interest free loans. However, SIPRI notes that very little is known about Chinese credit terms and forms of repayment and that there is no way to substantiate the Chinese claim that the PRC is the only country to give weapons free.² In the past the Chinese reportedly refused to accept payment for their weapons by saying that, "we are not weapons traders."³ President Mubarak of Egypt spoke of China's very reasonable prices, while it was reported that Pakistan and Sri Lanka paid only half the price for aircrafts purchased from China, that a comparable aircraft would have cost in the west.⁴

But it is also true that China was not able to offer complex and advanced military equipment till late seventies which could fetch higher prices. Neither would have been the states interested in Chinese weapons had they been as costly as the western ones without matching their

2. SIPRI - 1980, p. 74.

3. *The Times* (London), 26 March 1970.

4. See Chapters on Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

sophistication. So, "China sought to compensate for its lower level weapons by providing better terms. In essence, China had no choice, for its military aid was otherwise unattractive."⁵

But in the eighties, China began turning military aid into a lucrative source of hard currency earnings. The recent Chinese philosophy on arms sales is succinctly summed up by a Chinese military official - "We can not sell at friendship prices all the time."⁶ Foreign currency is needed for China's own modernisation and for funding its own R&D programme.

China's military aid policy is new and advantageous to the exchequer. "It is more attuned to the needs of the recipients and because of its relative unsophistication and generous terms, China's military aid creates a minimum degree of dependence."⁷

Fourthly, during the initial years China mainly supplied small arms because they were not immediately required by the PLA and it put less strain on Chinese economy. Small arms were easier to transport and China had

5. Segal, Ibid., No. 1, P. 262.

6. Wall Street Journal, 4 May 1984.

7. Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, **China and the Arms Trade**, (Sydney : Croom Helm Australia Pvt. Ltd., 1985), P.165.

long range logistics problems. However, some key allies like Pakistan were supplied heavy arms in the mid sixties.⁸

But during the seventies, China began to export more heavy naval equipment, including submarines and destroyers, mainly to Pakistan. However, since specialist steel was scarce, China began license co-production agreements rather than loose the account.⁹ This is part of the growing Chinese move towards granting licensed co-production during the seventies. China's late entry into the ranks of major arms supplier countries who have granted licensed production agreements to client states is not due to it's unwillingness to transfer technology. The Chinese scope in this field is limited because most of China's aid recipients are underdeveloped countries who lack the facilities to produce major weapons. And the States who had the infrastructure, were unwilling to co-produce China's outdated equipment.

Fifthly, in the overall Chinese strategy, economic aid had an edge over military aid. But in recent years, like Chinese foreign policy, this too is changing. In the past, China had extended economic aid to countries without giving them military aid, e.g. Nepal, but the reverse was never

8. SIPRI - Arms Trade Register, Also Military Balance (IISS), 1963-69.

9. Segal, Ibid, No. 7, P. 154.

true. Pakistan was the only exception which received more military aid than economic.

Finally, China enjoyed an edge over the western countries in terms of its abilities to maintain a steady supply of arms at very reasonable prices. This is primarily due to China's centralised state planning and control of the military-industrial complex and its continued production of older models for export. This also explains the narrower time lapse between order and supply.¹⁰

FUTURE CHINESE ROLE IN SOUTH-ASIA

For a long time China viewed the South-Asian region through the lens of global geopolitics and the overall effect of this had been that it froze the regional politics in a cold-war pattern. As a result, China's relationship with the South-Asian countries became subservient to the state of Sino-Soviet and Indo-Soviet relations. But with the rapid changes in the international scenario, particularly the gradual decadence of the bipolar system, the Chinese leaders have started paying a closer attention to the South-Asian region and have modified their policies accordingly. By adjusting and modifying their policies, the Chinese leadership hopes to maintain and wherever possible, to expand their role in the region.

10. Gilks, Ibid, No. 7, P. 164.

Because, the Chinese leaders have realised that a strong Chinese presence in the South-Asian region is a prerequisite to their claim to be the dominant power in Asia.

Since the fifties, the Chinese actions in the South-Asian region had been primarily designed to curtail Indian and Soviet spheres and levels of influence, making it a Zero-sum-game, where one's loss is another's gain. Earlier, China behaved like a hegemonistic power and did not hesitate to use any power at its disposal to threaten its perceived enemies, especially those in its neighbourhood. But the Chinese policy failed to stop the emergence of India as an eminent power in the sub-continent, especially after the Indo-Pak War of 1971. So, China has realised that instead of pursuing a policy of confrontation, the tactics of conciliation would better serve its purpose. China also hoped that a better relationship with India would help it in expanding its influence among the third world countries. A growing Chinese interest in recent years to enter into negotiations with India to solve the vexed border problem and a gradual but slow normalisation of Sino-Indian relations, coming on the heels of a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, gives sufficient proof of this changed Chinese thinking.

Given this background, it seems plausible that the Chinese role and presence in the South-Asian region would

gradually diminish. This also appears more likely because, China itself is threatened by domestic turbulence in the face of a pro-democracy movement, a floundering economy and growing ethnic problems and therefore it will definitely like to minimise its involvement in another turbulent region, i.e. South-Asia.

For India, none of the South-Asian countries present the same kind or magnitude of problems that either Pakistan or China do, as none of them possess the same resources to pose similar threats. However, they can and certainly will be used as and when the interests of China demand. Although China had tried its best to exploit the differences in the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bangladesh relations and given arms and ammunitions besides economic aid and assistance to prop up these countries as independent centres of power around India, it has failed in achieving its desired goal. India's differences with Bangladesh and Nepal are not of alarming proportions now and presently of only nuisance value.

Apart from Afghanistan Sri Lanka had been the region's major security pre-occupation in the eighties and it presents India with difficulties as intractable, though different in nature, as Pakistan. In fact the veteran Indian diplomat Jagat Meheta remarked long back that, Sri Lanka had the potentials

of being a running sore like Pakistan.¹¹ India succeeded in keeping out the undesirable external powers from Sri Lanka, including China, from 1987 onwards after the signing of the Indo Sri Lanka accord.

But recently with the change of government in both the countries and the subsequent withdrawal of IPKF, things are back to square one in Sri Lanka. There are reports of Sri Lanka granting transmission facilities to VOA and the Chinese sale of arms to Sri Lanka, including fighter planes, to fight Tamil militants.

Finally that brings us to the Chinese involvement in Pakistan and its impact on India. Given its past record and the present situation, China may not militarily support Pakistan in the event of another Indo-Pak War. This seems all the more probable since China is no longer faced with both U.S. and Soviet opposition and on the contrary it is being wooed by both. And, "if there is no further increase in the tension between India and Pakistan and if China and India make further progress towards normalising their relations, then the Sino-Pak alliance may become a residual partnership, sustained more by habits of political ritual than by strategic necessity".¹²

11. Jagat Meheta, "India, Home and Abroad : Importance of Good Neighbour Bourliness", *The Stateman*, 13 April 1985.

12. Steven I. Levine, "China and South Asia", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol-XII, No. 10, Jan 89, P. 1117.

But, there are other darker possibilities also. In the event of a nuclear arms race in South-Asia, China may become the proverbial holder of the balance. Also, since a long time, China has been emphasising the need and actual creation of power projection capabilities in distant areas, which is an essential ingredient for acquiring the status of a global power. "This was amply demonstrated in May 1980 South-Pacific deployment when the Chinese Naval fleet travelled for 130,000 nautical miles without stopping at any foreign port for refueling and performed all it's most important exercises. During the winter of 1985-86, Chinese Naval ships sailed into the Indian Ocean for the first time, with port calls in Karachi, Colombo and Chittagong in countries which have been importing arms from China".¹³ With the visit of the Chinese naval ships to Karachi, Colombo and Chittagong ports, a new dimension has been added to the Chinese role in the region. This is a definite pointer towards a growing Chinese desire to acquire a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region. Chinese efforts to establish strong economic and political ties with Iran, Iraq and other Middle-East countries through Pakistan, are part of this strategy.

13. Jasjit Singh, "Growth of Chinese Navy and its Implications for Indian Security", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 12, March 1990, P. 1213.

So, in the coming years, Pakistan, China, United States and Soviet Union would constitute the main naval threat to India. But the threat from China could be the greatest, since the United States is not a neighbour and has no real or direct dispute with India and while the Soviet Union is a friendly country, Pakistan without any external propping will not be much of a problem. Therefore, although the threat levels to India from its immediate neighbours would come down due to a diminishing Chinese presence and decreasing supply of arms and ammunitions to these countries by China in the changed regional and global scenario, the overall threat level to India would remain more or less constant in view of a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean region, which is of paramount importance not only for India's security but for its economy also.

India and China are the two most populous countries in the world and are neighbours. Both are inheritors of a great civilisation and rich cultural history but are following different political and developmental models. But ironically, this makes them enemies instead of friends as both vie for a position of pre-eminence in the Asian region. India and China may learn to live with each other in future but they will always be rivals at best and, at worst, in conflict with each other.

SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

--	Negligible figure (Less than 0.5)
()	Uncertain Data
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
Ar	Air craft
FAC	Fast Attack craft (Missile/Torpedo Armed)
Grd	Ground
LT	Light Tank
SPH	Self-Propelled Howitzer
TG	Towed Gun
MRS	Multiple Rocket System
ShShM	Ship to Ship Missile
PC	Patrol craft (Gun-Armed/Unarmed)

APPENDIX-1

Chinese Arms Transfers to South-Asia from 1973-1988

Period - 1973-1977 (At constant 1975 prices and in \$ mn)				
Country	Total Arms Imports	Chinese Share	% of Total	Armament Types (Nos.)

Bangladesh	100	10	10	Land Armaments (650) Artillery (130), Motor boats (10) combat aircraft (80), other aircraft (30)
Nepal	20	-	-	
Pakistan	650	200	31	
SriLanka	20	10	50	

Period - 1975-1979 (At constant 1977 prices)				

Bangladesh	55	10	18	Tanks (400) Anti-Air artillery (50), Patrol boats(2), combat aircraft (120) other aircraft (45)
Nepal	5	-	-	
Pakistan	880	240	28	
SriLanka	20	-	-	

Period - 1978-1983 (At constant 1980 prices)				

Bangladesh	85	60	70	Tanks (80) Anti-air artillery (105),Field Artillery (55), Patrol crafts (13),Misile crafts (4),combat aircraft (3) surface-to-surface missiles (20)
Nepal	5	-	-	
Pakistan	1570	230	15	
SriLanka	15	5	33	

Period - 1982-1986 (At constant 1984 prices)				

Bangladesh	230	140	60	Tanks (125) anti-air artillery (3) Patrol crafts (12) missile craft (8), combat aircraft (80),other aircraft(15),SAM (105)
Nepal	10	-	-	
Pakistan	2195	240	11	
SriLanka	40	-	-	

Period - 1984-1988 (At constant 1986 prices)				

Bangladesh	220	160	73	Tanks (140) Mine sweepers etc. (7),Missile Craft (8), combat air-craft (53), other air-craft (18), SAM - 230.
Nepal	5	-	-	
Pakistan	1950	330	17	
SriLanka	120	40	33	

Source: ACDA, 1978,81,83,87,89.

APPENDIX-2

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFERS TO PAKISTAN

Weapon designation (1)	Weapon Description (2)	Number ordered (3)	Year of order (4)	Year of delivery (5)	Number delivered (6)	Comments (7)
Gun boat	--	9	--	1971	--	For use as Mine seekers.
T-59	MBT	210	(1968)	1970-72	(210)	
F-6	Fighter	(80)	1969	1971-72	(80)	Including some F-5 Trainers.
Shanghai Class	PC	12	1970	1972-73	(12)	
Mig-19	Fighter	--	--	1971	(400)	Pak sources claim deliveries of 400 fighters and bombers began in late 1971
'W'-Class	Submarine	2-3	1970	--		
T-63	LT	(50)	1971	1972-73	(50)	
Mig-19	Fighter	50+	1972	1972	--	
Huchan class	Hydrofoil FAC	4	1972	1973	4	
Shanghai Class	Gun boats	6	1972	1972	--	Displacement 120 tons.4 were probably converted for firing missiles.
T-531	APC	200	1972	1973-76	(200)	
T-59	MBT	100	1972	1972	(100)	
F-6	Fighter	(15)	1972	1974	(15)	
T-59	MBT	(159)	(1973)	1974	(159)	
Shengyang Mig-19	Fighter	1 squad	1973	1974	--	Including spares. Total brings to 120
SAM-6	SAM system	--	1973	--	--	
Type 59/1	TG	(200)	1974	1976-80	(200)	
Hainan Class	PC	2	1975	1976	2	

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T-59	MBT	--	(1975)	(1978-86)	(675)	
--	Submarine	--	--	1976	--	Small number delivered. Not known if gift or sale.
F-6 Shengyang	Fighter	60	1976	1976-79	(50)	
Type 54 122 mm	SPH	(50)	(1977)	1978-79		30 each delivered in 1976 & 1977.
F-4	Fighter	(24)	(1978)	1978	24	Unconfirmed. Probably FT-6.
F-6	Fighter	(20)	(1979)	1980-81	(20)	trainer negotiated
SA-2 SSM's	Mobile SAM system	(6)	1979	1980	(6)	
SA-2 guideline	Land mobile SAM	(54)	1979	1980	(54)	SAM's deployed in July-80. In addition 2 delivered in 1980.
Hainan	PC	2	1979	1980	2	
F-6 bis	Fighter	65	1979	1980	--	Also designated Fantan A.
CSA-1	SAM	(20)	1979	1980	--	SAM's deployed in July 1980; designation unconfirmed.
Hegu class	FAC	(4)	1980	1981	4	Arming 4 Hegu Class FAC's
Haihing-2	ShShM	(8)	1980	1981	(8)	
T-60	LT	(50)	(1980)	1981-82	(50)	
T-59	MBT	(1000)	1980	--	--	China delivered 50 per year. Handed over to Pakistan in Karachi.
Romeo Class	Submarine	2	1980	1980		
Type-81 122 mm	MRS	(50)	1981	1982-83	(50)	
Q-5 Fantan A	Fighter	(100)	1982	1982-83	(50)	30 delivered in 1983.
Haiying 2 L	ShShM launcher	4	1983	1984	4	Arming 4 vessels procured earlier.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DO	DO	(16)	1983	1984	(16)	
F-7	Fighter	60	1983	1984	-	
Huangben Class	FAC	(4)	(1983)	1984	4	
Q-5 Class	Fighter	(100)	1984	1986	(50)	For Delivery in 1986-88.
CSA-1	SAM	(20)	1985	1985	(20)	Unconfirmed, copy of SA-2 SAM.
DO	DO	(2)	(1985)	(1985)	(2)	Unconfirmed.
Romeo Class	Submarine	--	--	1988		Negotiating retrofit Packages with western firms before delivery.

SOURCE: SIPRI, ACDA, MILITARY BALANCE.

APPENDIX-3

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFERS TO BANGLADESH

Weapon designation (1)	Weapon Description (2)	Number ordered (3)	Year of order (4)	Year of delivery (5)	Number delivered (6)	Comments (7)
F-6	Fighter	36	1974	1975-76	36	Including some FT-6 Trainers.
Mig 15 UTI	Fighter trainer	4	1974	1975	4	
F-9 Shengyang	Fighter a/c	50	1976	1977	10	
F-6	Fighter	36	1978	1979	24	
BT-6	Trainer a/c	(12)	1979	1979	12	
Shanghai Class	PC	8	1980	1980-82	8	
Hainan Class	PC	(2)	(1980)	1982-83	2	Options on more
T-59	MBT	36	(1980)	1980-81	(36)	
F-6	Fighter	(10)	(1980)	1983	(10)	
F-7	Fighter	(48)	(1980)	(1981)	--	Unconfirmed.
Hinan Class	FAC	4	(1981)	1982	1	The Status of rest 3 are unknown.
P-4 Class	FAC	4	1982	1983	4	
Romeo Class	Submarine	(6)	(1983)	1984	(1)	First submarine delivered 1984, 5 more ordered.
Hegu Class	FAC	4	(1983)	1983	4	
Haiying 2	ShShM	(24)	(1983)	1983	(24)	
Haiying 2L	ShShM Launcher	4	(1983)	1983	4	

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Type-54 122mm	SPH	20	1983	1984	(20)	
Hainan class	PC	4	(1984)	1984-85	4	In addition to 2 delivered in 1982-83.
F-6	Fighter	(36)	(1985)	--	--	Negotiating
F-6	Fighter	(36)	(1986)	--	--	Negotiating
F-7	Fighter	16	(1989)	--	16	

SOURCE: SIPRI, ACDA, MILITARY BALANCE.

APPENDIX-4

CHINESE ARMS TRANSFERS TO SRILANKA

Weapon designation (1)	Weapon Description (2)	Number ordered (3)	Year of order (4)	Year of delivery (5)	Number delivered (6)	Comments (7)
Shanghai class	Gunboat	5	(1971)	(1971)	5	Cost \$0.8mn to 1.0mn
Shanghai-II	Gunboat	2	(1979)	1980	2	Gifted to Sri-Lanka unspecified number ordered in addition to 10 delivered in 1986-87
Y-12	Transport	(10)	1986	1986-87	10	10 delivered in 1986-87
Y-12	Transport	--	(1987)			
Y-8	Trainer air craft	2	1987	1989	2	

SOURCE: SIPRI, ACDA, MILITARY BALANCE.

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