

AHMADIYYA COMMUNITY IN PAKISTAN POLITICS

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
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DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled
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submitted for the award of an M.Phil. degree in this
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work.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan attained nationhood in the name of Islam. It was the much frenzied reference to Islam being in danger alongwith the portrayal of differences between, Hindus and Muslims, that paid rich dividends to Muslim League. The emotional exploitation in the name of religion, further encouraged by Britishers' to promote their vested interest to divide and rule, this enabled the Muslim League to attain its cherished dream of separate nation for Muslims. After the initial euphoria of independence, the interpretation of Islam in new state became problematic. The Western educated leaders' had the vision of Islamic democracy on the lines of western liberal democracy, whereas to the fundamentalist it was a return to roots of Muhammadan era of Muslim glory. The confusion between Islamic tenets of statehood and ideals of western liberal democracy, continues. According to Aziz Ahmad, "To the western educated leaders, the creation of Pakistan and its external Islamic personality was enough but from the pressure of the traditionalist and fundamentalist they had to retreat during the process of constitution making to a position whereby Pakistan became laboratory of Islamic principle".¹

1 Aziz Ahmad, 'Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964' (London, 1967), p. 157.

The result of this has been reflected in Pakistan polity, where religion has come to play a dominant role in the political sphere. Under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism, the proper definition of rights of Muslim and non-Muslim has gained greater significance, more so in case of the Ahmadis, who by law have been declared minority on the basis of Islamic ideology.

The Ahmadis, are a group of people, who follow the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian. Mirza was born in 1835 to a wealthy noble family. He began his early career as an officer in Sialkot. The turning point in his life came after the mutiny, in 1857/^{he} took up the cause of Muslims who were suspected by Britishers. By 1882 Mirza claimed to have received divine revelation and in 1889 he declared himself to be a prophet.² Mirza, during his life time itself, became a controversial figure. The Muslims regarded him to be an imposter, a brain child of British imperialism, used to divide Muslims and crush, the Islamic resurgence. They looked upon Mirza's claim to prophethood and his pro-British attitude as part of this dubious plan.

The Ahmadis due to their pro-British attitude were able to benefit economically. They took to western

2 H.A. Walter, The Ahmadiyya Movement (Calcutta, 1918), p. 12.

education and adopted western way of life much earlier than their Muslim counterparty. As a result they gained social standing. Due to the closed attitude of the sect they were able to maintain their social cohesion even after independence. With partition Ahmadis moved over to Pakistan but they did not lose their integrity.

After independence Pakistan claimed itself to be an Islamic State, as it came into existence in the name of Islam. The Ahmadis ^{who} were regarded as heretics ^{were hated.} Furthermore they were better off economically and socially, but their role in independence struggle was pro-British and pro-Congress. This gave an opportunity to the fundamentalist to create mistrust in minds of people against Ahmadis. The propaganda against the Ahmadis was undertaken by their most sworn enemies; the Ahrars. This propaganda led to an agitation against Ahmadis, and the anti Ahmadiyya agitation started gaining ground from 1949 which intensified into riots of 1953.

The agitation which was suppressed during 1953 resurfaced again in 1974. The demand of the religious parties remained same i.e. to declare Ahmadis 'Non-Muslim' on the basis of Islamic ideology. "Finally Pakistan National Assembly in September, 1974, with constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis as non-Muslim minority".³

3 The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 8th September, 1974.

The Ahmadiyya problem in Pakistan became complex due to various reasons - in the religious sphere there has been the need to define properly who is a Muslim, and what is the criteria to define a Muslim and how Islam defines apostasy. Politically, the Ahmadiyya controversy has been manipulated by fundamentalist to gain political mileage. Socially, there had been more spill-over to the problem; Ahmadis who were a closed sect were pushed further within their own fold.

In order to understand this problem alongwith the prospect of Ahmadiyya community within Pakistani politics it is necessary to understand the meaning of minorities and of their classification. In order to understand the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic State as Pakistan claims itself to be, one has to briefly deal with what Islam has to say about State and Statehood alongwith rights it guarantees to a non-Muslim.

To begin with, the term 'minority' has been vigorously used as a result ^{it} needs proper definition. 'Minority' can be defined as a distinct ethnic group with individual, national and cultural character, which is dominated by an other group and which is viewed by the later as a particular expression of rights of own individuality. There also exist national minorities which actually constitute the ruling privileged group

within a State. The current usage has restricted the application of term 'Minority' to those who are in defensive position".⁴ The problem of minority developed with the development of modern nation states.

A minority has been defined as an "aggregation of people whose distinguishing features concerning their race, religion, language or ethnic orientation, marks them to be a distinct class in contradiction to majority groups".⁵

For practical purposes, the term 'Minority' can not be explained simply by interpreting the word in literal sense. Generally minority is thought to be the opposite of majority. In democratic State it is based on numerical ratio to the population as a whole. The group often defined as 'minority' consist of individuals who have sense of likeness, and a sense of one-feeling. The minority problem or minority groups arise only when groups have contact with one another, and out of this feeling of divergence that these groups arise.

There can be no more a minority in itself or in socio-political reality than there is in civil or parliamentary law. There are only minority because

4 Definition of Minority, Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.

5 A.K. Buzhi, Muslim Communities in Non-Muslim State (London, 1980), p. 30.

their are majority in a relationship that can vary.

The minority groups are placed in the minority position due to its relationship by force, with the majority group and often it is the will of the group not to assimilate with majority that helps define their identity.

Laponce has categorized this relationship into two groups - (a) minority by will : who themselves do not want to assimilate with majority, (b) minority by force: who are forced by majority to accept their minority status.⁶

A minority is a group specifically dominated, established in a situation of dependence or inferiority by act of power that designates, categorizes and removes any group which can thus be placed in minority status.⁷

A minority is a social entity because it is a collective being, a group which manifests itself in collective subjectivity. "There is only a minority because there is a group dominated by majority. The minority group possesses an internal life structured by its own relationship of force. The norms, internal to

6 Md. Ghulam Kabir, Minority Politics in Bangladesh (Delhi, 1980), p.22.

7 Gerard Chelland, Minority Peoples in Age of Nation State (London, 1989), p. 40.

minority, plays an essential role in the process that maintained it as an unit. These norms derived from social relation, instituted in a group, necessarily express the contradiction underlying the organisation of the group".⁸ In the scientific point of view the "term minority includes many elements; which are changeable both in contents and in degree of intensity".⁹

It has been observed that the term minority is more frequently used for communities with certain characteristic like ethnic, cultural or religious and it always possesses an organisation of the community. The members of such community have a feeling of separate national group or sub-group which is different from the majority group, which is politically dominant.

In order to classify any group to be a minority five distinct features can be seen :

- (a) A minority group is subordinated to a social group, its members suffer disadvantage resulting from prejudices, discrimination, segregation and persecution.
- (b) The members of the minority group have their own physic, culture, dialect etc. which the dominant group holds at low esteem.

8 Ibid., p. 45.

9 Satish Chandra, ed., Minorities in National and International Law (New Delhi, 1985), p. 96.

- (c) The members of minority group identify themselves as a part of the group.
- (d) Membership in a minority group is usually not voluntary rather it is by birth.
- (e) Members of minority have strong bond of unity.¹⁰

The term minority has been defined under the charter of United Nation by two criteria.

(a) Objective: The objective criteria makes reference within a state population of distinct group possessing stable ethnic religious or linguistic characteristic that differs sharply from those of rest of the population. Secondly it deals with numerical size of the group. Third objective criteria consist of non-dominant position of the group. Fourth and last objective criteria concerns the judicial status of members of the group in relation to state of residence.

Subjective: The subjective criteria can be defined as a will on part of the member of group in question to pressure their own characteristic.¹¹ The subjective criteria is implicit basic is the Objective criteria. The term minority has been classified into various groups.

10. Ibid.

11. Ben-Whitaker, ed., 'Minorities' - A Question of Human Rights (New York, 1984), pp. 1-10.

There can be ethnic, national, linguistic and religious minorities. In the conventional sense if we see, the minorities are basically of two types - (a) ethnic minorities : who are sub-group within the culture, (b) religious minorities : who are distinguished from dominant group in principle by their ideas and ideology.

The term national minorities came into use in order to describe particular social position of some people in relation to rest of the population alongwith the modern conception of political nation. It included the belief that it was to serve the interest of particular nationality, the smaller group within the boundaries of the nation came to be known as minorities. On the other hand race is a biological category, "the people of a given race have inherited physical features that distinguishes them from any other race, people of certain races are discriminated against other and they become racial minority".¹²

Like national minorities, "Linguistic minorities are differentiated on the basis of language and also possesses distinctive cultural traits, but religious minorities are members of certain small sects who have broken away from the main religious stream or who profess

12 Arnold M. Rose and Caroline B. Rose, ed., Minority Problems (New York, 1965), pp. 3-4.

different religion from declared state religion or from the religion professed by majority".¹³

The religious minority in the west have been assimilated to large extent because of the breakdown of the religious institution as a dominant institution, but the areas where religion is a preponderant factor, religious institution plays a dominant role, as in case of Pakistan, The religious minority has a well defined character, structure and stamina, result of which complicated problem arise for solution.

The question of minorities, their status and the position of non-Muslim in an Islamic State has always been controversial. This has been reflected in case of Pakistan, which claims to be an Islamic State. In Pakistan religion has come to play a dominant role in life of its people. Failure of the leaders to define religion in proper terms has given the ulema a free hand to exploit religion in their favour. This has given birth in Pakistan, the problem of proper definition of a Muslim and non-Muslims more so it has been reflected in the Ahmadis problem. The Ahmadis have been declared non-Muslims by law but they claim themselves to be true Muslims. In order to understand this problem which

13 Ibid., pp. 5-7.

involves the Ahmadiyya community, it is necessary to understand how Islam has defined minorities and how it has dealt with non-Muslims.

Islam has vividly dealt about non Muslims and the right a non-Muslim is guaranteed to. Islam was a religion of Arabian society, so it touches all aspect of it. As Islam was a religion of a society it carried much of its practise within its fold. "In tribal Arabia the stronger tribe protected the weaker one and this practice was carried on in relation to non-Muslim in an Islamic State. Members of Islamic State who do not embrace Islam are not according to Islamic law to be deprived of life property or freedom of religion".¹⁴

"Islam recognises three categories of human beings - (a) Muslims, (b) protected people, (c) Polythesist or Pagan's. With the third category ^{of} people there can be no compromise but the second category of people who believe in god, in last day of judgement and prophets are to be accorded tolerance and protection in Islamic State."¹⁵

Under the parpet of Islam the world religion is divided into two main classes - (a) Universalist religion

14 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 1968), p. 49.

15 A. Hourani, Minorities in Arab World (London, 1980), p. 14.

(Christianity and Bhuddhism) and (b) ethnic religion (Hinduism and Judaism). The universalist religion condemns non believer to eternal doom in hell and ethnic religion condemns a non believer in two ways, religiously and socially. On the other hand Islam claims to recognise non believers in three distinct levels -

(a) Humanism : At first Islam believes that all men are born with one or other religion which is true, genuine and valid and all men are creation of god.

(b) Islam believes in revelation and believes that all men are sent a messenger to guide them and believes that non-Muslims are equal. (c) On third account Islam identifies with historical revelation of Christianity and Judaisim and acknowledges the prophet of two religion and accepts them as their own.

There are two basic authority on which rights and obligation of a non-Muslim is decided - (a) Quran and (b) Sunnah : the practise of prophet. The Quran speaks of division of mankind into groups and communities and differences of manners and customs, beliefs and practices among different people. Islam maintains that religious and social differences are due to influence of historical, geographical and ethnological factors and traditions which work in minds of different people.¹⁶

16 Journal of Institute of Muslim Minorities Affairs, The Concept of Al phimah and Rights and Duties of Dhimis in Islamic State (London), vol. 9, July 1988, p. 37.

According to Islam prophet was sent to every people and conversion through coercion or any other means should not be undertaken. The Quran categorically lays down that there is no compulsion in Islam.

Islam has preached all Muslims to give protection to all non-Muslims who seek protection from them. It maintains that apart from war Muslims cannot under any circumstances abuse the deities of non-Muslims. It further forbids Muslims, who through divine revelation are instructed not to revile God's and Goddesses, whom other people worship.

"Islam classifies non Muslims into two groups - belligerent foes and peaceful non Muslims. The former include those who are out to destroy Muslims and Islam; or are the citizen of Islamic state who support and make common cause with the enemies of Muslims and create disturbance in the State. Peaceful non-Muslim, are those ^{non-} Muslims who live at peace with Muslims and do not contemplate any harm. The Quran forbids the Muslims to be friendly with their mortal enemies of life and property. As for peaceful non Muslim neighbours, the Muslims are required to deal kindly. Those non Muslims who make common cause with Muslims and fight as one nation, shall form a nation with Muslims".¹⁷

17 Dr. Shaik Ghulam Maqsood, Islamic Attitude Towards Non-Muslim (Rajshahi, 1952), pp. 40-52.

"The non Muslim subjects of Muslim state particularly those coming under security undertaking are called ahl adh-dhimma".¹⁸ The relationship of non Muslims with the ruler was regulated by contract. Once the non Muslim community is incorporated in domain of Islam; under special condition of contract, which provided for the tolerance of dhimmi and allows him to follow his religion.

While the system was primarily a political one, it was always assumed that the minority group was homogeneous in respect of religion. "The privilege of being a protected minority was only given to communities which follow a messenger or prophet, they are known as ahl-ah kitabi; (the people of book) they had much of the equality status along with Muslims".¹⁹

The non-Muslims are outside the full community of state. Since in the principle the state is theocratic they have to face certain disabilities; they must pay special tax and are not allowed to carry arms or give evidence against the Muslim on Court of Law or marry Muslim women.

18 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 1968), p. 49.

19 Ibid., p. 87.

Zakat which is the surplus property tax levied on the Muslims for the welfare of the state, it is not levied on non Muslims. Rather they have to pay a tax called Jizya which was taken in return for the protection given to them and in lieu of military service, and full protection given to dhimmis. The non Muslims who serve in the army are exempted from the payment of Jizya, the non Muslim is inferior to the Muslims.

Islam provides for the protection of religious institutions of non Muslims and they are allowed to follow their religion and perform their religious rights in Islamic state. The non Muslim are granted equality under law in par with Muslims. The poor and helpless non Muslims are exempted from Jizya.

In an Islamic state according to A. Hourani population is divided into two - (a) believers - Muslims and (b) People who believe in their own revealed book.²⁰

Since Islamic state is ideological state, the administration is entrusted in hands of Muslims and in order to protect the state and extend its boundaries military service is compulsory for able bodied Muslims. The Islamic state guarantees full liberty of conscience, protection of property, life and freedom of religious beliefs, to the non Muslims. It also provides full

20 A. Hourani, Minorities in Arab World (London, 1980), p. 17.

opportunity for growth of their culture, and tradition. Ismail Faruqi maintains, "The non muslim are not obliged to protect an Islamic state but are required to pay the tax called Jizya for their protection".²¹ The Islamic state neither protects or helps a non believer of god and it is at perpetual war with godless cult. The non Muslims can hold public office and engage in economic enterprise as long as security and welfare of Ummah (Muslim Community) do not depend on him.

Islam claims to be a religion giving equality to the non muslims but in reality a non Muslim suffers from legal disadvantage. Non Muslims are not dealt as separate citizens but as a separate community. They have the rights of protected community and they cannot hold the office of responsibility and as such they have the status of inferior subject.

With the brief discussion about non Muslim within the fold of Islam it has become clear that a non muslim is ^{treated as} ~~an~~ inferior subject in the Islamic state but the question that arises is about the Islamic state as to ^{what} ~~it~~ means and how Islam has dealt with state-craft? What has been the ideals of Islamic statehood, which has led to a debate about an Islamic state in Pakistan

21 Syed Abdul Quddus, Islamic Polity in Modern Times (Lahore, 1987), p. 97.

giving the fundamentalist ^{the right to} persecute the Ahmadis and declare them non-Muslims on the basis of Islam.

In Islam, religion is not separated from politics. An Islamic state cannot be isolated from society because Islam is an integrated way of life, and the state is the political expression of Islamic society. In narrow perspective the relationship between religion and politics is linked with state power. "Within Islam both state and society has to differentiate between right and wrong, truth and falsehood and Halal and Haram (Prohibited and permitted things)".²²

"The word Islam is an Arabic word it is a two root word one 'Salm' meaning peace and other 'Silm' meaning submission. Islam stands for commitment to surrender one's will to the will of God and thus to be at peace with the creator and with all that has been created by him. It is through the submission to will of the God that peace is brought about".²³

The state under Islam is organized in accordance to revelation of god. The concept of state in Islam is altogether different from present day concept of state

22 S.B. Choudhury, The Profile of Islamic State (Dhaka, 1984), p. 9.

23 G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (Essex, 1988), p. 7.

in modern times. "The basis of Islamic state is the Quran, it is neither a treaty of state or of politics but a guide of action; it gives reference about authority which is of organized life. It teaches the dignity of man, social equality of mankind."²⁴ The Islamic State is bound to protect the interest and rights of individual in the state.

Islam is much more than just a political system, which by very nature is limited. Islam is not merely religion in narrow import. There is no dichotomy between the temporal and spiritual structure of Islam. Under this system the state forms the integral part at the apex. Islam presents a whole reality to men. The concept of Islamic state is a state patterned on socio,-moral and religio-political principles of Islam.

"In the Muslim view the source of the rulers authority is neither his predecessor, nor people but God and since God is the sole source of authority, it is He who delegates and empowers the head of the state. He is the sole source of law," According to Bernard Lewis, 'In Islamic state the sovereignty belongs to God, the all mighty Allah, but it does not mean that the laws are made by God rather in an Islamic state the law is to be made by

24. Syed Anwarul Haq - Haqqi, Contemporary Relevance of Quranic Concept of State, Islam and Modern Age (Delhi), May 1988, pp. 932-45.

people in accordance to Quran.²⁵

The first characteristic of the Islamic state, according to the Holy Quran, is fraternity, all muslim belong to one 'Ummah'. Secondly the Islamic state guarantees equality but the equality granted is not absolute equality. It gives equality before law of civic rights and obligation of state. The third characteristic is liberty, the greatest character of individual liberty is involved in 'Kalima'. A Muslim is free, he is not required to obey any other authority except God i.e. he is free within the prescribed wall of the 'Sheriah'. The fourth characteristic of Islamic state is justice; which in an Islamic state is impartial. According to the Islamic notion the head of the Islamic state has two fold function i.e. positive and negative. His positive function relates to establishment of state and negative function consists of punishment to evil doers. The last characteristic of the state is that from the Khalifa to an ordinary citizen, each is doubly responsible i.e. to God and some earthly authority.²⁶

25 Bernard Lewis, Islam and Political Movements, Middle East Review, Summer 1985, pp. 47-60.


26 Syed Abdul Quddus, Islamic Polity in Modern Times (Lahore, 1987), p. 154.

In the Islamic state and society individual is under restraint put by the 'Holy Quran'. The individual and society exist in mutual complementation. Individuals' welfare at the cost of society is not regarded as a welfare, though Islam allows full freedom but not unlicensed freedom.

"In Islamic concept Allah is all supreme and everything in earth and heavens belong to him. Men and women derive their strength from God".²⁷ The society and state is founded on the principle of supremacy of divine sovereign along with the injunctions of Holy Quran and teachings of Prophet Muhammad. It is not a monopoly of class neither is it a product of class struggle or of supremacy of individual and group. Rather it can be seen as crystallization of political ideals of people belonging to same religion and thought.

According to Omar Asghar Khan, "the Islamic state is built upon five fundamental criteria, (a) belief in one Allah, (b) compulsory prayer's five times a day, as religion is integral part of Islamic state, (c) one month of compulsory fasting during the month of Ramzan by Muslim population, (d) performance of Haj by able and wealthy, (e) payment of Zakat (Welfare Tax)

27 S.B. Choudhury, The Profile of Islamic State (Dhaka, 1984), p. 14.



by the Muslim population.²⁸

The Quran also lays down that no person can acquire the right to rule over others by virtue of hereditary succession. It teaches that government is a trust, which should be committed to care for people. The scriptures have limited the power of those in authority and have subjected them to discipline. The exercise of authority on proper occasion and in a subtle manner is no favour shown to the people but is only discharge of trust imposed upon those in whom the authority is vested.

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The ideological foundation of the state lies in the doctrine of Tawhid (the unity of god) and of human life, as comprehensive and exclusive programme of worship. Secondly it believes in Rishala (prophethood) and lastly has the basis of Quran.²⁹

The Islamic state is not a secular state neither is it a nationalist state, nor is it absolute or sovereign entity. Rather it is subjected to higher norms which represents the will of god. The state is not primordial. The primary institution in Islam, the form of government

28 Omar Asghar Khan, Islam and State, Viewpoint (Lahore), April 26, 1984, p. 30.

29 Hassan Turabi, The Islamic State, in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York, 1983), p. 157.

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is determined by foregoing principle of Tawhid. The government is bound to exercise all power necessary for providing a minimum basic condition of Muslim life. The actual scope of government depends on society.

The Islamic state is constructed in three stages - (a) the movement of Hagra when prophetic power emerged, (b) the second was after the seige of Medina when the power gradually acquired the principal attributes of state and its geographical basis expanded through Arabia, (c) lastly with the death of prophet and under Abu Bakr when the Islamic state demonstrated the power to crush the dissident forces.³⁰

The evolution of Islamic state took place in and around Mecca. Muhammad was the executive head, the legislator and jurist, but the state so founded by the prophet was not a theocratic state. Few months after his arrival to Medina he drew up a constitution and sought to rearrange political life.

The new Muslim community that came into existence, introduced a pattern of social organization based on religious solidarity which sought to replace the tribal

30 Richeem Diyat, Origin of Islamic State, in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari, ed., Islam State and Society (Riverdate, 1988), p. 74.

solidarity, but the tribal solidarity and morality had its own place in the community. "Islam became a basis of civil society that came into existence with its spread in Arabia. It found its ultimate expression in development of Ummah".³¹

The state was ideological state based on Islamic principle which permeated to every aspect of socio economic and political life. The prophet was religious as well as temporal head of the state, he was the chief communicator of God's law, he regulated social relation and passed law in light of the Quran and enforced them.

The state had a decision making body called Mala'a (Senate) which looked after the governmental function. The member of Mala'a were tribal chiefs as a result the decision undertaken was unanimous.³² In early Islamic days there was nothing like a state machinery. Muhammad was accepted as a supreme arbiter and service of the state was voluntary.

The state was based on general Islamic concepts and values laid down in Quran and it seeks to guide mens spiritual and worldly affairs as Islam is regarded

31 Mahmud A. Faksh, Islamic State System, Islamic Quarterly, 1984, p. 96.

32 Ashghar Ali Engineer, The Islamic State (New Delhi, 1980), p. 20.

as 'deen wa duniya'.³³ The Muslim state adhered to such lofty principles and practices as the rule of law, brotherhood and equality in name of Allah.

After the death of prophet the mode of succession acquired a significance in developing Islamic political and constitutional theory. The state took a proper shape under Khalifa Umar, who was able to capture the large area and bring people under his rule. In running the affairs of the state the Khalifa adhered to the dictates of Quran and Sunnah. There was a basic difference between authority of the prophet and Khalifa. "Unlike the prophet, Khalifa was not transmitter of divine law because transmission and revelation ended with the death of prophet".³⁴ Khalifa Umar who gave a proper shape to ~~the~~ ^{He} state, increased the avenues of trade, and introduced many socio-economic reforms apart from maintaining the tribal policy of equal distribution of wealth and a proper succession policy was laid down.

The tax of Zakat, the concept of charity, which was introduced by prophet was made permanent by Umar and it became a part of state treasury. He also introduced the land revenue system. The Khalifa established

33 Mahmud A. Fakh, The Islamic State System, Islamic Quarterly, Fall 1984, p. 97.

34 Ibid., p. 98.

a separate police service under the 'Shaib al Ahadha' (the chief of police). The function of the chief was to keep watch over weights and measures, preventing construction of house on public roads and enforce prohibition. He also organized the judicial services, he appointed a chief Qadi and number of Qadis under him. According to him justice was an important duty. He maintained a standing army as initially the armed service was voluntary. But Umar brought a decisive change in defence when he introduced regular salaries for soldiers and officers.

It was under Umar that true Islamic state developed in full form. The Islamic republic lasted for 30 years after the prophet's death. With death of Ali and the massacre at Karbala new development took place in Islamic world.

The Islamic state had its origin in the general principle of Quran and Sunnah. The dynamic view of Islam and Islamic state is certainly in agreement of doctrine of Ijtihad which enables learned ^{men to make} independent judgement about the application of Islamic principle in varying situations.

With the gradual pace of time two characteristic attempts at evolving a theory of state has become famous -

(a) the sociological inquiry of IBN Khaldun and (b) philosophical study of Al Farabi. According to IBN Khaldun sources of communal happiness is the economic and social factor which is necessary for man to develop his potential but Al Farabi maintained that the ideal state represents the optimal combination of conditions conducive to full community life.³⁵

In the present century Maulana Maududi tried to give an interpretation of Islamic state which according to him could be the basis of Pakistan. Though there was no clear concept of state in Islamic theology, he made an extraordinary attempt to define state in accordance to Islamic orientation.

According to him the word 'din' is approximately synonymous with modern connotation of state submission to and obedience of a sovereign authority by the people. It is the basis of the state and also basis of 'din'. The true 'din' is when man submits to the authority of Allah. All those who submit themselves to the authority of God are welded into a community and that is how the Ummah comes into existence. According to him the Islamic state is an ideological state.

35 Ilse Lichtenstadter, Islam and Modern Age (New York, 1958) p. 110.

Dealing with the legislation in Islamic state he maintained that the Shariat is divided into two parts; one is permanent and other subjected to modification. The permanent one is important to the Islamic social order and is the characteristic feature of its culture. The second part of the Islamic law is flexible according to the needs of ever-expanding human society. At every age the law has been evolved.

The political system in Islam is according to Maududi, based on three principles viz. Tawhid (unity of god), Risalah (prophethood) and Khalifa (representative). Tawhid means that one God alone is the creator, the medium through which we receive the law is Risalah and the Khalifa maintains law through representation.³⁶ The aim and purpose of this state is to establish, maintain and develop those virtues with which the creator of the universe wishes the human life to be adorned with.

Maududi tried to give an interpretation of state in accordance to Islamic orientation and theology, in co-relation with modern state system. Maududi was an orthodox fundamentalist. To him it was Islam which was all prevailing and he failed to interpret state in secular terms.

36 Ibid., p. 244.

With the proper analysis of the Islamic state it has become clear that politics and religion in Islam are inseparable, so is power and religion inseparable. The religion of God cannot play the role of royal opposition, and there can be no authority against Islam. It is the state as well as government, as the state serves the cause of Islam. It is an willing instrument of God in His design. The Muslim politics of early days rarely acted without explicit reference to Islam and their rulers invariably styled themselves as protector of Islam.³⁷

With the passage of time the Quranic concept of supernational state which was essentially republican, lost its essence as a doctrine and degenerated into authoritarian system.

This gave birth to the problem, whereby the conservative section of Ulema in name of Islamising the state have tried to establish their hegemony over the state apparatus. Much of the debate appears to be misplaced as there can be little doubt that state by very nature is an institution that is neither externally given nor divinely ordained and since the state is a social institution with economic roots, the state cannot

37 Martin Kramer, Political Islam (London, 1980), p. 57.

be called Islamic though its inhabitants may be Muslims. By invoking the concepts of Islamic state and defining it in accordance with their own interpretation certain section of Ulema aim at establishing their political hegemony. In upholding the principle of sovereignty, which belongs to God and not vested in people these elements attribute, themselves the right to exercise power on behalf of God and thus they try to monopolise power into one autocrat.

The Islamic state has been classified differently either into divinely ordained based on Quranic principle and Sunnah or as a social institution, but Islam along with its varied interpretation has been used by conservative section of people to establish their hegemony. Islam deals with society and also gives various laws to establish an ideal state, but the laws and guidelines of Islam were meant to bring the warring tribes of Arabia together to form composite normal society. Islam in present days is a religion like all other religions which guides man morally but to use Islamic law as a guideline to develop modern day society is nothing but an exercise to develop an autocratic society.

In the subsequent chapter it will be analysed how Pakistan has used Islam and what has been the result of this? Has it been able to develop into an ideal Islamic

state or has Islam been misinterpreted and used by certain section of leaders to maintain their dominance within the country. The chapters will attempt to analyse the Ahmadiyya controversy which is based on religion.

Chapter II

THE AHMADIYYA COMMUNITY

Pakistani political arena has been dominated by religious controversies. Religion has been used by all leaders in some way or other in order to maintain themselves in power, even the modernist leaders had to concede certain demands of the fundamentalists in the Objective Resolution of 1949, and since then religion has come to play a vital role in the Pakistani political life. In this arena dominated with religion the Ahmadiyya controversy has been a major weapon in the hands of fundamentalist leaders to maintain their status, position and power and in certain cases it has helped them to stage major upsets in the political life. In order to study further how Ahmadiyya community and the controversies around it have affected the Pakistani political life giving conservatives the liberty to persecute them in the name of Islam, it has become necessary to understand who the Ahmadis are and why are they being discriminated against.

This chapter deals with the historical evolution of Ahmadiyya community and how they interpret Islam, what is the organizational and socio-economic structure of their society, what are their differences with the mainstream Muslims. It also deals with Ahmadis

political life and the Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy in the pre-partition days.

Islam travelled to India alongwith the Arab traders, and gradually with the establishment of the Slave Dynasty Islam became a state religion. The rulers in order to propagate Islam undertook ruthless measures. This yielded benefit and Muslim population increased within the Indian subcontinent and Islam became a major religion. With gradual passage of time emperor Akbar tried to interpret Islam into a particular fashion so as to represent the Indian subcontinent, as most Muslims were converts and had carried their beliefs and traditions along with them. The most perenial problem in Islam was interpretation. With the advent of Aurangzeb's rule came the traditional theological interpretation of Islam, which advocated harsh measures against Hindus and this became the most important reason for the downfall of the Mughal empire.¹

With the coming of British, the Mughals lost all their valour and pride. The Muslim population stood disintegrated, divided and dismantled from the seat of power. After the mutiny of 1857 they lost all hope to

1 Freeland Abbott, 'Islam and Pakistan' (New York, 1968), p. 360.

recapture the power, and the Muslim population became more disintegrated than ever before.

Out of this disintegrated Muslim population developed the controversial sect of Islam, known as Ahmadiyya's. They are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, who has been regarded as a modernist by many writers mainly because they maintained, he realised that in order to develop, the Muslim population had to adopt the Western education and its life style.

Ahmadiyya movement emerged in Punjab in contrast to urban movement. It emerged as a rural movement. Mirza was born on 13th February 1835 in Qadian. He was the son of Ghulam Murtaza and Charag bibi. He belonged to a noble family with royal lineage of the Mughals. The ancestral family of Mirza owned extensive estate in the area of Qadian. They ruled Qadian until they were driven out by the Sikhs during the reign of Ranjit Singh. "It was not until 1818 that his father Ghulam Murtaza and his uncle returned to Qadian. They joined the army of Ranjit Singh and served him with utter devotion and faithfulness. This made Ranjit Singh restore five villages from his ancestral property to Ghulam Murtaza".²

2 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyya Movement History and Perspective (Delhi, 1974), p. 164.

With the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 the Sikhs' power came to an end and the British rule extended over Punjab. As a ruling power before the British, the Sikhs were in minority, concentrated in Lahore and Amritsar. With the rise of British power, came the important pillars of their maintenance; the Zamindari and aristocracy. The family of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad fell in this category, who were favoured by British to foster their vested interest i.e. to rule.

It is claimed, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad did not have a normal childhood, his father had an unhappy marriage and he spent his life and money to regain his ancestral property which was lost to Sikhs. In this attempt too he was unsuccessful.

The depressing family environment probably provided the impetus to Ghulam Ahmad to follow religion and devote his time to theological studies.

Ghulam Ahmad received his early education from the village teacher Fazal Ilahi, who taught him Quran and few elementary books in Persian. At the age of 17 he began his education with Shia tutor Gul Ali Shah of Batala.³ In his youth, though Mirza liked to live

3 Maulana Mohammad Ali, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian (Lahore, 1963), p. 66.

in solitude and hated the worldly pursuit, he had to, "under the instructions of his father, undertake the management of his land".⁴

The early years of Ahmad's encounter with worldly life included experience of mutiny in 1857. His father enrolled many men in the service of the Queen. Later Ghulam Ahmad joined the service of the Crown as the reader in the Court of Sialkot. In Sialkot Ahmad came in contact with Hindu and Christian missionaries. With this contacts he came to realise the ulterior motives of Christian missionaries. But he did not protest as he was impressed by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan who was a great friend of the Britishers. After Sayyid Khan's publication of Tafsir he rejected the Aligarh position because of his apologetical attitude. Dejected by Sayyid Ahmed's position Ghulam Ahmad left the job and returned to his house to look after the land in 1868.

After the death of his father in 1876 he devoted himself completely to the study of Quran. By then he had already reinterpreted the Islamic term Jehad i.e. struggle in way of God. According to him Jehad could not mean an Islamic revolt against the British rule.⁵

4 Mirza Nasir Ahmad, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (Lahore, 1965), p. 8.

5 H.A. Walter, The Ahmadiyya Movement (Calcutta, 1918), p. 116.

This created a suspicion in minds of mainstream Muslims about Mirza's position and religious interpretation.

By 1877 Hindu revivalism was emerging in Punjab. This worried Ahmad and he took leave from the estate and devoted himself to study Quran deeply. In 1880 came the turning point in his career when he started publication of 4 volumes of Barahin-i-Ahmadiyya i.e. (proofs of Muhammad). By very application of reason and logic Ghulam Ahmad tried to establish the superiority of the Quran over other revelations, the main purpose being to rejuvenate Islam.

It was in 1882 while he was writing the 3rd part of the book, that he claimed to have received divine revelation and it was revealed to him that he was chosen to be appointed as a reformer of 14th century Hijera for defending the cause of Islam. He had repeatedly argued that due to decay of Islamic life a Messiah is due to appear. He debated the issue on the basis of scriptures which maintained, that Jesus had arrived 1400 years ago and the time had come for a Messiah to appear again.⁶

From 1882 to 1889 he claimed to have received divine revelation appointing him the Mujaddi - the

⁶ Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continues (Delhi, 1960), p. 76.

reformer of religion and renewer of faith. By 1889 he announced the conditions in which he would accept followers.

The condition laid by Ghulam Ahmad had complete understanding with Islam but there existed certain differences. He laid down ten conditions for bai-at⁷, which are :

- (a) A person must swear by monotheism i.e. he must believe in one and only Allah.
- (b) He must keep away from evil i.e. from falsehood, cruelty, dishonesty and by no means should support evil.
- (c) Pray five times a day.
- (d) He should not harm any of God's creature.
- (e) In every stage of life he should be faithful to God.
- (f) He will not follow the vulgar customs and evil practices.
- (g) He must give up pride and haughtiness.
- (h) He must hold religion dearer than his life.
- (i) He must show sympathy to all his fellow beings.
- (j) He must believe in 'Mirza' to be a promised Messiah and establish a brotherhood with him.

7 Abdul Majid Khan, Ahamadiyy Movement, in S.T. Lokhandwalla, India and Contemporary Islam, (Simla, 1971), p. 340.

Apart from the tenth conditions, rest had the forbearance of Islam. During 1890-91 Mirza published three major works and publicly declared that he was the Masih-Mawud (the promised Messiah). According to him it was fulfilment of divine promise made to Muslims. He claimed that Jesus was dead and the phrase "son of Mariyam" in Quran refers to a person with likeness of Jesus and referring to Hadith which refers that, with the appearance of Messiah the cross will disappear. It meant the Christian will be incorporated into Islam. He repudiated the fact, that the second Messiah will be like the first. He argued that the prophet nowhere maintained that the coming Messiah will be a prophet. He could be an ordinary Muslim, living according to Shariat. Mirza claimed himself to be a Mehdi and Messiah as he possessed the spirit of Jesus, Zorathrostra and Krishna.⁸

The teaching of Mirza which became the basis of the Ahmadiyya community was much alike many religion in the world. It was more in complementary to Islam. It is mainly because he never claimed to have established a separate religion.

8 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyya Movement, A History and Perspective (Delhi, 1974), p. 176.

Mirza preached the language of peace and admonished his followers not to injure other persons whatever religion he may belong to. He maintained that Islam never preached violence in any form. He called to give away Jehad as Jehad does not mean war against nonbeliever. Rather it means to overcome immorality and evil, it is an internal struggle. Mirza preached that there was no compulsion in Islam to convert any one.

Mirza preached reconciliation between the various factors in human life that leads to discord and has made life peaceless and restless. He sought to bring reconciliation between man and his creator, between different sections of mankind. He preached that one must recognise the differences that exist between men and try to eliminate it through reason and intelligence. He preached adherence towards tolerance and forbearance, as tolerance alone can make men pious and understanding. "Mirza taught that human nature was pure and not tainted with evil. Evil is not inherent in man, it comes from outside and man's greatest inclination towards evil comes from lack of economic and social standing. And in order to maintain a true and pure community all Muslims must pay the tax of zakat and live in oneness of equal brotherhood".⁹

9 Sir Zafarulla Khan, The Message of Ahmediyya From the Speech Delivered on 2nd March, 1953 (Lahore, 1987), pp. 13-33.

Mirza preached that the revelation from God had not ended with the prophet himself, rather there were more avenues for further revelations but he maintained that holy Quran was the most superior of all revelations. It was the last book of law, the fountain head of salvation. It purifies men from within. According to Mirza the deliverance from sin lies in perfect and true conviction as conviction gives the power to do good and it alone can turn you to a lover of God. Everyone who is purified is purified through conviction as it enables men to see God".¹⁰

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was regarded to be a British spy and an British implant to divide the muslim resurgence which was gaining momentum against Britishers by the mainstream muslims. The Muslims maintained that the Mirza was an hypochondriac maniac who imagined things, and it was his burning desire to rise to a position of a religious guide and mentor. And this desire of Mirza was exploited by Britishers against the Muslims in order to divide them.

Whatever may be said about Mirza's desires and ambition, the fact remains that he possessed certain kind of charisma which attracted a large number of followers.

10 Mirza Bhasir Ahmad, Our Teachings (Qadian, 1988), pp. 33-54.

followers.

Although Ghulam Ahmad accepted followers from 1889, the formal establishment of Ahmadiyya community as such did not occur till 4th November 1900. It was marked with the publication of Istihar by Ahmad, "the decision to identify the movement separately from the Sunni fold was due to intense opposition from Sunni's and sectarian ulema".¹¹

In 1901 they got themselves separately listed in the census under the name of Ahmadiyya, which they chose after the name of prophet Muhammad as he was known in Mecca. This was the period when prophet suffered persecution and the Ahmadis regarded their position to be same.

The leadership of Ahmadiyya Movement during the last decade of Ghulam ^{Ahmad's} life had become increasingly diverse and consisted of well educated men like Mohammad Ali of Lahore and Khawaja Kamal-ud-din of Kashmir.

With the death of Ghulam Ahmad in 1908 his first disciple Maulvi Nur-ud-din became the Khalifa of Sadr-Anjuman-i-Ahmadiyya. He lacked the charisma of Ghulam Ahmad, but was respected by all, and was

11 Dr. Hira Lal Chopra, Ahmadiyyat in Modern World (Qadian, 1989), p. 20.

supported by Mohmmad Ali and Kamal-ud-din to maintain the leadership of the Anjuman.¹² During his last days Maulvi Nur-ud-din became gravely ill and disintegration within the 'Anjuman' began to appear. There emerged two factions contending for power; the intelligensia led by two able leaders Kamal-ud-din and Mohmmad Ali and the other faction led by Mirza Bhasir Ahmad, son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. In 1911 there was an attempt of reconciliation. Mohmmad Ali called a meeting in Lahore in which Mirza Bhasir Ahmad was also invited and was chosen to be the next Khalifa. The reconciliation could not last long as Mirza Bhasir Ahmad accused Mohmmad Ali of discussing the issue of Khalifat before the death of the incumbent. Then on controversies began to grow.

On 13th March 1914 Khalifa Nur-ud-din breathed his last and the controversies engulfing Anjuman intensified. The controversies reached its ultimatum on the question of interpretation of Al-Wasiyah (Will of promised Messiah). Mohmmad Ali took it in much of the literal sense as he wanted to pursue power of the sadar Anjuman. On the other hand Mirza Bhasir uddin Ahmad saw the document written at a time when all were committed to

12 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyya Movement - A History and Perspective (Delhi, 1974), pp. 98-117.

prophet and question of leadership^{and} of power was not raised. He maintained that Mohmmad Ali's opposition was^{not} directed against the prophet but to the fact that he was going to be chosen as the next Khalifa. This very opinion of Mirza Bhasir Uddin Ahmad created an intense row between the two factions and ultimately the sadar-Anjuman-i-Ahmadiyya split into two organizations. The Lahoris became the followers of Mohmmad Ali and the Qadiani section remained under Mirza Bhasiruddin Mahmud Ahmad.

From 1914 to 1920 Mirza Bhasir ud-din Ahmad consolidated his position within the sadar Anjuman, to avoid any other split within the organization and he reconstructed the Sadar-Anjuman-i-Ahmaddiyya. In order to counteract the increasing missionary influences he undertook to reformulate and reconstruct the Anjuman along modern lines.

At Qadian the Nazir-i-Ala (Chief Secretary) was made the president of Sadar Anjuman, while seven other were entrusted with the responsibilities of treasury, community discipline, external and governmental affairs, education, missionary work, publication and hospitability department.¹³

13. Mirza Bashir-ud-din Ahmad, The New World of Islam (Qadian, 1946), p. 116.

The Sadar Anjuman prepared the annual budget and submitted it to Majlis-i-Mushawrat (Khalifa's advisory board), for scrutiny by the sub-committee which in turn consulted the Khalifa himself. While Ahmadis living in Qadian came directly under these agencies those outside the Qadian, were related to central authority through amir's. The Majlish-e-Mushawrat was established in 1922, and comprised of a 500-600 members delegate of which 75% were elected from Sadar Anjuman.¹⁴

In 1925 the Khalifa instituted a special Qadiani Judicial system modelled after the traditional Islamic system. The system was applicable only to members of the community, who in case of conflict would attempt an adjudication before Ahmadi Qadi. The looser could apply first to the board of Qadi's and then to the Khalifa, but if the litigation involved the Khalifa, the decision of the board was final.

In 1934 he devised a scheme which entailed spiritual training of the community for propagation of Islam. In order to undertake these missions he established a Tehrik-e-Jaheed association to raise funds for the scheme.¹⁵

14. Ibid., p. 118.

15. Dr. Alhaj Mubarak Ahmad, Ahmadiyya in Modern World, in the Souvenir, Ahmadiyya Muslim Centenary (Qadian, 1989), p. 94.

In 1938 the Khuddamal Ahmadiyya association was established by Bhasir-ud-din Ahmad, the purpose of which was to transfer the teachings to hearts of all. The goal of the association is to put youth on path of virtue and protect them from evil influence. In 1940 the Ansarulla Association was formed which was purely a religious association with main objectives of inculcating righteousness, observance of prayer, learning and teaching of Quran and preaching Islam.

In 1940 the Lajna Imaullah association for the Women was established in order to impart education, spiritual training and give guidance so as to develop a better life. Mirza Bhasir-uddin Ahmad believed in the Maxim "No community can develop if their womens do not progress".¹⁶

Socially the community were highly integrated and cooperative. The Ahmadis took to Western education and culture and as a result they achieved a high literary rate. The Ahmadis were absorbed in the service of the British crown which gave a high social standing to them. The Ahmadis amongst themselves have tried to propagate education within the community through various associations formed by the community. They have under-

16 Ibid., p. 97.

taken the propagation of education within illiterate masses of the Jamat living in rural areas. Even though they enforced strict purdha for womenfolk they also had rendered great services to women for their development. The Lajna Imaullah association which was founded by Mirza Bhasir Uddin Ahmad had given women training not only in spiritual field but also in material life. They were also imparted education and training in vocational arts and crafts.

The Ahmadis being a closed sect have their own mosque and imman. They do not pray behind other Muslims neither do they enter into any social bindings with rest of the Muslim population. An Ahmadi women cannot marry a non-Ahmadi nor do they pray at the death of any other Muslim person. "The Ahmadis serve their community with utmost devotion and they have a strong bond of unity and integrity".¹⁷

One of the most important reason for the closeness of the community may be its economic prosperity. The Ahmadis are one of the most prosperous and rich community in the world. They have their missionaries in practically all parts of the world and funds are drawn from the community itself. The Ahmadis largely

17. Donald Wilbur, Pakistan, Its People, Its Culture, Its Society (Haven, 1963), p. 167.

fall under the category of intelligentsia, who hold office of importance in places they live. The Ahmadis have ascetic morality and live in modesty which gives them the avenue to save money or to recycle the profits which any business-man Ahmadi earns back into business. As the wants are less the money earned is mostly given as charity to the community for the welfare of the Jamaat. The money so in disposal of the community is evenly distributed for the welfare and upbringing of the community. The services over the years have yielded its results, the community has a strong and prosperous economic structure to reckon with. This helps them to face any onslaught against the community by the mainstream Muslims with valour and determination.¹⁸

The organizational, social and economic structure of the community has remained same as it was planned and reorganized by Bhasiruddin Ahmad except the fact that the headquarters from Rabwah (in Pakistan) has been shifted to London due to continuous onslaught of Zia Government against Ahmadis.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad during his life time itself was accused by the Sunnis and other conservative section

18 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyya Movement, Past and Present (Amritsar, 1976), pp. 134-36.

of Ulema as an imposter, who had been implanted by British in order to break Islamic resurgence. Accordingly numerous fatwas were passed against him. The basic difference between the two community arose from three important issues.

The most important issue which created distrust in minds of the Muslims about the Ahmadis was the claim of Ghulam Ahmad to be the promised Messiah and Mehdi, by which he challenged the finality of prophet. These terms to the Islamic world were neither new nor original or unusual. The concept of Mehdi as a rightly guided leader who would come at the end, existed in two different ways in Sunni and Shias tradition of Islam from early centuries. The Shias believe while talking about Mehdi it meant the Imam who had mysteriously disappeared would return as a Mehdi and lead them to everlasting glory. The Sunnis believed that a Mehdi would be God's representative in person of Jesus who would also come at the last day of judgement and lead the believers to the victorious war against Kafirs. The Sunnis believed that the Mehdi and Messiah would be two separate persons. When Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be both, the promised Messiah and Mehdi the Sunnis refused to accept his position. The Sunnis and other conservative section of Ulema did not agree with Ghulam Ahmad's view that revelation had not ended with

prophet and neither with his view that prophets were still to come. The traditionalist Muslims believe in Khatam-al-Nabiyyin (The finality of prophet). They maintained that prophet Mohammad was the last prophet and after him there can be no other prophet and the Quran was the last law revealed by God. Ghulam Ahmad maintained he was a nabi, he posited that the prophet was the last messenger of law. But according to him prophets were destined to come and revelation in form of reforms was to take place from time to time.¹⁹

The controversy between the Ahmadis and mainstream Muslims also centre around Jesus. The Muslims believe that 'son of Mariyam' was alive in 4th heaven who would come at the ^{last} day of judgement and lead the believers to a victorious war against the non-believers (Kafirs). The Ahmadis believe in Ghulam Ahmad who maintained Jesus was dead. According to him "Jesus did not die in the cross rather he was removed from the cross and cured of his wound by a ointment known as Mahram-i-isa Jesus, according to him, then escaped to India via persia and Afghanistan and reached Kashmir. He completed his prophetic mission there and died at the age of 120. His tomb is located at Khanyar in

19 Report of Court of Inquiry - Punjab Disturbances-1953
(submitted by Justice Munir, 1954), p. 117.

Srinagar. 20

There^{also} exist the controversy regarding Taqdir. The Muslims maintain that the Ahmadis do not believe in Taqdir (destiny). The Ahmadis, on the other hand maintain that they do believe in Taqdir, which is a law of God but God cannot be made a scapegoat for the punishment for evil done by any person.

One of the most controversial issues among the Muslims and Ahmadis has been the concept of Jihad. The term Jihad in al-Islam is derived from the verb 'Jahada' which in literal sense means exertion of one's power to the utmost of one's capacity in cause of Allah. Most specifically Jihad means 'fighting with non-believers for victory of Al-Islam' and also means 'striving against evil'. The Sunni jurist regarded it to be a collective duty which is binding on community as a whole. Jihad is obligatory on the free major Muslim male, who is sound in physical and mental condition and economically self sufficient. On the other hand the Shia legal theory considered Jihad as allegiance to Imam who has the infalible right to decide and declare Jihad for the sake of community interest. According to Ghulam Ahmad, Jihad meant war,

20 M. Sharif Ahmad Amin, H.A., Muhammad the Most Successful Prophet (Qadian, 1978), p. 33.

undertaken only to protect religion from the enemies who use force. This is also an internal struggle of morality over immorality, good over evil. According to Ghulam Ahmad Jehad could not mean Islamic revolution against British rule as it was not destroying Islamic religion.²¹

This pro-British attitude of Ahmad also earned him the wrath of the Muslims. The organizational set up of the Ahmadis also earned them the problem from Muslims. The Muslims claim that prophet was against priesthood and organizational set up as he emphasized on direct relationship between individual and god. He wanted to avoid the danger of spiritual monopoly. It pays tribute to leadership, the best man in congregation with best knowledge and character is chosen to lead prayers, where as Ghulam Ahmad laid a foundation of organization under sader-a-Anjuman.²² According to Muslims he had laid a foundation of separate religion along with organization of new jamaat. The Ahmadis have ^{always} claimed themselves to be, very much a part of Islam. This controversy has persisted till today.

The differences between the Ahmadis and Muslims which has led to series of anti Ahmadiyya movement

21 Mirze Wasim Ahmad, What Is Ahmadiyyat (Qadian, 1987), pp. 37-39.

22 Fries Land Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (New York, 1968), p. 369.

in Pakistan after partition had its origin during the pre-partition days of united India.

In the year 1914-1928 the public images of the Ahmadiyya revolved on 4 major points : (a) its attitude towards the Islamic concern, (b) sectarianism and struggle against Arya Samaj and Sikhs, (c) mission to Europe and conversion, (d) and growing concern in India for self-government. Initially it was the Lahories who were involved in politics and the Qadianies maintained their restraint in case of self Government. The Lahories supported Indian Muslim leaders, but the Qadiani leaders stretched their support to the British government. Gradually the Lahories withdrew from politics and the Qadianies came into the forefront.²³

With the increasing self awareness among the Ahmadiyya community Regarding the issue of self-Government, they began to participate in critical political and religious issues. It reached its zenith during Kashmir issue in 1931-34. Kashmir had a special position for the Ahmadis. They organized missionary activity in Kashmir, gave scholarship to Kashmiri youth to come to Qadian and study. During the Quran incident of 1931,

23 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyya Movement - Past and Present (Amritsar, 1976), pp. 114-20.

When
 the Mualims were prohibited to recite Quran, the All India Kashmir Conference was organized. The Ahmadis were able to muster great amount of influence in the conference.

During this period, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islami-i-Hind emerged. It was an organisation of Islamic freedom-fighter working within the Congress fold till 1930. Their leaders was Chaudhuri Afzal Haq. The Ahrar who worked within Congress fold withdrew from it after the Nehru report. This was marked by a sharp turn towards communalism within the Ahrar organization and they became involved in Kashmir.

On 14th August 1931 the Ahrar called for strike to mark Kashmir day on the issue pertaining to prime ministership, this was followed by the All India Kashmir Committes meeting. This meeting publically declared the Ahmadi Khalifa to be their leader. It called for a Hartal on August 14¹⁹³¹. The Ahrar group refused to join the meeting and openly declared ^{that} the Qadians were non-Muslims. They maintain that the Qadiani leadership threatened the Islamic unity.

The Ahrars in Kashmir united under Maulana Mazhar Ali, who gathered 400 Ahrar volunteers in Sialkot and threatened to lead the jatha to Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Kashmir was threatened and he invited

Mazhar Ali to Kashmir. During the last ^{the year} days of 1931 the conflict sharpened among the Muslim groups. During the whole agitation Britishers sided with the Maharaja who was concerned with the Ahmadis, who he believed wanted to keep the agitation live in order to keep Ahrar out.

By 1932 the Britishers and the Kashmiries, who supported the Maharaja had become openly hostile towards the All India Kashmir committee and the Ahmadis. On June 28, 1933 the Ahmadi Khalifa and his trusted ally were deported from Kashmir. The British government then adopted a harsh attitude toward the Ahmadis.²⁴ The Ahmadis and Ahraris demonstrated how two Muslim groups with different perspective could fight amongst themselves.

With tension subsiding in Jammu and Kashmir the problem intensified in Punjab. It grew in proportion between '34 to '36. During this period Ahrar were in offensive and Ahmadis were in defensive position. The reluctance of British to align with Ahmadis totally, created problems for the Khalifa and his followers. The Ahrars were ^{in the meantime} instigating a clash by

24 Dodds J. Leery, The Ahmadiyya Movement and Controversy, Muslim World, vol. 37, 1958, pp. 39-41.

planning a meeting in Qadian itself in October 1934. The Ahmadi Khalifa in order to prevent violence against the community asked assistance from Ahmadis, living all over the world. Ultimately the British Government had to intervene. It asked the Ahmadi Khalifa to withdraw his resolution asking ^{for} assistance and banned the Ahrars meeting.²⁵

During the decade of 1937 to 47 the Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy was relatively at low key. During the days of partition the Ahmadis position on jehad had made them pro-British. They became averse of independence, and uneasy about the prospects of being a minority in a Hindu or a Muslim majority country. With the beginning of riots after the partition the Ahmadis were forced to leave India and they migrated to Pakistan. They settled in Rabwah. The Ahrars also migrated to Pakistan and along ^{with} them the Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy resurfaced in Pakistan a new.

The subsequent chapter will deal with anti-Ahmadiyya agitation in Pakistan and try to analyse how religion has been used to persecute Ahmadis. It will also try to analyse, what has been the impact of these agitations in Pakistani political life.

25. Ibid., p. 45.

Chapter III

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan came into existence because of Muslim Leagues demand for partition of India. The League originated in 1906 as a result of British policy of divide and rule. The League till 1930 did not think about partition rather they were concerned with better treatment and privileges for the community. It was only after 1930 when Jinnah joined the League after being disillusioned from Congress, he felt that Muslims would have no prospect of fair deal in India. The first open reference to Hindus and Muslims being a separate nation was made during the session of Sind. Muslim League provincial conference was held in 1938. He maintained "Hinduism and Islam represent two separate civilization from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are the nation's in Europe; if therefore it is accepted that there is in India a major and minor nation, it follows that parliamentary system of democracy based on majority principle, it must inevitably mean the rule of major nation over minor nation and as India was composed of two nation - Hindus and Muslims, the scheme of central-federal government could be detrimental to Muslims. According to him "Muslims were a nation according to any definition of a nation and so

they must have their homeland, their territory and their State, and since Indian Muslims constitute a State they alone have right to determine their future".¹

With Jinnah's proclamation of separate statehood, demand for Pakistan grew in strength and in proportion, in March 1940, the Muslim League formalized its views. By the Lahore resolution it demanded separate statehood in Muslim majority areas. The Pakistan movement brought together in the same arena a collation of forces among Muslims that had not been witnessed. Islam was vigorously used to appeal the inherent religious sentiments of the people, by the leaders of Pakistan movement. But the leaders never defined the nature of the Islamic state that was to come in existence. This created problems for Pakistan after partition. Another major drawback within the League which created problem for Pakistan after the partition was its elite leadership. According to Taylor "Jinnah was typical representative of the Northern elite. He sought to protect the interest of those Muslims who owned property or of those who possessed education. He welcomed the Ulama to support the League but only within the subordinate level".²

1 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan - 1857-1964 (London, 1967), pp. 166-67.

2 David Taylor, The Politics in Islam and Islamisation in Pakistan in James P. Piscatori, ed., Islam in Political Process (London, 1983), p. 187.

The League was dominated by landlords of north India, the cradle of Muslim power and the merchants of West India became the junior partners in the League. The League lacked the mass character apart from the Islamic rhetoric the Muslim Leagues mass mobilization was narrow based.

The difficulties of the state of Pakistan that came into existence in 1947 were enormous among them the political difficulty was most important. The League despite its success in creating Pakistan lacked well developed organization that could span to the provinces and link its loyalties to the center. Adding to the problems, was early demise of Jinnah in 1948 and his successor Liaquat Ali failed to possess any charisma and authority of Jinnah. Gradually Pakistan came under the influence of landlords and merchants who held power position within the League. The League which did not have a mass character could not commit itself to democracy. "The ruling elite began to develop Islamic ideology into a device to prevent people to participate in decision making process".³ And the Pakistani society remained predominantly feudal. With lack of

3 Zia-ul-Haq, Islamic Ideology and Islamisation of Society, in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, ed., Pakistan Roots to Dictatorship (London, 1983), p. 118.

ethnic unity, common language Islam became the major link. "In Pakistan the Islamic fundamental value structure do not count much, what passes as Islam is archaic superstitious and irrational religious practice perpetuated by traditionalist Mullahs".⁴ The vested interest of Pakistani society collaborated with these elements and became a powerful force.

The ideological controversy over the nature of Pakistan's political system emerged as a contest for supremacy and leadership between modernist, traditionalist, and neo-traditionalist.

With the independence the politicians who came to power, felt that they had to profess some degree of commitment to ^{the} ideals of Islamic State. The concept of Islamic state has a varying degree of connotation according to religious and political opinion. After the independence of Pakistan the ruling elite were contented to see that Pakistan had an external Islamic personality. The government was run on the lines of British India secular principle. The leadership which was essentially modernist in consensus on the question of Islam was challenged from two directions : (a) there was more directly the claim that Pakistan should

4 Asghar Ali Engineer, The Islamic State (Delhi, 1980), p. 163.

be more overtly Islamic state and (b) secondly it were the Ulema who felt that their support to the League was betrayed.

The nationalist leaders propagated secular ideology based on the concept of modern nation state. Pakistan according to Qaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was to be a contemporary nation state, he called upon all Muslims to welcome their ^{non-Muslim} bretherens. He discounted the notion that Pakistan was a theocratic state. Pakistan according to Jinnah was "formed to demonstrate that a Muslim majority state could satisfy the needs and fulfill the aspiration of its citizens".⁵ The Ulema on the other hand were strictly against such a type of state. They maintained if secular state was the destiny of Indian Muslims it could be arranged within United India. According to the Ulema "if Islam is not brought in the center of Pakistani politics and the refusal to form the constitution on the basis of Shairah was a betrayal of whole creation of Pakistan".⁶ The fundamentalist Ulema were led by Maulana Maududi, who had opposed the Pakistani movement

5 Mohammad Ayoob, Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan, Asian Survey, December 1979, p. 535.

6 Salim Mansur, Pakistan: A Case of Two Nation Theory, Jerusalem Quarterly, vol. 38, 1986, p. 118.

but later he migrated to Pakistan and soon became a leader guiding the state towards Islamic orientation. According to him "sovereignty in an Islamic state belongs to Allah which means the Islamic law founded in Quran and Sunnah, and all law and rules must confirm to it".⁷ The Ulema wanted to adopt the institution of early Khalifate. They wanted to reproduce such a society which no longer existed and a polity which suited the early days of Islam.

The traditionalist and neotraditionalist in order to make a legitimate political position for themselves embarked upon the strategy to declare the modernist, not true believers. During the initial period, the traditionalist and neotraditionalist gradually but successfully asserted themselves and were able to secure a legitimate role in the political system of Pakistan. They possessed considerable determination, political skill and ambition.

Under the pressure from the traditionalist and neotraditionalist the modernist leaders had to retreat during the process of constitution making to a position whereby Pakistan became a "Laboratory of Islamic

7 Anwar Hussian Syed, Pakistan, Islam Politics and National Solidarity (New York, 1982), p. 63.

principle in continued effort to reconcile the opposing concept of Islamic state".⁸

The traditionalist and neotraditionalist were able to struck their first victory in March 1949 in the ^{form of} Objective Resolution, when they succeeded in getting the Islamic injunction, which maintained that "sovereignty over entire universe belongs to God and the authority that he delegates to the state of Pakistan through his people to be exercised within the prescribed limit and provided that the Muslims should be able to order their life in accordance with teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in Holy Quran and Sunnah and minorities would be able to freely profess and practice their religion".⁹ This compromise of the modernist leaders marked the beginning of Islamization of politics. The Objective Resolution passed in 1948 proved to be a turning point in Pakistani politics as Pakistan began to drift from liberal democratic ideal to Islamic ideal. The Ulema along with the sound base of objective Resolution demanded that, there should be board of Ulema and it should have the right to declare any

8 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964 (London, 1967), p. 237.

9 Saeed Shefquat, Politics of Islamisation: Ideological Debate on Pakistan Political System, Asian Profile, Vol. 15, October 1987, p. 450.

law ultravires if it was repugnant to Quran and Sunnah. In 1949 the constituent assembly appointed a board of 'Talimat-i-Islamiyya'. The board advised that the head of the state should be a Muslim. The committee of Ulema were to decide which legislation was repugnant to the injunction of Quran and Sunnah.

During the tenure of Liaquat Ali the traditionalist tide was held back with some determination. His own effort and his Government's policy in keeping constitution and legislation, secular in British tradition, while accepting an Islamic Veener was reflected in the interim report of basic principle committee in 1950. It referred nominally to Shariah provision.

With the assassination of Liaquat Ali a different equation effected the balance between religion and politics in Pakistan. The successors to Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nizamuddin and Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali were deeply religious men and had cordial relation with the Ulema. The influence of Ulema increased considerably between 1951 to 1956. The political stability provided by Muslim League as a party with overwhelming majority in the legislature was shattered with the crushing defeat in 1953 election in East Pakistan. The League came into the hands of the conservative forces who found their alliances with the Ulema and their

conservative interpretation of Islam, the means to legitimise their power. The alliance between the politicians and the Ulema was opportunistic as far as the political parties and their leaders were concerned. This alliance served in establishing the influence of Ulema in ^{the} political sphere.

"Religion and politics in Pakistan became intertwined as result of 3 major developments - (a) the question of constitution and law, (b) on the war in Kashmir on which the politician wanted Ulema to declare Jihad, (c) it was on the question of role of minority in Islamic state".¹⁰ This came to the forefront with Anti Ahmadiyya agitation. This was second great achievement of the traditionalist for they could mobilize the masses in name of Islam.

The anti Ahmadiyya agitation which turned violent in 1953 began as early as 1949. The agitation was led by Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam shortly after the passage of Objective Resolution. The Ahrar-Ahmadiyya agitation was the continuation of the sectarian politics practised by both these groups in pre-partitioned India. The Ahrars were sworn enemy of Ahmadis. After partition they took the first opportunity to attack the Ahmadis.

10. Saleem M.M. Qureshi, Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan, in Aziz Ahmad, ed., Contribution to Asian Studies, vol. 2, 1971, p. 54.

The Ahrars were the communal off-shoot of Congress. They were known for their ideological instability. The Ahrars had opposed the formation of Pakistan. After partition they migrated to Pakistan and declared that they would continue as a religious organisation.¹¹

The Ahrars declared publicly to follow the Muslim League in political sphere. With this announcement the Ahrars began to demand Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslims. According to them Ghulam Ahmad the Ahmadi prophet was a Dujjal (evil force) created by British to break the Islamic unity. The Ahrar made Ahmadis the target of attack in order to gain hearing. The government of Pakistan did not take any major steps against the ~~Ahrar~~ propoganda initially. "Quoting from the pamphlet of Ash Shabah, which dealt with apostate in Islam and Ahmadis were regarded by it to be one who had the rightful penalty of death, the Ahraris instigated people to incite violence".¹²

The Ahrar began to channelise their action against Sir Zafarulla Khan who was ^{then} the foreign minister of the state and demanded his resignation. During 1951 the

11 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley, 1961), p. 259.

12 Report of Court of Inquiry, Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (submitted by Justice Munir, 1954), p. 110.

Ahrar declared to support Muslim League in Punjab provincial election if no Ahmadi candidate were nominated. The Muslim League won with a massive victory but the Ahmadi candidates lost. With the result of the election, the Ahrars were able to gain a base and they with renewed vengeance demanded Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslims. They accused Ahmadis to be the spies of India and regarded them to be potential threat to Muslim unity. The Ahmadis were accused with the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan. Chaudhari Zafarulla Khan was accused of giving away Kashmir to India for the sake of Qadian. The Ahrars, intekam-i-Ahmadi meeting in Sargoda was a clear representation of Ahrar's propaganda against Ahmadis. Tension mounted the Ahmadis mosque was burnt and the worshippers beaten. The Ahmadis made a representation to the government regarding the growing menace. They were assured of safety and protection.¹³

The Ahmadiyya agitation was so emotionally charged and religiously involved that neither the provincial government of Punjab where the agitation centered nor was the central government willing to take any severe and restrictive action. Somewhat unwillingly

13 Ibid., p. 112.

the provincial government had to take action and on May 25, 1952 it banned the Ahrar public meeting. Article 144^{CPPC} was issued in Gujranwala and Sargoda.¹⁴ At the same time Chaudhari Zafarulla Khan made a speech in Jahangir Park where he clearly elaborated that the Quran was the last book of law. He maintained that the Quran refers to the appearance of a renovator and such a renovator was Ghulam Ahmad and Ahmadis are plant of God. This speech gave Ahrars the much needed opportunity and on June 2nd, 1952, all Pakistani Muslim parties convention was called, Punjab Muslim League also joined the convention. The convention agreed to take the demand of Ahrars as their own. This agreement changed the whole character of the agitation, it became the demand of all Muslims.

The Central Muslim League directed the provincial organization to avoid any kind of participation with Ahrar. The provincial Muslim League defied the orders of the centre and began to demand Ahmadis to be declared as non-Muslims and Rabwah to be an open city. The Ahmadis took the threat seriously, as Rabwah had become an important international centre, it had above

14 Saleem M.M. Qureshi, Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan, in Aziz Ahmad, Contribution to Asian Studies, vol. 2, 1971, p. 56.

all members professing various trade. In 1952 Ahmadi wrote a secret letter to Home Secretary warning him of impending danger and enlisted 3 slogans used by Ahrar to exploit the feeling of people -

- (a) Propagation of masala-i-khatam-a-Nabuwat (matter regarding finality of prophet).
- (b) Declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslim.
- (c) Removal of Chaudhari Zafarullah Khan. On question of eradication of Ahmadis they asked what would happen to other minorities.¹⁵

Chief Minister Daulatana's efforts in directing Ahmadi controversy to Karachi was successful, by the early months of 1953 the problem reached its peak. On 27th February, 1953, the members of the action committee were arrested. The government initially tried to subdue the matter by declaring Ahrar as traitors, working under foreign power. By March the situation became out of control, Lahore D.S.P. was shot dead. On "5th March 1953 curfew was clamped in the city".¹⁶ Sialkot was handed over to the army. The situation in Lahore continued to be tense. When the problem became totally chaotic and violent "Lahore

15 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyya Movement, Past and Present (Amritsar, 1976), p. 118.

16 Dawn (Karachi), March 5, 1953.

was placed under martial law on 7th March, 1953.

General Azam Khan was made Chief Martial Law administrator".¹⁷

Khawaja Nizamuddin refused to accept any of the demands put forth by the Ulema. With the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the anti Ahmadi agitation came to an end. The Prime Minister declared that the "recent anti Ahmadiyya agitation was a result of power politics", the movement according to him was "directed against him and the Central Government by the subversives who wanted to overthrow the Central Government and destabilized the state".¹⁸ Though the Ulema failed to get any of the specific demand relating to controversy accepted by the Government, but they were able to make an influence in political sphere. Islam was made constituent part of Pakistan by 1956 Constitution. The preamble of the 1956 Constitution affirmed that the "entire universe belongs to Allah and the authority will be exercised by people of Pakistan within the limit prescribed as a sacred trust". It had settled for a compromise accepting the modern view of state with democracy but adhered to the Islamic principle of

17 Dawn (Karachi), March 7, 1953.

18 Dawn (Karachi), March 20, 1953.

social justice. This permanently involved Islam in political life of Pakistan and religion became intertwined with politics. The two nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan achieved independence became a question of debate and contributed to its political demise.

Ayub Khan who seized power in 1958 declared to put the country on the road of development and not to Islamise it. He regarded that the politician and Ulema had wasted the years in futility, without any kind of development. With the pace of time even Ayub Khan yielded to the dogma that Pakistan was an Ideological state and its ideology was Islam, as the country came into existence to practice the Islamic way of life. The 1962 constitution which was promulgated by Ayub Khan also acknowledged the "sovereignty of Allah over entire universe but it did not place public authority within the limit prescribed by him. Rather he held that no law should be repugnant to Islam and the Muslims should be able to order their life according to the fundamental principles of Islam. The whole decade of 60's was marked by continuous debate on ideological dimension of the state.

The disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 reflected the failures of ruling elites to evolve any consensus

over the nature of the political system. The end of 1971 marked the beginning of a new era, Bhutto was the first politician to mobilize mass support for his political programme.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's accession to power was also because of the decade long debate between the relationship of Islam with state and society. With economic disbalances affecting Pakistan after the war, Bhutto decided to draw closer to Arab oil countries for aid and in order to enhance his aims, he emphasized their common Islamic identity. "Bhutto drew heavily on Islamic symbolism he gave the orientation of Islamic socialism like, Musawat-i-Muhamadi".¹⁹

"Bhutto drew heavily on Islamic ideology. He undertook many Islamic reforms within the country. The 1973 constitution also contained explicit Islamic provision. This constitution also placed the sovereignty on Allah. It also contained the provision of bringing all the existing laws in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran. No law was to be enacted which was repugnant to the Quran."²⁰

19 John L. Esposito, Islamization: Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Muslim World, vol. 72, 1982, p. 198.

* 20 Zia-ul-Haq, Islamic Ideology and Islamization of Society, in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, Pakistan Roots to Dictatorship (London, 1983), p. 120.

Bhutto also laid the foundation of Council of Islamic ideology. This council was set up mainly to give recommendation to the Parliament about the ways by which Muslim would be able to guide their lives in accordance with Islamic teachings laid down in Quran.

With all the Islamic symbolism and orientation, Bhutto failed to keep a check upon traditionalist and neotraditionalist forces. Though the 73 Constitution provided for more Islamic injunction than the previous one, it was not able to protect traditionalist onslaught. The traditionalist challenged Bhutto of legitimacy of his rule. They were able to keep the modernist on defensive. The traditionalist described his rule as immoral and not in conformity with the ideals of Pakistan.

The traditionalist struck a major gain when they were able to reorganise the anti Ahmadiyya agitation during Bhutto's rule during 1974.

The Ahmadi community who consist of hard working, educated tightly knit are relatively few in number. They have always played a prominent role in industry and commerce, military, civil and diplomatic services, and have always supported the government of the day, whether civil or military. "The community is socially

progressive and strongly proselytizing".²¹ The Ahmadis have always been the source of attack of the traditionalist Ulema, it was clearly visible in 1953 riots when they were persecuted in the name of religion and same was repeated in 1974.

During elections of 1970 the Ahmadis supported President Bhutto and were returned to the National Assembly of Punjab in large number. With this Ahmadi problem became political once again. Bhutto was challenged of the legitimacy of his rule. The 1973 Constitution which declared Pakistan to be an Islamic republic gave a *fillip* to the sectarian demand of Ulema against Ahmadis as early as 1973. The Ahrar leader Agha Shorish Kashmiri and Jammat-i-Islami spearheaded the agitation. They accused Bhutto of showing sympathy towards the Ahmadiyya community. Sardar Quyum Khan moved the resolution in the National Assembly to declare Ahmadis non-Muslim, this gave much ^{needed} impetus to the anti Ahmadiyya agitation. During the early months of 1974 demands began to grow for the removal of Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhuri. Bhutto reluctantly yielded to this secretarian demand. The acceptance of the demand by Bhutto cleared the way for the agitation.

21 Georgia Ashworth, ed., World Minorities, vol. I (Sunbury, U.K., 1977), p. 14.

By May 1974 the anti Ahmadiyya agitation with the Rabwah incident, where in "group of students who were passing in a train through Rabwah, the Ahmadi headquarter shouted abusive slogan, two days later the train returned, the Ahmadis were ready to take revenge from the students; they attacked them. Though the incident was small but by the time the student returned home passion were high, riot and arson began and the movement took a violent turn".²²

The demand to declare the Ahmadis non-Muslims became more aggressive. The more conservative section of the Maulavis wanted the Ahmadis to be pushed out of jobs from both the private and the public sectors. They called upon the newspapers and businessmen not to include Ahmadis in board of directors.²³

On June 4, 18 religio-political parties composed, the Majlish-Taffuz Khatum-i-Nabwat (Association for protection of finality of prophet). With the formation of this association, the situation in Pakistan became more volcanic, tense and complicated. "21 Ahmadiyya mosque were burnt, 71,000 Ahmadis were killed and 5,000 were rendered homeless".²⁴ The demand

22 Pakistan, a host of problem still to be solved, Strategic Digest, 1974, p. 26.

23 Organiser, Feudal Bhutto battling for Political Survival, August 10, 1974.

24 Link, June 23, 1974.

was also put forward by the parties claiming to be secular and professing secular ideologies. Bhutto was accused of adopting a soft attitude towards the community because of political reason. The Ahmadis supported Bhutto and he was able to gain a major victory in Punjab.

The main demands put forward by the Majlish-i-Taffuz-Khatum-i-Nabwat was :

- (a) To declare Ahmadis non Muslim minority.
- (b) To declare Rabwah to be a open city.
- (c) To remove the Mirza Nasir Ahmad, the head of the community from the post of Khalifa, which was claimed by him.
- (d) To remove all Ahmadis from important key post under the Government.
- (e) The para-military forces of the Ahmadis should be declared illegal.
- (f) Mirza Nasir Ahmad should be arrested for propagation of the Ahmadis religion.
- (g) Sir Zafarulla Khan tried and his passport should be impounded.²⁵

The anti Ahmadiyya agitation which generated large scale violence, was not only a religious problem,

25 "Pakistan demand for action against Ahmadis", Asian Recorder, July 16-22, 1974, P.12106.

rather there was the social and economic dimension to the problem. Ahmadis who were pro-British, were encouraged by Britishers as a result they were able to acquire the patronage of Britishers. The other Muslims felt left out. After the independence the Ahmadis were able to exploit their strong economic position against the growing economic competition, this resulted in jealousy and hatred against them in minds of other Muslims. With demand to declare the Ahmadis non Muslims the mainstream Muslims wanted to remove Ahmadis from all important positions which were economically strong and socially vibrant.

During the agitation the situation of the Ahmadis became quite hopeless. They quoted from the Holy Quran and sayings of prophet Muhammad in order to prove that betraying a believer is most deadly sin. The Ahmadi Khalifa put the blame on Bhutto for engineering the riots. According to him P.P.P. (Pakistan Peoples Party) had lost its credibility and in order to boost its staggering image it had engineered the riots so that it could bring the law and order situation under control and give the impetus to its public image".²⁶

26 Satish Kumar, New Pakistan (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 91-93.

Bhutto initially tried to deal with the problem cautiously. He assured to deal with the problem constitutionally, he held discussion with Ulema. He asked people to help him in finding a long-term solution. On June 5th answering to the demand of Ahmadis to be declared as non Muslims, he declared that "minorities were already defined in the constitution."²⁷ By mid June the problem became complicated, Bhutto assured people of tabling the issue in front of the National Assembly and promised to refer it to the ideological council, but Bhutto's rhetoric was of no use, the violence and arson had already taken its toll. Unable to control the problem, Bhutto blamed the opposition and tried to entangle the foreign powers. He drew a link between the Ahmadi problem and Indian nuclear blast along with this, he drew the connection of the visit of Afghan President to Moscow and a presence of a Pakistani leader there. This he portrayed as a part of great strategy to destabilize Pakistan.

When the problem became complex and demand against Ahmadis grew in proportion threatening to go against his own rule, Bhutto yielded to the demands

27 Dawn (Karachi), 6th June, 1974.

of opposition parties. The Ahmadis in order to protect themselves from any kind of onslaught with help of British M.P's had brought a motion in the house of commons (U.S.A., Congress) to put pressure on Pakistan to prevent the killings of Ahmadis in Pakistan and to prevent the Government to declare them as minority, but in no avail. On 7th September, 1974 after months long campaign the Ahmadis by 2nd constitutional amendment act were declared non Muslim minority.

The amendment declared that "persons not believing in absolute finality of prophethood of Muhammad were not Muslims for the purpose of the constitution, special seats would be reserved for Ahmadis in election. They are guaranteed protection by law, but are not eligible to become president or Prime Minister or Marry a Muslim", along with the resolution, it was adopted stipulating, that "any Muslim professing, propogating against the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad would be punished under penal code".²⁸

Bhutto's sudden leaning towards the rightist demands of declaring the Ahmadis as non Muslims, was not because of any kind of religious orientation for

28 Georginia Ashworth, ed. World Minorities
 (U.K., 1979), p. 16.

Bhutto was not a religious man as per Islamic fundamentalism. Neither was Bhutto so paranoid about foreign entanglement in the Ahmadi problem mainly because it was a part of his own rhetoric. Bhutto was slightly disturbed by the opposition campaign but he still possessed the ability to regain the mass support in order to stabilize his rule. The most important issue which played the crucial role in declaration of Ahmadis as non Muslims, had its origin in the ~~External~~ relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Arab world.

Bhutto after the 1971 war had depended on the oil rich countries for economic aid. In order to gain this he emphasised on the Islamic solidarity. With the growing threat of separatism from Baluchis in South West and Pathans in North, the need to retain the supply of economic aid and oil became necessary. To retain this on the basis of friendship with the co-religionist in the Middle East, it became necessary to acquiesce with the Islamic conference pronouncement in March 1974 in Jeddah, which declared the Ahmadis to be non-Muslim and debarred them from taking part in Haj. Another factor that played an important role in this direction was the Ahmadis position on Jehad which was potentially undermining anti Israeli solidarity.

The Ahmadiyya sect from the onset refused to accept the minority status. They clearly maintained

that "they were in no way a non-Muslim minority rather they claimed themselves very much to be part of Islamic fold". According to them "their prophet Ghulam Ahmad was appointed by God himself to rejuvenate and reform Islam, as a result they were a sect planted by God himself within the Islamic fold". They have also argued on the basis of their missionary work that "it was their community which had spread Islam among the divergent population of the world; and done a great service to the religion, which was negated while declaring them non-Muslim".²⁹

The Ahmadis accepted their position as minority or not, but they were declared to be one. The fundamentalist yet again proved their strength in the political arena of Pakistan with this major declaration the ^{Islamic} resurgence in Pakistan was established permanently.

The Pakistani politicians and intellectuals who wished to harmonize Islam with modernity, tended to think that Islamic principle and values were same as those of dynamic progressive, democratic polity. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto professed the same view. This basic thought created the problem of proper interpretation of Islam and these leaders got entangled

29 Mirza Wasim Ahmad, Philosophy of Revival of Religion (U.K., 1987), p. 33.

more in debate of Islam as a result Islam had a sway over other issues and they became more rightist in due course to protect their rule. Bhutto who sought to meet the difficulty of his government by adopting the term Islamic socialism, "claimed service of Islam signifies service to Muslims. The ideology of Pakistan was that Muslims should govern and make it prosperous in order to get rid of corruption and injustice". Gradually Bhutto became entangled in debate of Islam, which led to his downfall.

The recourse to Islam has always provided a fig leaf to hide the predatory nature of Pakistani elites authoritarianism. In this misadventure the Ulama have been accomplice to the politicians.

Muslims have never objected to the creation of an Islamic society but what is an Islamic society still remain a mystery and this has been exploited by the Mullahs, Generals and elites in order to gain political mileage. Islam as a political ideology of 'Mullahocracy' reign of Mullahs and Generals in Pakistan have always tried to subvert those who do not share their ideology. The rule of General Zia was in true sense an ascendancy of Mullah's to power.

The subsequent chapter will vividly deal how General Zia used Islam as an legitimizing factor for

his rule. How he has used Islam to segregate the Ahmadis further in order to gain support from the religious parties for his rule. The Islamization process which was one of the most significant features of his rule had its origin in the debate of Islam and Politics. This will be analysed further.

Chapter IV

GENERAL ZIA'S ISLAMIZATION PROCESS AND THE AHMADIYYA COMMUNITY

The policy of accelerating Islamization of institutions which has been the characteristic feature of Pakistan during the rule of General Zia. Its origin can be traced in struggle for independence of Pakistan. When created, secularism had presented the first option of Jinnah. With the death of Jinnah, the tide of fundamentalism began to grow in 1953. This was reflected in the anti-Ahmadiyya riots against government. It made one thing very clear that secularism was not meant for Pakistan and from then religion has remained a potent force in directing politics within the country. Pakistan since then has struggled for the meaning of its identity. During the various phases of rule, the governments that have come to power committed itself to Islam and Islamic character and form of the state, but this has never been systematically addressed or adequately resolved. Pakistan has remained in suspended animation between ambiguity of her founder's call for Muslim homeland and varying expectations of the majority, for religious establishment and populace for an Islamic state. When deemed opportunate the religious leaders have appealed to the people for political purpose, in name of Islam and Islamic state.

The political position in Pakistan during the last days of Bhutto was very precarious. The struggle for power between Bhutto and the opposition consisting of the alliance of various parties reached its zenith. They accused Bhutto of rigging the 1977 election and demanded a fresh elections and boycotted the provincial elections. Bhutto yielded to the demand partially. He promised to hold elections in areas where complaints of rigging was launched. The opposition refused to yield and demanded his resignation. Bhutto in order to bring the situation under control took help of the army and three important cities - Lahore, Multan and Karachi were placed under Martial law. This signalled the entry of army into Pakistani political arena once again. By 4th of July, 1977 there was total chaos and complete breakdown of law and order situation, the negotiation between Bhutto and opposition seemed to fail; but when agreement was round the corner, the army moved in. On the "5th of July, 1977, Bhutto and his Cabinet colleagues along with prominent opposition leaders were arrested".¹ General Zia-ul-Haq promulgated the Martial law.

General Zia announced that due to the breakdown of law and order and growing polarisation within politics there was danger to the security, integrity

¹ Dawn, 6th July, 1977.

and sovereignty of the country as a result army had taken over. General Zia promised to hold elections within 90 days, a promise that he preferred to forget. Rather he began the process of accountability and creditability of the previous government, in order to keep peoples mind away from elections. In order to give a semblance of a civilian rule to the government, as martial law was high treason under 1973 Constitution, General Zia appointed a Cabinet of Ministers with the help of small religious parties and nominated himself as the President. He ordered the execution of Bhutto on 4th April, 1979. He dismissed the Cabinet on 21st April, 1979 because the cover for which i.e. execution of Bhutto the Cabinet was needed had been achieved. General Zia promulgated Martial law on 22nd April, 1979 and postponed the elections for an indefinite period.

Zia had realised early during his tenure that he lacked legitimacy. Politically he knew that he possessed no legal right to the head of state as he was not elected. On the religious ground also, he failed to hold power because he was not elected by people or by their leaders, neither was he an interpreter of law. Moreover, he had realised that with the execution of Bhutto large sections of the society was alienated. The only option that Zia's military regime

had, to gain legitimacy was Islam and "General Zia embarked upon the process of Islamization".² This process emerged as a cardinal concern of martial law. There has been a section of people who feel that the process of Islamisation undertaken by General Zia was because of his religious leanings but the fact remains that it was only after election was postponed that confrontation began to grow and from then on Islamization figured prominently in General Zia's speeches and statements.

With promulgation of Martial law the opposition was effectively silenced. General Zia pledged to make Pakistan a true Islamic state, and he introduced the programme of Nizam-i-Islami. According to him the main purpose of his regime was to form a true Islamic state which had been the basis of independence. In order to undertake measures towards Islamic democracy General Zia reorganized and reoriented the council of Islamic ideology. It was brought under his direct supervision. It became a part of Zia's advisory board for undertaking various measures of Islamization. In order to introduce Nizam-i-Islami (Islamic democracy) on 10th February,

2 Anita M. Weiss, The Historical Debate on Islam and State, in South Asia, in Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (Lahore, 1987), p. 10.

1979, General Zia introduced various measures - (a) it issued orders of regular observance of salat (prayers); (b) it promulgated ordinances providing that tradition and rules of Ramzan must be observed.³

In order to direct Pakistan towards a true Islamic society General Zia undertook vigorous Islamisation. "The Islamisation process had three aspects - (a) efforts were made to mobilize and forge a cooperation and relationship with conservative Islamic fundamentalists who shared the regime's perspective on Islamization; (b) reliance on conservative Islamic tenets to introduce changes in politico-legal system; (c) introducing of various measures".⁴ These measures could be categorised into four major areas : (i) judicial reforms; (ii) the introduction of Islamic penal code; (iii) economic programmes; (iv) educational policy. One of the most important Islamic measure undertaken during the rule of General Zia was the systematic segregation of Ahmadis.

On the recommendation of the Council of Islamic ideology General Zia promulgated ordinance introducing

3 S.S. Bindra, Islamization of Pakistan, in M.D. Dhalmassin, ed., Benazir's Pakistan (Varanasi, 1989), p. 120.

4 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore, 1988), p. 233.

judicial reforms in 1979. The ordinance sought to restructure Pakistan's higher Judicial organization. Originally the shariat benches were drafted for the higher courts, and the Shariah courts were established in four provincial high Courts. The Shariah Courts were empowered to dispose off appeals filed in them, arising out from the judgement or order given by session judge in cases tried under the Hudood ordinance. By 1980 the federal Shariah benches were dissolved in the high courts and were replaced by federal Shariah benches in the supreme courts.⁵ These Shariah Courts were empowered to examine the validity of any law and decide if it was repugnant to injunction of Islam. By 1985 new measures were taken by Zia's government and he introduced Quazi Courts in provinces and districts.

Along with the judicial reforms in 1979, General Zia introduced five Ordinances amending the existing Pakistani penal code known as Hudood laws. "These laws provided punishment for three major categories of crimes - (a) Sarqah (theft of private property); (b) Zina (adultery and fornication); and (c) El Shareb (consumption of intoxicants)".⁶ It provided for various

5 Charles H. Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of Hudood Ordinances (Asian Survey, vol. 28, 1988, p. 307.

6 Ibid., p. 309.

punishments for the crimes conducted under any one category.

The offences against property included the punishment of amputation of thief's right hand in case the offence was committed for the first time. The amputation of right leg in case the offence was committed for the second time and imprisonment for life in the third time. The amputation was to be carried out by surgeon of repute.

Eighty lashes were prescribed for a Muslim who consumed intoxicating beverages or drugs, foreigners and non-Muslims were allowed to consume alcoholic drinks during their religious occasions. The ordinance also prescribed 30 lashes or 3 years of imprisonment for non-Muslims consuming intoxicating beverages and drugs in public.

For Zina (adultery) the ordinance provided stoning to death for both men and women. It also prescribed whipping for wrongful accusation of illegitimacy. Purdah was strictly enforced for women. The position of women was negated and dissolution of marriage on basis of Quzf i.e. a husband's accusation of wife's adultery was accepted in the ordinance. The non-Muslim was deprived of the right to testify for Muslims, neither could they act as judges.⁷

7 Hafeez Malik, Martial Law and Islamization in Pakistan (Orient, 1987), p. 595.

General Zia in order to maintain his rule introduced the laws which were outdated, shackling people to the medieval past. Islamic principles were gradually introduced in Pakistani economy.

In the economic field Islamization was based on compulsory tax of 'Zakat' (compulsory welfare tax). 'Zakat' is one of the five pillars of Islam. The act required a Muslim to demonstrate submission to God. 'Zakat' is a traditional religious institution which involves both payment and distribution of 'Zakat' as unilateral and unconditional transfer by Muslim ownership with all his respect as an act of piety of a prescribed portion of property to poor Muslims. 'Zakat' has been an integral part of Muslim history. It was established by prophet himself as a part of administrative machinery of his government. 'Zakat' was an important government structure of Islamic state revenue. Ushr is another form of *Islamic tax* paid on produce of land. It is not a tax on land but on harvest.⁸

With the promulgation of 'Zakat' General Zia introduced compulsory deduction of 2.5 per cent from wealth of the Muslim population. The 'Zakat' money was collected and used for welfare of people. This was

⁸ Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan, in Anita M. Weiss, Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan (Lahore, 1987), pp. 70-75.

resented by the people of various sects, most prominent among them were the Shias who did not want the money to be spent on Sunnis welfare as the Sunnis are in majority in Pakistan. Along with Zakat, General Zia promulgated 'Ushr tax' in 1980 but it was not applied until 1983. The Pakistani ushr laws was the culmination of classical Shariah rules, "This imposes 5% tax on values of harvest on agricultural lands that do not have artificial irrigation, The Ushr under the law has to be collected from every landowner, guarantes, allottee, leasee, leaseholder or landholder for any crop grown in their land. The tax has to be paid in cash on self-assessment basis under the supervision of a local committee empowered to review the accounts of the tax payers assessment.

In order to generate Islamic spirit to the cultural life of Pakistan, General Zia introduced far reaching changes in educational sphere of Pakistan. New laws had been introduced to renew the educational policy like : (a) a Muslim student had a compulsory course in religion from primary to the university level, whereas a non-Muslim was required to undertake a course in ideology and culture; (b) Arabic as a compulsory language had been introduced to make the reading of Quran easy; (c) keeping with the tradition of purdah, seperate educational facilities had been undertaken for

men and women, separate women's university had been opened.⁹

In order to impart knowledge of Shariah law a separate Shariah faculty was opened in Qaid-e-Azam University. This faculty imparted education regarding the Shariah law and conferred the degree equal to Bachelor of Law. The reason for establishing the separate Shariah faculty was that President Zia felt the hurdle in Islamic law and Fiqah was due to lack of knowledge.

President's Zia's important reason to undertake Islamization was to maintain himself in power. In order to secure firmly his political position, he undertook series of political measures. In 1981 a definition of Muslim was provided. It maintained - (a) a non-Muslim means a person who is not a Muslim and it includes a person belonging to Christian community, Hindu, Sikhs, Buddhist or Parsi, a person of Qadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis) or a Bahai and a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes; and (b) a Muslim means a person who believes in unity and oneness of almighty Allah in absolute and unqualified finality of prophethood of Muhammad and do not believe

⁹ Louis D. Hays's, Islamization and Education in Pakistan, Asia Pacific Community, 1984, pp. 99-101.

in or recognises any other prophet or a religious reformer. This definition gave a ~~boost~~ to anti-Ahmadiyya agitation because the main controversy revolved on question of proper definition of a Muslim.¹⁰

In 1982 General Zia formed Majlish-i-Shoora, an all nominated body to advise the government. It consisted of traditionalist pro-government Ulema and landlords. On the 12th of August, 1983, Zia declared constitutional framework which would form the basis for election. This constitutional framework especially maintained that sovereignty belongs to Allah. The entire state functionary and elected representatives are functionaries of Allah or holy Prophet. All ideological contradictions in the Constitution would be eliminated. Islam will be the religion and code of Pakistani life and Islamic equality would be established".¹¹

General Zia in order to maintain the support of the traditionalist Ulema and other small religious parties undertook a effective policy of segregating the Ahmadis to please these elements.

The anti-Ahmadiyya agitation which had generated much controversy during 1953 and later in 1974 when

10 Ziaullah Syed, Islam and Pakistan, Secular Democracy, 1983, p. 592.

11 Sita Ram Sharma, An Analysis of Political Future of Pakistan (New Delhi, 1983), p. 96.

they were declared minority, resurfaced during Zia's regime with much vigour and became more aggressive. All Pakistan Khatam-a-Nabuwat organization was formed and it intensified the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation.

The 1981 definition of Muslim provided by the government had given the much needed impetus to the association to mobilise people in the name of *Islam*.

The all Pakistan Khatam-a-Nabuwat organization pressurised the government to introduce 'jiziyah' against the Ahmadis as they were regarded as non-Muslims; the Ahmadis on the other hand refused to pay 'jiziyah' as they regarded themselves as Muslims and paid Zakat and Ushr. The Ulama demanded action against the Ahmadis. Meanwhile the Lahore high court in 1981 prohibited a Ahmadi to inherit the property of a Muslim. This gave an upper hand to the Ulama and they began to demand a new law punishing the Ahmadis for declaring themselves as Muslims.

Gradually the movement began to gain ground, In 1983 fresh demand were put forward by Majlis Khatam-i-Nabuwat. It demanded to put restriction on the missionary activities of the Ahmadis as they propagated their religion in the name of Islam, and also put forward the demand to arrest Mirza Tahir Ahmad, the Ahmadi Khalifa as he was responsible for all the activities

of Sadar-i-Anjuman-i-Ahmadiyya.

By early months of 1984 the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation spread like wild fire and engulfed the major cities in Punjab. The demand to arrest Mirza Tahir Ahmad began to grow. "The Ahmadis were accused of working for the disintegration of the state with the collaboration of Israel and other imperialist forces and they were accused of trying to frustrate the attempt of the state for introducing Islamic law in Pakistan".¹²

On April 9th, 1984 the Annual Khatam-i-Nabuwat conference was held. It demanded immediate removal of Ahmadis from all key posts that they held in the government. They maintained that 'since the Ahmadis had been declared minority they should live in accordance with their minority status and refrain from propagating against Islam and the Ulama, and in case they accepted this reality the Ulama will pledge their safety'. The conference further demanded immediate recovery of Maulana Muhammad Aslam Qureshi of Sialkot who was found missing. It issued a warning to the government that "if it failed to recover the Maulana dead or alive the majlish Amal would adopt other measures".¹³

12 POT, January 5, 1984, p. 51.

13 POT, 12 April, 1984, p. 1273.

Later that month the Majlish-i-Khautam-i-Nabuwat presented the charter of demands to the government in which the Ulema demanded - (a) immediate imposition of Islamic punishment; (b) steps should be taken to check the anti-national activity of the Ahmadis, (c) complete ban on Ahmadi literature.

These demands were endorsed by the Islamic ideology council. The decision of the Islamic ideological council in favour of the Ulema gave them the much needed backing. The anti-Ahmadiyya agitation was intensified and the central action committee of Majlish-Thaffuz-Khatam-i-Nabuwat declared that "if the demands were not met before April 30, 1984 all religious places of Ahmadis would be demolished and concerned authority would be responsible for it."¹⁴

With the growing proportion of the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation, the government of Pakistan was bound to react. In the press communique issued on April 15 the government took the side of the Ulema. General Zia's government issued a warning to the Ahmadis. The government maintained, "they had been declared minorities in Pakistan and if under garb of Islam they tried to propagate their religion, their publications would be placed under confiscation and rigid ban would be

14 Dawn, April 14, 1984.

placed on their activities". The government also announced that "the district level committees consisting of Zilla Council members, federal Councillors, officials headed by nominees of government were being formed throughout the country to keep strict vigil on anti-Islamic propaganda.¹⁵

The press communique issued by the government gave clear indication to the Ulema that the government would accept their demands. This confidence of the Ulema intensified their struggle. They constantly repeated the April 30, 1984 deadline, and called upon government to ban the Ahmadi jamaat. They further demanded to restrict the communities' representation in services.

Throughout the agitation the Ahmadis were at receiving end, they could not make their views known, their pamphlets were confiscated in pretext of being anti-Islamic. With deadline fast approaching the government of Pakistan on 27th April, 1984 issued an ordinance known as the ordinance to amend the law to prohibit the Qadiani group, Lahori group and Ahmadis from indulging in anti-Islamic activities. The ordinance over-rides all decisions of courts. The ordinance laid down that - (a) any person of Qadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or by any

¹⁵ The Pakistan Times, April, 15, 1984.

other name), who by words either spoken or written or by visible representation - (i) refers to or addresses any person other than (Kaliph or companion of the holy prophet as Amee-r-ul-Mumineen, Khalifa-tul Mumineen, Khalifatul - muelimeen, Sahaabi or Razi Allah Anho :

(ii) refers to or addresses any person other than a wife of the Holy Prophet, Muhammed as Ummul-muminee; (iii) refers to or addresses, any person, other than member of the family of the Holy Prophet Muhammad as Ahle-bait-or; (iv) refers to, or name or calls his place of worship as masjid; shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine; (b) any person or Qadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadi or by any other name) who by words either spoken or written or by visible representation refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by faith as Azan or recites Azan as used by Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine; (c) any person of Qadiani or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadi or by any other name) who directly or indirectly pose himself as a Muslim, or calls and refers to his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith or invites others to accept by words, either spoken or written or by

visible representation or in any other manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall extend upto three years and shall also be liable to fine".¹⁶

No sooner the ordinance was passed, the fundamentalist leaders put in demand to the Pakistani Council of Islamic ideology to consider apostasy punishable by death through stoning, which they claimed the Ahmadis were liable to. The demand that the "domes of Ahmadi Minarets should be pulled down and the Ahmadis should be prevented from offering their prayers in congregation. The direction of their place of worship should be changed so that they no longer face Mecca and Ahmadis be identified as non-Muslim on identity cards and passports. They should be prohibited to use Islamic surnames.

The anti-Ahmadiyya ordinance was accepted with great shock and horror by the world community. Even the United States, the strongest ally criticised Zia for persecuting certain sects in the name of Islam. The United Nation's Human Rights Commission reprimanded Pakistan government for tampering with the basic human rights of certain sects within Pakistan.

16 Asian Recorder, July 22-28, 1984, pp. 17858.

Within Pakistan the anti-Ahmadiyya ordinance was criticized by all walks of life. The opposition accused Zia for playing in the hands of the fundamentalists in order to retain his power, they accused Zia 'in wanting to balance the scales, of power in his favour he had fallen for religious sentimentality to win the support of majority Muslims as economy of Pakistan was sliding down'.¹⁷

The Ahmadi community did not retaliate directly against the ordinance. The head of the community requested people to refrain from violence. They accepted the ordinance without much resistance. According to them, "if they can pray peacefully there is no need of Azan, which is an outward proclamation of Gods greatness".¹⁸

Though the Ahmadis accepted the ordinance they outrightly rejected the allegation of the maulavis, they maintained - (a) it is against the basic teachings of Islam that a person whether a Muslim or non-Muslim be debarred from acting on any part of Islamic shariat custom or practice; (b) it is absurd to claim that the feelings of Muslims are hurt if a person, whether

17. The Muslim (Islamabad), 24th May, 1984.

18. S.N. Ahmad, Anti-Ahmadiyya Stance of General Zia in Perspective of Political Crisis in Pakistan (Switzerland, 1984), p. 16.

a Muslim or non-Muslim practices Islam; (c) lastly, they maintained that the 1973 Constitution which after amendment declared them to be a minority group gave them right to follow their belief and practice, including the use of terminology like 'Nabi', 'Rasul', 'Alaihiassalam' etc.

The Ahmadis claim Islam to be a universal religion. According to them, "Prophet was sent to entire mankind and the Holy Quran was the divine law for entire mankind and if the non-Muslim decided to offer 'Namaz' or keep 'Ramzen' or call 'Azan' no one could object to it as they were following the divine commandment".¹⁸

In October 1984 the Ahmadiyya community challenged the decision of the federal Shariah court which had stayed the ordinance to be in accordance to Islamic injunction. The Ahmadis submitted to the Supreme Court a petition in which they challenged the validity of the ordinance as it encroached upon the basic rights and beliefs of worship of the Ahmadis. They maintained that "the ordinance was in conflict with the spirit of Holy Quran".¹⁹ This was a case the Ahmadis were sure to lose. Even the Supreme Shariah Court stayed the order.

18 S.N. Ahmed, Crisis of Conscience (Switzerland, 1984), p. 6.

19 Pot. 12th October, 1984, p. 3273.

The problem which arose according to the Ahmadis out of this ordinance are - "(a) since Ahmadis are 'non-Muslim' under law in Pakistan what is their de-facto religion; (b) is the religion of the Ahmadis to be decided by Ahmadis themselves or is it to be decided by outside agency; (c) if Ahmadis believe in Holy Quran and Sunnah as their Shariah and if the religion assigned to them by the said authority does not correspond to that of Shariat, do the Ahmadis have the right to decline the assignment and keep professing and practising their religion according to Quran and Sunnah; (d) regardless of the fact that Ahmadis are not considered Muslims in Pakistan for the purpose of constitution and law, and since Ahmadis feel that they are not permitted to profess any religion other than Islam under the divine commandment. As a result the fact remains that the idea behind the demand and passing of ordinance, is repugnant to Islam, which has always guaranteed religious freedom".²⁰

The Ahmadis who have accepted the ordinance, had no other option other than the acceptance or to renounce their faith. The ordinance has effected them in all spheres economically, socially and politically. Politically the Ahmadis have become defranchised

20 S.N. Ahmad, Crisis of Conscience (Switzerland, 1984), p. 7.

citizen having being declared minority, they were required to vote in separate electorate which the Ahmadis have refused for they have yet to accept the minority status. Economically the Ahmadis have suffered a lot, Their shops and other establishments have been either burned or looted. The government under General Zia took rigorous measures against them specially within the government service sector. They are dismissed from key posts or demoted to junior position. They are often not promoted beyond certain stage till they do not renounce their faith and are often voluntarily retired. The Ahmadis have been boycotted socially, they are not allowed to undertake 'Id' procession or hold a 'Iftar' party, moreover they are arrested and tried for reciting the 'holy kalima'.

General Zia throughout his regime maintained his anti-Ahmadiyya stand. He banned the meetings at Rabwah. The Ahmadi lawyers were refused to stand at the bar of Shariah bench. The Ayats of the holy Quran was removed from the Ahmadi mosque. The Ahmadis who refuse to accept their minority status were segregated completely during the rule of General Zia. Due to ~~the~~ anti-Ahmadiyya stand of General Zia, the Ahmadis were forced to shift their headquarters from Rabwah to London. The Ahmadis from there have tried to pressurise General Zia's

government through diplomatic channels to adopt a soft attitude towards Ahmadis.

Various governments from time and again have found Ahmadis to be convenient scapegoat to deflect peoples attention from the real economic and political problem and embroiled them in fratricidal conflicts. General Zia was having no option, his military regime which was most unpopular and isolated one in Pakistan undertook most backward ideological contents, undistinguished bigotry and tried to develop a base sentiments in society for themselves. General Zia tried to divide society on the basis of religion and sect by making religious minorities and certain Muslims sect special targets.

General Zia ruled Pakistan for more than decade with iron hand. *Nothing* seems to have changed during this period for the General till his death in 1988. But in a decade General Zia brought *in* significant changes. "Pakistan moved from an democratic to an authoritarian theocratic state".²¹

General Zia in order to legitimise his rule undertook vigorous Islamization. According to him Pakistan was

21. Omar Noman, Pakistan: General Zia's Era and Legacy, Third World Quarterly, January 1989, p. 52.

created in the name of Islamic state and so should it develop as, he also maintained that the split in Pakistan was a result of abandonment of Islam.

Islamization in Pakistan has travelled rocky roads with General Zia-ul-Haq. It had become the Islam of General Zia and the Ulema, in order to maintain themselves in power. This process of Islamization has not helped Pakistan reach anywhere near a Islamic state, rather Islam again was misinterpreted for benefit of a few against suppression of many.

The process of Islamization was an outcome of ideological conflict between highly organized and politicized faction of Islamist and nationalist. The conflict had existed in latent form in Pakistan since its independence in 1947. For the Islamists, Pakistan is a country and not a nation but to nationalist it was a nation as well as a country.

CONCLUSION

The Ahmadiyya community along with the controversies that surround it, has time and again, posed serious religious questions to the Pakistani political leadership. The genesis of the controversy can be traced in the doctrinal difference, that persists between the Ahmadis and the mainstream Muslims. These differences led to serious disturbances spearheaded by Ahrar in the pre-partition days. The problem resurfaced in Pakistan after partition. This can be viewed as an continuation of the sectarian politics practised by Ahrar against the Ahmadis.

The Ahmadis who are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, are regarded as heretics by mainstream Muslims. It was the claim to prophethood by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad that made him a controversial figure. He reinterpreted the Islamic term 'jihad' which according to him 'could not mean an Islamic revolt against British rule'. This created a mistrust in the minds of Muslims, they began to regard him 'as an imposter - a brain child of British imperialism, used as a device in order to crush Islamic resurgence and divide Muslims. They viewed Mirza's claim to prophethood and his pro-British attitude as a part of his dubious plan".¹

1 Eshan Elahi Zehar, Qadianat: An Analytical Survey (Lahore, 1972), p. 114.

The Ahmadis due to their pro-British attitude were able to gain economic benefit along with social standing. The rest of the Muslim population felt left out; this created jealousy and hatred in the minds of Muslims for the Ahmadis. Even after partition, the Ahmadis were able to maintain their economic and social integrity, as a result they were despised by their Muslim counterparts.

Pakistan attained nationhood in the name of Islam. It was the perceived danger to Islam in a united and free India that helped Muslim League to achieve its cherished dream of separate state. But with independence the problem to interpret Islam properly within the new state began. The western educated leaders had a vision of Islamic democracy on lines of western liberal democracy, whereas to the fundamentalist it was return to roots of Muhammadan era of Muslim glory. The ideological controversy over the nature of Pakistani political system emerged as a contest of supremacy and leadership between modernist, traditionalist and neo-traditionalist. The nationalist leaders who felt that there was the need to profess some degree of commitment to ideas of Islamic state were challenged from two directions - (a) there was more directly the claim that Pakistan should be more overtly Islamic, and (b) it was the Ulema who felt their support to the League was betrayed. They maintained

that "if secular state was destiny of Indian Muslims, it could be arranged within united India".²

Under the pressure from the traditionalist and neo-traditionalist the modernist leaders accepted the Islamic injunction of sovereignty of entire universe which belongs to God and authority he delegates to the state of Pakistan through his people, in the objective resolution of 1949.

Under the influence of fundamentalism, the issue regarding proper definition of Muslim and Non-Muslim gained greater significance. This has been clearly reflected in the issues involving the Ahmadis.

The anti-Ahmadiyya agitation which turned violent in 1953 resulting in intensified riots, began to gain ground as early as 1949 soon after the passage of Objective Resolution "the demand for declaring Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority was publicly made at Ahrar meeting on 1st May, 1949".³ Thereafter the demand to declare the Ahmadis non-Muslim grew in proportion.

The Ulema based their demand on basis of Islamic state. They maintained that "Pakistan was claimed and

2 Saleem, M.M. Qureshi, Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan, in Aziz Ahmad, ed. Contribution to Asian Studies, vol. 1, (Leiden, 1971), p. 54.

3 Report of Court of Inquiry, Punjab Disturbances of 1953 - submitted by Justice Munir - 1954, p. 15.

was brought into existence so that the future political set up of the new state may be based on Quran and Sunna; and this was recognised in Objective Resolution".⁴

The Ulema clearly pointed out the doctrinal difference with the Ahmadis. They maintained that, the Ahmadis do not believe in Khatam-i-Nabuwat, according to them their leader Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed himself to be a prophet (nabi) and this claim according to Muslims placed him outside the pale of Islam; because prophethood ended with Muhammad. Another difference that the Ulema pointed out between the Ahmadis and mainstream Muslims was in regard to christology. The Muslims believe that Jesus is alive in 4th heaven and will descend on earth before the day of resurrection; but the Ahmadis believe that Jesus who was saved from cross, came over to Kashmir, where he died a natural death.

The third important difference that was pointed out by the Ulema was in regard to jihad. According to Al - Islam, jihad means escalation of ones power to the utmost of one's capacity in cause of Allah more so it meant fighting with non-believers for victory of Islam, whereas Ghulam Ahmad maintained that jihad means war undertaken to protect the religion from enemies; and it more specifically meant an internal struggle of morality over immorality, good over evil.

4 Ibid., p. 118.

The Ulema with theological argument tried to prove that the Ahmadis were out of the pale of Islam and not entitled to take part in public affairs of the country which was to be managed in accordance with the rules of Islam.

In Islam, religion is not separate from politics. "Islamic state cannot be isolated from society because Islam is an integrated way of life and states is a political expression of Islamic society".⁵

In Islam there is fundamental distinction between the rights of a Muslim and a non-Muslim subject. One of the major distinction which may be mentioned is that the non-Muslims are not attached with business of administration in higher sphere. Since the Ahmadis were not regarded as Muslims, the Ulema demanded dismissal of the Ahmadis who were occupying the key position in the state. Along with this they demanded, "the Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslim minority to ensure that no Ahmadi may in future be entrusted with any such position in the State".⁶

On the other hand the Ahmadis vehemently argued on their position of being a true Muslim. They maintained that Islam was a live religion and Quran was the last

5 S.B. Choudhury, The Profile of Islamic State (Dhaka, 1984), p. 9.

6 See, Munir, n. 3, p. 200.

revealed book which contained the final code of humanity, and this code was not abrogated or superseded, the prophet of Islam was Khatam-i-nabiyin, who gave the last divine message to humanity. In regard to Ahmadiyya creed they maintained that God had promised an appearance of a person, who would reform and renovate Islam and such a person was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and Ahmadiyya's were a plant implanted by God himself, to preserve Islam and Ahmadis in no-way were non-Muslims.

Though the agitation was suppressed with the help of Martial law, the Ulema were able to gain political mileage out of the issue and were able to make a legitimate position for themselves. With the Ahmadi issue, the question of apostasy became controversial. In an Islamic state apostasy is punishable by death, but the question that has been raised in this regard is on definition of apostate. If the Ahmadis are regarded apostate by the other Muslims same fate befalls Debandis and Wahabis who regard each other to be a kafir and out of pale of Islam and describing them death penalty. Even Shia-Sunni controversy has the same basis, as a result apostasy in Islamic state is based on fact who holds powers.

The Ahmadi controversy which was suppressed in 1953 resurfaced in Bhutto's time. Bhutto who was democrat

first politician to mobilize people on the basis of sound political programme was unable to check the traditionalist tide.

The anti-Ahmadiyya agitation began to gain ground by 1974 when the Rabwah incident took a violent turn. The demand to declare Ahmadis non-Muslim was put forward with renewed vigour. "The more conservative section of Ulema wanted the Ahmadis to be removed from the important key positions that they held under the government of Pakistan".⁷

On June 4th, 18 religio-political parties came together to form the 'Majlish-Taffuz Khatum-i-Nabuwat in order to put forward the demand in a unified manner. With formation of the association, whole character of the movement changed. The demand to declare Ahmadis non-Muslim now became a demand of all Muslims.

Initially Bhutto tried to deal with the problem cautiously. When the problem became complex with intensified riots, it threatened to go against his own rule, Bhutto yielded to opposition demands. "By the 2nd Constitutional amendment Act of 7th September, 1974 the Ahmadis were declared non-Muslim minority".⁸

7 Organiser (New Delhi), 1974 - Feudal Bhutto Battling for Survival.

8 Gorginia Ashworth, ed., World Minorities (Sunbury, 1974), p. 16.

The Ahmadis throughout the agitation were at the receiving end. The Ahmadis tried to emphasize on their Muslim status, which was negated by the Ulama. The Ahmadis who refused to accept their minority status have been reduced to the status of disenfranchised citizen. Being declared minority the Ahmadis are required to vote in separate electorate. Since the Ahmadis have refused their minority status they have also refused to take part in election.

With the army take over on 6th July 1977, General Zia came to power. The accession to power of General Zia was marked by intensified Islamization. Zia realised early during his tenure that he lacked legitimacy and furthermore he realised one thing that with execution of Bhutto he had alienated large section of society. The only option that Zia's military rule had to gain legitimacy was Islam and General Zia embarked upon the process of Islamization".⁹ General Zia's Islamization programme can be divided into three important fields -

(a) Economy - Zia opted for mixed economy. He introduced Zakat (welfare tax) and Ushr (harvest tax) and brought in interest free banking;

(b) Legal System - Initially he introduced federal shariat benches in four provincial high courts, later

9 Anita M. Weiss, The Historical Debate on Islam and State in South Asia, in Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (Lahore, 1987), p. 10.

it was replaced by Shariah benches in Supreme Court. Along with judicial reforms he introduced 5 ordinances amending the existing Pakistani penal code, known as Hudood Ordinances. The law provided punishment for 3 categories of crime - (a) sarqā (theft of private property, (b) zina - (adultery and fornication), (c) al sharab - (consumption of intoxication.

(c) Education - President Zia in order to develop a proper Islamic society introduced educational reform. Arabic was made compulsory in school and non-Muslim was required to take a subject of Pakistani culture. In order to impart the knowledge of shariat a separate faculty was opened in Qaid-a-Azam University, maintaining the strict Purdah system women universities were opened".¹⁰

Apart from the Islamisation programme undertaken by General Zia, another of the prominent features of his rule was systematic segregation of Ahmadis. All Pakistan Khatam-i-Nabuwat Organization was formed and it intensified the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation under the protection from Government.

Gradually the movement gained ground and fresh demands in order to curtail the activities of Ahmadis was put forward. During the early months of 1984, the

10. Ibid., p. 14.

anti-Ahmadiyya agitation began to turn violent. On April 9th the organization put forth a fresh charter of demands. Under it the Ulema demanded for imposition of Islamic punishment and complete ban of Ahmadi literature".¹¹

With the intensification of the movement Government accepted the demands of the Ulema. On April 27th, 1984 it issued an Ordinance known as an ordinance to amend, the law to prohibit the Qadiani, Lahori group and Ahmadis from indulging in anti-Islamic activity.

The ordinance curtailed the Ahmadi activity further. They are deprived of the right to propagate their religion, neither are they allowed to pray openly or call Azen.

Throughout the movement Ahmadis faced all the onslaught, they were unable to make their views known as their pamphlets were confiscated at the pretext of being anti Islamic. The Ahmadis accepted the ordinance as they had no other option rather than to denounce their faith.

The ordinance effected the community quality. Due to minority position they were deprived of their political rights. With the ordinance they were

11 POT, January 5, 1984, p. 51.

affected economically and socially Zia Government took rigorous measures against them within government service sector. They were either dismissed from key post or demoted to junior post. Socially they are boycotted and not allowed to undertake Id procession. With the death of General Zia, Pakistan came a full circle. General Zia left behind a vacuum in political sphere, where a democratic government is a Misfit in Islamic oriented authoritarian system. The crisis ridden Pakistan posed a serious threat to democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto tried to do away with the brazen interpretation of religion, in the political field. She has not been able to gain much success, this was clearly reflected in the arson and riot that took place in check Sikandari against the Ahmadis.

In April 11th and 12th of the year 1989, the problem began in early hours when after the announcement was made from the local mosque that the Ahmadis have burnt the copy of Holy Quran. With this announcement, the demand for strike and procession to be taken out was put forward. Later during the whole day there was gradual intensification of the movement against the Ahmadis. With early hours of 12th April, 1989 the mobs went on rampage as they attacked the Ahmadi building, burnt the Quran, prayer center and homes

of Ahmadis. The shops were looted, libraries were gutted and there was a total chaos in the area.¹³ Though the problem was brought under control, the official view was known as late as 5th June, 1989 when the government claimed to have given assistance to the Ahmadis. According to official spokesman the Ahmadis are minority and if they accept the position no outward incident will arise even locally.¹⁴ The official view reflected the hardline attitude of the government against the Ahmadis. According to Mr. Rehman, Editor, 'The Pakistan Times' the problem of Ahmadis is that they want to be more Muslim than Muslims, they are against secularism, which can be a better option for them. Whatever may be the view, the Ahmadis have not reconciled with minority position, the Ahmadiyya community on September 23, 1989 decided to boycott the election for the seats reserved for them in the parliament.¹⁵ They openly demanded from the new government to abolish separate electorate so as to re-enter the political stream. With movement by the new government to re-enter commonwealth the Ahmadiyya community urged the Commonwealth leaders to call upon Pakistan to repeal

13 Alys Faiz, City Features: Arson and Riot, Viewpoint (Lahore), October 5th, 1989, p. 22.

14 Ibid., p. 23.

15 The Times of India, 24th September, 1989.

the anti-Ahmadiyya laws, so that the community can exercise their basic human rights as human being in that country".¹⁶

In Pakistan itself there was a strong movement within the democratically elected government of Pakistan to abolish the separate electorate based on religion. The new governments approach towards solving the problem came to a total halt with escalating Kashmir problem and ethnic clashes in Sind.

The Ahmadiis who had felt assured with the advent of democratically elected government of being treated equally in par with their counterparts and be able to enjoy their basic rights have remained in the position that they have been reduced to by the previous regime.

The Ahmadiis who had proved to be a convenient scapegoat to deflect peoples attention from real economic and political problem, face fundamentalist onslaught. The problem of Ahmadiis is that ^{they} insist on their Muslim identity which gives the fundamentalist an opportunity to persecute them in the name of Islam.

The Ahmadiis who have faced the fundamentalist onslaught, time and again have been effected thoroughly.

16 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 16th October, 1989.

The Ahmadis with the declaration of minority have been reduced to the status of disenfranchised citizen. They no longer take part in politics as a result, they have the problem of representation, which has generated the problem, whereby they are unable to make their view and problems known to the people.


The reducing social relationship has led to economic downfall for the Ahmadis. Their business establishment has suffered because of the social boycott, moreover during agitation, their shops and offices have been attacked incurring heavy losses. Even within service sector they face the problems. They are either, demoted to a junior post or not promoted after certain stage till they do not renounce their faith. Religiously they are faced with problem of propagation of their religion as their pamphlets are confiscated as anti-Islamic. The '84 ordinance further curbed their activity and prohibited the propagation of their religion. The community faces a serious threat of disintegration and extinction in Pakistan. With the gradual erosion of economic development, they are losing their social integrity that bound them together. There have been cases where the Ahmadis have renounced their faith. With continued political disenfranchisement, there is the growing neglect towards the community by ^{the} government.

The inability of the various governments to protect the Ahmadis from the fundamentalist onslaught is threatening the very existence of the community in Pakistan. They face grim prospect in Pakistan until a positive attitude is adopted by the government in order to bring them back in the mainstream.

The Ahmadiyya issue which has generated a religious debate within Pakistan, has clearly reflected the failure in parts of the leaders to interpret Islam properly. The issue has openly manifested the predatory nature of Pakistani elites, who have used Islam to be a fig leave to hide their authoritarian nature. The whole issue had led to the debate on the proper definition of a Muslim and that of a non-Muslim. This issue has gradually intertwined religion with politics in Pakistan and has led to democratic demise in the country.

There are various shades of opinion in regard to the Ahmadi problem, some view the problem can only be solved if Pakistan adopts more secular principle in order to deal with the religious problem. There are others who feel that the Ahmadis creat problem for themselves, either they should accept the minority status or adovocate for certain degree of secularism. According to Mr. Rehman (Editor, Pakistan Times) "The

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problem with Ahmadis is that they insist to be more Muslims than their counterparts".

The Ahmadiyya issue which has generated a religious debate in Pakistan, can only be solved with the help of its religio-political leadership, who by adopting a positive and understanding attitude towards all sects, can incorporate them in the mainstream of Pakistan's political and social life. This remains to be seen how the democratic government deals with the problem.

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