The United States and the NATO Under Reagan Administration: 1981—1988

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO UNDER REAGAN ADMINISTRATION:1981-1988" by Ms SUMANA MOHANTY in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

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PREFACE

The United States has played a vital role in preserving its alliance system with Western Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The NATO came into existence in 1949 as a part of United States foreign policy commitments in Western Europe. The end of the World War II brought about the onset of the Cold War. Various measures were adopted by the policy planners in Washington to counter the Soviet influence in Europe. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were the corollary of the policy of containment as a broad strategy of the United States foreign policy. The North Atlantic Treaty was a sequel to these objectives.

The member nations that included the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, West Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Norway, Iceland, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Luxemberg and Denmark were committed to each other in terms of mutual co-operation on defence matters. Of all the alliances and treaties that the United States signed with other member nations in the years that followed, the NATO

has withstood the test of time and to a certain extent mutuality of common interest.

The United States has passed through several phases of its Cold War with the principal adversary, Soviet Union between 1950 and 1980. There had been years of intense Cold War, the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-55), the Indo-China Crisis (1954-1965), the escalation of Vietnam War (1965-1975) and also the moments of confrontation with each other in other parts of the globe. The same period has also witnessed thawing of the Cold War during the period of Kennedy Administration as also the formation of detente with People's Republic of China in 1971 followed by a similar gesture during Nixon-Brezhnev meeting in Washington in 1973.

The present dissertation is an attempt to examine and analyse the relations that the United States had developed with its principal allies among the NATO countries in a changed scenario of international relations. The economic and commercial interests of the member nations in counter distinction to the paramountcy of similar United States interest; the strategic differences between one and the other; the divergent approaches on matters pertaining to nuclear warheads and the universality of

disarmament negotiations have constantly been the key points of difference between NATO and the United States.

The present dissertation has within its purview an examination of these issues as they appear during the two term administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1988).

The first chapter begins with a brief historical analysis of the origin of the NATO, the reason for its formation and the policy pursued by United States towards the NATO countries since its inception.

The second chapter mainly concentrates on Reagan Administration's legacy in managing alliance security affairs. While the Reagan Administration got off to a shaky start in Europe it has ended its tenure with US-West European relations in better shape than its critics dreamed possible.

The areas of disagreement between United States and NATO countries on various policy measures has been the main theme of the third chapter. Many allies questioned the massive build up of US forces and were also disturbed by the Reagan Military Strategy, which they felt had overtones of unilateralism and even

isolationism. Furthermore, the United States had its own complaints about the allies. Therefore, suspicion in Europe were matched by dissatisfaction in Washington.

The last chapter has focussed on the major strides made towards the unity in NATO during the second term presidency of Ronald Reagan. Historical and analytical methods have been employed as principal tools of research.

I would be failing in my duty if I don't acknowledge the enormous help, inspiration and encouragement that I have received from several persons during the course of the preparation of this work.

At the very outset, I express my sincere gratitude to my esteemed supervisor Professor R.P. Kaushik for his tireless assistance, priceless inspiration, constant encouragement and timely advice in bringing this piece of research to fruitition.

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Finally, I myself bear the responsibility for any mistake in my work.

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Second World War, the United States emerged as one of the most powerful nations in the world. No sooner had the war come to an end, than the American policy planners found the Soviet Union as their principal adversary. The tension of the Cold War was tangible even in the wartime conferences. The Yalta Conference in February, 1945 had been regarded as the harbinger of problems, soon to follow in regard to arrangements reached in Eastern Europe as well as the Far-East. It has been commented by several experts that Yalta represented a failure of American diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The controversy regarding the diplomatic manoeuvre at the Yalta Conference as persued by the two powers had yet not come to rest. American interest appeared to have been lost in regard to the arrangements that followed in the post War years. What finally emerged, however, was the fact that the United States launched an ambitious scheme of bilateral as well as multilateral agreements with countries that were within the western hemisphere of Europe.

In pursuance of the famous "Containment Policy" of George F. Kennan, the U.S. applied the Truman Doctrine vis-a-vis Greece and Turkey. The Truman Doctrine stalled the communist insurgency in this part of the Europe. Soon followed the Marshall Plan. This was announced after George Marshall addressed the Harvard University audience where the United States suggested that it would rehabilitate Europe in the economic sphere. The war-torn Europe needed immediate attention of America to reconstruct it and bring about economic strength in the post war years.

The Secretary of State emphasised that if European nations could demonstrate a determination to cooperate and gave assurance that the aid they received would be used to the economic benefit of Western Europe as a whole, the U.S. would help pay the bill.

The European Recovery Plan was not the first of its kind. The Lend Leased funds were already made available to Europe during the War. The lend leased, in toto, recorded some $ 48,500,000,000 worth of American assistance during the war years. United States had acted in magnanimity by reducing billions

of dollars to mere millions when it found that the recovery of such money was not easy to come by. The principal reason for America's assistance was to make Europe economically viable.

The Marshall Plan had succeeded to a great deal. So much so that by 1949, Western Europe's agricultural and industrial production had reached its figure of 1939. In January 1951, Great Britain renounced voluntarily further aid. In August, 1952, self-supporting Europe launched at Luxemburg European Coal and Steel Community better known as the Schuman lan. While these economic arrangements were in progress, the United States had also thought of working out a collective alliance with the European allies.

In March, 1948, the British, French, Dutch, Belgium and Luxemburg governments signed the Brussels Pact creating the Western European Union (WEU). This pact was a political gesture. It did not have much military significance. Dean Acheson who was then the Under Secretary of State, observed that the help of the U.S. should go beyond the economic field and encompass some positive actions that would diminish fear of aggression.

The members of the Brussels Pact and the Truman Administration believed that a formal alliance was essential to establish a credible American pledge of military assistance.

Thus the ground was prepared for laying down a plan before the United States Senate for enlarging the U.S. commitments in regard to Western Europe. Senator Arther Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, brought out a resolution on 11th June, 1948 which was passed by the Senate, commonly known as Vandenberg Resolution. The resolution created an association of the United States under proper constitutional safeguards with regional collective security arrangements.

"These events outlined the objectives of the bargain, identified the partners of the deal and suggested some of the reciprocal obligations to be borne by the participants".[1] The Soviet action by imposing a blockade of Berlin in June, 1948 only accelerated the process. In many ways the expansion and formalisation of European - American relations in the late 1940's and early 1950's reflected a global

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1 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain (London: MacMillan, 1986), p.3.

process-the ending of the Second World War, and the delineation of the 'lines of battle' for the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe as a whole was the cockpit of the early Cold War tensions, arising from the disputes over the post War status of Germany, Poland and other defeated countries.

It can, therefore, be assumed that the U.S. policy after the Second World War has been immensely Euro-centric. Europe occupied the primacy of U.S. interest. Western Europe had long been the source of economic and commercial links with America. From late nineteen century, the U.S. capital investment in Europe and a suitable market for American merchandise had been well known. Europe represented an industrial reservoir for the United States. Traffic of Ideas in the field of literature and cultural Anglo-Saxon bonds further strengthened their ties with each other.

With the rise of Hitler's Germany and a fascist regime in central Europe, U.S. interests were threatened. As a result, Washington showed keen interest in keeping Europe in the orbit of its influence.

Thus it can be inferred that though many of the most significant trends and tensions were set in motion during the 1920's and 1930's, the beginnings of a formal American 'presence' in and commitment to the affairs of Western Europe can legitimately be located in the later years of Second World War. And it would be no exaggeration to say in the words of Henry Kissinger that "the most constructive American foreign policy since the end of World War II has been the development of Atlantic relationships".[2]

After six months of prolonged negotiations among the founding partners the deal was hammered out. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was thus devised and born with the United States as the principal signatory and remaining partners of Europe involved in it. The membership of NATO included United States, Canada, Britain, France, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxemberg, the Netherlands, and subsequently Italy, Greece, Turkey and West Germany followed. Spain and Portugal joined much later - as late as 1982.

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2 Henry A. Kissinger, Troubled Partnership: A Reappriasal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw Hill, for the Council of Foreign Relations, 1965), p.3.

While signing the North Atlantic Treaty, Truman noted, "/It is/ one more step in the evolution of United States Foreign Policy alongwith the United Nations Charter, the Greek Turkish Aid programme and the Marshall Plan".[3]

The Treaty signed in April, 1949 committed the signatories to aid each other in case of aggression within a definite geographical area and also to enter into continuous and effective self help and mutual assistance.

Harlan Cleveland has aptly described NATO as a 'Transatlantic bargain'. It is a bargain, to be sure but far more than the sort of deal struck between business partners and with roots in the hearts as well as minds of the partners.[4]

A series of factors like Soviet pressures and Western demands combined to create a demand for American investment and support from a structured set

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3 Jeane, J. Kirkpatrick, "Atlantic Alliance and the American National Interest", World Affairs (Washington, D.C.), vol.147, no.2, Fall 1984, p. 85.

4 Sloan, n.1, p.3.

cultural obligation and commitments between the West European countries and the United States. "While the global arena provides much of the scenery against which European American relations developed, the Atlantic system is responsible for many of the more tangible and immediate aspects of the relationship".[5]

Thus, the arrangements reached in Europe in the form of NATO bore clear indications that the United States believed in the continuity of its relations in this part of the world.

Some Contentious Issues

However, NATO never had a trouble free development. Periodic skirmishes and differential approach could be discerned between United States and its allies, more specifically, France, right from the beginning. The basic conflict was between French and American priorities. The spectre of Germany haunted France more than anybody else and it was determined to prevent Germany from acquiring any substantial

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5 Michael Smith, Western Europe and the United States: The Uncertain Alliance (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 43.

military capability. British orientation was also unfortunate because it wanted to keep away from the continental involvement. The American preference was to help balance Soviet power in Central Europe by rearming Germany. With this end in view, U.S. sought cooperative effort of all its allies in defence matters.

> The Pentagon was not anxious to take on what appeared to be a massive and potentially open ended commitment in Europe without parallel development of West European defense forces. Given the British reluctance to play a major role in the continent and the fact that France with forces tied down in Indo-China would not provide sufficient ground forces to balance the Soviet Union in Central Europe; German rearmament seemed an inescapable pre-requisite for any major U.S. commitment to continental defense.(6)

The Korean Catalyst

The Korean War which occurred in 1950 proved to be the catalyst for shaping post war Euro-Atlantic relation and resolving the Franco-American impasse on German rearmament. To some extent, it consolidated the European-American relationship, at the outset.

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6 Sloan, n.1, p. 10.

It did not however signal an end to tensions and uncertainties about the way the relationship might be organised and conducted.

"The Korean war led to the first and last real effort of all the major allies in the North Atlantic Alliance to build up their forces to levels specified by the military as being necessary to withstand Soviet attack".[7] Korean war was also significant in the sense that it led to the establishment of the treaty organisation, with a council, an "integrated" military force, and a unified headquarters headed by an American commander - the permanent military organisation envisaged by the Brussels Treaty signatories. As a follow up action it also led to the semi-permanent stationing of American forces in the continent with a view to encouraging the European allies to meet their force goals and subsequently to reinforce the credibility of American's guarantee.

Nonetheless, the issue of German rearmament persisted as a major impediment to transatlantic

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7 Robert J. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 49.

relation. After a prolonged negotiation US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman chalked out a compromise formula on German rearmament issue and subsequently it got the approval of French and US Governments. Timothy Ireland observes that the compromise satisfied the principal objectives of French Government and US Administration. "The United States had gained French adherence to at least the idea of German rearmament. The French gained an immediate American military commitment to the defense of Europe while delaying the rearming of Germany".[8]

EDC Controversy:

With the passage of time, NATO further witnessed recurrent stresses in its structure. The most spectacular discord between the US Government and NATO countries was the question of European Defense Community (EDC). Observes Michael Smith:

> There were other nagging failures by West European regimes to live upto their obligations - both doctrinal and material -

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8 Timothy, P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 207.

> within the Atlantic Alliance, but it was in the EDC controversy that the full ramifications of the great divide between rhetoric and reality emerged.(9)

Originally, EDC was designed to reassure France against future German power and to provide a constructive framework for the creation of a Western Europe. "While the Americans adopted the EDC as the symbol of Atlantic Solidarity, they were met with British reservations and French inability to deliver on their declaratory commitments.[10]

The Eisenhower Administration which assumed office in 1952 did see the EDC as a potential source of relief from the burdens of European defence. The United States tried its best to pressurise France for the acceptance of the proposal. But France could not adhere to the American policy; as a result, the EDC proposal had to be shelved. The decision against the EDC was thus a tragic event in the history of US and its European partner, as far as the post-war alliance system was concerned. "Ironically, it was France, the original author of the EDC plan, which had bec ne uncertain about her work and had finally torn up the

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9 Smith, n.5, p. 23.

10 Ibid., p. 24.

script".[11]

Notwithstanding the dissensions, important strides were made in military and strategic sphere. US government was very keen on establishing a military-command-structure for NATO right from its inception. The US government appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) at the behest of Military Committee of NATO. The Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) was set up in July, 1951 at Rocquencowt near Paris. The Supreme command of the Allied powers for central Europe was established in Fontainebleau:

> The appointment of General Eisenhower satisfied the Europeans on two counts: by virtue of his illustrious past as the victorious Allied Commander-in-Chief, he was popular, and by sending an American General, the United States showed that it was taking the defense of Europe as seriously as its own.(12)

The Eisenhower Administration, however, had to cope with the challenge arising from the Soviet nuclear capacity. As a result, the "New Look", a

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11 Sloan, n.1, p. 26.

12 Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: The European-American Relations since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 157.

form of deterrence based on the threat of "massive retaliation" by nuclear means against Soviet transgressions was evolved. From the outset the administration was virtually inclined to use nuclear weapons deployments to meet diverse national security objectives while pursuing fiscal solvency. It had envisaged that the countries of Western Europe should share more of the non-nuclear burden in NATO. In Europe it created suspicion and uncertainty.

> The tensions were compounded of domestic and international features, of economic burden such as rearmament and questions of military doctrine, and of the frailties or miscalculations of leaderships in a number of countries".(13)

These hostilities and recrimination attained its zenith in 1954 but by the middle of 1955, the storm appeared to have subsided. The years from 1955-1960 could be viewed as a different phase in which a series of new initiatives and trends emerged, some of which led to a few crises. The most notable of these incidents was the Suez Canal Crises in 1956, which brought both the partners of the alliance on the threshold of conflict.

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13 Smith, n.5, p. 13.

The period of Eisenhower presidency was dominated by the problems of post colonial adjustments. The idea that the United States would undermine the interests of the allies in order to further its own became deeply entrenched in Europe. It was a result that was brought about partly by Dulles' aggressive Wilsonian rhetoric and partly by the incidents in the Real-politik. France complained of the ambivalent attitude of the US towards the former's position in Indo-China and Algeria. The Vietnamese situation was particularly disturbing to the French people due to the division of Vietnam into two; One zone was ruled by the Communists and the other by American supported ruler; both in any case, not conducive to the interest of the French. The British, likewise, had a grave suspicion of American intention in the Middle East, especially in Iraq.[14]

It was during this time that the policy of containment advocated by Truman was more vigorously pursued than ever before. This obviously ruled out any improvement towards a German Settlement or the

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14 See Lawrence Freedman, ed., The Troubled Alliance: The Atlantic Relation in the 1980s (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 33-34.

normalization of relations with communist China. The doctrine of massive retaliation which appeared during this time also assumed great significance. It intended to reassure the West Germans by establishing a link between their fate and the use of American nuclear power. But along with this it promoted the idea that the US was capable of destroying the human race in defence of its own interests and preconception.

French Stance

In 1960's two different strands of view became visible in European-American relations. On the one side there was a long list of institutional and operational achievements to the credit of the Alliance. And on the other, there were contentious issues over strategic doctrines and responsibilities; over economic costs and benefits and over the shape and legitimacy of West European political and social structure.

This contrasting view was further explained by the President Kennedy's 'grand design'. The "grand design" was based on a declaration of interdependence between the United States and a United Europe, which would form the basis of a burgeoning liberal world system. But this interdependence and partnership was

conceived in opposite ways on the two sides of the Atlantic.

> Where the Kennedy Administration foresaw a military division of labour which left the United States with the whiphand in nuclear weapons policy, the French in particular (but also the British) felt the need to emphasise their own nuclear capabilities.(15)

The Johnson Administration, which came to office immediately after the Kennedy Administration, further contributed to the deteriorating relationship. "The waning of Atlanticism, however, did not put an end to the tensions between rhetoric and reality which seemed to have become part and parcel of European American relations".[16] French assertion of rationale independence, in particular, created a trans-atlantic rift of major dimensions. The French suspicion against the dominant partner was very strong, so much so that it prevented the entry of British into the European Economic Community (EEC) by applying veto in January, 1963. Thus the dream of a United Europe was shattered by this hostile action on the part of the French.

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15 Smith, n.5, p. 24.

16 Ibid., p. 26.

In 1966, De Gaulle announced his decision to leave NATO's Integrated Military Command and urged the NATO to remove its headquarters' forces and the facilities they had been enjoying in the French territory. He viewed that once the Soviet Union had broken the US atomic monopoly, Europe could not count on the United States to risk its own devastation in order to defend Europe. He built up France's own nuclear deterrent to give it independence in this respect. He ridiculed NATO as a mere appendage of the United States. Though De Gaulle withdrew France from the military organization of NATO, he claimed to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty. He was unwilling to give up the possible benefits of the North Atlantic Treaty, which he did not rate very highly, for whatever worth they were. "The essence of Gaullism was the complete freedom of France or a French dominated Europe to do as it pleased, independently of the United States, in diplomatic, economic and military affairs".

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17 Theodore Draper, "The Phantom Alliance", in Rober W. Tucker and Linda Wrigley, eds., The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 5.

The defection of France was, in truth, a deadly blow to the alliance in its original form. Without France, Western Europe was a political and geographical amputee. It had some serious long term consequences, which were quite detrimental to the alliance militarily. The French action disrupted NATO's lines of supply and communication, so essential to its functioning. The political balance also altered as a result of this action, with France conferring on itself an independent status. The alliance became all the more dependent on American leadership.

The American pre-eminence on the alliance ironically came at a time when Western Europe was moving towards a more powerful position in the Atlantic relationship; when as a result of its economic strength, role of the West German forces in the alliance, was increasing.

Another major consequence was that the withdrawal of France enhanced the status of Germany within the alliance. Eventually the Federal Republic of Germany became the second most influential ally in NATO and its leading European member.

At this point of time, Harmel report, the product of a prestigious committee led by Harmel, asserted the virtues of improved consultation. It emphasised the fact that military security and the policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary. The report's 'defence and detente' combination provided an intellectual and political framework for NATO policies which accomodated the growing split in the alliance between left and right. The Harmel exercise revitalized the foundation of the alliance. It provided a political framework more relevant to the challenges posed by East West environment of the 1960's. In a way, it did give the alliance a new lease of life and a renewed sense of purpose. However, in March 1968, when Lyndon Johnson announced his decision to retire from the presidency, European-American relations reached its lowest ebb.

The significance of the Harmel Report lies in providing a way to deal with a problem which had been brewing between the United States and European allies. The United States had become actively involved in bilateral arms control discussions with the Soviet Union. These bilateral discussions led to apprehension among the allies about the future role of the United States

as their protector. Americans too expressed their concern over the fact that the European allies might succumb to Soviet peace offensive. The Harmel Report implied that the NATO consultation could serve to coordinate Western approaches to the East which would help alleviate European concerns about US-Soviet bilateralism.

The allies wasted no time in translating the Harmel Mandate into alliance policy. When the North Atlantic Council met in Reykjavik, Iceland in June, 1968, the allies issued a "Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

The Conference on the so-called Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) took place in Vienna in January, 1973. Participants were the seven Warsaw Pact nations and the twelve NATO countries. France had refused to participate in any form since it was opposed in principle to any negotiations between the blocs or alliances. Secondly, it desired not to become involved in future arms limitation or disarmament measures in a certain part of central Europe.

The Vienna MBFR negotiations thus proved to be protracted and frustrating. But their lengthiness and

the constant change in negotiation topics did not keep them from causing serious disagreements and tensions between the United States and its European allies.

Allies Mounting Suspicions

In this process of change and fragmentation the order was challenged in both the strategic and the economic arenas. The strategic field was transformed partly because of the coincidence of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was complemented by a change of attitudes and policy style in the United States, especially with the preference of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger for "balance of power" policies and pursuit of national interests rather than ideological crusades. The result was a pervading and mutual suspicion. It was believed that the Soviets and the U.S. were doing deals at the expense of Western Europe. Two events particularly underlined the problem: the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 which applied in theory to all the allies; and the West German pursuit of a Ostopolitik, which contradicted the global notions of the American by working for a relaxation of tension

in Central and Eastern Europe.[18]

In the meantime, United States and the Soviet Union had initiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to deal with nuclear inter-continental ballistic missiles which were threatening Europe with the prevailing balance of terror. In Moscow, Richard Nixon and Leonard Brezhnev signed a permanent treaty limiting anti-ballistic missiles and a provisional five year agreement in May, 1972. The Foreign Ministers of NATO decided to limit the inter-continental missiles as well as other weapons. This meeting was held at Reykjavik in June, 1968 with a view to proposing negotiations with the Warsaw Pact nations. With the signing of the SALT I agreement, nuclear war came to be seen as a mere theoretical possibility. Few worried about European Security and indeed few in America worried about Europe as a whole. The Americans tended to concentrate on extricating themselves from Vietnam quagmire and on building a new structure of peace with the Soviets.[19]

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18 Smith, n.5, p. 16.

19 Pierre Lellouche, "The transformation of NATO: Parallel European Cooperation," in A.I. Broadhust, ed., The Future of European Alliance System: NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1982), p. 88.

It was during this period that Washington thought it necessary to launch "year of Europe" in 1973 to demonstrate to its allies America's continued interest in the commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. But this ill-fated declaration ended in bitter recrimination fuelled by the crises and disturbances which occurred elsewhere.

After the confusion and recriminations of the early 1970's there was a lull in this relationship. Indeed, during 1975 and 1976 there were frequent references to 'rebuilding', and'consolidation'. They also referred to the other constructive activities. The problems in Euro-American relations came to be viewed in a larger context and assumed worldwide ramifications. The process of globalisation had thus gained currency.

During the late 1970's and the early 1980's, the rhetoric of Atlanticism and partnership was muted in European-American relations. President Carter began his term of office with what had become almost the ritual promise of consultation with the European allies.[20] He expressed his determination to pursue the policy of Human Rights. But by the end of his term, Carter had made major policy changes and stressed the strategic aspects of the American confrontation with the Soviet

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20 Smith, n.5, p. 26.

Union. Thus the 'Carter Doctrine' sought to set limits on Soviet expansion in South-West Asia as well as in the Middle East. His actions and policies triggered off transatlantic recriminations.

Thus, during Carter's regime, political relation between Europe and America plummeted to the lowest ebb. Transatlantic frictions which grew partly owing to some military setbacks were greatly intensified by parallel diplomatic and economic developments. "General European disapproval of American diplomacy was parallel by an almost universal European disdain for American economic policy".[21]

Carter's policy of denouncing detente and imposing broad sanctions against the Soviet Union (after 1979 invasion) did not find favour with the Europeans. In this mood, Europeans began to have substantial reservations about Carter's new Rapid Deployment Force.

Carter undoubtedly had made significant changes in the broad military, diplomatic and economic initiatives of the Nixon years. Unfortunately, it came to be

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21 Ibid., p. 71.

viewed as insufficient, tardy, vacillating and amateurish in the eyes of the public. "Carter came to office as the beneficiary of Nixon's mistakes at home, he left it as the scapegoat for Nixon's mistakes abroad".[22] The election in 1980 of Ronald Reagan as the President of the United States was accompanied by the promise to mend forces and refurbish the Atlantic partnership. He sought to enhance America's prestige and power in the global arena. However, he found himself confronted with a fragmented and often hostile West European audience.

The history of NATO would thus be incomplete without some reference to the fact that American European relations had not been altogether blank pages filled in only by events since 1945. On the contrary, both Americans and Europeans had a deep store of attitudes about each other. Both reinforced and envenomed their relations in the alliance. The ties of history, ideology, institutions, values and culture that underlie the recent security and political relationship would be significant because they were instrumental in fashioning the whole set of strategic reaction of NATO.[23]

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22 David, P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of Western Alliance (New York: Inc. Publishers, 1987), p. 71.

23 See Stanley R Sloan, ed., NATO inthe 1990s (Washington: Pergamon, 1989), p. 73.

C H A P T E R - II

A SHIFT IN U.S. APPROACH

During the latter part of the 1970's the Superpower relations changed drastically. Among other developments, a major event took place in Afghanistan. The Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan in December 1979 which brought about a major crisis between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Soviet intervention in the region was regarded by America as a direct threat to the gulf region and a problem to its traditional ally, Pakistan. With the hostile regime in Iran and a non-aligned India, Washington regarded the Soviet action as a further pointer to a possible Soviet preponderance over the region. It was feared that in an adverse eventuality, the industrial strength of the Western Europe would be curtailed drastically by blocking the oil supply to that region. Japan, another ally of the United States, would also be hit severely by such an action.

The security as well as military-cum-strategic considerations of Europe loomed large on the estimate of American policy planners. Europe on its part also felt increasingly threatneed by the possibility of optimum utilisation of conventional forces as also of short range nuclear warheads on its door steps with

the Soviet Union. As a result, European security as also its future status vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, became the key point in East-West relations.

With the activities of war in Afghanistan, Western Europe believed that America's commitment to its allies were at a stake. Hence, any negotiations on arms control with the Soviet Union, would be carried out with European viewpoint as well.

Besides on a wider geo-strategic scale, the invasion of Afghanistan, coming as it did after the extension of Soviet influence into Ethopia and Yemen, changed the strategic map of the Persian Gulf region from which Europe received about 60 per cent of her oil requirements. The presence of Western naval forces (essentially American and French) in the area had expanded East-West confrontation beyond the traditional European theatre into a region which in itself was extremely volatile and unstable.

> The promulgation of the Carter Doctrine proclaiming the Gulf a vital US interest and threatening the use of force to preserve the oil flow, and the eruption of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, coming after the second dramatic oil price rise in the wake of the Islamic revolution in Iran the previous year, finally brought home to Europe the lesson

> which had been quickly forgotten after 1973, namely that European Security can no longer be geographically limited to the European theatre alone. (1)

Earlier, in a bid to restore the superiority of American military power, Carter Administration adopted an ambitious "long term defence programme" and attempted to strengthen its nuclear as well as conventional force posture. But when the improvement programme for these forces was threatened from various fronts, the Reagan Administration assumed office with the promise to consolidate the alliance by re-establishing American military strength and reasserting American leadership.

In the early years of NATO, U.S. had enjoyed an absolute nuclear superiority over its principal adversary, i.e. the Soviet Union. But gradually Soviet Union also achieved nuclear parity with the United States, thus changing one of the most important conditioning factors for the original trans-atlantic bargain.

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1 Piere Lellouche, "The Transformation of NATO: Parallel European Cooperation" in A.I. Broadhurst, ed., The Future of the European Alliance System: NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 91.

One of the experts opined:

> For the past 25 years, the United States has become progressively more vulnerable, its very existence more dependent on the intentions and capabilities of a hostile power than it has been since the American Revolution.(2)

The tactical advantage that the United States had enjoyed for a long time was countered in the 1970's by Soviet nuclear force improvements. It included the deployment of SS-20s, a mobile and accurate missile system. In Europe, uneasiness about the inter-continental strategic military balance revived the usual fear about American decoupling.[3] Growing impatient with the rapid increase in the number of new intermediate nuclear missiles SS-20s, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt began pressing the Americans to counter by deploying intermediate range missiles in Europe.

Henry Kissinger also expressed his dis-enchantment over the adequacy of NATO's nuclear policy. He urged the NATO to modernize its European-based nuclear forces and encourage the allies to strengthen conventional defence. He was of the opinion that the

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2 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 64.

3 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The .....

extended deterrence had been rendered obsolete by the advent of Soviet strategic nuclear parity, and the expansion of Soviet theatre nuclear forces had checkmated NATO's adoption of the flexible response strategy and deployment of thousands of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

1979 twin track policy and its repercussions

In 1979, NATO adopted the historic twin track policy to negotiate with the Soviet Union about the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe while at the same time preparing to deploy Euro-strategic missiles.

In pursuance with NATO's 1979 decision to modernise its theatre nuclear forces while seeking to negotiate limits on such forces with the Soviet Union, the United States began deploying Pershing II ballistic missiles and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in December 1983.

> Reagan Administration officials hearlded the initial deployment as a victory for NATO, demonstrating the ability of the allies to stick with a difficult decision even in the face of strong Soviet opposition.(4)

Future of Western Alliance (New York: Publishers Inc, 1987), p. 66.

4 Sloan, n.2, p. 67.

Alliance solidarity behind NATO's 1979 dual track decision on INF modernisation prevented the Soviets from unilaterally dictating Western security policy. This solidarity stemmed from the extensive consultation which the U.S. conducted with its European and Japanese allies on arms control issues. These consultations assured a consensus among the allies which was essential in dealing with the Soviets on these vital issues.[5]

The main intention of the decision was to enhance deterrence against Soviet aggression and to reassure Europe about the American nuclear guarantee.

> The decision to modernize nuclear forces in Europe was taken in order to reinforce the alliance's structure of collective security and to maintain the credibility of America's extended deterrent and to support the alliance strategy of flexible response. This decision represented continuity not change".(6)

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5 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington, D.C.), vol. 20, no. 52, December 31, 1984, p. 1922.

6 Richard R. Burt, "The Alliance at a Cross Road", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: GPO), vol. 82, no. 2059, February 1982, p. 44.

SALT II AND AFTERMATH

However, the arms control track suffered a major set back due to the general deterioration in U.S. - Soviet relations which had begun in the years immediately prior to the NATO decision.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of NATO 1979 decision provided a rallying point for the critique of Soviet global intervention which had been building in the United States for a number of years. It subsequently led to the non-ratification of the SALT II Treaty by the US Senate.

The 1980's ushered a new era in American politics. Ronald Reagan after trouncing a discredited Jimmy Carter in the 1980 election, set American foreign policy on a new course. The new Administration was deeply sceptical about arms control and sought to project Soviet Union as the principal adversary to US interest. It embarked upon developing the defence build up in a grandiose manner.

The Reagan Administration's approach to the 1979 decision was based on its dominant philosophy that the Soviet Union would not act seriously in arms control negotiations until Moscow saw that an expensive arms

race was the alternative to arms control agreement.

Owing to the pressure from the allies as well as from within the Administration itself, President Reagan announced the famous "zero option" proposal on 18 November 1981, which called for the total elimination of all Soviet intermediate range nuclear weapons in return for cancellation of NATO deployment plans. The principal motive behind it was to gain European public support for its deployment programme. This proposal was spurnned by the Soviet Union on the ground that there already existed a rough parity between East and West in such system. It counted British and French forces in the West's totals and did not want to sanction new American deployments in an arms control accord.

The "zero-option" proposal temporarily helped allay the concern about the Administration's casual attitude towards discussion of limited nuclear option. But Europeans felt jittery over Administration's hard-line rhetoric toward the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration defended its negotiating approach by arguing that the West needed to counter the SS-20s and re-establish a balance in intermediate range nuclear weapons.

Different Perceptions with regard to Soviet Union

Thus "The Reagan regime came to office with excessive zeal for rearming and an all-too-apparent disdain for negotiating".[7] He eschewed the policy of cooperation and instead embraced the confrontationist approach. He virtually held the previous regime responsible for the decline of America's power in the world in 1970's. He sought to regain superior position of the U.S. in the world politics and asked the Western allies to work more cohesively for this end. Unlike the US, most West Europeans believed that a mix of preparedness and cooperation was the only alternative to face the Soviet challenge, without, of course, going in for a war. There were sharp differences between the two over a number of issues.

> To the Reaganites detente was an unspeakable French word. To Europeans the idea was still very much alive; signifying not only trade with the East but also a gradual evolution in the two Europes, leading to a partial restoration of historic ties.(8)

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7 Singal Y. Leon, "NATO: Reagan's Radical Challenge", Bulletin of Atomic Scientist (Chicago), vol. 45, no.1, Jan-Feb. 1989, p. 38.

8 Ibid., p. 38.

Reagan also exaggerated the Soviet threat. He saw the Soviet Union as utterly expansionist, while Europeans regarded it as defensive, and indeed struggling, to maintain the status quo with the US in the international arena.

> Reagan's extravagant anti Soviet rhetoric which was thought to have deeply offended Soviet leaders, thoroughly alarmed the fitting Western European. They noted the administration's massive arms building and bellicose tone and concluded it was callous to the horrors of nuclear war, not serious about arm talks and spoiling for a fight all over the globe.(9)

While Reagan spoke of increased danger, the Europeans saw the Soviet threat diminishing as a consequence of the erosion of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, the diversion of its military resources to Afghanistan and the Far East and a weakening of Soviet economy.

The Reagan Administration also challenged the very idea of NATO as a defensive alliance in Europe. First, it tried to expand the NATO mission to encompass Poland, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, although allied involvement outside Europe had always been a debatable issue.

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9 Calleo, n.3, p. 73.

The nuclear issue was probably the most acute point of divergence between the U.S. and its allies. US planners said that Europe needed to install new missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union. In U.S. eyes, this step would reinforce deterrence in Europe, thus reducing the risk of war.[10]

> European leaders instead emphasize arms control negotiations to produce nuclear equilibrium in Europe, ideally at a lower level - reduced Soviet deployment and perhaps no new US missiles.(11)

The assumption of office by Reagan further escalated the risk of nuclear confrontation in Europe. The Europeans knew what even a limited war in Europe's crowded spaces would wreak such havoc that no recognisable society could reemerge there for centuries to come.

> Such fears reflect a gulf between American and European public attitudes about the Reagan Administration's policy to strengthen NATO's nuclear forces to offset "mounting Soviet powers.(12)

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10 International Herald Tribune (Paris), 24 June 1981.

11 Ibidem

12 National Herald (New Delhi), 19 February 1982.

The period from the mid 1970's to the mid 1980's highlighted both the typical and recurring transatlantic differences and the process by which they had been contained. Starting in the mid 1970's, the Americans embarked on a policy of rearmament and confrontation with the Soviets. The Europeans were willing to follow but they too had their reservations about it. Europeans believed that detente in Europe should be insulated from Soviet-American confrontation elsewhere: American policy therefore was not at all to their taste.

> American policy was based on a sharply different view -- both of the Soviets and of Western Europe's proper role in the alliance. The Carter and Reagan administration believed that because NATO was America's major military investment and the Europeans were American's major allies, Europe should not be a safe zone for detente, but a pressure point where the Soviets could be punished for bad behaviour elsewhere. Since the Soviets had come to depend on European trade and investment, America's allies should use their economic leverage in the common task of containing Soviet power globally.(13)

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13 Calleo, n.3, p. 5.

It is worth quoting Lawrence S. Eaghburger, an astute commentator on American and West European relations.

> The Reagan Administration considers restoration of Western defense capability and allied cohesion an overriding priority. It is in concert with our NATO partners that US foreign policy can achieve its full effectivensss.(14)

The Administration, as one of its primary goals, tried to lay the foundation for an improved relationship with its allies. At the NATO ministerial meetings, the alliance took significant steps towards forging a new consensus on a firmer, more realistic approach to the Soviet Union. This approach had several components as outlined by Secretary Haig. First, an insistence that Soviet restraints and reciprocity in East-West relations must be a key element. The communique for the NATO ministerial put the Soviets on notice that a stable and constructive East-West relationship depended on Soviet restraint. Second, the alliance must be strengthened in order to restore

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14 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "US policy towards Western Europe and Canada" (statement before the sub-committee on Europe and Middle East of the House. Foreign Affairs Committee on June 2, 1981), Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, D.C.:GPO), vol. 81, no.2053, August, 1981, p. 65.

the military balance. The NATO foreign ministers thus reaffirmed the decision made in December, 1979 to proceed with theatre nuclear forces (TNF) modernization.

NATO Strategy

Strategy for the defence of Europe had changed significantly since the inception of NATO. Until the mid 1960's America enjoyed an overwhelming strategic and theatre nuclear superiority which was considered sufficient to deter any form of Soviet aggression. Although the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies maintained, as they do today, a preponderence of conventional forces on the continent, the threat of massive nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union itself was adequate to deter the use of such forces. The function of NATO's conventional forces was primarily that of a trip wire designed to establish the fact of aggression and ensure an immediate nuclear response.

By the mid 1960's the credibility of nuclear weapon in detering Soviet attack across the whole spectrum of threats ranging from nuclear attack to

limited conventional aggression had markedly declined. The Soviet Union was making all out efforts to achieve strategic nuclear parity with the US.

The result of these concerns was the formal decision by NATO in 1967 to adopt the doctrine of flexible response. It called for the development of strategic nuclear theatre and conventional capabilities to provide NATO with the ability to deter, and if necessary, to defeat a Warsaw Pact attack. The essence of the doctrine was the altered role of the alliance's conventional forces no longer simply a trigger to nuclear war, but they were charged with the task of halting a conventional attack without an immediate resort to a nuclear response at whatever level.

Although Europeans accepted the idea of flexible response, they were clearly opposed to any plans for fighting a protracted conventional war in Europe; on the contrary, it was their intention to develop primarily a strategy which was nuclear in essence, as the most effective way of deterring the Soviet Union and also of having the United States

save the risks while they accepted the idea.[15]

Two flaws had always existed with regard to defensive value and credibility of the strategy of flexible response. The first was an open ended nature of the conventional defences the strategy pressures to be feasible. The second flaw lay in the fundamental incompatibility of the force postures required to wage conventional versus nuclear warfare.[16]

In brief, Europe's security had been based on a triad consisting of three legs : conventional capabilities, theatre nuclear capabilities and a US promise of help, if necessary, from its global strategic nuclear capabilities. The whole package was popularly known as conventional flexible response.

Two of the above legs of Europe's security tool were crumbling, and the third, its conventional forces, was far too weak to carry the load. Furthermore,

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15 Kenneth Hunt, Atlantic Unity and European Defence in A.I. Broadhurst, ed., The Future of European Alliance System: NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) p. 82.

16 See Robert C Richardson, "NATO: Challenges and Opportunities", Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies (Washington, D.C.), vol. 12, no.4, Winter 1987, p. 377.

there was no will to pay the cost of building these to an adequate level. The Soviet strategic missile and the submarine build up over the past decade had eroded the credibility of the last leg of this triad. Allied confidence in the US that it would use its strategic capabilities when faced with certain Soviet retaliation had steadily declined. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proposal designed to reverse this trend by providing defence against missiles, whether launched in a first strike, in retaliation for a strategic or tactical nuclear response to limited aggression in Europe, or by accident, was in limbo.[17]

SUMMARY:

The shift in United States policy towards Europe could be understood in terms of three components: relative decline in power, attitudinal changes towards nuclear weapons, and third, the decline in its relations with Western Europe itself.

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17 Robert C. Richardson, "A Solution to the NATO-INF problem", Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies (Washington, D.C.), vol.13, no.1, Spring 1988, p.4.

Reagan rejected both the Carter Policy and that of Nixon and Kissinger and instead, adopted policies based on nostalgia for the 1980s. The Administration attempted to ignore all limits to the United States power. American decline was attributed to a "decade of neglect". The implication being that it could be reversed through sustained efforts to the restoration of American Military Power.

The second arena in which there had been a discernible shift in American attitudes was in the arena of nuclear weapons. In the 1950s and early 1960s nuclear weapons played a major part in solving many of America's security problems. But in the latter period, they posed new dilemma and difficulties. Furthermore, this sentiment was shared across a wide range of political spectrum, from liberals to conservatives. It manifested itself the arguments of explicit "No First Use Advocates". The non-nuclear sentiment has been evident in some of the policies and actions of the Reagan Administration itself. The President's Strategic Defence Initiative, the proposal at the Reykjavik Summit for the abolition of ballistic

missiles and the subsequent INF agreement were all indicative of changed attitudes towards nuclear weapons and towards their role in NATO strategy.

The third trend challenging the exising policy framework concerned American attitudes towards its West European allies. These three stances were distinct, but mutually reinforcing.

Thus, under Ronald Reagan the US-West European relations got off to a trouble start and remained that way through his first term. The early difficulties were caused largely by its effort to pursue new controversial strategic policies that its allies did not support.

The United States under Reagan redeemed its lost prestige, both, with its allies as well as its adversaries. The President resurrected its lost image by bold initiative on the field of SDI programme. The pressure of SDI worked remarkably well. The Soviet Union faced by economic crises was not in a confrontable position to respond to the US challenge. Their negotiations in arms control showed a considerable defensive posture. The Soviet ability to withstand the

US nuclear pressure diminished gradually. In the strategy-calculations, the US succeeded in bringing round the Soviets to their viewpoints in SDI. There were several occasions which showed moments of desperation in terms of arms control negotiations with the United States. The Summit with Gorbachev in Reykjavik made President Reagan look taller to the Soviet leader in terms of the crude "real-politik".

Reagan, on the other hand, insisted, despite the pressure building at home, that he would not relax on his plan of SDI. It was in the interest of the United States that the world should move, so he argued from Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) to the Mutually Assured Survival (MAS). This helped lift the US image considerably in the eyes of its allies too. The Prime Minister of Britain Margaret Thatcher, gave support to Reagan's plan. The French and German showed their lukewarm attitude but were, nevertheless, with the United States in terms of its tough postures towards the Soviet Union. The home governments in both these countries i.e. France and West Germany had to face anti-nuclear war lobbies. As a result, there were times of critical approach towards US nuclear policy. They were however committed to the common goal of defence for Western Europe.

Contrary to the prevailing notion that the United States and Western Europe had differences over defence matters, it was the economic matters that perceptibly gave some jolts to their relations. Both France and West Germany were engaged in their economic revitalization. The strengthening of European Economic Community and the concept of Pan-Europe, became the key points of European personality. The major economic competition for Western Europe laid in the United States of America. There were times of crises on liberalisation of trade, enhanced commercial activities, chase in the markets in the Third World countries, became the points of disarray in the Western camp. As a result, Reagan faced a tough Europe but with a friendly nod.

Reagan on his part had communicated to his NATO allies that the US would not fail them in time of difficulties. Reagan's position was communicated unequivocally. The relationship became very warm and cordial during the later years with the Europe. Regardless of the mechanism it employed, the Reagan Administration deserves the credit for orchestrating this positive turn of events.

C H A P T E R - III

REACTION TO THE U.S. POLICY

Since 1949, the North Atlantic Alliance had been the nucleus of the post war international system. "Bound together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North America and Western Europe have given the postwar World its vital centre of military stability and politico-economic order".[1] However, this complex international institution had not had a trouble-free development. The history of NATO had been the history of crisis -- from the stillborn European Defence Community to the scuffled Multilateral Force; from Suez to Vietnam to Grenada and Libya; and from the anti-nuclear revolt of the 1950's to the peace marchers of the 1980's. Thus, there had been crises periodically in the history of NATO. But the alliance had withstood the test of time in meeting the challenges that had come up before it.

Several new developments had been discernible in the world of today. The qualitative change in military balance, the remarkable progress of detente between the two super powers, the growing power of the

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1 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of Western Alliance (New York: Inc. Publishers, 1987), p. 3.

Third World countries with the economic crises emanating all over constitute significant changes in the post war global framework. As a result of these changes, it would be inevitable that the United States and its allies in NATO would experience some turbulence among themselves. The treaty had gone a long way in meeting each other's collective requirements on defence matters, but not necessarily without a rancour from one or two of its partners in the alliance system.

The issues over which disagreements or divergence of opinion existed between United States and Western Europe concerned mainly to Alliance Management and comprises the following four aspects of Atlantic relationships:

i) the modernization of NATO's theatre nuclear forces;
ii) the standardisation of weapons;
iii) the proper level of defence spending, popularly known as burden sharing; and
iv) out-of-area problems.

Theatre Nuclear Forces:

Towards the end of 1970's a clear imbalance in Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces between Soviet Union and U.S. and its NATO allies had become a major issue.

The growing advantage held by the Soviet Union seemed to threaten the security by questioning the NATO's deterrent strategy. In a bid to counter Soviet Union's aggressive posture, NATO adopted the historic December, 1979 dual-track decision in which its members agreed to deploy long range INF missiles while simultaneously showing the inclination and sincerity to negotiate on arms control issue.

The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles with sufficient range to strike targets in Europe, but not in the United States. In the late 1950's it deployed some 600 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles against Europe. The United States deployed almost equivalent types of missiles in Western Europe in the early 1960's, although the number was comparatively small. Thus, till the end of 1970's, the Soviet Union held sway over the Western European nations over INF missiles. Further, the Soviet Union went ahead with its programme of deploying SS-20 missiles which were more accurate and possessed a much greater range than SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. They had the capability to strike targets in Europe, the Middle East and much of Asia and were regarded as highly mobile. As opposed to the single war-head of the earlier missiles they carried three independently targetable war-heads.

All these deployments led to fear and suspicion among NATO allies. Intensive NATO consultations also took place. And finally the Alliance decided to redress the INF imbalance through deployment in Western Europe of 108 single war-head Pershing II Missiles and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs).

The above constituted the modernisation track of the decision. The second element of the dual track decision was the arms control track. While making arrangements to modernise its nuclear forces NATO concurrently offered arms control negotiations on INF. The criteria for these talks were evolved within NATO's Special Consultative Group, a body which was specially constituted to ponder over INF arms control matters. A second NATO body, the High Level Group of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group also met to address questions raised by the prospective deployment of US longer range INF missiles. These meetings, as a whole, represented one of the most intensive intra-alliance consultations in NATO's history.[2]

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2 See for details, Christopher Coker, The Future of Atlantic Alliance (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 29.

However, the programme of modernization of theatre nuclear forces evoked serious criticism from two disparate groups. The first group felt that the NATO decision of 1979 as totally an inadequate response since it has focussed on a single element of the theatre nuclear spectrum and thus distracted attention from the real problem facing the Alliance. They criticised the piecemeal and ad-hoc steps which was underway in replacing obsolete nuclear weapons in the alliance.

The second group of critics had altogether a different story to tell. They contended that whatever be the validity of the programme the costs would far outweigh any marginal gains. They refuted the principle that strategic parity neutralised the deterrent effect of central strategic system for all situations except a direct attack on the homeland. They believed that the present capabilities of the United States, combined with its deep sense of commitment to defend Western Europe in the event of a Soviet aggression were sufficient to deter Soviet Union from any initiative involving a nuclear warfare.

Thus from 1979 the alliance had been surely challenged by disagreements over nuclear policy. At

the level of mass opinion there was widespread questioning and at the level of intergovernmental discussion there were widespread fears that the US wanted to keep nuclear war limited to Europe. Given the deterioration in US-Soviet relations in the 1980's, fears multiplied and security concerns mounted as the US and its allies argued at cross purposes. As a result, opposition intensified to the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Opposition parties in key European states - including West Germany, Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands - became committed in varying degrees to removing US INF and to supporting a non-nuclear defence. Nuclear weapons were increasingly seen as politically divisive and not militarily credible.

The modernization decision was a clear attempt to secure elite-to-elite agreement and to reinforce the visible symbols of the US guarantee. The ensuing politicization of defence debates had called into question the empirical reality of the symbol. It had generated doubts about the possible removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe, and it had excessively strained the resort of ambiguity that was so vital in preserving consensus in the alliance. A balance had to be struck between

the elite consensus between governments and mass elite opinion over issues of deterrence and defence if the alliance was to survive.[3]

NATO Standardisation:

> Efforts to ensure cooperation between partners in the Atlantic Alliance have a long history and have taken many forms. In theory, a strong interest in promoting such cooperation should exist for it would be possible to strengthen security at less cost.(4)

This is a major advantage which could be accrued by avoiding loss, wastage, and duplication.

In the present day world, budgetary constraints had justified cooperation for major programmes such as the MRCA, Ronald and Jaguar. Most of the countries pooled their resources more or less on equal terms resulting in the proliferation of multinational programmes.

Technological constraints were a corollary of budgetary constraints. Most were due to the fact that only few countries had sufficient resources to pursue

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3 Steve Smith, "Theatre Nuclear Forces and the NATO Alliance" in Walter, Goldstein, Fighting Allies: Tensions within the Atlantic Alliance (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, Ltd, 1986).

4 Coker, n.2, p. 83.

research in technical field and hence the only option available was to pool their knowledge. Lastly, political considerations had been no less significant in forging extensive cooperation with a view to maintaining the competitiveness of the European defence industry in the present world crisis.

Here it will be worthwhile to mention three different fora where Alliance cooperation supposedly had taken place.

Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)

The CNAD was originally established to improve the mechanisms of cooperation in research, development and production of military equipment. This has resulted in achievement of some production economies and avoidance of duplication of development effort. The savings which had been achieved through such cooperation had been quite significant. The second major area in which equipment cooperation had made important strides was in the field of increased military effectiveness. Its more recent initiatives had been the establishment of two additional committees: the NATO Armaments Planning Review (NAPR) and the Periodic Armaments Planning Systems (PAPS).

Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)

The IEPG was set up in 1975 to tabulate on an annual basis the major equipment replacement intentions of all its 12 members. The main limitation to the IEPG procedure was that the scheduling exercise concerned itself only with proposals for the replacement of existing equipments. Nevertheless, in the comparatively short time of the IEPG's existence, a number of significant European projects had been identified. The most important related to a new tactical combat aircraft, a new family of European military helicopters and third generation European anti-tank guided weapons.

West European Union (WEU)

The most important forum in which standardisation was often discussed was perhaps WEU's Standing Committee on Armaments. It came into being in 1955 with the sole objective of promoting standardisation of weapon systems. It had received unflinching support from France since its inception. All throughout, this French preference had been echoed in numerous statements and proposals. In September 1983, French Premier

Pierre Mauroy called on the Europeans to develop a real spirit of defence in their countries and to agree on a joint arms production policy in the West European Union .

In October 1984, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU countries, meeting in Rome, agreed to revitalise the WEU. They decided to hold, twice a year, combined meetings of foreign and defence ministers to discuss a wide range of defence and security issues. They also pledged to develop an effective and competitive European armaments industry as "a fundamental aspect of Europe's contribution to the Atlantic Alliance".[5]

Nuclear Weapons Collaboration:

The United Kingdom and France with their independent nuclear systems, had contributed to Western deterrence, apart from the U.S. Efforts towards rationalising these capabilities through cooperation had always lacked sufficient political support.

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5 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 175.

Such cooperation would require a fundamental change in French policy and substantial shifts in British as well as French attitudes towards the process of European integration. Furthermore, a premature European move toward nuclear cooperation might inspire an equally premature American folding of the nuclear umbrella. European nuclear cooperation, therefore, apparently remained an issue for the future.[6]

Arms Production and Procurement :

Cooperative European Production and procurement of weapon system were the two key issues which had thwarted NATO's standardisation programme. Since the inception of NATO military structure, U.S. provided bulk of the armaments necessary to maintain a credible deterrent strategy. This, however, had resulted in a one-way traffic on the two-way streets of armaments trade. Hence, there had been occasional demand to chalk out a common European industrial policy in order to protect European interest in the armament industry. But the European governments had not demonstrated much political will to rationalise defence production

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6 Ibid., pp. 183-85.

and procurement. European members had generally remained apathetic to this problem. In the absence of a European armament market (which only the government can create), European industrialists would not be motivated to form European armament industries. Over and above, both the Euro-group and IEPG lacked the political base necessary to serve as the agency for coordinating European armaments efforts.

Out of Area Problem:

From its inception, the Alliance had been designed solely to defend the North Atlantic area, not interests outside it. The alliance had never had a Third World mission. Its out of area problem had naturally evoked objections from its members for domestic political reasons or otherwise.

Surprisingly, however, the alliance had never remained apathetic to problems outside the NATO area. Events of the last decade had emphasized the extent to which Western security was vulnerable to events outside NATO's prescribed area. The allies had historically used a variety of consultative opportunities provided by NATO committees and meetings to continue a dialogue on threats to Western security outside NATO area.

The Alliance took a potentially historic step when it agreed to the first phase of a plan enabling the United States to divert forces currently assigned to NATO to deal with emergencies in the Persian Gulf, "By implication, the alliance for the first time in its history defined its security interest which lay outside its traditional defence perimeter".[7]

This was reinforced nine months later by the decision of the incoming Reagan Administration to shift the command of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) from Readiness Command at MacDill Air Force base to European Command (Eurocom) in Heidelberg. Instead of making it an entirely new Command in the Middle East, the United States transferred it to the control of the Supreme Allied Commander. In the process the United States had increasingly sought allied support for its actions outside the North Atlantic Area.

The Reagan Administration gave the theme a new sense of urgency. It showed signs of wanting to mend its bridges within the Alliance in order to secure full allied agreement for moves outside the Treaty area which in its judgment was in allied

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7 Coker, n.2, p. 95.

interest as well.[8]

Thus out-of-area contingencies posed a continuing threat to alliance cohesion. The lack of European involvement in future out-of-region confrontation where Soviet or Soviet-backed forces might be directly involved would promote the U.S. view of its allies as totally dependent on the American extended containment for safeguarding their own interest.[9]

Issue of troop withdrawal

The American Military presence in Western Europe was almost a permanent feature of the political and strategic landscape. Any debate on cuts in these forces aroused considerable consternation in Western Europe. Supporters of the status quo contended that any large scale force reduction would jeopardise the existing structure of security in Europe and offer the Soviet Union unprecedented opportunity to expand its influence.

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8 Coker, n.2, p. 96.

9 See William T. Tow, "NATO's Out of Region Challenges and Extended Containment" Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 28, no.4, Winter 1985, p. 845.

Whatever might be the case, American military presence in Western Europe ran counter to American historical traditions and political process. Moreover, there were certain aspects of the European-American relationship which encouraged periodic challenges to the existing troops levels.

In a long term perspective, American troops in Europe were an aberration. In the formative years of NATO, it was suggested that the American military presence was a temporary supplement to European effort rather than a long term substitute for them. From the outset there was a symbolic relationship between questions relating to American troop levels in Europe and the notion of burden sharing.

> The ambiguities attendant upon the initial troop deployment, the tension between the internal and external dimensions of the commitment, and the idiosyncracies of the American political system made it likely that there would be periodic reappraisal of the American military presence in Western Europe.(10)

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10 Phil Williams, "American Troops in Europe: A New Great Debate?" World Today (London), vol. 43, no. 12, December 1987, p. 216.

The most sustained and fundamental reappraisal of the American military presence in Western Europe occured from 1966 to 1975 when Senator Mike Mansfield introduced legislation designed to bring about substantial troop reduction. But Nixon administration remained committed to the existing force levels and prevented Mansfield from obtaining a majority in favour of unilateral force reductions. Over and above, the prevailing international climate also created some conditions by which pressure, which was mounted, began to subside. As a result, the issue of troop withdrawal was relegated to the background for quite a few years. However, in the early years of 1980's this issue came to the fore with renewed sense and vigour. This could be attributed partly to the resentment created by the European failure to support the United States on "East-West" and "out-of-area issues" and partly due to the disparities that existed between the American and the European defence expenditure. The Stevens Amendments in 1982 reflected these concerns and was essentially a punitive response. The Nunn Amendment of 1984, however, was more positive in its approach and attempted at establishing the conditions under which American troops would remain in Europe.

Nunn advocated that the symbolic function of American troops should cease and they should be treated as part of stalwart conventional defence. In pursuance of this objective Europeans had to make greater efforts to overcome deficiencies in their conventional forces.

> By making the number of American troops in Europe conditional on these efforts, Nunn was adopting a more explicitly coercive approach to burden sharing than had hitherto been evident in American foreign policy.(11)

During testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in January, 1987, Professor Zbigniew Brzesinski, the former White House National Security Advisor, suggested that the United States should gradually remove 100,000 troops from Western Europe, and use them as a rapid mobile reserve for Persian Gulf and other Third World contingencies. This proposal found favour with the Congress. Indeed, during the first half of 1987, there appeared to be considerable restiveness on capitol Hill with the current level of American forces in Western Europe. This did not

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11 Ibid., p. 217.

develop into a serious movement to reduce troops largely because of progress in the negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces, the allied governments (especially that of West Germany) became extremely sensitive about what appeared to be a weakening of the American nuclear guarantee.

On being asked under what extreme circumstances would he consider withdrawing U.S. troops from German soil. President Ronald Reagan observed :

> The cooperative security arrangements of the NATO alliance have maintained the peace for almost forty years. As President of the United States, my most important task is to continue to preserve our peace and freedom. As long as we face a determined adversary in Europe, the presence of U.S. forces in the Federal Republic and in Berlin will be essential. I would like to emphasize the cooperative nature of our arrangements. Unlike the Warsaw Pact NATO security relations are based on common agreements. U.S. forces will remain in the Federal Republic as long as they are needed and welcomed by the Federal Republic.(12)

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12 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office), vol. 19, no.19, May 16, 1983, p. 952.

Burden Sharing

One of the recurring differences among allies centred around the American view, periodically articulated, that the burden of defence was not fairly shared. This debate over burden sharing had been an endemic controversy within the Atlantic Alliance since NATO came into being.

> From the earliest days of the U.S. Senate deliberation over ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, vocal and influential segments of the American political leadership have questioned the 'fairness' of the burden the United States bore for the defence of Western Europe.(13)

For almost 40 years, NATO nations had wrestled with the problem of who should pay and how much for Europe's defence. It had been alleged that the United States, the leader of the alliance, had borne a disproportionate share of the NATO defence burden. In almost every year since 1950, the U.S. had allocated a greater percentage of its resources to the military than its NATO counterparts. This issue assumed serious significance during Reagan's regime.

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13 James B. Steinberg, "Rethinking Debate on Burden Sharing", Seminar (London), vol.29, no.1, January-February 1987, p. 56.

In 1984, the Administration expressed its deep concern over the Congressional efforts to link the number of American troops in Europe to increase in European defence spending. The Senate's Defense Appropriation Sub-Committee, for example, vote 12 - 1 in October 1982, for an amendment to the Pentagon's budget proposed by Ted Stevens, Republican from Alaska, that would have cut U.S. forces in Europe by six per cent. The next year Senator Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat, sought to require withdrawal of one third of U.S. troops from Europe unless the Europeans met NATO's goal of three per cent growth in defence spending. This amendment was defeated by a vote of 41 to 55. Senator Nunn did not want the amendment to be an irritant in Alliance relation. He saw the introduction of the amendment as a shock tactic to serve notice that the U.S. would finally take punitive action if the allies in Europe did not increase their levels of defence expenditure.

However, these votes indicated broad, bi-partisan support for efforts to increase the contribution of the allies to collective security. Seventy eight per cent of those questioned then, in a survey, wanted the United States' allies to pay more towards

their own defence. Reducing the number of American ground forces abroad had been frequently proposed as a way to accomplish this objective. As in the past, the strength with which these views were expressed appeared to depend on coincident events. Today renewed attention to burden sharing had come when America's budgetary and balance of payments problem were again severe and European support for several U.S. initiatives, in economics as well as security affairs had been equivocal.[14]

Considering GNP resources devoted to defence, it was clear that the United States had carried a proportionally greater share of the burden than any of its major allies. Of the four allies, only the United Kingdom was willing or able to increase its military spending at a level commensurate with its economic growth during the 1970's. France seemed to be prime exception to the "free-rider" problem . It had consistently maintained a large number of troops throughout the post-World War II era. Over the years West Germany's contribution had been marginal. However, the fact that West Germany bore the indirect costs

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14 Mark A. Elord, and John R. Oneal, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change", Orbis, (Philadelphia) vol.33, no.4, December 1989, pp. 437-38.

accruing from the stationing of allied troops in their country could not be overlooked. West Germany provided a great deal of land for NATO bases and operations, foregoing the revenue that could be generated if it were taxable property.

In many different ways, NATO provided political and economic benefits to U.S. interest. One reason for the distribution of NATO's defence burden was the U.S. desire to maintain nuclear dominance and the strategic leadership role in the alliance. Such benefits were not without costs. As long as the U.S. retained nuclear dominance, it correspondingly had to allocate weapons for NATO defence and therefore paid for the right to maintain its dominance. Thus, in return for this "hegemony", the U.S. had devoted greater portion of its resources to the common defence. Another reason for the heavy burden on the United States had been NATO's strategy of defence and deterrence against the Warsaw Pact states. As the nuclear leader of the alliance, it was obvious that U.S. would bear the vast expenses for providing a global deterrent capability.[15]

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15 Paul F. Diehl, "Sharing the Defence Burden in NATO" in Walter Goldstein, ed., Fighting Allies: Tension within the Atlantic Alliance (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986).

Disagreements over strategic doctrine and economic problems made the defence burden issue troublesome for NATO relations. The Reagan Administration's hard line policy toward the Soviets displeased government leaders in Europe, in the first term of his presidency. The major problem before the West European states was to balance security with domestic political and economic concerns. The decision of France, Britain and Germany to fund and build the Siberian pipeline, and the reluctance of the smaller allies to accept Pershing and Cruise Missiles strained relations between Europe and the United States. This had resurrected the defence burden issue among American political leaders who believed that they should not subsidize allies who did not support U.S. policy. This, in turn, led to the misgivings among the partners.

Further, if Gorbachev continued to pursue policies of accommodation then it would be very difficult for European governments to justify spending more on defence. In these circumstances, with a Congress looking for budgetary savings in defence and with growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the allies in sharing the burdens and diminishing the nuclear risks to the United States, cuts in American forces in Europe could

begin to look increasingly attractive -- especially if linked to changes in force structure. Such cuts could be seen simultaneously as a way of saving money, of pressurising the Europeans into doing more and of punishing them not only for their lack of support on other issues but also for economic policies which have contributed to American trade deficit.

Disagreement Over the Soviet Pipeline

Soon after the Reagan Administration took office, conflict erupted over the contruction of a Soviet pipeline that would carry Soviet natural gas to Western Europe. It overwhelmingly depended upon imported energy. Europe was eager to diversify its energy-sources and became less dependent upon the Arab members of the OPEC. The Reagan Administration fiercely opposed the pipeline, which was to be built by the Soviets but financed by the European nations, for, it feared that it would give the political leverage that might gradually undermine NATO. Another reason was that the pipeline would allow the Soviets to earn hard currencies with which they could buy Western technology. But the allies argued that economic sanctions generally had failed as instruments

of punishment. The Reagan Administration's idea of cutting Western economic links to the Soviet Union to compel its leaders to behave with greater restraint would have just the opposite effect. It would produce resentment and anger and reinforce Soviet hostility towards the West. Indeed, great Soviet moderation was more likely to be produced by an extensive network of economic relationships.

To force the Europeans to comply with American policy, Reagan ordered American companies, their branches in Europe and European firms licensed by American corporations to produce American technology, not to sell to Moscow the items needed for the building of the pipeline. But the emotional and political fallout led the European governments to order their firms to comply with national policies and go ahead with the Soviet deal. Washington responded by imposing sanctions against these firms. Reagan became the first President to impose sanctions against U.S. allies.

Other Areas of Disagreement:

For Europeans the most disturbing example of the narrowing scope of U.S. foreign policy and its increasing inability to reflect the collective interest

was the irresponsible and unprofessional conduct revealed by the Iran-Contra Scandal. The White House was caught shipping and ferrying weapons into Iran in an attempt to rescue its hostages in Lebanon, while pressurising the allies into a collective no ransom policy towards terrorist actions. The proceeds were to be diverted to Nicaragua of which most Europeans were highly critical. And this whole circular operation was illegal. Like its Watergate predecessor, the Iran gate scandal was followed in Europe with a mixture of astonishment, amusement and horror. But its impact abroad was worse even than that of watergate.[16] It was a dismal spectacle to see that president had entrusted important foreign policy initiatives not to the Secretaries of State and Defense, but to Oliver North, a White House employee motivated by some sort of populist militarism.

> Iran gate struck at the very essence of American foreign policy. It was not so much the content of the Iran contra programme that shocked America's friends and allies; rather was the fact that it existed at all, the kind of people responsible for it and the light it shed on the nature of Mr Reagan's presidency - these were the aspects that caused such widespread alarm.(17)

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16 Calleo, n.1, p. 483.

17 Ibid., p. 484.

That spectacle raised serious doubts about the reliability of the United States as a partner, let alone as a leader.

European allies were also alarmed by the casual indifference to their interests shown by the Administration's handling of the strategic issue at the Reykjavik Summit with the Soviet Union. According to some assessment, after Reykjavik and Iran-contra scandal, U.S.-West European relations reached a 30 year nadir.[18]

It is hard to overstate the alarm allied leaders felt when the Americans agreed to talk about the elimination of all strategic weapons from the face of the earth. The proposed elimination of the INF was labelled by a French political leader a 'European Munich'.

According to Mitterand, even Thatcher, the leader most congenial with the U.S. President, was alarmed. Reykjavik made a joke of allied consultation on nuclear strategies. Thus in December 1986, NATO was haunted in the words of French Premier Jacques

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18 Michael Howard, "A European Perspective On the Reagan Years", Foreign Affairs, (New York), vol. 66, no.3, winter 1987-88, p. 479.

Chirac, by "the feeling ..... that decisions vital to the security of Europe could be taken without Europe really having any say in it".[19] Besides, Rejkjavik meant that Europeans had to reconsider the basic tenets of their security. Moving toward a world without strategic weapons meant that European security could no longer be based on total deterrence, but had to be conceived of in terms of battleground - capabilities, with their national territories as the battle grounds.

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19 David Housego, "U.S. Leadership of NATO: Alliance Worries France" Financial Times (London), December 3, 1986.

C H A P T E R - IV

A CHANGED OUTLOOK

President Reagan's second term was marked by new and positive developments in regard to the U.S. relations with West European countries. The chilled atmosphere of the early 1980's subsided. Both the Superpowers came closer to each other in arms control negotiations which had long been neglected by the two giants. The process of detente set in during the middle of 1980's. It had its profound impact on the US-West European relations. The tough posture of America softened in the wake of Gorbachev's proposals for sweeping reforms. This changed the complexion of international relations.

By the mid 1980's, U.S. policy appeared to be moving into a more conciliatory phase. The fear of nuclear war in the eyes of people threatened to become a major political force, both, in Europe as well as in America. The large American budget deficit implied cutbacks in further defense spending. Accordingly, by 1985, the Reagan Administration having long denounced earlier arms control talks, entered an unprecedentedly

broad and comprehensive arms negotiations.[1]

The Gorbachev Factor:

The Gorbachev factor had been, perhaps, the most important one in orchestrating positive turn of events in East-West relationship. Gorbachev's regime was marked by changes in not only the style but also the substance of Soviet international behaviour. The threat perception had taken a back seat with his assumption of office as the Soviet Premier. Changes in the Soviet performance and behaviour in the world arena had its impact on the West European nations also.

> They bring, simultaneously, both new opportunities for reducing international tensions on terms beneficial to the interests and values of industrial democracies and new challenges in dealing with a more sophisticated, attractive, dynamic, but not necessarily less ambitious and assertive superpower.(2)

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1 See David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1987), p. 5.

2 Dimitri K. Simes, "The new Soviet foreign policy approach: challenges to and opportunity for the West" in Stanley R Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: International Defence Publishers, Inc., 1989), p. 129.

Remarkable changes took place in the Soviet approach to foreign policy since Gorbachev took over in March, 1985. The Soviets had developed unprecedented penchant for public relations and the practice of diplomacy had been marked by new vigour, purpose and flexibility.

Substantive changes had occured in all areas of Soviet international activity as well, viz., relations with the West, involvement in the third world approach towards regional disputes, and control over Eastern Europe. Far more important was the fact that he had significantly improved Soviet-American relations ending the Cold War phenomenon that had been the characteristic of the earlier period. As one expert pointed out: "All in all, Soviet geopolitical maneuvering under Gorbachev has demonstrated a new sense of purpose, a new realism, and a new creativity".[3]

The most significant feature of the U.S.-Soviet relations during Reagan-Gorbachev period perhaps lay in the doctrinal shift that marked the Soviet foreign policy. The Gorbachev regime put a

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3 Dimitri K. Simes, "Gorbachev: A New Foreign Policy?", Foreign Affairs, (New York), vol. 65, no.3, 1987, p. 491.

premium on the Soviet defensive posture relating to its foreign policy. In his book, Perestroika: New Thinking for our country and the world, Gorbachev made a detailed review of Soviet security stances in general and Europe in particular. The theme of a defence-oriented military capability constituted the leitmotif of Gorbachev's writing. The USSR insisted that its military doctrine was directed towards the prevention rather than the outbreak of the war. Notions like "the indivisibility of security" and "equal security for all" or "none at all", surfaced repeatedly in Gorbachev's theme.

In pursuance of his policy, Gorbachev opted for unilateral Soviet reductions. The series of concessions that the Soviet Union made in clearing the decks for INF agreement bore ample testimony to the fact that the doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency" had been translated into practice. Further, he agreed not to insist on the inclusion of the British and French INF capability in the Euro-Missile negotiations. Thus, he was prepared to delink it and settle for an INF agreement as a starter. Again, on the issue of verification, it was Gorbachev who went beyond his

predecessor's inhibitions and fears and accepted, for the first time, comprehensive verification, including on-site inspection. Finally, the long standing Soviet precondition of the Americans giving up their SDI, had also been relaxed. The Soviet Union signed the INF treaty without insisting on American suspension of SDI.[4]

Soviet Union under Gorbachev thus offered a chance for East-West accommodation that was without precedent in the post-war period.

SDI and its implication for NATO

In March, 1983, President Reagan announced that he would launch the Strategic Defence Initiative programme, popularly known as the 'Star Wars'. This programme would build up a defensive system which would provide protection to the US and its NATO allies. US advocates of the SDI had suggested that an Anti-Tactical Missile (ATM) system could be deployed in

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4 R.V.R. Chandrasekhar Rao, "Military Balance in Europe", World Focus (New Delhi), vol. 9, no.10-11-12, Oct.-Nov.-Dec.1988, p. 65.

Europe to assure protection against attacks by Soviet intermediate and short-range ballistic missiles. Supporters of an ATM system viewed its deployment as a way to strengthen NATO's theatre deterrent. However, there was a segment of population who opposed it on the ground that Soviet Union might counter an ATM system by deploying more numerous and more effective INF systems, thereby increasing the number of nuclear weapons directed at Western Europe. Gil Kinger observes:

> Europe's likely opposition to an ATM system, and eventually to the SDI as a whole, will fundamentally stem from the different views of deterrence kept by Europeans and Americans. The United States has linked the credibility of deterrence to its ability to prosecute a war at various levels of escalation, while most Europeans are sceptical about NATO's ability to control or limit conflicts which involve nuclear weapons.(5)

Europeans felt that for geographical reasons strategic defence could never be as effective for Europe as in theory it might prove for the United States.

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5 Gil Kinger, "Superpower Arms Control II" in Walter Goldstein, ed., Fighting Allies : Tensions within the Atlantic Alliance (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), p.102.

If the Soviets developed a strategic defence, the British and French deterrents might be devalued and Europe would be pressed to maintain a more plausible conventional balance -- a policy European governments had long resisted. There is no gain-saying the fact that U.S. allies were highly satisfied with the traditional deterrence doctrine. They were of the opinion that no rational government (in which they included Soviet Union also) would initiate a nuclear war. For them, Reagan's SDI implied an end to that deterrence. The fear and opposition of the allies of the U.S. were based on the following grounds.

The implication of Strategic Defence Initiative were quite negative for European security. This raised the question of the likely consequence of a situation in which America had a missile defence and Europe remained the logic on the ground that the whole arrangements would help U.S. in extending its nuclear guarantee to Europe. "But the real danger was that the Missile Defence of the United States would lead to a Fortress America Mentality - or that the Europeans would perceive and fear this - leading to a 'decoupling' of the United States from the defence of Europe".[6] Even more

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6 Andrew J Pierre, "US and NATO: The New Agenda", International Journal (Toronto) vol.40, no.1, winter 1984-85, p.8.

dangerous was the fact that it would provide an impetus to the Soviet Union to follow suit. Europe would then become a hostage to its neighbour - the Soviet Union. "In such a situation in which both the United States and the USSR had missile defences, while Western Europe had none, a war might be completely fought out in Europe itself".[7]

Another consideration laid in the high value that the Europeans attached to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty because it made the task of the British and French nuclear forces in penetrating Soviet defences less arduous. Yet, once the SDI goes beyond the research stage it would become necessary to abrogate the ABM treaty. Any substantial missile defence would either greatly reduce the credibility of the British and French forces or make it essential for London and Paris to increase them substantially in order to maintain the current state of effectiveness.

Finally, the Strategic Defence Initiative programme posed a major hurdle in the way of arms control negotiations. If it were to become simply a bargaining

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7 Ibid., p. 8.

chip in future negotiations, it could usefully be traded off against some Soviet offensive forces. The Soviet Union too was very much concerned with stopping or sharply restricting American SDI. They even threatened to stonewall all negotiations if the United States refused to make concessions in the area of space weapons.

The emerging consensus on SDI in Europe:

After years of analysing the programme, thanks to the efforts of American officials to explain the scope of the project to the Europeans, a new consensus was forged among the Europeans during the second term of Reagan's presidency. The governments of France, West Germany, Britain and Italy all agreed with the United States about the current phase of SDI, which was a phase of pure research; and they all recognized that this research programme was wholly consistent with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Further, there was a general agreement that the SDI had brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table.

Allied support for SDI derived from : (a) concerns over Soviet SDI-type research as well as Soviet ABM deployment; (b) the desire to reap benefits from the

resulting technological upsurge brought about by the SDI research; (c) the fear that the technology gap between Western Europe and the United States would widen further if they did not participate; (d) the hope that participation in SDI would give the Europeans a greater voice in eventual deployment decisions; (e) the realization in some European quarters that deterrence could indeed benefit from an offense - defence mix of forces, rather than relying solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation; and (f) support for SDI had in some instances been a consequence of President Reagan's own charisma, leadership, and persuasive abilities.[8]

While the Allies were eager to extend political support for SDI, they were most unwilling to support a U.S. decision to deploy strategic ballistic missile defences in contravention to the ABM Treaty unless the Soviets first began a substantial deployment of their own. Though Thatcher, Kohl and Chirac had endorsed SDI research, and had encouraged their own industry to

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8 See Robert M. Soafer, Missile Defenses and West European Security: NATO Strategy, Arms Control and Deterrence (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 148.

participate, they made a clear distinction between research and development.

Criticism for SDI had come primarily from the opposition Labour Party in Britain and Social Democratic Party (SDP) in West Germany. "Their rejection of SDI research probably based less on the strategic and technical issues surrounding SDI than on their philosophical outlook toward security as a whole".[9] Nuclear weapon deployments (and SDI) were seen as a stumbling block to the political process of East-West detente and cooperation at political level. These critics viewed SDI as a misguided unilateral technical approach to an essentially political problem. They seemed to have advocated the concept of "security partnership" or "common security" as opposed to technical-military solution.

INF TREATY:

The events of the latter half of the 1970's marked the traumatic end of detente. To the deployment of Soviet SS-20s President Carter responded in 1978 with an accelerated development of the Cruise and MX missiles. President Reagan in 1981 launched a far

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9 Ibid., p. 149.

more extensive programme. Under pressure from European allies, he began negotiations in Geneva on intermediary nuclear forces (INF) with the Soviet Union. Before the 1979 decision was taken, the Soviet Union offered to reduce Soviet INF if no new weapons were deployed by NATO; then they threatened that there would be no negotiations on INF if they installed new systems. However after much acrimonious debate over this issue, American proposals for INF limitations from the Reagan administration came on 18 November 1981. In a speech broadly painting the dangers of the Soviet threat, Reagan offered a 'zero-zero option'. The U.S. would cancel its deployment plans (the American zero) in exchange for the elimination of all Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) deployed in Europe and Asia (the Soviet zero). This proposal was characterized by American policy makers as 'real arms control' calling for the global elimination of an entire class of nuclear delivery systems. When the zero option was presented in negotiations in February, 1982, the U.S. included a call for a freeze on shorter range INF (SRINF) that the Soviet Union had deployed in Eastern Europe - SS-12/22, SS-23.

The Administration made two moves away from zero over the next two years. In July, 1982 American negotiator Paul Nitze opened an informal but authorised negotiation with his counterpart Yuri Kvitsinsky. The infamous 'walk in the woods' formula involved a trade of reduced numbers of SS-20 IRBMS (75 launchers, 225 warheads) in exchange for zero pershing II IRBMS and 284 ground launched cruise missiles.

> The trade off reflected typical arms control bargaining procedures, leaving the US with more warheads. French and British systems were to be excluded in return for the cancelling of Pershing II - which had always worried the Soviet Union more than Cruise.(10)

Eventually the proposal was rejected because of the underlying distrust between the two.

The second shift of American positions away from zero came in the Spring 1983. From the beginning of the internal American debates in 1981, a 'zero-plus' alternative existed. Proponents of this alternative argued that some deployment of the U.S. INF was

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10 Steve, Smith, "Theatre Nuclear Forces and the NATO Alliance" in Walter Goldsten, Fighting Allies: Tensions within the Atlantic Alliance (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986),

necessary for NATO security. "In other words, US INF deployments were justified not simply as a response to Soviet SS-20s but as an essential element in the whole NATO strategic structure of flexible response".[11] Even if all SS-20s were removed, NATO would still want some INF deployments to strengthen the coupling of the US with European defence.

In 1983, America's European allies, particularly Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany, were encountering domestic revolt pressurizing for more progress on arms control that would obviate the need for deployment. The pressure was also felt by the U.S. As a sequel to this, in March 1983, the U.S. offered an interim proposal, allowing each side to build up (US) or build down (Soviet Union) to an equal number of missiles and warheads.

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11 William B. Vogela, "Tough Bargaining and Arms Control : Lessons from the INF Treaty", The Journal of Strategic Studies (England), vol. 12, no.3, September 1989, p. 259.

During the fifth round of negotiations between May and July, 1983, the U.S. proposed global equality of war-heads at a level between 50 and 450.

> On 19 June 1983 President Reagan promoted the interim agreement saying that, if the Soviets would not accept zero, OK, then a reduction as far as you will go.(12)

In September the White House press secretary stated that the US was seeking more flexibility "in our negotiating stance and would find acceptable an agreement that specified equal rights and limits".[13]

In Autumn, during the sixth round, American negotiators amended their position again. Warhead equality would be applied only to Europe if the Soviets froze the number of SS-20s deployed in Asia at 108. American negotiating changes offered in the final months before the scheduled deployment of Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles did not persuade Soviet negotiators to continue talking. Finding US negotiations and deployment incompatible, the Soviets walked

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12 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document, (Washington, D.C.) vol.19, 29 June 1983, p.957.

13 Ibid., 12 Sept. 1983, p. 1238.

out of INF talks in late November 1983 and refused to set new dates for either Strategic Arms Reduction Talks or conventional force limitation talks.

During 1985, the U.S. continued to float the proposal that drastically reduced Soviet SS-20s and permitted deployment of some U.S. GLCMs and Pershing II IRBMs. During the third round of new negotiations (nuclear and space talks), America sought agreement for equal launcher numbers of 140 and equal warhead numbers of 420. American bargaining positions were revised again in the autumn, 1986, when the US indicated that it was willing to pursue elimination in stages. A new interim agreement would permit 100 INF warheads on each side in Europe plus 100 Soviet INF warheads in Asia, and 100 American INF warheads maintained in the continental United States.[14]

A framework for an INF treaty emerged from the summit talks in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October, conceived as a pre-summit summit. General Secretary Gorbachev arrived prepared for serious bargaining. One of his offers was an INF treaty eliminating weapons from Europe.[15]

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14 See Vogela, n.11, p. 260.

15 Ibid., p. 261.

NATO concerns began to focus seriously on the security implications of the emerging agreement -- eliminating the new American Missiles that had been deployed to more firmly couple the US defence to the European one, numerical disparities of shorter range INF favouring the Soviet Union, chronic conventional force imbalances, the problem of verifying the residual 200 INF warheads, the continued presence of Soviet INF in Asia without compensating American forces. Members of British, French and German governments voiced concern.

Gorbachev increased the Western dilemma in April 1987 by proposing elimination of SRINF. Secretary of State George Shultz, supported by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, argued in Moscow for an American right to match. US and NATO SRINF would be created by converting with-drawn pershing IIs to Pershing 1b, by removing a booster stage and then transferring these to West Germany to replace the older Pershing 1-a. However, a Soviet draft treaty presented in April specifically prohibited this conversion.

The second zero of the SRINF created much stir in the West German government. Chancellor Kohl sided with conservative opponents of the proposal, but acquiesced in the face of German public opinion, domestic requirements of coalition politics and the evident American desire to have an INF agreement.

British and French officials also were unenthusiastic about the second zero and were prepared to take a tough line on SRINF before the Gorbachev offer.[16] Elimination of SRINF meant leaving short-range battle field nuclear weapons deployed only in Germany, thus heightening German fears of becoming an isolated battlefield in a European conflict.

London and Paris, however, feared that this situation would encourage Germany to pursue the 'third zero' elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. In effect Britain and France feared undercutting German commitment to the Alliance's nuclear deterrent posture and continuing nuclear weapons modernization.[17]

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16 James M, Markham, "Missile Diplomacy: Europe Prepares" New York Times (New York), 2 April, '87.

17 Markham, "Bonn's tactical stand worries some NATO Allies", New York Times (New York), 9 October, 1987.

On 25th of July, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would proceed from the concept of "global double zero" (elimination of both INF and SRINF) and that elimination of Soviet missiles in Asia was not linked to American forces in Far East. This shift of approach by Moscow allayed mounting Western criticisms and set the stage for the final compromises.

Finally, the treaty was hammered out in December, 1987 between President Reagan of United States and the Soviet Premier Mr. Gorbachev.

> Reagan administration's 'tough bargaining' strategy seems to have been vindicated by the INF success, even though its promise in START remains unfulfilled.(18)

In Richard Perli's words:

> However one regards the INF treaty, it is the treaty that Ronald Reagan set out to get in 1981. His will and resolve and that of our allies has vindicated the judgment that the Soviets could be pressed to abandon their intermediate missiles in exchange of ours.(19)

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18 Vogela, no.11, p. 257.

19 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The INF Treaty, part 3, Feb. 1988 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1988), p.5, cited in Vogela, no.11, p. 257.

Indeed, INF treaty appeared to support these claims. Each of the treaty's major achievements -- elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons system and extensive verification measures including on-site inspections -- represented almost total Soviet embrace of American position.

However, the allies expressed deep concern over the security implications of the treaty for the NATO. They anticipated the decoupling of U.S. from Europe. Reacting to this, Kenneth, L. Adelman observed:

> The bogus claim that this agreement (INF) will 'decouple' the US from Europe perversely exaggerates both what the NATO deployment was intended to do and what an INF agreement will in fact do. On the Western side, the treaty will affect only one class of weapons, with less than 400 weapons in all -- system that did not exist in Europe before late 1983. So it is a little ridiculous to talk as if the US guarantee of Western Europe's security depends on these modest deployment.(20)

NATO's security continued to be coupled to that of the United States by a broad range of nuclear weapons systems, not affected by the INF agreement.

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20 Arms control update, A publication of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament agency, Nov. 1987, no.2 (Washington, D.C.), by Kenneth L Adelman (Adelman was the then arms control and disarmament agency).

Among them are tactical nuclear weapons, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and nuclear weapons carried by the FB-III and other nuclear capable air craft.

According to Chancellor Helmut Kohl:

> This treaty represents a major political victory for NATO, a success far beyond what many thought possible. It carries important lessons on how successfully to negotiate arms reduction with the Soviet Union.(21)

The conclusion of the INF accord was due to the exemplary statesmanship shown by both Soviet Premier, Gorbachev and President Reagan. Even though it sought to eliminate only four percent of the strategic systems of the two Superpowers, its significance lay in the fact that it had set the ball rolling in the domain of arms control negotiations. The three-fold facets of the accord may be mentioned here.

Firstly, in the post war history of disarmament this was the first time that an entire class of INF forces comprising two categories of land-based

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21 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document (Washington, D.C.); vol.24, 22 Feb. 1988. Remarks following discussion with Chancellor Kohl of the FRG.

intermediate and shorter-range missiles stationed in nine European countries had to be eliminated. Secondly, the accord was based upon the principle of equal security for all the concerned parties. It was for this reason that the U.S.S.R. agreed to eliminate more INF systems than the U.S. Thirdly, it provided for on-site inspection and intensive verification of each other's nuclear installations. This had set a healthy precedent in the sense that it would make secrecy in the military build up of superpowers redundant.

> Curiously, West Europeans' response to the INF has been somewhat ambivalent for the simple reason that they dread the change, more importantly when it carries, even if remotely, the implication of reducing qualitatively the US presence in Western Europe (which may be interpreted as the beginning of decoupling of the two alliance partners). However, they welcome, whole-heartedly, the Gorbachev phenomena of Glasnost, perestroika (restructuring) and democratisation, of which the accord is only a by-product.(22)

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22 H.S. Chopra, "European Security: INF Treaty Leads the Way", World Focus (New Delhi), vol.9, no.5, May 1988, p. 87.

Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

MBFR talks began in 1973 but had not yielded any tangible outcome due to the unaccommodating attitude on either side, i.e. USSR and U.S. Unlike its earlier rigid stand, there were indications of much greater flexibility on the part of the USSR under Gorbachev. Although the superpowers were unable to reach un agreement on long-range arms reduction before Reagan left office, it was clear that they had entered a period of relaxation in which they were increasingly willing to take steps to moderate and regulate their relationships and to cooperate on security issues.

Phil Williams very aptly sums up the changed international scenario in the following words:

> President Reagan came to office in 1981 as an enthusiastic cold warrior determined to restore American power and pre-eminence and to show the Soviet Union that it could not embark upon expansionist policies without paying a very heavy price. He left in 1989 as the co-architect of a new Super power detente.(23)

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23 Phil Williams, "US-Soviet Relations: Beyond the Cold War?", International Affairs (London), vol. 65, no.7, Spring 1989, p. 273.

As early as in 1983, the Reagan Administration was saying that, having rebuilt US strength, it wanted to engage the Soviet leaders in a constructive dialogue. From the beginning, the priority and sequence were very much clear. Regeneration of American power was the first priority and constructive dialogue would follow only after this had been achieved. The basic idea was that the Soviet Union would respond positively to hard-line policies.

However, towards the mid-1980's remarkable progress had been made in the direction of detente. Reagan Administration took care not to use the concept of detente for the new thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations; instead, it preferred a more modest language such as "dialogue" to describe improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The detente of late 1980's stood in sharp contrast to that of the 1970's. The most obvious point of contrast between the two periods was that there was a much greater degree of pragmatism about the new detente than there was under President Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

"In some respects the current situation could even be described as a policy of 'detente by default".[24] Thus, there was a broad agreement about the necessity of continuing policies that sought a lowering of tension, arms control and selective cooperation.

The capabilities of the Soviet Union to wage war, the modernization of Soviet arms production (quantitatively superior to that of the West) have not changed since Gorbachev came to power. Only the future would tell whether Soviet Union is actually willing to reduce its superiority; and even major reductions would not eliminate the political cause of East-West conflict within the near future.[25]

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24 Ibid., p. 279.

25 Karl Kaiser, "A view from Europe: The US role in the Next Decade", International Affairs (London), vol.65, no.7, Spring 1989, p. 218.

C H A P T E R - V

CONCLUSION

> Since the beginning, NATO has rested on a three legged base: Soviet Obduracy, European dependency and American prosperity. Together they have provided a foundation that has kept the alliance intact through numerous vicissitudes.(1)

And these conditions have continued to prevail for quite a long time and have remained unchanged.

However, cracks have begun to appear in the structure of NATO with the changing international scenario and emergence of new realities threatening the old ones. The erosion of the Cold War consensus combined with the economic and political power shifts has left NATO with an uncertain future. It could remain mummified in its present form but would lose its relevance. Ronald Steel puts it:

> Perhaps the more fundamental problem is that NATO itself may be an idea whose time has passed. The alliance, a victim of political and economic change in the world, seems likely either to atrophy as its members squabble over the meaning of burden sharing or to fragment as devolution gradually takes hold.(2)

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1 Ronald Steel, "NATO's Last Mission", Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.), no.76, Fall 1989, p. 84.

2 Ibid., p. 90.

Thus after four decades of long nuclear peace of the post War period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has become the victim of its own success.

While the NATO partners have had some severe and intractable differences over the years, the alliance has served the United States and its allies very well.

There is a demand that the United States should disengage itself from NATO because of the high cost. Half the American defence budget, some $ 150 billion a year, is said to be devoted to sustaining the NATO commitment. The reasons are not only economic but also military and diplomatic. Some opine that militarily NATO commitments have become extremely dangerous in view of the fact that United States has lost its nuclear superiority. In the diplomatic sphere, some feel that Gorbachev offers a chance to end the US-Soviet military confrontation in Europe. So United States should move quickly to seize this opportunity in order to rid itself of an unsustainable strategic and economic burden.

"But while an American protectorate no longer suits military, economic and political realities, an American disengagement from NATO is an excessive and self destructive solution".[3] The Americans still have great and lasting stakes in Europe and the geopolitical significance of the trans-atlantic connections remain crucial. So the solution lies not in doing away with the alliance system but reforming it so that the disproportionate and unsustainable diplomatic, economic and strategic burdens of the United States are relieved.

The solution probably lies in the policy of "devolution" - a shift of responsibility within the alliance. Europe's own major powers should take the primary responsibility of managing their own territorial defence. Such a policy does not preclude an American contribution to Europe's nuclear and conventional deterrence altogether. But the devolution does preclude a hegemonic alliance, that is to say, an alliance in which the United States takes the primary responsibility for organizing and managing

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3 David P. Calleo, "The American Role in NATO", Journal of International Affairs (Columbia University), vol.43, no.1, Summer/Fall 1989, p.20.

Europe's defence. In the future, the United States should assume the role of an ally rather than that of a hegemonic protector, managing Europe's defence. Thus, devolution does not mean withdrawal. The United States should keep its nuclear commitment to Europe but it should not be expected to bear the full weight of collective deterrence. This task should be shared with a parallel European deterrent.

So the crux of the problem is that NATO must be transformed from a U.S. dominated protectorate into a more equitable relationship.

The NATO of the future will be essential to world stability as much as to West European security, because the control of Europe's heartland, Germany, is still the most contested issue in world politics and the control of Germany is the key to European domination.

Raymond Aron was right in saying that the Superpowers are enemy brothers "who can't make war and can't make peace".[4] The Soviet threat was

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4 Cited in Michael Stuermer, "NATO Still in Europe's Interest" in Stanely R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Pergman Brassey's Publishers, 1989), p. 105.

paramount at the beginning and the Soviet Union's overwhelming weight as the Eurasian landmass would continue to be the dominant reason for NATO's existence as long as the bipolar structure of world politics persisted.

Whatever changes have occurred in the meantime, the basic relationship is still one of inescapable partnership and inescapable antagonism. Europe continues to be the bone of contention between the two sides as it provides the economic, psychological and geostrategic element that would tip the balance in favour of one side or the other.[5]

Under NATO America has not only been the guarantor of Western Europe's defence but the holder of European balance. So whatever settlement ultimately takes place in Europe, it involves the United States. NATO is more than just a military alliance. As its primary role of defending Europe against a Soviet onslaught diminishes its political role increases. NATO keeps the United States in the European defence equation.

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5 Ibid., p. 105.

But alliance goes beyond the threat, it may be a defence treaty against external aggression, but for its members, it is also a sort of internal non-aggression pact, a framework for resolving differences within the alliance community.[6]

Under its present arrangements, NATO has become both militarily unstable and economically unsustainable. But NATO could be saved by being organized differently if only, the United States and its allies can rise to the occasion.

NATO is not a work of art beyond time and space that cannot be improved. It must be transformed in order to accommodate a European situation that has outgrown most of its War and post War traumas. As NATO cannot be replaced, it must surely be improved.[7]

Alliance issues promise to dominate George Bush's foreign policy agenda in the wake of the fluid situation prevailing amongst NATO countries. As the threats from the Soviet Union seem to diminish, speculations are rife that NATO nations will relax, drop their guards and fall into endless bickerings. "One major secret weapon

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6 Time (Chicago), 12 February 1990, p.13.

7 Stuerner, n.4, p. 107.

is to deprive you of an enemy", says Georgy Arbatov, a key Kremlin figure.

Thus, Bush Administration faces a three cornered diplomatic game. In one corner is West Germany which provides more troops to NATO than any other country save Turkey but whose commitment is increasingly questioned. In Washington and London, officials are concerned that, far more than others, the Germans are captivated by Gorbachev and are tired of the military burdens. The immediate concern is that the Germans will push for hasty, imprudent agreements with the Soviets and seek removal of some of NATO's frontline defences. A deeper fear is that Germany will drift into neutralism returning to the days of Bismarck, when it saw itself as central European power balancing nations of East and West. That would shatter NATO.

For the US, the challenge is to respect German opinion that Bonn remains a firm ally but not so much that ostpolitic holds a veto over NATO's military needs.

In the second corner of the diplomatic game is America itself. Many members of Congress believe that the US carries a disproportionate share of NATO's costs and that the time is coming to bring home some troops

from Europe. In the view of a top Bush advisor, a unilateral reduction would be a 'disaster' convincing the West Germans that the Soviet threat has indeed disappeared and driving them further Eastward.

Occupying the third corner of the diplomatic triangle are the Soviets. Gorbachev, says NATO Commander Galvin, is still bent on removing both nuclear weapons and US forces from Europe, and he is playing an extremely clever hand. His UN speech was only the latest example where he floated the proposal of troop reduction on which the NATO bureaucracy had been working on for several months before. NATO officials now worry that unless they come up with eye catching new ideas on conventional arms reduction, Gorbachev will repeatedly outflank them and continue to steer Western opinion in his direction. Against this backdrop Bush must soon begin sorting out a number of arms control issues all requiring a careful management within NATO.[8]

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8 David Ger Gen, "NATO in Disarray: This Time, Reality", US News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol.106, no.3, January 23, 1989, pp.24-6.

A recent Pentagon Study, alleged to have been made by a top Soviet expert, Philip Peterson, believes that the Soviet Union will face a break-up by the end of the century. The study is based on classified and unclassified materials.

In the context of the study, following surmises and inferences can be drawn. "All nations of Eastern Europe will join European community", strengthening the West European nations. Furthermore, Britain, Portugal and Switzerland will be outside the West European confederation leaving Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxemberg and the Netherlands in the European community.

It is also believed that Britain will join "North Atlantic Group" which would have US and Canada in it. While the rest of the study is regarding the fate of the Soviet Union, it supports "the need for an effective United States military force in Europe during the continent's transition to a new economic order".[9]

The main problem before NATO is how to fit a unified Germany into the security structure. If Soviet

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9 Times of India, (New Delhi), 14 March, 1990.

Union insists on neutrality as the price of German unity, several negotiating positions are bound to be discussed. If Germany stays in NATO but no foreign troops are allowed on its territory, France may come under pressure to accept American troops. For the present West Germany maintains that a united Germany must remain in NATO. As Mr Helmut Kohl puts it 'there was no question of West Germany leaving NATO after unification'.

Mr Genscher, the foreign minister of West Germany has expressed the view that a neutral Germany was in nobody's interest but added that the alliance must not extend its military territory to take in the present day East Germany. He forsees the Warsaw Pact working alongside the Western alliance to guarantee European security.[10] Thus it appears that the United States has pursued a policy of caution, and adherence to relative closeness with the members of NATO in regard to its future vistas under Reagan Administration.

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10 Times of India, (New Delhi), 3 February 1990.

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Appendix I

NATO ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization consults intensively and continuously at the political and military levels. Consultations among NATO members go on in a variety of fora and at many levels, both multilaterally and bilaterally. There are normally high level consultations both preceding and following any US-Soviet Summit meeting. Various NATO bodies meet in regular sessions to maintain constant consultations. These include the following:

I. North Atlantic Council (NAC)

The NAC and the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) are the highest decision making bodies and fora for consultations within the alliance and are composed of representatives, [illegible] of 16 member countries. The NAC normally meets at least once a week at the level of permanent representatives (ambassadors) to NATO; it meets twice a year at the foreign minister level. NAC meetings may be reinforced by representatives from capitals and may be held at the heads-of-state level as deemed necessary.

II. Defence Planning Committee (DPC)

The DPC is made up of representatives of countrie in the NATO integrated military structure and deals with

matters related specifically to defence. Like the NAC, the DPC is in permanent session at the ambassadorial level and meets twice a year at the level of ministers of defence.

III. Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

The NPG was formed to meet the need for non-nuclear NATO members to be associated with allied nuclear planning. Fourteen countries (all NATO members except France and Iceland, the later currently an observer) participate. It meets under the chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General as required at the level of permanent representatives, and twice yearly at the defense minister meeting.

IV. Military Committee

The Military Committee is the senior advisory body to the NAC and DPC within the Alliance, and is composed of the chiefs of staff of all member nations except France and Iceland (France is represented by the Chief of the French Military Mission, and Iceland, which has no military forces, may be represented by a civilian). The Military Committee meets twice a year and functions on a continuous basis through permanent military representatives who are appointed by their chiefs of staff.

V. Special Consultative Group (SCG)

The SCG was established in 1979 to support the negotiating track of the 1979 Dual Track decision: specifically, US-Soviet negotiations involving Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). All NATO members except France and Iceland chaired by the US and attended by high level foreign ministry officials from allied capitals. The SCG meets as deemed necessary by the US Chairman.

VI. High Level Group (HLG)

The HLG, established to support the deployment track of the 1979 Dual Track decision, is a subsidiary body of the NPG. It is composed of high level defence ministry representatives from all NATO members except France and Iceland, and is chaired by the US. The HLG deals with special projects as designated by the NPG. The HLG meets as deemed necessary by the US Chairman.

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Appendix II

European views of the Necessity of NATO, 1987[1]

Country	Denmark	Norway	France	FRG	Great Britain	Italy
Sample Size	(845)	(1009)	(961)	(1022)	(970)	(1061)
NATO still necessary	61%	41%	49%	70%	72%	65%
NATO no long necessary	22	14	19	15	16	23
Don't know	16	15	32	15	12	12
Total	99%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%

Source: US Information Agency, Office of Research Memorandum, February 10, 1988; Surveys conducted in September 1987.

1 Cited in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990s (Washington D.C.: Pergman Brassay's Publisher, 1989), p. 155.



Source: Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Towards A New Transatla-ntic Bargain (Washington, D.C. : National Defence University Press, 1985), p.99.

NATO: Membership and Area

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the United States, Canada, and 10 European countries on April 4, 1949. The treaty established the North Atlantic Council as its principal organ, which first met in September 1949 and, setting up subsidiary bodies, satisfied the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The treaty provided that any other European state could, by unanimous agreement, be invited to join the alliance and that any member could withdraw after 1 year's notice after the treaty had been in existence for more than 20 years. Four countries have since joined the alliance but none has withdrawn.

All members are obliged to come to the assistance of any member under military attack. But membership does not entail uniform participation. Iceland has no armed forces. Denmark and Norway do not permit foreign troops to be stationed on their soil permanently in peacetime (except, as to Denmark, in Greenland), and France (since 1966) and Spain do not take part in the integrated military command structure.

Defense obligations under the treaty extend to members' home territory and to the North Atlantic islands under their jurisdiction north of the Tropic of Cancer. Colonial possessions and other dependencies outside this area are not covered.



Distances:

Earth's circumference at Equator—24,800 miles

Washington, D.C., to Paris—3,800 miles

Arctic Circle to Tropic of Cancer—3,000 miles

North Pole to Tropic of Cancer—4,600 miles

Bonn to Ankara—1,475 miles

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Members	Population	Armed Forces
Belgium (1949)	9,865	95
Canada (1949)	24,882	83
Denmark (1949)	5,115	33
France (1949)	54,604	493
Germany, Federal Republic of (1955)	61,543	495
Greece (1952)	9,898	185
Iceland (1949)	236	no forces
Italy (1949)	56,345	373
Luxembourg (1949)	366	0.7
Netherlands (1949)	14,374	103
Norway (1949)	4,151	43
Portugal (1949)	10,008	64
Spain (1982)	38,234	347
Turkey (1952)	49,115	569
United Kingdom (1949)	56,006	321
United States (1949)	234,193	2,136

Source:Department of State Bulletin (U.S. Department of State: Government Printing Office,1985), Vol.85, NO.2096,p.45.

Burdensharing

Although NATO countries, as sovereign states, have full authority to determine their own military budgets, they all accept the principle, known as burdensharing, that each must do its part and assume a fair share of the costs of common defense.

NATO's part in the budget process is to establish overall needs and recommend force goals (level and quality of forces) for each member taking part in the integrated military commands. Contributions for the common infrastructure and other joint projects are established by consultation. These two procedures set a general framework for national defense planning.

NATO recognizes that no single formula can provide an exact measure of each country's contribution. Demands on national resources vary from country to country, and some expenditures not included in the defense budget—foreign aid, for example—may also promote international security.

Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GNP[1]



[1] Spain is excluded because it joined NATO in 1982. Iceland has no armed forces.

Source: ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms*

Source: Department of State Buletin (U.S. Department of State: Government Printing Office, !985), Vol.85,No.2096,p.48.

NATO's Integrated Commands and Infrastructure

NATO began to establish its integrated military structure in 1950, following the invasion of South Korea.

NATO's military integration is essentially a system of centralized command to be implemented in wartime. The forces each country assigns to NATO remain under national control in peacetime and are transferred to the appropriate allied command only in an emergency.

The allied commanders act under the general direction of NATO's Military Committee; they are responsible for preparing for the most effective coordinated use of the forces in their regions.

In 1950 NATO also resolved to create a common military infrastructure. Construction of common facilities is paid for by the host country with funds contributed by all participating members.

France withdrew from the integrated military structure in 1966 but takes part in NATO defense support and procurement programs. France also joins in infrastructure funding for air defense and warning installations. Spain has never participated in the integrated commands. (Spain joined NATO in 1982.)

Infrastructure: Some Basic Common Facilities

NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE): Radar system running from North Cape to Turkey's eastern border

Airfields: 220 in European NATO countries (except France, Spain) designed for full, coordinated military use

NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS): Rapid communications for military and political authorities

NATO Pipeline System: Separate networks in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Denmark and United Kingdom; and Central European Pipeline System in Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands



NATO Commands

- Allied Command Europe — Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
- Allied Command Atlantic — Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)
- Allied Command Channel — Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN)
- Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group

Note: Allied Command Europe is divided into three regions: the Northern, Norway, Denmark, approaches to the Baltic, and the far northern F.R.G.); the Central (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and most of the F.R.G.); and the Southern (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, and the Mediterranean). U.K. NATO Air Forces is a fourth regional subordinate command of Allied Command Europe.

Source: Department of State Bulletin (U.S. Department of State: Government Printing Office, 1985), Vol.85, No.2096, p.49.

NATO Members' Military Presence Outside the NATO Area

Some NATO members have military forces outside the treaty area (in addition to those serving with UN peacekeeping units). French, Dutch, and U.K. overseas deployments reflect obligations stemming from the colonial era.

French forces overseas are concentrated in the former colony of Djibouti (independent since 1977) and the island of Reunion (a French overseas department). France has small detachments in four of the African countries with which it has bilateral defense agreements.

The United Kingdom withdrew from all military bases east of Suez (except Hong Kong) in 1971 but remains a partner in the Australia, New Zealand, U.K. (ANZUK) arrangement for the defense of Malaysia and Singapore. The Netherlands has token military forces in the Netherlands Antilles (an autonomous part of the Netherlands realm).

U.S. bases overseas, outside the NATO area, are governed by mutual defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines; the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty; the 1903 agreement with Cuba on Guantanamo; and the 1966 agreement with the United Kingdom on Diego Garcia.

NATO recognizes that its vital interests may be served by its members' involvement in other regions. In 1980 the defense ministers agreed to consider special measures to compensate for a possible diversion of NATO-allocated U.S. forces to Southwest Asia.



Source: Department of State Bulletin(U.S. Department of State: Government Printing Office,1985), Vol.85,No.2096,p.56.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

The U.S. strategic nuclear force is NATO's ultimate deterrent and must, therefore, be able to inflict unacceptable damage upon a potential aggressor. To counter Soviet improvements over the last decade, the United States has begun to modernize its strategic forces. The United States consults with the other NATO allies at the highest level on the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reduction efforts. NATO policy is to encourage verifiable agreements that would maintain the deterrent and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

France and the United Kingdom possess independent nuclear forces capable of retaliation in the event of Soviet attack.

U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms: Modernity Compared[1]



[1] Currently operational systems only.
[2] The modification series for Soviet intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles is shown in parentheses—for example, SS-18(4), SS-N-18(2).

Source: Department of State Bulletin (U.S. Department of State: Government Printing Office, 1985), Vol.85,No.2096,p.53.

West European and North Atlantic Economic Cooperation

Military cooperation was but one part of a general strategy to secure peace and prosperity. Economic cooperation was equally important and was already underway when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. Article 2 of the treaty required members to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and encourage economic collaboration.

The European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, was initiated in 1947 to speed up postwar recovery with the help of American aid. (The Soviet Union refused to take part in this program and prevented its extension to Eastern Europe.) The body set up to administer Marshall Plan funds, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, was replaced in 1960 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which included Canada and the United States. Now encompassing all industrial democracies, the OECD seeks to promote world trade and economic growth and improve economic assistance to the Third World.

The European Communities (EC) is the main achievement of postwar efforts for West European unity. Established in 1967 to combine the coal and steel, atomic, and common market communities set up in the 1950s, the EC has the authority to conclude binding economic agreements. It also provides for regular meetings of its members' foreign ministers.

Since 1975, leaders of the major industrial democracies have held yearly economic summits. Participants now include Japan and six NATO countries—Canada, France, the F.R.G., Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The EC also is represented



Source: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No.2096, (U.S. Department of State: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 59.