

**PAKISTAN AND THE KASHMIR ISSUE :
1972—1990**

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D. VARMA

**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH-EAST-ASIAN
AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA**

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


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
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, "PAKISTAN AND THE KASHMIR ISSUE : 1972-1990", submitted by D. Varma, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** has not been previously submitted to this University or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.



Dr. Uma Singh
(SUPERVISOR)



Prof. S.D. Muni
(CHAIRPERSON)

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PREFACE

Kashmir holds the key as far as Pakistan-India relations are concerned. The status quo in Kashmir was implicitly accepted in the Simla Agreement of 1972. But, over the years the problem has once again surfaced. While India, by and large, is ready to accept the 1971 Line of Actual control in Kashmir as the international boundary, Pakistan does not accept such a solution. Pakistan has been gradually undermining the Simla Agreement by raising the Kashmir issue at various international forums. The increasing secessionist tendency in Kashmir witnessed in 1990, and reports of Pakistan aiding various secessionist groups and terrorist outfits in Jammu and Kashmir raise new doubts about the possibility of resolution of the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan, since 1972, has steadily undermined the Simla Agreement. Its raising of the Kashmir issue seems to be closely related to the domestic crisis of the respective regimes. Pakistan, however, was much restrained because of the influence of external powers US, USSR and China and their emphasis on bilateral and peaceful negotiations, in the settlement of all differences between Pakistan and India. The asymmetrical power structure in South Asia, also seems to have checked Pakistan from resorting to an open

conflict with India in the 1972-1990 period.

It is in this background, that an effort has been made in the following chapters to analyse Pakistan's Kashmir policy during the period 1972-1990.

Chapter I gives an historical account of the Kashmir issue and the way Pakistan pursued it till 1972.

Chapter II deals with the determining factors behind Pakistan's approach to Kashmir, such as ideology, historical legacies, and above all domestic compulsions of the governments etc.

Chapter III deals with the way Pakistan pursued the Kashmir issue during the period 1972-1990. The Chapter, mainly tries to corelate the internal weaknesses of the respective Pakistani Governments and their corresponding interference and rhetoric on Kashmir.

Chapter IV would look into the policies of the United States, the Soviet Union and China forwards Kashmir issue during the period, 1972-1990 and its impact on Pakistan's stand.

Chapter V gives an objective analysis of the whole issue.

In the course of this work, my supervisor Dr. Uma Singh, has been a continuous source of help and encouragement. But for her critical suggestions and sympathetic support, this work would not have been completed. For all this, I am immensely grateful to her.

I am also thankful to Prof. S.D. Muni for his help and cooperation.

No words are enough for my friends Abbey, Anil, Prakash, Prarit, Rashmi, Reddy, Seenu, Srinivas, Supriyo, Vinod, Vijay and many others who stood by me in times of need and have contributed their bit in doing typing, proof reading etc.

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Finally, I am alone responsible for all the errors, factual or otherwise, that might have crept into this dissertation.



(D.VARMA)

CHAPTER - 1

INTRODUCTION

Kashmir had been one of the prominent factors guiding Pakistan's foreign policy. The roots of Pakistan's obsession with regard to Kashmir, lie in the partition of British India, which was based on the 'two-nation' theory of Jinnah.

Pakistan, born on the false premise that Hindus and Muslims constitute two separate and distinct nations, extended its claim on Kashmir because Jammu and Kashmir happened to be a Muslim majority princely state. This ideological component supported by other factors such as historical legacies, the strategic location of Kashmir, the domestic conditions of Pakistan at the time of partition, etc., influenced the Pakistani decision makers to pursue their irredentist claim on Kashmir, even after the princely state acceded to India in October 1947.

The Kashmir problem originated by the fact that Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, did not accede to India or Pakistan by 15 August 1947, after the lapse of British paramountcy.

Lord Mountbatten in his statement before the princes of India on 25 July 1947 said : "The subcontinent of India was an economic entity and if all links between the states and government of India were to be broken, it could result in chaos hitting the states first. The states were free to link themselves with either of the dominions but there were certain geographical compulsions which could not be evaded".¹

A confusion was created by Pakistan after the lapse of British paramountcy by its statements that the princely states could accede to either India or Pakistan or remain independent. This view of Pakistan was contrary to the official British view that the princely states must accede to either of the two dominions. Pakistan's motive in such a move was to create problems for India, within domain the majority of princely states would fall.

Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir was thus made to believe that he can remain independent. By August 15, 1947, Hari Singh signed a standstill agreement² with Pakistan,

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1. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir : A study in India Pakistan Relations (Bombay 1966), p.77.
 2. The Standstill agreement guaranteed that until new arrangements were made, all existing agreements and administrative arrangements would continue between the princely states and the new dominions of India and Pakistan. The standstill agreement of Kashmir with Pakistan was with regard to postal services, railways and communications.

while India refused the offer as it needed time to study his proposal. Thus, at the time of partition, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was semi-independent in nature.

Meanwhile in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference, a party with secular credentials was very popular amongst all the groups of the state. In September, 1947, Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison by the Maharajah in order to check the growing communal tension in the state. Abdullah had never accepted the 'two-nation' theory. On 3rd October, Sheikh Abdullah in a meeting at Srinagar had stated "Our choice for joining the Indian Union or Pakistan would be based on the welfare of 40 lakhs of people of Jammu and Kashmir state. But even if we join Pakistan we will never believe in the two-nation theory"³

Pakistan, which was aiming to make Jammu and Kashmir accede to it mainly because it was a Muslim majority area, was caught off guard by the secular nature of the majority of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus it began to plan to acquire Kashmir by force. Despite the stand still agreement with the Maharajah and the promise of friendship, Pakistan gradually began to mount pressure on Kashmir to

3. Sisir Gupta, n.1, p.102.

accede to it. The economic blockade and infiltration began. This measure was necessitated because Pakistan feared that in case a referendum was held in Kashmir, with regard to accession, it might go against it. The Pakistan authorities cut off supplies of food, petrol, cloth, rail and other essential commodities in the hope that hunger would secure the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.⁴

On 22 October 1947, thousands of tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, with all the panoply of an armed force, swept into the state mainly along the Rawalpindi-Srinagar road, putting down town and village on the way to sword. The small defending army of the Kashmiri ruler was broken up and scattered. Driven by lust for loot, rape and murder the invaders spread havoc amongst the innocent and unarmed people, mostly muslims and advanced rapidly towards the state's summer capital, Srinagar.⁵

The Maharaja of Kashmir, in no way able to defend the state, acceded to India on 7 October 1947. Indian troops were immediately airlifted to Srinagar on the same day, in order to defend and repulse the marauding invaders. The

4. K. K. Mishra, Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy, (Allahabad, 1979), p.51.

5. B. L. Sharma, The Kashmir Story, (New Delhi, 1967) p.1.

induction of the Indian troops into the state quickly expanded the scope of the conflict, as Pakistan explicitly committed itself to the cause of "liberating" Kashmir. Thus, the first Kashmir war began in full earnest. India approached the United Nations (UN), at this time, to mediate in the conflict on 1 January 1948. The U.N. mediation finally brought the war to a close on 1 January 1949. Pakistan was able to occupy certain areas of Jammu and Kashmir which it named as 'Azad' Kashmir.

India took up the Kashmir issue to UN in 1948 in the hope that the international body would be able to make Pakistan see reason and desist from any future aggression on Indian territory. However, the U.N. by that time was basically guided by Cold War considerations and was dominated by the Western Powers. Instead of declaring Pakistan as an aggressor, the world body made Pakistan, a party, to the so called dispute over Kashmir. The UN Security Council passed two resolutions, one in 1948 and another in 1949, which infact helped Pakistan to consolidate its stand on Kashmir. The proposals talked of a plebiscite, demilitarization and other general principles. The UN mediation efforts which began with McNaughton of Canada failed to bring in any change and a deadlock on demilitarization arose. Later efforts of Sir Owen Dixon also failed to make the parties accept any agreement on

demilitarization.⁶ The various efforts at demilitarization till 1953 failed to achieve any concrete results.

It must be pointed that Pakistan, since 1948, has consistently avoided the holding of a plebiscite. India, on the other hand maintained its stand, that the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir has to be respected. The fear of Pakistan, till 1953, has been mainly centered around the fact that if a plebiscite was held then, may be the people of Kashmir would vote for India. As Alastair Lamb clearly points out that "in the early stages of the Kashmir problem when the memory of the horrors of the tribal invasion of October 1947 was still fresh in Kashmiri minds, thoughtful Pakistani leaders cannot have been convinced that the vote would infact go in their favour. At this period in 1948-49 a Kashmiri plebiscite would have involved a considerable Pakistani gamble."⁷ Further, with Sheikh Abdullah openly following a secular line, Pakistan felt that any move towards plebiscite would end all its prospects in Kashmir. Thus, even during 1950-53, Pakistan held up the prospect of any plebiscite by creating a deadlock over the aspect of demilitarization.

6. Sisir Gupta, n.1, pp.202-254.

7. Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir 1947-1966, (London, 1966), p.57.

Meanwhile the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir began to undergo a change. In 1951 a Constituent Assembly was proclaimed by the crown prince, on the basis of free elections. The elections were held and Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference came to power in Kashmir. The Constitution Act of 1951, formally divested the Maharajah of all his powers. Being in power, Sheikh Abdullah entered into negotiations with the Central Government of India as regard to the status of Kashmir and for greater autonomy. In 1952, Abdullah signed an agreement with Nehru, that granted special rights and privileges to Jammu and Kashmir, that no other states in the Indian Union enjoyed.⁸ The agreement provided that residuary powers would rest in the state in case of Kashmir, although in regard to all other states it would rest with the Indian Union. Further the state legislature was given the power to regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the state, especially regarding the immovable property, appointment of services, etc. The agreement also provided that Central Government's intervention with regard to internal disturbances in the state could come only at the request or the concurrence of the Government of the State. Pakistan protested this move and also the setting up of Constituent

8. See Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, (Princeton, 1966), pp.224-225.

Assembly of Kashmir. In the prevailing tense atmosphere, the Graham Mission of the 'United Nations which was appointed on March 1951 failed to achieve any success on the aspect of demilitarization.

The internal politics of Jammu and Kashmir had undergone a lot of change. Abdullah began to stress on the formation of an independent Kashmir in 1953. He even moved a resolution in the Working Committee of the National Conference for an independent Kashmir. Probably in his new thinking he was inspired and encouraged by Washington.⁹ Abdullah's change was also because of the problems he was facing at home. By attempting to undermine his political opponents, Abdullah succeeded in polarising the communal organizations. They coalesced to found the Praja Parishad Movement and started a Satyagraha effort for the full incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir into India. Abdullah facing the domestic turmoil, tried to divert the attention of the people by raising the slogan of independence instead of meeting their demands. Abdullah's cabinet was split on this decision and seizing upon Abdullah's recent statements, that he might renounce the accession of Kashmir to India. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the second powerful man in the

9. Satish Ganjoo, Kashmir Politics, (New Delhi, 1990), p.32.

Cabinet, took over power in the state and had Abdullah arrested.

Pakistan, now began to make a fuss over plebiscite, after the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, evidently, in the belief that the turn of events would divide the people of Kashmir, the majority of whom might retaliate, by turning to Pakistan.¹⁰

International relations, which came to be guided by the 'Cold War', also made their entrance into South Asian region. In April 1954, the United States of America decided to sign a treaty with both Pakistan and Turkey. Though it was not defence treaty in an explicit sense, laid the ground work for the Baghdad Pact.¹¹ Pakistan, subsequently, joined the SEATO in 1954 and Baghdad Pact in 1955, not because it perceived an external communist threat, but to generate American support for its claims on Kashmir. This was very evident from the statement of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali's statement in 1954 that "...the hope of resolving the Kashmir tangle to Pakistan's satisfaction through the acquisition of military strength by joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, is the very raison-de-

10. B.L.Sharma, n.5, p.136.

11. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan & Great Powers (London, 1972), p.97.

etre for Pakistan, to remain a member of these pacts."¹² Pakistan joined the western alliances to strengthen itself militarily and later use the new strength at an appropriate time, to acquire Kashmir by force.

Pakistan joining the Western alliances, which were basically aimed at the Soviet Union, drastically affected the politics of the sub-continent. It introduced the Cold War into the region and resulted in the Soviet Union, supporting the stand of India on Kashmir issue. Kruschev, then Prime Minister of USSR, on a State visit to India in December 1955 clearly stated "The question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir... while in the Republic of India we find an ally... unfortunately we cannot say the same about Pakistan...we do not like the Baghdad Pact at all, the most active participant of which is Pakistan."¹³

The most important consequence of the Soviet entry into the Indo-Pak scene was that, Kashmir problem became more and more difficult to be solved. Apart from this, it also illustrated to Pakistan, the futility, of trying to solve the problems like Kashmir, with the strength borrowed

12. B. L. Sharma, n.5, p.139.

13. Sisir Gupta, n.1, p.300.

from one of the Cold War blocs. This was evident during the later years when the Soviet Veto brought a dead lock on Kashmir at the UN.

The direct negotiations between Pakistan and India from 1953-56 failed to bring in any desired results. It is during this period that Nehru proposed the 'No War' declaration to Pakistan. The 'No War' Pact mentioned that both Pakistan and India declare that "they condemn the resort to war for the settlement of any existing or future dispute between them".¹⁴ It also included that all differences would be settled by peaceful means, mutually agreed upon by both the countries. Nehru offered this, probably to undermine any possible Pakistani incentive to use the newly acquired might against India.

Pakistan refused to agree to a no-war pact and reiterated that until all outstanding disputes were solved, such a declaration would have no significance.

Pakistan took the Kashmir issue to the United Nations in 1957 and questioned the ongoing process of integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India. Further, Pakistan was facing a severe domestic crisis, and had as

14. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis, (London, 1973), p.49.

many as five governments between 1953-56. In such a state of internal chaos, Pakistani leadership was in no position to engage in talks and take proper decisions, on a sensitive issue like Kashmir. The ruling elite, for their own political survival, have to maintain a hard stance on Kashmir, in order not to antagonise the Pakistani public opinion.

The raking up of the Kashmir issue in the United Nations in January 1957, is also closely related to the declaration of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, that the new Constitution of the state would come into force on 26th January, 1957. Pakistan observed a 'Kashmir Day', on the day the security council met, to discuss the Kashmir issue, as per Pakistan's letter of 16 January, 1957.¹⁵ The Security Council resolution reaffirmed the earlier UN resolutions and the UNCIP resolutions. It reminded the Governments of India and Pakistan, that the final disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir would be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite

15. Pakistan's letter of 16 January, 1957, blamed India for failing to honour international commitments and her opposition to plebiscite in Kashmir. It pointed that the steps taken by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir to integrate the state with India were contradictory to UN resolutions. The letter accused India of crushing all opposition in Kashmir and called on the UN Security Council to implement the UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949.

conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Its operative part was a reaffirmation of the resolution of 30 March 1951, that the convening of the Constituent Assembly would not constitute disposition of the state, in accordance with the above principle.¹⁶

India protested strongly against the resolution. The resolution, however, did not come into effect because of the veto of the Soviet Union. At this time, the Soviet Union also drew attention to the fact that one of the members, India, had now rejected the aspect of plebiscite in Kashmir. The Soviet delegate, Mr. Sobolev, further stressed that the attempt to hold a plebiscite with outside interference would only complicate the international situation. Thus, Pakistan was checked by the veto of the Soviet Union at the United Nations.

The Security Council was forced to rephrase the proposal and this time it instructed Gunnar Jarring "to examine...any proposals, which in his opinion were likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute."¹⁷ The Jarring mission, however, failed to achieve any results. The report of Jarring Mission to the Security Council made a

16. Sisir Gupta, n.1, p.316.

17. Joseph Korb, n.8, p.312.

crucial point when it stated, "... the council will further more, be aware of the fact that the implementation of the international agreements of an adhoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they have to cope has tended to change."¹⁸ This tried to prove the point that multi-lateral efforts to solve the issue would not work because of the changed times.

However, once again, the United Nations sent Dr. Frank Graham, to mediate in the Kashmir dispute. The recommendations of Dr.Graham are broadly: "to maintain an atmosphere favourable for further negotiations; reaffirmation of respect for integrity of ceasefire line; a prompt study under the auspices of the United Nations representative, of how the territory evacuated by Pakistan could be administered pending the final solution and consideration for the possibility of stationing UN troops on Pakistan side of the border of Kashmir and in Pakistan to ensure security; an early agreement on the interpretation of the provisions regarding plebiscite and a Prime Ministers Conference to discuss the issue in early spring or at the earliest possible date."¹⁹

18. Quoted in Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia, (Boulder, 1987), p.73.

19. Sisir Gupta, n.1, p.335.

Pakistan accepted these proposals. But India rejected them because the recommendations did not point out that Pakistan was an aggressor and secondly, India could not undertake discussions on plebiscite because of the changed circumstances. The report evoked tremendous response in Pakistan. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Feroz Khan Noon, threatened to desert the western camp unless the western powers indicated positive support to her with regard to Kashmir. But the over all atmosphere remained peaceful despite Pakistan's outbursts.

Thus, at the end of 1958, the Kashmir issue was left to be discussed by direct negotiations between Pakistan and India, a point which was suggested by Dixon, Graham and Jarring also.

In October 1958, the military-bureaucratic nexus in Pakistan, formally took control over the political system of the country under the leadership of Ayub Khan. However, this did not really bring in any drastic change on Pakistan-India relations. In April 1959, Ayub Khan proclaimed at Rawalpindi that, "in the event of an external threat, Pakistan and India should defend the sub-continent in cooperation with each other". The Pakistani offer of a joint defence, was subject to the condition that big

problems like Kashmir & Canal waters must be settled.²⁰ This offer on joint defence by Ayub Khan was to take advantage of India's troubles. Ayub Khan believed that because of the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations, in the wake of the Tibetan turmoil and the border differences, India would favourably react to Pakistan's offer. He tried to take advantage of India's differences but India rejected this offer.

In 1960, Ayub Khan and Nehru signed the famous Indus Water Treaty. Signals of cooperation showed, but no progress could be made on the Kashmir issue. During 1961, the leaders of Pakistan reiterated their views on Kashmir question. President Ayub Khan began to talk about 'other means' if the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question proved impossible.

Pakistan, in 1962, took the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council. Interestingly, as in 1957, in 1962 also, the decision of Pakistan to take the matter to the Security Council followed a sharp deterioration in India's relations with western countries. Indian Police action in Goa in December 1961, was viewed in the western world as a serious violation of the rules of international conduct.

20. S.M.Burke, n.14, p.232.

Pakistan tried to use the Western resentment in order to mobilise western support for itself on the question of Kashmir in the Security Council. The attitude of the western nations was that it would not be helpful in any way to have a formal discussion on Kashmir.²¹ However, because of Pakistan's pressure, they moved a resolution, which was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

In October 1962, China attacked India in pursuit of her ambitions in South Asia. India received a severe setback and lost territory in Kashmir and North East Frontier Agency areas. The western support to India, especially by USA and UK, during the course of the war, gave them much leverage and this had an effect on the Kashmir issue. In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war, USA and Britain were able to persuade India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations on Kashmir. As a result, six rounds of talks were held between December 27, 1962 and May 27, 1963.²²

However, little could be achieved in the course of the talks. In a series of discussions held in 1963, Pakistan delegates agreed to consider any alternative

21. Sisir Gupta, n.1, p.346.

22. Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence, (New York, 1984), p.123.

solution of the Kashmir question, while formally reserving its position on the need for a plebiscite.²³ Accordingly, the Indian delegation proposed a plan for the settlement of Kashmir, by the partition of the state. Even Pakistan, began to think in terms of partition, but the actual lines on which partition was to be done differed widely.²⁴ However, Pakistan, in its public statements, continued to point that partition was harmful and not acceptable.

In Pakistan, Ayub Khan's popularity began to wane significantly from the beginning of 1963. Popular sentiments in Pakistan ran against the President when he failed to take advantage of the Sino-Indian border war and march his armies into Kashmir.²⁵ Ayub Khan was forced by Bhutto and others to take a hardline stance on Kashmir, if he wanted to check people's antagonism. Thus, with such a domestic atmosphere in Pakistan, the talks with India were bound to fail. From then onwards, Pakistan began to gradually drift towards a war with India, over Kashmir, which eventually took place in 1965.

23. Sisir Gupta, n.1, p.354-55

24. Ibid.

25. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era - 1958-1969, (New York, 1971), p.50.

The Sino-Indian War of 1962, brought an improvement of Pakistan-China relations. Although Pakistan has no border with China, it signed a provisional border agreement with China in March 1963, surrendering some 2,700 square miles of territory in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. India protested against the border agreement, but in vain. China further began to endorse Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. This gave much satisfaction to Pakistan and added to Pakistan's belligerent attitude.

The domestic politics in Kashmir also began to undergo a change. Pakistan was hostile to any further moves at the integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India. The atmosphere was already surcharged by the report of the theft of the 'holy relic' of the Hazratbal Shrine in Kashmir and it evoked wide spread agitation in Pakistan. In 1964, Abdullah was released from prison. He was rearrested because of his anti-Indian statements. In 1965, the Kashmir Legislative Assembly changed the title of the Head of State to Governor and that of the Prime Minister of Kashmir to Chief Minister, to conform with the titles in the other states of the Indian Union. Further, the Indian Parliament had amended the Constitution, so as to enable the President of India to take over the administration of Jammu and Kashmir, in case of collapse of the constitutional arrangements. This moves at integration were not acceptable

to Pakistan and its hostile attitude towards India increased.

The road to war was also rooted in the domestic and welfare of Pakistan. Ayub Khan, in order to attain some sort of legitimacy, held elections in Pakistan under the Basic Democracy Scheme. Ayub Khan won, but with a narrow margin. which only reflected his weakening political base. "Weakened in elections (in East Pakistan) and under pressure from Bhutto and the militants, Ayub Khan needed real success to restore the confidence of his government and the attentive public. Since the base of the regime was in West Pakistan, that success had naturally to appeal to the values and goals of that region of the country where Kashmir and relations with India were most powerful emotional issues.²⁶ The ideological threat posed by the closer integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India, coupled with domestic necessities of the military regime, led to a hostile policy towards India, which gradually led to the 1965 war.

Prior to the war in Kashmir, Pakistan attempted a 'limited probe' operation in Rann of Kutch and began to feel very confident. Though, the Rann of Kutch episode was settled, Pakistan began to greatly underestimate India's

26. Quoted in Sumit Ganguly, n.18, p.81.

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military strength. Further, it was also interested in settling the Kashmir question by force, before India became powerful militarily after the launching of its military modernisation programme. Apart from this, Pakistan also underestimated the calibre of the soft spoken and humble looking Lal Bahadur Shastri and overestimated the so-called Kashmiri population's alleged alienation from India. This led them to completely ignore Nehru's warning of 1951 that a war in Kashmir the next time would not remain limited to Kashmir and Lal Bahadur's statement in Loksabha, that India would respond to Pakistan's provocation at a place and time of its choice.²⁷

The increasing tendency to war by Pakistan in 1965, is embedded in the fact that it wanted to reopen the Kashmir issue as an international question and thus check the integration of the state with India. Stephen P. Cohen rightly remarks that "Pakistan has usually regarded war as an opportunity to bring long standing conflicts to the attention of the international community..."²⁸

Border clashes, along the ceasefire line started and infiltration of guerilla troops began in large numbers.

27. Sreedhar, "Misperceptions in Pakistan's Calculations", Strategic Analysis, Vol.8, no.10, p.945.
28. Stephen P.Cohen, The Pakistan Army, (New Delhi, 1984), p.145.



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This aggression by Pakistan began as early as 5 August, 1965 and on 1 September, 1965. Pakistan launched a might thrust in the Kashmir sector. On 16 September 1965, Indian forces crossed the international border near Lahore to relieve pressure in Kashmir. Simultaneously, the Indian forces also moved into West Punjab, towards Sialkot. The fighting which was mainly confined to the western sector, continued for 22 days and the performance of the Pakistani forces was demoralising. The military debacles forced Ayub Khan to bring the war to an end and a ceasefire was declared on 23 September 1965. Further, international opinion was also against the war. The super powers took a neutral stand during the war with China being the only great power vocally supporting Pakistan.

The United Nations attempt to mediate, during and after the war, was not acceptable to both the countries. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union offered its good offices for mediation. Though India accepted the proposal immediately and Pakistan was a bit hesitant about it. The discussions at Tashkent between Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri, resulted in the Tashkent Declaration of 10 January, 1966.

Even though Kashmir was the focal point of the 1965 war, the Tashkent Declaration only made a passing reference of the issue because of the continuing diplomatic

impasse over it. The main provisions of the Tashkent Declaration were India and Pakistan pledged themselves :-

- 1) to restore normal and peaceful relations between them;
- 2) to withdraw their respective armed forces, not later than 25 February 1966, to the positions they held before 5 August, 1965 - the date of the outbreak of the second phase of the Indo-Pakistani hostilities;
- 3) to repatriate captured prisoners of war;
- 4) to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries, as well as economic and trade relations, communications and cultural exchanges.
- 5) to end hostile propaganda; and
- 6) to deal with the question of refugees and illegal immigrants.

Apart from these, the Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agreed that both sides would make all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the UN Charter. They affirm their obligations under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region, particularly in the sub-continent, and the interests of the people of India and Pakistan were not served by the

continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective positions.²⁹

The Tashkent declaration provoked very hard reaction from the people of Pakistan, because it did not solve the Kashmir issue, in favour of Pakistan. The people, fed on fairy tales of Pakistan's military victories, began to feel that the victories on the battle fields have been lost by the leadership at the negotiating table.³⁰

Ayub Khan's domestic troubles increased further with the wide spread discontent against him. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began to stress on the importance of Kashmir and tried to mobilise the public opinion against Ayub Khan. President Ayub Khan's statements that the Tashkent declaration would gradually envisage the settlement of Kashmir dispute did not carry much weight in Pakistan. The Ministerial level talks between Pakistan and India in Rawalpindi in 1966 failed to achieve anything.

Pakistan tried to stress on the final settlement of Kashmir, but India remained firm saying that the Indian

29. A. Appadurai and M. S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, (New Delhi, 1985), pp.98-99.

30. G.S.Bhargava, Pakistan in Crisis, (New Delhi, 1972), p.149.

sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir was not negotiable. Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister, began to stress that Pakistan should once again take the Kashmir question to the United Nations Security Council.³¹ But Ayub Khan resisted such attempts, because even international opinion was against such a move. The United States and Britain began to maintain a more neutral position on Kashmir, since the 1965 war and began to propagate the idea that the United Nations could not do much even if Pakistan took the matter to the Security Council. They also stressed the point that Pakistan and India must reach an agreement between themselves on Kashmir. Thus, the principle of 'bilateralism' in the settlement of Kashmir issue came to be accepted by one and all.

Further, from 1966 onwards, Pakistan was more engrossed in trying to solve the domestic problems, especially the growing discontent in East Pakistan. The failure of Pakistan political system to meet the demands of various ethnic groups in Pakistan, finally led to the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.

The discontent in East Pakistan was because of many factors including lack of proper share in the power

31. See White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute, Ministry of External Affairs, (Islamabad, 1977).

structure of Pakistan, under development, the revival of Bengali nationalism and the assertion of Bengali language, etc. The Pakistani rulers failed to meet these basic demands, thus, leading to the breakaway of Bangladesh.

Facing such a domestic turmoil, Ayub Khan was compelled to resign and pass on the power to General Yahya Khan in March 1969. The general elections held in 1970, however, failed to satisfy the demands of the Bengalis. The subsequent negotiations to arrive at an agreement failed and the Pakistan army began a region of terror on the people of East Pakistan. Refugees from East Pakistan began to flood India and as Mrs. Gandhi rightly put forth "What was claimed to be an internal problem in Pakistan has also become an internal problem in India".³² Pakistan now began to accuse India for its internal troubles. India tried to remain peaceful, but was being provoked by Pakistan. Pakistan made a lot of noise on the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August, 1971.

Meanwhile, the liberation movement in East Bengal gained momentum and Pakistan's leaders having failed to solve its own internal crisis, began a hate-India campaign. On 3 December, 1971, Pakistan launched a surprise attack

32. Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, (New Delhi, 1984), p.213.

along the Indian frontier in Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan. India, had no option but to retaliate. India recognised Bangladesh on 6 December 1971 and with the coordination of the Mukti-Bahini, was able to make the Pakistani forces to surrender on 16 December 1971, in East Pakistan. The war on the western front came to an end on 17 December, 1971, after Pakistan accepted the Indian offer of a ceasefire.³³

After the emergence of Bangladesh, and the repudiation of the two-nation theory, the 1971 war also proved to Pakistan, the futility of trying to challenge India. Pakistan lost much territory in Jammu and Kashmir to India. It was also forced to accept India's supremacy in the region.

Thus, as we see from 1965 to 1971, Pakistan has not seriously pursued the Kashmir issue. Further, from 1965, United States and Soviet Union also distanced themselves from South Asia. The arms embargo imposed on Pakistan in 1965 was because of the fact that United States realised that Pakistan's main motive was to use the western weapons against India. The relations between Pakistan and America thus weakened and resulted in the developing of

33. A. Appadurai & M.S.Rajan, n.29, pp.104-105.

Pakistan's relations with Soviet Union. With America showing disinterest in the sub-continent affairs, Pakistan was not able to pursue the Kashmir question actively in the UN during 1965-1971.

At last, Kashmir only remained a frustrating issue for Pakistan and a non-issue for India. However, the opening of a major front by Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir, in the 1971 Bangladesh war clearly showed that Pakistan still continued to believe that it could acquire Kashmir by force. But, the defeat in the 1971 war, made Pakistan to see more reason, and accept the reality.

CHAPTER II

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF PAKISTAN'S KASHMIR POLICY

Kashmir has figured prominently in Pakistan - India relations. Kashmir to a large extent determined the relations of Pakistan with other countries of the world. Infact, Pakistan had gone to war, atleast twice with India ie. in 1947 - 49 and 1965, in order to acquire Kashmir. The Bangladesh war of 1971, exposed Pakistan's domestic weakness and its policy failure in the process of national integration.

The political scenario in Pakistan, immediately after the Bangladesh war of 1971, was one of a state whose ideological basis was proved wrong. This weakened Pakistan's ideological argument as regard to Kashmir. Domestically, Pakistanis themselves became unsure of the identity of their state. In Kashmir, status quo had to be accepted and the Simla agreement formalised it. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who came to power in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, despite his promises of solving the socio-economic problems of Pakistan could not really achieve much. These domestic troubles persisted in the later years also. The military bureaucratic complex of Pakistan was still very powerful and in 1977 their supremacy was once again asserted with the coup of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. Faced with crisis

situations domestically, Pakistan's rulers continued to emphasis on Kashmir in order to divert the attention of the people and stabilise themselves. Domestic compulsions acted as the chief determinant of Pakistan's Kashmir policy in the post 1971 period. However the other factors such as geopolitical setting of Kashmir, the historical legacies dating back to the pre-partition years, the Pakistani drive for parity with India, and external environment etc. continued to have their influence on Pakistan's approach to Kashmir.

One of the important factors which determined Pakistan's approach to Kashmir was the geographical location of Kashmir and its importance for Pakistan's security.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir lies in the northernmost part of the sub-continent with an area of 86,023 sq. miles. Thus Kashmir has its own strategic importance because of its location.¹ The Pakistanis believed that Kashmir is geographically inseparable from the Indus valley and as such is of vital importance to Pakistan. The rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab which flow through Kashmir into West Pakistan are the life line of its agricultural economy and the defence of west Pakistan can

1. Fahmida Ashraf, "The Kashmir Dispute: An Evaluation" Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, Summer 1990, p. 63.

easily be out-flanked from mountaineous Kashmir in the rear.²

The strategic importance of Kashmir has been acknowledged even by Nehru, who had clearly stated the importance of Kashmir: "Kashmir because of her geographical position, with her frontiers marching with three countries namely Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India".³ Whoever had Kashmir had access to the vital strategic-areas in the north-west.⁴ Secondly, the geographical setting of Kashmir is such that it provided the traditional link between central Asia and the Indian sub-continent.

The location of Kashmir has made Pakistan to strive and acquire it for its security needs. Pakistanis believed that their country's safety depends on having Kashmir. Akbar Khan, a former Major-General notes, "one glance at the map of South Asia was enough to show that Pakistan's military security would be seriously jeopardized

2. Fahmida Ashraf, "Strategic significance of Indian States bordering Pakistan", Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, Summer 1989, p. 63.

3. Fahmida Ashraf, n.1, p.63.

4. Sisir Gupta, "Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations", (Bombay, 1969), p. 442.

if Indian troops came to be stationed along Kashmir's western border. Once India got the chance, she could establish such stations anywhere within a few miles of the 180 miles long vital road and rail routes between Lahore and Pindi. In the event of war, these stations would be a dangerous threat to our most important civil and military lines of communication. The possession of Kashmir would enable India, if she wished to take the war to Hazara and Muree... more than 200 miles behind the front. This of course could happen (not) only in the event of war, but in peace time too, the situation could be as unacceptable because we could remain permanently exposed to a threat of such magnitude that our independence would never be a reality. Surely that was not the type of Pakistan we wanted".⁵ Apart from this west Pakistan's three important rivers, the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab originate in Kashmir and Pakistan feared that it would be constant threat of diversion of waters of these rivers if it did not acquire Kashmir. The state of Jammu & Kashmir has a larger boundary with Pakistan than with India, roads from Kashmir mostly led into Pakistan and Kashmir's trade was mostly carried through Pakistan's territory.⁶ These above arguments were

5. Quoted in Sumit Ganguly, "Origins of War in South Asia" (Boulder, 1986). p.50.

6. D.C. Jha, "Foreign Policies of India and Pakistan : Kashmir as a Factor", South Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No.2, July 1969, p. 161.

given by Pakistan in order to get hold of Kashmir. The strategic importance of Kashmir was well observed by G.W. Choudhury. "Any hostile power installed in Kashmir can threaten vital rail and road communications from Lahore to Peshawar and can control the waters of Jhelum and Chenab on which the economic life of the country depends. For economic, ethnological and strategic reasons Pakistan cannot possibly allow any hostile country to hold Kashmir".⁷

Historical legacies are yet another important factor guiding Pakistan's policy towards India in general and Kashmir in particular. As Sisir Gupta clearly points out that "the origin of the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir can be traced back to the division of the sub-continent. In fact, the major elements in this conflict are the images that India and Pakistan had created of themselves on the eve of Partition. For the Congress, the old India continued to exist as an entity, though the secession of some areas was agreed to in the conviction that what remains would be a stable, secular and unified state. Muslim League envisaged that the Muslim majority areas in the northwest and east India, constituted into a separate state, would grow into a strong, strategically vital Islamic state. What more the latter would become as important as

7. Sisir Gupta, n. 4, p. 441.

India or indeed even stronger than India, which might well be balkanised into independent units due to the sovereign rights of princely states."⁸ The struggle between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress which dates back to the formation of the Muslim League in 1906, was also reflected in Pakistan's approach to Kashmir. The bitterness, the jealousy, the rivalry and the sense of animosity which marked the relationship between the Muslim League and the Congress began to be predominant features in Pakistan - India relations and was reflected in the Pakistani drive to acquire Kashmir. As Keith Callard points, "in a large measure the Pakistani feeling towards India has been a continuation of the political struggle before partition".⁹

The Congress opposition to the partition before 1947 made Pakistan suspicious about India and inclined to find in Indian moves a desire to break up Pakistan by questioning the two-nation theory. The Pakistani's argue that India by acquiring Kashmir has questioned the validity of partition.

The Muslim League's distrust of the Congress was reflected in Pakistan's distrust in India. Pakistan

8. Sisir Gupta, n. 4, p. 440.

9. Quoted in Surendra Chopra "Post Simla Indo-Pak Relations", (New Delhi, 1988), p. 11.

continued to believe that India would not allow her free existence and whenever it had an opportunity to do so, it would destroy Pakistan. Ayub Khan writes in his autobiography, "India's ambition was to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite".¹⁰ The debate over the two-nation theory which was used as a justification for the partition of India on religious lines does not seem to have exhausted its steam¹¹ in Pakistan. The ideas of the Muslim League that it alone had the right to speak for the Muslims in the sub-continent language was contradictory to the secular and multi-religious ideologies of the Indian National Congress. This aspect reflects in the clash over Kashmir. Pakistan believes that Kashmir being a Muslim majority area, must rightly accede to it. But this did not happen. This made Pakistan to attempt to acquire Kashmir even by the use of force if necessary.

Closely connected with this historical legacy was the aspect of the colonial disengagement of the British. Pakistan contends that because of its geographical contiguity and Muslim majority population Kashmir must necessarily be a part of Pakistan. The failure of the

10. Mohd. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London, 1967), p. 115.

11. Partha, S. Ghosh, "Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in South Asia", Conflict Studies, No. 178, 1985, p.3.

British to smoothly disengage from the Indian sub-continent had made Pakistan to claim Kashmir.

Paramountacy has governed the relationship of the British with the 565 princely states, that composed the Indian union along with the British ruled provinces. With the departure of the British, some believed that paramountcy would lapse and the states are to be nominally independent.¹²

Jinnah initially tried to project the image that the princely states can remain independent in order to create problems for the integration of princely states into India. Contrary to the official British view on this aspect which was clearly stated by Lord Listowel, the Secretary of State for India, "we do not of course propose to recognise any states as separate international entities".¹³ It was the ideological, psychological and strategic significance to the Pakistani leadership that made them to insist that Kashmir should join Pakistan and stressed on the fact that the will of the people be respected contrary to its stand on Junagadh and Hyderabad where it stressed that the decision of the rulers was final in their accession.

12. Sumit Ganguly, n. 5, p. 39.

13. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (London, 1973) p. 16.

The ruler of Kashmir did not accede to either India or Pakistan by the 15th August, 1947 and this led to the later problem over Kashmir. Kashmiri people who had taken a secular path under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership were inclined towards Indian and this led Pakistan to invade and acquire Kashmir by force. As Alastair Lamb remarks, "in one sense, Kashmir problem can be seen as a consequence of the British failure to find a satisfactory method for the integration of princely states into independent India and Pakistan which succeeded the British Raj".¹⁴

These historical legacies and traditions continue to haunt Pakistan's thinking even after 1972 and they act as a determinant of Pakistan's approach to Kashmir even till date. Though over the years, this argument has lost much validity, Pakistan continued to use them.

Another important factor which played a dominant role in Pakistan's approach to Kashmir was its religious ideology. The concept of Islam has always been central to the ideology of Pakistan. In Pakistan's perception, Islam and Hinduism are antithetical to each other. With large number of Muslims remaining in India and Kashmir a part of India questioned the very ideological basis of Pakistan.

14. Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947-1966, (London, 1966), p. 3.

The Pakistani leaders continued to assert religion as a basis of nationhood. Joseph Korbel points that "the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organisation that find locked in a deadly conflict in which Kashmir has become both a symbol and a battle ground".¹⁵ It is this ideological factor which governs to some extent the continued Pakistan's claim on Kashmir.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto points towards these ideological arguments when he says "Jammu & Kashmir is not an integral part of India had never been a part of India. It is more a part of Pakistan than it can ever be a part of India ... The people of Jammu & Kashmir are part of the people of Pakistan in blood, in flesh, in life, in culture, in geography and in everywhere and ever form. They are a part of the people of Pakistan".¹⁶

The ideological basis of Pakistan's claim on Kashmir has to a large extent been undermined by the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. However, the Pakistani leaders continue to stress on this ideological factor because the day they give up the claim on Kashmir, in their

15. Joseph Korbel Danger in Kashmir, (Princeton, 1966), p. 25.

16. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Reshaping Foreign Policy (1948-1966) (Pakistan, 1981), p. 224.

perception, it would question the very validity of the formation of Pakistan. All Pakistani leaders use this ideological card in their arguments over Kashmir. Even Zia-ul-Haq's repeated references on Kashmir show this ideological strain. In his interview to a reporter of the Times of India, he said, "Simla Agreement or no Simla Agreement" Kashmir is a live and "burning issue" and that he was free to raise it at the United Nations and even at the Islamic conferences and to equate it with the highly emotive problem of the Muslim world, the Palestine problem.¹⁷ This is in total contrast to the Simla Agreement of 1972. The Agreement clearly emphasises on "bilateralism" in the settlement of all differences between Pakistan and India. Pakistan taking of the matter to world forums was a clear violation of the spirit of the Simla Agreement.

The unrest in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1980s gives further credence for the Pakistani leaders continued emphasis on the ideological factor for their claim on Kashmir. Pakistan also believes that by propagating successionism they can undermine India's secular credentials. However, in term of ideology, realistically speaking, Pakistan had lost much ground after the liberation of Bangladesh, because this destroyed the concept of the

17. Times of India (New Delhi), 1 March, 1981.

two-nation theory of Pakistan. Pakistan faces a crisis of identity with the over worked cement of religion having come unstuck.¹⁸ However, it is this crisis which makes Pakistan to continue to harp on Kashmir.

Kashmir epitomizes Pakistan's frustration as a nation that never attained conceptual fulfillment. It stands out as an embodiment of Pakistan's failure in its integrity and self-respect. It also symbolises India's success in depriving Pakistan of what was believed to be its legitimate entitlement in terms of the partition principle.

Pakistan drive for parity with India was another important factor which determined its policy towards Kashmir. This drive for parity was evident in the pre-partition days also. Sisir Gupta points "the intense status conflict between the two parties (Muslim League and the Indian National Congress) was transformed into a status conflict between India and Pakistan. The Indian Muslim's urge for parity with the Hindus now became Pakistan's urge for parity with India.¹⁹ Pakistan believed that the acquisition of Kashmir would enhance Pakistan's position in the Western world, in West Asian countries and would make it

18. B.G. Verghese, An End to Confrontation (Bhutto's Pakistan), (New Delhi 1972), p. 19.

19. Sisir Gupta, n. 4, p. 16.

an important power in South Asia. Joining of Kashmir to Pakistan would also increase its size and other potentials, would reduce Pakistan's inequality in size and other things vis-a-vis India and would make Pakistan more powerful and important in South Asia than what it is today.²⁰ It is this aspect of trying to be equal in status with India that continued to determine Pakistan's moves to acquire Kashmir.

The South Asian power system in which India occupies predominant place was never acceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan was not prepared to accept any inferior position vis-a-vis India. Its obsession because of its small size led Pakistan to acquire Kashmir in one way or the other and thus undermine India's size and prestige. David Taylor points "the Kashmir problem is because of the asymmetry inherent in the Indian sub-continent. Pakistan's hampering on Kashmir is its claim of a spurious equality with India".²¹ Pakistan believes that by occupying a part of Kashmir and laying the claim for the rest of the state, it has entered into a struggle with India on an equal basis and was recognised so by the international community.

Domestic compulsions of Pakistan also acts as an important factor in influencing Pakistan's policy towards

20. D.C. Jha, n. 6, p.161.

21. Wolfgang Peter Zingel and Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemand, (ed.), Pakistan in the 1980s, (Lahore, 1985), p. 553.

Kashmir. "Foreign Policy", wrote Trotsky "is everywhere and always a continuation of domestic policy for it is conducted by the same ruling class and pursues the same historic goals".²² In Pakistan's case this aspect becomes all the more relevant because of the crisis in the domestic political structure, the ethnic crisis, and the continued influence of the military in politics.

Pakistani leaders in order to fight their domestic political adversaries and to control the ethnic turmoil, calculatedly mobilize anti-India opinion and at times even rake up an anti-india hysteria in order to retain their control over the domestic system. One of the easiest ways to raise up the anti-India hysteria was to stress on the Kashmir issue. These Governments use a highly emotional Kashmir issue unashamedly to strengthen their political base. The traumatic experience attending the creation of Pakistan and the people's conviction about the righteousness of the Pakistan's cause were factors that blinded them to support any government that promised to secure for Kashmiris the right of self-determination. Politically it is too powerful a factor to be disregarded and politicians rather than statesmen wielded power in Pakistan.²³

22. Quoted in Tariq Ali Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of State, (London, 1983), p. 123.

23. Mohd. Asghar Khan "Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982", (New Delhi, 1983), p. 209.

This factor to a large extent explains the Pakistani leadership's consistent stress on the final settlement of Kashmir. The domestic turmoil in Pakistan is rampant and is evident from the ethnic tension engulfing Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province and Sindh. These ethnic hot-spots were never amicably solved because of the dominance of the Punjabis in all spheres of life in Pakistan. Apart from this, the governments of Pakistan had always had the problem of legitimacy because the rule of the military dictators was more common than representative democracy.

Lacking legitimacy, the military dictators spread the canard of an external threat in order to sustain themselves in power. The idea that the country had a foreign enemy is easy for the people to understand and it acts as a powerful stimulus to unity. For Pakistan, India has filled this role.²⁴ It is here that the Kashmir issue becomes important and continues to be used for domestic political purposes.

Ayub Khan facing a domestic crisis in the 1960s raised the bogey of Kashmir and followed it up with a war in

24. Sisir Gupta, "Islam as a Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Policy" in Donald Smith, (ed.), South Asia Politics & Religion", p. 433.

1966. Similarly, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to preserve national unity by stressing on Kashmir since 1974, because of the civil war in Baluchistan and the disturbances in North-West Frontier Province. Zia also consistently raised the issue because he faced a crisis of legitimacy at home. Since the Movement for Restoration of Democracy began in 1981, Zia's stress on Kashmir also increased. The military oligarchies and military dictatorships alienated from the people tend to develop a vested interest of their own. The obvious way out is to search for an external enemy to silence the opposition at home and cover up their domestic lapses.²⁵ Further, during the reign of Zia-ul Haq, there was an excessive stress on Islam within Pakistan. Islamization in the domestic arena has external ramifications also. Stress on Islam at home would also mean the emphasis on ideology in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. The importance of domestic politics in Pakistan's pursuit of Kashmir issue is evident from Zia-Ul Haq's statement when he was asked about a solution to the Kashmir problem. Zia points out "in India it may or may not be difficult, but in Pakistan, what has for 35 years been done, I cannot undo. For 35 years, Pakistan has got Kashmir

25. D.C. Jha, "Basic Foundations and Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" in Surendra Chopra, (ed.), Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy, (Amritsar, 1985), p.22.

wrapped in its internal policies. I cannot unwrap it even if I had all intentions".²⁶

There seems to be a certain uniformity in the public opinion of Pakistan only as regard to Kashmir. It is due to this aspect that the Pakistani governments when ever faced with an internal crisis tried to rake up this issue. As G.W. Choudhury points, "no government in Pakistan, however, strong it may be, can survive if it neglects or tries to evade the issue of Kashmir The Kashmir issue dominates national thinking".²⁷

External environment was another important factor which determined Pakistan's policy towards Kashmir. In the initial years of the Kashmir problem, the prevailing cold war situation helped it greatly in the pursuance of a vigorous Kashmir policy. Pakistan joined the American alliances SEATO to CENTO in order to balance India in the regional sphere. American on the other hand was involved in South Asia in order to contain the communist countries, USSR and China. Thus, both of them were pursuing their own national interests and not a coordinated policy. America never contemplated that the military equipment supplied to

26. R.C. Sawhney, Zia's Pakistan: Implications for India's Security (New Delhi, 1985) p. 87.

27. G.W. Choudhury, "Pakistan's Relations with India" (Meerut, 1971), p. 55.

Pakistan would be used against India. The Pakistanis on the other hand expected that the Americans would not only extend full diplomatic support to Pakistan's case on Kashmir but would also back Pakistan in the event of a war with India.²⁸

Though initially the American support helped Pakistan in the United Nations, the entry of the Soviet Union into the South Asian scenario has brought in a radical change as regard to Kashmir in the international sphere. The Soviet veto or the threat to use veto power in the security council of the United Nations resulted in a stalemate on Kashmir. India by the late fifties became bold enough to declare that the plebiscite in the Kashmir which it had promised earlier was no longer feasible in the changed circumstances.

Sino-Indian war of 1962 not only brought about American neutrality but also increased Sino-Pak friendship. Since 1965, America considered the Kashmir issue as the least important in its global pursuits. The Afghanistan crisis of 1979 renewed once again the US-Pak security relations. The US interests in Afghanistan and Persian Gulf made it to ignore the Pakistani nuclear weapon

28. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "American Policy in South Asia" in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), "The Security of South Asia", (Chicago, 1987), p. 121.

programme which could have a drastic effect for the Kashmir issue in the future.

China was another external factor which had influenced Pakistan's policy towards Kashmir. China since 1962 had always taken a pro-pakistani stand as regards to Kashmir. The Chinese objective in forging a relationship with Pakistan was to contain the influence of India in South Asian region and at the same time check the Soviet and the American influence in South Asia. This coincides with Pakistani's interest to achieve parity with India. Sino-Pakistan military collaboration has been growing steadily through the decades of 1960s, 1970s and 1980s because of the identical perceptions they held about India's role and position in South Asia.²⁹ China is the only Great Power since 1972, which had taken a consistent pro-Pakistani stand in all its dispute with India. But even this has undergone a change in 1980s. China had improved its relations with India. China began to recognize that it would serve its long-standing goals if peace was maintained in South Asia. Chinese recognition that India was a major power in the region had brought about a slight shift in its

29. Aabha Dixit, "Enduring Sino-Pak Relations : The Military Dimension", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 12, No.9, December 1989, p. 989.

pursuance of Kashmir issue. However, Pakistan - China relations had remained steady through out, because of their identity of perception on major issues vis-a-vis India.

Another external factor which influenced Pakistan's relations with India and especially over the Kashmir issue was the increased Pakistan's connections with West Asia. Pakistan since the 1970s gradually dispensed itself from South Asia and identified itself with the Middle East. The Middle East link pursued by Bhutto and latter continued by Zia-ul Haq brought lot of economic benefits to Pakistan. Foreign remittances have formed an important part of Pakistan's economy in the recent years. The oil rich Muslim countries have also extended liberal aid to Pakistan. Pakistan also began to play a major role all Islamic conferences. Persistent emphasis on Islam within the country and its foreign policy can not logically continue with out affecting Kashmir issue.

Thus all the above mentioned factors such as strategic location of Kashmir, historical legacies, ideological nature of Pakistan state, domestic compulsions of the Pakistani regimes, etc. have continued to influence Pakistan's approach to Kashmir. However, since 1972, it was mainly the domestic compulsions which greatly determined Pakistan's Kashmir Policy. Pakistan's ideological argument

as regard to Kashmir weakened because of the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. The importance of historical legacies had also greatly reduced. The strategic location of Kashmir and Pakistan's drive for parity with India continue to have their influence and was reflected in the attempts to integrate Giljit, Hunza and Skardu provinces of Northern Kashmir into Pakistan. The military build-up of Pakistan in 1980s and its clandestine nuclear weapon programme, show the continued relevance of the parity aspect. Above all, it was the domestic compulsions of the various Pakistani governments which resulted in continued stress on Kashmir during the period 1972 - 1990.

CHAPTER - III

PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR ISSUE : 1972-1990

The Bangladesh war of 1971 has radically changed the power configuration in South Asia. India was recognised as a pre-eminent power in the region and Pakistan was forced to accept its inferior position vis-a-vis India. The fighting in Kashmir also enabled India to significantly redraw the ceasefire line to its advantage. Ideologically, with the emergence of Bangladesh, the 'two-nation' theory of Pakistan stood repudiated. Pakistan was facing a domestic political crisis of severe magnitude. It is in the context of these trying circumstances that Bhutto had to move for a peace settlement with India.

The Bangladesh war has also introduced a fundamental change in Pakistan's approach to Kashmir. Prior to 1971, Pakistan had been an anti-status quo power as far as Kashmir was concerned and was interested in seeking a radical transformation of the then existing situation in Kashmir.¹ In fact, it went to war at least twice in order to change the political and military status quo in Kashmir. India, on the other hand, has been a status quo power in Kashmir and was interested in the formalization of this

1. Mohammad Ayoob, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, (New Delhi: 1975), p. 87.

status quo on the basis of an Indo-Pak Agreement.² For Pakistan, however, such a stance was never agreeable.

This situation underwent a change after the 1971 war. India held a number of trump cards, including over 90,000 POWs and over 5000 square miles of Pakistani territory and strategically advantageous position in the Kargil sector along the Line of Actual Control of 17 December 1971. This gave India a decisive upperhand in the bargaining of the peace settlement. India was in a position to make Pakistan accept the status quo in Kashmir and formalise it as a part of an Indo-Pakistan agreement.

Pakistan, on its part, was also interested in an agreement with India because the issue of POWs had to be settled fast and, more importantly, it had to get back its lost territory from India-Pakistan, thus, had to wrest lot of concessions from India. Added to this Bhutto had to set his house in order in the domestic political arena.

Preliminary discussions on a peace settlement took place at Murree between the officials of Pakistan and India in the spring of 1972. From the outset, India pressed for an overall settlement of all outstanding disputes and even sought a binding 'no-war pact' with Pakistan. Well aware that accepting any such final settlement would create

2. Ibid.

problems domestically, the Pakistani delegates rejected such an approach.³ However, Bhutto took a soft line later and the summit at Simla was planned out.

Bhutto's political strategy with regard to Kashmir centered around the fact that he must not give many concessions on Kashmir, and he must make the Pakistanis feel proud of their leader's stance and thus gain their support for the acceptance of any agreement with India. Pakistan tried to recapture the two posts in the Tithwal sector which it had lost in the 1971 war and used the occasion not only to alter the status quo in its favour but also involve the United Nations.⁴ This was to prove to his people that he had not given up on Kashmir. Bhutto also began to make hard hitting statements on Kashmir. He began to suddenly emphasise on the relevance of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. Speaking to the German magazine 'Der Spiegel', Bhutto had said "The Kashmir question involves the right of self-determination of the people of the state. If they want to exercise their inherent right, Pakistan cannot take away this right from them."⁵ Bhutto apparently made this hard hitting statement so that the people may accept any agreement he might reach at Simla.

3. Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography (London, 1979), p. 139.

4. Satish Kumar, New Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1978), p. 230.

5. Ibid.

In his more direct dealings with India, Bhutto began to follow a more conciliatory approach with regard to Kashmir as the Summit meeting approached. He told The Statesman on 26th March 1972, "What I say now is you maintain your position that Kashmir is an integral part of India, between these two positions (yours and ours), there is enough room to diffuse that problem and lower the tension. We can make the ceasefire a line of peace. Let the people of Kashmir move between these two countries freely".⁶

Bhutto was doing a sort of a balancing act in trying to mollify domestic sentiments where Kashmir has always been a very emotional issue and at the same time to come to some agreement with India, thus accepting the reality of the time.

The summit level talks at Simla between Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi resulted in the signing of the Simla agreement on 2nd July 1972. Though India was in a position to dictate terms to Pakistan, it did not do so, realising Bhutto's domestic compulsions. The Agreement satisfied the most important demands of both India and Pakistan.

The Agreement, equivalent of a no war pact, sets out in paragraph 1 : both countries agreed "that the basic issues and conflicts ... shall be resolved by peaceful means." It also declares that "they will refrain from the

6. Salmann Taseer, No.3.

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other." The Agreement further incorporates the salience of bilateralism over multilateralism, when it states that "the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between the two countries." No unilateral alterations are to be made pending the final settlement of any problem.

The agreement also incorporates the Indian position on Kashmir. In Paragraph 4, Clause II, it states: "In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control, resulting from the ceasefire line of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both the sides. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretation. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line." This proves that the line of control of 17 December 1971 would replace the ceasefire line of 1949 as sort of an international boundary. The principle of bilateralism was given a definite form with the delimitation of the Line of Actual Control in December 1972. India and Pakistan alone were to be responsible for the maintenance of peace along the Line of Actual Control and not an United Nations observer group or any other external body.

The Simla Agreement, while not terminating the Kashmir dispute, implicitly accepted the status quo. In paragraph 4, Clause (b), a reference to Jammu and Kashmir was made, in the context that India and Pakistan would discuss and strive for peace and normalization of relations "...including the questions of repatriation of POWs, and civil internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and resumption of diplomatic relations."

Even here reference to Jammu and Kashmir was a passing one. The acceptance of the line of control of 17 December 1971 showed that the ceasefire line of 1949 has disappeared and partition of the state was a fait accompli in practical terms. This argument receives further credence because of certain newspaper reports of a secret deal between Mrs. Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In the New York Times of 3 July 1972, Mr. James Sterba reported on the resolution of the Kashmir deadlock..." Bhutto was willing to forsake the Indian part and accept the ceasefire line gradually - the key word is 'gradually'. He added that President Bhutto wanted softening of the ceasefire line...and a secret agreement with Mrs. Gandhi that a formally recognized border could emerge after a few years during which he could condition his people to it without riots and overthrow of his government.

7. A.G. Noorani, India, the Super Powers and the Neighbours(New Delhi, 1985), p. 204.

But Bhutto however interpreted the Simla Agreement as a gain for Pakistan. He pointed that "by bifurcating and delinking the international boundary from the ceasefire line in Kashmir, Kashmir has been acknowledged as a disputed issue."⁸ Further, Pakistan stressed, that the mention of "the relations between the two countries should be governed by the principles & purposes of the United Nations" as to mean that Pakistan can still take the matter for the consideration of the United Nations. Further Pakistan began to stress that the mention of "final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir" clearly points that it was regarded as an area of dispute between Pakistan and India.⁹

Immediately after signing the agreement Bhutto took an hardline on Kashmir. He argued that for the first time since Tashkent, "Kashmir has been reactivated". He went on to say that he would have got the POWs back if he had agreed" to a settlement on Kashmir on India's terms.¹⁰ Bhutto also interpreted the Simla Agreement as a victory for Pakistan. "It was never my intention to agree to another Tashkent... Another Tashkent can only be signed over my dead body.. on the vital question of Kashmir too, we have made no

8. Salmaan Taseer, n. 3, p. 142.

9. For details of arguments developed by Bhutto see 'White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Islamabad, 15 Jan 1977).

10. Mohammad Ayooob, n. 1, p. 103.

compromises. We told them categorically that the people of Kashmir should exercise their right of self-determination"¹¹ Bhutto made all these self-appraising statements in order to calm down the domestic atmosphere and avoid any mass chaos, as seen after the declaration at Tashkent in 1965, which had led to the fall of Ayub Khan.

Inspite of his hardline on Kashmir, Bhutto introduced a subtle change in Pakistan's stance on Kashmir. He shifted the primary responsibility for the 'liberation' of Kashmir from Pakistan to the people of Kashmir when he said that there was only one way to 'free Kashmir' from the 'Indian yoke' and that was, for the people of Kashmir to start "their struggle for freedom". He went on to add that "as soon as the people of Kashmir launch their freedom struggle" the people of Pakistan would go "all out in support and assistance to the people of Kashmir."¹²

This shift in Pakistan's policy was evident as early as March 1972 when he remarked to Dilip Mukherjee of 'Times of India' that "the struggle for Kashmir's self-determination cannot be inspired from outside. Like revolution, it cannot be exported from outside."¹³ These statements of Bhutto clearly showed that Pakistan in the

11. Salmaan Taseer, n. 3, p. 145.

12. Mohammad Ayoob, n. 1, p. 104.

13. Ibid.

aftermath of the Bangladesh war, gave up its traditional, "use of force", policy to acquire Kashmir. The importance of this shift is evident even in the later years when Pakistan did not take any further military action to acquire Kashmir, but instead gave support to the terrorist and secessionist elements in Kashmir. Indian supremacy seems to be tacitly accepted by Pakistan.

The hardline statements of Bhutto in the aftermath of the Simla Agreement was to make it acceptable to the people of Pakistan. It was also intended to get it ratified by the Pakistan National Assembly, which was done on 15 July, 1972. After this, Pakistan seems to have put the Kashmir issue in cold storage and was more involved in setting its house in order.

The issue was, however, reactivated by Bhutto in 1974 and his rhetoric on Kashmir increased. This sudden change in Bhutto was motivated by renewed attempts at integration of 'Azad' Kashmir into Pakistan as also because of the bright prospects for the success of the dialogue between Sheikh Abdullah and the Central Government of India. The Indian peaceful Nuclear Explosion in May 1974 has also been a factor in Pakistan's continued reference to Kashmir at that time, because it feared that India attained much strength because of the explosion. Above all, the most important reason for Bhutto's raising the Kashmir bogey

seems to be rooted in the fact that Pakistan was facing a domestic crisis of great magnitude in Baluchistan and North west Frontier province.

Bhutto postponed the normalisation talks with India in 1974, in the wake of the Pokharan explosion and it was only in August 1974 that the talks resumed. However, with regard to Kashmir, antagonism prevailed. Massing of troops across Kashmir began to take place and skirmishes took place across the Line of Actual Control. The Pakistani rulers also aimed at shoring up the sinking morale of the pro-Pakistani elements in Kashmir.¹⁴ The Pakistan media began to accuse India of trying to violate the Simla Agreement and unilaterally change the identity and status of Kashmir in collusion with Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg.¹⁵

Bhutto also reacted strongly against the possible accord. At a meeting in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Bhutto remarked "any unilateral decisions will not be acceptable to the people of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan."¹⁶ In October 1974 Bhutto made an offer for a summit talk on Kashmir and he began to reiterate Pakistan's determination "not to

14. Motherland (New Delhi), 8 August 1974.

15. Dawn (Karachi), 7 August 1974.

16. Times of India, (New Delhi) 24 September 1974.

accept any settlement of the Kashmir dispute except on the basis of the self-determination of the Kashmiri people."¹⁷

On 24 January 1975, an accord was reached between Sheikh Abdullah and the Central Government of India by which the substance of accession of Kashmir was left intact and it also upheld the special status enjoyed by Kashmir according to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

The Pakistani reaction to the accord was very hostile. Pakistan lodged a protest with India, also with the United Nations Secretary General and the Security Council against this accord stating that the agreement 'is in complete disregard of the UN resolutions and the commitments of the parties to the dispute.'¹⁸ Bhutto also called for a 'hartal' on 28th February and 17th March throughout Pakistan and also in Jammu and Kashmir to protest against the accord. Bhutto further emphasised "that the dispute is still there. It is between India and Pakistan."¹⁹ India protested against the anti-India propaganda in Pakistan.

Pakistan's protest against the accord was due to its domestic crisis. Bhutto was facing a crisis of credibility at home with regard to his Kashmir policy. The hard core anti-India Punjabi opinion was still strong and

17. Dawn, 22 December 1974.

18. Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 27 February 1975.

19. Times of India, 7 March 1975.

the Pakistan Government had to satisfy this section of the public opinion in Pakistan which was, in fact, the most vocal opinion. Besides, such a stance also solved the purpose of focussing peoples attention against India when internal problems in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. were cutting at the roots of Pakistan's, political stability and national integrity.

Even after the separation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was not able to keep its house in order. Bhutto's democratic ideals began to slowly give way to his feudal proclivities and he dissolved the North-West Frontier Province NWFP and Baluchistan assemblies. Bhutto's 'forward policy' of increasing central control was greatly resisted in Baluchistan. Bhutto used strong arm tactics and sent 70,000 troops to the province to quell dissent in 1973.²⁰ Subsequent events led to a severe insurgency in Baluchistan from 1973-77. The arrest of Khan Abdul wali Khan, the National Awami Party leader, in 1975, also created strong resentment.

Thus, there was wide spread resentment against Bhutto in these two provinces from 1974 onwards. Bhutto, as Richter points out, "acted like a feudal lord; he linked subordinates to himself, through personal ties of loyalty,

20. Ataur Rahman, 'Unity or further Divisions'? in Jayaratnam Wilson (ed.) The States of South Asia (New Delhi, 1982), p. 199.

centralized control in his own hands and minimized local grass root political activity."²¹ This made the people to despise him and the resentment against him increased day by day. In such circumstances, Bhutto, like his predecessors, began to make harsh statements on Kashmir and believed, that by doing so, he would be able to divert the attention of the people from the domestic turmoil. Bhutto had promised democracy and delivered dictatorship²² and was using anti-India slogans for his own political survival.

In addition to this, Bhutto's rhetoric on Kashmir must also be seen from the point of his moves to integrate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) into Pakistan. As early as November 1973 while touring 'Azad' Kashmir, Bhutto had hinted that he was in favour of integration of POK with Pakistan pending the final settlement of Kashmir issue with India. But this brought in a wave of protest both in Pakistan and POK and the opposition elements described it as a sell out, as it implied acceptance of the accession of the rest of the state to India. ²³

However, Bhutto by 1974 had his way and constitutional changes were announced. Constitution of

21. William L. Richter, 'Pakistan under Zia', Current History, vol. 76-77, no. 443, 1979, p.169.

22. Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan and India', Politics, Personalities and Foreign Policies, Asian Survey, vol.18, No.7, July 1983, p. 718.

23. Mohammad Ayoob, n.1, p. 138.

'Azad' Kashmir was amended to provide a parliamentary form of government. An 'Azad' Jammu and Kashmir council was set up with Pakistan's Prime Minister as the head of this Council. Bhutto also wanted to extend the control of his PPP to 'Azad' Kashmir, and, thus for the first time, the mainstream political party of Pakistan, the PPP, contended for government in 'Azad' Kashmir elections in March 1975. Abdul Hamid Khan of PPP was elected as the first Prime Minister of POK. The hard stance of Bhutto was also related to this aspect of elections in POK and to make his party win in the 'Azad' Kashmir elections.

The setting up of 'Azad' Kashmir council has brought 'Azad' Kashmir in congruence with the provinces of Pakistan and diluted what little was left of the 'independent' facade of 'Azad' Kashmir.²⁴

This move of Bhutto also underlines acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir. What was important for the government was to gain time until it was possible to clinch the settlement and to keep the issue alive until then for possible internal use.²⁵

In May 1976 Bhutto reassured the Kashmiri people that their struggle for 'self-determination' was inseparably

24. Mohammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics 1958-1982 (New Delhi, 1983), p. 58.

25. Satish Kumar, n. 4, p. 210.

liked with the ideal of Pakistan.²⁶ At Peking, Bhutto reiterated that "co-existence with India was only possible after the settlement of the Kashmir issue in accordance with UN resolutions."²⁷ Bhutto's rhetoric on Kashmir was to keep himself in power, which was being challenged, from all sides, because, of his failure to solve the socio-economic problems of Pakistan.

By the end of 1976, disappointment with Bhutto was total. There was resentment against him everywhere. In these trying circumstances Bhutto agreed to conduct elections and they were slated for March 1977. On the eve of the elections, Bhutto tried to use the Kashmir issue for domestic political purposes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued on 15 January 1977, a 'White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute. This was done by Bhutto with shrewdness and an eye on the ballot. The 'White paper on Jammu & Kashmir, greatly emphasised on the righteousness of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and Bhutto's energetic championing of the issue etc.'²⁸

But all this did not make much difference. The elections though held on time, brought in huge protests and Bhutto was accused of rigging. There was mass upsurge

26. Dawn, 3 May 1976.

27. Dawn, 30 May 1976.

28. See 'White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir', 15 January 1977.

against him and the Pakistan National Alliance led the anti-Bhutto campaign. His efforts at reconciliation failed. On 5 July 1977, Bhutto was imprisoned and Gen. Zia-ul-Haq took over, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, of Pakistan.

In spite of his rhetoric on Kashmir, Bhutto had continued normalisation of relations with India. On April 1974, a tripartite Agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh India and Pakistan at New Delhi on Prisoners of War. In September 1974, Pakistan and India opened travel facilities for each other citizens. A trade protocol was signed in December 1974 and many other agreements were signed. Diplomatic relations with India were also resumed in 1976. Thus, despite Pakistan's rhetoric on Kashmir, its relations with India improved because of the realization on both sides that confrontation was not beneficial.

Another factor to be noted is that the fall of Bhutto in 1977 was in no way related to his pursuance of foreign policy. As Lawrence Ziring points out "Governments have been known to fall as a result of misconceived foreign policies, but what is curious is that in the demise of..Zulfikar Ali Bhutto foreign policy virtually played no role.²⁹

29. Lawrence Ziring, No. 22, P. 712.

Overall we can say that from 1972-77 Bhutto relegated the Kashmir issue to the background. In whatever way he used it, he did so, for his own political ends. A tacit approval of status quo was seen in Bhutto's policy towards Kashmir. He stuck to the Simla Agreement of Keeping the differences between Pakistan and India at a bilateral level. The importance of Bhutto, however, is that, the arguments which he provided, as regard to the Simla Agreement, were used by the subsequent Pakistani rulers in pursuance of the Kashmir issue. Bhutto, further, was able to keep the Kashmir question alive and never allowed it to totally eclipse out. Bhutto himself had mentioned in his personal diary. "...I am a defiant, determined soldier of Islam...What I did, and the principles which I stood for, aroused quite a few critics,...Whatever their attitude towards me, the fact remains that I have given to my country all that I could have, say, by way of keeping the Kashmir dispute alive.³⁰

Zia ul-Haq's martial law regime began on 5th July 1977. Zia promised elections within 90 days. Zia however did not stick to his promise. Zia's government lacked legitimacy of all sorts. In order to consolidate his rule, Zia moved towards an Islamic system for Pakistan.

30. B.L. Kak, "Z.A. Bhutto-Notes from a Death Cell"(New Delhi, 1979), p.28.

The militarisation of Politics infact led to continuous emphasis on external threat and conflict, for that was the reflection of the new systems' ethos and its search for legitimacy.³¹ It is in this perspective that one must understand Zia's attitude towards India and his raising of Kashmir issue in order to acquire legitimacy in the domestic field.

Zia raised the question of Kashmir to a greater level than Bhutto. The Simla Agreement of 1972, which stressed on the aspect of "bilateralism", was gradually watered down by Zia with respect to Kashmir.

Bhutto, inspite of his tall claims on Kashmir, did not move away from the bilateral aspects of the settlement of all difference with India. Bhutto, further, did not raise the Kashmir issue at the UN General Assembly. But Zia started raising the Kashmir issue at the UN General Assembly and at other international gatherings. The 'Kashmir card' was used by Zia not only to enhance his position domestically but also to score a diplomatic point over India.

Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at the UN General Assembly in 1978. In July 1978, the First Asian

31. S.D. Muni, "South Asia" in Mohammad Ayoob (ed.) Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, (New Delhi, 1980), p.44.

Islamic Conference at Karachi recommended that the Kashmir issue, between Pakistan and India be resolved on the basis of UN resolutions, calling for a general plebiscite under international supervision.³² This conference had the blessings of the Pakistan government.

At both the UN and Islamic summit in 1980 General Zia personally equated Kashmir with Palestine and understandably invited a sharp retort from New Delhi.³³ Infact at the Islamic Summit Zia went a step further and described Jammu and Kashmir "as yet another vital issue" facing the Islamic 'Ummah'.³⁴

By raising the Kashmir issue at every international forum and trying to present it along side the case for Palestinian rights, Gen Zia was trying to involve Islamic countries in a purely bilateral issue between Pakistan and India. The significance of Pakistan's correlation of Jammu and Kashmir with Palestine must be seen from the increasing cultivation of West Asian countries by Pakistan since 1971. The domestic dimensions of raising the

32. Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 10 July 1978.

33. Inder Malhotra, "India and Neighbours", Strategic Digest, vol. XI, No.1, November 1981, p. 956.

34. Surendra Chopra, Post-Simla Indo-Pak Relations (New Delhi, 1988), p. 175.

Kashmir issue at international forums seems arise from fact that Bhutto attacked Zia for being soft on India in his final political testament "If I a assassinated..."³⁵ Perhaps to show that he was not yielding on Kashmir, Zia raised the Kashmir question at various international forums, thus reactivating the issue more vigorously than Bhutto.

Zia also raised the Kashmir issue, in January 1981, at the 37 Nation Islamic Summit at Taif in Saudi Arabia. He said he hoped that the process of normalisation of relations with India would proceed to its logical conclusion with the solution of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of provisions of the Simla Agreement and the relevant UN resolutions."³⁶ India protested, that the raising of the Kashmir question at international forums was in violation of the Simla Spirit. Aga Shahi, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, tried to make a distinction between mentioning "the Kashmir issue at international forums and attempts to internationalize the issue."³⁷

When Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at the UN General Assembly on 3 October 1981, N.Krishnan, the Indian

35. Stephen, P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, (New Delhi, 1984), p. 102.

36. Deccan Chronicle (Hyderabad) 27 January 1981.

37. Deccan Chronicle 18 July 1981.

representative at UN, took strong exception and pointed out that "Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India" and that "there is a contradiction in declaring one's commitment to Simla Agreement and at the same time raising Jammu and Kashmir"³⁸ at international forums.

The high rhetoric on Kashmir is to be understood in the background of the ongoing talks with USA for a \$3.2 billion aid package for Pakistan. Zia made a diplomatic turn around and made the offer of a "No-War Pact" with India in 1981. Zia had now begun a strategy of waging a "peace offensive" with India. The no-war pact was infact really addressed to the US Congress which was deliberating on the aid to be given to Pakistan and the development of Security relationship with that country.³⁹ Zia had declared only a few months ago that a no-war pact "would not be worth the paper it might be written on."⁴⁰

India, however, accepted the Pakistani offer, despite the fact that it clearly knew, that the Simla Agreement was for all practical purposes a non-aggression pact. The Government of India felt that it would be much more fruitful for both the countries to think in terms of

38. Indian Express (New Delhi) 4 October 1981.

39. Inder Malhotra, n. 33, p. 964.

40. India Today (New Delhi), 16-29 February 1980.

building further on the Simla Agreement and concluding an even broader accord between the two countries,⁴¹ in the form a "Treaty of Friendship". Zia however was not actually interested in signing a no-war pact.

When the talks of a 'no-war pact began in 1982, Zia started raking up the Kashmir issue once again. Statements contrary to the Pakistan 'peace offensive' began to be made by various leaders in Pakistan. Sardar Ibrahim, the Chairman of the Peoples Party of POK, tried to establish a link between Kashmir and no-war pact. He remarked that "the Kashmir dispute must be resolved if there was to be a permanent peace settlement between Pakistan and India."⁴² Meanwhile, Pakistan, once again, raised the Kashmir issue, at the UN Human Rights Commission meeting at Geneva, almost on the eve of the Second Round of talks of No-War Pact which were to begin on 1 March 1982. At the UN commission, Agha Hilaly equated Jammu and Kashmir with the question of self-determination for Cambodia, Namibia and Palestine.⁴³ India, in retaliation postponed indefinitely the Foreign Secretaries meeting scheduled to be held at Islamabad.

41. K.D. Sharma "Decade of Indo-Pak Relations : An Ambassador's view", Strategic Digest Vol. XV, No. 4, April 1985, pp. 397-398.

42. Times (London) 22 January 1982.

43. Salamat Ali, "Clouds over Kashmir", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 115, No. 10, 5 March 1982, p. 10.

Realistically, what Pakistan could not achieve in two wars with India, It cannot gain through good offices of the UN.⁴⁴ The very purpose of normalisation of relations were flaunted by, Pakistan's persistent abnegation of the spirit of the Simla Agreement.

Pakistan's periodic rhetoric on Kashmir, especially from the beginning of 1980s, was related to the turbulent domestic politics of Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq, lacked legitimacy of rule and his constituency was basically the army. The military dictator was resorting to diversary tactics to suppress the chaotic internal situation.

The democratic forces of Pakistan had formed the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and the regime was naturally antagonistic to such moves. The Movement for Restoration of Democracy got wide response, especially in Sindh and also in Baluchistan. The MRD decision to launch a movement from 14 August 1983 represented a signal for a change in status quo in the domestic arena. Zia used hard measures to suppress the democratic movement. In his foreign policy he tried to be more vocal on the Kashmir issue in order to increase his support base. As Ikram Azam rightly points. "...Kashmir acts as a catalytic agent producing

44. Ibid.

bravado, short lived Patriotism and momentary national unity or integration and a standard excuse to delay elections."⁴⁵ In addition to this, Zia also took certain other measures to consolidate his rule. Zia held a referendum in 1984 and tried to consolidate his power and to manipulate the path of Pakistan destiny in such a way so as to sustain himself in power and institutionalize his primacy.⁴⁶ The non-party elections of 1985 were boycotted by the MRD parties. From 1985 the demand for democracy further increased. Facing such opposition at home, Zia ul-Haq quite naturally took a hardline on Kashmir.

Zia raised the issue at the Non-aligned Summits at New Delhi and Havana. In the New Delhi Summit he stated that "We should find a just solution to the problem of Jammu and Kashmir". This hit headlines in India and evoked a sharp official response from New Delhi. At Havana he said that Pakistan was actively engaged in the task of "developing relations with its neighbours on the basis of peaceful co-existence. Further, he added that Pakistan is determined to seek the resolution of the dispute in accordance with relevant UN resolutions and the spirit of

45. Ikram Azam, Pakistan's Security and National Integration (Lahore, 1986), p.36.

46. Aabha Dixit, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Legance of Zia-ul-Haq", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. 1, April 1989, pp. 8-9.

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the Simla Agreement.⁴⁷ Even at the Harare NAM Summit Pakistan did not neglect to highlight the Kashmir issue.

From 1986 onwards, Pakistan's stress on Kashmir reached a feverish pitch. This can partly be explained because of the increasing demand of the democratic forces which began to gradually assert themselves. Zia-ul-Haq, facing lot of troubles, began to stress on Kashmir. The 'Azad' Kashmir Radio, in a special broadcast titled "Kashmir Banayga Pakistan" (Kashmir will become Pakistan), claimed that Kashmir "from all points of view was part of Pakistan", adding that 'Kashmir people' "have resolved to join their motherland with Pakistan and they are waiting for the right time and conditions for the purpose".⁴⁸

In 1986, after a gap of four years, Pakistan and India were involved in an exchange over Kashmir in the United Nations General Assembly after Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan raised the issue. Yaqub Khan called for a "peaceful settlement of the dispute" on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and in the spirit of the Simla Agreement". This was the first time since 1982 that India had exercised her right of reply

47. Tribune (Chandigarh), 22 March 1983.

48. News Time (Hyderabad) 21 August 1986,

after Pakistan's reference to Kashmir at the UN Assembly.⁴⁹
In earlier times, Pakistan had refrained from mentioning the UN resolutions whenever it referred to Kashmir, in the main General Assembly debate, since 1982, confining its remarks to an expression of hope that the matter would be settled peacefully.

Zia, in April 1987, further stressed that the Kashmir solution must be in accordance with the UN resolutions. He made no mention of the Simla Agreement.⁵⁰ Earlier, Mohammed Khan Junejo, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, also took the same position, in Azad Kashmir and made no mention of the Simla Agreement. These statements clearly indicated a shift in Pakistan's policy with regard to Kashmir. Simla Agreement, which stressed on "bilateralism", was being relegated to the background.

The hardline stance of Zia may be because of the fact that he wanted to placate public opinion in his country which had been provoked by the accusation of some opposition leaders, such as Benazir Bhutto, that Zia had adopted a soft line on Kashmir. Kashmir rakes up emotions in Pakistan and politicians of every brand do not hesitate to use it in order to gain an upperhand over their adversaries.

49. Patriot (New Delhi) 1 October 1986,

50. Tribune, 10 April 1987.

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Zia-ul-Haq's rule also saw the beginning of Pakistan-India differences over the Siachen Glacier. Zia's raising of Siachen Glacier issue was to keep alive the Kashmir problem and at the same time question the validity of the Simla Agreement. The Siachen problem is essentially a fall out of the Kashmir question and has acquired importance since 1983. The position taken by Governments of India and Pakistan in regard to this dispute, were influenced by the positions taken by each side in regard to earlier differences over Kashmir.

The issue of discord is a 75 km large and 2,8km wide glacier which lies in the heart of 640 km long Karakoram range. It is the second largest glacier in Asia. It is strategically located, being important to India, Pakistan and China, for to the east lies the Tibet-Sinkiang road, through Aksaichin and to the north the 537 mile long Karakoram highway, built across the Khunjerab pass which gives easy access to the Chinese, to reach, Indian Ocean, and persian Gulf.

The whole problem arose, because, the boundary has not been properly demarcated in that region. For nearly 30 years, the border remained peaceful in that region and even during the 1965 and 1971 wars, the area remained more or less unaffected.

The original ceasefire line agreed to by India and Pakistan by the July 1949,, Karachi Agreement did not cover the area of the glaciers because of the difficulties of delineating the line. Beyond the delineated grid point NJ 9842 near Chalunka, the Karachi agreement, spoke of the line passing "north to the glaciers". When the ceasefire line was changed into a mutually accepted line of control in October 1972, the newly delineated line ran from Shyok river, west of Thang which is in India to point NJ 9842. The area north of it was left blank and open to subsequent Pakistan encroachments by force.⁵¹ Prior to this, Pakistan, launched an "orographic warfare" by encouraging mountaineering expeditions since 1957 and permitting them to traverse Indian territory. Even the western media and journals, such as American Alpine Journal, showed this area as belonging to Pakistan.⁵² Indian army, organized, its own expeditions from 1978 onwards.

Pakistan, after having won the orographic and cartographic battles, particularly in the West, began to plan a physical occupation of the area. In order to avoid a repetition of Aksaichin India on 29 May 1984, deployed its

51. Jasjit Singh, "Siachen Glacier : Facts and Fiction", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XII, No. VII, October 1989, p. 698.

52. Taranjit Singh Sandhu, "Conflict in Siachen", Hindustan Times, 27 December 1985.

men on the worst terrains of the world.⁵³ Skirmishes took place every year from 1984. The Siachen glacier episode exposed Zia's regime to criticism, on the fact, that, it failed to control a territory which it claimed as belonging to Pakistan. Further, India's success at establishing its military grip on the Siachen glacier inevitably undermined Islamabad's credibility amongst Pakistanis as guardian of the country's claim to all Jammu and Kashmir state.⁵⁴ This, failure, at Siachen, by the Pakistan army, also resulted in increasing stress on Kashmir, by Zia-ul-Haq.

Despite its support to the so called aspect of self-determination of Kashmiris, the actual intention of Pakistan seemed to be to incorporate the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. This is quite evident from the fact that Pakistan till today has maintained a fairly ambiguous position in respect of its jurisdiction of different parts of the state occupied by it by force in 1947-48. The state of 'Azad' Kashmir does not appear on any published Pakistani Map, and it has its own constitution, its own capital city, a full fledged government, a national flag, but without formal

53. P.M. Parischa, "Siachen Glacier: An Orographic Offensive by Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, Vol.9, No. 9, December 1985, p.855.

54. Robert, G. Wirsing, "The Siachen Glacia Dispute II: The Domestic Pollitical Dimension", Strategic Studies, No. 3, Spring 1988, p.93.

recognition by Pakistan.⁵⁵ Under Zia, Pakistan, continued its efforts to integrate "Azad Kashmir into its territory, an exercise which was earlier followed by Bhutto in the 1970s.

Zia-ul-Haq, for all practical purposes, made 'Azad' Kashmir an integral part of Pakistan. The 'President' of 'Azad' Kashmir takes orders directly from Islamabad. There is no representative government and although martial law had not been declared formally, for all practical purposes, it existed as effectively, there as in the rest of Pakistan. Political leaders were detained and political parties prevented from functioning as had been the case in Pakistan. Local bodies councilors from the Northern areas of 'Azad' Kashmir had been given representation in the nominated Majlis-I-Shoora as observers.⁵⁶

In 1982, Pakistan had tried to formally annex the strategic areas of Giljit, Hunza and Skardu. Zia declared these areas as part of Pakistan. Islamabad had no locus-stand in these areas. Zia's moves were totally illegal both historical and constitutionally.⁵⁷ These are had always been a part of Jammu and Kashmir. The integration process only

55. Jasjit Singh, No. 53, p.697.

56. Mohammad Asghar Khan, n. 24, p. 211.

57. International Herald Tribune (Paris) 13 May 1982.

proves Zia's real intentions as regard to Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's stress on 'self-determination' for Kashmiris is only meant for international consumption.

Zia also tried to fish in troubled waters of Jammu and Kashmir. As unrest broke out in Jammu and Kashmir, Zia tried to use it for his advantage. He gave the secessionists political and moral support through fiery statements on Kashmir. Reports of clandestine military sales to terrorists are also abundant.

The death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982 and the failure of the subsequent leadership of Kashmir to preserve the Kashmiri identity, increasing corruption, lack of proper development, unemployment, and the alliance of the National Conference of Farooq Abdullah with the Congress (I) in the 1987 elections and the subsequent reports of rigging, further, distanced people from the democratic process.⁵⁸

Zia used this internal tension in Kashmir. India protested against Pakistan's interference in its internal affairs. The continued instigation of various terrorist groups in Kashmir by Pakistan was also evident from the plan which Zia reportedly undertook in the name of 'Operation

58. Askar A Zaidi, "Behind the increasing militancy in Kashmir", Times of India, 1 January 1990.

Topac'⁵⁹, which is a low level insurgency plan to gain foothold in Kashmir.

Pakistan having failed to acquire Kashmir by force was now trying to acquire it by using dissidents in Kashmir and by guerrilla tactics. This shift in strategy was an outcome of Pakistani realization that it could not afford another war with India. Increasingly in Pakistan, the military strategists were stressing on the importance of "People's Guerrilla War" by which, people would be trained and armed so that any invader would be deterred from attacking. A variation of this people's guerrilla warfare involved a more activist strategy; train and arm friendly population in the territory of your enemy, tying him down in a hundred places.⁶⁰

This seems to be the policy which Pakistan is following with regard to Kashmir, especially in the 1980s. There are many organizations in Kashmir which are opposed to India and some of them are terrorist groups. These include Jamait-e-Islami, Jamait-e-Julba, Shooba-e-Tulba, the People League, Al-Jihad, Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front etc. The Indian effort, to curb the terrorist activities, have been characterized by Islamabad as violation of human rights, in

59. Indian Express, 8 July 1989.

60. Stephen, P. Cohen, n. 35, p. 146.

order to gain international support for its cause and thus keep the Kashmir issue alive.

The nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan has also its implications for Kashmir. Bhutto initiated in early 1970s a nuclear bomb programme. Zia's motivation was to coordinate and intensify the nuclear bomb project and to avoid a bomb demonstration; Zia moved away from fixation with a bomb test and instead moved in the direction of "bomb in the basement" type of nuclear weapon option.⁶¹

Pakistan was seeking parity with India. Its quest for nuclear weapons was also rooted in the need to restore military pride to a nation which had been defeated earlier.⁶² The Pakistani nuclear programme has greatly progressed in the 1980s and possible Chinese connection in helping Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme is very much evident.⁶³

The implication of a Pakistani bomb is that, besides neutralizing the assumed Indian nuclear forces, it

61. Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (New York, 1987), p.2.

62. William H. Kincaid and Christoph Bertram, Nuclear Proliferation in 1980: Perspectives & Proposals (New York, 1984), p.5.

63. See R.R. Subramaniam, 'The Nuclear Factor in South Asian Security', Strategic Analysis, Vol. VIII, No. 9, August 1984 pp. 823-834.

would provide Pakistan, the umbrella under which, it could reopen the Kashmir issue. A Pakistani nuclear capability would paralise not only the Indian nuclear decision, but also Indian conventional forces, and a bold Pakistani strike to 'liberate' Kashmir might go unchallenged if Indian leadership was indecisive.⁶⁴ A Pakistani bomb might enable Islamabad to reopen the Kashmir issue by the threat of force.

Thus as we see Zia, till his death in an air crash in August 1988, kept alive the Kashmir question. He raised Kashmir at the UN and other international forums. He also introduced a change in the acceptance of 'bilateralism' for settling all differences between India and Pakistan as envisaged by the Simla Agreement, by not mentioning at certain times, the importance of Simla Agreement with regard to Kashmir. The irredentist claims of Pakistan on Kashmir has been given further impetus by the uncertainty and unrest in Jammu and Kashmir. Zia, used this opportunity to his advantage. Kashmir formed one of Zia's many cards which he used in order to sustain himself in power.

The coming of democratic forces to power in Pakistan raised hopes of improvement in Pakistan-Indian

64. Stephen Cohen, n. 35, p. 153.

relations and subsequently the dilution of propaganda on Kashmir by Pakistan. Though Benazir Bhutto tried to revive the Simla spirit, the domestic compulsions were such that she could not follow a policy of accommodation with India.

Benazir's policy with respect to Kashmir has not been much different from Zia's. As regard to Kashmir issue there has been no departure from the Pakistani stand that the conflict has to be resolved according to the UN resolutions.⁶⁵

In September 1988, the Kashmir issue was raised at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conferences at Nicosia by Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. According to him, Pakistan had consistently sought establishment of good neighbourly relation with India, "On the basis of universally accepted principles of justice, sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs of other states, and peaceful settlement of all disputes including Jammu and Kashmir, which is to be solved in accordance with the Simla Agreement and on the basis of relevant UN resolutions."⁶⁶

65. Uma Singh, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Assessment" Kalim Bahadur & Uma Singh ed., Pakistan : Transition to Democracy (New Delhi, 1989), p.98.

66. Statesman (New Delhi), 9 September 1988.

In January, 1989, Yaqub Khan, argued in the Senate of Pakistan, that the present government in no way has yielded to India on Kashmir and other unresolved issues.⁶⁷ This statement of Yaqub Khan was in response to the charges of opposition parties, who had been severally critical of Benazir's conciliatory approval towards India.

Pakistan also raised the issue at the UN Human Rights Commission. The issue was raised at the Belgrade NAM Summit, in pursuance of its policy of raising Kashmir issue at all international forums.

By the middle of 1989, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir worsened and a severe law and order problem arose. Taking advantage of the difficult situations faced by India, Pakistan continued its provocative statements on Kashmir.

Tension mounted on the India-Pakistan border across the Line of Actual Control of 1971 and war clouds loomed large in the subcontinent. However, internationally there was lot of pressure urging the two countries to undertake negotiations and diffuse the situation. Pakistan Prime Minister's special envoy Abdur Sattar visited New Delhi in January 1990 for talks, to diffuse the tension. Prime Minister V.P. Singh, of India clearly conveyed the

67. Prem Bhatia, 'Benazir's Kashmir Card' Tribune, 28 January 1989.

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message that, Islamabad must demonstrate that it wishes to stop assistance to Kashmiri terrorists - if it wants better ties with India.⁶⁸ Later Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan also visited India, but nothing concrete was arrived at. In Jammu and Kashmir, the situation worsened and President's rule had to be imposed.

The Pakistan Government called for a national strike and it was observed through out Pakistan on 6th February 1990 and provocative statements with regard to Kashmir continued to be made. Benazir Bhutto stepped up her diplomatic activity in order to obtain international support for Pakistan's stand. She visited West Asian countries in order to acquire the support of Islamic countries but all this activity did not pay much dividend. All the Great powers, US, USSR, and China conveyed the message to Pakistan, that it must enter into negotiations with India and settle the matter peace-fully. In May 1990, Pakistan submitted a letter to the President of the Security Council calling upon India to exercise restraint and work for the political settlement of the Kashmir dispute and to redeploy its forces to peace time locations.

The actual reason for the increasing hardline adopted by Pakistan with regard to Kashmir seems to be born

68. Times of India, 11 January 1990.

out of crisis in the domestic political arena. There was an intense power struggle going on between the IJI alliance and the PPP and at the same time there was a deadlock between the President, the Army Chief, and the Prime Minister.⁶⁹ Benazir tried to use the 'Kashmir card' in order to strengthen herself, in the wake of the unstable nature of her government, which could be dislodged at any time.

The hard stance of Benazir's government was also because of the fact, that she could not go against popular sentiments. The majority of the people in Punjab harbour anti-India sentiments, which was a fall out of the communal carnage during partition. Therefore, any stand on Kashmir which could annoy the majority province, would be fatal for the government, especially when the Punjabis comprise an overwhelming majority in the armed forces. Benazir Bhutto seems to be of the view that if she make some headway in favour of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, she could strengthen the position of the government, which otherwise was vulnerable. Further, Benazir had political interests also in trying to outplay Nawaz Sharif in rhetoric over Kashmir. Added to this were the elections in 'Azad' Kashmir in May 1990. Another domestic pressure for the Pakistan

69. See Uma Singh, n. 65, p. 97.

government's hard line on Kashmir was that the Pakistan Army had more than 50,000 serving Kashmiri soldiers and officers.⁷⁰

Thus, Benazir played up the Kashmir issue in order to sustain her fragile government. However, this did not seem to help much. The military-bureaucratic complex of Pakistan struck once again and Benazir was removed from power by the President in August 1990. Unstable civilian governments in Pakistan have always turned to foreign policy as a way of shifting, the content of political debate in their favour and this led to further instability.

Thus Pakistan, continued to internationalize the Kashmir issue during the period 1972-1990. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto used the Kashmir issue in order to stabilize their own governments and to divert the public opinion from domestic turmoil. The major shifts evident were that, Pakistan, no longer used its force strategy in order to acquire Kashmir, instead it relied on aiding and abetting the various secessionist groups in Jammu & Kashmir. Further, it began to undermine the Simla Agreement especially during the 1980s, by internationalising the Kashmir issue. However, Pakistan was much restrained,

70. Times (London), 30 January 1990.

because of its own inferior position vis-a-vis India and also because of the neutral stand taken by the great powers with regard to Kashmir issue.

CHAPTER - IV

EXTERNAL POWERS AND KASHMIR ISSUE

The search for a new world order following the termination of the Cold War has unsurprisingly had its impact on the subcontinental struggle for preponderance. It is almost a truism that the Kashmir issue is as much a relic of the partition as a manifestation of Cold War politics in the region. In so far as the world stood divided during the Cold War period on the Kashmir issue along larger strategic interest, the crumbling of the Iron and Bamboo curtains have left the Kashmir issue at odds with the global disentangling of vexatious Cold War fuelled disputes. Whereas the three major powers - Soviet Union, United State and China have made a retreat from hard stances on subcontinental differences, the dynamics of purely intra-regional and domestic politics in South Asia have resulted in escalating acrimony. The Kashmir issue, along with the traditional Indo-Pak tussle for power had formally been a theatre for Cold War shadow boxing between the United States and Soviet Union. In a reversal of roles, India and Pakistan now play their own cards with little extra-regional provocation or support while the major powers urge caution and restraint.

Earlier South Asia has seldom been an area of top priority for any of the Great Powers. However, it has been an area where all the three Great Powers US, USSR and China have been involved for many years, usually in confrontational rather than cooperative interactions. Each of these major powers has had rather extensive relations with India and Pakistan and these relations differed greatly in nature and intensity. The Great Powers in their relationship with either India or Pakistan have been, to a large extent, guided by their own global geopolitical considerations rather than regional aspects.

The impact of the international environment on the Kashmir issue was very much evident since the inception of the problem. In fact, it was the influence of these countries on the Kashmir issue that made it very difficult for the problem to be solved. The position taken by the great powers on the issue has varied and this becomes clearly evident, especially since the 1971 Bangladesh War.

The US involvement in the Kashmir question can be traced back as far as the late 1940s. The United States of America, because of the 'Cold War', had in the beginning, supported Pakistan on Kashmir, despite being aware that Pakistan was the aggressor. In the 1950s, containment of the Sino-Soviet bloc was the main consideration. Thus Pakistan,

which is very strategically located became very important for the US. Pakistan's entry into SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1955, on the other hand was aimed at checking India and trying to wrest Kashmir with the help of outside powers. In view of such an alliance, the US in the 1950s began to support Pakistan's view on Kashmir. However, this underwent a change in the 1960s, very much evident since the 1965 war. America realized in 1965 that Pakistan was more concerned about India and Kashmir than about the hypothetical Soviet drive across the Hindu Kush.¹ America adopted a position of neutrality during the 1965 war and imposed an arms embargo on both Pakistan and India. This shift was because of the fact that South Asia had become of lesser security importance to Washington due to the emergence of Sino-Soviet conflict in 1960s and also the American view that the Pakistan-India tussle over Kashmir kept both of them weak rendering them of little use in its containment policy.

The reflection of this neutrality on the Kashmir issue was that America did not henceforth endorse Pakistani view on Kashmir. From 1965 till 1979, US policy of minimum concern for South Asia continued.

1. W. Howard Wriggins, "U.S. Interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean", in Lawrence Ziring's (ed.) The Subcontinent in World Politics, (New York, 1982), p.209.

One major exception was the American "tilt" in the 1971 war towards Pakistan. USA and China were both pro-Pakistan while the Soviet Union supported India. The US 'tilt' in the 1971 war was mainly conditioned by the policies which America adopted in pursuance of her larger global and geo-political interests. The US 'tilt' towards Pakistan was mainly due to the opening which it provided with the People's Republic of China.² The American naval task force "Enterprise" episode was a result of this shift.

The US 'tilt', was to prove to China the American reliability in case of a crisis. In 1972, explaining the American Policy during the war, President Nixon, in his report to the Congress stated "during the week of December '6', we received convincing evidence that India was seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan's military force in the West".³ This statement is of considerable importance because this proves that America was interested in keeping the existing status quo as far as Kashmir was concerned. The US however, did not do anything concrete to prevent the debacle of West Pakistan forces in

2. See Christopher Van Hollen "The Tilt Policy Revisited. Nixon - Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia", Asian Survey No. 20, April 1980, pp. 340-341.

3. Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India, (New York, 1984), p.54.

Bangladesh. The policy of the US also proves that she was averse to any change of status quo in Jammu and Kashmir.

In February 1972, the Shanghai Communique - issued at the end of Nixon's visit to China made a mention of Kashmir. It made an appeal to India and Pakistan to withdraw their troops from Jammu and Kashmir and continue to observe the cease-fire, called for in a resolution of the United Nations Security Council on 21 December 1971⁴. This is to be seen more in the context of the emerging relationship between the US and China rather than as a reflection of any real interest in Kashmir, or for that matter concern for her one time ally, Pakistan.

Since, 1972, India has been recognized as a regional power to be reckoned with by the USA. The detente with the USSR, and improved Sino-American relations, made America detach itself from South Asia in the 1970s. The US, now began to cultivate India and recognized her as a regional power. In October 1974, when Kissinger visited India, he declared. "The US accepts non-alignment...The size and position of India gives it a special role of leadership in South Asia and in World Affairs".⁵ This drift towards a

4. Palmer, n. 3, p. 69.

5. Palmer, p. 76.

more cordial relationship with India also resulted in US neutrality on all disputes between Pakistan and India.

Earlier in 1973 Nixon had declared that "the US will not join in any groupings or pursue any policies directed against India..."; and further said that "the relations between the countries of South Asia and countries outside the region must be consistent with the peace and independence in the subcontinent and the peace of the world".⁶

These statements of the US clearly show that the objective of America in the 1970s was the maintenance of peace in South Asia and avoidance of any conflict between the South Asian states over any dispute between them. America, in the 1970s kept herself considerably aloof from the South Asian region. Its view on Kashmir appeared to be that it was an issue to be solved between Pakistan and India. But till such a settlement was reached, the status quo had to be maintained on Kashmir.

Further, the US from mid 1970s till the end of 1979 was more interested in the pursuance of its non-proliferation drive in South Asia rather than the Kashmir issue. The toning down of the Kashmir issue during the

6. Palmer, p. 115.

Bhutto Years also resulted in the US giving little attention to this vexed issue. Thus, in the 1970s, once Indian predominance in the subcontinent was established, the United States accepted it and made no attempt to play any significant role in the South Asian security affairs.⁷

The US, as noted earlier, since the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974 and the Pakistani drive towards nuclear weapons, started giving more importance to its non-proliferation drive in South Asia. President Carter was more concerned with nuclear proliferation and sought to impose curbs on both Pakistan and India. USA even went to the extent of stopping US economic assistance to Pakistan in 1979. Pakistan, however, refused to desist from its nuclear programme.

The situation dramatically changed with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. South Asia once again was embroiled in Cold War politics. Due to its strategic location, Pakistan acquired renewed importance for the US in view of the overall security implications for the Persian Gulf. The US-Pakistan security relationship was once again revived in 1981, and a 3.2 billion dollar economic and military aid package was given

7. William J. Barnds, 'The United States and South Asia: Policy and Process', in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.) The Security of South Asia (Chicago, 1987), p. 155.

to Pakistan. The bolstering of Pakistan's military potential during the Zia regime raised doubts about the prospects of continued peace in South Asia. As it is the South Asian sub system has always been vulnerable to outside intervention.

The impact of renewed US assistance to Pakistan has been that Pakistan's belligerence on Kashmir increased. The USA on its part continued to believe that the arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used by it in order to settle its disputes with India. The US administration did not appreciate India's grave concern over the supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan.

The USA, however, continued to improve its relations with India. In 1982-1983, India and Pakistan had acrimonious exchanges on Kashmir due to an increase in Pakistan's rhetoric on 'self-determination' for Kashmir and solution of the problem in accordance with UN resolutions. The United States advised caution and called for peaceful negotiations between these two states. The USA was interested in the maintenance of peace in South Asian region because it did not want its global calculations to be upset by a flare-up between Pakistan and India. Further, peace in South Asia would also keep the South Asian region away from excessive interference by the Soviet Union and China.

The US, since the 1970s, has stood neutral on Kashmir and accepted the status quo in Kashmir. Another important factor to be noted is that the US began to increasingly stress on 'bilateralism' in the Kashmir issue. This policy of the US on Kashmir became more clear in 1990 when it stepped up its diplomatic activity in order to avert a war on Kashmir between Pakistan and India.

By the end of 1989, war clouds loomed large in the subcontinent. The USA immediately began to urge settlement of the Kashmir issue in a peaceful manner through negotiations.

The USA urged Pakistan to exercise military restraint and further indicated to Islamabad that Washington would not be able to take sides over the Kashmir issue. This attitude of the US on Kashmir was underscored by Richard Barcher, the Department of State Spokesman, who said that "A framework for consultations for such bilateral issues was agreed in the 1972 Simla Accord and we are encouraging both the parties to use this framework to settle the problem".⁸ The USA began to stress that India and Pakistan must settle the Kashmir dilemma through bilateral negotiations. Thus, the USA sent signals to Pakistan that it should not

8. K.K. Katyal, "Kashmir : Challenge & Response", The Hindu, 27 February 1990.

"internationalise" the Kashmir issue. It also indicated that the US was not willing to extend any support to Pakistan in case the matter was taken to the United Nations Security Council.

The tension between Pakistan and India over Kashmir increased US anxiety, on the probability of an Indo-Pak war over Kashmir. President George Bush's Deputy National Security Adviser, Mr. Robert Gates, visited Pakistan and India in May and cautioned both the countries against going to war. The Gates Mission did not seek to resolve the Kashmir issue, but only prevent a war between the two countries.⁹

Stephen Solarz, Head of the House Foreign Affairs sub-Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, also visited the South Asian Region and advised caution. Earlier, Mr. Solarz had argued that the Kashmir issue, whatever be its solution, had to be resolved "in terms of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India".¹⁰ This attitude of the USA clearly showed that she has been reducing its tilt towards Pakistan.

9. Michael, R. Gordon, "Washington fears an Autumn War in Kashmir", International Herald Tribune, 18 June 1990.

10. Newstime (Hyderabad) 8 February, 1990.

The stress on peaceful bilateral negotiations went against the efforts of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, who had been touring West Asian capitals in order to get support on Kashmir. It clearly indicated a US-Pakistan divergence on the Kashmir issue.

The thrust of Washington's policy seems to be to prevent war between Pakistan and India. The new US diplomacy is based on the premise that Kashmir is not an international issue which requires involvement of the UN Security Council, It recognises that the Kashmir problem is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan to be settled as per the Simla agreement; further, a plebiscite in Kashmir is no longer valid and that Pakistan should not aid terrorists or contemplate another war with India.¹¹

The active diplomacy of the US acted as a restraint on Pakistan and stopped it from internationalising the issue by taking it to the Security Council once again. The US involvement has to be seen in terms of the new global realities. Detente between the US and USSR has been established and maintenance of global peace has become the main concern. Further, with the USSR being more occupied with its domestic turmoil, it was left to the US to take an

11. Bhabani Sengupta "Change in US - Pakistan relations" Newstime, 16 July 1990.

active diplomatic posture on Kashmir in 1990. Pakistan, on its part, realized the futility of trying to get American help in order to pursue its stand on Kashmir. With Pakistan's heavy dependence on American Economic and Military aid, it could not ignore American interests in maintenance of peace in South Asia. The US emphasis on "bilateralism" on the Kashmir issue restrained Pakistani ambitions.

The Soviet Union was another major actor in the South Asian region, which greatly influenced the course of the Kashmir issue since the mid 1950s. Pakistan's entry into the SEATO and CENTO encouraged the Soviet Union to establish a firm relationship with India and subsequently support India's stand on Kashmir. The primary significance of the States of South Asia for Moscow, lies in their role in the competition between the Soviet Union, China and United States for the global and regional influence. Growing Sino-Pakistan relations since 1962 resulted in shifts in Soviet policy. Thus, while in the 1950s, Soviet Union ardently supported the Indian stand on Kashmir, by the mid 1960s, Moscow appeared to be moving towards a neutral posture on Kashmir. During the 1965 War, Moscow demonstrated its new approach of maintaining balanced relations between India and Pakistan. Pakistan-Soviet relations improved and the Soviet

Union even supplied arms to Pakistan in 1969. This shift in policy clearly showed that with respect to the Kashmir issue also, the USSR would maintain its neutrality.

Moscow-Islamabad relations, however, soured by 1971. The change in the Soviet Union's stand was necessitated because Pakistan refused to join the Asian Collective Security Plan and, Secondly, because of Pakistan played a key role in aiding US-China rapprochement. However, this did not result in a change in Soviet stance over Kashmir. In spite of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971. during the Bangladesh war, Soviet Union urged great restraint on India.

President Nixon quotes in his memoirs that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Varontsov had said that "the Soviets were prepared unconditionally to guarantee that there would be no Indian attack on West Pakistan or on Kashmir".¹² Subsequently, even Mrs. Gandhi stated "We do not want any territory of West Pakistan. We want lasting peace with Pakistan".¹³ It is apparent that during the 1971 war

12. Quoted in Reshma, "Pakistan-Soviet Relations since 1947", Indian Journal of Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1-2, March-June 1987, p. 74.

13. Ibid.

the Soviet Union was not interested in bringing about any change in the status quo in Kashmir.

Since 1972 Moscow has been more interested in developing relations with both Pakistan and India. This balancing of relations was aimed at neutralising Beijing's influence on Pakistan. Thus, the Soviet-Chinese antagonism also became a factor in the sub-continent. Further, India's refusal to accept the collective security proposals of the USSR in 1973 also encouraged the USSR to maintain a balance in its relations in South Asia. The Pakistan government's stress on "bilateralism" in its relations with all the major powers also encouraged Moscow to improve its relations with Islamabad. This change in attitude had its repercussions on the Kashmir issue as well. In October 1974, a joint Soviet - Pakistan communique expressed the hope that "All important issues between India and Pakistan will be settled in conformity with the Simla agreement in the interests of lasting peace in South Asia."¹⁴ This statement clearly identifies the Soviet stand, that the Kashmir issue must be resolved 'bilaterally'. This also points out that Soviet Union has taken a neutral stand on Kashmir. The Soviet stress on peace in South Asia is to check the influence of USA and China in the region, because, in terms of tension

14. Patriot (New Delhi), 12 July 1983.

the influence of these two countries over the region increased greatly. This stand of Soviet Union on Kashmir continued throughout the 1970s.

The Soviet Union welcomed Pakistan's formal withdrawal from CENTO in 1979 and its joining of the non aligned powers. The distancing of Pakistan from the United States also encouraged Moscow's improvement of relations with Pakistan, especially in the wake of the cutting of all economic assistance (except food aid) to Pakistan by Washington, in reaction to Islamabad's desire to obtain nuclear weapon capability.¹⁵

"Soviet intervention in Afghanistan resulted in renewal of antagonistic relations between Pakistan and USSR. Pakistan began to perceive a joint Indo-Soviet collusion to take over Azad Kashmir at the propitious moment."¹⁶ The Zia ul-Haq regime used this pretext of a Soviet threat to acquire arms and stabilize itself domestically. Washington also reacted immediately and overnight Pakistan became a "frontline" state. It resulted in the renewal of security

15. Robert, H. Donaldson, 'Soviet Security interests in South Asia', Lawrence Ziring (ed.), The Sub-continent in World Politics. (New York, 1982), pp. 193-194.

16. Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy after Afghanistan" in Stephen P. Cohen's, (ed.), The Security of South Asia, p. 68.

relations between USA and Pakistan. The Soviet Union tried to dispel the fears of Pakistan. In February 1980, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister said, "We are once again convinced that there is an opportunity for developing good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and India".¹⁷ This was to reassure Pakistan that the USSR had no designs on Pakistan. The soft-line was also meant to check Pakistan from once again joining the American fold. However, once the aid to Pakistan by USA was agreed upon in 1981, the Soviet News agency reported that "it is not surprising that toughening of Pakistan's stand in relation to Kashmir coincided with arms shipments from USA".¹⁸

Inspite of these developments, the Soviet Union's neutrality on Kashmir continued. The Soviet Union's stand on Kashmir is to be seen from its perception of growing US and Chinese influence on Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan. USSR wanted to check any move that would totally force Pakistan into the Sino-American axis.

In July 1983, the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Vitaly Smirnov, said that his country was of the view that "The Kashmir issue concerned India and Pakistan and

17. Statesman, 14 February, 1980

18. Patriot, 12 April 1982.

should be resolved by them through peaceful means."¹⁹ Similarly, when Pakistan-India tensions over Kashmir increased in 1986, the Soviet Union categorically ruled out interfering in the affairs of India and Pakistan. Soviet Union also made it clear that "the two countries must solve their problems themselves".²⁰

In 1986, Gorbachev on his visit to India, declared that "India holds a privileged position in Soviet policy". However, the overall Soviet policy was aimed at normalisation of relations with both Pakistan and India. They also stressed that the two countries must maintain peaceful relations. The beginning of detente between the Superpowers also had its effect on Soviet policy towards South Asia. Soviet Union realised that blatant partisanship towards India would encourage Pakistan to look towards the USA and China. It would also leave the Soviets without access to a very important country. If they were to achieve their goal of a South Asia that was peaceful and posed no potential threat to them; the Soviets must work to iron out differences between Pakistan and India.²¹

19. Patriot, 12 July 1988.

20. Pakistan Times, 21 December 1986.

21. Thomas Thorton, 'India and Soviet Union', Round Table, No. 304, October 1987, p. 461.

This attitude of the Soviet Union was reflected in their stance on the Kashmir issue and their insistence that it must be settled peacefully and bilaterally. The Gorbachev Phenomena had far reaching implications, not only for internal developments in USSR, but also in the international sphere. Moscow has improved its relations not only with USA, but also with China. The Geneva accords on Afghanistan were signed in April 1988. Great Power rivalry in other regions of the world also began to come to an end. All this further emphasised that peace and stability must be maintained in South Asia.

Thus, Soviet Union cautioned both India and Pakistan in 1990 to settle their differences over the Kashmir issue peacefully and through bilateral negotiations.²² This attitude of the Soviet Union, on Kashmir corresponds with the view of both USA and China. The Soviet stress on bilateral negotiations also acted as a deterrent against Pakistan's move to take Kashmir to the United Nations.

The People's Republic of China is another major power whose involvement in the South Asian region had much impact on the Kashmir issue. The Chinese aggression on India

22. Hindustan Times, 30 January 1990.

in 1962 ended the era of Sino - Indian friendship. China from then onwards began to take a very pro-Pakistani stance on Kashmir. China and Pakistan in 1963 signed a border agreement by which Pakistan ceded certain parts of POK to China. China, by the acquisition of territories in Kashmir conceded to her by Pakistan, had acquired a vested interest in Pakistan's perpetual occupation of that part of Kashmir.²³ China further has her own claims in the Aksai Chin area of Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in her continued stress on 'self-determination' principle on Kashmir.

The Chinese regional strategy since 1960s till the end of 1980s was mainly conditioned by the perception of China with regard to global politics. By mid - 1960s, the Soviet-China alliance collapsed and India has replaced China as the Soviet Union's major partner in Asia. China, unwisely perceived India as a client of the USSR and playing an unsavoury role in the Kremlin encirclement strategy, that sought to contain Chinese power. Thus China's South Asian strategy became a function of its long term preoccupation with a perceived Soviet threat. Beijing attempted to counter Moscow's strategy by striking at New Delhi. Thus China increasingly began to frame its relationship with South Asia in the context of great power politics. China greatly

23. S.P. Varma, "India, Pakistan and China", South Asian Studies, Vol. 6, No.2, July 1971, p.9.

strengthened its ties with Pakistan, in order to contain India's power in the region.

China, guided by the above factors, stressed on the solution of Kashmir in accordance with UN resolutions. Nevertheless, the limits of Chinese support became very obvious during the 1965 and 1971 wars. This reduced China's credibility in the region.

Since 1971 also the Chinese thinking, continued to be clouded with the above mentioned factors and its support to Pakistan on Kashmir continued. In May 1974, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited China, Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao Ping spoke of Chinese support to "the right of self-determination" of the people of Kashmir".²⁴ The assertion on the part of China periodically did not make much difference. With the Sino-Pakistani partnership rooted in the mutual self-interest derived from geopolitics - the desire to contain India and the suspicion of Soviet role in South Asia.²⁵ Such a stance was not unexpected. Further, the Chinese stance in 1974 on Kashmir is to be viewed with regard to the process of integration of Sikkim in the Indian Union.

24. Mohammad Ayoob, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1975), p. 49.

25. Steven Levine, "China and South Asia", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 10, January 1989, p.1112.

Despite these, China began to make efforts to improve of relations with India. In 1976, diplomatic relations between China and India were resumed. However, China's stand on Kashmir remained unchanged. In January 1979, when Chinese Vice Premier Mr. Li Hsien - Nien visited Islamabad, he said "China formally supports the Pakistani Governments efforts for realisation of the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir."²⁶ This reiteration of China's stand is consistent with its policy on Kashmir. Further, China seems to have been prompted into making such a statement because of the Indian support to Vietnam. China's relations with Vietnam had deteriorated and any pro-Vietnam stance was not acceptable to it in the wake of the Kampuchean crisis.

In the 1980s, however, one sees a shift in China's stand over the Kashmir issue. This shift seems to stem from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In December 1980, Chinese officials advised Aghashahi, the foreign minister of Pakistan "to improve relations with India, in order to reduce the danger of Soviet pressure through Afghanistan."²⁷ With Washington providing security guarantees and advanced

26. Indian Express, 23 January 1979.

27. Hindu (Madras), 15 May 1981.

military hardware, Beijing may have felt less constrained in approaching New Delhi.²⁸

China continued to welcome any improvement in Pakistan-India relations. China, hailed as a heartening development the Summit talks in New Delhi between Mrs. Gandhi and Zia in 1982. In a commentary, the People's Daily pointed out that "better Indo-Pak relations are not only desired by the two peoples but also required for development in South Asia and whole World. One or two rounds of talks, of course, cannot offer a solution to all differences. But relations can be expected to improve so long as the two countries seek common ground in good faith while resolving their differences".²⁹ This statement of China indicates a clear shift in policy in South Asia. These statements are consistent with China's efforts to improve relations with India while sustaining the long-standing ties with Pakistan. The policy shift is also evident on Kashmir. The foreign minister of China, Mr. Wuxueqian, at a press conference in Islamabad said that China wants "India and Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue through friendly consultations in

28. Levine, n. 25, p. 1115.

29. The Times of India, 3rd November 1982.

accordance with relevant UN resolutions and the Simla Agreement"³⁰

This shows that China increasingly began to consider that the Kashmir issue must be solved bilaterally and not through internationalisation of the issue. The mention of the UN resolutions was to satisfy Pakistan.

China since 1982-83 seemed to act on the assumption that it's interests in South Asia could best be achieved by consolidating its existing ties in the region while inching towards long-term detente with India, the dominant power in the region. China seems to believe that super power involvement in South Asia may be kept in check by a gradually enhanced regional capacity for self-help, self-management and conflict resolution. China seems to refrain from active involvement in South Asian intra-regional conflicts.

This attitude of China, coupled with India's initiatives for normalisation and friendly relations, brought in a subtle shift in its stand on Kashmir. The improvement in the India-China relations in the aftermath of the Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Peking in 1988, raised new hopes. Though differences over the border settlement

30. Hindustan Times, 30 July 1983.

remained, stress was made on gradual improvement of relations. The Sino-Soviet thaw also encouraged improvement in Sino-Indian relations. Thus, the changing international scenario made Beijing take a more neutral line on Kashmir.

In 1990 when Indo-Pak tensions over Kashmir increased greatly, China did not immediately comment on the issue. It was only after Mr. Iqbal Akhund, the foreign policy advisor of Mr. Benazir Bhutto, went to Beijing and persuaded them to speak up in support of Pakistan's position that China made a statement on Kashmir. The Chinese mentioned that 'Kashmir is a dispute' and 'a problem left over by history'. But they asked Pakistan and India "to set peace and stability in South Asia above everything else." This is a far cry from the past when China used to wallow in Indo-Pak disputes and over the Kashmir issue and routinely offer support to the 'Kashmiri peoples right of self-determination'.³¹

This statement of China proves that it did not want the normalisation of relation with India to be hampered and at the same time wanted to maintain its strategic relationship with Pakistan which served them for nearly three decades.

31. Inder Malhotra, "Chinese Stance on Kashmir", The Times of India, 22 February 1990.

China's increasing stress that the Kashmir issue be solved through peaceful negotiations and bilateral means was also reflected in the statement of Mr. Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister in New Delhi. He called on "India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir problem peacefully and through dialogue". He further pointed out that the Chinese media always maintained neutrality on the Kashmir issue. He ruled out any possible mediation by China in the Kashmir issue.³²

This shift in Chinese policy on Kashmir was in consonance with positions adopted by the US and USSR. China seems to increasingly believe that the Kashmir issue is essentially a bilateral problem to be solved mutually by Pakistan and India. The Simla agreement has tacitly been accepted as the framework for such a dialogue. This change in China's policy discouraged Pakistan from internationalising the Kashmir issue by bringing up the matter in the United Nations Security Council. It also restrained Pakistan from taking any ambitious path in order to change the status quo in Kashmir.

Thus, we can see that all the major external power the US, the USSR and China have taken a very neutral stand

32. Bangladesh Observer (Dacca), 27 March 1990.

on Kashmir. They stressed on the maintenance of status quo in Kashmir. The change in the major power approach to Kashmir issue was because of the growing recognition of India's power. All of them have stakes in the maintenance of peace in South Asia. Thus, they cautioned Pakistan from pursuing any ambitious policies with regard to Kashmir. This attitude of the major powers had greatly weakened Pakistan's position on Kashmir. The strive for a new world order, based on diffusion of power would bring peace in South Asia.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The legacy of partition of British India has been four decades of conflict centering around competing subcontinental nationalisms, manifest especially in the bitter wrangle over Kashmir. In a way, Pakistan's legitimacy as the Muslim subcontinental state hinged on its claims on Kashmir. The geopolitical realities reinforced ideological contentions to make Kashmir Pakistan's perpetual lure.

Pakistani gains in 1947-49 in Kashmir through use of force resulted in India applying to the United Nations for corrective measures. Instead, the Western Powers being guided by cold war calculations, supported Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. The United Nations resolutions of 1948 and 1949 stressed on plebiscite and demilitarization of Kashmir. Pakistan avoided a plebiscite in the initial years because, it feared that the Kashmiris would vote against it as the scars left by the marauding invaders were still present.

Pakistan joined the American alliances of SEATO and CENTO in early 1950s so as to acquire military strength and wrest Kashmir from India. Pakistan continued to internationalise the issue, and began to advocate a

plebiscite in Kashmir. The 1950s were days of political instability in Pakistan.- the "liberation" of Kashmir, was a favourite theme among the politicians, who vied with one another in raising the issue so that they could remain in power.

During Ayub Khan's regime the belligerent attitude of Pakistan on Kashmir continued. At a time when his political base was very fragile, especially after 1963, Ayub Khan used the emotive Kashmir issue to acquire legitimacy. Ayub Khan was also criticised by various politicians of Pakistan for not taking advantage of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 to wrest Kashmir by force. These domestic compulsions, coupled with the fear of complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir in 1964, resulted in Pakistan's pursuance of 'use of force' strategy in order to acquire Kashmir in 1965. The 1965 war was a reflection of the continued use of Kashmir for domestic political purposes by Pakistan's rulers. The stalemate in the war stoked the fires of dissent against the regime of Ayub Khan. The Tashkent Declaration of 1966 was used by Ayub Khan's opponents to marshal public opinion against him and force his exit.

The Bangladesh War of 1971 marks a watershed in the politics of the sub-continent. Islam as a tool of

nation-building received a severe jolt when Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan. The war clearly proved Indian superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan. India came to be accepted as a dominant power in South Asia and Pakistan was forced to reconcile to an inferior position.

The 1971 war also demonstrated to Pakistan, the futility of armed action to change the status quo in Kashmir. Even though unlike the 1947 and 1965 conflicts, the 1971 war was not directly related to Kashmir, Pakistan's offensive started in the Kashmir sector. Pakistan's attitude seemed to be that even if it lost East Pakistan, it would gain Kashmir in the bargain and this would sustain the military regime of Yahya Khan. This strategy of the Yahya Khan's regime failed. The defeat in the 1971 war resulted in the rise of democratic forces to power in Pakistan.

The Simla Agreement of 1972 froze the status-quo in Kashmir. The Agreement stressed on "bilateralism" in the settlement of all differences between Pakistan and India. It also laid down that the Line of Actual Control of 17 December, 1971 in Kashmir would be respected and both sides would refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of this line. Subsequently, because of the changed power configuration in South Asia, Pakistan did not try to engage in direct conflict with India over Kashmir. This changed

perception was also because of the fact that Pakistan, with the experience of 1965 and 1971 wars, learnt that India would not limit any military conflict to the territory of Kashmir alone. Further, the 'two-nation' theory of Pakistan stood repudiated as a result of secession of Bangladesh. This greatly weakened Pakistan's claim to Kashmir based on the muslim preponderance in Kashmir.

Kashmir continued to be relevant in the domestic political scenario of Pakistan from 1972 onwards. Successive Pakistani governments stressed on the self-determination for Kashmiris in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. Pakistan began to point out that the Simla agreement did not prevent it from taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. It also used the passing reference of the "final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir" in the Simla Agreement to mean that it was regarded as an area of dispute between Pakistan and India.

In reality, the status quo in Kashmir could never be disturbed easily. This is because of the asymmetrical balance of power in South Asia. Pakistan can never match India in terms of resources, size, manpower or level of development. Pakistan, operating within such a power system, cannot acquire Kashmir by force alone. Rather, it is argued that the continued stress on Kashmir after 1972 by

the various governments of Pakistan was more because of domestic compulsions of the regimes.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stressed on 'self-determination' for Kashmir only after 1974. This sudden change was motivated by domestic turmoil. Pakistan failed to solve its problem of national-integration even after the secession of Bangladesh. Bhutto's forward policy in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province was much resented and resulted virtually in a civil war. Kashmir was one issue on which public opinion was united in Pakistan. Bhutto used this emotional issue to divert the attention of the people from domestic troubles. The Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion on May 1974 coupled with the Kashmir Accord of 1975 (which brought in a reconciliation between the Central Government of India and Kashmir) prompted Bhutto to raise the Kashmir issue in Pakistan. No government in that country could afford to keep silent at moves which would shore up the understanding between Government of India and Kashmir. Bhutto's hard stance on Kashmir was also related to elections in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Bhutto's People's Party contested and won in the 1975 elections held under the New Constitution of Azad Kashmir and succeeded in integrating POK into Pakistan. This showed that Pakistan was mainly interested in keeping POK within its fold.

The Bhutto period also saw a shift in Pakistan's Kashmir policy. The realisation that it could not change the status quo in Kashmir through use of force made Pakistan shift the onus of responsibility of the struggle for the so-called right of 'self-determination' to Kashmiris themselves. This shift matured, in later years, especially during Zia-Ul-Haq's time. Pakistan began to aid terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir. The strategy of Pakistan on Kashmir now was aimed at formenting insurgency in Kashmir, so as to debilitate Indian power through insurrection over a period of time, culminating in secession of territory without Pakistani military involvement. This approach to Kashmir seemed to be the best, in the changed circumstances.

The period of General Zia-Ul-Haq's rule (1977-88) saw excessive internationalisation of the issue. Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations, Nonaligned Summits and other International forums. The increased stress on Kashmir during Zia's rule stemmed from the weak political base of the military dictator. Zia lacked legitimacy to rule and he used Kashmir as one of his cards for political survival. The greater emphasis on Kashmir since 1981 was because of the increasing demand from various groups for democratisation of the political system. The Movement for Restoration of Democracy which was formed in



1981 by a conglomeration of political parties picked up momentum and Zia stressed on Kashmir in order to widen his support base, especially in Punjab at a time when large scale disturbances took place in Sind and other areas, in the course of the democratic movement.

Pakistan's escalation in rhetoric on Kashmir in the 1980s was also closely related to the Islamisation Programme of Zia-Ul-Haq in the domestic sphere. Increased stress on Islam domestically was bound to have ramifications on the external policy. Pakistan based on Islamic ideology perceived that logically Kashmir would belong to it.

The unrest in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1980s because of various factors like inadequate economic development, failure of political parties to perform, unemployment, etc., resulted in Pakistan's increased rhetoric on Kashmir. Pakistan, finding chance to undermine India's secular ideology, greatly stressed on 'self-determination' of Kashmir and aided various insurgent groups.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 has renewed the United States-Pakistan security alliance. Pakistan, in order to get the American aid, started a 'peace offensive' against India by proposing a 'No-War' Pact in 1981. However, when the matter came up for discussion,

Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue, effectively undermining all attempts at any agreement on the issue of a No War Pact between Pakistan and India.

A major shift on Kashmir during Zia's period was the relegation of the Simla Agreement to the background. The first challenge to the Simla agreement came in the form of Pakistani attempts to capture the Siachen Glacier. Zia claimed that the Siachen Glacier fell on the Pakistan side of the Line of Actual Control. He alleged that the presence of Indian troops in this area was a violation of the Simla Agreement. Since 1983, Indian and Pakistani troops had engaged in occasional skirmishes in this high altitude area. Pakistan's drive to acquire Siachen Glacier shows that it no longer considers the Line of Actual Control of 1971 as inviolable. Further, by raising the Siachen dispute, Pakistan indirectly kept the Kashmir issue alive.

Further, since 1985, because of increased pressure from democratic forces, Zia-Ul-Haq took a harder line on Kashmir. In fact, on several occasions, while seeking a solution to the Kashmir issue, Pakistan did not even make a mention of the Simla Agreement. This shows that Pakistan was increasingly drifting away from the spirit of the Simla Agreement. It's raising of the Kashmir issue at international forums, showed its long term plans of greatly reactivating

issue at an appropriate time.

The nuclear programme of Pakistan is also of much relevance to the Kashmir issue. During Zia's period, Pakistan had greatly advanced in its clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The future implications of a Nuclear Pakistan on Kashmir issue, is that, Pakistan may once again try to reopen the Kashmir issue by the threat of force.

Benazir Bhutto, in 1988, initially tried to revive the Simla spirit. Benazir because of domestic compulsions, realised that she could not follow a policy of accomodation with India. Benazir's policy on Kashmir was a continuation of Zia's policy of internationalising the issue and undermining the Simla Agreement. By the end of 1989, the situation in Kashmir worsened and tension mounted along the border in Kashmir. Pakistan's rhetoric on Kashmir greatly increased. The hardline stance of Benazir was because of the fragile nature of her government. Benazir perceived that she could use the Kashmir card in order to strengthen herself vis-a-vis the then, Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif, the President Ishaq Khan and the Army. Further Benazir also had to succumb to the public opinion especially in Punjab, which was always guided by anti India sentiments. Her hard rhetoric on Kashmir seems to have brought no dividends. She was removed from power by the military-

bureaucratic complex in August, 1990.

It is therefore, argued in this work that from 1972 to 1990 the various governments of Pakistan, both democratic as well as dictatorial in character, have used the Kashmir issue to satisfy domestic compulsions and secure regime stability. But this use of an external issue to divert attention from the pressing socio-economic problems of the people, did not solve any problems. Further, far from bringing stability to the political system, it further undermined the system. Though the Kashmir issue was used by the various governments of Pakistan for domestic political purposes, in actuality it did not bring in much change in the situation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his daughter Benazir Bhutto used the Kashmir card in order to strengthen themselves, but as we saw it was of little use. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto failed to solve the socio-economic problems of Pakistan and he behaved more like a military dictator. It was this which brought his downfall. Similarly, despite the high rhetoric on Kashmir in 1990, Benazir Bhutto fell prey to the military-bureaucratic complex. The military dictator Zia-ul-Haq used the Kashmir card in order to widen his political base but it never happened. He had to slowly move towards democratic functioning, although in a farcical way. The more pressing need of Pakistan is to correct the major

faults in the structure of the political system and its concepts of nation building. External issues, such as Kashmir, do not remove the decay in the political system.

Pakistan since 1972, had largely used Kashmir issue for internal purposes. However in its overall policy we see that it did not take the matter to the UN security council or try to use force in order to acquire Kashmir. This change was because of the tacit acceptance of India as a regional power. This was also rooted in the fact that the Great powers such as United States of America, Soviet Union and China have since 1972, adopted a more rational policy as regard to Kashmir. They stressed that the Kashmir issue be resolved by peaceful means and through bilateral negotiations. Thus, all the great powers accepted the status quo in Kashmir. This is because of the realisation that India has emerged as a regional power to be reckoned with especially since 1971. The policy of the great powers acted as a restraint on Pakistan and stopped it from pursuing an ambitious policy or actively internationalising the Kashmir issue. The entente cordiale between the Super Powers would further strengthen peace in South Asia. The acceptance of Status quo in Kashmir by outside powers greatly weakened Pakistan's position on Kashmir.

A degree of ambiguity hovers about the Pakistani position on Kashmir issue. At the rhetorical level, Pakistan's leaders continue to claim that Kashmiris must be allowed the right of 'self-determination'. However, there is a divergence between this outright moral stand of Pakistan as regard to Kashmir and the stress on United Nations resolutions for solving the issue. While stress on 'self-determination' seemed to include the right of independence of Kashmir, the stress on UN resolutions point to the fact that Kashmir can join either India or Pakistan after a plebiscite. The UN resolutions do not speak of any other alternative. Thus, Pakistan's rhetoric on self-determination was mainly for international consumption. Its actual interest was in incorporating Kashmir into Pakistan. However, it is awkward for Pakistan to make an outright demand for joining Kashmir into Pakistan.

Kashmir will, therefore, continue to be an issue for Pakistan and a non issue for India. Political leaders of Pakistan will not give up the claim on Kashmir, because that would mean the signing of a political death warrant. However South Asia cannot remain isolated from the dramatic changes taking place around the world because of the end of the cold war phenomena. It would be better for both Pakistan and India if they would not attempt to change the status quo in Kashmir.

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