POLITICS OF CABINET FORMATION IN BIHAR
(1952-1990)

BIDYA SHANKAR "BIBHUTI"

CENTERE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES   c P
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA

1991

19,July,1991

DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled `POLITICS OF CABINET FORMATION IN BIHAR (1952-1990)', submitted by Mr. Bidya Shankar "Bibhuti" in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university and is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. KULDEEP MATHUR

Supervisor

PROF. BALVEER ARORA

chairperson

Chairperson
Centre for Political Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Acknowledgment

"Honour to those whose words or deeds,
Thus help us in our daily needs,
And by their overflow,
Raise us from what is low".

                              ----H.W. Longfellow.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Prof. Kuldeep Mathur whose expert guidance, valuable suggestion and diligent supervision made it possible for me to complete this dissertation. He endeared in me an urge for learning and always reminded me of the famous sermon of Lord Krishna, `Karmanevadhikaraste'

It is beyond imagination to express gratitude to parents because words are limited and feelings are limitless.

I must be failing in my duty if I miss this opportunity to express a sense of indebtedness to Prof. Roma Mitra, Prof.N.R. Mitra, Prof. B.P. Singh and Prof. A.Prasad (Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur) for their forthrightedness, educativeness and encouragement to face the challenges of life fearlessly and to express what one strongly feels with openmindedness `let noble thoughts come to us from all sides'.

Dedicated

to   the

'Kisses'   and   'cares'

of   my   Late   Grandfather.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

State Politics acquires an important dimension within a federal system where states operate as constituents of the nation, though not as independent and autonomous political entities. The logic of federal structure implies the regional, religious, cultural and linguistic differences among the people of the nation, which make the states differ in the degree to which they fit into this pattern. The operation of politics differ in states and the impact of national policies and parties affect the structure and operation of state systems. But, it is also true that the impact on state systems vary bringing variations and turbulences in structure, style and spirit of state politics which provides base for exclusive research.

In India, the constitutional structure and political processes at the state level have been mostly examined from national perspective, although a lot of case studies have also been done an various facets of state government or politics or on individual states. A single written constitutions treats the country as an organic entity and has tried to bring about a sort of basic uniformity in the constitutional frameworks at the national as well as state levels. It has been taken for granted that the government

1

is a true copy of the union government within the jurisdiction of each state, this helps states to draw examples and inspiration from the working of the union government in almost every field of activity' (Pylee, 1974 :157). So, many authors have described the formal, constitutional and legal aspects of state government on national pattern. They treat the structure, institutions and their operation in the state as the miniature of structure, institutions and operation of union government and fail to perceive the speciality in which a particular state is set.

The centralized structural arrangement overshadows the issues being discussed at the state level and results in the lack of public visibility of purely state issues (Pandey, 1982:xi). A considerable disinterestedness in the field of study of state politics can also be attributed to various other reasons. The argument has been forwarded that the states as political systems are artificial categories for analysis and within the states public attention can not be focused sharply on state affair because most of the people place a high premium on a set of national politics of concern and that blurrs their visions on state politics. The state system seems to be caught between the immediacy of the local system and the glamour and importance of national system (Pandey, 1982:xii) the phenomena of one party

dominant system has also obstructed the indigenous growth of state politics·because the Central High Command interfered in the state politics as routine affairs.

A lot of studies done on government and politics in the state have applied the historical or legal-institutional or even behavioural and comparative method but the trend has remained the same i.e. viewing of state politics from the national rather than state perspective.

The necessity of the study of state politics from the state rather than national perspective was perhaps first felt by the Committee on State politics in India, 'an informal group' organized by Myron Weiner (Pandey 1982:xii). The indigenous attempt was, however, made by Iqbal Narain who felt that "a proble into the intricate labyrinth of state politics is basic to an intelligent, meaningful and critical understanding of Indian politics as a whole"(Narain, 1966;16) It assumed that states can be studied as constituent units of a larger system and the units themselves are large enough to be studied as total ·systems. This mathematical interpretation seems correct because a sub-set although a part of the set happens to be a set in itself.

It is true that constitutional provisions empower the centre to encroach upon the powers of the states but at the same time it does not mean the negation of constitutional competence of each federated units. After 1977 states have started exercising pressures on Central Government for different types of concessions and there is a constant effort from the non-congress ruled states for more autonomy. "Whereas India's states were orginally regarded as little more than subodinate components of a highly centralized government structure, it is now clear that the political relationship between the Center and the States is an interdependent one. While the states must recoganize the centre's Constitutional superiority and in varying degrees, depend on New Delhi for financial support. They have also been evolving as powerful political arenas in their own right........especially, in the bigger or more affluent states, the winners at the state level are able to assert their power against the power of the centre". (Wood, 1984:2) The permutations and combinations in states politics have affected the Central policies. The state leadership have played strategic importance in national decision-making process and in context of even successions to the Prime Minister. The ontario experiment done recently in case of Mr.Chandrashekhar government proves this fact. On the operational side, the states act as implementing agencies

for national development plan. "No other large and important government.....is so dependent as India on theoretically subordinate but actually rather distinct units responsible to a different political control for so much of the administration of what are recognized as national programs of great importance to the nation" (Appleby, 1963:21) The states perform the traditional functions which have direct, immediate and intimate impact on tl. futures of the citizens of states which gives tangible relevance to state politics. The states cater to the needs and aspirations of the people and it is the local issues which rouse the passion of the people. So, the centre cannot treat a state government as a passive agency. The political activities at the state level has it after effect on the entire political system. "The instabilities and shocks associated with the economic development process first felt at the state level and only thereafter move into national politics" (Weiner, 1963:3) "The long term tendency in India is towards pluralism, regionalism and decentralization. One of the fundamental reasons for this is that significant political change in India occurs first at the state level and subsequently shapes national political processes. State governments, in effect, are in the front line when it comes to coping with the tensions produced by socio-economic

5

change. A close examination of state politics also reveals that" each state has in fact been undergoing its own pattern of political development and its own internal political crisis." (Weiner, 1968;67). So to understand state politics in India, it has to be approached from state perspective.

The studies done in America on state politics are concerned more with the use and development of scientific techniques and various conceptual frameworks such as that of the 'political system'. They are being employed to focus upon the behavioural charactisistics of state politics. They also stress on comparative study of state politics because it is feasible there but "the question of developing a theoretical framework for the study of state politics in the specific Indian context is an intriguing one" (Narain, 1976:XVI) The comparative perspective, through functional tools cannot be applied in Indian States because there is striking ' infra-structural diversities in terms of region, communities and caste and religions' (Narain, 1966;11) "There exists an appalling gap among states in respect of the levels of literacy urbanization, industrialization and economic viability. The process of constant flux and change in Indian state politics, though not deviating too far from the Central strand of democracy and development, makes the work much more difficult than the infra-structural plurality

within individual states" (Pandey, 1982: XViii)

Myron Weiner's approach treats each state 'a constituent unit within a large system, but nonetheless also as a separate political system' and tries to describe and analyse 'the political processes in a single state ' and to relate that process to ˜ (a) the social and economic environment in which politics occurs and (b) the performance of government'(Weiner, 1968:7). It reflects a distinct bias towards the ˜system approach but with an explicit difference.

Iqbal Narain's analytic framework though draws heavily upon ˜ systemic' approach is added by few relevant dimensions. For developing the framework, he has delineated conceptual image which consist of five determinants-institutional, physiological, level of politics, socio-economic and political and elite structure. He has constracted three dimensional framework consisting of the contextual, structural and operational . In the contextual dimensions, he has included following components : (i) history of a state; historical identity of the state, its political states before independence, its role in the freedom-struggle, and the impact of integration of princely states or of linguistic reorganization; (ii) The geographical locale; (iii) infra-structure manifesting

itself in social pluralism; (iv) the level and pattern of economic development; (v) human resources; (vi) the level of education; and (vii) urbanization. The structural dimension included formal constitutional structure – office of the Governor, office of the Chief Minister, the Ministry and the Legislature, political institutions and processes – political parties, pressure groups and elections; and administrative framework. In the Third Category he has included role orientation of the actors, political behaviour and functional dimension having a distinctive job connotation (Narain, 1976:XVI-XL)

Both these frameworks have their limitations. Weiner's framework is primarily meant for describing and analyzing some pre-conceived aspects of single state. No doubt he expected that the framework would simultaneously enable him to compare a set of themes, but, it was too lopsided to have in its compass the full blown portrait of state politics, let alone providing bases for comparison. (Pandey, 1982;XX). Iqbal Nariain's framework provided in the main, only a political aerial survey rather than a penetrating study of the forces operating at the state level. The framework seems to be more complex to be applied in the study of state politics.

This study, therefore, refrains from adopting either of the frameworks. becuse the nature and range of its subject is quit differnce Here is an attempt to study the politics of Cabinet formation by taking into consideration there Chief Ministers who have completed at least one year in office in Bihar. This may be diverse view point for the study of Cabinet that is, as an organization of elite, as a supreme management machinery in the state etc. But Cabinet is also a reflection of groups, their strengths and bargaing capacities. It is the Chief-decision making body in state,virtually, it provides a mirror of state politics. The formation of the Cabinet reflects the reality of social milieu in the state. Although in a state cabinet formation is the sole `prerogative' of the Chief Minister but he is constrained by the composition of social milieu and fectors like regional, religious and minority represantation as well as the pulls and pressures of the factions in the party. The faction wie with one another to have maximum represantaion to influence decisions This view point of Cabinet formation has been taken into consideration in this scheme of study to understand the State Politics in Bihar.

The study is organized into five chapters First Chapter deals with the review of readily available literature on the politics of Cabinet-Making in parliamentary form of

9

government. It also includes a brief reference of different Prime Ministers and their style of Cabinet making in .India. The second Chapter presents an overview of the politics of Cabinet formation in Indian states by surveying information available on some states and tries to bring out certain common factors. In the third Chapter focus shifts exclusively to Bihar, where an attempt is made to study the interactions of social structure, economy and politics over the years. The fourth Chapter deals with the styles of ministry-making of Chief Ministers in Bihar. The fifth Chapter highlights the composition and trend of the Cabinets in Bihar. Finally, an assessment is made ofvarious factors that play important role in the formation of the Cabinets in Bihar their trends and their probability in days to come.

CHAPTER - I

CABINET FORMATION: A REVIEW

On the basis of the relations between the executive and the legislature governments are distinguished between parliamentary and presidential form. The parliamentary system which is also known as cabinet system, has in the 20th century become the so called `Prime ministerial System' due to well known reasons. The cabinet system separates the head of state from the head of government whereas the presidential system combines them. The former links the executive with legislature and ensures that both are controlled by the same party or parties. The latter separates the two arms of government; which may indeed be controlled by different parties. The former despite the enhanced status of the prime minister, insists upon collective responsibility the latter places sole executive responsibility upon the president.

The chief characteristics of the cabinet system are political homogeneity, responsibility to the lower house, joint responsibility and the tendency of the Prime Minister.

The cabinet is supposed to be composed of the principal ministers who, while holding important portfolios are

supposed to meet regularly i.e weekly in normal circumstances and anytime in extraordinary circumstances. It presents a picture of unified team. As assumed, it is responsible generally for the government's policy and administration. "It is a supreme decision-making body of the country. To approve all proposals for the legislative enactment on governmental policy to recommend all major appointments to settle departmental disputes and to co-ordinate the various activities of the gvernment and oversee the execution of its policies are the major functions of the cabinet". (Pylee;1965:377)

The cabinet in certain ways is accountable to the head of the state, to the Prime Minister, to parliament and to the public. But the nature of the responsibility varies in each case. The head of the state must be kept fully informed, his advice taken, and his consent obtained. Between the head of the state and cabinet, the Prime Minister ordinarily acts as intermediary but it is always possible for the head of the state to reprimand a minister who has failed in respect or duty. The responsibility of the cabinet to Prime Minister is two fold; collective, in that when he resigns, the whole cabinet follows, and in individual, in that, the Prime Minister appoints each member of the cabinet to his post and can at anytime demand his

resignation. As regards Parliament, the responsibility is in the main, collective, since the individual action of each is usually caused by the collective responsibility of all. And if an individual ministers takes publicly an independent line, either contrary to, or without consulting the general opinion of his colleagues, it is usual for the Prime Minister to demand his resignation. Lastly, in speaking of the cabinet's responsibility to the people, it means something more than the continuous modification of policy by public opinion, something more than the increasing tendency of ministers in their parliamentary utterances to address the nation at large at least as much as their immediate hearers. The responsibility is greater and more direct than that, and is best illustrated by the practice of dissohing parliament instead of resigning on defeat. Thus, appealing from Parliament to the people, and by that other practice not generally followed of accepting the verdict of the electorate as final and resigning on defeat at the polls. The cabinet, infect, is a wheet within a wheel.

Its outside ring consists of a party that has a majority in the lower chamber, the next ring being the ministry which contains men who are most active within that party and the smallest of all being the cabinet, containing the real leader or chief. It is, in brief, the driving and sterring force of the state.

UNION COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

INNER CABINET

CABINET MINISTERS

P.M.

MINISTERS OF STATE

DEPUTY MINISTERS

PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARIES

(Source: Johari, 1981: 320)

It is a highly flexible institution easily adjustable to meet emergencies. In fact, the success of cabinet or Parliamentary form of government may properly be attributed to the cabinet's high degree of adaptability. It is the supreme directing authority; "the magnet of policy which co-ordinates and controls the whole of the executive government and integrates and guides the work of the legislature". (Baker,1943:54). According to Bagehot, the cabinet is a `hyphen that joins, the buckle that fastens, the executive and legislative department togather'. Lowell calls it, `the keystone of the political arch'. Sir John Marriot describes it as "the pivot around which the whole political machinery revolves", Ramsay Muir speaks of it as, "the steering wheel of the ship of the state." with whatever colorful phrase it may be described and from whatever angle it is approached, the cabinet is the motive powers of all political actions.

So, to say in a nutshell, the cabinet as an institution occupies the highest position in this type of political system vis-a-vis in the development of the country overall. "A principal factor in the success of this development is, therefore, that quality of the countries cabinet leadership. Persons occupying these positions have had and can be expected to continue to have a decided effect on the

development of their respective countries. In view of this, it is relevant to ask about the types and qualifications of people recruited for cabinet position and their manner of recruitment". (verner, 1973:637)

The role that ministers especially cabinet ministers may perform are multiple and demanding. Formally, each minister is responsible in several senses of the term for all that is done in his development including matters of details that may be politically explosive. He is also expected to speak on behalf of his department in the popular chamber both to advance departmental causes and to defend the department against criticism. He represents department in inter-departmental negotiations and at cabinet. Such negotiations not only affect administrative details but also competition for two scarce resources : public funds and parliamentary time for the passage of departmental bills. Another role of the minister is of spokesman and chief negotiator with interest groups affected by departmental measures. The minister can also present and publicize the department in the press and on television. His contribution is also expected from time to time in cabinet decisions on matters not directly connected with his own department. In addition, a minister also has two personal political roles not immediately connected with departmental business: as a

16

constituency MP and a politician concerned with his future career.

The making of a minister involves two important and distinctive elements: the experiences that an individual has while qualifying for selection and the tasks that confront him once he has been appointed to office. The minister's potential capability for meeting the demands of office is thus conceived as a ratio between the skills gained in recruitment, and the demands made upon him once he has been recruited. The approach differs from many socialization studies in that the emphasis is upon role socialization in a political environment rather than upon pre-political socialization. It differs from many recruitment studies in that the emphasis is not upon the politician's career as dependent variable but as intervening variable. The dependent variable is the executive process of government. Its structure and convention influence the recruitment of individuals, which, in turn, affects the process.

In analyzing the making of cabinet ministers one might choose either of two contrasting approaches. A deductive approach emphasizes the substance of the job, as in management theory. The job of the minister is first defined and characteristics necessary or relevant to success are

specified. Given this, one can then ask as to what extent individuals recruited into ministerial posts have these characteristics, or what kind of individuals in a society are likely to have them, whether or not they are made ministers. The great advantage of the deductive approach is that it avoids tautological reasoning of the form: what characteristics are necessary for ministerial success ? The characteristics that successful ministers have. Its limitation is that analytic objectives is achieved standing outside the system as it has evolved and operates at present. An inductive approach emphasizes the selection of ministers as the product of a series of conventions and rules that have evolved in the course of time, without a coherent plan or rationale. Instead of asking, what kind of person ought to become a minister, one asks: what kind of people does the process throw up ? (Rose,1973:395)

In a society in which constitution is being newly written or substantially revised, the reasoning from first principle will be entirely appropriate; it will also be necessary, if no appropriate foreign models are available for imitation. In a country in which the chief rules of government are not worked out deductively but have evolved through the centuries, there is substantial justification for analyzing the process as it is, before considering the

13

criteria that might be invoked in making ministers.

Following the dynamics of the parliamentary system, cabinet-making is considered to be the exclusive domain of the Prime Minister – a duty to be performed by him in a way he considers proper or expedient. Although Prime Minister is one among equals it is his `prerogative` to appoint ministers and to decide their respective offices. He may be assisted in some appointments by advice from the chief whip or occasionally from other senior ministers, a Prime Minister can not allow others to determine the composition of the cabinet for if he does so, he risks deposition from office. Because the power of appointment is concentrated in the hands of one individual, then the criteria for appointment are invariably subject to fluctuation, as one Prime Minister succeeds another or even as an individual Premier's outlook changes during his/her tenure of office. At least three major criteria can be identified in regards to the composition of a cabinet.

a) **Representativeness** – This is in relation to political factions and tendencies of the prevailing situations as well as social origins. The convention of collective responsibility given the Prime Minister an immediate incentive include political opponents in the cabinet, to silence criticism and to implicate their in what is done by

the government. The tactic is liable to fail if an individual refuses an appointment. Sometimes representativeness of social groups are also included in the cabinet. A representative cabinet ensures a Prime Minister maxmimum support by opinion leaders in the parliamentary party and secures smooth functioning of the government. It brings wide variety of views to bear in cabinet. Mattei Dogen expresses it as the problem of parliamentary arithmetic,"Under a parliamentary regime, a majority has to constantly express itself. The government must shape this majority. The best means to do so is to choose ministers from among the most influential parliamentarians." (Dogan, 1979:10)

b) **Loyalty to the Prime Minister** – If potentially disloyal colleagues are appointed to gain silence, they must be counterbalanced by the appointment of individuals whose loyalty can be relied upon by the Prime Minister. Loyalty may be founded in personal friendships, well established status relationships, ie of senior patron to junior, or in alliances of convenience or of principle.

c) **Competence** – This factor is taken into account in due course because a Prime Minister has fewer clues about the competence of a minister before hand. So, change is required

sometimes to promote and dismiss which generally illustrates competence and incompetence of a minister. However, competence is a highly abstract them. Question can be raised as to what kind of competence - oratorical ? administrative? technocratic ? etc.

So, the attributes that gain an individual a ministerial appointment may be singular or several. In theory, an individual can be representative, loyal and competent, and alternatively, he may be so outstanding loyal or representative or competent that his one attribute alone assures him a place in government. The less qualified a man is on one or two counts, then the more important it is that he shows qualities on another. In the extreme case, there may be an inverse relationship between two attributes: an individual may be very loyal but incompetent or very competent but disloyal. Just as an individual may cobbine within himself several attributes, so a Prime Minister combines within a cabinet people with a mixture of attributes. If he does not find individuals who are simultaneously representative, loyal and competent, then he appoints some individuals primarily for their competence, some for their representativeness and some for their personal loyalty.

21

Of the three above mentioned criteria, representativeness and loyalty concern with solidarity aspects of government because this type of minister have their 'following in back benceres or their concern with supporting the Prime Minister. The attributes of `competence' is immediately relevant to instrumental goals of the system. In other words, what is the self-interest of the Prime Minister need not be in the interest of ministry collectively. Because a Prime Minister has no fixed term of office, he has good institutional incentive to concern himself with party solidarity. His standing in the party can be eroded substantially by private, public and leaked muttering against him by his nominal colleagues and subordinates. So, the best security a Prime Minister has for retaining office is that his cabinet consists of competent ministers. The limitations upon this argument is that the more successful senior ministers become, then the more readily comparisons may be drawn between them and the Prime Minister to the disadvantage of the latter. Hence, a Prime Minister dos'nt want around him as senior ministers a large number of men who are `too' competent for fear that he is promoting his successor sooner because this is an institutionalized incentive for senior ministers to consider their prospect of becoming Prime Minister, tomorrow, should

their leader be forced to retire by health or other considerations.

As the Prime Minister is the sole initiator and authorizer of ministerial appointments, his patronage power are of intense importance to all MP's who hope for preferment in government. The convention of collective responsibility binds them to slow the outward signs of loyalty. There is, of course, nothing new in the use of patronage to maintain support within Parliament but this has increased tremendously. It is because of the rise in circulation of ministers, that is, the speed with which they move from post to post, the total numbers of appointments that a Prime Minister makes during a fixed period of time increases. The apparent tendency of more MP to regard this job as a full time career increase the desire for patronage within the lower chamber as appointment to a ministerial job constitutes promotion in career terms. Sometimes self-conscios and ambitious back-benchers looking for their first appointment show the outlook of a ministerialist by virtue of anticipatory socialization, hoping that their adoption of this outlook while not yet in receipt of patronage will help gain them a government appointment. From the Prime Minister's point of view, the substantial increase in the patronage that he dispenses to MPs is valuable to increase

his support within the Parliamentary party. In so far, as he can claim the formal loyalty of those who accept his patronage, he will have a substantial block vote for use when questions of confidence are raised in party meetings. The use of such support to defeat critics does not ensure a Prime Minister of freedom from criticism by back benceres or for that matter, by colleagues speaking off the record. It does leave him in possession of formidable institutional powers to maintain the endorsement, if not the assent, of his fellow partisans in Parliament. From a detached point of view the increase in the number of ministers drawn from the popular chamber has as a corollary a decline in selectivity is making appointments. It has become a convention. Except in emergency or war time, ministers are rarely appointed without having already established membership in Parliament. So, the personalization of selection remains inevitable. From all evidence says Dogan "ministers are not selected through anonymous competitions. The composite phonomenon which finally emerges is that of friendship - sponsorship - patronage - co-operation, which has nothing to do with nepotism, a very rare practice anyway at this high level. Even godfatherhood, like friendship, necessarily implies esteem and confidence". (Dogen 1979:16)

Certain criteria can also be chalked out which restrict a person from the ministerial eligibility.There are strong conventions against appointment of <u>newly elected MPs</u> to ministerial posts. Equally, <u>age</u> is the second restriction upon ministerial eligibility, of course, not by force of law. It is assumed generally that MPs above the age of seventy or below the age of thirty are outside the appropriate age brackets for office. A third category of MPs are effectively disqualified from appointment on <u>personal grounds</u>. In a handful of cases, this involves extreme political views.A large number of MPs are ruled out on grounds of unsuitable personal characteristics, such as poor physical or mental health, drinking problems, questionable business association, sexual delinquencies, etc. It accounts for five percent for all MPs. The same proportion can be ruled out because of the inability to handle administrative tasks, even with the maximum of assistance from civil servants. There are some MPs who do not wish office, perhaps a tenth of the house. So, the total number of MPs in the majority party who are ineligible for a ministerial appointment ranges from one-third to two-fifths, depending upon circumstances fluctuating from Parliament to Parliament.This means that a Prime Minister is left with a pool of potential ministers that happens to be very small.

There is, of course, competition and choice for higher offices, especially cabinet but to reiterate the things, the competition here is among a very restricted pool of competitors.

The pattern of recruitment identified above is the result of many influence. The literature on the subject treat these influences as constant. Yet, in terms of social science theory, they are best conceived as variable i.e. conditions that are potentially capable of change. The low probability of any of these influence changing, does not detract from the analytic values of examining the chief props of the system. Three conventions can be identified in this regard.

i) <u>The convention that minister must also be member of Parliament</u>

This not only stipulates that an individual must be given a seat upon appointment but also that an individual must serve as apprenticeship in Parliament prior to appointment. There is practical justification for this. Only by experience a minister can learn how to represent a department adequately in Parliamentary debates. Failure to master parliamentary forms is harmful to a minister and his department.

ii) **The convention that minister should not disagree with each other publicly because of collective responsibility.**

It `privatizes' conflicts amongst decision makers in the executive. Yet increasingly, minister use leaks to the press and other covert devices to signify personal views to a wide audience, or to dissociate themselves from blame. A more serious consequence is that the privatizing convention extends to activities of civil servants including their ministerial relationships. One can hardly have it known that civil servants disagree among each other and offer conflicting advice to ministers, if the latter are always to be treated as in agreement. This privatization tends to reduce public influence until after decisions are collectively promulgated in the name of the Cabinet.

iii) **The movement of ministers and Prime Minister in and out of office without notice.**

The uncertain tenure of a Prime Minister encourages a sense of insecurity and makes him give greater attention to patronage as a device for ensuring personal loyalty and survival than would be the case if he had a fixed term of office. Logically, the choice of a Prime Minister for a

fixed period of office is independent of the direct election of a Prime Minister. The popular chamber could be asked to make such a choice more easily than the electorate creating a fixed-term Parliament without simultaneously fixing the tenure of Prime Minister would increase his insecurity because there could be no sanction of dissolution to intimidate those trying to supplant a Prime Minister. The insecurity of individual ministers in their membership in cabinet and charge of a particular department is a disincentive for an individual to become deeply involved in the work of his department. It would not require legislation or a major change in constitutional convenstion if prime minister began to give more attention to the career devlopment of client ministers.

So, "turnover in cabinet membership is clearly product of a variety of factors including;

1) the incidences of resignation, death and ill-health among ministers;

2) the preferences of the Prime Minister;

3) Variation in Parliamentary situations; and

4) the influence of extra-parliamentary circumstances and events". (Alderman & Cross,1981:425)

The literature available on the subject deals mainly with the elite composition in term of social backgrounds more than the political experiences. It is because a description of the elite group and comparison between its characteristics with that of the population which it seeks to represent is aimed at examining the democratic system where "procedures are established with a view to making the choice of personnel deliberately open and subject to negotiation and bargaining, so that, many elements of the population can inject their own spokesman into the inner circle. Robert A. Scalpino argues it in this way that "the small group of people or the elite, who actually hold power and make decision for the society, has been broadly defined as a group within a society differecintiated on the basis of the authority which it commands, hence the power which it can wield." (Scalapino,1977:1). Warnapala makes it simpler by stating that due weight is given to "certain important social and political considerations while selecting their team-mates and such factors as coalitional nature of the government, Party identity, Parliamentary experiences and minority and provincial representation." (Wisma Warnapala 1973:127). Objectively observable facts can atleast provide four principal career pathways in the selection process;

committees, the principal party channel and the higher administration channel" (Dogan:1979:1).

Since the inception of the system of Parliamentary government, one factor can be noted down with significance that the size of cabinet grew gradually inspite of constitutional claim of keeping it small. This shows that political considerations, more than constituational recommendation `r decision-making efficiency influence the size of the cabinet. In India, the number of cabinet ministers has varied between 13 in 1957 to 21 in 1977 and 1980 as well. But "it is significant that the biggest cabinet so far; was during the Janta Government in 1977. As P.M., Morarji Desai was heading a fragmented party; it is obvious that he had to form the largest Cabinet. In contrast smallest Cabinet was at work during the Indira Gandhi's Government in 1971 as during 1971 she was enjoying two-third clear majority in the House and she could well restrict the size of the Cabinet."(Patel:1984:47) Inspite of the Dononghmore Ministers proposal for a Cabinet of ten Ministers the Cabinet of 1965 and 1971 in Sri Lanka had 17 and 21 ministers respectively. The British Cabinet of 1964-70 and 1974-79 varied between 20 to 23. In case of Japan, the Cabinet of Prince Ito in 1885 contained only ten men, while the Tanaka Cabinet (1972) was exactly doubled.

Experience is considered to be the vital factor in promotion to the Cabinet rank in Parliamentry form of Government. "The members of the British Government between 1868 and 1958 had an average experiences of the 14 years in the House of Commons when appointed." (Willson:1959:225). In France, on the other hand, entry into Cabinet did not depend upon Parliamentary seniority. In Sri Lanka, the 1970 Cabinet had 8 ministers having more than 14 years of Parliamentry experience. In India, the case is different, a study covering 1952-71 period suggests that, "an overwhelming number of person have moved laterally i.e. to similar positions, only one-third occupied lower positions before moving up." (Jha:1979:45). However, " it is equally remarkable that the latest trend is different in comparison to initial Cabinets. Element of stability and continuity in the membership of Cabinet are significantly decreasing."(Patel, 1984:50) There is sharp contrast between Britain and France in this regard. "Two channels of ministerial selection that lacking in France are institutionalized in England; the position of junior minister and the shadow cabinet. On the other hand, the filter of Parliamentary committee and mandarin ascent, so effective in the recruitment of French ministers, play a secondary or negligible role in the British two-party

system." (Dogan,1979:22).

The religions, racial and provincial elements are given recognition as representative as possible of all the diverse elements that exist in the country in forming a cabinet. The significant reason for this is the need to maintain political and parliamentary stability. Mrs Srima Bandarnaike recognized this in 1970 in SriLanka. There were nine kandyan sinhalese and nine low countery sinhalese apart from two christian, a cathotic, a Muslim and a Hindu. Prov.nces were given equal representation. In Japan three prefectures get importance, they are, Tokyo, Yamaguchi and Kagoshima. In Britain, representatives from Scotland, Wales and North Iceland are usually included and are given key posts. The Canadian Prime Minister pays due regards to French Canada, the other provinces and the non-French Roman cathotic population. "In India, over the decade of 1962-72, the 20 percent of India that is urban contributed slightly more than half of all cabinet ministers; and of these, almost two-thirds were from cities with over 100,000 population......It is apparent that all the important regions of the country have been well represented Nehru, Shastri and Indira Gandhi, all appear to have acted similarly; Muslims have been represented in the cabinets of all in about the same proportion as they are in the general population."

(Arora,1972; 1524-25) The promptness with which the council of ministers is constituted in the UK does not mean that the Prime Minister has a completely freehand in the selection of his cabinet colleagues. In fact, he is governed by the same considerations which influence his counterparts in other countries with parliamentary systems of government. There will always be a few inevitable choices in the party even if the Prime Minister personally may not like some of them. These are the party heavyweights who cannot be ignored by any Prime Minister. Very often in the UK these senior leaders are allowed also the choice of their portfolios. In choosing the rest of the cabinet, the Prime Minister has to take into account considerations like the need for regional balance, the claims of minority groups, the importance of infuasing fresh blood and talents etc. No Prime Minister in the UK can, for example, ignore the claims of Scotland, Wales and the city of London or of important community groups like the Cathotics. (Alexander, 1991(6Jan.): 18)

So far the educational qualification is concerned," the Indian Council of Ministers as a whole, and the Cabinet in particular, are probably among the most highly educated group of political leaders in power anywhere in the world."(Arora, 1972:1525) And it is more remarkable in comparison with the low literacy rates of the general

population (52.11 percent). It can be taken for granted that cabinets in all countries comprise of highly educated individuals.

A glance at the distribution of occupation among members of the cabinet reveals a striking lack of diversity in the occupation experience of its members. There is decreasing variety as we move through the decades of the sixties, amounting to what almost appears to be the professionalisation of the apex by 1971 In the decade prior to 1971, for instance, agriculturists had made up between 13 and 18 percent of the cabinet, in the cabinet constituted in 1971 we find an absence of agriculturists. The absolute number of lawyers remained constant but almost all the categories of occupation were either reduced or eliminated altogether. The strong domination of lawyers in our cabinats is not an unusual phenomenon Cabinets in United States and Canada, for instance, have had 70 and 60 percent of their numbers respectively who came from the legal profession. In Germany lawyers often constituted half of its cabinet.

In terms of social characteristics perhaps the most impressive factor is age. In India," in terms of age, the members of Lok Sabha, taken as a whole, are younger than those coming from the Congress Party, who in turm are

younger than the ministers. Within the Council of Ministers, the Cabinet Ministers are the oldest while the Praliamentary Secretaries are the youngest. This tendency of `improvement' with ascending ministerial categories is revealed also with reference to educational attainment." (Jha, 1974 :57) A cursory glance at the data provided by Satish K.Arora reveals that majority of cabinet members remain in age group of 40.to 60 years of age. However, in France and Australia the same cannot be said about the age. In India, in the 70's the young blood were infused due to their exceptional talent and capabilities as well as to give an idea of the degree of openness within a party. (Arora, 1972:1529)

Indian situation can be substantiated in the following findings of S.A. Kochaneck's study of the Congress Party in India that 'as one moves........from the secondary legislative elites to the top of the elite pyramid, as represented by the central and state ministers, one finds Indians decision- makers drawn increasingly from the top of the social pyramid in terms of occupation, caste, education and social status.

The literature available so far on the politics of cabinet formation is scanty and it becomes apparent when an

attempt is made to study it in relation to a counting having a monolithic, ideologically coherent party (eg. Communist party). There a clear cut distinction can be made that unlike the liberal countries where parties are interest based, here they are cadre based. The people powerful in the party are often considered to be superior than those in the party hierarchy or in the cabinet. Here party governs the cabinet rather than cabinet govers the party. Still the factors pointed out hold and the only exception can be that pygmies might replace stalwarts.

It is imperative now to have a cursory look at the formation of cabinet under different Prime Ministers in India. This is so, because, now it can be better understood and somehow or other the study proposed here has a co-relation with the union cabinet. The Prime Minister of India, howsoever, powerful, is limited by the compulsions of geography, religion, caste and community besides political and personal pulls and pressures in the formation of the cabinet. Pandit Nehru himself had admitted that in selecting the members of the Cabinet,"one consideration apart from quality or merit is somekind of geographical distribution". (The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 13,1962). Still when Shastri was forming the cabinet, the bogey of 'broad-based' or representative cabinet was raised.

Pandit Nehru's authority as Prime Minister was severely limited due to the fact that the cabinet consisted of several powerful colleagues who did not see eye to eye with him on major problems. Sardar Patel's powerful personality prevented Nehru from having that amount of freedom in the cabinet which he came to have after Sardar's death. Apart from Gandhi, Patel, Azad and Rajendra Prasad's nominees were into his cabinet. Interestingly, though Nehru had enough to choose within his own party in 1947, looking at the situation in the country he preferred to choose the best men, even though it meant from outside. In fact, the suggestion came from Patel. He suggested the induction of C.H.Bhabha, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Ambedkar and Shanmukhan Chetty, all outside the congress. Nehru appreciated the suggestion and inducted all of them. By inducting Sardar Baldev Singh as Minister of Defence, Nehur ensured representation for Sikhs. With Jagjjivan Ram as Labour Minister the aspirations of Harijans were also taken into consideration. This of course, in addition to Dr.Ambedkar. Similarly John Mathai represented Christians, and Azad and Kidwai accounted for Muslim representation. While the minority and weaker sections were given their due share, Nehru also ensured that all regions got representation. All these by just inducting 14 ministers.

(Gopala Krishnan, 1990; 15-18)

So, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had taken special care to form a truly broad-based cabinet. No one would have doubted Nehru's secular or nationalistic credentials even if he had not taken such meticulous care in foroming his cabinet from all regions and important communities, but he did so as he realised the crucial importance of giving his cabinet an all-India character. Nehru's first cabinet included four ministers from the western region, two from the south and one from the eastern region besides seven from the north. In terms of religions background, it had two Muslims, two Christians one Parsi, one Sikh and two from the Scheduled Castes. (Alexander, Jan.27, 1991;12)

In short, characterising Nehru's cabinet, Gadgil says,"All members of the cabinet were equal, but in the first Indian cabinet, Nehru and even more than him, Vallabhbhai was more than equal. Next to them, the Maulana was regarded as the older, statesman. All the rest of us were on the same level". (Gadgil, 1989; 144) Gadgil further says.....My five years experience in the cabinet is that no one would say a word against Nehru. While vallabhbhai was alive, he (Nehru) used to consult him. Afterwards he consulted the Maulana occasionally. But the Maulana rarely

contradicted him. Gopalaswami said only what Nehru wanted him to say; others used to keep their own counsel.(Gadgil,1969;144)

After Patel's death, there was no one with the same towering personality. There were indeed competent and experienced leaders like G.B.Pant, Azad, Kidwai and later Shastri, Desai and S.K.Patil. Gradually the number of non-congressmen were reduced and after 1958 all the senior posts were held by congressmen. Still various departments pulled in different directions, ministers openly criticized one another and no serious attempt was made to wield the cabinet into a cohesive unit. And nowhere was this lack of co-ordination seem more glasing than in handling the food problem and defence. During the last phase of Nehur's Prime Ministerhip, the cabinet was more compact and homogeneous than ever before. Never since the achievement of independence had Nehru enjoyed so much power as he did since September 1963. He wielded alsolute authority in the cabinet and was in a position to impose his policies without Opposition from his colleagues. R.H.S. crossman's words suit this situation i.e, "He is now the apex not only of a highly centalized political maline but also an equally centralized and vastly more powerful administrative machine. In both

these machines loyalty has become the supreme virtue and independence of thought dangerous advanture". Anyways as Prime Minister Nehru sometimes committed mistakes but everytime he was able to come out because of his tremendous prestige, even when India was put to shame by China. Nehru's role came for criticism on several grounds. It was pointed out that he sometimes took major decisions without consulting the cabinet, that he was unable or unwilling to enforce discipline or ensure co-ordination and that he deprived his colleagues of initiative by interfering too much with the details of administration. Patel, Azad, Ayyanger, Kidwai, Pant, Desai, Menon and Shastri along with Nehru at one time or the other formed 'inner-cabinet' of Nehru. Nanda, TTK and Shastri assisted Nehru in last month of his office. All these narrations explain human factor. It consisted of emotions, personality characteristics and individual capacity, but it does not prove that Nehru was authoritarian or he arbitrarily over ruled any proposal made in the interest of the nation.

After Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India. During his period of Prime Ministership the fundamental change in the cabinet was of a more relaxed atmosphere and greater freedom in discussion. But there is an exaggeration in Brecher's remark that "cabinet as an

institution has come to life......decisions now represent a much more genuine concensus than before". (Desai, 1974:147) The fact is Shastri fully realised that he was stepping into the shoes of greatman who strode the stage like a colossus and he had neither the qualities nor the upbringing which would make it possible for him to play the same distinguished role that Nehru had done. Also one should add to the credit of Shastri that he realised this fact and acted accordingly.

Shastri's cabinet was designed to give greater satisfaction to the greatest number. He retained the Nehru team with a few addition. Mrs. Gandhi was inducted. He pleased syndicate and Karmraj by adding S.K.Patil and Sanjiva Reddy. Thus Shastri acted in a pleasing manner in respect of the powerful party concerns so far as the formation of his cabinet in 1964 is caucus. T.N.Singh got cabinet rank on account of personal relationship with him. He said in reference to the formation of his first cabinet that he had been 'secretive'in the matter and had not consulted anybody in reshuffling. So, Shastri's brief term characterised 'collective leadership'.

Mrs.Gandhi like Shastri retained the bulk of her predecessor's team. The 'inner' or 'kitchen' cabinet came to revised and Dinesh Singh, C.Subramaniam and Ashok Mehta

is become the members of this informal body. Here was a difference of style-Nehru's 'inner cabinet' generally comprised of senior ministers and inner body under him was something like a 'policy' or a 'partial' cabinet. But Mrs.Gandhi trusted her junior colleagues like U.S.Dixit, D.P.Dhar and Inder Gujral. Outside the cabinet circle D.P.Mishra, Nandini Satpathi, S.S.Ray, D.K.Barooah and Rajini Patel were close to her. Coming back victorious from the polls in 1971, when she formed her new cabinet, her prerogative became all the more clear. Chagla wrote in 1973 about her temprament and dominant attitude;"Today she is undoubtedly one of the most powerful ruler in the world, perhaps the most powerful. There is probably no ruler whose authority within his country is as unquestioned as her's in India. All power is concentrated in her hands. What she says is law. There may be formal consultation with her colleagues, but she realises and they realise, that ultimately it is her writ that runs throughout the land".(Chagla, 1973:441) In 1974, she touched the portfolios of most senior ministers like Chavan and Jagjivan Ram. She reduced the cabinet to a minieature by her sheer guts and autocratic ways and inducted now faces in the cabinet. The 'kitchen' cabinet' became too powerful. The system virtually moved towards the often referred 'Prime

Ministerial form of government.

Once again Mrs.Gandhi came to power in 1980. Dr.H.Patel observes,"with the authority of the office of the Prime Minister, her own charismatic leadership and with considerable political skill, she wields enormous power, bringing the cabinet into weak and submassive form. Through Cabinet change and the reshuffling of portfolios she controls the power of the lieutenants. It seems, she enjoys more dominance over her cabinet — even more than what Nehru had enjoyed over his cabinet colleagues. Dominance of few ministers in cabinet creates inner cabinet. However, no stable inner cabinet exists during the rule of Mrs.Gandhi is an established fact.(Patel, 1984:53) However, P.C.Alexander has contradicted this fact,"Indira Gandhi has often been criticised that she kept too much power in her hands and did not allow her minister to exercise the powers which normally belonged to them........I should admit that far too many cases came from the ministers to the Prime Minister Office seeking `advice', `direction', or `decision' during the eighties compared with the practice in the sixties or early seventies.(Alexander,Sep.4,1990:7) On his personal account it can be discerned that she was a shrewd judge of men and loyalty to her counted a great deal in induction of several persons who lacked administrative and professional

competence to very important posistions at the state and central levels."She had a softness for these who had loyalty stood by her in times of crisis. She also had her own assessment of a person's usefulness to the party, irrespective of his efficiency as a minister. She knew the power-equations within the party and who counted most and where at the time of elections. She was also quite conscious of the intricate play of communal, caste and even sub-caste considerations at state levels and could not be easily persuaded to drop a minister merely on grounds of his poor performance. One may not fully agree with her, but it was her clear policy to assess the usefulness of a person not mainly on the basis of his performance as a minister but also his usefulness as a partyman. Some inefficient ministers were extremely important as party men and she considered it necessary to carry them in her council of ministers. Critics may say that party interests clouded her objectivily in choosing ministers but she thought that same degree of inefficiency had to be tolerated for political reasons". (Alexander, Sep.4, 1990:7)

She was quite averse to merciless chopping of deadwood because she did not wanted to humilate any of her ministerial colleague and thereby reduce their influence and effectiveness as party leaders. Indira Gandhi used the

meetings of the cabinet and of the cabinet committees to assess the worth and capabilities of her ministerial colleagues. She often used to consult some of her senior cabinet colleagues particularly R.Venkatraman and P.V.Narsimha Rao individually on sensitive issues. In this period, the circle of advises included G.Parthansarathi, L.K.Jha and Pupul Jayaker. On important political issues she use to consult leaders like kamalapati Tripathi and Uma Shankar Dikshit. In cabinet reshuffle she never followed the technique of a clean sweep or even a major shake up and rarely consulted any of her senior cabinet colleagues regarding this. Inspite of her reputation for ruthlessness in dealing with her colleagues, she was never really ruthless in manner of dropping or shifting her colleagues. She did not have the heart to make any of her senior colleagues feel humiliated. (Alexander,Sep.4,1990:7) Janta Party experience was very brief and as it was a fragmented political party, there was a tug of war between the members of the cabinet. This is apparent from the rift between different leaders which ultimately led to the collapse of the government. The cabinet during Janata government was the weakest although composed of strongest leaders. It was a cabinet without any team spirit. All were leadersand no followers. The Prime Ministers remainted busy consolidating their positions; although the cabinet represented all shades

of people and opinions,"The Desai cabinet was not a cohesive team. It was a loose coalition". The conventional criteria of forming a cabinet was restored and institutions were accorded due weightage but without any substantial impact". (Limage, 1989: 160)

Rajiv Gandhi's induction to politics brought in a sea change in the apex body. The cabinet became the domain of 'safri-clad-computer boys' Patronage of the Prime Minister was heavily utilized and the 'inner cabinet' conducted the business. Man like Pranab Kumar Mukherjee was cut to size, K.C.Pant was reduced. He reshuffled cabinet like a pack of cards -27 times in 50 months and made 95 ministers. The Prime Minister changed even his coterie manytimes. But while ministery-making all the factors were taken into consideration . Limage writes,"cabinet discussion in India had long back ceased to be meaningful. In the days of Indira Gandhi's first tenure (1966-77), cabinet was a real forum of discussion only till 1969. With the ouster of Morarji Dasai and the congress split, even ministers of the calibre of Jagjivan Ram and Y.B.Chavan chose not to speak frankly.(limage, 198:167) And the trend continued in Rajiv Gandhi's time.

The Prime Ministers who succeeded Nehru had no difficulty in ensuring proper representation for different regions and communities in the central cabinet as the parties they led could provide a wide enough base for such choices. It was only after the 1989 elections that the task of forming a cabinet representative of all regions and minority groups became difficult. The Janata Dal, DMK, Congress(s), Telugu Desam and AJP, the partners in the National Front, together had only four MPs in the Lok Saabha from the south . " Formation of the cabinet becomes a difficult problem if the position of the Prime Minister in the party is weak as it happened with V.P.Singh."(Alexander Jan.2,1991:19) He scraped the bottom of the Janata Dal barrel to stuff his ministry with as many loyalitists as he could. Additional complication was caused by leaders like Devi Lal, Ajit Singh and Chandra Shekhar, all of whom wanted their supporters to be accommodated in the Union cabinet. In the end V.P.Singh compromised and formed a large but mediocre ministery containing a majority of members loyal to him roughly one out of every four Janata Dal MPs became a minister. Even in expansion it was no coincidence that the overwhelming majority of the 18 new faces represented just three states, six from Uttar Pradesh, five from Bihar and four from Orissa. The three remaining ministers were from Gujarat, Kerala and Rajastan. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and

Orissa constituted the real base of the Janata Dal."The
Minister has in a sense also rewarded the states which have
overwhelmingly supported the Janata Dal and clearly intends
to strengthen his party's organisation in these
states".(Banerjee and Shukla, 1990:37)

Chandrashekhar relished the idea of Harold Wilson's
famous trurism "one week is a long time in politics" and
formed the government with 54 defectors. It was a sort of
'Ontario experiment' in the history of parliamentary
government in India. Shekhar faced the same situation while
forming his ministry."All the key faction leaders supporting
Shekhar-Devilal, Gujarat's Chiman Bhai Patel and Uttar
Prades's Mulayam Singh Yadav - had their own list of
nominees". (Murthy, 1990;29) Chandrashekhar's cabinet was a
Hindi-belt phenomena or a Bihari cabinet. The South had no
representation, nor the North-East. There was a scathing
comments on Shekhar's ministry-making style," out of the 34
ministers as many as 26 are from the Hindi states. In the
councial of ministers, only 10 states and one union
tarroatry ministers as many as it 10 states and one Union
Territory find representation. Believe it or not, as many
as 15 states and six Union Territories have no
representation. The Western region has four ministers, the

Eastern region three, North-Eastern region nil and South has one minister (minister of state) Such a lop-sided ministry has never been sworn in independent India. Even with 14 ministers, Nehru saw to it that regional and religious representations was well balanced. So was the caste combination. Chandrashekhar's ministry lacks representation of the backward communities and Harijans. Nor do christians and sikhs get representation."(Gopal Krishan,1990:54)Chandershekhar coterie of advisors included Prof.S.K.Goyal, C.B.Gautam, Jayant Malhotra, Gopi Manchanda and colleagues like Yashwant Sinha and Kamal Murarka,Devi Lal and Subramaniam swamy

The new council of Ministers appears to be a true congress cabinet meaning virtually representative of regions. The minorities,the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and women.(Joshi 1991;6) But of 15 cabinet ministers, 13 are experienced and efficient. Madhya Pradesh has maximum, representation of three while Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, UP, Bihar, Kerala and Gujrat has one each in the cabinet of Narasimha Rao. He himself with Vijay Bhaskar Reddy represent A.P while Ghulam Nabi Azad is a Rajya Sabha MP and Dr.Man Mohan Singh and M.L. Fotedar are not the members of the either of the two houses. Replying to the criticism of Rao's ministry making style congress(I)

spokeman Pranab Mukherjee has said that it is the prerogative of the Prime Minister, he can shuffle the cards anyway and availability of persons must be taken into account and not only the regional representation. Rajiv loyalists have got birth in the cabinet. For the first time south has 24 members over 22 of north because of the majority of MPs are from south. The mix of experienced hands and greenhorns does not lend itself into controversy.(The Times of India, New Delhi Feb.22,1991;8) There are as many as 28 new faces in the Rao's cabinet. Although members of states like Tamilnadu, Kerala, Karnataka, West Bengal ,Haryana and Maharashtra are not satisfied with their lesser value in the cabinet, still it can be said that it appears a reasonably homogeneous team which means business. The BJP leader, Mr.L.K.Advani commented that 'it is odd for a minority government to have an outsize ministry' but it is the need of the hour keeping in mind the situation in which the Prime Minister is set in.

Now from the view point of Survey of Literatures available and on account of cursory look at the formation of cabinets in India under different Prime Ministers it can be deduced that the composition of the cabinet reflects a concern for a degree of regional balance and for the representation of important communities. Political weight,

distinguished party record and command over a large group of Party MPs, loyalty to the Prime Minister etc. are the other main considerations in composition of the cabinet.

CHAPTER – II

CABINET FORMATION IN INDIAN STATES: AN OVERVIEW

In the federal set up of India state are important political units and the governments at this level occupy a significant position. Since the Constitution provides parliamentary form of government at the state level which is modelled on the parliamentary system of the union, an important place is accorded to the executive at the state level.

Although theoretically, the executive power is vested in the Governer, yet it is "the Council of Ministers headed by the chief minister which wield the executive power."(Reddy and Prasad, 1976:181). As such every politician if pitiable , tries to hold the office of the state chief minister. because , as L.J. Edinger and D.D. Searing point out : "as incumbent of such key postions they have a far greater influence than the masses in studying and giving expression to political relationships and policy outputs at various levels of authoritative decision-making. They wield this influence by virtue of their exceptional access to political information and position and their consequently mighty disproportionate control over public policy-making and communication processes which relate society to policy and governors to governed." (Edinger and

Searing ,1967:425)

Since the framers of the Indian Constitution had adopted the British model of parliamentary government both at the Centre and in the States, they provided the chief minister of a state the similar position as that the of the Prime Minister of India. He was expected to function as the real executive head of the state government , the pivot around which the whole machinery of the state should. revolve. A ccording to the provisions of the Indian constitution, but more so having in view the principles and conventions of the parliamentary system. Thus, the chief Minister is expected to be more than primus inter pares and less than an autocrat in the British sense (Narain, 1972 :142). He is to be central or `Brahma ' (the centor) ,`Vishnu' (the preserver),` Mahesh' (the destroyer), to the formation of the council of minister and along with it exercises all the executive powers of the state in the name of aiding and advising the Governor. This simple analysis of the position of the Chief Minister no doubt, confirms to the working of the cabinet system in genral and also to the position of the Prime Minister at the centre in particular. But the office of the Chief Minister in various states has not displayed unifirmity in its function. Even during the one party dominance Chief Minister of all the state did not

enjoy the position of exceptional authority. No doubt, the first phase (pre-1967) witnessed the phenomena of the functioning of some dominating Chief Ministers but gernally intra-party conflicts, inter-personal equations of leaders at the state level with those at the centre and factors like regionalism and casteism often placed limitations on the effectiveness of the office of the Chief Minister the powers and functions have been, therefore, a subject of debate, hindering, thus the process of its institution (Pandey ,1982:106)

The phase of coalition (Post- 1967) government in states, however, placed this office in a peculiar situation, where the principle of parliamentary Chief Executive hardly appeared to be empirically tenable. The office of the Chief-Minister in most of the states having coalition government-suddenly sank into the position of less then primus inter pares and even worse. The entire structure of the Chief executive seemed to have lost its proper place. His position vis-a-vis of the Governor and council of ministries lost lustre and became a subject of constitutional and political debate. In his report to the President, the Governors, of Uttar Pradesh raised a fundamental question, When he stated `the powers of the chief Minister of such Governments (coalition governments) have to be viewed vis-a-

vis the constitutional obligation of the Governor, taking into account the due realities of the situation. In other words, the Chief Minister of a coalition government cannot be treated at par with the Chief Minister of a single party majority government.....' (The Times of India , New Delhi, Oct 1, 1990). Even the Deputy Chief Minister of a coalition Government in West Bengal, Jyoti Basu held such view and often tried to out smart Chief Minister. The issue was raised earlier too, when E.M.S Namboodiripad wanted to remove a minister belonging to Indian socialist party, a constituent of the coalition government he was heading. The spokesman of the Indian Socialist Party mentioned that "the Chief Minister of a coalition was a postman and according to them he had no power to choose and get rid of Ministers "(karunakaran, 1975:30).The advent of the phase of coalition government thus made a distncit erosion on the traditional power and authority associated with the office of the Chief Minister.

To make it crystal clear, it can be said that the actual position of a Chief Minister depends upon three situational dimensions:

STATE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

CHIEF MINISTER

INNER CABINET MINISTERS

CABINET MINISTERS

STATE MINISTERS

DEPUTY MINISTERS

PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARIES

'SHOWMAN'
(CONGRESS
GOVT.)

'SPOKESMAN'
(NON-CONGRESS
GOVT.)

'POSTMAN'
(COALITION
GOVT.)

(Source: Johari, 1981: 367)

Chief Minister of a Single Majority Party in Power at the Centre.

A Chief Minister of the party in power at the Centre having comfortable majority behind him always remains in a very strong position as he finds a natural friend in the Government and puppet body in the Legislature of the State. His induction into office is certainly a result of the invisible blessings of the High Command. In most cases, he looks like a man of the Prime Minister. What determines his basic appointment and his strong and unassailable position is the support of the Prime Minister in addition to his personal hold and influence over the local units of the party. Men like B.C.Ray of West Bengal, G.B.Pant and C.B.Gupta of Uttar Pradesh, S.K. Sinha of Bihar, Pratap Singh Kairon of Punjab, Mohan Lal Sukhadia of Rajasthan and Kamraj Nadar of Madras may be placed in this Catagory. Such a Chief Minister behaves like a ˋshowman'.

Chief Minister of a Single Majority Party not in Power at the Centre.

The Position of such a Chief Minister is not so strong, though not so weak too because he happens to be the leader of the party not in power at the Centre but having clear majority in the assembly. The Chief Minister feels like

having a natural enemy in Governor by virtue of latter's being a nominee of the Centre. He gets his office because he enjoys the support of the majority party and that leaves no option in the hands of the Governor than to pick him up for the august post: He may, however, face the critical role of the Governor now and then and tackle it carefully to avoid the use of his discretionary any power as the Governor, in most of the cases must be expected to do anything great at the invisible behest of his master sitting in the centre. The Chief Minister, however, has nothing to fear from the side of the assembly unless there are forceful dissident elements in his party to create problems for him. Such a Chief Minister behaves like a `spokesman'.

Chief Minister of a Coalition Government:

The Chief Minister of a Coalition government is virtually a prisoner of circumstances. He holds his office at the pleasure of the parties constituting majority for his purpose. What hangs over his head is the fear of any parties getting out of the coalition. Thus, the Chief Minister has nothing else more urgent than to see that there develop. No cracks that eventually destroy his government. The Chief Minister of a coalition Government has, thus, his natural opponent on all fronts - in the Governor, in the

Council of Ministers, in the State legislature, and, above all, in the Union Government. Such a Chief Minister is debunked as a ¨post man' to buy a phraseology from Kerala incident in the same situation.

The managerial responsibilities of a Chief Minister are steadily increasing which make him more than primus inter pares. This necessarily brings him into conflict with other colleagues, particularly more ambitious ones. The trend has been noticeable in good measure before 1967 in States with Congress government also, where rivals for power would dig in within the Congress camp itself and would make a bid for Chief Minister on the basis of their factional strength. But in the post-1967 period the phenomenon could be witnessed in a rather acute form in the context of non-congress coalitional government. Every function of the Chief Minister, except that of calling cabinet meetings came to be questioned. The more controversial issue related to the selection of team-mates, allocation of portfolios, guidance and coordination of work programme, joint responsibilities of ministers and the like. The magnitude of the dilemma would become obvious by the fact that a Chief Minister had to stage a Satyagraha, ironically against his own ministry as a protest against violence and insecurity. The report from Kerala brings out the crux of the problem in

the specific context of the period of Chief Ministership of
B.M.S. Namboodiripad in these words:

A Chief Minister in a coalition owes his position more
to the spirit than to his pre-eminence and de fecto
leadership of the legislature. Thus his role performances
could not be taken for granted just as the reconciling
expectations of constituent partnres could not be taken as a
reliable constant of ministerial amity, the position of
Namboodiripad there was as difficult as it was delicate. No
wonder that there were sometimes caustic comments about him.
Such as that he is unable or unwilling to assert himself or
end the irregularities going on under his nose! one
constantly hears the refrain that `the chief minister does
not wield real power any longer', or there was the
allegation, made by the ISP, a constituent of Namboodiripad
ministry, equating the chief minister in the coalition with
a post man and mentioning that he had no powers to choose
and dismiss ministers, or even to reshuffe portfolios.
However, Namboodiripad prevailed and the ISP minister had to
go.

Most of the Chief Ministers as head of coalition
governments including Charan Singh in UP had to face similar
situation, except when they would exercise considerable
self-restraint like R.N.Singhdeo in Orissa and Achuta Menon

in Kerala. Here the danger always is that self-restraint may not tantamount to a negation of one's responsibility as head of the team. Thus, apart from a academic analysts, the partners in coalition government would themselves maintain a distinction between head of a majority government and head of a coalitional government. The distinction,however, is at best one of degree rather than of kind. One finds in practice that Congress Chief Ministers in UP, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir states had to face equal, if not greater challenge and their position was not always more eviable than that of the Chief Minister heading coalitional government. One has to remember in this context that more often than not, Congress Governments at the State level as coalitions of intra-party fuactions can be equally, if not more, problematic for Chief Ministers heading than the inter-party coalitions. (Narain, 1976: 594-5)

In a parliamentary system all the policy decisions of some consequence need approval of the Council of Ministers or its smaller body, the Cabinet. These bodies have been playing useful role, though at times they have been by passed by powerful Chief Ministers or paralysed because of prolonged fictional politics. The Congress-ruled States have had a record of mixed experience in this regard with cabinets in some states playing an active, and in others,

not so active a role. The situation in regard to coalitional government, whether congress or non-congress was somewhat different. There the Cabinets, more often than not, were sandwitched between somewhat demanding ministers with vaulting personal ambitions and group interests and a jealous coordination committees, often consisting of organizational men, will take too doctrinaire and rigid a position on policy matters and reprimand even the ministry of their party for deviating from party ideology. (Narain, 1976: 595) Besides built in structral limitations, the Council of Ministers will also feel crippled by divergent approaches adopted towards coalitional or united front experiments. It will, however, be wrong to take the position that coalition experiment was an utter failure. In this regard the performance of first Gurnam Singh Ministry in the Punjab, first Ajoy Mukherjee ministry in West Bengal, and M.P.Sinha ministry in Bihar can be taken into account.

So far the study of the pattern of Cabinet making in Indian States" is concerned it would be imperative to raise many a basic questions. Some of them are :

"(i) How were the Party leaders elected in the States?
(ii) Were full democratic procedures adopted in the election

of the leaders?

(iii) Were State Party units free to elect their own leader or did the Congress High Command `interfare' in this right of the State Party units? What was the role of the Congress High Command in election of State Party leaders?

iv) How were the Cabinet formed? What were the factors and considerations responsible in the formation of the Cabinet?

v) To what extent was the leader free to select his team?

vi) How far factionalism, groupism and regionalism influence Cabinet formation?

vii) What was the role of the Congress High Command in the formation of the State Cabinet? " (Bhambhri, 1963:69)

However in the present changed circumstances it can be further streched that not only the Congress but any party coming in power in States is guided by the diktat of its High Command whether BJP or Janata Dal.

Now, on the basis of available literature it would be ascertained as to how the leaders were chosen? And how the caste, region, religion and factors were accommodated in the Cabinet of different States at different times.

A study by Panjala Narasaiah reveals that inspite of constitutional position that majority party leader in the assembly will be the Chief Minister, the Party High Command has intervened on several times at the State level. J.Vengal Rao, the former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, provides an example in point. (Narasaiah:1979:121-32). In some case central ministers were `sky-labbed' as Chief Ministers. In support of this point, can be cited the names of S.S.Ray(West Bengal), H.N.Bahuguna(UP), Mrs.Nandini Sathpathy(Orissa), Chandrashekhar Singh and Bhagwat Jha Azad, S.N. Sinha (both Bihar)etc. It appears from this study that 96 percent of Chief Ministers were in the age group of 41 to 85 at the time of their election as Chief Ministers of their respecstive states. This very emphatically illustrates the hold of gernotocracy on the institutional functioning in India. Although Indian Constitution offers equal political opportunities to men and women, the study reveals that out of 125 Chief Ministers only two (1.6%) women became the Chief Ministers in the nearly 30 years of independence. It appears that the law degree holders have more chances of becoming Chief Ministers than other degree holders that is 65.6 percent. The study reveals that while Hinduism has lion's share (89.6%) of Chief Minister, Islam (5.6%) and christianity(4.8%) are not

unrepresented. It is to be noted here that Muslims are becoming Chief Ministers only of Jammu and Kashmir and Hindu dominated States of Rajasthan and Bihar. So far the castes of the Chief Ministers are concerned mostly dominating castes have their greater say in particular State. What is interesting to note is that 49.6 percent were Ministers of their respective States but only 22.4% persons enjoyed the full term of five years. Only in case of 29.6% the office of the Chief Ministers helped as a stepping stone for higher political office. The study reveals that 52.8% of Chief Ministers participated in national liberation struggle and 73.6% of the Chief Ministers belongs to the Congress Party.

The State of Andhra Pradesh provides a fascinating study of central intervention in state politics. As a fish cannot survive out of water, the leaders of Andhra Pradesh cannot survive without central rescue. Since Mrs.Gandhi decided to replace home-grown leadership with hand-me-down nonentities without their own support case, like a pomp and circumstance march, a procession of Chief Ministers has gone by - M.Chenna Reddy in October 1980, Anjaiah in Feburary, Venkatraman in September 1982. And vijayabhashar Reddy was caught in a nut-cracer. An unnamed Andhra Pradesh Congress-I leader quoted in Enadu remarked -

" To get a good candidate, the Congress-I should put up ads in newspaper saying. Wanted a Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh. Andhras living anywhere in India or abroad can apply. Qalifications working knowledge of Telegu. Please apply directly to 1, safdarjung Road, New Delhi." (India Today, Oct.31,1982;11) Sometimes peculiar situation was created. Before installation of Anjaiah Minitery, Chenma Reddy government continued for two and half month in peculiar circumstances. The Chief Minister had handed over a letter of resignation to the High Command and kept another ready in the pocket for the Governor waiting for the direction of the High Command. The present Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, when became Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh had relied heavily on the Central leaders. He visited Delhi several times to prepare his list of ministry. Speaking to newsperson, Rao had said a number of times that he was going to Delhi for consultations with the Congress High Command on the choice of ministers. The Chief Minister was guided mainly by Mrs.Gandhi, U.S.Dikshit and Sanjivayya. Narsimha Rao who was questioned by the members whether he had obtained the Congress president's approval for the slection of ministers replied: what made you think that I would make the selection without such approval? I am a disciplined soldier'. (Indian Express, New Delhi Oct.3,1971) This

clearly illustrates as how the `imposition from above' took

place in Andhra Pradesh time and again vis-a-vis the central

upper hand in the appointment of the Chief Minister and

Ministry `making. Myron Weiner has remarked,`the distinctive

characteristics of Andhra State Politics was the incidence

of Central government inter vention in crucial situation".

(Weiner, 1968: 428)

To accommodate the regional pressured and pulls the

post of Deputy Chief Minister had been crated thrice

although in the Gentleman's Agreement it was stipulated that

if the Chief Minister was from the Andhra areas, the Deputy

Chief Minister should be from the Telengana area but no

Deputy Chief Minister was appointed until 1960 P.V.Narsimha

Rao was the first Telangana man who became Chief Minister.

A study of the composition of the seven ministeries

reveals interesting facts. It is common for the Chief

Ministers to take into account several factors while forming

their ministeries, most important of them being caste and

minority groups and women. Important castes such as the

Reddys, the Kammas, the Brahmins and the Scheduled Castes

always found representation in the ministry. In terms of

percentage the Reddys and Kammas have had higher

representation in the ministry, the other castes which

usually represented were the velamas the Brahmins, the Backward classes and the Scheduled Castes, Muslims and the Kshatriyas. (Ram Reddy, 1976;14)

The Reddy power in Andhra Pradesh is exercised with awe some totality. Every fourth MLA in the State is Reddy and so is every third Panchayat Samiti President. Seven out of the first eleven Chief Ministers of the State belonged to the Reddy community. (Fodia, 1984;21) All-though numerically, Harijans are the most important caste, the leadership from the Brahmins has shifted to the dominant agricultural castes of Redddys, Kammas and Valmas. A good number of Chief Ministers, with the exception of D.Sanjeeviah (Harijan) and P.V.Narasimha Rao (Brahmin) came from the dominant peasant castes. N.T.Ramarao was the first Kamma Chief Minister of the State.

The composition of the Cabinet has reflected the same phenomena. The Reddys, the Velmas and the kammas held betweeen 45 to 58 pecent of the seats in the cabinet with the Reddys being the single largest group (28 to 38 percent) till 1971. (Fadia, 1984; 21-2)

It was P.V.Narsimha Rao who initiated the policy of giving greater representation to the backward classes and weaker sections in the legislature and the Council of

Ministers. The 26 members ministry formed under his Chief Ministershipafter the 1972 elections had the largest number of persons belonging to the weaker sections (4 Harijans, 6 from the backward classes, 1 Girijan, 2 from the minorities (total 13). The upper castes had for the first time a markedly lower representation with only 4 Reddys, 2 Kammas and 3 Brahmins (total 9). (Fadia, 1984; 22)

In Maharashtra, unlike most other states where several land owning castes inhabit different regions, one dominant caste, the Maratha, spans the entire state with a history of local and regional rulership of several hundred years, It also dominates the contemporary political scene. Estimated at about 40 per cent of the population the Marathas has controlled nearly 80 per cent of the positions of political power. Although the proportion of the population that claims to be Marathas is roughly the same in various parts of the state, articulation of its eliteness components is different in the four regions of vidharbha, Marathwada, konkan and western Maharashtra because of difference in their said and political history. (Lele, 1981; xv)

Unlike all other congress states, Maharashtra had only one father - figures - Y.B.Chavan till 1971. The social structure in Maharashtra represents a similar caste pattern as in other areas except for the fact that those is only one

middle class group, Maratha Kunbi (40%), unlike in other states, the peculiarity with Maharashtra politics is that not a single Chief Minister from Marathwada has completed the full term of five years whether it is the case of Nilagekar, S.B. Chavan or Bhonsale. This has become the convention too some extent that the Chief Minister must be of Maratha Caste. Except the present Chief Minister, only Vasant Rao Naik, Tribal, a became the Chief Minister from Vidharbha region of the State. It is obvious from the above description that so called `suger lobby ' of Western Maharashtra plays a vital role in the making of the Chief Ministers as well as the ministers. Western Maharashtras maratha leaders Y.B.Chavan, S.Basant Dada Patil and S.Pawar even played a major role in central politics.

In Maharashtra, in making of the Council of Ministers apart from the pulls and pressures of the individual leaders, regional representation plays a major role and the adequate representation is given to all like Maratha Kunvis, the Mahars, the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and also to women.

Kerala the `mad house of political parties,' presents a paradox to observers both within India and abroad. It was here for the first time that a communist government was

voted to power through ballot box. With a highly intelligent and politically consious electorate, Kerala has established that multi-party coalition government can be durable affairs. An unique feature of Kerala Legislative Assembly is that every political party has shared power in the state at one time or another.

Kerala is comparatively more articulate state. Broadly, there are two types of pressure groups in kerala politics one communal and other occupational. Caste and communalism have been the catalysts of political conscious in Kerala. The Hindus (61%) comprising (5%) of Namboodiris 12.5% of Nairs are a pivoal force in state politics. It is generally held that four major groups are contending for a dominant place in the social, economic and political life of the region i.e, Nairs(12.5%),Ezhavas(26.4%), christian (21.1%) and Muslims (19.5%).

It is a unique feature that followers of not only the Hindu religion, but those of monolithic religions like christians and Islam, also are split into caste divisions which reflects upon the pattern of conversion. (Durmont. 1970: 202-8) So, also the failure of any party to secure a majority, however, only emphasised the fact that while the politics of Kerala may be caste-based no party can rule with the support of the community alone.

It is broadly alliances led by either communist or congress, that rules the state. During left rule, the occupational groups become prominent and make a dent in ministerial posting while in Congress ruled. alliance, religion gets an upper hand. Even then, in both of the alliances due representation is given to different castes, communities, women and weaker section in the Council of Ministers.

West Bengal, where politics has an ideological orientation has been described the `fortress of leftism' or `multiple polarisation. Here the division is mainly between Brahmin and Shudra. Although there is class-consciouness but it is also true that there is overlapping of caste interest and class interest. Still no party which sets up candidates and aspires to win an election in certain district could afford to ignore the strength and interests of caste.

B.C.Roy who remained Chief Minister of this problematic state for 14 years had devised a well knit formula for broad-basing his Council of Ministers. he had given representation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes ,Marwari, Nepali, women and Muslims in his Council of Minister. The tendiency towards larger Council of Minister

was the result of representing influential sections inchiding industrial and powerful local groups and accommodating religions and ethanic minorities. There was also the need to include men with parliamentary ability. But some ministry seem to have practically without any duties worth the name. Even at the risk of digression, it is worth while to point out that in the post 1967 period, accent in ministery- making particualrly in second U.F.Government was on the apportioning of the key ministeries among the different parties having regard to the relative importance of the claimants. It was a question of how much a party regard as essential for itself and how much the other constituntes of the front were ready to conced to it. A good deal of horse-trading and bargaining was inevitably a part of the process. The smaller parties had to get reconciled with the dominance of the bigger in the matter of sharing power. In 1970, with a shift of power to the Congress, the elder have been oblized to share power with the student and youth leaders having regard to their significant contrbution to party's victory at the polls. Sikh got representation in the Council of Ministers. The practice initiated by Dr.B.C. Roy of having minister of state has come to stay. UF found it convenient and it is used even today

In the state of Karnataka, the use of caste as an instrument of exploitation by the leaders and their supporters is said to have been quite commir, particularly at the informal level of political convassing on occasions like the election of the leader of the party, organisational elections, ministry-formation, allotment of party tickets and the like. Caste has ben used on a large scale to win votes during election. "It should, however be noted that there are not the special features of politics of only the Lingayats and the Vokkaligas. Leaders belonging to the other caste groups have also acted in a similar manner on similar occasion". (Parvatamma, 1971; 253)

The fact that caste does play role in politics should not lead one to give undue prominence to the caste factor only. Sentiments of regionalism, linguism and religion have also been exploited effectively on many occasions. Thus it would be proper to conclude that politicians in the state, whatever party, caste, region are relgion they belong, have not hasitated to use caste sentiment, reogional sentiment, linguistic sentiment or sentiments of religion or anything for that matter, if that in their opinion would help them consolidate and elevate their position.

Lingayats and vokkaligas are the prominent caste group

which effect even the cabinet-making. Despite his grave concern, Hegde had no option but to include Deva gowda (vokkaligas) and Bommai (a lingayat) in his cabinet and to give them very prominent posts. 'Hegde then saw to it that a member of Urs-ite or Lohia-ite or minority or backward class minister were choosen to act as a counter weights to the vokkaligas and Lingayats. Hegde's initial team of 24 ministers consisted of one Brahmin (the Chief Minister himself) five Lingayats, four vokkaligas, four members of Scheduled Castes, two Muslims one of each of the following groups (most of which are included among the " backward class") Arasu, Kumbara, Naidu, Jain and Maratha. (Manor 1984;155) Of the 16 ministers holding cabinet rank, 8 were from the old Kranti Ranga. Of the full list of 24, 10 had been Kranti Ranga members. (Manor, 1984:156) Over representation was the result of Hegde's efforts first to retain the support of old Kranti Ranga members despite the continuing (and self-destuctive) refusal of their former leader Bangarappa to enter the government and second to enlist backward class leaders form the Kranti Ranga into the cabinet as a counter weight to Lingayat and Vokkaligas ministers.

"India is not a single nation-state. It is a continent of many communities united though shared experiences but

powerfully   motivated   to   parochial   and   regional
considerations." (Nayak, 1976: 405) These in turn serve
as one of the logical basis for politics of regionalism all
the   more because political parties also try   to   articulate
and represent vested and conflicting interests to build and
strengthen their support structure and complete for power on
their   basis.   One can refer in this context the efforts   at
forging   regional   bases   and more   importanly   of   regional
parties   originating and thriving upon   regional   sentiment.
The   politics of regionalism in Tamil Nadu with DMK   as   its
pivot,   broadly,   falls in the latter category.   As   most   of
the MLA's are ˋ local boy made good ,' their stature in   the
party   determine   their postion in   political   office.   The
dominance of wealthier strata has declined and agriculturist
are   making   a   dent   in   the   politics   of   the   state.
Representation   in the cabinet is given to all   stratas   of
society but important portfolios goes to the ˋheavy weights'
and loyalists of the leaders and the faction-leaders in   the
party.

Tamil   cultural   rationalion   has   been   central   to
Tamilnadu's   political development.   Between 1957   and   1971
elections   in   Tamil Nadu were charactrized   by   two   party
competition   and high levels of political participation −   a
combination unusual in Inidan State politics of that period.

Caste and language have been important factors in the State politics. ·Cinema glamour has always played a role in the politics of the state. Society is divided into three castes — Brahmins, non-Brahmins and Harijans . Tamil Nadu has been the only state of India where non-congress government formed by single political party after the forth general election remained in power up to 1983.

In Orissa, political stability has been a chimera. The natural political pattern of the state is coalitional. The bulk of population of SC and ST (38.20%) have been pawn in the game of power politics played by rival non-tribal leaders. The state is clearly divided into two-the Eastern and the Western. The Chief Minister mainly comes from eastern area of the state and 40% of ministers are from SC and ST group. The congress in the state is faction ridden.

In the formation of the cabinet, legislator from the eastern side dominate while adequate representation is given to different cast groups, SC and ST and women.

Next to Bihar, caste exercises the single most important influence on politics in Haryana. Some of the classes and castes have a more or less set pattern of political behaviour. The Jats and the Ahir and the Meo-Muslims are the important caste groups. There is a very

telling local slogan heard during the election which says `Jat ki beti, Jat ko, Jat ka vote Jat ko, just as a Jat's daughter should be married only to a Jat, a Jat's vote should go only to a Jat.'(Indian Express, New Delhi , 30th May, 1982). Community, caste and sub-caste have divided Harijans electorate in so many small groups working at cross purposes that parties, ideologies and programmes have become irrelevent. In the land of `Aya Ram' and `Gaya Ram' election victories and defeats are, in the ultimate analysis,of little consequence. The real game starts only after the election for this is a state where politicians are better than chameleons at changing their colours.

In the ministry-making apart from caste considerations, the influence of the person is taken into account and it depends upon the head counting. Although minorities are represented in the ministry but they are not given the important portfolios.

From the above description it has become clear that both analytically and empirically, the state can be most accurately conceived as a political subsystem because it has clearly definable boundries and structural mechanism and popular perceptions for maintaining them. It has become clear that the three situational dimensions reinforce the role of a Chief Ministers al beit differently. The para-

politics plays an important role in state politics. It provides the hot-bed of political casteism. In Andhra Pradesh, the struggle for positions of top leadership is being waged by leaders of non-Brahmins, the kammas and the Reddys. A similar pattern is to be found in Bihar where the Bhumihars and Rajputs - two rural gentry of higher castes are in the fray for top leadership while upper backward shave made a dent into it and has assumed the position of eminence. Then there is fight for power between the Nairs and Ezhavas in Kerala, between Rajputs and Jats in Rajasthan, between Brahmins and Marathas in Maharashtra.

Religious comunalism is another force though a weaker nature in state politics. Religious ministeries are a strong force in Kerala and Punjab. Muslims are a substantial minority in Kerala, in West Bengal, in Uttar Pradesh, in Bihar in Keranataka, in Gujrat, in Maharashtra and in Andhra Pradesh. Christains are the largest minority in Kerala and in Tamil Nadu.

So, in state politics religion and caste provide bases for political coherence as well as social competition in absence of any secondary organisation.

The politics of cabinet formation in Indian states primarily revolve round the para-politics of the system. A

part from the situational position of the incumbent Chief Minister and the nature of intervention of the Central leadership or Party High Command as the case may be, the factors of factions, religion, region, caste and often class influence the decisions of the decision-makers in forming cabinet at state level in India.

With the increase in awareness of loafs and fishes of the political office, the so called backwards and SC and ST have strated making their claims in proportion to their population in the states.

CHAPTER - III

BIHAR : SOCIAL STRUCTURE, ECONOMY AND POLITICS

The Setting

The state of Bihar lies between latitudes 21°'.58' and 27°'.31'N and longitudes 93.21° and 58.32°'E. The state is entirely land locked and the nearest point from the sea (Bay of Bengal) is 90 kms. To the north it shares an international frontier of approximately 482 kms with the independent kingdom of Nepal, to the east, its boundary stratches with that of West Bengal for a distance of 482 kms, to the south it is bounded by Orissa for a distance of 421 kms and to the south-west and west lie the states of Madhya Prades and Uttar Pradesh with which it shares a border of 280 kms and 540 kms respectively. The State is roughly qua drilaternal in shape with a maximum distance from North to South being approximately 685 kms and the east-west distance at its widest point being about 483 kms. With a total area of 173,877 sq.km Bihar covers 5.42 percent of India's land surface and it is the ninth largest state in the Indian Union in terms of area.

Bihar has a population of 69,914,734 persons with a break up of 35,930,560 males and 33,984,174 females during 1981 census. Its share in the total population of the country is 10.51 percent which is next to Uttar Pradesh

(16.18%). The number of females per thousand males are 946 during 1981 which is higher than the national ratio of 934. Allthough the sex ratio is higher in comparision with national figure but literacy is much below the country's average. There are 30.25 per cent literates in Bihar while in India, the ratio of literacy is 41.95 per cent. The position of working population is also not satisfactory. 32.35 per cent of the total population is working in Bihar in comparison to 35.70 percent in the country. The diversity of population is 409 per cent per km as per 1981 Census. In this term it stands third in the country and is preceded by West Bengal (615) and Kerala '(655). In 69,914,734 persons enumerated, 61,195744 persons (87.53%) lived in rural areas comprising of 77,848 villages and 8,718,990 persons in urban areas (12.47%) lived in 197 urban centres/U.As in the state. For administrative convenience, the state has been divided in 11 administrative division and 51 districsts.

Physiography

On the basis of physical features, the State has been divided into two regions that is (i) Bihar plain and (ii) Bihar plateau.

BIHAR

CHAMPARAN

SARAN   MUZAFFAR PUR   DARBHANGA   SAHARSA   PURNEA

RIVER GANGA

PATNA

BEGUSARAI   KHAGARIA

SHAHABAD   MONGHYR   SAHIBGANJ

BHAGALPOR

GAYA   JAMUI   BANKA   GODDA   PAKUR

DEOGHAR   SANTHAL PARGANA

PALAMU   HAZARIBAGH   DUMKA

JAMTARA

DHANBAD

RANCHI

SINGHBHUM

NORTH

SOUTH

CHOTANAG

(Source : Census. 1971)

83

Bihar Plain

It is the part of the great Indo-Ganga plain where surface is almost level. However, some variations in surface are noticed in the south and the north-western parts of this region. A projection of the Southern plateau appears in this region of the State. This plain is further divided into (i) North Bihar Plain and (ii) South Bihar Plain.

North Bihar Plain

This is a riverain plain which extends between the 'Terai' bordering Nepal in the north upto the northern bank of Ganga river in the South. Except a large chunk of siwalik hills in the north part of Paschim champaran district, this plain is very fertile and densly populated. The general slope is towards the south-east. The areas beyond Kosi river is known for flood havoc. It is the 'play ground' of Kosi river and is characterised for the shifting of the channels of the Kosi to greater extent. The north plain with an area of 53.8 thousand sq.km has a population of 25.4 million and throughout 22,000 sq.miles of its area, no where the elevation exceeds 76 metres above sea level. (Report on Agricultural Cencus, 1970-71,Bihar:28)

South Bihar Plain

This region extends roughly from 150 contour in the south up to the bank of the Ganga river in the north. It is

broad in the west and tapers towards the east. The general slope is towards, the north-east. This plain is rather a sandwiched area between the southern plateau and Ganga river. There are numerous isolated hills, located in this tract. Barabar, Rajgir and Kharagpur hills are a few example in this regard. Due to intrusion of Kharagpur hills towards the north, Ganga has taken a sharp bend near Munger. Statistically spread over 40.3 thousand sq.kms. it has a population of 16.7 million. (Report on Agricultural Census, 1970-71, Bihar:28)

Bihar Plateau

This tract is more prominently known as Chotanagpur plateau and extends south of 150 m contour. It consist of a series of plateaus of different elevation - Ranchi plateau is the highest with an elevation of about 1100 m. This is also known as `pat' land. The geological structure of `pat' lands consists of Deccan lava. From this zone, the slope gradually descends to all directions in a steep from due to various erosion circles. The area east of Ranchi plateau is known as the Hazaribagh plateau which extends upto the Rajmahal hills in Santhal Pargana. The average height is 600 m from the mean sea level but there are areas with 300 m also form lava level plateau. The general slope of the region is towards the southeast. The western part of this

region slopes towards the north. In this part North Koel river after leaving the hills, joins Son near Rohtasgarh. Intermittently, some fringe areas of this region have more or less characteristics related to plains. This is formed by the debris of the streams descending down the hills. The southern extension of this broad plateau region is known as Singhbhum plateau which covers Singhbhum district in a major way. The average height of the plateau is 150 m but there are may hillocks of 300 m and even more. Dalma and Baghmundi are the main ranges in this plateau. The entire Chotanagpur plateau is very rich in mineral deposits. It is spread over an area of 79.6 thousand sq.km with a population of 14.2 million. (Report on Agricultural Census 1970-71,Bihar;28) It comprises of 46 percent of total land surface of Bihar and often viewed as the `Ruhr' of India. It accounts for 40.47 percent of India's mineral production, composing coal, iron ore, limestone, mica, copper, kyanite, china-clay, fire-day and bauxite. Its coal production accounts for 48 percent of the total coal production of India, its iron ore production for 40 per cent of India's total and copper production for 100 percent of India's total. (Ahmed,1965:67)

Civilization in Bihar grew along the river Ganga and spread towards north and south. In the south, it was

checked by the hills and the plateaus of chotanagpur. The barrier was so formidable that the culture and economic pattern of chotanagpur remained completely distinct from those of the river valley civilization of the north. The people of chotanagpur retained their tribal social pattern and methods of production. (Techno-economic Survey of Bihar,vol.7,Bombay;5-8)

The Society

Bihar is a highly cleavaged society with multiple lines of reinforcing linguistic, religions and caste divisions. Hindus are by far the largest religious community accounting for 83.5 percent of the population of the state. Muslim comes next in numerical strength comprising of 13.5 percent. The State has a large Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes population. They were 14.5 per cent and 8.3 percent respectively in the total population of this State. (Census of India, 1981, series-4, Bihar, part II B,Patna; ix)

Muslims

The HIndus and the Muslims are divided into several social stratification. The Muslims are first divided into two Sects - The Shiyas and the Sunnis. Both sects are sub-divided traditionally into various stratification including Syed, Sheikhs and Malliks. Lowest in the stratifiction are

the Julahas, the Dhunias, the Kujars and the Kabaris and distinct from them, the Momins. Though the Muslims claim that their social relations are based on the Islamic principle of equality, in actual practice, they have followed Caste-lines. The sunnis and the Shiyas ranking above the rest have continued to be guided to some extent, if not wholly, by the traditional social alienation and antagonism between two sections. As recent studies have shown, Brahmanism also had a significant impact on Muslim society, intoducing caste-like tendencies in local `beradari' group which did not permit intermarriage. Social ranking systems were not based on purity and pollution, but descent, traditional occupation, education, wealth, numbers and observance of purdah. Group having the highest rank, known as `ashrafs', including saiyad, sheikha and pathans, where ancestors either came as part of conquering armies or converted from Rajput castes. The saiyads and pathans mostly belonged to the landowning classes. Groups of low rank, on the other hand, were descendants of low caste Hindu converts. Most of them followed their traditional occupations such as weaving, tailoring and distilling liquor and provided services like laundering and barbaring .
(Ali,1978: 30-2)

Major Caste Groups of Bihar

Category	Caste	Percentage of Population
Forward or 'twice-born'	Brahman	4.7
	Bhumihar	2.9
	Rajputs	4.2
	Kayasthas	1.2
	Total Forwered	13.0
Upper Backwards	Bania	0.6
	Yadav	11.0
	Kurmi	3.6
	Koiri	4.1
	(Total Upper Backwards)	19.3
Lower Backwards	Barhi	1.0
	Dhanuk	1.8
	Hajjam	1.4
	Kahar	1.7
	Kandu	1.6
	Kumhar	1.3
	Lohar	1.3
	Malah	1.5
	Tatwa	1.6
	Teli	2.8
	Other Shudras	16.0
	(Total Lower Backwards)	32.0
	Total Backwards	51.3
	Muslims	12.5
	Scheduled Castes	14.4
	Scheduled Tribes	9.1
	Grand Total	100.0

(Source : Blair, 1980: 65)

89

Hindus

The Hindus of Bihar have continued to remain divided into three sub-strata - the High castes or Upper castes. the Backwards and the Scheduled Castes (Harijans and others). In terms of ritual status, the caste system forms a hierarchy with the Brahmins at the top and the Shudras at the bottom with kshatriyas and Vaishyas in that order - in the middle. The first three jointly constitute the elite Dwija `twice born' category and can be conveniently referred to as the `Upper Castes', whereas the Shudras or the `Backward Castes', and the lower shudras or the `Scheduled Castes', can be characterised as the lower castes

and the Kayasthas constitute the upper caste stratum, the Yadava, the Kurmis, the Koiris, the Benias, the Barhis, the Dhanuka, the Kahars, the Kanus, the Kumhars, the Lohars, the Mallahs, the Nai, the tantwa and the Telis fall in the Backward Stratum. The Dusadhs, the Chamars, the Mushars, the Tantis, the Dhobis, the Pasis and the Doms are in the Scheduled Caste stratum.

The caste system is the most salient features of the Hindu social structures. It divides and stratifies the Hindu Society into a large number of sub-groups, separate yet integrated. The separate identities of the various castes are nourished by strict prohibitions on marrying

outside the sub-group and sanction against mobility, from one caste to other. "Integration among the various castes is maintained by hierarchical gradation and function at inter-dependence among them in a complex system of exchange services and obligations known as the `Jagmani System'" (Lewis, 1958:55-84)

Upper Castes

A notable feature of the Caste System in Bihar is the predominant position of Upper Castes in the life of the State inspite of their numerical weakness. They constitute only 13.6 percent of the State population but their numerical weakness is compensated to a considerable extent by their higher ritual status. Social prestige, economic power and modern education. The table shows percentage distribution of castes in various regions of Bihar.

Caste	North Bihar	South Bihar	Chotanagpur	State of Bihar
Upper Castes	13.8	18.4	7.7	13.2
Lower Castes(BC)	56.3	55.6	48.4	52.2
Scheduled Castes	14.0	16.8	11.9	14.1
Scheduled Tribes	7.3	1.2	31.5	9.1
Muslims	15.3	9.7	8.0	11.5

(Source : Singh., 1975 :29)

91

The Brahmins enjoy the first position in ritual matters though economically they are the poorest. The Kayasthas, although low on the scale of ritual status, have `rivalled the Brahmins in everything connected with the pen'. (Mishra, 1961: 61) The Bhuminars and the Rajputs constituting about 7 percent of the population, are the land-owning gentry accounting for 78.6 percent of the land areas in Bihar and thereby dominate the economic life of the State. (Singh 1972: 748). The economic inequality had its effects in other fields also. In terms of modern skills and education, too, the Upper Caste happened to be the earliest recipient of the modern western education with the result that they predominate even in high status modern profession. (Prasad,1968; 26-29) `The 1931 Census for Bihar and Orissa reveals that of the four Upper Castes, the Kayathas have been the most literate caste (372 per 1,000), followed by the Brahmins (195 per 1,000), the Bhumihars (136 per 1,000) and Rajputs (120 per 1,000). Among the lower castes, for the Kurmis and the Yadavas there were only 40+50 literate persons per thousand and the Teli had only 52 literate persons per thousand'.(Roy,1970:234). The Census further shows that the Kayasthas are ahead of all other castes in respect of English education. They were followed by Brahmins, Bhumihars and the Rajputs. The gap between the

Upper castes and the lower castes is again very wide.

Backward Castes

However, the situation has now changed to a considerable extent especially after the 1967 elections when `Backward Caste dominated politics began in Bihar. Accordingly their share in ministerialposts has also incrased considerably. After 22 percent reservation in government jobs for them, the situation has further improved in their favour. Thus, the `cumulative inequality' maintained so far by the Upper Castes has been removed to a very great extent. And finally with Laloo Prasad Yadav's arrival on the seat of power has indicated that Backward are not backward even in the field of politics.

It is important to note that among the Backward Castes, Yadav, Kurmis, Koiris and Banias constitute a seperate segment of `advanced' castes as they are often addressed as `upper backward castes'. Indeed, members of these four castes are better off both economically and politically than some of the Upper castes in many areas. For instance, the Brahmins in Madhubani district are desperately poor, while the former own most of the land in the district. Similarly, the Yadavs and the Koiris enjoy the status of dominant castes in some parts of the State. "The Yadavas, the Koiris

and the Kurmis make up 18.7 percent of the population in Bihar or more than three-fifth of the total population of the 128 Backward Castes. The Kurmis, the smallest among the three groups, were even in 1931, regarded as the most socially conscious of the Backward Castes" (Jha,1978:624). The extent to which these four castes dominate the state in various spheres becomes clear from the fact that "of the 94 MLAs belonging to the Backward Castes after the 1977 elections, as many as 91 belonged to them. So, was the case with the Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of State except the Chief Minister Karpoori Thakur. Among the Parliamentary secretaries, there was only one who belonged to a different caste, of the 216 gazetted officers belonging to the Backward castes, only 7 belonged to other castes. Only 1.4 percent of the stipends and scholarships to students of Backward Castes are enjoyed by those who do not belong to the four Castes". (Gandhi, 1978:6) It is, therefore, not surprising that the four castes constituted the vanguard of the job reservation agitation and pro-Mandal Commission rallies and helped install Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav.

Scheduled Castes

The lower Castes known as "Scheduled Castes ' in government vocabulary, who account for 14.1 percent of the

94

total population include the untouchables or Harijans. They earn their livelihood as sweeper, agricultural labourers and landless labourers. Inspite of having two Chief Ministers, besides their numerical strength, they have not yet been a political force to reckon with. They are still oppressed not only by the Upper Castes but also by the neo-rich advanced section from the Backward Castes.

Scheduled Tribes

The Scheduled Tribes, accounting for 9.1 percent of the total population continue to suffer on account of their economic and educational backwardness. They are still exploited by the `Dikku' (outsiders who have settled in chotanagpur region). But their political leaders have not been very honest to them. No doubt, they very often raise the banner of separate Jharkhand State, but the moment they get political pull, they forget their exploited fellows. Howerver, it is heartening that the sleepy tribal region is witnessing the emergence of Adivasi power as a reaction to the age-old exploitation of the tribal masses.

Bihar is perhaps, the most striking example among the Indian States, which provides a vivid picture of the intricate relationship between politics on the one hand and social institutions such as Caste and economy on the other. "The connection between caste and politics in Bihar has been

a close one, so fact is that to mention one has been almost automatically to speak of the other'. The story is a well known and often told one"(Blair, 1984:62). In contemporary Bihar, economic issues have always generated great stimuli for political awakening. The major changes in the political system of the State, at different points of time, have been caused by substantial alteration in its economic composition. Yet it has failed to surpass the phenomena of caste which appears to have been most instrumental in political mobilization. And it seems, almost certain that the `Democratic Polity'of the State in coming years will also be guided more by the consideration of caste than class. This is not to deny, however, the potentiality of class politics in the long run. But at present it is weak, largely owing to "under developed political economy of this predominantly agrarian society featuring strong survivals of feudal characteristics". (Prasad, 1989: 52)

The people of this State have been divided unequally not only in terms of traditional values but also, rather more, because of disparity in the distribution of landed property. Thus, although there was no absolute parity between caste and class in colonial Bihar, as a result of the permanent settlement of 1973 all the Zamindars, tenants, landlords and big peasants were from the upper caste Hindus.

Till 1951, 80 per cent of the landlords were either Brahmins, Rajputs or Bhumihar. Yet, not all upper caste men were landlords. The poor middle peasantry and the peasantry were constitued mostly by the middle castes. The poor peasants and vast stock of agricultural workers were drawn mainly from the Scheduled Castes and lower middle castes. These three classes as differentiated in terms of ownership, control and use of land broadly fit into the common language of `Malik', `Kisan' and `Mazdoor log'.

Politics in Bihar has, in course of time, undergone remarkable changes, due to alteration in the economic composition of the society itself. Such changes were, however, brought about by various land reforms measures taken by the Britishers and later by the government of independent India. On the basis of the turn in the very dynamics of Bihar politics, three major phases can be identified. The first phase was the period of absolute political dominance by the upper caste Hindu and covers the period mainly from permament settlement to 1950. The very fact that the utter castes had advantages over others, both in social and economic spheres, made them dominant in the field of power politics as well. Thus, the social structure of traditional Bihar, was to use Weber's formula as ` Ideal type' of what is called `Cumulative Inequality' a phrase

often used by liberal sociologists.

The most important feature of political activity during this phase was competition among the upper castes to get the maximum benefit out of the avilable resources through caste mobilization. Reaction of the Kayasthas and Bhumihars over 1901 Census report is the indicator of this fact. The 1901 Census had included these two castes in the category of vaishya verna, which was not acceptable to them. They were not willing to consider themselves ritually inferior to the Brahmins and Rajputs because otherwise they were not behind them. The Kayasthas had been on the forefront from the very beginning in the field of education and other modern professions. The Bhumihars similarly, had maximum amount of landholding with them. Ultimately by mobilizing their resources and caste men, they managed to imporve their ritual status. However, competition among the upper castes became open after the separation of Bihar from Bengal in 1911. Before that all the modern education oriented technical and other services were dominated by the Bengalis. Precisely because of the fact that it was not possible for the Kayasthas to compete with the Bengalis they raised the demand of a separate Bihar under the leadership of Sachchida Nand Sinha. At the outset, "the effective leadership was confined for all practical purpose to four persons-Sachchida

Nand Sinha; Mahesh Narain. Nand Kishore Lal and Rai Bahadur Krishma Sahay-all Kayasthas" (Jha,1977:15) After separation the Kayasthas enjoyed the same privilege which was once upon a time held by the Bengalis. Later on other castes joined this race and started consolidating their position in the field of education and government services.

Political mobilization in terms of caste to get ritual and other benefits was observed among the middle and lowest ranks as well during 19th century, the kurmis of Bihar, traditionally, a peasant caste because of their predatory activities of food-gathering was officially declared as a criminal tribe. As a consequence of that they were prohibited against joining government job like army and police. To fight against this discrimination, they rose unitedly in 1894 and formed ¯All India Kurmi Mahasabha'. The Mahasabha which was originally a organization for social reform later turned into a forum of political mobilization. In the subsequent years, it was joined by other castes or sub-castes of almost the similar economic status with minor ritual difference including Awadhias and ¯Dhanuks".

The whole process including the spread of education, rise of national movement, Congress promises of egalitarian society after attaining independence and Gandhi's advocacy

for the upliftment of the downtrodden and other social reform movement led to the rise of consciousness among poor backwards and Harijans also. A number of depressed caste such as `Dusadh' and `Mughhar' joined the reform movement of Kabirpanthi (which treated everyone as equal irrespective of caste and creed) and started bearing `Kanthi' (a symbol of vegetarianism, a custom traditionally prescribed for upper caste Brahmins) At the facevalue this might appear as an act of imitation or what Sriniwas would prefer to call as process of `Sanskritization' but basically it was a sign of protest against upper caste domination. It is correctly said that such type of movement also reflected the decay of Zamindari relations. Naturally this protest was countered violently by vested interest of the upper caste Zamindars and landlords. Despite appreciable awakening on the part of the poor Harijans and other depressed caste, against socio-economic exploitation, the fact remains that the symbol of unity among them was issue related to ritual value. Even the militants movement like Kisan Sabha, originally formed to fight aganist the economic exploitation of the Zamindars and led by so dynamic personalities as Sahjanand Saraswati and Rahul Sanskritayan, in later years, could not survive the onslaught of the caste pressure.These movements also failed to weaken substantially the political dominance of the Upper caste.

The hegemony of upper caste politics was effectively challenged during the second phase of political development in Bihar. This is the period which covers the events starting from abolition of Zamindari till the fall of Janta Party which came to power in 1977. This turning point in the contemporary politics of Bihar was caused by changes in its agrarian economy which even today finds itself in the strangle hold of a `semi-feudal mode of production'. "As the agrarian economic crisis deepended the socio-economic exploitation got intensified after the mid-sixties in Bihar" (Prasad,1989:53). Most important, however, was the impact of Zamindari Abolition on the social prestige of the upper castes. Land reform struck hard at the position of petty Zamindars and tenure holders who lost the right to collect rents from tenant cultivators Jannuzi found that "in a village of Darbhanga, where most intermadiaries cover brahmans the status value was greater than the economic value of their interests. The brahamns made a direct connection between Zamindari Abolition and a decline in their previously unquestioned authority" (Jannuzi,1974:54).

In short, the upper Backwards simply outnumber the Forwards in most places. In the past this numerical authority did not hurt the forwards, for they were the major

land owning castes under the British Zamindar System. After the Zamindari abolition of 1950s, the picture become a bit more blurred as large numbers of Zamindars `resumed' cultivation of their lands and become ryots, but the basic division remained. "Now, the forwards become the larger cultivators, often with holdings greatly in excess of the land ceilings imposed by congress government; holdings which they were able to retain through a combination of benami transfer, badly maintained land record, and corruption(Blair, 1980;70) Even then in the after month of the abolition of Zamindari and green revolution, some of the middle castes such as Yadavas, Kurmis and Koiris had substantially improved their economic position. These castes have traditionally been the peasant castes and therefore depend mainly on their family labour. Unlike the forward castes even their women go outside household to work for wages. Not only that they have nominal expenditure on various occasions like marriage, shradh, and even on daily consumptions. Naturally in course of time, these sub-tenants and poor peasants managed to save money. When the law related to ceiling was passed, though not efficiently implemented and the absentee landlords started selling their land, they preferred these middle castemen instead of their own caste-fellow for their better and improved paying capacity. According to one estimate in the wak of Zamindari

abolition 10 per cent of land passed into the possession of such people (Singh ,1989:52) (Prasad 79:483).

"Thus, the middle and poor middle peasantry emerged as most efficient class in the context of agricultural development in ˋsemi-feudal' Bihar with their newly acquired economic power".(Roy, 1970:233) They made a successful bid for the capture of political power. The demon of casteism which was created by the elites of semi-feudal set up (the upper castes Hindus) to keep themselves in political power, has now turned against their creators. It was used by the middle and poor middle peasantry to rally the middle castes from the poor class also to their side. "They now out- numbered the castes Hindus by a ratio of more than 1:2. By now every one acre land in the hands of upper caste Hindus the landlords, the cultivators and the big peasantry, the middle and poor peasantry own about two-third of an acre. In operational term, the share became more. The level of adaption of new technology became higher. Therefore, the per acre output in case of the later become on an average about 20 per cent higher than that of the former. The later's intensity of cropping was much more than that of the former". (Prasad, 79:483) This happened because of the percolation of the advantages of the green revolution especially in the gangetic belt of Bihar. The

rise of Kulaks' or `Bullock-cart capitalists' loom on the horizon.

However, their improved economic strength coupled with adaption of parliamentary democracy where number of votes count in independent India had paramount impact on the course of events which followed. To begin with, these middle peasants castes emerged as the dominant castes of Bihar (rather in whole of North India) And when as a result of the massive compaign by Ram Manohar Lohia and others, Congress supremacy was challenged in North Indian states during 70s, in Bihar, Yadav alone had the maximum representation in the legislative assembly of 1967. It had, secondly, a negative effect in so far as it diffused the class contradiction between the rural rich on the one hand and the middle and poor middle peasantry on the other. Contradiction was once again sought to be treated in terms of castes not classes. The peak of the situation was observed when Janata Party came to power. In its election compaign the party had promised to give concession to the backward castes in government jobs. The demand of reservation in government services was the brain-child of Karpoori Thakur, a barbar by caste, who had emerged by then, as the most important leader of the backward peasent castes in north India, next only to charan singh. The situation

took a violent turn with the upper caste unitedly fighting and even seeking the help of the scheduled castes. But it also raised the hope and aspriatin of the scheduled castes and the middle castes. "Zamindari abolition had already demonstrated that the traditional superiority of upper castes hindus was not invinicble" (Prasad,1979:483). "The slogan given by the upper castes leadership at theat time willsubstantiate this fact. It said "Forward Harizan Bhai — Bhai, backward castes Kahan Se Aai" (Forward and Harizans are brother where from backward caste came?"(Singh,1989:52).

However, the crisis was difused with the fall of Janta Party and Mrs. Gandhi's Congress coming back to power.

But history takes its own course. The contradiction created by the development of the second phase prepared the ways for third turning point in the political history of Bihar. It is the phase Bihar is passing through. Now there has emerged two types of antagoanistic contradictions. On the one hand, it exists between the landlord/big peasants and the poor peasants/agricultural workers. On the other hand, it is between the agricultural workers and the newly emerged peasants. This has resulted into organisation of armed gangs and private armies in both sides. The Patna Kurmi has Bhomi Sena, the Harijans have their various Lal

Senas and Lal Fauj, while Bhuminar formed the Brahmarsi Sena and the Yadavas in Sahara District, the Samajvadi Shosit Sena."The rising middle peasants are facing the dilemma of paying maximum surplus to the state supported upper caste landlords and meeting the demand of legal minimum wages of the suffering agricultural workers. The poor agricultural workers and small peasants are the most affected section of this dilemma. The large scale collective violence in the last more than a decade is the product, of this dual contradiction created by semi-feudal economic structure" (Singh,89:53) This contradiction has important implications in the area of power politics also. Mobilization of agricultural workers and poor peasants are increasingly taking place on the basis of class. Under the banner of various mass organisation it has gained considerably over the last few years in several districts of South Bihar such as Bhojpur, Rohtas, Aurngabad, Gaya, Patna and Nalanda. According to one report'of the union Home Minister "within three years, the number of poors drawn under the influence of Nazalism has incresed from 3000 to 6500" (Singh 1989:53) No one can deny the fact that the Indian People's Front (IPF) has emerged in the democratic polity of Bihar as force to reckon with yet the class formation which could decisively mould the political affairs of the state has not take place. As yet, it is limited in its scope, in so far as

the alliance between the peasantry and the agricultural workers have not come into being and often breaks on the issue of backward/Harijan caste differentiation. That apart the caste unity of the upper segment is still very difficult to be broken. The reason behind this limited class formation lies in the underdeveloped political economy of agricultural sector which is still as pointed out by almost all Marxist scholers on Bihar from Pradhan H.Prasad to Arvind N.Das, predominantely semi-feudal. However, on thing has happened that now upper caste especially the landlord scions are not investing in agriculture and they are going for opening cinema halls and colleges and also settling themselves in urban areas. And the rising kulaks are yet to practise the technical know-how of scientific farming.

The Congress in 80's was not unaware of this fact. The decision of the Congress High Command to give the leadership of Bihar in the hands of Mr.S.N.Sinha and Dr.Jagannath Mishra was based on caste consideration and not on moral values. Selection of S.N.Sinha as successor of Mr.Azad was an attempt to win the confidence of Rajput. Being a traditionally known and influential caste leader Sinha was the best Congress coice to counter Mr.V.P.Singh factor in Bihar Politics. Dr.Jagannath Mishra had the support of Brahmin's and had capacity to turn some section of the

Muslims and even Bhumihars. However, it does not mean caste is the sole or ultimate factor to decide the fate of Politics in Bihar.Poltical bargaining is a complex and sensitive issue which cannot always be effected by one cause such as caste: History reminds that the people of Bihar have voted above caste line at different points of time i.e. 1977, 1984 and 1989 with the coming of Janta Dal in power the prophecy of Pradhan H.Prasad stand correct. "The recent reservation in appointments and promotion in government in favour of the middle castes in the teeth of stiff opposition from the upper caste Hindus is proof of the political supremacy of middle castes. No doubt this has led to unprecedented violence on caste line, but it is not going to reverse the process. The violence will last for sometime, and then it will find the middle castes in control of the political power in State" (Prasad, 1979:483). He is of the view that the fanning of caste passions which at one time led to a diffusion of class contradictions and thwarted agricultural growth, now turns out to be a factor which may sharpen the contradiction and cause the disintegration of `semi-feudal' production relation's in Bihar. The other view can be summed up as the caste stucture still sits like a dead weight holding back not merely economic and political but also the cultural and moral developments of socitey and even putting its imprint on the new emerging classes.

CHAPTER - IV

THE MINISTRY-MAKING IN BIHAR

CONGRESS POLITICS UPTO 1967: CASTE BASED FACTIONALISM

For twenty years following independence Bihar's political system was dominated by the Congress Party. It was a system in which a single party of consensus i.e. the Congress Party, occupied the dominant, central position with the minor opposition parties acting from the margin as `parties of pressure' without providing an alternation of power (Kothaari, 1967:1-18). A one-party dominance system, however, does not mean the absence of political competition as minor national or regional parties constantly pose a threat to the dominant party (Duverger, 1963: 307-312) However, the congress was an open system - an `open umbrella' (Jones 1966:480) which in order to maintain its dominant position brought into its fold a variety of social and economic interests which were neither compatible nor homogenous. But the dominance and accommodation cannot go togather. "To dominate, the Congress must acccomdate, yet accommodation encourages incoherence which destroys the capacity to dominate "(Jones,1966:40).

"The Congress Party, established in 1908 in Bihar, functioned until 1947 as an integrative force by bringing

together diverse elements from different geographical and culture .region. It submerged local and regional loyalities in the overweening national identity with national freedom as its primary objective" (Roy 1966,707-8).

With the emergence of the Congress as structure of power and with the prospect of political power becoming reality the aims of the organization or of larger group became secondary to sectional or personal goal. Thus, the Congress became the playground for sectional and personal interest even before the objective of the national freedom was achieved. The full implications of the change became manifest however in the post-independence period when the Congress was transformed into a ruling party.

Since Independence, the Congress as a political party has had to content with such interest groups trying to get the control of the organizational apparatus and the organs of the government. •The computaion to depend on votes as an essential condition for remaining in power made it all the more essential for the Congress to seek support from diverse socio-economic groups of the society. Further the relatively weaker position of the opposition until,1967, caused almost all the politically significant groups and interests to be drawn to the Congress. This resulted into a situation in which intra-factional competition and conflict became

110

significant for the political process "making the Congress party a highly competitive sub-system which must tolerate internal conflict and acquiece to factional demands in order to prevent them from colliding with the party's grand design from power" (Roy, 1968:559).

Once personal ambitions and fulfillment of sectarian interests were accepted as suitable goals, the formation of alliance and coalitions became the pattern of the Congress organization. Conflicting claims and counter-claims acted as catalyst. The process of fractionalization of the party structure into faction and sub-coalition begun. "Regional loyalities, caste consideration, diverse economic, interests and personal ambition all provided bases of alliances" (Roy, 1967:418). It is important that personal ambition was guiding force which exploited diverse affinities— of which caste was the most important — in making political alliances.

Caste distinctions were the most important factor for mobilizing political support. Political rivalry among the upper caste and, as a result , the gradual involvement of other caste groups in Congress politics is a characteristic feature of politics in Bihar. "In the early years, the congress leadership apart from the Muslim, came from the

Kayasthas who had received English education earlier and in large numbers as compared to other castes" (Roy, 1968:563). But their dominance came to be challenged by the Bhumihars who were more numerous and economically more influential. The rising aspirations of the Bhumihars brought home to the Kayasthas the fear of dislodgment from the position of power. They responded to this threat by entering into an alliance with yet another emerging caste, the Rajput (Roy 1967:419) (Jha, 1967:575-87). Alliances led to counter alliances, the leading castes co-opted men from politically inarticulate castes to position of second rank leadership in a obvious bid to consolidate their own positions. This brought more and more castes into the votex of politics. Thus the tension and conflicts among the combined forces of Kayasthas, Rajputs and Bhumihars guided the course of Congress in Bihar until 1967.

By the time the first Congress ministry was formed in Bihar in 1937, the Congress leadership in the state had split into two factions each, composed of several caste groups. One was headed by S.K.Sinha, a Bhumihar from Monghyr district and the other by A.N.,Sinha , a Rajput from Gaya district. (Jha 1967:577).

The first open division in the Congress Leadership in

the State appeared in December, 1939, when a bid for the unanimous election of the member of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Working Committee (BPCWC) failed. The next two years were marked by intense factional rivalry. The Congress high Command had to take the note of the situation and Maulana Abul Kalam Azaad was sent to Patna by the High Command in February 1942 in a vain hid to patch up difference between the two group (Roy,1966:708) The growing heterogeneity in the Congress reflecting the increasing political mobilization of cross section of the society and their conflicting claims to position of power in the party hierarchy as well as in the government, adversely affected the cohesiveness of the top leadership by 1942, it had split into two oppositing camps.

The two sub-coalitions, dominated by the Rajputs and the Bhumihars continued to function in the Bihar Congress till 1946. But after the formation of the Congress Ministry in 1946 alienation and defection from the ruling group started and got accelerated further in 1952. The formation of the new Ministry disappointed some of the non-Bhumihars supporters of S.K.Sinha who was expecting to be rewarded with the Ministerial gaddies in their support to the Bhumihar Chief Minister. Saragdhar Singh, a Rajput was particularly confident of being picked up a Minister, but

was disappointed (Sinha 1961:374 and 382).

The formtion of the Congress Ministry in 1957 gave further shock to the supporters of S.K.Sinha and accelerated the process of defection . One of the important factors was the inclusion of Mahesh Prased Sinha, a Bhumihar and a close relative of S.K.Sinha in the Ministry. M.P.Sinha's rise to power made K.B.Sahay, a Kayastha lieutenant of S.K.Sinha, whom the latter had earlier weand away from the Rajput-Kayastha alliance and who aspired to be Chief Minister apprehensive of the intentions of the Chief Minister. (The Indian nation,Patna, 8 August 1959). It quickned the alienation of the Chief Minister's non-Bhumihar lieutenants who had been passed over from ministerial position in the both 1946 & 1952. "M.P.Sinha soon started denigrating K.B.Sahay and the non-Bhumihar favourities of the Chief Minister and replacing with persons from his own caste" (Sinha, 1961:437). M.P.Sinha and K.B.Sahay rivalry intensified caste rivalry.

"The bifactional structure came to an end by 1953 when almost all the important non-Bhumihar supporters of the Chief Minister S.K.Sinha deserted his camp and found `Centrist' group. This group got busy in discrediting M.P.Sinha holding him responsible for their grievances. However, it is interesting to note that the Bhumihar

114

supporters of the Chief Minister by and large struck to him even in cases where they failed to get rewarded by ministerial position. Presumably the reason was the Psychological satisfaction they derived from belonging to the `ruling caste'" (Roy 1967:422). "The revolt of the centrist group was directed mainly against the ruling Bhumihar factions . This group, apart from impressing upon the Congress High command the need for taking action aganist the Bhumihar leaders, was busy in creating public opinion against them. The group further provided a forum for other disgruntled elements, both within an outside the party, for criticising the ruling Congress leadership in the state (Singh, 1975:62).

Greed for power had been the most important factor responsible for the emergence of the caste-oriented factional politics in the Bihar Congress. So, it is pertinent to analyse intra-factional conflicts in relation to the Ministry-Making in Bihar.

The top leaders of the Congress Party in Bihar for the first time tested the glory of power at the state level in 1937, when a congress ministry was formed under the government of India Act, 1935. A contest for Chief Ministership between the two sub-coalition leaders S.K.Sinha and A.N.Sinha was averted by Rajendra Prasad, who was

authorised by the Congress High command to ascertain the consensus of the members. As A.N.Sinha expressed his desire not to be considered, S.K.Sinha was unanimously elected (Prasad,1961:217-18) The former was elected the Deputy leader unanimously.

However, the formation of the Ministry proved a ticklish problem. Pressures for inclusion in the Ministry began to the be applied on the leadership. Some Harijan leaders demanded a Harijan member in the Ministry. There was pressure from the legislators of the chotanagpur belt for the inclusion of a minister in the Cabinet from that area. Apart from Syed Mahmud and Ram Dayalu Singh and also Ram Charitra Singh, Abdul Bari and Baldev Sahay were also in the race for Ministership. Rajendra Prasad recounts in his autobiography, "the selection of the Minister was a knotty problem. The Governor's Executive Council had only four members and I thought if four men could do the job then four Ministers ought to be sufficient to run the congress government now "(Prasad,1961:442). In a clever move the leadership decided to avoid bickering in the party, to appoint some important men as Parliamentary Secretary and some others to other high positions. Finally Abdul Bari's proposal that S.K.Sinha, A.N.Sinha, Syed Mahmud and a Harijan be made Ministers and Ram Dayalu Singh, the speaker

was accepted (Sinha,1961:220-21). It was also decided to appoint Jaglal Choudhary as a minister and Jagjivan Ram as parliamentary secretary (Prasad,1961:443.). After a lot of discussion the names of the Parliamentary Secretary was finally decided on July 16, 1937.

Although factionlism had its role to play in the Ministry-making, it had not become very strong. The leadership showed the spirit of accommodation and was able to adjust counter-claims while taking into consideration the claims of castes regions and personalities. Most of the aspirants for high offices were accommodated as ministers or Parlimentry Secretaries or as the speaker or dupty speakers or Advocate General.

In the making of the Congress Ministry in 1946, again conflicts over the leadership of the congress Lagislature Party between S.K.Sinha and A.K.Sinha aganist devloped. But Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the then Congress President, with the help of Rajendra Prasad, the then BPCC President, managed to get S.K.Sinha elected unanimuosly (Azad,1959:113-14). The spirit of accommodation was compromised in the claims and counter-claims of factions. As a result, most of the members selected as ministers and Parlimentary Secretaries belonged to one or the other of the

117

factions. In the 18, man ministry, S.K.Sinha faction was in
a dominant position. The faction leaders tried to
accommodate within their faction, as many second rank
leaders belonging to other castes as was possible.

The S.K.Sinha Ministry

Factional politics assumed serious proportions in the
1952 and 1957 Ministry-making. Factional activities were
intensified to such a degree in 1952 that the high command
had to intervene by sending three central ministers from
Bihar to patch up differences. They, however, failed and it
was the intervention of the Prime Minister and the AICC
President, Jawaharlal Nehru, which led to the unanimous
election of S.K. Sinha as the leader of the Congress
Legislature Party.

However, the formation of Ministry presented a lot of
difficulties. Most of the major caste groups in the CLP
pressed their claims for their respective shares in the
Ministry by holding meetings and by carry on various kinds
of convassing. Some important interest groups such as
Muslims, Harijans, Adivasis and the members of the fair
sexes became active and pressed their claim also. The
question of geographical representation was also raised. It
was the adjustment of factional claims which created the
real problem. The two main factional leaders - S.K.Sinha and

A.N.Sinha met as many as eight times without success. It was the ninth meeting which produced an agreed list of Cabinet Ministers. An amusing way of advancing factional claims and counter-claims was that if the name of a particular person from a particular caste was proposed by one faction, the other faction too, proposed the name of some other person for the same caste. For example, when the name of Deo Sharan Singh, a Kurmi MLA, was proposed by S.K.Sinha, A.N.Sinha put forward the name of Birchand Patel, another MLA beloning to the same caste. Protracted discussions between two faction leaders also took place for the finalization of the names of Deputy Minister and Parliamentary Secretaries. They took the oath of their office after six month to that of the cabinet Minister.

S.K.Sinha faction was in the majority in the council of Minister. It had five men in the cabinet, two Deputy Ministers and two Parliamentary Secretaries, while A.N.Sinha faction had four cabinet Minister, one Deputy Minister one Parliamentary Secretary.

The S.K.Sinha faction included two Bhumihars, one Kayastha, one Brahmin, one Harijan (all Cabinet Ministers), one Muslim, one Bengali (both Deputy Ministers), one Adivasi and one Kurmi (both Parliamentary Secretaries) The A.N.Sinha

group had nominated two Rajputs, one Kayastha, one Yadav (all Cabinet Ministers), one Kurmi (Deputy Minister) and one Harijan (Parliamentry Secretary).Among the three Ministers, whose factional loyalty was not clear, two were Muslims and one a Bhumihar.

So far, geographical representation was concerned, North Bihar had as many as nine berths in the council of Minister;six of .them were Cabinet Minister, two Deputy Ministers and one Parliamentary Secretary. South Bihar had got five seats, four Cabinet Minister and one Deputy Minister. Both S.K.Sinha and A.N.Sinha belonged to this region. There were three men in the Council of Ministers (one Cabinet Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries) who belonged to Chotanagpur region.

Following the 1957 General Election, a direct contest between S.K.Sinha and A.N.Sinha for the Congress Legislature Party Leadership could not be avoided. All efforts of the High Command to settle the matter amicably were in vain, for neither was prepared to accept any compromise. In the first open contest A.N.Sinha lost and subsequently accepted Dupty Leadership.

The formation of the Ministry again caused feverish activity on the part of the factional leaders. All kinds of

caste groups, interest groups and groups of self-seekers became active for ministerial spoils.Finally the choices of the Minister were made at the intervention of the Congress High Command (Singh 1978:255-261). It is worth mentioning that the S.K.Sinha sub-coalition had to face several problems in the selection of Ministers. Caste groups, pressure groups and important individuals pressed their claim to ministerial posts. On the contrary, the A.N.Sinha faction had no such problem and the choices of Minister to be included in the Ministry were left to its leader (Singh 1978: 256-58). It is also important that the S.K.Sinha faction, this time, negotiated from the point of strength, as it was victorious and succeeded in having a lions shore of ministerial posts. Among the nine Cabinet members, only three, including A.N.Sinha, were from his group. Almost all Deputy Ministers belonged to the the S.K.Sinha faction.

A siginificant feature of this Ministry-making was that more and more groups and individuals started demanding rewards for their support to the Chief Minister. The A.N.Sinha faction had nominated one Rajput, one Brahmin and one Kurmi as Cabinet Minister and a Yadav as Deputy Minister. After the death of A.N.Sinha, his group included another Rajput, Deep Narain Singh, in his place. Among the two Deputy Ministers, whose factional allegiance was not

clear, one was a and the other a Harijans. Thus, the secodn 23-man S.K. Ministry was dominated by the forward casteman. There were eleven forward castesmen- four Brahmins, three Bhumihare, two Rajputs and two Kayasthas, four backwards-two Yadavas, One Kurmi and one Koiri, two scheduled castemen, one scheduled tribe man and four Muslims in his Ministry. The remaining one was a Bihari-Bengali.

As regards regional representation, the North Plains had eleven representatives-two Cabinet and nine Deputy Minister-in the Council of Ministers. It was followed by the south Plains which had eight members -five cabinet and three Deputy Ministers-in the Ministry. The Chotanagpur belt had only one representation.

THE B.N.JHA MINISTRY

After Mr. S.K.Sinha's death and following Mr.B.N.Jha's election as the leader of the Congress Legislature Party (From 1.2.61 to 18.2.61 Mr.D.N.Singh worked as the stop-gap Chief Minister), factional claims for the allotment of ministerial berths were pressed again. Both the factional leaders-B.N.Jha and M.P.Sinha requested the High Command to accomodate maximum number of their supporters in the Ministry (The Indian Nation, Patna, Feb. 13,14 & 15,1961). This time the leader of the Legislation Party, B.N.Jha asserted his right to choose his colleagues.He told the

Congress President Nilam Sanjiva Raddy who was keen to have a composite Ministry, that if "any choice was forced upon him, it would be difficult for him to carry on" (Singh 1978:268). However, he met M.P.Sinha on February 15,1961 in New Delhi and asked him to suggest two names of his choice for the Cabinet (The Indian Nation, Patna, Feb 16,1961). Earlier on February 13, the Congress High Command decided to have a nine men Cabinet-seven from B.N.Jha Camp and two from M.P.Sinha faction. (The Indian Nation, Patna, Feb 15,1961). They again met on February 16 but failed to reach on any agreement. M.P.Sinha was insistent on having three cabinet posts and retaining all the five Deputy Ministers of his faction (The Search Light, Patna, Feb 17,1961) B.N.Jha submitted a list of seven Cabinet Minister (all from his group) and nine Deputy Minister (including two from M.P.Sinha faction) to the Governor. All of them barring Sinha's supporters, took oath on February 18, 1961 (Bihar civil List Sept-1961:1-2).

The situation turned serious, when B.N.Jha was advised by the High Command to broad-base his Ministry by including members from the M.P.Sinha faction. "It was decided that two Cabinet Ministers and five Deputy Ministers would be taken from the Sinha faction "(Singh 1978:272) B.N.Jha expanded his Ministry on April 13, 1961 when only Zawar Hussain

(Cabinet Minister) took oath again. (The Search Light, Patna, April 1, 1961) ultimately, they had to join the Ministry on April 9, 1961 after receiving serious warring from the High Command (The Serach Light,Patna,April 20,1961).

Thus, the Ministry formation was completed in three month's time as a result of the hardening of the attitude of the High Command. B.N.Jha having a majority of his men in the Ministry, did not include any member from the opposite camp while appointing ten Paralimentary Secretaries on April 4,1961.

The dominant position of B.N.Jha group was natural in the sense that K.B.Sahya and S.N.Sinha were with him in the game of power.

The B.N.Jha Ministry was also dominated by the forward castemen. There were fourteen men belonging to these castes- five cabinet Minister, six Minister of State and three Parliamentary Secretaries. These were eight ministers belonging to the Backward castes-one cabinet Ministerm three ministers of state and four Parliamentary secretaries. The Scheduled Castes had six men-one cabinet minister, two ministers of state and three Parliamentary Secretaries in the ministry. The Muslim Community had four men-two cabinet

and two minister of state in the Jha Ministry. However, the scheduled Tribes had only one men.

The North Bihar Plain had the highest number of representatives in the Ministry, i.e. twenty. Among them, five were caibnet minister, ten minister of state and four Parliamentary Secretaries. The South Bihar plains had two cabinet minister, one minister of state and five Parliamentary Secretaries. The tribal belt of Chotanagpur had one representative in a minister of state.

After the 1962 General election a trial of strength between the ministrialists and the dissicdents took place over the CLP leadership. The dissidents put up K.B.Sahay aganist B.N.Jha but lost once more despite the K.B.Sahay , M.P.Sinha combination.

Ministry—Making, this time was not a long drawn battle inspite of factional claims and counter claims for ministerial berths. One of the reasons perhaps was that the dominant faction was not so dominant after the defection of K.B.Sahay. Secondly, the factional leaders were more pragmatic and accommodative. B.N.Jha himself wanted the Ministry to be broad—based and he publicly expressed the view that he had no prejudice aganist anybody who had voted aganist him (The Indian Nation,Patna, March 10 and 11,1961).

The dissidents also were not taking any offensive action, prehaps because of their two consecutive defeat. M.P.Sinha statement "B.N.Jha is the undisputed leader of the Bihar Congress Legislature Party. There is alone to decide the strength and nature of the cabinet "(The Indian Nation,Patna,March 10,1961) was a clear proof of it. The third and one of the most important reasons was the attitude of the COngres High Command which wanted a homogeneous Ministry represented by all sections (The Search Light,Patna,MArch 13,1962) (The Indian Nation,Patna,March 14,1962).

However, the factional leaders did their best to secure as many ministerial posts as was possible in order to reward their supporters. In the process some difference remained unresolved upto the last moment. The K.B.Sahay-M.P.Sinha faction wanted to have four berths in the cabinet but the B.N. Jha faction was not ready to concede this demand. (The Search Light,Patna, March 12 1962) B.N.Jha had succeeded in rewarding most of his supporters by taking them in the Ministry. Even then, in an obvious bid to meet the ambitions of some more of them, he appointed six Parliamentary Secretaries from his faction.

The dissidents were given three berths in the cabinet and three of their supporters were appointed as Deputy

Ministers. None of their camp followers were taken as parliamentary secretaries. K.B.Sahay one of the two important leaders of the rival faction was appointed as a member of the cabinet on June 1962 alongwith Shyama Sharan Tubid about three and a half months after the formation of the Ministry (Bihar Civil List,Patna, March 1963 : 1-2). B.N. Jha further expanded his cabinet and appointed Jaipal Singh on September 3, 1962 after the merger of the Jhakhand Party with the Congress (Bihar Civil List, March 1963:1-2).

Though B.N.Jha had forged an alliance with the Backward castes his ministry was again packed with forward castes men. There were fourteen minister belonging to the forward and five to the Backward castes. The Scheduled castes had four men in the Jha Ministry (One Cabinet, one Deputy Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries). The scheduled Tribes had two men (both cabinet ministers0 in the council of minister, while the Muslims had three berths.

Among the Forward castes there were five Brahmins, five Rajputs, three Kayathas and one Bhumihar. This was the first occassion after S.K.Sinha's death that Bhumihars were reduced to such a miserable minority, while B.N.Jha had raised the strength of his own castemen from four to five and that of Kayasthas from two to three. Among the Backward

Castes, Kurmis were given a place of importance by being included in the Cabinet. One Yadav was made a Minister of State. There were three Koiris (One Deputy Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries). Among the Scheduled Castes, Dusadhs were given three posts (One Cabinet, One Deputy Minister and one Parliamentary Secretary) and Dhobi in one Parliamentary Secretary.

For the first time in the history of the Congress Ministries, members from the Chotanagpur region were included in the Cabinet. Its two representatives were made Cabinet Minister. The North Plains were again given the highest number of seats in the Ministry. There were thirteen Ministers (five Cabinet Minister, two Minister of State, three Deputy Ministers and three PArliamentary Secretaries.) belonging to this region. The South plains got ten berths (Five Cabinet,One Minister of State, One Deputy Minister and three Parliamentary Secretaries.)

The K.B.Sahay Ministry

Follwoing B.N.Jha's resignation in 1963 under the Kamraj Plan, a fresh contest for Chief Ministership occurred between K.B.Sahay-M.P.Sinha-S.N.Sinha combine and B.N.Jha faction. Birchand Patel, a Backward Caste (Kurmi) liuntenant of Jha, who lost the contest to K.B.Sahay. There were some striking features of the contest. For the first time in the

123

history of the Bihar Congress, Kayasthas, Bhumihars and Rajputs come together to defeat B.N.Jha faction. In the contest, members of the Backward Caste/Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes were sharply divided. R.L.Singh Yadav, leader of Yadavas and S.K.Bage, leader of Scheduled Tribe, were with Kayastha-Bhumihar-Rajput alliance. The B.N.Jha faction was further isolated by the desertion of B.P.Shastri, an influential Harijan Leader, who conveyed his support to sahay throgh A.A.M. Noor an influencial Muslim supporter of B.n.Jha (Singh 1978:238-41) (Jah 1967:580).

Factional warfare started over the formation of the Ministry but the firm handling by the Congress High Command saved the situation. It invited both group leaders for adismssion on the formation of the Ministry and worned them that if they failed to agree, the CBP would prepare the List (The Indian Nation,Patna, Sept 29,30 and Oct,1, 1963). Inspite of K.B.Sahay's insistence on 27 the High Command decided to have "a 20 member Ministry consisting only of Cabinet Ministers and Minister of State" (Singh 1978:284.5).

Only two Minister were taken from the B.N.Jha faction. No Minister of State was included from his faction, though Birchand Patel had put forward the claim of three Ministers of State and one Deputy Ministers (Bihar Civil List, sept

129

1964:1-2).

The rest of ministerial berths was shared by three leaders of the Kayastha-Bhumihar-Rajput combine. However, K.B.Sahay took away six Cabinet, three Minister of State posts this being the highest member of berths taken by any of the group leaders.

The Ministery unlike the past was not dominated by the Forward casteman. On the contrary the Backward castes had increased their strength considerably in the cabinet which rose to three, one short of the Forward caste's strength. One of their men was included as a Minister of State. There were nine forward casteman (four Cabinet and five Minister of State) in the K.B.Sahay Ministry. Among them three came each from Bhumihars and Rajputs, two from Brahmins and one from kayasthas. Among the Backward Caste one each came from Yadavas and Koiris and two from Kurmis. There were three scheduled casteman (One Dhobi and two Dusadhs) in the last undivided Congress Ministry. The Scheduled tribes and the Muslim each had two members in the Ministry.

As regards regional representation in the Sahay Ministry the South Plains had nine representatives,while the worth Plains had eight men. The chotanagpur belt had only one representative.

Thus political expediency, guided by personel interests and ambitions was the main reason of the factional conflicts. This is indicated by the foregoing analysis of Ministry formation. From the above account, it seems clear that upper castes did not form a single cohesive and coherent group. Each unit of the Upper Castes was serious contender for political power. Despite all this, there seems to have an unwritten agreement among them to keep political power in their hands. The upper Caste leaders of the main factions within Congress, who used to group and re-group among themselves, managed to keep real power away from the Backward Castes. It is among the Upper Castes that a major portion of political rewards in terms of political leadership was distributed. All Chief Ministers during the period belonged to Upper Castes. Though, B.N.Jha to keep himself in power, had forged an alliance with the backward Castemen in the legislature, it was K.B.Sahay who brought them to the centre of power. While the former had included one man from these castes in each of his two cabinets, the latter had taken three of their men in the cabinet and allotted a very important portfolio, PWD to one of them. The Scheduled Castes and the Muslims continued to be in a better position. The scheduled Tribes were given a place of honour as late as in 1962, when B.N.Jha formed his second ministry.

There was thus a shift in the direction of greater participation by the Backward Caste elites in the game of politics in Bihar.

Most of the members of the Ministries formed during this period came from the North Plains. But all the Chief Ministers belonged to the South Plains. The latter continued to receive a fairly good number of ministerial berths. It is only the tribal belt of Chotanagpur, which continued to get the lowest number of berths in all the Ministries.

MULTI-PARTY COALITION GOVERNMENT :THE PHASE OF NON-CONGRESSIM
The year 1967

The Fourth Gerenal Election held in February 1967, proved to be momentous year from the point of view of Indian political development. The results clearly showed that the hold of the monolithic Congress in a large number of states was gratly diminished. This defeat of the Congress Party and the emergence of a number of other political parties on the post-election scene, thus provided a watershed in the post-in dependence Indian politics.

The Congress party failed to secur the requisite majority in Assemblies in varoious states or subsequently members elected on Congress tickets left the fold of the Congress to form splinter groups. What many observers had

predicated for the fifth General Elections in 1972 happend in 1967. "One party dominant system was not succeeded by two-party or three-party or multiple party, but rather by a cross-party system of dubious value". (Palmr, 1967:275) Thus, after the 1967 Gerenal Elections , Indian politics enterd into "Second stage "(Brass 1968: 1174) concerned with the problems of transferring power from the previously dominant Congrees party diverse parties and party coalitions in more than half of the Indian states.

In Bihar, the Congress was reduced after the 1967 elections, to a minority in the state Assembly. At the same time it emerged as the largest single party in the legislature. It was able to secure only 128 out of 318 seats, polling 33.12 percent of the votes cast. The non-Congress parties among them secured 178 and the independents 12 seats. The Congress defect was said to be largely attributable to : (i) The defections of M.P Sinha and Raja of Ramgarh group (ii) The continued strains in the relation between K.B. Sahay and B.N. Jha factions within the party and (iii) Public dissatirfactioin and anger at the poor handling of the famine situation in the state by the Congress Government (Kashyap, 1974 : 307-10)."The press was antagonised, government employees alienated students infuriated, and farmers scared. On the other hand, prices of

food and other things of common necessity touched every year a new height. Stories of corruption floated widely amongst the people, while demanding of inquiry into such case, made both by congressmen and opposition parties were either not considered at all or were given casual attention. The state exchequer reached a stage of bankrupty" (Prasad 1976:53).

In this election, the largest gain was recorded by the SSP, It, therefore, took the lead in attempting an alliance of a non-Congrees parties. An non-Congrees parties coalition was formed under the leadership of M.P.Sinha in March 1967. The five parties which constituted the united front were the SSP, PSP, Jana Sangh, Jana Kranti Dal and the CPI. The CPI(M) and the Swatantra party supported the goverment from outside.(Appendix-II).It may be noted that the various political parties who joined in this coalition goverment didnot share any commen ideology. They were chiefly motivated by the desire to keep the Congrees out of power and share the spoils of the victory.

Congress leaders decided to make a concerted effort for topping the United Front ministery. There were numbers of defections from the ranks of the coalition parties and in January 1968 it succeded in out voting the M.P.Sinha government.

As a result, B.P. Mandal. a defector from M.P.Sinha's government, formed another coalition government with the support of the Congrees. On 18 March i.e, after 47 days the Congress backed Soshit Dal ministery headded by B.P. Mandal and consisting entirely of defectors was voted of office. In March, 1968, another United Front government was formed under B.P. Shastri, a defector from Congress. But even his government did not last long because of the black-mailing tatics of the Raja of Ramgarh, while tendering his resignation, the Chief Minister recommended to the Governor the dissolution of the Assembly a recommendation which was accepted by the Governor. Thus, the state was placed under the president rule.

The Mixed Coalition Governments(1969 -1971)

The mid-term election of february 1969 didnot bring about any substantial change in the complexion of the Bihar Assembly. Soon after the electioins , a Congress led coaltion was formed under the leadership of Sardar Harihar Singh However, his government fell dowen in june 1969 when several members crossed the floor. There after another coalition was formed by Bhola Paswan Shastri with the. support of the SSP,CPI, Jana Sangh and certain other minor parties, however, within eleven days Shastri Government

tenderd its resignation due to withdrawal of support by the Jana sangh.(Appendix II).

In the wake of the Congress split of 1969, new aligments took place amongst the various Congress factions in Bihar while K.B.Shahy, M.P.Shina and S.N.Sinha supported the congress(o), leaders like D.P.Rai etc. supported the Congress (R) Efforts to form a coalition governmant did not yield any results till february 1970 when the revocation of the 227 day second spell of presidents rule was followed by the installation of a three member cabinate headed by D.P.Rai of Congress (R). The Partners of this coalition were BKD, Soshit Dal and the All India Jharkhand Party. The CPI and PSP also extended support to this Ministry D.P.Rai's Ministery stayed in office for 306 days and was ultimately turned out bya non-confidence vote in the Assembly.The D.P.Rai Ministry ran into rough weather due to the simmering discontent over the composition and expansion of the cabinet.

On the fall of the D.P.Rai's Ministery, Karpoori Thakur, the SSP leader, formed a new Coalition (SVD) Minister. This was the ninth ministery in Bihar since the 1967 election. This ministery was in office at the time of the 1971 general election to the Lok Sabha. The success of the Congress (R) was spectacular and was bound to unnerve

the SVD parties. A spate of defection towards Congress (R) followed.the Congress (o) particulerly seemed to be in for landslide defections and ultimately Karpoori Thakur tendered the resignation of his ministery on 1 June, 1971. Once again , B.P.Sastri formed the government with the supportr of the Congress(R), the CPI, the PSP, a Jharkhand and Soshit Dal group. this coalition stayed in office till it was advised to tender resignation to faciltate Assembly election in Ferbery 1972.(Appendix II).

The function of coalition government in various Indian States between 1967 and 1972 was generally charactrised by instability but Bihar have experienced the largest number of cabinet changes. As a matter of fact, the fourth General Electiosn indicated a phase of unstable political process in this state which had a unique pattern of its own. The nature of Party system plagued by factionalism accentuated the process of defections, which in turn resulted in the functining of a highly unstable politics witnessing the formation and the breakdown of as many as nine government, within five years (Appendix-1). But there was nothing very new in these defections except their magnitude, range and character. From March 1967 to December 1971, the life-span of nine governments ranged from four days to ten months (Appendix-II). As many as seven of the nine Chief Ministers

were defectors. In all the nine governments, alltogather 54 defectors shared various ministerial offices and a large number of them enjoyed other political patronages.

In cabinet formation the criteria followed the route of defections. The defectors were accommodated as soon as they changed their party. As this phase witnesed the Backgward Castes occupying the seat of power, so their numerical strength increased in the Cabinet and so also of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. (Appendix-III).

COMPETITIVE DOMINANCE SYSTEM (1972-1977)

In the state Assembly elections of February 1972 the Congress (R) secured a clearcut majority and formed the Government under the chief ministership of Kedar Pandey. He was a nominee of the Central leadership. Mrs Gandhi had responded to the advice of L.N.Mishra that the Brahmin should take a more prominent role in Bihar politics after the defection of Bhumihar and Rajput faction leaders. He was obstructed in his work by members of his own party. When he asked seven of his Minister to resign, the ministers refused. Pandey then resorted to a major reshuffle of the Cabinet in order to drop the unwanted ministers. Fourteen of the ministers appointed to his new Cabinet, however, failed to turn up for the oath taking ceremany. They took the oath

133

of office only after Pandey had agreed to reappoint three of the ministers whom he had dropped. Factional conflict became sharp. Meanwhile, there was mounting pressure for the removal of Pandey himself. On 22 June, 1973 twenty four minister resigned to demonstrate the utter lack of support for Pandey who was then advised to resign. 35 members Pandey had 13 cabinet ministers, 16 ministers of state and 6 deputy minisers. He expanded it thrice taking the total number to 40 including himself. he had refined the technique of circumventing the aggresive Backwards by building up representation of the forwards at the sametime as the proportion of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in his council of minister. His Ministery included 14 from forward castes, 8 from backward castes, 4 each from scheduled castes and scheduled tribe, 2 Muslims and 3 women. As usual north region was given much representation in comparison to the south and chotanagpur region.

After the resignation of Kedar Pandey, Abdul Ghafoor, a muslim became the chief minister. He was also the nominee of L.N.Mishra. In the 22 member Ghafoor Ministery the upper backward use 23 percent while forward were 38 percent, muslims, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes were also represented. In the final before his unceremonious exit Ghafoor had 46 member ministery with three expansions. It

comprised of 21 forwards,8 backwards,6 scheduled castes,5 scheduled tribes 5 muslims and 4 women.As usual north had the upperhand in regional representation.Among them,21 were cabinate ministers ,20 ministers of state and four deputy ministers. The ministry was expanded after the due approval of the high command. But Ghafoors' tenure was not of peace. He was accused of having soft corner for J. P. movement. After he divested Dr.J.M Mishra of Law portfolio,joint statement signed by pro-Mishraite, such as Uma Pandey,G.S. Kant Jha and five former Minister. Mrs P.Gupta, Hemant Jha, Mrs Manorma Pandey, Bittal Paswan, K.N. Sardar said that "we say it in pair that the attitude taken by Mr. Ghafoor has only proved our belief that if he was allowed to continue as the Chief Minister any longer, the Congress in Bihar will suffer immense harm (Patriot,New Delhi,Sep 21,1974). Sitaram Kesari, the BPCC chief accused Ghafoor of facing neither the people nor the legislature, MLA's threatened to censur Ghafoor. the Prime Minister became dissatisfied with Ghafoor's stewwardship but the removal was not possible because it would have the mean bowing down to J.P.'s wishes and in Bihar's caste ridden politics, the replacement by any other caste leader was found impossible. Later on, Kedar Pandey, J.Mishra group combined to oppose Ghafoor. Finally CPB decided to accept the offer of Ghafoor

to step down (The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 12 March 1973). The race for leadership started. Kedar Pandey's candidature was announced and Sidheswar Prasad Singh – Ghafoor – R.L.Singh Yadav – Nagender Jha faction backed him but the Prime Minister wished to see Dr. Mishra elected unanimously.

The third Congress Ministry after 1972 mid-term poll was formed under J.Mishra leadership Mishra finalised the composition of his ministry with central leader including Congress President D.K. Barooah,Mr. U.S. Dikshit, Mr Kamla pati Tripathi and Mrs Indira Gandhi (The search light Patna 10 April,1975) The 16 member ministry included 15 cabinet and one minister of states. It comprised of five upper caste Hindus,four backwards, three harijans two adivasis and two muslims and one woman. While five of the 16 members-ministry were from outgoing ministry of Ghafoor, Mr. N.K. Sinha and Mr. S.P. Verma were MPs and Jawar Hussain, the vice-chancellor of Bihar University. As regard regional representation the nnorth scored over the south and the chotanagpur region. When on 26 June 1975, the President of India accepted Mrs Gandhi's recommendation of declaring an Emergency it was especially despised in Bihar where J.P. symbolized political selflessness throughout the state. The installation of a J.Mishra gave the impression that the

government of Bihar was managed and controlled by Brahmin. The all powerful chief minister,moreover opposed the introduction of reservation for the other Background classes and concentrated his efforts on speeding up the implementation of land reforms. This measure annoyed the Backwards and landed gentry mainly of upper castes as well. Long time adversaries S.N.Sinha and Karpoori Thakur found themselves taking shelter under the common Janata Umbrella. In Bihar the reponse to appeals for support by Janata leaders transcended rivalries between forward castes and backward castes. They joined together in an `allout war' aganist Mrs. Gandhi and the Brahmins. Only the bulk of Harijans remained loyal to the Prime Minister. The Janata won an unprecedented 68 percent of the popular vote. Congress strength dwinded to less than 23 percent.

The Janata Government under Karpoori Thakur was born out of dissidence, the bitter infighting in its rank had been the bane from the outset. The squabbles in the party began right on the eve of the Assembly elections by the State Election Committee Chairman S.N.Sinha, MP, being the President of the State unit of the party also.

It was taken for granted that Sinha, the undisputed leader of the Rajputs in Bihar, who were a powerful force behind J.P.Narayan's agitation in the state and principal

architect of the party's resounding victory in March Lok Sabha polls would be called to head the Government S.N.Sinha had the backing and support of both the Prime Minister and the Party President, Chandrashekhar. But what followed was something for which Mr.Sinha and his supporters had not bargained for. An alliance struck overnight between the BLD and the Jan Sangh, changed the whole situation radically and as a result Karpoori Thakur, defeated Sinha by an overwhelming majority. The peculiar circumstances in which Thakur assumed the Chief Ministership, it became evident that there would be no peace or stability for his Government. His nine-member ministry had three members of the erstwhile BLD including Thakur, while two belonged to the Jana Sangh constituent and one each to the erstwhile Congress (o) and CFD, Jabir Hussain belonged to the Bihar movement of Jayaprakash Narayan. Six person had become ministers for the first time and five of them were new entrants to the assembly. It included a Muslim and a women too. In his entire tenure of Chief Ministership Thakur tried his best to be at peace with all the constituents of Janata Party and after piecemeal expansion five rounds made 37 minister which included 21 cabinet ministers, 12 minister of and one parliamentary secretary. He gave adequate representation to Backward,weaker sections and Harijans too.

But as, it was inevitable, the Rajput-dominated Congress (o), the socialist party and a disgruntled section of the CFD became antagonised. In terms of caste, apart from the Rajput, the Brahmins, the scheduled castes and Adivasis turned hostile to the Chief Minister. However, kayastha felt rehabilitated.

S.N.Sinha had been lying how since his defeat in the leadership contest but the dissidents was being led by Ramanand Tiwari who had been constantly exposing the failure of the Government. Sinha's supportrs become sore over the "caucus" consisting of the Union Home Minister , Charan Singh, the party General secretary Mr Madhu Limaye and the Union Health Minister Raj Narain over the State Government and the total identification of the chief minister with the backword castes.In this context a proposal initiated by the chief minister and his group to raise the precentage of reservation in Government appointments and promotions for backwards castes to 50 percent met with stiff opposition from the ministers belonging to the Sinha faction and precipated a near crisis in the Government. The dissidents whose views were also sharded by the Jan Singh, not objected in principle to raising the reservation limit by they insisted that the main criterion for judging backwardness should be economic and not caste. Factional fight and

144

quarrels between the representatives of the erstwhile constituents of Government often erupted at the cabinet meetings (Hindu, Madras, 12 Nov, 1977) A former socialist and Irrigation minister Sachida Nand Singh walked out from the cabinet meeting and Lalmuni chaube criticised the government of perpetuating casteism and corruption as their congress counterparts. In the meeting of State Janata Legislature Party, demand for resignation of karpoori was raised. Ramanand Tiwari alleged that a mini-emergency was operating in the state in the garb of `kadoot operation'(Hindu, Madras, 12 Nov 1977) With the mounting pressures of dissidents and public unrest over the resarvation issue and chaotic situation in unversity campus, On 19 April, 1979 karpoori Thakur was defeacted by 30 votes mano-confidence motion and paved the way for Ram Sunder Das to become Chief Minister. "Ram Sunder Das, a Harijan restored the forwards to their strongest position in state government since 1967. They received 50 percent of ministerial posts while the backwards were pushed back to 20 percent" (Blair, 1980:69).He made 32 member ministry which included 20 cabinet minister and 12 ministers of state . With the historic split of the Janata Party and formation of the Lok Dal in mid 1979, the Ram Sunder Das Ministry was saved by the support of the Congress (I).

CONGRESS RESURGENCE (1980-1988)

The Congress (I) after its victory in the Lok Sabha elections of January 1980 dismissed all the state goverments it had no use for and dissolved the legistlative assemblies. The Bihar assembly was one of those nine assemblies which came under the Congress (I) axe. Bihar presented a broken down political landscape during the May 1980 Assembly elections with eleven parties contesting and the hospitable electorate not totally rejecting any of them. "The outcome of the June 1980 election was much the same as that of the parliamentary election during the previous January. The Congress (I) managed to retain 33 percent of the vote. The Lok Dal held to 15.4 percent while the congress (V) polled about 7 percent. The divided Janata sustained the largest losses with its fragments polling less then 16 percent" (Blair, 1982:24).

Dr.J.Mishra was elected the leader of the Congress Legislature Party unanimously, although it was done on the choice of the Congress High Command. This was a reward Mishra got for his support to Mrs.Gandhi in the hey days of emergency. Dr.Mishra in the process easily overcame the rival camp of Kedar Pandey. With 18 Cabinet Ministers Mishra took outh on 8 June, 1980 and distributed the portfolios on 9 June 1980. Although Dr. Mishra gave representation to

Forwards, Backwards, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes but his Council of Ministers retained the supremacy of the Forwards and north region got the upper hand to which even the Chief Minister belonged, On May 30, 1982. Dr. Mishra dropped Minister for State for Housing and Law Sagir Ahmed and effected a major reshuiffle of the portfolios of most colleagues to revamp his Ministry (Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 31 May, 1982) But that was not enough to save the sinking boat of Dr.Mishra. Mr.Rajiv Gandhi, the AICC(I) General Secretary was not pleased with him and he took serious note of his dissident activities. But Mishra wanted to prove that he could resist commands from Delhi and that he would definitely not give up the Chief Miniter chair without a fight (Telegraph, Calcutta, 7 Aug. 1983) Replying to a debate on the appropriation Bill, Mishra launched an attack on the Centre blaming it for neglecting the State. "It was almost joining as though he was joining the ranks of N.T.Rama Rao and Farooq Abdullah". (Telegraph, Calcutta, 7 Aug. 1983) His anti-centre stance was evident and the stress seemed to be on regionlism. Mishra, however, defended his action by saying that he had duty towards the electorate. A meeting of pro-Mishraite MLAs was held in Botanical garden in Patna and it was decided that if some one from outside was imposed on the State they would not

accept it. The message was clear in case there was any change in the State leadership, the new leader would have to be chosen from the Congress (I) legislative Party where Mishra still enjoyed a majority especially since he had pampered a number of MLAs with luicrative posts in government organisation.

Chandrashekhar Singh became the Chief Minister after Dr.Mishra was forced to pave the way for him on 14 August, 1983. Mr.Prnab Mukherjee and Mr.Arun Nehru met the MLA's individually and finally Mukherjee said," not everyone subscribes to one opinion, but when most share the same view then it is a consensus....... Yesterday I met most of the MLAs and MLCs and a number of them expressed the view that there was no need to change the leadership. But the consensus was that Chandra Shekhar Singh should be elected the leader." (Telegraph, Calcutta, 19 August, 1983)

The representatives of High command had realised the extent of Mishra's support, yet C.S.Singh had to be made the Chief Minister because that was what Mrs Gandhi wanted. This became evident when a 10 member Cabinet was sworn in at the Raj Bhawan. Only two dissident leaders Nagendra Jha and L.P.Shahi had been included in the Cabinet. All the other, except Rafiq Alam, were members of the Mishra Cabinet. Lahtan Chaudhury and Ramashray Prasad Singh, were included

in the Cabinet under pressure as the ministerialists had thrown up their names as possible successors to Dr.Mishra. The Cabinet formation had,understandably, caused some amount of resentment among the dissident leaders. Some prominent dissident leader like Ashwini Sharma, Shiva Chandra Jha and Yogeswar Prasad Yogesh had not been included. " Jagannath Mishra had blackmailed the high command by having that Cabinet stuffed with his men." (Telegraph, Calcutta, 19 Aug. 1983) C.S.Singh expanded his Ministry raising to a strengh of 26 which included 14 Cabinet and 12 Ministers of State. This Ministry, although gave representation to all section of the society but was in favour of the forwards and as usual north scored over the South. But this awaited expansion was not without surprise. For instance, few of the MLA's who had actively campaigned for the out of the former Chief Miniter Dr.Mishra, had figured in the list of Ministers indicted. One erstwhile dissident MLA was repostedly heard saying to member of the legislature Pary that " we will not allow even this ministry to last long". (Times of India, New Delhi, 28 Oct.1989) And this what happened. A fall out between Mishraite and singh's supporter occurred and Mishra started his vitrolic campaign against the Singh Ministry. "In the meeting for the final instruction prior to election of the state leader, Dr.Mishra

was in a rebellions mood, asserting that he would never allow Chandra Shekhar Singh continue as the Chief Minister. The Prime Minister had obviously directed that Mr.Singh should be reelected as the legislature party leader. However, when it came to the crunch, it was found that Chandra Shekhar Singh was in a hopeless minority and the AICC observer, Bansi Lal, conveyed almost a fait accompli to the Prime Minister on phone: There was no stopping for Bindeshwani Dubey. (Newstime, 25 July 1985)

Dubey was elected leader of the Congress (I) legislature Party on 12 March, 1985 and took oath in the same evening. However, in 14 March, 1985, he constituted his Council of Ministers including 9 Cabinet Ministers and 13 Ministers of State. He reshuffled his Cabinet in February 1986 raised the number of his Cabinet Minister to 14. However he also made 10 Ministers of State with independent charges. The power lever in the Dubey Ministry as usual rested with the forwards although all sections got representation with North dominating over the South. Rajiv Gandhi was against the installation of Dubey who was known to be a Mishra man. In fact all the lobbying and campaigning for Dubey had been organised by Dr.Mishra. The real levers of power in the State were being operated by the back-seat driver,Dr.J.Mishra. Indeed he had become the "

Super Chief Minister" and this had even so right from the start of the Dubey minitry Dubey functioned as the dummy of Dr.Mishra. Dubey had no option but to rehabilitate all Mishra cronies who had been dispossessed of their custy positions during the term of Chandra Shekhar Singh. But there was a fall out between Mishra and Dubey. And Mishra had made it clear to the central Party leadership that he had to be taken into confidence on the choice of Debey's successor. (Patriot, New Delhi 5 Feb. 1984) In Dubey's and Dr.Mishra, the Bihar Congress had two faction leaders. " Caste did not matter much in the two alignments, ambition did. the explosion of discontent against Dubey date back to the Cabinet expansion last February. He failed to ratify many individuals with vaulting ambition". (Times of India, New Delhi, 9 July, 1986). Although Dubey completed 1000 days in power and became the fourth Chief Minister to do so after S.K.sinha, K.B.Sahay and Dr.J.Mishra but three charges shook Dubey. He was accused of castigating a ramshackled power sector in Bihar resulting in the absence of new big industries, public as well private. The second was the attack on implementation of land reforms and third charge by seven dissident Congress-I legislators pertained to the co-operative sector - Dubey's own portfolio. (News Time, Hyderabad 30 Dec.1987) But what delayed the decision of succession most was the "caste factor" that weigh in the

state politics and the exercise in the AICC(I). However, three kingmakers of Bihar politics - Dr.Mishra, Sitaram Kesari and Dr.S.D.Sharma vied with each other to install their own protegy in Bihar. (News time, Hyderabad. 5 Feb.1988) When it became evident that only Brahmin would replace Dubey, who too was a Brahmin, AICC(I) treasuer Kesari and Union Minister of Steel and Mines, M.L.Fotedar prevailed over Dubey to forget about Bihar and come over to Centre. (Statesman, New Delhi, 7 Feb,1988)

Bhagwat Jha Azad became the Chief Minister of Bihar after the departure of Dubey to the Centre. He was the nomineee of the High Command and Dr.Mishra was not happy with his election. He had said," let us wait for six months. Give the new Chief Minister sometime. Though he is from Bihar, he has never dabbled in Bihar politics, soon he will be acquainted with the situation here". (Deccan Herald, Bangalore 22 Feb, 1988) In constituting the 22 member Ministry, Azad took into account not only the caste composition of the State but also the need to give his Government an image quite different from that of the previous regime. Azad gave representation to almost all the groups in the state Congress i.e of Dr.Mishra and S.N.Sinha. Of the 11 Cabinet Ministers and 12 Ministers of State, two were from Yadava Caste,three from Bhumihar, two from

Rajput,three from Kurmi, three Brahmins including the Chief Minister and three Harijans. Three tribals were also included and Muslim got two berths. The Kayastha drew a blank. Azad gave more or less a similar proporation to the various regions in his ministry. He has given weightage to the twin consideration of image of the person concerned and his administrative ability in picking up members of his ministry. (Hindustan Times, New Delhi 22, Feb 1988).

Azad's ministry contained a fair mixture of old and new faces. While Dr.Nagandra Jha, Mochi Rai Munda and Dilkeshwar Ram represented the old faces, the new faces wer represented by Shyam sunder Singh Deeraj, Dilip Kumar Sinha Ishwari Ram Paswan. Mrs.Hembman and A.Ansari Ministry.

Although Azad's Ministry was composit, balanced and corruption free (New Times, Hyderabad 21, Feb. 1988), serious difference as cropped up between him and the Governor. The Governor's frequent reference in his public speeches to the fact that Bihar continued to be backward despite substantial grants from the Centre irked the Chief Minister. Azad became unable to get along with the Governor, the Speaker and a sizeable section of the Congress(I) legislators including Dr.Mishra's group. His leadership proved insensetive to the public. The underworld and

private arimes took over the administration and earthquake relief was not provided to the real victims. He also developed a truce between him and BPCC- I President Tariq Anwar. The law and order situation deteriorated at fast pace and that convinced the High Command to change the leadership in Bihar.

S.N.Sinha became the third Chief Minister since the last assembly elctions. He was a nominee of High Command and Dr.Mishra backed him fully. S.N. Sinha was nominated to lead Bihar in order to counter-balance the effect of V.P.Singh on the Rajput voters. With BPCC(I) President Dr.Mishra and Chief Minister S.N.Sinha, the High Command sought to capture power in coming election. As usual in the CLP meeting ,Sinha's name was proposed by Azad and seconded by Dr.Mishra, Bhisma Prasad Yadav, Mahabir Paswan and Ram Jaipal Singh Yadev. However, the former BPCC (I) Chief Tariq Anwar did not join his Ministry. The five-month old Ministry was expanded with induction of 33 members on 24 August, 1989. The total strengh of sinha Ministry went up to 45 with 17 Cabinet Ministers. 21 Ministers of State and 7 Deputy Ministers. The Ministry once again demonstrated that Mishraites were not given due representation and Sinha relied heavily on the followers of Azad, Dubey, AICC (I) tresurer, Sita Ram Kesari and former BPCC (I) chief Tariq

Anwar. Sinha although gave representation to the all the sections but it was loaded in favour of the forwards and the north once again scored over the south and chotanagpur region.

During the period (1980-1988) a new kind of culture developed in the selection of the Chief Ministerhip in the State : In the name of unanimously election, it was virtually the selection of the High Command, the `sky-labbing' of Chief Ministers took place and Dr. Mishra proved his mantle in running the state. It was virtually the tacit agreement between the High command and Dr.Mishra which resulted in different permutation and combination in the process of change of Chief Ministers. Factions of Dr. Mishra, AICC (I) treasure Sitaram Kesari, Dubey. R.L.Singh Yadav and S.N.Sinha played important role in functioning of the Government. Every Chief Ministry took due consideration in Ministry-making of these factins. The Ministeries were loaded in favour of Forward castes but in 1977 Karpoori Ministry had actainly given the taste of power to the Backwards, so the Chief Ministers tried to rope them even too. In the regional representation, the north dominated the south and chotanagpur regions.

EMERGENCE OF JANATA DAL

With the emergence of Janata Dal under the leadership of V.P.Singh, a second wave of anti-congressism developed throughout the country. V.P.Singh became the Prime Minister and the State political set up too went for a total change. In the Assembly election held in March 1990, Janata Dal secured a comfortable majority in Bihar. Laloo Prasad Yadav became the Chief Minister on 10 March 1990. Initially Yadav had 11 member Ministry mainly consisting of his trusted lieutenants. But after the defection of Chandra Shekhar group in the Centre from the V.P.Singh's Janata Dal and subsequent change of stand of UP Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav and Gujarat Chief Minister Chiman Bhai Patel, Yadav thought it a safe bet to expand his ministry. Yadav who was so far running the state adminisataion with a small 11 member cabinet inflated it by 65 ministers to a record of 76. accomadating all his loyalists as well as potential dissidents. However, six ministers did not take the oath for various. reasons (Telegraph,calcutta,16Dec, 1990) of the 59 members invited, 25 were of cabinet rank, 27 were ministers of state, 7 deputy ministers. So the number of cabinet minister shoot upto 33 and of ministers of state to 30. Among the expanded members 17 were Yadavas and 9 were Rajputs. The representation of caste and communities was as

follows. Muslims (7), Brahmin (5), Bhumihars (3), Schedule castes (9) and others.(Telegraph, Calcutta, 6th December 1990) Through this expansion Yadav wanted to prove that he can be there by any hook or crook. He did tried his best to satisfy the factious of Ramsundar Das and Hind kesari Yadav(he belongs to erstwhile Bahuguna faction of the Lok Dal).

From the above description it becomes clear that the position of Chief Minister largely determines the formation of his Council of Ministers. The faction ridden party chief has always to satisfy the various factions and personalities. This was the situation prevailing in Congress before 1967 when it was characterise by the intra-party conflict amoung various personal caste-based factions.

The Era of non-congressism (1967-71) saw the accommdation of various coalition parteners in the Ministry. It was something of an opportunistic alliance. The advent of Kapoori Thakur on the political scene of Bihar brought a major change in the polities of Bihar. The Backward Castes especially and others first time tasted the fruits of political power and it made them conscious of their representation in the Council of Ministers. In the 80's, once again congress returned to power and brought a

different style of selecting or 'sky-labbying' of Chief Ministers. The thrusted Chief Ministers had always to face adversaries on all fronts. The Mishra faction dominated the scene and it depended on him to whom to accept or reject. The enigma of Mishra even sometimes made the High Commond to retreat. The advent of Janata Dal of Laloo Prasad brought the different type of politics — of clinging to power by whatever means. His expansion mania earned him a special place in the history of ministery-making. Anyway, two things standout that the Forwards got maximum representation in the council of ministers and north region always scored over the south and Chotanagpur region.

COMPOSITION AND TRENDS IN CABINET FORMATIONS IN BIHAR

The cabinet forms the core of political power in a parliamentary form of Government. It is the very centre of power around which everything revolveas and men at the helm of affairs in the cabinet are considered to be the most powerful in the entire political set up. The process of cabinet formation in a state requires the Chief Minister to exercise political skills and demands and understanding of the personality of the candidate being choosen a member of the cabinet and his influence over the party. As has been pointed out earlier, the formation of cabinet depends also on the three situational political status of the chief ministers in state i.e. whether he is 'Showman', 'Spokesman' or the 'Postman.' His mode of election or selection too influences the cabinet making process apart from the factors of factionalism, groupism and regionalism, certain other factors like caste, community and other para-political systems are also taken into account while forming the cabinet.

Here, an attempt is being made to study the compositional trends of cabinet formation in Bihar under different Chief Ministers during 1952-1990. All the Chief

Ministers who have completed a minimum of one year in office have been considered for the study. The time atleast one year in office is justified in the sense that it is not possible for a Chief Minister to concretize his cabinet at once. He has to take some time to weigh the strength and weakness of a person as well as his hold on the party. One year period can also be treated as sufficient time for consoliating one's hold over the Cabinet. The effect of change in the Centre can also influence the Cabinet-making in the State and subsequent nature of High Command can also be judged during the said period on this criteria out of 27 Chief Ministers, 12 can be consider for the study in Bihar.

POSITION OF CHIEF MINISTERS

Since independence, Congress has enjoyed the fruits of political power in Bihar except for a brief period in coalition phase of 1967-71 (although later coalition was headed by Congress), 1977-80 and at present since 1989 it is on the opposition bench. Naturally, in this scheme of study, the Congress Chief Ministers are in majority except Karpoori Thakur (1977-80) and Laloo Prasad Yadav (1989 to present). Congress which had converted itself into a political party had mass base just after the independence, so the regional leaders had their own standing and they were

`king-makers' or `Regional-satrap'. S.K.sinha falls in this category. After that all the Chief Ministers of Bihar were `showmen' which included even Karpoori Thakur. Laloo Prasad Yadav has latally acquired the position of `spokesman'. During the coalition phase, the Chief Ministers were ` Postmen': The position of the Chief Ministers were weak as it is evident from their stay in office (Appendix I) out of 27 Chief Ministers, Satish Prasad Singh was in office for only 5 days and S.K.Sinha enjoyed this position for 8 years, 9 months and 2 days which is a record. He also holds the record of being the only longest serving Chief Minister till his death in 1961 in India. Person wise, 20 persons became the Chief Minister of Bihar in which S.K.Sinha, B.N.Jha and Karpoori Thakur became Chief Minister twice and B.P.Shastri and J.Mishra thrice. The State also experienced President's rule five times. This shows the weak position of the Chief Ministers and political instability in the State.

CENTRAL INTERFERENCE : `SKY-LABBYING' OF CHIEF MINISTERS

The Centre or the Central leaders or the High Command have interfered in Bihar politics as a routine affairs. The Chief Ministers were guided by the whims and fancies of the High Command and their blue-eyed boys at the Centre. It

started just after independence. After the death of S.K.Sinha in 1961. Athough Party HIgh Command had denied to have played an interfering role in selection of successor of S.K.Sinha but Nehru wished to see Bindoanand Jha on Chief Minister's gaddi. After 1972 it was L.N.Mishra and company at the Centre who aided and advised Mrs.Gandhi in frequent transfer of the Chief Ministers. After 1980 onward, it was Mrs.Gandhi's personal wish in `sky-labbing' of Chief Ministers in Bihar. Karpoori Thakuar had to rush to Delhi to get clearance for his Cabinet formation who became Chief Minister due to change of stand in Jana Sangh and Lok Dal combine which had resulted in defeat of S.N.Sinha in leadership contest. Laloo Prasad Yadav too, assumed the Chief Ministership with the backing of the Centre by side-tracking veteran Ram Sunder Das.

FACTIONALISM

The intra-party feud had been the bane of Congress party in Bihar and this weakness has given unnecessary power to central leaders or the High Command to intervene in State Politics and especially in formation of the Cabinet. It was Dr.Rajendra Prasad and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who intervened to seek out differences between the factions of S.K.Sinha and A.N.Sinha. Later on, M.P.Sinha and K.B.Sahay were at logger heads but they ultimately combined to defeat

Binodanand Jha's nominee Birchand Patel, a Kurmi. Since the death of A.N.Sinha, his son S.N.Sinha has enjoyed a considerable following in Rajputs or better to say of a section of Congress in Bihar. During the coalition phase it was nothing but the factionalism at its worst. Karpori Thakur of Janata Party had to face the onslaught of the faction of S.N.Sinha. After 1972 when Congress regained power, there were factions of L.N.Mishra, Kedar Pandey, Sitaram Kesari and later on, of Dr.Jagannath Mishra after the demise of L.N.Mishra in a bomb-blast. It was L.N.Mishra who intervened in oath taking ceremony of Harinath Mishra in Kadar Panday Ministry in which later his brother Dr.Jagannath Mishra was accommodated. In 1980's onward, it is powerful Mishra faction which is dominating Bihar Congress and which played a major role in changing Chief Ministers. Laloo Prasad Yadav faces Ram Sunder Das faction. Hence, it is crystal clear that which ever party may be in power in Bihar, factionalism played an important role in Cabinet-Making which was mainly based on caste than or personality. The faction leader got their demand fulfilled as per their political weight compared more number of followers than personalities, their standing in the party and relation with the Central High Command of their respective parties.

An Analysis of Cabinet Ministers (1952-1990)

	S.K. Sinha	B.N Jha	K.B Sahay	K. Pandey	A Ghafoor	J Mishra	K Thakur	J Mishra	C.S Singh	B Dubey	B.J Azad	L.P Yadav	Total
Toatal	18	16	11	18	22	15	24	18	17	16	11	34	220
Male	18	16	10	17	21	14	23	18	16	15	10	33	211
Female	-	-	01	01	01	01	01	-	01	01	01	01	09
North	07	07	03	09	12	06	07	09	07	07	04	17	95
South	09	03	05	05	02	01	12	02	06	04	03	12	64
Chota- nagpur	-	01	01	03	05	03	03	04	01	02	01	01	25
Hindu	15	12	09	14	18	12	22	15	14	15	10	30	187
Muslim	03	03	02	03	02	02	02	03	03	01	01	04	29
Chris- tian	-	01	-	01	01	01	-	-	-	-	-	-	04
Forwa- rds	11	09	04	06	08	05	06	08	08	07	04	11	87
Upper (BC)	03	01	03	05	05	03	08	04	04	05	03	12	56
Lower (BC)	-	-	-	-	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	02	03
SC	01	01	01	02	03	02	02	01	01	02	02	04	22
ST	-	02	01	02	03	02	02	02	01	01	01	01	18

(Source : Appendix - IV to XV)

MEN/WOMEN REPRESENTATION

In the present scheme of study, it has become apparent that inspite of hue and cry of different political parties to give adequate representation to women, only 9 (4.09%) were able to be Cabinet Ministers in Bihar whereas 211 (95.90%) men enjoyed this opportunity.

Although, in the Council of Ministers two women included as earlier as on 6th July 1957 in the reshuffled Ministry of S.K.Sinha but their percentage never increased. In the Cabinet, the first lady to come was Mrs.Sumitra Devi in K.B.Sahay Ministry on 12th May,1962. The reason for this can be found out in the conservative social set-up of Bihar. The women who join politics are not accorded a place of respects even today. Over the years those who have joined the politics and become Cabinet members or even members of Council of Ministers are from the political family or have the blessings of some political god father. Now, women have started stepping into the shoes of their late fathers and husbands. But one thing is to be noted here that out of 9 women Cabinet Ministers and Mrs.Ram Dulari Sinha thrice, Mrs.Sumitra Devi and Mrs.Uma Pandey twice, Mrs. Prabhavati Gupta and Mrs. Sudha Srivastava one each have enjoyed this

opportunity,. In otherway, only five women have became cabinet ministers and three of them were from Forward castes and two from Upper Backwards.

REGIONAL REPRESENTATION

The fertile North region has more representation in the cabinet. It is 95 (44.09%) out of 220 cabinet minister. It is because of two factors. The majority of the chief ministers who fall in this scheme of study belonged to this region and it also sends more MLA's in comparison to other regions. This can be generalized for all time because politically it is most conscious region and heavy weights and faction leaders of political parties in these days are from this region.

The South region (29.09%) has more representation than chotanagpur (11.36%), although there is not much difference of numerical strength in sending MLA's. South had got upper hand over North during Dr.S.K.Sinha and Karpoori Thakur Ministry only while Chotanagpur had more share over South in Abdul Ghafoor and second Ministery of Dr.J.Mishra. The industrial belt of Chotanagpur has witnessed popular `Jharkhard Movement' which is older than independence has led to the formation of a political party called' Jharkhand Mukti Morcha'. This party has fought election, time and again has worked as appendage of Congress Party.(Although

presently, it is not with the Congress Party) There are more reserved seats in comparison to any other regions. So Parties in power, after giving a nominal representation from this area felt satisfied.

RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION

It is but natural that Hindus have got more representation (85.00%) which is proportional to their population of 83.5 percent in comparison to Muslim's (13.18%) population of 12.5 percent. The christians have got 1.8 percent representation in the cabinet which seems also proportional to their population. They are mostly converted tribals who have a acquired elite status among them and drainway the fruits of development for their well-being and political benefits.

CASTE REPRESENTATION

Caste is the most pervasive factor in politics in Bihar and it has influenced not only the making and unmaking of the Chief Ministers but also the Cabinet Ministers. The forward castes have dominated the Cabinets and they have 39.54 percent representation which is more in proportion to their population of only 13 percent. It is because they are at the apex of political scene since independence. Only three Chief Ministers D.D.Rai., Karpoori Thakur and

presently Laloo Prasad Yadav have given them less representation in comparison to Upper Backwards. Although during coalition period B.P.Mandal had given Upper Backwards and Lower Backwards (Appendix III) more representation in the Council of Ministers but not in Cabinet. But the coalition politics increased the value of legislators. The process of defection brought into limelight the sense of their importance in State Politics especially in case of Upper Backwards. Now, Forward Castes citadel is shaking. Castewise, Brahmins have enjoyed 35.63 per cent representation in camparison to Rajput's 28.73 per cent, Bhumihar's 24.13 per cent and Kayastha 11.49 per cent. This figure is more in comparison to their respective population of 4.7 per cent, 4.2 per cent, 2.9 per cent and 1.2 per cent. Their share is more than the proportion to their population because at any cost they have tried to outwit Upper Backwards from gaining political power by aligning with Harijans and Scheduled Tribes. So, also when opportunity came they opposed the Upper Backwards together. A case in point here is that of Birchand Patel to defeat whom the antagonistic factions of M.P.Sinha, a Bhumihar and K.B.Sahay, a Kayastha aligned and later S.N.Sinha fall out from Binodanand Jha. They have tried to share power even by means of money and mussel but have divided the political spoils according to their proportion in population.

The Upper Backwards have their share of 25.45 per cent which is as per their proportion in population, i.e 19.3 per cent. Among them, the Yadav due to their numerical strength of 11 per cent in population has got 39.28 per cent representation in the Cabinet followed by Kurmi (28.57%), Bania (21.42%) and Koiri (10.71%). Their respective shares in population are 3.6 per cent, 0.6 per cent and 4.1 per cent. It is discernible from the above figures that Kurmis are politically more dominant in Upper Backwards followed by Yadav, Bania and Koiri. This is because this caste has emerged economically in the Gangetic belt of Bihar after the Zamindari abolition and forms a new type of rising political elite with Yadav which are described variously as `rising kulak power' or `bullock cart-capitalist.' The green revolution has benfitted them and emergence of Janata Party in 1977 virtually become the bench mark for them. The politics for them is now stimulating and enterprising. They are head bent to replace the dominance of Forward Castes. Banias, who are mainly traders have improved their political position through money power whereas the Koiris, still economically weak incomparison to all three, are not represented in proportion to their population.

Lower Backwards have virtually been consumed by the

Upper Backwards due to their weaker economic position and rigid traditional-occupational structures for their all political purposes. Karpoori Thakur was the only Chief Minister from the Lower Backwards, who identified himself more with Upper Backwards than Lower. His clarion call of Backward-Forward divide and reservation infused the Upper Backwards to out wit Forwards politically. In spite of 32 per cent of population of Lower Backwards, their share in Cabinet in Scheme of this study stands only at 1.36 percent.

The Scheduled Castes have got more or less representation as per their population of 14.4 per cent in the Cabinet. Among the 10 per cent of their share in Cabinet, Dusadh has 36.36 per cent representation, followed by chamar (27.27%), Dhobi (13.63%), others too (13.63%), and Mushar (9.09%). In the past they remained aligned with Forward Castes who used them especially in voting but the advent of Janata Dal has made them militant.

The Scheduled Tribes, who are mainly in chotanagpur region and a section of them are converted Christians, have 8.18 per cent representation in Cabinet which is near to their population of 9.1 percent. Their share remains such despite of majority of them being the member of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. It can also be understood then that their

representation mainly came through converted Christians who are in Congress.

REPRESENTATION OF MLAs AND MPs

In this scheme of study it is also found that 20(9.09%) members of Cabinet came from State Legislative Council. It can be interpreted variously as competence of the members, their maneuvering capability, nearness to centre of political power in the State personal choice of the Chief Minister, their own heavy weight or the interest in them of the High Command and Central leaders as was in case of Abdul Ghafoor and at present in Laloo Prasad Yadav.

It is also discernible from the figure that 8 (3.63%) Members of Parliament enjoyed the status of Cabinet Minister in Bihar. Out of them 5 were the Chief Ministers as per the Scheme of this Study. This demonstrates the interference of Central Leaders and High Command in the politics of Bihar and especially in Cabinet formation.

As has already been pointed out the three situational political positions of the Chief Ministers have greatly influenced the politics of Cabinet formation in Bihar. Most of them were `Skylobbed' Chief Ministers or `Showmen' who danced on the tune of High Command and found enemies or all fronts — the legislators. The speakers, the Governor and the State party heaving weight members.

The rampant factionalism in the ruling party always provided the scope for the Central leaders or the High Command to intervene in State politics at regular intervals. The factions were caste-based rather than personality-based.

The women have not been given due representation in the formation of the Cabinet although all parties claim to give them fair chances in every fields of life. This is also due to conservative social set-up of Bihar where entering into politics for a women is not considered good.

The North region got more share in the Cabinet because of their numerical strength of MLAs. Majority of Chief Ministers also belonged to this region. The impact of gamindari revolution and of green revolution which brought sea-change in the agrarian economy of this Gangetic plan

172

made the people politically conscious too.

Hindus, Muslims and critions are represent proportionally to their population in the Cabinet.

Although the upper castes have dominated the politics of Bihar among them selves they are represented proportionally to their population in the Cabinet. For maintaining their dominance they aligned sometimes with Harijans and Muslims.

Among the Upper Backwards, it is the Kurmi Caste which has dominated the share in Cabinet formation. Banias comes next, where share is more than their population. Lower Backwards have been under utilized by Upper Backwards for political purposes and hence there representation is very low.

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have got representation in proportion to their population in the Cabinet.

Representation of MLAs and MPs in Cabinet Ministry indicates the personal preference of the High Command, Central leaders and the State Chief Ministers

Now, from this we can make out some probabilistic trends for the future. The intervention of Central leaders

or High Command can not be ruled out even in future. There would be a difference of degree only. It would be more if Congress comes back to power and, in case of other parties it will be mild.

There is not a single ray of hope that women would march hand in hand with men in the formation of the Cabinet.

As usual, the North region would be in a dominant position because of their numerical strength as well as proximity to the levers of powers in State politics.

The trend in case of religious repersantation will remain the same in the days to come.

So far the caste factor is concerned, the Brahmins and Rajputs would dominate while Bhumihars will be engaging themselves in different activities apart from politics like private ventures of opening colleges, cinema halls and .settling in urban areas for trading and industrial purposes. Kayasthas seem to be the force of by gone days.

The Upper Backwards would pose a neck and neck challenge to Forward Castes. Apart from Congress, the other parties would give them more preference and spoils of political power. Even in Congress, they will be getting their due but not like in other parties. They have become a

force to reckon with and their supremacy in future will not be questioned due to their numerical majority. Kurmis and Yadavas would has benefited more because they are not only politically conscious but their economic status also has grown and they are what Blair Calls. The rising Kulaks or Bullock cart-capitalist. As they are likely to control agrarian economy of Bihar, their dominance in years to come in State politics and Cabinet cannot be ruled out.

The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes would get the similar share which they are getting now but their assertion is likely to grow in coming days. Among the Scheduled Tribes, whose political participations centre around their christian converts are likely to be challenged due to growing awareness among them for their rights and consequently in politics of Cabinet formation.

The trend of having MLCs and MPs as Cabinet Ministers is like to continue in future also as a sign of Central intervention, personal choice of the Chief Minister, of thir aproximity to the levers of power or individual Heavy weighti and as faction leader.

Appendix -I

Statement showing name, party and duration of Chief Ministers.

SNo.	Chief ministers	Party	Duration
1.	Dr.S.K.Sinha	Congress	29.4.52 - 27.3.57
2.	Dr.S.K.Sinha	Congress	27.3.57 - 31.1.61
3.	Mr.D.N.Singh	Congress	01.2.61 - 18.2.61
4.	Mr.B.N.Jha	Congress	18.2.61 - 03.0.61
5.	Mr.B.N.Jha	Congress	04.0.62 - 1.11.63
6.	Mr.K.B.Sahay	Congress	02.2.63 - 5.03.67
7.	Mr.M.P.Sinhg	Janakranti Dal	06.3.67 - 28.1.68
8.	Mr.S.P.Singh	Shosit Dal	28.1.68 - 1.02.68
9.	Mr.B.P.Mandal	Shosit Dal	01.2.68 - 22.3.68
10.	Mr.B.P.Shastri	Loktantrik Dal	22.3.68 - 29.6.68

PRESIDENT'S RULE — 29.6.68 - 26.2.69

| 11. | Mr.Harinder Singh | Congress | 26.2.69 - 20.6.69 |
| 12. | Mr.B.P.Shastri | Loktantrik dal | 20.6.69 - 04.7.69 |

PRESIDENT'S RULE — **04.07.69 - 16.02.70**

13.	Mr.D.P.Rai	Congress(R)	16.02.70 - 22.12.70
14.	Mr.K.Thakur	Samyukta Socialist	22.12.70 - 02.06.70
15.	Mr.B.P.Shastri	Congress(R)	02.06.71 - 09.01.72

PRESIDENT'S RULE — 09.01.72 - 19.03.72

16.	Mr.Kedar Pandey	Congress	19.03.72 - 02.07.73
17.	Mr.Abdul Ghafoor	Congress	02.07.73 - 11.04.75
18.	Dr.J.Mishra	Congress	11.04.75 - 30.04.77

PRESIDENT'S RULE — 30.04.77 - 24.06.77

| 19. | Mr.K.Thakur | Janta Party | 24.06.77 - 21.04.79 |
| 20. | Mr.Ram Sunder Dass | Janta Party | 21.04.79 - 18.02.80 |

PRESIDENT'S RULE — 18.02.80 - 08.06 80

21.	Dr.J.Mishra	Congress -I	08.06.80 - 14.08.83
22.	Mr.C.S.Singh	Congress -I	15.08.83 - 12.03.85
23.	Mr.B.Dubey	Congress -I	12.03.85 - 13.02.88

SNo.	Chief ministers	Party	Duration
24.	Mr.B.Jha.Azad	Congress -I	13.20.88 - 10.03.89
25.	Mr.S.N.Sinha	Congress -I	11.03.89 - 16.12.89
26.	Dr.J.Mishra	Congress -I	06.12.89 - 10.03.90
27.	Mr.L.P.Yadav	Janta Dal	10.03.90 - Continuing.

Appendix-II

Life span of Coalition Government in Bihar 1967-72

Chief Ministers	Parties in Coatition	From	uptill
Mr. M.P. Sinha	SSP,PSP,IS,CPI,JKD	5.3.67	28.1.68
Mr. S.P. Singh	Minority Ministry Backed by Congress	28.1.68	1.2.68
Mr. B.P. Mandal	Soshit Dal Backed by Congress	1.2.68	22.3.68
Mr. B.P. Shastri	LTD,CPI,JANTA,JS	23.3.68	29.6.68
PRESIDENT'S RULE MIDTERM POLL FEBRUARY		29.6.68	26.2.69
Mr.Harihar Singh	Congress Janta Soshit	26.2.69	20.6.69
Mr. B.P. Shastri	LTD,Soshit,BKD Jhakband backed by SSP,JS,CPI	20.6.69	4.7.69
PRESIDENT'S RULE		4.7.69	16.2.70
Mr. Daroga Rai	Congress(R),Jharkhand, Soshit backed by CPI,PSP	16.2.70	22.12.70
Mr. Karpoori Thakur	SSP,Congress(o),JS,SWT, Janta,BKD,Soshit,a section of PSP	22.12.70	2.6.71
Mr. B.P. Shastri	Congress (R),CPI,PSP,Soshit, Jharkhand(Horo)	2.6.71	9.1.72

(Source : Official record, Assembly Library Patna)

Appendix-III

Caste Composition of Ministers in Bihar(1967-1971)

Ministry	Upper Castes	Lower Middle Castes	Lower Castes	Scheduled castes	Scheduled Tribes	Muslim	Others	Total
1. Mr. M.P. Sinha,1967	12	4	1	1	-	1	2	21
2. Mr. B.P. Mandal,1968	8	11	1	3	6	4	2	35
3. Mr. B.P. Shastri,1968	7	2	-	1	1	1	1	13
4. Mr. Harihar Singh, 1969	4	8	-	3	5	3	-	33
5. Mr. B.P. Shastri,1969	6	6	-	2	2	3	-	19
6. Mr. D.P. Rai,1970	8	11	1	4	5	2	-	31
7. Mr. Karpoori Thakur	19	15	2	5	5	4	3	53
8. Mr. B.P. Shastri,1971	14	7	1	6	3	2	1	34

(Source : Rai and Pandey, 1981 : 55)

—

179

Dr. S.K. Sinha(20.4.52-31.1.61)

S.No.	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste	Consitituency
1.	Dr. S.k Sinha	M	S	Hindu	Bhumihar F.C.	Kharagpur
2.	Sri A.N. Sinha	M	S	Hindu	Rajput F.C.	Nabinagar
3.	Sri Ramcharitra Singh	M	N	Hindu	Bhumihar F.C.	Teghra
4.	Sri Badrinath Verma	M	S	Hindu	Kaystha F.C.	Patna city cum-Naubat pur
5.	Sri K.B Sahay	M	S	Hindu	Kaystha F.C	Giridih-cum-Dumri
6.	Sri D.N. Singh	M	N	Hindu	Rajput F.C.	Maner
7.	Sri M.P. Sinha	M	N	Hindu	BhumiharF.C.	Muzaffurpur-cum-Sakra
8.	Sri S.P. Mandal	M	S	Hindu	Yadav U.B.C	Murliganj
9.	Sri D.S. Singh	M	S	Hindu	Kurmi U.B.C	Patwa
10.	Salah Md	M	N	Muslim		Benipatti west
11.	Md Shafi	M	MLC	Muslim		
12.	Sri B.P Shastri	M	N	Hindu	Dusadh Sc	Dhamdaha
13.	Sri Harinath Mishra	M	N	Hindu	BrahminF.C	Madhubani
14.	Sri B.N Jha	M	S	Hindu	BrahminF.C.	Rajmahal
15.	Sri B.C Patel	M	N	Hindu	Kurmi U.B.C	Lalganj south
16.	Sri. Jagat Narayan lal	M	S	Hindu	Kayastha F.C	Danapur
17.	Kr. Ganganand Singh	M	MLC	Hindu	Brahmin F.C	
18.	Maqbul Ahmd	M	S	Muslim		Colgong

M= Male   N=North   F.C =Forward Castes   SC= Scheduled Castes
F=Female   S=South   U.B.C =Upper Backward Castes   ST= Scheduled Tribes
    C=Chotanagpur   L.B.C =Lower Backward Castes

Appendix-V

Sri. B.N. Jha (10.2.61-1.10.63)

S.No.	Name	M/F	Region	Religon	Caste		Consitiuency
1.	Sri B.N Jha	M	C	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Rajmahal
2.	Sri D.N Singh	M	N	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Hasipur
3.	Sri B.P Shastri	M	N	Hindu	Dusadh	SC	Dhamdaha
4.	Sri B.C Patel	M	N	Hindu	Kurmi	UBC	Lalganj(South)
5.	Sri S.N Sihha	M	MP	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Aurangabad
6.	Zaffar Iman	M	MLC	Muslim			
7.	Sri R.P Lal	M	MLC	Hindu	Kayastha	FC	
8.	Jawar Hussain	M	N	Muslim			Zeradie
9.	Sri J.R Mishra	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Dashyanga(South)
10.	Sri K.B Sahay	M	S	Hindu	Kayastha	FC	Patna(west)
11.	Sri B. Verma	M	S	Hindu	Kayastha	FC	Patna(South)
12.	Sri M.P Sinha	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Sakra(Muzaffar pur)
13.	Sri H.Mishra	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Bahera(Dashianga)
14.	Sri S.C.Tulid	M	MLC	Christian		ST	
15.	Sri Jaipal Singh(MP)	M	MP	Hindu		ST	Ranchi west
16.	Abdul Quyxum Ansari	M	S	Muslim			Dehri-on-Sone

181

Sri. K.B. Sahay (2.10.63-5.3.67)

S.No.	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Consitituency
1.	Sri K.B Sahay	M	S	Hindu	Kayastha	FC	Patna west
2.	Sri S.N Sinha	M	N	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Nahinagar
3.	Sri M.P Sinha	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Sakra
4.	Abdul.Q.Hussian	M	S	Muslim			Dehri-on-Sone
5.	Sri B.C Patel	M	N	Hindu	Kurmi	UBC	Lalgang South
6.	Zaffar Iman	M	MLC	Muslim			
7.	Sri S.K Bage	M	C	Hindu		ST	Kolibera
8.	Sri R.L S.Yadev	M	S	Hindu	Yadev	UBC	Peligang
9.	Sri Mungari Lal	M	MLC	Hindu	Dukdh	SC	
10.	Ms.Sumita Devi	F	S	Hindu	Koiri	UBC	Avrah
11.	Sri H. Mishra	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Bahera-west

Sri. Kedar Panday (12.3.72-2.7.73)

S.No.	Name	M/F	Region		Religion	Caste		Consitiuency
1.	Sri K. Pandey	M	N	←	Hindu —	Brahmin	FC	Raxaul
2.	Sri D.R Rai	M	N	←	Hindu	Yadev	UBC	Parsa
3.	Abdul Q.Ansari	M	S	←	Muslim			
4.	Sri L.P Shahi	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin →		FC	Vashali
5.	Sri C.P Singh	M	S	Hindu	Rajput ——→		FC	Chakai
6.	Mrs. R.D.Sinha	F	N	Hindu	Rajput ——→		FC	Gopalganj
7.	Dr. J. Mishra	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin →		FC	Jhanjharpur
8.	Sri L.Choudhary	M	N	Hindu	Bania ——→		UBC	Mahisi
9.	Sri N.Baitha	M	N	Hindu	Dhobi ——→		SC	Bagha
10.	Theodar Batra	M	C	Christian→			ST	Chakradpur
11.	T. M.R. Munda	M	C	Hindu →			ST	Khunti
12.	Sri R.P. Singh	M	S	Hindu →	Kurmi ——→		UBC	Chandi
13.	Rafiq Alam	M	N	Muslim —→				Kishanganj
14.	S.R.J.S.Yadev	M	N	Hindu	Yadev —→		UBC	Sonepur
15.	I. Hai Khan	M	S	Muslim→ Baghmara →————————→				
16.	Sri B Dubey	M	C	Hindu→ Brahmin→			FC	Bermo
17.	SriR.S.P Singh	M	S	Hindu→ Kurmi →			UBC	Islampur
18.	Sri T.Parasad	M		Hindu→			SC	Ganwar

Appendix-VIII

A. Ghafoor (2.7.73–11.4.75)

S.No.	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Consituency
1.	Abdul Ghafoor	M	MLC	Muslim			Madhubani
2.	Sri D.P Rai	M	N	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Persa
3.	Mrs. Ram Dulari Sinha	F	N	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Gopalganj
4.	Sri C.P Singh	M	S	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Chakai
5.	Dr. J Mishra	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Jhanjharpur
6.	Sri Lahtan Choudry	M	N	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Mahisi
7.	Sri Mungeri Lal	M	MLC	Hindu	Dusadh	SC	
8.	Sri S.S Singh	M	C	Hindu			Hisua
9.	Dr. Ramraj Pol Singh	M	S	Hindu	Kurmi	UBC	Chandi
10.	Sri R.Jaipal Singh Yadav	M	N	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Sonepur
11.	Sri Vidyakar Kavi	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Alamnagar
12.	Siddui Hembnum	M	C			ST	Jagannathpur
13.	Sri Karamchand Bhagat	M	C	Hindu		ST	
14.	Sri Narsingh Baitha	M	N	Hindu	Dhobi	SC	Bagha
15.	Sri Jai Narayan Mehta	M	N	Hindu	Koiri	UBC	Dhandaha
16.	Sri Kedar Panday	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Raxaul
17.	Sri Baleshwar Ram	M	N	Hindu	Chamar	SC	Hayaghat
18.	Theodor Batra	M	C	Christian			Chakradharpur
19.	Sri L.P Shastri	M	N	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Vaishali
20.	Rafiq Alam	M	N	Muslim			Kishanganj
21.	Sri B. Dubey	M	C	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Bermo
22.	Sri Shankar Dayal Singh	M		Hindu	Rajput	FC	Topchanchi

Appendix-IX

Dr. J. Mishra (11.4.75 - 30.4.77)

S.No	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Consituency
1.	Dr.J.Mishra	M	N Hindu	Brahmin	FC		Thanjhar Pur
2.	Smt.R. Dulari Sinha	F	N Hindu	Rajput	FC		Gopalganj
3.	Dr.Ramraj Singh	M	S Hindu	Kurmi	UBC		Chandi
4.	Jabhar Hussain	M		Muslim			
5.	Sri.N.Kishore Sinha	M	MPHindu				
6.	Sri.R.S.S.Yadav	M	N Hindu	Yadav	UBC		Sonepur
7.	Sri.B.Dubey	M	C Hindu	Brahmin	FC		Bermo
8.	Sri.Vidyakar Kavi	M	N Hindu	Brahmin	FC		Alamnagar
9.	Sri.R.S.Pal Singh	M	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC		
10.	Sri.Narsing Baitha	M	N Hindu	Dhobi	SC		Bagha
11.	Jheodir Bodra	M	C Christion		ST		Chakredharpur
12.	Sri.K. Chand Bhagut	M	Hindu		ST		Bero
13.	Sri.S. Pal Verma	M	MPHindu	Koiri	UBC		
14.	Sri.Ram Ratan Ram	M	C Hindu	Chamar	SC		Silli
15.	Md.Hussain Azad	M	N Muslim			BC	Thakurganj ←

Appendix-X

Sri. K.Thakur (24.6.77 -21.4.79)

S.No	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Consituency
1.	Sri.K.Thakur	M	MP	Hindu	Nai	LBC	
2.	Sri.K.P.Mishra	M	S	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Bikram
3.	Sri.J. Mendal	M	S	Hindu	Kurmi	UBC	Sultanganj
4.	Sri.K. Singh	M	S	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Lakhisarai
5.	Sri.T. Azad	M		Hindu			
6.	Sri.A.l. Yadav	M	N	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Triveniganj
7.	Smt.S. Devi	F	S	Hindu	Koiri	UBC	Arrah
8.	Sri.S. Singh	M	S	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Dinara
9.	Prof.J.Hussain	M	S	Muslim			Monghuyr
10.	Sri.K. Paswan	M	S	Hindu	Dusadh	SC	Fatwa
11.	Sri.L. Orarn	M	C	Hindu	ST		Sisai
12.	Sri.J.Adhikari	M	N	Hindu			Purnia
13.	Sri.S.P.Tekriwal	M	N	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Saharsa
14.	Sri.U.P.Verma	M	S	Hindu			Gurua
15.	Prof.M. Prasad	M	N	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Ghanshyampur
16.	Sri P. Chand	M	C	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Daltoniganj
17.	Gulam Sarwa	M	N	Muslim			Siwan
18.	Sri.Mohan Ram	M	S	Hindu	Chamar	SC	Fatehpur
19.	Sri.D.Thakur	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Madhubani
20.	Sri.M. Marandi	M	C	Hindu		ST	Dumka
21.	Sri.T.P. Singh	M	S	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Patna(West)
22.	Sri.R.C.S.Yadav	M	S	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Jahanabad
23.	Sri.B.Mehta	M	N	Hindu	Koiri	UBC	Raghopur
24.	Sri.S.J.B.Singh	M	S	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Khamagpur

Dr. J.Mishra   (8.6.80 - 14.8.83)

S.No.	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Constituency
1.	Dr.J.Mishra	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Jhanjharpur
2.	N.H.Khan	M	MLC	Muslim			
3.	Sri.R.P.Singh	M	N	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Ghorasahan
4.	Sri.R.S.P.Singh	M	S	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Makhaddumpur
5.	Sri.K.C.Bhagat	M	C	Hindu		ST	Mandar
6.	Sri.M.Sada	M	N	Hindu	Mushar	SC	Allauli
7.	Sri.B.D.Singh	M	S	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Danapur
8.	Sri.J.N.Trivedi	M		Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Barhampur
9.	Sri S.D.Singh	M	C	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Baghmar
10.	Sri L.P.Shahi	M	M	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Lalganj
11.	Dr. U.P.Verma	M	MLC	Hindu	Kayastha	FC	
12.	Sri Y.P."Yogesh"	M	C	Hindu	Banai	UBC	Dhanbad
13.	C. Salauddin	M	N	Muslim			Simri Bukhtiarpur
14.	Sri L.Choudhary	M	N	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Mahisi
15.	Sri R.Jha	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Saharsa
16.	S.Nadvi	M	N	Muslim	Darbhanga		
17.	Sri T.M.R.Munda	M	C	Hindu		ST	Tamar
18.	Sri G.Singh	M	N	Hindu	Kurmi	UBC	Chautham

Appendix-XII

Sri. C.S.Singh (15.8.83 - 12.3.85)

S.No	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Consituency
1.	Sri.C.S.Singh	M	MP	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Banka
2.	Sri.R.P.Singh	M	S	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Mokhddumpur
3.	Sri.L.P.Shahi	M	N	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Lalganj
4.	Rafiq Alam	M	MLC	Muslim			
5.	Sri.L.Choudhary	M	N	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Mahisi
6.	Sri.N.Jha	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Manigachhi
7.	Sri.T.M.R.Munda	M	C	Hindu		ST	Tamar
8.	C.Md.Salanddin	M	N	Muslim			Simri Bakhtiyarpur
9.	Sri.D.Ram	M	S	Hindu	Chamar	SC	Deo
10.	Sri J.N.Trivedi	M	S	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Barhampur
11.	Sri.R.J.S.Yadav	M	S	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Bakhtiyarpur
12.	Sri.D.K.Singh	M	N	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Rupauli
13.	Md.Hussain Azad	M	N	Muslim			Thakurganj
14.	Sri.S.Jha	M	S	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Bhagalpur
15.	Sri.B.Singh	M	S	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Danapur
16.	Smt.B.Gupta	F	N	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Motihari
17.	Sri.U.P.Verma	M	MLC	Hindu	Kayastha	FC	

Appendix -XIII

Sri.B.Dubey (12.3.85 - 13.2.88)

No	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Consituency
1.	Sri.B.Dubey	M	MP	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	
2.	Sri.L.Choudhary	M	N	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Mahisi
3.	Sri.R.J.S.Yadav	M	S	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Bakhtiyapur
4.	Sri.R.P.Singh	M	MLC	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	
5.	Sri.D.Singh	M	N	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Rupauli
6.	Sri.S.Prasad	M	MLC	Hindu	Kurmi	UBC	
7.	Sri S.Mishra	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Forbisganj
8.	Smt.U.Pandey	F	N	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Baniapur
9.	Sri.M.Choudhary	M	S	Hindu		SC	Barligha
10.	Sri.H.Mahta	M	N	Hindu	Koiri	UBC	Cheria-Bariarpur
11.	Sri.I.Bhagat	M	C	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Lohardagga
12.	Sri.L.N.Jha	M	N	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	Jale
13.	Sri.R.P.Singh	M	S	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Kharagpur
14.	Sri.B.Bhagat	M	C	Hindu		ST	Vishurpur
15.	Sri.M.Paswan	M	S	Hindu	Dusadh	SC	Mohania
16.	H.Khan	M	N	Muslim		FC	Harsiddhi

Appendix-XIV

Sri. B.J.Azad (13.2.88 - 10.3.89)

No	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste		Consituency
1.	Sri.B.J.Azad	M	MP	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	
2.	Sri.L.Chaudhary	M	N	Hindu	Bania	UBC	Mahisi
3.	Smt.U.Pandey	F	N	Hindu	Bhumihar	FC	Baniapur
4.	Sri.R.P.Singh	M	S	Hindu	Rajput	FC	Kharagpur
5.	Sri.S.Parsad	M	MLC	Hindu	Kurmi	UBC	
6.	Sri.M.Paswan	M	S	Hindu	Dusadh	SC	Mohania
7.	H.Khan	M	N	Muslim		FC	Harsiddhi
8.	Sri.N.Jha	M	MLC	Hindu	Brahmin	FC	
9.	Sri.B.Yadav	M	N	Hindu	Yadav	UBC	Madhora
10.	Sri.T.M.R.Munda	M	C	Hindu		ST	Tamar
11	Sri.D.Ram	M	S	Hindu	Chamar	SC	Deo

Sri. L.P. Yadav (10.3.90 - Continuing)

S.No	Name	M/F	Region	Religion	Caste	Consituency
1.Sri L.P. Yadav		M	MLC	Hindu	Yadav UBC	
2.Sri R.Jha		M	N	Hindu	BrahminFC	Shivahass
3.Sri J. Singh		M	S	Hindu	Rajput FC	Rangash
4.Sri B Patel		M	N	Hindu	Kurmi UBC	Vaishali
5.Sri R.V.Singh		M	S	Hindu	Yadav UBC	Oberai
6.Sri R. Ram		M	N	Hindu	Chaman SC	Bochha
7.I. Hussain		M	S	Muslim		Dehri
8.Sri R.Singh		M	N	Hindu	BhumiharFC	Cheria Bariyaspur
9. Sri K. Bhageed		M	C	Hindu	ST	Mandar
10.Sri M.Prasad		M	N	Hindu	Yadav UBC	Ghanshyampur
11.Sri D.Yadav		M	N	Hindu	Yadav UBC	Baluibashi
12.Sri G.Himansu		M	N	Hindu	Yadav UBC	Hasanpura
13.Sri M.Suleman		M	N	Muslim		Thakurganj
14.Sri M. Munna		M	N	Muslim		Kisanganj
15.Sri S.Singh		M	S	Hindu	Yadav UBC	Sandesh
16.Sri N. Singh		M	S	Hindu	Rajput FC	Chakai
17.Sri T.Singh		M	S	Hindu	Yadav UBC	Karakata
18.Sri V.N.Singh		M	S	Hindu	Rajput FC	Arrah
19.Sri D.Singh		F	MLC	Hindu	Rajput FC	
20.Sri V.Kr.Singh		M	N	Hindu	Rajput FC	Paru
21.Sri N.R. Singh		M	N	Hindu	Bhumihar FC	Kanti
22.Sri U. P. Verma		M	S	Hindu	Kurmi UBC	Jamalpur
23.Sri M.Mandal		M	MLC	Hindu	Kurmi UBC	
24.Sri S.Jha		M	S	Hindu	Brahmin FC	Jhajha
25.Sri P.k.Paswan		M	N	Hindu	Dusadh SC	Jale
26.Sri V.N.choudry		M	S	Hindu	Pasi SC	Imamganj
27.Sri R.N. Pal		M	S	Hindu	Dusadh SC	Fatehpur
28.Smt.S.Srievastav		F	S	Hindu	Kavustho FC	Nathagar
29.Sri R.Purve		M	MLC	Hindu	Suri LBC	
30.Md. Azimuddir		M	N	Muslim		Sikti
31.Sri V.S.Nishad		M	N	Hindu	Gorhi LBC	Parhatta
32.Sri S.P.Tekriwal		M	N	Hindu	Balis UBC	Saharsa
33.Sri T. Mehta		M	N	Hindu	Kurmi OBC	Jandaha
34.Sri R.V. Mishra		M	N	Hindu	Brahmin FC.	Sarai Ranjan.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adiraju ,Venkateswar Rao.	1986.	Gandhi to Gandhi
		(Hyderabad : Sathya Publications)
Ahmed, Enayat.	1965.	Bihar: A Physica;, Economi and Reional Geography
		(Ranchi: Ranchi University)
Ahuja, Ram.	197⁻.	Political Elites and Modernisation - The Bihar Politics
		(Meerut : Meenakshi Parkashan)
Alderman, R.K. and	1967.	The Tactis of Resignation
Cross, J.A.		(London : Routledge and Kegan Paul)
Ali Hasan	1978.	'Elements of Caste among the Muslims in a District of Southern Bihar'
		in Imtiaz Ahmed(ed),Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims in
		India
		(New Delhi: Manohar Publication)
Appleby, Paul H.	1953.	Public Administration in India : Report of a Servey
		(New Delhi , Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat)
Arora, Satish K	1972.	'Social Background of the Indian Cabinet'
		Economic and Political Weekly
		Special Number Vol II No. 31, 32 & 33.
Azad, Abul Kalam .	1959.	India wins Freedums
		(Bombay : Orient Longmans)
Banerjee, Saumitra.	1983.	'How Jagannath Mishra has defied Delhi and paid for it'
		The Telegraph, Calcutta , 7 August.
		'Manouvres behind a 'consensus'
		The telegraph, Culcatta. 19 August.
Bhambhri, C.P.	1963.	'Pattern of Cabinet Making in Indian States'
		The Political Scince Review Vol II No. 1, Jan-June.
	1990.	'Era of weak governments'
		Financial Express, Bombay, Dec 16.
Bharti, Indu	1989	'Bihar crisis : Making of a CM'
		Economic and Political Weekly Vol XXIV No. 24. 8 April
Blair, Harry W.	1980	'Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar'
		Economic and Political Weekly Vol XV no. 2 , 12 Jan.
	1984	'Structural Change , The Agricultural sector and Politics in Bihar in John R. Wood(ed)
		State Politics in Indra Gandhi's India : Countinuity or crisis(Westview)
Bose , Saroj Ranjan.	1971.	Economy of Bihar
		(Calcutta :Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay)
Brass , Paul R.	1968.	'Coalition Politics in North India'
		The American Political Science Reiview VOl LXII No. 4
	1975.	Language , Religion and Politics in North India
		(Delhi : Vikas)
	1982.	'Pluralism, Regionalism and Decentralizing Tendencies in Contemporary indian Politics '
		in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (ed)
		The State of South Asia : Problems of National intigration
		(Honolulu : The University Press of Hawaii)
Burstein, Paul.	1977.	'Political Elites and Labor Markets: Selection of American Cabinet Members, 1932-77'
		Social Forces Vol LI No. 1.
Bhatia, Krishan	1974.	Indira : A Biography of Prime Ministyer Gandhi

		(London : Angus & Robertson)
Brecher, Michael.	1959.	Nehru : A Political Biography
		(London : Oxford University PressCarras, Marry C.
	1972	The Dynamics of Indian Political faction
		(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press)
Chagla M.C.	1973.	Roses in December: An Autobiography
		(Bombay : Bharatiyá Vidyabhawan)
Chaudhury , Vijay Chandra Prasad	1964	The Creation of Modeern Bihar
		(Patna : Yageshwar Prakasnan)
Cheng , Peter P.	1974	'The Japanese Cabinets : 1885-1973: An elite analysis'
		Asian Survey Vol XIV No. 12.
Crew , Jr . Robert(ed)	1968	State Politics
		(Balmont : Wardsworth Publishing Co. Inc)
Das , Arvind N.	1983	Agrarian Unrest and Socio-Economic Change in Bihar 1900-1980
		(New Delhi : Manohar Publication,)
Desai, Morarji	1974.	The story of my life Vol I & II.
		(India : Macmillan)
Diwakar ,R.R	1956.	Bihar Through Ages
		(CalCutta: Orient Longmans)
Dogen, Mattei.	1979	'How to Become a Cabinet Minister in France: Career Pathways, 1870-1978'
		Comparative Politics Vol XII No. 1
Dumont , Louis	1970.	Homo Hierachious: The Cast System and its Implications.
		(Delhi: Vikas)
Duverger, Maurice.	1963.	Political Parties : Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State
		(London : Methuen)
Edinger, Lewis J. and Searing , Donald D	1967	'Social Background in Elite Analysis- A Methodological Inquiry '
		The American Political Science Review June .
Fadia , Babulal	1984.	State Politics in India Vol.II
		(New Delhi: Radieant)
Frankel, Francine R.	1978	India's Political Economy 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution
		(Princeton ,N. J. : Prinston University Press)
Frankle ,Francine R and Rao. M. S. A	1989	Dominance and State Power in Modern India , Decline of Social Order Vol. I
		(Delhi: Oxford University Press)
Gadgil N.V.	1969	Government from Inside
		(Meerut: Meenakshi Prakshan)
Gandhi P.C	1978	'Job Reservation in Bihar: Playing For High Stakes '
		The Times of India : New Delhi. April 20
Gangal, S.C	1972	Prime Minister and the Cabinet in India
		(Varanasi : Navachetana Prakashan)
George, T.J.S.	1965	Revolt in Bihar
		(New Delhi: Prespective Publications)
Gopalakrishnan, K	1990	'What A Fall......'
		Onlooker, Bombay , Dec 15.
Innaiah ,N	1986	State Government and Politics
		(Hyderabad: Scientific Serwice)
Jannuzi , F. Tomasson	1974	Agrarian Crisis in India : The case of Bihar
		(Austin : University of Texas Press)

Jha , Chetkar,   1967   'Caste in Bihar Politics ' in Iqbal Narain (ed),
                                     State Politics in India
                                     (Meerut : Meenakshi Parkashan)

Jha , Chetkar and Jha,   1964   'Some Aspects of Bihar Politcs'
Shree Nagesh   India Quarterly Vol. XX , July-Sep.

Jha Prem Shankar   1978   'Bihar's dangerous venture : Reseverd Jobs For Backward Castes'
                                     The Times of India New Delhi, March 30.

Jha , Radhanandan   1982   Origin and Development of Bihar Legislature
                                     (Patna : Text Book Press)

Jha , Shashishekhar   1972   Political Elite In Bihar
                                     (Bombay: Vora)

Jha, Shree Nagesh   1974   'The Union Council of Ministers in India 1952-71: A Study in Elite
                                     Composition'
                                     Political Science Review Vol XIII No. 1-4.

Johari, J.C   1981   Indian Govenment and Politics
                                     (Delhi : Vishal)

Jones Morris   1966   'Dominance and Dissent: There Inter Relations in the Indian Party
                                     System'
                                     Government and opposition Vol I. No 4
                              1967   'From Monopoly to Competition in Indian Politics '
                                     Asian Survey Vol I. No. !.

Joshi , manoj   1991   'Mixed Signals'
                                     Frontline, Madras Vol. VIII No. 13. June 22-july5.

Karunakaran, K.P.(ed)   1975   Coalition Government in India
                                     (Simla : Indian Institute of Advanced Study)

Kashyap, Subhash.C.   1969   The Politics of Defection , A Study of State Politics In India
                                     (Delhi : National)
                              1974   The Politics of power Defections and State Politics in India
                                     (Delhi: national)

Kochanek, Stanley A.   1968   The Congress Party of India
                                     (Princeton, New Jeresy: Princeton University Press)

Kothari , Rajni   1964   'The Congress System in India '
                                     Asian Survey Vol.IV No. 12. Dec.
                              1967   Party System and Election Studies
                                     (Bombay : Allied)
                 (ed)   1970   Caste in Indian Politics
                                     (New Delhi: Orient Longmans)
                 (ed)   1970   Politics in India
                                     (New Delhi: Orient Longmans)

Lele , Jayant   1981   Elite Pluralism and Class Rule : Political Development in
                                     Maharashtra
                                     (Bombay :Popular Prakashan)

Lewis, Oscar   1958   Village Life in Nortern India
                                     (New York : Vintage Books)

Limaye, Madhu   1989   Cabinet Government in India
                                     (New Delhi: Radiant)

Maheshwari, Shriram   1979   State Governments in India

		(Delhi: Macmillan)
Mancur, Olson .Jr.	1965	The Logic of Collective Action
		(Cambridge, Mass: Harward University Press)
Manor, James .	1984	'Blurring The Line Between Parties and Social Bases: Gundu Rao and the emergence of a Janata Government in Karnataka' In John R. Wood (ed)_ State Politics in contemporary India Crisis or Continuity?
		(Westview press)
Murthy, sachidananda	1990	'Team Trouble)
		The Week, Madras . Vol. VIII .No. 49
Narain , Iqbal	1966	'The Problems '
		Seminar No. 87 Nov
		Twilight or Dawn: The Political change In India 1967-71
		(Agra : Shivalal Agrawall)
(ed)	1976	State Politics In India
		(Meerut : Meenakshi Prakashan)
Narasaiah, Panjala	1975	'Social Background of Governors in India '
		Political Scince Review Vol XIV. No. 3 & 4. July-Sep and Oct,December.
	1979	'Social Background of State Chief Ministers '
		Political science Review Vol XVIII No. 2.
Nicholson , Norman K.	1952	'Factionalism and the Indian Council of Ministers'
		Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies. Vol. X
Palmer Norman D	1967	India's Fourth General Elections '
		Asian Survey Vol . VII No. 5.
Pandey , Jawaharlal	1982	State Politics in india (A Study in Coalition Politics In an Indian State)
		(New Delhi : Uppal)
Parvatamma C	1971	Politics and Religion
		(Delhi :Sterling)
Patel , Harbans	1984	'The Cabinets in India From 1952-1990: Sum Observations and reflections '
		Gernal of Political Studies Vol VII No. 1
Perwin, (Mrs) Shaukat.	1985	The Cabinet Government At Work In Bihar : A Historical Study (1952-1980)
		(Bhagalpur : Bhagalpur University , Ph.D Thesis (Unpublished) Feb.
Prasad , Pradhan H	1979	'Caste and Class in Bihar '
		Economic and political Weekly Annual No.Feb
	1989	'Rural Violence in Central Bihar
		Science and People Vol. I No.1. August.
Prasad , Rajendra	1961	Autobiography
		(Bombay : Asia Publishing House)
Prasad , R.C	1976	'Bihar Social Polarization and political 'Instability' in Iqbal Narain(ed)
		State Politics in India
		(New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan)
Pylee M.V	1965	Constitutional Government in India
		(Bombay : Asia Publishing House)
	1974	India's Constitution

		(New York: Asia Publishing House)
Rai ,Haridwar and Pandey ,Jawaharlal	1972	'Politics of Coalition Governments: The Experience of the First UF Government In Bihar' • Journal of the Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies Vol. VI No.2
	1979	'State Politics : In need of a Framework of analysis' Indian Journal of Political Science Vol XLII No.2
Reddy, G.Ram and Prasad Ravindra D.	1976	'Recruitement to the Council of Ministers in Andhra Pradesh' Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies vol X No 2 April-June.
Rose, Richard	1971	'The Making of Cabinet Ministers' British Journal of Political Science Vol 1 No.4
Roy, Ramasharay	1966	'Intra - Party conflict in the Bihar Congress' Asian Survey Vol. VI No. 12
	1967	'Politics of Fragementation : the case of the Congress party in Bihar' in Iqbal Narain (ed) State politics in India '(Meerut ; Meenakshi Prakashan).
	1967	'Bihar' Seminar, July
	1968	'Dynamics of one Party Dominance in an Indian State' Asian survey Vol VIII No.7
	1970	'Caste and Political Recruitement in Bihar' in Rajni Kothari (ed) Caste in Indian Polictics (New Delhi : Orient Longmans)
Scalpino, Robert A.(ed)	1977	Elites in the People's Republic of China (seattle : University of Washington Press)
Sharma, L.N.	1976	The Indian Prime Minister , office and Powers : (Delhi : Macmillan)
Sheth, D.L.	1979	'Caste and Politics : A survey of Literature' in Contributions South Asian Studies I (Delhi : Oxford University Press)
Sinha, S.L.N	1990	'Cabinet Expansion Galore' Southern Economist Vol XXIX No. 1
	1990	'Bihar : Economic prospects' Southern Economics Vol XXIX No. 15 & 16
Singh, Bamehswar	1978	The control of the AICC Executive over the Making of Congress ministrey in Bihar (Muzafferpur : Bihar university, Ph.D. Thesis (unpublished), February)
Singh, J.D.	1978	'A Mixed Record in Bihar, Janata Ministry' The Times of India New Delhi, 18 July
Singh, Mahindra P.	1975	Cohesion in a Dominent Party : The Pradesh Congress and Party Politics in Bihar (New Delhi : S. Chand & Co.)
Singh, N.K.	1972	'Many Faces of Caste Politics' Economic and Political Weekly Vol VII No. 15 April 8
Singh ,P.C	1989	'Caste , Class and Politics in Bihar ' Third Concept Vol. III .No. 27. May
Sinha , Anugrah Narain	1961	Mere Samsmaran (My Reminiscences)

		(Patna : Kusum Prakashan)
Sinha , Arun	1986	'Caste and faction in Bihar Politics ' The Times of India , New Delhi ,9th July
Sinha ,J.K.P	1973	'Emerging trends in Bihar Politics ' Indian Jurnal of Political ScienceVol XXXIV No. 4, Oct-Dec.
Sinha , Mahamaya Prasad	1974	Jab Main Mukhya Mantri Tha (Arrah : Pustak sadan)
Sinha ,Sachchidananda	1988	Coalition in Politics : The New Challenge (Muzaffarpur : Moral)
Sriniwas ,M.N.	1962	Caste in Modern India and other Essays (Bombay : Asia Publishing House)
Thakur, Janardhan	1985	'Mishra Dominance in Bihar ' News Time ,Hyderabad.2 July.
	1990	'Indian Society Backsliding towards medievalages.' Onlooker ,Bombay. Dec 15th.
Varma, Vishwanath Prasad	1987	'The Political system of Bihar ' The Indian Journal of Political ScineceVol XXXXVIII, No. 4
Varshney, Ashutosh(ed)	1989	The Indian Parardox: Essays in Indian Politics /Myron Weiner (New Delhi: Sage Publication)
Venkateswaran.R.J	1967	Cabinet Government in India (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd.)
Verner, Joel Gorden	1973	'The Recruitment of Cabinet Ministers in the Former British Carribbean : A Five Country Study' The Journal of Developing Areas.Vol VII no.4.
Weiner , Myron	1957	Party Politics in India : Development of Multi-Party System. (Princeton : Princeton University Press)
(ed)	1968	State Politics in india (Princeton : Princeton University Press)
Willson, F.M.G.	1959	'The Routes of Entry of New Members of the British Cabinet ,1868- 1958' Political Studies Vol VII .
Wisma Warnapala W.A	1973	' The Formation of the Cabinet in SriLanka : A Study of the 1970 United Front Cabinet' The Political Science Review Vol XII no.1-2.
Wood John R.(ed)	1984	State Politics in Contemporary India Crisis or Countinuity (Boulder and London : Westview Press)