

DOMESTIC THREATS TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY
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DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled 'DOMESTIC THREATS TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY' ⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁻¹⁹⁸⁸⁾ submitted by Mythili Sundar is in partial fulfilment of six credits out of a total requirement of twenty-four credits for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of an M.Phil Degree in this University or any other University. This is her own work.

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C H A P T E R - I

INTRODUCTION : DEFINITION OF SECURITY, EARLY YEARS
OF PAKISTAN AND THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH

Security, conventionally defined would mean the endeavour of a state to preserve its territorial integrity and political independence. Pursuit of security, ever since the formation of nation-states has constituted the basic postulate of a state's policy making. Though it is generally accepted that security includes the basic consideration of territorial integrity and political independence, the concept of security has acquired various meanings over the years especially in the post colonial era. In general terms, preamble to the Constitution of United States defines security as providing for "common defense". While it can be said that the "core values" of security remain constant, the concept of security has become more broad-based and seeks to include various factors other than the "core values" with which security has come to be identified in the past. Krasner and Brown forcefully advocated economic considerations also as core values of security. Harold Brown especially embarked upon the economic consideration. In his words, "National security is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory, to maintain its economic relations with the rest of

the world on reasonable terms, to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruption from outside, and to control its borders¹". In more broad-based terms security can be defined as the preservation and protection of political, economic and cultural institutions internally and protection against external threat to the sovereignty of a state.

This definition leads to two different dimensions of security, internal and external. In other words, a state's security may be jeopardised by internal or external threats. External threats are international threats of military, political or economic nature. These originate from the policies of other states. Internal threats may be economic or political. They usually manifest themselves in the form of sub-nationalism, economic disparities etc. It is, however, not possible to strictly compartmentalise internal and external security. The problem of internal security makes the problem of external security intense and vice-versa. These two aspects often complement one another.

1. Harold Brown, "Thinking about National Security". (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983). P.4

Generally, internal threats are more apparent in developing countries. This is not to say that external threats are not apparent in developing states or that external threats are not serious. The developed states, especially the western states by and large, underwent a long process of political, economic and social evolution and developed a stable system in military, political and socio-economic terms to combat internal challenges more or less effectively. The Third World countries on the other hand, were exposed to colonialism and imperial exploitation which had their effects in the post-colonial era. Most of these states were faced with the challenge of a divided society in economic and social terms. Besides, the newly independent countries were tied to their former colonial rulers economically and politically, they adopted a western system. Extreme economic disparities as a result of colonial exploitation was typical of these countries and this also led to regionalism. The need to grow economically meant dependence on their ex-colonial powers for aid and trade. In short, colonial framework systematically made these countries politically and economically dependent. Besides,

these countries were relatively new and 'young' as compared to the western countries which evolved over centuries of upheaval and dissent, and therefore, did not have the necessary infrastructure to combat internal challenges. Buzan argued that "Applying the concept of national security to Third World States will at the very least involve making major allowances for the higher significance of domestic factors in these states"².

The absence of broad based political participation, as a result of poverty and mass illiteracy, makes the system more vulnerable to military coups or political instability internally, and to attacks from external power. "The overall security environment of the Third World is thus set by combination of factors marked by different from those in the North, a local environment dominated by weak States, and a global one dominated by outside group of strong powers,"³ argued Buzan.

2. Barry Buzan, "People, State and Fear, The National Security Problem in the Third World" in Azar Edgar and Moon (ed) National Security in the Third World (Great Britain: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988), p. 26

3. Ibid, p.32

Even while talking of internal threats as being more apparent in developing states, it becomes necessary to differentiate among these states. If the system is broad-based and does not lack a general consensus, the internal factors may not become serious threats. On the other hand, if the system is based on an ideology divorced from popular perception, legitimacy is sought through coercion and more often, support from external powers almost becomes pre-requisite. This is more so in the case of military regimes. These regimes in order to legitimise their position externalise the internal threats and use their coercive power to put down dissent of any kind.

Mohammad Ayub argues that there are no external threats to a developing country and that the threats were almost always internal and were externalised for the benefit of those in power. According to him, "External threats quite often augment the problems of insecurity that exist within state boundaries and in many cases would be quite ineffective if internal threats and domestic

fissures did not exist within Third World Societies"⁴.

In other words, the fragility of Third world countries helps in converting internal issues into international ones. Though it can be conceded that internal threats are "externalised" and blown out of proportions because of the vulnerable and fragile nature of Third World societies, one cannot overlook the fact that external threat factors are also formidable and inevitable. As already mentioned, colonialism and the post-colonial period has made Third World countries dependent on external factors such as foreign aid, trade etc. The internal threats cannot by themselves become serious security hazards unless intensified by external factors. For example, sub-nationalism in East Pakistan, in all probability, would have failed to create Bangladesh but for the immediate Indian role in the region and Soviet role at the global level. Again, there are instances where internal fissures do not necessarily invite

4. Mohammad Ayoob "Regional Security and the Third World" in Ayoob (ed). Regional Security in the Third World (London: Mohammad Ayoob Croom Helm Ltd., 1986) p.8

external aggression but the state's security faces external threat. The Sino-Indian war of 1962, is an instance of external aggression without sufficient internal motivation. However, as mentioned earlier, the two aspects of security seldom exist in isolation and are mutually supportive. While internal threats may be made more dangerous by external factors, external threats may become more hazardous by internal vulnerability.

While it has been argued that the concept of security is linked to threats, internal or external, it is also linked to the threat perceptions of a state. Here, one must make the essential distinction between regime's threat perception and real threat perception. The gap between the two levels of perception is narrow in a system which is representative and broad-based to include broad societal consensus. But in a system where the regime is not representative, the two levels of perceptions vary. It is in this system that internal threats are externalised "In order both to portray these threats as illegitimate and to portray their (the regime's) repressive actions

as legitimate"⁵, the regime converts all domestic threats of any nature into a military one and that too, as emanating from external sources.

The factors which generally influence the threat perceptions of a state are related to psychology, geo-political environment, history and domestic conditions. "The psychology, pre-conceptions, belief system and values, and motives and interests of the leaders and related organisations need to be taken into consideration in analysing threat perception"⁶. The historical consideration would include the location, land power, resources, vulnerability of boundaries etc.. Strength of a nation depends much on factors like natural resources, industrial capacity, social and political organisation⁷. In most developing countries, certain common factors can be identified as internal threats. Ethnicity is a phenomenon which afflicts most of the developing countries.

5. Ibid., p.8

6. Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States (Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1987) p.17

7. S.T. Das National Security in Perspective (Delhi: Gian Pub. House, 1987) p.4

This is because most of the countries are multi-ethnic. Banuazizi and Weiner explain the word ethnic as the "way individuals and groups characterize themselves on the basis of their language, race, place of origin, shared culture, values and history"⁸. Ethnicity becomes a source of conflict when an ethnic groups feels isolated vis-a-vis another dominant group, which may be a majority as in the case of United States (where Whites form a numerical majority) or a minority as in the case of South Africa. This feeling of deprivation leads to increased ethnic consciousness and the ethnic groups begins to demand greater share in the economy and polity of the state. In developing countries, the resources are limited and in the course of development, if one group gets access to most of the limited availability, the other groups feel deprived and alienated. Or if one group is left behind in the process of development while the others prosper, this group begins to assert its identity. In South Asia,

8. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner in Banuazizi and Weiner (ed.) The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (Syracuse: University Press, 1986)p.2

there has been the problem of Tamils in Srilanka, the Baluchis, Pathans, Bengalis and Sindhis of Pakistan, the people of 'Tarai' in Nepal and the people of North East in India.

Apart from ethnicity, military intervention in politics is a common phenomenon in developing countries. The military in these countries serves as the advanced segment in society in terms of both ideas and technology. It is the forerunner of technological innovations. Besides, it is looked upon as a privileged institution because it safeguards the country. Due to the huge defence budgets and access to sophisticated training and technology, the military becomes a powerful organ of state. As contrasted to this is the absence of effective civilian control which is generally the result of political incompetence, which in turn is the consequence of lack of evolution of political process. Military intervention thus becomes not only possible but to some extent desirable to vested interests because it provides stability to the system.

Socio-economic differences/disparities form an intrinsic part of all developing societies. Long

years of colonial rule and lack of popular participation contribute to the perpetuation of these differences. They make the society vulnerable and weak and open to exploitation both internally and externally.

The role of external powers in enhancing the internal threats is significant. The big powers have extra-territorial interests which may be political, economic or military in nature. As early as 1913, Munroe Doctrine sought to defend USA territorial interests. In the post-war period, the big powers have sought to preserve their interests and used the fragility of developing countries to do so. The reaction of the developing countries may be varied. If a society has powerful political structure, based on popular consensus, the role of external powers is minimum. On the contrary, a society lacking in effective political infrastructure is faced with interference in a big way. The military in such societies often becomes supportive of external influence because it falls prey to the military assistance and aid from the external powers.

The above mentioned characteristics which can become threats to the security of a country will be examined in the subsequent chapters with relation to Pakistan.

Given the above theoretical framework, it would be interesting to study the internal threats, their nature and influence in a developing society. The South Asian countries became independent in the post-colonial era and are in that sense "new". These countries, with the exception of Nepal, were afflicted with the typical problems of a divided society, economic disparities and fragility in the wake of independence. This was because these countries had remained under long years of colonial rule. Colonial legacy had been to divide and rule and economically to keep the elites satisfied. The independence of India was accompanied by the creation of the new state of Pakistan along religious lines. The creation of this State was an example of the divisions which existed in a colonial society. The British systematically divided the Hindus from the Muslims and intensified their differences which led to the State of Pakistan. It has been argued that a separate

Muslim political movement started in India after the British conceded separate Muslim electorates in 1906⁹. But whether the introduction of separate electorates created differences or recognised cultural and religious differences that already existed is debatable. It would, however, be unfair to blame British imperialism alone responsible for the partition of India. Some historians argue that Pakistan was the result of differences that existed over a long period of time. It was inevitable in the sense the Muslims of India had known themselves as rulers for centuries¹⁰. So when, a national movement was launched, they could not include themselves in the mainstream when they saw Hindus emerging as an equally powerful force. The Muslim memory of years of rule in India was alive particularly among upper-class Muslims and they

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9. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (U.S.A: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967) p.2
10. H.V. Hodson The Great Divide, Britain-India-Pakistan (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1969) p.11

fostered the feeling in other Muslims that having ruled India, they should not allow themselves to be ruled by the Hindus"¹¹ .

On the other hand, it is argued that Pakistan was not necessarily inbuilt in the system. "The distinctness, self-consciousness and historical yearnings of the Muslim community did not necessarily pre-determine its political status or power, let alone the eventual birth of a new state"¹² . It was the result of a politico-religious movement where the political forces prevailed upon the Muslims, exploited the religious differences and generated mass upheaval in the name of religion. Some of the right-wing Hindu organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha also added to the fears of Muslim masses when they spoke of India as a Hindu state and the natural right of Hindus to rule the country. The political differences between Indian National Congress and Muslim League, were projected as indications of "Hindu" benevolence. As Sayeed puts it, "The

11. Sayeed, n.9, p.6

12. Hodson, n.10, p.11-12

Hindu-Muslim conflict was further heightened when more and more political power was placed on the counter by the British after 1919 and Hindu and Muslim leaders appeared as rival contenders to grab as much of it as possible for their respective communities .

That the movement for Pakistan was not purely religious was apparent from the fact that the principal Islamic groups in India opposed it . Besides the leadership of the movement was not deeply religious. It is well-known that Jinnah was a secular man, influenced by western education. (This was apparent from his inaugural speech at the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan where he declared that Pakistan would almost be a secular state). Apart from being secular, the leadership was drawn from various sects of Muslims. This laid the foundation of the contradiction in Pakistani system relating to ideology. While the leaders on the one hand were secular, they were creating a state along

13. Sayeed, n.9, p.4

14. The 'Ulama' organization, the 'Jamaat-Ul-Ulami Hind', the 'Jamaat-I-Islami' and Deoband School opposed the movement for Pakistan.

religious lines. This controversy acquired a significant dimension in independent Pakistan and those in power had to make concessions to the religious groups or the "Ulama"¹⁵. Since Pakistan was drawn from various sects of Muslims, sectarianism became a factor in Pakistani polity.

Another by-product of the Pakistan movement was the communal violence, on an unprecedented scale among the Hindus and Muslims. It was most widespread in Punjab and Bengal. This left deep scars of mutual suspicion and hatred amongst the peoples of both communities and consequently both the nations. At the political level, mutual mistrust between Indian National Congress and the Muslim League was manifest in the attitude of the respective governments of both sovereign states. This shaped the psychological aspect of threat perceptions of both India and Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan's fears of Indian or "Hindu" designs to undo partition and India's apprehensions of Pakistan instigating the Muslims in India and

15. The ideological debate is discussed at length in the Chapter 'Islamization and Militarization in Pakistan'.

its wooing of extra-regional powers to counter its perceived threat from India marked the early years of Pakistan's existence.

Having come into existence in the name of religion, it was not possible to build a purely secular Pakistan. The essentials of Islam had to be incorporated in the political structure. One of the first steps was to make Urdu the national language of Pakistan. This antagonised the Bengalis of East Pakistan, who wanted to retain their indigeneous, cultural background. The Bengalis, despite being a part of Pakistan were deeply conscious of belonging to a distinct cultural group¹⁶. Defining the political culture of Bengalis, Sayeed writes, "Bengali Hindus produced a culture which left a far greater impact on the Muslims of Bengal than did the contribution of Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs on Punjabi Muslims"¹⁷. Hence, the East Pakistanis attached a deep sense of admiration for Rabindranath Tagore even in an independent Pakistan.

16. Sayeed, n.9., p.185

17. Ibid p.187

A notable feature which marked the early years of Pakistan was the widening gap between East and West Pakistan. The East wing contributed to most of the exports in the form of jute. It was also a market for the finished goods from West Pakistan. But most of the economic benefits which Pakistan received especially in the form of American aid, went to West Pakistan. The Bengalis began to feel that their status in the federation was not equal to that of the West wing. There was dissatisfaction over the control of national affairs by the West wing and no acceptable economic programme was drawn. Politically, there was manoeuvring and bargaining among the East and West Pakistani politicians. Controversy relating to constitution making and regional autonomy alienated the Bengalis.

The Bengalis had been drawn into the Pakistan movement for economic reasons. It was a society where the Bengali Hindus were the rich and landlords while the Muslims were poor peasants. Pakistan seemed an end to the economic plight of Bengali Muslims and freedom from conservative Hindu domination. But by far, religion was the only uniting force between East and West Pakistan, who

differed sharply from each other in customs,
heritage and language ¹⁸ . Therefore, the state's
feasibility was challenged by a few inherent
factors. Firstly, it was seperated from the West
wing by miles of territory which was Indian. The
Bengalis were drawn mainly from the peasant class
and they were economically much poorer than the
affluent Punjabis of the western wing. These
factors and the so-called "step-brotherly"
treatment meted out to them, made them alienate
from the mainstream of national politics. They
began to demand regional autonomy and recognition
of Bengali as a state language along with Urdu.
They looked at the ruling clique, comprising mainly
of Punjabis, as detrimental to their progress.
They were equally dissatisfied over their lack of
adequate representation in the army and
bureaucracy, which again they thought was dominated
and manipulated by the Punjabis to suit their
interests. "The racial, temperamental and cultural
differences between two entirely different peoples,

18. Russell Brines Indo-Pakistani Conflict
(London: Pall Hall Press, 1968) p.29

geographically wide apart, were sought to be bridged only by the emotive symbol of Islam... It is inconceivable that a political experiment of the sort could ever succeed without implementation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination, without cultural and racial accommodation, without political freedom and economic justice, in the equation between the two wings".¹⁹ With the initial excitement of independence dead, it was realized that the differences were of serious nature. The composition of the people and their leadership was different. While in West Pakistan, the leadership comprised of landlords, in East Pakistan, it consisted of middle-class. This middle-class could emerge because landlords were not as powerful in rural areas as in West Pakistan and 'pirs' did not exercise as much influence.²⁰ In the newly established state of Pakistan, Islam and fear of India "were sufficiently political and could be used for integration. But for economic

19. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, The Genesis of Bangladesh (India: Asia Publishing House, 1972) p.8-9

20. Sayeed, n.9., p.176

and cultural realities gradually overshadowed the
21
unifying factors"

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The early years in Pakistan were marked by growing nationalism of Bengalis, increase in demand for economic benefits. The Bengali politicians squabbled with their West Pakistani counterparts. General political instability led to the declaration of martial law by Ayub Khan in 1958. In the fifties, Pakistan had become close to the United States, and become a member of American sponsored military alliances of South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The Pakistani leaders looked to the West for economic and political support ever since it came into existence . The U.S. economic aid was very significant but East Pakistan got very little share. The military aid was also seen by

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21. Safdar Mahmood Pakistan Divided (New Delhi: Alpha and Bravo, 1983) p.5
22. For an excellent study of Pak-American relations in the early years see M.S.Venkataramani American Role in Pakistan 1947-59 (New Delhi: Radiant Pub., 1982). Venkataramani has written in his book that even before Pakistan came into existence, Jinnah had approached the United States.

the Pakistanis as supportive of West, particularly Punjabis, because they dominated the army.

The political chaos and the frustrated attempts to draft an acceptable constitution led to the involvement of the army in politics. The civil Service had also become very powerful in the absence of political stability and it is even alleged by many radicalists in Pakistan that the Civil Service was hand in glove with the army when it 'seized' power in 1958²³.

When Ayub Khan launched a new constitution in 1958 and sought to bridge the economic gap between the two wings of Pakistan and introduced land reforms etc., the steps he took became counter-productive. The economic disparities increased as a result of bureaucratic nepotism and poor planning. Besides, Ayub's one strong source of power was the landed aristocracy. This made it very difficult to realize fully the ideals of economic parity.

Ayub Khan's military regime was marked by an

23. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970) p.89-90

increased role for bureaucracy. The main reason for the army takeover in 1958 was the bureaucracy's desire to prevent a general election in Pakistan²⁴. Apart from the role of army and bureaucracy, the United States also had its interests in perpetuating status quo, "It controlled every facet of policy making in Pakistan and without foreign aid the very existence of feudalism and capitalism would be threatened" and it was, therefore, quite natural for America to get involved²⁵. The army in Pakistan by the late fifties was equipped with an ideological stance favourable to world capitalist interests.

In the course of Ayub era, the bureaucrats acquired great political influence. Ayub Khan concentrated on economic issues, the most important of them being the Land Reforms. Though these reforms were, theoretically, aimed at granting

24. Ibid p.87. An election would have meant the possible withdrawal of Pakistan from military alliances and a new government could reduce the influence of bureaucracy and the military and establish civilian control.

25. Ibid. p.88

economic benefits to the peasants, in reality, they did very little to alter the status quo of the landlords in Pakistan. The reforms affected only the very big landlords, but the average landlord remained more or less unaffected²⁶. The Bonus voucher system introduced by Ayub was also counter-productive because it affected the wealthy in a very insignificant way and resulted in inflation. In the political field, Ayub Khan's period was marked by a large-scale repression. Press censorship was imposed and many socialists and left-wing leaders were arrested both in East and West Pakistan and political parties were banned. As regards the administration, a system of Basic Democracy was introduced under the 1958 constitution. Basic Democracy sought to include every village in the administration of the country. However, it only enabled the bureaucracy to tighten its control over the villages and the landed gentry became more powerful by strengthening their ties with the bureaucracy²⁷. Some of the social

26. Bilal Hashmi, "Dragon Seed: Military in the State" in Gardezi and Rashid (ed.) Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983) p.163

27. Ibid., p.107

measures instituted by Ayub Khan included an Ordinance on Muslim Family laws. This was certainly beneficial to Pakistani women who could be liberated from the unfair exercise of institutions like polygamy and divorce .

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In 1962, President Ayub Khan launched a new constitution and lifted the Martial Law. Ban on political parties was lifted and Ayub decided to set up his own political party. He joined the Muslim League, causing it to split into Convention Muslim League and Council Muslim League. Press censorship was lifted. However, it was restrained by subsequent ordinances in March and September 1963. Repression of opposition parties and student movements continued unabated in both wings of Pakistan. In 1964, Ayub Khan announced elections for the Basic Democrats, who would, in turn elect the President. The opposition parties formed the COP (Combined Opposition Party) and sponsored Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as their presidential candidate. She was very popular among the masses and soon became a symbol against

28. Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) p.6

oppression. It seemed as though most of basic democrats would vote for Miss. Jinnah but Ayub had at his command, the police and the bureaucracy who won the election for him²⁹. After having won the election, Ayub Khan's "loyalists" resorted to oppression of those who had opposed Ayub.

Between 1962 and 1969, politics in East Pakistan became more 'seperatist' in nature. Ayub Khan's economic reforms had done very little to bring any substantial benefit to the East Pakistanis whose sense of economic deprivation increased. The ruthless political repression made them view the army as an instrument of the already existing domination of West Pakistan. The National Awami Party and others opposed Ayub and demanded more autonomy. "It was during Ayub Khan's administration that this movement (in East Pakistan) towards autonomy acquired firm shape... the word 'secession' became not only utterable, but printable"³⁰. The 1965 war dealt a severe blow to the East Pakistanis and had a worsening effect on

29. Tariq Ali, n.23., p.128

30. Ibid. p.177

their psyche. East Pakistan was left defenceless and unguarded during the war with India and it was no longer possible to believe that the army could rush to the defence of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in case of an eventuality. However, the more important outcome of the war was the fact that it destroyed all illusions of the army that one Pakistani soldier was equivalent to five Indian jawans. Though Pakistan claimed to have had an edge over India in the war, the war was the beginning of the end of Ayub's era.

In foreign affairs, the first phase of Ayub's regime was marked by pro-American relations. The relations with Soviet Union were not friendly and they deteriorated further when Peshawar was used by Americans as a base for their U2 intelligence operations. Relations with India also deteriorated as a result of increased American military aid to Pakistan. However, in 1962, Washington and India moved closer when the Sino-Indian war broke out. America appealed to Pakistan to improve relations with India. But Pakistan preferred to seek closer ties with China. China was now regarded as a reliable friend and an useful ally. In 1964, the

Chinese Prime Minister, Chou-En-lai, during his visit to Pakistan, announced his government's support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. The close ties between Pakistan and China certainly did not mean that Pakistan was willing to displease America. This was demonstrated when Pakistan supported the U.S. position in Vietnam. The 1965 war with India over the Kashmir question ended in a stalemate and deteriorated relations between the two countries. The possibility of China fighting a war with India on Pakistan's side proved a false expectation and Ayub Khan realised that no country would fight other's wars. An agreement was worked out between India and Pakistan under Russian mediation in Tashkent. None of the countries were satisfied with the agreement but it was generally felt by Pakistan that the Soviet Union had conceded most of the Indian demands. Once again, Pakistan found China most useful because China alone supported Pakistan's argument. Despite China's friendship, Ayub's regime was moving closer to United States. American aid was revived but only after Bhutto, the Foreign Minister was removed for his anti-American rhetorics . (The American aid to

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31. Ibid., p.38

Pakistan in early 1960s was \$ 400 million and in 1965, it fell to \$ 150 million). An arms embargo on Pakistan was imposed after its war in 1965 but resumed after Nixon made the 'One time exception' and approved military package of \$ 40-50 m including 300 - M-113 A1 armoured personnel carriers, bombers etc...

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After the 1965 war, Ayub was confronted with mounting opposition from both East and West Pakistan. Bhutto himself led the opposition in West Pakistan and Ayub finally stepped down in 1969 when Yahya Khan imposed the second Martial Law in Pakistan. Bhutto welcomed the Martial Law while Bhashani and Mujibur Rahman (leader of the Awami League in East Pakistan) remained silent.

The situation in Pakistan at the time of Yahya Khan's assumption of power was in many ways different from Ayub's time. In East Pakistan, the dissent had become more overt and the lower sections of the people were demanding more economic benefits. While there was a general political vaccum in 1958, the political system was more

32. Rashmi Jain, U.S. - Pakistan Relations, 1947-1959 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983) p.31

stable and two, alternate, well-organised leaderships had emerged in East and West Pakistan in 1969. Most significantly, even though the army was numerically stronger in 1969 it did not have the same political influence as it did in 1958.

The 1965 disaster led to widespread dissatisfaction against Ayub, even in Pakistan. Bhutto, the foreign Minister in Ayub's government, began to attack him and eventually he was relieved from office. Bhutto led the wave of dissent in West Pakistan and even shared sympathy of the Bengali demand for regional autonomy. General Yahya Khan as the President and Martial Law Administrator made very little difference to the Bengalis because military rule at the centre was looked upon suspiciously by them. Yahya Khan accepted Bengal's demand for representation on the basis of population. And he decided to hold popular election on the basis of one man, one vote in both the wings. The elections saw Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League come out with glorious success in East Pakistan. Bhutto's People's Party

did better in West Pakistan . This, even while restoring popular government, threw up two regional leaders who were not in agreement with each other on any of the major issues. The crisis in leadership arose when President Yahya Khan could not decide between Mujibur Rahman and Bhutto. It was the contention of the Awami League that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman should become the leader of the National Assembly because he was the leader of the largest party. This would have meant the framing of a constitution on the basis of the six point programme of Mujib demanding autonomy for East Pakistan. Bhutto resisted this and consequently, after negotiations between Yahya Khan, Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman failed to reach an agreement, the Awami League was banned. The army crackdown on Awami League and the arrest of its leaders and followers was now seen as a clear indication of West Pakistan's reluctance to share power with the East. The point of no return was reached and it

33. Results of December, 1970 elections saw Awami League capture the entire 160 seats of East Pakistan in the National Assembly. In the West, Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party got 81 seats while the Muslim League, Jamaat-I-Islam and others got 57 seats. Figures borrowed from Shahid Javed Burki Pakistan A Nation In the Making (London: Westview Press, 1986) p.65

now became impossible to suppress the Bengalis by coercion. "Mukti Bahini" was formed by leaders in exile and a massive guerrilla warfare was launched. Ruthless suppression by Pakistani forces continued unabated. The leaders in exile found asylum in India, where they came naturally because of their past traditional ties. Finally, with the intervention of India in 1971, there was an outbreak of an all out war and Bangladesh came into existence.

Though Bangladesh's creation and dismemberment of Pakistan and the humiliating defeat of Pakistan's army at the hands of India were attributed to India and its desire to undo partition, it cannot be denied that much of the cause lay in Pakistan and its system. The use of religion to keep the country unified was not very successful because religion alone cannot override tides of nationalism and economic deprivation. It would not be very optimistic to say that Bangladesh was inevitable, given the inherent features of Pakistan. Even the Western powers which were largely sympathetic to Pakistan's regime, would not have denied Bangladesh its right to emerge. It was

the role of India which was criticised by many. The result of deepening of mutual mistrust between the two countries was seen as the cause for Indian intervention and the realization of its twenty years objective of undoing partition. The creation of Bangladesh, questioned the religious basis of Pakistan and dealt a severe blow to the two-nation theory. It appeared that in Pakistan, many nations in form of various nationalities existed and Bangladesh was only one such nation. Islam could not suppress Bengali nationalism because besides other differences, the Bengali elite did not attach so much importance to religion like the elites of West Pakistan .³⁴ Moreover, the feeling of alienation was so much during the Ayub era that though East Pakistanis received more share, they felt more alienated. This was because the bureaucracy and military, the influential elements in decision-making process was pre-dominantly West Pakistani³⁵ .

34. Sayeed n. 9 p.189

35. Ibid., p.211

"It is one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically, economically, ³⁶ lingusitically and culturally different" . The creation of Bangladesh and the factors leading to it show that in a regime which lacks broad societal consensus, the internal threats to security assume great significance. While it is attempted to 'externalise' it, as in the case of Pakistan, which sought to blame Bangladesh's emergence as Indian design, these threats boomerang on national security. Bangladesh is a typical instance of domestic fissures which became formidable threats, due to (a) lack of a consensus between the regime and people on threat perception. In other words, while the threat existed internally, attempts were made by the regime to perceive threats from outside the system, (b) intensification of the internal threats by external factors.

The creation of Bangladesh is a typical example of the fragility of a developing nation and the lack of the necessary infrastructure (Political and economic) to overcome internal threats. Most

36. Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (New Delhi: Oreint Longman, 1958) p.227

developing countries "suffer from fragile domestic political structures, shortages of qualified manpower, and ineffective security infrastructures" ³⁷ .

In any developing country, internal factors determine the mood of the nation and the political and economic framework is dictated by internal situation. With reference to Pakistan also, the same can be said. The military in Pakistan came to power because of the political incompetence of the politicians and the absence of a strong political structure made it difficult to resolve the conflicting interests within the system. "Internal factors and the balance of forces in the social formation determine which type of client role a government has to fulfill" ³⁸ and the social formation in Pakistan in the 60s was marked by the domination of Punjabi and West Pakistani interests, which the two successive military regimes tried to preserve and paved the way for Bangladesh.

37. Azar and Moon, n.2., p.5

38. Mutiul H. Abidi "Pakistan's Military Dictatorship and Democratic struggle-I" Marxist Review Vol.16, Nos. 9 & 10 (April, 1983) pp.339

CHAPTER - II

CRISIS OF POLITY:

ISLAMIZATION AND MILITARIZATION OF PAKISTAN

The State of Pakistan came into existence as a result of the two-nation theory propounded and advocated by the Muslim League. It was perceived that the Muslims of India wanted a free State, based on Islam as it was not possible to co-exist in a free India dominated by Hindus. However, the leadership of the Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement did not envisage Pakistan as a theocratic State or an Islamic country.¹ Jinnah was personally secular and believed in the ideals of liberalism and democracy. Yet the contradiction lay in the fact that on the one hand, there was a demand for the creation of a state along religious lines, while the leaders of that State were secular in outlook. This laid the foundation of the ideological debate which ensued immediately after creation of the State and continues to this day. The Muslim League resorted to the use of religion, only to achieve political ends. To support the demand for Pakistan and to give credence to the two-nation theory, the Muslim League used religion.

1. While a 'religious' state refers to the creation of a state along religious lines, 'theocracy' refers to the promotion of religion by State. The final authority lies not in the state, but on 'Allah'.

As Binder observed: "Islamic government, Islamic State and Islamic constitution were the slogans of the last years of empire and the first of independence, but no one was quite sure what they meant.." ² However, it was clear that religion was used as a means to achieve political power, which the Muslim League found difficult if not impossible to share with the Indian National Congress within the parameters of an united and undivided India.

The euphoria generated by the creation of a new State initially submerged any ideological differences. Jinnah was the undisputed leader of the State and his charisma was sufficient to keep the conflicting elements under control. However, after his death and the death of his successor Liaquat Ali Khan, the ideological controversy over the role of religion in Pakistan became a major issue. To explain the roots of this ideological debate, it is important to analyse the various components of Pakistan. When the 'Pakistan Movement' gained momentum in India, there were

2. Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1968) p.4

still many sections of Indian Muslims who had reservations about the State of Pakistan. The scholars of Deoband Movement were a significant few who did not support Pakistan because they felt that a nationalist movement could not be Islamic and they did not trust the movement's westernized leadership.³ The 'Koran' does not define an Islamic nation or State but only an Islamic society. A State would mean territorial limits and it was felt by the Deobandi scholars that a movement for an Islamic State was not 'Islamic'. Even the 'Jamaat', which later came to represent the traditional school of thought in Pakistan, opposed the Pakistan movement. The Ahmediyas also did not support the movement. Significantly, therefore, no school which was identified with Islamic religion in India supported the movement. That Pakistan was founded on religious ideology is an irony because every Muslim group in India which was religious was opposed to Jinnah and opposed to the demand for Pakistan.⁴

3. Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (New York: Cornell University Press, 1968) p.184

4. Hamza Alavi, 'Ethnicity, Muslim Society and Pakistan Ideology,' in Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan in Anita Weiss(ed) (Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1987) p.21

The support for Pakistan came largely from the middle class Muslims, many of whom accepted the spirit of Syed Ahmad Khan and Mohammad Iqbal. They viewed Pakistan and the Movement as a re-orientation of Islam in India and not as the re-⁵establishment of the Wahabis. The Muslim League leaders also did not view the Pakistan movement as a purely religious one though the movement had religious appeal. When the independent State of Pakistan came into existence, Jinnah made the inaugural speech to the Constituent Assembly in which he declared that Pakistan belonged to all, irrespective of the religious differences.

In the initial years of its inception, the controversy of national identity and ideology were overshadowed somewhat by more basic problems such as refugee problem, economic growth, planning etc. Though the ideological debate did not assume an important dimension, it was an important issue since the State was created. The religious groups which had opposed the Pakistan Movement, later joined the State. The 'Jamaat' was the most

5. Abbott n.3., p.185

significant of these groups. The 'Jamaat' and the 'Ulama' in general, wanted Pakistan to shape into a religious State, along strict religious lines. Opposed to this stand was the stand taken by the secularists, among whom were the prominent Muslim League leaders, who wanted Pakistan to be a secular state.

The independence of Pakistan came at a time when neither the 'Ulama' nor the politicians had a clearcut perception of the nature of the new state. The religious groups on the one hand and the secularists on the other kept the ideology question alive. The gap between the two groups was very wide, "Nowhere has the element of democratic nationalism been so weak, the desire for an Islamic constitution so generally admitted and the cleavage between the Western educated and the 'Ulama' so alive".⁶ The "Ulama" represented the traditional

6. Binder n.2., p.6. Binder asserts that the problem in Pakistan was more than just providing an Islamic constitution. It was more of bringing about a unity amongst the intelligencia of Pakistan and making them understand the Islamic theology and the possibility of its application to practical circumstances. He further argues that in any Muslim State, the controversy between traditionalists and modernists is inherent but in Pakistan it was more manifest because the gap between the two groups was more wide.

view, whereby they claimed to be the upholders of tradition and said that establishment of Islam was possible only if their own institutions were recognised. The secularists, on the other hand were exposed to Western, liberal education and came from the top brass of the military and Civil Service. The society of Pakistan was divided into a cross section of trends and thoughts. Even while the government under the Muslim League was secular and could not accept the traditional stand it had to appease these elements to forge unity in the new state. The leadership tried to resolve the islamic question but it could not allow the creation of a religious state strictly in accordance with the Islamic laws. The traditionalists were more concerned with the glory of being an Islamic state even if it meant not observing standards of international conduct.

The first instance which flared up the controversy at a national level was the disturbance of Punjab in 1953. The 'Ahmadiyas' or the 'Quadianis' were subjected to violence and brutalities by the Conservatives, led by the

7. Abbott. n.3., p.189

'Ulama', largely by the 'Jamaat', for their non-acceptance of Prophet Mohammad as the last Prophet. The military was used for the first time to restore law and order and martial law was imposed. The demand for declaring 'Ahmadiyas' as a non-Muslim minority was rejected by the government. As a result, important questions concerning the nature of an Islamic state and who constituted Muslims were raised. No common definition could be derived and it looked like Islam could also be a divisive force. Though the people of Pakistan had come together on the basis of a common religion faith or ideology, the definition of ideology was not universally acceptable. What was significant in the anti-Ahmadiya riots was that the military, a powerful organ of state was given the task of restoring internal law and order and thereby making it the arbitrator in the realm of ideology. The Munir Committee was appointed by the government to inquire into the Punjab disturbances and to identify the basic issues concerning the controversy. The Committee gave a liberal report

8. Abbas Rashid. "Pakistan: The Ideological Dimension in Asghar Khan, (ed) 'Islam, Politics and the State' (India: Select Book Service Syndicate, 1986) p.85 ,

pointing out the contradictions between the orthodoxy and secularists.

Though in general the State did not yield to the stand taken by the traditionalists, all the governments in Pakistan made use of Islam to appease the 'Ulama'. The imposition of Urdu as the official language of Pakistan, even in the face of a strong opposition from East Pakistan, was one such example. Even in the Constitution-making process, atleast in a token manner, religious feelings had to be appeased.

As already mentioned, the claim that Pakistan was created to fulfil religious aspirations of Indian Muslims cannot be accepted because the principal Islamic groups in India were against the Pakistan Movement. In fact, religion and ideology became matters of controversy only in independent Pakistan, "Islam was not at the centre of Muslim nationalism in India, but was brought into the political debate in Pakistan after the nation was created." ⁹ The State of Pakistan was made up of various regional, linguistic, economic and social groups. Both Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province were made part of Pakistan because they

9. Hamza Alavi, n.4., p.22

were Muslim Majority States, but the leadership in these provinces did not support the Pakistan movement. There was a wide gap in the economic status of the Punjabis and the others. Compared to the native inhabitants of Pakistan, the Indian migrants were economically more affluent. East Pakistan not only presented a sharp contrast in economic terms, it was also culturally different from West Pakistan. In fact, the peoples of both wings shared nothing in common except an ideology. Hence, the society of Pakistan was a loosely knit entity held together by the weak chain of religion. The leaders of Pakistan attempted to use religion to counter any problem of regionalism or nationalism. But religion was certainly not as powerful a force as they envisaged. This was demonstrated in 1971 when the State was dismembered and Bangladesh came into existence. Though the Pakistanis blamed India for the outcome, its leadership was certainly responsible in many ways. Firstly the inability of the politicians to provide a stable government led to the bureaucracy and army

becoming very strong in Pakistan. Secondly, the failure of its leadership to derive an ideology, acceptable to all sections led to further splits and sectarianism in the society. Thirdly, the attempt to put down Bengali nationalism by means of repression and coercion led to increased feeling of insecurity among East Pakistanis. Finally the inability to bring about an economic balance and stop the lop-sided economic growth contributed to the creation of Bangladesh. This seriously questioned the ideological basis of Pakistan.

Islam and the Constitutional process in Pakistan

In Pakistan, religion was invoked only formally in the early years. Initially, the secular leadership and later the military-bureacracy oligarchy, dominated largely by the Punjabis, did not want the fundamentalists to encroach upon their monopoly of power. On the other hand, it became necessary for this very class to use Islam to counter the ethnic problems.

10. Hamza Alavi, n.3., p.27

11. Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Crisis' in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, ed. 'Pakistan: The roots of Dictatorship', (New Delhi; Oxford University Press, 1983) p.57-58

The process of Constitution making in Pakistan can be traced to the Basic Objectives Resolution which was clearly a victory for Pakistan's liberal leadership. It sought to recognise the people as centre of power. The next attempt at framing a Constitution was done under the Ayub regime. The 1956 Constitution was given a religious facade - it commenced in the name of Allah and declared that the country would be based on "Islamic principles of social justice". But no attempt was made to declare Islam as State religion. Even with regard to other religious provisions, very few steps were taken to enforce them in true spirit. There was a tendency to evade these provisions which were included basically to appease the 'Ulama'.¹² The 1962 Constitution differed from the 1956 Constitution in many ways but with regard to Islamic provisions, there was no major change. It was still retained formally. Significantly, however, the Constitution recognised the various sects within Islam and stated that the laws would be in conformity with Holy 'Quran' and 'Sunnah' but they could be interpreted by the

12. Afzal Iqbal Islamization of Pakistan (Delhi: Idarah-I-Adabiyat-I Delhi, 1984) p.68

various sects in accordance with their personal law. And, as for the laws said to be in violation of the Islamic principles, it was provided that they could not be examined in a Court of Law. In the 1956 Constitution, the Court had been given power to examine such a law. The 1973 Constitution was framed in the aftermath of the creation of Bangladesh and the general election. It was, therefore, necessary to draft a constitution wherein an agreeable consensus could be derived and controversies avoided. The Constitution, like the others, began in the name of Allah and for the first time, Islam became the State religion of Pakistan. The 'Ahmadiyas' were declared non-Muslim minorities and the Constitution further laid down that the State of Pakistan recognised Prophet Mohammad as the last of the Prophets. These were the compromises made by the Bhutto regime to appease the 'Ulama'. The basic thrust of the Constitution was economic reforms and programmes. Other Islamic provisions included compulsory teaching of Quran, restoration of eminence to the Mosque, establishment of federal Ulama Academy, strengthening Islamic Research Institute and increase of 'haj' facilities. Most of the

religious provisions were incorporated to placate the 'Ulama' and the groups opposed to Bhutto's economic policy. This Constitution deleted the clause relating to Article 227 of the previous Constitution which provided that 'Quran' and 'Sunnah' could be interpreted in accordance with the personal law of various sects.

Riaz Hassan argues that Islamization emerged as a state policy under Bhutto's government though the steps were taken primarily to appease certain sections of people. ¹³ The process of Islamization was perpetuated by the Zia regime but was marked by the attempts to restore fundamentalism and the use of military to achieve the same. The bureaucracy had been Ayub's constituency. With its help he could rule for well over a decade. Zia, however, came to power with the promise of restoring democracy within ninety days. But it was soon clear that he had no intention of relinquishing power. Zia had no mass base or even the support of politicians and bureaucracy. He used religion and

13. Riaz Hassan, "Islamization : An analysis of Religious, Political and Social changes in Pakistan", Middle Eastern Studies Vol.21, No.3, July 1983 pp. 263-80

Islam, therefore, to attain legitimacy to his rule. It was a major base on which he attempted to build a structure of support.¹⁴ He declared that his army would defend both the "territorial" and "ideological" boundaries of Pakistan.¹⁵ His measures in Islamization included pre-medieval Islamic laws like death sentence for adultery, exemplary public punishment for petty crimes etc. With the introduction of these and other measures, Zia gained the support of the fundamentalists. Zia's Islamization was a clear indication of the usefulness of religion for political ends and it certainly was not a resurgence of Islam as was widely and popularly anticipated.

Riaz Hassan defines Islamization as a process of change which sought to "expand the role of religious institution and scope of religious practice in the country".¹⁶ Methodical Islamization in Zia's regime included Islamization at various levels of society. Religious institutions were brought under the direct

14. Eric Gustafson and William Richter, "Pakistan in 1980: Weathering the Storm", Asian Survey Vol. XXI, No:2, February, 1981 pp.162-71

15. Hassan Gardezi, n.11, p.364

16. Hassan n.13., pp.264

patronage of the State. It became the State's responsibility to propagate religion and its teachings and the enforcement of strict observance of religious codes. Educational institutions were also Islamised and education was oriented to inculcate 'Islamic mentality'. The distinction between 'Madarasah' and other schools was abolished and the determination of teaching standards was to be determined by the State. Cultural institutions were Islamized, and so were the traditions and customs to promote 'Islamic way of life'. All laws were Islamized. In the economic sphere, it was sought to provide for equitable distribution of wealth, taxation system in accordance with Islam, abolition of monopoly etc.. Two taxes, 'Zakat' which was 2.5 percent tax on wealth and 'Ushr', a 10 percent tax on agricultural produce were introduced. This led to sectarian violence in Pakistan with the 'Shia' community considering it a voluntary tax and hence not enforceable by the State. Zia hurriedly amended the ordinance which provided that one could opt out of paying the tax if his Faith did not oblige him to pay 'Zakat' but he would have to file a sworn declaration to that effect. Apart from sectarianism, Zia's Islamic

measures had other sociological consequences. As mentioned already, religion was used by him only to legitimise his rule and in that sense, it had more of a political use. In the process, Zia came closer to the Right, especially the 'Jamat-I-Islami'. The military regime and the 'Jamaat' found each other useful; for the 'Jamaat' it meant "enjoying a relative autonomy to engage in low-key political activity and extend its influence in bureacracy, the military, the mass media and educational institutions. For the military government, the threat of political agitation by a political party with a well-organised cadre was temporarily removed".¹⁷

Two schools of thought/debate determined the Islamization process in Pakistan - the Islamists who felt that the country should be ultimately transformed into a nation and this could be done only if the State cuts across geographical, racial or linguistic concepts and was based only on Islamic ideology. Further, the 'Ulama' alone was

17. Hassan Aksari Rizvi, "Paradox of Military rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey Vol.24, No.5, May 1984, pp.534-5

to be recognised as the Viceroy of Allah who could bring about this process. They felt that there was no need for political parties and that man has no right to decide his life but must only conform to religious Injunctions.¹⁸ As opposed to this were the Nationalists who believed that religion should not be enforced by the State and recognised elected legislature as the trust of Allah.¹⁹

While Zia used religion to legitimise power, he also made farcical moves of restoring parliamentary democracy and it looked like he was trying to mix the impossible.

Another view on Islamization was expressed in economic terms and the whole process was viewed as a ploy to perpetuate concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. According to Haque; "The process of Islamization is, in reality, a process of feudalization and development of capitalism as an

18. Hassan n.13., pp.271

19. Ibid. pp.273. The Nationalists, contrary to the Islamists, believed that Pakistan is the homeland of Muslims in the sub-continent and is a nation-state consisting of various nationalities, linguistic groups and religions.

appendage of international monopoly capitalism"

Omar Asghar Khan argues that Islamization was resorted to not merely to perpetuate power but also to pave way for vested interests to exploit

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the masses." The introduction of 'Zakat' and 'Ushr' did not make any difference to the poor sections and it was even alleged that 60 percent of the tax collections in Sind were surindled by the officials. Neither the banking policy nor the industrial policy made any difference to the poor people. In the words of Abidi, "The purpose of Islamization has been apart from procuring legitimacy for the dictatorship, to prepare ground which will help foreign and indigeneous capital to draw off surplus value intensively and

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unhindered".

20. Zial Haque "Pakistan and Islamic ideology" n.11, p.380-81 in Pakistan the ideology of feudal lords and other upper classes' was projected as the ideology of Islam in the Zia period. The aim of this was to preserve status quo in existing class relations and continued enserfment of the masses. It promoted concentration of wealth and other feudal tendencies. For the masses, it was only a means of distracting attention from their genuine social and economic problems.

21. Omar Asghar Khan n.8 p.144

22. Mutiul M.Abidi, "Pakistan's Military Dictatorship and Democratic Struggle - Part I" Marxist Review, Vol.16, Nos.9 & 10 (April 1983) pp.339.

Islamization in the Zia period was not popular in Pakistan. It benefitted very few sections and the fundamentalists gained ground. It was used to put down all kinds of opposition ranging from ethnic discontent, and economic problems to political upheavels against the regime. With relation to women, Islamization was most dismal and deliberate suppression was done against them to placate the 'Ulama'. In the name of Islamizing laws, the judiciary was curtailed and its role minimised. In short, Islamization had adverse affect on the society and whipped up religious hysteria verging on insanity.²³ Zia's Islamic state "appeared to be strong on intimidation and punishment but weak in areas of cooperation and accommodation"²⁴. Islamization only polarised the society further and failed to build the much required consensus on the issue of religion.

23. Haque n.11, p.146

24. Lawerence Ziring "Pakistan's Public Policy Dilemmas and Nationality Problems", Strategic Digest Vol.19, No.4, April'89, pp.398

Role of Military and Bureaucracy in Pakistan

As mentioned in the first chapter, developing societies, as compared to developed countries, are more vulnerable to internal threats to their security. This is because of lack of development of political, economic and social institutions. This aspect often results in political instability, distorted economic growth, divisions within the society, all of which can be manipulated into potential threats to the security of the nation. Military intervention in politics is more common in developing countries. This is because civilian institutions are not usually based on broad consensus (that is, awareness among the people is not widespread) and civilian control over the military is weak. In developed countries on the other hand, the military is integrated into the system "with the norm and tradition exercised firmly through political institutions that have demonstrated their effectiveness and legitimacy under conditions of mass political participation or controlled mass mobilization" .

25. Veena Kukreja, "Military Intervention in Politics", (New Delhi, NBO Publishers, 1985) p. 15

Various theories have been propounded to explain military intervention in politics. One such explanation states that military intervention in third world is common because their armed forces are "most technically advanced, cohesive and modern institution"²⁶ .

Yet other scholars like Edward Shils argued that in developing countries, the society is essentially primitive and the Military perceives a modernizing role for itself and this acts as an incentive for intervention in politics²⁷ . The Marxist theory traces the "Origins of the army with society's division into classes and the emergence of the State. The army is in fact an image of the social system under which it has emerged and is developing in so far as its social composition at each historical stage is determined by the class relations existing in the country. An army that is

26. Kalim Bahadur "Military and Politics in Pakistan" in Urmila Phadnis etal. (ed) Domestic Conflicts in South Asia Vol.1 (New Delhi: South Asian Pub., 1986) p.130

27. Edward Shils "The Military in the Political Developments of the New States" in John Johnson (ed.) "The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped countries (New Jersey: 1982),

above state, above politics has never existed" .

A few common factors that can be identified as conditions of military intervention in politics are (i) organisation of the military (ii) Social and economic factors (iii) level of political institutionalization (iv) civilian control (v) external influence . The organization of the military is much more superior than the civilian organization. It is more developed in terms of discipline, accountability, heirarchy etc. Besides, they have easy access to arms and thus their coercive capability is increased. This factor alone cannot explain the military's ambitions as a contender for power. This argument which tries to explain the military intervention in terms of its class structure (i.e the social background of the military) is not acceptable because there are instances like Pakistan where the military with the western orientation had intervened in politics. On the other hand, a "hinterland social background' has also contributed to a lack of integration in the system and caused a military intervention.

28. Kalim Bahadur, n.26., p.133

29. Kukreja, n.25., p.23

The social and economic conditions of a system also contribute to the intensity of military intervention. A country which is economically balanced and developed is less prone to intervention because "civilian opportunities for social mobility" increases with economic development and it encourages stable political system .³⁰ With increase in social mobilization, the military's opportunities to intervene decrease. A military intervention is more probable in a society which is divided as it is difficult to mobilise it. Another aspect relating to socio-economic factors is the presence of a national bourgeoisie. (A system which is able to build a strong national bourgeoisie (which is largely constituted by the middle class) can thwart military intervention. The absence of effective political institution and frequent political instability makes it easier for military intervention in politics. An unstable political system leads to a weak government and thus, poor civilian control. Where the regime is not based on a broad social consensus the possibility of military intervention is higher. It

30. *ibid.* p.28

is argued by many that external military aid increases the probability of military intervention in recipient countries³¹. This is because this assistance helps the military become more powerful in comparison to civilian institutions. However, none of the above mentioned factors can independently bring about military intervention. More often it is a combination of two or more factors which lead to a military coup.

In Pakistan, the military and the bureaucracy formed two pre-dominant groups. This was due to the nature of the Muslim League which was more of a movement than a party, and the form of freedom struggle, which left the colonial framework intact, because it was largely a constitutional one and not revolutionary³². In the British Raj, the army, apart from protecting the frontiers, was also the custodian of internal law and order³³. In Pakistan, the army largely constituted of recruits from the land owning class and urban, western educated class. It was quite natural for the armed

31. Ibid. p.35

32. Akmal Hassan n.8 p.207

33. Bilal Hashmi, n.11 p.148

forces to have class affinity with the bureaucracy, whose members were also drawn predominantly from these classes. The leadership of Muslim League was also westernised and looked upon the army as a privileged institution.

The Pakistan Civil Service also inherited its characteristic from the colonial legacy of the British Raj. The colonial service was a "political bureaucracy" where separation between policy and administration was rather meagre ³⁴. Its functions included taking decision on all issues pertaining to the maintenance of law and order. This had a great impact on Pakistani Civil Service.

In the initial years, both the army and the bureaucracy were strictly professional and kept away from the politics of the State. But the crises in the Muslim League leadership after the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan and the inability of the politicians to provide stability created a vacuum which made army intervention in the affairs of the state possible. Likewise, the

34. Mustafa Chowdhury "Pakistan-its Politics and Bureaucracy" (Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1988) p.72

bureaucracy also rose to power in the face of political incompetence. When Jinnah and Liaquat Ali were Chief Executives, the Civil servants could not exercise much power. But the successive Chief Executives were members of the civil bureaucracy. Ghulam Mohammad had himself been a Civil servant. When West Pakistan was transformed into one unit, he eliminated most of his opponents³⁵. Thus, he enhanced the power of the bureaucracy. While the politicians in the post Liaquat era squabbled over sharing of power, the state machinery was run by the bureaucracy. When the martial law came in 1958, the army found the bureaucracy indispensable. As Asghar Khan rightly said "Both needed each other - the bureaucracy wanted the support of the armed might while the latter sought the skilled and adroit assistance of the former in elbowing out the professional politicians who were relegated to the status of junior partners."³⁶

The increasing role of army has been explained by Tariq Ali as a result of the failure of Pakistan to build a bourgeoisie democratic system. He said:

35. Ibid p.10

36. Asghar Khan, 'Generals-in Politics' (Delhi: Jupitar Offset Press, 1983) p.5

"This failure was a boon to the army and the Civil service, who were well organised, well paid and in the case of the army well armed, making them the two strongest 'political parties' in Pakistan.³⁷ The common features of military and bureaucracy made them compatible and both were privileged classes with a glorious colonial heritage and both wielded power because of political incompetence and hence needed each other.

A few explain army intervention in Pakistan in terms of changing class structures and alignments.³⁸ in Pakistan Society . A few others explain it in more external terms .³⁹ Asghar Khan, for instance, argues that Pakistan, like other countries which were under long colonial influence, could not develop a national bourgeoisie because of the

37. Tariq Ali, 'Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power' (Great Britain: Jonathan Cape, 1970) p.89

38. See Hassan, n.8 p.208, Hashmi, n.11. The growth of army influence owed to factors other than failure of political institutions. Economically, the army found its interests converging with the bourgeoisie, consisting of land owning and industrial class. Thus the bourgeoisie benefitted a lot in Ayub's era.

39. Asghar Khan, n.36, p.13

domination of foreign commercial interests. The army suited these foreign business classes as it could protect their interests. The absence of the national bourgeoisie also hampered the growth of a leadership that could launch any nationalistic economic programme or control the bureaucracy and army effectively.

Stephen Cohen cites three major causes to explain army intervention in the politics of the country ⁴⁰. Political incompetence is one of the major reasons. Secondly, he argues that military intervention is a cover for continued Punjab domination over the rest of Pakistan and thirdly, "Domination of the military is closely related to its outside linkages.... The Pakistani generals are unrepresentative dictators who have forced their way into power in order to prevent a rapprochement with India" ⁴¹. In other words, the army in Pakistan thrives on the image as the saviour of Pakistan against the external threat posed by India.

40. Stephen Cohen The Pakistani Army (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984) p.111

41. Ibid.

The first instance when the army was used in Pakistan was in Punjab during the anti-Ahmadiya riots in 1953. The first military rule in Pakistan was declared by Ayub Khan in 1958. General attitude of the people towards martial law was not very discouraging. The army had never been tried in civilian affairs before and it seemed better than the existing political stability.

The role of the army in Pakistan cannot be studied without referring to the role of external powers. The United States found in Pakistan an useful ally which was willing to serve its global interests and cold war policies in return for a stand on Kashmir and economic aid and strengthening of the army was an inevitable consequence of the economic and military aid. The army was well-disposed towards the United States and the military rule suited America. Thus, the relation between the two countries was firmly entrenched when Ayub Khan brought the country under martial law in 1958.

Ayub Khan's regime was marked by the increased
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role of bureaucracy . The 1956 and 1962

42. The detailed study of Ayub Khan's era and the effects of his military regime have been discussed at length in the first chapter.

constitutions were aimed at economic reforms in the country. But these steps did not solve the economic problems substantially. East Pakistan was becoming more and more irreconcilable with the West. The army became an instrument of repression to the Bengalis and this was perpetuated when Ayub Khan was forced to step down and Yahya Khan assumed power with the imposition of second martial law. The background in Pakistan at the time of Yahya Khan's assumption of power was in many ways different from Ayub's time. Bengali nationalism had become more overt and the lower sections of the people were demanding more economic benefits. While there was political vacuum in 1958, in Yahya Khan's time, political system was more stable and two, alternate, well-organised leaderships had been thrown up in East and West Pakistan. The army, however, did not wield the same degree of political power because it had lost some of its credibility in its war with India. Yahya Khan derived his support from the army and West Pakistanis. Once again, like Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan's imposition of military regime was not to serve the country but to protect the vested interests.

Yahya Khan's attempts in finding a solution to the economic and linguistic problems of Pakistan began well. He called for the first ever general election of Pakistan. While the Awami League won in East Pakistan, Bhutto's PPP swept the polls in the West. As such, no party had a clear majority in the National Assembly and it looked like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would have to become the Prime Minister, as he was the leader of the largest party. For the first time, East Pakistan had emerged powerful. For West Pakistan and particularly for the army, this was not acceptable and soon, Yahya Khan's regime resorted to repression in East Pakistan, in the name of controlling sedition. Guerrilla activity in East Pakistan increased and despite severe army crackdowns, independent state of Bangladesh came into existence.

Though the creation of Bangladesh was due to various reasons, it was a blow to the Pakistan government and its army. The dismemberment of the country in 1971 discredited the army to a great extent and Yahya Khan was forced to step down. Bhutto, a popularly elected leader, became the

leader of Pakistan. His period was marked by introduction of land-reforms and attempts to bring about radical changes in the economy. Soon, however, Bhutto compromised with the feudal lords and his land reforms were, in effect diluted. As for the army it was strengthened along his dreams of building the finest army in Asia. He thus brought army back to its position of power and strength and this ultimately resulted in his overthrow. Zia-ul-Haq, the hand picked general of Bhutto overthrew him to to become Chief martial law administrator. His military regime was the first in Pakistan's history where ruling generals declared that they were conservative and forged ties with the right ⁴³. Large scale Islamization was resorted to and religion was used extensively to legitimise military rule.

Among the many benefits for the army under zia was increase in budget allocations. To make the civil-military oligarchy all-powerful officers were appointed to top civil jobs. A 10 percent quota of civil jobs was reserved for ex-servicemen. The

43. Rizvi, n.17, pp.542

army was used to quell any resistance in the country. One factor which seemed a serious challenge to Zia's regime was the PPP, led by Bhutto's daughter and the Movement for Restoration of Democracy launched by the party. But the movement gathered momentum only in Sind and could not become popular in other parts of Pakistan, as the Punjabis were most benefitted out of the military regime. It, therefore, became possible for the Zia regime to use selective repression in Sind to counter the movement.

Another aspect of Zia's regime in Pakistan was the country's involvement in the Afghan crisis. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan readily agreed to become the conduit for supplying arms from U.S. to Afghanistan rebels. This converted Pakistan into an arms bazaar and introduced drugs, thereby making the security of the country precarious. The coming of arms into Pakistan brought about a structural change in its society. As for the army, there was increase in aid from the U.S. and it also benefitted a great deal by intercepting the arms of the 'Mujahideen' from the U.S.

Relations with India did not improve significantly in the Zia regime. Notwithstanding the Shimla agreement between the two countries which had been signed after the Indo-Pak War of 1971, Zia made references to the Kashmir question. It is believed that he wanted to 'free' Kashmir from India and had spelt out a three-phased plan to do so ⁴⁴. An attempt was made to normalise relations when Zia proposed a no-war pact with India. India, on the other hand, proposed a mutual friendship treaty. However, the two countries could not normalise relations. While India accused Zia of interfering in the Punjab by providing arms and military training to the Sikh terrorists, Pakistan accused India of perpetuating disturbance in Sind. Besides this, India accused Pakistan of acquiring nuclear weapon capability. The relation between both countries deteriorated to the culminating point when they mobilised their respective troops in Siachen area. Zia's regime, like that of the other military regimes in the

44. Indian Express, July 8, 1989. This article has alleged that Zia's plan had included a low-level insurgency, generation of chaos in collaboration with Sikh extremists of India and deployment of a special force to form an independent, Islamic state of Kashmir.

glaring instance of repression was the trial and execution of Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan⁴⁵. The limited protests that followed were also effectively curbed by the regime. Zia came to power with the promise of holding elections within ninety days. Soon, however, he consolidated his hold over the country. His was an isolated regime internally. Though he was contemptuous of politicians, he forged ties with the extreme right 'Jamaat-I-Islami' to gain political support for his Islamization drive. He held a referendum followed by an election on a non-party basis in 1985. These elections were boycotted by all major opposition parties in Pakistan. With the martial law revoked, Mohammad Khan Junejo became the Prime Minister. His government was unceremoniously dismissed by Zia in 1988. Though the two had differed on various issues like Siachen, Afghanistan, senior military appointments etc. it was the increasing tendency of Junejo to assert himself that led to his dismissal⁴⁶. Zia announced fresh elections to be

45. Victoria Schofield Bhutto, Trial and Execution (London: Cassell Limited, 1979)

46. Junejo had irritated a few sections of the army and Zia when he refused to extend the tenure of certain top-level officers. Besides this, he openly held the army responsible for violence in Karachi.

held in November, 1989 but there was speculation as to whether it would be on a non-party basis. His premature death, however, paved way for elections on party basis and civilian rule was restored.

Post-Zia period is marked by the existence of a very powerful army. Zia, in order to gain legitimacy, systematically dismantled political institutions and consolidated the military junta to hold on to power and it is to be seen how the military which has often tasted power will behave. Pakistan has, in its forty years of existence, gone through three military regimes and political upheavels, resulting in yet another partition. The crisis of polity in Pakistan deepened during the Zia regime when religion was used by the army to legitimise power. Zia regime was the first instance of the army using religion in Pakistan. This only increased sectarianism and fundamentalism. The irony was that Zia did not revive Islam in any way; he merely used it for the political ends. He once again enlivened the debate on religion and the country once again divided itself into Islamists and secularists. It is to be seen whether democracy can undo the effects of Islamization and

reduce the influence of fundamentalism and whether the army can be subject to the civilian control to prevent yet another martial law.

CHAPTER - III

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

This chapter will focus on the social and economic factors that challenge Pakistan's security. All factors were inherent in the very state structure. West Pakistan, particularly Punjab was endowed with rich natural resources, was well developed economically and its system was largely feudal in character. Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province were dominated by tribes and therefore the system was essentially tribal. Despite its rich natural resources, East Pakistan was economically backward and there was no economic parity between the two wings of Pakistan. Besides economic differences, culturally also, the people who formed the state of Pakistan were different. West Pakistan was diverse while East Pakistan was linguistically and ethnically homogeneous. Religion was the only common factor that sought to unite the people of Pakistan. Though the fear of India was also commonly shared, the people of East Pakistan did not give up their affinity for their traditional Bengali culture. Besides the Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans and Bengalis, the Indian migrants formed a category of 'Muhajirs'. They were the wealthy Muslims who had migrated from Gujarat, Bihar and Bombay and were economically

more affluent than many living in the areas that constituted Pakistan. Thus, the state of Pakistan came into existence with various cultural and economic components. People with extreme cultural and economic differences had been brought together in the name of religion and it was hoped that it would hold the nation together and help them overcome the differences.

In independent Pakistan, the economic factors that caused differences were mainly related to regional disparities and growing ethnic consciousness among the various groups submerged religious affinity. To understand the history of ethnic movement in Pakistan, it is necessary to understand the meaning of ethnicity and why ethnicity leads to dissent in a particular society. The meaning of the term "ethnic" pertains to "nations or races". Pakistan, being a multi-ethnic state, in a sense, therefore, consisted of nations within a single national framework and these were united precariously by religion. Hence, when the euphoria of independence died down, social and economic realities began to surface. When one ethnic group began to dominate and enjoy more

economic and political power, the others felt relegated to the status of ethnic minorities and thus ethnicity gradually became a threat to national security.

Various theories have sought to explain ethnicity. Gankovsky explains it in economic terms, particularly in terms of the growth of capitalist relations. According to him, "A distinct social system corresponds to a particular phase in the development of production techniques. Any change in production techniques as a result of the development of productive forces leads to changes in the corresponding social system and determines the change of social formations. This alters not only a society's economic basis and super structures but also the corresponding type of human ethnic community."¹ He argues that in Pakistan "the development of capitalist relations exercised a crucial influence on the ethnic processes at work in the territory of the sub-continent, resulting in the formation of bourgeois nations in the country. Because the levels of socio-economic development in

1. Yu.V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1971) p.16

various parts of the sub-continent were different and their historical evolution under colonial rule was peculiar, bourgeois nations in Bengal began to take shape earlier than in the north-west (especially in the Pashtun lands and Baluchistan) Colonial rule arrested the development of capitalist relations and thus had a negative effect on the consolidation of the peoples of Pakistan². Thus, the basic thrust of his argument is that where capitalist relations grow strongly, national consolidation is also stronger.

Many other theories have been propounded to explain ethnic conflict in a society. There is the primordialist approach with its emphasis on culture, the cultural plural approach which explained ethnic movements in terms of mutual compatibility, the Developmentalist approach and the neo-Marxist approach but all these are inadequate in explaining ethnic behaviour³.

2. Ibid. p.211

3. For an assessment of all theories which have sought to explain ethnic behaviour, See Urmila Phadnis 'Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia', in Phadnis etal (ed.) Domestic Conflicts in South Asia, Vol.2 (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1982), p;103-7

The theory of 'relative deprivation' has been accepted by many scholars for the explanation of general political violence and conflict. This theory, conceptualized by Ted Gurr, states that relative deprivation occurs when an individual does not get what he thinks is justifiably due to him⁴. With relation to group behaviour, relative deprivation is the gap "between the expectations and perceived capabilities of a group vis-a-vis their economic situations, political power and social status in relation to others"⁵.

This element of relative deprivation became widespread among the various groups in Pakistan vis-a-vis the dominant ethnic group of Punjabis. While in East Pakistan the ethnic unrest led to disintegration of Pakistan, in the Western wing, it has been expressed every now and then and the movements have taken the form of organised insurgency, as in the case of Baluchistan. To understand the ethnic movements, it is necessary to follow the formation of Pakistan and the response

4. Uma Singh, n.3., p.157

5. Phadnis n.3., p.183

of the various provinces to the Pakistan movement. In the Punjab, many political parties were active during the pre-independence days. In rural areas, the landlords dominated the political scene while in urban areas, many other parties challenged their authority. Notable among them was the 'Ulama' the learned scholars of Islam. So, when the Muslim League sought to capture the support of the Muslims of Punjab, Jinnah had to steer a "middle course between the urban and rural interests" and then mobilise support from both the groups. His main rival was the Unionist Party and Jinnah soon won over this party and used religion to arouse the sentiments of the people. The Muslim League leaders in the Punjab were westernised landowners but made use of religion to gain political power that would go with an independent Muslim State. Besides them, the British rulers had recognised a class of 'landed gentry' which constituted the religious leadership of 'Sajjada Nasins' (descendants of a Holy Saint) as well as the political leadership of landowners. They provided

6. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) p.10

the support to the Muslim League. The Punjabi Muslims were generally patronised by their colonial masters partly because this area largely contributed to the recruitment in the armed forces and partly because they had supported colonial rule to preserve their economic interests. An independent state therefore did not appeal much to the aristocrats and the landlords but the charismatic leadership of Jinnah and the possible share in the political and economic power of Pakistan and most certainly the appeal of religion were difficult to ignore. For the common people, apart from a Muslim homeland, Pakistan seemed to offer better material prospects which would not be available to them in India, dominated by the Hindus. The 'Muhajirs' were the group of Indians who migrated to Pakistan for greater economic and political prospects which they feared would not accrue to them in a 'Hindu' India. Like the Punjabis, for the 'Muhajirs' also, an important consideration was the possibility of a share in political and economic power in return for their support to the Pakistan movement.

The Pathans of North West Frontier Province

(NWFP) were ethnically distinct and extremely conscious of their ethnicity. They had been deliberately left at peripheral level of development by the British because of their aggressiveness and because of the cost they had exacted in terms of money and troops when the former tried to enforce its decisions⁷. The Pathans could not be tamed by coercion. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan emerged as a strong Pakhtun leader who could defy the British rule. He tried to organize the disorganised Pakhtuns into one national identity⁸. For him, the idea of 'Hindu' domination was not very convincing. He, therefore, opposed the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement. He had close ties with the Indian National Congress, particularly Gandhi. When the Mountbatten Plan for partition was accepted by the Congress, Khan and his 'Khudai Kidmadgars' were taken unawares. For the Pathans, Islam was undoubtedly sacred but their ethnic consciousness was much more over-riding. Mountbatten agreed to conduct a referendum in NWFP

7. Asaf Hussain, 'Ethnicity, Identity and Praetorianism in Pakistan', Asian Survey, Vol.XVI No.10, October, 1976

8. Sayeed, n.6, p.19

to enable the people to choose between accession to India or Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan and his 'Khudai Kitmatgars' boycotted the referendum and a mere population of fifty percent voted in favour of accession to Pakistan.⁹ Ghaffar Khan maintained that the choice given to the people of NWFP should have^{been} between accession to Pakistan or independent 'Pashtunistan'. As it is, the British had divided the Pathans by imposing the Durand Line in 1893 and they now proceeded to handover their territorial gain to the new Punjabi dominated government of Pakistan in 1947.¹⁰ Thus, NWFP became a part of Pakistan in 1947 but this in no certain terms meant that Islam had appealed to all the Pathans and therefore, they had opted for Pakistan to be their Muslim homeland. In independent Pakistan, the demand by Pathans has varied from an independent Pashtunistan to be carved out of Pakistan, to a 'Greater Afghanishtan' comprising the lost

9. See WaliKhan Facts are Facts (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1987) p.131

10. Selig Harrison, 'Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan' in Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (ed.) The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics (Syracuse: University Press, 1986) p.284

territories . Afghanistan has viewed the Pathan issue sympathetically and this resulted in strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1947. The issue of 'Pashtunistan' remains alive and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has added a new dimension to it. The impact of the crisis will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.

The Baluchs of Pakistan were also tribal and their system rested on tribal allegiance. They allege that the Pathans atleast had a referendum to opt for India or Pakistan whereas they were not even consulted but merely coerced to become Pakistanis .¹² Like the Pathans, the Baluchs also campaigned for an independent Baluchistan. They were represented by the Kalat National Party and this party cited the 1876 Treaty with Whitehall which permitted British presence in Baluchistan only if it respected the independence of Kalat. When Pakistan was formed in 1947, the question of Baluchistan remained unresolved, with Mir Ahamd Yar Khan demanding right to an independent state and

11. Ibid.

12. Urmila Phadnis 'Ethnic Movements in Pakistan' in Pandav Nayak (ed.) Pakistan: Society & Politics (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986) p.191

13

Pakistan demanding unconditional accession . Khan declared independence of Kalat but finally, it was forcibly annexed. The Pakistani army got the accession signed by Khan under pressure . None of the Baluch leaders favoured accession to Pakistan and wanted the recognition of a distinct, unified Baluch identity. For them, the accession to Pakistan for purely religious reasons was not convincing. At the most the leaders were willing to have a special relationship with Pakistan in "matters of defence, external affairs and communication" .

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Among the various ethnic groups, the Baluchs have perhaps had the most organized insurgency to press the demand for independent Baluchistan. The nationalist sentiment among the Baluchis grew when the "One Unit" plan, seeking to unite the four provinces of West Pakistan into a single unit, was introduced in 1955. A day before martial law was declared by Ayub Khan in 1958, the Pakistan army moved into Baluchistan. Political leaders were

13. Selig Harrison In Afghanistan's Shadow (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) p.24

14. Ibid

15. Ibid p.25

arrested and then began a series of fights between the armed forces and the Baluchs. The foundations of insurgency were laid and guerrilla warfare was organised by Baluch leaders like Nauroz Khan. This insurgency continued in a sporadic manner. With the withdrawal of "One Unit" system by Yahya Khan, there was a temporary truce. In 1970, Baluchistan for the first time had a provincial government of its own. In 1973, however, the government headed by Ghous Bux Bizenjo the governor, and Ataullah Mengal, the Chief Minister was dissolved by Bhutto on charges of conspiracy to dismember Iran and Pakistan in connivance with Iraq and Soviet Union. Though alleging that Bizenjo and Mengal had exceeded their constitutional authority, "Bhutto's larger political objectives, pressures on Islamabad from the Shah of Iran, Iraqi-Iranian tensions and Soviet support for Baghdad in its conflict with Tehran were also key factors that contributed to the outbreak of hostilities".¹⁶ To substantiate the Iraqi-Soviet involvement, Pakistani authorities

16. Ibid p.34

claimed that they had found Soviet arms in Iraqi embassy which was destined for Baluchistan. The dismissal of the provincial government led to large-scale guerrilla activities and the Pakistani authorities responded by using ground and air attack to contain insurgency. In 1975, in the face of brutal repression, the Baluchis moved into Southern Afghanistan to train, rearm and reorganise their insurgency.

The role of external powers, especially Soviet Union is regarded important by the Baluchs and the possibility of an independent Baluchistan would depend much upon the political will of Soviet Union and the political scene in Afghanistan. Most Baluch leaders are impressed with the Marxist-Leninist ideology but the moderates within the movement are not strictly communist. Prominent leaders of Baluchs are Khair Bux Marri, Ataullah Mengal and Ghous Bux Bizenjo. Marri has been an advocate of armed liberation for Baluchistan. He is the leader of the Baluch Liberation Front. Bizenjo, on the other hand, has been moderate and has believed in the possibility of working out a solution if Baluchistan is granted more regional

autonomy. "The people of Baluchistan do not want to secede from Pakistan. They only want their national rights as a federating unit of Pakistan, recognised and protected within the federal framework of Pakistan"¹⁷. Mengal, the former Chief Minister of Baluchistan is like Marri, weary and suspicious of the ruling Punjabi clique and is "a symbol of uncomplicated Baluch patriotism and commands broad respect in all political factions"¹⁸. He was instrumental in organising the Baluchistan branch of National Awami Party (NAP) with Marri and Bizenjo. The NAP was outlawed during the insurgency in 1973. The Pakistani National Party (PNP), the rechristened NAP was formed. Apart from PNP, there is the Baluch Student Organisation (BSO) and BSO (Awami). They are militant and believe in an independent Baluchistan. Whatever the ideological orientations all the groups are universal in their opposition to Punjabi dominated system in Pakistan and better prospects for the people of Baluchistan.

17. "Interview with Ghous Bux Bizenjo on Democracy", Mainstream, Vol.22, No.29, March, 1984, pp.23

18. Harrison, n.13., p.61

Sind was linguistically a homogeneous province but as a result of partition, its homogeneity was affected. In Sind, the Muslims were in a majority before partition. It had supported the movement for Pakistan for material reasons. After its separation from Bombay Presidency in 1936, Sind had found itself checkmated politically, socially and economically. For this, the domination of minority "Hindus" was thought responsible. While the middle-class faced competition from the Hindus, the Muslim peasants had to face exploitation at the hands of Hindu landlords and moneylenders. According to K.R. Malkani, there was never any communal disharmony in Sind and hence Sind never supported Pakistan . Indian National Congress did not fight for the province when it was awarded to Pakistan and Sind forcibly acceded to Pakistan .

As mentioned earlier, Sind's homogeneity was affected as the result of partition. This was because most of the Urdu speaking Indians migrated

19. K.R. Malkani The Sind Story (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984) p.127

20. Ibid. Malkani argues that Congress did not have the wisdom and political foresight to prevent Sind's accession to Pakistan.

to Sind. This group of 'Muhajirs' soon outnumbered the Sindhis in their own province. They were economically better off and they tried to adopt Urdu language and culture as the way of life in Sind. Ethnic consciousness became rigid in the face of 'Muhajir' prosperity which the Sindhis thought would hinder their economic opportunities . The 'Muhajirs' came to be known as the "new" Sindhis. These immigrants began to dominate Sind politically, economically and culturally. Sind was playing host to a large number of refugees who had to be settled in Sind, given land and job opportunities. This naturally meant loss of opportunities for the Sindhis.

In the post-independence period, Sindhis have become a minority in their own province . Economically, more than half of Pakistan's industries are located in Sind but the Sindhis have practically no participation in it . Agricultural

21. Uma Singh, n.3., p.157

22. 1981 population census shows that the Sindhi-non-Sindhi divide is 63-35. Non-Sindhi speaking people speak Urdu, Pushto, Punjabi. Main Findings of the Population Census (Islamabad: Govt. of Pakistan, 1983)

23. Feroz Ahmad "Pakistan's Problem of National Integration" in Asghar Khan (ed) Islam, Politics and the State (India: Select Book Service Syndicate, 1986) p.235

lands used to be the bastion of Sindhi economic power but that also has been drastically altered with lands being awarded to refugee claimants by Pakistani government .²⁴ Apart from the economic issue, the language issue became the bone of contention between the Sindhis and 'Muhajirs'. Sindhis protested against the imposition of Urdu as the official language. It was the language that used to be spoken by the Muslim elites of Northern India. In 1972, after Bhutto came to power, Sindhi was made the official language of Sind. The Urdu speaking 'Muhajirs' were provoked and the language issue exploded .²⁵ Finally, a compromise was reached. An amendment was introduced to the ordinance, granting parity to Sindhi and Urdu. In other words, nothing would be done in the affairs of state which would prejudice the use of Urdu. The growing ethnic consciousness of the Sindhis reflected partially in the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). All the major opposition parties joined the movement to protest against Zia regime.

24. Ibid

25. There were demonstrations and large-scale rioting and violence in Liauquatabad and Hyderabad

Though it was launched at a national level, it became most popular in Sind. The response was immense in Sind but the absence of effective mass-base elsewhere, especially in Punjab, made selective repression possible and easy. Another movement launched in Sind to represent Sindhi grievances against the 'Muhajirs' is the 'Jiye Sind' movement. Headed by G.M. Syed, it has called for the establishment of an independent 'Sindhudesh'. He feels that "Pakistan is a folly and a crime, refugees have ruined the country. West Punjab has reduced Sind to a colony. Pakistan must die"²⁶. The 'Muhajirs' in turn, to preserve their interests have begun to assert their ethnic identity. They have made demands to be recognised as the 'fifth' nationality in Pakistan.

In their opposition to Punjabi domination, the Sindhis, Baluchs and Pathans are united. They have bitterly opposed the 'Punjabi' policy of encouraging the exploitation of their local resources by 'outsiders' i.e people other than the

Cited in
26. ^ Malkani, n.19, p.127

locals. Another aspect of common disillusionment is the lack of representation in the army and civil services. While the Pathans have had a comparatively better representation, the representation of Baluchs and Sindhis has been ²⁷ dismal. It was, therefore, only natural for them to look upon the army and the power structure as instruments of Punjabi domination. The Punjabis who account for fifty-eight percent of the population occupy eighty percent of the armed forces and eighty percent of the higher bureaucracy and business.

In Bengal, the Pakistan movement had gained support largely because of economic reasons. Bengal was a typical society where the rich and the owning class were the Hindus and poor peasants and workers were Muslims. For these Muslims, Pakistan seemed a land of hope where they could be economically more prosperous and also free themselves from conservative, Hindu domination. They feared political and economic dominance of Hindus in a free India. The Bengalis, however,

27. Phadnis n.12

were extremely conscious of their nationality. It was the partition of Bengal in 1905 by the British that had divided the Hindus and Muslims along economic lines. Though in 1947, the Bengali Muslims opted for Pakistan, they could not give up their distinct culture even in an independent Pakistan.

Thus Pakistan emerged with five distinct ethnic groups, the Punjabis, Bengalis, Baluchs, Pathans and Sindhis. The 'Muhajirs' formed a class of their own. Given these various nationalities in Pakistan, it was necessary to have a federal system. Jinnah had envisaged a highly centralised state structure. It was the adaptation of the British Government of India Act, 1935, which had provided for a centralised federal structure, in keeping with the highly heterogeneous Indian system. But, the formal incorporation of any federal principle was not done till 1956, when the first constitution was enforced in Pakistan. Meanwhile, the "one unit" system was introduced, which brought together all the four provinces of West Pakistan into a single unit. This was done "to neutralise the numerical majority of the Bengalis and sought

to suppress the sub-national movement" in NWFP and
Baluchistan ²⁸ . . . This single unit was dismantled by
Yahya Khan in 1970 in the face of increasing
demands for regional autonomy and all the provinces
again became different federal units. However,
federalism in Pakistan has not been able to solve
the regional problems there. As already mentioned,
Pakistan was basically committed to centralised
federalism. Secondly, the military-bureaucracy
oligarchy at the centre hindered the functioning
of federalism. This combination also represented
the dominant Punjabi interests, and could never
accede to genuine regional interests.

29

After the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 ,
genuine and serious efforts were made to draft a
constitution. The 1973 constitution seemed to
provide relative stability to the system. Bhutto
had come to power with the promise of radical
economic reforms. Apart from economic issues, his
constitution provided consensus on three major

28. Satish Kumar, n.12, p.23

29. The autonomous movement in East Pakistan and the factors leading to the creation of Bangladesh have been discussed in the first chapter.

issues. Islam was made the state religion and the 'Ahmadiyas' were declared a non-Muslim minority. Division of powers and responsibility between the President and Prime Minister was incorporated. A no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister was made very difficult. The division was made to protect the "Prime Minister from frivolous charges in party loyalty of the type that had paralysed governments in the politics before Ayub Khan"³⁰. A consensus on federation included the creation of a bi-cameral legislature; Senate with equal provincial representation and Assembly with seats distributed according to population. Thus, two non-PPP governments came to power in NWFP and Baluchistan. Soon, however, Bhutto compromised with the power elites. The Left and the urban middle class had provided his support but Bhutto alienated them. It was not possible for him to antagonise the feudal lords and aristocrats who wielded power in Pakistan. His reforms were thus in effect diluted. As for the ethnic issue, Bhutto's ethnic affinity soared the expectations of

30. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan - A Nation in the Making, (London: Westview Press, 1986) p.72

the Sindhis. The Baluchs and Pathans were also expecting a better treatment than the previous military regime because he was the first Prime Minister to be democratically elected. He, however not only dismissed the Baluch government but also resorted to the worst repression of Baluch insurgency. On the Pakhtoon issue, he tried to negotiate with Afghanistan. But the overthrow of Daud government in Afghanistan and the removal of Bhutto himself from the political scene almost simultaneously prevented the possibility of a solution. Within the NWFP, Bhutto encouraged Abdul Qayyum to divide the leadership, because of his differences with Wali Khan of National Awami Party (NAP). After Bhutto's overthrow by the Zia 'coup' and the subsequent entry of Soviet Union, the political and social complexion of NWFP and Pakistan in general changed considerably. It will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

Apart from the political reasons and the ethnic history the Baluchis, Pathans and the Sindhis suffer from economic deprivation. In the following section, the economic policy of the Pakistani regimes will be analysed and it will be

seen how the deliberate policy of the state systematically alienated the minorities. The role of Afghan crisis will also be analysed and the role of external powers in Pakistan's political system will be examined.

Agriculture is the largest productive sector in Pakistan. The social relations in this sector were evolved from the colonial experience. In Sind and Punjab, the prevalent system was share-cropping of the landlord-tenant feudal structure, in NWFP, the peasant system was largely constituted of family farms and in Baluchistan, the system was essentially tribal with the pre-feudal 'Sardaars' holding most of the arable land. Since independence and after the 'Green Revolution', the land tenure systems broke up and paved the way for capitalist relations of production. This has resulted in the concentration of wealth at the hands of a few, mostly Punjabis, at the expense of the large poor peasants. The total cultivated area in Pakistan is much less as compared to the vast

31. Akbar Zaidi, 'Regional Imbalances and National Question in Pakistan', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.24, No.6 (Feb.1989) pp.303

32. Ibid

size of the country. Of this total cultivated area, about 58% lies in Punjab. Besides, the use of agricultural machinery and technology has been maximum in Punjab. Thus, Punjab had a more developed system historically and this advantage helped it to become the most developed province.

In the industrial sector, again, Pakistan inherited a colonial structure. Most of its industries were dependent on imports from Britain . Punjab, in the industrial sector also, had a significant edge over the rest of the country in the manufacture of metal, machinery etc. and this was enhanced by the aid received from the Western countries. However, Karachi is, in terms of the population of the province, the most industrialized region in Pakistan. Most of the industries in Sind are located in Karachi. Going through the economic development of Pakistan, it can be seen that in the early 1950s, Pakistan enjoyed an agricultural surplus and textile industry grew. However, by the late 50s, heavy

33. Pandav Nayak, 'Pakistan: Political Economy of a Developing State. (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1988) p.76

foodgrain imports were registered. Though Ayub's regime sought to bring about economic benefits, it did not help much in real development. This land reforms did help in transfer of land to middle-sized landowners but most of them were army officers. His Bonus Vouchers Scheme sought to increase foreign exchange and keep the value of rupee intact. This only provided artificial stability to the economy.

The 1965 war crushed the economy of Pakistan. During Ayub regime, most of the development was concentrated in too few hands and that too, in West Pakistan. While East Pakistan provided most of the raw materials and accounted for most of the foreign exchange earnings it was deprived of economic benefits. Even the massive foreign aid which was a significant aspect of Pakistan economy did not help East Pakistan in any way. The ultimate cessation of East Pakistan was a reflection of the Punjabi domination and the 'step-motherly' treatment meted out to the Bengalis.

In Bhutto's period, some efforts were made to introduce radical reforms in the economy. The tribal 'sardari' system was abolished and this only

earned the ill-will of the Baluchis . He did not cut down expenditure on defence, which remained high ever since Pakistan came into existence. As for his efforts to curb capitalism he could not do so in practice because it meant antagonising the power elite in Pakistan, without whose support Bhutto could not survive smoothly. Inflation was high but Bhutto did not curb it by generating domestic income, which again could not be done without dispensing with the landlords and feudal lords. His shift from the west to West Asia in terms of trade had positive effects but this did not reduce Western connection as the economy was still dependent on Western economic assistance. Foreign assistance had increased significantly since Ayub's days and it was concentrated largely on strengthening the army. During Buutto's time, also foreign aid continued. However, its external implications were immense. External debt increased. This phenomenon continued unabated even during Zia's period but the coming of the Afghan

34. Bhutto dismantled only a part of the features of the 'Sardari' system but continued to rely on 'Sardars' as his agents in Baluchistan.

crisis in 1979 provided 'stability' to the economy because U.S. aid increased at tremendous scale. The details of this are discussed in the next chapter.

In terms of comparative regional development, undoubtedly Punjab is the most developed region. Ayub Khan's regime helped Punjabis the most essentially because political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of the army, which was pre-dominantly Punjabi. Even while Bhutto's government tried radical reforms he did not alter the powerful elite structure. Zia's regime again saw the rise of Punjabis, both politically and economically and the army stood to gain as never before from the Afghan crisis, notwithstanding the social costs.

One salient feature of Pakistan's economy has been its expenditure on defence. While Ayub Khan strengthened the army to secure against Indian threat, Bhutto strengthened it to build the finest army in Asia. Domestically, this resulted in furthering Punjabi domination.

Another aspect of Pakistan economy is the

money flowing in from Middle East where many Pakistani nationals are employed. Again, Punjab has taken the lead. NWFP follows closely on the heel and it has accounted for increased wealth in the province.

The migration of population within Pakistan has also benefited the Punjabis largely. Especially, in Bhutto's period the Punjabis were encouraged to occupy the limited arable land in Baluchistan, alienating the Baluchs further and increasing their sense of economic deprivation. Many Baluchis have migrated to Sind in search of employment. As for the Sindhis, they face a two-fold exploitation, both at the hands of the Punjabis and the Urdu speaking 'Muhajirs' within their own province.

In the Zia period, economic reforms were introduced within the framework of Islamization. 'Zakat' and 'Ushr', two taxes on property were introduced. It has been discussed in the previous chapter. Apart from these, profit and loss counters were introduced in banks to eliminate 'riba' (an increase in capital on loans). But in

Pakistan where businessmen maintained multiple account books, this system seemed to pave way for fraud on a large scale .

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As for 'riba', the military regime could not do anything concrete to eliminate extortions from financial transactions because it would have meant creation of alternative public institutions. Besides, to put an end to the extortions from landless peasants and poor farmers by money-lender landlords, it would have been necessary to introduce drastic land reforms. Given the framework of military regime, Zia derived a degree of political support only from the rich landlords. Moreover, the leadership of most of the political parties was feudal. It was, therefore, not possible to alter the economic structure significantly.

Estimates show that the current regional disparities are more acute than the East and West Pakistan of 1971. It is indicated that nearly 100 percent of the population in Baluchistan, 69

35. Omar Asghar Khan 'Political & Economic Aspects of Islamization) in Asghar Khan (ed.) Islam Politics and the State (New Delhi: Select Book Service Syndicate, 1986) p.149

percent in Sind and 75% in NWFP fall below poverty
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line .

The impact of Afghan crisis on Pakistani economy has been felt by NWFP. Because of the large number of refugees in NWFP, it has received massive aid. Besides foreign aid, it introduced arms and drugs trade, which was very lucrative but exacted tremendous social costs. Drug addiction increased and an arms-bazar created in NWFP.

The role of foreign powers in the enhancement of regional disparities cannot be overlooked. It has suited the United States to strengthen the army in Pakistan and keep its 'stability' in the region intact. After the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in 1979 particularly, the U.S has had vested interests in ensuring Pakistan's stability at all costs. The Soviet interests in the region are not as overt. Its sympathetic stand on Baluchistan in no certain terms indicates an armed intervention because Soviet Union has always been concerned about the balance of power situation in the region.

36. S. Naseem, "Poverty and Landlessness in Pakistan" in ILO quoted from Phandis etal (ed) n.7., p.8

The role of regional and extra-regional power in Pakistan politics will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the policies of ethnic preference in Pakistan, has brought the country to the crossroads. With increasing demand of regional autonomy and independence, Pakistan is faced to cope with the nationality question. To reduce these tensions, it will be necessary to assure these minorities of their status in polity and promote social justice. For this purpose, economic disparities will have to be bridged. "Economic growth which is truncated or fragmented, cannot be sustained for long without creating the potential for conflict"³⁷ .

"The question of the rights of the nationalists is going to be one major issue that will determine the course Pakistani politics takes in the near future. Any attempt to suppress the national communities under the Islamic cover-up is not going to succeed. The relationship of the

37. Mukherjee, n.7. p.14

Centre with the provinces will continue to be the source of considerable tension and conflict in
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Pakistan.

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38. Kalim Bahadur, "Islam and the National Question in Pakistan", in Kalim Bahadur (ed.) South Asia in Transition (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers 1986) p.145

C H A P T E R - I V

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ROLE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS

In the developing countries, which emerged in the post colonial era, external powers played an important role. These powers have exercised their influence in both economic and political spheres. Generally, the role of external powers can be seen in the larger context of global power politics. The world witnessed two distinct power blocs when most of the former colonies began to acquire independence after the second world war. These countries were faced with the option of joining either them or remaining non-aligned. But even for the countries which adopted non-alignment as their foreign policy, it was difficult to eliminate the foreign influence. These countries were economically dependent on their ex-colonial powers and politically their institutions were influenced by the western models. This dependency syndrome manifested itself in many ways in the post-war period.

Many political scientists tried to explain this dependency by arguing that while the political evolution of a society is influenced by both external and internal factors, the impact of external factors has been greater in recent

modernizing societies . Thus, an external armed intervention is not uncommon in the modern era. As the developing countries were not politically and socially mature, the foreign intervention became possible in these countries. Their political economic and social institutions were not sufficiently evolved or were not allowed to evolve independently. This was partly due to the colonial framework which allowed the growth of divisive forces within the system and partly due to the global scenario in the post-war period marked by cold war politics. The two super-powers were looking for areas of influence and tried to safeguard their respective global interests in the strategic areas. Thus, the Soviet moves in Eastern Europe or Iran and the American moves in Cuba, Vietnam and the Mediterranean were part of their post-war cold war policies. In the economic sphere, foreign powers influence the developing countries through aid trade relations and

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1. Samuel Huntington and Dominguez 'Political Development' in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.) 'Handbook of Political Science' quoted in Ataur Rahman Pakistan and America: Dependency Relations (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1982) p.1

international monetary and financial institutions which are constituted and controlled by the great powers.

Ever since Pakistan came into existence, its foreign policy objectives were dictated by the India factor. It was the continuation of Congress-Muslim League conflict of pre-independence years. Pakistan was haunted by Indian designs of undoing partition and as a result, set out to find allies to counter the perceived Indian threat effectively. It began by showing an inclination to align with the West, especially the United States because the U.S had failed to woo India into its military alliance system. At a time when "those who are not with us are against us" attitude of the Truman Doctrine dictated American global relations, India chose Non-alignment as its foreign policy means. Pakistan, on the other hand, was willing to tow the American line and sought aid to protect itself against India in the name of fighting the communist threat. While America responded to Pakistan's anti-communist rhetoric, it did not respond to Pakistan's fears of India in the same way. Nevertheless, its stand on Kashmir was favourable

to Pakistan. In turn, Pakistan provided military bases to the United States. It further joined the American sponsored alliances South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and thus the Pak-American relationship became firmly entrenched. In the course of this relationship, massive economic and military aid was provided to Pakistan. Significantly, the military in Pakistan was looked upon by America as the modernising elite and the entire process of military aid was carried out by top bureaucrats². Thus, the U.S. strengthened the military-bureaucracy nexus in Pakistan. Apart from the containment policy, the United States was motivated by Pakistan's proximity to the Gulf which increased its strategic value for United States³.

India and Pakistan could not establish cordial relations since 1947. There were many disputes among the two countries like the sharing of national resources, rehabilitation of refugees,

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2. Ataur Rahman Pakistan and America: Dependency relations (New Delhi: Young Asia Publishers, 1982) p.14
 3. Mohammad Asghar Khan 'Pakistan's Geopolitical Imperatives' in Asghar Khan, (ed) Islam, Politics and the State (New Delhi: Select Book Service Syndicate, 1986) p.251

Kashmir issue etc. In 1947 itself, the two countries fought over Kashmir. The dispute became an all-out war and Kashmir eventually acceded to India but Pakistan annexed parts of Kashmir which came to be known as "Azad Kashmir". The accession was disputed by Pakistan which claimed that being a Muslim majority state Kashmir should rightfully belong to it. India on the other hand justified Kashmir's accession on the ground that the two nation theory was not accepted by India and, therefore, Kashmir could not be acceded to Pakistan by virtue of its Muslim population. Besides, the people of Kashmir under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah had fought against Pakistani invaders in 1948 and thus proved that they did not want to be a part of Pakistan. The question of Kashmir remained unresolved and it was referred to the United Nations. While the U.S took a stand favouring Pakistan the Soviet Union favoured India. All other permanent members in the Security Council supported Pakistan.

In 1965, two countries again went to war over the Kashmir issue. Ayub Khan had calculated that India had suffered heavily at the hands of the

Chinese in 1962 and were militarily weak. Besides, China was clearly on Pakistan's side. But, unfortunately for Pakistan, both the superpowers brought about a ceasefire, fearing Chinese involvement⁴. Both sides maintained their respective lines of actual control till U.N. observers arrived and this meant that Pakistan occupied a few parts of Chhamb area in Jammu and Kashmir and India a few parts of Pakistan in Punjab. India had advanced into Punjab to check Pakistani advances in Kashmir and to force Pakistan to fight war on two fronts. Ultimately, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by India and Pakistan with the Soviet leaders mediation. The ceasefire line of 1948 was accepted as the international boundary. In Pakistan, Tashkent Declaration was seen as a diplomatic defeat because Pakistan had failed to secure the right of 'self-determination' for the people of Kashmir. Remarking on this war Feldman observed: "For Pakistan, India had emerged an aggressor and for India, Pakistan had not only

4. Herbert Feldman 'From Crisis to Crisis' (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) p.158-59

tried to wrest Kashmir, but had forged links with China and would, when necessity provided the occasion, collaborate with China in an assault on two or three fronts"⁵. Domestically, the Tashkent Declaration sowed the seeds of Ayub Khan's downfall because it was the root cause of his differences with his Foreign Minister Bhutto, who ultimately became one of the leaders of the movement against Ayub⁶. Besides this, America suspended the arms supply to Pakistan in 1965 and resumed it in 1969 and this seriously affected Pakistan. The relations between both countries deteriorated to the extent of Pakistan's abandonment of SEATO and CENTO⁷. As mentioned earlier, in 1965 East Pakistan was left virtually defenceless and was at the mercy of India and this led to the intensification of the secessionist movement there.

The relation between India and Pakistan

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. p.162

reached the lowest ebb when India dismembered Pakistan in 1971 and the independent state of Bangladesh was created. Bangladesh was the result of the economic and social deprivation of East Pakistanis. While its creation enhanced Pakistan's suspicions of India, domestically it disgraced and discredited the army. The army was no longer looked upon as the saviour. The Pakistani alliance with the United States could not prevent the creation of Bangladesh. By taking a stand favourable to India on the issue, the Soviet Union endorsed Bangladesh. As for the United States, it was not willing to ruin the spirit of 'detente' for the sake of Pakistan. Thus Pakistan had to contend with its Western wing.

In the post-Bangladesh period, Pakistan and India tried to find a mutually acceptable solution through bilateral means under the Shimla agreement. After the fall of Bhutto government and the imposition of Martial Law by Zia-ul-Haq, the relation between the two countries deteriorated again. The spirit of Shimla Agreement was violated when Zia referred the Kashmir issue in various international forums, especially the United

Nations. Other irritant issues included the nuclear question and alleged interferences in the internal affairs of the respective countries. While India claimed that Pakistan, was encouraging terrorism in Punjab, Pakistan accused India of interference in Sind. Siachen glacier has been another bone of contention.

Pakistan's relations with China have been cordial. In China, Pakistan found an ally which could deter Indian threat in the region. Also when Pakistan's relations with the U.S were at a low ebb in the sixties it turned to China. China's objective lay in attaining a dominant position in Asia. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 brought Pakistan closer to China. "China with its 2400 mile long border with India, its large army, equipped with nuclear weapons, and vast resources able to exercise pressure on India at will" ⁸ was attractive to Pakistan. However, its calculations about the possible Chinese help in the 1965 war

8. D.C. Jha "Basic Foundations and Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" in Surendra Chopra, (ed.) Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University Press, 1983) p.34

was misplaced. China demonstrated that it would not fight a war for another country unless its own interests were affected. Nevertheless, China continued to take a sympathetic view towards Pakistan. In the 60s, the Sino-American rapprochement was of a great help to Pakistan, as it became an important conduit for both the powers. On the other hand, the growing Sino-Soviet conflict in the sixties resulted in Pakistan's increased importance to the Soviet Union. Pakistan was able to acquire economic and military aid from Soviet Union. In the '80s however, Soviet Union's relations with Pakistan are not very cordial because of Pakistan's deep involvement in the Afghan Crisis.

Pakistan's West Asian environment was very conducive to its assertion of Islamic identity. It used its close ties with the Muslim world against India by alleging in Organization of Islamic Conference that Muslims in India were treated badly, and India was not 'secular'. However, Pakistan's relations with Iran deteriorated after the fall of the Shah of Iran. But it continues to identify itself with the Muslim world. Economically, Pakistan stood to gain through its

West Asian policy. The foreign exchange it has gained from the remittances of Pakistanis in the Middle East was significant. The 1973 oil crisis and petro-dollars increased the importance of West Asia for Pakistan.

The Soviet entry into Afghanistan in 1979 led Pakistan to shift its foreign policy orientation. Though still mindful of India, it became more concerned with the threat from the West and with this new orientation, sought security by aligning itself more closely with the United States⁹. The presence of Afghan rebels had exacted a number of social costs for Pakistan.

If one looks at the history of Pak-Afghan relations, it can be seen that the two countries did not have very cordial relations since the emergence of Pakistan. Though both countries share a common religion, it could not help improve relations. Their fundamental difference revolved around the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and NWFP of Pakistan. It was argued by the Afghans and the Pathans of NWFP that the border

9. Khan, n.3., p.252

was imposed on Afghanistan by the British and would not be acceptable in wake of the withdrawal of the British from India ¹⁰. The Durand Line was a part of Imperial strategy and was forced upon the Pathans. The agreement had been reached on Durand Line with the then ruler of Afghanishtan, Amir Abdur Rahman under duress. Therefore, after the withdrawal of the British according to the Pathans, NWFP could not be made part of Pakistan. The Pathans were "akin to them from the ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical as well as traditional points of view" ¹¹.

As for the referrendum which was held in NWFP soon after partition to decide its accession to India or Pakistan, Afghanistan refused to accept it as it was a unilateral decision of the British ¹². The Pathans of NWFP, under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had boycotted the referrendum, on the grounds of a limited franchise. Thus, neither the Afghans nor the Pashtuns of NWFP accepted the Durand Line or the status of NWFP as

10. Kulwant Kaur Pak-Afghanistan Relations (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1985) p.46

11. Ibid

12. Ibid

part of Pakistan. This was the genesis of the 'Pakhtoonistan' issue, a demand for an independent state of the Pathans on both sides of the Durand line or a state as a part of Greater Afghanistan.

Though the successive Afghanistan governments took a sympathetic stand on the 'Pakhtoonistan' question and maintained that the people of NWFP had the right of self-determination there have been changing stands on whether it should be part of Greater Afghanistan or not. Both from the economic and strategic point of view, NWFP was important for Afghanistan. For one thing, Afghanistan is a land locked country and its only access to the world has been the Khyber Pass. Besides, whenever there was internal disorder in Pakistan, Afghanistan was affected. For example, during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Afghanistan was said to have mobilised its army in view of Pakistan's marginal edge over India¹³. The insurgency in Baluchistan, especially in 1973, also saw the flow of refugees and Baluch guerrillas into Afghanistan. Thus, the happenings in the two tribal areas of Pakistan had their

13. G.S. Bhargava South Asian Security after Afghanistan (Masachusetts, D.C. Heath and Co., 1983) p.19

impact on Afghan security.

Pakistan was always dissatisfied over the Afghan refusal to recognise the Durand Line. Pakistan argued that the 1893 treaty on the Durand Line was a valid treaty and that it should be accepted. Since the treaty terminated Afghan sovereignty over the people on the East of the boundary¹⁴, the claims made by the Pathans was illegitimate. On the question of self-determination, the Pakistani governments have maintained that there was a referendum in the province in 1947, and the majority voted in favour of the accession to Pakistan.

However, regardless of the legality and validity of the Durand Line, Afghanistan made Pakhtoonistan a major focus of its foreign policy¹⁵. After the coup of 1978 which led to the ouster of Dauod, the Soviet intervention and the emergence of Babrak Karmal Afghanistan declared that no international border existed between the two countries but later diluted its stand. During

14. Kaur n.10, p.56

15. Bhargava, n.13, p.25

Dauod's time the tension between the two countries had been somewhat eased.

The differences between the two states started when Afghanistan opposed the entry of Pakistan in the United Nations in 1947. Later, when the "One-Unit" plan was initiated in 1954, Afghanistan had strained relations with Pakistan. Then, the Dir issue led to the closure of the border by Pakistan and as a result Afghanistan had to suffer economically. Diplomatic ties were severed for a while in 1955 and the relations, however, were normalised with Iran acting as a mediatory power. Nevertheless, the "Dir issue, a domestic variable, which involved the basic controversy regarding the autonomy and status of the internal units in Pakistan had become an important policy output" for Pak-Afghan differences.

Despite the differences that existed between the two countries, Afghanistan never went beyond protests and declarations of support for Pathans. This was due to the more superior armed capacity of Pakistan and the possibility of incurring the wrath

16. Kaur, n.10., p.123



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of the United States. Besides, the close ties between Pakistan and China also deterred Afghanistan. It had sided with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict and hence was not in very friendly terms with China.

After the coup in 1978, which overthrew the Daoud regime in Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin became the president. He was a hardliner and soon the Soviets began to feel insecure. In 1979, Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan, and Amin was killed and was replaced by Karmal. Many reasons have been attributed to the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was always sensitive about its borders and it had always wanted to stabilise its borders and consolidate power. When the American influence seemed to increase in Afghanistan and Amin also broke ranks with Moscow, the Soviet Union moved into Afghanistan to prevent its border becomes vulnerable. The traditional thrust of Soviet Union towards the warm-waters of the Persian Gulf was seen as another important factor. Moreover, "The incumbent wave of Islamic fundamentalism generated fears for possible negative influence in the Soviet Central Asian Republics... the emergence of hardliners within the

Kremlin decision-making mechanism led to the belief that Soviet Union must draw a line beyond which it will not retreat.... and there were anxieties and fears that Amin would be overthrown and his government replaced by an anti-Marxist regime" ¹⁷ .

Bhabani Sengupta describes the Soviet entry into Afghanistan in terms of the "super power politics". "For the U.S., Afghanistan was a daring climax of Soviet military intervention through proxy powers in third world conflicts through the seventies, a direct assault on the global balance of power. For the Soviets, the U.S. response to their perfectly legitimate and entirely defensive action in Afghanistan was the culmination of a series of invasions against detente, noisy herald of an off season cold war" ¹⁸ . The Soviet intervention did not help in the transformation of Afghanistan into a Communist State but only alienated the Afghans. Result was the emergence of a large number of Afghan rebels, who sought refuge

17. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma', Asian Survey, Vol.23, N.3, March 1983 pp.229

18. Bhabani Sengupta Afghan Syndrome (New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House, 1982) p.49

in Iran and Pakistan to fight the government forces. The refugee influx in Pakistan increased. The United States provided arms to the rebels and Pakistan became a conduit as well as a training centre for the guerrilla activities.

There were far-reaching external and internal repercussions of Pakistan's Afghan policy after Soviet intervention. The reason for Pakistan's involvement in the crisis can be attributed largely to the Zia regime, which had no mass base internally and did not have any significant external support because U.S had suspended aid since Pakistan had allegedly acquired the ability to explode a nuclear device (this has been discussed in the latter section of the Chapter). By getting actively involved in Afghanistan, Zia was able to legitimise his rule. Besides, Pakistan became a 'frontline' state and received military aid from the United States. By internationalising the issue, Zia was able to get sympathy and material aid from the Muslim countries of West Asia. In short, Zia played both the American and Islamic cards successfully and the Afghan syndrome turned out to be a 'summer of opportunities' for

19
him .

Notwithstanding the 'gains', Pakistan has had to incur heavy costs internally. The gravest of them has been the structural change in Peshawar and as such, the whole of Pakistan. There was a possibility of Soviet support to Baluch and Pathan insurgency increased and there was also the introduction of arms and drugs in the society. One of the most devastating social repercussions on Pakistan has been the introduction of an arms-drugs mafia. This lucrative business boomed in Pakistan as a result of the enormous arms aid flowing in from the United States. A sizeable portion of these arms found their way into Pakistan's open arms bazaar as well as the Pakistani army itself. "The clandestine arms bazaar is no longer confined to the theatre of war between Afghan 'mujahideen' and the Soviet-Afghan forces. Arms are now almost freely available to anti-social elements everywhere in Pakistan... The wanton bombings in Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi are an evidence of the scale on

19. Ibid, p.142

which arms are available in illicit bazaars" . As for the drugs, they opened up lucrative markets in Baluchistan and NWFP and the trade in arms and drugs sustained each other. "Drug abuse" according to Aksari "is exerting a socio-economic burden on the nation in terms of medical cost, loss of health, vigour and productivity... The abuse of drugs in a society creates social imbalance, religious decay, weakens social bonds and ultimately renders the society defenceless against poverty ignorances and national security...."²¹

The economic costs incurred by Pakistan in the wake of refugee influx has also been tremendous. The problem has been one of providing food and shelter to the refugees. These refugees, changed the ethnic complexion of the areas in which they were concentrated²² . In fact, in Baluchistan, the influx was so high that some leaders expressed fear over the possibility of the native population becoming minorities in their own provinces. In the

20. M.H. Aksari, 'Pakistan's Security and Drugs/ Arms Mafia' Strategic Digest, Vol.17, No.12 December, 1987 pp.2305

21. Ibid.

22. Cheema, n.17, p.235

economic sphere, the Pakistanis found Afghan refugees competing with them in business. The Afghan shopkeepers competed with the local population and to gain employment, were willing to work at lower wages. This resulted in the increase
23
in the demand for Afghan labour .

The Soviet entry in Afghanistan increased hopes of Baluchs of possible Soviet help in their endeavour to create an independent Baluchistan. But Moscow, even before its entry, had soft-peddled the Baluch and Pashtun issues. In February 1980, Karmal declared that the national issue of Baluchs and Pashtuns in Pakistan was an internal matter and
24
it was for them to take action . The presence of Soviet troops till early 1989 and their ultimate withdrawal shows that the Russian interest in Baluchistan stopped short of creating an independent state. The military costs incurred by the Soviets in Afghanistan were high and they could not contemplate with the idea of another occupation

23. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan in 1983 and still no Solution" Asian Survey Vol.24, No.2 February, 1984, p.147

24. Quoted in Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981) p.147

which could be long-drawn. Secondly, Baluch nationalism was not as widespread and vigorous to organize an effective insurgency. As for the United States, the Baluch issue had to be pivotal in its Afghan policy because Baluchistan "is so conspicuously vulnerable to Soviet Political and military pressures"²⁵. In the current situation also, if Soviet Union were to intervene again in the region militarily, Baluchistan could be the target of retaliation and Pakistan may have to regret its active involvement in Afghanistan. Further, the United States might not be able to provide any assistance to Pakistan to suppress Baluch nationalism as this might only invite indirect Soviet intervention. Though the Pathans of NWFP have been raising the issue of Pakhunistan, their clamour for Soviet support is not so overt. The entry of Soviets into Afghanistan led to a wave on unpopularity in NWFP in favour of fellow Pathans in Afghanistan and against the Soviets.

Besides these, Pakistan's Afghan policy also had some political repercussions internally. A

25. Ibid. p.199

section of Pakistanis were against Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan. Thus, Mohammad Khan Junejo, the Prime Minister of Pakistan was instrumental in signing of the Geneva accord in 1989 to end the Afghan crisis. Zia-ul-Haq was not so much in favour of this and this led to serious differences among various sections in Pakistan.

From the point of view of foreign policy, one important factor in Pakistan's Afghan policy was that it "incurred Soviet disapprobation by supporting the rebels' cause, by allowing their leaders to conduct their propoganda campaign from Peshawar, and by acqeuiscng in the flow of foreign arms to the insurgents"²⁶. The rebels can be broadly classified into three groups viz., those operating from within Pakistan, those operating from within Iran and the others who do not have a base outside Afghanistan and among these three, all the strongest and powerful groups are based in Pakistan²⁷. This had strained the relations

26. Mehrunnisa Ali, "Soviet-Pakistan relations after Afghanistan Crisis", Asian Survey Vol.23, no.9, September, 1983) pp.1034

27. Cheema, n.17, p.233

between Pakistan and Soviet Union. In view of the involvement of Pakistan in Afghanistan, Moscow has warned that it will not be silent spectator and has protested over the Pakistan involvement. Notwithstanding these, Pakistan continues to follow its Afghan policy which to a great extent is dictated by American global interests.

As already discussed, India occupies the most important dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy objective. Though Afghanistan became a threat after the Soviet Intervention, Pakistan has viewed India as a more serious threat to its security. In the initial years, it was weary of the "Hindu" designs to undo partition and this opinion became more pronounced after the creation of Bangladesh, in which India had played a crucial role. The Indian threat and the Kashmir issue helped divert the attention of the people from problems of ideology, national question and economic inequalities. The allegations of Zia regime on India and its role in Sind were a reflection of this tendency. The relations between both countries have improved with the return of democracy in Pakistan but no regime in Pakistan

would afford to play down the fear of eternal Indian threat.

Again, Pakistan and United States shared favourable relations from the early years of Pakistan's creation. On matters of vital importance such as Kashmir and Bangladesh, U.S support to Pakistan was complete. As a result of continuous arms aid to Pakistan, India had protested to the United States and President Eisenhower had promised that the US arms would not be used against India. But in the 1965 war with India, these arms were used by Pakistan against India. This, in the face of Reagan's increased arms aid to Pakistan in the eighties, generated fears in India that the 1965 syndrome could be repeated. Though these arms were acquired by Pakistan under the pretext of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, India had expressed concern that these arms were acquired mainly to be used against India. Besides United States, the China factor is also important. China has been supplying arms to Pakistan and has favoured Pakistan, thereby giving

it an edge over India in the strategic equation .
The signing of the Geneva Accord in 1989 seemed to bring a solution to the crisis in Afghanistan. Junejo, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan was largely responsible for Pakistan signing of the accord. As per the accord, the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan. But neither U.S. nor Pakistan have refrained from assisting the rebels in waging a war against the Kabul regime. Both Kabul and Moscow have warned Pakistan of the dangers of the involvement of its military in Afghanistan.

Ethnicity in Pakistan and the role of external powers

Among the many factors that have contributed to the political failure in Pakistan, "the most sensitive and intractable has been the built-in conflict between dominant Punjabi and 'Muhajir' elites and the non-Punjabi ethnic groups indigeneous to the areas that have made up

28. Tapan Das, Sino-Pak Collusion and U.S. Policy (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1972) p.125-35

Pakistan" . As discussed elsewhere, the Pathans, Baluchs and Sindhis have been demanding greater economic benefits vis-a-vis the Punjabis and 'Muhajirs'. The distinct ethnic identities of Baluchs and Pathans have made them aspire for independent states. Pakistan has so far not been able to find an amicable solution to include these alienated groups into the mainstream of politics. Regarding Baluch nationalism, Pakistan has regarded it as a problem artificially stimulated by the 'Sardars' and believes that it can be solved if economic modernization gradually erodes the 'Sardari' system . It is, however, ambitious thinking on the part of Pakistan because Baluchs have a well organised insurgency (for details see chapter-3). The Soviet entry in Afghanistan raised fears of a possible Soviet role in Baluchistan. Though the Soviet Union has so far refrained from overt moves in Baluchistan, the continued Pakistani support to the Afghan rebels may provoke Soviet interference in the troubled area of Baluchistan.

29. Selig Harrison, "Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan" in Banuazizi and Weiner (ed) State Religion and Ethnic Politics (Syracuse: Oxford University press, 1986) p.267

30. Ibid

The grievance of the Sindhis in Pakistan has been largely economic in character. They claim that they have faced a two-fold domination, one by the Punjabi and the other, by Indian immigrants i.e. the 'Muhajirs', who are known as the new 'Sindhis'. The Sindhis represented their discontent when the Movement for Restoration of Democracy was launched during the Zia regime. Though this movement was launched all over Pakistan, it was most successful in Sind. Pakistan accused India of encouraging the Sindhis in their endeavour to establish an independent 'Sindhudesh'. The possibility of Indian support cannot be discounted in the context of continuing tensions in the relations between the two countries.

The Pathans in North West Frontier Province claim that they were made part of Pakistan without their approval. Ever since Pakistan was created, they have been demanding an independent Pakhtunistan. Afghanistan has taken a sympathetic view to the Pakhtunistan issue. The Soviet entry into Afghanistan saw the influx of a large number of refugees. The supply of arms led to creation of an arms-bazar in Peshawar. Drug abuse in the

province increased. NWFP, like Baluchistan faces the possibility of a Soviet offensive in the face of present Afghans policy of Pakistan. The 'Muhajir' group in Pakistan has also started asserting its ethnic identity and the 'Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) has become a powerful lobby.

The army and the role of foreign powers

The army in Pakistan was a product of the British Raj. It was a privileged institution and was looked upon by the Pakistanis as the protector against Indian aggression. As a result of Pakistan's Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States and entry into SEATO and CENTO, U.S aid to Pakistan was a constant feature of its armed forces. Throughout the 1950s, defence accounted for over 50 percent of total government expenditure in Pakistan and it was largely supplemented by the United States military grants. During the Ayub regime, the United States continued its military aid to protect Pakistan against the 'communist' threat from China and Soviet Union. Having supplied Pakistan with armaments, it was also imparted training. To an average Pakistani the

presence of American aid personnels became
31
"anything but desirable by native standards"

Besides this, the continued foreign aid made the military stronger. Even whenever United States provided military assistance to Pakistan, those parts of the army in Azad Kashmir and East Pakistan was excluded from such assistance 32 . Since Kashmir was a source of conflict between India and Pakistan, it was not in U.S interest to alienate India by assisting troops in the region 33 . Since troops in East Pakistan were also excluded, the Bengalis came to regard the army an instrument of West Pakistan, particularly Punjabi domination. Apart from these consequences, a very significant effect was that it created a self-delusion that the military was capable of not only mastering the Pakistani politics but could master the Indians as well. It thus influenced military's judgement of its own competence and raised civilian expectations

31. Unpublished manuscript of a retired Pakistani army officer cited in Stephen Cohen 'Pakistani Army' (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984) p.68

32. Bilal Hashmi, "Dragon Seed: Military in the State" in Gardezi and Rashid (ed). Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983) p.162

33. Ibid

to excessive heights . Due to this self-image of the army, Pakistan under Ayub Khan, provoked the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 which ended in a stalemate. American aid to Pakistan was suspended as a result of this war and resumed in 1969.

The 1971 war with India and the disintegration of Pakistan dealt a severe blow to the morale of the army. Bhutto, after coming to power in 1971, sought to restructure the army and dismissed a few officers. But, soon he was determined to build a strong army and the defence expenditure increased again. Bhutto became the victim of his own creation when he was overthrown in a military coup by Gen. Zia. This military regime assumed importance for the United States when the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in 1979. U.S decided to equip Pakistan with up-to-date weaponry and resume

34. Cohen n.31 p.69

massive military aid . Apart from aid to counter the possible Soviet threat, United States made Pakistan a conduit for supplying arms to Afghan rebels. Aid and assistance on such a large scale no doubt provided an artificial stability to the country. The internally isolated Zia regime was getting a new face-lift but in return, it paid tremendous social costs. Free flow of arms and drugs played havoc in the society. The regime by allowing the United States to dictate its Afghan policy, this had only served the American Strategic interests. It is quite clear that the U.S. needed military bases for its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to replace facilities that it had lost in Iran . It is a part of the Central command with Pakistan operations as a "frontline state".

35. The United States had taken a tilt towards Pakistan in 1969. However, Bhutto period could not be used by the Americans as a bargaining power with India to break India's ties with Soviet Union. Besides Bhutto had talked of building nuclear weapon capability which irritated the United States. The United States, therefore, devoted its time and money to improve relations with India. But with the coming of the Afghan crisis in 1979, it began to take more interest in Pakistan. For more details see Tariq Ali Can Pakistan Survive (London: Penguin Books, 1983) p.189

36. Ibid.

The nuclear issue played an important role in Pakistan's 'military aid' relationship with America. In the first instance, controversy arose when Pakistan signed a contract with France, in March 1976, for purchasing plutonium processing plant. U.S. exerted pressure on the both countries to abandon the contract. Failing this, the aid to Pakistan reached an all time low during the Carter administration. Sale of 110 A-7 light aircraft to Pakistan was rejected. France was ultimately pressurized to cancel the deal in 1978 and then project aid to Pakistan was resumed in October. In January, 1979, the fall of Shah of Iran resulted in the loss of an important ally to the United States. Significance of Pakistan increased and the Americans gave \$ 40 million as aid .

In April, 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency of America (CIA) reported that Pakistan was involved in a clandestine purchase of equipment necessary to build Uranium enrichment plant. U.S., as a response, cut off military assistance and training programme in accordance with the Symington

37. Rashmi Jain, U.S - Pakistan Relations, 1947-1983 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983) p.79

Act of 1977 . Even while Pakistan tried to assure the United States that its nuclear programme was peaceful, the latter stuck to its decision. However, the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in 1979 increased the strategic importance of Pakistan. It became necessary to resume aid to Pakistan. The Symington Act was, therefore, waived on the ground that if the President of the United States was confident that the country was not going nuclear, then the concerned country can be provided U.S. aid and assistance. A "consortium" aid of \$ 400m was offered to Pakistan, divided equally between economic and military aid, for 'legitimate, defence' needs. This aid was referred to by Zia-³⁹ ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, as "peanuts" . The expectations of Pakistan had increased and it became aware of its importance to the U.S. The aid offered by the United States was according to Zia, too small to be effective but too large to provoke the Soviets .⁴⁰ Nevertheless, American military aid

38. Symington Act states that America should not provide military and assistance to any country which acquires the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

39. Hindustan Times, January 19, 1980

40. Rashmi Jain, n.37, p.82

was increased and it was agreed to supply Pakistan with modern F-16 aircrafts and the military ties were gradually intensified.

The strengthening of the regime by United States demonstrated that the latter has always been supportive of military dictatorships in Pakistan, notwithstanding its declared commitment to freedom and democracy. With the restoration of civilian rule, it is to be seen whether Pakistan will be able to loosen the grip of the armed forces and restore civilian control over the affairs of the State.

C_H_A_P_T_E_R = V

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been is to identify the internal threats to Pakistan's security. In developing countries, internal factors are more formidable and can become serious threats if intensified by external factors. Internal threats are significant in developing countries because of ^{their} political, economic, social and military vulnerability. While internally, there is a lack of popular participation in governance due to widespread illiteracy and poverty externally, vested interests exploit the fragility of the system. Also the dependence of developing countries upon the external powers especially the big power for economic and political stability allows undue external interference. An inevitable consequence of such a phenomenon is the gradual exploitation of the developing country's political and economic policies by the big powers.

A few factors, characteristic of most developing countries, are military intervention in politics, ethnicity leading to sub-nationalism, economic disparities and influence of external factors. These factors have been analysed in relation to Pakistan. Pakistan, which sought to

unite the people in the name of religion was faced with the problem of national integration since its inception. It could not reconcile the economic, social and ethnic differences through religious bond alone. When Pakistan was created on August 14th, 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah became the first Governor-General with virtually unlimited powers. Popularly known as Qaid-I-Azam, Jinnah was a leader who could keep the conflicting interests together. With his death in 1948, Pakistan and Muslim League lost the only leader who could have held it together ¹. The death of Liquat Ali Khan was another blow.

The initial years of Pakistan were marked by political instability and the lack of political competence. There was no consensus on the role of religion in the new state. Jinnah had wanted Pakistan to be a secular state ², and so were the leaders of Muslim League. But the 'Ulama' wanted Pakistan to be a theocratic state. Though in 1958

1. Tariq Ali Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London:Jonathan Cape, 1970) p.37

2. Ibid

and 1962, religion was incorporated in the constitution, it was formal. The controversy over ideology remained alive even after Bhutto granted many provisions to placate the 'Ulama' in 1973. During the Zia regime, Islamization became a state policy and the 'Ulama' came to prominence and became powerful. But this only led to displeasure among the Pakistanis who saw Islamization as a means of legitimising the martial regime. Besides, Zia's Islamization was "instrumental in whipping up religious hysteria verging on insanity"³. Thus, the controversy in Pakistan over the role of religion continued unabated.

The main question has been whether religion should be the sole criterion or should it be separated from politics. While the leaders in Pakistan, with the exception of Zia, showed a tendency to separate religion from politics, they could never deny its importance. The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 raised serious

3. Omar Asghar Khan, "Political and Economic Aspects of Islamization" in Asghar Khan (ed) Islam, Politics and the State (New Delhi: Select book Service Syndicate, 1986) p.144

questions about the effectiveness of religion as the unifying force in a society which was endowed with cultural, economic and ethnic differences. In the post Bangladesh period, Baluch nationalism and increased demands of Sindhis and Pathans have become serious problems.

The role of ethnicity in Pakistan has been significant. The Baluchs and Pathans have felt they are not a part of Pakistan's mainstream because the leadership in these places did not support the movement for Pakistan before 1947. They became parts of Pakistan only because they were Muslim-majority states. Though religion sought to play an important role in Pakistan, it could not suppress the nationalism in Baluchis or Pathans. Apart from the Baluchs and Pathans, the Sindhis form a distinct ethnic group in Pakistan. Though the Sindhis supported the Pakistan movement, they became alienated when the Indian migrants or the 'Muhajirs' began competing with them (and overtook them as they claim) for economic and political power. While the Baluchis and Pathans feel that the governments in Pakistan support the Punjabi clique and encourage them to prosper at the

cost of others, the Sindhis feel that they face a two-fold domination; one from the Punjabis and the other, from the 'Muhajirs'. The Bengalis had also resented what they called 'West Pakistani' domination and launched a movement for greater autonomy which finally led to a Civil war and the disintegration of Pakistan. The question that needs to be considered seriously is whether Pakistan can hold the various ethnic groups together by granting more regional autonomy which would mean a system of Confederation. In the face of increasing restlessness in the provinces of Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP, Pakistan perhaps, may have to examine its options rather more seriously. As Selig Harrison argues ethnic question in Pakistan is perhaps the most sensitive and intractable factor which jeopardises its security ⁴.

The one common grievance of the ethnic groups in Pakistan is what they call the Punjabi domination. The Punjabis have constituted the bulk

4. Selig Harrison, "Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan" in Banuazizi and Weiner (ed) State, Religion and Ethnic Politics (Syracuse : Oxford University Press, 1986) p.267

of the army and bureaucracy in Pakistan. This is because Punjab in a big way^{had} contributed to the recruitment in armed forces even during the British rule in India. In an independent Pakistan, however, the large presence of Punjabis in the army and the subsequent rise of the army to political eminence, alienated the other ethnic groups who felt that the army and powerful state machinery were becoming the instruments of Punjabis.

The army seized political power in Pakistan because of the changing political system and the failures of successive governments to provide political stability. The army came into the political arena of Pakistan due to various reasons. Among them are, political incompetence continued Punjabi domination and the role of external factors⁵. The rise of the army and its assumption of power undoubtedly provided relative stability to the system but it brought with it the influence of external powers, especially the United States. The U.S. provided military and economic assistance and

5. Stephen Cohen, Pakistani Army (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984) p.111

made army a very powerful institution. Having tasted power, the army was not willing to relinquish it. As a result, except for a brief period when Bhutto was the Prime Minister, Pakistan has been ruled by military regimes. The Zia regime witnessed an unprecedented phenomenon; the use of the military and state structure to Islamize the nation. As a result of displeasure over Islamization, the army's popularity also came down. The military regime sought to 'externalise' the domestic problems. The Sind problem was attributed to India, and the Baluch problem was seen as a possible provocation by Soviet Union. Thus, as an ideal military regime of the developing world the Pakistani military was externalising the domestic threats to legitimise its position. . The army continues to be a very powerful organ in Pakistan and going by its past history, another intervention cannot be ruled out.

Any failure to off-set the Punjabi domination could eventually lead to serious polarisation on

6. Mohammad Ayoob "Regional Security and the Third World" in Mohammad Ayoob (ed), Regional Security in the Third World (London: Croomhelm Ltd., 1986) p.8

ethnic lines leading to further complications. Given the success of the Bengali nationalisam, it could possibly aggreviate ethnic differences and intensify their resistance especially in NWFP and Baluchistan. Since Punjabi elements dominate the army, repeated military intervention only helped in consolidating the grievances of non-punjabi elements. Long military rule created two serious problems for army itself. It had led to the erosion of its credibility in Pakistan and secondly, repeated use of army to bring about political stability could even reduce its fighting abilities.

The role of external factors in Pakistan's domestic politics has been important. It has shared a close relationship with the United States since it came into existence. While the U.S. found in Pakistan an ally which could help the former realize its global objectives of containing Soviet power in the region, Pakistan found America useful for getting economic and military aid. With China also Pakistan had close relations since the sixties. This was partly because of the strained Pakistan-US relations over the 1965 Indo-Pak war.

Moreover, Pakistan's major foreign policy objective was to secure itself against India. This, it sought to do by building up and strengthening its military. Disputes between India and Pakistan have been many. In the initial years, Kashmir was the important source of conflict and the two countries went to war twice on the issue, in 1948 and 1965. Its domestic and international consequences were many. Domestically Ayub Khan's regime became weak and internationally, Pak-⁷American relations deteriorated. In the 1971 war, Pakistan blamed India for its role in creating Bangladesh. It was seen as continued Indian design to undo partition.

In the post-Bangladesh era, the two countries were not able to normalize relations successfully. There are continuing tensions over issues like Siachen, nuclear capability, alleged interference in their internal affairs often. In short, the problem between India and Pakistan has been threefold; for Pakistan, India's large size, its

7. See Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1972)

stronger army and the fact that it has remained politically stable for most of the time since its independence poses a psychological security threat . For India, on the contrary, Pakistan's close ties with America and China and its continuous build-up of arms pose a threat to the security. However, the consequence of this animosity has been an unending arms-race and the super powers involvement in South Asia.

Another external factor which had domestic repercussions in Pakistan is the Afghan crisis since 1979. By agreeing to supply arms and to provide bases to Afghan rebels, Pakistan has paid heavy social costs . It has led to to the creation of an arms-drugs nexus in Peshawar and this has jeopardised Pakistani security. In the wake of growing domestic disillusionment Afghan crisis proved useful for General Zia and he legitimised

8. David Taylor, "Changing pattern of Indo-Pakistan Relations" in Zingal Ellemant Pakistan in the 80s - Ideology, Regionalism, Economy, Foreign Policy (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985) p.49

9. M.H. Aksari "Pakistan's Security and Arms/Drugs Mafia" reproduced in Strategic Digest, Vol.17, n.12 December, 1981, pp.2305

his regime by serving American interests by getting Pakistan involved in Afghanistan. As a result, even after the signing of Geneva accord in 1989, Pakistan has continued to involve itself in the crisis.

To sum it up, Pakistan is a system where internal factors have become sources of threat to its security. It is to be seen whether the Benazir government and the restoration of civilian rule can resolve the crisis of its polity, the ethnic question and bridge economic inequalities. Army having evolved as a powerful institution may not respond to civilian effect control so easily. As for the role of external factors, Pakistan's policy has become a sub-set of American global policy. It may not be easy for Pakistan to do away with American influence completely but it can nevertheless minimise it to the extent where it does not harm Pakistan's political, economic or social interests.

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