Mimesis, Myth and Subjectivity : A Study of the Philosophical Signification of Jean Anouilh's <u>Antigone</u> (1944)

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This is to Certify that the dissertation, entitled
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_C O N T E N T S_

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Introduction

Somewhere in a strangely incantatory realm of address, two unfathered particles of an equally strange language called 'Greek', break free of the incantation and present themselves, out of context and as if out of time itself, to be quickly cited in this very 'fathered' address: *Poros* , *Aporos* . We 'are' not Greek, we don't know Greek either - but in this project which entitles itself with the name, 'signification', we are duty-bound ourselves to 'signify'. Hence, out of the recklessness of the sense of duty, let us cite further: *Poros* means the forging of a way and *Aporos*, the blockage of all ways, the self-staturation of all *porosity*.

Between the forging and the blockage, the way and the ellipsis of the possibility of any way, a single shred of flotsam - that we call 'signifying unit' - surfaces to bear the assault and carry the mark of what dialectics calls 'contradiction'. That of the impossible - yet existent - *poros-aporos.* A long time back when the ring of incantation had not severed its links with the silent enigma of a dialectics

outside discursivity, Sophocles' _Antigone_ found - and founded - a Choric discourse which <u>could</u> pronounce both <u>pontos-poros</u> and <u>pontos-aporos</u> punctuating its speech with the name of the flotsam we have seen surface - 'man'. Let us quickly cite:

CHORUS : Wonders are many on earth,
and the greatest of these
Is man, who rides the ocean
and takes his way
Through the deeps, through
wind-swept valleys of perilous seas
That surge and sway . 1

But the Chorus which says of man, he is 'pontos-poros' <u>could</u> say of the same, 'aporos'. And in the same stasimon, Chorus has said:

There is nothing beyond his power, his subtlety
Meeteth all chance, all danger conquerth
For every ill he hath found its remedy
Save only death.2

And further still:

But he that, too rashly daring,
Walks in sin
In solitary pride to
his life's end
At door of mine shall
never enter in
To call me friend.3

In the face of a voice which sets the conditions of a speech itself, the conditions of the signification of this speech inhere in the delimitation of the space from where a direction

which the Chorus faces in Greek drama, is inscribed and deployed in one and the same move. The direction is also the locus of the path of what Jacques Lacan has called in a seminar on Antigone, 'desire'. Desire returns the question of direction to its proper site of a pre-constituted 'law' of man (extensible to 'men') and also swerves along the direction of the return to disarticulate the law and set up law against law.[4] The law, that is, of the contradiction, of the one against that of 'man' - the one of 'woman'? The ghost in the machine now is Hegel and in this introduction itself we seem to have moved towards a certain articulation of dialectics which occupies the recognizably philosophical desiderata of theory and of method. Sophocles, in the Hegelian comment, seems to have been breached.

* * *

Our study is concerned with the extent and nature of dialectics contained in the simulacrum projected on the claim of theory to have fashioned the tools to read Jean Anouilh's Antigone - and to have read the same. That is, we are henceforth committed to a presupposed theory of reading and signification as well as to a relentless questioning of this presupposition on the other terrain of a philosophical history of Antigone. The dialectical is exactly our method in so

far as this latter resolves the engagement between the two without stopping to fortify the general discourse of philosophy against any sacrifice of signification. The operational competence of the dialectical method is assured by the possibility of an internal critique of its rationality. While the possibility of the sacrifice - following Bataille - is impossible. The philosophical history of Antigone has re-symbolised the fable of Antigone in many forms of the mythos to rejoin these forms to the global architecture of the dialectic. But this has been possible only as long as the absolute concretion of a realized dialectic has not thought the supposed fact of this realization as a discursive problematics of veridicality of procedures of normalization of a system of recognition called 'truth' - that is, it has not thought itself from the 'outside'.[5] Co-existensively, it has not thought the possibility of this thought.

* * *

The validation of a concrete dialectics which differentiates rigorously between objects and subsumes these differences under the rich plenitude of its self-same subjectivity, depends on the extent of exhaustion achieved in positing the structure of opposition constitutiing the 'reasons' of respective objects. Capitalised immediately, 'REASONS'.

Between Sophocles and Anouilh, the comparison of their
'Reasons' gives us simply this: In Sophocles' play, Creon
tells Antigone, "what you are doing is wrong because the
brother you want to bury is so different from your other
brother. Polynices is a traitor, a defiler and a law-breaker."
In Anouilh Creon tells Antigone, "what you are doing is
meaningless. The brother you want to bury is no different
from your other brother - who was equally bad."

The first two fields of exploration we have chosen - mimesis
and myth - are productive of the theory of 'Reason' that
produces, in turn, an intelligibility called 'reading'. The
third is the dehiscence of the sign 'Reason' under the dis-
placement of the axiomatic of production that produces readings
and co-terminously normalizes them. We have called this
're-mark' of dehiscence, 'madness' and thought it important
to trace the horizon of our formulation alongside the questi-
on of the history of theatre where the actor's articulation
is the redundancy intrinsic to all real performativity
'madly' in commensurate with the redundancy of the pure signif-
ier in the subjection of the circuit of 'normal' communica-
tion.

Based on these grids of analysis, the categorical links holding the postulation of principles and method together present themselves as an epistemological problem of the possibility of method not speculatively transgressive of validation. This somewhat neo-Kantian turn taken in conjunction with what we have said about the dialectical compulsion, specify the currency which circulates in the discourse after and anterior to structuralism. As a question of repetition and not anteriority, the flows of circulating material require a certain economy of historical time to repeat in the mode of discontemporalizing the temporalization of this time. Our limiting theoretical ambition is to extract fragments of resistance to the normalized circuit of exchange and the rates and speeds of circulation and exchange so as to subject these extractions to the pressures of a textual synchrony and such that they yield the rhythms of dis- and assymetry irreducible to the axialized schema of time itself. Beyond the limiting is the absolute non-presence of any kinesic affect accompanying a reading of Antigone and within it, the absolute presence of a mass and series of lexemes and monemes. Between the two lies the limit itself in its elusive element and inaccessible density, and henceforth we traverse its space in order not so much to identify this space as to

find a way, a <u>poros</u> to inscribe this traversal in the

shimmering opacity - the <u>aporos</u> - of language.

<u>N o t e s</u>

1. Sophocles, 'Antigone', in Sophocles,<u>The Theban Plays</u>, trans. E.F.Watling. (Middlesex : Penguin, 1947), p. 135.

2. ibid, p. 136.

3. ibid.

4. For Lacan's seminar on Antigone and especially the importance of the <u>dike</u> against the <u>ate</u> in the context of law, see Mohammad Kowsar, 'Lacan's <u>Antigone</u>: A case Study in Psychoanalytical Ethics', in <u>Theatre Journal</u>, March, 1990, pp. 94-106.

5. Such is the case with the 'new philosophers' in France who exemplify Antigone as a symbol situatable within the civilizational malaise characterized by the Foucauldian 'Panopticon' always extra-discursive to the interiority of the master-dialectic and yet regulating the literary dramatization of the dialectic as itself an original systematic of visibility, a theatre without the medieval spectacle. For example, see Andre Glucksmann, <u>The Master Thinkers</u>, trns. Brian Pearce (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980) pp. 107-9.

Chapter I

Analytic Of The Mimetic:
The 'Gratuitous' Speech Of Antigone

Let it be understood, at the very outset, that our
purpose is to undertake the labour of a patient yet
pitiless granulation of what is a dense, dramatic discourse.
Jean Anouilh's Antigone, unrelenting in its diegetic and
characterological consistency, offers itself up to a correspo-
ndingly relentless analytic gaze in the spirit of discursive
engagement. This spirit of engagement institues such a
methodological exchange that the age when a war-torn Europe
began increasingly to codify a philosophy of existence under
the rubrics of a subject of contingency and freedom today
appears, in the light of its cultural production, to become
an intelligible site for the production of the signs of
discursive intelligibility.[1] A discourse, that is, which
produces such signs as 'contingency', 'necessity', 'freedom'
as rigorously delimited philosophical signifiers. It is apposite
to note here that we are already implicated in the ruling
dialectic of our critical methodology.

Of the three epistemic categories that we have positioned
vis-a-vis a specific text of drama, the one which seems to

emerge almost directly from the very positivity of what is the material embodiment of this text as a graphematic image and a phonetic reservoir of theatrical articulation, is what from the Greeks onwards, has been called mimesis.[2] And yet we don't treat mimesis here as anything but a problematics. And if it is a category with an epistemic function, it is dynamically self-problematizing precisely because it concentrates the being of a textually specified dramatic language into the density of a general theatrological core of drama, traditionally called 'expression' or 'enactment'. Of course one treats this core increasingly as a play of mimetic signification but then that is exactly the proposition that demands nothing less than a granulated, analysed and demonstrated assertion.

Mimesis as a Primoridal Onto-logic

Paradoxically the Greeks, finally by the post-Aristotelian schools of philosophy — Stoics, Sceptics, Epicureans, Peripatetics — , rhetors or technologists of the imitatio of rhetoric as Horace, had displaced the signifying space of mimesis from a direct Platonic eidetic solicitation to the discipline of an economics of the discourse on public oration (oratorio and elocutio) and a hermeneutics of persuasion.[3] Mediating this displacement is the definitional codification of tragedy in terms of a critical expropriation of mimesis

in Aristotle's _Poetics_.[4] If we were to substantiate the magnitute of this exproprition we would doubtless have to measure the compass of a thought that negotiated the breach that had both problematized and naturalized the hierarchical opposition of the origin (_arche_) and the derived in cosmology, the axiom and the theorem in geometry, the _Apollonian_ and the _chthonic_ in religion, the _basileus_ or the king and the _hoplite_ or the soldier in the political warfare...[5] If we are habitually ensconsed in the systematic kernel of the Greek philosophical discourse by being naturalised to the period from Plato to Aristotle, it is a result of the re-eclipse of the unthought and valorization of this hierarchy that experienced aborted subversions and mutations from at least Heraclitus down to Socrates. Thus the reading of the Book X of _Republic_ does not fail to articulate the silent opposition of 'being' and 'becoming' in Plato working insidiously within the discussion on imitative poetic practice.[6] And even more systematized in the physics of Aristotle is the hylemorphic metaphysic of an order of universal causality which, in the process of legitimating a set of ethico-political practices of an Athens structured by its _polis_ and its _oikos_ (household or private space of the home), duplicated this division in the imaginary of the cosmos.[7]

In _Poetics,_ mimesis is no more the logical object of the degrees of alethic approximation as in Plato but the functional operator of a logic of cultural practice that theoretically re-inserts a Sophocles in the social space of theatrical performance even while performance itself is an object of ontological elaboration. In the process, we witness a discursive mutation in the structure of the sign 'truth' that dominates Western metaphysics and characterizes its historicity as a 'tradition'.[8]

What emerges from Aristotle is a systematic reduction of the Platonist opposition of appearance and essence to its constitutive dialectical movement - a movement formally, already examined in _The Sophist, Philebus_ etc. by Plato himself - in terms of the laws of discursive conceptualisation in such structured fields of practice as politics, art, economics, physical science, ethics. In the _Poetics,_ the question of practice, bifurcated into its 'praxic' and 'poetic' components, takes as its _telos_ or object, the _techne_ or art of making epic, tragic and comic poetry. If we are clear as to the specificity of a taxonomic or _diaeretic_ discourse as _Poetics_ in the context of an Aristotelian universe of philosophical significance which differs crucially from Plato in that it does not refer mimetic 'action'

directly to a vertical schema of noetic transcendence -
bringing into relation <u>nous</u> or an impersonal intelligence
and <u>alethia</u>, disclosure as the springing forth of truth
without the mediation of an active social subject of 'serious'
mimetic import -, we can then submit this taxonomy to a
gradual horizontal concretion in the world of practice where
mimesis reassimilates what Marx in <u>Theses on Feurbach</u>
called 'the active, sensous side' of this world.[9] This
materialism of thought, albeit without the vigorous equivocity
of a Heraclitus or an Empedocles, informs <u>Poetics</u> even as
it etymologically derives 'comedy' and 'drama' from a real
movement of meaning such that Peloponnesian Dorians called
them <u>Comae</u> and the Athenians <u>demes</u> in rhythm with the
social slot of the comedians in favour of the hamlets as
opposed to the city.[10] That this materialism nevertheless
resists equivocity is testified to by the fourth section of
<u>Poetics</u> when it is clearly posited that the ontogenetic
rationale for the mimetic arts lie in that imitation is
'natural' to the higher animal, 'man'.[11] The lateral shift
from an increasingly reduced equivocity in the philosophical
'sign' from Plato's codification of the Socratic dialogue
(the <u>maieutic</u>) culminates in this double hierarchical bind of
Aristotle. The first, that is, of nature and culture where

there is already a direction which natural psychology travels and the second, wherein, the opposition of _physis_ and _nomos_ subsequently reenters what is now an 'electrified' Platonic cave armed by a taxonomic gradation that articulates the order of natural being on to the order of the cultural.[12] Within this schema, itself a historical articulation, Aristotelian mimesis produces an onto-logic which regulates from the _techne_ of theatre to that of ethical existence. That is, we are trying to bring out the philosophical component of the system of relations - the _episteme_ - that governed ancient discursive practice.[13]

It is not our job here to carry out a detailed exegesis of either the _Republic_ or the _Poetics._ From perspectives varying from medieval soteriology to hermeneutic understanding in this century, such exegeses have been done. For our purpose, which is to situate a particular dramatic fabulation in a discursive exchange spanning a gap in time of more than two thousand years, we can mention, as a point of departure, Martin Heidegger's re-questioning the issue of 'Being' in the light of a _mimetos praxeos_ who 'discloses' the _Dasein_ of the Greeks in the mode of being peculiar to the 'enactment' of drama.[14] In the related area of axiology - a choice between 'good' and 'bad' that is predicable

of the action imitated - that Aristotlenianism codified early
we will attempt to formulate the problematics of 'desire'
as a moment of Hegelian intervention in the discourse on
mimesis and ethical judgement.[15] Given this double articula-
tion of what is called by Heidegger a 'fundamental ontology'
and the cultural figuration of what, Hegel onwards, we
specify as 'desire', the central mimetic engagement of
Antigone would - hypothetically here - open up the contempo-
rary site where the subject of mimesis is scissoned exempla-
rily between a re-reading by Paul Ricouer of Poetics as an
inaugural text on narrative and historical time and Jacques
Derrida's solicitation of the metaphorics of the 'sun' as a
penetration of the origin of the thought on mimesis by its
insidious unthought.[16] Probably the example will multiply its
signifying membranes into the specular basis of drama as
derived from the optical relations of dromenon and
theorien in the Greek language such that theatrology will
examine its constitutive metaphoric guilt in the interpreta-
tive site significantly excavated by Jacques Lacan, the
'returning' Freudian and opposedly, in the critique of the
Oedipal unconscious as a 'theatre' in Gilles Deleuze and
Felix Guattari, the Anti-Freudians.[17]

This discursive space must be hollowed out from the analysis of Anouilh's Antigone henceforth, the first phase of which is that of its mimesis.

Mimesis and the Syntagmatics of Antigone

The syntagmatic expression of Jean Anouilh's text is, in its germinal desire to produce a dramatic embodiment of its inert language, productive of its history. Of course we are thrown back to the scenario of the war we had mentioned very early in this chapter wherein the arrival of a literary 'work' was co-extensively a 'work' of equivocal culture in occupied Paris. In other words, in restoring to its structure its latent possibility of making history – paradoxically made possible by a history already made – an objective syntagmatics re-reads its unfolding into the very grain of its objectivity.

The above thus connects up the problem of a singular reading with the general problematics of desire (already alluded to in thematizing the moments of mimetic theory) at the specific level of historical reflexivity, such that this singularity itself is in question. That this was actually so remains testified to by the opposed political interpretations

of the Nazis and the Resistance of <u>Antigone</u> bringing forth opposed effective symbolics.[18] A symbolics of the persuasive demagogue who institutes the rhetorical imagination of a conservative rationality as against one of the subject - the subjected, that is - who resists the redundancy of the instituting discourse of a will to communication by a meta-communicative will to suspend all communication through an investment of one's silence into the subversive 'act' which functions as intervention and closure in its very realisation.

We are already in the midst of the Anouilhian confrontation of Creon and Antigone. This is the confrontation which stages and is staged by all of these unities of contradictories - the pleasure of a power that dictates communication and its deprivation, the discourse of this power and its suspension, the vertiginous postponment of an event that is a nomological necessity and its self-subversive effectuation... We must thus follow the discipline of a syntagmatic production which appears both to withhold the narrative fluidity of a chronological time and to dramatically - in both senses - irrupt into the body of the syntagm as a time, in the spirit of its classical antecedent, exactly 'synchronological'.

* * *

Antigone is the writing of a play which spaces its writerly product as a function of what are perfectly conventional units of drama – the dialogue, the diegetic division into dramatic 'scenes', the global scenography of a theatrical 'work'. Each of these carry the seed of the Aristotelian classification on the side of technical discourse and the Pythagorean peras or limit as the mark of a finished product or ergon on the side of a metaphysics of commensurable quanta qualifying this former discourse. And yet if it is a spacing, the play called Antigone written for the Parisian theatre by Jean Anouilh must permit the extractions of disparate fragments such that these will regulate the re-constitution of a linear dialogic syntax investing the conflictual rationality of a rationalizing event – that of the War which brought the Resistance into 'incommensurable company' with the Nazis and which instituted the governance of the Paris theatre by the collaborationists.[19] Thus the fragments and their re-constitution:

> 1. CHORUS: Well, here we are. These people
> are about to act out for you
> the story of Antigone.[20]

At the instant of the presentation of the first fragment, the fragment already inscribes a speech in its absurd body

using an initial inscription to bear the nominal responsibility of a subject of speech - that is, a subject of action - an actor - whose genealogy in the history of praxiology till Peter Strawson and in that of dramaturgy till Richard Schechner still is traceable down to a certain Aristotleianism.

> 2. While CHORUS has been speaking the characters have gone out one by one. CHORUS disappears through the left arch. 21

Inserting the authorial function in the interstice of an already projected spatial surface onto the body of a writing allowing the articulation of an author - function, the sign 'left arch' finally erects a marker of internal reference opening the possibility of two sets of 'disappearance': (i) that of an ensemble of signifiers who permit the tyranny of a logocentric choric indicative such that it is mimetically encoded as to why the curtain ever rose at all ('these people are about to act out for you the story of of Antigone'), (ii) that of the theatrical logos itself as far as within the diegetic assurance of a drama which will continue, the mythic duration of a classical lexis specifies this chorus already limited and deported through 'the left arch' as bearing the burden of an auto-topic mimesis.

That is, now Antigone can assume her protagonistic mantle to represent the space already embodied in the perfect presence of mimetic disappearance ('...have gone out' wherein the subject filling this empty slot of a factical report is pre-supposed to have written himself/herself into this 'act' of writing) by appearing yet again to necessarily accept the thread of individuation - a labyrinthine thread through the density of a language, a spacing - from the capitalized CHORUS. Henceforth the bibliothetic signifier which was the archival apriori[22] for the dramaturgic writing which will perpetually await the graphics of the 'scene' - another order of materialization called 'scenographic' in another order of discourse - while entitling itself the play, the book ANTIGONE, must individuate its constitutive individuations further as the 'story' of Antigone is invested in the embodied significations of a metaphysico-cultural sign - that is, henceforth ANTIGONE, the capitalised princess, woman, Other, mimeological unit of the enunciative conditions of mimetic enunciation must 'act'.

3. (...CHORUS looks in that direction).
CHORUS (in a changed tone):

The play is on. Antigone has been caught.
For the first time in her life, little
Antigone is going to be able to be herself.[23]

We are imprisoned so inescapably in the exterior of the object we have undertaken to analyse remorselessly that the object seems to have but only an exterior. The object mutates autotellically into its own fragment. Thus in the above, the voice - choric again - is fractally implicated in a reportage, an ensemble of a 'look' and a 'tone'. The reportage on the subject of the signifier which itself is an intervening mimetic discourse, institutes the time of a plupresentified duration where the tone whose textural change will become a function of enunciation is already instituted within this discourse as changed.

At exactly this abstract point of a signifying continuum where the subject of the signifier is penetrated by its own exteriority from the 'outside' - and a whole iconoclasm is initiated with this mode of interpretation of the problematics of 'fate' in tragic drama[24] - the diegesis estranges its narrative 'desire' to a further figuration of this mythic sign called 'Antigone'. Specified within the consistent characterology of a popular 'psychological' playwright, 'little Antigone' is under the necessary mimetic obligation of being commensurate with her prescribed axis of which the structure of the myth and an ethically rationalized fabulation called <u>Antigone</u> are the two poles.[25] However, the ethics

and the rationality must themselves be dramatized as codes of historical intelligibility specifying the truth of an Antigonesque 'self' in the modes of a mimetic and a mythic regime of truth.[26]

> 4. CREON (turns towards arch and calls) Guard !
>
> (GUARDS enter through arch)
>
> ANTIGONE (in a great cry of relief) At last, Creon!
>
> (CHORUS enters through left arch)
>
> CREON (to the GUARDS) Take her away!
>
> (CREON goes upon top step)
>
> (GUARDS grasp ANTIGONE by her arms, turn and hustle her towards the arch, right, and exit. ISMENE mimes horror, backs away towards the arch, left, then turns and runs out through the arch. A long pause, as CREON moves slowly downstage)
>
> CHORUS (behind CREON speaks in a deliberate voice)...27

These are not innocent fragments. But then perhaps the fragment is never innocent by the very nature of its dis-memberment. In the above, we are inextricably 'incurved' by the verisimilitudious homogenity of a remorseless simplicity that writes itself as bracketed stage instructions. Then why 'incurved' when the 'topos' abounds in an anti-classical, anti-tragic, anti-Aristotleian psychologism vindicating the

circumstantial causality of a series of contingencies that eventuate a 'gratuitous' speech outside of the possibility of any peripatetia of fortunes, any internal structural mutation?[28] After all, we have here no more than the functional mobilisation of a set of characters in the context of a dramaturgically established scenography of arches('left' and 'right'), directions('left' and 'right'), entrances and exits. We have, that is, a language of fairly representational theatrology.

And yet this is a language that proliferates into seductive dramatizations of its own rationality in that it institutes the mimesis of the conditions of its mimetic climax diegetically encoded in the narrative memory of that Antigone who is already a sign of tragic death, of that Creon who is already the upholder of the political order of the 'city'. In the process of this dramatized justification of a narrative rationality exceeding the bounds of semiotic economy and thus exceeding the conditions of its own empirical genesis, we are the victims of that which institues us as the purveyors of the signifiers of seduction. And of course in a play of mimetic organisation which reduces the ensemble of contextual property to the representatives of a closure of opposed speech - one formally staging the sign 'Creon' against the sign 'Antigone' outside of a

structured Sophoclean discourse - it is the dictate of the indigenous logic of this organisation to refer analysis back to the density of the central order of enunciation before its slippage into the traditionalism of a modern psychological interregnum is dramatised in the peripheral continuance of the Anouilhan dramatization such that 'the deliberate voice' which Chorus is written into, as a bit of signifying matter into a bit more of the same, will testify to the further falsification of that regime of mimetic and mythic truth we have alluded to earlier.

It follows from the nature of our fragmentary citations that the process of falsification grounded in a discourse of the history of correspondential analyses of 'truth', must ground its particular desire to correspond to itself as far as it itself is its truth, in a final self-division which will mimetically make commensurate the divided in that future which 'will have been' buried in the institution of this particular play <u>Antigone</u> after the curtain has fallen.[29] When this much is clear, we can eschew any further fragmentation for the moment.

* * *

In the syntagmatic constitution of <u>Antigone</u>'s signifying

space, a history of mimetic production is inscribed in the
light of what we have previously called 'the conditions of
mimesis'. The story that is told is not originative as a
story but then the opacity of every fragment we have cited
above fails to reflect back any diegetic light outside of
the hermenueutic pre-supposition of a pre-existent historical
covenant of horizons permitting the theatricalization of a
narrative knowledge called loosely 'myth'.[30] The conditions
of mimesis, in this case, don't exist as far as the mimetic
'body' must render visible its own space as materially
signifiable of its transformations in excess of the delimita-
tion of the semantic objectivity called 'understanding'.[31] This
confrontation of theatrical positions on the discourse of mi-
mesis engages the latter as a problematics of signifying
exchange modalising an economy of signs dramaturgically formali-
zed as a sequence of mimetic inscriptions - we are never
outside the graphics of the traditionalism of simple play-
writing (thus the tautology) - organising the diegesis of the
mythic material into a system of communicative visibility.
This visibility articulated as a syntagmatics must function
at the levels of: (1) the order of enunciative exchange,
(2) the meta-order where enunciation becomes an image of its
body, the signifier, (3) the order of desire where the double

temporalities of (1) and (2) metonymically refer the epistemic 'ground' of a duration of signification to the Real which is the duration itself such that it is an unfolding unto the imaginary of an immanent mimetic body.[32]

1. The Order of Enunciation

The enunciative sequence is the progressive structuration of an inscribed speech such that regressively, a subject of speech is structured along the axes of this enunciation. The methodological field opened up in the light of this proposition is obviously structuralist. A whole range of objects have found their analytic domains in the wake of what has been called 'the structuralist activity'.[33] While the status of the narrative as a morphological closure of functions, actions and indices has already a respectable theoretical apologetics to quote, we are here concerned with the meta-theoretical impact of this closure as a figure of diegetic 'estrangement' even while the extensive enunciative terrain hollowed out by a mimetic discourse as it signifies itself as the possibility of mimesis, reassimilates the estranged into further enunciation. And it is exactly on this point of a logorrheaic subjectivation of a perfectly contingent mimetics, that the integrity of the object-domain of a purely structural necessity seems compromised. Let us observe the progression of

the enunciative sequence keeping the above stated argument in view.

Antigone consists of an initial presentation of the whole assemblage of human bodies that consequently produces a repetition of the classical 'mythos' and individualises itself as a characterology. However, that even the initial presentation is an abstraction of itself-that is, a re-presentation - is what allows the speech of the singular universal of a one-man chorus to indicate ''These people are about to act out for you the story of Antigone'.[34] At the very beginning of the inaugural syntagm, a mimetic area called an 'empty space' by Peter Brook and a mimetic conditional in the shape of the progressive 'filling out' of this area are the indexical and deictic functions of a clearly delimited enunciative position.[35] The narrative expanse of this position is demonstrated when Chorus bears the diegetic function - within the mimetic - of introducing the characters as the King Creon, the sister Ismene, the lover Haemon, the Soldiers, the Nurse, the Queen as imbricated in the mythological memory of a fable that recapitulates a history of writing. A history of writing the signs 'Cadmus', 'Thebes', 'Laius', 'Oedipus', 'Eteocles', 'Polynices' and finally 'Antigone'.[36] A history which entwines in the genealogy of its emergence the

Sophoclean Theban trilogy with its own modes of discursive transformation whether as re-dramatisation or translation. The prominent nodes of this transformation include Seneca, Racine, Holderlin, Anouilh, Cocteau, Brecht among amany others.[37]

It is the temptation of the theatrical optic to translate the stage-instructions of Jean Anouilh at the very beginning into a visual receptacle so as to add an aural-oral attribute to the spatial substance already anthropomorphized into a set of actors-characters introduced by an inclusive choric consciousness. This temptation is dangerous in that it forecloses both theatrical articulation as a specific discursive practice as well as the field of signification irreducible to anything but a heterotopic textuality. This cautionary note is in conjunction with our earlier argument on an Aristotelian classification that must be resisted as merely the additive product of a metaphysics of passive substance or 'substantia' termed ousia in Greek.

And yet the 'clearing' effected within the domain of a nascent speech promising a drama through the agency of a chorus must constantly supplement the epistemic guarantee of a still uncontaminated mimetic space with the doxalogy of a particular speech. The significance of this dialectic produces

an opinion expressed by the Chorus in relation to Antigone
projecting this relation as a function of an authorized
prophecy where the difference with the unmediated violence of
the signifying power of the Sophoclean Tiresias is specif-
ied by the narratological <u>endoxa</u> of an internal mimetic
community referred internally to the functional exteriority
of the Chorus in the former case and the conflict within
the formation of the 'endoxa' as itself a divided discourse
on the 'episteme' in the latter.[38] Thus, Chorus declares of
Antigone:

> That thin little creature sitting by herself
> staring straight ahead, seeing nothing, is
> Antigone. She is thinking. She is thinking that
> the instant I finish telling you who's who
> and what's what in this play, she will burst
> forth as the tense, sallow, willful girl whose
> family would never take her seriously and who
> is about to rise up alone against Creon, her
> uncle, the King.39

Given the redundant impossibility of an exhaustive re-
citation of the text of <u>Antigone</u>, this deictic construction
of a complicitious prophecy about Antigone structured by the
spatial complicity of a homogenous enunciative presence of
s/he who marks each 'other' presence and is marked in the
'act' (a speech-act, in fact) of marking and she who is
marked as transcendent precisely to the extent she is
caught up in the immanence of a generalized speech which

is inscribed in this ensemble of deixis and performativity, as transcendentalized in that she is said to 'be thinking'. However, the privilege of this immanent transcendence is the specificity of a capitalized Antigone as far as she is a mythical heroine transformed into the medium of a modern mimetic transformation.[40]

The syntagmatic series that formally represents the order of transformations is a narration of the adventure of a 'consciousness'. This is very clear to us especially in the light of the phenomenological terminology we have introduced in the opposition of 'transcendence' and 'immanence'. But what does it mean, to say 'consciousness'? Following our argument, it means the figuration of the syntagm itself such that it signifies the distance between the discourse on mimesis and the mimetic discourse of drama as the imaginary of a Simulacrum. A Similacrum, we conventionally call 'a reading'. 'Consciousness' is the signifier of its own enunciation, that is, a figure.[41]

The adventure of Antigone as 'consciousness' is the enactment of her possible spaces as a general 'spatiality'. But the hypothesis is that this spatiality is the correlative resultant of forces that are not contemporaneous with

Antigone's 'destiny' if destiny is the product of an order of
eventualities or 'scenes' or normative 'units'. There are then,
provisionally, two sets of articulations. The first is schemati-
zed as an order of appearances, of, figuratively the 'phenomenal'
encounters of the protagonistic consciousness:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{O} & \text{I} \\
\text{(Antigone)} \quad - & \text{(Antigone) E/V (Nurse)} \rightarrow \\
\\
& \qquad \text{II} \\
& \text{I E/V (Ismene)} \rightarrow \\
\\
& \qquad \text{III} \\
& \text{II E/V (Haemon)} \rightarrow \\
\\
& \qquad \text{IV} \\
& \text{III E/V (Creon)} \\
\\
& \qquad \text{V} \\
& \text{IV E/V (Guard)} \rightarrow \\
\\
& \qquad \text{VI} \\
& \text{V E/V (Antigone)} \rightarrow \quad (\text{Antigone})
\end{array}
$$

LINE OF IMMANENCE/CONSCIOUSNESS

Symbolically written E denotes 'belongs to' and V denotes
'or'. The bar separating the two inserts a possibility of
super-ordinate exclusion or disjunction even as the ' → ' sign

symbolises a unlinear direction of diegetic unfolding. This is

the bare expression of the internal diachrony of a series

of appearances where the subsequent absence of any of the

earlier elements marks it as a structuring absence in the

universe of hermeneutic re-construction.[42]

And yet this symbolism is incomplete. It works by a hypo-

thetical, additive space epistemologically grounded in the

hermeneutic of a progressively self-conscious language of

the 'cogito'. It is, representable, by the mathematics of

an Euclidean neutral space which is constituted by the

axiomatic minima of an extensionless 'point' as understood

by Aristotle and that we inscribe in the semiotic of a

zero — (Antigone). And it is indeed incomplete because every

element that functions as an ideality, a 'bit' of the

eidos that is itself an eidos is already inscribed in the

complicity of the inscription, the fragment, the symbolism

and the desiring body of that individuation which we have

called 'mimetic' and which a certain criticism has called

'melodramatic'.[43] We need to introduce the sign of negation

perhaps '∿ ', where every unit of hypothetical space is

relentlessly supplemented by the materiality of a mute signi-

fier, a 'gratuitous' speech, transforming the sign and the

signifier to an 'image' that surpasses the phonic substance

of Saussure to the side of what has been called 'the Simulacrum'. This, then, is the critically re-affirmed second articulation.

2. The Order of the Simulacrum

> NURSE: ...Didn't I promise your mother? What would she say if she was here? "Old stupid !"...That is what she'd say, your mother. And I'd stand there, dying of shame if I wasn't dead already. And all I could do would be not to dare look her into the face, and "That's true," I'd say. "That's all true what you say, your Majesty." 44

The order of the simulacrum is the order of the 'gratuitous' 'if' and in the context of the discipline set by the choric voice on the essence of tragedy itself, this conditional is precisely the verbal simulacrum of its mimetic duplication such that the objectivity of tragic pre-destination is progressively, syntagmatically realized. The above cited is the internal dramatization of a single agential voice, called NURSE, investing the grain of its 'geno-affectivity' into its 'pheno-realism' immediately interpretable again as verisimilitudinous psychologism. We have situated this latter as an epistemic modality and a rationality earlier. The material connection of the affect and the truth-effect

mediated by the play of shifters and quotation marks, implicates the whole syntagmatic chain into a further order of significative sociality - the order of desire - where the NURSE, who is an invention, an Anouilhan cog in the mechanism of dramatic consistency of characterology, expropriates the hyper-reality of an extant structure, the myth of Antigone when she converses with Jocasta, Antigone's mother (a name totally unfounded within precisely the Anouilhan consistence) to institute herself as an inferior, expropriated by the regime of the slavish affect, characterologically and co-extensively to affirm this instituting within the institution of a 'gratuitous' Simulacrum. The syntagmatic significance of the NURSE is in the fact that she is an initial node in the series of nodes wherein the reality of the invented (the structured supplementing the structure) and the hyper-reality of the inherited structure are progressively exchanged for the mimetically mutating conditions of exchange. That is, for the hyper-reality of a pure Simulacrum that signifies a 'realism' in the manner of psychological causality and the reality of an object of structural analysis, a reduced paradigm of oppositions rendered unrecognisable outside of its mimetic inscription. As a result, the expansion of sequences up to the final announcement of the MESSENGER of Antigone's

and Haemon's suicide seems to project an image of its body onto the invisible wall opposite, reflecting unto its own surface, a 'gratuitous' Creon, Ismene, Thebes, Oedipus, Antigone born in the spirit of a contingent invention such that the signifier turned into a global sign returns its nominal subjects to their constitutive contingencies, now necessitated by the very structure of their constitution to effect a torsion of the mimetic exchange into a region of the mythic 'gaze' interpellating these subjects as the meto-mymic locus of what Jacques Lacan has called, 'a lack in being'[45] Now, the conditions for tragic recognition or anagnorisis have shifted to a critical discourse on the impossibility of any recognition that does not falsify its own narrative closure by its infinite circulation in the space of the Simulacrum.[46]

3. The Order of Desire

In this order, desire is the conceptual locus of the circulation of a specific problematic of 'identification'. This term has a meaning arising in the psycho-analytic discourse on the relation of the ego and the external world in the constitution of object-choice, such that this meaning is the function of an oedipal structure where the source of

progressive differentiation of the relation and choice remains
this structure embodying as if a familial, social and 'anth-
ropological mirror representing the subject to itself as
identical to itself.[47] That implies, a model is being
proferred under the responsibility of the psycho-analytic
logic to laterally conflate the reality of this model to
itself as the Real as far as this latter is absolutely
synchronic with its groundless speech, its mimesis. This is
clear when Chorus returns to subvert the diegetic linearity
of our basic syntagmatic schema to intervene with the
pedagogics of tragic and melodramatic theatre in the form of
a self-identified technology of role-playing mobilising the
temporal specification of the lighting which refers the
diegesis back to its own contemporaneity as 'mid-afternoon'.[48]
Chorus thus 'allows a pause to indicate that a crucial
moment has been reached in the play'[49] identifying the
incommensurate choric appearance - the intervening syntagm -
with the very ground of the question of identification
which is the absolute duration of the play structured by
'crucial moments'. Subsequently a domain of rationalization
is opened up in the regime of the speech recognisable in
its mimetic dispacement onto the scale of its volume - its
pure exterior - when Chorus relates the epistemology of

'tragedy' (capitalized again as 'Tragedy') to the possibility
of the shifter 'you' to be doing nothing but 'shout'.[50]

This clears the terrain for the problematic of identifi-
cation as a discourse of desire circulating its material
signifier in the ludic space of characterological exchange
governing the signification of 'destiny' as a rule-governed
unit of intelligibility - a knowledge, that is - allowing for
the comparison of its Greek and modern metaphysics in terms
of no essence to be really falsified but as a play of
falsification that secures the conditions of a mutant set
of rules in a mutated discursive practice.[51] This emerges
as a powerful theoretical conclusion when our earlier discus-
sion of Aristotelian tragedy as a mimetic classification is
set against the thematics of a substantive certitude within
the strict imagistic formality of the choric voice:

> In a tragedy nothing is in doubt and
> everyone's destiny is known that makes
> for tranquility. There is a sort of
> fellow-feeling among characters in a
> tragedy: he who kills is as innocent
> as he who gets killed: it's all a
> matter of what part you are playing.[52]

The specificity of the Chorus pointed out by George
Steiner, in Anouilh as different from the two poles of the
lyric - classical and the folkloric - Brecht inserts the notion

of tragic recognition into a domain of knowledge discursively
articulated as 'tragedy' to siginify the latter increasingly
as a mimetic space, a 'gratuitous' and abyssal arena freed
for the production of a purely 'scalar' speech.[53] It is a
historical Chorus in Anouilh who enacts the possibility of a
wordly dialectic of identification and recognition of a world
whose deux absconditus infects it with an affect of 'worldles-
sness'[54] codified through the last three centuries from the
'turning away of the gods' in Holderlin and the 'death of
God' in Nietzche to the 'empty freedom' of Sartre (the time
when Anouilh was writing).[55] This disenchanted world freed
by the Chorus materialises at different points, 'the body of
Polynices',[56] 'the earth' sprayed over this body by sister
Antigone,[57] the body of Antigone stripped of its sororous
'desireless desire' to be hollowed out as a site for the
preparation for an inevitable suicide,[58] and the reduced
formality of a syntagmless space inscribing the interminable
'ethical imperative' individuating Creon in the wake of his
fading individuality,[59] as values of mimetic consumption
establishing the circuit at each terminal, as a mechanism
of the functional negation of these values affirming the
negation in the 'gratuitous' exchange of a 'hopeless' speech.[60]
This is the ideological discourse of 'yes' against 'no' that

so easily facilitates the existentialist ontologisation of the ludic desire to enunciate the 'yes' of Creon and 'no' of Antigone as mimetic affirmation in each of these cases.

The progression of these affirmative oppositions as the seedlings of enunciative positions ordered in the duration of Antigone's unfolding as the 'no' of Ismene to the act of dirtying her fingernails with the earth to be put on Polynices' body as against Antigone's 'yes' mirrors each other's identity as the first stage of characterological recognition where character is still discovering the thought of its essence thrown into play by Chorus initially as the work of mimetic referral.[61] Thus:

ISMENE: Antigone, I've thought about it a lot.

ANTIGONE: Have you?

ISMENE: I thought about it all nightlong. Antigone, You're mad.

ANTIGONE: Am I?

ISMENE: We cannot do it.

ANTIGONE: Why not?

ISMENE: Creon will have us put to death.

ANTIGONE: Of course he will. That's what he's here for. He'll do what he has to do, and we will do what we have to do...That's the way it is.62

The signs of a freedom ante-predicative to all ethics are the signs of Antigone's desire to mimetically commit herself to the 'yes' of the gesture of dirtying her fingernails with a 'bit' of earth - that is, the auto-affection of a solipsistic identification whose exteriority as a subject of speech 'images' the gesture as itself a signifier of an insurgent ethics, an auto-critique of solipsism.[63] That is, solipsism is the mimesis of a post-ritualistic indifferentiation that must, as mimetic body, differentiate itself into, what Rene Girard has argued, to be inherently 'an-religious' caesura of tragedy outside of the precincts of the 'sacred' and thus is from within the philosophy of the _parousia_ of the _sacer_ ontologically and 'critically outside'.[64] We don't argue with this argument here but we consider it only within the understanding that any _parousia_ is a metaphysical referent in its entirety and as much an exteriority and a discontinuity as in any other discourse. We will, then cite two ciphers of this 'exteriority' in _Antigone,_ encoded in the folds of their respective speeches - (1) the private Jonas (2) the page. The first comes from the spatially removed, as the 'docile body' (in Foucault's words) on the frontiers of Creon's city to return the subverter of the interiority of this city, Antigone, to this interiority, to

Creon. The second, a boy, enacts the pure mimesis of a white face, a Mallarmean medium writing the body of its extensionless surface to materialise the fact of existence of a minimal speech whose fold unto its desire is the desire itself to be its own simulacrum, dissumulating nothing at all. The page is Creon's 'yes' returned to the weak grain of its constitutive nothingness such that he is an ontogenetic minima of characterology and the 'scene' of phantasy that Creon inserts into the hallucinatory rationali- sation of disobedience of the law he brings into speech as a demand ('the precious, innocent blood of a child on my hands')[65] and also an object of the solicitation of the phantasy's veridical objectivity ('would you be willing to die for me? ...Of course you would')[66] as a further mimetic rationalisation of a rationalised mimesis called the Law.[67]

The central opposition of Creon and Antigone dramatized in the principal syntagm of the struggle for commensurate reco- gnition in the dialectic of desire and demand which we will paradigmatize as the mythologic of Anouilh's Antigone and which we will further characterize as 'existentialist', is the subject of the chapter to which we turn now.

N o t e s

1.	In the immediate proximity of Anouilh, Jean Paul Sartre
	represents the initiation of this philosophical discourse
in France. We will refer to Sartre as the occasion of the
significant transformations of this discourse into several
contemporary re-evaluations, in the course of our study.

2.	'Mimesis' translated generally into the common-sensical
	'imitation', was conceptualised as a problematic of
cosmic (**Kosmai** or 'the whole' in Greek) order following the
immutable principle of the order of the 'number' in
Pythagorean philosophy such that this achieving of the order
of the phenomenal whole was the product of a mimetic constru-
ction based on the abstract models generated by the laws of
number-series. We mark this use of 'mimesis' as the beginning
of a particular articulation of its signification that contin-
ues up to Aristotle. For 'mimesis' and 'number', see
W.K.C.Guthrie, **A History of Greek Philosophy**, Vol. I(Cambridge:
CUP, 1962), pp.229-31.

3.	For Horace, 'imitatio' and the imitation of Aristotelian
	models of 'mimesis', see Hanna Scolnicov, 'Mimesis,
mirror, double' in **The Play out of Context** ed. Hanna Scolincov
and Peter Holland (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p.89.

4.	"A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is
	serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself;
in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in
separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in
narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, where-
with to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions."
Aristotle, 'Poetics,'trns. Ingram Bywater in **The Basic Works of
Aristotle**, ed. Richard McKeon (New York : Random House, 1941),
p. 1460.

5.	We use 'expropriation' in the context of an internal
	displacement of Greek thought under the guidance of the
movement of Heidegger's solicitation of the metaphysics of
the 'proper' in the Western search for the 'ground' of
entities in 'Being'. See in this connection Gianni Vattimo,
The End of Modernity, trans. Jon R. Snyder (Oxford : Polity
Press, 1989), p. 29.

6.   After the example of the bed and the carpenter as a problem of the degree of proximity to the highest 'maker', that is, the exponent of <u>techne</u> in terms of the degrees of mimesis, Socrates at a later point posits the nexus of the <u>Phantaseia</u> or image and its 'maker' in this terse assertion to Glaucon, "Here is another point : The imitator or maker of the images knows nothing of the existence; he knows appearances only". Plato, 'The Republic', <u>The Works of Plato</u>, trans. B. Jowett (New York : Tudor Publishing Company, undated), p. 387.

7.   We encounter this systematic division in Aristotle based on a primordial principle of logical identity (A = A) that itself is based on an axiomatics of fundamental discursivity (logos) instituting subsequently regional discourses of the human being who lives in the <u>polis</u> (of which the <u>Oikos</u> is the dependent 'other'). For the aspect of 'identity' and its connection with 'coherent' discourse, see Corneliur Castoriadis, <u>The Imaginary Institution of Society</u>, trans. Kathleen Blamey, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), p. 350.

8.   For the structure of this sign as a transformation, from a problematics of adequation or <u>homioasis</u> to one of disclosure or <u>alethia</u>, see Martin Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Truth', in <u>Basic Writings</u>, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 117-41.

9.   This is an important point of departure for the epistemological debate on the relation between a mimetic mediation of 'rational' social practice and mediation of 'rational' social practice and mediation of mimetic practice by an 'inimitable' rationality. The first position on this debate was taken by Plato when he linked the particular 'art' of imitation to an aggravation of 'irrationality' through the complicity of an aesthetics, a regime of 'pleasure' exclusive of knowledge. See Plato, op.cit., pp. 393-94. In Aristotle, the Platonic degrees of valuation of the essential <u>physis</u> to the merely apparent <u>mimetos demiourgi</u> is submitted to the critique of the signification of the creative principle of demiurgic 'pro-duction' which mediates this valuation independently of 'mimesis' in Plato. Thus, a social subject of a creative mimesis is implied in Aristotle's critique. Marx's materialist thesis is the reopening of this critique in an age when the problematic of mimetic commensuration of the

resistant alterity of the Real is shifted to the terrain of 'social relations' which is productive of the rationality that produces its commensurate Real. Marx called this critique 'ideological' and the object of the same,'ideology'. See Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feurbach' in Marx and Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: Progress, 1978), pp. 618-20.

Theodor Adorno's revival of this problem as an aporia of 'negativity' that lodges the mimetic 'impulse' as the irrational 'other' of a split subjectivity, split in the excision of this 'other' by the ideology of a rationality which is mimetic in its ideological performance of this excision, of its constitutive other and thus is, in essential constitution, irrational, is our point of departure for a contemporary rethinking of the problematics of the mimetic subject. See T.W.Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).

10.   Aristotle, op.cit., p. 1457.

11.   "Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation." ibid, p. 1457.

12.   For the discursive nexus of 'vision', 'light', 'knowledge', 'wisdom' and the function of the 'sun' as a sign of intelligibility outside of sensate reception of the phenomenal world, dramatized in the parable of the 'Cave'. Book VII, Plato, op.cit., pp. 265-304.

13.   For 'episteme' as a delimitation of the possibility of the existence of diverse discourses, producing a largely periodizable regime of truth, see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things : An Archaeology of the Human Sciences(New York: Vintage, 1973).

14.   For Heidegger's discussion of Greek tragedy (under the influence of the work of Karl Reinhardt) in the frame of the thought on Dasein, see Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Yale : Yale University Press, 1959).

15.   This is an indication of the genesis of the logic of the 'system' as a philosophical architectonic refusing the primacy of any fundamental conceptual articulation in

favour of the systematic articulation by a conceptual universe of a primary and cosmic Real. This effort, called 'science' by the Greeks is the object of a massive philosophical overthrow by Hegel who thinks the movement of 'desire' as an immanent transformation of itself as 'ethical' in a specific moment of the historically instituted opposition of 'good' and 'bad' in contrast to Aristotle who accepts the possibility of thinking this opposition as only exemplified in the subservience of 'desire' to Phronesis or practical wisdom. See 'Nicomachean Ethics' in Aristotle, op.cit., pp.935-1126 and G.W.F.Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B.Baillie (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), pp.215-548.

16. For the reading of Poetics, St. Augustine's Confessions and the construction of 'time' in history and historical narrative, see Paul Ricouer, Time and Narrative, Vol. I, trans. Kathleen Mclaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago : UCP, 1983); and for the relation of 'mimesis' and 'metaphor' as a problematics of the 'proper', see Jacques Derrida, 'White Mythology : Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy', Margins of Philosophy, trns. Alan Bass, (Sussex : The Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 207-71.

17. See Jacques Lacan, 'The Mirror Stage,' in Ecrits, trans. Alan Sheridan, (London : Tavistock, 1977), pp. 1-7, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Gaattan, Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane,(London: Athlone, 1984).

18. For Antigone's reception in occupied Paris, see David Bradby, Modern French Drama 1940-1980,(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 34-52.

19. Critics like J.L.Styan would however like to dissociate the question of Anouilh's 'committment' to the Resistance during the war from 'the dramatic strength of his talents'. see J.L. Styan, The Dark Comedy - The Development of Modern Comic Tragedy (Cambridge : CUP, 1968), p.187.

20. Jean Anouilh, 'Antigone', trans. Lewis Galantiere in Makers of the Modern Theater (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1961), p. 490.

21. ibid, p. 492.

22. Here, we use Michel Foucault's meanings 'archive',
'a priori' in the effort to derive from his project
of an 'archaeology' the synthetic image of a collage of
'entitling' statements conditioning the possibility of a
historical memory of myths in the form of discourse where
ANTIGONE is one title. See, Michel Foucault, The Archaeology
of Knowledge, trans. A.M.Sheridan (New York : Pantheon, 1972).

23. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 501.

24. As an example of this iconoclasm, see JanKott, The
Eating of the Gods : An Interpretation of Greek Trage-
dy, trans. Bolesaw Taborski and Edward Czerwinski (London :
Methuen, 1974).

25. For 'little' Antigone, the role of myth and the possi-
bility of a psychologically 'reduced' character,
cf. Michael Spingler, 'Anouilh's Little Antigone : Tragedy,
Theatricalism and the Romantic Self' in Drama In The Twenti-
eth Century, ed. Clifford Davidson, C.JGianakaris, John H.
Stroupe (New York : AMS Press, 1984), pp. 173-183.

26. As a specific instance of the construction of this
self instanciating a conflict of codes of aesthetic,
ethical and psychological intelligibility, see the description
of Goethe's and Eckermann's discussion of Hegel's exegesis
of the Greek Antigone, in George Steiner, Antigones : The
Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought(Oxford:OUP,1984),
pp. 49-51.

27. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 511.

28. At the conjuncture when Antigone will be caught and
brought before Creon, Chorus characterises the nature
of tragedy thus, "In melodrama, you argue and struggle in the
hope of escape. That is vulgar; its practical. But in
tragedy, where there is no temptation to try to escape,
argument is gratuitous; its kingly." ibid, p. 501.

It is this very absence of 'practical' intervention that
permits an internal psychological explanation to be critically
constructed and this explanation, in all its consistent theoretici-
sm, does not allow any necessary objective determinism between
contingent actions. This allows, for both a Humean psychologism
and an existential 'situationalism' to be posited, as 'explanatory
myths'.

29.   For following the necessary indeterminacy that governs
that particular turn of events, installing a nearly
unrecognisable modification of the Aristotelian triad of complica-
tion, peripatetia and denouement, that is , between the institut-
ing moment of an individual individuation of a component scene
in its twin aspects of 'speech' or legein and 'work' (includi-
ng the work of speech called 'enunciation') or tukhein and the
institution of one tragedy as completed in its trans-individual
individuation as a species - individual within the genus
capitalised as 'Tragedy', we must base our epistemological
stand on the critique of a singular presentation of legein
and tukhein in their correspondent expression as a hermeneutic
'text', as a critique of truth expressed as 'correspondence'
(see note 8). For legein and tukhein, see Castoriadis, op.cit.,
pp. 222-272.

30.   Even within more thematic criticism this problem has been
recognised as the irreducibility of 'form' and the order
of constitutive elements. Hubert Heffner compares Hippolytus of
Euripides with Phedre of Racine and Antigone of Sophocles
with that of Anouilh, in this analytic mode. See Hugh Heffner,
'Towards a Definition of Form in Drama', in Classical Drama and
Its Influence, ed. M.J.Anderson (London : Methuen & Co., 1965),p.146.

31.   This is meant also as a reservation about the philo-
sophical hermeneutics and its 'application' (which is a
hermeneutic concept) to the mode of being of Greek tragedy initi-
ated by Hans Georg Gadamer. 'Understanding' and the recovery
of an ontological substrata of historically effective meanings
in Gadamer's transformation of Diltheyan and Heideggerian dis-
courses into an anti-subjectivist project proceeding from a
critique of Kant's Critique of Judgement , nevertheless,
concede the construction of a virtual subject working as a
'horizon' of self-disclosure of meaning. See, H.G.Gadamer, Truth
and Method, trans. Garret Barden and William G.Doerpel (New
York : Seabury Press, 1975).

32.   This methodological division of analytic levels will
clarify itself in its operation. However for a few
concise references with regard to its basic formulation, see
Patrice Pavis, 'Problems of translation for the stage: Inter-
culturalism and post-modern theatre', trans. Loren Kruger in
The Play Out of Context : Transferring Plays from Culture to
Culture, ed. Hanna Scolnicov and Peter Holland (Cambridge : CUP,
1989), pp. 25-44;

Keir Elam, <u>The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama</u> (London: Metheun, 1980);

Roland Barthes, 'Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein', trans.Richard Howard, in <u>The Responsibility of Forms</u> (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. '89-97;

Gerard Genette, 'Frontiers of Narrative',in <u>Figures of Literary Discourse</u> , trans. Alan Sheridan (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1982); and

Anthony Wilden, 'Metaphor and Metonymy : Freud's Semiotic Model of Condensation and Displacement', in <u>System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange</u> (London : Tavistock, 1972). pp. 31-62.

33.   R.Barthes, 'The Structuralist Activity', in <u>Partisan Review</u> 34(1), 1967, pp. 82-84.

34.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 490.

35.   See Peter Brook, <u>The Empty Space</u> (Middlesex : Pelican,1972).

36.   The writing of these signs is the hypothetical re-constru-
ction of their structural articulation as a diachrony transforming into the synchronic objectivity called 'myth'. However, the very fact of writing, in its irreducible graphism, reduces this construction to its space of 'play' where the question of 'centering' this space with a structural invariant cannot be resolved even with the hypothetical minima (used in linguistics as 'zero-degree phoneme') of a 'zero degree mytheme'. See, in this regard, Claude Levi-Strauss, 'The Structural Analysis of Myth', in <u>Structural Anthropology L</u>trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Middlesex : Penguin, 1963); and

Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences', in <u>Writing and Difference,</u> trans. Alan Bass (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).

37.   For a remarkably vivid account of these transformations in
the case of the figure of Antigone, see George Steiner, op.cit.

38.   The meaning of 'doxa' as a ground of the dialectical
structure of the 'enthymeme' or the practical syllogism, present already in Plato in a very different context, becomes

the peripheral object of the <u>Prior Analytics</u>. See, Aristotle, op.cit., p. 105-7. The function of 'probability' and the 'sign', using the example of the pregnant woman in the figure of this syllogism as the premiss, nascently releases the possibility of the imbrication of a material-practical universe of signs, ideologically hypostatised, with the veridicality of the legitimising discourse (<u>Logic</u>, being the leading) and clearing the conditions for the production of tragic fictions, based on 'probable impossibilities' rather than on the reverse, and thus providing the criteria for a paradoxical 'truth' of mimesis.

For two divergent perspectives on the problem of the 'doxa', see (1) Edmund Husserl, <u>Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology</u>, trans. Boyce Gibson (London : Allen and Unwin,1969) for the doxic 'enactment' of the approximate noesis towards pure form or <u>eidos</u> of judgement. (2) For a mimetically grounded habitus enacting doxic truth in the reproduction of its collective investment of 'Symbolic Capital', see Pierre Bordieu, <u>Outline of a Theory of Practice</u>, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge : CUP, 1977), pp. 159-171.

39.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 490.

40.   It is in this conflict between a privilege and a burden of being mythically privileged that Antigone's enunciative status is divided between two positions of desire, that of the mother's and lover's. The locus of these positions is the sequence with Haemon. The first position, in its 'irreal' transcendence, contrasts itself with 'real mothers' when Antigone, speaks to Haemon of the little boy they would have, thus: "... She would have been strong where he was concerned, so much stronger than all those real mothers with their real bosoms and their aprons round their middle."

The second position in its corporeal embodiment of Antigone's immediate immanence with respect to her lover she will leave forever, attempts to return speech to the position of transcendence from where 'love' must be verified even while the measure of verification remains immediately mimetic - that is, mediate - space of the body. Thus Antigone asks Haemon:

"Your arms round me aren't lying, are they? Your hands, so warm against my back - they are not lying? This warmth that is in me; this confidence, this sense that I am safe, secure, that flows through me as I stand here with my cheek in the hollow of your shoulder;

they are not lies, are they?"(Anouilh, op.cit.,p.497).

41.   The ancient example, pregnant with theatrical significa-
        nce, of this 'figure' is the mask which enacts the
mimetic surface of the tragic and comic logos (the vocal source
of the lexis already by its local 'dynamis' to have found its
vocalised universality, its entelechia or form) onto itself as a
pure surface signifying an 'absolute distance' from the face
which becomes a standardized invisibility (and is not privatively
invisible) in Greek drama such that the signification of the
mask becomes the distance it 'is' itself. This ontological di-
vision marking the instrument of mimesis has been the object
of discussions from Nietzche to Levi-Stauss and Rene Girard. Here,
we use 'consciousness' as the expropriated part of a philoso-
phical discourse that breaks largely with the classical
episteme - a discourse that had expropriated the Greek psyche
into the gnoseological model of Christian knowledge investing
the pueuma or spirit with a more worldly and yet more divine
rationality and which still had a place for gnosis or 'recogni-
tion'. 'Consciousness', like the Greek mask, is the mode of propo-
sitional articulation (that is, "this is a mask/consciousness which
has the function of actually being what it represents - which is
the mask/consciousness with this function" is a propositional
function, limiting the variable to the deictic particular 'this')
that, revives the Aristotelian comparison of 'history' and
'poetry' in terms of singularity and universality to encode this
comparison as the dramatized narrative of each of the expropria-
ted discourses of history - historical, fictional or philosophi-
cal - such that each becomes its pure formal possibility and
is immediately expropriated in this 'becoming' to become its
pure Simulacra.   See Aristotle, op.cit., p.1464, and Jean Baudri-
llard, 'Simulacra and Simulations' in Selected Writings, ed.
Mark Poster (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 166-84.

42.   It is by virtue of this kind of a regressive reconstruc-
        tion that George Steiner conflates the mimetics of
Anouilh which is purely a writing, an inscribed speech with a
thematics of Antigone as such. Thus, Steiner can say finally
'Creon Wins' in Anouilh or that in the end Creon 'gently teases'
the young boy, his page. To gently tease or not to is Rudra-
prasad Sengupta's prerogative when he 'does' Creon in a Bengali
translation of Antigone and not George Steiner's when he 'does'
criticism. See Steiner, op.cit., pp. 192-94.

43.   S.Beynon John is an example of this criticism and its
        language; the example intensifies with melodrama's alleged
connections with an 'escape' qualified as 'aesthetic'. In
the third chapter, we examine the structure of the connection as
well as the qualification. See note 70, chapter 3.

44.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 493.

45.   See 'Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of
        Desire', in Lacan, op.cit., pp. 292-325.

        But this problematics can be displaced to the work of
Deleuze and Guattari where the conjunctive subtraction of the
subject as an organic abstraction from the concrete multiplicity
of 'desiring machines' is effected as subject to a 'gaze' which
positivises this subjection as a 'territorialisation' and does
not metonymise it as a 'lack'. We will have occasion to return
to this dislocation later in connection with 'power' and 'subjec-
tivity'. See, Deleuze and Guattari, op.cit.

46.   On the psychoanalytic notion of 'mis-recognition' and
        Tragedy, see Andre Green , The Tragic Effect : The Oedipus
Complex in Tragedy, trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge : CUP, 1979),
pp. 221-30.

47.   To refer this vast conceptual terrain to Freud directly
        is to refer to the whole of Freud's work. However for
the specific role of the 'unconscious' as a 'systems' and a
'topos' in 'staging' the drama of identification and recogni-
tion mediated by the genetic and structural phenomena of
'repression' see Sigmund Freud, 'Repression and The Unconscious',
in Collected Papers, Vol. IV, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth
Press, 1925), pp. 84-136.

48.   See   Anouilh, op.cit., pp. 500-501.

49.   ibid, p. 500

50.   "Tragedy is restful, and the reason is that hope, that
        foul, deceitful thing, has no part in it. There isn't
any hope. You're trapped. The whole sky has fallen on you,
and all you can do about it is to shout", ibid, p.501.

51.   For the mapping of these mutations onto a concrete
        ritualistic space as it transforms itself in the
process of falsifying its Dionysian event of the sparagmos into

a liturgy of Christian 'passion', rather eclectically but significantly received today as a mapping on to the generality of 'madness' (in the structural framework of the abstract theatrological space of Euripides' The Bacchae), see Kott, op.cit., pp. 186-230.

52.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 501.

53.   See, Steiner, op.cit., p. 171 and note 50 for 'scales' of 'hopeless' speech and the closure of tragedy.

54.   'Worldliness' is the theologian Rudolf Bultmann's characterization of Creon as an exemplum of 'pure immanence'. See ibid, pp. 189-90. Based on a variety of positions, from Karl Barth's Christian Kerygma to Karl Lowith's 'secularization' thesis, the problem of modernity as a legitimized epistemico-praxic epoch is thinkable within the dialectic of 'worldliness' and 'worldlessness' opening up the site for the constitution of the existentialist subject. For a position on modernity that differs with both the hermeneutics of Kerygmatic recovery of the domain of the 'sacred' and the secularization of Christian eschatology, see Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Massachusets: MIT Press, 1983),pp.3-11.

55.   For a Nietzchean and evidently post-modern view on the symbolisation of the 'end of modernity' with 'the death of God', see Vattimo, op.cit., pp. 19-47.

56.   Anouilh, op.cit., pp. 499-500.

57.   ibid, p. 501.

58.   This is not a psychological statement wherein Antigone is bound to kill herself but it is a structured space - a site - which produces an internal rationale for a mode of dying - suicide - co-terminously psychologized. This process is evidenced by the sequence of Antigone and the Guard in the prison scene. See, ibid, pp. 512-514.

59.   This is also a fading of the imperative. Thus Creon submits to a 'personal' affect when as a 'personality' (in the Hegelian sense largely) he is alienated from the Law bearing his own signature as far as he is a personality (in the same sense) to cry to Haemon, "For God's sake, Haemon, do not judge me, not you too !", ibid, p.512.

60.   See, note 50.

61.   This is a fictional history of womanly 'manners' throwing the question of identity into the discourse of gendered socialization where the ontogenetic signifier 'girl' permits a mimesis already implicated in the embodied 'empowerment' (Foucault's term) of such signs as 'beauty' and 'uncle' entering into the familial node condensing a patrocentric history. For the fictional particulars of this 'permitted' mimesis of ideological conflict, see the long exchange between Ismene and Antigone, Anouilh, op.cit., pp. 494-495.

62.   ibid, p. 494.

63.   This is a movement traceable from Kierkegaard's paradoxical Antigone to Sartre's who is a 'pure choice' mobilising the Dasein-analytic of Heidegger in its wake. This movement, from auto-affection to an auto-critical auto-affection will be argued out and documented in course of our study.

64.   This is a thesis that conjoins 'tragedy' with the social ontology of 'differentiation' based on the religious ritual of the sacrifice itself based on the original violence of the original sacrifice purging the original violence of indifferentiation before the original sacrifice. This thesis, doubling origin upon origin, posits the repetitive phenomena in history of 'surrogate victims' that arise in tragic crises, i.e., a crisis of religion. In this sense, for Girard, tragedy is anreligious. See Rene Girard, <u>Violence and the Sacred</u>, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore : John Hopkins, 1972)

65.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 500.

66.   ibid, p. 500.

67.   For 'phantasy' and the effect of tragedy on the ensemble of an audience living the psychoanalytic insight of 'misrecognition' in the mode of identifying metonymically with the pathological 'symptom' fictionalized into an 'other scene' of the theatre, and thus, in the mode of displacing an original repression unto its sublimated 'lifting' so as to invest a quota of catharsis to a jouissance pleasure called 'aesthetic', see Green, op.cit., pp. 1-34.

Chapter II

The Determinations Of Indeterminacy :

The Analysis Of Myth In _Antigone_

Mimesis, we have discovered, is the necessary indeterminacy that punctuates the determination of an exchange of signifiers in the constitution of the field of signification of an object producing itself as a dramaturgic or theatrological 'text'. Conversely, the constituted field itself is a mimetic production simultaneously producing a set of determinate conditions that tie the signifying exchange in a circuit of variable signitive combinations determined in turn by the 'punctual' indeterminacy which circulates itself as a 'desire' and specifies itself as a 'mimesis' to institute itself as a textuality inscribed in the field — the text — while exceeding it.

In an extremely altered epistemological circusstance, we bring into play the signification of _logos_ — presence of an enunciation in the fact of speech — _lexis_ — the order of the enunciative discipline silently producing the

possibility of a speech - and 'mythos' - the exterior
determination of the enunciative position, as a semiological
reading of Aristotle's definition of tragedy in Poetics
such that this reading extrapolates its conceptual reception
into an active archaeology of the abstractions of a body
(intuitively, the actor's) mimetically conditioning itself
into the dense outline of a materiality defined by the
discourse of theatre.[1] It is the serious consequence of the
reiterable character of this discourse that its mimetic
determinations - that is, its indeterminate iteration in
every re-iterated determination of itself as further 'rei-
terable' - throw into question, the inimitable seriousness
of an object-domain that denotes itself as originally repro-
ducible as original and is conventionally internalised as
'the Real'.[2] Mimesis, as the condition of its difference
from itself, in reproducing its differentiated body, challen-
ges the ontology of originary presence in terms of the
structural determination of this presence, pointing out
further the indeterminacy of determination in an ostensive
'act' of signification, which spatialises itself as a schema
of itself, and which, in its self-inscription, theorises its
own body as an institution of difference, repeating the
ostension and differing from the repeating in one and the

same move. We identifiy this move as the impossible deixis
of a spatiality in general - a theatre in general.[3]

Myth and Mimesis
The Problem of Modes of Mythical Existence

Jane Harrison has traced the movement of the practice
integrated into the cyclically programmed mode of
social existence of the early communities, that we call
'ritual' to its localisation to a spectacle - which is to
be seen, to state an important tautology - resulting in a
shift of cultural code from the practical religion of
seasonal invocation of the seasons (the simple cycle, that is)
to a dramatized version of this invocation projecting a
pantheon of gods to as if, legitimise the constructivist,
rehearsed and highly anthropomorphised event that is called
'drama' (derived and removed from the early Greek dromenon)
in the name of a sanctified narrative itself constructed -
and in the process called 'theatre' mimetically intervening
in the earlier cycle.[4] In following Harrison, we are
specifying our use of 'mimesis' to be the equivocal self-
subjection and self-reflection that ritual brings about in
concretely embodying a moment of theoretical transformation of
practical religion (with its extensive taxonomy, theory and
mythology, as Levi-Strauss shows) practically and as pointed

out by her.[5] And in following our own thought, we submit the structure of ritualistic equivocity to the structure of that epistemological closure which, in reducing this equivocity to its categorial possibility, constitutes the impersonal self-consciousness of a 'science' called 'mythology' taken to be transcendental yet unconscious.

In his The Raw and the Cooked, Claude Levi Stauss, situates the genesis and rationality of myth in a schematism of universal significance, which can be very tentatively called 'thought'.[6] While Levi Strauss' The Structural Study of Myth offers a method of 'writing', paradoxically, the fictional history of myth without falling into the absurdity of a mythological historicism, the fundamental epistemic importance of the mytheme as an abstract unit of analysis of homologies, analogous to the phoneme or the gene, must be referred to a vigorous critique of metaphysics of what any analysis must owe and that is the problem of the mode of existence of 'thought' (bearing a family-resemblance with the nous of the Greeks, the geist of christianity and classical German Philosophy, the Cartesian Cogito and the 'consciousness' in Brentano's psychology to Husserlian phenomenology). Particularly in the study of the function of myth, this becomes a conceptual movement which must engage the special

problematics of 'fiction', already adumbrated by Aristotle in his Rhetoric with his classification of the sign and its correlative 'affect'.[7] The two, in the case of tragedy, prepare us for the understanding of the substitutive taxonomy of affects - fear (phobos) and pity (pathos) - that mobilise the mimetic inscription of catharsis in ancient tragedy, an inscription that survives as 'text' and as a historiography of performance.[8] Thus, from a different perspective Sophocles' Antigone and Aristotle's Poetics. And thus, Anouilh's play and a reading of the Poetics such as ours.

The schema which conceptual investigation inserts between the empiricism of observed social behaviour and the positivism of functional classification of this behaviour as a mode of generalisable sociological rationality, is what Levi-Strauss, after structural linguistics, in his study of kinship rules, totemism, myth and custom, generalised as a symbolic rationality preserved in matrices of structured objective positions (statements narrativising a mythical story, in the case of myth) and articulated in combinations such that these formed objects analysable as their own possibility and synthesisable as themselves in their mode of social existence.[9] Exactly, at the node of this objectal

transmutation, the metaphysics of organic thought or thought as the organ of analysis and synthesis (bringing into immediate relation Aristotle and Kant)[10] expresses itself as the problem of temporality which regulates the effective mutation in 'the Real' grasped as History. And here, history is itself grasped as the sign of concrete change and the latter, as the passage of existence in its possible modes. But further, finally, the modal possibilities are already structured by their objective schematism, their matricial dimension, excluding, by their necessity the formation of the question of a contingent temporality of historical existence within their horizon.[11] The circularity of this movement, formed the themes of an epochal debate in the field of epistemology between Sartre and Levi-Strauss.[12] Our interest in this debate - especially after the use we have made of the notion of 'reproduction' in our discussion of mimesis - centres on the status of the schematism conflated as 'thought' when it individualises itself as 'mythical' and when its specific continuity is understood as historical.[13] The epistemic thrust of this connection must revert to a discursive rationality that symbolises the connected terms in the wake of an exteriority understood either as 'truth' as in the case of Sartrian 'totalization' or as 'Kantianism

without the transcendental subject', in that of Levi-Strauss.[14] Resultantly, the symbolism itself forms a specific domain of mythology, whose epistemic possibility was found by some one like Louis Althusser, to be in 'ideology' that 'interpellated' individuals as relata in the reproduction of a generalised subjectivity and which in this century ranges from the early historicism and humanism to later-day 'structuralist ideology'.[15]

The scission which structualist methodology brings about between knowledge and the being of the Real, joins consequently the thought on being to knowledge as the symbolic mediation of the former by the latter where the symbol is the paradigmatic expression for the progressive 'ellipsization' of the Real.[16] But this means the Platonic logos free of the contamination of the mythos, is rupturally invaded by a noesis differing from itself as the noesis circumscribed by the logos and the hermenia and is, if anything, structured by its constitutive mythos. A tradition of reflection, from the Kantian Earnst Cassirer to Heidegger, has mapped the devaluation of the Platonic logos as the historical displacement of an onto-logic that governed Plato's hierarchy of the good, the true and the known to an individuation of the 'event' that, in Heidegger's discourse, could be called the 'withdrawal' of the metaphysics of the

logos opposed strictly to the mythos and that instituted

Being as the abyssal ground (to be deliberately paradoxical)

of a thought of historical time that would temporalize itself

as a history and as a discontinuity by the 'occurential'

grasp of both.[17] Myth would be, in this manner of proceeding,

the mythos of a historical understanding of itself as its

own interpretation or as logos or even more 'occurentially' its

'performance' by the silent receiver of the mythical thought,

meaning the receiving of the message sent by him/herself in

a circuit of symbolic exchange where the receipt and the

receiver are the upsurge, the event of the vindication of a

historically effective position in the mythic structure.[18] In

this way, a certain Heidegger and a certain Levi-Strauss are

brought into conjunction by way of a critique of 'restorative'

hermeneutics. While the tradition of this kind of hermeneutics

has been borne by theology and mythography of the kind

Mircea Eliade initiated, as pointed out by Paul Ricouer, its

phenomenological counterpart is the philosophy of the

'detotalized totalization' called the subject of history and

described as 'praxis' by Sartre.[19] The important difference

between the two would however be their divergent construction

of such an object as the one called 'myth' where the first

would 'restore' it to its sacral symbolism as a realised

hermeneutics and where the second would transform it as a historicized reflection of symbolic practice itself a dialectical product of the original praxis of the subject who is produced as the truth of its praxis, producing, in this process called 'totalization', a single, undivided, materialist 'truth' that is phenomenologically lived as a diasporatic 'time' and the time, as 'eks-tasised' (from the vocabulary of Being and Nothingness) is constituted as the history, 'men make' and constitutes the being of knowledge - 'class-being' that Marx wrote about in Hegelian language - irreducible to 'Being' or a capitalised, 'History'.[20] On precisely the question of 'historical society', Levi-Strauss interrogated Sartre's understanding of a dialectics that arose from a rupture with analysis of knowledge-objects and in his study of 'cold societies', Levi-Strauss showed a fundamental dialectic between myth and ritual that inscribed these societies in a network of rules and rule-bound practices, whose symbolic character was not a secondary reflection of an original mediation but which demonstrated the dialectical emergence of a logical object in some other societies called hot which could be called 'history' and which could be analysed for its truth felt as an 'effect' of its structure and which, finally, in the largely political act of conflating this truth as

'Truth' alleged the absence of history in societies whose symbolic certainty was irreducible to any single real development of the series of praxic mediations that define Sartre's use of 'mode of production' or 'historical materialism'.[21]

We have travelled to some distance, in a debate that skirts the boundary of 'anthropology' and what Sartre constructed as the prolegomenon to any future anthropology by way of articulating the site that hosts the production of a determinate mimetic movement, determined as a product of history.[22] The importance of the War and the Paris Occupation, in the context of Anouilh's writing, has been highlighted earlier. This happened to be a vexatious problem of opposed interpretations that read their justifications - their hermeneutics, that is - into the same *mythos* as far as the latter is reducible to a structure, a set of mutatable positions individuated by a Saussurean mutuality of reciprocal difference. We will, in the following, examine the play of difference in the field structured by an exchange syntagmatized by the 'dialogue' between Creon and Antigone, after Antigone has been arrested. While this play will be synchronically reducible to a set of oppostions, the relations of similarity and dissimilarity that characterise these oppositions as a confrontation of 'values' must significantly divide the

meaning of this confrontation as a structural occupation -
that is, as a hypostatized possibility called 'myth' - and as
an event that, especially, in the discourse of analogous ethi-
cs, irrupts into the Real of pure possibility - and that is
perhaps what Lacan means by Real as the impossible - as a
mode of concrete existence, historical in that it is 'myth'
and mythical, in that it is History.[23]   Theoretically, the
formal functions of a third term, a meta-term mediating an
opposition and being mediated by it as a meta-term, returns
the question we seek to position, to its epistemological flux
from the time of Kant to that of Hegel. And of course the
genealogy of this flux goes back to, at least, the opposition
of possibility (dynamis, potentia in Latin) and actuality
(entelechia, actualitas in Latin) and their order of precede-
nce in Aristotle's Metaphysics.[24]

The 'Perfect' Mythology of Antigone

Our contention, here is that Sophocles' Antigone is not a
perfect mythology. We will not adduce many reasons for this
beyond pointing out that from Hegel, in his The Phenomenology of
the Mind to Charles Segal in his Tragedy and Civilization
interpretation has divided up the imperfection of Sophocles
into an extensive discourse of methodological mythologies

themselves arising from Greek thought, from the tragedians, from Sophocles.

Our further contention is that Anouilh's is a perfect mythology; it 'means the telling word'.[25] It speaks. It is an intelligibility structured by a flawless enunciation, projecting this structure onto an imaginary screen opposite to produce a brilliant image of its thematics, its 'drama' as a form of thought, a mythology. The intelligibility of this intelligible mythology, we propose, is the structured field of ontological oppositions specifying the philosophical discourse of existentialism. This brings back the epistemological problematic of myth, history and the discourse of theory, to the fore - the problematic introduced in the earlier section - to be inscribed in the mimesis of a densely silent speech, in the excessive materiality of a theatrologic - another unscientific science - conventionally called, after the Greek codification, 'dialogue'.[26] We prefer to think, despite the intense pulsion of their reality, both the theatrological and the philosophical discourses, function as capillary phantasmagorics as Foucault, in an essay on Deleuze, names, a _Theatrum Philosophicum_.[27] But, the axiomatics of the capillary is the product of 'power' and the theatre as an exterior and this exteriority of an assemblage will be the pragmatics of subjectivity which will

follow our archaeology of the structure of Anouilh's mythology, in the next chapter.

* * *

1.   Transcendence/Immanence

or

Freedom and Facticity

The opposition of transcendence and immanence has already been cited in our discussion of Antigone's enunciation. Here we will argue that this pair of opposites relates itself to the other, 'freedom or facticity' as a relation of pairs dividing the singular duality (that is, the individual individuation) of the Antigone/Creon opposition into multiple modes of stating certain themes and arguments that are 'gratuitous' as far as they are tokens of speech but are necessary as far as they contribute to the dramatization of a discourse, inescapably mythological. Myth, that is, makes Antigone's 'gratuitous' speech, inescapable.

"Why did you try to bury your brother?" - this is the question Creon poses to Antigone. She replies: "I owed it to him".[28] This little exchange takes place after there has taken place an extended pause. And the pause has occured after it has been made clear that Antigone intends to do again

what she has already done - spray a handful of earth over Polynices' body. Of course, we know that Antigone is arrested, trying to bury the body the second time. The sequence at her quarters with the Nurse, Ismene and Haemon was following her having done it the first time. Anyway it is evident that Antigone is as committed to do again what she has done before as the three guards are committed to abort her action into an 'act', which in its truncation, becomes a relay of signification. In interrupting and continuing the relay, Creon asks her the question and she gives the answer, we mentioned above. And because, following the logic of what American schools of pragmatism call 'conversation', the question is asked, the answer is given and because it is given, the possibility of an exchange realises itself as a 'conversation'. That is, the universe of signification that is through and through transcendent being transcribable as a 'code' releases a microcosmic enunciative situation to articulate its contour as the use of this code and as the displacement of the same to the region of immanence or equivocity (the instantiation of a possibility, in its paired symbiosis as the existence of possibility as possibility) where the time of mediation - the pause, that is - is the duration of the danger of its destruction, that is, a return

to transcendence, to a pure and dead code.[29] Our study, is oriented, in the mapping of the movement of mediation, towards the moment of destruction and towards the last breath of the code such that it can marginally provide for a hermeneutics of death which would be that of tragic closure, the rationale for the code itself.[30]

* * *

We can briefly note here Heidegger's thought on 'Being-towards death' which in its being is no-one's but 'mine', noting further that this was a thought penetrating the question of 'authenticity' as a transcendence within its existential conditional.[31] Sartre thought this conditional, in his critique of Heidegger, as a problem of fundamental nihilation that projects man as 'human reality' (this was the dubious translation used by Sartre of Heidegger's _Dasein_ literally and relevantly rendered 'there-being') as a nihilating being into his realm of existence where authenticity was the overcoming of 'bad faith' in the concrete engagement with the other who is forever making an other of me, making my transcendence an immanence, my freedom a facticity and thus surpassing my Being-in-Self into a Being-for-Other.[32] The fact of death, as a fact, being 'unnoemable' (to return to Husserl, somewhat distortedly), never phenomenologises itself

as a structure of being-for-self and thus, as a problem is purely for the Other. That is, the primordiality of the Sartrian project of freedom individuating being as choice regulates its own absolute non-relation with its own death in an alienation from its own life dispossessed to the advantage of the Other.[33] This form of regulation which chooses itself as the absurdity of its upsurge into the absurd possibility of an inevitable death, separates Sartre's concept of freedom from Heidegger's in that the latter sought to ground the factical existent in the groundlessnes of 'anxiety', its own most potentiality-for-being (or of Da-Sein's general structure as 'care' - which is its 'thrown' pro-ject - in the face of 'Nothing')[34] while the former wishes to think nothingness as a concrete, nihilating articulation of the human being as an anguished transcedence and not as a region for the meta-physics of non-being. Thus Sartre writes:

> ...What is the use of affirming that Nothingness provides the ground for negation, if it is merely to enable us to form subsequently a theory of non-being which by definition separates Nothingness from all concrete negation.[35]

He writes much later in his vast ontological exploration:

> ... the fact remains that death such that I can discover it as 'mine' necessarily engages something other than myself. In fact in so far as it is the always possible nihilation of my possibles, it is outside my possibilities and I cannot wait for it.36

In his reply to Sartre Heidegger writes in <u>Letter on</u>

<u>Humanism</u> :

> Nihilation unfolds essentially in Being itself, and not
> at all in the existence of man - so far as this is
> thought as the subjectivity of the 'egocogito'. 'Dasein'
> in no way nihilates as a human subject who carries
> out nihilation in the sense of denial; rather,
> 'Dasein' nihilates in as much as it belongs to the
> essence of Being as that essence in which man
> 'ek-sists'.37

In this confrontation of positions loosely encompassed into

'existentialism', we note the conceptual torsion of a discourse

and a code that submit the opposition of transcendence and

immanence - which is a semantic closure opposing the opposite

terms at one level of logical typing - to a contradictory

movement of application, when applied to the historically

determined 'sign' which is the human-being determined as an

existent of the possibility of indeterminacy where the possi-

bility is the determination of the code and the sign, in a

discursive event of great moment.38

<p style="text-align:center;">* * *</p>

Returning to Antigone's answer, we can ask, what does it

mean to say. 'I owed it to him'. Under the command of what

axiological economy does this debt account for itself as

exchangeable for what we have called, 'the act'? Antigone

herself answers:

ANTIGONE : I owed it to him. Those who are not buried wander eternally and find no rest. If my brother were alive, and he came home weary after a long day's hunting, I should kneel down and unlace his boots, I should fetch him food and drink. I should see that his bed was ready for him. Polynices is home from the hunt. I owe it to him to unlock the house of the dead in which my father and my mother are waiting to welcome him. Polynices has earned his rest.39

Claude Levi-Strauss reads two sets of opposition in the structure of the myth that the Theban trilogy is based on, a myth narrating the story of Thebes from Cadmus, the Spartoi, Dionysus to Oedipus and Antigone. These are auto-chthony and hetero-sexual birth, under- and over-valuation of blood relations.40 The two sets relate to each other as two ratios of functions where the terms and relations are mutatable given a change of narrative version.41 Here we want to emphasise one point that emerges as the figural imaginary which immanently spreads through the transcendent logic of the code to particularise the code as the play of a supplementary message - which is that the opposition of elements in a unit of structure (which itself is a structure) signifying a universal methodological opposition of Nature (physis) and culture (the order of the Law or nomos), has already entered the methodological discourse where the intelligibility

of distinction is 'positable' only as an opposition rationalized by a cultural or social imaginary.[42] In the case of Greek tragedy and its civilisational structure as shown by Charles Segal, the content of this imaginary is the spatial, ritualistic and dietic code which opposes god to man.[43] In the specific case of the oedipus myth as Levi-Strauss writes, the central figure of this imaginary is the one who walks clumsily, the swollen-foot, the cripple, 'Oidi-Pous', 'know' - foot, the one who cripples himself in the eye (and there the Freudian Andre Green differs sharply with Levi-Strauss on the psychoanalytic significance of symbolic castration which means castration as its own sign).[44] We can, elliptically, state that this figure, this mask as a figural space marks the differential birth of mimesis as the condition of its reproduction as and in the history of theatre. Hence, Antigone in Anouilh must, as a 'mimetos', be overdetermined as the speech of her mythical rationality and overdetermine - in the wake of indeterminacy - the economy of signifiers as another mythology - Anouilhan in its metaphysic and its overcoming of itself as its own thought.

Antigone has said: "Polynices is home from the hunt...I owe it to him to unlock the house of the dead..." That is, Polynices does not walk clumsily and Antigone honours him

for that in the spirit of honouring the transcendence of a
'power' or a <u>potentia</u> that, in its actuality, is the truth
of this transcendence.[45] We can note the displacement of the
ancient code to the side of a process of re-codification,
a 'mythicalization', a speech, that is in Barthes' words,
sticky like a <u>doxa</u>.[46] Correlatively, 'house of the dead' is
a metaphorization, an <u>epiphora</u>, which means a transfer of semantic
valence from a 'topos' which was the spatial code of Greek
thought (as articulated in Segal, Jean Pierre Vernant,
Marcel Dettiene et al)to one which is the immanence of a
theatrical space theorized by Sartre, in his lectures and
writings on theatre, as carved by an image realized in its
derealizing of the being of the 'act' into the line of the
'gesture' as a presentification of non-being.[47] In the
discourse of the metaphoreme, , Jacques Derrida, diagonises
the order of precedence structuring being and non-being as
itself the metaphysical movement or 'epiphora' of a philoso-
phical text that conceals the metaphysics as a relation of
hierarchical forces, a discourse of metaphysical values, that
is.[48]

That the sexual and gender code in dramatizing Antigone's immane-
nt transcendence, situates her as a field of forces or one
ideological message such that this field is immediately

intelligible as a generation of exchange-relations (of debts paid), is clearly visible in the gestic metaphor - a metaphoreme of power-relations - articulating a mimetic body onto that one which does not (of course !) walk clumsily, in saying, " I should kneel down and unlace his boots". This is an exemplary metaphoreme of an affective discourse which could, programatically, call itself existentialist and attempt a total literalization of the genitive in the 'facticity of freedom', by expropriating the imaginary of the body as a signifier, as a material positivity to, as if, derealize it in the mode of mere dramatic narration of a myth and inscribe (crucify) it on a philosophical referent supposedly exclusive of mythology and originative of the hermeneutics of the symbolic act while, in its being, free of the same. Hence, Sartre writes of Anouilh's Antigone, "she represents a naked will, a pure, free choice; in her, there is no distinguishing between passion and action."[49] And finally, it is in the interests of the economy of re-presentation, that Anouilh seems to chose the nominalism of 'house of the dead' to dissumulate its metaphoric valence and elide the ethno-logic of **Hades**, eliding thus, the close connection of Hades, the Chthonai, the Olympian order and the Dionysaic conversion to 'enthusiasmos'.[50] The result is a different condition for

mimetic movement in a different spatial code giving a different
affective rationality - action in Sartre, 'passion' in
Christian allegoresis, 'enthusiasmos' in Greek ritualistic event
and 'pathos' in tragedy...

But of course to interpret the code within the code,
an immanent speech must be unleashed and this immanence itself
must be codified as the pure in-self, the objective scienti-
city, the facticity of the interpretation of freedom as
diasporatised by the nothingness that comes between itself
and itself as factical. So Creon must speak to Antigone and
of her as a daughter, a transmission of 'social heredity'(in
Lacan's words), a message interpreted as a factical 'attri-
bute which is 'pride' wherein the attribute is a determina-
tion of a characterology signed by the eidos, the form of
the knowledge instituting the myth of 'Oidi-pous' or 'Know-foot'.
Creon speaks and expropriates the speech of myth when he
shifts from the 'why' of the action (signfied as the 'act')
to his own psychological speculations:

> CREON : The pride of Oedipus! Oedipus and his head-
> strong pride all over again. I can see your
> father in you - and I believe you...Your
> father was like that. For him as for you
> human happiness was meaningless; and mere
> human misery was not enough to satisfy his
> passion for torment.51

We intervene to note that a certain process of interpretation - which is the process rationalized by mythology into an internal constituion of a psychological universe, repeated in Anouilh's case, from Antigone to Becket and The Lark - names 'action' as 'passion'. And in doing so, it raises 'passion' to the power of a heredity, a relay connected, in its synchronic and diachronic axes, by the facticity of an action which is 'merely' factical in that it is immediately collapsible into the signitive economy of a mythic 'passion'; the truth of which passion and myth is the closure of another Anouilhan mythology produced in part by the expropriating speech of Creon. He says further:

> The happiest hour of your father's life came when he
> listened, greedily, to the story of how unknown to himself
> he had killed his own father and dishonoured the bed of
> his own mother... How avidly men and women drink the brew
> of such a tale when their names are Oedipus - and Antigone !
> And it's so simple, afterwards, to do what your father did,
> to put out one's eyes and take one's daughter begging on the
> highways.52

We punctuate the above with three brief observations:
(1) there is a residual language ruined in its narrative exploitation to be reduced to an impression ('greedy') of two modes of the narrative being (which is the immanence of the dying transcendence of what is called 'Greek Tragedy') of the being which is language (and let us remember after Levi-Strauss

and Barthes, that myth is a kind of language) - called in turn 'parricide' and 'incest', (2) there is the realization of a metaphor for the contingency of the being of language as the contingency of a sensory affect, a 'brew' such that this language is the territorial expanse populated by the fecund tribe which multiplies its investment of affects into the formation of an identity of two spaces (or masks, for that matter), which embodies two bodies which are names - Oedipus and Antigone,[53] (3) there is the necessary valuation of contingency as the devaluation of tragic necessity such that the facts of an existence - whether seeing or blind - 'ek-sists' (in Sartre's sense rather than Heidegger's) as the resistance to the facticity of the fact, passing from its exteriority as myth to itself as mythical existence, an upsurge of scissioned internality while the mode of this upsurge is simultaneously its dissolution into the mundane ('And it so simple afterwards, to do what your father did, to put out one's eyes and take one's daughter begging on the highways'). Oedipus of Colonus has been elided to be inscribed as the proto-trace of a contingent mimesis of narrative contigency in the texture of Creon's representation of a past containing purely a mimetic duration.[54]

And now Creon is free (and we mean to situate 'situated

freedom' in a complicitous and implicative language called myth) to mobilise the interpretative strategy of an immanence which as the transcendental condition of the instituting of the opposition between the two terms, freedom and facticity makes the opposition a transcendence in the name of a 'relation' and which clears the critical space for the criticism called 'existentialist' to valorize one term in favour of the other to name the relation itself 'freedom'. The movement from an analogical distinction or difference to a digitalized opposition encodes the opposition as mythological when the movement itself is collapsed into its terminus.[55]

Creon strategises thus:

... if, tomorrow, some wild and bearded messenger walks in from some wild and distant valley - which is what happened to your dad - and tells me he's not quite sure who my parents were but thinks that my wife Eurydice is actually my mother, I shall ask him to do me the kindness to go back where he came from, and I shan't let a little matter like that to persuade me to order my wife to take a blood test and the police to let me know whether my birth certificate was forged.[56]

Let us not forget this is the King's discourse, the one who signs his name with the seal of Law incarnating this name as a royal value, which is precisely the value of the myth that sets the Law of the Law.[57] And that is myth as

discourse. We will examine this discursivity as a genealogy of subjectivity spread through the dis-contemporaneities of Greek, Christian, rationalist, existentialist and other discourses of the subject of truth, in the next chapter. Here, we locate the abstract schematism (we have pointed out the metaphysical valence/violence of the notion of schematism already) of a largely formal operation of inclusion versus exclusion that functions through myth as a 'creative' logic of dramatization, in the light of its originary sign when the origin, as a sign, is grasped as the mythological possibility of narrative closure.[58] As the mode of enunciative existence of the presence of this possibility, Creon must differentiate himself from himself as the transcendent necessity of his own possibility as immanence. And as a speech scissioning its body with a thin diffraction of itself towards the other, in the hope of recognition through the freedom which is always, of necessity of its contingent facticity, removed further towards the other, the King's speech, in its dialogic particularity, must return to the universal of the code, the mytho-logic, to institute a generalized affect of the renunciation of affectivity (existentially understood, always private). Creon tells Antigone, "Kings, my girl, have other things to do, than surrender themselves to private feelings".[59]

But a contradiction develops when the humanism of existential freedom must return from the other to the being who is for-self.[60] The King, as the sign of mytho-logic, is dislocated from the very product of this logic which is a 'humanized' universe of signification. The mediation which reflects a relation unto its constitutent terms, immediately capsizes under the weight of the relation as far as this latter is a value, known to be 'humanism'.[61] There is thus, semic distance between the King and Creon which was already spoken forth by the Chorus at the beginning.[62] Our argument leads us to propose that this distance is the condition for the reproduction of the significant object (a theatrical textuality, approximately) of drama, understood as the opsis or 'spectacle' and is the locus of the interpretation of this reproduction at the same time, in the form of a series of irruptions that interrupt the spectacle to transform it in the direction of the parousaic perfection of its mythology.[63] Antigone is trajected into this direction of the 'abstract universal' of Hegel where the locus mentioned is the transformation of the abstract universal itself into its most concrete differentiations such that the concrete is the product of a discursive re-constitution of another order, the order, that is, of our discourse.[64] This is evident when it is Antigone who is individuated in a perfectly

transcendent speech closing in on a short syntagm of great condensation:

> CREON : ... You still insist upon being put to death –
> merely because I refuse to let your brother
> go out with that grotesque passport, because
> I refuse his body the wretched consolation
> of that mass-production jibber-jabber which
> you would have been the first to be embar-
> rased by if I had allowed it. The whole thing
> is absurd.
>
> ANTIGONE : Yes, it's absurd.
>
> CREON : Then, why, Antigone, why?
>
> ANTIGONE : For nobody. For myself.[65]

This is the conjuncture at which we will shift our own object to the terrain of another set of oppositions that, in their doubled co-implication, prepare the problematic of the for-self as a site where the question of the legitimized, 'juridical' self is permitted to be asked as its own inversion into a 'natural', nihilating 'cogito'.

Autonomy/Heteronomy

or

Nature and Culture

Nomos in Greek means something analogous or similar to the order of the Law where a certain form of structured existence is codified.[66] The ranges of these codes,

historically transmitted, have comprised the substance of what
we call, especially after the signification given to it by
anthropology, 'culture'. Both 'auto-nomy' and 'hetero-nomy' are
defined in relation to 'nomos' and gain their specific
validities, to use a Neo-Kantian acceptation, from the value-
spheres delimited by the nomological discourse as a logic.[67]
And here we are especially interested in this aspect of the
nomos because it is as an articulation of the mythic structure
of Antigone that the collateral opposition of autonomy and
heteronomy presents itself as the exterior constraint set
by the structure on the modality of the action thematized by
existentialist thought as an unthematizable congealment of
freedom and facticity. That is, we try to,,henceforth, uncover
a double-articulation that gives us access to Anouilh's play
as a field of critical oppositions broadly termed 'philosophi-
cal' and which we call 'mythological'.

In the exchange recorded above, Antigone has said : "For
nobody. For myself". We quickly paraphrase this message into
its constitutive logic of predication to write: "For myself
being not for anybody but myself". That is, "for myself who
is not anybody but myself". That is, further, "for myself who
is not anybody but myself, as spoken by myself". A logos
of enunciation has, in its constituted nomos, constituted

its predicative statement. Much ahead, when Creon has told the story of Eteocles and Polynices, the two vile brothers who are 'not worth dying for' or being 'chosen from',[68] Antigone gets up to go away. Before leaving she asks:

ANTIGONE : Why do you tell me all this?

CREON : Would it have been better to let you die a victim to that obscene story?

ANTIGONE: It might have been better. I had my faith.[69]

We are, fundamentally, oriented towards an examination of the structure of an enunciated 'cogito' as it weaves a narrative texture around its epistemological nucleus to enlarge that nucleus into a discourse of its own rationality. This rationality would itself be the epistemic effect of an engagement of axiological and ethical forces. The mode of being of this rationality is a mytho-logic and the signature of this logic is itself the law which produces an apparently contradictory set of statements within its discursive jurisdiction: (1) the radical alterity of an autonomous self, (2) the radical loss of an ecceity produced by the 'being' of faith, as it were, by the loss of this being. The movement of this loss has been architectured as a dialectially overcome redemption (the religious connotation is half intended) in the

context of Hegel's work, which is archetypal, according to

Paul Ricouer, of a dialectic of dispossession and re-approp-

riation governed by the two catalyses of 'archaeology' and

'teleology'.[70] The problematic of the juridical subject is the

thematic of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Antigone and Oedipus

are two symbolic totalities in the early stages of the deve-

lopment of the substantive ground of the juridical relation

(that is, the relation of the terms of a discursive statement

that discovers its truth in the transcendental condition of

a necessary value-form called the 'questijuris', put in somewhat

Kantian manner) where the substance is mediated unto its

concrete universality as a subject of Law.[71] In point of

fact, this universal is the teleological totalization of a

process that is symbolically structured in its earlier ethical

articulation as the tragic conflict of Antigone (Hegel is

of course reading Sophocles against the very specificity of

the Sophoclean universe to situate that universe as a speci-

fically historical — and not simply fictional — discourse).

Antigone — and Oedipus, who is the incarnation of a split

divinity in the 'Idea' still unconscious of itself as substan-

tive will, as the bearer of 'guilt' — is the archeologically

recovered will which is sundered in its particularity as the

co-implication of the divine law and the law of woman in the

law of the _polis_ as the antithesis of the latter such that this will strain towards the _telos_ of a consciousness that can enunciate 'faith' and of course of necessity, fails to do so. Thus even while we interpret Hegel within the structure of a certain teleology, the possibility of a christian speech - the discourse of faith, that is - is denied Antigone even as Anouilh expropriates that speech in its 'loss'. We cannot, resultantly, rationalise the existentialist 'telos' of a nihilating transcendence as the dramatized and in Hegel's words, the 'Pathic' individuation of a differently narrativised version of the myth of Antigone except in the form of a altered mytho-logic which posits itself in the opposition of a heteronomous faith and the autonomous self lived as a loss of heteronomy, and further institutes itself as a drama, in the Hegelian sense of an 'acted contradiction' as the figural re-combinations of the elements of the terms of the contradiction within the discipline of the mimetic synchrony of a theatrical duration.[72]

There is a whole philosophy of religion in Hegel's work that divides itself up as the phases of its 'Idea' which in its highest spiritual self-consciousness, is the Christian religion, called by Hegel, 'revealed'.[73] The collateral history of symbolic figuration paradigmatising the dialectical

aufheben of each of the phases into its sublated next, is perhaps, a little schematically put, the history of Socrates, Antigone and Christ as the three modes of religious 'sacrifice' lived subjectively as an experience of dying (and we emphasise the infinitive) such that this experience is an experience of historical 'destin-ing', put somewhat in the Heideggerian sense.[74] We note, in this effort to lay bare the philosophical technology behind the enunciative nomos of 'faith', that its Christian signification becomes an element within the Jansenite ellipsis of an altered subjectivation that struck its relation with 'God' as a 'wager' whose mode of individuated expression was a 'choice'. The genealogy of choice, from this Pascalian strategy, as it were, to Sartrian 'freedom' is of course vitally punctuated by Kierkegaard's penetration of the 'paradox' that served as the grid of logical abstraction existentially displaced by the subject of what is now, an 'auto-nomos' (by the time of the established philosopheme called 'existence'), towards the free act, freeing the paradox out of its abstraction to be motilised (epiphora in Greek is also a motility, a transfer of energy that is forever its internal conatus as the release towards that which is the object, the telos of transference) as a paradoxical existence.[75] Let us round off this movement with

the summative existentialist conclusion. The conclusion, as its theoretical displacement from the rationalization of a doctrine of 'faith' historically to the spontaneity of a cogito sprung from the inevitable paradox (which is a theoretical structure of thought after all, reflecting its own indeterminacy, precisely proved by Kurt Godel),[76] excludes the possibility of Reason guaranteed by the nomological ground of 'faith' (thus going beyond Kierkegaard) in Sartre, to insert the exclusion as a practical structure of being, giving 'being' a renewed ontological nature, a _physis_ which is called 'absurdity' and whose phenomenological subject is a subject of choice. The conclusion, produces itself, as an established 'philosopheme'.

* * *

It is clear by now that in the circuit of the exchange of mythological signs, facticity is equable to _physis_ and the cultural instituion of exchange must be reproduced under the stamp of the Law, the _nomos_. The Law is the grand signifier (_ala_, Lacan) which is also, as the instituted instituting a sign under exchange. But this second circuit, is in the spiralling image of the global structure, the site of resistance. In Anouilh's _Antigone_, Polynices' body is

coded by the language of 'Nature' while the burden of the language - that is, the code - is borne by the body of Antigone; a body traversed by the sign of the institution of any code as a pulri-valent sign. The valences are divided between: (1) the commensurality of the kin - the sign of the blood-relation, (2) the authority of the King - the sign of the law, (3) the sovereignity of Reason - the sign of the sign (meaning in this case, specific self-consciousness positing the ontological necessity of contingency while returning ontology under the sign of contingency, to the sovereignity of this specific self-consciousness as a freedom and history - we hint at the genetic rationality of Sartre's _Being and Nothingness_ and _Critique of Dialectical Reason_).

From the viewpoint of the third valence, we narrate Creon, in the following, as an ideologue of the meta-sign, facticizing the body of Polynices as a dissolving signifying surface, acted by the contingent 'potentia' or 'power' of 'the breeze' to make it the deceptive and dangerous transversal movement of the resistant line of freedom from unattended _physis_ (or 'Sacrificed' chthonic gods, to use a loose comparison with Sophocles) to an instrumental cultural space (or the theatre of a heteronomous speech):

CREON :   ... this whole business is nothing but
politics, the   mournful   shade of Polynices,
the   decomposing   corpse, the   sentimental
weeping   and the   hysteria   which you   mistake
for   heroism - nothing   but politics.

... Don't think   I   am not just as   offended
as   you are by the thought of   the meat
rotting   in the sun. In the evening, when
the   breeze come   in off   the   sea, you can
smell it   in   the   palace,   and   it nauseates
me.   But I refuse even to shut my window...
I admit   what   I am doing is childish. But
if the featherheaded   rabble   I   govern
are to to understand what's what, the stench
has got   to fill   the   town   for a month ! 77

Polynices' body is the   meta-sign, the sign of Anouilh's principal

dramatic construction and like the 'earth' which Antigone

dirties her fingers with and like Antigone herself, there are,

in the constitution of the signifying field, strategic sign-func-

tions to which the meta-sign or its body - the body, that is

- acts as the receptacle, in the sense of an arche-representative

of representation, itself unrepresentable - the Platonic chora

in Timaeus as understood in different ways by Julia Kristeva

and Castoriadis.78   And thus, the meta-sign is really not

a signitive presence at all. But as a surrogate formulation,

the question of semiotization returns in the form of a defence

of physis, of autonomy before nomos. And before this question,

is the other one on the interrogation for the origins of

the nomos within the nomological order of a psychological

causal speech, set off by the fixity of the 'why' -

ANTIGONE : Why do you do it all?

CREON :   My dear, I woke up one morning and found
               myself King of Thebes.79

This is a simple reply and Creon is carried forward by the logic of an argument that has already started and that is meant to symmetrize the opposition of auto-nomy and hetero-nomy at the single level of transcendental contingency (which means immanence and which completely relativises the necessary filiations and line of descent in the House of Cadmus in which Creon is the avuncular representative in a translation of authority to the mother's side).80 And the labour of this symmetrization must be borne by the structure that articulates the position of the nihilating, heteronomizing autonomy of a 'freedom', a woman, Antigone who bears the stamp and name of her father Oedipus in an avunculate which logically reproduces its authority by the uncle's son. But the uncle's son is Haemon and he loves Antigone and will die with her. Our point here is that the symmetrization, as in a strict anthropological schema, is not different in Anouilh and the mytho-logic is archaic in the most restrictive sense. But that is true if one were at all to schematize the system of relations anthropologically. We try to illustrate the work of symmetrization in Anouilh as a figural (and we emphasise the genetic materiality of the 'figure' as a

form-edness whether in the space of the body or language) transformation of anthropologism into another mythologic which is projectable onto the accepted categories of anthropology as their displacement to what is called, in the discourse of philosophy, 'existentialism'. As an inscription of this work of symmetrization in the field of _Antigone's_ language, the mimesis of the play ex-propriates the classic example and metaphor of the animal-function as a mechanistic 'horde', the natural order of autonomous existence outside of the _nomos_ unsubverted by the heteronomous thought (as a categorical penetration of the event of thought) of autonomy:[81]

> CREON :   It is easy to say no. To say yes, you
>   have to sweat and roll up your sleeves
>   and plunge both hands into life upto
>   the elbows. It is easy to say no, even
>   if saying no means death. All you have
>   to do is to wait...'No' is one of your
>   man-made words. Can you, imagine a world
>   which trees say 'no' to the sap? In which
>   beasts say 'no' to hunger or to propa-
>   gation?[82]

The paranoia of a reductionist and physicalist interpretation cannot be arrested as an 'interested' rhetoric with the anthropomorphism of the sub-human example; with, that is, a merely primitive degree of anthropomorphism. Its enunciative compass must reach that point of mimetic application which interprets itself as the sign of the philosophical anthropology which stages the opposition of 'yes' and 'no', in the

irreducibility of the single level - and we call it 'human' - when the opposition doubles into another - 'life' and 'death'. As we have said, Antigone must bear the work of symmetrization as an assymmetrical speech:

> ANTIGONE: Animals, eh, Creon! What a king you could be, if men were animals![83]

The conditional, in the above (... 'if men were animals'), is the homologue of the 'becoming' of the anthropomorphic sign into a propriative space where the opposition of man and animal is displaced to the differentiation within the human universe of signification (the only universe of signification, that is) of a nomically transparent to a nomically opaque but attitudinally - in a way, psychologically, that is - transparent typology. This is the same typology which inheres Creon as a movement onwards from the zero-degree mimetic significance of the Page, as we pointed out in our last chapter, but in the following, it, as it were, relates the 'phantasy' of a nomically opaque childhood in the mode of a qualitative disjunction symbolized in the will to murder and where the will is a hallucinatory gratification granted by the interpretative speculum (or imagination) of a specific mytho-logic:

CREON : You despise me, don't you? (ANTIGONE is silent. CREON goes on, as if to himself) Strange. Again and again, I have imagined myself holding this conversation with a pale young man I have never seen in the flesh. He would have come to assassinate me, and would have failed. I would be trying to find out from him why he wanted to kill me. But with all my logic and all my powers of debate, the only thing I could get out of him would be that he despised me.[84]

We have made it clear that in its mythic structuration, Antigone, the play must be pro-duced as a work of symmetrization which cannot stop with merely the generalized metaphor. Rather it is as an 'epiphora' that the symbolization of 'feeling' ('despise', in the above) and 'type' ('the pale young man', in the above) must lead to further interpretative schema and further narrative strategy. The story of Eteocles and Polynices that intervenes as Creon's definitive argument on the contingent 'ceremoniality' of politics problematizes the identity of Polynices' body as the dissumulation of myth within the simulacrum of political expediency.[85] The exigent individualization of the detotalizing multiplicity has been theorized as such by Sartre in his Critique of Dialectical Reason.[86] We, without going into any details point out the rigorous space produced by interpretation for exigency as an imbrication of rationalizing speech posing as the

guarantor of Reason. The logic, that is, would close in with the judgement on the 'project' as a test-case of its truth in terms of a <u>nomos</u>, a validity-sphere of value-claim. In our next phase of investigation we would attempt an unravelling of this logic in the context of discursive intelligibility given the conflicts of the psychoanalytic discourse and the Foucauldian and the primary object of our attempt will be the subjectivity that is mapped on to the territory of the <u>nomos</u> as a necessary feminine 'nature', a <u>physis</u>. Here, we enter into the stage of syntagmatic disjunction from where Antigone will go towards her death and the play towards its end as the institution of 'tragedy'.

The disjunction comes with Antigone's return to speech from the point she 'lost her faith'. This is the speech which is inscribed, according to Simone De Beauvoir, in the young girl's body as a collapse of the social time of Woman's becoming into the time of the stasis of immanent and neuroticised being when the young girl's body's transcendence is laid aside' and when it 'imitates immanence'.[87] However, where the mode of return is speech, the mimesis of immanence achieves a phantasmatic transformation into the structure of the myth of Antigone and the myth of Woman as one transcendent

term in an ordered pair of opposites. This term is character-
ized by Beauvoir as the one, which 'in being unable to control
the future, wants the eternal'.[88] That is, according to our
argument, the <u>physis</u>, structured by the opposition of Nature
and Culture and signified by a speech on the negative that
is the affirmation of the speech as negativised in a valori-
zed mythologic contrast. Antigone screams to Creon:

> ANTIGONE : I spit on your happiness ! I spit on
> your idea of life - that life that must go
> on, come what may. You are all like dogs
> that lick everything you smell. You with
> your promise of happiness - provided a
> person doesn't ask too much of life. I
> want everything of life, I do; and I
> want it now ! I want it total, complete.
> Otherwise, I reject it! I will not be
> moderate. I will not be satisfied with the
> bit of cake you offer me if I promise
> to be a good little girl. I want to
> be sure of everything this very day, sure
> that everything will be as beautiful as
> it was when I was a little girl. If not,
> I want to die![89]

Creon must answer under the constraint of the 'common tempo-
rality' of Holderlin, materialized as a historical rationality
and arguing with the logic of genetic attribution.[90] Creon
says, "Scream on, daughter of Oedipus ! Scream on, in your
father's own voice!".[91] We contend that the commensuration effe-
cted by Anouilh's mythic closure is burdened with the

equivocity of a constructed presence of the Oedipal voice even if co-terminous with the emphasis on the 'now' as a plenitudinous phantasmatic vocal presence that underlies Antigone as the subject of the nomos, the subject of speech. This equivocity circulates its differential mimetic valence within the channels of myth. The valence, exceeds the myth while being implicated in it. That is, a different discourse enters the site of theorization that resists simple Oedipalization of nomos as a heteronomous triangulation auto-nomized by pallologocentric legitimation as well as simple humanization of the nomos, as represented by the Oedipal symbol, as a naturalization, under the sign of an existentially excavated physis (called 'human reality' by Sartre), into the heterogenous moment in an autonomous universe of cogitos called mit-sein alternatively - within the inter-subjective dimension of the problematics - called 'freedom' or original ontological 'choice'.[92] The equivocal movement is enacted by the significance of 'the tribe' whose feminine exception occupies the disjunctive - vocally and bodily- in voice - site from where the tribe as a tribe against the avuncular totality, is specified as a challenge to the closure of the logic of mythic reason - which is the Reason of Anouilh's Antigone, we point out - within the space of figuration wherein

myth is mediated unto itself as its destruction – its

closure – into the institution of 'tragedy'.[93] Antigone

invites subjectivation at the moment, in proceeding henceforth

towards death, when she screams further:

> ANTIGONE : In my father's own voice, yes ! We are
> of the tribe that asks questions, and
> we ask them to the bitter end. Until
> no tiniest chance of hope remains to be
> strangled by our hands. We are of the
> tribe that hates your filthy hope,
> your docile, female hope, your whore.[94]

Now that we are prepared to traverse the diagram of

subjectivity in Antigone, a network of genealogical lines sur-

face from this last speech recorded. They could be quickly

summarised as:

1) the molar out-growth called 'tribe';

2) the architecture of questions genealogically distributed

as the map of affects, we called 'consciousness' earlier;

3) the status of the end as a terminus of the word-chain,

the syntagmatics and as a Moebius interior – which is an

exterior – graspable as the topological image of a Western

theatre hosting the works of Anouilh, Pirandello, Artand,

Brecht;

4) the line of descent of 'hope' as an axiomatics of

chance, a metaphysics of probabilism and the irruption of the

uncertain unquestioned unconscious invested in the capillary

trans-individual individuation of Woman as naturally 'a whore'

and culturally implicating culture with her nature, Nature -

which is 'hope'.[95]

N o t e s

1. This is a reading indebted to Paul Ricouer's of Aristo-
tle. Ricouer reads Aristotle as a part of his project
of investigating the productivity of the metaphor and this is a
hermeneutic and not quite a semiological project. Nevertheless
the relevance of Ricouer's hermeneutics of Aristotle is great
even in our context which is the subject of mimesis as related
to a mimetic 'punctum' as it were. See Paul Ricouer's 'Between
Rhetoric and Poetics : Aristotle' in Paul Ricouer, <u>The Rule of
Metaphor : Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Lan-
guage</u>, tr.Robert Czerny with KathleenMaclaughlin and John Costello
(London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 9-43.

2. For re-iterability and logocentric determinisms of 'unique'
communication, see 'Signature Event Context', in Jacques
Derrida, <u>Margins of Philosophy</u>, trans. Alan Bass (Sussex: The
Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 307-330.

3. This is our introductory statement on the possibility of
delimiting a different field of the Real in the discipl-
ine set by theatreas a generalized spatiality. The field will
be elaborated in the next chapter and for its first conceptual
under-pinning one must consult Zeno's paradoxiacal spatialization
of time which is to say that the origin of a representational
scene or stage is paradoxical in its internal logic of 'being';
it is hetero-logical. Theatre as a heterological practice is
necessarily divorced increasingly from its equally heterological
and mimetic origin in Aristotle. See 'Poetics' in Aristotle,
Basic Works, Vol. I, ed. Richard Mckeon (New York: Random House,
1941), pp. 1455-1456.

Doubtless, for a complete re-valuation of the Greek respo-
nse to the question of origins and mimesis, we must go to
Nietzche for a new beginning in the reading of tragedy. See
'The Birth of Tragedy', in Friedrich Nietzche, <u>The Birth of
Tragedy And The Case of Wagner</u>, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York : Vintage, 1967), pp.17-144.

4. See Jane Harrison, 'From Ritual to Art', in <u>Sociology of
Literature and Drama</u>, ed. Elizabeth and Tom Burns (Middle-
sex: Penguin, 1973) pp. 323-327.

5. This approach will be in a silent and often resistant
dialogue with Rene Girard's engagement with 'mimesis' and

the 'double' within the order of religion and the development of tragedy and ritual. See note 64. Chapter 1.

6.   Our effort is to study the relation of myth to how thought has been always discussed. Cornelius Castoriadis and Paul Ricouer are among others who have responded to Levi-Strauss on the specific issues of thought and social symbolism in light of mythological construction. As an example of these responses, see, in his elaboration of the meaning of the 'imaginary' and institution of social structures, Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey(Cambridge : Polity Press, 1987) p. 390, note.39.

7.   See 'Rhetoric' in Aristotle, op.cit., pp. 1379-1403.

8.   This is again the movement from Dionysaic ritual of the sparagmos and enthysiasmos and the substantive function of the tragic drama as a performative code circumscribing certain affects and not others. This is clear also from the changed meaning of 'catharsis' in Aristotle whether it is in Poetics or Politics from Plato's es-static definition of the cathartic function in relation to the Pythian priestess who is an absent sign within the humanized 'presence' of tragic drama but not mantic within the cathartic site of religious transformation, as in Plato or the Pre-Socratics. For Dionysian religion in Thrace and Greece and its relation to the 'mantic' and the 'mania', see Erwin Rhode, Psyche, trans. W.B.Hillis(London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925), pp.253-81.

9.   This is intelligible in terms of 'mind', 'thought' and 'unconscious' in Levi-Strauss. For example, "Like phonemes kinship terms are elements of meaning; like phonemes, they acquire meaning only if they are integrated into systems. "Kinship Systems", like "Phonemic Systems" are built by the mind on the level of unconscious thought". Claude Levi-Strauss, Structuctural Anthropology I, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Middlesex: Penguin, 1963), p. 34.

10.   This relation would possibly emerge from comparing the finite and category-bound faculty of the 'understanding' in Kant with the metaphysics of faculties as well as the generalized organon of infinitely logical modes inhering in thought free of error in Aristotle's Logic (organon) and his De Anima.

11.   The connection of structuralism with Spinoza in the

attempt to schematize the issue of temporality within the bounds of a 'causasui' as an immanent, structuring absence (which is also a co-presence), is interesting for both its philosophical implications as well as the special role of the absence of time as a knowable attribute in Spinoza. For this problem see, S.Alexander, 'Spinoza and Time', in <u>Studies in Spinoza</u>, ed. S.Paul Kashap (Berkely, Los Angeles, London : University of California, 1972), pp. 68-85.

12. See, 'History and Dialectic', in Claude Levi-Strauss, <u>The Savage Mind</u>, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 245-69.

13. Paul Ricouer takes a divergent view on this problem of time and history when he relates the phenomenology of time-consciousness of the historical subject with the narrativization of the problem itself in the mode of writing history, that is historiography. See Paul Ricouer, <u>Time and Narrative</u>, Vol. I, trans. Kathleen Mclaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: UCP, 1983).

14. "Kantianism without the transcendental subject" is Ricouer's characterization of Levi-Strauss.

15. For a Critique of Althusser's theory of ideology from the viewpoint of an understanding of 'contradiction' and practice different from a theory of 'imaginary' cohesion of the totality, see Jacques Ranciere's "On the Theory of Ideology - Althusser's Politics" in <u>Radical Philosophy Reader</u>, ed. Roy Edgley and Richard Osborne (London : Verso, 1985), pp. 101-136.

16. For a rigorous critique of the ideality of form and metaphysics of a Real taken as presence and the meaning of 'ellipsis' of the Real as ideal form, Derrida's reading of Husserl and phenomenology in general, is exemplary. For example, see his 'Form and Meaning : A Note on the Phenomenology of Language', in Derrida, op.cit., pp. 185-172.

17. Plato, in his example of 'the Sun and the Line' inaugurates the heliocentric universe of the thinkable and the knowable leading thought and knowledge upto the supreme acheivement of 'the good'. This universe, as a metaphysics, opposes 'logos' to the 'mythos'. For the displacement of this opposition in the history of what is instituted as 'philosophy' and that regulates the thought of a history of 'beings' (that

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is, as a history of reason finally), see Heidegger's "What Calls for Thinking" in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London and Henley : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp.351-352.

18.   For the concrete and effective operativity of the myth as a 'performance' and as an isomorphism of continuity and discontinuity,Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology, Vol. I, trans. John and Doreen Weightman (London : Jonathan Cape, 1970), pp. 1-30.

For the general problematics of time, structure and the presence of 'duration' anterior to ordinary measurable time and for a comparison of Bergsons's relation to Hegel with Levi-Strauss' to Sartre in this context, see Messay Kebede's 'Way Leading to Bergson's Notion of the Perpetual Present', in Philosophy Today, Vol. 33 : 3, Fall 1989 (Chicago, Illinois : De Paul University), pp. 275-87.

19.   For hermeneutics of the 'sacred' and a restorative symbolism, as against a 'hermeneutics of suspicion', see Paul Ricouer, Freud and Philosophy : An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 20-56.

For 'totalization' and praxis' dialectic in and as human history, see Jean Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, trans. Alan Sheridan Smith (London : NLB, 1976).

20.   This works against the letter of Sartre's intention with regard to the question of continuity between Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason since the site of intended transformation remains the meaning of time and temporalization. Nevertheless the running conception of ek-stas-is is clear in both works. For this conception and temporali ty, see Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York : Washington Square Press , 1956),pp. 159-237.

21.   For the dialectic of myth and ritual, see Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology I, pp. 232-241; and for Levi Strauss' critique of Sartre, see note 12. For Sartre's discussion of Levi-Strauss' work on kinship and matrimonial structures, see Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason,pp.480-5.

22.   See Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, pp. 820-4.

23.   The system of oppositions that are abstractable as a
       structure and the function of significations as the
products of structured field form the substance of most of
the epistemological contentions stemming from psychoanalysis
after Lacan and the problematizations of these contentions(in
many way homologous to those of structural anthropology) in
what is called the practice of deconstruction after Derrida
wherein the space of play is released as both the limit of
closure and the solicitation of this limit. The meanings of
'myths' or historical existence in Derrida are sought in
relation to a generalized 'play' that disrupts the totalization
of structures, whether structurally or phenomenologically and
that emphasises textuality before the symbolic punctuality of
the 'code'. Our effort to question the givenness of the Real
meets both the Lacanian 'impossibility' in relation to the
symbolic and the critique of the structural 'reality' of the
symbolic - or the signifier precisely in Lacan - within
Derrida's 'doctrine' of the trace. See "Differance" in Jacques
Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, pp. 1-27.

24.   See 'Metaphysics' in Aristotle, op.cit., pp. 820-834.
       and for the vastly altered systematization of change
and the order of precedence between actuality and possibility
in the philosophical subjectivity of historical being - 'being'
which is esse in scholastic thought also translatable as
'existence' - see, G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of
World History: Reason in History, trans.H.B.Nisbet(Cambridge:CUP,1975).

25.   Heidegger says, "Myth means the telling word". See
       Heidegger, op.cit., p. 351.

26.   We are interested in 'dialogue' outside its conventional
       usage especially with an eye towards the figure of the
Other in the two-actor discipline of pre-Sophoclean tragedy
and the Sophoclean introduction of the third actor. The third
actor - the Other's Other - is the final bearer of the
mask and of speech in classical tragedy. In modern drama, the
third actor multiplies. The mediation multiplies in modern
philosophy in the same way while the model of the dialogue
remains Socratic. Mikhail Bakhtin, while bringing into considera-
tion the Menippean Satire or medieval carnival, goes back to
the Socratic dialogue to oppose it to the 'monologism' of the
Hegelian dialectic or of Goethe's works against Dostoyevsky.
See, Mikhail Bakhtin Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics, trans.

Caryl Emerson, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 26-8.

The properly philosophical response to a primordial yet social 'dialogism' brings into confrontation Martin Buber and the existential traditions of Kierkegaard ('indirect communication'), Gabriel Marcel or Karl Jaspers. For a rigorous movement from Husserlian 'empathy' towards the ontological 'betweenness' in Buber, via Sartre's 'look of the other', see Michel Theunissen, The Other : Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber, trans. Christopher Maccan (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: MIT Press, 1977).

27.   In this connection, see Michel Foucault's 'Theatrum Philosophicum' in Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 165-196; and also see Herbert Blau's 'The Audition of Dream and Events', in TDR, The Drama Review, Vol. 31, Number 3, Fall 1987, pp. 59-73.

28.   Jean Anouilh, 'Antigone' in Makers of the Modern Theatre, trans. Lewis Galantiere (New York, Toronto, London: Mcgraw Hill Book   Inc.),p. 503.

29.   Our point here on the code and 'death' is well evidenced from the work of semiotics itself where Roland Barthes onwards, structuration, code and structure are sought to be distinguished. Paul Ricouer has tried to oppose a semiotic rationality to a hermeneutic openness probably not satisfied with the above distinctions. The debate - and the danger of death - is clearly centred on how to introduce an effective temporality into the universality of structure. A. Greimas' semiotic square in differentiating between contradiction and contrareity and in distinguishing a surface from a deep structure, in many ways responds to the hermeneutic critique and rejoins an ancient thought on time and the vital preservation of the code in an immanent language which is productive of the signs of 'time', now readable as a temporality. Aristotle in his On Interpretation provides an initial paradigm for this articulation. See Aristotle, op.cit., pp. 38-61.

30.   For 'time', 'structure' and tragedy as 'destruction of mediation', in Sophocles especially, see Charles Segal, Tragedy and Civilization : An Interpretation of Sophocles , (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London : Harvard Univ.Press, 1981) .

31.   See Martin Heidegger, __Being and Time__, trans.John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 305-12 and p. 373.

32.   Properly speaking 'bad faith' belongs to structures of the Being-in-itself but its constant relation to Being-for-other is clear even while ontologically, 'bad faith' does not depend on the other, but is structured by him/her. However we recognize this is a controversial view especially in view of Sartre's criticism of psychoanalysis which after all is precisely the critique of the way in which the latter always begins with the inter-subjective dyad and not being-in-self. For 'bad faith', see Sartre, __Being and Nothingness__, pp. 86-116.

33.   ibid, pp. 680-707.

34.   Martin Heidegger, __Being and Time__, pp. 342-3.

35.   Sartre, __Being and Nothingness__, pp. 53.

36.   ibid, p. 697.

37.   See 'Letter on Humanism' in Heidegger, __Basic Writings__,p.238.

38.   For the sign 'man', the 'origin', its return and retreat, and its codifications in the 'human sciences' see Michel Foucault, __The Order of Things : An Archaeology of the Human Sciences__ (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 303-387.

39.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 503.

40.   Levi-Strauss, __Structural Anthropology I__, pp. 213-218.

41.   "...every myth (considered as the aggregate of all its variants) corresponds to a formula of the following type: $F_x(a) : F_y(b) - F(b) : F_{a-1}(y)$", ibid, p. 225.

42.   This social imaginary is different from an instituting radical imaginary which arises from a __magma__ of a general unrepresented and monadic differentiability, according to Castoriadis. See Castoriadis, op.cit., p. 131 and pp. 369-373.

43.   See Segal, op.cit., pp. 13-42.

44.   See Levi-Strauss, <u>Structural Anthropology</u>I,pp. 216-217,
and Andre Green, <u>The Tragic Effect : The Oedipus Complex
in Tragedy</u>, trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge : CUP, 1979), pp.186-217.

45.   The 'hunt' is a non-significant element gaining significance when put into the universe of Greek signification - especially when inserted into the pradigmatic 'body' of a deformed <u>Oidi-Pous</u>, where the 'hunter' is at the end - the <u>eschatia</u> of the <u>polis</u>, removed from its centre or <u>meson</u> . In Anouilh, Polynices - the prince, the brother, the master - must remain, being in the mode of a hunter, at the centre. When Antigone says 'home from the hunt', a strange mixture of Greek character and diluted Christian end or 'eschaton' stand metaphorically for 'death'. The <u>oikos</u> or home remains a structural common factor between the Greek and Christian ways of 'discoursing' about death wherein the rather informal connection of home and death is a specifically Christian dilution and also dilution of Christian individuation of individual death. The overall effect in Anouilh is the psychological plausibility of Antigone's reaction-pattern as well as her language. In a way, the neurotic and phantasised speech of Antigone is made possible as a symptom of character-formation by the re-activated centre of a death of the other, the brother and whether its Polynices or Eteocles doesn't matter formally. This degree of freedom permitted earlier on 'choosing' to bury one brother against another serves as Creon's political justification later when it is his job to re-occupy this same formal centre. At any rate, the Greek indeterminacy of <u>Oidi-pous</u> has been determined as a decided centre, in Anouilh. The structural rhythm of Plato's <u>Laws</u> is replaced by the humanization of the rhythm as an ontological property of the centre, the origin or 'arche' in Sartre. The indeterminacy in Anouilh - the mimesis - is the question of attribution of the property as grounded in an identified and substantive 'will'. Typologically, the Greek opposition structuring the paranoid universe of exclusive power of civic right and royal sanction was of the black hunter, the youth called <u>Krypteia</u> who is to be excluded against the disciplined <u>hoplite</u> and <u>ephebos</u>. See 'The Black Hunter and the Origin of the Athenian ephebeia' by Pierre Vidal Naquet in <u>Myth, Religion and Society</u>, ed. R.L.Gordon (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 147-162.

In Anouilh, the paranoid opposition is 'typical' - between a 'type' called Antigone against another called 'Creon'. Between

the Greek and the Anouilhan typologies, there is the equivocal region neither quite a meta-language nor a connatitive one.

46.   For 'myth' and the 'doxa' see, Roland Barthes, 'Change Object Itself : Mythology Today', in R.Barthes, Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (London : Fontana, 1977),pp.165-169.

47.   See Sartre's 'The Actor' in Jean Paul Sartre on Theatre, trans.Frank Jellinek (New York: Pantheon, 1976), p. 163. For a general essay on the phenomenology of the theatre and Sartre's theory of the 'free act', see James M.Edie, 'Appearance and Reality : An Essay on the Philosophy of the Theatre' in Phenomenology - dialogues and bridges, ed. R. Bruzina and B.Wilshire (Albany : State University of New York Press, 1982),pp. 339-352.

48.   See Jacques Derrida's 'White Mythology! Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy', in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, pp. 207-271.

49.   See Sartre's 'Forger of Myths' in Jean Paul Sartre on Theatre, pp. 34-35.

50.   For this connection between Dionysiac religion with its 'foreign' contagion and the Olympian order of the 'properly' Greek Apollo, see Erwin Rhode, op.cit., pp.282-334.

51.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 504.

52.   ibid, p. 504.

53.   The 'brew' is not only the quality, a secondary ousia which Oedipus and his blood 'drink in' but also the 'stuff' - the fundamental metaphysical aither - of the blood which is pneumatized by itself secondarized as a dietic quality whose dietic code is signifiable at another level as the homologue of a general femininity which is capillary to the Oedipal family. In contrast Creon, the avuncular head, is structured by the properly male and martial code without any Dionysian infection given that Dionysus is also the active femininization of a culture whose active and passive poles are 'normally' occupied by the male and the female respectively. The differentiation of the feminine, between the 'lawful' function of the Demeter who is mother and legitimate wife and the

'seductive' excess of Aphrodite's aromatics exceeding the law of functions in general in the festival of the <u>Adonia</u> against that of the <u>Thesmorphia</u>, is an opposition stabilized within the 'given' passivity of Greek woman at large. See in this regard with connection to the emblematics of the <u>melissa</u> , Marcel Dettiene , 'The Myth of Honeyed Orpheus' in R.L.Gordon, op.cit., pp. 95-109.

Anouilh's is a 'mundanized' language but Creon's sophistics is nevertheless based on a duplicative expanse of this language insofar as the latter duplicates the original tribal codes of Oedipal territoriality The meaning of mundanization thus 'appears' on a post-oedipal language of the theatre which interpretation can well oedipulize if it is psychoanalytical. And of course in that case, the mythic continuities of language and signification join the hypotheis on original interdiction, original differentiation and finally original (<u>ur-</u>) phantasy.

54.   This elision in turn produces modern versions of trage-
       dy which problematize the meaning of tragedy. And the
problematization is not equally realizable either between,say, a version of <u>Oedipus Rex</u> called the <u>Infernal Machine</u> by Jean Cocteau and another of <u>Oedipus at Colonus</u> by T.S.Eliot called <u>The Elder Statesman</u> or finally of Sophocles' <u>Antigone</u> by Anouilh called <u>Antigone</u>. Do Cocteau, Eliot and Anouilh realize the problematics of the Theban trilogy as a single domain of 'modern versions' and as one effort of problematization in 'one' history? We are not so sure.

55.   For the 'analogical and the digital,   Anthony Wilden's
       work in general is the point of reference. Wilden's
relationship with Lacan or Levi-Strauss - a relationship which is both comradely and critical - is based on an examination of the confusions of the analogical with the digital in psychoanalysis and anthropology. The epistemological site of this examination is the dialectic and its resolutions of the Russellian paradox of logical types. See Anthony Wilden, <u>System and Structure : Essays in Communication and Exchange</u>, (London: Tavistock, 1972).

56.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 504.

57.   For the old Aristotelian theory of the particularity of
       the historical event and the role of the King's narra-
tive in history as originative of the discourse on history

and the relation of this royal role to the historiographer's, see Louis Marin , 'Writing History with the Sun King: The Traps of Narrative', in On Signs : A Semiotics Reader, ed. Marshall Blonsky (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 267-288.

58.   This is the creativity of a concrete science of myth that does not, like abstract science, move from synchrony to diachrony. The creativity is a continuous dramatization of elements that are encountered as effective components of 'thought-events' in social existence. The closure of this dramatization, of what Levi-Strauss has called bricolage in myth is the silent possibility of narrativisation and the preservation of opposition as a logical mode of existence without the active mediation of social existence. See Levi-Strauss, 'From Mythical Possibility to Social Existence', in Claude Levi-Strauss, The View from Afar, trans. Joachin Newgroscheland and Phoebe Hoss (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 157-74.

59.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 504.

60.   But by this time, the supreme antinomy of existentialism is sought to be grounded by Sartre is man's desire to be God. This is the antinomic impossibility of 'in-self-for-self'. See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 723-724.

61.   This was seen clearly by Heidegger when he asked 'humanism' to return to its historicality of being – which is also that of language – as always already emplaced within the bounds of a temporality invested in the particularity of the human-being's life. 'Valuing' of life is a subjectivising of it but 'subjectivism' itself is value, not pre-ontological relation and this value as a 'humanitas' is up for exchange in the circuit of discourse in history, see 'Letter on Humanism' in Heidegger, Basic Writings, pp. 193-242.

62.   There is what can be called the personal touch, when Chorus speaks of Creon in these following terms as if from the insight of sympathetic familiarity:

        Now and then, when he goes to bed weary with the day's work, he wonders whether this business of being a leader of men is worth the trouble.
See Anouilh, op.cit., p. 491.

63.   This parousia is the termination of the spectacle as a locus of positions in drama. The image of the

termination of analysis in psychoanalytic treatment is guiding us here but the specific question of a perfected mythology not only takes into account the elusive Lacanian relation of knowledge and truth but also drives the relation into the closure of a theatrical duration to a posteriori refer the relation, for its truth, to the termination of the duration and the generalized thematization of this specific termination to the universal cyclicism of a perfected mythology, that is, to an awareness of something like 'science' of myth.

64.   We will examine the interplay of the universal in its concretion which is a realized totality with the process of totalization recognizable as a Hegelian movement of subjectivity rising above the inactivity of mere substance, in the context of the objectivity of discourse and its order, in our next chapter.

65.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 505.

66.   For forms of codification, development of these forms and the relation between the nomos and the sovereign in the codifications of the Greek polis, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (London : Methuen & Co., 1982).

67.   See Gilian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London : Athlone Press, 1981), pp. 2-13.

68.   See Anouilh, op.cit., pp. 508-509.

69.   ibid, p. 509.

70.   See Paul Ricouer, Freud and Philosophy, pp. 459-493.

71.   For 'Oedipus' and 'Antigone' in Hegel's philosophy of the development of the 'Idea' of right, see Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.Knox (Oxford : OUP, 1967),p.81, 250, 114-15,and 254.

72.   See G.W.F.Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B.Baillie (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), pp. 744-745; and Hegel's Aesthetics : Lectures on Fine Art,Vol.II, trans.T.M.Knox (London : Clarendon,1975), pp.1185-90 and 1208-37.

73.   See G.W.F.Hegel, The Christian Religion, trans. Peter C. Hodgson (Montana : Scholars Press, 1979), pp. 1-44.

74. The twin contexts of Girard's 'victimage' thesis and the Heideggerian deconstitution of the metaphysics of truth in Western Philosophy from the viewpoint of mimesis' implication in these contexts in Philippe Lacoue Labarthe, 'Mimesis and Truth' in <u>Diacritics</u>, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, pp. 10-23.

75. This is the very uneven site of the problem of the self-certain <u>cogito</u> as against an existential a priori. Pascal was one of the first - Spinoza was another - to question Descartes' rational (after 'ratio') project of a 'first philosophy', when he posited a necessary penetration of the 'fallen' human-being by uncertainty. The Janseneist God was <u>absconditus</u>. The movement in the Pascalian subject was more 'auto-bio-graphical' than merely meditative as in Descartes. Later Kierkegaard was to inscribe this movement in a paradoxical existence whose essence was the 'angst' of bearing the paradox as a continuous structure of being. But ontology is not the last word in Kierkegaard and so is not aesthetics. But from the aesthetic to the religious via the tragic as the way to indefinite 'faith', ontology is a mode of deciding the constitutive indecision of a graphism of the 'auto-nomos' whose <u>nomos</u> is not quite exclusive of passion and whose passion is the incision of a 'psuedonymous' (Climacus, Silentio etc) 'grapheme'. Tragedy would be the 'record' of angst and the gesture of onto-logic (the laws of being, as it were). For the difference between the knight of faith, Abraham and the tragic hero, Agammemnon, see Kierkegaard's 'Fear and Trembling', in Soren Kierkegaard, <u>Fear and Trembling and the Sickness Unto Death</u>, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton : Princeton Univ.Press, 1941)

76. See Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, 'Godel's Proof' in <u>Mathematics in the Modern World</u>(Sanfrancisco, W.H.Freeman and Co., 1948),pp. 221-30.

77. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 506.

78. See Julia Kristeva, 'Revolution in Poetic Language', in <u>The Kristeva Reader</u>, ed. Toril Moi (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 93-98; and Cornelius Castoriadis, op.cit., pp. 186-195.

79. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 506.

80. The system of filations and alliances in the House of Cadmus from the Spartoi to Antigone is one thing and the dramatic significance of a single translation of authority from

from Oedipus or his sons to Creon is another. The latter is an open space for the questioning of the authority itself in terms of a contingent action like Creon's edict in Antigone. The possibility of Anouilh's play arises from the inherent dramatic nature of such contingency. Something like the archaic Oidipodia narrates an arrangement of such contingencies as a series whose single-column mappings as a lineage of the House of Cadmus remains one rationalization in the spirit of anthropology. If anything, Sophocles as well as Anouilh arise from the conflictual dissymetries between mythic contingency and, the anthropological necessities of 'mytho-logic'. Maurice Druon's Megaree belonging to the same year as Anouilh's Antigone, 1944, appropriates a remote region from this conflict when he writes of Megareus, Creon's other son who was sacrificed to the gods to obtain salvation for Thebes. In Druon's play Megaree becomes Ismene's lover and the symbol of the already instituted knowledge doubtless ironic and tragic - that Thebes is already betrayed. If Antigone and Megaree are taken up as one cross-section of literary-dramaturgic instantiation, then the question of knowledge and its mark of contingency on the ancient problem of 'fate', inform both texts. As Segal points out as an important observation on Sophocles' Antigone, Eurydice and Antigone are adjacently related vis-a-vis filial 'loss', Polynices for the latter and Megareus for the former where loss is not legitimately up for 'mourning'. See Segal, op.cit., p. 195. Our point is that even in the 'modern' Anouilh, such a correspondence is at work at the level of a different mythic or ideological alliance, not of blood and the uterus but of a capillary axiomatic exteriorised as 'existing' and simply 'not-existing' : does 'Eury-dike' exist at all in the Sartrian sense in Anouilh? is not uterine life, Aristotle onwards, a monstrously anonymous life, an 'inexistence'? For Oidipodeia, Druon's play, see George Steiner, Antigones : The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought (Oxford: OUP, 1984), pp. 111-113, 147-148.

81.   The 'horde', original parricide and the beginning of
        totemic religion also set the stage for ancient
tragedy as a tragic re-enactment of a phylogenetic and anthropomorphic community of nomos and 'guilt', in Freud's Totem and Taboo. From many undeveloped perspectives, Freud's work influences our study. See Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo. trans. James Strachey(London : Ark, 1983).

82.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 507.

83.   ibid, p. 507.

84.   ibid, p. 507.

85.   'Ceremony' is the linear temporality of obsessive neurosis which unfolds an universe of things dissumulated ceremonially onto what is a religious domain of interpretation and the linearity of time (against hysterical time which diffracts the body into a system of eretogenetic memory cyclically erupting – in the manner of the upsurge of myth) is stabilized as a perpetually disavowed and yet 'lived' imaginary of 'paranoia'. See, for the ceremonial, obsessive acts and religion, Sigmund Freud, 'Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices', in Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. II, trans. Joan Riviere, (London : Hogarth Press, 1971), pp. 26–28.

86.   See Jean Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, pp. 326–7.

87.   See Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H.M.Parshley, (Middlesex : Penguin, 1972), pp. 380–381; and for a comparison of Antigone the sister with the exclusion from time of Virgin Mother written by Julia Kristeva as a 'paranoid fantasy', see Julia Kristeva, 'Stabat Mater', in The Kristeva Reader, pp. 180–181.

        Also see note 80.

88.   See Simone De Beauvoir, op.cit., p. 381.

89.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 510.

90.   For the 'Junoian' rationality, Aorgic and Antigone as Antitheos in Holderlin, see Steiner, op.cit., p.81–83. Our work here is to trace the line of immanence of Antigone in Anouilh, the mythic Antigone remaining in Holderlin's words, "a surfeit of transcendence".

91.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 510.

92.   The question of naturalization into physis or Nature bringing up the possibility of a mit-sein ('they-being') as a We-subject in Sartre within the orbit of a humanized nature – human nature, nominally – posits the negative outside the Unconscious without however seriously encountering the

Freudian thesis on the Unconscious which does not 'know' the negative as the very 'positive negativity' which makes possible the work of negative as forms of consciousness. We work further with the Freudian Unconscious in our next chapter as the dismemberment of the abstract of structure as negativity itself, in the 'event' of Schizophrenia.

93.   cf. Josette Feral, 'Antigone or the Irony of the Tribe', in Diacritics, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1978, pp. 2-14.

94.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 510.

95.   'Hope' is a whore but the whore is woman whose nature is to be a whore but all this is myth; that is, it is the way thought finds itself as 'having been thought'. Exactly at this node of objectivation of thought and its depostion in myth as Husserlian 'passive syntheses', the archaism of arche-narrative reaches back to Hesoid's Works and Days and Theogony wherein the bringing-forth of a being of artifactual thought, a being of the metis and the ergon (at the level of artifact), narrates the original division between gods and men borne by the body (cf. Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound) of Prometheus, the man-god. The product of this division - different from Biblical Creation - is the concrete technologist. Man who transforms an extinguishable 'fire' into the principle (arche) of human 'work' (cf. Heraclitus, if read as an ethical and not merely cosmogonic philosopher) which is 'valuable' and the deceptive, secondary and whore-like ('bitchy') woman whose structural prin-ciple is the confounding of unequivocal arche. Hope is the god's 'gift' to Man along with the 'gift' of Woman. But the 'gift' is a final totem/sign of a hierarchical arche-relation wherein Man's metis is the stochastic variable unit inhering already in the metis (also daughter) of the mind of Zeus. Zeus' metis is the deployment of contagious variabili-ty in the element of Woman and Hope perpetually endangering the domain of Man and not itself subject to the law of tyche or chance. See Jean Pierre Vernant, 'The Myth of Prometheus in Hesoid', in Myth, Religion and Society, pp.43-56.

Chapter III

The Specifications Of Madness :

The Diagram Of Subjectivity In Antigone

After our having travelled to some distance of the structural interior of what, in our discussion of mimesis, has been produced as an graphematic exteriority - a writing recognizable as the play Antigone - we are now confronted with the quandary of the interior itself as another exterior. It is clear that the theoretical figure mediating this transformational quandary remains the signitive compass of what we have called 'consciousness'. In our unravelling of the strands of a contemporary mytho-logic, contemporary, that is, with Anouilh's work, the discursive localisation of this figure of 'consciousness' has been specified as a resultant of symmetrization stemming from the oppositional hypostasis of such terms as 'freedom' and 'facticity', 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy'. Very broadly, the methodological grid distributing the play of symmetrization, understood as the 'work' of Anouilh's theatre, in the form of a historical resolution of variant problematics whether of classical 'right' in Hegel or of human 'existence' (related but different from

existenialia in Heidegger or _existenz_ in Jaspers) in Sartre, performs this distribution within the primordial - and rather empty - generalization encoded by contemporary anthropology as the opposition of 'nature' and 'culture'. Purely in terms of semantic equivalence, _nomos_ and _physis_ in Greek help to illustrate this generalized point of methodological departure. In terms of the discourse that archives statements from knowledges ranging from ancient tragedy to philosophical theory of the twentieth century however, the equivalence demonstrates its external fidelities as far as it operates as a particular problem of characterology in Anouilh that exceeds methodology in expropriating it.[1] We saw how this problem particularises itself concretely as a mimetic speech circulating within the system of mythic exchange that abstracts itself, as it were, as the noetic of Anouilh's _Antigone_. It was, that is, the particularity of a collective _hypokeimenon_ (in Heidegger's language) receiving an objective substance called 'myth' into its volume - its interior - to immediately rarefy into an objectivity - an exterior - that folds the universal substance of myth unto the plane of pure discursive immanence which dissolves the contradiction of transcendence and immanence characterizing the mediations of mythical existence, into the 'lines of flight' (in Gilles Deleuze's language) of this plane.[2]

The plane is also a diagram where structures are mapped and the mapping is the release of material fluxes that function as the corpora of structures, themselves anything but structures. For example, nomos and physis characterize the problem of mediations in Antigone such that Creon and Antigone are mediated as their thematized possibilities as 'character' in the element of myth but the relations inscribed between the two that trace the territory of the 'contact' which we called 'mimesis' in our first chapter, and that actually 'dramatize' mediation, are themselves the trace of what we henceforth call as different from mimetic subjection and mythic structure, 'subjectivity'.[3]

Madness and Subjectivity

Subjectivity is the trace of a relation that specifies texts as structured transcendences, that is, as 'works'. Madness is the crisis of relation put most cogently by Michel Foucault in his Madness and Civilization, as the 'absence of work'.[4] Within the history of theatrology - a codification of theatrical practice in the manner of the discursivity called logos or science - for every relational specification of the mise en scene as an organon producing a critique of the representational text in the shape of a work' - we mean

Bertolt Brecht of course[5] - there is an Artaud who consumes the extension (given the genealogy of Cartesian res extensa) of a relation whose closest metaphor is the line joining two points, into its internal line - its intensity - as the consumption of 'work' and the erasure of trace.[6] Madness and the trace which is subjectivity engage the political discursivity of theatre into a conflict with the Greek meaning of discursivity as the primordial presence of God's speech in the logos, to finally displace the conflict to the terrain of an effectivity of politics whose fundamental materialist flux is the movement of Marx's first volume of the Capital.[7] The region of theory that allows the emergence of this discourse of political effectivities is the one delimited by Hegel from one side of the nineteenth century and Nietzche from the other.[8] The articulation of this emergence is the articulation of a new problematization of subjectivity that inscribes the signification of 'relation' in the plane of a political immanence such that the empiricist meaning of the same in Hume and Locke is refigured as the historical erection of a discursive statement on the near-total de-psychologisation and de-syllogisisation (ala anti-Leibniz) of the 'truth' of relation.[9] We can, thus, identify subjectivity with this 'truth' closer to the 'episteme' in Greek than the

alethia.[10]

In our analysis of mimesis and myth in <u>Antigone</u>, the question of truth has been posed both in terms of enunciative commensuration and the mythic ensemble, the <u>mytheme</u>. While in the first case, we found reason to link our argument with the structure of 'desire', in the second, we were constrained by the notion of structure itself in the context of its signification in philosophical analysis of historical veridicality of fiction. As a result we were able to connect up the concrete positivity of mimesis in Anouilh's text with a certain code that made it possible for some one like Sartre or Beauvoir to thematize this positivity with recognizable critical figures transferred from the philosophies they invested with the name 'existentialist'.[11] Especially with a semiotically dense sign as 'Antigone', the response to truth in relation to this sign has made it possible for us to set a certain exterior condition on the criterion of recognizability of mythic or symbolic figuration in the history of philosophy. In his readings of Hegel and Genet, Jacques Derrida narrates the 'experience' of Antigone in classical idealist philosophy as a 'denegated' valorization of irreducible alterity in Antigone's singular speech in the interests of a contradictory — and violent — reduction of this speech

to the divided universality of a law of woman against that of the political animal, man.[12] And we quickly cite Derrida here to illustrate our urge to image the philosophical sign in the Antigonesque mirror given our own burden of having to analyse the regimes of truth regulating a history of such images legated to us already.

But it is signally crucial to be able to situate the legacy of a philosophical Antigone - and a comparison with a philosophical Socrates and Christ is certainly not out of order[13] - within the blank of philosophy's interiority called 'discourse' and its 'gratuitous' occupation by the slippage of madness. In the non-space of this blank, we are faced with three utterances that inflict their form as questions with the infinite contagion of a madness whose capillary possibility is the impossible practice of an irreducible aesthetics of the theatre as life.[14] These utterances or questions are:

1) The Hegelian vis-a-vis Kierkegaardian. If Antigone's is an ethical being, what individualises her as a possibility of pure deed such that the substantive actuality of an ethics of historical society is mediated unto the practice of this ethics as the construction of a concrete 'relatum' which can individuate this deed as an event open to political judgement?[15]

2. The Nietzchean vis-a-vis Holderlinian. If tragedy is the aesthetic practice of a competent age, what is the historical price of an excessive competence which presents itself as a 'normalization' of the threshold of Dionysian intoxication into the Socratic knowledge of the 'theoretical man' and the Euripidean sophism propositioning Dionysus with his structural entanglement with the line of division relating gods and men in the very element of an intoxicated body (in Euripides' Bacchae)?[16]

3) The Lacanian vis-a-vis Deleuzian What does madness signify, in the light of the dispersion of an imaginary substratum of the intoxicated 'state' which is already a theatricalization and a scissioned desire such that this state is perpetually paralogicizing the propositional closure of a 'normal' socio-familial resolution called the dissolution of the Oedipus complex by psychoanalysis and is the hybris of Oedipus and Oedipus' daughter whose bare neurotic symbolism propels the aetiological series of sexual complexes, leading upto the one called 'Oedipus complex'(naturally silent about the 'madness' of Antigone whose psychotic rejection of structure is the paradoxical realization of the structure as a political model of subjectivity)?[17]

We pose these questions as open-ended strategic deployments in the generalised contexts of tragedy, Antigone and a histori- cally specified contemporaneity of interpretations.[18] And we pose them, in their Hegelian, Nietzchean or Lacanian articulations to declare that the obverses of these articulations - Kierke- gaard, Holderlin and Deleuze - are the articulations of our position on these questions, vis-a-vis their articulation and not their answers. Their answers will probably have to be sought in the material theatricality of the writing which we identify as Anouilh's Antigone. But before that, let us take up the problematic of subjectivity in its discursivity and 'practicality' yet again; this time from the Greek, Christian and Hegelian points of view. And it is definitively important at this point to analyse 'points of view' into its plural 'points' and its specualr 'view' to further re-insert them as a disjunctive unit functioning in the mode of a 'diagram'; our approach thus, following Deleuze in some ways, more geographical than historical.

There is little doubt about the historical condensation of this geography in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind but our concern remains the geography of this condensation as it is diagrammatized in the 'imagination' of The Phenomenology of Mind

as a mapping of the space of the Hegelian **Begriff** or Notion
as it is extracted from the <u>geist</u> or 'mind' that articulates
this space as a movement from the natural - or physical deri-
ved from <u>physis</u> translated 'nature' - universe of entitative
externality to the regime - which is a regimen, a discipline -
of 'time' that <u>geist</u> falls into as a history.[19] In the
process of this movement from the immediate indifference of
natural determination to the differentiated determinatedness
that constitutes the development of self-consciousness in
history, a particular stage is set where every dramatization
of the dialectic into the field of dialogic opposition -
exemplified summarily by the dialectic of recognition in the
lord-bondsman economy - is verified by the impersonal gaze of
a 'we' which is the product of the <u>nomos</u>, the law of the
dialectic but which holds the guarantee to the 'techne' - the
art - of the production of the dialectic itself as far as
it is a historical codification of the enunciative fluxes
that traversed the political territory of effective <u>sophia</u>
or wisdom of Heraclitus to a philosophical effectivity called
the <u>maieutic</u> of Socrates and specified as a <u>topos</u> by
Aristotle in his <u>Topics</u>, in the regime of the truth in
which Greek subjectivity recognised (and this follows the
meaning of recognition in tragedy as <u>anagnorisis</u>) itself.[20]

In Hegel, we are authentically plunged into the complications
of a knowledge and a diagram because the successive delimi-
tations of the system of logic and the science of appearance,
'phenomenology' are referred to a revolutionised philosopheme
called 'Science itself' by Hegel himself.[21] This philosopheme,
even if derivative from the Greeks by a hermeneutic paradigm of
semantic transformations, remains a ruptural constraint on any
examination of the knowledge of the subject as a subject of
recognition, unless the possibility of a mediate recognition
is discursively situated in a rationality of the confessional
faith called 'Christianity'.[22]

In his **History of Sexuality** Foucault has traced the lines
of subjectivation that emerge within a series of regimes of
truth that follow problematization of pleasures called 'moral'
in the age of the classical Greeks and where morality and
its 'existential aesthetics' are decisively displaced to a
'hermeneutics of desire' from early Christianity onwards.[23] The
crucial meaning of confession as a technological component
of the production of a Christian 'self' is precisely the
mediation we are trying to mark in a Hegelian diagram which
in its transversal and architectonic after all does negotiate
a representational - and the difference between 'vorstellung'
and 'darstellung' is important especially in the context of

theatrical, nominal and philosophical orders of representation - episteme.[24] This is the mediation which centres the extreme oscillations between sceptic 'unhappy consciousness'[25] (modelled after Abraham and Judaic religion earlier) and the romantic 'beautiful soul' of Novalis,[26] in the abyssal space that separates - and joins - the early critical consciousness of post-Aristotelian subjective spirit to the rational (following the difference underlined by Kant between 'Verstand' (understanding) and 'Vernunft'(reason) objectivity of the historical being of geist after the French Revolution which stood at the door way to Absolute Spirit.[27] The absolute subjectivity of the Absolute - the meaning emerging clearly only via a study of Hegel's Logic and his theory of the modern state in Philosophy of Right - is the trace of an absolute contemporaneity that specifies the 'Idea' - the concrete Notion, that is - of two orders of subjectivity: (1) the order of the 'Term' which the geneaology of logical - and not merely mathematical as beginning from Newton and Leibniz - calculus relates to (i) plane geometry and the geometry of solids in Euclidean axiomatics as incorporated in the knowledge of the practice of royal strategy in Plato's Republic only being subservient to the art of the number of the Pythagoreans[28]; (ii) the ontologics of the Christian 'God' whose structure of

ontological proof in St. Thomas Aquinas (after St. Anselm's a priori proof) is the incorporation of Aristotle's syllogism of the terms A, B, C into a scholastic practice which resists the 'irrationality' of a Monastic spatialization of the order of the 'pure' term into a theatre of 'practical' proof of Hell, purgatory and paradise[29] (2) the order of the 'Relation' which has a collateral genealogy going back to the solitary significatory practices of Heraclitus and Empedocles in Greece, the first of who pronounced the message of the Delphic oracle to be a pre-indicative signification, this meaning a 'relation' of course without the pre-subjection to terms of relation, and the second inscribed a circular schema of 'creation' and 'destruction' whose break with the hierarchical 'arche' is the move by which a hollow is extracted out of Thalesian cosmology to yield a madness, a shamanism of the rhizomata and the katharmoi, the violent expulsion also an implosion into the universe called by Nietzche 'the tragic age of the Greeks'.[30]

In Hegel's Phenomenology, the madness and the implosion are are re-valorized within a system of the absolute kosmai and the absolute arche such that their inclusive disjunction is the epistemic signature, the rationality of a geist neither

Greek nor Christian but both in their sublation into the contemporaneity of the logos of the absolute - the Absolute discourse. But if discourse is the perpetual exterior of dispersion of anonymous statements - as Foucault says and we follow him - then the exterior to the absolute[31] - the madness to the absolute subject of a realized philosophy of history - cannot be absolute without meta- communicating on the paranoic fixation of a semantic closure of sublated opposition and re-instituting a movement of regressive contradiction which subverts this closure. This is precisely what Marx did is his use of the dialectic method in Capital and his analysis of concrete contradiction following the discovery made by him that, in Althusser's language, the problematic - the ideological field - of the Hegelian dialectic is the dialectically structured object of another dialectic and another problematic recognizable by us as productive of the theory of an order of subjectivity traced by the contour of a political effectivity and as it were, a political cybernetics within the exteriority of the knowledge called 'materialist'.[32] The best account of the tracing of this subjectivity emerges in the Capital where the capitalist mode of production determines its structure in the wake of the concrete historical movement of the relation that

ideologically presents itself as one of men and machines, as
purely technological in the sense that technology is the
humanization of the organic nature (the _physis_) of the
manufacturing process patterning the tool as interposed
between man and man as producer (following Hegel in his
System of Ethical Life in many ways) into a technicity of
of 'being human' in the mode of modern industrial regimes of
the free labour enacting the _nomos_, the law of freedom in
the market for labour-power as a 'natural mechanism' of the
absolute contemporaneity of capitalism.[33] The real contradiction
between the organicity of 'mechanism' supported by the
human body and the mechanical regulation of this body as a
territory for the corporeal infliction of a truth systematized
organically within the order of the conceptual axiomatic of
capitalism – a perfect abstraction – is precisely the
material ground of the discourse which takes up 'madness'
and 'subjectivity' in their capillary connections to designate
that connection either a normal 'relation' or pathological. It
may be noted, in conclusion, that the strategic management of
this dangerous game of contradiction manages the
health of a subject – speaking in being inscribed and
inscribing itself as a speech – by rationalizing the constant
possibility of madness by claiming it in the name of

discourse whether that of mal-functioning perception in Merleau-Party's Phenomenology of Perception or of the foreclosure of the Phallic signifier - the Absolute subject now the Absolute Master - in Lacan's reading of Freud and Schreber.[34]

Theatre and Normalization
in Antigone

It is evident from the title of this section that we intend to re-work the category 'mimesis' in the global discipline set by the optic of 'theatre' whose specular root in the theorien of Platonic heliocentrism is not irrelevant at all. Our position with regard to what Derrida calls the 'economimesis', cf Anouilh's Antigone within the discipline of this optic is that the economics of mimetic exchange assumes a measure of signifying 'values' which is problematical in that it is dynamically theatrical and dynamically such that the externality and semiotization of the measure is precisely the epistemological region from where a conflict of interpellated subjectivity which is ideological in the Althusserian sense and dehiscing madness which is the dehiscence of an anthropological - that is, a logical - measure are recoverable as the originary disturbance of this measure which is itself the standard of the mensura problem in the

evaluation of tragic conflict of <u>deus mensura</u> and <u>homo</u> <u>mensura</u>.[35] Luigi Pirandello makes the first theoretical attempt to formulate this disturbance in terms of a complex conjunction of speech and action in the theatre. This is the earliest mimetic conjunction which can be read off from Aristotle's taxonomia of the <u>ethe</u>(character), <u>lexis</u> (diction) and <u>mimesis</u> (imitation) in <u>Poetics</u>.

Pirandello's play <u>Six Characters in Search of an Author</u> and his essay <u>Spoken Action</u> together thematize the possibility of dramaturgic pre-determination in the mode of the writing called 'play-writing' in that this mode is the existent possibility of a theatrical writing - a script - without the signature of the 'author' who acts before the acting of a play as a virtual dramaturg.[36] The ontological status of this possibility is referred by Pirandello in the above mentioned play to an irruption of an originary writing which is the representational mark of writing 'six characters' in an ideologically normalized body of the theatre - both melodramatic and naturalistic - of the early twentieth century typified by an order of representations that incarnated itself so well in the <u>personas</u> of Tommaso Salvini or Eleanora Duse, the great Italian actors of those times.[37]

We emphasise Pirandello's meta-theatrical contribution to the fluxion of speech that called itself 'realistic' Ibsen onwards, in the context of a parallel continuity of the popular art of acting called 'histrionics' which constituted a historiography of performance confronting the demands of literary realism of the later nineteenth century with an inventory of gesture and technique whose material connections with visceral melodrama or genetic naturalism were more organic than with an Ibsenite realism, already institutionalised as an aesthetics of theatrical experience, a regime of the truth of mimetic 'pleasure' (whose 'jouissant' explosion counter-pointed Brecht's harness against the codification of this truth going back to its legitimation by bourgeoise modes of 'realistic' identification).[38] We are interested in Pirandello before Brecht precisely because of the measure that is formalized within the former's work to equalize the histrionic dissymetry between realism and melodrama by the instrument of a theatrical semantics that problematizes the ontological precedence of a 'realistic' measure but does not free it of its expressive ideology that actually makes possible this semantics, this commensuration of measures which concretely exists in the mode of a spatiality neither critical like Brecht's nor multiply affirmative like Artaud's. And in this, the

similarity of Pirandello and Anouilh, pointed out by some one like J.L.Styan in his The Dark Comedy, is significant.[39]

* * *

1. Measure and Spatiality

In Antigone, the relation of measure and spatiality is concretely the relation of what Hegel called in his construction of ethical life as a phase of objective geist, in the Phenomenology of Mind, the 'organic' and 'inorganic'.[40] Patricia Mills and George Steiner exemplify two perspectives permitting two readings of Hegel in this context; the first as delimiting the praxic space within which Antigone's ethical justification in Hegel is existentially engaged with the question of authentic subjectivity and the second as delimiting the semantic space of tragic articulation which produces a hermeneutic of nomic equalization between Antigone and Creon in the paradigmatic freedom of choosing between the split ethical substance of chthonic and empyrean divinities in the mode of choosing between the polis and the oikos.[41] We could say that at least in Steiner's case, an element of the formal genos or genus that is the abstraction of the critical social line dividing the oikos and polis is reproduced as the form of interpretative mediation of scholarly criticism.

In both Patricia Mills' and Steiner's analysis, the relation
of organic and inorganic as well as that of legitimacy and
usurpation of the law focus Antigone as the Sophoclean
subject of the pure deed - Antigone, who buries her brother
Polynices against Creon's edict.[42] In Anouilh, the edict and the deed are
both present. So is the final series of deaths of Antigone,
Haemon and Eurydice. Nevertheless it is extravagant to simply
read Antigone as the daughter of Hades or the Antitheos,
the Chorus as the speaker of the first stasimon in the
Theban tragedy who brings home the Da-sein of an age which
plunged the ontic utilitarianism of the anthropomorphic
measure into the abyssal immeasurability of a physis close to
what one learns from Plato about the philosophical or
divine lysia, madness, and Eury- dice as Eury-dike, the sombre
mother of the 'dike' or justice conjoined with the primordial
divinities of Demeter and Niobe.[43] That is, the simplicity of
this extravagance of reading is off-set in Anouilh by another
simplicity - that of the theatrical measure whose spatial
analogue is the body of a 'modern' Antigone who is structured
by the freedom of a code which doesn't insist she be draped
in Hellenic costume but neither prescribes a pair of jeans
as an instructing symbolism of modernity.[44] We are thus
referred back for this theatrical simplicity to the absences

constructing Anouilh's writing. And we are faced with analysing the relation of organicity with the inorganic by way of the spatial 'accident' which Anouilh's _Antigone_ encodes - and overcodes - within the representation of a nature and a cosmos that must be asemically connoted for recursive losses of connotative power and that projects a symbiosis of the contingent and natural necessity without any Hegelian mediations of universal history.[45] The measure of this skepticism is historically embodied in Samuel Beckett's _Waiting for Godot_, collapsing the existential measure in Anouilh or Pirandello with the material imaginary of the possibility of measure, commensurability or even hyper-commensuration of the type Kant's analytic of the sublime delineated in his _Critique of Judgement_.[46]

In a sense the beginning of the measure's function in _Antigone_ is _Antigone's_ beginning. As we inscribed this beginning in an economy and system of writing in our fixing of the conditions of mimesis, we unfold the spatiality of this writing of the beginning as a construction of the Anouilhan theatre-machine, that is, the unfolding unto the immanence of a measure immanent to the exchange of values - mimetic as well as mythical - henceforth. In the beginning there is -

and we must capitalize yet again - the NURSE and ANTIGONE.
But this is a rationalized beginning in that within the
visibility of the 'scene', CHORUS has already spoken but at
a pre-diegetic level where the diegesis - the 'story' of
Antigone - is Chorus' 'mimetic'; the Chorus is, in fact, as
a subject of mimesis, pre- and ante- diegetic, an empty
mimeme whose function is to, within the bounds of an
Aristotelianism still, reproduce itself as the plenitudinous
condition of the diegetic rationality of 'palatable' theatri-
cality and an aesthetics exclusive of any dysfunction that
would affect the originary 'sanity' of the choric 'mimeme'.[47]
In this possibility of crisis and crisis - management represe-
ntable as an epistemology of the modern theatre, NURSE is the
simplified and the sentimental homo oikonomicus of the age of
a burgeoning bourgeoise and ANTIGONE, the sign of historical
memory whose theatrical particularity in Anouilh is the
symptomatic - and this of bourgeoisiedom itself - impressionism
of a 'normalized' homo natura.[48] But if normalization is the
work of history as Foucault shows in Discipline and Punish
and the 'Panopticon' is the diagram and the optical apparatus
of a 'pan-theatre' that ensures the reproduction of a discip-
line of dramatization or 'diegesification' - the works of
normalization - then the speech of homo natura is the economics

of the disciplined desire in the theatre whose regulative knowledge goes back to the 'tableaux' of Diderot and the Napoleanic ballet-masterly militarism but which, as the line of flight of a desire and an immanent body, must still face the 'deterritorialized' exteriority of nature, this time capitalized as a NATURE and as the OUTSIDE (whose philosophical antecedent goes back to the Heideggerian 'open' and 'the fourfold').[49] Thus we read, after Antigone has quietly come back to the palace the Nurse discovering her enigmatic presence.

> NURSE : Where have you been?
>
> ANTIGONE : Nowhere. It was beautiful. The whole world was grey when I went out. And now - you would not recognise it. It's like a postcard: all pink, and green and yellow. You'll have to get up earlier, Nurse, if you want to see a world without colour.[50]

Our interest in the measure of the significatory world of sign-values in relation to the 'nature of theatre' as a site of mimeological recognizability, bringing Anouilh in relation to Pirandello and both in relation to Beckett, is oriented towards: (1) the subjectivation according to the regime of recognition, of Antigone in a 'theatre' to which she returns from the 'outside' which was 'beautiful' when she was there and not in the 'theatre', here; thus,

constituting a deictic spatiality called theatre without quota-
tion marks (2) the problematics of a chromatic continuum
that metonymically and also metaphorically - disjuncts as well
as signifies a qualitative time specifiable within signification
only as the temporal quanta of another continuum, that of a
natural duration which is no duration either by the standards
of ancient cyclical cosmology or by that of modern Bergsoniani-
sm. The measure of 'a world without colours' within the
psychological romanticism of 'little' Antigone's 'character'
remains a problem of epistemic identity of impressionist or
subjectivist topics.[51] Our contention is that subjectivism is
neither world-view nor ideology but a subjectivity before the
ideological emplacement of (which follows Althusser's concept of
the 'agency' in Marx) the subjectivist subject. That is, it is
a diagram, another chromatism and another theatre.

But, for the diagram and the measure of subjectivism as a
'phantasy' this time, let us read Antigone's and the Nurse's
scene, as both the address of psychoanalysis' 'demand' and
the return of language's address to its 'flesh' as a desire
which according to Lacan is the desire of the other - to
invest the language and also perhaps the Lacanian Other in
language as the locus of recognition, in its theatre as
NATURE to produce the same as the assemblage of subjectivism

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and its sensory-motor, perceptual, mnemonic or phantasmatic experiences:

> NURSE (very tenderly) : Where is your pain?
>
> ANTIGONE : Nowhere, Nanny dear. But you must keep me warm and safe, the way you used to do when I was little, Nanny ! Stronger than all fever, stronger than any nightmare, stronger than the shadow of the cupboard that used to snarl at me and turn into a dragon on the bed-room wall. Stronger than the thousand insects gnawing and nibbling in the silence of the night... Nanny, stronger than death, give me your hand, Nanny, as if I were ill in bed, and you sitting beside me.52

The fever, the nightmare, the shadow of the cupboard and death are the substantives of the signified fluxion on the diagram called 'subjectivism' and the fluxion themselves as infinitives are the gnawing, the nibbling, the seeing of shadows (itself as a monocular shadow of a gaze defining the Anouilhan theatre) and we add as our major thesis at this point, the dying of a 'tragic' Antigone that is - and the ontological copula revives Heidegger's question on the Being of primeval art as a gathering of beings unto the fold of the 'earth' - imploded into the tragic code as Antigone and as an implosion of the sign 'existence'.53 But the code must be mobilized within the cybernetic immanence of theatre (and we follow Barthes' designation of the theatre, here) as

an existentialist practice and an ontogenetic formation of
the identity of a feminine subject as subject of the reflexi-
ve cogito; but all this within the fluxion of the infinite
movement of the infinitive and the regime of signs regula-
ting the movement of speaking the cogito. The following thus
is read from our own way of reading as well as from
Patricia Mill's critical position (especially after we have
discussed the bourgeoisiedom of the oikos as a family which
Horkheimer has dealt with also within the critical theory of
the Frankfurt school) given of course the large difference
between the two readings:

NURSE   My sparrow, my lamb ! What is it that's eat-
          ing your heart out?

ANTIGONE: Oh, it's just that I'm a little young still
          for what I have to go through. But nobody
          but you must know that.54

The identity, in its 'figuredness' in the tropic sense of
the 'tropos' as a turning and a forming, is the measure of
the psychological self, the res of the speaking subject
called 'character' in the theatre that in its affectual
displacement of this self on to the theatrical impersonality
of the measure - the identity as the ancient mask, the
mimetos , the histrion, the theatron - makes it possible

to question, in some one like Anouilh, the relevance of a
Greek spatiality whose tragic amplitude which is the oscilla-
tion between hybric man and inscrutable god, is measurable
by the effect - the affect again - of the oscillation in the
pharmakos, the primitive Oedipus who is the measure of
tragedy without a measure (the evidence of which is amply
supplied by Sophocles in Oedipus at Colonus).[55] And so, in
Anouilh's Antigone, we must consult speech again. Antigone has
told something to the nurse which nobody but she must know.
Thus the nurse is thematizable henceforth as 'Nanny'. The
demand of the address and the multiple vocal foundations that
constitute an address counted by the number of times 'Nanny'
is written into Antigone's speech and spatialised by the
material grain of a de-idealized voice - and here psychologi-
cal humanism giving forth 'bad' melodrama would still be a
strength - in what emerges, in the following, in a nominally
naturalized and archetypally - that is, typically - gendered
meaning of the word 'power'.

> NURSE :   (Places her arm around ANTIGONE's shoulder) A
> little young for what my kitten ?
>
> ANTIGONE :Nothing in particular, Nanny. Just all this.
> Oh, its so good that you are here. I can
> hold your calloused hand, your hand that is so
> prompt to ward off evil. You are very power-
> ful, Nanny. 56

And to the definitive symbiosis of 'power' and 'Nanny', we can respond with an assertoric typology of pure qualities that transcursively control Nanny's discourse, the definitive discourse. This is the typology which Nietzche envisaged as close to an emergence of 'willing' as a willing of qualities and, following Deleuze we can say, which symbolically images a taxonomy with a typology of toponymy.[57] The figures of this typology is the anti-Aristotelian, anti-biped It is the regime called 'animal' and a population of 'creatures' – the sparrow, the lamb, the kitten... ; nevertheless, one of signs.

But we must read further, this time for the subjectivation of the anti-biped as a specific <u>topos</u> and a specific affect. In the regime of the same domesticity which Nanny, who herself is the territory of slavish affects as we argued in our first chapter, commands through a sentimental speech. The <u>topos</u> is abstracted from the body of Antigone's pet dog, another designation and another figure of a subjectivism both within and outside domesticity. In the following, the problematization of 'Nature' as the anti-humanism which penetrates the body of the quadruped, the dog is clear given the fact the dog is a pet and is after all, symbolizable within the regime of an Antigonesque psychologism:

ANTIGONE : My dog, Puff...

NURSE :   (Straightens up,draws her hand away) Well?

ANTIGONE : Promise me that you will never scold her
            again.

            ... ...

ANTIGONE : Please, Nanny, I beg of you !

            ... ...

ANTIGONE : And promise me that you will talk to her.
            That you will talk to her often.

NURSE (turns and looks at ANTIGONE) : Me, talk to a dog !

ANTIGONE : Yes. But mind you: You are not to talk to
            her the way people usually talk to dogs.
            You're to talk to her the way I talk to
            her.58

The language of problematization is clearly inscribed : what is
it to talk to a dog? What is it, further, to talk to a dog
'the way' one talks to it ('her') and not others who do it the
'usual' way? What is the 'usual' way of talking to dogs? We
feel these questions are the articulations of a problematized
'Nature' whose mode of problematization is 'human' such that
humanist psychologism and its natural-after _physis_ - speech
are our epistemological unconscious, our burden of normaliza-
tion and codification. We feel that this, in Foucault's
words, is the 'positive unconscious' of a mode of theatre -
that is precisely the meaning of any 'theatre' - whose

cosmology is the resolution of the force of the unconscious into a regime of signs and a universe of symbolism (from the Greek _symbolon_). The analogical imagination which has, since Aristotle at least, structured the metaphoric articulation of this regime and this universe, works in _Antigone_ at, this point as a movement from the symmetrical parallelism of projected antinomian mythic opposition to the irruptive repetition of the empty universal (as in Hegel) of an indifferent inorganicity, that is, of 'death'. After all there is no particular knowledge of why Antigone should want Puff to be killed in this 'theatre' - yet. The opposition is yet unformed in this play and its symmetrization is our burden of historical _ek-sistence_ in the world of oppositions called 'myth' in the mode of mnemotechnical theatre - something like psychoanalysis' 'other scene' - allowing the use of a psychoanalytical and repressed, that is, a negative unconscious this time. Death has nothing to do with the diegetic unfolding of the play yet and yet it is our theatrical aporia in the theory of tragedy which recapitulates the earliest movement from an uterine matrilineality which avenges murder but does not thematize death to an Athenian patrism - governed by the judicial veto of Pallas Athene - which must thematize death to predicate it in the structure of the

judgement as an originary discourse on blood ties through filiation and alliance. We mean the career of the Oerestian trilogy from Aeschylus to Eurpides naturally as both a theory of tragedy and a discursive specification of the problem of the nomos in the realm of a metaphysics of a measure of life and death - the first monement of humanization as a 'knowledge', in fact. Even if this sounds a digression from our reading of Anouilh, it is relevant to our reading of this other phase of humanization which impales 'death' and 'the dog' on the body of a 'subjectivist' speech interpretable as both romantic and existentialist. Let us read then:

ANTIGONE : But if there was a reason why I could not go on talking to her.

NURSE (interrupting) : Couldn't go on talking to her? And why couldn't you go on talking to her? What kind of poppycock - ?

ANTIGONE : And if she got too unhappy, if she moaned and moaned, waiting for me with her nose under the door as she does when I'm out all day, then the best thing, Nanny, might be to have her mercifully put to sleep.59

We are, with our analysis of the scene with Antigone and the nurse, prepared to face the global analytic intelligibilities of what in psychoanalytic discourse is called 'paranoia'

and 'schizophrenia', as the two judgements on madness, madness remaining in our eyes an 'absence of work' up for discursive claimation. The site of _Antigone_ is the site of power-relations and the analysis of _Antigone_ is the methodological investment of a knowledge that is immanent to the will - the politics, that is as Julia Kristeva points out from a different perspective than ours - to intelligibility.[60] The relation of paranoia and psychosis, in psychoanalytic hermeneutics as well as Lacan's analysis of the work of the signifier - reminding one of Hegel's labour of the negative - subjectivate a field of corporeal and conceptual movement in the discourse of what since Freud's and Breur's efforts with hysteria and the cathartic method, is known as 'the talking cure' (in Anna O's words). Our question is, does the talk of any cure apply to Antigone? Further, is Antigone mad? Further still, what is the status of the realism of the copula in the imagination of a theatre? Finally, what is 'Desire' in theatre that returns the status of 'the Real' to the discourse of a mimesis that, in relation to a Real, as the Real, must be perfectly 'mad'?

2. Paranoia and Schizophrenia

In Lacan, the Real is the impossible and without fissure; the psychosomatic is this reality of the Real. The discourse

of the psychotic, according to Lacan, collpases the symbolic with the Real under the shadow of a foreclosed Phallus, the grand signifier of the locus of alienated desire.[61] On the other hand the paranoid speaks at the place of the conjunction of the Real and the Imaginary and speaks at the single level of specular opposition governed by an enemy-otherness and if one were to go back to Hegel's interposition of the ethical substance's split within its own element in the Greek _Antigone_ - at the level of the single combat where the two brothers Eteodes and Polynices must kill each other in a war of pure prestige.[62]

Freud's reading of Schreber's 'diagrammatic' diary as a case of paranoid homosexuality alienated under the law of a dead father and exploded into a dementia of becoming the voluptousness of woman forms the basis of Lacan's rigorously articulated thesis on the scission of delusional sexuality into a psychotic split of the fundamental law of desire as the desire of the other and his analysis of the split is in terms of the paradigmatic Lacanian thesis - 'the unconscious is structured like a language'.[63] We are not able to analyse the assymetrical movement of the normal to the extrme patho-logical in Lacan's ordering of madness into a system of theoretical and specifically, epistemological intelligibility

here. It is enough to say that in the attempt to rescue a subject of speech in the analytic site, it has been essential to follow this system. In a psychoanalytic reading of tragedy as in the case of Andre Green, the system is a space of theatrical transformation. This is of course extremely plausible in view of the fact that Freud's analysis of Sophocles' Oedipus Rex is the 'analyticization' of tragic theatre giving finally, a theatre of universal neurosis and a regime of aesthetic escapism, a truth.[64] And it is imperative to note given all this, that, ours is not a psychoanalytic reading of Antigone.

* * *

Our reading is concerned with the function and significance of the truth of Anouilh's Antigone perpetually engaged with the will to truth immanent in the discourse of psychoanalysis and the ethical as well as political subjectivation of the will taken in the Foucauldian sense of 'subjectification'. It is obvious that Creon, the King and Antigone, the King's neice and subject divide up the identity recognizable as an effective subjectification. The medium and measure of this is the work of structuralism in Antigone elaborated in our discussion of myth earlier. Nevertheless we must search for the work of truth in a more diffuse and more indexical speech before

returning to Creon and Antigone. This is possible in the case of the GUARDS. Keeping the concept of an invisible structure of interpellation, called 'ideology', in mind, the conditions of a theatre of paranoid interpretability of and by structure and the theatrical fractalization of structure from its axiomatics to its problematics can be secured for Creon, the interpreter - Apollinian and Antigone, the 'dying' Dionysian as well as for the cell of paranoid symmetry (the structure, that is) and the molecular flux of the schizophrenic message - which is an anti-message in the paranoid system of communicative ordering - within the cell but in the mode of deterritorializing this cellular territory. We must move with caution however in view of the clear difference between Anouilh's __Antigone__ and the 'idea' of Antigone, the tragic and mythic 'figure' in that the former is a contingent and 'psychologized' expropriation of the latter, in the form of a 'story', a prosaic, sophistic, argumentative speech.

The gift of our caution is that deterritorialisation, for us, in Antigone is the end of Antigone, its suspension as a performative duration and thus immediately a re-codification, a death which is not the infinitive of 'dying' but a closure.[65] The sanity of tragedy with which Holderlin and Nietzche were concerned, is re-affirmed for us. The paradigmatic oppositions

of instinctual life in Freud that were resymbolized and re-
enacted in the life of 'adult' pathology and which, in their
vicissitudes, open up the analytic site for obsessional
neurosis as against hysterical neurosis or paranoia as against
'absolute' dementia of paraphrenia where even the imaginary
object is introjected into the projected immanence of the
paraphrenic body[66] - a body no more the 'abreacted'
hysterical theatre but a rigorously and consummately theatrolo-
gical and paralogical reality - provide for us a theoretical
exterior which must be traced in the wake of the indexical
signs of a sanity which restores to the code, the tragic
'genre' its adaptive life, its mimesis of death that is not
an entropic ethology of adaptation. Hence we read the scene
of the GUARDS as fairly representational, fairly indexical
and fairly paranoic. After all, CHORUS has made it clear
with regard to the guards that they were the functional
cons tant, the ideologico-praxic frame within which the critical
variation on a political or social thematic must be made in
the mode of a theatrical imaginary. This emerges from the
context of the chorus' first introduction which s/he introduces
the guards in the following manner:

As for those three red-faced card players - they are the
guards. One smells of garlic, another of beer; but they

are not a bad lot. They have wives they are afraid of; kids
who are afraid of them; they are bothered by the little
day-to-day worries that beset us all. At the same time - they
are policemen : eternally indifferent, for nothing that
happens can matter to them. They are quite prepared to arrest
anybody at all, including Creon himself, should the order
be given by a new leader.67

We take the above as an exemplary statement in what is
called 'ideology'. The conditional in the last line ('should
the order be given by a new leader') acts as the primitive of a
propositional universe where political subjectivity is defined
by the individuation of the subject as a subject of interest,
that is, an 'individual' ('homo oikonomicus' now graduated to
the space of civil society as in Hegel's Philosophy of Right)
and as a trans-individual subject of power, the Cameralist
unit, that is the 'policeman' 'eternally' bound to nothing but
the 'Reason of the State'. In Anouilh, the symbolic mediation
between the two levels is as always language and its regime
of 'sign-affects'(the sympathy of 'they are not a bad lot'
hence). What Lacan has called the symbolic order and what for
us, is the locus of normalization and exchange - but within
the rationalist dialectic of an ideal exchange of signs-in-
transit in contradiction with the fetishized exchange of imagi-
nary values - is the codification of the regime of the
plebian affect into its class-discipline ('they have wives they

are afraid of; children who are afraid of them'), its humour as
against the anti-indexical irony of Creon's royal - and Socratic,
we contend - sophism which distributes a network of counter-
paranoic lines in the minor language of the guards under the
paranoid 'literacy' and rhetoric of a major language of the
updated chief of the tribe that is not Antigone's 'poetic' and
delusional tribe we encountered earlier.[68] Before the rhetoric
of major language the humour of the minor when the guards
bring Antigone to Creon:

> FIRST GUARD : Listen, we're going to get a bonus out
> of this. What do you say we throw a
> party, the three of us?
>
> SECOND GUARD : At the old woman's ?
> Behind Market street?
>
> THIRD GUARD : Suits me. Sunday would be a good day.
> We're off sunday. What do you say we
> bring our wives?
>
> FIRST GUARD : No. Let's have some fun this time. Bring
> your wife, there's always something goes
> wrong. First place, what do you do with
> the kids?[69]

...   ...

What we call 'humour' is something serious and in the
order of sociality. In its empiricity of place ('old woman's,
'Market Street') and time ('sunday would be a good day') and its
operational exclusion - wives and children - an order of

representation is produced that maps the presentation of three 'red faced' guards onto the abstract of a programme - 'a party', in the above - as the slippage of representative values of 'realism' to an assemblage of socialized chromatism - red-faced 'means' grubby of course ! - and the determined programme within the plebian code whose description vis-a-vis, the territory of the city - the 'polis' onwards - is the map of tragic theatre in mutation.

But Antigone is present when the guards talk. We must situate her within the strategic possibility of affectual alliance in tragedy and politics, the encoding of which in the mythos goes back to the question of women and slaves in classical Athens. The site of this possibility remains the discursive specification of WAR which kings (who are men) and men make. But we can't go far on this point because Antigone, the molecular - hence quite 'mad' of course - existence in Antigone (rationalized as an ontological nihilation by Sartre) must be through and through contrasted with the molar groupings of a minor language as well as a major. In the spirit of rejection, Antigone - and that is our major argument here - must be tattooed with the sign of death which is neither index nor icon but a repetition of 'Antigone', a dead code rationalizable thus as without strategy and as a futile heroine, a

martyr and schizophrenic without ends outside herself in Anouilh.[70] Antigone has told the first guard with regard to the other two:

> I don't mind being killed, but I don' want them
> to touch me.[71]

It is clear thus the social machine which enacts the technology of individuation giving liminal locations to paranoia and schizophrenia in a critical quest for a motivational intelligibility collapses before Antigone's career in a speech established as 'gratuitous'. For the technology that produces an implicated and implicative 'gratuitousness' of Antigonesque 'self', we must return to the rhetorical architecture of Creon's significatory and paranoid universe in the spirit of re-encountering the meaning of the 'foil' in dramatic theatre where the interpretative skill-technicque of Creon makes possible the 'story' of Antigone, its constitutive technology.

The sample that we extract from the sequence or more exactly, the syntagm of Antigone's confrontation with Creon is structured by the affect of an appeal to understanding and is technologically programmed towards the continuation of an argumentative discourse. After Antigone has refused the seduction of Reason ('why did you try to bury your brother')

while being mobilised within the tension between the seduction as an original drama of trauma (as emerges in early Freudian themes of child sexuality) and the phantasy of seduction rationalized by the work of Reason which itself is a non-originary, and dramatized - or narrativised - version of seduction, Creon, in the following, attempts a rhetorical and tropic resolution of this tension through valorizing the contingency of a 'Political Reason' - the comparison with the necessary claims of pure and practical Reason in Kant is interesting - into a discourse and apparatus of this Reason, that is, its technology:

CREON : But God in heaven! Won't you try to understand me ! I'm trying hard enogh to understand you! There had to be one man who said yes. Somebody had to agree to captain the ship. She had sprung a hundred leaks; ... The wheel was swinging with the wind. The crew refused to work and were looting the cargo ... Every man jack on board was about to drown - and only because the only thing they thought of was their own skins, and their cheap little day-to-day traffic. Was that a time, do you think, for playing around with words like yes and no? ... You grab the wheel, you right the ship in the face of a mountain of water. You shout an order, and if one man refuses to obey, you shoot straight into the mob. Into the mob, I say ! The beast as nameless as the wave that crashes down upon your deck; as nameless as the whipping wind. The thing that drops when you shoot may be someone who poured you a drink the night before, but it has no name. And you, braced at the wheel, you have no

name, either. Nothing has a name - except the
ship, and the storm.72

It is clear that Creon must be responsible for the consistency
of this architecture of the rhetorical argument that must
serve as a Law-effect. This is the fundamental metaphysical
question which, Aristotle in his Rhetoric had posed with reg-
ard to Sophocles' Antigone in terms of the written and the
unwritten law while both occupy conflictual sites in the
discipline of the sophistic and oratorical (enunciative) dis-
course ('logos') called 'rhetoric'.73 But within the subjecti-
vism of the Anouilhian diagram, this question must be asked
in its particular utterance. Thus immediately after the above
- a work of spacing mingling in the architectonic of the
practised actor's vocalization - Creon looks towards Antigone
and asks:

Now do you understand?74

But what must the paranoid symmetrization of difference
into conflicting opposition - tragic collision in Hegel - do
to enforce a methectic as against mimetic participation in
the horizon of the hermenuetic called 'understanding' in
terms of the subjection of the collective and the individual?
Our contention is that, in Antigone, a paradoxical substance
is mobilized as a metaphorics within the density of language

to axiomatise the metaphorics into the nominalism of 'argument';
a nominalism that structures the individualisation of a popula-
tion as the 'policed' aggregate of a sum of quanta - the
politics of this going back to the Pastoral mode of singulari-
zation of the 'flock' - whose variant qualitiative determina-
tions are machined by the 'cybernetes' (in Greek) or the
steersman into a territorialization of unregimented lines of
force into a field of efficiency ('the ship of the state').[75]
But the territorialization is an act of punctuation of the
code from the exterior to institute a paranoid over-coding -
an axiomatics, that is - which must wield the necessary weapon
('the gun') to implode the field of efficiency into an inorga-
nic body - a mass - whose surface is crisscrossed by the
theatrization of matrix of affects immediately codified in the
axiomatics of the episteme after the classical age of represen-
tation - following Foucault - as an insurrectionary 'mob' led
by - and this is crucial - the infinite political productivity
of the sign 'Man'. The desperation and breathlessness of
Creon's speech prove the conflict that arises between the
epistemic dependence of a free will willing itself as a
nihilation and the strategic instrumentality - the danger for
the king - of this will as it is a will to its own truth
as qualitatively determined in its social productivity, as a

will to power. Here, Deleuze's work following Nietzche helps us to situate the topological invariant of a subversive quality - Antigonesque, as proved by many avant-garde productions of Antigone vastly less conventional than Anouilh - that in its existential mythologisation of a phenomenological onto-logic, nevertheless, as a form of knowledge, had the space to regulate an effective political affect and message. The royal cybernetes' machine, by the very force of cybernetic mathematics, is transformable into a different and antagonistic repository of the permanent memory of Antigone, the palimpesestual myth, and the digital particularities of this Anouilhan theatre as a machinic presence into a message - taken widely as a simplistic untragic irony - turned cipher (we contend tragedy is anyway, highly ironic the moment it is de-ciphered as 'tragedy').

But we are not content with discovering the technology of rhetoric whose structure is paranoic. We are finally faced with the abyssal question as to what does it mean to say. Antigone is molecular or 'mad' when as a character (ethe) her intelligibility is the burden of royal and totalitarian knowledge which must make everything intelligible. Then Antigone, if imbricated with the cascade of madness as a mimetic and theatrical body cannot be limited to the psychotic

intelligibility in Lacan's thesis on the cascade of signifiers given the foreclosure of the paternal signifier and the collapse of the order of the sign whose signifieds are constituted and elided in the process of 'normal' symbolic exchange of signs.[76] We are pinned to the fourth wall of a proscenium theatre whose 'existentialist' drama led by Sartre – after all what does it mean within the commensuration of a praxic space called the stage regulated by the proscenium distance, a locus of apraxia, to say "Hell is other people"? – must select a 'normal' body to rotate it on the histrionic axis at that very odd but still crystalline-intelligible and virtual angle such that the body will be mimetically irradiated with the real knowledge of the Real outside the Real – a theatrical knowledge – of madness. Our thesis is that Antigone in Anouilh bears the silent mark of a schizophrenic occupation while the silence is continually covered over by the work of language working in the interests of a 'miraculating theatricality' and diffuse complexity of characterology giving forth the rigorous mytho-logic we discussed earlier. This residual characterology emerges clearly from the prison-scene when Antigone gets the guard to write a letter for her to Haemon, a rather sentimental and substitutive message after the traditional perpatetia (reversal) and before the cosmic

inversion called _catharsis_ . In the absence of any visible peripatetia catharsis or/and the classic amphibology which Vernant sees in _Oedipus Rex_ in Anouilh, the following acts as a further testament to subjectivism: [77]

> ANTIGONE (turns and looks at the GUARD) : It's you, is it?
>
> GUARD :   What do you mean, me?
>
> ANTIGONE : The last human face that I shall see.[78]
>
>   ... ...
>
> ANTIGONE : How old are you?
>
> GUARD :   Thirty-nine.[79]
>
>   ... ...
>
> ANTIGONE : Do you love your children?
>
> GUARD :   What's that got to do with you?[80]
>
>   ... ...
>
> ANTIGONE : (breaking him off) Listen.
>
> GUARD :   Yes, Miss.
>
> ANTIGONE : I am going to die soon.[81]
>
>   ... ...
>
> ANTIGONE : Do you think it hurts to die?[82]
>
>   ... ...
>
> GUARD :   ... That means, they shove you in a cave and wall up the cave.

ANTIGONE : Alive?

GUARD : Yes ... (He moves away a few steps)

ANTIGONE (murmurs): O tomb ! O bridal bed ! Alone.[83]

Where do these scattered utterances take us? Doubtless, back to the plane of immanence recognisable as a mundanization of tragedy whose signs are the nominations of 'love', age ('How old are you?), death ('I'm going to die soon'), pain ('... it hurts to die?) and absolute particularity, as subaltern death ('Alone'). And the relatum of this nominalism remains a caricatural theatre (' O tomb ! ...'). Our reading is that the caricature is an application of language to a regime of affects that makes it effective theatre. And Anouilh's effectivity as a man of the theatre has never been denied. But more important is the preservation of the relatum as productive of sense, which means productive of terms of relation. This is the field of signifieds that revives the theme of existence in terms of 'death' as a sign. And thus in the above, the telos of mundanization requires the serious transformation of a nominal scatter into the propositional consistency of a political and veridical regime and is normalised as well by the rhetoric of ultimate nominations. Creon has said earlier, "Nothing has a name except the ship and the storm". That is, the expediency of war

whose despotic or democratic rationalities have been objects of description - as narratives of war-machines- Homer onwards, is the object of a language of theatre which, in preserving the relation at the levels of the 'mob' and that of Antigone in terms of the 'Term' - the King - refuses the freedom to this relation to sunder its propositional structure into seperate essences and to reassemble these essences in the impossible delusion of 'realizing' what Lacan calls after Hegel, the place of Other such that this re-assemblage is in the schizophrenic mode of the relation as the Real outside the conjunctive marker of the territorial 'Term'.[84] Thus, Antigone's passage to death within the element of a 'scene' is not visibly, entitatively or quotably schizophrenic and is in fact ideologically diagnosiable as defeatist within the order of the sign.[85] Nevertheless, this defeatism is the thematization of a theatrical normalization whose attempted regulation within the exterior - the politics - of the 'Nature' of this theatre is co-existensively the problematization of this thematization and the 'counter-effectuation' of a 'normalized' theatre.[86]

Notes

1. Richmond Y. Hathorn's use of existentialism in the inter-
pretation of tragedy, based on Gabriel Marcel's distinction
between 'mystery' and 'problem', needs just such an equivalence,
outside of discursive fidelities, to mobilise this distinction as
a kerygmatic problematics which wishes to observe reductions of
'mystery' to 'problem' in the history of tragedy. See Richmond
Y. Hathorn, Tragedy, Myth and Mystery (Bloomington : Indiana
University Press, 1962).

2. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi,
(London : Athlone Press, 1988), pp. 39-74.

3. Criticism of Anouilh's Antigone has articulated the
field of character in a language that collapses the
field with character. Nevertheless the language can be torn
from the middle to let the articulation escape. Our study is a study
of Antigone and as well as that of the system of such articula-
tions as this. "... Anouilh turns the tragedy of Antigone into a
discussion " in Peter Norrish, New Tragedy and Comedy in France,
1945-70 (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1988), p.25.

4. The relation of Unreason and Reason in the Classical
Age which is dominant in the 'theatrical time' of Racine
and its vertiginous separation from the absence of work of madness,
as profoundly dramatized by Foucault, forms our own point of
departure for an incursion into the 'visibility' of subjectivity
in the wake of a historically decided 'mathesis of light' in
Cartesian physics (as Foucault says) which masters Nature in
the name of another and higher Nature whose only 'sane'
remnant - as a proof - would be the 'trace of light'. See Michel
Foucault, Madness and Civilization : A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason, trans. Richard Howard(New York : Vintage Books, 1965)
pp. 109-116.

5. For Brecht's 'organon', see 'A Short Organum for the
Theatre', in Brecht on Theatre : The Development of an
Aesthetic, trans. John Willet (New Delhi : Radha Krishna, 1979)
pp. 179-205;
and for an aesthetics and paradigmatics of Brechtian
theatre in the light of the conflict of 'representation' and
'production'see Darko Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond : Studies in
Modern Dramaturgy (Sussex: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1984).

6.   This consumption as a theatre without trace in Artuad
       and as demolishing the last remnant of the text, aims
at the very fundamental opening of representation. But the
problem of this theatre as a production and as an 'erection',
a work in its absolute, material de-metaphorization engages the
fundament as an area, a material 'open' - a stage or space -
elementally committed to the destruction of its own reprodu-
cibility. The contradiction here and the status of this commit-
ment characterize the amplitude of this Artaudian problem
which excludes theatre as such being theatrically inclusive of
nothing but its own consumption as theatre. See Jacques Derrida,
'La Parole Soufflee', in his Writing and Difference, trans.
Alan Bass (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 169-195.

7.   Reading Marx in this light can take into account both the
       theoretical realm of the thought on ideology in Marxism
and its consistent system of identification and interpellation
and the realm falling outside ideology which works with what is
called by Lyotard and others, a 'libidinal economy'. The
analysis of money and its function in the capitalist mode of
production, is in fact the specific region from where ideology and
what departs from ideology, are deployed as opposed theoretic-
al trajectories. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore
and Edward Aveling (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1938)
pp. 66-122.

8.   It is rash to offer a Nietzchean politics to finally
       bring a Hegelian and a Marxist politics to a climax in
the history of effective materialism in nineteenth century
German Philosophy. If anything, Nietzche forces us to re-think
the question of politics from the side of discursive and 'practical'
emergences of the site that is recognizable today as a materia-
lism. This warns against conflating a history of 'materialism'
with a history of genealogy of practice that was 'ignobly'
materialist even before the 'noble' institution of materialism
as a knowledge. For Nietzche's approach, see Michel Foucault,
'Nietzche, Genealogy, History', in Michel Foucault, Language,
Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry
Simon (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) pp. 139-164.

9.   The tradition of analytic logic reaches upto Russell and
       Whitehead in the twentieth century and the calculus of
relations in this tradition is a part of increasing degrees
of formalization of a deductive system whose basic cell remai-
ned the Aristotelian syllogism. There is also a tradition of
'psycho-logic' which was debated over by Franz Brentano and

Edmund Husserl and which was concerned with grounding the ideality of relations in something like a pure consciousness of form. If one can talk of an opposed tradition to those of logic and psychology it is a critique of the theory of traditions. We are concerned with the role of discourse and politics precisely in the spirit of a pragmatics of active relations and not in that of a system of relational modalities based on a calculus, only - the latter as a formal theoretical consciousness informs also Althusser's concept of the 'problematic'. As different from Althusser, we are, in our study of the trace of subjectivity, interested more in what Foucault calls, 'Problematization'. See, Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure : The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, trans. Robert Hurley (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), pp. 3-13.

10.   The most interesting speculations on Foucault's episteme and the Heideggerian alethia arise from a reading of Deleuze's search for a sub-individual truth of 'fold' and relation. It is in the very element of the relation that the mode of alethic unconcealment in Heidegger and the epistemic regularity in Foucault work jointly towards a region of subjectivity that relate as the relation - the thought of subjectivity with its unthought, which is precisely the thought of relation. See Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand (London : Athlone, 1988) pp. 94-123.

11.   This is also evidenced when a critic, Joseph Chiari, writes of Anouilh in the context of his difference with Giradoux and Cocteau with respect to their poetry in drama and also of Anouilh's 'amorality of love'. Such a problematic attitude in Anouilh is clearly working in his conception of St. Joan in The Lark where Joan's purity is directly conjoined with life and existence and is not the product of Anouilh's philosophical or religious belief. But then there is something as an imputation of non-belief by the beliefs of a certain criticism. In this spirit we read the following about Anouilh by Chiari: "In Anouilh the mystery has been dispelled, the immense figures who cast their shadows have disappered, we are strictly on the plane of the contingent, and intellect and dialectics assume pre-eminence over imagination and poetry." in Joseph Chiari, The Contemporary French Theatre : The Flight From Naturalism (London : Salisbury, 1958), p. 100.

12.   This is also an universalizing rationale for a higher sphere of division to be constructed in the theological or Hegelian mode, that of the 'modern' god of Man and

the 'archaic', nether god of woman. Thus the single level of opposition is rationalized at another imaginary 'session' this time clearly a politico-theological discourse which divides speech between man and woman. For Derrida's texts on Antigone and Hegel in Glas, see George Steiner, Antigone: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 164-165.

13.   We are not in a position to carry out this comparison here. But the formal frame of this exercise would be the question of the 'whole' in Hegel which is also 'the true'. The flux of movement (Kinesis in Greek is only a physical stage of this movement as a natural moment in Hegel) that would realize the speculative statement 'the true is the whole' is the systematic of The Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel's efforts in this work as well as his lectures on the philosophy of religion are in the direction of a technology of the self as a 'type' with historically higher degrees of proximity to the self-dirempting 'Idea' as the path towards truth. Socrates, Antigone and Christ as the 'destined' are the embodiments of this techology of world-spirit and figured as 'types' demiurged by the hand of divinity as the Idea.

14.   This madness of an impossible aesthetics is in the order of the phantasmagorics Foucault sees in Deleuze's philosophical theatre against a representational psychodrama which does nothing more than a posteriori 'aestheticize' theatrical practice by the method of psychogenic laws of beauty and feeling. The madness we see as modified into the claims of Reason is perhaps nothing else but the 'feelings' the phantasms of theatre outside Law, outside its own phantasmic modifications. See Michel Foucault's 'Theatrum Philosophicum' in his, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, pp.171-172.

15.   "It may well be that the right, which kept itself in reserve, is not in its peculiar form present to the consciousness of the doer, but is merely implicit, present in the Subjective inward guilt of the decision and the action. But the ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt purer, if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, if it takes them to be sheer violence and wrong, to be a contingency in the ethical life, and wittingly, like Antigone, commits the crime. The deed when accomplished transforms its point of view; the very performance of it eoipso expresses that what is

ethical has to be actual; for the realization of the purpose is the very purpose of acting." G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; New York : Humanities Press Inc., 1931) pp. 490-91.

cf. Kierkegaard's 'Antigone' in George Steiner, op.cit., pp. 51-66.

16. Friedrich Nietzche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', in Friedrich Nietzche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York : Vintage, 1967), pp. 20-22.

In Holderlin the return of the aorgic - the infinite interpretation by Oedipus of the Oracle, visited on Antigone - and the Dionysian as an intoxication - as a possibility of schizophrenia where the possibility itself is a schizophrenic formulation - is the contradictory infinite of interpretation in tragedy both within and exceeding the discipline of Apollo. Tragedy realizes the tragic body of the 'hero' or 'heroine' as the reduction to a minimal sign-value - a hypothetical zero, a trace. The 'Sobreity' of Juno, the regulative god above the line dividing gods and men is capsized, under the force of the trace, to the element of the line itself, the medium of a godly slippage into the ungodly. In a way, the return of nature here is the over-whelming of the recognizable god of light into the immanence of the god in the 'nature of man', Dionysus. This gives forth the infinite torsion of tragedy and also thought and philosophy - Empedocle's madness paradigmatic of the latter. cf. note 90, Chapter 2.

17. "We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term 'imago'". Jacques Lacan, "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience", in Jacques Lacan, Ecrits : A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London : Tavistock, 1977), p.2.

For the specific understanding of Electra in the Oerestes trilogy as a daughter of mother or daughter of father in the context of 'imago', identification and Oedipal resolutions (the comparison of Electra with Antigone is instructive) and for the paranoid resistance of the imaginary to psychotic collapse of the 'model' of identifications and object-choice, and effecti-

vely the revenge on a 'jouissant' mother, see Julia Kristeva, 'On Chinese Woman', in The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 151-52.

18. And in this act of posing, we are indebted to the inspiring - and provocative - example of George Steiner whose hermeneutics and whose scholarship has been the well-constituted 'case' of Antigone now to be displaced, after Steiner, to the sites of discourse and practice yet again where the politics of the 'case' must supplement and question its hermeneutics.

19. This means a response to Hegel crucially different from the existentialist one (which followed Alexander Kojeve's reading of Hegel largely). The import of condensation and geography in Hegel is the involution of Hegel's philosophy of history, the 'inner' against the pure externality of brute nature, which sublates and transforms nature, into its discursive nature, its exterior. This response is important also for being conceptually up to the task of grasping the ruptural transition(posing as a supreme continuity) from objective geist to the Absolute. The beginning of Absolute spirit is an analytic of the principle of the construction of the 'Idea' of History as an analogon of the science of appearances of the spirit to itself such that this science must become the 'truth' of absolute for-self (which is the existentialist aporia of 'God') in so far as this analytic is the finite technology - a method and structure - of the 'topos' of the Absolute, the Infinite for-self (whose model in the Logic is the circle). See for this exegesis on the finite of Hegelian method in Hegel (after all!) and the exegetic objects of condensation (Religion, Art, Philosophy or Knowledge) condensing the principles of exegeses in the 'facts' - the brute nature - of history which occur in linear way and where the principles are 'universal moments', the ground of negativity and development of the 'Notion', G.W.F.Hegel, op.cit., pp.685-694.

20. For the dialectic of recognition between the master and the slave, see ibid, pp. 229-240. The law of dialectic in Hegel is the law's relation to force intro-reflected as the transparency of law to itself, its truth. The relation itself is the point of historical application - beginning from a theory of the polis with the Greeks - and is the form of the ideal or the ideal form which must, as a force and a power of the negative, realize itself with the law of History as a knowledge which has gathered its content, the ideal itself. This is the movement from a love of the sophia of the Platonic philosopher to sophia itself. The purely practical laws of this law

of transformation called the 'dialectic' is visualized by Aristotle as a grid on the problematics of techne, that is - a 'topic'. see Aristotle, 'Topics' in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Vol. I, ed. Richard Mckeon (New York : Random House, 1941), pp. 195-206.

21.   'Science itself' is the 'Science of the experience of Consciousness' called Phenomenology by Hegel. It is 'for us' that this Science is a process of coming to be and passing away but as speculatively grasped movement of the whole, it includes 'us'. It is, thus, 'Science itself'. See Hegel, op.cit., p. 144.

22.   This is meant as a point on the historicity of the Hegelian dialectic vis-a-vis, the kind of work Hans Gadamer has done on the same. See, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic : Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P.Christopher Smith (New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1976).

23.   Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, p. 92.

24.   This is a complex terrain of inquiry and Foucault's early and late works, in their continuity and divergence, testify to this complexity. As far as the theatre as well as the Church (and many a time they are one archetectural enclosure) are concerned, as the expanse of an exterior usually thought of as 'spectacle' of drama and confession, their representational status as spectacle and their strategic deployments as 'exercise' involve both the regularity of the episteme and the genealogical anonymities of what is generalizable as Christian practice.

25.   See Hegel, op.cit., p. 251.

26.   ibid, pp. 666-67.

27.   With respect to the analogical imagination in the construction of a philosophical attitude towards the 'event' of history we can cite the Kantian application of 'categories' to historical understanding as against Hegel's extraction of the concrete category from a speculative process of the understanding of history. cf. Jean-FrancoisLyotard, 'The Sign of History' in Post Structuralism and the Question of History, ed. Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington and Robert Young, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 162-80.

28.   See Plato,   Book VII, 'The Republic', in The Works of
        Plato,   trans. B. Jowett (New York : Tudor Publishing
Company, Undtd.), pp. 276-86.

29.   For Aquinas' attitude towards 'spatialization', see
        Jacques Le Goff, 'The Learned and Popular Dimensions of
Journeys in the Other World in the Middle Ages', in Understa-
nding Popular Culture : Europe from the Middle Ages to the
Nineteenth Century, ed. Steve Lawrence Kaplan (Berlin : Mouton
Publishers, 1984), p. 32.

30.   For the 'rhizome', See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet,
        Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tom Linson and Barbara Habberjam,
(London : Athlone Press, 1987), p. viii; for Heraclitus' thought,
C.H.Kahn,   The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 1979); and for Empedocles' fragments
'Katharmoi' translated 'Purifications' and 'On Nature', See
Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin, 1987),
pp. 161-201.

31.   In Foucault's The Order of Things what Kant is said to
        embody as an 'analytic of finitude' is precisely the
infolding of the sign 'man' into its discursive materiality to
become as an absolute signifying reservoir - perpetually
exterior, 'double'. See Chapter 2, note 38.

32.   For the categorical effectivity of materialist analysis
        in the form of a dialectic-method of political econo-
my, see Karl Marx, 'Introduction to the Critique of Political
Economy', in Marx and Modern Economics, ed. David Horowitz (New
York and London : Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1968) pp. 21-48.

33.   For the development of capitalism from the stage of
        manufacturing to modern industry and the
alteration of the 'motive-force' in production relations and
technology from one stage to the other, see Karl Marx, Capital,
Vol. I, pp. 327-515.

34.   Merleau Ponty's theory of the 'lived body' with its
        programme of perpetual openness to the world in the
mode of a 'being-in-the-world' perpetually caught up in the
spatiality and localization of the subject - body - giving itself
a 'phantom limb' as the intangible support of tactile fluxes -
is always caught up with the possibility of atrophy of faculty
and disruption of the life of this body. As an example, see

the Schneider Case in Maurice Merleau Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) pp. 113-118.

On psychoanalysis and psychosis, Foucault says, "...Psychoanalysis 'recognizes itself' when it is confronted with the very psychoses which nevertheless (or rather, for that very reason) it has scarcely any means of reaching as if the psychosis were displaying in a savage illumination, and offering in a mode not too distant but just too close, that towards which analysis must make its laborious way." in Michel Foucault, The Order of Things : An Archaeology of Human Sciences (New York : Vintage, 1973), p. 376.

35.   It is perhaps as an imposition of a heteronomic mensura that Lewis Galantiere sought to re-appropriate Anouilh's play in the name of a hypomnesic god against the speech of Anouilh's anamnesic Antigone (who would recapitulate her act till her death in the fullness of the act unsigned by god's law) when Galantiere changed Antigone's words in his translation for the first production in English, from 'For No One, For Myself' to "No, Creon. There is God and there are His Priests. And they are not the same thing." In Anouilh this anti-aporetic discourse sounds truly squeamish about the problem of the mensura given a specific structure - and texture - of Anouilhan aporias. For Lewis Galantiere's modification see, Leo Aylen, Greek Tragedy and the Modern World (London : Methuen and Co., 1964), pp. 282-83.

36.   See Luigi Pirandello, 'Spoken Action', trans. Fabrizio Melano in The Theory of the Modern Stage : An Introduction to Modern Theatre and Drama, ed. Eric Bentley (Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. 153.

37.   For Pirandello on Duse and the melodrama of D'Aununzio, see Luigi Pirandello, 'Eleanora Duse', ibid, pp. 158-169.

38.   For the phenomena of 'individualism' and 'bourgeoisie drama' in this connection and their relation the tragic possibility of 'guilt' and 'action', cf. George Lukacs, 'The Sociology of Modern Drama', trans. Lee Baxandall, ibid, p. 425-50.

39.   See for 'fiction of human behaviour' in Anouilh and Pirandello, J.L.Styan, The Dark Comedy : The Development of Modern Comic Tragedy, (Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 187-9.

40.   This is of course the large conflict of life (organic)
       and death (inorganic). The rationality of Antigone's
deed is constructed by Hegel within a liminal tendency towards
the inorganic but the movement of this tendency is a movement
through to the relation of household divinities (penates) and the
gods of community and to the individual desireless induplicability
of the sister-brother relation. The relations individuate opposed
pathic elements and these are the 'stuff' of tragedy as it
were. See Hegel, op.cit., pp. 476-482.

41.   See Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, Woman Nature and Psyche
       (New Haven and London : Yale Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 7-49
and 113-16; and George Steiner, op.cit., pp. 19-42.

42.   Patricia Mills nevertheless emphasises the decisive
       importance of Antigone's last words in Sophocles
(against emphasizing her suicide) to devalorize the Hegelian
universalization of Antigone's deed as an opposition of
sundered universals in an ethical life insufficiently individua-
lized in the history of societies.

43.   See in this connection, for Segal on Eurydice, Chapter 2,
       note 80, and for Da-sein and the catharsis of the scape-
goat, David Hulliburton 'Concealing Revealing : A Perspective on
Greek Tragedy', in Post Structuralist Classics, ed. Andrew Benja-
min (London and New York : Routledge, 1988) pp. 245-67.

44.   This would fix altered terms for comparison between
       classical tragic theatre and modern tragic 'performance'
(in the sense that Anouilh 'performs' Sophocles). The question
of an abstract theatrical space of Greek tragedy is emphasized
by Oliver Taplin's anti-ritualistic approach. See Oliver Taplin,
Greek Tragedy in Action (London: Methuen & Co., 1978).

       Given the theory of this abstraction of theatre which is
its 'nature' as a transforming measure of spatiality of the
theatre, we can localise Guicharnaud's argument that Creon
breaks down Antigone's 'Greek Reasoning' in Anouilh to a site
of contradictory spatial practices staging and debating - and
hence Creon's paranoid sophistics - the identity of an abstract
theatricality; a measure of concrete theatre,yet a spatial empiri-
city. See for Guicharnaud's comment, Michael Spingler, 'Anouilh's
Little Antigone : Tragedy, Theatricalism and the Romantic Self', in
Drama in the Twentieth Century, ed. Clifford Davidson, C.J.Gianaka-
ris, John H. Stroupe (New York : AMS Press, 1984), p. 127.

45. But the Hegelian idea of universal history is probably best encompassed in the way 'overcoding' is used by Deleuze and Guattari. They write, "Overcoding is the operation that constitutes the essence of the state, and that measures both its continuity and its break with the previous formations" in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, <u>Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia</u>, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London : Athlone Press, 1984), p. 179. Obviously in the case of this usage the possibility of dialectical mediation is entirely demolished.

46. Compare this view of Beckett with a view based on an Althusserian reading of 'dialectics' (following Lenin's Conspectus) in Beckett's monologues such as Peter Gidal's. See Peter Gidal, <u>Understanding Beckett</u> (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1986).

47. For the mimeme and palatability, see Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology : Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", in Jacques Derrida, <u>Margins of Philosophy</u>, trans. Alan Bass (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 239-240 (note 43).

48. We have already talked of the <u>homo oikonomicus. Homo natura</u> following Deleuze, comes to the fore in unrelieved exchange with the <u>homo faber</u> of Marxist thought insofar as nature, for us, is the primary upsurge of fabrication.

49. Our problematization is of the articulation of this NATURE as an 'open'. And in <u>Antigone</u> the body of WOMAN codified as a feminine body is the territorialization of NATURE's articulation as well as the possible articulation of a deterritorialized NATURE. The code in this possibility, is dismantled in favour of a 'feminization' of the Anouilhan theatre, that is, in favour of an Outside, to this theatre which has already structured the labour of the feminine. For 'territoriali-sation' and 'deterritorialisation', see Deleuze and Guattari, <u>Anti-Oedipus, pp. 130-37.</u>

50. Jean Anouilh, 'Antigone', trans. Lewis Galantiere, in <u>Makers of the Modern Theatre</u> (New York , Toronto, London: Mcgraw Hill Book Inc., 1961), p. 492.

51. cf. Spingler, op.cit.

52. Anouilh, op.cit. p. 496.

53. See Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in Martin Heidegger, <u>Basic Writings</u>, ed. David Farell Krell (London and Henley:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1978)pp.171-73

54.   Anouilh, op.cit., p.496

55.   The theory of the 'affect' in tragedy must select as
         its site what in Freud's characterization of a dream
is a rebus and the reading of this rebus as a theatrical
cipher, will have to penetrate the energetics and linguistics of
what is called 'the dream-work'. See Sigmund Freud, The Interpre-
tation of Dreams. trans. James Strachey (London : George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1954), pp. 277-508.

56.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 496.

57.   Gilles Deleuze, Nietzche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlin-
         son (London : Athlone Press, 1983) pp. 117-46.

58.   Anouilh, op.cit., p. 496.

59.   ibid, p. 496.

60.   See in this connection, Julia Kristeva, 'Psychoanalysis and
         the Polis', in The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi, pp.301-20.

61.   See Jacques Lacan, 'On a question preliminary to any possible
         treatment of psychosis', in Jacques Lacan, op.cit., pp.179-225 .

62.   This is what Anthony Wilden says with regard to Sophocles'
         Antigone. He adds that Anouilh's political 'moderniza-
tion' has been reduced to a representation of existentialist
martyrdom by interpretation. See Anthony Wilden, 'The Ideology of
Opposition and Identity : Critique of Lacan's Theory of the Mirror-
Stage in Childhood', in Anthony Wilden, System and Structure:
Essays in Communication and Exchange (London : Tavistock, 1972),
pp. 473.

63.   This major Lacanian articulation is contextualised and
         elaborated in Jacques Lacan, 'The Agency of the Letter in
the Unconscious',Lacan , op.cit., pp. 146-178.

         With respect to the analysis of psychosis the function of
this articulation must be conjoined with another on the Freudian
'slogan' of the normalization of the subject via ascension of the
ego "where the id was, there the ego shall be". For this other
articulation, see Jacques Lacan, 'The Freudian Thing', in Lacan,
op.cit., pp. 128-29.

64. For Freud's 'analysis' of Oedipus, see Sigmund Freud, op.cit., pp. 261-4.

65. The enunciative locus of this closure remain Creon and the Page and the depleted despotic paranoia this time selects the Page as a surface for the inscription of a further thematic, 'finitive' against the Antigonesque infinitive which already has escaped to the 'Outside', literally outside of Creon's - and Anouilh's- Scene:

> CREON : ... In a hurry to grow up, aren't you?
> PAGE : Oh yes, Sir.
> CREON : I shouldn't be if I were you.

Anouilh, op.cit., p. 515.

66. See Sigmund Freud, 'On Narcissism : An Introduction', in Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. IV, trans. Joan Riviere (London : Hogarth Press, 1925), pp. 31-2.

67. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 491.

68. For 'majoritarian' and 'minoritarian' language and becoming, see Deleuze and Parnet, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

69. Anouilh, op.cit., pp. 501-2.

70. S.Beynon John writes of the moral melodrama and aesthetic escape in Anouilh's plays which submit his heroines to 'hysteria and self-pity'. See S.Beynon John, 'Obsession and Technique in the Plays of Jean Anouilh', in Modern Drama : Essays in Criticism, ed. Travis Bogard and William.I. Oliver(London, Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 20-42.

71. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 501.

72. ibid, p. 507.

73. See Aristotle, 'Rhetoric', in The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 1370.

74. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 507.

75. For 'cybernetes' and the mathematics of communicational 'machines', see Norbert Wiener, 'Cybernetics', in Mathematics in the Modern World (San Fransisco : W.H.Freeman and Co., 1948), pp. 378-84.

In Foucault, the Pastoral mode of exercise of power is precisely different from a Greek model of power and the state which was based on the captain-steermanship axiomatic. In Anouilh, the paradox is heightened and sustained by precisely circumventing a historically precise difference and it yields, a result, an equivocal metaphoric substance up for contrary axiomatization. For pastoral power, morality and conduct, see Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure : The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, pp.30-32; also see, 'Politics and Reason', in Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. Lawrence D.Kritzman (New York, London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 57-85.

76. For the Lacanian algorithm of $\frac{S}{s}$ and elisions of the signified in the linguistic contexts of metaphor and metonymy, see Jacques Lacan,'The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious', in Lacan, op.cit., pp. 146-178.

77. For Vernant's magisterial reading of Oedipus Rex, see Jean Pierre Vernant, 'Ambiguity and Reversal in the Enigmatic Structure of Oedipus Rex', in Oxford Readings in Greek Tragedy, ed. Erich Segal, (Oxford : Oxford Univ.Press, 1983), pp.189-209.

78. Anouilh, op.cit., p. 512.

79. ibid, p. 512.

80. ibid, p. 512.

81. ibid, p. 512.

82. ibid, p. 513.

83. ibid, p. 513.

84. For 'Law of Heart' and madness, see Hegel, op.cit., pp. 396-97.

85. George Steiner is one exception to this mode of diagnosis when he clearly relates Anouilh's play to the resistant politics of occupied Paris. See George Steiner, Death of Tragedy, (London : Faber and Faber, 1961), pp. 330-31.

86. For 'counter-effectuation' of the 'event' in stoic philosophy and for an extra-ordinary response to entitative individuation (and we recognise Gilles Deleuze in our many responses besides this, working in remorseless silence), see Deleuze and Parnet, op.cit., pp. 64-6.

Conclusion

To conclude this analytic address which addresses the 'ear' of theatricality - and theatre constitutively embodies the abstract continuum of the voice, gives it an 'ear', a mark of punctuation - we must, as if from the call of obligation, open our ear to the last of Antigone's utterances. The Chorus is written to have said at the dawn of the curtain falling:

> CHORUS : And there we are. It is quite true that
> if it had not been for Antigone they would
> all have been at peace...
>
> Antigone is calm tonight, and we shall never
> know the name of the fever that consumed
> her. She has played her part.1

And while the rapacity of interpretation is not calm yet and probably never shall be, the conditions of the possibility of interpretation itself return yet again to instate themselves in the interstices of the fragments "And there we are", "We shall never know...", "the name of the fever", consumption of the name and by it, "played her part", the playing of the "played"... But of course our effort throughout has been to

specify the fragment as the very substance of the interstice. In this, we are led to analyse the direction of the choric speech as the determination of the end, the formality of the form 'end' to be interstitially circular. This is so because the knowledge denied of the name of the fever of Antigone is simultaneously the name - silently inscribed in full speech - ANTIGONE as well as the 'substance' of this name (or signifier) already removed to the other domain of formalization which is that of the speculative affect. Thus smuggling circle within circle Chorus prepares to close this play - of tragedy - when he surreptitiously names 'fever', the speculative affect. From then on the play ends and interpretation is set off. And a 'history of criticism' is made possible. Our work doubtless is both the beneficiary and victim of this possibility.

The benefit has been that we have mobilised the strengths and weaknesses of the history to which we belong and in which we participate, in favour of a _topos_ of enquiry that, in its heterogeneity of strata, enables the qualities - the mobilized history - one of tool-fragments and concept-affects - to appear 'de-familiarized' in their own eyes. Were our venture strictly formalist or even structuralist, this defamiliarization

would claim methodological and substantive immunity from the contagion of what, after Foucault, we have called the 'statement' and the problem of the possibility of history would already have been solved in so far as this possibility would simply have been pre-supposed.

We, in our study of Antigone have been victims of a history precisely because of our tortured capture by the structure of the question of the possibility of this history of what somewhat opaquely pronounced by the same, 'theatre'. This victimage seems to us to unfold in its stark actuality as the 'scene' of the history of theatricality begins to show its flipside from the movement from Anouilh to Beckett. This flip side which multiplies the effects of Otherness in discursivity, latches on to the materiality of a discourse of the theatre by the hinge of that opacity which was already shrouding a theory and a meta-language when it formed the exterior of a 'philosophical' history of the 'art' of performance (linked primarily to dance in early Greek satyr and dithyramb) such that the constitution of this art would grow transparent by its very language. And its language is the language of Aristotle when he 'selects' drama as an object of strategic elaboration of something always already exterior in its ontological import to the particularity of merely one

human being imitating another (that would be parodic history) and that is encoded 'mimesis' completing a break with Plato at least in this respect. Hence Aristotle onwards, we are transmitted with a critical measure of judgement, a style and a canon. The heritage of literary criticism is the increasing totalization of 'the text' into an interiority which is akin to the scripuralization of a field of mythic immanence into a body of theory, a body erasing its mark of erasure to present itself as an order of representation, that is, as a 'literature' or a 'mythology'. The mark of the erasure that erases the performative mark of earasure, is the literary Aristotle, the Aristotelian mimetic and the mimesis purged of its hetertopic opacity realized in the 'really' theatrical finally in nineteenth century Europe when the theatrical is doctrinally supposed to be farthest removed from the Real. Our interest has been in the figurality of that discourse in the theatre which, like in Anouilh's Antigone, ceases to repeat the doctrine of representation as it were but quickly reterritorializes on the site of an avialbale machinery of semiotization to institute a signification of the theatrical by programming a path for the signifier that would concede something to theatricality within the Real to precisely credit that 'something' to the facility of an increasingly symbolizable

Real. Thus if there is defamiliarization with a 'mystified' _Antigone_ in Anouilh it means that a relentless de-mythification of a historical familiarity with the post-Renaissance Cosmos – the Real as with the Greeks – whose mode of existence in the exteriority of knowledge is the mythology of another cosmology, not opposed to the anthropological, but itself so, is being carried on as the familiarization with something like anthropological mythology which ruins cosmology by usurping its constitutive mode of existence. And exactly at this point of re-territorialization the problematics of Anouilh's _Antigone_, returns the burden of a philosophical apologetics of 'application' – of categories of course ! – to the condition of possibility of any philosophy at all. This condition is that of practical (from 'practice') individualization without the irreducibility of the individual, of anonymous subjectivity without the quiddity of the subject. We have tried to thus conjoin an examination of a philosophy of existentialism with the extraction of procedures of normalization which are immanent and extra-philosophical in a sense, in _Antigone_ to re-orient ourselves to the other more diffuse area of what is the historiography of performance in the period of Jean Anouilh (and periodization would itself be a threshold of problematization in this

historiography).

We have desisted from entering this diffuse area out of a certain pre-thematic submission to the resistant heterogenity of a single play - our object - to its very singularity and thus we have found it necessary to systematize the grids of a literary specification of the 'truth' of this resistance without opening up the site for performative specification of the Anouilhan corpus, of a 'directorial' empiricism of 'preparing' the mode of a certain theatre (legitimated by the name of an author or age). Before the task of deducing any modalization internal to the range of Anouilh's work and before 'comparing' plays, we have found it important to allow the axiomatic of a deductive method of criticism to re-emerge as a language and an imagination peculiar to the fluxion of theatricality, in the exteriority of discourse's 'essenceless' murmur. To us Antigone - Anouilh's text as well as that equivocal moment of recodification which is called a myth-in-transformation - is the grain of this murmur and a precise micro-incision of this grain in the restless surface of an anti-human, unnameable body called 'truth' and which is our body : 'us'.

N o t e s

1.   Jean   Anouilh,   'Antigone',   trans. Lewis   Galantiere, in
      Makers   of   the   Modern   Theatre (New York,   Toronto,
London :   Mcgraw Hill, Book   Inc., 1961), p. 515.

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Addendum to 'Notes'

Note 17, chapter 1

Jacques Lacan, "The mirror stage as formative of
the function of the I as revealed in psychoan-
alytic experience" in Ecrits : A selection...