

CONFIDENTIAL

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NINTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH  
NATIONAL CONGRESSES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY  
OF CHINA

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NINTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH  
NATIONAL CONGRESSES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY  
OF CHINA

M.K.R. REDDY

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

of the

School of International Studies  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI

1979

P r e f a c e

## PREFACE

In this present study an attempt is made to understand the Communist Party of China's line in its development through the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Party Congresses. In other words it deals with the character of the policies that were evolved at the Congresses, and the overall development that took place in the realm of policies in the course of time.

Therefore, the study is limited and specific. It does not deal with all aspects of the Party nor is it a general history of the Party in post-Revolutionary period. Yet, no other aspect is more important for comprehending the dynamics of the Chinese Political System. Generally all major policy decisions and important changes in the policies of the Party acquire legitimacy with the ratification of the Party National Congress. Precisely speaking, all major policy decisions take shape at the Congresses. Thus the study helps in understanding shifts and turns in the Party's line between Ninth and Eleventh Party Congresses.


Introductory Chapter examines the developments that preceded the Ninth Congress. Chapter I analyses the Ninth Party Congress and Lin Piao affair. In Chapter II discussion focusses on the Tenth Party Congress and the "Eleventh inner-Party Struggle". Chapter III deals with the Eleventh

Party Congress. And in concluding Chapter an attempt is made to compare the policies evolved at the above-mentioned Congresses and sum up the changes and developments that have occurred in the course of these years (1969-77).

The study would have been impossible without help from many quarters. I owe special debt to Professor (Mrs) Gargi Dutt, my Supervisor, for her unstinting help at every stage, including a painstaking reading with extensive comments on each and every Chapter of the preliminary drafts.

I am thankful to my friends for their unfailing help and co-operation in the preparation of this study. I wish to acknowledge the help that I received from the staff of ICWA Library and JNU Library. Finally I am grateful to my parents whose love sustained me during the entire gestation period.

While thanking the aforementioned I wish to state that I alone am responsible for all the inadequacies in this study.




( M.K.R. REDDY )

New Delhi

Dated: 23. 6. 1979.

C O N T E N T S

	Pages
Preface ...	i - ii§
Introduction ...	1 - 12
Chapter I      Ninth Party Congress and Lin Piao Affair	13 - 43
Chapter II     The Tenth Party Congress and its Aftermath	44 - 78
Chapter III    The Eleventh Party Congress	79 - 113
Chapter IV    Conclusion	114 - 125
Select Bibliography ...	126 - 144



## INTRODUCTION

## INTRODUCTION

The role of the Communist Party is pivotal in the functioning of all socialist societies. In the absence of such a Party economic and social system cannot be revolutionized, and restoration of bourgeois domination becomes inevitable.

The role of the Party consists not only in defining sound objectives, but also in grasping what the masses are prepared to do and in leading them forward, elaborating adequate tactics and strategy and in helping the masses to organize themselves. Thus it is the Party which centralizes the initiative of the masses in order to help proletariat and the masses at large to advance along socialist transition. Such a party is necessary for the exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for it is with the aid of such a Party that the proletariat and the popular masses can gain increasing control over their conditions of existence.

This study proposes to deal with one of the important aspects of the Party, i.e., the National Congress of the Party. In the Congresses' either old policies get legitimised or new policies are declared. To explain its significance clearly, one can say that in the Congress a blue-print for the socio-politico-economic development is formulated.



Since the liberation starting with Eighth National Congress of CPC, four National Congresses have been held so far. Even though this study is concerned only with Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh National Congresses of CPC, it would be difficult to understand them properly without some knowledge of historical background. Because the convening of the Ninth Party Congress was the result of the success of Maoist group over the 'Rightists' in the Cultural Revolution.

So an account of Cultural Revolution would be appropriate before we start the actual appraisal. Cultural Revolution which erupted in 1966 was actually many years in the making. Its origins were deeply embedded in an ideological dispute regarding the best method for implementing the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism in China.

Beginning with debates over Big Leap and Communes, the disagreements among the party leaders were gradually transformed into a much more fundamental dispute over basic policy. "The trouble is not of recent origin but dates back to about a decade and is intimately connected with developments in 1957 and 1958, particularly the "Big Leap" and the "Peoples Communes".<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> V.P. Dutt and Gargi Dutt, China's Cultural Revolution (New York, 1970), p.3.

After completing political consolidation and accomplishing rehabilitation of war-torn economy, Peking launched the First Five Year Plan in the year 1953.

The First Five Year Plan was based on Soviet Model of economic development. Mao himself has explained this:

"In the early stages of liberation, we had no experience of managing the entire nation. So in the period of First Five Year Plan, we could do no more than copy Soviet Union's methods although we never felt satisfied about it". 2

In the first plan, priority was given to industry over agriculture and heavy industry over light industry, within heavy industry workers participation gave way to Soviet system of one-man management.

The results of the First Five Year Plan in industry were dramatic. China put up a rate of growth which was unprecedented in any comparable country. But economic growth and development of the modern sector in particular was restricted in various ways by the slow advance of traditional sector, especially agriculture.<sup>3</sup>

---

2 Mao Tse-tung, "Reading Notes on Soviet Union's Political Economics", in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, 1949-1968 (Virginia: Joint Publication and Research Service, 1974), p.310.

3 Li Choh-ming, "Economic Development", in Franz Schurmann, and Orville Schell, ed., Communist China (Harmonds Worth, 1977), p.199.

These economic factors argued, therefore, for some new approach to national development a different strategy that could halt the decline of economy and stimulate renewed progress towards the regime's goals.

In order to alleviate the situation Mao in his report entitled "Ten Major Relationships" submitted to Supreme State Conference held in April 1956, suggested a way out. These ten relationships, crudely synthesize three trends in Mao's thought at that time: "the desire for accelerating socialist construction, the question of counter revolutionary trends inside the party and searching for a new economic model that would resolve the dichotomies between industry and agriculture and so on. The important thing to note here is that Mao's suggestions on these lines were ignored in the Eighth National Congress held in October 1956." <sup>4</sup> The general line which Liu put forward at this Congress was the continuation of Soviet model of economic development.

But political circumstances that existed in 1956-57 forced new choices upon CPC. The Polish and Hungarian crisis following Khrushchev's 'de-Stalinization' stimulated the party to re-examine China's own internal tensions and

---

4 Manoranjan Mohanty, "Theory of Continued Revolution in CPC", in IDSA Journal (New Delhi), vol.6, no.2, 1973, p.243.

problems. Added to this the flood of criticisms, made during 'Hundred Flowers' period, revealed widespread dissidence.

Mao found answers to this question in his speech entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions". It contained the main elements of basic line through it was not described as such yet. Mao said that only class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat is the guarantee against counter revolution. This seems to have contributed to the intensified ideological debate inside the CPC and Mao appeared to have gathered enough strength by early 1958. Because the CPC was called for a second session in May 1958 to launch new line.

The resolution on the report spoke of "continuing with the socialist revolution on the economic, political and ideological fronts".<sup>5</sup> This was in sharp contrast to the 1956 resolution which had declared that "the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeois in our country has been basically resolved..... and that the social system of socialism has in the main been established."

---

5 See Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee September 1956-April 1969 (Hong Kong, 1971), pp.87.

6 Ibid., p.32.

The political report submitted by Liu laid down the basic tenets of Great Leap Forward Movement. In order to accelerate the economic development the party proposed to increase growth in agriculture and industrial sectors using both modern capital intensive and labour intensive methods, and as a means of encouraging local initiative, it argued for the decentralisation of economic planning and management to give greater discretion to local authorities. To facilitate mobilisation of local savings and surplus labour for the development of local industry and agriculture, APC's were merged together to evolve higher form of co-operative-communes. Thus the strategy demonstrates the CPC's urge for rapid development in socialist construction and the adoption of mass line approach to development.<sup>7</sup>

Post-Great Leap Period:

But the movement rapidly changed into something very different from the original form. It resulted in dislocation; scarcities; the collapse of national planning; the over-stretching of labour force; neglect of agriculture; commandism; and suppression of local initiative.<sup>8</sup>

---

7 See Documents of the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC (Peking), p.51.

8 see Kang Chao, "The Great Leap", in Schurmann, n.3, pp.402-412.

With the result nation's agriculture and industrial production had shown a marked decline; and growing discontent among the masses had brought about widespread disorder. A series of conferences were called to consider changes in the policy. This period (post-1958) saw severe inner Party struggles. During this period Mao and his policies were severely attacked by then Defence Minister Peng Teh-huai. Peng argued that "in the view of some comrades putting politics in command could be a substitute for everything --- putting politics in command is no substitute for the economic principles, still less for the concrete measures in economic work."<sup>9</sup> However, Mao was able to carry the majority of CC with him in removing Peng from his position at the Eighth Plenum of the CC.

Nevertheless from 1958 onwards many decisions were taken, which initiated a process of liberalization. Firstly, it granted decision making power to local production units and units of production were made individually responsible for their own performance. It means that managers, administrators, and technicians were given relatively wide zone of discretion in meeting the

---

9 See "The Wicked History of Peng Teh-huai", in Current Background (Hong Kong), no.851, 26 April 1968, p.22.

contractual obligation of the State. Secondly, principle of reward according to labour was restored. In the field of agriculture three levels of control were introduced. Production Brigade constituted the basic one. Ownership at commune level was another one. Small part was vested with the Production Brigade.<sup>10</sup>

The hall-mark of these measures was that they were governed primarily by pragmatic and materialistic considerations rather than by politics and ideology. Propelled by these, Chinese society began to move in a direction which in terms of the goals and techniques of the Great Leap amounted to nothing short of a great retreat. Mao said shortly after Lushan Plenum that "very many people are hurling insults at our Great Leap Forward and People's Communes..."<sup>11</sup>

However, the process of liberalization continued unabated. Among these the most important was CC's decision in 1960 to permit the peasants to cultivate small plots, and engage in family secondary enterprise on a small scale and to revive village fairs and markets.<sup>12</sup>

---

10 See Joint Editorial, "Struggle Between Two Roads in China's Countryside", in Peking Review (Peking), no.49, 1 December 1967, p.15.

11 Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed (Harmonds Worth, 1975), p.156.

12 Parris Chang, Power and Policy in China (Pennsylvania, 1975), p.128.

Later in 1962 these privileges were popularised with the help of the following slogan: 'Three Freedoms - One Guarantee',<sup>13</sup> popularization of the newly granted privileges of private plots of land, free markets, and a liberalized policy of free enterprise, with each household responsible for meeting its production quota set by the State. More important thing to note was that 'Right Deviationists' reprimanded at Lushan were encouraged to refute the charges made against them.<sup>14</sup> During the same period devastating criticism was directed at Mao and his policies by leading Peking intellectuals, especially Wu Han, and Teng To.

Nearly two years after Lushan Plenum, Mao took offensive at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth CC. At the meeting Mao said:

"We must acknowledge that classes will continue to exist for a long time. We must also acknowledge the existence of a struggle of class against class, and admit the possibility of the restoration of reactionary classes. We must raise our vigilance and properly educate our youth as well as the cadres, the masses and the middle and basic level cadres." 15

Thus Mao reminded the people to "never forget class struggle."

---

13 Cited in Y.C. Chang, Factional and Coalition Policies in China: The Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath (New York, 1976), p.8.

14 The Case of Peng Teh-huai (Hong Kong), 1968, p.v.

15 See Schram, n.11, p.189.



At the Plenum, Peng Teh-hua<sup>1</sup> submitted a report of over "80,000 words, "which repeated his earlier criticism of the "Three Red Banners". It is said that the Report was also approved by Liu. But Peng was not forgiven.<sup>16</sup>

The Plenum, however, did not alter then existing moderate policies while agreeing on the necessity of launching an education campaign in the rural areas.<sup>17</sup>

On 20 May 1963 the party adopted a "Draft Resolution of the CC of the CPC on Some Problems in Current Rural Work" - the Blue Print for the Rural Education Movement. This resolution was authored by Mao himself and often referred as First Ten Points.

However, in the face of mounting resistance in the villages, the Resolution was modified to the point of making it ineffective.<sup>18</sup> Mao apparently faced by overwhelming opposition at the Conference, was unable to impose his views and left in late November 1965 for Shanghai where he joined his wife and other radicals.<sup>19</sup> At this time Lin Piao who replaced Peng Teh-huai as Defence Minister, gained control of Peking with the help of his forces. Mao ended his absence and returned

---

16 See n.14, p.vii, viii.

17 See Chang, n.12, p.143.

18 See n.10, p.17.

19 Mao Tse-tung, "A Talk at the Work Conference of the Centre, 25 October 1966", in Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.1, no.1, 1968, p.8.

back to Peking to convene Eleventh Plenum of the CC long overdue, at which Liu had hoped to unseat Mao.<sup>20</sup>

The Plenum issued the 'sixteen points' as guideline for conducting Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with the objective of launching struggle against those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticise and repudiate ideology of the bourgeoisie in all parts of super-structure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the development of the socialist system.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the contradiction between the two lines sharpened. Beginning with the debates over Big Leap and Communes, the disagreements among the party leaders were gradually transformed into a much more fundamental dispute over basic policy. The differences between the two groups can be summed up as 'politics command' versus 'technique command'. These reflect a fundamental difference between Mao and Liu. "Liu's theory holds that productive forces - land, technique, machinery, and labour power - determine productive relations - the arrangements men make for production - and the whole super-structure of ideology and culture that follows as a result. Mao on the other hand, understood that the

---

20 Chang, n.12, p.170.

21 David Milton and others, ed., Peoples China (Harmonds Worth, 1977), p.270.

connection between productive forces, productive relations is dialectical and in constant interaction.... while the forces of production play a major role in determining the contours of human society, there are times when new productive relations are needed to release and develop new productive forces such times massive political transformation is a prerequisite for further productive development."<sup>22</sup>

Consequently, the struggle became very acute. The Cultural Revolution in fact is a real struggle for political power by political actors. At the same time it is a campaign to raise political consciousness of the leaders and the led. "While the political struggle involved the removal of capitalist roaders, the ideological struggle established ~~criteria~~ <sup>criteria</sup> for remoulding the consciousness of the whole nation."<sup>23</sup>

Ninth National Congress of the CPC was convened on the morrow of victory of Maoist group to legitimise the expulsion of Liu and his faction from CPC. It was also necessary to affirm faith in Mao Tse-tung Thought and to replace the purged Liuists in the CPC with Mao's supporters. Twelfth Plenum of Eighth<sup>CC</sup>/met in the month of October 1968, discussed the preparations for the event.

---

22 William Hinton, Turning Point in China (New York), pp.43-44.

23 Milton, n.21, p.221.

CHAPTER I

NINTH PARTY CONGRESS AND LIN PIAO AFFAIR

## CHAPTER I

### NINTH PARTY CONGRESS AND LIN PIAO AFFAIR

#### The Agenda of the Congress:

The Ninth Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) opened in Peking on 1 April 1969, and it was in session till 24 April 1969 to reaffirm Maoist policies. The date of the Congress was kept secret. Even though 12th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee, held in Peking from 11-31 October announced that Ninth Party Congress would be convened at an "appropriate date", no precise date was given. Then when the world started guessing, NCNA declared that the Congress is already in session from 1 April 1969.

In the same way there was much publicity in the Chinese mass-media about the preparations for the Congress, but no details were given. A communique issued by the Presidium of the Secretariat of the Ninth National Congress of the CPC on the same day when the Congress opened, stated that a total of 1512 delegates attended the Congress, the largest number ever. According to the communique the delegates included the old party members, party members who have emerged in the course of the Cultural Revolution, party members in the PLA, and Red Guards. Delegates were selected at provincial party congresses after consultation with the masses and party organisation at various levels.<sup>1</sup>

---

1 See Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CPC, in Peking Review (Peking), no.44, 4 April 1969.

The achievements of the Congress included a Political Report submitted by Lin Piao, New Party Constitution, "some very important speeches" by Mao Tse-tung. And the Congress elected the Ninth Central Committee.

Election of the Ninth Central Committee:

The process of selection of the Central Committee continued for more than a week. In the beginning candidates for membership and alternate membership of the Central Committee were nominated by the delegates in accordance with the rules laid down by the Presidium of the Congress. According to the press communique issued by the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Congress on 24 April, the Presidium finalised a preliminary list of candidates after consulting the delegates, election by secret ballot was then conducted. After such "repeated consultations from below and above", a final list of candidates was decided upon.

The Central Committee had 170 members and 108 alternate members. In the Central Committee, 50 per cent of the members were military men as compared to the Party cadres share of 31 per cent. Another 17.5 per cent was claimed by Mass Organisations.<sup>2</sup>

---

2 Jurgen Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution  
(London, 1976), p.35.

There is no dispute about the fact that during Cultural Revolution period, Party and Government were virtually paralysed as a result of attacks made by Red Guards. In such a situation it was the PLA, which once again ruled the country as it had in 1949. Later it even played vital role in rebuilding the Party. But one need not conclude from this highly visible increase in military in the higher organs of power that China was under military rule, and that army displaced the Party as ruling elite. Because the army/party distinctions do not apply in a country like China. As a people's army its strictly military and non-military characters are inextricably linked. Similarly the relation between party and army is never that of mutual exclusivity. While functionally the army was under the direction of the Party, distinct lines between military and non-military personnel were blurred by organizational fusion of the PLA and the CPC. So they cannot be viewed as totally distinct entities with conflicting interests. And those who held "key positions did so not simply by virtue of their position in the army but also by virtue of their position in the Party."<sup>3</sup>

---

3 Graham Young, "Party Building and Search for Unity", in Bill Brugger, ed., China : The Impact of the Cultural Revolution (New York, 1978), p.43.

Another thing is the Central Committee as constituted was too large to be effective. Even though the Central Committee is an important body, it meets only infrequently, and that too largely to ratify operational policy. General policy decisions are made by the Politbureau and in particular by its Standing Committee.

In contrast to the enlargement of the Central Committee the Standing Committee has shrunk in size. The Standing Committee of the Eighth Central Committee had seven members whereas the Standing Committee of the Ninth Central Committee had only five members. All of them were well known; Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, and Chen Po-ta. As for Lin he held this position, as explained earlier, by virtue of his position in the Party.

Above all, the Congress expressed strong desire to rebuild the Party as the vanguard. Lin Piao has devoted an entire section of the Political Report to 'consolidation and building the Party', which can be discussed later.

For the first time in the history of the Communist movement, the names of the Central Committee members with the exception of Mao and Lin were announced in alphabetical order. This was in keeping with the general anti-hierarchical trend prevalent during the Cultural Revolution period.



The Revised Party Constitution:

The Constitution of the Party also manifested this trend. As one writer pointed out "it could be described as the epitome of the struggle against bureaucratism within the Party during the Cultural Revolution".<sup>4</sup> The Constitution has given a party member the right to by-pass immediate leadership and report to higher levels in case he disagrees with their decisions and directives. In the same way Party members were required to be bold enough in making criticisms and self-criticisms. All the members were supposed to work for the majority of the peoples and consult masses whenever problems arise.

The Constitution like the Political Report, attributed all the victories achieved till that period to Mao, hence Mao Tse-tung thought was incorporated in the Party Constitution as the guiding principle of the Party.

It explained very little about the process of the Party reconstruction. The basic principles as laid down by the Constitution were simple enough: "members would be selected from 'revolutionary elements' after consulting masses."

---

4 G.P. Deshpande, China's Cultural Revolution: A View from India (Bombay, 1971), p.71.

As if to out-do all this, the general programme of the Constitution declared that "Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close Comrade-in-arms and successor."<sup>5</sup>

The Political Report:

The most important item in the agenda was the Political Report. It was submitted by Lin Piao on 1 April 1969 and had been subjected to "minute group discussions by the delegates for two weeks." The Press Communique issued by the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Congress on 14 April 1969 stated that "many good proposals for additions to and modifications to report had been made". But no information is available about the nature of discussion and type of changes suggested by the Congress.

Apparently the Political Report was thoroughly discussed by the Central Committee prior to submitting to the Congress. It was said that the draft of the Report prepared by Lin Piao with the aid of Chen Po-ta was rejected by the Central Committee and it was again drafted under Mao's guidance. Chou En-lai in his report to the Tenth National Congress stated that "prior to the Congress, Lin had produced a draft Political Report in collaboration

---

5 The Constitution of CPC, in Chinese Law and Government (New York, 1969), vol.2, no.1, p.65.

with Chen Po-ta. They were opposed to continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, contending that the main task after the Ninth Congress was to develop production.... Naturally this draft by Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta was rejected by the Central Committee.<sup>6</sup> It is difficult to explain why Lin was made successor to Mao, eventhough the draft Report prepared by him was rejected by the Central Committee on the grounds that it was based on productivist theory.

The Political Report has opened with discussion on the class struggle. Quoting Marx and Lenin, it explained that classes remain and class struggle persists even after the proletarian dictatorship has been established. Evidently Marx and Lenin's authority was invoked to underline that ideological vigilance is a must. Only by arousing the masses to air their views freely can the capitalist roaders be exploded. After establishing the necessity of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao narrated the course of the Cultural Revolution.

Origins of the Cultural Revolution were traced back to 1957. "From the struggle against the bourgeois rightists in 1957 to the struggle to uncover Peng Teh-huai's anti-party clique at Lushan meeting in 1959, from

---

6 Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CPC, in Peking Review, nos. 35-36, 7 September 1973, p.17.

the great debate on the general line of the Party in building socialism to the struggle between two lines in the socialist education movement - the focus of the struggle was the question of whether to take the socialist road or to take the capitalist...."<sup>7</sup>

Thus the report conformed the notion that differences in the Party became really acute in late fifties. Whereas Liu Shao-chi felt that the "question which wins out capitalism or socialism is already solved", Mao stressed that the "question is not really solved". Nevertheless Lushan Plenum is the watershed in Chinese history. At Lushan Plenum Defence Minister Peng Teh-huai was dismissed and Lin Piao took over. Two wings had by now clearly emerged in the Party. For the first time in 1962 at Working Conference of the Central Committee, according to Lin Piao, Chairman Mao pointed out the "necessity of guarding against the emergence of revisionism." At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao suggested Socialist Education Movement to make people more vigilant against revisionists. Following this 10-point Decision on Rural Work was formulated, which laid down the line, principle and policies of the



---

7 Report to the Ninth National Congress of CPC, in Peking Review (Special Issue), 28 April 1969, p.13.

Party for the Socialist Education Movement. Lin Piao stated that all these warnings did not influence Liu Shao-chi and his gang. So, "at the end of 1964, Chairman Mao called the Working Conference of the Central Committee, and under his direction the document 'Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialised Education Movement in the Rural Areas' was drawn up. And for the first time Chairman Mao specifically indicated that "the main target in the present movement are those persons in power taking the capitalist road."<sup>8</sup>

With the criticism of 'Hai Jui Dismissed from Office', the conflict erupted into struggle for political power. 'The Circular' of 16 May 1966 worked out under Mao Tse-tung's guidance laid down the line and theory of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It called upon the whole nation to criticise those persons in the Party who are taking capitalist road. Startled at the great upsurge among the people Liu Shao-chi was alleged to have suppressed the revolutionary movement. At this juncture, Mao called on Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party. The Plenary Session adopted the document '16-Point Decision Concerning Cultural Revolution'. Mao called on the people to 'Bombard the Headquarters'.

8 Ibid., p.15.



But 'no reactionary class ever stepped down from the stage of history of its own accord". This is natural: "When the revolution touched that portion of power usurped by bourgeois, the class struggle became all the more acute".<sup>9</sup> From the winter of 1966 to the spring of 1967, counter reaction started to make itself felt. Lin said that the adverse current was overcome under the guidance of Mao in the Spring of 1967. But again the situation had become complicated. In between summer 1967 and Spring 1968, both the 'Right' and the 'extreme Left' tendencies emerged to reverse correct verdicts. They directed their spearhead against the PLA and Revolutionary Committees. Lin said that finally like their predecessors they were also defeated without giving any details about it. Lin closed his account at this, leaving an impression that everything was settled by this time.

Lin Piao's narration of the Cultural Revolution corroborated chronology of struggle between Mao and Liu, widely held among China watchers. But there are certain gaps in it. The most important of them being total silence on the role of PLA in Cultural Revolution and

---

9 Ibid., p.17.

internal struggles in the PLA. The Report, which was fairly specific on the question of 'preparations and the course of the Cultural Revolution' has become rather obscure on problems of policies. Two sections in the report were devoted to the policies and stance of the Party.

The Report stressed that as the class enemy has not been completely eliminated the revolution was supposed to continue. The question of which class holds leadership was not decided. The proletariat could consolidate its position only through relentless struggles in the realm of super structure and by forging greater unity through 'struggle-criticism-transformation'. In order to carry the revolution into the super-structure, Lin suggested the following steps: establishing three-in-one Revolutionary Committees in all factories, mines, educational and cultural institutions, offices, army units, communes etc., mass criticism of all Right or Extreme "Left" erroneous ideas which run counter to proletarian lines, repudiation of wrong-doers and purification of the class ranks. With regard to the people who made mistakes, the policy of 'curing the sickness to save the patient' was suggested. To escape the strangle-hold of bureaucracy, simplification of administrative structure was

envisaged. Finally, office workers and party cadres were asked to participate in productive work. To ensure workers participation in the management and to release their initiative all irrational rules and regulations were supposed to be changed.

These policies have great significance in transition period. For example, the co-operation between workers and technicians, ensured through 'three-in-one' team, would promote technical development. Because "workers have rich practical experience of technical methods, it is possible, by stimulating on this experience, to develop technology according to the criteria of quality, economy and speed".<sup>10</sup> Further workers participation in management enables immediate producers to gain knowledge, that would enrich their practice of production and gives them a chance to transform it themselves. Concurrently, by participating in manual labour cadres and technicians could have more accurate knowledge of production as well of the ideas and requirements of the masses. Hence the factory was

---

10 Marco Maccio, "Party, Technicians and Working Class in Chinese Revolution", in Andre Gorz, ed., The Division of Labour (London, 1976), p.115.



supposed to become a centre for mass training of people. Thus the report proposed a blend of 'theory' with 'practice'.

By criticising revisionism and repudiating wrong doers, workers would also overcome their division and achieve complete unity without which they would not be able to exercise complete power.

All these changes can be aptly explained in one single phrase 'politics in command'. As Marco Maccio said "to put politics in command does not mean that they must restrict themselves to propaganda work, but will give rise to a mass movement in enterprise that establishes workers control over technology, organisation and management"<sup>11</sup> It offers a field of action to the creative responsibility and collective concern for production.

Thus the policies envisaged in the report intended to destroy capitalist relations of production - where worker is completely subjugated by the capital and is a mere appendage to the machine. Collective appropriation of capital can take place only when capitalist relations of production are completely destroyed. Further one can say that State ownership of means of production does not indicate transformation of relations of production, it denotes nothing more than transfer of legal ownership.

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.117.

If such a transfer leaves intact the relations of production power will remain with capital only those who represent it will be different. If the transition to communism is to take place, if there is to be collective appropriation by the producers of means of production, the immediate producers must themselves take over means of production and radically transform production relations.

Policy-wise another significant feature of Lin Piao's report was the very small space given to economic problems. "Everything was explained in one slogan 'grasp revolution and promote production'. What one can deduct from this is as follows: "Even in socialist society the contradiction between productive forces and production relation does exist, once the contradiction is grasped and production relations are changed productive forces develop. Besides this, no specific details about the economic strategy were given. Maybe Lin thought that economic goals could be decided against the backdrop of political goals that have been attained after long struggle. This could be the only plausible explanation because Maoists "desired a re-orientation of the values and norms of economic activity, not a re-orientation of the economic development programme itself. The most essential goals

of the Maoists were the destruction of the emerging elitism and the fostering of great popular participation in that economic development programme".<sup>12</sup>

Although the report manifested the urge of the Congress to rebuild the Party, there remained important unanswerable questions concerning the way in which the progress of rectification and party building was to be effected.

But on the basis of the report certain generalizations can be made. The report emphasised that Party building should be an integral part of the programme of 'struggle-criticism-transformation'. Party building was separated into two components - ideological consolidation and building and organizational consolidation and building. It was continuously stressed that ideological building should have priority and had to be carried out before organizational building could proceed. The political report said "the Party organization should be composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat, it should be a vigorous vanguard organization capable of leading proletariat and revolutionary masses in the fight against class enemy".<sup>13</sup>

---

12 R.F. Dernberger, "The Cultural Revolution and the Economy", in Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol.12, no.12, (October 1972), p.1061.

13 Report to the Ninth Congress of CPC, n.7, p.23.

Unlike other policies the report gave clear picture of China's view of the world. Section seven, the longest of all, dealt with China's relations with other countries. China feared as it continues to do so, that in the two power domination of the world no one else would have a place. Lin perceived the contradiction between superpowers and the third world countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America as the 'primary contradiction'. The report placed China in the camp of oppressed nations. It proposed a broad united front as the best method, by which imperialism could be opposed.

The report stated that "all countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by US imperialism and Soviet revisionism must unite and form the broadest possible united front and overthrow our common enemies".<sup>14</sup>

Eventhough both 'Soviet revisionism' and 'US imperialism' were severely attacked, the brunt of the attack was on the former. Lin referred to the border dispute with the Soviet Union. He spoke of China's initiatives in 1960s to continue the talks, and their final start during 1964 in Peking. And the report blamed the Soviet Union for the final

---

14 Ibid., p.27.

breakdown of talks. Further, it stated that "since Breznev came to power, with its baton becoming less and less effective and its difficulties at home and abroad growing more and more serious, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been practicing social imperialism and social fascism more frantically than ever".<sup>15</sup> Thus Soviet Union had become enemy number one of China. But it is difficult to derive from the Report any softening of attitude towards the USA.

Lin emphasised that the "US imperialism and Soviet revisionism are always trying to isolate China". At the same time there was no slackness in the desire to mend the differences"... to strive for peaceful co-existence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles".<sup>16</sup>

On the whole, the Congress was held in an atmosphere of triumph. Lin Piao was very jubilant about the success in the Cultural Revolution. This is evident from the lengthy passages about past struggles. But at the same time the Congress was not complacent about then prevailing

---

15 Ibid., p32.

16 Ibid., p.34.

situation. From the report one <sup>can</sup> makes the following list of problems that the Congress resolved to solve:

1. Unity among the masses;
2. Reconstruction of the Party;
3. Carrying out the struggles in the superstructure.

Thus the Congress was primarily concerned with the problem of political consolidation of the country. What made political consolidation the first order of the day was the fact <sup>that</sup> during the Cultural Revolution the Party was split into several factions. If the Party was to rule effectively the country, it had to be rebuilt. Secondly many people had been alienated from the Party due to excesses of the Red Guards. These impediments must be removed if the country had to progress. That is why the Congress called for unity of the masses to win greater victories. This was made clear by Mao in his address to the Congress. He said, "I hope this will be good Congress, a Congress of unity, a Congress of victory". <sup>17</sup>

But unfortunately in such a critical juncture, the Congress failed to give specific instructions for socio-economic development. It raised many problems and left

---

17     Stuart Schram, ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed  
 (Harmondsworth, 1974), p.280.

them without giving any solutions. As mentioned earlier, it stressed that struggle in the superstructure did not come to an end and suggested 'struggle-criticism-transformation' method to carry the revolution into the superstructure. But no details were given about its process. Again regarding the Party reconstruction the report gave only a general outline of the scheme. Concerning economic development little information can be derived from the report about the economic strategy. "Surprisingly the Cultural Revolution failed to produce an official pronouncement of the radical institutional changes sought by the apparently victorious Maoists...."<sup>18</sup>

So the Congress did not raise upto the expectations to lead the country away from the ensuing crisis. The report was too general to derive any specific instructions.

#### Lin Piao Affair:

Even the belief that after the Ninth Congress peace and stability would be established, had been thwarted by intense political struggles which led to the downfall of Lin Piao. The unity established at the Congress proved to be very brittle.

---

18 Dernberger, n.12, pp.1060-61.

The crimes that Lin was alleged to have committed fall into two categories: deviations from the line and policies set by the Party and Mao, and his personal ambition for power and his engineering of a conspiracy to overthrow Mao by use of arms.

At the level of line and policy, Lin was specifically charged with having advocated the erroneous theory of 'genius'. By advocating such a metaphysical theory, it was charged that Lin tried to undermine the role of the Party and masses to enhance his own position. Secondly, Lin was accused of indiscriminate purges in the Party.

On the personal level charges mentioned were 'careerism', 'high handedness', 'arrogance', and 'conspiracy' to overthrow proletarian dictatorship'.

According to Philip Bridgham the struggle had passed through three stages.<sup>19</sup> In the first stage the struggle was muted, characterised by growing divergence of views. In the second stage, extending from the Second Plenum through the Summer of 1971, the struggle revealed itself into an open political combat, the third stage of the struggle occurred in 1971 when Mao sought assurance of regional leaders for an impending show down and Lin, on learning this, reacted by attempting to flee China.

---

19 Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao", China Quarterly (London), no.55, 1973, p.428.



The origin of the struggle can be traced as far back as Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. Chou En-lai in his report to the Tenth Congress stated, as mentioned earlier, that the draft political Report prepared by Lin Piao to be delivered at the Ninth National Party Congress was rejected by the Central Committee. It was alleged that in this Lin sensed threat to his position. As Chou En-lai said "although Lin Piao had become successor at the Congress, his mind was not at ease. He knew that he would not really become successor".<sup>20</sup> Lin apparently turned to Chen Po-ta and certain military leaders for support in struggle for succession.

Even before the Congress also, there were differences between Mao and Lin over the scale of purge within the Party and on the theory of 'genius'. On the eve of Cultural Revolution, Lin expounded his theory of 'genius' at an enlarged session of politburo held between 4-18 May 1966. In his speech Lin said that Chairman has mastered dialectics and has gained a thorough understanding of everything. What Mao experienced was said to be much more than what Marx, Engels and Lenin had experienced.<sup>21</sup>

---

20 Cited in Ibid., p.429.

21 See Lin Piao's Talk at the Enlarged Session of the Politburo, 18 May 1966, in Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.8, no.5, February 1972, p.104.

Following this, exaltation of Mao Tse-tung became a national movement. It implies that heroes make history and the role of the Party and masses in the making of history is nominal. Broad masses and the party can proceed progressively only by following the 'hero' blindly. Thus it intended to enhance his own prestige and power. True to his belief that 'masses are supreme' Mao opposed it. In his letter to Chiang Ching he wrote,

"I was quite uneasy at some of his thinking. I have never believed that the several booklets that I wrote would have so much supernatural power. Now after he exaggerated them the whole nation has exaggerated them...".<sup>22</sup>

As a corollary to the concept of 'genius' came Lin's notion of 'requirements for revolutionary cadres: He stated emphatically that a cadre should follow Mao Tse-tung obediently despite the fact whether he understood Mao or not. He said: "Whoever opposes Chairman Mao shall be dismissed from office no matter how capable he is".<sup>23</sup> Instead of enabling the wrong-doers appropriate the ideas and analysis of Marxism-Leninism, Lin Piao seems to have thought only in terms of criticising them.

---

22 See Mao Tse-tung's private letter to Chiang ching, in Issues and Studies, vol.9, no.4, January 1973, p.95.

23 See Lin Piao's Instructions on the question of the line of Cadres, in n.21, 10 August 1966, p.108.

And it also diverted masses from their efforts at analysis by asking them to wait for orders. "It accordingly advanced the notion that it is more important to replace one person with another than to revolutionise prevailing social relationships".<sup>24</sup> This tendency also manifested in Lin's proposition to study quotations from Mao Tse-tung. It is tantamount to saying that the study of Marxism-Leninism was an obsolete task. So Lin Piao never believed in re-education and the transformation of wrong-doers, instead he encouraged only 'life-and-death' struggles. Consequently, it disrupted unity and resulted in factionalism.

Mao who initiated attack on party cadres during the Cultural Revolution had been alarmed by widespread violence and wholesale purge. He subsequently told Edgar Snow that he had been "most unhappy about the maltreatment of....party members and others removed from power".<sup>25</sup> The 1969 New Year Day editorial suggested that in carrying out the rectification campaign thereafter, "the target must be narrowed and more people must be helped through education".<sup>26</sup>

---

24 Charles Bettelheim, Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China (New York, 1974), p.109.

25 Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (London, 1973), p.174.

26 See joint editorial of 1 January 1969, "Place Mao Tse-tung Thought in Command of Everything", in Peking Review, no.1, 3 January 1969, p.8.

The Ninth Congress Political Report also emphasised this aspect. The Political Report also stressed that with regard to those who have made mistakes the policy of 'curing the disease to save the patient' should be followed. The policy of 'killing none and not arresting most' was suggested to all except those against whom there was evidence of crimes such as murder, arson or poisoning.

Around the same period some articles appeared in Peoples Daily and Red Flag criticising the work-style of some high-level party cadres as "arrogant and complacent". An editorial in Red Flag criticised the theory of 'genius' in a subtle way. It said that "Mao highly values the creation and wisdom of the masses. He makes theoretical and scientific generalizations and summing of their advanced experience which is of fundamental and universal significance...."<sup>27</sup> This was intended to show that masses are creators of history and to refute the theory of 'genius'. On the other hand the editorial said that arrogance and "priding oneself on one's own merits" comes in the way summing up experience of the masses.

---

27 See Red Flag editorial of 14 March 1969, "On Summing Up Experience", as reproduced in Peking Review, no.12, 21 March 1969, p.3.

A People's Daily editorial emphasised the importance of work-style in achieving desirous goals. It had given some suggestions regarding work-methods.<sup>28</sup>

Following this, two important events occurred which set the stage for confrontation at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee in August 1970. First was Mao's decision to remove the post of Chairman of the State from the new draft constitution. A Central Committee statement in 1970 revealed Mao's insistence that no state Chairman be provided under the new Constitution. It states that:

".... our great leader Chairman Mao, in March 1970, suggested that we convene the Fourth Peoples Congress and revise the Constitution, and he also recommended that we should not establish a state Chairman".<sup>29</sup>

This decision, which confirmed Premier Chou En-lai as the de-facto head of the government suggested a collective leadership in which Lin as head of the party, and Chou as head of the government would share power. Lin Piao might have interpreted this decision in effect disinheriting him as the successor.

---

See

28 People's Daily editorial of 5 November 1969, "Payment attention to Work-methods", as reproduced in Peking Review, no.47, 14 November 1969, pp.5-6.

29 See Document of the Central Committee of the CPC No.567, 1970, in Chinese Law and Government, vol.5, nos.3-4, 1972-73, p.69.

Following this decision, a Joint Editorial of 1 July 1970 had set new criteria for selecting Communist Party members which differed sharply with those put forward by Lin Piao. The editorial redefined "a Marxist as one who was loyal to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought, who trusted masses and who after making mistakes, was willing to conduct self-criticism".<sup>30</sup>

Finally, in the Lushan Conference the struggle reached its pinnacle. At the Second Plenum held from 23 August to 6 September 1970, it was alleged that Lin Piao in league with Chen Po-ta and seven top military leaders (Huang Hungsheng, Wu Fe-hsien, Yeh chun, Li Tso-peng, Chiu Hui-tso, Li Hsueh-feng, Cheng weishan) carried out a 'surprise attack'. The 'surprise attack' contained in speeches by Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. According to the Central Committee Documents Lin-Chen group had attempted from 23-25 August to alter the agenda of the Plenum.<sup>31</sup> Instead of tackling the problems of the National People Congress, whose

---

30 See Joint Editorial of 1 July 1970, "Communists should be the Advanced Elements of the Proletariat", in Peking Review, no.2, 3 July 1970, p.11.

31 Summary of Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades, in Schram, n.17, pp.290-291;

Document of the Central Committee of the CPC, no.4, 1972, in Chinese Law and Government, vol.5, nos.3-4, 1972-73, pp.43-58; and

Document of the Central Committee of the CPC, no.24, 1972, in Ibid., pp.58-68.

convention had been overdue since the beginning of 1969, passing the national economic plan for 1970, they were said to have intended passing a resolution on the significance of 'genius' in the process of historical development, and providing for chairmanship in the draft Constitution. Apparently the move had not been discussed either with Mao or with other members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. According to the Central Committee Document, the move had been settled, as far back as 1970, when Mao instructed that the Constitution should not provide for any Chairmanship.<sup>32</sup> It seems then that the suggestion to create the post of Chairmanship was made, to enable Lin Piao become the head of the State so as to ensure the succession. However, the attempt failed after two and a half days of resistance by the majority of the Central Committee. Chen Po-ta was stripped of his posts and he had been last seen on 1 August 1970. It was not until the 10th Party Congress that Chen Po-ta was officially overthrown.<sup>33</sup>

---

32 See Document of the Central Committee, n.29, p.69.

33 Jurgan Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution: Politics Between Two Party Congresses (London, 1976), p.84.

Then, Mao began to cast the incident in theoretical context of line and class struggle: "the question was a theoretical one: they advocated idealist empiricism". He had come to the conclusion that "the struggle at the Plenum was a struggle between two headquarters".<sup>34</sup>

Thus, after the Lushan Plenum stage was set for major power struggle. According to the Central Committee Document, Mao worked from September 1970 onwards to break up Lin's power bases in the Central Committee, the Military Affairs Committee and the Peking Military Region.<sup>35</sup>

This involved many critical measures. He gave call for criticising Chen Po-ta in the month of September 1970. At the same time, education in ideology and political line was carried out. Following this the Central Committee criticised Lin Piao and other top military generals. Later at an enlarged meeting of Politburo, which met in December 1970, top military generals submitted their confessions, which were submitted to the Central Committee Work Conference in April 1971. Having weakened the positions of top military leaders, Mao then resorted to reorganization

---

34 Schram, n.17, p.294.

35 Ibid., p.295.



of Military Affairs Committee of the Party's Central Committee and the Peking Military Region.<sup>36</sup>

Lin, it was alleged, alarmed by threat to his position, drafted an outline plan for military coup called 'Project 571'. A number of top military leaders such as Huang Yeng-sheng (Chief of Staff), Wu Fa-hsien (Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force), Li Tso-peng (First Political Commissioner of the Navy) and Chin Hui-tso (Director of General Logistics Department), seem to have been involved in the plot besides Lin's wife Yeh Chun and his son Lin Li-kuo.<sup>37</sup>

It is said that "actions taken by Mao tarpedoed this arrangement by an anti-Party clique". On hearing about the failure of the coup-d'etat attempt, Lin, Yeh Chun and Lin Li-kuo, it was reported, attempted to flee in an aircraft but the plane crashed in Mongolia on 13 September.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, the eleventh inner-party struggle was against Lin Piao, who defined the priority of politics in such a way that the objective economic and social limits were

---

36 Document of the Central Committee of the CPC, no.4, n.31, p.45.

37 See Document of the Central Committee, no.24, n.31, p.62.

38 Ibid., p.64.

disregarded. For example, a belief in individualistic heroism prevented the rehabilitation of old cadres necessary for the reformed party and book-waiving and slogan chanting was no substitute for the ideological reconstruction of the Party.

But unlike in the previous occasion, the "... Lin Piao issue had no substantial effect on the development policy..."<sup>39</sup> So another Party Congress was convened, basically to get its approval for anti-Lin Piao campaign and to reaffirm the line of the Ninth Party Congress. Of course, replacements for the fallen Linists also necessitated the Congress.

However, rather ironically, the fall of Lin Piao itself paved the way for another struggle in the Party. "The political forces pressing for the rehabilitation of veteran cadres have found it politically expedient to blame Lin for the excesses of the purges during the Cultural Revolution and his opposition to the correct treatment of erring cadres".<sup>40</sup> Thus, veterans, who were purged during the Cultural Revolution as reactionaries found their way into the Party.

---

39 Brugger, n.3, p.255.

40 Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign", Asian Survey, vol.14, no.10, October 1974, p.879.

Eventhough the Congress was supposed to restaff the Party and legitimise anti-Lin Piao campaign, it also helped for the revival of pragmatic modernization policies. So, in this sense it is a significant event in the recent history of modern China.

CHAPTER II

THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH

## CHAPTER II

### THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH

7 | The Tenth Party Congress was held in Peking from 24 to 28 August 1977. The Tenth Congress meeting four years and five months after the Ninth, was, in fact, the first national Congress in the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to be convened earlier than stipulated time. The session of the Congress was extremely brief in comparison with that of the Eighth and Ninth Congresses, which have lasted 13 and 24 days respectively. The oddity about the Congress was its secrecy. Like the Ninth, it received no advance publicity. The first official announcement that it has actually taken place was issued on 29 August, the day after the Congress was closed.

The Agenda of the Tenth Congress and the Ninth Congress were alike. The agenda of the five-day meeting was: (1) to adopt the political report; (2) to adopt revision of the Party Constitution; (3) to elect the Central Committee. Chairman Mao was reported as having "presided over" the Congress, but like the previous occasion where he had made a "most important" but unpublished speech, there was no indication of whether or not he had actually addressed the delegates.

The Tenth Central Committee:

The Congress after "repeated deliberations and discussions" elected the Central Committee. The "195 members and 124 alternate members elected to the Central Committee embody the combination of the old, the middle aged and the young".<sup>1</sup> The total strength of the Tenth Central Committee increased by 40 over that of the Ninth Central Committee. And 55 full members and 58 alternate members of the Tenth Central Committee were not members of the Ninth Central Committee, 35 full members and 28 alternate members from the Ninth Central Committee were not re-elected.<sup>2</sup> Worst affected were the members from the army. In comparison with the Ninth Central Committee, the number of military cadres in the Tenth Central Committee dropped considerably; "only 23 per cent of the new Central Committee members are actually military cadres as compared to 46 per cent previously".<sup>3</sup> So, naturally majority of those who disappeared were cadres

- 
- 1 See Press Communique of the Tenth National Congress of CPC, in News from Hsinhua News Agency, (London), 30 August 1973, p.36.
- 2 See "The CCP Hold Their Tenth National Congress", Issues and Studies (Taipei), vol.10, no.1, October 1973, pp.4,5.
- 3 "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", China Quarterly (London), no.56, 1973, p.806.

who served in PLA and probably they could be associated with Lin Piao. But the most significant feature of the Central Committee was that "at least 40 full and 12 alternate members of the new Central Committee are rehabilitated cadres who were previously removed from office in the Cultural Revolution".<sup>4</sup> These include Cultural Revolution notireities such as Teng Hsiao-ping, Ching Ping-hua, Tan Chen-lin, Uianfu, Li Ching-chuan etc.

Unlike the Central Committee, the Politburo contained the same number of people as its predecessor, i.e. 21. But the strength of the Standing Committee had been increased from five to nine. There were only four active officers of the PLA in the Tenth Politburo as opposed to ten in the Ninth.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps the major surprise of the Politburo was the emergence of Wang Hung-wen, a former Sanghai worker and a Secretary of the Sanghai Party Committee, as what seemed to be the number-three man in China. Other new members were Chen Yung-kuei, who was Party Secretary of the famous Tachai Brigade;

---

4 Ibid., p.806.

5 Ibid., p.806.

Hua Kuo-feng, then First Secretary and Chairman in Hunan; Wei Kuo-ching, First Secretary, Chairman and First Political Commissar of the Military District in Kwangsi; Ni Chi-fu, originally a model engineer worker from the Peking First Machine Building Plant and then Director of Peking Federation of Trade Unions; Saiffuddin, who was the First Secretary, Chairman, and First Political Commissar of Military Region of Sinkiang; Su Chen-hua, Deputy Commander of Navy and Wu Kuei-hsien who gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution in Sian, and Deputy Secretary to Snense Party Committee.

Thus the composition of the Tenth Central Committee register the fact of erosion of military influence in power structure. This was attained mainly through influx of new civilian leaders. Most of the new members were rehabilitated cadres. In the name of maintaining balance between old, middle and young cadres, most of those members who have been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated, in an attempt to counter the growing influence of radicals. So, the Central Committee reflected a careful balancing of the two major groups on the Chinese political scene.



The first group consisted of radicals who were initially associated with the planning and execution of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Not surprisingly, they were defenders of values of the Cultural Revolution and attacked fiercely in the summer of 1973 those trends which they considered as threat to the new born things of the Cultural Revolution. Key members of this group were Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen, all of them were close to Mao personally and ideologically.

The second group consisted of a large number of veteran party officials who dominated China's administrative hierarchy both in the Centre and in the Provinces. Chou En-lai was the major representative of this group. Generally speaking, these cadres were defenders of status quo against revolutionary changes, such as those the radicals tried to bring about during the 1960s. Not surprisingly they came under attack during the Cultural Revolution and many were purged then, but they were rehabilitated after the downfall of Lin Piao. In as much as these were victimised by the Cultural Revolution, they were unlikely to have much sympathy for "new born things" of the Cultural Revolution. They were the opponents of the radicals.

Political Report:

Chou En-lai's report to the Congress was considerably shorter than that made by Lin Piao on previous occasion. The report stressed the underlying continuity with its predecessor by re-affirming the political and organisational line of the Ninth Congress. It stated that ".....the Ninth Congress summed up the experience of history as well as the new experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, criticised Li Shao-chi's revisionist line and re-affirmed the basic line and policies of the Party for the entire historical period of socialism".<sup>6</sup>

In brief, this line can be explained as follows: The proletariat has not completely established its control over production. Because the former ruling classes are not completely overthrown in the war of liberation, ".....in a socialist society there are still conservative and vested interest groups. There still remain certain differences between mental and manual labour, city and countryside, workers and peasants. Although these are not antagonistic contradictions, they cannot be resolved without struggle".<sup>7</sup>

---

6 Report to the Tenth National Congress of CPC, and Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution (Calcutta: Peoples Book Agency, n.d.), p.3.

7 Mao Tse-tung, A Critique of Soviet Economics (New York, 1977), p.71.

So the historical role of the proletariat is not only to change forms of ownership but also to destroy old production relations and build new ones, thus ensuring the transition from capitalist mode of production to socialist mode of production. But the mutual relations of men in production are inseparable from the superstructure, especially from the influence of man's thinking. It means that the development of social relations among people depends on socialist superstructure and the proletariat world outlook. To transform the superstructure continuous struggle has to be waged against bourgeois ideas in the realm of superstructure; and class struggle is the barometer for the progress towards communist stage.

After putting forth the line of the Ninth Party Congress, Chou then proceeded to explain how Lin Piao tried to sabotage it. The report traced the genesis of the Lin affair to the Ninth Congress. It stated that the political report prepared by Lin and Chen Po-ta was rejected by the then Central Committee, for it contended that the main task was production. Under Mao's guidance an alternative document was prepared and delivered. Chou then went on to describe how Lin after grudgingly reading the report continued with his conspiracy, culminating with an abortive coup during the second plenum of the Ninth Central Committee in

August 1970 and an actual attempt to usurp power based on 'Project 571'.

"The essence of the counter-revolutionary and revisionist line they pursued and the criminal aims of the counter-revolutionary armed coup d'etat they launched", said Chou En-lai, "were to usurp the supreme power of the Party and State, thoroughly betray the line of the Ninth Congress, radically change the Party's basic line and policies for the entire historical period of socialism, turn the Marxist-Leninist CPC into revisionist and fascist Party, subvert dictatorship of proletariat and restore capitalism".<sup>8</sup> In brief, it was accused that Lin Piao tried to capture supreme power to subvert the line of Ninth Congress i.e. to discontinue the struggle against the bourgeoisie. Lin was reported to have said in 1966 at the Politburo meeting that "the fundamental problem of revolution is the problem of political power. Once they obtain political power, the proletarian class and labouring people will have everything. Once they lose it they will lose all. Production is undoubtedly the basis;

---

8 Report to the Tenth National Congress, n.4, p.6.

however, it relies upon changes, consolidation and development resulting from the seizure of political power".<sup>9</sup> Perhaps Lin might have had thought that after the Cultural Revolution there won't be any more such revolutions. Moreover, he propounded the concept of 'genius', that Mao was a 'genius' and any one who follows Mao without questioning would be liberated.<sup>10</sup> Further, he said that it would be better if people learn some quotations from Mao's writings by heart. All those cadres who did not agree with Mao Tse-tung thought were condemned to be thrown out of the Party.<sup>11</sup> All this naturally generated splitism in the Party and tended to destroy mass line.

It appears that Mao took a serious note of this and decided to fight back.<sup>12</sup> Thereafter several campaigns were launched one after another. The campaign to study classics of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao; to sing 'Internationale' which rejected the belief in saviours;

---

9 See Lin Piao's Informal Address to the Enlarged Session of Politburo meeting, 18 May 1966, in Chinese Law and Government, vol.2, no.4, 1969-70, p.44.

10 Ibid., pp.57-58.

11 See Lin Piao's Instructions on the question of the Line of Cadres, 10 August 1966, in Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.8, no.5, February 1972, p.108.

12 See summary of Mao Tse-tung's talks with Responsible Comrades at various places during his Provincial Tour, in Stuart Schram, ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed (Harmondsworth, 1974), p.295.

to criticise 'idealism and Metaphysics'; to criticise revisionism and to rectify the style of work.

Chou En-lai then went on to summarise the experience of the struggle to smash Lin Piao clique. The most widely published statement in this context was "practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and above board, and not intrigue and conspire". These were said to be the criterion for distinguishing correct line from erroneous line and basic principles to be followed by every party member. Moreover, the criticism of Lin Piao clique was said to have strengthened the unity among the masses.

After explaining the "Tenth Struggle" in the Party, Chou En-lai dealt with specific policies in various fields. But the information on domestic policies is scanty. At first sight, the report submitted by Chou En-lai to the Congress for a superficial observer might be quite misleading to think it as advocating a revolutionary line. But a careful scrutiny of the report will make it clear that in the name of revolution he actually advocated a policy of "pragmatic modernisation". Take for example, his reference that there may be in future "disputes in the Party like the Lin Piao affair", but he was carefully

avoiding the mention of future Cultural Revolution of larger proportions. In the same way, Chou En-lai talked about the necessity to "consolidate and carry forward the achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution",<sup>13</sup> but he did not mention 'Continuous Revolution'.

Concerning economic development, the general line was "going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism; grasp revolution and promote production".<sup>14</sup> This statement makes amply clear the policy of 'pragmatic modernisation'. It is also not in conformity with the policies and principles laid down at the Ninth Party Congress. The Ninth Party Congress emphatically stated that economic development can take place only through revolution. The Political Report submitted to the Ninth Party Congress stated that "politics is the concentrated expression of economics. If we fail to make revolution in the superstructure, fail to arouse broad masses of workers and peasants, fail to criticise the revisionist line, fail to expose the handful of renegades, enemy agents, capitalist roaders in power and counter revolutionaries and fail to consolidate the leadership of the

---

13 Report to the Tenth National Congress, n.6, p.19.

14 Ibid., p.20.

proletariat, how can we further consolidate the socialist economic base and further develop the socialist productive policies? This is not to replace production by revolution, but to use revolution to command production, promote it and lead it forward".<sup>15</sup> It seems Chou did not perceive dialectical relation between revolution and production as explained in the above quoted statement. The Tenth Congress Report gives an impression that revolution does not result in production. This could be an indication of change in the policy. Whereas the Political Report submitted to the Ninth Congress expressed the notion that production develops only through struggles. Chou believed that technical and organisational amendments could result in the increased production. He said: "Planning and co-ordination must be strengthened, rational rules and regulations improved and both central and local initiative further brought into full play".<sup>16</sup>

Maoists were of the opinion that the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations is constant, and productive forces cannot be really developed

---

15 Report to the Ninth National Congress of CPC, in Peking Review, no.18, 20 April 1969, p.27.

16 Report to the Tenth National Congress, n.6, p.20.



unless the contradiction is perceived and production relations are transformed through intermittent and continuous struggles in the superstructure. But for the moderates this is not very significant factor in the development of productive forces. He felt that any part of the superstructure which is not conducive to the economic base can be amended. It means that Chou did not believe in the necessity for 'continuous revolution'. This is manifested clearly in the following statement:

".... transform all parts of superstructure which do not conform to economic base". 17

It thus tantamounts to the 'productive forces theory', which was severely attacked during the Cultural Revolution. In other words:

"The question of developing productive forces is indeed important but to say that it is the most important means giving it precedence over class relations, and so taking up a productivist position". 18

Regarding foreign policy, the report was elaborate and detailed. In fact major chunk of the report dealt with Chinese view of the world. Throughout the report, Chou defended the policy he had introduced of an opening towards West and detente with the U.S.

---

17 Ibid., p.20.

18 Charles Bettelheim, "The Great Leap Backward", in Monthly Review (New York), vol.30, no.3, July-August 1970, p.80.

But the report maintained a semblance rigorous attack on both the superpowers. It stated that "the purpose of the superpowers is to contend for world hegemony. They contend as well as collude with each other".<sup>19</sup> One need not deduct from the above statement, that China was intending to fight both the superpowers, because the list of the crimes placed at the door of the USSR for outshadow those attributed to the U.S. According to the Report, the USSR "has invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia, massed its troops along the Chinese border, sent troops into the People's Republic of Mongolia, intervened in Egypt causing expulsion of the Soviet experts, supported traitorous Lon Nol clique, suppressed the Polish workers rebellion, dismembered Pakistan and carried out subversive activities in many Asian and African countries".<sup>20</sup> On the contrary, the crimes committed by the U.S. were not at all specified. Thus the Chinese were obsessed by the threat from USSR to China as well as to the world.

---

19 Report to the Tenth National Congress, n.6, p.15.

20 Ibid., p.16.

Moreover, the US, by Chinese assessment, was waning power and "started to go down hill after its defeat in the war of aggression against Korea. It has openly admitted that it is increasingly on the decline; it could not but pull out of Vietnam".<sup>21</sup> By contrast, the Soviet Union was described as a growing and dynamic power. And according to Mao that which is growing and young, is the trend and wave of the future. Thus Chou supported rapprochement with the US and other Western countries. And he quoted Lenin to point out that "necessary compromises" with imperialist countries must be distinguished from predatory form of 'collusion and compromise' found between US and USSR. Such compromise as Peking then followed was said to be "temporary and superficial".<sup>22</sup>

The Revised Party Constitution:

As mentioned by Wang himself, there were not many changes in the Constitution. The first and most obvious was that all references to Lin Piao, and phrases associated with him were dropped. But the most noticeable feature of the new Constitution was concerning the Cultural Revolution. The Constitution said that "revolutions like this will have to be carried out many times in the future".

---

21 Ibid., pp.15-16.

22 Ibid., p.17.

Since revisionism still existed and was the main danger, the Constitution made it a primary task of all the primary organisations to "criticise revisionism". Moreover, it emphasised that a "true communist must act without any selfish consideration....". So naturally the "revolutionary spirit of going against tide" enunciated by Mao had been added to the Constitution. And the Constitution specially stated that "it is absolutely impermissible to suppress criticism and retaliate". Members of the Party were also required to practice Marxism and not Revisionism. The Constitution asked the members to adhere to "three do's and three don'ts" put forward by Chairman Mao, which formed the theme song of anti-Lin Piao campaign. They were: "practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and above board, and don't intrigue and conspire". According to the Report, the most fundamental of these three principles is to practice Marxism and not revisionism. Because, it seems, if one practices revisionism, one will inevitably go in for splits, intrigues and conspiracy. Finally the intention to oppose great power chauvanism had been added. The necessity to carry out Cultural Revolution in the coming years was the main theme of the amendments of the Constitution.

Factual Alignments:

The most significant feature of the Congress was that two documents - Political Report and Report on the Revision of the Constitution - manifested two distinct trends on future policy.

Both Chou and Wang emphasised that in future there will again be disputes within the Party. However, the Chinese Prime Minister referred to struggle between these two lines and stated that "such struggles will occur ten, twenty, thirty times" whereas Wang referred to Cultural Revolution as such, and declared that "revolutions like this will have to be carried out many times in the future". Chou while prepared for further intra-party conflicts, obviously wanted to restore order to accelerate pace of development. In doing so, Chou was not simply altering the priority list but substituting production for the struggle.

There were also serious differences about the foreign policy. As explained earlier, Chou characterised USA as a waning power and quoting Lenin, he justified improvement of relations with America. Consequently, the Soviet Union emerged as the main threat. According to Chou, the USA also was capable of launching war against China; but the real danger comes from USSR. He said: "We must

maintain high vigilance and be fully prepared against any war of aggression that imperialism may launch, particularly against a surprise attack on our country by the Soviet Union." <sup>23</sup> But Wang Hung-wen enunciated a policy of fighting both the superpowers: "We must without fail prepare well against any war of aggression and guard against surprise attack by imperialism and social imperialism". <sup>24</sup>

Thus battle lines for a new confrontation were clearly drawn. To add fuel to the fire most of the important moderates were rehabilitated to the highest bodies of decision-making in the Party.

But the conflict in the Party could be noticed even before the Congress, of course, in a muted form over issues like rehabilitation of old cadres and education policy. Particularly the first half of 1973 saw a resurgence of ideological fervour. In this period a new campaign was launched to "defend and develop the victorious fruits of the Cultural Revolution", that is, to emphasise the positive contributions of the Cultural Revolution and radical 'new things' it created. <sup>25</sup>

---

23 Ibid., p.18.

24 Ibid., p.32.

25 See Henry Bradsher, "China: The Radical Offensive", in Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol.13, no.11, November 1973, pp.990-991.

Apparently, the leftists in the Party were fearful that the political pendulum had swung too far to the 'Right' - in the direction of moderation - and they were fearful that rejection of Lin Piao might lead, or was leading, to rejection of the hard-won gains of the Cultural Revolution.

The Tenth Congress of the CPC did not help to thrash out the differences. Instead, the 'Leftists' in the Party and the 'Moderates' agreed to adjust each other only to decide who should prevail. As the Party diverted its attention from anti-Lin campaign to socio-economic problems the difference among them became clear and conflict became inevitable.

#### Post-Congress Developments:

Immediately after the Congress, the 'Left' in the Party launched an attack on the 'Moderates' to strengthen their position. The differences were, in most cases, aired through <sup>the</sup> medium of historical analogy. The anti-Confucius and anti-Lin Piao campaign launched immediately after the Tenth Congress was used by Radicals to attack Moderates. The lessons to be learnt from the history of Confucius period were: great care must be taken to prevent contemporary reactionaries from re-imposing their old system. While part of the anti-Confucius campaign has been linked with Lin Piao and his supporters as those

supposedly in favour of restoring the old; some references seem to point in Chou's direction. "Under the cover of criticising figurative Lin Piao and Confucius, however, the radicals have in fact continued to attack the conservative veteran cadres, using terms such as "political swindlers like Lin Piao" and "political forces represented by Lin Piao".<sup>26</sup>

The attacks on Chou and the moderates centred around the following issues: Firstly, Chou was accused for having rehabilitated those cadres who were purged during the Cultural Revolution as "capitalist roader". For example, the People's Daily 15 March 1974 editorial stated that like Confucius, Lin was said to have favoured "reviving States that were extinct, restoring families that have lost their positions and calling into office those who have fallen into obscurity".<sup>27</sup> Read in the light of Teng's rapid rise to prominence, it can be treated as a tacit criticism of Chou who initiated it.

---

26 Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao Campaign", in Asian Survey, vol.14, no.10, October 1974, p.884.

27 Peking Review, no.9, 1 March 1974, p.7.



Some of the allegorical articles, as analysed by Kenneth Liberthal, were directed against the foreign policy followed by Chou i.e. detente with the West.<sup>28</sup> Whereas the 'Radicals' argue that China's national security depends upon her leaders pursuing the proper domestic political course, the moderates view the threat from abroad in military terms and call attention to the fact that China is falling behind its enemies in its military power. Naturally they tend to argue for rapid industrialization and import of technology from the West.

There were also criticisms of general nature. Some articles took serious note of the threat of reversing the course of the Cultural Revolution. For example, a short commentary in the March issue of 'Red Flag', entitled 'Study Conscientiously and Deepen Criticism' pointed out that to deepen the anti-Confucius campaign, one "must link it with reality, that is, with major issues of right and wrong in the current class struggle and the struggle between the two lines". Such issues included whether one "affirms or negates the fruits of the Cultural Revolution,

---

28 Kenneth Liberthal, "Peking's Foreign Policy Debate as seen through Allegorical Articles", in China Quarterly, no.71, 1977, pp.528-554.

whether one supports or is antagonistic towards the new-born things which emerged in the Cultural Revolution", or whether one "persists in or opposes Chairman Mao's revolutionary line...., continues the revolution or goes in for restoration and retrogression".<sup>29</sup>

These charges were also echoed by Wang Hung-wen. In his report submitted to the Central Study Class, Wang complained that some people view "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as a great misunderstanding, they are discontented with everything in existence, anxiously waiting for the situation to get back to normal.... In the factories, they practice control, restrictions, pressure; in schools, they put intellectual education in the fore and everything in an old frame". Regarding rehabilitation of cadres, Wang believed that "the evaluation of cadres should not be based only on history without consideration of the present facts and that primary emphasis should be placed on their consciousness in the line struggle".<sup>30</sup>

---

29 See Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines, no.771, 25 April 1974, pp.2-4.

30 See Wang Hung-wen's Report to the Central Study Class, 14 January 1974, in Issues and Studies, vol.XI, no.2, February 1975, pp.102, 103.

The campaign was followed by the much anticipated Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), which met in a brief and secret First Session from 13-17 January. At the People's Congress the division between moderates and radicals became very clear.

Chou's report "On the Work of the Government" sought for stability and order at home to promote economic development and continue to pursue a foreign policy of detente with the West. The report stated that "the unification of our country, the unity of our people and unity of various nationalities - these are the basic guarantees of the sure triumph of our cause".<sup>31</sup> All the forces that can be united must be united to "work hard to increase production and speed up socialist construction so that our socialist system will have a more solid material base".<sup>32</sup> On the contrary, Chang Chun-chiao, in his Report on the Revision of the Constitution, spoke of "contradiction between the production relations and the productive forces and between the superstructure and economic base. Like morning sun our socialist system is still very young. It was born in struggle and grew only in struggle".<sup>33</sup> Even Chou also suggested that

---

31 News from Hsinhua News Agency (Special Issue), 22 January 1975, p.13.

32 Ibid., p.13.

33 Ibid., p.10.

"while tackling economic tasks leading cadres must pay close attention to the socialist revolution in the realm of superstructure...."<sup>34</sup> By doing so, he gives an impression that the former is more important and it has nothing to do with the Revolution in the superstructure.

In all, the impression to be gained from the NPC is that it asserted the moderate policies enunciated at the Tenth Congress of the CPC.

Added to this the control of moderates over administrative machinery and the Party organisation was also strengthened. Second Plenum held just prior to the NPC, had elected Teng Hsiao-ping to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and to the post of Vice-Chairman. Later on, he had become number-one Vice-Premier of State Council and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA. It means Teng had become the most influential man after Mao and Chou En-lai. Besides Teng, many of the veteran cadres, were also appointed to the State organs.

"Twentyfour (80.3 per cent) of the twentynine Ministers exercising actual control over the daily operations of the Central Government can be categorized as having loosely allied with Chou".<sup>35</sup> Teng's leading position

---

34 Ibid., pp.13-14.

35 Y.C. Chang, Factional and Coalition Politics in China (New York, ), p.117.

supported by the 'veteran cadres' in the Party might have facilitated the implementation of political and economic line of moderates without serious disruption. But the selection of Chang Chun-chiao to the post of Director of General Political Department of the PLA and Vice-Premier shows that radicals were then still influential to whom concessions had to be made. However, the main feature of the team was the somewhat sparse representation given to the 'Radicals'. It is said that the "Gang" had tried for positions at the Second Plenum and at the Fourth NPC.<sup>36</sup> Considering the fact that the "gang" had failed to gain any positions, one can assume that the strength of the Radicals has weakened. On the other hand, the election of Teng Hsiao-ping at the Plenum as Vice-Chairman of the Party and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and his confirmation by the NPC as the ranking Vice-Premier, as well as other appointments, tilted the balance of power in favour of Moderates in the Party as well as in Government. In such a situation, it is very difficult to explain how the "gang" could indulge in disruptive activities. And in April 1976, the "gang" could also remove Teng from

---

36 The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China: Documents (Peking, 1977), p.12.

all his positions in the Party and Government. It is difficult to explain how the "gang" could indulge in such activities right under the nose of powerful moderate group. The whole event is very perplexing. At the moment, there is not much information available in translations to answer such questions. It is also difficult to explain why the moderates awaited the death of Mao Tse-tung to purge the "gang" from the Party, which they could have carried without much opposition.

The rehabilitation of veteran cadres in a big way to the State organs and reassertion of 'moderate policies' at the NPC prompted the radicals to ring the alarm bell of "restoration and retrogression". Strong attacks on "capitalist restoration" appeared in Chinese media after the conclusion of the second plenum of the CPCCC and the first session of the Fourth NPC. It was initiated by People's Daily editorial published on 9 February 1975 entitled "Study well the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". The editorial declared that "the proletariat must not only suppress the resistance of the overthrown landlord and capitalist classes and guard against subversion and aggression by imperialism and social imperialism but must also struggle against the newly engendered bourgeois elements...."<sup>37</sup> This was followed

---

37 See Hsinhua Weekly (Peking), no.7, 17 February 1975.

by major articles by Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-Chiao in the March and April issues of 'Red Flag' respectively.<sup>38</sup>

A recurrent theme running through both the articles is the idea that because of the eight-grade system of pay industrial workers are especially vulnerable to the process of embourgeoisement and that struggle against bourgeois should not be relaxed.

Following the campaign to study classics was launched, which continued till July 1975 and ultimately had given way to another campaign - the campaign to criticise 'Watermargin' in which moderates were attacked directly. It was initiated with the publication of an editorial by People's Daily on 4 September 1975 entitled "Unfold Criticism of Shui-chi".<sup>39</sup> As was the case with the previous campaign the new campaign took its theme from a comment in which Mao reversed his long favourable assessment of epic novel - Water Margin - and pointed out that it should serve as a negative example, the merit of which lay "precisely in the portrayal of capitulationism".

---

38 Yao Wen-yuan, "On the Social Basis of Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique" as reproduced in Peking Review, no.10, 7 March 1975, pp.5-10; and Chang Chun-chian, "On Exercising all round Dictatorship over the Bourgeois", as reproduced in Peking Review, no.14, 4 April 1975, pp.5-11.

39 Peking Review, no.37, 12 September 1975, p.7.

The contemporary significance of "capitulationism" was taken to mean, in the words of the editorial, "class capitulationism at home and national capitulationism in foreign affairs". That such a quick succession of repetitions pronouncements were devoted to the theme of class struggle at a time when new compromises should have been worked out, seems to indicate that the "Leftists" were not happy about the results of the Fourth NPC.

During the same period Teng also began to argue for the acceptance of official policies. For example, in a document entitled "Outline of a Briefing on the Work of the Academy of Science", he suggested that "without a situation of stability and unity, neither production nor science and technology can be well done. With production and science and technology unable to be pushed forward, the material base will not be made solid; while the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot possibly be consolidated".<sup>40</sup>

Later in another document headlined "On Some Problems in Speeding up Industrial Development", Teng emphasised that "without strong development of social productive forces the socialist system cannot be consolidated".<sup>41</sup> He called for "Four Modernizations" to

---

40 See Issues and Studies, vol.13, no.9, September 1977, pp.65.

41 See Issues and Studies, vol.13, no.7, July 1977, p.93.



achieve all round development of the economy. Stress on growth-oriented policies was justified by the propaganda of the three directives of Mao "study the theory of proletarian dictatorship; keep in order and unite; let national economy forge ahead".

Before the left really launched a counter attack, the "first National Conference on Learning from Tachai" was convened in Tachai and Peking from mid-September to mid-October 1975, and it became a scene for the intense conflict between the Left and the Moderates. Both Teng and Chiang Ching reportedly made important speeches, but they were not published by the Chinese media. The Conference was concluded by a speech of Hua Kuo-feng, which the Chinese media have published.

But from the attacks on Teng, it is possible to construct major thrust of his argument.<sup>42</sup> As for Chang's address is concerned, excerpts of it are published in "Chinese Law and Government". Three different policies can be identified at this conference.

Hua Kuo-feng may be in this occasion identified as a middle-of-the-roader. He also stood for a restoration of the original concept of the communes, but he felt that

---

42 See Chinese Communist Documents criticising Teng Hsiao-ping for his "Unorthodox" views and behaviour, in Issues and Studies, vol.12, no.5, May 1976, pp.108-121.

only through mechanisation this can be achieved. On the other hand, he also acknowledged the possibility that the new bourgeois may be engendered and points out the necessity for continuation of class struggle.

Teng believed that transition to communism is not possible without a strong material base. And he might have thought that unless masses are motivated by profit and material incentives, economic development is not really possible. So he argued for greater role to production brigades and increasing the pace of development, naturally it involves increasing role of 'science' concentrated in the hands of 'specialists' and growth in the rate of accumulation, which demands submission of workers to the demands for profits.

On the contrary, Chiang Ching related the difficulties in agricultural production to the existence of capitalism in the countryside. She believed that "peasants still harbour to a serious degree the notion of a small peasant economy". And further Chiang complained that a number of cadres still lack the fervour to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of proletariat. Thus for her, it is more a problem of fighting the "capitalist tendencies."<sup>43</sup>

---

43 Chiang Ching's speech at the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, 15 September 1975, in Chinese Law and Government, vol.10,no.1, p.14.

No sooner the conference ended than posters appeared in Peking and Tingshua Universities attacking Teng and the Minister of Education, Chou Jung-hsin. And the media began from mid-December onwards to attack Teng - without mentioning his name - as "that unrepentant capitalist roader within the Party".<sup>44</sup> Then the death of Chou on 8 January 1976 precipitated the second overthrow of Teng. On 15 January he delivered the eulogy for the deceased Premier, but that was his last public appearance until July 1977. From the mid-February the media escalated the attack on Teng - still without mentioning his name.<sup>45</sup> People's Daily on 10 March finally declared that central leadership was giving full support to the campaign against Teng.<sup>46</sup> Eventhough the name was not mentioned, the target was made very clear.

- 
- 44 See Hung Li-hsin, "Develop New Things Emerging from the Great Cultural Revolution", as reproduced in Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines (Hong Kong), no.854, 12 January 1976, pp.1-2; and Chih Heng, "Firmly Grasp Class Struggle as the Key Link", in Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines, no.856, 23 January 1976, p.13.
- 45 Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, no.66, 1976, pp.424-433.
- 46 See Survey of People's Republic of China Press (Hong Kong), no.6057, 18 March 1976, pp.123,125.

The whole issue reached the climax with the incident in Tien An-men square, which occurred on 4 April 1970. On that day many posters appeared eulogizing Chou En-lai. The posters were removed. But following day several posters and wreaths were brought to the monument by secondary school students who intended to post them there. They being prevented from doing so, launched a demonstration which lasted the remainder of the day and involved occupation by the demonstrators of barracks as well as igniting of a number of bonafires. The demonstrators were quelled late in the evening by the intervention of Wu Teh, Mayor of Peking.<sup>47</sup> It is difficult to point out the author of the whole scene due to the dearth of information. However, this demonstration had provided a strong pretext to expel Teng from all positions in the Party and the Government.

Nevertheless the conflict in the Party continued regardless of Teng's defeat in the battle. This is evident from the fact that the "Left" had to accept Hua Kuo-feng till then sixth, out of the 12 Vice-Premiers and Minister of Public Security as Premier of the State Council. Since neither left, nor the moderates could prevail, Hua might have been made Premier as a compromise candidate.

---

47 See Peking Review, no.15, 9 April 1976, pp.4-7.

Moreover, the 'Left' was unable to carry out the purge of Teng's followers obviously because of the pressures in the Party. As Mao's <sup>health</sup> started deteriorating, the succession became a vital issue. The Radicals' failure to secure the appointment of Chang Chun-chia~~n~~ as Premier rendered it imperative, that they made one last attempt to bolster their political position. An article in the People's Daily called for intensified struggle against the capitalist roaders in the Party. This article pointed out that "although Teng Hsiao-ping has fallen, the capitalists roaders are still on the capitalist road. They still continue to toy with intrigues and plots".<sup>48</sup> Thus, it was aimed at dislodging a large number of veteran cadres.

The Party conflict had reached its final stage in the month of August, while the health of Mao deteriorated. Mao's death on 9 September seemed to have given a short breathing space. Within a month after Mao's death on 6 October 1976, soldiers of the Central Guard Division

---

48 See Chin Huai-wen, "On Capitalist Roaders within the Party", People's Daily, 27 August 1976, as reproduced in Survey of People's Republic of China Press (Hong Kong), no. 6178, 14 September 1976, p. 61.

under Wang Tung-hsing arrested the leadership core of the Left; Chiang Ching, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan.

Following this, events in China have taken swift turn. On 7 October, Hua was made Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China by the Politburo of the Central Committee. From 10 October onwards, a campaign was launched against the four, who were accused of "revisionism" and of "weaving plots and intrigues". From the end of October on, Hua put himself forward as Mao's sole legitimate successor and set in motion a sort of cult of his personality.<sup>49</sup>

At the same time calls for discipline became more frequent. Criticisms against Teng stopped at the end of November. In December calls for modernisation increased. In January 1977, various demonstrations calling for Teng's return were reported. In February, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua, said that Teng would return "at the opportune moment". In March Hua proposed at the working meeting of the CC that Teng again be given responsibilities.<sup>50</sup>

---

49 See Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, no.69, 1977, pp.194-195.

50 See Bettelheim, n.18, pp.89,90.

At the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee held from 16-21 July 1977, Hua was officially appointed as Chairman and Teng ~~Teng~~ recovered all his previous powers. The Plenum also passed a resolution expelling the members of the "gang of four". In addition, the Plenum also decided to convene the Eleventh National Party Congress.<sup>51</sup>

In such a circumstance in which moderates defeated Left in the inner Party struggle, the Party Congress was convened to legitimise moderate policies and to establish moderates leadership in the Party, ahead of the stipulated period.

---

51 See Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the CPC, in Peking Review, no.31, 29 July 1977, pp.3-8.

CHAPTER III

THE ELEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS



## CHAPTER III

### THE ELEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS

The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Peking from 12-18 August 1977. It was attended by 1,510 delegates. A preparatory meeting had taken place on 11 August to elect Presidium of 223 delegates. As usually, the agenda of the Congress included:

1. to adopt the Political Report of the Central Committee.
2. to adopt the revision of the Constitution of the CPC; and
3. to elect the New Central Committee.

#### The Eleventh Central Committee:

After "full consultations and discussions", the delegates elected the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC which constituted 201 members and 132 alternate members. Thus the Eleventh Central Committee is the largest Central Committee ever formed in the history of the Communist Party of China. Another significant feature of the Central Committee was the high political mortality rate characterised by the fate of the members of the Tenth Central Committee. "Among the 201 members, 105 (54.7 per cent) were elected from the full members of the Tenth CC, 20 (10 per cent) were promoted from alternate to full member status, and 71 (35.3 per cent) are new members. Of the 171 full members of the Tenth CC who were still alive at the time of the Eleventh Party Congress, 105 (61.8 per cent) were re-elected,

5 (2.8 per cent) were demoted to the alternate members and 61 (35.3 per cent) did not reappear".<sup>1</sup> Most of those dropped had connections with radicals of one kind or another, because majority of the purged were representatives of the trade unions, youth league, women's federation, educational, cultural and health work, and PLA political commissars, which were the strong base for the radicals. This can be proved from the following statistics. Those members who were purged include, "17.8 per cent of the civilian cadres on the Tenth CC, 29.6 per cent of its military men, but 76.5 per cent of the mass organisation representatives on the outgoing CC".<sup>2</sup> This was in consistency with the effort to create the Party apparatus free of radical influence.

Further, to strengthen the hold of Moderates over the Party, a large number of veterans and people with scientific and organisational skills were appointed to the new CC. "Among the 201 full members appointed to the

---

1 Jurgen Domes, "China in 1977: Reversal of Verdicts", in Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol.18, no.1, January 1978, p.7.

2 Ibid., p.7.

Eleventh Central Committee, there are 76 (37.6 per cent) who had been purged as "capitalist roaders" and "anti-Party elements" during the Cultural Revolution".<sup>3</sup>

The Eleventh Politburo is also considerably bigger than the previous one. Whereas the previous Politburo contained 21 members, the new Politburo included 23 members and 3 alternate members. As analysed in the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation of the China Quarterly, the membership of the Politburo covers a broad range of interests. It has included four Vice-Chairmen of the CPCCC's Military Affairs Commission, the Commanders of the three of the China's eleven Military regions, the Political Commissar of the Navy, the Commander of the Air Force, five Party Chiefs of the 29 provincial level Party Committees, the Premier and six of the nine Vice-Premiers; four heads of Government Ministries; a representative of peasants; an industrial workers representative; and three representatives of minority nationalities.<sup>4</sup>

---

3 Ibid., p.9.

4 Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly (London), no.72, 1977, p.883.

The five members constituting the Standing Committee of the CC represent a more concentrated power base than the elected by the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth CCs. The five members of the new Standing Committee are Hua Kuo-feng, Yen Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-ping, Li Hsien-mien, Wang Tung-hsing. Clearly these changes stemmed directly from the death of Mao Tse-tung and the purge of the "gang-of-four" in the previous year, and final expression of victory of the anti-radical faction.

The "Episode" of Eleventh Struggle in the Party:

The Political Report delivered by Hua to the First Plenum of the Congress on 12 August was considerably lengthy when compared to the previous Congress Reports. The Report tried to rationalise the purge of the "gang-of-four" and justify the moderates policies, which was the result of moderates victory over Chiang Ching and other radicals.

After a profound tribute to Chairman Mao and to other leaders and members who had died since the Tenth Congress, the first section of the Report dealt with the "Eleventh struggle between the two lines" in the history of the Party, that was between the Radicals and the Moderates.

The main charge against the "Gang" was that they "tried their hardest to cause damage and disruption". It was alleged that the Radicals indulged in disruptive activities eventhough Mao pointed more than once that "eight years have passed since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution started. It is preferable to have stability now. The whole Party and the whole army should get united".<sup>5</sup> Further, the Radicals were accused of exploiting "every political movement launched by Chairman Mao to do something different, vainly hoping to divert the cause of each movement and to plunge the Party, the army and the country into chaos. They used all sorts of underhand methods to oppose Chairman Mao, the Central Committee headed by him and his revolutionary line, in their attempt to achieve supreme power in the Party and State...."<sup>6</sup>

Explaining how the Radicals had attempted to divert the cause of each movement initiated by late Chairman Mao following the Tenth Congress, Hua reconstructed the struggle indicating the counter measures taken by Mao.

---

5 The Eleventh National Congress of CPC: Documents (Peking, 1977), p, 51.

6 Ibid., pp.9-10.

Mao was quoted extensively to show his abhorrence towards the "Gang". "The text included ~~remarks~~ made by Mao, some apparently quoted for the first time to further incriminate the "gang".<sup>7</sup>

The struggle between the "gang" and the Party was traced back to 1974. In that year the Radicals were accused of misleading the "anti-Confucius and anti-Lin Piao campaign". It was reported that the "gang" instead of criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, launched their attack against Chou En-lai and "other leading comrades in the Party". Thus in the name of Confucius and Lin Piao, the Radicals seem to have criticized Chou and other veteran cadres.

The Report stated that the "gang" again led astray, in the year 1975, "the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the Proletariat". Hua said that "against his (Mao's) teaching that revisionism is the main danger at present, they raised a din about empiricism being the main current danger, in an effort to label veteran cadres as "empiricist" and strike at Premier Chou and other leading comrades of the Central Committee".<sup>8</sup>

---

7 Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, n.4, p.884.

8 n.5, p.15.

Again in August 1975, the Radicals were said to have distorted Mao's comments on the novel "Watermargin" to "split the Central Committee" and attack Premier Chou and Teng Hsiao-ping.

The Radicals, besides being criticised for deviating the movements launched by the Party, were also accused of attempting to capture power. The Report said: "Prior to the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee, Fourth National People's Congress, they stepped up their factional activities in order to usurp Party power and plotted to set up their own cabinet and seize state power".<sup>9</sup> It was stated that Mao empowered Chou Eng-lai to select personnel for the Fourth NPC and State Council. It seems that Teng was made Vice-Chairman of the Party and Vice-Premier of the State Council at the behest of Mao. Again after the death of Chou En-lai, the "gang" was alleged to have demanded that Chang Chun-chiao be made Premier. But, according to the Report, Mao intervened and on his proposal, the Central Committee appointed Hua as Premier. And on the instance of Mao a post of First <sup>Vice</sup> Chairman was created to prevent the "gang" from coming to power. On the Teng incident, the

---

9 Ibid., p.12.

Report said that the "gang" acted against the wishes of Mao. It indicted them for raising false charges against Teng.<sup>10</sup>

The charges on ideological level are much more serious. Hua asserted that the "gang" completely corrupted Chairman Mao's theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of Proletariat. But he has not bothered to explain where and how the "gang" corrupted Mao's theory. But he described the "gang's" programme of "equating veteran cadres with democrats", as the most concentrated manifestation of Radicals deviation from Mao's teaching on capitalist-roaders. Whereas Mao's teaching on capitalist-roaders within the Party is based on the analysis of the class struggle in socialist society, it was alleged that the "gang" called all the veteran cadres as capitalist roaders. Mao believed that the struggle between bourgeois and the proletariat is bound to be reflected in the Party, hence the emergence of capitalist roaders in the Party. The "gang", according to Hua, distorted the thesis of Mao on capitalist roaders.

---

10 Ibid., pp.18-19.



Here is an example, which presents a case of gross distortion of "gang's" ideas. The Radicals did not say that all veteran cadres are capitalist roaders. They said that seniority should not be the sole criteria for rehabilitation of veteran cadres. For example, in his Report to the Central Study Class, Wang Hug-wen said that "it would be a mistake not to exploit the talents of veteran cadres and it would also be a mistake to determine their position by experience and age regardless of their performance in the realistic class struggle. Their ability to fight in the North and South in the past is important, but we should also see their consciousness and performance in the realistic class struggle!..."<sup>11</sup>

On the whole the Report corroborates the fact that in the last three months of 1974, when final preparations were made for convening the Second Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee and the Fourth National People's Congress **the struggle between Moderates and Radicals, and the manoeuvring for positions intensified.**

The Report also shows that the "revolutionary" great debates held after the Tenth Congress - the campaign to criticise Lin Piao and Confucius, to study the theory of

---

11 Wang Hug-wen's Report at the Central Study Class, 14 January 1974, in Issues and Studies (Taipei), vol.11, no.2, February 1975, p.102.

Dictatorship of Proletariat, to restrict Bourgeois right, to criticise the novel 'Water Margin', to oppose Rightist attempt to change verdicts - were not simply efforts to promote "socialist education" among Chinese people, but in fact provided some of the principal arenas in which the political struggle was waged.

Thus, one can safely conclude that there was intensive struggle between Moderates and Radicals in the Post-Tenth Congress period. It does not mean to suggest that the "gang" perverted Mao Tse-tung thought; and the moderates are apostles of Mao Tse-tung. Without involving into the ideological intricacies of the struggle between the Moderates and the Radicals, it can be said that both factions were locked together in a fierce struggle after 1973.

But it is difficult to believe that Mao Tse-tung sided with Chou En-lai-Teng Hsiao-ping group to suppress the Radicals as the report stated. In fact, in this aspect the Report hardly seems credible.

The question of Mao Tse-tung's position in the Eleventh Major Struggle is a very intricate issue. There is not much evidence before us to show that Mao participated in the struggle between the Radicals and the Moderates.

In fact, after the Lin Piao affair, Mao kept himself away from the active politics. His role in the Tenth Congress and the NPC was minimal. So the report's claim that Mao supported Hua and Teng group against the "gang" is open to question.

With all their belief in discontinuing the revolution in the transition period, it is impossible to accept that Mao propped up Hua and Teng group. The declaration of the Eleventh Congress, concluding the Cultural Revolution, is a clear manifestation of the deviation of the new leadership from Chairman Mao's line. The report stated that the "smashing of the 'gang-of-four' makes the triumphant conclusion of our first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted eleven years". In this context the Eleventh Congress has really undermined the significance of the Cultural Revolution.

According to the Political Report submitted to the Ninth Congress, the significance of the Cultural Revolution is as follows:

"In the past we waged struggles in rural areas, in factories, in the cultural field and we carried out the socialist education movement. But all this failed to solve the problem because we did not find a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses to

aspect

expose our dark openly in an allround way and from below. Now, we have found this form in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". 12

Thus the Cultural Revolution is not only a struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie but also a newly discovered and most effective form of struggle. It is a new form of struggle formulated from those forms of struggle that were prevalent before the Cultural Revolution. By declaring the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, the Eleventh Party Congress has undermined Chairman Mao's theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

As justification for concluding the Cultural Revolution, the Report has quoted Mao out of context. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, in reply to those who were shocked at seeing the disorder spreading across the land, Chairman Mao said: "Great disorder across the land leads to great order". It indicates the dialectical relation between disorder and order. Instead it never means that order should be established as soon as there is disorder. As is evident from this argument the present leadership has obliterated the theory of continuing revolution.

---

12 See Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol. 4, no. 2, 1973, p. 45.

But then one tends to be perplexed because Hua has taken vow in the report to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of proletariat. The report said: "It is necessary to carry on the revolution in the realm of relations of production and to consolidate and develop socialist public ownership and other aspects of the socialist relations of production so that they will correspond better with the productive forces. It is necessary to introduce technical innovations, carry out technical revolution and speedily develop productive forces so as to provide the socialist system with a growing material base and promote change and development in the relations of production and the superstructure".<sup>13</sup>

These lines clearly indicate that the leadership has started deviating from the theory of continuous revolution. Mao in his article on "Correct Handling of Contradictions" explained that only by breaking the fetters of relations of production can the productive forces grow. That is, productive forces can grow only if the revolution is conducted in the realm of relations of production. In his review of Stalin's book on Soviet Economy, Mao

---

13 See n.5, p.29.

said: "First production relations have to be changed and only then the productive forces can be broadly developed. This rule is universal".<sup>14</sup>

On the contrary, the present leadership gives an impression that development of productive forces, cause capitalist forms of division of labour, or other bourgeois social relations, to disappear. Thus, they have reversed the relationship between productive forces and productive relations. In the next step, they said that in order to promote change and development in the relations of production and the superstructure, it is necessary to carry on technical revolution. It means that productive forces always go ahead. If the productive forces are developed, spontaneous change and development will occur accordingly in the relations of production. In effect this stresses the development of the productive forces or the technical revolution. Thus they have smuggled through backdoor the ideas of Liu Shao-chi.

Same type of argument was also given by Teng in his "Three Poisonous Weeds" - Some Problems in Speeding up Industrial Development; Outline of Briefing on the Work of the Academy of Science; On the General Programme of

---

14 Mao Tse-tung, A Critique of Soviet Economics  
(New York, 1977), p.17.

the (whole) Party and the (whole) Country - which were attacked by the Radicals. The death of Mao Tse-tung and the arrest of the "gang" has given the moderates free hand to implement their policies.

Moderates on the Stage of the Congress:

Domestic policies and foreign policy enunciated in the report emanate from the productivist theory, which the moderates seem to be following after denouncing the theory of continuous revolution. The main task of the leadership has been to establish order throughout the country to speed up the process of economic development.

Hua suggested "Eight Musts" for attaining "great order" across the land. These eight points are: to carry the struggle to expose the "gang"; to strengthen party building; to increase pace of economic development; to develop socialist culture and education; to strengthen people's state apparatus; to promote democracy and democratic centralism; to implement the policy of overall consideration and all round arrangement; to mobilize all positive forces to build socialism.

Prime concern of the leadership then appears to establishing order throughout the country and to expose and criticise the "gang", to cleanse the party from the influence of the "gang". The report said: "Not only

must we settle accounts with the gang in the sphere of political and organisational line, we must also conduct criticism on the theoretical plane of philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism so as to eradicate their pernicious influence in every field".<sup>15</sup>

The report discussed elaborately the modalities involved in the rectification of the Party. Proper investigation of individuals involved and the incidents connected to "gang" was supposed to be conducted and only those who form the "backbone of the gang should be punished". Even people belonging to this group would be condoned, the Report stated, if they are willing to amend their "mistakes". Rectifying the Party from the influence of the gang apparently has been the central task in consolidating and building the Party. The report further emphasised the need to strengthen the leading bodies of the Party at all levels in accordance with the principle of the three-in-one combination of the old, the middle-aged and the young. Veteran cadres apparently would guide young cadres on the basis of their experience so that the Party's style of work can be improved. It justified the rehabilitation of the veteran cadres by saying that mistakes are hardly avoidable and whoever commits an error should make a self-criticism and

---

15 See n.5, p.70.



and be given chance to amend mistakes. Thus, Hua manifested the tendency to emphasise the importance of experience at the cost of political consciousness.

As far as economic reconstruction goes, the report emphasised that the "developing socialist economy is the basic task of the dictatorship of the proletariat". It hoped that by 1980 China would build an independent and fairly comprehensive industrial and economic system. To achieve these goals it envisaged the following policies: "A complete set of policies known as walking on two legs, and we must bring the country's economy into the orbit of planned proportionate and high speed development, take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor, and achieve co-ordinated growth and an all-round leap forward in agriculture, light industry and other sectors".<sup>16</sup>

"It emphatically stated that scientific research has to anticipate economic construction, and blamed the "gang" for underdevelopment in this sector. Widerange of measures were suggested to give full scope to the "revolutionary enthusiasm" of all the cadres and masses on the scientific and technological front and spur them on their march towards the modernisation of science and technology".<sup>17</sup>

---

16 Ibid., p.86.

17 Ibid., p.88.

When compared with the political report of the Ninth Congress the priorities in the economic programme did not change. As usually, agricultural sector was characterised as the "foundation" of the economy. But the motives of the economic programme have undergone significant change. Now they are not following the priorities laid down by Mao in his article "Ten Major Relationships" to solve contradiction between various sectors. But the development of agriculture is seen from the standpoint of its contribution to capital accumulation. Because, as explained earlier, in the opinion of Hua, development of productive forces is very important and it consequently leads to transformation of superstructure.

The Report gives an impression that science and technology are neutral; development of science and technology is essential in the development of productive forces. But science and technology are never above class struggle. As a part of productive forces, its orientation and content is always conditioned by the form of production relations. In capitalist societies, it serves the purpose of the capitalists to enhance the profit and maintain the division of labour. "The socialist transformation of the production processes thus fosters the progressive obliteration of the social separation between scientific

~~between scientific and technical activities and directly productive activities".~~<sup>18</sup>

It is therefore a conservative political line that focusses on the defence of the immediate professional interests of scientific and technical workers, or in their unconditional right to work in jobs in which they can use their present skills. If scientific and technical workers are to be politically radicalised they have to be under the political control of workers so that content and orientation of their professional skills are radically transformed to suit the needs of the socialist society. But the report did not mention about three-in-one teams which were formed in a context of class struggle to transform relations of workers to their means of production.

The report resolved to develop and improve the quality of the education to create a large contingent of experts in order to match the development of science and technology. Hua gave a call for encouraging China's most skilled people, who, in the past have been suppressed and stifled from participat<sup>ing</sup> in work and education in a more confident way. In the field of cultural sphere policies of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and

---

18 Charles Bettelheim, Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organisation in China (New York, 1974), p.82.

hundred schools of thought contend" of "making the past serve the present and things foreign serve China", and of "weeding through the old to bring the new", were reiterated.

Hua indicated that the principle of "from each according to his work" would continue for a long time. But he has not specified any measures to restrict "bourgeois right" in the long run which is characterized as the breeding soil of capitalist tendencies. So it is implicit that production will have to be stimulated with the help of material incentives.

At the end of the report, Hua accentuated once again the importance of mobilising all positive forces to build socialism. He called it a "strategic policy".

As usually the report gave a detailed account of the nature of Chinese foreign policy. The passage on foreign policy started with a note of optimism saying that "the international united front against aggression, interference, subversion control and bullying by the superpowers is broadening, "and that both the superpowers are beset with difficulties".<sup>19</sup>

Both the superpowers - the Soviet Union and the US - were characterized as the villains of peace. It was

---

19 See n.5, p.55.

believed, as they continue to do so, that these superpowers' contention for world domination would lead for conflagration. All the talk of 'detente' and 'disarmament', the report stated, is nothing but an eyewash. War between these countries or revolution by the people was said to be the only way to establish any lasting peace.

However, the report characterized USSR as the number-one enemy of the people of the world. Quoting Mao, it explained that while the US imperialism is fast loosing its ground, the USSR started becoming more and more hegemonistic. The report said that "the current strategic situation in their contention is that Soviet social-imperialism is on the offensive and US imperialism on the defensive".<sup>20</sup> According to Mao, the new-born things are always stronger than those decaying and weakening.

The list of crimes attributed to the USSR as usually is detailed, while the crimes of the US imperialism were almost neglected. The USSR under the garb of socialism, the Report alleged, is working to expand its hegemony over the world. The report said that "the Soviet Union has massed its troops in Eastern Europe and at the same time accelerated its plunder of strategic resources and its

---

20 Ibid., p.57.

scramble for strategic bases in Africa and the Middle East in an attempt to encircle Europe from the flanks by seizing the Persian Gulf in the East, thrusting round the Cape of Good Hope in the South and blocking the main navigation routes of the Atlantic Ocean in the West".<sup>21</sup>

The Soviet Union has been held responsible for worsening the relations between China and the Soviet Union, and for failure of negotiations to improve relations between the two countries. And China decided to "wage a tit-for-tat struggle against its (USSR) hegemony". Confronted with threats of aggression from "Social Imperialism", the Congress decided to strengthen the army and it called for strengthening research in science and technology to increase the armament production. The report described People's war as the magic weapons, even then it felt that modernisation is inevitable because the enemy is "armed to the teeth".

"Thanks to the efforts made on both the sides", relations between China and the US improved inspite of the fundamental difference between their social systems. But Hua felt that further improvement in relations between the two countries would not be possible till the US severes diplomatic relations with Taiwan which, of course, is fulfilled by the US very recently.

---

21 Ibid., pp.57-58.

Hua evolved the "Three World Theory", which is attributed to Mao Tse-tung, to analyse and understand world situation.<sup>22</sup> The two superpowers together constitute the first group. The third world countries consisting of Afro-Asian countries, it was said, bear the worst oppression and are the main force in combating the superpowers. The second world countries of West Europe and Japan were characterized by dual nature; on the one hand they oppress, exploit and control third world, and on the other they are controlled and threatened by superpowers.

The report believed that in order to fight the superpowers successfully the third world countries must win over as many allies as possible and hence an alliance with countries in the second world. Hua asserted that China belongs to the third world and decided to support the second world countries. Recently Teng requested the people of the world to align with the US to fight the Soviet Social Imperialism. Prior to leaving China on a visit to US, Teng said in his interview to Time correspondents that "according to our view of the three

---

22 Charles Bettelheim in his article "Great Leap Backward", published in Monthly Review, vol.30, no.3, July-August 1978 challenged the authenticity of the fact that Three World Theory is formulated by Mao. He argues that the theory is not developed by Mao Tse-tung.

worlds, the first world consists of the US and the Soviet Union, but in this concept of our thinking of three worlds, we proceed from the establishment of a united front against hegemonism and for the defence of world peace, security and stability, and this united front includes the US".<sup>23</sup>

So the Chinese foreign policy stood on the premise, as it continues to do so, that "Soviet Social-Imperialism was the principal threat not only to China but also for example to the people of Chile - who, to their astonishment, saw Peking extend aid to General Pinochet's military junta".<sup>24</sup> And they preach the third world that maintaining independence from the danger of aggression is very important and requested them to unite with the Second World to fight against the Super Powers.

It is impossible to understand how all sections of the third world will fight against the Super Powers. It characterized the political forces of the third world as single entity. In every country there are certain sections which are pro-imperialist. Most of the regimes in the third world are bound with the Super Powers. According to their logic, the oil Sheikhs who deposit their money in

---

23 See Time (Chicago), 5 February 1979, p.16.

24 John Gittings, "The Statesman", in Dick Wilson, ed., Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History (London, 1977), p.264.



the Banks of Wall Street, are fighters against imperialism, while the US who sell weapons to these regimes is assisting the patriotic forces.

Moreover, it cannot happen that the second world countries or the US can allign with oppressed nations. It is true that the countries of the second world have definite contradictions with the two Super Powers, but these contradictions are of non-antagonistic character. They are contradictions over markets, spheres of influence, zones for the export of the capital. These contradictions may weaken the position of imperialism. But it is incorrect to say that some of these may join the struggle of the oppressed nations for the destruction of imperialism.

Thus it diverts the peoples struggles and asks them to unite with their oppressors. In other words, Chinese leadership is in pursuit of state-to-state relationships at the expense of peoples revolutions. Whatever may be the explanation, Chinese clearly follow the tendency to place national interest above proletarian internationalism for which Kruschev had been castigated in the sixties.

Revised Party Constitution:

The Party Constitution also reflected the moderates' efforts to establish order and discipline in the Party, at the same time praising Mao Tse-tung thought. As

mentioned by Yeh Chien-ying in a report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Party submitted to the Eleventh Party Congress, revised constitution recorded the contribution <sup>of Mao Tse-tung</sup> in the general programme. It stated that Mao defended and developed Marxism-Leninism in the struggle against imperialism and reactionary class and against the Right and Left opportunist lines in the Party and against modern revisionism of the Soviet Union.

Concerning internal policies, the Constitution contained revised version of the domestic tasks such as "the Communist Party of China adheres to its basic line for the entire historical period of socialism. It must correctly distinguish and handle the contradiction among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy, and consolidate and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat"; and "the Party must lead the people of all nationalities in making China a powerful socialist country with a modern agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology by the end of the century".<sup>25</sup>

Thus the constitution makes four modernisations as the main aim of the Party and in doing so it reflected the moderate policies enunciated by Hua Kuo-feng in the

---

25 n.5, pp.123-124.

political report submitted to the Congress. The new Party Constitution does not proclaim the end of the Cultural Revolution like the political report. But there are indications to this extent. Referring to the Cultural Revolution, it says that "great proletarian Cultural Revolution was a political revolution carried out under socialism by the proletariat against bourgeois...."<sup>26</sup> (Emphasis added). So it leaves an impression that the Cultural Revolution is a thing of past.

The Constitution was very specific as far as inner party democracy and requirements for cadres go. It stipulated that all members should strictly follow "three do's and three don'ts" - practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and above board, and don't intrigue and conspire - which were said to be the outcome of major struggle between the two lines in the Chinese history. These three principles are supposed to be the touch stone to identify the capitalist roaders.

Like the previous Constitution it too accepted that "going against the tide is a Marxist-Leninist principle", but added that one should go against the tide only if it runs counter to these three basic principles.

---

26 Ibid., p.123.

At the same time the Constitution maintained the importance of discipline in the Party. It accused the "gang" for perverting revolutionary principle of "going against the tide" to create factionalism and to whip up anti-Party tendencies. Referring to the "gang", who have had intermittently launched struggle against Teng and moderates, the report on the revision of the Constitution said that "... the Communist Party must have not only democracy, but also and still more so, centralism, they don't understand that democracy inside the Party is intended to strengthen discipline and enhance its fighting power rather than to weaken discipline and reduce its fighting power; and they don't understand that the Party's iron discipline is one of the basic conditions for defeating bourgeoisie and achieving victory in the revolution".<sup>27</sup> Thus the Constitution warns that inner party democracy should not lead to factionalism. Eventhough it accepted that going against the tide is a revolutionary principle, it took precautions to see that such measures are not wrongly interpreted by the members. But instead of emphasising the need for unity in the Party to fight the the Constitution called for "iron discipline". This statement has a flavour that stands in distinct contrast

---

27 Ibid., p.169.

to Mao's position, which while acknowledging the need for central supervision, always left more room for the importance of spontaneous local initiative. "The emphasis on order and unity was not new, but was a part of a tightening of central control and discipline that started immediately after Hua came to power".<sup>28</sup>

On the whole the policies adopted by the Congress towards socio-economic development and foreign policy have been largely those developed by Chou-Teng group in the early 1970s. Taken as a whole the programme was one of construction, restoration and development. This line of an all out development effort on all fronts may be described as the "line of the Eleventh Congress". Acceleration of the pace of development means nothing but an attempt to substitute the struggle for production by class struggle. So naturally, "it seeks to strengthen one-man management and the exclusive role of the Party Committee, the different forms of "three-in-one combination groups, and the tightening of labour regulations and labour discipline".<sup>29</sup> In other words, growth is expected to result, in the main, not

---

28 Christopher Howe, China's Economy (London, 1977), p.XXXV.

29 Charles Bettelheim, "The Great Leap Backward", in Monthly Review (New York), vol.30, no.3, July-August 1978, p.43.

from development of workers initiative, organisation and consciousness but from enforcement of strict regulations.

More on the Moderate Policies:

These trends are clearly manifested in the political report of the Fifth Session of the People's Congress.

The report said:

"We must race against the time to strengthen ourselves economically and heighten our defence capabilities at top speed, for this is the only way to cope effectively with possible social-imperialist and imperialist aggression against us. Domestically speeding up socialist modernisation in the above four fields is likewise highly important. Only thus can we further consolidate the worker-peasant alliance on a new basis and enhance the power of the proletariat for victory over the bourgeoisie and of socialism for victory over capitalism". 30

Thus the report has characterized that development of productive forces as a very important factor without which workers cannot establish their control over process of production.

The reproduction of a system of production relations is not a function of the operations of the mode of production alone, but of the social formations as a whole, including its "superstructural forms". To "forget about" the role

---

30 Documents of the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress of the PRC (Peking, 1975), p. 26.

of the "superstructure" in the reproduction of production relation to want to explain everything (for example, crisis in capitalism or the transition to communism) by reference to the economic structure alone is, of course, economism".<sup>31</sup>

To attain higher levels of production they plan to realise major savings through better administration, improving planning apparatus, reducing speculation and waste, tightening cost-accounting and financial procedures, vigorously instituting a system of one man responsibility, replacing revolutionary committees with more efficient management structures except at key administration levels of government, and stressing discipline and stressing hard work for government employees, factory management and workers alike.

The report said that "with the exception of those factories, mines or other enterprises where government administration is integrated with management, factories, production brigades, schools and colleges, shops, party and government organisations and other enterprises and establishments will no longer set up revolutionary committees in as much as they do not form a level of government. In lieu of revolutionary committees, a system

---

31 Louis Althusser, Essays in Self Criticism (London, 1975), p.14.

of division of responsibilities should be adopted with factory directors, production brigade leaders, school principals, college presidents, and managers taking charge under the leadership of Party Committees".

Thus it not only throttled any attempt to establish workers control over process of production but also subjugated workers to the control of managers. It means that the position of worker vis-a-vis production process remains the same i.e. they still do not have any control over their labour. It is believed that domination is necessary if production is to be maximised. However, domination is used by capitalists to maintain the extent to which the labour serves the interest of capital and not those workers. In a capitalist system "the aim of capital is accumulation, and the pursuit of this aim is the separation of producers from the product of their labour, from the means of production and from work itself, which must be imposed on them from outside as a predetermined quantity, fixed by inhuman necessities of labour process".<sup>32</sup>

---

32 Andre Gorz, "Technology, Technicians and Class Struggle", in Andre Gorz, ed., The Division of Labour (New York, 1976), p.174.



In such a situation "the enthusiasm of the masses cannot be aroused if no distinction is made between those who do more work and those who do less; between those who do a good work and those who do a poor one, and between those who work and those who don't".<sup>33</sup>

And in the wake of upsurge in economic construction, the role of educational institutions is to produce more and more experts because development of science and technology is supposed to be essential for speedy development of the country. Regarding education, Teng says: "We lost a whole generation as regards education, including science and technology we need quite some time and much effort to catch up".<sup>34</sup>

The report gave a call for mobilising scientific and technical personnel to speed up research into urgent scientific and technical problems, in economic construction and national defence. Teng has gone even to the extent of calling the scientists as "part of the proletariat". The difference between them and manual workers lies only in a different role in the social division labour, those who

---

33 See n.30, p.3.

34 See n.23, p.17.

labour, whether by hand or brain are all working people in a socialist society".<sup>35</sup>

It shows that the present leadership is not making attempt to transform the relations of production. It is even willing to retain them. In the above statement Teng does not see any difference between manual and mental labour which is most profound character of all class societies - the separation between theory and practice.

Through the division of labour the bourgeois ensures its ownership of technology and intellectual labour and prevents the broad masses from taking it into their own hands. By utilizing the practical experience of workers acquired in production to take technology and science into their own hands enables full growth of the productive forces. "In the transitional stage from capitalism to communism, the triumph of proletariat or, on the contrary, the resurgence of bourgeois, depends on the domination by one or other of these classes on the technical organisation of production and on techno-scientific development".<sup>36</sup>

---

35 See "Speech at the opening Session of National Science Conference", in Peking Review, no.12, 24 March 1978, p.11.

36 Marco Maccio Party, "Technicians and Working Class in the Chinese Revolution", in Gorz, n.32, p.103.

In other words, the proletarian revolution must overcome the bourgeois division of labour that represses the creative energies of the working class and prevents them from actively participating in the development of productive forces.

But the present leadership does not see the significance of this task, which tantamounts to following the productivist theory whereby development of productive forces becomes the primary task. That is why Teng said: "It is also necessary to obtain capital from the developed countries and to learn from the experiences of the developed countries, especially in the field of management".<sup>37</sup>

(Emphasis added) Ideologically and politically such an argument will block any organised action by the proletariat to transform the production relations, i.e. to destroy the existing forms of process of appropriation.

---

37 See n.23, p.16.

## Chapter IV

## CONCLUSION

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION

The transition from capitalism to communism takes an entire historical epoch. This transition phase is socialism. One of the unique features of the social formation in transition period is that it does not consist of any single mode of production, but is a combination of two modes of production, capitalist and communist. In the presence of two contradictory modes of production struggle between them is inevitable. As Lenin pointed out:

"Transition period has to be a period of struggle between dying capitalism and nascent communism or in other words, between capitalism which has been defeated but not destroyed and communism which has been born but is still very feeble". 1

Thus it makes clear that classes and class struggle continue even in the era of dictatorship of the proletariat. Like all other societies, socialist society also develops through internal contradictions. "The large-scale and turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of the previous revolutionary period have in the main ended, but the class struggle is by no means entirely over". 2

---

1 V.I. Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow, 1975), vol.3, p.230.

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings (Peking, 1971), p.446.

The liberation of China in 1949 which smashed bureaucratic capitalism, feudalism and imperialism was not a socialist revolution but a People's Democratic revolution. It thereby opened the way for socialist transformation. So the victory in 1949 gave a chance for workers to build socialist society but it could not be taken for granted as inevitable. It is quite probable that "in the course of socialist development each and every period is bound to have a group that is more than willing to preserve backward production relations and social institutions".<sup>3</sup> Thus the development of socialism towards communism depends on the development of class struggle.

The conflicts in the society inevitably reflect in the Party. It takes the form of two-line struggle inside the Party. There would always be a conservative section in the Party, which would oppose radical policies to bring about changes in the society. In the history of the CPC, as Chinese themselves stated, 'eleven inner-Party struggles' had taken place. After each struggle the Party united on the basis of a new set of policies only to divide again.

---

3 Mao Tse-tung, Critique of Soviet Economics  
(New York, 1977), p.72.

The Party Congresses have significant place in the process of the two-line struggles in the Party. At the Congress the winning group would consolidate its position. It also plays a vital role in vindicating the victorious line. Thus the Congress acquires a crucial role from the perspective of political consolidation. The veracity of the argument can be proved by the fact that each of the Party Congresses studied here, was held after struggles in the Party.

The Ninth Party Congress was preceded by severe conflict in the Party between Liu Shao-chi line and Maoist line. The disagreement which began with the debates over great leap policies gradually extended to other areas and became a dispute over "general line". Liu Shao-chi had seen the progress towards communism as completely dependent upon the development of productive forces. Under these conditions the fundamental problem of the Chinese proletariat was that of increasing production as quickly as possible. In developing the productive forces it was believed that the corresponding production relations and appropriate superstructure would develop automatically without much struggle.

On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung believed that the main obstacle to the transformation of society is not the level

of development of productive forces alone but rather the nature of dominant social relations - both in/<sup>re-</sup>production of the capitalist division of labour and in the ideological and political relations which, while being an effect of this division, also constituted the social condition for this reproduction. In other words the development of productive forces could never by itself, cause the capitalist forms of the division of labour or the other bourgeois social relations, to disappear.

The Ninth Party Congress was the culmination of the victory of Mao Tse-tung group over Liu group. In fact, it legitimised Mao Tse-tung's policies. The political Report submitted to the Congress laid down the broad spectrum of the policies of the Party. The Report was not specific on any issue except on the course and nature of the Cultural Revolution. After narrating the course of Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao discussed domestic and foreign policies.

The Report expounded that classes had not been completely eliminated. Apparently the question of which class held leadership was not decided. In order to consolidate the position of the proletariat, it was believed that relentless struggles in the realm of superstructure had to be launched. Further to enable the proletariat to establish its control over production process, the Report suggested a number of



measures, such as establishing three-in-one committees, repealing irrational rules, criticising revisionism to strengthen unity among workers etc. The Report also opined that production could not develop unless struggles were carried in the superstructure. In other words, the Report believed <sup>that</sup> development in the productive forces would follow transformation of productive relations. As the Report stated "this is not to replace production by revolution, but to use revolution to command production, promote it and lead it forward".<sup>4</sup>

Thus the Ninth Party Congress made it clear that struggle waged under the proletarian dictatorship could only bring about the disappearance of capitalist form of productive relations by attacking the capitalist division of labour and, at the same time the ideological and political relations that made it possible for relations of exploitation and oppression to be reproduced. Suffice it to say that class struggle was seen as the driving force of history.

---

4 Report to the Ninth National Congress of CPC, in Peking Review (Peking), no.18, 20 April 1969, p.27.

But the unity established at the Congress did not last long. The Congress was followed by continuing conflict in the Party, which resulted in the overthrow of Lin Piao. Lin Piao was alleged to have attempted to usurp state power, to subvert the policies established at the Ninth Congress.

According to the Chinese sources available to us, the Political Report originally prepared to submit to the Ninth Congress by Lin Piao, was said to have been constructed on the basis of productivist theory. However, the text is not available to judge the veracity of the statement. Nevertheless in a speech made in the year 1966, Lin said that "production is undoubtedly the basis. However, it relies upon changes, consolidation and development resulting from the seizure of political power".<sup>5</sup> Thus Lin might have believed that after the Cultural Revolution, the primary task would be production. This naturally went against the notion of Continuous Revolution. Moreover, by calling Mao a 'genius', and asking the Party to vouch for him, Lin Piao seemed to have hindered the process of Party reconstruction. The conception of 'genius' also underestimates the role of masses in the history. To cap it all,

---

5 See Lin Piao's Informal Address to the Enlarged Session of Politburo Meeting, 18 May 1966, in Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.2, no.2, 1969-70, p.44.

it appeared that at the third plenum he stalled the proceedings to make Chen Po-ta Chairman of the State against the intentions of the Central Committee.<sup>6</sup> When the attempt was busted, it was alleged, Lin planned a coup to capture state power. Mao then toured the country to muster support for fighting Lin Piao.

Apparently Lin was purged by a coalition of Radicals and Moderates in which Chou Enlai appears to have played an important role. But the removal of Lin from the Party helped the Moderates to stage a comeback. With the purge of Lin and Mao more than normally absent, with no chosen successor to the Party, Chou achieved particular eminence.

Moreover, in the name of undoing the mistakes made by Lin, most of the veterans cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated to their previous position. This was naturally the case detrimental to the radical positions.

But before the struggle between Radicals and Moderates reached a serious stage, the Tenth Party Congress was convened. At the Congress, for the first time moderate policies were initiated. Eventhough Chou En-lai in his Report submitted to the Congress, proclaimed continuity

---

6 Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local Comrades During his Tour of Inspection, in Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.5, nos.3-4, pp.35-36.

of the policies evolved at the Ninth Congress, the actual trend was towards "pragmatic modernisation policies". Chou was not ready for any more revolutions, like the Cultural Revolution, because in his opinion it would disrupt production. Chou's Report gave the impression that economic development was primary and it had little to do with revolution. Unlike the Ninth Congress Report, Chou's Report did not show any dialectical relationship between revolution and production.

However, there was opposition to such policies in the Congress, Wang Hung-wen in his report on the revision of the Party Constitution delivered at the Congress declared that "the current Proletarian Cultural Revolution is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism".<sup>7</sup>

Thus the Radicals did not agree with Chou's proposition that order had to be restored to accelerate production. In their opinion old ideas and class relations do not end by simply developing a "strong material base". They opined

---

7 Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CPC and Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution (Calcutta: People's Book Agency, n.d.), p.26.

that only through recurrent class struggles could the proletariat establish its control. Apparently they believed that production would develop only through struggles.

Immediately after the Congress, both groups were locked in severe struggles. Radicals launched an indirect attack on the moderates. The campaigns that were launched after the Tenth Congress, were in fact the principal arenas in which political struggles were waged. In the same period moderates strengthened their position in the Party and the Government. At the Tenth Congress a large number of veterans purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Later Teng Hsiao-ping was made Politburo member and first Vice-Premier. Radicals tried to manoeuvre for positions in the Party and Government but in vain. During the later part of 1975, Teng also criticised Radical policies and justified moderate line. The struggle continued till 1976 October, when Radicals were finally purged.

But due to paucity of information it is difficult to explain conclusively the "Eleventh Major Struggle". For example, the purge of Teng in 1976 is a very complicated event. It is not known how the Radicals could remove Teng from all his positions at a time when moderates seemed to have established their control over the Party. In the same way the cause behind Hua's alignment with the moderates is not clear.

However, tentatively it could be suggested that Radicals either acted with the tacit support of Mao or enjoyed his full confidence. Perhaps, this explains why moderates awaited the death of Mao to purge Radicals and reinstate Teng. And Hua might have been closer to the Moderates than to the Radicals. Of course, he was not willing to give up the "new born things of Cultural Revolution". But then he maintained that such institutions cannot exist without strong material base. This could be the reason for Hua's alliance with Moderates to purge the Radicals.

However, there is no dispute about the fact that Moderates emerged successful out of the eleventh struggle in the Party. So, naturally it enabled them to implement their policies freely. The Eleventh Party Congress held in August 1977 legitimised moderates pragmatic modernisation policies. The Report said:

"It is necessary to introduce technical innovation, carry out technical revolution so as to provide the socialist system with a growing material base and promote change and development in relations of production and superstructure".<sup>8</sup>

That is why it declared that "the developing socialist economy is the basic task of the dictatorship of the proletariat".<sup>9</sup> So naturally such policies tended to

---

8 The Eleventh National Congress of the CPC (Documents), (Peking, 1977), p.29.

9 Ibid., p.83.

restrict workers participation in the management; increase the power of managers; strengthen material incentives; curb the struggle against revisionism and so on. This position is not fundamentally different from the one taken by Liu Shao-chi. It appears it would not be too long when Liu will be posthumously rehabilitated.

In other words the fundamental problem for the proletariat to solve, according to the new line, seemed to be that of increasing production as quickly as possible; in building the material foundation of socialism it is believed that the corresponding production relations, and appropriate superstructure would develop. Such a thesis would block any organised action by the proletariat to transform production relations, and build a new process of appropriation, excluding the social division between the function of the management and that of the execution, the separation between manual and mental labour, and the difference between town and country and between workers and peasants - in short the objective basis for the existence of classes. Because it presupposes that any contradiction that might seem to exist in the superstructure would disappear in course of time, as the productive forces develop.

Thus the policies of the present leadership are not in consonance with Mao Tse-tung's thought. Mao said in the transition period "all social relations must be fundamentally transformed" --- "All social relations" include in its meaning the production relations and the superstructure, economics, politics, ideology and culture etc."<sup>10</sup> He also said that "all revolutionary history shows that the full development of new productive forces is not the prerequisite for the transformation of backward production relations".<sup>11</sup>

Thus drastic change of shifting emphasis from "politics in command" to "technique in command" has occurred in China. These changes, as the study shows, started in 1972 and they have crystalized at the Eleventh Party Congress.

---

10 Mao Tse-tung, A Critique of Soviet Economics, (New York, 1977), p.34.

11 Ibid., p.51.



SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

## SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

- "A Big Character Poster that Denounced the "Gang-of-Four", Peking Review (Peking), no.4, 21 January 1977, pp.22-26.
- Bowie, R. and FairBank, J., ed, Communist China, 1955-59: Policy Documents with Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
- "Broaden and Deepen Struggle to Criticise Lin Piao and Confucius: "Red Flag" Commentary", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.6, 11 February 1974, pp.5-6.
- CCP Central Committee Circular on Holding National Science Conference, Peking Review (Peking), no.40, 30 September 1977, pp.6-10.
- Chinese Communist Documents Criticising Teng Hsiao-ping for his "Unorthodox" Views and Behaviour, Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.12, no.5, May 1976, pp.102-121.
- Chen, Jerome, ed., Mao Papers (Bombay:Oxford University Press, 1971).
- Chi Wei, "How the "Gang of Four" opposed Socialist Modernization", Peking Review (Peking), no.11, 11 March 1977, pp.6-9.
- Cheng, Li, "Theory of Productive Forces: Its Counter-Revolutionary Essence", Peking Review (Peking), no.48, 30 November 1973, pp.11-14.
- Chen, Li, "Attach Importance to the Revolution in the Super-structure", Peking Review (Peking), no.34, 24 August 1973, pp.4-9.
- Chang-chun, Chiao, "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.14, 7 April 1975, pp.9-14.
- Chun, Tien, "The Sole Purpose of Mastering Marxist Theory is to Apply it", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), 19, 12 March 1975, pp.5-6.

- Chung An, "Counter-Revolutionary Features of Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi and Chou Yang Revealed by the Play "Death of Li Hsiu-cheng", Peking Review (Peking), no.21, 21 May 1971, pp.6-12.
- Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Peking Review (Peking), no.31, 29 July 1977, pp.3-8.
- Counter-Revolutionary Political Incident at Tienanmen Square, Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.15, 12 April 1976, pp.4-6.
- "Document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, no.56, 1970", Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.5, nos.3-4, 1972-73, pp.68-71.
- "Document of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, no.4, 1972", Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.5, nos.3-4, 1972-73, pp.43-57.
- "Document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, no.24, 1972", Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.5, nos.3-4, 1972-73, pp.58-67.
- Documents of the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978).
- Documents of CCP Central Committee 1956-1969 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1971), vol.I,II.
- Failure of "Gang of Four" Scheme to set up a "Second Armed Force", Peking Review (Peking, no.13, 25 March 1977, pp.10-12.
- Feng, Yen, "Criticizing Lin Piao, Confucius is Great Struggle to Oppose Revisionism", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.12, 25 March 1974, pp.8-10.
- Heng, Chih, "Firmly Grasp Class Struggle as the Key Link", Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines (Hong Kong), no.856, 23 January 1976, pp.9-15.

"How the "Gang of Four" used Shanghai as a Base to Usurp Party and State Power", Peking Review (Peking), no.6, 4 February 1977, pp.5-10.

Hua-hung, Szu, "Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique: Sworn Enemy of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Peking Review (Peking), no.52, 28 December 1973, pp.4-7.

In Camera Statements of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Law and Government (New York, vol.1, no.4, 1968-69.

Joint Editorial, "Place Mao Tse-tung Thought in Command of Everything", Peking Review (Peking), no.1, 3 January 1969, pp.7-9.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Hold Aloft the Banner of Unity of the Party's Ninth Congress and Win Still Greater Victories", Peking Review (Peking), no.24, 13 June 1969, pp.6-8.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Firmly Grasp Revolutionary Mass Criticism", Peking Review (Peking), no.35, 29 August 1969, pp.3-5.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Usher in the Great 1970s: 1970 New Year Day Editorial", Peking Review (Peking), no.1, 2 January 1970, pp.5-7.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Leninism or Social Imperialism", Peking Review (Peking), no.17, 24 April 1970, pp.5-15.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Peking Review (Peking), no.12, 19 March 1971, pp.3-13.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Unite to Win Still Greater Victories, 1972", Peking Review (Peking), no.1, 7 January 1972, pp.8-12.

Joint Editorial, "Study Hard and Continue to Advance",  
Peking Review (Peking), no.40, 5 October 1973,  
pp.8-9.

\_\_\_\_\_, "New Year Message, 1973", Peking Review  
(Peking), no.1, 5 January 1973, pp.9-12.

\_\_\_\_\_, "New Year Message, 1974", Hsinhua Weekly  
(Hong Kong), no.1, 7 January 1974, pp.7-10.

\_\_\_\_\_, "New Year Message, 1975", Hsinhua Weekly  
(Hong Kong), New Year Special Issue, 6 January,  
1975, pp.5-7.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Nothing is Hard in this World if you  
Dare to Scale the Heights: New Year Day Editorial,  
1976", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.1,  
5 January 1976, pp.8-11.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Build Party in Course of Struggle, 1 July,  
1976", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.27, 5 July,  
1976, pp.5-7.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Study Documents well and Grasp Their Links",  
Peking Review (Peking), no.8, 18 February 1977,  
pp.6-7.

Jung-kuo, Yang, "Confucius - The Thinker Who Stubbornly Defends  
the System of Slavery", Chinese Law and Government  
(New York), vol.8, no.4, 1975-76, pp.56-69.

Kang, Fang, "Capitalist-Roads are the Bourgeoisie In The  
Party", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.24,  
14 June 1976, pp.9-11.

Kuo-feng, Hua, "Continue the Revolution Under the Dictatorship  
of the Proletariat to the End", Peking Review  
(Peking), no.19, 6 May 1977, pp.15-27.

Kuo-feng, Hua, "Speech at the Second National Conference on  
Learning From Tachai in Agriculture", Peking Review  
(Peking), vol.20, no.1, 1 January 1977, pp.31-44.

Kuo-feng, Hua, "Speech at the National Conference of Learning  
From Tachai in Industry", Peking Review (Peking),  
no.21, 20 May 1977, pp.7-15.

Lenin, V.I., Marx Engels Marxism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978).

\_\_\_\_\_, The State and Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976).

Li-cheng, Chung, "China's General Principle for Developing the Economy", Peking Review (Peking), no.33, 17 August 1973, pp.4-7.

Li-hsin, Hung, "Develop New Things Emerging from the Great Cultural Revolution", Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines (Hong Kong), no.854, 12 January 1976, pp.1-4.

"Lin Piao's Talk at the Central Work Conference, October 1966", Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.1, no.1, 1968, pp.13-31.

Mao Tse-tung, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the US Agressors and Their Running Dogs", Peking Review 23 May 1970, Special Issue, pp.8-9.

"Mao Tse-tung's Talk to "Liberated Cadres" and "Wuhan Cadres": Excerpts of an Unpublished CCP Confidential Document", Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.11, no.2, February 1975, pp.91-93.

"Mao Tse-tung's Private Letter to Chiang Ching", Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.9, no.4, January 1973, pp.94-96.

Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, 1949-1968, (Virgenia: Joint Publication Research Service, 1974), 2 volumes.

Mu-chiao, Hsueh, "Two-~~line~~ Struggle in the Economic Field During the Transition Period", Peking Review (Peking), no.49, 2 December 1977, pp.4-8.

Ping, Chi, "Seeing the Essence of Problems", Peking Review (Peking), no.19, 11 May 1973, pp.5-7.

People's Daily Editorial, "Pay Attention to Methods of Work", Peking Review (Peking), no.46, 14 November 1969, pp.5-6.

People's Daily Editorial, "Conscientiously Study Chairman Mao's Philosophical Works", Peking Review (Peking), no.45, 6 November 1970, pp.4-5.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Advance from Victory to Still Greater Victory Along the Course Charted by Ninth National Congress of CPC", Peking Review (Peking), no.14, 8 April 1970, pp.6-9.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "The Working Class must Further Play its Role as the Main Force", Peking Review (Peking), no.17, 27 April 1973, pp.11-12.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Several Years of Persistent Efforts Will Surely Produce Good Results, 6 July 1972", Peking Review (Peking), no.28, 14 July, 1973, pp.13-15.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Carry Struggle to Criticise Lin Piao and Confucius Through to End, 2 February 1974", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.6, 11 February 1974, pp.3-5.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Restrain Oneself and Restore the Rites, 20 February 1974", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.8, 25 February 1974, pp.15-16.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Study Well Theory of Dictatorship of Proletariat", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.7, 17 February 1975, pp.3-4.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Grasp Theoretical Study, Promote Industrial Production, 11 March 1975", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.11, 17 March 1975, pp.3-4.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Leading Cadres Should Take Lead and Study Well, 21 March 1975", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.12, 24 March 1975, pp.7-8.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Illustrious Historic Document, 20 March 1975", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.21, 26 March 1975, pp.3-4.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Grasp Crucial Point and Deepen Criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping, 23 August 1976", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.35, 30 August 1976, pp.3-4.

People's Daily Editorial, "Masses are Real Heroes, 29 May 1976", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.22, 31 May 1976, pp.14-15.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Beat Back Right Deviationist Attempt to Reverse Correct Verdicts, Promote Industrial Production, 26 March 1976", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.13, 29 March 1976, pp.3-4.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Reversing Correct Verdicts goes against the Will of Peoples, 10 March 1976", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.11, 15 March 1976, pp.3-4.

\_\_\_\_\_, "The Crux of "Gang of Four's" Crimes is to Usurp Party and State Power", Peking Review (Peking), no.2, 7 January 1977, pp.29-32.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Carry out in an All-Round Way the Strategic Policy Decision on Grasping the Key Link in Running the Country Well", Peking Review (Peking), no.16, 15 April 1977, pp.8-10.

Red Flag Editorial, "On Summing up Experience", Peking Review (Peking), vol.12, 21 March 1969, pp.3-5.

Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Peking Review (Peking), Special Issue, 28 April 1969.

Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China and Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution (Calcutta: Peoples Book Agency, n.d.).

Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters, 1956-71 (Harmandsworth: Penguin Books, 1974).

Selected Criticisms of "On the General Program for all Work of the Party and the Country" and "Some Problems in Speeding up Industrial Development", Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vo.18, no.6, June 1977, pp.107-115.



Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung  
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971).

Shi, Chuang, "Criticise Revisionist Fallacies on the Industrial Front", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.21, 24 May 1978, pp.-6-10.

"Speeches and Instructions of Lin Piao, 1966-71", Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.6, nos.1,2, 1973.

"Study Consciously and Deepen Criticism: "Red Flag", Commentary", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.10, 11 March 1974, pp.10-11.

Teng Hsiao-ping, "On the General Program for All Work of the (Whole) Party and the (whole) Country", Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.18, no.8, August 1977, pp.77-99.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Outline of a Briefing on the Work of the Academy of Sciences", Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.13, no.9, September 1977, pp.63-70.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Some Problems in Speeding Up Industrial Development", Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.18, no.7, July 1977, pp.90-113.

Teng Hsiao-ping's Comments on Industrial Development, 18 August 1975, Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.13, no.9, September 1977, pp.77-79.

Teng Hsiao-ping's Speech to the Ad Hoc Forum of the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth CCP Central Committee, Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.13, no.10, pp.74-78.

The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-69 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969).

The CCP Central Committee Circular on the Distribution of the "Revised Constitution" of the People's Republic of China, Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.8, no.5, pp.99-101.

The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China: Documents (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977).

- The "Gang of Four" Stamped on Party's Policy on Intellectuals, Peking Review (Peking), no.12, 18 March 1977, pp.19-20, 24.
- Tieh-sheng, Chang, "A Provocative Answer", Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.7, no.3, 1974, pp.87-90.
- Wen-yuan, Yao, "On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique", Hsinhua Weekly (Hong Kong), no.10, 10 March 1975, pp.3-8.
- Wang Hung-wen's Report to the Central Study Class, Issues and Studies (Taipeh), vol.11, no.2, November 1975, pp.94-105.
- Writing Group of the Kirin Provincial Revolutionary Committee, "Socialist Construction and Class Struggle in the Field of Economics: Critique of Sun Yen-fang's Revisionist Economic Theory", Peking Review (Peking), no.16, 17 April 1970, pp.6-12.
- Yang Pu, "The Spirit of Going Against the Tide", Chinese Law and Government (New York), vol.7, no.2, 1973, pp.91-93.
- Yi Ko, "Material Incentives" are a Reaction to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Peking Review (Peking), no.6, 20 February 1970, pp.14-17.

### Secondary Sources

#### Books:

- Althusser, Louis, Essays in Self-Criticism (London: New Left Books, 1975).
- Barnett, Doak, A., Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974).
- Baum, Richard, ed., China in Ferment (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971).
- Bettelheim, Charles A., Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

- Bettelheim, Charles A., Class Struggles in USSR, 1917-23 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
- Brugger, Bill, ed., The Impact of the Cultural Revolution (New York, N.Y.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1978).
- Chang, Parris, H., Power and Policy in China (Pennsylvania, p.a.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975).
- \_\_\_\_\_, Radicals and Their Ideology (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1973).
- Chang, Y.C., Factional and Coalition Politics in China: The Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1976).
- China After the Cultural Revolution: A Selection from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1970).
- Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, China! Inside the People's Republic (New York, N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1972).
- Domes, Jurgen, The Internal Politics of China (London: C. Hurst, 1973).
- \_\_\_\_\_, China After Cultural Revolution: The Politics between Two Party Congresses (London: C. Hurst, 1976).
- Dutt, Gargi, and Dutt, V.P., China's Cultural Revolution (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1970).
- Gray, Jack, ed., Modern China's Search for a Political Form (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
- Good Stadt, L., Mao Tse-tung: The Search for Plenty (Hong Kong: Longman, 1972).
- Gorz, Andre, ed., The Division of Labour (London: New Left Books, 1976).
- Hinton, William, Turning Point in China: An Essay on Cultural Revolution (New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

- Lindbeck, J.M., ed., China Management of a Revolutionary Society (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972).
- Lewis, J.W., ed., Party Leadership a Revolutionary Power in China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
- Mac Farquhar, Roderick, The Origins of Cultural Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
- Mehnert, K., Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969).
- Milton, David, et al., ed., People's China (Harmonds Worth: Penguin Books, 1977).
- Myrdal, Jan, China: The Revolution Continued (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon Book, 1970).
- North, Robert Carver, The Foreign Relations of China (Belmon, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1969).
- Robinsam, Joan, The Cultural Revolution in China (Harmonds Worth: Penguin Books, 1969).
- Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung (Harmonds Worth: Penguin Books, 1967).
- Schram, Stuart, ed., Authority, Participation and Political Change in China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
- Schurmann, Franz, and Schell, Orville, Communist China (Harmonds Worth: Penguin Books, 1977).
- Snow, Edgar, The Long Revolution (London: Hutchison, 1973).
- Sweezy, Paul, and Bettelheim, Charles, On the Transition to Socialism (New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1971).
- Townsend, James Roger, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969).

Van, Ginnekan, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao (Harmonds-  
Worth: Penguin Books, 1976).

Wheelwright, E.L., and Mc Farlane, Bruce, The Chinese  
Road to Socialism: Economics of the  
Cultural Revolution (New York, N.Y.:Monthly  
Review Press, 1970).

Articles:

Adie, W.A.C., "China's "Second Liberation" in Perspective",  
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Chicago, Ill.),  
vol.25, no.2, February 1969, pp.23-28.

Bandopathyaya, J., "Triumph and Tragedies of Maoism in China",  
China Report (New Delhi), vol.9, no.2, 1973,  
pp.20-30.

Baum, Richard, "China: Year of the Mangoes", Asian Survey  
(Berkeley, Calif.), vol.9, no.1, January 1969,  
pp.1-17.

Bethe, Hans A., "The ABM, China and the Arms Race",  
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Chicago, Ill.),  
Vol.25, no.5, May 1969, pp.41-44.

Bettelheim, Charles, "The Great Leap Backward", Monthly  
Review (New York, N.Y.), vol.30, no.3,  
July-August 1978, pp.37-131.

Borovosky, V., "On the Tenth National Congress of  
Communist Party of China", International  
Affairs (Moscow), no.12, December 1973, pp.73-79.

Bradsher, Henry S., "China: The Radical Offensive",  
Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), vol.13,  
no.11, November 1973, pp.989-1009.

Bridgham, Philip, "Fall of Lin Piao", China Quarterly  
(London), no.55, 1973, pp.427-49.

---

\_\_\_\_\_, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle  
to Consolidate Power", China Quarterly  
(London), no.41, 1970, pp.1-25.

- Brugger, William, "The Ninth National Congress of CPC",  
World Today (London), vol.25, no.7, July 1969,  
pp.297-305.
- Chang, Parris H., "The Second Decade of Maoist Rule",  
Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol.18,  
no.6, 1969, pp.1-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance  
Sheet", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.),  
vol.18, no.2, 1969, pp.1-10.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Political Profiles: Wang Hung-wen and Li  
Teh-sheng", China Quarterly (London), no.57, 1974,  
pp.124-132.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign:  
Its Meaning and Purpose", Asian Survey  
(Berkeley, Calif.), vol.14, no.10, October 1974,  
pp.871-886.
- Chaudhari, Ranjit, "Mao's Dilemma on the 20th Anniversary",  
China Report (New Delhi), vol.5, no.5, 1969,  
pp.14-17.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "A Note on the Role of Agriculture in China's  
Economic Development", China Report (New Delhi),  
vol.5, no.4, 1969, pp.9-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Mao's Unfinished Revolution", China Report  
(New Delhi), vol.6, no.2, 1970, pp.24-27.
- China: Politics, Far Eastern Economic Review Year Book  
(Hong Kong), 1974, pp.117-120.
- "China's New Diplomacy, A Symposium", Problems of Communism  
(Washington, D.C.), vol.20, no.6, 1971, pp.1-32.
- Chu, Wi, "CCP Hold Their Tenth National Congress", Issues and  
Studies (Taipei), vol.10, no.1, October 1973,  
pp.2-6.
- Chun-kuei, Fan, "An Analysis of the Tenth Central Committee  
of the Chinese Communist Party", Chinese Law and  
Government (New York, N.Y.), vol.7, nos.1-2,  
1974, pp.44-105.

- Daubier, Jean, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution", Monthly Review (New York, N.Y.), vol.22, no.5, October 1970, pp.31-37.
- Dernberger, Robert F., "Economic Realities and China's Political Economies", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Chicago, Ill.), vol.25, no.2, February 1969, pp.34-42.
- Deshingkar, G.D., "Vice-Chairman Lin Piao", China Report (New Delhi), vol.5, no.3, 1969, pp.42-47.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Fall of Lin Shao-chi", China Report (New Delhi), vol.5, no.1, 1969, pp.14-18.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Ninth CCP Congress: The Problem of the Day after a Long Night", China Report (New Delhi), vol.5, no.3, 1969, pp.33-39.
- Diao, Richard K., "Impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's Economic Elite", China Quarterly (London), no.42, 1970, pp.65-67.
- Dittimer, Lowell, "Structural Evolutions of "Criticism and Self-Criticism", China Quarterly (London), no.56, 1973, pp.708-29.
- Domes, Jurgen, "New Course in Chinese Domestic Politics: The Anatomy of Readjustment", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), vol.13, no.7, July 1969, pp.633-46.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Chinese Leadership Crisis: The Doom of an Heir?", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.17, no.3, 1973, pp.863-79.
- Durding, Tellman, "The New Face of Maoist China", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol.20, no.5, 1971, pp.1-13.
- Eastman, Lloyd, "Mao, Marx and the Future Society", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vo.18, no.3, 1969, pp.21-26.
- Fairbank, John K. "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), April 1969, pp.449-463.

- Findorff, W.D., "China and European Community: New Developments in China's International Theory", Round Table ( London ), no.251, July 1973, pp.341-50.
- Fitzgerald, C.P., "A Revolutionary Hiatus", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago, Ill.), vol.25, no.2, February 1969, pp.53-60.
- Ganguli, Shivaji, "China's Strategic Objectives", China Report (New Delhi), vol.5, no.6, 1969, pp.13-17.
- Gittings, John, "The Great-Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", China Quarterly (London), no.39, 1969, pp.41-54.
- Goodstadt, L.F., "Wages in Command", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol.69, no.32, 6 August 1970, pp.52-54.
- Goodstadt, Leo, "Lin on the Congress Stage", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol.81, no.34, 27 August 1973, pp.29-30.
- Gray, Jack, "The Economics of Maoism", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Chicago, Ill.), vol.25, no.2, February 1969, pp.42-51.
- Gupta, Sisir, "Triangular Power Balance", Seminar (New Delhi), no.133, September 1970, pp.21-27.
- Gupta, Dipankar, and Gupta, H.K., "Tachai and Taching: The Two Red Banners of Socialist Construction in China", China Report (New Delhi), vol.14, no.1, 1978, pp.
- Gupta, K.P., "Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought: Visions and Revisions", China Report (New Delhi), vol.10, nos. 5-6, 1974, pp.19-37.
- Gurley, John G., "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (San Fransisco), vol.2, no.3, 1970, pp.34-50.
- Gurtov, Melvin, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs During the Cultural Revolution", China Quarterly (London), no.40, 1969, pp.65-102.



- Gyn, Mark, "Who After Mao?", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol.51, no.2, January 1973, pp.300-309.
- Harper, Paul, "The Party and Unions in Communist China", China Quarterly (London), no.37, 1969, pp.84-119.
- Huck, Arthur, "China and the Chinese Threat System", International Affairs (London), vol.49, no.4, October 1973, pp.617-23.
- Jain, Girilal, "China's Dual Approach", China Report (New Delhi), vol.6, no.4, 1970, pp.12-15.
- Jenner, Bill, "The New Chinese Revolution", New Left Review (London), no.53, 1969, pp.83-96.
- Kanet, Roger, "Soviet Union and China: Is War Inevitable?", Current History (Philadelphia, Pa), vol.65, no.386, October 1973, pp.145-72.
- Klatt, Werner, "Review of China's Economy in 1970", China Quarterly (London), no.43, 1970, pp.100-120.
- Liev, Richard, "New Light on Mao: His Views on the Soviet Union's Political Economy", China Quarterly (London), no.67, 1975, pp.95-117.
- Lin, Paul, "Development Guided by Values: China's Road and its Implications", China Report (New Delhi), vol.10, nos. 5,6, 1974, pp.3-18.
- Lindsay, Michael, "Contradictions in a Totalitarian Society", China Quarterly (London), no.39, 1969, pp.30-40.
- Lisann, Maury, "Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol.18, no.6, 1969, pp.32-41.
- Mazwell, Neville, "Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao", China Quarterly (London), no.56, 1973, pp.730-739.
- Mendel, Ernest, "The Nature of Soviet State", New Left Review (London), no.108, 1978, pp.23-46.
- Mohanty, Manoranjan, "Maoist Revolutionary Strategy: A Re-interpretation", IDSJ Journal (New Delhi), vol.2, January 1970, pp.322-353.

- Mohanty, Manoranjan, "Ideology and Utopia", Seminar (New Delhi), no.145, September 1971, pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Revolutionary Environment and Maoist Outlook", IDSJ Journal (New Delhi), vol.3, January 1971, pp.293-310.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Problems of Political Consolidation in China", China Report (New Delhi), vol.9, no.5, 1973, pp.25-37.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Theory of Continued Revolution and the CPC's Line", IDSJ Journal (New Delhi), vol.4, no.2, October 1973, pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Future of China's Polity", China Report (New Delhi), vol.10, nos.5,6, 1974, pp.91-101.
- Michael, Franz, "China After the Cultural Revolution: The Unresolved Succession Crisis", Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.), vol.17, no.2, 1973, pp.315-333.
- Neuhauser, Charles, "The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution", China Quarterly (London), no.32, 1967, pp.3-36.
- Niemeyer, Gerhart, "Ideological Dimensions of New China Policy", Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.), vol.50, no.3, 1971, pp.808-817.
- Oksenberg, Michel, "The Strategies of Peking", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol.50, no.1, October 1971, pp.15-29.
- Pfeffer, Richard M., "Purity of Mao's Cultural Revolution", Problems of Communism, (Washington, D.C.), vol.8, 1969, pp.12-25.
- Possony, Stefan T., "Chinese Communist Cauldron", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.13, no.3, 1969, pp.783-821.
- Prybyla, Jan.S., "China's Economy: Experiments in Maoism", Current History (Philadelphia, Pa.), vol.59, no.349, September 1970, pp.159-164, 179-180.

- Ramachandran, K.N., "The Second Rise and Fall of Teng Hsiao-ping", China Report (New Delhi), vol.12, no.3, 1976, pp.17-27.
- Rawski, Thomas, "Recent Trends in the Chinese Economy", China Quarterly (London), no.53, 1973, pp.1-33.
- Riskin, Carl, "Small Industry and the Chinese Model of Economic Development", China Quarterly (London), no.46, 1971, pp.245-273.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Maoism and Motivation: Work Incentives in China", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (San Francisco), vol.5, no.1, July, 1973, pp.10-24.
- Robinson, Thomas, W., "Chou En-lai's Political Style: Comparisons with Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), vol.10, no.12, December 1970, pp.1101-1116.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "China in 1972, Socio-Economic Progress Amidst Political Uncertainty", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), vol.13, no.1, January 1973, pp.1-18.
- Rahul, "No Sino-Soviet War", China Report (New Delhi), vol.5, no.5, 1969, pp.18-20.
- Schapiro, Leonard, and Lewis, John W., "The Roles of Monolithic Party and Under Totalitarian Leader", China Quarterly (London), no.40, 1969, pp.39-64.
- Sen, N.C., "China's Fourth National People's Congress", China Report (New Delhi), vol.6, no.5, 1970, pp.6-8.
- Snow, Edgar, "Mao and the New Mandate", World Today (London), vol.25, no.7, July 1969, pp.289-297.
- Sreedhar, "China's Agricultural and Industrial Policies in 1972", IDSJ Journal (New Delhi), vol.5, no.4, 1973, pp.508-27.
- Trager, Frank N., and Bordonara Robert F., "The Ninth CCP Congress and the World Communist Conference: Their Meaning for Asia", Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa), vol.13, no.3, 1969, pp.736-762.

- Tsou, Tang, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Political System", China Quarterly (London), no.38, 1969, pp.63-91.
- Van Ness, Peter, "Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary Self-reliance", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol.20, no.1/2, 1971, pp.68-74.
- Wang, Ting, "Succession Problem", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol.22, no.3, 1973, no.13-24.
- Warialwalla, B.K., "The Promising Triangle", China Report (New Delhi), vol.6, no.2, 1970, pp.18-20.
- Whetten, Lawrence L., "Moscow's anti-China Pact", World Today (London), September 1969, pp.385-393.
- Whitson, William, "China's Quest for Technology", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vo.22, no.4, 1973, pp.16-30.
- Wich, Richard, "The Tenth Party Congress: The Power Structure and the Succession Question", China Quarterly (London), no.58, 1974, pp.231-248.
- Wylie, Ray, "Revolution within a Revolution", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Chicago, Ill.), vol.25, no.2, February 1969, pp.29-32.

\*\*\*\*\*