

SOVIET VIEW OF  
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1947 - 64

SOVIET      VIEW      OF  
INDIAN      FOREIGN      POLICY,  
1957 - 64.

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P R E F A C E

## PREFACE

Soviet Policy towards India is very much conditioned by Soviet View of India. India's internal developments and external behaviour are crucial here. For an objective understanding of Soviet policy towards India, it is therefore necessary to examine Soviet perception of India's foreign policy and internal developments. Hence, this is a study of Soviet view of India's foreign policy during the Nehru era, 1947-64.

The study has been divided into four chapters.

The first chapter has investigated a framework of Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World with particular reference to India. Moreover, an attempt has been made to focus attention on the relevance of this framework for examining Soviet perception of foreign policies of the Third World, India, in particular.

The Second Chapter deals with the gradual evolution of Soviet view of nature of Indian foreign policy. Such problems as correlation between external behaviour and domestic problems and internal socio-economic developments are discussed here.

The third chapter analyses the general and the specific features of Soviet view of Indian foreign policy.


The final chapter gives an overview of Soviet perception of Indian foreign policy against the background of Soviet compulsions vis-a-vis India.

Thus an attempt has been made to present the totality of Soviet view of Indian foreign policy during 1947-64.

This study is primarily based on English and Russian published materials from both Soviet and other sources.

My grateful thanks are due to my guide Dr. Zafar Imam, Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, for his invaluable guidance in the preparation of this M.Phil. dissertation. The shortcomings, however, are all my own. Last, but not least, my thanks are due to the staff of the Jawaharlal Nehru University and the School of International Studies for their help and encouragement.

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(REKHA SINGH)

CHAPTER I

THE FRAMEWORK OF  
SOVIET VIEW OF DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES AND THEIR ROLE  
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

## CHAPTER I

### THE FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET VIEW OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Second World War not only caused the loss of men and materials, but also marked major changes in international system. At the end of war, the United States emerged as a Super Power with nuclear weapons. It was the only western country which was least weakened by the war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also emerged stronger with East Europe under its military and political influence, and soon it attained a super-power status. The European imperialist powers were weakened down and their colonies in Asia and Africa resurged as independent countries in international arena. Many Latin American countries were also struggling for their independence. By the close of the forties, the international politics was thus qualitatively transformed.

These newly independent countries as Khrushchev once put it, consist of "majority of the population of our planet"<sup>1</sup> and command vast economic resources. This is a group of nearly 100 countries and has 58 per cent of earth's land surface or a territory of 80 million square kilometres and is inhabited by 1,500 million people. But they have only 10 percent of world's industrial products.

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Congress, Foreign Language Publishing House : Moscow, 1958, p.23.



This shows their economic backwardness. Though politically these countries became independent, economically they continued to have close ties with former imperialist powers. As economic power could very much control the political power, the metropolitan countries of the West continued to exert political influence on these countries.

The political confrontation between East and West started even during the War and it developed alarmingly after it. The Western countries, particularly United States of America, tried to contain the Soviet Union within its limits. They tried for closer links with newly independent developing countries and to form a bloc against Soviet Union. Thus a policy of "cold war" was propagated.

During the years, which followed 1945, the Soviet Union was busy in the economic restoration of the country and in strengthening East European bloc. It gave less attention to these newly independent nations and their utility in changed international conditions. As these former colonial and semi-colonial countries got independence, yet remained tied down to western economy and also because of the fact that the Communist Parties in these countries were not included in administrative bodies, the Soviet leadership did not accept them as totally independent countries. According to Zhdanov, an important member of the Soviet leadership, the World

is divided in "two basic orientations" or "camps" - imperialist and anti-imperialist.<sup>2</sup> In these conditions the existence of these newly non-aligned nations were given no importance.

But these developing countries posed a challenge to the conceptual framework of the foreign policy of both East and West. They rejected the theories of "iron curtain" and "two camps", which increased only international tension and this tension was considered as against their national interest. These Afro-Asian countries wanted peace and a conducive international environment for their own development. To ease this tension and to get support from both the blocs, a majority of these countries followed a policy of non-alignment and tried to maintain their independent position in international forum. In spite of diverse level of socio-economic development and adherence of a sizeable number of Afro-Asian countries to Western sponsored military and Political alliances, non-alignment soon became a reckoning force in International Politics. The super powers were thus compelled to re-evaluate their policy towards these developing countries or "Third World".

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2. A.A.Zhdanov. "Report on the International Situation". For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy. 10th Nov. 1947, pp.2-4.

The foreign policy is believed to be an "interaction, perpetual or behavioural, which span national boundaries.. . . . ."<sup>3</sup> But Soviet foreign policy is not merely a reaction of world events. It is based on Marxist-Leninist principles of historical materialism, which helps to enquire into international problems against the background of complexity and diversity of socio-economic process and thus to determine foreign policy strategy, tactics and priorities in international tasks. Objective laws of social developments were applied by Soviet leadership to determine, it is claimed, the course of world history and the leading tendencies in international relations.

Lenin provided a scientific approach to a better understanding of foreign policy. According to him, foreign policy of a country depends on the socio-economic character of a state and political and economic interest of its ruling class. Lenin considered foreign policy an important form of class struggle and it is bound to affect working class. After the October Revolution of 1917, the proletarians were claimed to be the ruling class of the Soviet Union and under the guidance of Lenin Soviet Foreign Policy propagated the principles of Proletarian internationalism. This approach reveals the international behaviour of a country and its future

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3. James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, Free Press, New York: 1977, p.80.

political course and thus linked foreign policy with internal policy of a country. Thus, like domestic policy, foreign policy has also a socio-economic class character. In this scheme foreign policy of socialist countries has novel objectives in view. "The moral and political impact of socialist foreign policy is enhanced by the fact that socialism promotes peace and is the main barrier to imperialist plans for preparing another World War."<sup>4</sup>

To sum up, two relevant factors are crucial for Soviet foreign policy. The one, "Soviet approach to international politics is primarily conditioned by its pre-occupation with the changes in the Social structure of other societies, "and other" to the Soviets, international politics is not simply a clash of interest between nation-states, but, is primarily determined by the confrontation with the two world systems, the socialist system and the capitalist system". (See, Zafar Imam, World Powers in South and South-East Asia, Sterling: New Delhi, 1972, p.149). Therefore, Soviet strategy and tactics is directed towards its final triumph over the capitalist system. It can easily be seen that the countries of the Third World are assigned considerable importance in Soviet framework of international politics. In its concrete and specific form, this policy vis-a-vis Third World is generally referred to as a non-capitalist path of development (for details, see V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogoslovsky, Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline, Progress, 1975).

At this stage it is fruitful to investigate the origin of development of Soviet attitude of Third World within the framework enunciated above.

E.M. Zhukov, the main Soviet commentator on colonial system characterised US imperialism as the chief obstacle to aspirations for independence. In October 1946, he marked the national liberation movements in the colonies as the important product of the war and declared the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia as the guide for colonial people. He noted the independence movements in Arab

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4. N. Kapchenko, "Foreign Policy and Ideology", International Affairs, Moscow, Nov.1970, pp.78.

World, struggle against British imperialism in India and Burma and the armed struggle in Indonesia, Indo-China, Malaya and Philippines. As these people could not get rid of imperialist exploitation because of the changed form of imperialist domination, the political independence of these countries however, was given no importance. Zhukov warned: "The grant of formal independence to the colonies by no means guarantees their actual independence".<sup>5</sup> The "national bourgeoisie" in the developing countries were called "reactionaries" and a group which feared the mass movement and collaborated with imperialists for market and capital. In 1949 Zhukov reaffirmed: "The national reformists in the colonial and semi-colonial countries mendaciously insist upon their desire to 'remain aside' from the struggle of the two camps, upon their 'neutrality' in the ideological conflict, as they put it, between the USSR and USA, while in reality acting in bloc with the reactionary bourgeoisie, they slander the USSR and actively aid the imperialists."<sup>6</sup>

The Soviet Union believed that the independence of these countries is only a compromise between the bourgeoisie of these countries and the imperialists of the West.

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5. E.M. Zhukov, Pravda, Aug. 7, 1947. as quoted in Charles B. McLane Soviet Strategies in South-East Asia, Princeton: 1966, p. 256.

6. Ibid, p. 363.

Moreover, the parliamentary efforts of the Communist Parties of France and Italy failed, as they were excluded from the coalition governments after the war. So a more militant line was advocated by Zhdanov. It was a shift from the moderate strategy of 1945-47, when the United front with the national bourgeoisie was preferred. Now it preferred armed struggle against the national bourgeoisie. Under these conditions armed struggle started in India, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya and Indo-China. But these struggles were suppressed by the powerful army of national governments as these were not well-organised with strong mass bases. This proved the incorrect Soviet analysis of the political conditions of the developing countries.

Till 1949, Soviet Asian Policy was the result of Soviet policy in Europe, where it faced a challenge from West in forms of Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Soviet leadership was busy to counter-act West in Europe. There was the problem of East Germany and Berlin blockade. Except this, Soviet leaders were expecting Communist-led revolutions in France and Italy, where Communist Parties became important factors after the war. They were trying to establish firm economic and political control over the East European countries. The Soviet Union suffered heavy loss of economy and manpower during the war and there was problem of

restoration of economy. Nuclear parity with the USA was also necessary for any confrontation with the West. All these preoccupied Soviet attention in Europe and prevented it to offer an alternative to the Third World Countries.

On the other hand, there was no stability in Third World. The nationalist governments in this part were politically and economically weak. The weakness was further increased by local clashes, such as Indo-Pak wars, Arab-Israel conflicts and Indonesia and Malaysia confrontation. The Western powers helped in continuation of these local conflicts to justify their presence in the area. Often they took side of one power against other. As there were no other big power in the area, the smaller powers were compelled to take help of the West. When Burma faced Communist insurrection, economically and militarily it was helped by Commonwealth countries. Indonesia and India were receiving economic assistance from West. All former British colonies continued to be members of Commonwealth. The leaders of these countries visited USA. In 1949, in New York, Nehru, the Indian Prime-Minister agreed to support US in any "defensive War". Dyakov criticised it by saying that "India was prepared to offer all her resources to the Anglo-American bloc of instigators of a further cold war".<sup>7</sup>

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7. "Anglo-American Plans in India", Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.1, No.48, Dec. 27, 1949, p.34.

They were dependent on West even for grains. All this obviously led them to follow a pro-west foreign policy, though they avoided joining any western pact. ✓

Soviet policy regarding these countries marked a change since the early fifties. There were many national and international factors that made the Soviet leadership reanalyse their policy. In the meantime the Soviet hegemony in East Europe was established, although there was Yugoslavia with nationalist aspirations. The Communist revolution did not take place in France and Italy inspite of the economic dislocation and political instability in West Europe. The Socialist revolutions of North Korea, North Vietnam and China led to a successful end and the Soviet leadership was hopeful that with this, a series of socialist revolution will take place in different Afro-Asian countries, but this did not happen. The insurrections of India, Indonesia and Burma proved that the national governments were strong enough to be overthrown by weak Communist Parties there. Except this, in 1949, China emerged as a Socialist country and the Communist Parties of Asia were influenced by the Communist Party of China more than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In this condition if the Soviet Union would have remained neutral regarding Asia, it could have lost its influence in the East. The lack of Soviet interest in Third World increased Western involvement and economic commitments in the area. As the Soviet



Union achieved the nuclear parity with USA and was ready to compete with her in international sphere, it could no longer remain inactive in the developing countries. According to Rubinstein: "The Third World has become a key arena of super power rivalry because it enables the Soviet Union and United States to engage in a low-cost, low-risk, highly intensive pattern of sub-strategic inter-action".<sup>8</sup> This shows that both the Super Powers avoided direct confrontation nearer to their territory. But the Soviet intervention in the Third World is mainly to counter-act Western and much later, Chinese influence. The successive Five Year Plans made the USSR an advanced industrial country and this confidence gave its leadership an opportunity to divert its attention outside Europe. Moreover, now its boundaries were secured and there was no fear of European intervention. All this led the Soviet Union to advocate status quo in Europe and to increase its influence in developing countries.

The developing countries also helped the Soviet Union to view them from a different angle. During the Korean War, India refused to support US resolution in the United Nations condemning China as an aggressor. Except this the views of developing countries regarding China and atomic

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8. Alvin, Z. Rubinstein (ed), Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union: Random House: New York. 1971, p.405.

bomb were different than those of the West, in general, and USA, in particular. They demanded the admission of Communist China in the United Nations. The 'Pacific Pact' was the another issue which emphasized the non-aligned policy of developing countries. India, Indonesia and Ceylon opposed the anti-Communist slogans of the conference. In 1951 Burma and in 1952 Malaya and to some extent Thailand also joined them. The opposition was viewed by a Soviet writer, V.Kudriavtsev, as a step which stated the reluctance of Asian Powers to join American sponsored organisations.<sup>9</sup> India, Burma, Pakistan and Indonesia also opposed Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Fransisco in 1951. These countries maintained trade relations with Peoples Republic of China. Some of these countries again refused to join NATO, CENTO and SEATO.

Soviet Press and politicians marked all these new developments in Third World and gradually decided to come forward to offer an alternative to these countries, so that these countries should not join the Western alliance system and could maintain their non-aligned policy. The Soviet Union followed a policy of cooperation with "national bourgeoisie" and stop encouraging the Communist Parties of these countries for the overthrow of national governments.

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9. Izvestia, Aug.7, 1952 as quoted in Charles B.Maclane, op.cit, p.451.

It maintained diplomatic relations with these countries and India being the most important of the developing countries, was paid more attention. In 1952, meeting of Stalin with Indian Ambassador Dr. Radhakrishnan was the factual proof of changed Soviet view. This policy was moderately followed by Stalin's immediate successors. In 1953 Soviet Premier Malenkov praised "the efforts of peace-loving countries directed towards the ending of the Korean War".<sup>10</sup> Cultural and scientific exchanges started between the USSR and the developing countries. In 1954 when Panchsheel was signed by India and Peoples Republic of China, Pravada commented: "There cannot be any doubt that the acceptance of these important principles by the Asian as well as other countries would diminish the possibility of wars, serve to alleviate tension in the world community and improve the valuable cooperation between countries".<sup>11</sup> E.M. Zhukov commented on Bandung Conference, that it made possible Lenin's conviction of close cooperation between communists and nationalist against the common imperialist enemy.<sup>12</sup> Principles of Bandung Conference were hailed as, "a positive contribution to peace in Asia and the World".

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10. Pravada, Aug. 9, 1953. Quoted in Zafar Imam Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia. Kalyani Publishers, Delhi, 1975, p.16.

11. Pravada, July 1, 1954. Ibid., p.70.

12. E. Zhukov, "The Bandung Conference of African and Asian Countries and its Historic Significance", International Affairs Moscow, May, 1955. p.28.

More and more government officials of India, Burma and Indonesia visited the Soviet Union and in the winter of 1955-56 Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India, Burma and Pakistan. At the end of his visit Khrushchev said that 370 million Indians as well as peoples of Burma and Afghanistan were their "allies in the struggle for world peace".<sup>13</sup> The Soviet leadership thus gradually moved towards reexamining its views of the Third World.

In the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union such a change of attitude was given a final shape and Khrushchev called the developing countries, "a vast peace zone" and the policy of 'peaceful co-existence' was given a wide publicity. Calculated steps were taken by Soviet Government to increase its influence. The potentiality of Third World to help Soviet Union and East European countries on international issues like disarmament, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism was realised. Their support could change the balance in favour of the socialist camp. Moreover, the Soviet leadership realised that a socialist revolution in these countries could not succeed unless these countries would be economically independent. According to changed Soviet view, a kind of 'state capitalism' has begun to develop in these countries termed as non-capitalist path of development, which play a

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13. N.A. Bulganin & N.S. Khrushchov, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afghanistan, Moscow, 1956, p.220.

progressive role in their economy, as it is directed towards the creation of an independent and self-reliant economy by the development of its own productive forces. For instance, countries like India, preferred to 'a socialist pattern of society' and gave more emphasis to public sector. All these developments led Soviet Union to establish economic relations with the developing countries. This decision was taken keeping two aims in mind. Firstly, the economic relation is to enable these countries to decrease their dependency on the West. Secondly, the economic aid to heavy industrialization under public sector is to accelerating the process of socio-economic changes, increase the number of workers and thus help the proletarians to organize themselves in urban areas. The local Communist Parties can utilise them for an eventual socialist revolution in a country.<sup>14</sup>

Economy of Third World presents the picture of all types of economy from feudalism to mixed economy. The level of development in these countries also varies. Bulk of the states are either in capitalist or pre-capitalist stage. Hence Soviet Commitment in these countries also differed. The countries having stable government and planned economy with emphasis on industrialization under state sector were given more importance.

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14. V.Solodovnikov and V.Bogoslovsky, Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline, Progress, Moscow, 1975, p.125-26.

Again, the countries having strategical locations and nearer to Soviet Union, were paid more attention. For instance between 1954-67 Soviet economic aid to India, the United Arab Republic and Indonesia constituted about 56 percent of total socio-economic aid to the Third World.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet rate of interest is very low, that is 2.5 per cent to 3 percent against the Western rates of 4.5 percent and 6.3 percent annually and it is payable within ten to twelve years. Again, the Third World countries need not pay in hard currency. It is paid by their products or raw materials.

This aid is important for the economic development of the newly independent countries. From 1954-55 a aid of 130 million roubles was given to the Third World. Between February 1955 - February 1961 this aid increased upto 806 million. Due to the Soviet aided projects, the prestige and importance of the Soviet Union increased in developing countries. The Soviet Union gave more emphasis on heavy industries and assisted developing countries in building up of steel and iron plants, engineering and electronical equipment plants and exploring and refining of oil all under state sector. Generally, the entire factory equipment is supplied on turn-key basis. The Bhilai Steel Works in India is the most important

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15. Zafar Imam, op.cit., p.205.

project in public sector with an annual production capacity of 2.5 million tonnes. It agreed to economically assist Afghanistan in construction of motor road and Jalalabad Canal. Soviet aid was given to Guatemala in 1954. Assistance was given to Turkey for the construction of a glass factory. In 1957 USSR and Syria signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. Again, in 1964 an agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed by the USSR and Yemen. In 1959 the Soviet Union supplied Ethiopia with equipment for an oil refinery and a gold mine and credits for research. USSR and Republic of Guinea agreed in 1959 for building of some industrial enterprises. In 1963 Soviet Scientists were invited by Brazil to help in search for oil. This year again trade agreements were signed between Soviet Union and Colombia and Soviet Union and Brazil. Trade between socialist countries and Asia doubled every four years between 1953 and 1964. In 1961 one-third of Egyptian exports and under one-twelfth of Indian exports were directed to socialist countries. Emphasis was given on barter system. The European Socialist countries supplied capital equipments, technology and technical assistance. In return, the developing countries supplied them products of these equipments, knowledge and technical assistance. USSR imported iron and steel products from Indian and Egyptian plants, helped by it. Raw materials are also supplied

to the USSR. These trade relations provide stable market for the developing countries. These long-term agreements were mostly bilateral and they protected Third World from arbitrary fixing of price by the West. It enable them to bargain with West. On the other hand, USSR was also benefitted due to these favourable relations and posed a challenge to Western trade in these countries.

Soviet assistance in training the personnel of developing countries, is also important. Thousands of specialists of the developing countries were trained in USSR, particularly engineers, teachers, agronomists and scientists. Many educational institutions were established in these countries with the help of the USSR. These institutions helped in development of technology, medicine, agriculture and science. Many medical personnel were sent to the developing countries at their request. Soviet Union also tried for cultural exchanges. The different cultural groups visited USSR. In 1962 Indo-Soviet Cultural Society was established. The Soviet film festivals were organised in developing countries. Films from developing countries were also invited in the USSR. According to an American observer 196 Indian delegations visited Soviet Union from 1954-57. Soviet Union also assisted Third World under UN auspices.

Soviet Union tried to win the support of developing countries by supporting their national interests in UNO.



India was supported by it against Pakistan on Kashmir and against West on Goa. It got surprising support in its conflict with People's Republic of China. Egypt was also supported against Israel and the West. On Soviet initiative, Indonesian question was raised in the UN. As a result, the colonial rule in Indonesia came to an end and West Irian was transferred to Indonesia. It supported Burma against Koumintang Party in UN. From 1952-55 Soviet Union demanded in UN to fulfil the national aspirations of Tunisia and Morocco. In 1957 it demanded independence of trust territories of Africa. It helped Republic of Congo against Belgium in UN. It supported Security Council resolution, condemning interference in internal affairs of Guatemala.

All these calculated steps of Soviet Union improved its international position and gradually increased the confidence of USSR to compete both USA and later, People's Republic of China. Books, pamphlets and magazines were published in different languages of the developing countries and propagated the Soviet Social, political and economic system, and the Soviet view of the developing countries. In 1955, 17,000 books were sent only in India and in 1958 number increased to 4,000,000. Libraries and reading rooms were also opened. Radio Moscow in 1955 used to broadcast in three languages to India and Pakistan.

Gradually the broadcast in other languages of developing countries also started.

The most of the developing countries were influenced by Soviet Union and gradually decreased their dependency on West. The Soviet ideology appealed these developing countries mainly because of their economic and social backwardness. Except this, they had a colonial past and inherent hatred for the imperialist countries. But there was no such feeling against Soviet Union. Soviet literature which flooded these countries, helped in exposing the imperialist tactics of West, but it never thought of imposing its economic social or political system on them.

On the other hand Soviet Union was also helped by this changed international conditions. Now there was no fear of imperialist encirclement. Moreover, socialist countries got rid of their isolation. Economically they got a stable market. It also affected internal conditions and living-standard of socialist countries.

With all these changes, the Soviet view of non-socialist countries undergone a change. During late fifties and early sixties, it followed a new policy towards some aligned countries. Herbert Dinerstein stated three categories of Soviet activities in Third World. Firstly, the denial of these countries to Western or lately Chinese influence. Secondly, intrusion into

the areas of an opponents influence and thirdly, promotion of Socialist revolution.<sup>16</sup> In fact, Soviet Union followed a traingular policy. It tried to normalise its relations with the countries like Pakistan, Iran and Turkey which were very much aligned themselves with West. The national aspirations of these countries were not fulfilled by West and Soviet Union encouraged their disengagement with West. USSR was also trying to establish close relations with the countries where the influence of China was increasing. In fact, China's attitude towards Soviet Union compelled USSR to put its full weight in Asia. Except this, the Third World, it took up the projects in which either the West failed or refused to help. In 1960, Soviet Union discovered oil in India, where the West failed after explorations. It sold crude oil at lower rates than West. In 1958, USSR decided to give economic assistance to Egypt for the construction of Aswan High Dam, when, U.S. decided to withdraw its promise to help with 56 million dollars for the project. In 1964, when US refused India to finance for Bokaro Steel Plant in public sector, Soviet Union provided technical and financial assistance.

The economic relations of Soviet Union with the developing countries were politically motivated. B.Pichugin stated - "the Soviet Union utilises economic contracts

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16. Herbert Dinerstein, "Moscow and the Third World: Power Politics or Revolution" Problems of Communism. January-February 1968. pp.52.


principally as an important lever for strengthening peaceful relations and establishing the desired confidence between states with different social systems".<sup>17</sup> With this aim in view, Soviet Union gave no importance to a profitable trade. To a greater extent it was successful in its political aim of decreasing the Western influence in the developing countries.

After the Second World War the Soviet leadership watched the developments in the third world countries. It found that the policy of non-alignment, which was given wide publicity by the leaders of developing countries, was not followed by them in practice. They were more close to West and were not well informed of Soviet social, political and economic systems. This led to their fear of the totalitarian system and their incorrect interpretations of Soviet activities in international forum. But gradually, when change took place in Soviet view of the former colonial and semi-colonial countries, a close relation was established between them and they started realising the importance of each other in international system.

Due to their past experience, these newly independent countries tried to maintain a distance from the West and this trend was encouraged by Soviet Union. Soviet Union

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17. B.Pichugin, "The Seven-Years Plan and the Soviet Union's Foreign Economic Relations", International Affairs (Moscow) No.10, 1959, p.70.



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helped them in maintaining their non-aligned posture by giving them economic and political support. The Central Committee report to 20th Congress of CPSU acknowledged that in the changed conditions, the international relations were not limited between East and West; it enveloped the whole World.<sup>18</sup> The non-aligned policy of Third World is necessary for their social, economic and political development. The Soviet Union viewed their policy as a struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism and considered that it enabled these countries not to join military pacts and to maintain their political and economic independence. It has its roots in the economic conditions of a country. In Soviet Opinion, this policy has its roots in the political and economic conditions as it has emerged due to the clash between foreign capital and national capital.

Due to the developed nuclear weapons system the war between East and West was no longer inevitable. So the Soviet tactics were changed, though its aim and political programmes remain unchanged. The new tactics stressed peaceful competition with the West and it ruled out the possibility of a total nuclear war. Moreover, Khrushchev reanalysed the Lenin's thinking, that independence movements

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18. Khrushchov, N.S., op.cit., p.26.

against imperialism in these countries should be assisted by the Soviet Union because this would further Soviet interest. This "Zone of peace" helped in decreasing the tensions. According to V.I.Pavlov "... countries of South Asia were always for Marx Engles and Lenin not only objects of cognition, but also subjects of consciousness, active participants in the historical struggle and not just passive contemplators".<sup>19</sup> The report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Twenty Second Party Congress declared: "... Most of them," (the third world countries)" however, are by no means neutral when the cardinal problem of our day, that of war and peace, is at issue. As a rule, those countries advocate peace and oppose war".<sup>20</sup>

The Programme of the CPSU stated: "All the organizations and parties that strive to avert war, the neutralist and pacifist movements, and the beourgeois circles that advocate peace and normal relations between countries will meet with understanding and support on the part of the Soviet Union".<sup>21</sup>

Thus, due to its changed tactics and ideological adjustment with the changing international conditions, the USSR become a power to be reckoned with by the whole world.

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19. V.I.Pavlov, Soviet Review, Vol.12, No.14 (March 27, 1975)

20. The Road to Communism, Moscow, 1961, p.41.

21. Ibid., p.507.

Such a change in Soviet policy encouraged many developing countries to come closer to the USSR and the socialist bloc. As one Soviet commentator put it, their (Third World) stand "on international issues objectively restricts the sphere of action of aggressive imperialist circles, narrows their chances of unleashing military conflicts."<sup>22</sup> The community of interest between the USSR and the developing countries is thus stressed.

As India is the most important developing country, the following chapters will explain this change of Soviet attitude towards India in particular. The Soviet Indologists minutely observed the internal developments of India, the class character of Indian leadership and their influence on Indian foreign policy. Thus, the causes of changed attitude of the (Soviet) Soviet Union towards India in particular, and developing countries in general, have to be examined in the above perspective.

Thus it can be seen that the Soviet view of the Third World countries is based on two crucial factors, firstly, the nature of socio-economic structure of the Third World country and its inter-connection with their foreign policy postures. Secondly, the foreign policy posture itself in general, and its relationship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in particular. On both these counts the Soviet Union considered the Third World

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22. Mikhail Kremnyev, "Non-aligned countries and World Politics", World Marxist Review, Vol.VI, no.4, (April 1963), pp.28-35.

countries as potential ally and friend inspite of multi-dimensional character of the process of the socio-economic development that are underway in developing countries.

Hence, it does support the aims and aspiration of the developing countries and encourages them to get away from the capitalist world economy and its political domination.

India is abviouslyatest-case for the Soviet viewnof the Third World. It is more so in relation to Indian foreign policy. Hence, we shall now proceed to examine soviet view of Indian foreign policy in the following chapters.



CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT  
OF SOVIET VIEW OF INDIAN  
FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER - II

EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET

VIEW OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

For our purpose INDIAN foreign policy of Nehru era can be viewed in three distinct phases. The first period, 1947-50, was a passive phase when ~~the~~ independent India was not paid due attention by the Soviet leadership. The second phase started from 1951 to '59, when a sympathetic view of Indian foreign policy gradually began to emerge. The Third phase, 1959-64, may be called an active phase when the role of independent India in international arena was understood and appreciated. Thus the Soviet view of Indian foreign policy started from a critical and often hostile view. But gradually the Soviet leadership began to show favourable disposition to Indian foreign policy. From the beginning of 1950s onward, this trend was marked and it began to grow by the time Nehru died in 1964.

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The Bolshevik Revolution and establishment of the Soviet State in October 1917 introduced a new force in international politics which began to assert itself against imperialism and colonialism. Likewise it openly began to <sup>§</sup>exp~~o~~se the cause of freedom of the colonial and semi-colonial people and launched a programme of

support to all movements struggling against imperialism and colonialism. All these trends were clearly notable in the various postures of Soviet foreign policy and in the decision and proceedings of Communist International during the inter-war period. Although, Soviet foreign policy and the Communist International had their own unpredictable ways, the main trends as indicated above were not entirely abandoned or forgotten.<sup>1</sup>

The Bolshevik leaders observed the internal development of India even during early years of 20th century. Lenin wrote about the exploitation of the colonies by European imperialists and in this connection, he devoted considerable attention to India.<sup>2</sup> As early as in 1908 about the general strike in Bombay, Lenin commented, "The proletariat has already developed to conscious political mass struggle and, that being the case, the Russian style British regime in India is doomed".<sup>3</sup> Later, by 1920, the internal developments of colonies in general and India in particular led him to view the working class movement of Europe as inter-linked with the national liberation movements of Asia and Africa. Even during the war, inspite of the preoccupation of the Soviet leadership, Stalin did bring

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1. See for details, Zafar Imam, Colonialism in East-West Relations: Soviet Policy toward India and Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-47. New Delhi, 1969.
  2. See for details, V.I.Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1947.
  3. V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, vol.15.p.184.

up the subject of freedom of colonies and semi-colonies in various war-time allied conferences.

After the war, the Soviet Union, continued to oppose all manifestations of colonialism and neo-colonialism. On Soviet initiative the U.N. General Assembly adopted important resolutions as the Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples. Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. All these initiatives helped in the process of independence of the former colonies after 1945.

At the end of the Second World War, with the deterioration of the cordial relations between the allies, the Soviet leadership became pre-occupied in Europe and with the restoration of war time Soviet economy. With the declaration of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in 1947, Stalin tried to strengthen the economy and defence system of the Soviet Union. The economy of different countries of East Europe was gradually integrated into a single economic system. To transform the military victory into a political victory the non-communist parties form the Govts. of East European countries were ousted. The Soviet nuclear programme was also intensified and in 1949 Soviet Union broke the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons, while its conventional army had already emerged

quite powerful. By the beginning of the fifties, the worst was over.

It is indeed inspiring that the changed international politics in 1947 and the independence of India coincided with the passive phase of Indo-Soviet relations. The Soviet criticism of India became more vocal and more direct. For this passive phase, India and Soviet Union both share equal responsibility. Soviet Policy towards India was very much conditioned by its European policy. In Europe, it faced challenges in forms of NATO, Berlin blockade and National Communism of Yugoslavia. Due to all these problems, Soviet decision makers paid not much attention to the emergence of independent India and its problems. Vijay Sen Budharaj stressed, that Moscow's attitude towards independent India should be studied in the perspective of the Cold War atmosphere of 1947 and against the background of Soviet fear that the Western powers preparing to attack the Soviet bloc.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, Soviet view of Indian foreign policy was projected within the framework of Soviet view of the Third World in general. It emphasised the nature of Indian foreign policy and took into account various domestic compulsions that India faced during this period. This chapter will present an analysis of Soviet and Indian domestic compulsions and their correlation with the

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4. Vijay Sen Budharaj, Soviet Russia and the Hindusthan Subcontinent; Somaiya publication; Bombay, 1973. p.37.

foreign policy; it is also proposed to deal with the evolution and growth of Soviet view of India during 1947-64.

We now turn to evaluation and growth of Soviet view of India's foreign policy.

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After the independence in 1947, the Indian foreign policy was formulated under the idealistic influence of Pandit Nehru and in international sphere India decided to follow a policy of non-alignment, non interference in internal affairs of other countries and peaceful coexistence. But, during 1947-51 Indian foreign policy was non-aligned only in a formalist way. Economically it was closely tied down with the West and as economic policy is very much able to influence political policy of a country, India followed a pro-West policy during the early years of its foreign policy. Moreover, the host of internal problems that India faced had provided little scope for India's initiative in World affairs.

About the transformation of India into two Dominions, the noted Soviet economist Prof. Verga wrote in Fundamental politics of Imperialism, ".... It is an attempt of the Indian ruling classes with the help of English Imperialism against the growing revolutionary movement of workers and peasants".<sup>5</sup> Again, when the power was actually transferred

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5. Journal of USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, August, 1953.

to India and Pakistan it was interpreted as "an act which signified that both the Indian landlords and upper bourgeoisie, represented by the National Congress and the Muslim landlords and bourgeoisie, whose interests are represented by Muslim League, had openly gone over to the camp of imperialism and reaction".<sup>6</sup> Thus both the important parties of India, National Congress and Muslim League were viewed according to their class interest and class character. As the interest of the ruling party of India was oriented towards West, the foreign policy of India was also seen as pro West, in spite of its repeated claims of non-aligned policy. Moreover, independent India was described as a base of the Imperialist against the "national liberation movement" of the peoples of Asia.<sup>7</sup> Gandhi and his policy was severely criticised and A.M.Dyakov described him as a "traitor" to the mass movement of national liberation and that one should unmask his betrayals of the movement with a view to fight against Gandhism.<sup>8</sup>

In fact, the Indian foreign policy in the late '40s was closely tied down with the West. It was mainly because, the policy makers of India were educated in West and were influenced by Western Administrative system. Except this, Pandit Nehru was influenced by various groups

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6. A.M.Dyakov, The Crisis of The Colonial system; Chap.3. USSR Academy of Sciences; 1948.

7. New China News Agency, Dec.7, 1949. p.124-25.

8. A.M.Dyakov, Crisis of the Colonial Systems, PPH, Bombay, 1951, p.32.

and persons within and outside his ministry. Yuri Nosenko has clearly analysed the class character of Indian ministers and administrators and their influence on the foreign policy of India.<sup>9</sup> According to him, the Congress Party was divided into many fractions. It had right and left wings and there was clash of interest between them. The then General Secretary of Communist Party of India, Ajoy Ghosh, wrote that the Swatantra and Jan Sangh parties "would not be so dangerous. But the fact is that they have powerful friends and supporters inside the Congress, particularly in right wing of the Congress. They get financial support from some of the biggest monopolists, who want to build up parties like the Swatantra and Jan Sangh in order to bring more pressure on the Congress and force it to shift still more to the right".<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, most of the ministers and civil servants were either from landlord or industrialist families. They exerted their influence on India's domestic and foreign policy. Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence minister, was a big capitalist of Lahore and he influenced India's policy towards Pakistan. As the Finance Minister Mr. Chetty was closely related with Indian Princes, the government could not take any effective step against wealth and privileges

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9. Yuri Nosenko, Jawaharlal Nehru and India's Foreign Policy, Sterling, New Delhi, 1977. Ch.I.

10. World Marxist Review, No. 2, 1962, p.11-12.



of Indian Princes. Again, Mr. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, the Minister of Communications was a landlord from U.P. and safeguarded their interests in cabinet. Dr. Ambedkar had close ties with Indian civil servants. The Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel was director of some business concerns. He had good relations with the industrialist like G.D. Birla. He was reported to have assured that "... Finance Minister belongs to your own class. He knows his mind, is able, clever and efficient .... Our Commerce Minister is also an experienced industrialist. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, the Minister for Industry and Supply, is not a Congress man, but an able, painstaking and conscientious public servant. I am quite certain that all these Ministers would like to secure your cooperation in making India industrially great".<sup>11</sup> In fact, there were inner party differences between Nehru and Patel and Patel was supported by the above mentioned members of the cabinet. Even George Petterson, a British expert on Asian affairs wrote - "struggle for pre-eminence between the idealistic Pandit Nehru and the pragmatic Sardar Patel continued after independence over several issues and from 1947 to 1950 India was in fact, ruled by a 'duumvirate'".<sup>12</sup> This explains the cause of pro-west and anti-Soviet steps of Indian government. But in 1950,

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11. Yuri Nesenko, op.cit. p.11.

12. Ibid., p.13.

with the death of Sardar Patel, his whole group resigned and Nehru's position became stronger in foreign policy sphere.

However, to understand Indian foreign policy postures of early years, one should minutely study the internal problems and developments of India. With the declaration of independence, communal riots broke out in different parts of India. Again, due to the division of Hindustan sub-continent into Pakistan and India, the influx of refugees started and this was one of the acute problems faced by Indian government. In 1947, Pakistan also invaded Kashmir and all these conditions compelled India to take the western help as there was no alternative. Moreover, Communist insurrection took place in Telengana and in some places in Bengal and Nehru government had to suppress it and to declare Communist Party illegal. This act of Indian government was severely criticised by the Soviet government and adverse reports were published in New Times and Pravada.<sup>13</sup> Thus, due to all these internal problems, Indian government could not play an important role in international forum.

The economic policy of early India was also criticised by Soviet leadership. In February 1948 Prime Minister Nehru announced, "... there should be no sudden change

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13. New Times, No.3, 1949, Pravada, Feb., 27, 1949.

(in the economic structure) which might upset the present structure without its being replaced. .... We should not waste our resources at the present movement in trying to nationalise existing industries".<sup>14</sup> This policy of Indian government was very much influenced by Sardar Patel and his group and no action was taken against the Indian monopolists and industrialists. Indian economy was very much controlled by British capital. Till 1951 Britain held "85 percent of the foreign holdings of government securities and 78 percent approved foreign investment of long-term capital in India".<sup>15</sup> 47 percent of its export was of raw materials and 22 percent of the total foreign trade was tied with Britain.<sup>16</sup> Nehru in 1950, admitted that economic policy of India was tied to western powers. Moreover, India established trade relations with Yugoslavia, when its relations with Soviet Union were strained.

Moreover, Indian membership of Commonwealth continued and Indian government supported the commonwealth policy of anti-Soviet and anti-communists. In 1949 Indian government supplied arms to nationalist government of Burma against communist rising there. It decided to provide transit facilities to French government for war in Vietnam and did not recognise government of Ho Chi Minh

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14. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol I, Sep-1946-May 1949, The Publication Division, Government of India, p.112,113.

15. Zafar Imam, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia: Kalyani Publishers, Delhi, 1975, p.26.

16. Prof. D.P.Chatterjee, "India and Soviet Union: Partners in Prosperity." Socialist India: vol.7.No.27 (Nov 27, 1973) p.17.

there. Besides, the British government was helped against Malaya liberation movement. In January 1949, India called an Asian conference on Indonesia but Asian Republics of USSR, China and North Vietnam were not invited. In 1949 Nehru visited USA and there he criticised centralised Soviet administrative system and agreed to support U.S. in a defensive war. In Singapore in 1950, Nehru called communism, the enemy of nationalism in Asia. The Korean crisis, in its early phase encouraged Indian move towards West and North Korean government was not recognised by it. In 1949, Soviet students and writers' delegations were refused visas.

All these activities of the Indian government provoked Soviet criticism. The Soviets continued to criticise all the external and internal policies of 'bourgeoisie' government of India. In fact the Soviet Union viewed India against the background of Cold war politics and the Soviet Indologists analysed Indian policies and activities in a very partisan and dogmatic fashion. Accordingly the non-alignment of India was severely criticised. "If (neutrality) does not change the basic fact that in the present days conditions, the neutrality.....profits only the US and British Imperialists".<sup>17</sup> However, India was also behaving against its claimed principles and had

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17. New Times No.43, Oct. 1950, p.28.

close economic, political and cultural relations with West. Its dependency on West and anti-Soviet policy was bound to provoke Soviet criticism. In the U.N.O. in 1947 Soviet Union opposed India for Security Council seat and supported one of its republic, Ukraine as India and Pakistan were thought to be integral parts of Anglo-American bloc. During the early phase it abstained from voting on the issues concerning Indian national interest.

Though the years 1947-50 are considered as passive phase of Indo-Soviet relations, both India and Soviet Union did take some steps to build a working relations between themselves. Soviet Union tried to maintain economic relations with India and in 1949, India received grain from Soviet Union in exchange of Jute and tea. On the other hand, India was the first non-communist country to recognise socialist China and this led the Soviet Union to show a favourable gesture to Indian foreign policy. To provoke Indian sympathy, in the U.N.O. Soviet representative spoke against Anglo-American interest in Kashmir. During this phase, articles were published in New Times criticising Sardar Patel and Dr. John Mathai but Nehru was left out from any direct attack.<sup>18</sup> But the liberation of Tibet by China provoked

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18. New Times No.32, August, 1948.

a strong protest in India and this was condemned by both the Soviet Union and China. Articles criticising India's Tibet policy were published in Pravada and New Times,<sup>19</sup> and China asked India not to interfere in its internal affairs. However, K.M.Panikar, the Indian ambassador in Peking, played an important role in normalising Sino-Indian and Indo\_Soviet relations.

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The years of early 1950s were important regarding India's internal development and its international relations. During this period a favourable Soviet view of India's foreign policy postures started. There were some causes for this change. The new constitution was introduced in India. In the first general Election of India, Congress party got clear majority and a stable government was established in centre. Communist Party of India was legalised and it contested the first General Election. The refugee problem was not so much acute then. Moreover, Kashmir war was stopped and negotiations had begun with Pakistan. On international forum, Communist China emerged on the border of India. This indeed changed the balance in Asia in favour of Communism and Nehru was quick to realise it. He tried to maintain cordial relations with China and India supported Communist China's claim for

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19. New Times No.47. 1950, p.28. Pravada.Nov. 20, 1950.

Security Council Seat. In 1950, it tabled a resolution in U.N.O. regarding the representation of People's Republic of China. Moreover, India reexamined its policy on the Korean war and it opposed the crossing of 38th parallel by UN armies and branding China as an aggressor. It supported Soviet proposal of cease-fire along 38th parallel in June 1951.

The Korean War was the first international problem which provided India a chance to play an important role in international arena. It was the first problem in which India came out with an independent policy. It often supported pro-West and pro-East resolutions of Security Council and General Assembly. The pro-East policy of India was sympathetically viewed by Soviet Union. But in December 1950, when Chinese troops moved towards South Korea and India proposed cease-fire, it was called by Soviet representative as an act to "save American troops from a disaster".<sup>20</sup> Indeed Nehru tried to localise the Korean crisis and he explained India's position and view of the crisis to Stalin. Stalin did not lose this opportunity and he promptly answered Nehru. It was a turning point in Soviet view of India. In fact, during the Korean Crisis, the UN provided a platform where, the Soviet Union felt that India and other Afro-Asian countries

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20. Quoted in Zafar Imam. op.cit. p.45.

may play an independent role in future. Moreover, India's refusal to attend the San Francisco Conference in 1951 and its support to China's claim of Formosa further accelerated the process of normalisation. In 1951, India agreed for a barter trade with Soviet Union and received wheat in exchange of tea, tobacco, and raw materials. Though Soviet leadership showed a favourable posture towards India, it did not refrain from criticising U.S. imperialists and Indian government for the current food crisis. As the First Five Years Plan of India had very insignificant industrialisation programme, it is called as "nothing more than the imperialist plan of Mountbatten".<sup>21</sup>

But the change of Soviet Policy towards the developing countries was clearly indicated in Stalin's last work, 'Economic Problems of Socialism in USSR' where he propagated that economic relation and peaceful co-existence is possible between Capitalism and Communism. Thus the changed Soviet view of India began to take shape even during the life time of Stalin. Stalin met the new ambassador (to) India, Mr. K.P.S. Menon and Dr. Kitchlew, the head of the delegation of the Indian Peace Council. Malenkov also reported to the 19th Party Congress of CPSU that an anti-imperialism resistance movement was growing in colonial and dependent countries.<sup>22</sup> In fact,

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21. Pravada, June 21, as quoted in Safar Imam, op.cit. p.12.

22. G. Malenkov, Report to the Nineteenth Congress of the work of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), Moscow, 1952, p.7.



the public opinion in India was becoming anti-West, as the industrialisation Programme of India in public sector was not financed by the West. Moreover, the Soviet ambassador in India, Noviko expressed Soviet Union's desire for trade with India.

This new trend in Soviet foreign policy gained momentum after the death of Stalin in March, 1953. The new leadership searched out the community of interest between India and Soviet Union and tried to develop it. Indeed, India and the Soviet Union began to share common views regarding racialism, colonialism, neo-colonialisms and disarmament. In spite of the differences between them on some international issues, they avoided any direct clash. Malankov, the Soviet Premier praised India in 1953 and said: "In the efforts of the peace loving countries directed towards ending the Korean War, India made a significant contribution. Our relations with India are becoming stronger and our cultural ties are growing. We hope that in future relations between India and the USSR will grow stronger ....."<sup>23</sup> ✓

In fact, there was possibility of Pakistan joining US sponsored military organisation. India was against such an alignment and the new leadership of the Soviet Union tried to encourage Indian dislike of such an organisation. To help India in maintaining its independent policy, a five year trade agreement was signed, in which India was to

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23. Pravada, Aug., 9, 1953. as quoted in Zafar Imam, op.cit. p.16.

pay in rupees. In 1954 Pakistan signed US military pact. This pact made both Soviet Union and India cautious as they had common border with Pakistan. Soviet press severely criticised the formation of South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and praised India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylone as they did not join it. In fact, "India's refusal to join the imperialist bloc.... helped to safeguard the Soviet Union, especially as India's stand encouraged a large number of young states not to support the imperialist policy".<sup>24</sup> In Indo-China Conference at Geneva India could not participate formally due to the US opposition. But the Chinese and Soviet representatives maintained close contact with Krishna Menon who led the Indian delegation. This conference provided them an opportunity where they could understand each other's policy vis-a-vis different international issues. Moreover, Molotov proposed India's name for the chairmanship of Neutral Nations Commission for the supervision of cease-fire in Indo-China. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union agreed to give economic aid for the establishment of a steel plant in India. As India was the most important developing country and was able to influence the policy of other developing countries, the Soviet Union avoided a direct criticism of internal developments of India.

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24. E.N.Komarov. "Historical roots and Contemporary Development of Soviet India Cooperation", Soviet Review, Vol.12 No.14. (March 1975) p.46-7.

Moreover, during the period (1952-59) non-aligned policy became a movement and more and more newly independent countries started following it. On the other hand, though Nehru criticised the Communist party of India, Warsaw Pact and Cominform, he had fully realised the benefits of non aligned policy. He was the leader of a country which was economically and industrially backward and had to take any decision very carefully. He invited Chau-en-Lai and this visit of Chinese Premier and the joint communique issued by them (Pancha Sheela) was widely reported in Soviet press". There can be no doubt that the acceptance of these important principles by the Asian as well as other countries would diminish the possibilities of war, serve to lessen tensions in world community and improve the valuable cooperation between the countries".<sup>25</sup> Later, the Soviet Union and China decided to base their relations with Asian and Pacific countries on the basis of Pancha Sheel. The Central Committee of CPSU, on the anniversary of the October Revolution declared: "May the friendship and co-operation between the peoples of India and the Soviet Union grow and strengthen for the protection of peace in the world".<sup>26</sup> Thus, the positive Soviet view of Indian foreign policy developed with the development of Sino-Indian relations.

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25. Pravada, July 1, 1954 As quoted in Zafar Imam, op.cit.p.70.

26. Pravada, Oct. 28, 1954, Ibid., p.60.

The year 1955-56 was an important year in this regard. Visit and counter-visit by Indian and Soviet heads of state took place for the first time in 1955. On 26 Jan. 1955 Pravda published an article saying that "the relation between India and the Soviet Union will strengthen and grow in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation".<sup>27</sup> To counter U.S. pressure, a pro-Soviet change started in Indian foreign policy. As the Indian aspiration for industrialisation was not fulfilled by West, Soviet aid at lower rates of interest became necessary for it. Nehru avoided any direct criticism of the Soviet Union. He visited China and got favourable report about USSR from Tito. Due to these favourable steps of Indian government, Molotov announced in Supreme Soviet, "It is a fact of great historic importance that colonial India is no more and there is an Indian Republic instead".<sup>28</sup> Again he said "India's international prestige as a new and important factor of peace and friendship among nations is steadily rising".<sup>29</sup> On the other hand in historic Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung, Nehru held pro-Soviet and anti-West views.

During these days of pro-Soviet postures of Indian foreign policy, Soviet Union also took calculated steps. Before Nehru's visit to USSR, Soviet press published

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27. Pravda, Jan.6, 1955, as quoted in Zafar Imam op.cit.p.62.

28. New Times, No.7, 1955.

29. Ibid

articles on India's role in international affairs and it discovered historical ties of friendship with India. Nehru's "Discovery of India" was translated in Russian. Thus Nehru and India were given wide coverage by Soviet press. But the Indian press was not so much pro-East and it reminded itself of Soviet criticism of Nehru and Gandhi. But they were ignored by the Soviet Union. The joint communique at the end of the visit was mainly drafted by Indian delegation and India's internal development and Nehru's hostility to Communism were totally omitted. Nehru's visit was thus hailed "From bottom of their hearts the Soviet people welcome the growing friendship with the people of India and say: long live the friendship".<sup>30</sup>

At the end of the year 1955 Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India, Afghanistan and Burma. In India they hailed its policy of non-alignment and its role in international affairs. India's claim on Kashmir and Goa was also supported. Industrialisation programme of Indian government was supported by them and Bulganin said.... "We are prepared to share our experience in the construction of industrial enterprises.... and utilisation of the atomic power for peaceful purpose".<sup>31</sup> He further asserted: "... there is not a single serious problem in Asia - and not only in Asia - that can be settled today without the participation of people's Republic of China and India".<sup>32</sup> Thus Soviet leaders

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30. Pravada June 7, 1955 As quoted in Zafar Imam, op.cit.p.65.

31. Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afganistan, Moscow, Foreign Language Press, 1956. p.131.

32. Abid.,

tried to influence India by highlighting (to) national interests, its aspirations for peace and by praising its traditions and ideology. They avoided criticism of the internal developments of India and showed no overt preference to Communist Party of India.

The happenings of 1955, led to the finalization of Soviet attitude towards India when in 1956, the 20th Congress of CPSU provided a theoretical framework to Soviet foreign policy regarding the Third World in general and India in particular. It propagated the theory of different roads to socialism and reiterated the concept of peaceful coexistence. This Soviet attitude was the result of the internal changes in Soviet Union. With the death of Stalin, a policy of liberalism was followed by the new leadership. Moreover, the changed international conditions paved the way for the peaceful coexistence between capitalists and socialist systems. In 1955 the Soviet Union ~~had~~ achieved the atomic parity with United States. This new confidence led her to play a global role and to establish cordial relations with Third World countries. Thus Soviet foreign policy became more flexible and conditioned by the internal compulsions and international changes. The new leadership admitted that socialism might be achieved even through parliamentary system. In report to the Central Committee of CPSU Khrushchev said that, "the great Indian Republic had made a big contribution to strengthening peace in

Asia and the whole world".<sup>33</sup> He suggested again "to consolidate untiring the bonds of friendship and cooperation with the Republic of India".<sup>34</sup> In April of 1956 Soviet sources announced the dissolution of Cominform.

All these developments in Soviet outlook were favourable viewed by Indian government. Vice President Dr. Radhakrishnan said, "It will be unreasonable to think that the Soviet Union is still aiming at World domination by Communism through methods of violence". The same year, an agreement was signed between India and Soviet Union for the equipment of the Steel plant at Bhilai. Thus the Soviet foreign policy tried to adjust itself with the changed international conditions.

The year 1956 is important for the international issues like ~~the~~ Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Crisis. During the Suez crisis India and the Soviet Union worked together in UNO and severly criticised Isreal, Britain and France. But Indian governmetn faced an acute problem when Hungarian Crisis began. It could not criticise the Soviet Union like the West. Even in U.N.O. India abstained on most of the resolutions regarding the Hungarian Crisis. But gradually the public opinion of India became anti-Soviet due to its intervention in Hungary and prosecution of Hungarian leader Imre Nagy. Western powers also influenced Nehru. Moreover, he himself

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33. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 20th Congress, Moscow, 1958, p.31.

34. Ibid. p.47.

did not want to be branded as a pro-Soviet leader. So he started criticising Soviet intervention in Hungary.<sup>35</sup> He also paid a visit to U.S.A.

On the other hand Soviet Union did not allow the Hungarian Crisis to affect its relations with India and supported India in its diplomatic initiatives in 1956 and 1957. It increased economic aid to India's second Five year plan. On Republic day of 1957 Pravada published an article which commented: "India has become a great power now playing an important role in the international arena".<sup>36</sup> In 1959, when in U.N.O. proposal came for sending an UN team in Kashmir, Soviet delegate used his veto power in favour of India for the first time because Soviet government felt that Kashmir was one of the states of India. He declared that sending the U.N. force would mean a "flagrant contradiction of the U.N. charter and an offence to the Kashmiri people".<sup>37</sup> When Eisenhower Doctrine was proclaimed in 1957, Nehru criticised it. Nehru's stand was supported by Shepilov, the Foreign Minister of Soviet Union. He said: "The foreign policy pursued by the Republic of India..... is a striking example of a truly peaceful policy..... The Soviet Government intends to continue to develop all round friendly co-operation with the great Indian state on the basis of ~~the~~ five principles of peaceful co-existence".<sup>38</sup>

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35. Lok Sabha Debates, pt.2, Vol.ix, No.4, Cols.373-74, 377-382.

36. Pravada. Jan. 26, 1957 As quoted in Zafar Imam op.cit.p.143.

37. News and Views from the Soviet Union, Soviet Embassy, N.Delhi, Feb.23, 1957.

38. Pravda, Feb.13, 1957. As quoted in Zafar Imam, op.cit.p.145.



On the other hand, Nehru was careful to be branded as a pro-Soviet leader. To maintain the balance he often criticised Soviet system. In 1958 he condemned Soviet Union for interfering in Yugoslavians internal affairs. Soviet leadership did not like this act of Nehru and Khrushchev told Indian ambassador not to interfere in their affairs.<sup>39</sup> Again, Nehru continued to condemn Communist ideology and Soviet society. Due to all these unfavourable developments Nehru was severely criticised by Pavel Yuden, a former Soviet ambassador in China. He published one article in 'World Marxist Review' in which he made clear difference between Nehru as a peace - fighter and Nehru as an administrator and between Soviet Socialism and Socialism of Nehru. The internal policy of Nehru Government was also criticised and slow development of India was compared with rapid development of China. But he assured Soviet help for development of Indian economy. He added: "As to the ways and methods which the Indian people may adopt to achieve this noble goal, that is a matter for the Indian people alone to decide."<sup>40</sup>

It was a troublesome period for Soviet Union. Nasser, the President of Egypt, persecuted the communists of his own country and accused Soviet Union for helping them. China also condemned it for the liberal policy followed in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Nehru was also forced by domestic

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39. K.P.S. Menon, The Flying Troika: Extracts from a Diary, London, 1963, p.208.

40. Jawaharlal Nehru and Academician Yuden on the Basic Approach. Communist Party Publication: New Delhi, 1958, p.47.

problems to criticise Soviet Union and Communist ideology. Since 1955 he was following a pro-Soviet policy and almost all resolutions in UN he voted with USSR. The criticism of Communism was also necessiated by Communist victory in general election in Kerala. Moreover, India was receiving economic aid from USA, and this pro-Soviet policy was bound to affect this economic aid. He was also influenced by Tito, Yugoslav President and by his version of Soviet Yugoslav conflict.

This damage to Indo-Soviet relation was soon repaired in 1959 and Soviet economic aid was intensified. Moreover, Nehru had by then fully realised the differences between India and China regarding border policy. So, he himself responded favourably to the Soviet Union. In August 1959, when Sino-Indian border clash took place, the Soviet Union simply published the Indian and Chinese version of the incident and maintain its neutrality. In October, when a serious clash took place in Ladakh, the anti - Soviet elements emerged within the government, and Soviet Union was worried due to these internal developments in India. On 31st October. Khrushchev said in a meeting of Supreme Soviet, 'We would be very happy .....if the existing frontier disputes were settled through friendly negotiations to the satisfaction of both parties.'<sup>41</sup> He tried for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. But Chinese leadership became more criticle

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41. N.S. Khrushchev. World Without Arms, World Without Wars (Moscow, 1959)p.399.

of Soviet views on Sino-Indian border clashes. It refused Soviet Union as an 'honest broker'.

In fact, Soviet Union favoured India, risking its relation with China, a Socialist country. This Sino-Indian conflict was a challenge to Soviet Asian policy. Soviet leaders were not ready to risk their Asian policy which they developed during last decade. Due to this policy Soviet Union was not only benefitted, but was also able to prevent these countries to join Western bloc. On 26th Jan, 1960 Khrushchev praised Nehru and his efforts for peaceful co-existence and international co-operation. A delegation, headed by President Voroshilov visited India and praised India's internal achievements. When Khrushchev visited India in 1960, he extended his support to the industrialisation programme of India. Soviet aid of 1500 million Roubles for Third Five Year Plan was also announced.<sup>42</sup> Khrushchev persuaded Nehru for the settlement of Sino-Indian differences. The joint communique after his visit declared "As between India and the Soviet Union at no time have their mutual relations vested on a firmer basis of friendship and understanding than now." So, after his visit Nehru invited Chou En-lai for settlement of border dispute. But their meeting failed. This led to the Sino-Soviet rift in 1960.

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42. Zafar Imam, Ideology..... p.119, 205, 211.

Khrushchev criticised China's policy and the rigid attitude of Chinese leadership. The Central Committee of the CPSU also criticised Chinese leadership for "their narrow nationalist attitude."<sup>43</sup> The Soviet aid to China was stopped and on the contrary, economic and military aid to India was increased. Thus, during mid 1960 Indo-Soviet relations entered into a new phase. The Soviet support and material help increased the confidence of India and it decided to take over Goa, a Portuguese colony. The liberation of Goa, Daman Diu was supported by the socialist countries, particularly the USSR and this step by government of India was considered as a step against colonialism.<sup>44</sup>

In 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute led to an armed conflict. Though, after a few days China declared unilateral cease-fire and in December started withdrawal, it again helped the rightist elements in India to come in forefront. The non-aligned policy of India was again blamed for this disaster. Over 900 Communists were arrested all over India. The West agreed to give air protection to India if she agreed for a compromise with Pakistan on ~~Kashmir~~. But Nehru was again strong enough to bear these pressures. He denied to give up the non-aligned policy of India. Khrushchev said about this situation that, "For the imperialists this conflict

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43. New China News Agency, Nov. 29, 1963.

44. Pravda, Dec. 22, 1961. As quoted in Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan, Vikas Publication, Delhi, 1971. p.71.

is a gold mine"....."this action has another profitable aspect for the militarist, in that it throws back the development of democratic principles in India and creates conditions for the strengthening of the positions of reactionary forces in the country."<sup>45</sup> Though the Soviet Union did not play any active role during the crisis, with the increasing Sino-Soviet differences, Soviet view towards India changed from neutrality to active help. Kozlov, the first Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers criticised Chinese action by calling it 'adventuristic position'.<sup>46</sup> Articles in Pravda were published criticising Chinese action. In 1964 report to Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party criticised Chinese aggression saying that it has "rendered great service to imperialism....."<sup>47</sup>

After the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, India started receiving military aid from the Soviet Union. By May 1964 the total military aid amounted to 130 million dollars.<sup>48</sup> Even before this dispute contracts were signed with USSR for setting up a medicine factory. 30 enterprises

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45. N.S. Khrushchev, "On Sino-Indian Border Issues", News and Views from the Soviet Union, Vol.21, no.82(Dec.15,1962) p.9.

46. New York Times, 4 Dec., 1962.

47. Pravda, 3 April 1964, as quoted in Harish Kapur, The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations, (Micheal Joseph Ltd, Geneva) 1972, p.79.

48. New York Times (4 Aug. 1965).

were built with Soviet aid. Foreign turnover with the USSR increased to 690 million rupees. All these strengthened Nehru's hands in suppressing the reactionaries within the country. In spite of the Soviet praise of Nehru government, the Communist Party of India criticised Nehru's internal policies in Parliamentary session of 1963. Strikes broke out throughout the countries. However to strengthen his position, Nehru dropped the rightists from his cabinet.

The years 1963-64 were again the years of international problem for India. During these years, the Colombo proposal was put by Ceylon, the U.A.R., Burma, Ghana and Indonesia, for the solution of Sino-Indian border conflict. India and China accepted it in principle and decided to solve the problem through negotiations. In the meantime, Pakistan also created problems by demanding a special UN session for the discussion of Kashmir issue. Moreover, it agreed to give up some territories to China. During all these international problems India got clear support from USSR. In Feb., 1964, when the question of Kashmir was raised in the UN Security Council, Soviet delegate opposed it and said: "..... from the legal and constitutional stand point Jammu and Kashmir is and continues to be Indian Union territory."<sup>49</sup>

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49. SCOR, Yr. mtg., 1091, p.9, as quoted in Bimal Prasad, Indo-Soviet Relations, 1947-72: A documentary study (Allied, Bombay, 1973). p.271.

" The period 1947-64 is an important phase of Indian foreign policy. During this period Nehru was at the helm of the affairs of the nation. In international sphere, from the very beginning he faced Cold War tension and in internal matters, he faced all the problems of a newly independent and economically backward country. In making of Indian foreign policy he was influenced by different pressure groups within the country and ~~by~~ the Big Powers. Though, he denied to join any of the camps of Super Powers and criticised them to maintain ~~confrontation~~ between them, he was often influenced by them and was compelled to take their help due to the internal compulsions.

The Soviet view of the foreign policy of India during this period had also a ~~steady~~ course ~~and despite~~ to the variations of Indian international behaviour and internal developments. Tentatively this period can be divided into three phases. The first phase begin from 1947-51. It was a passive phase of Indo-Soviet relations, when both of them were busy in their internal problems and could not pay more attention to international happenings. The second phase started from 1952 and continued up to 1958-59. It was a period of active support to each other except a few exceptions like Hungarian Crisis. The Soviet Union paid more attention to India's internal developments and its external behaviour and helped her economically and politically to maintain its independent stand. The acute problem was faced by the Soviet Union during the third phase when Sino-Indian border conflicts started (1959-64). China was a socialist country

and India was only a friendly country. In the beginning Soviet Union maintained a neutral position and tried for the peaceful solution of the problem. But later on, with its increasing differences with China, it supported India openly and thus avoided a risk to its Asian Policy. This shift in Soviet view of Indian foreign policy was marked by a number of changes in international and internal position of India and Soviet Union. ~~INDIA~~ also received Soviet economic and technological assistance at an increasing ~~pace~~. Moreover, Soviet Union backed her to play an international role. On the other hand Soviet Union was able to make cordon <sup>of the west partially</sup> ~~senitaire~~ ~~ineffective~~ because many Afro-Asian countries followed the Indian policy of non-alignment. According to A. Stein, "India served briefly as an intercessor for the communist powers in the mid-1950s. Later, when the USSR had established more direct channels of communication with the West, India's support was valued on other grounds for example, as endorsing Soviet disarmament proposals and Soviet calls for Summit meetings."<sup>50</sup> Moreover, with the increasing Sino-Soviet rift, Soviet Union came closer to India. In fact both of them were interested in ~~combating~~ the Chinese influence in Asia.

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50. A. Stein, India and the Soviet Union, the Nehru Era (Chicago, 1969), p.251.



Thus the above discussion in this chapter shows the consistent appreciation of Indian foreign policy by the Soviet Union inspite of their different socio-economic developments and projected policies. The Soviet Union supported the foreign policy of Indian government more than its any other policy. The Indologists of the USSR co-related the foreign policy of India with its domestic policy and its socio-economic development was considered as an integral part of world socio-economic forces. India was considered as a model for the "Third World" and an important factor in socialist and capitalist confrontation.

CHAPTER III

THE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC  
FEATURES OF SOVIET VIEW OF  
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

always careful to Western sentiments. Indian leadership uttered only idealistic views and dared not to do anything against western interest. But during the late forties, Soviet Union opposed any compromise between nationalist and imperialist in the colonial countries.

India also supported Soviet proposal in Trusteeship Committee to vast international rights of certain trust territories in Security Council. All this helped in the gradual change of Soviet attitude.

Malenkov's report to the 19th Congress of CPSU mentioned the exploitation of the Colonial and dependent countries by the imperialists and determined resistance offered by the colonial countries.<sup>5</sup> In fact during the early 1950s many colonies in Asia and Africa became independent. As those were the days of Cold War, these independent countries avoided to join any of the Super Powers. They were in need of peace for their internal development. In U.N.O. they joined together and tried to decrease international tension. The records of General Assembly shows the Afro-Asian solidarity in voting pattern of U.N.O. This led the Soviet Union to reassess its policy towards newly independent countries.

Due to the Western opposition India could not join the Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indo-China problems,

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5. G. Malenkov, Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) Moscow, 1952, p.7.

but the Indian delegation was constantly consulted by Soviet and Chinese delegates. Again because of Soviet initiatives India was elected Chairman of the Neutral National Commission which was set up to supervise the cease-fire in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It signed the principles of Panch Sheel with Peoples Republic of China and hailed the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of each other. These principles were also accepted by Soviet Union as they were clear indication of anti-colonialism.

In 1955 Soviet documents noted : "It is fact of great historic importance that colonial India is no more, there is an Indian Republic."<sup>6</sup> India's role in Bandung Conference was appreciated by Soviet Union because Indian Prime-Minister held the view that the problem of East European Countries were not of colonialism. This conference upheld the principles of liquidation of imperialism and colonialism in all its manifestations. In the final communique a declaration on Problems of Dependent Peoples was included. This was praised by Soviet Press as a contribution to peace in Asia and the World.<sup>7</sup> In 1955 when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India, they extended their support to India in its struggle against colonialism. "We are the sincerest friends

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6. New Times, no.7, 1955, Supplement, p.13.

7. E. Zhukov, "The Bandung Conference", International Affairs, May 1955, pp.18-32.

of those who fight against colonial slavery and colonial dependence, "<sup>8</sup> he said.

In XV Session of General Assembly, the 43 out of 46 Afro-Asian countries, including India, tabled a draft resolution for the unconditional end of colonialism in its all manifestations. The Soviet Union supported this resolution, but tried to attach some time limit provisions or a machinery to supervise the liquidation of colonialism. But this was not accepted. In July 1958 Khrushchev sent a message to Nehru regarding the West Asian crisis and said : "We cannot and must not let the forces of aggression and the forces of war like colonialism imperil international peace and security."<sup>9</sup> Again, India's initiative in U.N. regarding South Africa was given support by Soviet Union. Khrushchev spoke in the General Assembly in 1960, "the liberation of nations and peoples under colonial domination leads to an improvement in international relations, an increase in international cooperation and the reinforcement of world peace."<sup>10</sup> Thus the Soviet leaders linked the problems of peace and international cooperation with the necessity to liquidate colonialism.

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8. Reports by N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev on visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan to the Supreme Soviet of USSR, 1955, p.38.
  9. Bimal Prasad, Indo-Soviet Relations, 1947-72, A Documentary study (Allied : Bombay, 1969), p.173.
  10. H. Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin, (London and Boston, 1972), p.293.

In the joint Indo-Soviet statement of September 1961, Khrushchev supported the desire of Indian people for the liberation of Portuguese colonies, Goa, Daman and Diu. Khrushchev said that colonialism in all its forms and manifestation be condemned. According to a resolution of 1960, the West agreed to cooperate with the Special Committee headed by India to put an end to colonialism in Africa but in practice they did not cooperate. This was criticised by Soviet Union and in 1961 it drew the attention of General Assembly for final and unconditional end of Colonialism. In Oct. 1962 Pravda's Editorial commented : "The Soviet people set great store by Sovereign India's contribution to the fight ... against colonialism ..."<sup>11</sup>

The Soviet view regarding colonialism was through out the period anti-West. It was a process due to which West was bound to be economically weak. In U.N. also its position might be politically weaker. On the other hand, most of the newly emerging countries were bound to be neutral or pro-Soviet bloc due to their past colonial experiences. Thus the emergence of the Third World countries in international forum decreased the international tension and stopped the ~~transformation~~ of Cold War to armed struggle as they tried to solve international problems peacefully within and outside UNO.

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11. The Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. XIV No.43, Nov. 21, 1962, p.17.

Racialism

Indian policy regarding racial discrimination in South Africa was also supported and encouraged by the Soviet Union before its independence in Aug. 1947. In September 1946 in the U.N. General Assembly India tabled the question of discriminatory treatment of South-African government to the peoples of Indian origin. Britain and U.S.A. opposed the resolution on the ground of 'internal jurisdiction'. But Vyshinsky, the Soviet delegate said : "The Indian delegation has every reason to draw the general assembly's attention to this question ... The problem is definitely within the scope of the U.N."<sup>12</sup>

The problem of racialism was one of the most important question of East-West relations. Though Indo-Soviet views regarding racialism were identical in 1946 and early 1947, with the increasing Cold War conditions they differed on this problem and during early 1950s Soviet Union did not give any active support to it. In 1949, when Prime Minister Nehru visited U.S.A. he condemned the policy of racial discrimination. The question of racial discrimination in South Africa came to U.N. every year from 1946 to 1964. During 1950s and early sixties this was not only supported by Afro-Asian groups but also by Soviet bloc. The government of

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12. GAOR, Session 2, 1st C'ttee., 110th and 112th Meetings, pp. 460-62 and 479-82.

South Africa recalled its delegation from the General Assembly in 1955, and refused to negotiate with India and Pakistan regarding the problem. In Indo-Soviet joint statement in September 1961, Khrushchev and Nehru criticised the racial discriminatory policy of government of South Africa. This policy was also violating the 'human right' and 'fundamental liberties'.

In 1962, when Indian and Afro-Asian countries submitted a draft resolution in Security Council to impose an embargo on South African government, it was supported by Soviet Union but opposed by United Kingdom, France and U.S.A. Like India, Soviet Union also believed that no action could be taken successfully against South African government till the West would help it.

The Indian delegate introduced a resolution expressing General Assembly's 'regret' over the failure to implement its earlier Resolution but the South African government, the U.K. and U.S.A. opposed it. Soviet delegate supported Indian proposal and opposed the view that the question be settled through bilateral negotiations between the parties concerned. The policy of racial discrimination was again and again raised in U.N. and supported by Soviet Union because, on the one hand, it was to encourage anti-West feelings of Afro-Asian countries and on the other, it was to create a pro-Soviet atmosphere in international arena.

<sup>12a</sup>  
12a. See for details, D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the U.N. Allahabad, 1969.



### Disarmament

The Soviet Union minutely observed the sentiments of the developing countries and from the early 1950s, it supported the disarmament issue proposed by non-aligned countries in general and India in particular. It was a verbal support to this issue. In fact, Soviet Union was sure of Western reaction and bilateral disarmament was neither logical nor desired.

Soviet Union proposed the inclusion of India in its talks with Big Powers on disarmament. In 1954, at Geneva Conference on Indo-China, Molotov consulted Krishna Menon on different issues, as Indian delegation could not attend it formally due to Western opposition. India became the Chairman of the three Control Committees set up to supervise cease fire in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia. In 1955, when the International Scientific Technical Conference was held at Geneva for the peaceful use of atomic energy under the Chairmanship of India Bulganin sent his message to it and wished its success.

According to the Communique signed in Delhi in 1955, by Bulganin, Khrushchev and Nehru Soviet and Indian government condemned the arms competition. They supported unconditional prohibition of these weapons. In May 1955 the Soviet Union proposed the reduction of conventional armaments and ban on atomic weapons. This proposal was supported by India. The

joint Indo-Soviet statement of 23rd June 1955 declared "To implement such disarmament and prohibition in this connection, the recent Soviet proposal on disarmament were acknowledged as a substantial contribution to peace."<sup>13</sup>

Bulganin said in Indian Parliament on 21st Nov. 1955 "The Soviet Union knows and whole-heartedly approves the stand taken by the Indian government on the question of prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons and reducing conventional armaments, with a view to utilising for peaceful purposes the immense resources now absorbed by the arms drive,"<sup>14</sup> and, "The Soviet Union has always stood for disarmament and complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons."<sup>15</sup> Again the Indo-Soviet joint statement of 13th Dec. 1955 held the view that "In order to establish world peace and to eliminate conditions leading to the inconceivable disaster of another World War, there is no course open but that of disarmament."<sup>16</sup> The USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on the results of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev and revealed the identity of the views regarding disarmament.<sup>17</sup>

In May 1956 Soviet Union proposed a summit conference on disarmament and included India with the 'Big Four' (USSR, USA, Britain, and France). Bulganin wrote a letter to Nehru stating

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13. Foreign Policy of India; Texts of Documents 1947-59 (New Delhi, 1959, 2nd edn.,) p.186.

14. Bulganin and Khrushchev, op. cit., p.28.

15. Ibid. p.29

16. Ibid. p.303

17. Ibid. p.326

the role played by India and Nehru in strengthening world peace. In November 1956, a statement was issued by Soviet government on Disarmament and Reduction of International Tension, where it proposed for the reduction of standing armies by Big Powers, prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons and destruction of their existing stocks.

The Soviet Union proposed India's name for 5-power Disarmament Commission meeting in London. But again, Western powers opposed it. Nehru appealed to USA and USSR to stop the nuclear test and arms race in 1957. By the December, Bulganin informed Nehru of his readiness to stop nuclear tests, but, as the West was not agreed to it, he was helpless. In 1956, when the West Asian crisis started due to the Western interfere in Jordan and Lebanon, Soviet Union again proposed a Conference of Big Fours and India - But due to Western opposition it did not come off. On the other hand, in 1958 Bulganin wrote letters to Nehru and Nasser and proposed for a conference of nonaligned nations for the consideration of the decision of installation of rockets with atomic weapons by NATO council in Europe.<sup>18</sup> He praised efforts, of Nehru regarding disarmament. But this conference did not take place.

In 1958, Soviet Union announced the unilateral cessation of nuclear test and appeal to USA and UK to do the same. This was mainly done to get the support of the developing countries. Moreover, it also proved the Soviet confidence

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18. J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India, Vikas Publications : Delhi, 1970, p.107.

and development of armaments. But when the western powers did not heed to Soviet appeal, it resumed the nuclear treaty in 1961.

The Disarmament Committees were appointed by General Assembly in 1959 and 1960, but they failed. The XIV Session of the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution for general and complete disarmament. So, Khrushchev said in Indian Parliament : "... let me assure you that Soviet Union will do everything in its power to ensure that the talks result in working out and signing a treaty on general and complete disarmament."<sup>19</sup> He said that during the last four years the unilateral reductions of Soviet armed forces totalled 2,140,000 men. On 30th June 1960 when Indian President Rajendra Prasad visited USSR President Brezhnev of Soviet Union said, " We noted with admiration the recent efforts of your government to stabilise and strengthen peace ... your initiative in the cause of disarmament of state."<sup>20</sup> In 1961 due to U.S. and USSR efforts, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was formed and India was also included in it along with some other neutral nations. The conference held at Geneva at the Foreign Ministers level, where the Soviet Union proposed for complete disarmament and West proposed for limited disarmament. To break this deadlock, the eight neutral countries of the Committee put some new proposals which Soviet Union agreed to

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19. Foreign Affairs Record, vol.VI, no.2, Feb. 1960.

20. Foreign Affairs Record, vol.VI, no.6, June 1960.

consider but Western powers rejected, and US started open air nuclear tests. The Prime Minister of India Nehru requested U.S. to stop it till the conference was on, but this request was given no importance. Soviet Union resumed nuclear test in 1961 at the time when the non-aligned nations were meeting in Belgrade. This was again not liked by Nehru and just after the meeting in Belgrade he went to Moscow, where he carefully expressed that resumption of atomic testing had "aggravated international tensions".<sup>21</sup> But Khrushchev did not want to restrain his relations with India and he simply ignored this by explaining away the futility of unilateral disarmament and stoppage of nuclear explosion.

Due to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee a partial Test Ban Treaty was signed in Aug. 1963. According to this treaty prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in atmosphere, in outer space and under water was accepted by USSR, USA and Britain. India was the first non-nuclear power to be invited to sign the treaty. After the conclusion of the treaty Khrushchev said: "The reaching of agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests shows that international problems can be successfully resolved on mutually acceptable terms given the desire and efforts of the states concerned."<sup>22</sup> India, however, did not sign the

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21. A. Stein, op. cit. p.135.

22. H. Hanak, op. cit. p.94.

NPT, but Soviet response to India's action was at a low key.

Disarmament was an international issue after the Second World War. From the very beginning of its independent existence, India supported total disarmament. But the Soviet stand on this issue was different during late forties and early fifties. After the Second World War Soviet Union tried to break the US nuclear monopoly. It supported Disarmament issue only when it attended nuclear parity with US. During the late fifties it attended the level, when it dared to declare unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. Thus, due to its disarmament policy, Soviet Union ~~gain~~ and India emphasized their community of interests.

#### Western Military Blocs

Indo-Soviet views regarding the Western military blocs were also identical. Soviet Union and India, both criticised these blocs from the very beginning of their existence, as these were to encircle them. India's neighbour, Pakistan became the member of SEATO and CENTO and thus both sides of non-aligned India became the base of Western military powers.

On the other hand, almost all the neighbouring countries of Soviet Union became the members of either NATO or CENTO or SEATO. This identity of views led India and Soviet Union to cooperate against the West within the UN and outside it. All most all the Indo-Soviet joint statements referred to these military blocs. According to Indian opinion, US help to

Pakistan led her to follow a vigorous foreign policy. Pandit Nehru pointed out that these military organisations did not at all help to maintain peace, rather, due to these organisations, the relations between the different states were strained and the international tensions increased which finally led to War. Soviet Union supported this view of India. In 1955 Bulganin said in Indian Parliament that Soviet Union 'favours the liquidation of the blocs already formed.' It "proposed the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe ." But this was opposed by the West.<sup>23</sup> Again joint Indo-Soviet statement of 13 Dec. 1955 declared that India and USSR "agreed that the method of ensuring peace and security was not by the formation of military alliances ... . Such alliances widened the frontiers of the Cold War."<sup>24</sup>

The USSR blamed the SEATO countries for the deteriorating conditions in Kashmir in 1957, as they encouraged Pakistan. It praised, encouraged and gave material help to the non-aligned nations to prevent them from joining the Western blocs. In 1961 when liberation of Goa by Indian army was opposed by the West, Soviet delegate in the UN Security Council said : "... United States and the United Kingdom are supporting their NATO ally, Portugal, a colonial power...

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23. Bulganin and Khrushchev, op. cit., p.31.

24. Ibid. p.304.

against the colonial people."<sup>25</sup> Thus the Soviet leaders emphasised again and again the liquidation of the Cold War and the abolition of military blocs.

On the other hand, Nehru did not refrain from criticising Warsaw Treaty, signed by USSR and the East-European countries. By criticising Warsaw Pact he tried to maintain balance between East and West and to prove that he was not the camp follower of Soviet Union. He also criticised Cominform and its interference in internal affairs of the other countries. In 1954 he told in Parliament that activities of this organisation caused disturbance in various countries.<sup>26</sup>

In 1955 in Indian Parliament Bulganin tried to clear the Soviet view regarding Warsaw Pact and its need in international relations. He said, as the West European countries joined NATO they were also compelled to form a defensive alliance. "The conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty was an enforced act, necessitated by the attitude of the Western Powers and USSR was ready "to renounce it as soon as"<sup>27</sup> the West would give up NATO and other offensive organisations.

In 1956 the dissolution of Cominform was declared to meet the needs of Soviet foreign policy in changed international

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25. SCOR, Yr.16, mtg.988, pp.25-26, as quoted in Bimal Prasad, op. cit. p.233.

26. M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56, Bombay, 1964, p.31.

27. Bulganin and Khrushchev, op. cit. p.32.



situation. This act of Soviet government was favoured by Indian government and was accepted as a positive change within the Communist World.

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Besides these international issues of colonialism, racialism and disarmament, Soviet Union praised and cooperated India on other world issues concerning international peace, as Korean crisis, Suez Crisis, Lebanese crisis.

#### Korean War

Korean crisis is the first international problem where India played an important role. During early phase of Korean problem India collaborated with West. On US initiative India became the first Chairman of the UN Temporary Mission on Korea in 1947. It refused to recognise North Korea and agreed to hold a separate election in South Korea. In 1950 India voted in favour of U.S. resolution supporting a police action against North Korea. As it could not contribute militarily, it sent a medical mission there. All this led Soviet Union to criticise India. But, gradually a change was marked in Indian policy. Emergence of socialist China, nearer to its border affect the Indian foreign policy to some extent. Nehru tried to localise the war and when he sent a message regarding peace proposals to Soviet Premier Stalin, he favourably and personally communicated to Nehru and this was published in 'Pravda' and 'New Times.' He wished Nehru's success to his

efforts.<sup>28</sup> Nehru himself was impressed and encouraged. India opposed the crossing of 38th parallel by U.N. armies in October 1950. U.S. resolution declaring Communist China as an aggressor was also opposed by India. These activities of Indian delegation at UNO were not overlooked by Soviet Union. But, at the end of 1950 when it opposed the crossing of 38th parallel by North Korean armies Soviet Union condemned her saying it an attempt to 'save American troops'.

In 1952 the problem of prisoners of war came in UN. India proposed a compromise resolution in the U.N. General Assembly and demanded again and again China's representation in it. But, it failed in its efforts due to Western pressure. Soviet Union criticised the resolution as it was "designated not to put an end to the war but to perpetuate it."<sup>29</sup> But, the India's effort for peaceful solution of the problem and its moral courage to follow an independent path was recognised by Soviet Union, "In the efforts of the countries directed towards ending the Korean war, India made a significant contribution."<sup>30</sup> Soviet Union proposed India's name for the conference on Korea, but, due to western opposition it was dropped. Later on, she was selected Chairman of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and solved the problem

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28. Kessings Contemporary Archives, vol.VIII, 1950-52, p.10847.

29. K.P. Karunakaran, India in World Affairs, Feb.1950-Oct. 1958, Calcutta : Oxford University Press, 1958, p.119.

30. Pravda, Aug. 9, 1953, As quoted in Dr. Zafar Imam, op. cit. p.16.

successfully. In fact, the Korean crisis set in motion a turn in Soviet policy towards greater involvement and utilisation of the world organisation and to propagate its views regarding international problems. This international crisis also helped Soviet leadership to view India and developing countries from a different angle.

### Suez Crisis

"The Suez Crisis revealed the common approach of India and Soviet Union towards predatory character of Western colonialism."<sup>31</sup> Both of them promptly reacted to this international crisis which took place due to the armed offensive of Britain, France and Israel against Egypt in 1956. In the London Conference on Suez Canal, Indian delegation proposed some suggestions according to which Suez Canal was to be inseparable part of Egypt and its sovereign rights were to be recognised. Soviet Union supported this proposal and Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister declared it as "a plan for a just and peaceful settlement of the Suez Problem."<sup>32</sup> Soviet Union warned Britain and France of its determination to "crush aggression and reestablish peace in West Asia."<sup>33</sup> The Soviet Union's draft resolutions regarding the cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces were vetoed by Britain and France. This naked invasion of

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31. Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan, Vikas Publication, 1971, p.62.

32. New Times, No.36, Supplement 1956, pp.36-37.

33. Hindu, November 6, 1956.

imperialist country on an independent Egypt made Indian government anxious. Nehru said : "in all my experience of foreign affairs I have come across no greater case of naked aggression than what France and England are trying to do."<sup>34</sup> Prime Minister Nehru demanded that the procedures of the UN should be made swifter than the procedure of invasion and aggression. He also appealed to the leaders of Britain and France for the peaceful solution of the problem. When the Western powers launched the economic boycott on Egypt India gave her a loan of Rs.50 million. On 3 November 1956 India tabled a resolution on behalf of 19 Afro-Asian countries to request Secretary General to report the results of talks within 12 hours. Soviet Union helped Indian moves but the situation improved only when Soviet Union gave a threat to intervene.

#### Lebanese Question

The Lebanese question came to UN because the U.S. and British armies intervened in Lebanon and Jordan on the pretext of helping those governments but their ultimate aim was to invade Iraq, where the pro-West government was overthrown. During this crisis again, India took an anti-West posture, but its efforts were less intensive than the Suez Crisis of 1956. It was perhaps due to the prominence of right wing in the government. Except this India was in need of the Western aid and this did not allow her to criticise West.

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34. Supplement "War in Egypt" in Hindu, Nov.2, 1956.

According to the resolution of Security Council, 'an UN observation Group in Lebanon' was formed consisting of Ecuador, India and Norway. The Soviet Union appealed in UN again and again to strengthen UNOGIL because the findings of UNOGIL were against the West and particularly against US. India appealed to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan for the withdrawal of their troops. Nehru said in Indian Parliament, "We do not accept that foreign troops should be used in any territory (in West Asia) in the circumstances prevailing there."<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, in July 1958 Soviet Union proposed for a meeting of the heads of the governments of UK, France, USA, USSR, and India together with Secretary General, Khrushchev wrote to Nehru, "we in Soviet Union know India as one of the leading states, a country whose voice is heeded not only in Asia, but throughout the world."<sup>36</sup>

The West did not accept the name of India. People's Republic of China also opposed the inclusion of India in the Conference. Moreover, Indian government was also not very keen to join it. Thus the conference did not take place. This crisis ended when an Arab Nations' resolution of Aug.21 was accepted by USA and UK and they agreed its withdrawal of the troops.

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35. Lok Sabha Debates, Pt.2, vol.18, no.4 (Aug.14, 1958), Col. 865.

36. New Times, no.30, Supplement, 1958.

Though India and Soviet Union both demanded withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan, their logic behind the demand differed. To USSR it was a chance to propagate anti-West feelings and their imperialist motives. This crisis was also to generate a pro-Soviet feeling among the developing countries, which was to some extent damaged by Hungarian Crisis. On the other hand, India was interested in localising the crisis in avoiding any direct confrontation of USA and USSR.

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#### India's attitude to China

India's early attitude to China greatly enamoured the Soviet Union. The representation of Communist China in international forum was the problem on which the Soviet and Indian policies were identical, whereas, it was among one of the important factors of discord between India and U.S. In 1950 the Indian delegate tabled a resolution in General Assembly for the representation of People's Republic of China. This issue was warmly supported by the Soviet delegate Vyshinsky.

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Now we take up some specific issues of bilateral relations where India's interests were directly involved such as Kashmir, Goa, Sino-Indian border dispute and aid and trade.

#### Kashmir

Indo-Pak conflict started as early as in 1947, When Pakistani tanks invaded Kashmir. During the early phase of

the crisis, the Soviet Union did not participate in UN debates. It believed that the British and other Western powers were engaged in it to turn that area as their base against USSR and People's Republic of China. In 1952, for the first time Soviet delegate spoke of Kashmir in UN Security Council. Again he blamed Anglo-American bloc for continuing this problem. It opposed the Western resolution for introduction of foreign troops in Kashmir and thus supported Indian cause.

But gradually the Soviet neutrality regarding this problem ended. Firstly, because this problem was created just near the border of Soviet Union. Secondly, there was possibility of Pakistan joining the Western security organisation and as India was against any military pact it must be helped to maintain its anti-West posture. Thirdly, the Soviet view of the developing countries had gradually undergone a change. Soviet Union decided to help them economically, politically and militarily to maintain their non-aligned policy.

The Soviet attitude to the Kashmir problem was quite different than the West. It always emphasised on the bilateral solution of the problem. In 1953 Soviet Union supported the bilateral talks between India and Pakistani Prime Ministers.

In 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India. They went to Kashmir and when they returned back to Soviet Union,

in Supreme Soviet they declared : "We saw in Kashmir that its people regard their territory as an inalienable part of the Republic of India."<sup>37</sup> In UN Security Council a resolution was tabled by US, UK, Austria, Colombia, and Cuba to hold a plebicit<sup>e</sup> under UN auspices, but Soviet Union opposed it saying that Kashmir was "an inalienable part of Republic of India."<sup>38</sup> When in 1957 a resolution was tabled by Western initiative to use UN force to hold plebicit<sup>e</sup>, the Soviet Union used its veto power for the first time in favour of India. Soviet delegate said : "The dispatch of United Nations force to permit the holding of plebicit<sup>e</sup> in Kashmir would be contrary to the Charter and would be insulting to the national pride of the people of Kashmir,"<sup>39</sup> as the people of Kashmir had settled the question themselves and considered Kashmir as an integral part of India.

In 1962 Kashmir issue was again raised in UN Security Council due to the Pakistan's complaint against India's preparations to recapture the Kashmir territory under Pakistan. An Irish resolution supported by West was introduced and a plebicit<sup>e</sup> was proposed. This resolution was again vetoed by Soviet Union. In fact, Indian government was embarrassed due to

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37. N.A . Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, op. cit. p.40.

38. ~~Report to the Supreme Soviet~~ by Official Records of the Security Council of the UN Jan.-March 1957; Document S/3779 (New York, 1958).

39. Ibid. p.32.



unhesitant support of USSR, Nehru felt that India was becoming independent on Soviet Union for its vital national interests as territorial integrity and stability.

In October-November of 1962 India received military help from West and agreed to bilateral talks with Pakistan. But this effort could not solve the problem and Nehru decided to end the special status of Kashmir.

Soviet support to India's stand on Kashmir issue is a land-mark in Indo-Soviet relations. It made India strong enough to bear the Western pressure and maintain independent policy regarding the issue. In 1964 the issue was again raised in the Security Council but the international conditions changed. The Super Powers became less interested in Kashmir issue. As Pakistan was not to get passed its resolution, so the debate was adjourned.

#### Sino-Indian border dispute

India's relations with Chinese People's Republic were strained in 1950, when Tibet was incorporated with China. But in 1954, the two governments signed the Five Principles of Panchsheel and normalised their relations. The Indian ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar, played an important role in normalising India's relations with China. In 1959, a minor border clash took place and restrained this relations again. Regarding this conflict, Soviet Union maintained a neutral position and did not support a paternal country for the

first time. It blamed the anti-peace group and hoped that problem would be solved by friendly negotiations. The Soviet Union followed this neutral attitude because, they differed on some world issues after the 20th Congress of CPSU and Soviet Union was not sure of future Chinese collaboration in international arena. Moreover, Soviet Union had established cordial relations with the developing countries and an open support to People's Republic of China might affect its relations with the developing countries. So it persuaded both the countries for a peaceful settlement. But the Soviet efforts failed, because on 20th Oct. 1962, a major Sino-Indian border dispute broke out. During this border dispute again, in the beginning Soviet Union maintained neutrality and only published the Indian and Chinese version of the dispute without any comment.

In the meantime China proposed the position of 24th Oct. as a cease-fire line. On 25th Oct. 1962, Pravda published an editorial and urged India to accept the Chinese proposal of 24th Oct. as a cease fire line.<sup>40</sup> But it was unacceptable to India. In fact, this crisis puzzled USSR. It was a time when Soviet Union was in need of Chinese support for its missile-launching programme in Cuba. Therefore, any direct support to India was to harm the socialist coalition. Except this, the Cuban Crisis diverted Soviet attention from Asia.

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40. Pravda, Oct. 25, 1962, as quoted in A. Stein, India and the Soviet Union, (Chicago, 1969), p.152.

On 30th Oct. Zorin, the Soviet delegate in the UN, again backed Chinese proposal of 24th Oct. Khrushchev also wrote a personal letter to Nehru in this respect. But Nehru did not reply to it. On the other hand, China was also not happy with the Soviet stand on the crisis. It criticised USSR for helping the 'reactionary' govt. of India. The Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba was also criticised.

But Soviet Deputy Premier A. Kosygin said in Nov. 1962, "there are no basic contradictions between India and China that could not be solved in round-table talks."<sup>41</sup> On Nov. 5th, Pravda again published an editorial for a peaceful negotiated settlement between India and China.

In 1963, the Sino--Soviet rift became more grave. Their views regarding 'Third World' vis-a-vis-West and the role of Communism in this changed international conditions differed. Gradually Soviet Union clearly came out in support of India. Pravda criticised China for its aggression against India and failure of peaceful settlement of dispute.<sup>42</sup> Khrushchev said that the conflict "had the most negative consequences for the cause of peace, inflicted great harm to the unity of the anti-imperialist front in Asia, and placed the progressive forces in India in an extremely difficult position."<sup>43</sup> Soviet Union

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41. Times (London) Nov.7, 1962.

42. Pravda, 10, 13 Aug. 1963, as quoted in Harish Kapur, The Soviet Union and Emerging Nations, (Geneva, 1972) p.7.

43. "Statement of the Soviet Government", Sept.21, 1963, Reprinted in Current Soviet Documents, vol.I, no.28, (Oct.7, 1963), pp.29-30.

also speeded up its aid to India's coal, oil and power industries. It helped India to build factories to manufacture MIG fighters. The military aid taken by India from Britain and USA was also not criticised by Soviet Union.

### Goa

"The Indian people rightly demand that such an intolerable situation be ended, that Goa be liberated."<sup>44</sup>

"Goa will free itself from foreign rule and will become an integral part of the Republic of India."<sup>45</sup>

On 27th Nov. 1955, Bulganin said : "there is no justification for the Portugese colony of Goa to exist still on the ancient soil of India. It is a shame on civilised people."<sup>46</sup>

These were the views of Soviet leadership expressed on different occasions before the liberation of Goa. In 1961 the Goa, Daman and Diu were liberated with the help of Indian Army. During the liberation of Goa, Brezhnev, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was in Bomba y and he supported Indian action. He said that the Indian people had got the opportunity to distinguish between their true friends, supporters of the national liberation of the peoples and those who covered up their real design with

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44. Report by N.A. Bulganin and Khrushchev, op. cit., p.15.

45. Ibid., p.73.

46. Times of India, Nov. 28, 1955.

mere talk of friendship.<sup>47</sup> Khrushchev also supported the liberation of Goa. He said : "The determined action of the government of India in liquidating the colonial pockets in its territory is a completely lawful and rightful act."<sup>48</sup> When this issue was brought to the UN Security Council against India by Western Powers, Soviet Union soon vetoed the resolution. The Soviet delegate in the UN Zorin said that his veto expressed... "the will to defend colonial countries and peoples and their right to life, freedom, and independence."<sup>49</sup>

#### Trade and Aid

Bulganin said : "Of great importance for the continued consolidation of our relations with India are the economic links between the two countries."<sup>50</sup>

Soviet proposals for trade were "made with both eyes towards propaganda and political debate rather than toward their economic utility and feasibility."<sup>51</sup> Indeed closer economic ties with India were necessary to maintain its non-aligned posture.

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47. Pravda, Dec.25, 1961 as quoted in E.N. Komarov, op. cit. p.84.

48. Pravda, 22 Dec. 1961, <sup>p.1,</sup> /As quoted in J.A. Naik in Soviet Policy Towards India (Vikas : Delhi, 1970), p.125.

49. U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess : 987th mtg.(Dec. 18, 1961) pp.21-26.

50. Reports by N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Op. cit. p.13.

51. A.Z. Robinstein, The Soviets in International Organization : Changing Policy towards developing countries, 1953-63, Princeton, 1964, p.22.

After the great October Revolution, Lenin said that Soviet Union would help the peoples who had liberated themselves from the domination of imperialists and help them to pass "to the use of machinery to the lightening of labour, to democracy, to socialism."<sup>52</sup>

Just after the foundation of United Nations Organisation and before 1949 when the Cold War started with its full intense, USSR supported the view that the financial assistance to the underdeveloped countries should be channelised through U.N.O. But "when confronted with tangible possibilities of implementing international economic aid through the UN ... the Soviet Government withheld its support"<sup>53</sup> because according to USSR, it was a means to retain Western influence on underdeveloped nations. Soviet Union decided to help separately only the non-aligned nations. But the economic aid was provided to the underdeveloped countries only when the Soviet leadership followed a 'policy of liberalisation' that is from 1954 onwards.

During the early years of its independence, India's economy was dependent on the capitalist economy. To retain their Indian market for the sale of their manufactured goods, West did not fulfill its industrialisation programmes. They demanded high rates of interest for their credits which they were to offer.

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52. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works (Russian Edition), vol.30, p.119 as quoted in E.N. Komarov, op. cit., p.87.

53. A. Rubinstein, "Soviet policy Towards underdeveloped Areas in the Economic and Social Council," International Organisation, (9 May, 1955), p.236.

The Indo-Soviet trade relations were established as early as in 1949, when a barter-deal was signed for wheat in exchange of raw materials like jute, tobacco and tea. As this was the year of food crisis Soviet Union sent the wheat before the conclusion of the agreement. In 1952 Novikov, the Soviet ambassador, informed of the readiness of the Soviet Government to establish trade relations with India either in hard currency or in rupees or on barter system. In a meeting of ~~ESCAP~~ (Economic Cooperation with Asia and Far East), in 1953, the Soviet delegate expressed the desire of the Soviet government to trade with the developing countries. The newly appointed Soviet ambassador to India, Menshikov also proposed for a trade agreement between India and USSR.

In December 1953 the first trade agreement was signed by India and USSR for five years and the transactions were to be done in rupees. This was an ~~advan~~-tageous agreement for India. They also decided to balance the trade. In 1958 a second five-year trade agreement was signed. Provision was made to establish a Soviet account with the Reserve Bank to facilitate Soviet trade in India.

The trade turn over increased from 8.1 million rupees in 1953 to 719.9 million rupees in 1961. It continues to increase in 1963-64. By 1963-64 the USSR ranked fourth nation in total trade with India. The Soviet Union did not import only the

traditional Indian exports like tea and tobacco, but also the industrial products. In 1950 these industrial products accounted for 18 percent, but in 1963 it increased to 30 percent.<sup>54</sup> In 1953 the total exports from India to the Soviet Union and other communist countries were worth only 110 million rupees. 10 years later, they came to 200 million rupees. Moreover, the transactions were settled in Indian rupees. This was helpful for a country like India which lacks hard foreign currency. India's trade relations were also established with other East European countries as, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia which provided it a vast market. Now the Western market was not the only outlet for Indian trade. Due to the trade relations with East, India got a foot hold to bargain with West.

In the meeting of UN ECAFE in Ceylon, Soviet Union expressed its desire to provide technical aid "with no political strings attached". But there was no immediate response to it, because some limitations were imposed on its use. Gradually India became the Chief receiver of the Soviet aid and it received 60 percent of Soviet aid furnished through the UN from 1955 to 1962.<sup>55</sup>

Though the Soviet aid to India during this period amounted less than US aid but it had important impact on the development

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54. V.I. Smirnov, "A New Era in World History", Indian Express (7 Nov. 1963).
55. A.Z. Rubinstein, The Soviets in International Organisation: Changing Policy Towards Developing Countries, 1953-63, Princeton, 1964, p.41.



of Indian economy. The Soviet aid was mainly concentrated in public sector on heavy industries because the Indian government gave emphasis on public sector. Soviet aid was mainly given for the building up of steel plants, exploring and refining of oil and development of heavy engineering and ~~engine~~ electrical equipment plants. Moreover, the whole plant was supplied by Soviet Union.

The aid was given for a long-term and comparatively at the lower rates of interests - 2.5. As the credits were for a long-term planning. The repayment starts after the one year of the delivery of the credit. It is to be repaid by the products of the plants or in rupees. If the credit is not used, the interest is not charged. Bhilai and Bokaro steel plants are the results of Soviet aid. Again, during the first two Five Year Plans India had to import oil, which was the onerous expenditure of Indian economy. So, the help of Soviet Union was sought and the Soviet experts discovered the gas and oil deposits in Cambay - in 1958 and in Ankleshwar, Kalot and Rudrasagar in 1960, with six million tons of oil per year. Soviet Union also supplied crude oil at 0.25 dollars a barrel and thus the West was forced to lower their price by 0.27 dollars a barrel. In September 1959 the Soviet Union gave aid for the construction of oil refinery at Barauni. Nearly 115 million rupees of credit were also provided for this project. Again, the Bhilai plant was expanded and in 1959 a Soviet credit of Rs.2812.4 million was announced. Credit

was also given for the construction of Heavy Machine-Building plant at Ranchi and Coal Mining Machinery Plant at Durgapur.

Thus the Soviet aid was proved advantageous to India.

S. Skachkov, Co-Chairman of the Soviet-Indian Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, said : "India is a reliable partner in economic cooperation and pays up its loans in time."<sup>56</sup>

Soviet Military aid to India is also of great significance. It was accelerated after the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962. It particularly armed India with the equipments for mountain warfare. A factory to manufacture MIG 21 jet fighters was also established. India was given light tanks, ground to-air missiles and radar equipments. By May 1964, the total Soviet military aid was of 130 million dollars which was more than the US military aid during that period. At the end of 1964 an aid of 140 million dollars was again given under which India was given 44 MIG 21, 50 ground-to-air missiles, nearly 70 light tanks and 6 sub-marines.<sup>57</sup> A ten-year loan at the rate of 2 percent interest was also given.

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If we ~~will~~ make an overall assessment, we ~~will~~ find that the Soviet aid to India increased with the changed international conditions and the changed Indian policy. It started after

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56. S. Skachkov, "Economic and Technical Cooperation between USSR and India", Vneshuyaya Torgovlya, No.3, 1975, p.13 as quoted in S.N. Komarov, op. cit., p.95.

57. New York Times, 4 August, 1965.

formation of Western military organisations as SEATO and CENTO and was intensified after its conflict with People's Republic of China. Thus through trade and aid policy USSR started playing a global role and India helped her in this.

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It is now worth our while to focus attention on some world issues where Soviet interests were directly involved. Likewise, a few major issues will be dealt with here on which India and the Soviet Union differed.

#### Hungarian Crisis

The preceding pages show the developing trends in Indo-Soviet relations and its assessment of India's foreign policy. Though the close relations between the two countries started developing from early 1950s, and continued upto 1964, there was temporary thaw in 1956, after the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Morally, India could not grasp this situation. But politically it could not oppose Soviet Union vehemently, because it was to affect their cordial relations and India was in need of Soviet help in its international and internal problems. In United Nations, when the resolutions were passed criticising Soviet intervention in Hungary and for the holding of a free election under the UN auspices, India opposed it, because it might be applied to Kashmir in future. India and other non-aligned <sup>countries</sup> moved a resolution to permit observers to enter in Hungary. This resolution was vetoed by Soviet Union

and in his criticism, Soviet delegate carefully dropped India's name. Later on, under the pressure of the internal developments in India and the West, Krishna Menon, the Indian delegate at UN cautiously criticised Soviet Union. He said: "... it is also necessary to take some effective steps which would alleviate the sufferings of the Hungarian people..."<sup>58</sup> and that the "overwhelming majority of the Hungarian people" wanted the Soviet forces to withdraw. But the Soviet delegate who spoke next to him did not refer India in its attack on US. India emphasised only the humanitarian aspect of the crisis and supported the resolutions regarding relief work and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Nehru also criticised Soviet action in Hungary. He was shocked by the execution of Imre Nagy.

This crisis helped the anti-Soviet group in India to organise and the suspicions about Soviet Union came in forefront. The Indian government tried to normalise its relations with West. On the other hand, Soviet Union, though watched the developments in India, ignored it. It did not want to strain its relations <sup>with</sup> India because that might affect its relation with Afro-Asian countries.

#### The Congo Crisis

The Congo crisis was another international issue, where India and Soviet Union had opposing attitude. But, the

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58. UN General Assembly, Official Records, 11th sess. 608th mtg. (Dec.4, 1956), p.521 ff.

leadership of both the countries, again, did not allow this difference to influence their cordial relations.

The Congo problem became an international issue due to the intervention of Belgian forces there. India and the other Afro-Asian countries wanted to present a draft resolution acceptable to all. But the U.N. initiatives failed and in February 1961 Lumumba, the Prime Minister of Congo was murdered. Though Nehru denounced the murder of Lumumba, he did not agree with the Soviet demand of withdrawal of UN forces because that might lead to a civil war. Khrushchev the Soviet Prime Minister, demanded dismissal of UN Secretary-General and he sought help of India. He wanted to replace General Secretary by a 'Troika' consisting of three persons representing East, West and the non-aligned countries. But Indian government did not respond to this demand as it believed that the UN as a whole should be blamed for this failure and there was no need for such a change. Their approach to the crisis also differed. India cooperated with the UN and contributed armed personnel. Soviet Union did not like this act of India. Soviet Union opposed the operation and described it as illegal and not authorised by the UN Charter. India held the view that financial and military aid to Congo should be channelised through the UN but Soviet Union opposed this. They threatened to give unilateral aid to Lumumba government.<sup>59</sup> In spite of these differences, they agreed that there should be no

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59. A. Stein, op. cit. p.133.

interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Congo. The struggle of the people of Congo was supported by both of them.<sup>59A</sup>

#### Disarmament

Indian and Soviet attitude differed <sup>a little</sup> regarding disarmament problem also. But mainly this ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> due to the idealistic views of Pandit Nehru and realistic steps of Khrushchev. (Discussed earlier in this Chapter).

#### CPI and Cominform

The Soviet and Indian views also differed regarding Communist Party of India and Cominform. With the independence of India in 1947, Soviet leaders fondly hoped that CPI would be in a commanding position. But this did not happen. On the other hand, due to the communist rising in Telengana and - Bengal, the Nehru government banned the party and suppressed their rising hard handedly. This act of Indian government was severely criticised by Soviet Union and articles were published in Pravda and New Times.<sup>60</sup> It gave support to the militant course persuaded by the CPI. But, with the increasing cordial relations with Indian government, the Soviet Press became less vehement to criticise the Indian government's view of CPI. Except this in 1950, the Communist Party of India was legalised by the new constitution of India. However, Nehru always maintained a difference

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60. New Times, No.3, 1949; Pravda, Feb. 27, 1949.

59A. See Sharma, op.cit.

difference between communism abroad and CPI. It is said that "the indigenous variety appears to irritate Nehru because it disrupts his regime and challenges his authority. It is ... difficult to understand how Nehru, who is so extremely careful about the sensitivity of Russian and Chinese Reds, treats their satellites and sympathizers in India with such utter contempt."<sup>61</sup> In 1954 the Preventive Detention Act was extended for next three years and many CPI members were held under this Act. In 1955 during the election campaign of Congress Party Nehru said that the Indian Communist "have no mooring in the land of their birth but always took to outside countries for inspiration and guidance." In 1956 he criticised CPI to follow a violent line and asked them to follow liberal policy like CPSU. CPI led government was formed in Kerala in 1957 but with the rising Sino-Indian dispute in 1959 it was dismissed and Presidential rule was imposed there. However, after 1959 Nehru did not criticise CPI vehemently and the 'right wing' of CPI also started favouring Nehru's foreign policy.

On the other hand, after 1950, Soviet Union gradually started supporting India's role in international affairs and stopped commenting on internal affairs of India. In 1955 when Khrushchev and Bulganin came to visit India, they did not show any special preference to CPI. In 1957 when CPI led government was formed in Kerala, it was favourably viewed by Soviet government. But 1959 when government of Kerala was dismissed, Soviet Press published a very few articles commenting on it.<sup>62</sup> After 1956, the Soviet Government began

61. D.F. Karaka, Nehru : The Lotus Eater from Kashmir, (London, 1953), p.39.

62. See Zafar Imam, (ed), Soviet View of India, 1957-75, (Kalyani publishers : Delhi. 1977), p.38.

to describe the bourgeoisie government of developing countries as "national revolutionary" and asked the local Communist Parties to cooperate the "revolutionary-nationalist" leaders.<sup>63</sup>

After the Chinese attack of India in 1962 the differences between the 'right' and 'left' wing of CPI became more prominent. Many left wing members of CPI were arrested after Sino-Indian border dispute. On Jan. 18, 1963 Pravda reported about a movement in India "to free the arrested communists, including ten members of Parliament who ... are deprived of the opportunity to take part in the opening session of Parliament on January 21."<sup>64</sup> Many articles in World Marxist Review were also published regarding Soviet Union's disliking of India government's policy.<sup>65</sup> But later on in mid-1963 most of the members of the Communist Party were released. Thus the momentary differences between India and Soviet government was for the time being not allowed to affect Indo-Soviet relations.

The Cominform was another issue where the two governments differed. Nehru occasionally criticised West for its imperialist policy but East was mainly criticised by him due to Cominform. He said "the activities of those organisations" have

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63. Richard Lowenthal, "Russia, the one Party System, and the Third World", Survey, no.58 (Jan. 1966), pp.43-58.

64. Pravda, Jan.18, 1963 as quoted in A. Stein op.cit., p.164.

65. I. Sumar, "Arrest of Communist in India and who Stands to gain", World Marxist Review, (6 Jan., 1963), p.94.



have caused a great deal of apprehension and disturbance in various countries."<sup>66</sup> In fact, Nehru did not like the interference of Soviet Union in internal affairs of other countries through Cominform and Communist Parties. In 1955 he visited Poland, Yugoslavia, Austria, Great Britain and West Germany and in every country he discussed his disliking of the Cominform, though he was not sure of Soviet non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries even after the dissolution of Cominform.<sup>67</sup>

The Cominform was founded after Second World War to organise the Communist movement of the world. It was founded on the belief that the World was divided in two groups - 'imperialist and anti-imperialist'.<sup>68</sup> The Soviet leaders minutely observed the Nehru's dislike of Cominform but they avoided any direct criticism of him. In 1956/<sup>they</sup>declared the dissolution of Cominform to meet the needs of their foreign policy in changed international situation.

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On April 18, 1956, when the Cominform was dissolved to suite <sup>(e)</sup>Soviet foreign policy in changed international conditions, <sup>(e)</sup>the New Delhi welcomed the decision and Nehru realised a "positive change" in Soviet Union.<sup>69</sup>

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66. Lok Sabha Debates, vol.7, no.31 (Sep.29, 1954), Col.3693.  
67. A. Stein, op. cit., pp.68-69.  
68. A. Zhdanov, op. cit., pp.2-4.  
69. A. Stein, op. cit., p.88

Our investigation amply shows that the Soviet Union generally took a very favourable view of Indian foreign policy after 1940s. Our investigation was based on three crucial tests. Firstly, Soviet view of India's stand on issues of World importance not strictly related to a bilateral relationship, as for example, colonialism, racialism, disarmament, Suez Crisis and Lebanese Crisis. Secondly, Soviet view of India's stand on issues directly affecting India's national interests, as Kashmir, Goa and Sino-Indian border dispute. Thirdly, Soviet view of India's stand on those issues, where the Soviet Union was directly involved or interested. While discussing these issues, we have highlighted how the community of interests between the two countries brought about identity of views. Likewise, we have also stressed how India and Soviet Union differed on some issues, yet the community of interest between the two countries continued and no damage was done either to Indo-Soviet relations or any effect was marked on favourable image of Soviet view of Indian foreign policy.

It should be thus obvious that a favourable view of India's foreign policy is based on Soviet perception of the realities of international life, its own national requirements as well as on a shrewd understanding of India's international position and domestic compulsions. Likewise, it is interesting to note that India's socio-economic conditions, particularly Nehru's critical stance on the Communist movement in India had not affected Soviet perception of Indian foreign policy.

CHAPTER IV

AN OVERVIEW

## CHAPTER IV

### AN OVERVIEW

In the previous chapters we have analysed Soviet view of different aspects of Indian foreign policy. It is now intended to sum up various Soviet compulsions of projecting a generally favourable view of Indian foreign policy and to attempt at the totality of Soviet view of Indian foreign policy, of 1947-64.

After 1940's, the community of interest of both the countries was reflected in the growing Soviet involvement in India. During early years of independence (1947-50) a state of confusion ~~was~~ marked in Soviet view of Indian foreign policy. During this phase, Soviet Asian policy was very much influenced by Soviet Policy in Europe. Therefore, India and other newly independent countries were not given due importance and their role in changed international conditions was not fully realised.

A gradual change was evident in Soviet view of Indian foreign policy during and after the Korean war, when India and the Soviet Union demanded the representation of socialist China in the UN. Even during the life time of Stalin, this change was marked. After the death of Stalin, his successors encouraged this trend of Soviet foreign policy and tried for a close relationship with India and for a better understanding

of India's foreign policy and its socio-economic developments. This change was clearly marked by the visit of India, Burma and Afghanistan by Khrushchev and Bulganin and counter visit of Nehru and U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma. Moreover, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, President Sukarno of Indonesia, Shah of Persia and many other leaders from the developing countries also visited the USSR.

After the 20th Congress of CPSU, this new trend in Soviet foreign policy was given a theoretical framework and the theory of different roads to socialism and the objective of peaceful co-existence became the guiding principles of the Soviet view of the developing world.

During the fifties and early sixties, India received unreserved support from the Soviet Union for different problems directly affecting her. In 1957 and 1962 the USSR cast veto in favour of India when the West sponsored resolutions regarding plebiscite in Kashmir were presented in the UN Security Council. It also vetoed Security Council's draft resolution regarding military take over of Goa (as discussed in Chapter III). Soviet aid to industrialisation programme of India's public sector gave India a sound footing to bargain with the West. Again, India's trade relations with the Soviet Union gave her an outlet for the export of finished and industrial goods.

India was given economic, political and military help to maintain its non-aligned policy and to check its drift

towards the West. The USSR appreciated many Indian moves in international sphere and tried to support them in various international forums, as India was generally critical of the West and held anti-imperialist views on various international issues as Cold War, formation of military blocs by the West in Asia and elsewhere, Suez Crisis and Lebanese Crisis (as discussed in Chapter III).

But there was a 'thaw' in this favourable view after the Hungarian Crisis. The Hungarian Crisis in its later part was criticised by Indian ~~Khrushchev~~ Prime-Minister Nehru and Krishna Menon, the Indian delegate in the UN. Nehru also indulged in criticising Soviet socialism. So, he was in turn severely criticised by Soviet Indologists (like Academician Yudin). This was perhaps the result of the Hungarian uprising and in the Soviet Union ~~and~~ the policy of liberalisation was slowed down.

During early sixties they again differed on Congo issue (discussed in Chapter III). Moreover, there were confusions and differences among them regarding Indian government's policy towards Cominform and Nehru's stance on Communist movement in India. Nehru also did not like the resumption of Nuclear testing at the time of Belgrade Conference (1961).

But, inspite of these differences, continuity of the appreciation of Indian foreign policy was maintained by the Soviet Union. Nehru's criticism of some internal and external developments in the Soviet Union were largely ignored by Khrushchev. In the UN also they avoided direct criticism of India. Moreover,

(not ?)  
Khrushchev was always careful to express a <sup>critical</sup> opinion on internal development of India, although his ~~progresses~~ <sup>likes</sup> were known. To weaken the pro-West elements in India, Soviet aid, trade and political support was given to India. He also utilised all the chances to show his sympathy with India.

In order to understand the nature of Soviet interest in Indian foreign policy and Soviet appreciation of India's role in world affairs, it is worthwhile to sum up their reasons.

Indian foreign policy was viewed by <sup>the</sup> Soviet Union as a model for Third World countries. It had become an important unit in East-West confrontation. Moreover, the complex socio-economic structure of India was paid enough attention, as this was to affect the foreign policy motives and its projection (as discussed in Chapter II).

Not that the Soviet leadership had not realised that India's socio-economic development is not to their liking. In fact, behind appreciative references to India's economic progress, one can easily see in Soviet writings on the subject a critical stance on complex process of India's socio-economic development. This however is not our concern in this study. Suffice ~~have~~ to point out that inspite of their less favourable view of India's internal development during the period under study,<sup>1</sup> the Soviet leadership continued to view Indian foreign

1. For details see <sup>Zafar Iqbal</sup> Soviet View of India, 1957-75, Kalyani Publishers; Delhi, 1977.

policy much more favourably. In fact, as the internal development in India became more problematic and complex, Soviet appreciation of India foreign policy continued to register a sharp rise. From the base year of 1947, the graph continues to rise reaching its apex by the time Nehru died.

However, Soviet cooperation and appreciation of the foreign policy postures of the 'bourgeois' government of India may be considered as a short-term goal. The long-term goal of the Soviet Union is claimed to be the establishment of a Socialist system in India. By the very nature of contemporary International environment, the Soviet leadership shrewdly put emphasis on the short-term goal and reacted accordingly. As a short term goal, an appreciation of India foreign policy appears to have a top priority.

Needless to add that Soviet view of Indian foreign policy was also influenced by geo-political factors as well as by Soviet perception of its own national requirements. India being a neighbouring country with vast potentials, obviously attracted involved attention from the Soviet Union. Soviet interest appears to see India free of Western military alliances, and later to encourage containment of China; likewise it wanted help in a creation of such socio-economic conditions in India through aid and trade so as to generate more consolidation to its traditional foreign policy postures.



We may thus conclude that Indian foreign policy during the period under study was viewed by the Soviet Union as a foreign policy of a friendly country having many internal problems of change and development. It is perhaps this favourable view which had provided sanction to the continuity of Soviet interest in India and its rising level of commitments to India's problems of economic development and social change. It may also be noted that such a favourable view transcended differences in their social system and emphasised the community of this interest, on vital issues of the contemporary world.

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