

**ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES TOWARDS
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA (1964-1984)**

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SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled
"ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES TOWARDS THE
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Shri Madhusudan Mishra in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER
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been previously submitted for any other degree of
this or any other University and is his own work.

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_C_O_N_T_E_N_T_S_

		<u>Pages</u>
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
CHAPTER I	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	1 - 14
CHAPTER II	POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT	15 - 34
CHAPTER III	INDIA-USA RELATIONS	35 - 58
CHAPTER IV	INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS	59 - 89
CHAPTER V	SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS	90 - 112
CHAPTER VI	INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS	113 - 139
	CONCLUSION	140 - 147
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	148 - 162

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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
(1947-1963)

After independence various political forces in the country were united with their common goal—liberation of the country from the imperialist intervention. The Indian big business played an important role in exerting pressure on the government. To ascertain the will of the people and for the promotion of world peace they put pressure on the government to break away India's relation from the tutelage of the western capitalist countries. Jawaharlal Nehru, first Prime Minister of India, "had great respect for the opposition than any other Prime Minister of India".¹ He made concerted efforts to solve all problems India faced, national and international, taking the opposition bench into confidence.

The Korean War had a great impact on the entire foreign policy of India. Nehru made it clear that India was determined to fight against imperialist conquest and enslavement. Declaring the motto of foreign policy of India, President Rajendra Prasad said, "My government are deeply concerned over the present conflict in Korea."² The CPI supported the position of Indian government on Korean problem. It realized that defeat of imperialists was an indispensable condition for the achievement of world progress. Anti-US feeling

1. Brecher, M., India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (Toronto Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 264.

2. Congress Bulletin issued by the Office of the AICC, No.5, July-August, 1950. p. 250.

gradually intensified because America ignored Nehru's call for a cease-fire to avoid the spreading of the war. At that stage, India headed by Nehru, made invaluable contribution to bring peaceful solution to the Korean War. The government enjoyed the support of broad sections of the people. The main objective of the foreign policy of India was "to pursue peace not through alignment with any major power or group of powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue."³ Notwithstanding to its declared policy, government of India, yielding to the pressure, voted against immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and on the question of Ukraine's representation in the Security Council. It was a device to paralyse the democratic forces. The CPI condemned the government for its inability to avoid Anglo-American bloc.⁴

Since the western industrialist countries feverishly looked for a new base, Kashmir emerged with an uncertain future. It became the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. After abortive attempt in the Commonwealth Conference, the USA and Pakistan proposed for a plebiscite under the U.N. auspicion. The Anglo-American bloc attempted to

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3. Nehru, Jawaharlal, Visit to America (New York: John Day, 1950), pp.29-30.
 4. The CPI Congress opened at Calcutta on Feb. 28, 1949; India and Pakistan Yearbook and Who's Who (Bombay: Times of India Pub., 1949), p.526.

force India to agree for an arbitration which India categorically denied. Thus, Kashmir question aggravated the deteriorated Indo-Pak relations.

Speaking in the Parliament, the CPI leader, A.K. Gopalan made it clear that the problem should be left to the people of Kashmir to decide their future. He rejected any solution of this problem under the U.N. supervision.⁵ Looking at the acute problem of the Kashmiris whose freedom was at stake, Jawaharlal Nehru stressed his argument in these words - "We are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to men's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral."⁶ Analysing the situation in Kashmir, Central Committee of the CPI viewed with grave concern on the reports came from Kashmir that "some personalities of the Sheikh Abdullah group demanding independent status of Kashmir."⁷ It was a moment when India's foreign policy had to face the test of time. The non-alignment, pursued by India, was in grave danger. At that crucial and increasingly complex situation,

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5. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.IV, No.8, August 7, 1952, Cols. 5802-06.
 6. Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publication Division, 1961), p.591.
 7. Cross Roads, August 2, 1953.

Nehru made a short speech saying that India was determined to "uphold to the ideals what it had proclaimed."⁸

The relations between India and Pakistan sharply aggravated. Several problems demonstrated again in straining the cordial bilateral relation. The western capitalist countries engineered military blocs to encircle India. It used Pakistan to give life to its proposed strategic plans. It became a sorest spot in Indo-Pak relations. By granting military assistance to Pakistan, the USA changed the peaceful environment for the worse.

Thus the military alliance of the USA and Pakistan, extension of U.S. War bases constituted a threat to India's sovereignty. It was a blackmail against India to divert its stand on foreign policy.⁹ On the other hand, in the midst of hostile atmosphere India repudiated the attempts by the US war-mongers to draw her into the western bloc. She withstood with the presence brought to her by the imperialists. Nehru expressed his unwillingness for any sort of military alliance with the USA and Pakistan. As a result, by 1954, Indo-Pak relations severely deteriorated and seriously intensified their differences. India thought that the US-Pak axis would worsen Indo-

8. Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru (1949-53), (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Publication Division, 1954), p.144.

9. Mukherjee, H., Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.X, No.29, December 23, 1953, Col.2995.

Pak relations, would affect the whole probability of easing their tension. Indirectly, it led to the growth of armaments both in India and Pakistan, and roused anti-Pak feelings among all sections of the people of India. Notwithstanding foreign policy deviations, rampant corruption and rousing socio-economic problems, the Indian bourgeoisie stepped up their efforts to improve Sino-Indian relations in 1954. All the political parties were eagerly waited for better relations with China. Late in 1954, the famous Panchsheel made its way. Nehru spoke of the agreement, "We have done nothing better in the field of foreign affairs during the last six years than signing the agreement."¹⁰ Nehru had taken a stand against many of the U.S. machinations in Asia. The CPI warmly and enthusiastically welcomed the development of relations with China.¹¹

In 1954-55 Pakistan joined in SEATO and CENTO and then the Indo-Pak relations confronted with crisis. Discussion of the Kashmir question by SEATO was tantamount to create anger among the bulk of the Indians. Kashmir turned into a playcard by the USA and freedom menaced, justice threatened in the valley. The CPI considered¹² SEATO as the modern

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10. Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p.220.
 11. Ramamurthy, P., "Drive U.S. out of Asia", New Age, July 18, 1954, p.14.
 12. Mukherjee, H., Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.III(31), March 28, 1956, Cols.3621-27.

version of conspiratorial acts against the peace and freedom in Asia.

In 1957 the US launched a fresh offensive against India. Facing challenges from many sides Indian bourgeoisie were making an effort in lining up with American plans. It enabled the U.S. imperialists to mask their intervention. Despite the outcry raised, it proved utterly hopeless. As a result Indian foreign policy beginning with non-alignment turned with a certain western bias. The CPI could not mark any line of improvement in the foreign policy of Indian government. It viewed the government as "a government of the landlords and monopoly capitalists collaborating with British imperialism and regarded its policies as designs to protect the interests of bourgeois classes and against the interests of the common people."¹³ Pakistan's military preparedness impaired its prestige in Asia and the world. It brought about a tense international situation.

The CPI launched a mighty propaganda against the dangerous war preparations of the USA and considered it as a plan to subjugate Asia.¹⁴

India's security and sovereignty was threatened by the US-Pakistan alliance. In that turmoil situation India found

13. Communist Party Documents, 1930-1956 (Bombay: CPI Publication, 1957), p. 201.

14. Gopalan, A.K. and Hiren Mukherjee, Communists in Parliament (Delhi: CPI Publication, January, 1957), pp. 28-29.

it beneficial not to get aligned with any power bloc. Nehru realized that by judging each issue from its own merit, India would protect her own interest. He pursued non-alignment as a way of life and action, as a matter of principle, not of opportunism or the convenience.¹⁵ Non-alignment position of India got the support of all political parties. Nehru assured the people to continue the policy because it "had its roots deep in the soil."¹⁶ As the foreign policy pursued by the government conformed to the interests of the people, to eliminate the vestiges of feudalism and colonialism, the CPI criticized it much less. The party consistently supported the government and worked for strengthening it. "The US imperialism had again and again sought to prevent India from acting boldly for peace and independence utilising the pressure of loans and aids in the crudest possible manner. So the CPI appealed that the imperialist manoeuvres against our independent foreign policy need to be exposed and people mobilised against it."¹⁷

The decision of the USA to give financial aid to India was considered inimical to India's national interest, to create favourable atmosphere for its machinations.¹⁸ The

15. Nehru, Jawaharlal, op. cit., p.348.

16. Congress Bulletin, January-February, 1957, p.28.

17. New Age, October 26, 1958, p.8.

18. Resolution of the CPI, adopted at the extraordinary party Congress, Amritsar, April, 1958, pp.2-4.

decision caused apprehension to the CPI and its abandoned the vaguely worded decision. It saw the desirability of ending western aid. The U.S. decision evoked immediate comments from many assembly members. The party considered the idea of helping India proposed by the pro-imperialist groups, had the intention to explore the possibilities of exploiting India. In one of its resolution, the CPI spoke that, "India's national advance could be secured and smoothened if it was subject to the ups and downs of American economy."¹⁹

The 1959 marked an abrupt cooling off relations between India and China. However, the Tibet issue of May, 1959 added to worsen their bilateral relations. The anti-national forces took the Tibet affair as a pretext for a concentrated attack on India's non-participation in military blocs. The imperialists and their Indian supporters tried to make a shift in India's foreign policy. The pressure brought no nervousness on the Nehru government and the non-alignment held on its way. He resumed to rest on Panchsheel Principles and kept India aloof from superpowers' game. The CPI called upon²⁰ Nehru and Chou-En-lai to take immediate steps in reducing the tension and settle the disputes amicably.

19. Ibid., p.8.

20. New Age, November 1, 1959, p.13. Also see New Age, December 6, 1959, pp.56-57.

Anti-Pak demagoguery infringed on India's national interests, it wounded the national pride. Fresh and bitter memories, indignities and humiliations again appeared on the scene. Jawaharlal Nehru repeatedly offered no-war pact to Pakistan. The CPI regarded²¹ Nehru's efforts valuable in the interests of both the countries. The party urged the government to settle all the disputes through negotiations in a situation when both sides have asserted with confidence and hope that in a similar spirit of give and take they would solve the rest problems.

During 1954-59 the CPI went on applauding Nehru's foreign policy. It welcomed Nehru's decision of denying the UN observer in Kashmir. The party highly spoke of "Panchsheel Declaration, denunciation of SEATO, his visit to the Socialist countries and demanded for the seating of the People's Republic of China".²² The CPI believed that by adhering to the policy of peace and anti-colonialism and establishing friendship with the Socialist countries, India could play independent role in the world politics.²³ Indian bourgeoisie was capable of

21. New Age, November 1, 1959, p.1.

22. Dange, S.A., Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol.XXXV (8), November 25, 1959, Cols.1721-24.

23. Draft Programme of the CPI, Sixth Congress, Vijaywada, April, 1961, vide Tafiq Ahmed Nizami, The Communist Party and India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1971) p.46.

upholding India's anti-colonial aspirations and determined to end colonialism. As the western capitalist countries made encroachments on peace, India's foreign policy naturally became increasingly anti-imperialists. The reactionary forces joined in fanning war halucinations. The undemocratic elements having been aligned with the Indian bourgeoisie pursued a policy subserving imperialism and started public speeches and campaigns of criticism of the government in Parliament. The CPI regarded it as utterly alien in thought and aspiration.

The Chinese attack of 1962 was the saddest chapter of Jawaharlal Nehru's life.²⁴ China's vigorous action against India was at variance with its approach. The antecedents of this operation were unclear but there were grounds for supposing that China acted as it did in response to a change of policy by India where Counsels were divided.²⁵ The post-war period witnessed threats of imperial domination over Indian sub-continent. A tense struggle was going on between the forces of world reaction and the forces of progress. The Americans made open acts of aggression against newly independent India. With this the matter did not boil down. A

24. Rau, M. Chalapathi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Life and Work (Delhi: National Book Club, 1973), p.400.

25. Calvocoressi, Peter, World Politics Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1983), p.288.

meaningful event took place in the mean time. The U.S.A. came out with several offers. The American radar was to be used. America was ready to station its air squadrons on the Indian soil. The critics raised a hue and cry about Nehru's covert alliance with the Americans. They took it as an absolute subjection to a small clique.

Speaking in the Parliament on the issue of VOA deal, Nehru promised to continue India's general policy without injuring its basic interests.²⁶ Some students of foreign policy witnessed western powers' negative attitude in their help to India. Nehru's desire to seek all round help from the U.S.A., to satisfy our vanity, was inevitably of a complete anti-national measures ignoring the interests and desire of the broad sections of the people. "The conflict with China in 1962 might be thought to have put India on the side of the western democracies in the Cold War, for India promptly turned to the U.S. for aid."²⁷ The CPI called upon the government of India to follow Colombo proposals for negotiation with the People's Republic of China.²⁸ It urged for cancelling

26. Lok Sabha Debates... Fifth Session, Third Series, Vol.XIX(2), August 14, 1963, Col.411.

27. Brown, W. Norman, The United States and India and Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 359.

28. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Third Session, Vol.XII (29), January 23, 1963, Cols.6007-12.

air-umbrella offer as it was contrary to India's declared policy of developing defence potential.²⁹

It must be approved without debate that the CPI considered China's activities dangerous to India's security. In spite of that it was interested for a peaceful settlement. With regard to Kashmir the CPI demanded a lasting accord with mutually agreed adjustments.³⁰ Speaking in the Lok Sabha President Radhakrishnan said, "The issue of Chinese aggression has been and is to-day, the over-riding issue before us and everything else has to be considered in that context."³¹ There is no question of serious discussion on the point that the Sino-Indian border conflict had been a determining factor in Sino-Indian relations. Jawaharlal Nehru, no doubt, enjoyed the support from all sections but when he tried to push India into the American camp, Indian press began with critical speeches. By aligning itself with the U.S. imperialism India turned empty-handed. It put country's sovereignty in an awkward position. "The central Secretariat of the CPI earnestly appealed to all patriotic Indians to join in strengthening the demand for rejection of the joint air defence exercises."³²

29. Resolution of the National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, February 5-12, 1963, pp.23-24.

30. Ibid., pp.26-27.

31. Lok Sabha Debates..., Fourth Session, Third Series, Vol.XIII(1), Feb. 18, 1963, Col.14.

32. New Age, July 21, 1963, p.12.

Indo-Soviet relation marked a new phase when the Soviet Union offered help to construct an iron and steel plant at Bokaro. The government of India extended the relation by building up inter-state and cultural relations in 1953. The people of India expressed their high opinions when India received much assistance and invariable support from the Soviet Union. At that moment the western capitalist countries took up an utterly unrealistic step by setting India against Pakistan.

The critics argue that India, for her economic development, should be linked to the developed countries. Jawaharlal Nehru also realized that the fundamental task before him was to raise the standard of living of the people. He told that, "Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping."³³

Thus, India's policy of non-alignment strengthened her relations with the Soviet Russia. A trade agreement was signed on December 2, 1953. The U.S.S.R. rendered her substantial economic aid. It was a major setback to the western industrialists. Their monopoly of aid and credit facilities came to a halt. Furthermore, on major international issues both India and the Soviet Union revealed their closeness of views

33. Nehru, Jawaharlal, op. cit., p.24.

Nehru highly appreciated the enthusiasm and determination of the CPI workers. It is because the CPI with its devotedness, dedication and intense propaganda machinery consistently helped the government to take Indian foreign policy in a progressive direction. It cannot be denied that the CPI, the most well-organized and disciplined party of India, rendered valuable contribution in motivating and moulding India's foreign policy.

CHAPTER II
POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

The growing disillusionment with the imperialist policies, the continued exploitation of raw materials from the developing countries, their neo-colonialist ambitions, in fact, is far grimmer to-day than at any time before. On the other hand, the national liberation movement in Asia and Africa, growing strength of Socialist countries, the disarray of world economic system, all together in combination, brought a new turn in India's foreign policy.

A foreign policy of Non-Alignment means an "anti-imperialist, anti-colonial policy for the purpose of strengthening colonial liberation movement, world-peace, mutual cooperation among the equal entities."¹

A non-aligned country may not maintain equidistance from the capitalists and socialist countries, nor neutrality, indifference; but it should not join any military bloc and in particular, stands against racism, imperialism, Zionism. Apparently, it reconciles with world peace as peace is vital for the evolution of mankind to the pinnacle of its promises and potential in this overarmed and turbulent world. Jawaharlal Nehru, a concrete action man, advocated the policy of non-alignment to keep India aloof from big powers' conflict and his aim was "to strive for world peace and justice for the have-nots",² to save the newly liberated countries from the

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1. Sardesai, S.G., Why Communists (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966), pp.87-88.
 2. Salvi, P.G., India in World Affairs (Delhi: B.R. Publication, 1985), p.19.

possibility of nuclear disaster, as India, along with some peace-loving nations, strived to strengthen it.

Initially the CPI had the view that the government toeing the line of the United Kingdom and its policy of non-alignment was the policy of British imperialism. However, after the mid-fifties it extended its support to the Indian government and shared with the policy of non-alignment of the Congress party.

Section-I

During the Shastri era the non-aligned movement (NAM) was not used to allow the exhortation and admonition of the great nations of the world. It was applied in a more modest geographical context. Non-Alignment tended to turn into non-involvement, stayed out of other nations' complicated affairs.³

Speaking on an occasion in the Rajya Sabha, Lal Bahadur Shastri made clear about India's policy of non-alignment. He said, "Our policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence is strongly and fully endorsed and is going to continue as our basic policy.... We are an independent country and we should have authority to think independently."⁴

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3. Misra, K.P., Foreign Policy of India - A book of readings (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1977), pp.138-39.
 4. India, Information and Broadcasting (Ministry of), Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri (New Delhi, Government of India, Publication Division, August, 1974), p.37.

Time and again the critics said that our foreign policy seemed to have subsided. Hiren Mukherjee, the CPI leader, sharply reacted to the statement. Addressing the Parliament he said that we considered our stand always just and not tilting towards western capitalist countries. In his words, "Let us make our non-alignment more vibrant, more dynamic, more understanding of the present-day realities and then surely we shall be able to make of it that gem which it is and which has been right from its first formulations."⁵ Though interdependence has been the hallmark of twentieth century, yet the third world countries keep up their independence by all means. In the words of Shastri, "old imperialism is fast dying. We have all to work for the achievement of a world order in which all nations are truly equal and in which no nation can impose its will on others."⁶ All the time the NAM had faced vital attacks by the pro-imperialist countries. At this moment the survival of the NAM was at stake. The CPI firmly reiterated to fight against US imperialism to protect all the peace-loving and democratic forces of the world, for "the U.S. imperialism wanted to discredit and humble India into creating submission to its blandishments and pressures.

5. Mukherjee, Hiren, Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. XXIX(47), April 10, 1964, Col. 10348.

6. Shastri delivered the speech with the text of an interview with Yugoslav correspondent in New Delhi, June, 1965. Selected Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit., p. 225.

One of their principal aims was to force India first to compromise and then to abandon its policy of non-alignment."⁷ The Indian bourgeoisie faced criticism from all quarters for its continuation of membership in the Commonwealth. On that point the CPI felt that⁸ as the British government had showed her uncompromising attitude in the Commonwealth meetings and did not take the consent of other members on the important issues like the Suez crisis of 1965, the government of India should quit it. "By her membership India had not gained anything rather it gave moral prestige and alibi to the British government and helped to further her ends adherent to all mankind."⁹

Shastri's contention was that we might have divergent views against the British Commonwealth but he was adamant to quit it. As a result affinity with the British continued. It was utterly a renunciation to the ideals of the non-alignment.

Besides this the Congress government sanctioned investment in certain key sectors, sought for foodgrains and aid

7. Resolution of National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, April 5-11, 1965, pp.1-2.

8. Lok Sabha Debates, Twelfth Session, Third Series, Vol. XLIV(29), Sept. 24, 1965, Col.7439.

9. Gupta, B., Quit Commonwealth (New Delhi: CPI (M) Publication, 1966), p.45.

for maintenance of imports from the industrialised countries and denies to some countries brought the image that the policy of non-alignment was on its way of being jeopardized.¹⁰ For its anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist contents the non-alignment is the movement not only of the Indian people but of the Afro-Asian and Socialist countries. But this content of the non-alignment was given up by wooing the U.S. imperialism for more aid. Thus the CPI (M) warned the people to challenge the opportunist evil deeds of the government.¹¹ In the opinion of the CPI, India's tenacious renouncement to recognize German Democratic Republic and developing relations with the Federal Germany symbolized the surrender of policy of non-alignment to the imperialist forces.¹²

Section-II

In a fast changing world peaceful co-existence is more important. Despite the breakdown of old alignments, the emergence of newer pattern of poly-centric power and the departure from the conformity of ideological power-groups, a tense situation was created. Non-alignment had a great

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10. Namboodiripad, E.M.S., The Programme Explained (Calcutta: CPI (M) Publication, 1966), pp.19-22.
11. People's Democracy, February 13, 1966, p.7.
12. Resolution of the National Council of the CPI (Hyderabad: CPI Publication, June 9-15, 1966), pp.3-8.

role to play there.¹³

The Indira government was watching like a mute spectator on some crucial issues. It did not oppose the abetting and aiding aggression of the U.S.A. The government could not maintain its firm stand on Palestine problem, on the U.S. dictate in Cuba and North Vietnam where the liberation struggle was drowned in blood. To add fuel to fire it maintained cordial relation with the U.S.A. knowing that America's naked aggression was against the welfare of the human beings. Under the Sea Custom Act the Indian bourgeoisie refused to receive books from North Vietnam whereas it laid no bar for the books of South Vietnam. "Distinguishing among the friendly nations India could not win over any of its friends."¹⁴ The CPI (M) leaders demonstrated against increasing Indo-USA relationship. They suspected that our long cherished policy of non-alignment might succumb to imperialist pressure. The party advocated for independent judgement on all issues.¹⁵

The U.S. intervention in the Vietnam affair raised the eyebrows of the peace-loving nations. India, too, took it to her heart. In a broadcast to the nation Indira Gandhi repeated

13. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, 'The Years of Challenge' (New Delhi: Government of India, Publication Division, 1973), p.326.

14. People's Democracy, August 11, 1968, p.3.

15. People's Democracy, February 15, 1970, p.4.

India's stand. She said, "The war must end, and I believe it is incumbent on all nations."¹⁶ "It is necessary to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam."¹⁷ The Communist Party of India was not satisfied with the steps taken by the Indian government. It rejected the 'Wait and See Policy' and India must call upon the US and its allies to stop the blatant invasion.¹⁸

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 Under Indira Gandhi's leadership India's foreign creditors allowed free access of private foreign capital and the government was laying her deaf ear. Under the pressure of American debts, the voice of the government was "convincing as they could not openly criticize the barbaric invasion of Vietnam. Thus the government repeatedly compromised with the capitalists in her foreign policy."^{18a} As non-alignment was a movement against imperialism, it should be based firmly on anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and on friendship and cooperation with the Socialist countries.¹⁹

16. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, The Years of Challenge, op. cit., p. 326.

17. Ibid., p. 327.

18. Report and Resolution of the CPI, held from May 8-May 12, 1970 (New Delhi: CPI Publication), p. 20.

18a. Election Manifesto of the CPI (M) (New Delhi: CPI (M) Publication, 1971), pp. 7-8.

19. Election Manifesto of the CPI, 1971, p. 3.

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Notwithstanding the opposition of the political leaders the Indira government made advances to the western capitalist countries and their allies and developed close military-economic links with them. The government presumed that "when the USA or the USSR helped through financial credits, they did it out of their own national self-interest, which also helped India to stand on its own feet."²⁰ But it was totally a faulty idea to fill in the lacunae in India's economic and technological development getting aid from the west. It is worth-noting that the most articulate persons in their personal life became pro-capitalists. The foreign policy pursued by the Indian bourgeoisie had always been to suit their class interests. No doubt, Indira Gandhi had wanted to push India towards self-reliance. But after twenty years of independence the economic independence remained a far cry. The multinationals became more and more unscrupulous in spite of the long suppressed voice of the people became sharper and sharper. The western imperialist countries were making an effort to subvert the independence of the third world countries. With the help of multinational corporations they started throwing their endemic economic burden to the heads of the underdeveloped countries and the latter were deeply moaning under the cruel impact of the crisis of the world capitalist system.

20. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, 'The Years of endeavour' (New Delhi: Government of India, Publication Division, 1973), p.686.

When the Indian government allowed for setting up of new subsidiaries by the British companies, the CPI (M) requested the government to refute the connection. The People's Democracy started with these lines - "The government of India was not contemplating any restriction on the remittance of dividends by foreign companies who have made heavy remittances of dividends."^{20a} The IBM and that type of blackguards were sucking the life blood out of the economy our country. The CPI made it clear that the determined intention of the government to go ahead for self-reliance seemed illusory as there was relaxation on foreign firms under the FERA.²¹ On this point both the CPI and CPI (M) demanded for curbing the jurisdiction of the MNCs out and out as it was an economic exploitation for the developing countries including India. Ranen Sen speaking in the Lok Sabha vehemently criticized the operation of the multinationals and considered that to accept them for the development of industry and technological know-how, were absolutely fake, unrealistic and incorrect.²²

Both the Communist Parties had been able to join hands with the Indian government on the issues relating to peace and

20a. People's Democracy, March 19, 1972, p.10.

21. Mukherjee, Hiren, Lok Sabha Debates, Sixteenth Session, Fifth Series, Vol. LX(30), April 30, 1975, Cols. 315-23.

22. Sen, Ranen, Lok Sabha Debates, Sixteenth Session, Fifth Series, Vol. LX(25), April 15, 1976, Cols. 252-254.

against imperialism, Zionism and for cooperation with the Socialist countries. They considered the foreign policy of the Indian government progressive which would help the forces of peace and national liberation movement.

Section-III

In 1977 when the Janata Party came to power it followed the concept of genuine non-alignment. Morarji Desai made it clear that his government would firmly adhere to the commitment to the policy of non-alignment. He clarified that India would not have special relation with any country. Stating the policy of genuine non-alignment A.B. Vajpayee said in Lok Sabha²³ that the basic guiding principle of Janata government strictly adhered to mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all non-aligned states. The government was interested to keep off from narrow regional and ideological issues which were essential for restructuring the world economic and political order.

An attempt was made to upheal and strengthen India's attachment to the Commonwealth. Morarji Desai regarded the Commonwealth as a "great institution, which in course of time, will set a pattern for the formation of Commonwealth of nations

23. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.24, No.8, August 1978, pp.293-96.

reflecting a veritable mirror of the world... an institution which can in course of time set the pattern for a commonwealth of the whole world."²⁴ The CPI (M) in its election manifesto openly condemned India's collaboration with the British imperialism. It demanded a consistent policy of anti-imperialist struggle and stated that enhancement of friendship with the Socialist countries might help as the weapons to drive a favourable bargain with capitalism. The party which was attached to the interests of the people did not go in favour of the anti-imperialist policy of the Janata government.²⁵ According to the CPI, Janata government's policy of non-alignment was alignment with all. The anti-imperialist contents of the policy was being replaced by a role of acquiescence in imperialist conspiracies, hatched against peace and national liberation movement. The CPI repudiated the pronouncement of Vajpayee in Havana Summit which constituted a total rejection of the essence of our policy as evolved by Nehru.²⁶ While non-alignment continued, it made India's foreign policy more and more pragmatic and

24. FAR, Vol.XXII (6), June 1977, pp.95-100.

25. Election Manifesto of the CPI (M), 1977, (See also People's Democracy, February 6, 1977), p. 3.

26. Report and Resolution adopted by the National Council of the CPI (New Delhi: CPI Publication, 1978), p.50.

less and less doctrinaire as time passed by.²⁷ This new trend brought India more closer to the Soviet Union. Of course, the relation was friendly and India could uphold the ideals of non-alignment, peace through thick and thin and indirect schemings from the West.

Therefore the CPI in its Eleventh Congress sought to sustain that tempo of activity and vigilance enhanced. In its view, India must not be dejected from its correctly chosen path, rather it should be taken widely, deeply near to the working people. The party asked the government to defend India's principles to last resort as that was the only alternative to protect the mankind from the evil faces of the war-mongers.²⁸

Off and on the Indian bourgeoisie felt that these were related fields chiefly to trade and economic assistance, finance and defence organisations for which the British help was inevitable. It was a moment when India sought to enter to the world scene, but the international response to its foreign policy of non-alignment was uncertain. So international connection was necessary. But it was a sad line of the history of India that Britain was not helpful and it

27. Prasad, Bimal (ed.), India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp.504-05.

28. Documents of the Eleventh Congress of the CPI (Bhatinda: Bhakna Nagar, March 31- April 7, 1978), p.81.

tilted to Pakistan till 1971, when Pakistan left it.²⁹ In spite of playing much mischief by the western industrialist countries, the tilt towards it was continued in Janata time. The tilt swerved the policy of non-alignment which was the cost of our national interest. The critics did not regard Janata's economic policy as a self-reliant one. Without scrapping of concessions made to the foreign monopolies, the critics added, and without changing the disparity in economic relations between the East and the West, self-reliant economy would be in peril.

In most of the conferences India was compelled to discuss things which were dominated by either America itself, or by her followers. The building up of military preparedness, stock-piling of nuclear weapons was increasing by the imperialist war incendiaries in Diego Garcia. The multinationals were continued their evil methods of plundering our economy but the government sat back as passive observer. There were many other subversion and distortion in our foreign policy when the government showed no concern, e.g., imperialist intervention in Ethiopia and in the Horn of Africa. Pakistan having been instigated by the imperialists intervened in Afro-Afghanistan territory. But in spite of its adherence to non-alignment the bourgeois government failed to condemn it. "India's position on the question of recognising Heng Samrin government

29. Prasad, Bimal, op. cit., pp. 331-37.

of Kampuchea was contrary to the policy of non-alignment."³⁰ Hesitating to go along with the anti-imperialist peace forces of the world, the Janata government was taking retrogrative trends and our freedom and national sovereignty was in danger.

Having succeeded in breaking the unity of the Arab world the Americans were penetrating to our internal affairs. To avoid the danger of war, to play an effective role in the comity of nations, to setermonize our policy of non-alignment it was essential to continue the non-alignment policy with even greater vigour. Therefore the CPI, put forward some suggestion to the government. It appealed for, "firm and consistent support to the cause of peace, to fight against apartheid. There should not be more entry of the multinationals and side by side effective measures must be imposed to curb the operation of the multinational concerns and also a drastic curb on remittances abroad by foreign private business concerns."³¹ On the contrary, the bourgeois government made after the imperialists by its unilateral declaration of surrendering the use of nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes. The government did it at a time when "the western capitalist countries attempted to enmesh India in an anti-India derogatory agreement on nuclear progress,"³²

30. New Age, January 10, 1979, p.1.

31. The Election Manifesto of the CPI, 1979, pp.11-14.

32. The Election Manifesto of the CPI (M), 1979, p.26.

whereupon the CPI(M) remarked that the policies pursued by the then government had "compromised national honour and showed the tilt of genuine non-alignment."³³

We may conclude with this point that India should quit the world forums dominated by the western bloc and energy must be utilised to develop new relations with the neighbours and Afro-Asian countries. The Indian government should scrap all pacts and agreements with the imperialist powers without going a step further in converting into a dependent territory under the grab of Anglo-American bloc.

Section-IV

The world bi-polarity does not correspond to the economic development and the developing nations go on depending on the world industrialist countries. It is totally impossible to keep abreast of the changing world, because of the ugly noses of the poverty and sufferings. Whereof the continuing struggle of the third world countries to overcome all kinds of pressures: economic and political, is yet to be seen.

When Indira Gandhi, after a lapse of nearly three years, returned to power in 1980 found the private sector organisations inclined towards foreign monopolies. But she did not make any serious move to discourage the private foreign

33. Ibid.

investments. This tendency of the ruling bourgeoisie increased the confidence of the elites to look to the west for industrialising India's rural economy and spared no time to get aligned with the MNCs causing economic ruin to India. With a high hand the leading nations of the East refused to make any economic concessions to India. Indira Gandhi spoke urgently on India's need in the international economic interdependence. She remarked, "It is our experience that the interest of the developed and developing countries are so intertwined that we can all survive in harmony only in conditions of true interdependence."³⁴ This stand of the government encouraged the multinationals to run at Indian economy.

The CPI condemned the activities of the multinationals both in public and private sectors. The MNCs, the party remarked, were able to carry the assets illegally and dwindlered the national exchequer by charging high prices. The CPI leader, Bhupesh Gupta said, "If we go to them with a begging bowl, to transfer technology... we cannot have an independent policy."³⁵

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34. Indira Gandhi, Speech at Cancun, in India's Views on the New International Economic Order (New Delhi: Government of India, 1982), p.59f.
35. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. CXVI (18), December 11, 1980, Col. 263.

Without rhyme and reason the Indian bourgeoisie ran after the western capitalist countries to get financial assistance. Thus India could have projected her image in the world forums without being aligned to any power.

The most important ideology which the imperialist countries were spreading in India and other non-aligned countries encouraged peasantism against industry. The imperialists were pressurising to follow the path of market economy as opposed to the path of economic planning.³⁶

It was a time when the whole international system got worsened and conflict acute. The USA continued its interference by inducting arms to her subsidiaries and in the name of maintaining regional balance it created acrimonious and internecine conflicts. The Reagan administration actively engaged in arming the Afghan guerillas. This aggressive design, the enemy of genuine freedom, posed threat to the NAM. Condemning the activities of the U.S. imperialism, Indira Gandhi remarked, "...where there is hostility, India's policy is to make every effort to minimise it. It is also our endeavour to find common areas, however small, between us and other nations, and to enlarge them our obligation is to... collectively resist moves to divide us."³⁷

36. Bhambhri, C.P., The Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi: Sterling, 1987), pp.32-33.

37. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.29, No.2, February, 1981, pp.53-65.

She protested against the interference by the great powers in the affairs of small nations. To overcome the threat she urged greater economic cooperation among the sufferers. She warned, "the solution of the two dominating issues of our day, disarmament and development are not to be found alone or overnight."³⁸ The member states of the NAM were against any interference in the internal affairs, directly or indirectly, which indeed, was a sledge-hammer blow to imperialism. The Sombre Prospects of destruction in chemical and biological warfare engineered by the USA alarmed the peace-lovers of the world. At that time Indira Gandhi government appealed for reduction in expenditure on conventional and nuclear armaments and closer effort to eradicate poverty. The government of India endeavoured to convince her immediate neighbours not to use technological capacity to any hegemonistic purpose, neither it allowed India to be anybody's camp-follower.

The CPI (M) highly spoke of the stands taken by the Indian government. It reiterated, "The government has rightly pointed out and gives a call to resist media exploitation by the imperialist countries against NAM."³⁹ But the

38. Indira Gandhi's address to Seventh Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-aligned Countries (New Delhi, March 1983). Final Documents, Annexe 2. Vide Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, (New Delhi: Sage, 1984), p. 374.

39. People's Democracy, January 31, 1984, p. 3.

party could not look in the same eyes for a long time. No doubt the CPI(M) gave credit to the role "NAM was playing in arresting the progress towards war, defending world peace and keeping the third world countries out of the clutches of imperialism,"⁴⁰ but it condemned the role of the Indian government for its "policy of play between the two camps without any consistent policy of non-alignment."⁴¹

The important question is whether receiving military aid from the big powers was in violation of non-alignment? The observers remark that by pursuing non-alignment, we should not be military barren, nor should we be military acquisitive. Consistent with its policy of non-alignment the Indira Gandhi government had no military treaties. India had not stationed any troops within the territory of other countries for aggressive design.

Section-V

The gloomy, dreary picture of the NAM puts it on the brink of collapse due to the moves of the pro-capitalist countries to disrupt the movement. The two superpowers are making their ways in producing arms and subjugating

40. Political Resolution adopted by the Twelfth Congress of the CPI(M), (Calcutta, December 25-30, 1985), p.18.

41. Ibid.

small nations. To protect the globe from girdling with military bases the non-aligned nations should be non-aligned both in letter and spirit. Unless they are able to focus it to a particular angle of treatment to a particular power, unless the movement becomes energetic, forceful, resonant and real, we cannot tackle the western capitalist countries roaming and creating disturbance around us.

The Non-alignment movement is a 'complementary movement' of the communist movement against imperialism, which as a world system, should be fought in a worldwide perspective. That is why, the communist parties consider themselves as a part of the world communist movement, and pursue their policies in favour of non-alignment. Though the NAM is being laid the national bourgeoisie of this country, however, it completes a task to weaken the western capitalist forces. It is a matter of fact that the newly liberated country like India is having a national bourgeois government and its main character within the country is pointed against the communist parties and their movement. However, to reduce the foreign market in its own country, it opposes the foreign capital. But the communist parties are of the view that the bourgeoisie of this country take a vacillating position time to time when the policy of non-alignment has been hampered in a historical process. To come out from this crisis it has called off multinationals and collaboration with foreign capital, but to defend the main content of the non-alignment.

CHAPTER III
INDIA-U.S.A. RELATIONS

After remaining hundreds of years under British imperialism, India got her independence in 1947, when the people of the world were trembling of the nuclear disaster. India, in the initial years, being a champion of non-alignment, sought to maintain cordiality with both the ideologically conflicting powers. Even if the tendency of polarization was vibrating in the world politics, the third country factor emerged, India abided to maintain friendly relations with the U.S.A. which was playing a conspicuous role in influencing international politics.

It is often argued that because India was pro-Soviet, the Indo-American relations found problems to develop. But this argument had no validity with it. It is true that India tilted towards Moscow, but it was certainly friendly and India's relation with the USSR had not simulated the India-US relations. It would be proper to state that if there was something that caused consternation and anger in the USA or in India was due to the differences over the supply of nuclear fuel for the Tarapore plant or arms supply to Pakistan, mainly.

Thus, the relation between the two great democracies of the world, India and the USA, was marked by ups and downs, zigs and zags. India's adherence to anti-racialism, anti-colonialism and importantly to anti-imperialism resulted in dissension between India and the western bloc. The opinions

of India and the United States might differ on particular aspects, but India seemed to have served by the United States of America. In spite of India's keen interest to have good relations with the western capitalist countries, the critics argued that the USA had undermined India's interest. However, they emphasize that, though there were dissensions and frictions, we cannot set aside the existence of conflux in the relations between the two countries.

The CPI held the view that the aggressive imperialist camp headed by the USA was detrimental to the interest of the peace-loving humanity. In every country where the ruling classes had succumbed to the pressure of Anglo-American imperialism, the cause of national freedom and democracy had suffered a serious set-back.¹

Section-I

After Nehru, in a crucial stage, the then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri found the ineluctability to cultivate the most important plank of India's foreign policy, and lingered on friendly and cordial relations with the USA. In his time the tumultuous situation in Vietnam caused concern to the Indian leaders. Shastri was whole-souled to call all the interested parties to settle it and ultimately leaving the destiny of the

1. Documents of Fourth Congress of the CPI, Palghat, April 19-24, 1956, pp. 3-4.

Vietnamese without foreign interference from any quarter. He was not in favour of military solution of Vietnam problem. According to Shastri it was a question pertaining to the independence or self-government of the people residing there. No foreign power should keep any area of any other country under subjugation. It was entirely the full right of the people to seek self-determination and India had always lent full support to the freedom of colonies.² The CPI lent its support to the Indian government that which was asking the Americans not to spread war in Vietnam. It asked the government to demand in co-operation with the peace forces of the world to close the Vietnam war. The US provocations and aggression, the party said, against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam must be brought to a halt.³ It was well aware of the fact that the aggression against countries would not be over and if imperialism left unwrecked, socialism was a far cry.

The superpowers entanglement in local conflicts and their strategic rivalries in the north-western corner of the Indian Ocean caused worry to the people of India. Entry of the Seventh fleet to the Indian Ocean raised eyebrows among the leaders of the country. In the opinion of the CPI,

2. Speech of Lal Bahadur Shastri in a Press Conference in Ottawa, Canada; Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit., p. 216.

3. New Age, August 9, 1964, p. 17.

it would threaten the security of the region. It was nothing but bringing the Cold War into our sub-continent.⁴ The party warned the working class of India to strongly object and protest against the entry of the Seventh fleet, for it might have carried strategic reasons of turning the Indian Ocean into a Zone of War. The Kashmir problem and arms supply to Pakistan were serious problems before the government of India. At the time of Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, the United States did not retort to call by the Indian leaders to insist Pakistan of not using the supplied weapons against India corresponding to the declaration of U.S. government. On the contrary the U.S. stopped food and economic aid for India. After being equipped with the American arms Pakistan created tension in northern region of India.

The improvement of Sino-Pakistan relations and American pre-occupation in Vietnam affected USA's position during Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. American pre-occupation with the Vietnam war prevented its playing an active role in maintaining balance in South Asia.⁵ Therefore, the CPI (M) in its day-to-day pronouncement warned that the USA far from wanting peace and friendship in that region was only interested in roping India and Pakistan in a front against China to suit its

4. New Age, Jan. 5, 1964, p.1.

5. Srivastava, B.K., "U.S. military assistance to Pakistan: A Reappraisal", India Quarterly, Vol.23(1), Jan.-March, 1976, p.29.

strategy of containing Communism in Asia.⁶ It asked for a consistent foreign policy, anti-imperialist, anti-war and said that by supporting the national liberation struggle and peace, India's genuine interests could be served.⁷

India's external trade was attached to capitalist markets and huge sum of money ejected out of the country by the multi-nationals. The critics viewed the western aid against our national interest whose remedy was possible mainly by routing U.S.A.'s entry into our economic life.

But according to Shastri foreign aid and foreign collaboration were vital for economic development of India. The western countries assisted in public sector projects. The same collaboration, he said, must be made in regard to the private sectors also.⁸ On this issue the CPI (M) seemed to have different view with the government. The central committee of the CPI (M) stated, "Our over-dependence on western aid has made us subservient to the will of the U.S. imperialism."⁹

6. People's Democracy, (editorial), February 27, 1966.

7. Ibid., April 24, 1966, p.7.

8. Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit., p.246.
From answers to questions at a meeting of the Federation of British Industries in London, on December 4, 1964.

9. Central Committee Resolution of the CPI (M), People's Democracy, Feb. 13, 1966, p.7.

The motive of the U.S. aid was nothing but neo-colonialist orientations to make the newly liberated countries subservient to the U.S. capital and to make them directly an instrument of the U.S. foreign policy.¹⁰ According to the CPI, those methods of seeking aid were poisoned weapons of national strife to undermine the young states those were not strong enough.¹¹ Thus the Communist parties^{spoke} of self-reliance. To summon under capitalist market and U.S. money, they said, was captious and totally defective. However, Shastri was not agreed to this concept of self-reliance. According to him, "self-reliance does not mean that we have everything we need... self-reliance means the capacity to make utmost of what we have and the courage to do without what we do not and what we cannot have."¹²

Section-II

The Indira Gandhi period did not show any improvement in the bilateral relations with the USA. It continued at a low ebb for quite sometime. Indira Gandhi openly resisted the iniquitous activities of the U.S. government and condemned

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10. Programme of the CPI (Bombay: CPI Publication, December 1964), p.14.
 11. Sen, Mohit, The New Line and the Dogmatists (New Delhi: CPI Publication, 1965), p.49.
 12. Selected Speeches of Shastri, op. cit., p.246. Broadcast to nation on the eve of National Solidarity Day, Oct. 19, 1965.

the bombing in North Vietnam. She openly criticised the U.S. bombing of Hanoi. Due to this impending decision both India and the USA kept themselves at loggerheads and the prolonged strife was furthered. The critics said that it was because Nixon did not take any specific initiative to ease the rotten relations.

Generally, the developing countries depend on the developed nations, despite their utilisation of manpower and resources and that is the reason why multinationals backed by the industrialised countries exert pressure. In particular, the approach of the U.S. towards the Indian sub-continent was determined by the overall strategy of the western bloc. The U.S. aim behind the export of food to India was to enter with private enterprises and to utilise technical know-how. They were utilising the economic aid to undermine independence to degrade political life.

It is true that the foreign investments was too small in India compared to Latin America and Africa. According to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India allowed foreign investments for the transfer of modern technology and managerial and technical skills. It was an attempt to become early beneficiaries of India's development. In her words, "The US has given us valuable assistance in our struggle against poverty, hunger, ignorance. We are grateful to this act of

friendship. But we also know that our own great society must and can rest only on the quality and the extent of our own effort."¹³ U.S. loans and credits to both the government and private agencies, had stupendously grown and the government dependence on U.S. aid for food under PL-480, for maintenance of imports, for capital requirements and for defence needs had grown in an alarming way.¹⁴ The CPI (M) referred that the invitation of more foreign capital was an economic slavery, an attack on our independent economic development. Unless these policies of Congress government were totally defeated, the party observed, the country might have dominated by the USA.¹⁵

The Americans had been supplying arms to Pakistan in spite of their assurance of discontinuation of arms supply. The CPI thought it a policy of U.S. expansionists to perpetuate disputes with our neighbouring countries. For our defence and independence we should cease to depend more and more.¹⁶ The USA "confronting with economic crises, could not solve,

13. Gandhi, Indira, The Years of Challenge, op. cit., p.461. Speech at dinner given by President Johnson, Washington, March 28, 1966.

14. Central Committee Resolution of the CPI (M), Madurai, Aug.8-Aug.27, 1967, p.15.

15. Polit Bureau Statement, "Ideological debate summed up" (New Delhi: CPI (M) Publication, 1968), pp.131-32.

16. Resolution adopted by the National Council of the CPI, Post-Election situation and our tasks, Calcutta, April 23-30, 1967, p.24.

engaged in arms expansion and war preparations."¹⁷ During the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the USA supplied arms to Pakistan. The CPI was critical of the US imperialists for supporting Pakistan. The party took it as an indication of the US approval of the genocide in Bangladesh and its desire to instigate Pakistan against India. In this connection, Jyotirmoy Basu criticized the government of India for its failure to understand the US position. Particularly he condemned the Indian foreign minister and the external affairs ministry. He said that the United States was indulging in double and multidealings.¹⁸

The most serious problem between India and America was due to their discerning gap created by their indispensable interests in the sub-continent to dominate the small countries. Bangladesh left a deep scar on their relationship. The Congress party condemned the support given to Pakistan. At a press conference on December 31, 1971, Indira Gandhi referring to American help to Pakistan stated that, "each country looks from the point of view of its own interest. Some countries also have a picture of what they consider their global interests and India, likewise, looks at things from its own interest and tries to harmonise national interest with national ideals"¹⁹

17. Polit Bureau Statement of the CPI (M) on the Ninth Congress of the CPC, 1969, p.51.

18. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.4 (26), June 28, 1971, Col.130.

19. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, "The Years of endeavour", op. cit., p.164.

and that was the reason why America gave military help to Pakistan. That was how America did everything possible to intensify the struggle and probably for an armed conflict between India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the USA started undeclared war against India.²⁰ The CPI (M) welcomed India's rejection of US proposal to send observers to the border of Bangladesh.²¹ The government of India had no dare to speak its American counterpart and they continued their policies endangering the peace and security of our country. Viewing the situation, Bhupesh Gupta told in the Rajya Sabha, "...We should consider this action as being aimed against India, against our security, our independence, our people and therefore, we consider this whole action to be hostile to our country."²² He demanded the change of policy towards the Americans corresponding to the situation and policy they were adopting.

The American intelligence activities in India dates back to the years of the Second World War. But after that the CIA spread its networks far and wide, interfered in our internal affairs. Besides intelligence sphere it was operating in educational institutions (e.g. Ford Foundation in

20. Chopra, V.D., Pentagon Shadow over India (New Delhi: Patriot, 1985), p.129.

21. People's Democracy, August 1, 1971, p.12.

22. Gupta, Bhupesh, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol.76 (24), June 24, 1971, Cols. 32-33.

Delhi University) to further their nefarious aims. The CPI sought to show how the US foundations twiddled in India's education to distort its aims and purposes. The ninth Congress of the CPI noted with concern the dangerous and disruptive activities of certain relief agencies financed by the CIA in the evacuee camps. It called upon the government of India to take steps in order to stop such activities.²³

The nuclear arms laden naval ships which were roving in the Indian Ocean created dissension among the Indians. It was a strategem to spread its tentacles to all spheres of social and political life of the Indian sub-continent. It seemed to be significantly timed to brow beat the countries adjacent to the Indian Ocean. According to President Kissinger America's military base in the Indian Ocean region was involved with the national interests of the USA. In the absence of any bold step, both the Communist parties of India were dissatisfied with the pious expression of the Indian government in making the Indian Ocean region a Zone of Peace. Indrajit Gupta, the CPI leader desiring some good decisions by the government, suggested, "...the government should continue its efforts to mobilise international opinions, take all possible measures to achieve our objective of creating the Indian Ocean as an area of peace and tranquility. These

23. The Ninth Congress of the CPI, Cochin, December 3-10, 1971 (New Delhi: CPI Publication), p.39.

imperialist powers... are trying now again in a different way to come and foothold in various parts of the Indian Ocean region."²⁴ If millions of lives were to be protected from war, the main aim of our foreign policy had to put ban on installing atomic and military weapons in the Indian sub-continent. But the narrow class interests of the ruling elites sacrificed national interests and adopted opportunist policies.

Thus the CPI urged for immediate action by the Indian government for it was to reverse the prices of detente. It was a renewed attempt to put pressure on India which refused to support the U.S. government in its global policy of aggression and war.²⁵ The worst faces of the imperialists, utilising neo-fascist methods had intended to destroy the security of the Asians. At this moment India had to play a responsible role to save India's sovereignty and independence, to create an atmosphere conducive to detente and social progress. The policies pursued by the government did not bring any positive result for India. Therefore, the Communist Parties called to be vigilant against the US imperialism.

24. Gupta, Indrajit, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.45 (3), November 15, 1974, Cols.408-14.

25. Report and Resolution of the National Council of the CPI, March 23 - March 26, 1974, No.4 (New Delhi: CPI Publication, April 1974), p.27.

The USA was helping to circulate an anti-India pamphlet of Pakistani origin 'Mazlumon Ki Pukar'. It was an instance to show that the U.S. had taken itself the task of indulging in anti-Indian activities and not allowing the situation in the sub-continent to become normal and stable.²⁶ In spite of India's periodic Proclamation to continue Friendship with all; infiltration and subversion continued in the border of Kashmir. Considering the situation inimical to India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said, "There is a special situation in Jammu and Kashmir not only because of its own constitution... it has been the main battle-field during repeated aggressions against us.... A problem that has been with us for a generation should be solved when we have the ability and opportunity to do so."²⁷ Due to the capitalist path of the Congress government, the monopolists and big bourgeoisie of India grew immensely in strength. The Indian bourgeoisie was keen on developing economic ties with the western industrialised countries. Cooperative arrangements existed between the Indians and the US companies in both public and private enterprises. In all these co-operation the USA was interested to drain our resources.

26. New Age, May 13, 1973, p.2.

27. Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi (1972-1977), (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Publication Division, October, 1984), p.160. Speech on Art.370 in the Lok Sabha on March 4, 1975.

It was necessary to discourage foreign capitalist investment for independent economic development. And if not, the Communist leaders stated, then it would sharpen the class contradiction in the Indian society. The CPI remarked the incoming of multinationals in the name of export promotion or to develop technical skills was an act of anti-planning.²⁸ The American monopoly companies were exerting more pressure to hold on to their advantages, e.g., HAL had a collaboration agreement with the American Home Products Limited for the manufacture of ampicillin.²⁹ The CPI leader Bhupesh Gupta spoke, "I would like the government to take economic measures against America and stop all these things, the multinationals and others."³⁰ To the CPI(M), in the past the foreign aid had whetted the appetite for more external loans and self-sufficiency on this road was not possible. In jute industry American manufacturing companies made their way to come into the Indian economy. The American investors were pressurising the Indian government to control the industrial set-up built by them. The Douglas Aircraft Company of the USA managed to influence the officers of Indian Airlines in purchasing aircraft from America. Moreover, oil companies of the USA

28. New Age, December 22, 1974, p.3.

29. People's Democracy, November 23, 1975, p.2.

30. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol.XCI (1), March 10, 1975, Col.27.

could be able to influence their Indian counterparts on India's dependence on American sources for supply of crude oil. Had all these things available in plenty in the world market, India would not have entered into rising market in the business world.

Section-III

A careful examination of India-USA relation in the Janata period, reveals that it was a period of cordiality setting aside very few political conflicts. The tepidity of bilateral relation was reflected in a series of visits by the heads and the representatives of both the States, namely President Carter's visit to India in January 1978 and Desai's return visit in June 1978. India witnessed a new hand of friendship by the USA. The then foreign minister Shri A.B. Vajpayee said, "There is no reason why on the basis of dignity and equality we cannot clasp the hands of friendship - such friendship does not have to be commented by a shared sense of adversity and animosity."³¹ The CPI visualised no common values with America and any attempt to share values with it would hamper our national interest and our international pursuits.³² The economic policy of the Janata Party, far

31. Vajpayee, A.B., Speeches delivered to welcome Warren Christopher, The US Deputy Secretary of States on his visit to India in July 1977; Indian Foreign Review, Vol.14, No.20, August 1, 1977, p.8.

32. New Age, June 25, 1978, p.6.

from promoting country's national interests, were only aggravating the crises, weakening the cause of economic independence and national self-reliance. The multinationals found several ways to circumvent the FERA taking advantage of the Janata Party's ideological affinity with the USA. The CPI demanded a drastic change in FERA.³³ In spite of the expulsion of the IBM and Coca-Cola in 1978, the medium size concerns were taking interests to invest in India. The invitation of U.S. based multinationals and senior corporate executive to promote trade and investment by Desai was not a good decision for national interest, said the CPI. In New Age, the CPI leader Bhupesh Gupta criticising the Indian government wrote, "Is India to be made a base for the US neo-colonial economic operations with some silver pieces thrown to the Judases of Indian big business?"³⁴ The government was anxious about the developments in the Indian Ocean region. Notwithstanding the declaration of India of an equal partnership to cooperate in international issues the inclusion of naval ships in the Indian Ocean was perpetuated. The Indians were ready to settle the disputes peacefully and showed eagerness for an early solution. Morarji Desai asked President Carter to keep the Indian Ocean free from power rivalries, to

33. Documents of the Eleventh Congress of the CPI; Bhakra Nagar, Bhatinda, March 31-April 7, 1978, pp.25-27.

34. New Age, June 25, 1978, p.6.

eliminate all the bases for lasting peace and security. The government asked for ejecting the Russian bases also.

Since there was naval intimidation in the Indian Ocean, the CPI as well as the CPI (M) asked the U.S. government to refrain from doing so. The CPI demanded for "effective steps, diplomatic, political and otherwise to halt arms race and for disarmament... bold actions against the aggressive moves of the western imperialists in Diego Garcia and for making it a Zone of Peace."³⁵ The Janata government was keenly interested to maintain friendly relations with all the nations of the world and was opposed to nuclear explosions nor the supply of arms to the puppet regime of the arms possessing countries. That is why the Janata leaders called for unilateral declaration to resort nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes. This announcement, however, "caused to weaken India and American pressure on India mounted. The US imperialists did not hesitate to exploit India's need, compelling it to sign the NPT."³⁶

Relating to the US resupply of arms to Pakistan there was vehement criticism from all quarters. The Communist Parties viewed the arms manufacture as an unnecessary expenditure at a time when the developing countries were seeking for a NIEO. So the yawning gap between North and

35. Election Manifesto of the CPI, 1979, p.14.

36. People's Democracy, June 18, 1978, p.10.

South was not receding. But the Janata Party leaders "did not see any bar in the Indo-American relation even if U.S. supplied arms to Zia regime."³⁷ However, President Carter assured to reduce arms supply to all the troubled States of the world. Anyway, the CPI marked it in a different angle. It said that if Pakistan got military help from the West, India for its security was bound to spend more in its defence which was not good for the economic development of the Indian peoples. The party leader Bhupesh Gupta stressed it in these words, "When we need money for development, America is creating problems in our border for which we are spending money to strengthen our military purposes, non-productive ways, keeping us weak in economic development."³⁸ The critics took the foreign policy of the Janata government pro-American in most of the cases. Whatever it might be, Shri A.B. Vajpayee denied any pro-American tilt in India's foreign policy and he disagreed of any India-USA cooperation on the international issues.³⁹

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37. Vajpayee, A.B., Statement in the Rajya Sabha on April 4, 1977, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol.C(5), April 4, 1977, Cols.10-15.
38. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol.CVI(23), August 17, 1978, Col.259.
39. Statement of A.B. Vajpayee, in an interview with Kewal Verma, Sunday, March 18, 1979, p.19.

Section-IV

India was prepared to extend friendship with all peace-loving nations. Even with the USA she stretched her hands to cooperate in all international as well as bilateral issues. In fact, it did not get equal treatment from America. Whenever India sought external assistance in concessional terms to maintain the pace of development the US did not stickle on India's cherished aims. It pursued a policy of economic blackmail through the IMF and the World Bank and bent on destabilising India. Certain sources had been making efforts to disrupt India's set-up and created confusion. Those factors, internal and external, not only threatened over security but also posed grave challenges to the nation's future. For the first time after Bangladesh war, India was encircled by big powers. It was because, firstly, American military aid to Pakistan and its involvement in the West Asian crisis, particularly in Afghanistan. Secondly, every governmental failure, an act of non-performance and even natural occurrences were ascribed to the designs of the trouble-makers to destabilise the country. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on June 12, 1980, the external affairs minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao said, "Our position regarding Afghanistan is well known. We do not approve the presence of foreign troops or bases in another country."⁴⁰

40. Foreign Affairs Record, "India's Stand on Afghanistan and Kampuchea", Vol.XXVI, No.6, June 1980, p.128.

The Communist Parties asked for India's voice against the U.S. aggressiveness in Afghanistan. According to the CPI(M), India being a champion of NAM should not favour intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Thus the party opposed the U.S. support to Afghan rebels and ultimately appealed to the Indian government to raise the issue in the UN meetings. The Reagan administration resumed arms supply to Pakistan hedged in with unacceptable conditions. Thereby, the security of the Asians became more serious. After the overthrow of Shah of Iran it lost its grip there and turned to Pakistan by bringing the warheads nearer to India and created instability and tension in the region. The USA reserved her right to supply arms to Pakistan with the assurance that it would not affect India's security. The CPI(M), took serious notes on the supply of supersonic class destroyer. According to it, "the friendliness, possibly normal relations with our neighbours must be restored without panick, soberly we must try to get it."⁴¹ India and the USA were at loggerhead because both of them were competing to establish their hegemony in South Asia while the Indian policy-makers viewed their goals in South Asia as legitimate, US penetration was considered as an act of hostility. That was an area of contradiction in the foreign policy goals of the US and India.⁴² For India, the most

41. Political Resolution of the CPI(M), Documents of the Eleventh Congress of the CPI(M) held in Vijaywada, from 26 to 31, 1982, pp.26-27.

42. Bhabhri, C.P., "USA and India: Conflict and Convergence", Mainstream, July 17, 1982, p.10.

disturbing factor was the concerted effort of the US-Pakistan administration to build a strategic consensus with obvious implications to the security environment of the sub-continent. The induction of sophisticated arms again promoted deep-seated mistrust and vitiated the process of normalisation of bilateral relations.⁴³ Those aggressive activities of the U.S. administration which corroded the peace in the international arena needed a vital step to prop up the struggle for peace and against the nuclear war.

To counter the threat posed by Pakistan, India sought military help from the USA. Indira Gandhi stated that India was not seeking military aid from the USA, rather it adopted methods to be self-reliant.⁴⁴ India's weakness lied in its many unresolved domestic and international problems. Apart from endemic poverty, there was a noticeable growth of separatist movements to the extent that there was a real possibility of Balkanisation of India.⁴⁵ The US government treacherously broke the agreement on Tarapore for resupplying of fuel and used all its pressures to compel India to give

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43. Khan, R., "Fall Out in India: US-Pak-China axis", World Focus, Vol.4(20), August 1983, p.34.
44. Indira Gandhi's speech to National Press Club on her 9 days visit from July 28 to August 3, 1982. Asian Recorder, Vol.XXVIII, No.35, Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 1982, pp.16760-61.
45. People's Democracy, July 3, 1983, p.1.

up her freedom in regard to nuclear development.⁴⁶ In spite of that, the government was trying to have a compromise with the western capitalists and thereby its image went down among the people of the third world countries who were looking for India's uncommitted and strong stand against imperialism, against exploitation of economy of the underdeveloped world.⁴⁷ The CPI leader Indradeep Sinha speaking to Parliament told that the US was planning a global confrontation with all forces standing for freedom, democracy and progress. It was trying to hoodwink the people by saying that limited war would remain confine to a particular region, but it would engulf the whole world. In such a situation he demanded for consistent policy of the Indian government in its application of the policy of non-alignment.⁴⁸

No doubt, there were conflicts between India and America. But India was benefitted by the American help also. She got the IMF loan, technological help for food processing, agriculture etc. It received food supply in a bad time. Import of raw materials and to enhance transport facilities came mainly

46. Polit Bureau Statement, People's Democracy, July 3, 1983.

47. Chakraborty, Satyasadhan, Lok Sabha Debates, Seventh Series, Thirteenth Session, Vol. XLII(10), December 6, 1983, Cols. 389-97.

48. Sinha, Indradeep, Lok Sabha Debates, Thirteenth Session, Seventh Series, Vol. CXXVIII(71), December 7, 1983, Cols. 348-53.

from the western countries. Thus the USA-India relationship was a mixture of strife and harmony.

Section-V

The capitalist path of development brought more and more sufferings for the toiling masses of our country. The movements made by the CPI activated the forces for peace and against arms race. The party leaders supported the post-war anti-imperialist upsurge, to put an end to capitalism, to constitute a happy socialist state.

The CPI(M) looked at the foreign policy of the bourgeois-landlord government in suspicion. It denounced strongly the dual character of the policy, cooperation with and opposition to imperialism.⁴⁹

The United States was the single traditional partner in spite of perceptual hiatus that raised its head, arm-twisting and pressure it created. It is well known that anti-Americanism and Pique against American investment the Indo-American trade grew up. So there was no significant departure from their past relationship. India's development in agriculture and industry owes a great deal to the USA. That was the reason for increasing cooperation. It is true

49. Ranadive, B.T., Two Programmes (New Delhi: The CPI(M) Publications, 1970), p.80.

that each and every country should try to be independent to increase its bargaining position, however, if they select to resolve the misunderstandings and disputes by negotiations, certainly it would pave the way for greater and smoother USA-India relations.

CHAPTER IV
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

There was antagonism between England and Russia before the Great October Socialist Revolution. Even though, the Czarist regime was gone, the strife continued for a long time. It was largely perceived that, as we were mildly nourished by England, there was latent hostility between India and the Soviet Union. While critically reviewing the present relations one could hardly agree with this perception. It would be better to say that as we had revoked the British imperialism, the friendship and cooperation started growing and the Soviet Union regarded India as her friend. India's anti-imperialist struggle inevitably strengthened the bond of relations, though many patriots were far from being Communists.

The emergence of the Soviet Russia in early of this century gave impetus to the Socialist countries to be committed to peace. The western imperialists were also getting tightened and the world peace, freedom and socialism were at stake. The emergence of powerful Soviet Union after overthrowing the capitalists and the role it played in the anti-Nazi war had consistently been inspiring the Progressive People's struggle all over the world.

Interdependence seems more valuable than ideology or the pattern of political set up. So both the Soviet Union and India started sharing their ideas and ideals. They came to

one table to extend their warmth hands in economic and political fields. "The imperialists pressurised India and compelled it to get involved in arms race. In reality... the real villain of the piece was United States. India needed a reliable friend to meet the threats from imperialism and the Indo-Soviet friendship based on reliability, reciprocity and mutuality."¹ The Indo-Soviet relations, therefore, symbolised the synthesis of modern world socialism with the developing world which had ruined the hobble of Capitalism.

Section-I

The industrialisation process of developing countries like India depends on the volume and rate of growth of their foreign trade. Modern nations are politically and technologically independent. They rely upon each other for resources and commodities that enable them to develop and sustain viable economy. Some economic systems, if they keep them aloof from the rest of the world, cannot function.

Soon after he came to power, Lal Bahadur Shastri carefully watched the national political and economic situations and took patient and painstaking efforts to resolve the complex issues by negotiation at all hazards. The Soviet Union played

1. Bhambhri, C.P., "Perspective on Soviet Contribution to India" in Vinod Bhatia (ed.), Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Panchsheel, 1984), p.41.

a very substantial role in supporting the liberation struggle in Asia and in assisting the newly independent countries of Asia to develop their backward economy by far. "The CPI highly spoke of Soviet contribution to the struggle against chauvinism and expansion of imperialist designs. The Party, therefore, urged the government to look forward to develop Indo-Soviet relations."² The party leaders of the CPI supported most of the acts of the government of India. It believed that India's desire to strengthen Indo-Soviet friendship would rebuff the imperialists. In its view the government should try to extend Indo-Soviet relations to other spheres also.³

Indo-Soviet relations marked another landmark for Soviet Union's sturdy economic assistance during second and third five years plans. Bhilai, Neyveli, Heavy electricals equipment plant at Hardwar were the outstanding examples of economic cooperation between the two countries. Thus in the opinion of the CPI though there was a change in the leadership of the CPSU, it asked the government to continue its Soviet policy without depending more on imperialist aid, for "the massive import of foreign capital together with

2. Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the CPI, Delhi, September 10-15, 1964, pp.8-12.

3. For the unity of the party and the international Communist movement (Delhi: CPI Publication, August 1964), p.112.

reliance on imperialist aid, would seriously jeopardise our freedom."⁴ The CPI was in support of stronger Indo-Soviet relations, but not at the cost of the relations with other countries. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Hiren Mukherjee said, "at all events the government must carry on the business of developing Indo-Soviet ties without bringing down the pride relations with other nations."⁵

Lal Bahadur Shastri expressed his eagerness over the independence of African countries. But foreign subjugation was not over. Emphasising on anti-colonialism he stated the stand India took at that time. In his words, "India stands against colonialism. We feel that there will be no peace unless all colonies have attained freedom and there is no subjugation in any part of the world."⁶

To offset US hegemony in South Asia the USSR supported India on Kashmir and Goa issues and began to take interests in the economic development of India. In 1961 when the U.S. tried to condemn India as an aggressor and demanded the withdrawal of Indian forces from Goa it was the Soviet Union that

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4. Resolution of the CPI, as adopted at the Seventh Congress, October 31-November 4, 1964, Calcutta, p.9.
 5. Hiren Mukherjee, Lok Sabha Debates, Eleventh Session, 3rd Series, Vol.XL(30), April 1, 1965, Cols.7213-7214.
 6. Lal Bahadur Shastri's address at Friendship University, Moscow, May 14, 1965. Selected Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit., p.268.

vetoed it. "The imperialist plans were checkmated with the support of Soviet Union in the U.N. against the intervention of western powers in liberating Goa."⁷ The machinations of the western capitalist countries were not favourable for the world peace. Highlighting the danger, the world was facing, Shastri observed, "India and Soviet Union both firmly believe in the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence. Peace is essential for the preservation of humanity in this thermo-nuclear age.... We must therefore cooperate among ourselves in the task of strengthening peace and promoting international amity and good-will."⁸ The government's reliance on Anglo-US aid for India's defence was given up. All available assistance from the USSR was unhesitatingly accepted and all necessary steps taken for development. India's independent defence potential and reliance on her own resources in men and materials was exactly to the purpose India stood for.⁹ The Indian bourgeoisie upheld Indian foreign policy of non-alignment. The Soviet Union contemplated India as an ally in the struggle for world peace. It acknowledged India's policy of non-alignment and appreciated that India did not join any power bloc. Soviet speculation was that India could have played a decisive

7. People's Democracy, 7 December, 1980, p.2.

8. Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit., p.270.

9. Resolution adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the CPI, Delhi, July 6-11, 1965, p.5.

role in bringing about normalcy in the dissensions among the states, especially between the East and the West. The USSR acquiesced with the fact that it supported India to further the cause of peace in the subcontinent. The Mutual Test Ban Treaty was clearly designed for this purpose. The Soviet Union took initiative in promoting measures to check the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Indian government was not in favour of any intervention or subversion in the affairs of other countries. It was eager to solve the dispute of the frontiers in a peaceful way. Unfortunately some countries had reinstalled the use of force on our border. India's approach for peaceful settlement was put under the cover of negligence. The Soviet government proposed for an international agreement to denounce the use of force for the settlement of border disputes. Shastri was a peace lover of the first water. In opposition to violence in the matter of border dispute, he told, "The use of force in international relations can be justified only as a necessity for repelling aggression. Our mutual assurance to reject the use of force means, therefore, that each of us has agreed to respect the territorial integrity of the other."¹⁰

Tashkent was an embodiment of Indo-Soviet friendship whose purpose was to promote peace. It exemplified the

10. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XII(1), (New Delhi: Government of India, January, 1966), pp. 7-9.

beginning of Indo-Soviet friendship. The Soviet Union had played an invaluable role by mediating in the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes. The Soviet Union took the initiative to boost her image in the world as a supporter to world peace and detente. India accepted it because it avoided third party involvement in deciding their future disputes. "The way Russia invited India and Pakistan to the negotiation table in 1966 testified her determination of solving the international problems by means of peace."¹¹ Therefore, the Shastri era signified the government's effort to keep off from imperialist manoeuvres with a view to propagate peace; it was cheered by the people with one voice.

Section-II

The emergence of Indira Gandhi in the Indian political scene as the Prime Minister after a good tussle for leadership boosted the American hope that she might be inclined towards Washington. But that perception was squarely misplaced. She found Soviet Russia friendly to India not merely for spectacular effects, rather to check the new seats of conflicts in the sub-region. The Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence inspired India to adhere to its proclaimed policies of secularism, socialism and non-alignment. Relations between both

11. People's Democracy, January 16, 1966, pp. 1-2.

countries was consistent, principled and selfless. "The pace and quality of industrialisation in India had been greatly influenced by the generous assistance India received from the Soviet Union in terms of both plant and equipment and of technical assistance."¹²

In 1966, the USSR signed a barter agreement with Pakistan which for quite sometime created deep sense of frustration among the Indians. Moreover, Pakistan sought the supply of military hardware and requested to reduce military assistance to India. Though Soviet Union did not want to woo Pakistan against India, but to wean Pakistan away from the USA, yet the visit of Kosygin created favourable atmosphere for Pakistan. In his visit he assured the supply of arms to Pakistan. This led Indira Gandhi to face criticism both inside and outside the country. "She was criticized because of her failure to take a constructive attitude to the proposals made by her friends, including Soviet Union, for a summit meeting with Pakistan."¹³ In the same year Indira Gandhi visited Moscow and a joint settlement came out of it where the people of India witnessed the strong base of peace and anti-colonialism. The nuclear arms production by the western capitalists and acquisition of military weapons by their allies caused concern to

12. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, (Address on T.V. in Moscow on July 15, 1966), "The Years of Challenge, op. cit., p.477.

13. People's Democracy, July 31, 1966, p.7.

the CPI. It became suspicious of Pakistan's stockpiling of dangerous nuclear war-heads. "The serious economic and political situation," the Party said, "in India and Pakistan revealed that all efforts should be directed towards constructive ends. Tashkent declaration should be made their basic way in their bilateral relations."¹⁴ Explaining in the Lok Sabha Indira Gandhi reiterated the familiar Indian position that Pakistan had no reasonable justification to increase arms strength.¹⁵ However, by no means the Indians were suspicious of the Soviet policies. Indo-Soviet friendship found no barrier to take each other. On the eve of twenty years of Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations, the CPI said, "Soviet Union's cooperation to help us came at a time when the western countries refused to supply us with plant, machinery. That brought extreme help to Indo-Soviet cooperation."¹⁶ Now and then, of course, India and the Soviet Union found divergencies. It was because the rigid stand the bourgeois Congress government withheld and sometimes Soviet Union's cold steps to ease Indo-Pakistan tensions.

Now that Indo-Soviet friendship found itself all of the milk and water kind, because India was in economic crisis due

14. New Age, January 22, 1967, p. 3.

15. Speeches of Indira Gandhi, op. cit., p. 480.

16. New Age, April 16, 1967, p. 11.

to severe drought, the western industrialist countries picked up the odds and ends that were scattered. "Due to devaluation of pound and dollar the capitalist countries of the west were trying to pump out more profits from India to buttress their own economies."¹⁷ On the other hand, the Socialist countries, the Soviet Union in particular, gave assistance of their own accord. That help favoured India to reduce her economic dependence on the West. In India, "the Soviet Union first contributed to the establishment of bases of heavy industry, engineering, oil etc. When further development of these vast industrial enterprises had been hampered by recession, leading to their closures and unemployment of workers, the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries proposed to buy their products and provided a stable market growing for them. Thereby they helped our country to resist imperialist blackmail and took to the path of independent economic development."¹⁸

No doubt, India got the benefit out of the Soviet assistance during the Indira Gandhi era. But the question arose how far the lots of the people of the country improved? The CPI (M) in its party weekly observed that the economic policy of the government had anti-popular, pro-monopolists, and pro-imperialist traits of the bourgeois-landlord government.

17. Political Resolution adopted by the Eighth Congress of the CPI, Patna, February 7-15, 1968, p.4.

18. Ibid., p.6.

Every step taken by the government was an impetus to the capitalists. It was an attempt to improve their position at the expense of the people in the name of buoying up the economy.¹⁹ But there was no similarity between the aid India received from the USA and the USSR. The CPI editorialized, while the US aid was fomenting the rivalry between India and Pakistan, the USSR, on the other hand, all the time was interested to promote friendship. It was against those powers who were creating discord and hostility.²⁰ To add fuel to fire the USA was giving massive military assistance to Pakistan.

Soviet Union's arms supply to Pakistan was a challenging task for India to counterbalance Pakistan and it was a challenge to peace and tranquility of the sub-continent, whereupon it was genuine for India to seek military help from other countries. Taking part in the debate in the Parliament Bhupesh Gupta battered out at those who were against the Soviet decision. According to him, "If Soviet Union's influence grows, it is not against the national interest of India as Soviet Union has always showed its eagerness in bringing India and Pakistan to peace and amity."²¹

19. People's Democracy, March 10, 1968, p.3.

20. New Age (editorial), July 21, 1968; Also see People's Democracy (editorial), July 14, 1968.

21. Speech of Bhupesh Gupta on July 23, 1968; vide New Age, July 28, 1968, p.8.

The government of India had always stood in the Soviet side barring some rare instances of divergent views on some issues. Dinesh Singh, the foreign minister of India said in the Lok Sabha that the Indian government "supported the Soviet stand for upholding respect for historically formed frontiers and for the non-use of force in settling bilateral questions."²² The Soviet leaders assured India that the Soviet Union valued its friendship highly and warranted not doing anything to the detriment of the friendship. It realised India's need of security and defence and promised to keep these in view while dealing with Southeast Asian regions including Pakistan.²³

Towards the end of the sixties Indo-Soviet trade rapidly expanded and tremendously improved. It was due to India's compulsions the government sought trade relations among the developed countries. The Bhilai Steel Plant proved the fact. There was substantial increase in Indo-Soviet collaboration. The economic cooperation reached new heights. "The most outstanding example of Indo-Soviet collaboration were in the fields of heavy machine building, steel, heavy electricals, oil refining and the manufacture of drugs. The friendship between the Soviet Union and India was a good example of

22. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.XV(4), April, 1969, p.73.

23. New Age, September 19, 1969, p.14.

international cooperation."²⁴ The vast country of five hundred million people was determined not only the destiny of India itself, but important questions of Asia. India had been influencing in the balance of progressive and reactionary forces in the international arena.²⁵ The Indian leaders were deeply conscious of the role Soviet assistance was playing in the Indian economy. Thus the then President V.V. Giri expressed "India's deep appreciation of the invaluable help the Indo-Soviet cooperation was brought to us in our advance towards self-reliant, modern industrial economy... vital role in our planning and more particularly into key branches of the industry... on which the future growth of the economy so largely depended. Conviction was expressed that further strengthening and expansion of close relation existing between India and Soviet Union both for national interest of the people of India and Soviet Union and also for the cause of stronger peace in the entire world."²⁶ In its attempt of increasing good-neighbourliness and bond of cooperation with the adjacent countries, the imperialists stood on the way. At that moment there was considerable growth in USA-Pakistan-China axis,

24. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, "The Years of Challenge", op. cit., p.480.

25. Izvestia (Moscow), 15 November, 1969.

26. Soviet Review, Vol. VII (65), (New Delhi: New Age Printing Press) October 13, 1970), p.30.

posed threat to India's security. On the contrary Kosygin, delegate of the USSR, made it clear that the Soviet Union would give priority to Indo-Soviet relations.

Indira Gandhi got massive mandate in the mid-term election. Soon after she assumed power, India faced imperialist threats made against the security of the sub-continent. Amidst the threat, there was peace, friendship and cooperation of 1971 looked up to their age-old friendship and to lay aside the encroachment of the western industrialist countries. The treaty itself was the logical culmination of the relations they had developed. It came at a time when the proletariats were progressing on a wide-front. The CPI(M) characterised the treaty as a fight against capitalism, imperialism and colonialism. Coming to the Article 9 of the treaty its leader A.K. Gopalan highlighted that the USSR agreed to abstain from giving arms to any other country at war with India. He outspoke the article as "a deterrent to the bellicose of Yahya Khan who was talking of unleashing a war on India."²⁷ It was a step in that direction which helped India in strengthening and consolidating nation's sovereignty.²⁸ The treaty gave India a most powerful leverage against the western

27. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol.57, No.10, August 14, 1971, Col.235.

28. Ghosh, Niren, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol.LXXVII(20), August 14, 1971, Cols.122-27.

imperialist forces.²⁹ The CPI in its 9th Congress had an extensive discussion of the validity of the treaty. It was, in view of the CPI, a powerful deterrent to check the threats of military junta of Pakistan and Maoists of China. The treaty aimed to preserve peace in Asia. It illustrated the indivisible bond between India's national interest and India's unity with the Soviet Union in the common struggle against the U.S. neo-colonialism.³⁰

Eruption of hatredness, conflict and violence between the nations had irked the durable peace and jaundiced the principle of peaceful co-existence enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru. The savage ordeal of a lengthy struggle led to the emergence of free Bangladesh. The imperialist attempts to lay waste Indo-Soviet cooperation was completely kept down. That time Soviet Union equally stood to help our Bangladesh brethren. It consistently helped and supported the forces all over the country fighting for national independence. The Russian government asked all countries to keep away from Bangladesh war and precluded the U.S. Seventh fleet from its entry to the Indian Ocean. At that moment it did not make any effort to balance the two nations - India and Pakistan. Rather inflowing of Russian arms started vigorously to support the

29. New Age, August 29, 1971, p.1.

30. Documents of Ninth Congress of the CPI, Cochin, October 3-10, 1971, p.28.

Bangladesh insurgents. The Soviet support for the liberation of Bangladesh morally boosted to the liberation forces world over. There was Soviet support, direct or indirect, to India in the way of recognizing Bangladesh because India was not fighting for territorial gains. That was the reason why Moscow had sympathetic view for the liberation struggle. Indirectly, both India and the Soviet Union established distinctive relations to counterbalance American help to Pakistan.

The Soviet Union shared the Indian view on the maintenance of peace and the elimination of racialism and colonialism. The Soviet leaders continued Russia's support in the General Assembly of the United Nations when matters concerning our national security and integrity such as Goa, Kashmir and more lately Bangladesh the Soviet assessment of the cases used to coincide largely with our own.³¹ Letting aside their difference on national issues, both the CPI and the CPI (M) on most occasions had no divergent views on international issues. On almost all cases they had convergency while they viewed the Indo-Soviet problems unidentical and the needed solution necessarily different, appealed to the government of India not to copy what was done in Russia.³²

31. Gandhi, Indira, "India and the World", Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, No.1, October 1972, p.73.

32. Sardesai, S.G., "Soviet Family of Nations and India", Soviet Review, vol.9(59), December 19, 1972, pp.38-43.

The Brezhnev visit in 1973 was a major diplomatic move to reaffirm and strengthen their friendship. It opened a new chapter which premonited for strengthening and expanding the relations between the two countries. The visit of L.I. Brezhnev was warmly welcomed by the Indians. The visit was a tour of roses and fragrance. In his address to the Indian Parliament, he brought up the concept of 'Asian Collective Security', to strengthen peace and stability through their collective efforts. The fifteen years agreement on bilateral economic and trade cooperation epitomized the strong Indo-Soviet harmony. "The Indira Gandhi government, too, had taken a number of positive steps in the direction of strengthening economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries."³³ The CPI (M) reiterated its stand and appealed to the government of India to extend Indo-Soviet relations with open eyes without restricting Sino-Indian friendship.³⁴

The Indira-Brezhnev talk made a qualitative advancement in the India-USSR relations. It contributed for the broad development of mutually beneficial cooperation and the strengthening of peace and stability in Asia.³⁵ On his visit

33. Report and Resolution of the National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, March 29 to April 1, 1973 (New Delhi: CPI Publication, April, 1973), No.12, p.3.

34. Namboodiripad, E.M.S., "Friendship - Yes, But with Open eyes", The States, Vol.5, No.2, November 24, 1973, p.30.

35. Resolution of the National Council of the CPI, December 2-5, 1973, No.23, pp.5-7.

scientific and technological cooperation rose to a higher level. The much-needed assistance the USSR gave, in the teeth of all odds, made significant contribution to make India self-reliant. Without going to the USA with a begging bowl, India in virtue of her non-alignment and anti-imperialist tendency, could win Soviet support. The American aid was discouraged because of US attempt to disrupt the relations between the two Socialist countries. The Soviet supply of scarce materials both for agriculture and industrial sectors was definitely a move to keep abreast of the growing Indo-Soviet cooperation.

The massive help the USSR started giving was an economic translation of the political line of Socialism of the Soviet Union which aimed to help the developing India, to sustain the democratic system with the economic aid.³⁶ India found Soviet Union cheerful to assist by giving credit for building a shipyard at Visakhapatnam. No doubt India was not interested to give that basic right to the Soviet Union. But some students of foreign policy witnessed in a different angle to the lively efforts the bourgeoisie were giving to keep up Indo-Soviet friendship in the nick of time.

Indira Gandhi declared emergency in 1975 looking at the grave situation the country was facing. The declaration of

36. Dange, S.A., "Completes A Cycle of Events", Link, Vol.16, No.16, December 9, 1973, p.16.

the emergency elicited sharp criticism in the western industrialist countries. The Soviet Russia understood the issues involved and gave her unstinted support. Towards the close of the extended life of the Lok Sabha she paid a visit to Moscow. There both sides expressed their willing to adhere to detente and to spread it to other parts of the world. The CPSU appraised the contribution of the NAM to world peace and security. Her visit came out as a big success. Among all agreements the most important one was that the USSR came forward ungrudgingly to give copious aid of heavy water to India. It may be recalled that Russia agreed to supply it against the American decision of not supplying Uranium to Tarapore Atomic Plant.

The pitch of friendship would have queered by tendencies propaganda, some motivated persons' alleging the negative Soviet assessment.³⁷ But it was due to the genuine interest of peaceful cooperation and mutual understandings, all the treacherous activities of the imperialists were thrown as ashes. The conspirators made their own way to go into the coffin. Both our people, thus, had common interest in promoting stability and in spite of convergence with disharmony among themselves, it led to build a concrete bond of friendship. To quote Prof. Bhambhri, "Since both India and the

37. Mukherjee, Hiren, The Trusted Treasure (New Delhi: Allied, 1975), p.58.

Soviet Union shared common history of exploitation by the imperialists, it was natural for the Soviet Union as a leading socialist country and India as a newly liberated country to join hands for confrontation against imperialism.³⁸ The importance of Indo-Soviet friendship was emphasized by Brezhnev. He spoke, "The Soviet people appreciated and more were in solidarity with India's peace loving foreign policy of India and the courageous efforts of her progressive forces to solve her difficult socio-economic problems. They wished the people and the government of India complete success in these efforts."³⁹ By those plenty of assistance India's productive capacity increased a lot. The cooperation between the two countries spread its tentacles to our entire economic sphere yielding good results. The Indo-Soviet friendship tremendously improved because, as Prof. Bhambhri puts, "any war preparation was detrimental to our economic development. Similarly Soviet Union's conception that Socialism brings prosperity and capitalism generates crises, made India and Soviet Russia partners in their common global efforts."⁴⁰

38. Bhambhri, C.P., op. cit., pp.46-47.

39. Brezhnev, L.I., Speech made on February 24, 1976; See 25th CPSU Congress: Documents and Resolution (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1976), pp.12-13.

40. Bhambhri, C.P., op. cit., p.46.

Section-III

In spite of the political change in 1977, the foreign policy objectives of the Janata Party primarily remained same. The new government gave priority to the USSR because it realized that both India and the Soviet Union had many common purposes. There were many reasons why both the countries tried to tone up their bilateral relations. Gradually the interrelation concentrated as both of them were panicked at the U.S. miasma in Pakistan. To invigorate their common security interests it was imperative to vivify their association. To flout the military games in the Indian Ocean and to contravene American presence in Pakistan, the USSR made up her mind to constitute links with India.

The U.S. media hoped that Desai would incline to the West. It was observed that after Indira Gandhi's defeat America offered opportunity to develop relations with India.⁴¹ Ever since the change of government in New Delhi there had been all sorts of speculations and inspired reports in big business press aiming at denigrating Indo-Soviet relations and undermining its importance for our country. It had been hinted that Indo-Soviet friendship was no longer viable.⁴² In the teeth of pressure of the certain correlation of forces, the Indian leaders did not give up Indo-Soviet friendship.

41. Washington Post, March 25, 1977, p.12.

42. New Age, April 24, 1977, p.9.

They showed their willingness to expand relation with the Soviets. Thus, "the Indo-Soviet friendship had been outcome of a natural process of evolution of close and friendly relations between the two peoples."⁴³ Perhaps, the critics viewed, due to the enunciation of genuine non-alignment by Desai doubts were verbalized about the viability and enviability of the Indo-Soviet relations. "Even some leftists believed that the fall of Indira Gandhi was a severe setback for Soviet policy."⁴⁴

At that time Gromyko's visit to India did not come at a surprise. Stressing on Indo-Soviet friendship A.B.Vajpayee reiterated to continue the relations. He said, "The friendship between our two countries has been reflected in the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation of 1971. The friendship has stood the test of time. In the changing kaleidoscope of the international situations over the years, this friendship has remained a constant factor for peace and stability in Asia and the world... We both realise that lasting peace will remain elusive or at best transitory, without peaceful co-existence."⁴⁵ The CPI hailed the

43. Ibid.

44. Ali, Tariq, "The fall of Congress in India", New Left Review, No.103, May-June, 1977, p.57.

45. Vajpayee, A.B., New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1979), p.159. (Speech on April 27, 1977).

Gromyko's visit. During his visit both the government chided the outbreak of new conflicts threatening the cause of peace anywhere in the world. They condemned the minority, racist regime in Zimbabwe and the republic of South Africa and the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.⁴⁶ The two countries signed three agreements - (1) a Rs. 225 crore long term credit; (2) For a Rs. 160 crore supplementing trade plan for 1977; and (3) Soviet technical assistance for the Tashkent-Srinagar tropo-sector link to improve telecommunications between the two countries.⁴⁷

In 1977 Morarji Desai paid a visit to the Soviet Union to strengthen the hitherto existing relations. In his speech, Desai emphasized that their relations were "not based on personalities or ideologies but on equality, national interest and common purposes."⁴⁸ In his visit he was given assurance to pay special attention to make Indian Ocean a zone of peace. In their joint declaration both of them urged for the removal of all the foreign military bases that existed in the Indian Ocean and the prevention of the establishment of new areas.⁴⁹

46. New Age, May 1, 1977, p.1.

47. Asian Recorder, Vol.XXIII (22), 28 May-3 June, 1977, p.13757.

48. Morarji Desai's speech; Soviet Review, Vol.XIV, Nos.51-52, November 3, 1977, p.11.

49. Soviet Review, Vol.XIV, Nos.51-52, November 3, 1979, pp.21-22.

The commercial and economic relations that was established in a short span of time during the Janata government was an important element in augmenting their bilateral relationship. On March 2, 1978, looking at the good relations between India and the USSR, A.B. Vajpayee, the then foreign minister of India expressed his views in a plenary session of Indo-Soviet joint commission in the following words - "the government and the people of India acknowledge with thanks the cooperation extended by the Soviet Union to help India achieve progress towards economic self-reliance and emerge among the more important industrial nations of the world."⁵⁰ The Janata Party continued to pursue the same policy. That was no surprise, the CPI (M) said in one of its resolutions, as it represented the same class interests. The Janata government upheld the treaty of 1971 because it was a welcome development.⁵¹ It seemed that the CPI (M) did not like the foreign policy pursued by the Janata government. It went on criticising as the party saw Indo-American alliances which would upset Indo-Soviet relations.

The Soviets were equally anxious to enlarge the area of friendship with India. They were highly critical of the

50. Vajpayee, A.B., op. cit., p.163.

51. Political Resolution as adopted at the Tenth Congress of the CPI (M), Jullunder, April 2-8, 1978, p.32.

increasing imperialist designs. At his luncheon in honour of Vajpayee, Gromyko said that, the schemes of the forces that were hostile to the security of Asia should be rebuffed. It was necessary to unmask and frustrate their aggressive designs.⁵² The CPI, was eager to strengthen the relation. It visualised the relation an indispensable one, for the imperialists far from reconciling itself to the defeats had mounted a new vicious offensive with certain adaptations in tactics and methods.⁵³ It added, "both the countries were concerned at the escalation of military activities in the Indian Ocean area. They called for liquidation of foreign bases there, condemned the build up of foreign military presence under any pretext."⁵⁴

Notwithstanding to the request made by the non-aligned countries and the socialist countries like the USSR, there was no reduction in the stockpiling of arms resulting to the mass destruction, elimination of the innocent peoples of the world. At that juncture moment, the leaders of both the Communist parties could not maintain isolation. They could easily see the danger of an another nuclear war. Up and doing they started movements to check the arms race.

52. Pravda (Moscow), September 13, 1978.

53. New Age (editorial), March 11, 1979.

54. New Age, June 17, 1979, p.3.

The joint efforts of the Soviets and the Indians always supported the freedom struggle of the oppressed people. Their effort was, no doubt, the pioneer in bringing about the new climate in the world. It could be said that the Indo-USSR cooperation played a powerful role for liberating Afro-Asian countries. The CPI highly spoke of the role India and the Soviet Union played. In its party journal the CPI highlighted, "The Soviet Union as well as India correctly reiterated in favour of a comprehensive and just settlement of the West Asian dispute and demanded for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine."⁵⁵ The CPI (M) showed gratitude to the USSR for its created process which decisively changed the world scene in favour of peace, democracy and socialism. Being a Socialist country the USSR helped a number of countries against the powers involved in colonial subjugation.⁵⁶

Section-IV

Indira Gandhi was out of helm for a short time. With her return to power the people of India greeted her victory. The Soviet media hailed the people of India and went on to say that her victory was elated. Soon after she became Prime

55. New Age (editorial), June 24, 1979.

56. People's Democracy, November 4, 1979, p.1.

minister the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan came to her as a bolt from the blue. From all quarters there was severe criticism against Soviet intervention. India's policy of non-alignment was put to severe test. It was Indira's intrepidity that saved India. India supported Soviet Union on the ground that it was justified under Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978. Indira Gandhi was suspicious about the disgraceful behaviour of the USA and recalcitrant neighbours Afghanistan had.

Indira Gandhi saw the Afghanistan development in the light of India's interests as well as she judged it from the interest of the world peace.⁵⁷ She tried to persuade the Soviet leaders to withdraw their troops. But Soviet Union was not satisfied with Indian approach. It wanted India's unequivocal support in justifying Soviet interference.

By the end of January 1980, India toned up against the Soviet interference in Afghanistan. India's foreign minister Narasimha Rao said, "We are deeply concerned and vitally interested in the security, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of this traditionally friendly neighbour of ours."⁵⁸ With this stand of the bourgeoisie the critics

57. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.1(13), January 14, 1980, Cols.156-57.

58. Narasimha Rao to Parliament, January 23, 1980; Times of India (Delhi), January 24, 1980.

feared about Soviet threat to India. However, the CPI (M) did not see any threat to India from the Soviet Union. It held the view that the security of India had to come from the US involvement in Afghanistan because the US was making Pakistan its base under the pretext of helping Afghan freedom fighters. Therefore, it demanded the withdrawal of all troops from Afghan territory.⁵⁹

In 1980 Brezhnev arrived New Delhi to discuss with his Indian counterparts about the then changing problems - both bilateral and international. The most important benefit came out of the visit was that Brezhnev gave his consent in the form of heavy industry defence production, Soviet Migs, Sukhoys missiles. With that visit USSR became the biggest purchaser of India's products like raw materials and manufactured goods. Both of them came to a joint declaration with an eye to increasing imperialist threat to Asia. Referring to the declaration, Bhupesh Gupta spoke to Parliament. He told, "if it is implemented and shared by others will help for preservation of peace, safeguarding detente, for bringing about a halt to the arms race and ensuring international security."⁶⁰ The government of India by that tremendous

59. People's Democracy, February 24, 1980, p.11.

60. Bhupesh Gupta's speech in the Rajya Sabha, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. CXVI, No.18, December 11, 1980, Col.263.

improvement of Indo-Soviet bilateral relations did not turn a deaf ear to other countries. According to the CPI(M), India made a right judgement by extending their friendly gesture to other countries also. It was illogical to exclude friendship with other countries by getting help from the USSR alone. The government was prepared to expand the area of friendship. The CPI(M) hailed the decision of the government and suggested to make an improvement in Sino-Indian relationship.^{60a} Looking into the international situations the CPI deserved Indo-Soviet friendship. Its leader M. Farooqi observed that it was not the monopoly of any one party or person. Such a friendship was in our interest, in the interest of Soviet Union and in the interest of the anti-imperialist struggle on a world scale.⁶¹

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit in 1982, a visit in return to Gromyko's visit, to exchange ideas on the international developments, came out as an immense success. It led to more closer understanding between India and the Soviet Union. The CPI felicitated the discussion and conclusion of the two leaders, their compliance with the principles of peaceful co-existence, strengthening confidence and mutual

60a. Article by M. Basavapurniah, People's Democracy, May 24, 1981, p.3.

61. Farooqi, M., "Indo-Soviet Friendship and the Present day critical international situation", Party Life, Vol.18, No.19, October 7, 1982, p.4.

understandings between them.⁶² As a Prime leader of the movement of non-alignment, India had global responsibilities which must be shared with the Soviet Union.⁶³ In spite of close cooperation there was trade imbalances and to work out the modalities of new measures to balance the trade was an important task. In the nick of time Soviet deputy Prime minister Ivan Arkhipov set off to India to have dialogue connected to bilateral and international problems. The CPI looking into the dialogues they had, remarked that "Arkhipov confirmed together with the Indian side, they had full identity of views, first of all, on matters of peace, detente and others."⁶⁴

Towards the close of the life of the eighth Lok Sabha there was a strong and warm friendship between the peoples of India and the Soviet Union. It was based on common opposition to colonialism, racialism and deep desire to enlarge economic and cultural relations for mutual benefit.

Section-V

The pitch of friendship which had wonderfully stood for a long time would have distorted by the imperialists' moves.

62. New Age (editorial), October 3, 1982.

63. Mukherjee, Hiren, "Sky is limit", Link, Vol. 25, No. 6, September 19, 1982, p. 12.

64. Mukherjee, Sadhan, "Successful Arkhipov Visit", New Age, May 22, 1983, p. 16.

The deep-rooted Indo-Soviet friendship had a profound character. Since India attained her freedom, in spite of a slight break in 1977, all the governments set up strong Indo-Soviet cooperation despite irregular attacks of the anti-national elements. The bond of friendship continued to upgrade the well being of our two peoples. The Indo-Soviet cooperation in all directions played a vital role in rooting out India's unwilling dependence on the West and helped to get rid of unprecedented economic crises. The CPI and the CPI (M) applauded the struggle, India and the USSR played, in curbing the aggressive activities of the western capitalist countries. To frustrate their combative policies, preservation and promotion of India's friendliness with the Soviet Union was much needed. Though there were many frivolous attacks on the improved climate of mutual cooperation, India managed to fortify her self-reliance economy and defence capability under Soviet assistance.

There is no denying the fact that in spite of multifarious developments, serious problems tormented the Indo-Soviet relations. There had been setbacks in their bilateral relations because India was not getting mostly needed high technology from the Soviet market like computers, which the western imperialists were ready to provide. However, India and the Soviet Russia being pulled together with their renewed efforts put forth their strength to expand the relationship.

CHAPTER V
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Ever since their formation, India and China are at daggers drawn with each other though each of them seek a just and durable peace with another. The critics say that India's policy of combining flexibility with stiffness - the Nehruvian model - to constitute a third force, was not responded equally by China. On the other hand, on more than one occasion India took irreconcilable stands on the border dispute which caused irritants among the Chinese. So any peace proposal or initiatives broached were nothing more than straw in the wind. All the high level talks could not serve the relations as either of them took negative stand. The rivalry between both the countries escalated due to the different foreign policies they followed. It was certainly strained and panick to the sub-region that the complex issues of national ideology emerged between the two most powerful nations of Asia, e.g., to occupy a position in the international hierarchy of supremacy, they were unwilling to accept any sort of mediation of a third power. Apparently, we can say that international compulsions had necessitated for sudden perversion in Sino-Indian relations. The penumbra of the past lied on both the countries. Till 1955, their relations were marked by close and friendly when they had great faith on Panch Sheel doctrines, then by bitter hostility between the two, especially after 1958. The political clash between the two in 1959 over the Tibetan~~n~~ development and the border dispute

of 1962 became irreparable and obstinate in latter period. Several cataclysms by-products came out of Sino-Indian conflicts.

Section-I

With the change in the national and international environment the Shastri era beheld illustrious development mainly in relation to China. After the border conflict of 1962 both the countries appeared to be to isolate each other. The cultural and economic exchange was maintained at a low ebb. Even the ambassadors were withdrawn. For quite some time the world could not mark any improvement in their bilateral relations. The possibility of reduction of tensions was at minimum possible level. On the other hand, condemning each other in the international forums made them easy for open hostility.

The CPI considered the attitude of the Chinese towards India was contrary to objective facts and Marxist-Leninist evaluation.¹ It believed that the Chinese leadership was footing on the path of chauvinism and found its policies unacceptable for the communists of the world as it was arising from the most fanatical great power desire for world

1. Resolution and decision of the National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, June 7-17, 1964, p.12.

domination.² But the CPI, it seemed, sidelined the fact that the Chinese leadership at the same time strongly denounced the imperialist policies being pursued by the western industrialised countries and Chinese condemnation of dominating any third world country by a strong nation must be taken into consideration.

Many a times the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) showed its eagerness that it was interested enough for redressal of grievances. Rather, to place itself in a dominant position India was pretending to be guardian of Asian countries. On the contrary, no body can deny the Chinese activities in the Indian border and the armed intrusion into our country. On this issue the government of India showed its concern. It urged the Chinese government to forsake the path of peace and reason in its relations with India. Shastri appealed China to respond to the call of India for preventing a major world crisis.³ The desire for exploring the possibilities of further improved climate of mutual respect and dignity and the willing to put an end to the strife, broke into pieces. They were in an age of virtual demolition of distance and natural barriers. Both of them marked emotional hostile experience.

2. Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the CPI, New Delhi, September 10-15, 1964, p.12.

3. India, Information and Broadcasting (Ministry of -), Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit. (Statement in the Parliament on Sept. 22, 1965), p.243.

The PRC lodged a complaint that India was no longer opposed to imperialism and made it clear that India was doubly aligned to the USA and the USSR. India's defence build-up was a threat to the smaller nations of Asia.⁴ The CPI (M) did not maintain acquiescence at that moment. The party leaders supported the way Tashkent came, but their covetous desire was to make another Tashkent to normalise Sino-Indian differences. They expressed doubt that the rest of the problem would be solved peacefully unless there was any peace accord between India and China.⁵

Because India took Tashkent agreement an idol to settle the disputes with Pakistan, in its party weekly, the CPI (M) suggested for the same principle of give-and-take method to China as well, to show eagerness for mutual adjustment in the Aksai Chin area, while emphasising on Mac Mahon line as our ^{taking} frontier. It accused the government of not ~~the~~ same path.⁶ S.A. Dange, the CPI leader repeatedly asked the government of India to take Sino-Indian conflicts in the Tashkent spirit so that the tension would be eased. He sought the assistance of the friendly powers for resolving Sino-Indian border dispute

4. Annual Report, 1964-65, Ministry of External Affairs (Govt. of India, New Delhi, 1966), p.28.

5. People's Democracy, January 2, 1966, p.12.

6. People's Democracy, February 13, 1966, p.2.

for nation's benefit.⁷

To meet the challenges of foreign aggression India had to spend its natural resources and capital in an unproductive way which might have been used for developmental purposes. Aggravation of Sino-Indian conflicts and diversion from economic development was not conducive to our national interest. The strife between them was a potent danger to the world peace and Afro-Asian solidarity.

Section-II

With the coming of Indira Gandhi the communists of India were interested for an immediate dialogue without continuing with bitter animosities. They suggested for concrete steps in achieving the objectives. However, the Indian bourgeoisie were not interested to extend the hand of friendship beyond Panchsheel. At all risks the bourgeoisie compelled India to hold on earlier stand and not to make any move towards easing of tensions. The Indian government's attitude, anyway, coincided with the communists' suggestion.

The critics said that during 1966-69, the PRC was actively interfered in the internal affairs of India, was engaged in full-scale campaign against India. The Indian government, too,

7. New Age, February 27, 1966, p.7.

condemned the Chinese attempts in disturbing national integrity of India. It characterized the act as a bid to create tension in the north-eastern border. The bourgeois class complained that China was engaged in exhorting Indian troops against the Indian government. On no account, the complaint against the Chinese government could prove that it was engaged in creating tension in India. Rather, the manifestation of Indian military presence in north-east region darkened the Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese accused India for its interference and stirring up trouble in the border region of China.

The Indian government was so much apprehensive about China that Indira Gandhi at a reception in New York on April 1, 1966 stated that to counter the Chinese influence the Asians and the developing world should build up popular and forward looking governments to fulfill the aspiration of the people.⁸ In spite of wide-ranging discussions for restoring friendship Indira Gandhi's China policy laid in shambles. The CPI (M) leader B.T. Ranadive, asked the government to take initiative to settle the border dispute. The CPI (M) asked the "government of India to stop talking in two voices and to take the urgently needed essential steps to find a basis for opening talks with China and through these

8. "The Years of Challenge", Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, op. cit., p.400.

talks a just settlement to the disputes could be sought."⁹ However, with the support of the PRC, the western imperialist countries found an opportunity to pressurise India on the Kashmir issue. By that the USA and China sought to stampede India into agreeing to their mediation with Pakistan.¹⁰ In spite of all the differences, the CPI asked the government to build strong ties with the Chinese. N.K. Krishnan explained that in the CPI's view the Chinese threat would remain if China continued her policies.¹¹

Thus the continued hostility spared no effort to malevolent Sino-Indian relations. Indira Gandhi promised not to harbour any evil intention towards the Chinese people as the interest of South-east Asia was involved there.¹²

Towards the end of 1967, the people of the world witnessed the feasibility of continuing the deadlock between India and China. The CPI (M) began to realize that in the interest of India the rigid stand on India-China border dispute must be given up. The party hinted at pliability of approach. Considering the political and administrative realities it was utmost

9. People's Democracy, August 21, 1966, p.12.

10. New Age, February 23, 1967, p.4.

11. The National Council of the CPI adopted a four-point Political Resolution in Calcutta on April 29, 1967; The Statesman (Delhi), April 30, 1967.

12. Speech of Indira Gandhi in the Lok Sabha on Dec. 22, 1967, "The Years of Challenge," op. cit., pp.400-1.

important to solve the frontier problems in the interests of the people of both the countries. The CPI (M) which was against those anti-China chauvinists attempts openly welcomed all steps in normalising Sino-Indian relations. The CPI (M) kept up its struggle to renovate India's image and prestige which suffered an ominous decline for a long time.

The Indian government got plenty of evidence about the Chinese incoming to north-eastern region and giving military training to the unarmed people. At times China's involvement in Nagaland boosted the hostile forces to create disorder and dissension. To clear up the mystery it would be proper to bring to light that the Sino-Indian relations exacerbated because "Chinese attempt for mediation produced no result and the crisis simply petered out".¹³ According to the CPI, the government's policy pursued mainly by the consideration of Sino-Indian problems was detrimental to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. That really weakened India's position and provided propaganda weapon to China.¹⁴ The blatant interference by China in our internal affairs was intended to fan Indo-Pakistan tensions. The Maoist policy was a serious

13. Calvocoressi, P., op. cit., p.288.

14. Eighth Party Congress of the CPI, Patna, February 7-15, 1968, p. 36.

obstacle to the normalisation of relations among the states in our region.¹⁵ The weakness of the Indian government and its instability to get the tribal peoples integrated into the mainstream of Indian life, led to the Chinese involvement in Nagaland. Though India's policy stucked to non-alignment it could not adhere to its policy regarding Tibet as a part of China.

The Indian bourgeoisie protested off and on against the use of force but for a long time there was no reply from Indian side to the Chinese demand that Tibet was an integral part of China. Only after 1954, the bourgeois ruling party recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. And once they realized it, it was totally vague and an absolutely uncompromising attitude on the part of India to raise the issue in all international meetings that China had no soft policy towards Tibet. That was the reason why the odds and ends of the proposal for peace was on the wane.

The illegal interference in its border states problem was regarded dangerous to Indian security. The government protested against China's infringement in Jammu and Kashmir. B.R. Bhagat, the government's spokesman "condemned China for disregarding the principle of peaceful co-existence and

15. Political Resolution of the CPI (M), Tenth Party Congress, Jullunder, April 2-April 8, 1978, p.62.

interfering in India's internal and external affairs."¹⁶
 Speaking in the Lok Sabha Dinesh Singh told, "Our policy is based on friendship and cooperation. We do not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of others.... We have a long frontier with China. We would like to reduce tension along this frontier. But it cannot be at the cost of our national honour, prestige and integrity."¹⁷

It is clear that, India protested against the threats to peace and tranquility of the region. Chinese help in the construction of a road from Mor Khum in the northern Kashmir to Khunjerab Pass was a clear territorial violation, a brazen intimidation. China's subversion activities, role in South Asia sowed suspicion and hatredness among the citizens of South Asia. On the other hand, there was not even slight change in the attitude of India towards China, too. The Indians were not prepared to discuss the border problem in a democratic manner and whenever they gave their consent for a discussion, it failed to produce any result due to their hostile attitude. Above all, the Chinese government was ready for closing the gap by extending its responsibilities further.

16. Report from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Publication, 12 April, 1969, vide Surjit Mansingh, op. cit., p.203.

17. Speech of Dinesh Singh on April 8, 1969, Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.XV(4), April, 1969, p.72.

For normalising Sino-Indian disputes the CPI and the CPI (M) had separate approaches. The CPI was awaited to check China-edge while the CPI (M) was interested for an immediate exchange of ambassadors. The Indian government shared her ideas with the CPI and propagated against Chinese actions. The CPI (M), in its party journal, said, "If India's foreign policy overcomes its anti-China Phobia, takes steps to develop friendly relations with China, it will be a fitting reply to all those who seek to exploit the bourgeois-landlord government's hostility towards China for their own selfish purposes."¹ It suggested for building up trade connection with the PRC for a large and expanding export market which would be helpful to our economy by taking off the unbearable burden of the huge military expenditure.¹⁹ Friendly and good-neighbourly relations in its opinion was a pre-condition for effecting any serious positive turn from the economic and political mess that the country had landed on.²⁰

Sometimes, the Indian government showed eagerness for a better friendship with the people's China. Prime minister

18. People's Democracy (editorial), May 26, 1968.

19. People's Democracy, January 26, 1969, p.4.

20. People's Democracy (editorial), October 25, 1970.

Indira Gandhi told that "the last two decades has failed to fulfill the initial hope of the people. India and China would learn from and assist each other and cooperate on the wider international scene."²¹ Addressing at a Seminar on August 31, 1970 on India's foreign policy, she reiterated, "While we must have arms to defend our country from any aggression, these arms, this military strength must be backed by conviction in our ideals and confidence on ourselves."²² The CPI(M), on this occasion, appealed for breaking all the deadlock both India and China had. The party threw a word of blame to the Indira government who having been frightened by the western bloc was not taking initial steps for bettering the relations.²³

It is also true that Chinese attitude towards Bangladesh and its support to Pakistan put obstacles on the process of improvement in Sino-Indian relations. In spite of considerable convergence Bangladesh cast a cloud over their friendly relations. "Its support to Pakistan against India, her provocative criticism against India for alleged subservience to the U.S.A. and latter to Soviet Union, her efforts to escalate internal subversion was aimed at undermining India's

21. Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, No.1, October 1972, p.72.

22. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, "The Years of endeavour", op. cit., p.687.

23. Election Manifesto of the CPI(M), 1971, p.24.

stability and at obstructing her rapid and orderly progress.²⁴ China's moves in Bangladesh was to encircle India from all sides. It was a part of a concerted Nixon-Mao strategy in this region.²⁵

Apart from it, the bourgeois political parties went on adding fuel to flame by condemning China heart and soul, ignoring what China was doing actually. Even if the great socialist country China had no bad intention to irritate India every now and then, it was due to their enmity with Pakistan, the bourgeoisie shamelessly egged on criticising the Chinese. China strived for peace not only to prevent the war or to avoid any just struggle, but it was seeking for the tranquility which came from understanding one another. The government of China thought for the benefit of the peoples of Asia and for that reason she stressed on Sino-Indian friendship. To bring in complete normalcy the people's China emphasized on exchanging diplomats.

The CPI made a valuable statement to the Indian government. It said that, in the field of foreign relations India required to persist on its anti-imperialist orientation and

24. Article of Indira Gandhi published in Foreign Affairs Quarterly, October, 1972, vide Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi (1972-1977), Vol. III, op. cit., p.633.

25. Report and Resolution of the National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, March 29 to April 1, 1973, No.12, p.4.

to consolidate it, above all, through working for a system of Asian collective security. That's why China must be welcomed to become a part of this system. The CPI considered it a best way to work for an improvement in China-India relations.²⁶ However, no bold initiative was taken by the Indian government to lighten the burden of worse relations with the PRC, except irregular pious declarations. E.M.S. Namboodiripad advised the Indian bourgeois leaders "for an Asian Collective Security Treaty to open a dialogue with the People's China".²⁷ With a glance at the international situation the CPI (M) went on saying that the restoration of normal relations with China was more urgent in view of the dangerous US moves in the Indian sub-continent.²⁸

Section-III

The victory of the Janata party in 1977 undoubtedly expedited the mechanism of normalising India-China relations. Within a short span of time the Janata party visualized a number of visits of the Chinese leaders indicating China's desire to live in a peaceful atmosphere. The trade mission,

26. Sen, Mohit, "India-China relations: Immediate Prospects", Mainstream, Vol. 11 (11), November 11, 1972, p.41.

27. People's Democracy, May 13, 1973, p.9.

28. People's Democracy, March 9, 1975, p.2.

the friendship delegation by China headed by Wang Ping-nan proved that unless both the Asians resorted to peace, the imperialist intrusion would continue. No doubt, China's anti-Soviet offensive in Balkans and Sino-American interactions hindered the progress of India-China good neighbourliness. However, one must take into account the politico-economic co-operation to build political bridges with India signified China's desire for accommodating its neighbours.

The Janata government was not satisfied with those minor developments. Prime Minister Morarji Desai urged his Chinese counterpart to take initiative for further development of their relationship. He said, "important bilateral relations would continue on the basis of five principles. As India had taken initiative first for normalising relations and then by sending officials for establishing trade relation with China, time had come for China to rejuvenate the Sino-Indian bilateral relations."²⁹ In the words of the then foreign affairs minister, A.B. Vajpayee, "the belief and philosophy of neighbouring countries should not come in the way of bilateral relations with them."³⁰ The Indian leaders had the belief that even if the friendly visit of Wang Ping-nan,

29. Indian and Foreign Review, Vol.14 (21), August 15, 1977, p.8.

30. Indian and Foreign Review, Vol.14 (23), September 15, 1977, p.7.

a mid-point on developing Sino-Indian relations, there was least possibility of full normalization if the outstanding border question left unresolved. For this, Desai's pronouncement of not allowing Soviet Union's interference or of any third party, showed that the government was taking seriously to bridge the gap between India and China.³¹

According to the CPI, the bridges of friendship were not broken simply by the border war of 1962, but due to apathetic attitude of the Chinese towards India.³² It told that there was no basis for normalising India's relation with China at the cost of our nationally accepted foreign policy.³³ While the CPI spoke about China government's unwillingness to soften the tension of India-China conflict demanding "a change in China's hostile attitude on issues such as Kashmir, Mizoram and Nagaland and conveyed its willingness to settle the border dispute on a just and mutually acceptable basis",³⁴ the CPI (M) condemned the Janata government for its wooing China despite the latter's open support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. It castigated the

31. EPW, Vol.XIII (11), March 18, 1978, p.502.

32. New Age, March 19, 1978, p.2.

33. New Age, October 29, 1978, p.2.

34. Report and Resolution adopted by the National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, October 29 to November 2, 1978, No.17, p.11.

government which was trying to make up with China at the bidding of the U.S. imperialists.³⁵

Facing severe criticism from the opposition bench that the government was not making sinister effort to hold on Indo-Soviet friendship, foreign minister A.B. Vajpayee made it clear that India wanted to accelerate her ties with China in a bilateral context and such improvement could not be at the cost of established friendship.³⁶

The CPI (M) demanded for strong Indo-Soviet friendship as well as closer ties with China.³⁷ The party earnestly wished to improve relations with the PRC and also welcomed the steps taken by the government, but so far as Vietnam was concerned, it demanded immediate Chinese vacation.³⁸ The CPI had the feeling that normalisation of relations between the two countries did not mean that one could not take an independent stand on its own feet, rather it would facilitate to take independent judgement to questions that arose in the international affairs.³⁹

35. People's Democracy, August 27, 1978, p.2.

36. A.B. Vajpayee's Statement in the Lok Sabha on February 21, 1979, cited in R.K. Jain (ed.), China-South Asian Relations, 1947-1980, Vol.II, pp.511-12.

37. Election Manifesto of the CPI (M), October 1979, p.26.

38. Lok Sabha Debates (Seventh Session), Sixth Series, Feb. 21, 1979, Vol.XXII (3), Col.320.

39. Gupta, Bhupesh, Lok Sabha Debates, (Seventh Session), Sixth Series, March 16, 1979, Vol.CIX (15), Cols.227-32.

Section-IV

After her coming to power, Indira Gandhi continued to keep up political dialogue with China. But the problem of adjustments and lack in harmonising their interests, repeated optimistic forecast by the western capitalist countries, caused for volatile and abrasive Sino-Indian relations. By a series of lengthy and patient attempts, though tiring, both India and China could have come round. The persistent desire for dialogues could not blow of the fire due to their different approaches towards border question. It was all along of half-hearted response and unwillingness in taking initiatives to begin the process of friendship and towards a less tense relationship caused to aggravate their relations beyond measure. Moreover, the Indian bourgeoisie suspected dominating tendencies in South-east Asia and did not take vigorous efforts to restore Chinese confidence. Thus, mild irritations continued and disruptive forces raised their ugly faces in bringing down the pride of Sino-Indian friendship.

As India's random attempt to break US-China encirclement, could not satisfy the CPI, its leaders Bhupesh Gupta made a suggestion on our foreign policy. He said, "The central aim of our foreign policy must be the rebuffs and defeats to the dark designs of Sino-US axis, in the confidence that the great Chinese people will no doubt one day settle their accounts with their present rulers."⁴⁰ When the Vice-Premier Deng

40. New Age, July 6, 1980, p.14.

Zia Peng came out with the proposal of a package deal to solve the boundary questions, reciprocating China's desire for improvement of Sino-Indian relations, P.V. Narasimha Rao, in the Lok Sabha, expressed India's hope to settle the border question on the basis of equality and welcomed any proposal for settlement of the eastern sector without any difficulty.⁴¹

India since its independence was committed to respect Pakistan's national unity and territorial integrity. But Pakistan, on the other hand in collusion with China posed serious threat to India's unity and integrity. India was encircled by Sino-Pakistan dangerous moves.

Considering Pakistan's acquisition of military hardware from the People's China, Indira Gandhi raised India's voice against that war clouds gathering all over the world. It was a time, she said, when India's security got shocked by Pakistani moves.⁴² The critics used to say that China got aligned with Pakistan. But it was a cock and bull story of the chicken-hearted bourgeoisie. China had not taken any action in support of Pakistan with a view to woo India, rather it was the bourgeois political leaders whose aversion to a settlement encouraged them to blame the People's Republic of China.

41. Rao, P.V. Narasimha, Cited in R.K. Jain (ed.), op. cit., pp.549-50.

42. Speech of Indira Gandhi at Patna on June 26, 1981, Times of India (Delhi), June 27, 1981.

The CPI came out to hold in the Sino-Pakistan-USA axis. Mohit Sen, the CPI leader, proposed for the defeat of the axis for the nation's interest. In his opinion, mass mobilisation and vigilance along with the broadest unity of all patriotic and anti-imperialist forces, was prime requisite.⁴³ The CPI viotriolically opposed to any move to normalize the relations which, in its view, would be a violation of Article 51 of the Indian Constitution. The CPI (M), therefore, asked the anti-national elements to desist from whipping up anti-China histeria at that happy turn of events after full twenty-one years of frozen relations when Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua visited India.⁴⁴ The CPI (M) had always called for friendly relations between India and China and welcomed all steps towards normalisation.⁴⁵ But the CPI was not agreed with the left communists on China issue because China, collaborating with the US and its aggressive, hegemonistic and great power chauvinistic policies, put India's sovereignty and integrity in dire peril and brought the danger of war to India's doorsteps.⁴⁶ Coming to the criticisms made by the bourgeois

43. Sen, M., "Danger of degenerated China", Link, Vol.23(46), June 28, 1981, p.14.

44. People's Democracy (editorial), July 5, 1981, pp.1-2.

45. Political Resolution of the eleventh Congress of the CPI (M), Vijaywada, January 26-31, 1982, p.28.

46. Political Resolution of the twelfth Congress of the CPI, Adhikari Nagar, Varanasi, March 22-28, 1982, pp.39-43.

political parties and groups that restoration of friendly relations with China would affect Indo-Soviet friendship, the CPI(M) viewed those opinions totally wrong and unrealistic. The sorting of differences, it said, was in the interests of world peace, security and national independence.⁴⁷ The government was also agreed not to sacrifice the friendship of other countries, nor it allowed to sacrifice Sino-Indian friendship.⁴⁸

It is clear that during the first half of eighties both India and China had stuck rigidly to their hegemonistic stand on several issues. It is also true that the Chinese collaboration with the armed separatist forces in our region was considered as the prelude to the premeditated assault. From time immemorial, the Sino-Indian conflicts were getting worsened on some vexed issues e.g., border problem and Tibetan affair. It had a retrogrative impact in the path of bridging the gap between the two nations. Both of them resorted to diplomatic pressure which brought no positive sign. No doubt, one can find the genuineness of the desire of the Chinese for having a settled border with India but the prejudice, constant consternation and anger of the Indians blocked the

47. People's Democracy, April 11, 1982, p. 2.

48. Speech of P.V. Narasimha Rao, Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), Vol. XXVIII (6), June 1982, pp. 176-81.

road for peaceful negotiation.

Towards the close of 1984 there was a sign both from India and China to resolve the disputes. To a great extent, in that period, the Chinese attitude was conveyed to protect the mankind from the evil faces of conflicts instead of fighting against heteroclitics of Indian policies.

Section-V

The observation indicates that in spite of the Indian accusation of increased Chinese acts of military and political destabilisation the people's China was creating favourable climate for ending the dead-lock in the Sino-Indian relations. Beyond question, the Sino-Indian antagonism keeps us in a vacillating position that which problem needs just and comprehensive solution, whether the border problem or China's alignment with Pakistan and America or appropriate measures to mend the bilateral relations? It is true that the border problem had come in a big way to blow out the cordial environment they had had. In spite of this, friendly bilateral relations must come off with flying colours so that the border dispute would be easily broken up in the long run. The Communist parties held the view that the policy to resolve the divergencies needed animation to get a comprehensive political solution. According to them, the utmost importance before the governments was their dissonant opinions in all conferences. It is clear that neither of them was ready to renew the pledge of proposed

and agreed agreements. On substantive matters China went on accusing India that it was not responding to Chinese call and on the other hand, India too went on blaming China for her arrogance and assistance to Pakistan. Thus the urgent need was, the CPI(M) emphasized, to de-escalate the tensed relations and to seek solution for age-old disputes. Both the Communist parties condemned perpetuated, systematic and barbarous criticism of the Indian bourgeoisie which continued to go at sixes and sevens and the leaders blew their own trumpets without awaring of any improvement in their bilateral relations. That was the reason why, they said, their cordiality saw the faces of divergences.

CHAPTER VI
INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

After the withdrawal of British hegemony from the Indian subcontinent Pakistan became a separate entity. Though India excoriated the partition based on religion, Zinnah's perennial desire for a separate statehood for the Muslims set aside India's willingness to pull together. As a result of their decades old bigotry and antagonism created by the British imperialism, both India and Pakistan had been facing frequent frictions. The fear and jealousy between the two countries aggravated after the demarcation of India. In the conduct of their foreign policy feeling of distrust exasperated their disputes and pushed them into antagonism. Having been spurred by the western imperialist bloc they had spent huge sum of money on arms acquisition and military preparedness which could have been utilised for economic development.

Periodic threats of war, tensions almost all the time since 1947 and importantly political warfare, vituperation, frustration and fear between the two neighbours India and Pakistan brought disappointment to the peoples of the world. It is marked as "Asia's ugliest unsolved problems."¹

Section-I

Change in national and international sphere during the Shastri period caused an adjustment to foreign policy

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1. Brecher, Michael, in Selig S. Harison (ed.), India and the United States, (New Delhi: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 3.

corresponding to the realities of international politics. As long as India's promiscuity was unhindered, slight change in non-alignment was not considered inimical to India, rather it was regarded as a fight against evils of the world. Then non-alignment was taken as non-involvement. With the deflection of time the factionalism and groupism among the bourgeoisie became so rampant that a change in the approach towards foreign policy was justified, because for the sake of unity and integrity of the country and side by side of the government, rare changes were not detrimental to national interest.

Pakistan being instigated by western capitalist countries started a massive destructive war which surprised the democratic elements of the world. In spite of India's sinister desire to avoid war, the confrontation perpetuated.

The Indians wanted to live in friendship with the peoples of Pakistan and were interested to settle the disputes over Kashmir by peaceful and democratic means which would enable the people of Kashmir to decide their own destiny without interference from the imperialist powers.² The CPI had always been demanding against foreign intervention. The party suggested for peaceful solution of conflicts

2. Masani, M.R., The CPI, A Short history (London: Derek Verschoyle, 1954), p.147.

between India and Pakistan. According to it the increased alliance on imperialist aid had enabled the Anglo-American imperialists to increasingly interfere in Indo-Pakistan disputes.³

Pakistan was getting massive military help from the U.S.A., Highlighting the international situation which was heading towards cold nuclear war, the CPI, opposed to all types of military pacts. In its view the development of monstrous means of mass destruction would cause annihilation of the entire world, destruction of world industry and culture.⁴

Pakistan had an envious eye on Kashmir. Her desire to exercise supremacy in Kashmir was repeatedly threatened by her bigger and powerful neighbour India.⁵ They raised anti-India slogans among the sections of the peoples and encouraged communal elements to create a sense of hatred against India so that they would occupy Kashmir. Lal Bahadur Shastri met the riots with strong repressive measures. Ultimately, the war broke out in 1965. Due to the war several thousands innocent human lives perished. Everytime each government

3. See Draft Programme of the CPI, (as adopted by the Seventh Congress of the CPI, Calcutta, Oct. 31-Nov. 7, 1964) p.23.

4. Programme of the CPI, as adopted by the Seventh Congress of the CPI, Bombay, December 13-23, 1964, pp. 9-10.

5. Ibid.

lodged complaint against another which created suspicion among the people. However the conflict ended after the unilateral declaration of cease-fire by India.

Soon after the defeat of Pakistan the game of the imperialists was thwarted, when the Soviet Union and other socialist countries reiterated their support to India.⁶ Pakistan's armed action was an act of naked aggression. It mounted an armed attack on territory over which Pakistan had never exercised possession.⁷ The CPI praised India's policy of forbearance towards Pakistan. The party accused the Pakistani government for the infiltration of refugees to India and ran down Pakistan's employment of political weapons against India aligning itself with the western capitalist countries.⁸ Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan after prolonged discussion concluded not to use force in settling their disputes. Speaking on the validity of Tashkent agreement Prime Minister Shastri remarked, "The Tashkent declaration would help to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. If there had been no agreement, tension would have become more acute and it could have led to greater conflagration. The whole

6. Sardesai, S.G., Defence, Democracy, Secularism and Kashmir (Delhi: CPI Publication, 1965), pp.35-37.

7. Selected Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit., pp.282-83.

8. Mukherjee, Hiren, Lok Sabha Debates, (Eleventh Session), Third Series, Vol.XLII(47), April 28, 1965, Col.11604.

world, I hope, will acclaim this declaration as an example of tackling problems."⁹ In the opinion of the CPI, the Tashkent declaration created new climate for peace for India and Pakistan. It could be a contribution towards the lessening the tension between the two countries and a beginning towards a settlement of existed problems.¹⁰ The CPI (M) highly spoke of Tashkent Agreement. It glorified the attempts the heads of states had taken in bringing normalcy. Therefore, it suggested the government of India "to consult the government of Kashmir on the one hand and the people of Kashmir, on the other, to find out solution to Kashmir problem."¹¹ By the victory over Pakistan the Indians could preserve the anti-imperialist struggle intact. It brought moral prestige and immeasurable material benefit to India.¹²

The intrusion of big powers in the form of military assistance was because Pakistan solicited foreign presence to counter her bigger neighbour India, whereas India's main struggle was to prevent foreign dominance. Therefore, the CPI, criticised, "Pakistan's aggressive designs against India,

9. Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, op. cit., p.360.

10. New Age, January 2, 1966, p.1.

11. People's Democracy (editorial), January 23, 1966.

12. Sen, M., Aspects of the CPI Programme (New Delhi: CPI Publication, 1966), pp.26-27.

where the US took the role of inciting Pakistan to wage war. The party's intention was to divert world attention from the naked US intervention and appealed the Indian government for strong action against it."¹³

There was upsurgence of anti-imperialism after the Tashkent agreement and it made the imperialists exposed. The western-backed conspiracy failed miserably. Facing a crucial defeat Pakistan considered to place herself under cover of Tashkent Declaration. Soon after the Tashkent Summit evil attitude of the big business class, shameless intervention of the warmongers under lock and key and primarily apathetic attitude of Pakistan, invited old centuries dissensions. The imperialist followers of Pakistan stuck to the pious declaration of Tashkent till the repatriation of prisoners of war was continued. After that Indians' 'gesture of strong faith in peace was cold-shouldered'. The Tashkent agreement could not satisfy the bourgeoisie of both India and Pakistan. However, the glorious Tashkent declaration provided guidelines to create congenial atmosphere and to avoid dangerous portent for peace and security.

Section-II

In spite of the desire of both India and Pakistan to look out for peace after the war of 1965, they could not

13. New Age, February 27, 1966, p.5.

solve all outstanding problems to the backbone. In spite of their efforts to normalise and to improve the bilateral relations, the disputes continued as both of them ran down each other and did not show eagerness and zeal to the point. The Pakistan President Ayub Khan felt that without a settlement of Kashmir problem, relation between themselves would not mark any improvement. On the contrary, the Indian bourgeoisie thought that the propaganda made by Pakistan caused resentment in India and marred the relations between the two countries. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told¹⁴ that the discouragement of hostile propaganda which worsened the development of friendly relations, would be a positive factor for the promotion of good neighbourly relations.

Towards the neighbours of India, the CPI (M)'s policy was that of friendship, alliance and cooperation. According to it the policy of keeping up tensions only worsened the situation because the Pakistani rulers made it public that all the aid that they would be getting under US-Pakistan military pacts would be used against India.¹⁵ The party accused the government for its inability to reach in peaceful

14. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, "The Years of Challenge", (Speech in the Lok Sabha on February 15, 1966), op. cit., p.406.

15. People's Democracy, July 31, 1966, p.6.

settlement with Pakistan, in the absence of which the burden over the suffering people of Asia would increase.¹⁶ According to one of its editorials of its party journal, the CPI (M) remarked that the Kashmir problem could be solved by releasing Sheikh Abdullah and then by negotiating and compromising attitude, there should be a discussion with the Kashmiris. Unless he was released the situation would deteriorate. On the other hand the settlement of Kashmir could ease Indo-Pakistan conflict, for the rest would be taking no time to solve. If the government of India reiterated on her stand without give and take policy than Pakistan would continue to internationalise the issue.¹⁷

Indian policies were based on non-violence as the people believed that violent methods would injure a nation like ours confronted with massive problems of poverty and ignorance.¹⁸ Notwithstanding Indian initiatives to live in peace the situation got worsened. So the CPI asked for renewed initiatives for carrying forward Tashkent spirit to establish good neighbourly relations and to resolve outstanding disputes

16. Ibid., June 26, 1966, p.6.

17. People's Democracy (editorial), October 9, 1966.

18. Indira Gandhi's speech on January 10, 1967, on a broadcast over AIR on the first anniversary of Tashkent Declaration, Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, op. cit., p.407.

between India and Pakistan.¹⁹ As there had been bone of contention on Kashmir question, the valley became a focal point of the western industrialist countries who wanted it to carve out from the Indian sub-continent by anti-India slogans. It remained as a place of great strategic importance being surrounded by India and Pakistan. "Had Kashmir made free, it would have found itself dependent politically, militarily and economically on American support."²⁰ In the opinion of the CPI, the issues involved must be considered calmly and dispassionately for finding a satisfactory solution of the problems that Kashmir possessed.²¹ The CPI, in its eighth party Congress, observed that the military built up was against the democratic rights and liberties of the people of the valley.²²

By stockpiling arms Pakistan accentuated tension in the sub-continent and added India's responsibilities in regard to the defence and security of India. It made Pakistan more obstinate than she had. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi explaining

19. Political Resolution adopted by the National Council of the CPI, Calcutta, April 23-30, 1967, (Post-election situation and our Tasks) p.18 .

20. New Age, January 7, 1968, p.2.

21. Ibid.

22. Political Report of the 8th Congress of the CPI, Patna, February 7-17, 1968, pp.34-5.

her government's protest explained in the Lok Sabha²³ that the gift of vast quantities of arms and equipments to Pakistan had no reasonable justification as it would augment Pakistan's armed strength encouraging her in its intransigent and aggressive attitude towards India.

Despite her serious attempts, the government of India failed to find out a democratic solution to the Kashmir problem. As a result it thwarted the game of imperialists to utilise the Kashmir question to fan hostilities between India and Pakistan.²⁴ As there was no end in the hostility, India had to take vigorous defence programme by doubling the defence expenditure. Pakistan feared that once India attained military supremacy, it would be difficult to turn Kashmir in Pakistan's favour. That tendency prompted Pakistan to seek military aid from the superpowers. In that period there was tremendous growth in Pakistan-USSR relations. Kosygin visited Islamabad to bridge the gap between the two South Asians. Pakistan was assured of massive help from the Soviet Union. Pakistan's growing relations with the USSR endangered the South Asian countries. India looked it as a step to aggravate the danger between India and Pakistan.

23. Indira Gandhi's speech in the Lok Sabha, July 22, 1968, "The Years of Challenge", op. cit., p.408.

24. Political Resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the CPI(M) at its meeting in Jaipur, August 7-11, 1968, p. 3.

The CPI was convinced that such a mutual cooperation would strengthen the national independence of States of Asia. In its opinion, if there was any improvement in the bilateral relations between two countries, it would allow to concentrate their efforts on the tasks of economic advance and higher living standards of the concerned people.²⁵ But in view of the CPI (M) Soviet arms supply to Pakistan was a potent danger to the security of India. The CPI (M) disliked the decision of the Soviet government to supply arms to Pakistan. The party observed that with that development of Pakistan-USSR armament race would be intensified in the sub-continent. On the other hand, in one of its resolution, the CPI (M) stated that it had exposed the utter failure of the foreign policy of the government of India.²⁶ The discords, strains created in the process of partition in 1947 and subsequently in the mutual relations between both the countries became a sempiternal problem. The Tashkent agreement could not secure its place for a long time and another confrontation came to the scene in 1971. The peaceful motives failed because both of them refused to budge an inch from their chosen path - the rigid and unsacrificed stands. As a result of which, it vitiated the prospects of an early solution to the perennial danger between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pakistan relations

25. New Age, June 8, 1969, p. 3.

26. Political Resolution of the CPI (M), adopted by the Central Committee of the CPI (M) at its meeting in Jaipur, August 7-11, 1968, p. 4.

got tensed when the large influx of refugees migrated to India in 1971. Indian planes were hijacked by the Pakistanis. The people felt extremely insecure because of periodic peppering of villages by long-ranged guns. The conflict resulted in the loss of life and property of the innocents.

Gradually the situation aggravated. Looking at the situation Prime Minister Indira Gandhi remarked that India was not afraid of Pakistan's attack. But she told it dangerous once Pakistan became a part of global strategies.²⁷ The issue, she emphasized, what was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan also became an internal problem of India.²⁸ On that disturbed situation, the CPI(M) condemned Pakistan's inhuman attack on the people of East Bengal. It urged the government of India to provide full assistance to the people of Bangladesh, both moral and material.²⁹ There was serious allegation against Sheikh Mujib's activities. The Indian government put blame on the shoulder of Mujib. But Yahya Khan "on his return from West Pakistan denounced Sheikh's activities as 'acts of treason'."³⁰ Facing problems due to

27. Noorani, A.G., India, the Superpowers and the Neighbours: Essays in Foreign Policy (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985), p.159.

28. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, "The Years of Challenge", op. cit., p.527.

29. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.I, No.17, March 27, 1971, Col.18.

30. Yahya Khan's broadcast to the nation, March 26, 1971, The Dawn (Karachi), March 27, 1971.

the Bangladesh war, Indian government found it suitable to recognize Bangladesh. "The CPI, on that issue, extended its support."³¹ The CPI(M) also extended its full support to all steps needed to repulse Pakistan's ambition.³² With reference to India's intervention in Bangladesh crisis the CPI(M) made it clear that India did not make any territorial claim but only to resist assaults of the monstrous US-built Pakistan war-machines.³³

It was a time when the government faced criticism from every nook and corner. There was doubt whether Pakistan would respect the cease-fire line as it existed on 17 December? Would it vacate the posts which it took afterwards? "On that question Indira Gandhi agreed to bilateralism. She desired to sort out the differences through bilateral negotiations."³⁴ But Bhutto denied India's locus standi in the matter of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh. He was not prepared for talks on that subject on Indian soil.³⁵

31. Mukherjee, Hiren, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 25, 1971, Col. 230.

32. People's Democracy, December 12, 1971, p. 3.

33. People's Democracy, December 19, 1971, p. 1.

34. Indira Gandhi's Press Conference in New Delhi, "The years of endeavour", op. cit., p. 638.

35. Bhutto's broadcast to the nation on June 28, 1972, The Dawn (Karachi), June 29, 1972.

As the war crises aggravated, Z.A. Bhutto showed his willingness to enter into negotiations with India. But the negotiation was delayed because Pakistan refused to recognize Bangladesh. "Had Pakistan accepted the need for abjuring the use of force for the settlement of the outstanding problems between the two countries, it would have been easy to discover the virtues of peace and stability in the region, and due contribution to the erection of a structure of accord and cooperation in this area."³⁶ When the war came to an end, Shimla agreement was concluded. The agreement satisfied most of the demands of both India and Pakistan leaving Kashmir dispute a disputed one. Both the countries gave their consent to settle their basic issues and causes of conflict by peaceful means.

The Shimla agreement was a victory of the forces of peace and amity and it brought new opportunities for working, for friendship and cooperation between India and Pakistan and a durable peace in the subcontinent. The CPI called upon the government of India to play a great role in bringing about peace, friendship and cooperation among the countries of South Asia.³⁷ The non-recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan needlessly

36. Gupta, Sisir, "India and Pakistan", Link, Vol.15, No.1, August 15, 1972, pp.117-19.

37. Resolution of the National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, August 24-28, 1972, p.75.

created complications in implementing Shimla agreement and in meeting the situation in the subcontinent as a whole.³⁸ The Indo-Pakistan Summit offered a grand opportunity for the realisation of noble objectives. It was a solution of the problems that had worsened the relations between the two countries. India sought it not only because it favoured peace, rather than a war but because of union of minds and hearts between the two neighbours in a shared quest for peace. The agreement compelled India and Pakistan to put an end to the conflict and dissension that had marred the relations and worked for the promotion of a friendliness and durable peace in the subcontinent. It was a turning point in Indo-Pakistan relations. Among the big powers India was supported by the Soviet Union whereas Pakistan got support from China and America. Getting the support of the great socialist country India moved on for an overall settlement of conflicts those arising out of the 1971 war.

The 1973-76 phase witnessed a series of trade and telecommunication agreements between India and Pakistan. The cause which inspired them for normalising their decades old rivalry, was that due to 1971 war and huge arms build-up they had spent large sums of money. Both the governments realized that instead of spending money in an unproductive

38. Review Report and Resolution of the National Council of the CPI, (No.4), New Delhi, December 6-10, 1972, p. 10.

way, decided to invest it for the upliftment of the poorer, suffered and exploited class. True to a great extent, with that realisation they paved the way for an early resumption of the glorious Indo-Pakistan amity. A trade agreement was signed which the CPI considered "as a step to further advance the process of normalisation of mutual relations in all respects."³⁹ On another occasion, an agreement was signed in Islamabad on September 14, 1974, for restoring postal and telecommunication and travel facilities were received with a sense of great relief by the CPI leaders. The party characterized the agreement as a step forward to strengthen detente.⁴⁰ The decision to resume post and communications links and travel facilities besides renewed trade facilities were indeed welcomed by the CPI(M) as well.⁴¹ Pakistan was a crucial strategic area for the US imperialists. The USA, therefore, continued its decades-old hegemonistic policies and went on arming Pakistan. The CPI viewed the position and the U.S. neocolonialist policies as a serious obstacle to detente in our sub-continent.⁴²

39. People's Democracy, January 14, 1973, p.4.

40. New Age, September 22, 1974, p.6.

41. For details see People's Democracy, September 22, 1974, p.1.

42. Party Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the CPI, Bhowanisennagar, Vijaywada, January 27-February 2, 1975, p.55.

At a time when the western industrialised countries were digging on their toes in the Indian sub-continent by stockpiling nuclear arms and intensifying inflow of military warheads, at that time a joint statement between India and Pakistan, to restore diplomatic relations as well as the suggestion for cultural and scientific exchange, held out encouraging promise of building up stable and good neighbourly relations. Highlighting the growing Indo-Pakistan amity, the CPI remarked⁴³ that it would create favourable conditions for the region and to frustrate the imperialist designs. The CPI (M) also welcomed the established relations which in its opinion "would reduce the steps for imperialist meddling."⁴⁴ The normalisation of Indo-Pakistan aggravated relations got another impetus with the exchange of letters between Indira Gandhi and Bhutto, in 1976. It became a fact that both the countries again sat on the table to resume negotiations.

Section-III

The Janata government gave priority to widen the areas of cooperation in economic, political and social fields with Pakistan. The Indian bourgeoisie intended to pursue the policy of friendship and understanding between India and its neighbours. Any intensification of the Indo-Pakistan tensions

43. New Age, May 23, 1976, p. 3.

44. People's Democracy, May 23, 1976, p. 1.

was bound to create suspicion and instability of both the governments. The world welcomed the constructive dialogues to reestablish their diplomatic relations and to resolve the problems. A new era of understanding and friendship emerged between the two countries. To build the sky-scraper of Indo-Pakistan friendship, amity and durable peace was the grim alternative of confrontation and conflict.

But Pakistan's nuclear efforts, the critics highlighted, had no peaceful dimensions. Evidences had piled up to expose Pakistan's intention to achieve its nuclear aim, with the assistance of the USA. Speaking on this grim situation, the CPI leader, Kalyan Roy, told to Rajya Sabha⁴⁵ that the entire U.S. policy on supplying arms to Pakistan was based on one thing to topple the non-aligned countries, to replace them by stooges of the American imperialist policies.

In the midst of all dissensions and discords, both India and Pakistan decided to cooperate with each other on a basis of equality and mutual benefit and thus to realise the full constructive potential of their talents. In a speech at Islamabad A.B. Vajpayee stressing on creating convivial atmosphere said that "both the government strived to build bridges of neighbourly cooperation to concentrate on the

45. Roy, Kalyan, speech on the Rajya Sabha, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. C, No. 5, April 4, 1977, Col. 13.

massive agenda of development and welfare of the peoples."⁴⁶
 It was necessary for both India and Pakistan constantly to seek until it was possible in a bigger ways to enable the people to know and understand each other better and to act for common good.⁴⁷

Fresh winds of understanding began to blow. Indo-Pakistan amity was a vital requisite before restoring peace and security in the sub-continent.

In the opinion of the CPI, constant improvement of good neighbourly and friendly relations with our neighbours was the primary task before the government of India. It suggested that, this again could have done only on the basis of principles and thereby opening the door to lasting amity and co-operation.⁴⁸ The CPI leader, Bhupesh Gupta pointed out that Pakistan was creating disturbance in our border, to compel India to spend more money on military purposes. In this way Pakistan was disturbing Indo-Pakistan relations.⁴⁹

Pakistan's new alliances with the USA where nuclear bomb was being developed caused threat to India's sovereignty.

46. Vajpayee, A.B., op. cit., pp.191-92.

47. Ibid. (Dinner speech in honour of Mr. Agha Shahi, April 10, 1978), pp.195-96.

48. Documents of Eleventh Congress of the CPI (Bhatinda: Bhakna Nagar, March 31- April 7, 1978), p.125.

49. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. CVI, No. 23, August 17, 1978, Cols. 260-63.

The CPI(M) appealed to the government to strengthen non-alignment to safeguard country's independence against possible and visible America's indirect invasion,⁵⁰ for to it country's security unity and integrity was more important than anything else. The military regime in Pakistan was in full trim as an accomplice in the implementation of the US global strategy in our region in collusion with the imperialist rulers. The CPI viewed the arms build up in Pakistan was the greatest factor in India-Pakistan friendliness.⁵¹ The Islamabad talk, therefore, had great implications. Both the countries held bilateral talks to combat the policies of tension-mongering and provocations made by the western capitalist countries. But the talk "failed miserably and thereby created danger to India by imperialist intervention in Pakistan."⁵² Thus, despite India's earnest desire to live in peace abjuring violence was frustrated because of west-sponsored alliances and constant anti-India propaganda, which consequently heightened and sedulously fostered. The Janata period, no doubt, made efforts to lighten the burden of bitter Indo-Pakistan relations, on any occasions and at times Pakistan too showed her eager

50. See Rajya Sabha Debates, Speech of Kalyan Roy, Vol. CVIII, No. 23, March 22, 1979, Cols. 191-92.

51. New Age (editorial), February 10, 1980.

52. People's Democracy, February 17, 1980, pp. 1-2.

and enthusiasm to make cooperation with India, but consequently that perception was squarely misplaced.

Section-IV

The western capitalist countries encouraged Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons for massive military build-up. As a result, Pakistan was turning as one of the biggest stockpile of battleships causing enormous threats to her neighbour India. Whenever, India raised her voice against it, it was consoled by the Americans not to get scared of it, for it was not aimed against India. The Pakistan military regime adopted multi-coloured tactics to duck the region into danger. Pakistan started negotiations with the French government to get marriage aircrafts and turned attention towards western industrialist countries for F-16 fighter planes. On a debate in the Lok Sabha the representatives of the CPI raised their voice to take steps to counter the imperialist threats; while the CPI leader Indrajit Gupta wanted to know the steps taken by the Indian government to safeguard India's security.⁵³ In this connection the statement of foreign affairs minister, C.V. Narasimha Rao, must be taken into consideration. Rao's statement warranted that "India was committed to respect

52. People's Democracy, February 17, 1980, pp.1-12.

53. Lok Sabha Debates, (2nd Session), Seventh Series, Vol.II, No.19, March 20, 1980, Col.16.

Pakistan's national unity, territorial integrity and sovereign equality."⁵⁴ The CPI(M) seemed to have dissatisfied with the policies of the bourgeois-landlord government. B.T. Ranadive "accused the government of not mobilising the popular forces to fight against imperialist designs. He asked the government not to turn a blind eye to the conspiracy against our freedom."⁵⁵ However, the government of India had the view that, "On matters concerning the developing countries, both Pakistan and India had held almost identical views."⁵⁶

To strengthen the bond of friendship the Indian government urged her Pakistani counterparts for a treaty of peace and friendship. Pakistan was reluctant to have a treaty like India and Soviet Russia had. Its "proposal was centred on non-aggression pact,"⁵⁷ to which India was reluctant. Whereof the dialogue to have peaceful bilateral relations, failed again. The repeated failure of all the constructive approaches had sufficient reasons to make Indo-Pakistan relations bitter. The United States had supported Pakistan on almost all issues starting from the General Assembly of the United Nations to

54. Narasimha Rao, in Islamabad, June 8, 1981, The Hindu (Madras), June 9, 1981.

55. People's Democracy, August 16, 1981, p. 11.

56. Rao, P.V. Narasimha, "India and Pakistan: A framework for friendship", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXXIV(2), 1981, p. 17.

57. MEA, Annual Report, 1981-82, New Delhi, p. 3.

all international conferences. In the entire Indo-Pakistan relations the West played a significant role in moulding their relationship, positive or negative. Thus, to the CPI(M) "to hide the whole game Pakistan played, it came with a no-war pact. The party considered it nothing but a smoke-screen to cover-up the US-Pakistan designs against India."⁵⁸

Pakistan on the one hand consolidated its military connection with the USA and on the other hand suppressed the democratic forces at home. With the U.S. arms Pakistan resorted to misadventures across the border to divert the attention of the Pakistani people from their own vital problems. The military regime in Pakistan wanted a formal no war agreement without corresponding close social, economic and political relations.⁵⁹ At that moment the government of India campaigned against arming of Pakistan. The CPI(M) observed the steps beneficial to India's national interest.⁶⁰

The imperialists' threat continued to create war-terror among the large sections of the innocent people. "Indira Gandhi told a public gathering that India's safety was

58. Documents of Eleventh Congress of the CPI(M), Vijaywada, January 26-31, 1982, p.381.

59. Bahadur, Kalim, "Indira-Zia mini Summit: NO breakthrough", Link, Vol. 25, No. 23, November 7, 1982, p. 9.

60. Ranadive, B.T., Speech introducing draft political Resolution, adopted by the Central Committee of the CPI(M), Part I: International situation, 1982, p.17.

jeopardized by Pakistan's acquisitions of lethal weapons beyond its legitimate defence requirements.⁶¹ Thus, the CPI, warned about the "developments in Pakistan and intensification of conspiracies of the US imperialists and their allies against India. It asked the people constantly to keep their vigilance."⁶² As a result of chain of incidents India and Pakistan were not in a happy attachment. Pakistan's cooperation with the Akalis and its support to the cause of a separate Sikh state deteriorated their relations further. India accused Pakistan of aiding and abetting Sikhs in Punjab. But Pakistan was in no mood to accept the charges. Pakistan's calculations were that by aggravating the Punjab situation, its interests would be best served. The anti-Hindu propaganda became so virulent that the world media started speaking of another Indo-Pakistan war. The U.S. imperialists aligning itself with Pakistan created ugly scenes in India under the slogan of Khalistan, to intensify Sikh-Hindu conflict. The CPI called upon the government to frustrate the plans of those anti-national elements backed by the western capitalist countries and Pakistan, whereupon its leader Bhogendra Jha speaking in the Lok Sabha told that the "imperialists

61. Speech of Indira Gandhi in Patna, vide Surjit Mansingh, op.cit., p.236.

62. Report and Resolutions adopted by the National Council of the CPI, New Delhi, September 17-20, 1983, p.50.

instigation for Khalistan, without India's passport and stubborn resistance was a violation of all international norms and International Law.⁶³ The Government of India, too, attacked at Pakistan's policies. Indira Gandhi remarked that the "basic policies of Pakistan was not in favour of stable and strong subcontinent."⁶⁴ In view of the CPI (M), that act of Pakistan "multiplied many times the danger to India's independence and unity. The security to the life of both the peoples receded considerably."⁶⁵

Thus, by 1984 Indo-Pakistan relations got frozen at a low level. Initiation of several peace proposals by the leaders of both the countries, more or less, the long standing rivalry could not march towards normalisation. Besides political and diplomatic relations, the cultural exchange and cooperation over agriculture, health and communication, too, were maintained at a low ebb. Many proposals for liberalising travel facilities were of no avail. In the absence of exchange of newspapers and periodicals, people-to-people contact remained on paper. In this way the deadlock continued and the prospects of normalcy darkened.

63. Lok Sabha Debates, (Fourteenth Session), 7th Series, Vol.XLIV, No.3, February 27, 1984, Cols.456-58.

64. Indira Gandhi, Interview, New Delhi, for details see Surjit Mansingh, op. cit., p.235.

65. People's Democracy, October 14, 1984, p.1.

Section-V

Illusions are stronger than the reality. So mere pronouncements for peaceful negotiations do not by themselves ensure peace. Thus, to maintain good relations with the neighbours abandonment of disruptive dimensions, the enmities, jealousies and accentuated divergencies needs urgent attention.

The dissensions between India and Pakistan was equally deleterious to Pakistan's national development and created insurmountable problems to India as well. The continuation of stalemate and consequent tensions cost a lot to both the countries. The mould of an adversary relation persisted due to enormous expenditure on arms build-up. Except for short spells of cordiality, their bilateral relations was generally strained and soured. The question of allowing foreign powers was another hindrance in reaching a durable peace accord. The hundreds of disturbances occurred in their relationship, some of which led to war twice, had caused incalculable damage to lives and property. Major irritants that took place in any of the countries bedevilled Indo-Pakistan relations. It may be asked why there were so many conflicts? It was due to the attitude of both the countries of not carrying on any serious dialogue to improve their bilateral relations. It was unlikely that there was any chance of third war between India and Pakistan, because India being a champion of peace and non-alignment was detrimental to aggravate the conflict

to a war. However, there were two wars the people of both the countries had faced. Therefore, the Communist parties always warned the government of India that it must not lose its sight from all developments with a view to take appropriate measures to ensure the security of the country if our interests and liberty were in stake. Both the Communist parties were not satisfied with the continuation of old dismal situation, 'damaged ego and hollow psyche' of both Indian and Pakistani governments. They appealed to the peoples of both the countries and their governments to resolve the discords amicably, considering the common history, common culture and common language both of them have had.

CONCLUSION

A certain amount of clemency and placability facilitates the working of a democracy. The political parties which are more or less organized groups occupy pivotal positions in the functioning of a democratic government. The Communist Party founded on Marxist-Leninist Principle (in 1925) fought against imperialism, colonialism, racialism, in later period. In 1964, however, there was a split in the Communist Party of India. As a result, the CPI (M) and the CPI maintained their separate identity. But on foreign policy issues they had, by and large, similar views. They considered that by powerful mass movement they would pursue anti-imperialistic foreign policy which was essential to preserve and protect democracy. Their main programmes were to fight against bourgeois-landlord government. The role they had played was obviously constructive and aimed at preservation of democracy and security of our country. They make it clear that a government cannot protect democracy unless it breaks with imperialist forces and thwarts the war-drive and neo-colonial aims. One has to accept, who may not be a Communist, that the Communist movement in India has great bearings on socio-political life of India. In the foregoing chapters our study makes an attempt to examine some aspects of the foreign policy of India as well as attitude of the Communist parties towards the foreign policy pursued by the government of India. This attempt has involved a brief study of some important issues which dominated the foreign

policy of India after Jawaharlal Nehru. Here we have dealt with the attitude of two Communist parties: the CPI and the CPI (M), as the approach of other parties like Forward Bloc and CPI (ML) was not significant to a great extent. We have attempted to study the importance of Communist parties, in particular, in moulding and influencing the foreign policy of India. On the whole our study assumes that the role played by the Communist parties had considerable impact on India's foreign policy. Of course, sometimes their pronouncements seemed to be subjected to the interests of international communism. However, the entire thinking of the Communist parties of India was beneficial to the interest of the nation as a whole. Our discussion confirms that there was no instance when the Communist parties showed any perception detrimental to Indian situation. On most occasions, both the CPI, and the CPI (M) shared their support with the principles India stood for, but they had not missed to assess the failures and achievements of the government of India. It is worth noting that during Nehru's leadership the opposition parties got ample opportunities to play an important role in influencing the foreign policy, because Nehru's 'democratic way of functioning' provided them independence to evaluate the related issues. In later period due to one party dominance in India and 'authoritarian and undemocratic' attitude of leadership, their level of involvement in policy-making decisions considerably reduced. It is reasonable for us to conclude that in

the absence of democratic functioning of leadership of the party in power, the opposition cannot play a constructive role.

Our analysis began with the policy of non-alignment championed by the then Indian leaders where we have discussed the reaction of the Communist parties also. Subsequently we analysed India's relations with Pakistan, China, Soviet Russia and the United States of America. Our discussion reveals that India's relations with these countries went through zigs and zags, ups and downs. Our analysis contains that the CPI and the CPI (M) helped to give India's foreign policy a progressive direction by their consistent efforts, e.g., opposed India's membership of the Commonwealth, fought against colonialism and close friendship with China and Pakistan, mainly.

The CPI considered non-alignment as an elementary instrument to bring peace in the world. So it warned the government to keep a vigilant eye on the western capitalist countries whose aim was to distract India from that direction. The CPI (M) had been of the opinion that though Indian bourgeoisie continued to be non-aligned, yet, its increasing dependence on US monopolies, the genuine implementation of non-alignment remained a far cry. So the party asked the government to give better shape to the movement so that the western industrialists would not be able to break it up. To play an

important role in the comity of nations, the CPI (M) emphasized that the government should not vacillate so far as our foreign policy was concerned. The CPI stated that in spite of some omissions and commissions, the main content of the policy of non-alignment was kept intact. The party asked the government to tighten the bond of friendship with the socialist countries and to keep itself aloof from western aid. It seems strange that while on the one hand the CPI asked the government to pursue non-alignment and not to get aligned with any power bloc, on the other hand it did not see anything wrong if India came close to Socialist camp. It is also true that during Sino-Indian war the USA and England came to rescue while USSR remained neutral. Thus, it is a mute question that keeping all these things before eyes, should India go to strengthen its relation with the Socialist countries or it should have soft corner towards western democracies? The USA had offered food-grains when India was suffering from famine. So should India leave USA out of her hand simply supporting 'anti-imperialist marathon'? Should not she seek help from both the power blocs?

Our study reveals that Sino-Indian conflict raised eyebrows among certain sections of people of the sub-continent. The problem remained as a complex one. No settlement could make its way, partly because the talks were held at the level of officials. On that issue, the CPI (M) realized that it

would take several rounds of talks to arrive at a mutually accepted formula. That is why the party leaders encouraged the government of India to give up its hostile attitude towards China and appealed to take initiative in creating a 'climate for negotiations', to develop relations of friendship and cooperation, to go on the lines of Panchsheel. According to the CPI the decades-old rivalry was a result of Sino-Indian border dispute. To ease the tension several rounds of talks were held and the gesture of goodwill was thrown by either of them. The party was opposed to the Chinese stand i.e. imposing India to make concessions on the McMahon line.

Besides this our study indicates that due to tenuous games the superpowers played to win their respective friends with their vitriolic military help, the years of relative peace turned out into frantic conflicts. The CPI (M) welcomed all peace initiatives initiated by the Soviet Union, but was critical of her suspicious role of offering peace plans but not allowed itself to desist from arms race. If the hypocrisy implicit in stockpiling the warheads, there could be no hope of peace for the world. However, the CPI (M) highly praised that the two countries were able to reaffirm and strengthen their relations in various fields. The CPI also amazed at the Russians, the way they came to India's rescue on many crucial issues. It recalled the issue of Kashmir when the Soviet Union alone backed India's action and saved India from

Security Council censure. It is often argued that the CPI is pro-Soviet. But should we hide the fact that the help we have received from the Soviet Union in building our technology, industries and so on? There is no reason why India should not be inclined towards the Socialist countries.

Our study underlines the fact that India-USA relations had been a cluster of misunderstandings, allegation and counter-allegations. The basic reason for Indo-American discord and divergencies was due to the supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan which threatened the balance of power in the sub-continent. Moreover, the motive of the United States and its 'vital interests' in the South-Asian region caused to reverse the process of detente. Thus, India's relation with the USA was marked more of strain than cordiality. We have seen that each side reiterated its positions and policies with candour, time and again, but the differences on vital issues remained unresolved. Both the Communist parties realized that the USA was moving to disintegrate our country. The top leaders of the CPI (M) asserted that any sort of attempt by the USA to destabilise us would be challenged by the Indians. It was of the opinion that the US wanted India to give up its independent policies and become an ally of the West which clearly indicated US designs against the interest of India. Penetration of American capital to vital sectors showed the 'inability of the

government' in resisting the mounting pressure from all quarters. Unless India gave up its reactionary and opportunist policies, the party reiterated, going on to collaborate and to compromise with the imperialists, India's freedom would be at stake. So both the Communist parties discouraged for no entry of private foreign capital. They went on criticising the insidious multinationals connections which forced India to adopt a compromising position and fastened her hands from playing desired role in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

The critics give different opinions regarding the Vapid India-Pakistan relations. We have studied that the climate of mistrust and suspicion aggravated as a result of irreconcilable stands adopted by both the countries, some day or other. Though both of them realised that only widespread people-to-people contact could ease the tension, their efforts failed once and again. The CPI considered the long standing dispute of Kashmir as the main point to their worsened relationship. It held the view that all agreements turned out to be futile and the prospects of settlements of the basic problems remained as it was before. The chaotic situation that existed in Kashmir encouraged the hostile forces to exploit India. The CPI blamed the Indian bourgeoisie for its failure of promoting a climate of good neighbourliness. The CPI (M) reiterated that Pakistan had let down all the peace

initiatives proposed by India and went on getting military aid from the USA. It was the main cause for their bitter relationship. The Communist parties marked Pakistan's move to destabilise us by extending help to Sikh extremists. After a close examination of India's relation with Pakistan the question rises that what are the 'real causes' for their bitter relationship? Is it because 'Pakistan's subversive activities' in Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir or it is the 'unwillingness of the rulers' to restore cordiality in their mutual dealings?

It cannot be denied that the Communist parties frequently express for friendly relations with the neighbouring countries, as good relations with neighbours are deemed of the utmost importance and considered as the most effective antidote to the imperialist threats, to overcome the sharpened confrontation among themselves. So the 'easiest solution to the problems of the sub-continent' is that the government of India should stick to its policy of peace and non-alignment. It should be free from 'imperialist blackmail' especially in economic field. Unless India attains self-reliance in technology and economy, and frequently goes to the doors of the loan-giving nations, poverty is bound to strike to such an extent that collision between 'haves' and 'have-nots' would be inevitable.

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