FRAGMENTATION OF A NATION : MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled ``FRAGMENTATION OF A NATION: MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR'' submitted by Air Commodore **Narendra Bahadur Singh** is an original work and has not been previously submitted in part or in full for any other degree or diploma in this or any other University.

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C O N T E N T S

MAPS, CHARTS AND APPENDICES

III. <u>Appendices</u>

PREFACE

In 1958, almost 32 years ago, I had the good fortune
to visit Lebanon and spend a few very happy days there.
The blue waters of the Mediterranean, the thick green
forests on the steep mountain slopes which led up to
the snow-covered peaks, provided a scenic beauty difficult
to surpass. Lebanon, then, was a land of peace and full
of life; it was a show-piece of modern Western democracy,
economic growth, and a centre of social, cultural and
academic activities in the entire Arab world.

Today, it is a sad but still beautiful country where
there is peace no more and life has no value. For the
past 15 years, Lebanon has been the victim of a civil
war which has been described as the greatest tragedy
since the Second World War. The political, cultural and
economic bonds that created Lebanese society have broken
down and factions from the same religious groups are
fighting each other. The causes for this internal strife
are many: the demographic changes giving a majority to
the Muslim population but without any political advantage
in the face of stiff Christian opposition to any changes

in the status-quo; the influx of Palestinian refugees
due to endemic Arab-Israeli confrontations in the region
and the presence of a large force of armed guerrillas
of the Palestinian Liberation Force which attacked Israeli
settlements from southern Lebanon and the resultant Israeli
reprisal raids into Lebanese territory, including two major
Israeli invasions in 1978 and in 1982; in the regional
context, the deep involvement of Israel and Syria, Iran
and Iraq and their support to opposing factions in the
Lebanese Civil War; and finally the opposing roles of
the superpowers in the region to gain influence over
the oil-producing Arab states by massive supplies of arms
to the region. The regional Arab-Israeli conflict and
the superpower rivalry has been super-imposed on the
internal crisis in Lebanon.

This complex and complicated internal, regional and
global scenario influencing the Civil War in Lebanon
appeared to me worth study and analysis, particularly in
its military dimensions. In the four chapters of this
dissertation I have attempted briefly to narrate the main
actors on the Lebanese scene, their motivations, and the
role of militias and the armed forces of regional powers
like Israel and Syria.

In preparing this dissertation, I had continuous guidance, willing assistance and encouragement from Prof Matin Zuberi, of the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, for which I am most grateful. For any errors and omissions in the text, I am alone responsible.

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May, 1990   NEW DELHI

Lebanon - CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1. 31 August, 1920 France established the State of ``Greater Lebanon''.

2. 23 May 1926 New Constitution declares Lebanon a Republic under mandatory control of France.

3. June 1941 Anglo-Free-French Forces invade Lebanon, and Lebanon formally declared independent.

4. 1943 Lebanese ``National Pact'' provides a ratio of 6:5 between Christians and Muslims in Parliament.

5. 1946 All French Forces leave Lebanon.

6. May, July, 1958 First Lebanese Civil War.

7. December 1968 Israeli raid on Beirut airport. Beginning of conflict in Lebanon over Palestinian issue.

8. November 1969 Cairo Agreement between the Lebanese government and the PLO.

9. 1970 PLO transfers main bases from Jordan to Lebanon.

10. May 1973 Confrontation between the Lebanese Army and the PLO.

11. 13 April 1975 Opening phase of the Second Lebanese Civil War. Fighting erupts when Christian gunmen ambush a busload of Palestinians in Beirut, killing 30. Lebanese Muslims rally behind Palestinians.

12. January 1976 Indirect Syrian intervention in the Civil War when Christians overrun Palestinian refugee camp in East Beirut. Syrian$ troops withdraw to prevent all-out war. Lebanese army disintegrates. Syrians enter Beirut as part of Arab Force.

13. 1 June 1976 Full-fledged Syrian intervention and 12,000 Syrian troops move in, stiff Palestinian resistance.

14. September 1976 Second Syrian offensive in Lebanon, Formation of Lebanese Front and Lebanese Forces.

15. October 1976 The Riyad and Cairo Agreements which end the Lebanese Civil War.

16. 25 July 1977 The Shtura Agreement between Syria, Lebanon and the PLO - another attempt to implement the 1969 Cairo Agreement.

17. 16 March, 1978 Israel's ''Litani Operation'' in Southern Lebanon. Israel invades South Lebanon and sets up security zone under client militia but withdraws as U.N. Peace Keeping Forces deploy.

18. January, 1980 First phase of Syria's redeployment in Lebanon.

19. December 1980 First phase of Syrian - Phalangist fighting in Zahle.

20. April 1981 Second phase of Syrian - Phalangist fighting in Zahle.

21. July 1981 Israeli - Palestinian fighting; Cease-fire negotiated by U.S.

22. 6-11 June 1982 Israel's ''Operation Peace for Galilee.' Israeli invasion with the declared aim of ousting Palestinian guerrillas. Israel drives Syrian troops from Beirut and besieges the Capital for 10 weeks. Palestinian fighters evacuate Beirut in August and a multinational peace-keeping force deployed. Israel occupies West Beirut.

23.	August	1982	Bashir Gemayel elected President of Lebanon. The PLO evacuates Beirut.
24.	September	1982	Assassination of Bashir Gemayel. Massacre at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps Amin Gemayel elected President.
25.	April	1983	Car bomb kills 50 people at US Embassy. Syria rejects accord with Israel negotiated by Gemayel for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Suicide truck bombings kill 241 US servicemen and 58 French paratroops of M.N.F.
26.		1984	Muslim militiamen seize West Beirut from Army units loyal to Gemayel, The Lebanese Army finally fragments. Whole brigades splinter or join the militias. Most of the Muslim units simply go back to barracks. Multinational force withdraws. Gemayel cancels accord with Israel, but Christian - Muslim fighting continues.

27.	February	1985	Israel, under daily guerrilla attack, begins pullout after talks on negotiated withdrawal fail. Syria withdraws 10,000 men from Beka'a, keeping some 25,000 in north and east.
28.		1986	West Beirut slips into chaos under militia rule.
29.		1987	Syrians enter West Beirut to quell militia fighting. Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, Rashid Karami Killed by bomb.
30.	23 September	1988	Parliament fails to elect successor to President, Amin Gemayel. He appoints Christian Army Chief, Michel Aoun to head an interim Cabinet. Muslims refuse to recognise Aoun, vow loyalty to Government of acting Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss
31.	9 November	1988	30,000 strong Labanese Army splits along religious lines.
32.	March	1989	General Michel Aoun clamps sea blockade on Muslim militia-run ports

to extend his authority beyond Christian enclave. Syrian-backed Muslims retaliate by shelling Christian suburbs of Beirut. Aoun declares war of liberation to expel 30,000 Syrian troops.

33. May   1989 Arab summit in Morocco forms Committee of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria to resolve Lebanese crisis.

34. 16 September 1989 Arab League Committee renews its efforts after obtaining international support. Calls for cease-fire.

35. 23 September 1989 Cease-fire comes into force after six months of battles which killed 850 people.

36. 30 September 1989 Muslim and Christian members of Parliament open talks at Saudi resort of Taif to discuss an Arab blueprint for political reforms giving Muslims equal say in Christian-dominated system.

37. 12 October 1989 Working group of Lebanese Deputies

		accept blueprint. Later rejected by Auon for failing to guarantee withdrawal of Syrian troops.
38.	5 November 1989	Christian and Muslim members of Lebanon's Parliament meet at Qlaiaat in Syrian-held north Lebanon and elect Rene Muawad President and endorse the peace plan. Aoun, who declared Parliament dissolved the previous day, denounces election unconstitutional.
39.	22 November 1989	President Rene Muawad killed in a car bomb.
40.	24 November 1989	Elias Hrawi elected new President Forms Cabinet.

No war is begun, or at least, no war should be begun, if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: what is to be attained by and in war?.

<div align="right">

- Karl von Clausewitz

On War

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Genesis of the Enigma

General

The Lebanese Civil War which has now been raging for the last 15 years, broken by innumerable short duration cease-fires, has taken a toll of at least 125,000 lives and made millions homeless. Today it continues its gory course, despite efforts of the United Nations Security Council and the Arab League to bring it to an end. The Lebanon of the 1950s and 1960s, the most modern of the Arab states, with its capital Beirut, once a flourishing economic and commercial centre, also compared to Paris for its social and cultural life, is no more. The Lebanese pound during the period 1950s to mid-1980s fell from 2.5 to 500 pounds per US dollar.

Al-Jumhouriya al-Lubnaniya or Lebanon as known in English, is a country with just about 3.5 million people (may now be less due to emigrations) living in 4,036 square miles of area, almost half of them in its capital city of Beirut. After the end of the Second World War,

when France moved out its troops and the country became truly an independent and sovereign state, till the beginnings of the Civil War in 1975, it had become the financial and commercial centre of the Middle East.

The internal situation in Lebanon resulting from the sectarian conflicts between the various elements of the Christian and Muslim population brought in military intervention from the more powerful neighbouring states of Syria and Israel. By November 1976, large scale fighting had been brought to an end by the intervention of the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) which ensured sufficient security to permit Lebanon to establish quasi-normal conditions. Large areas of the country, however, remained outside government control, including West Beirut which was the scene of frequent conflicts between opposing militia groups. In the south of the country, where the Arab Deterrent Force could not be deployed, conditions remained unsettled and subject to frequent Israeli reprisal attacks against Palestinian guerrilla bases.

The situation in Lebanon took a turn for the worse in 1982 when Israeli forces mounted a large-scale invasion with the aim of driving the guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from areas in southern Lebanon

from where the Palestinian guerrillas frequently raided Israeli settlement in the northern parts of Israel. In the process, they succeeded in driving them all the way into West Beirut, from where the PLO guerrillas were dispersed throughout the Arab World.

In 1983, Israeli and Syrian troops remained in Lebanon alongwith some Palestinian groups in the north of the country. Small military contingents from Italy, France and the United States were deployed in and around Beirut with a view to maintain peace in the area. However, these units of the Multi-National Force (MNF) were repeatedly attacked by the extreme-wing of Palestinian guerrillas, and the most deadly of their attacks were the suicide bombings of the US Marine headquarters and the French paratrooper's barracks in Beirut in October 1983.

By the end of 1984, the Multi-National Peace-Keeping Force from Italy, France and the USA had left Lebanon. Thereafter, only the Israeli and Syrian forces remained in the country, although the Israeli Army officially left Lebanon in 1985, and the leaders of different factions tried to find a political solution to the civil strife which had been going on since the last 10 years.

The Syrian Army numbering close to some 30,000 troops has since then tried to maintain a balance between the private militias of Christian and Muslim sects. During the height of the civil war, Syrian troops saved Maronite Christians from defeat by the Muslims and their Palestinian supporters, and then fought the Maronites when they tried to take advantage of the situation created by the weakening of the Muslim-left front. While Syria stood firmly alongside the PLO guerrillas in the early phase of the Israeli invasion in 1982, it later helped Israel in driving the PLO out of Beirut. Syrian troops have also taken on the Hezbullah fighters, who are the Iranian-inspired ``Party of God''.

The recent phase of the country's troubles began in September 1988 when Amin Gemayel finished his term as President of Lebanon. As the Muslim and Christian members of the National Assembly could not meet in adequate numbers to ensure a quorum because of disturbed conditions, and therefore a successor could not be elected, so each side nominated its own. The Muslim faction considered Salim al-Hoss as the Prime Minister of Lebanon, while in Christian eyes the Lebanese Government is headed by General Michel Aoun, who was put in charge of ``interim administration'' by the departing President, Amin Gemayel.

General Michel Aoun, a Christian, who is the Chief of the Lebanese decrepit official Army, has been calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and also for the resignation of President Assad of Syria. In mid-March 1989, the Muslim factions in the Western half of Beirut unleashed an artillery barrage on the eastern Christian-half of the city which killed 90 people and injured 400.

According to some reliable reports, in the recent past, Iraq has been supporting the Christian factions in Beirut led by General Michel Aoun by supplying them with weapons from the beginning of 1989. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, President Saddam Hussein is free to continue his revengeful and antagonistic measures against Syria's President Assad, his old enemy, who backed Iran during the war. He may have realised that the Syrian military involvement in Lebanon was President Assad's most vulnerable spot. [1].

With the present internal political developments in Lebanon and the deep involvement of the two strong

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[1] ``Shadow Over Lebanon'' The Economist (London) April 1, 1989, pp 35-36.

neighbours, Syria and Iraq, on different sides of the conflict, and with Israel dominating the south of the country by supporting the South Lebanon Army (SLA) of late Major Sa'ad Haddad, the small nation appears to be on the road to disintegration perhaps in two parts: a Christian Lebanon in the south and west and a Muslim Lebanon in the north-east. Christian Lebanon would very likely receive support from Israel, the United States and Iraq, while Muslim Lebanon supported by Syria could be merged with it to form a ''Greater Syria'' in the future.

Thus a country which only 15 years ago was a thriving commercial and financial centre in the whole of West Asia, a paradise for the wealthy Arab tourists with a flourishing fruit exporting trade is today in the throes of its final dissolution. How has this situation come about? What are the basic causes for the sectarian conflict and what role the outside powers, like Syria, Israel, the USA, the USSR, Iraq and Iran have played in the Lebanese imbroglio? It would be of great interest to examine the role of the armed forces of Lebanon and other neighbouring countries like Syria and Israel, as well as the role of the Superpowers in creating conditions in which political stability has become so elusive. Perhaps

from such a study there could emerge some useful lessons for other small non-aligned countries of the Third World.

Geography

The modern state of Lebanon was created in 1920, first as a French mandate under the League of Nations and then as an independent country since 1946 when the French forces withdrew after the Second World War. The State of Lebanon was formed to give recognition to nationalist aspirations of a number of Christian groups who had lived for many centuries under Muslim rule along the coast of eastern Mediterranean in the hills and mountains close-by.[2] In drawing the boundaries so as to provide a degree of geographical unity to the new state, which now occupies an area of 10, 452 sq km (4,036 sq miles), large areas containing non-Christian elements of Druzes and Muslim population were included, with the result that the present population of Christians in Lebanon forms less than one-half of the total population. (See Map No. 1)

Physical Character

Lebanon has, firstly, a very narrow flat coastal

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[2] WB Fisher, ``Lebanon'' in Middle-East and North Africa 1989,(Europa Publications Ltd., London, 1988) p. 585

Map 1. Smaller and Greater Lebanon: The Autonomous Province 1861-1915 and Lebanon since1920

Source : Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon 1970-1985 (London: Cornell University Press, 1985) p. 20

strip. To the east of it the land rises to a number of high mountains and valleys. The highest mountains are in Quarnet as-Sauda, just over 3,000 m. high, south east of Tripoli. Mt Sannin which is located north-east of Beirut is over 2,700 m. Further east there is a sharp drop into a broad valley, known as Beka'a (Bika) about 16 km. wide and 110-130 km long. On the eastern side of the Beka'a are the Anti-Lebanon mountains rising to 2,800 m. There are two rivers which rise in the Beka'a valley; the Orontes, flowing north into Syria, and the River Litani (Leontes). This latter river flows south and turns west-ward into the Mediterranean a short distance before the Israeli frontier.[3] (See Map No. 2) The western side of the Lebanese mountains is well watered by large springs which makes cultivation possible upto heights of 1,200 to 1,500 m.

Because of the great contrast of relief, from the deep blue sea to the high snow-capped mountains, there is a wide variety of climatic conditions. It is moderately hot in the coastal regions, while in the mountains there

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[3] Map of Lebanon and adjacent countries, from Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia Vol 22 15th Edition (1987) p.906.

LEBANON

No. 2. Map of Lebanon and Adjacent Countries

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is heavy snowfall in winter, and the top of the mountains are covered with snow from December to May. From this phenomenon, the name of the region `Lebanon' (Lebanon-Aramaic for white) is said to originate. Rainfall is between October and April and falls heavily in the coastal regions. The rainfall is between 750 and 1000 mm annually in the coastal region but decreases towards the east. The coastal area is also very humid.

Area and Population

Lebanon is a mountainous country about 135 miles long and with a width varying between 20 and 35 miles, bounded in the north and east by Syria, in the west by the Mediterranean, and in the south by Israel. The area is estimated to be 10,452 sq km (4,036 sq miles) and the population was estimated in 1984 to be about 3.5 million.[4]

The People

Lebanese society comprises several religious and ethnic groups. It shows traces of Phoenician, Greek, Armenian

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[4] John Paxton, ``Lebanon'', The Statesman's Year-Book 1987-88 (London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987) p. 787

and predominantly Arab elements in its ethnic structures. The varied religious composition of its population is perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Lebanese social system. The country has been a place of refuge for the persecuted Muslim and Christian minority sects in the eastern Mediterranean since the seventh century. The population of Lebanon is now estimated to comprise a majority of Muslims and a large minority of Christians. Among the Muslims, the Shi'ite group is the most numerous while among the Christians, the Maronites form the largest sect followed by Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics. Among the Muslim population, the Shi'ite group is closely followed by the Sunnites; the Druzes form a small percentage of the population. The population contains a small number of Jews also.

Demography

The distinguishing feature of the Lebanese demographic structure is the very varied distribution of its population. The city of Beirut and its suburbs are the most densely populated regions of the country while the valley of Beka'a has sparse population. There was a significant movement of people from the countryside towards the cities before the Civil War, thus increasing the rate of urbanization. Most of this internal migration was to the

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capital city of Beirut, where almost half of the Lebanese population became concentrated. ``The Civil War and post-war fighting led to a substantial return of people to their village and to a large migration abroad, primarily to the United States, Europe, Latin America, Australia, and the oil states of the Middle East.''[5]

Economic Base

The presence of high mountains so close to the sea and availability of spring water in sufficient quantity in the narrow coastal strip and the mountain side have played a major role in the evolution of economic life of the country. A wide range of agricultural activities flourish at different levels of steeply sloping mountains and various types of crops can be grown with comparative ease. There are pineapples growing in abundance on the hot, damp coastal belt; olives, vines and figs on the lowest foothills, cereals, apricots and peaches in the middle levels of the slopes and apples and potatoes in the higher levels. One of the more important commercial activity is the export of Lebanese fruits to the other countries of West Asia.

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[5] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia. Vol 22, 5th Edition. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1987) p. 907.

The major crops cultivated in the Beka'a Valley are sugar beet, cereals, and vegetables. A major source of income is poultry throughout the country while goats, sheep and cattle are also raised. The effect of the Civil War and the continued internal strife during the last 15 years has been to sharply reduce the production of agricultural crops. However, since the Civil War and the consequent loss in the capability of the Central Government to impose any authority except in parts of Beirut, there has been a sharp rise in the cultivation of hemp, the source of hashish, which is exported illegally through ports along the coast by different local militias and the huge profits used for purchase of weapons.[6]

Industrial Capacity

The Civil War of 1975-76 did not cause much damage to the industrial infra-structure, particularly outside Beirut. However, during the Israeli invasion in 1982, the Israeli Air Force bombed a number of towns all over southern Lebanon and badly damaged factories and other industrial complexes there. This situation was further

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[6] Ibid, p. 908.

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worsened by subsequent damage caused by the local warring
militias.

Beirut was famous for its tourist trade and its
free and easy banking laws. In fact, tourism was popular
throughout the year because of its hotels, bars, nightclubs,
and restaurants, its sea-side and mountain resorts, and
its international cultural festivals. The Lebanese Civil
War and the subsequent Israeli invasion of 1982 caused
serious damage to this lucrative sector in Beirut as
well as to the international airport and the sea-port.

Language and Racial Features

Arabic is the main language spoken throughout the
country. However, a large number of people, particularly
in the cities, speak and understand English, French and
Spanish because of a considerable amount of temporary
emigration to these countries. The leading European
language, however, is French because of the country's
association with France for more than 20 years during
the French mandatory period.

There is a highly mixed population in Lebanon
particularly in the coastal regions of the Mediterranean
with different cultural and racial elements. These have
been described as 'Leventine'. Lebanon represents almost

all the racial groups of the Middle East.

Historical Perspective

The land of Lebanon has been, since ancient times, under foreign rulers. In the early period of history, the Egyptians and Assyrians were followed by the Persians and Seleucids. Despite Arab conquest of the adjoining lands during A.D. 600-700, the country retained its Christian character till the ninth century. During ninth and tenth centuries Islam and Arabic language gradually penetrated Lebanon. Druze faith emerged during the eleventh century.

The Ottomans invaded Lebanon, then part of Syria, in 1516-17 and held nominal control until 1918, for more than 400 years. After about 20 years of French mandatory regime, between 1918 and 1941, Lebanon was proclaimed independent at Beirut on November 26, 1941. On December 27, 1943, two years after independence, the French National Committee of Liberation transferred most of the administrative powers to the Lebanese government. The evacuation of all foreign troops was completed in December 1946.[7]

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[7] John Paxton (Ed.) ''Lebanon'' The Statesman's Year Book-Historical Companion (London; 1988) p. 161.

Impact of Geographical and Historical Factors

The Civil War of 1975-76 and the subsequent Israeli invasion of Lebanon have their roots going far back in the history and geography of Lebanon. Helena Cobban, a reader in philosophy, politics and economics at St Hugh's College, Oxford, and having lived in Lebanon from 1974 to 1981 as Beirut Correspondent of The Sunday Times and The Christian Science Monitor, describes the impact of history and geography on the recent events in Lebanon as follows:

``If history is crucial to understanding present-day Lebanon, then some grasp of the country's basic geographical dilemma is also important. Mount Lebanon has always had a tentalizing and difficult relationship with the world around it. True, its fastnesses have always offered haven to the heterodox: but this haven has also been continually plagued by the fact that it is located right at the East Mediterranean intersection of some of the world's most strategic and jealously fought-over trade-routes.The sensitive location of Mount Lebanon has ensured that none of the successive empires which contended for power around the Mountain was ever able to ignore what was going on inside it. The Muslim rulers who dominated the region from the seventh century onwards quickly found a way of

dealing with the Mountain which caused the least damage to their own interests. Jealously guarding the coastal cities and the major inland trade-routes, they left the Mountain interior largely to its own devices, keeping the mountaineers on their toes by periodically inciting one clan or faction to go and fight another.''[8]

The main feature of the ''Republic of Lebanon'' as constituted in 1920, in its topography is the alternating system of lowlands and highlands. There are four such strips; the strip of lowlands between the Mediterranean and Mt Lebanon, then the Lebanon Mountains followed by the Valley of Beka'a & and finally Anti-Lebanon Mountains which form the country's border with Syria.

In modern times, this area remained under Ottoman rule from A.D. 1517 to A.D. 1922, a period of more than four centuries, perhaps the longest empire in history. In the early twentieth century, a number of divisive currents of political thought appear to have swept through the Lebanese society. Philip Hitti, the noted historian, describes them as follows:

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[8] Helena Cobban, <u>The Making of Modern Lebanon,</u> (London-1985) p. 11.

``The modern-educated Moslems favoured Pan-Arabism; the theologians leaned towards Pan-Islam; the masses were conscious of no sharp distinction between the two ``Pan-s''. As for the Christians, they stressed Labanese nationalism, although a number of intellectuals were spokesmen for Arabism. Druzes also leaned toward Lebanese nationalism.''[9]

The population of Mt Lebanon, before the formation of ``Greater Lebanon'', comprised a majority of Maronite Christians with a sprinkling of the Christian and Muslim sects. After 1920, when the State of Greater Lebanon was formed by adding portions of Syrians territory and the coastal towns of Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli, there was a significant increase in the Muslim population but the Christians still remained in a slight majority. However, in the next sixty years, due to Christian migration on the one hand, and the higher birth-rate of Muslim population on the other, the demographic balance changed in favour of the Muslims, who now became the majority community.

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[9] Philip Hitti, <u>Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to Present</u>, (London, 1957) p. 480.

Constitution and Government

Lebanon was declared a sovereign, independent state at the end of the Second World War. However, its first constitution was framed in 1926 when the country was under French mandate. This constitution has been amended several times in subsequent years. These amendments were made in 1927, 1929, 1943 (twice) and in 1947.

The Constitution provides for three separate independent pillars of a democratic government the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. In this it follows the classical French concept of separation of powers. The executive is headed by a President; a single chamber elected by universal adult suffrage is responsible for legislative functions followed by an independent judiciary.

The Constitution also ensures a working balance between the various communal and sectarian groups to create conditions for stability in the political life of the country. The allocation of deputies to the single-chamber Parliament is worked out on confessional distribution of population. Constitutional conventions also ensure that the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the single-

chamber Parliament a Shia Muslim.

The Chamber of Deputies or National Assembly has 99 seats, 53 of which are allocated to Christians and 45 to Muslims. The breakdown of the Parliamentary seats between the various sectarian groups is as follows:-[10]

Maronite Catholics	30
Sunni Muslims	20
Shia Muslims	19
Greek Orthodox	11
Greek Melkita Catholics	6
Druzes	6
Armenian Orthodox	4
Armenian Catholics	1
Protestants	1
Others	1
Total	99

Executive Power

The tenure of the President of the Republic is six years. He chooses the Prime Minister and the Ministers

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[10] Fisher, n, 2, p. 615

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of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister and the other Ministers may not be members of the National Assembly, although they are responsible to it and have access to its debates.

The distribution of power for administrative appointments to public office is also based on sectarian system of a ratio of six Christians to five Muslims.

Lebanese Armed Forces

The armed forces of Lebanon are entirely conventional and comprise an Army of about ten nominal brigades of some 21,000 men, a Navy with four coastal patrol craft and two landing craft manned by 500 sailors, and an Air Force equipped with Hunter fighters and light helicopters. However, this force is no longer viable as it disintegrated as splinter groups and joined the various sectarian factions during the Civil War of 1975-76.

A serious attempt was made by the United States and later by Syria to reorganise the Lebanese armed forces as an instrument of State but these efforts proved abortive because of increasing divergences in the different sectarian groups and their growing influence on the Lebanese armed forces. The responsibility for maintaining law and order has, therefore, fallen on the shoulder of local militias

and foreign troops belonging to Syria, Israel, the PLO and the United Nations Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Recent Political Developments

In early 1958, opposition to President Chamoun, consisting mainly, though not entirely, of Muslim pro-Nasserite elements, rose in insurrection, and for five months the Muslim areas of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and the northern Beka'a valley were in the hands of rebels. On July 15, the United States government, at the request of President Chamoun, landed a large contingent of army and Marines who helped the Lebanese Government to regain the control of entire Lebanon and re-establish its authority.

The increase in Palestinian refugee population into Lebanon after the creation of the State of Israel in the former region of Palestine, sharply brought into focus the internal sectarian problems which had long been dormant in the Lebanese society. The secret Cairo Agreement, (See Appendix A) between Lebanon and the PLO was an attempt to regulate the activities of the Palestinian armed guerrillas, but it could not be effectively implemented because the Lebanese government due to its structural weakness was unable to enforce it. The situation further

worsened when battle-hardened PLO fighters moved into Lebanon from Jordan in September 1970. There was another large influx of Palestinian guerrillas after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when Israel occupied more Arab territory. By March 1975, the presence of PLO fighters in Lebanon in large numbers (about 10,000) had destabilised the already weak political system and civil war erupted which engulfed the entire country causing considerable loss of life and destruction of property with economic activity coming to a standstill.

However, by November 1976, large scale fighting had been brought to an end by the intervention of the Syrian dominated Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) which ensured enough security to enable Lebanon to establish quasi-normal conditions under President Sarkis. Large areas of the country, however, remained outside government control, which included West Beirut, the scene of frequent fighting between opposing militia groups. In the south, where it was not possible to deploy the Arab Deterrent Force, conditions remained unstable and the areas there were subjected to frequent Israeli reprisal attacks mounted against the presence and activities of Palestinian armed guerrilla fighters.

The Unstable conditions in south Lebanon finally resulted in an Israeli invasion in March 1978 after the Palestinian fighters had carried out an armed attack inside Israel. While Israeli troops were withdrawn in June, the area occupied by Israel during the invasion was not handed over to the UN Peace Keeping Forces, but to the South Lebanese Army-an Israeli controlled Christian Lebanese force.

Israel mounted a major invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 with the main objective of clearing the southern parts of Lebanon of Palestinian guerrilla presence. However, Israeli armed forces, comprising armoured fighting units, naval ships and combat aircraft, in a combined and swift operation swept through southern Lebanon and finally laid siege to the capital city Beirut, which was heavily bombed from the ground and air. Israel achieved its aim in the short term as the major element of Palestinian forces and the leadership of the PLO was evacuated from Beirut to be dispersed in the rest of the Arab world. However, Israeli victory was short-lived.

Bashir Gemayel, the Phalangist leader, was elected as the President of Lebanon on August 23, 1982 with Israeli support. However, before he could assume office,

he was assassinated in a major bombing during a party meeting in which many other top leaders of his party were killed on September 14. Soon after, on September 21 his brother Amin Gemayel was elected as President.

During the Presidency of Amin Gemayel a condition of 'no-peace, no-war' prevailed in Lebanon. There were frequent clashes between rival militias which held de-facto control of different areas. On February 16, 1985, Israeli forces finally withdrew from Lebanon, except from the narrow security belt along the southern Lebanese border with Israel which remained under the control of Israeli-supported South Lebanese Army. On December 28, 1985, the leaders of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia (Phalange), the Druze and the Amal signed a peace agreement to end the Civil War. However, the terms of this agreement could not be implemented because of the weakness of the law-enforcing agencies of the Lebanese State. Peace-Keeping function in Lebanon continued to be the major responsibility of the Syrian forces stationed in central and northern Lebanon with the agreement of the members of the Arab League.

Current Stalemate

The term of office of President Amin Gemayal ended on September 22, 1988. Because of disturbed conditions

in Beirut, the members of the National Assembly could
not meet to elect a new President. Therefore, President
Gemayel had no other option but to hand over the
Presidency to General Michel Aoun, the Armed Forces Chief
of Staff, who was appointed the head of an ``Interim
Military Government'' till the time the National Assembly
could meet to elect a new president. However, the then
existing government of Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss did
not agree to hand over power to General Aoun. Therefore,
there were two parallel governments functioning in Lebanon
and this had far-reaching implications for the political
stability and unity of the Lebanese Republic.

With the formation of the two rival governments in
Beirut, one under Salim al-Hoss, the Muslim Prime Minister
and the other under general Michel Aoun, a Christian
and the head of the country's armed forces, the political
division of the country emerged in sharper focus. The
involvement of Syria and Iraq on the opposing sides
worsened the already fragmented political structure of
the country.

The Militias and the Armies

The main actors on the Lebanese stage are the various
sectarian militias and the armies which have been fighting
each other in different groupings, changing sides frequently

but always gaining strength by increase in numbers or by acquiring more lethal weapons. Brief details about these fighting elements are as follows:-

The Militias

I. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) The leader of this militia is Walid Jumblatt. It is a Druze militia supported by Syria and located in the mountains over looking Beirut. It has 5,000 well-disciplined troops and about 7,000 in reserve. It is equipped with about 100 tanks of Soviet origin. The PSP has close relations with the PLO and derives its financial support from Libya

2. Amal (the word means 'hope' in Arabic). This militia has close ties with Syria and is its main ally in Lebanon. It is secular and nationalist comprising mainly Shi'ite Muslims with a strength of 6,000 front-line fighters, Equipped with about 50 T-54 Main Battle Tanks supplied by Syria as well as heavy artillery. It suffers from poor discipline due to a bloody feud with pro-Iranian Shi'ites.[11].

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[11] James Bruce, ``Lebanon-Nearing the Final Battle'' in Jane's Defence Weekly (London) 2 September, 1989, p. 377.

The strength of reserves is about 7,000.

3.   The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) It has a strength of about 1,500 - 2,000 fighters, lightly armed and well-trained and disciplined. It is closely allied to Syria.

4.   The Lebanese Communist Party. It is one of the oldest factions in Lebanon and often supported by Syria. It has about 2,000 fighters. They are mainly Greek Orthodox, armed by Syria and oriented towards Moscow. They have a history of an old feud with the dominant Maronite Christians.

5.   Hezbollah (Party of God) This is the main rival to Amal and is backed by Iran. It has a fanatical hard core of about 3,500 fighters. It is reported to have carried out suicide bombings against American, French and Israeli forces and is believed to be the umbrella organistative for terrorists who hold Western hostages.

6.   Lebanese Forces This is the main right-wing Christian militia which is linked with the Christian units of the Lebanese Army and is opposing the Syrian

presence in the country. It has 6,000 hardcore fighters and thousands of reservists. The Lebanese Forces militia (LF) is well armed. It received from Iraq about 120 T-54 tanks plus APCs and 155 mm artillery in late 1988.

7.   The Marada (Giants) This militia is headed by former President Suleiman Franjieh, who controls northern Lebanon and is a Syrian ally. It has a strength of about 5,000 fighters, supported by Syrian artillery. However, this militia has not been in any recent operation.

8.   The South Lebanon Army (SLA) This is mainly a Christian militia armed by Israel. It is deployed around the mountain town of Marjayoun in south Lebanon. Its estimated strength is about 2,500 fighters who man Israel's self-proclaimed security zone under former Lebanese Army General Antoine Lahd.

9.   Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) There are around 10,000 PLO fighters in Lebanon. Of these about 5,000 are under the leadership of the PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat in south Lebanon who are not involved in the Civil War in the country. The

remaining fighters are part of radical Syrian-backed political groups which are opposed to Yassir Arafat. These are deployed in the Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley in east Lebanon and fighting actively against General Aoun's Christian elements of the Lebanese Army.

Regular Armed Forces

I. The Lebanese National Armed Forces with a total strength of 21,000, have split into two factions. The Christian faction estimated to be about 12,000 is loyal to General Michel Aoun. It is organised in six nominal brigades which are trained by the United States and equipped with US-supplied tanks and artillery. Some heavy weapons have been supplied by Iraq. The Muslim element of the Lebanese Army totals about 9,000 troops. These are poorly armed and they have not taken any active part in the fighting between General Aoun and Syria.

2. **Syrian Armed Forces** There are more than two divisions worth of Syrian troops, estimated at about 30,000 men equipped with 1,000 T-62 Soviet-built tanks and heavy artillery. These have been deployed in Lebanon under a 1976 Arab League peacekeeping mandate

given during the civil war of 1975-76 to bring the
internal strife to an end. (See Appendices B and
C) These troops are used by Syria to control northern
and eastern parts of Lebanon and in the south as
far as Awali River. In the recent past, they have
been used for fighting General Michel Aoun's forces.

3.   Israeli Armed Forces There are some 1,000
Israeli troops, supported by armour and artillery,
in the border region in south Lebanon to act as
a buffer. When Israel withdrew its armed forces in
1985, almost three years after its Invasion of Lebanon
in 1982, they were left behind to prevent PLO
guerrilla raids across the border into Israel.

4.   Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) These
number about 2,000 and are deployed in the Beka'a
Valley along with Syrian troops. They were sent
to Lebanon in 1982 to fight against the Israeli
invasion but now they support the Hezbollah
fighters.

In addition to these militias and armies, there are
5,750 troops in South Lebanon under the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) initially deployed in
1978 under the UN mandate.

The details of major political and military factions in Lebanon are given in Appendix D, E and f and the deployment areas of the various militias and armies is shown on Map No. 3.

1989 Taif Accord

In September 1989, Muslim and Christian member of the Lebanese Parliament met at Taif in Saudi Arabia to discuss an Arab blueprint for political reforms in which Muslims were to have an equal say in the Christian-dominated Lebanese political system. A working group of Lebanese Deputies accepted in October 1989 blueprint of political reforms. It was immediately rejected by General Michel Aoun for failing to guarantee withdrawal of a Syria from Lebanon on which he had been insisting since March 1989; he had even declared a war of liberation to oust the Syrian forces from Lebanon. Subsequently, Christian and Muslim members of Parliament met at Qaliaat in Syrian-held North Lebanon and elected Rene Muawad President and endorsed the peace plan which had been negotiated at Taif. General Aoun, who had dissolved Parliament the previous day, denounced the election of Rene Muawad as unconstitutional. Soon after, on November 22, 1989, President Rene Muawad was killed in a bomb explosion in Beirut.

Map 3 Deployment Areas of various

Militias and Armies

Source : Itamar Rabinovich. The War for Lebanon 1970-85

(London : Cornell University Press, 1985) P. 46

The Lebanese Parliament, meeting again in Syrian-controlled territory, then elected as Lebanon's President Mr Elias Hrawi under terms of the Taif Accord but Hrawi was denounced by General Aoun as a Syrian puppet.

The latest fighting in Lebanon, significantly, has been between the Lebanese Army loyal to General Aoun and the men of the Christian militia, the Lebanese Forces (LF) led by Samir Geagea. This Inter-Christian faction fighting is due to the different approaches to the Taif Accord by the leaders of the two warring Christian factions. Samir Geagea had upset General Aoun by accepting the peace plan drawn up by the Arab League in Taif, last October, which revised Lebanon's power sharing formula in favour of the Muslims and formalised Syria's military presence in Lebanon. The last item of the accord is what General Aoun cannot accept. [12]

The Aim of the Dissertation

The civil war in Lebanon has been going on for nearly 15 years. There does not appear to be any end

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[12] ``Lebanon: Onward, Christian Soldiers'' The Economist (London) 24 Feb-2 March 1990. p. 39.

in sight in the foreseeable future. The local factions, based primarily on religious-sectarian loyalties, have armed themselves to the teeth and the various militias have become all powerful when compared to the armed forces of the Lebanese State which have split on sectarian lines and have disintegrated following the 1975-76 Civil War and the subsequent major Israeli invasion of 1982.

The next chapter will analyse the military dimensions of the Civil War-the evolution and growth of local militias, the regional and the global forces influencing this growth and their alignments. The Third chapter will examine specifically. Syrian and Israeli roles in the Lebanese Civil War and, in particular, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The questions which need to be answered are the following:-

(a) What were the causes of the split and the breakup of the Lebanese Army which resulted in the weakening of the Lebanese State and its consequent inability to control and prevent the growth of local militias?

(b) What part have the external military influences played in stabilising or worsening the political and military situation in Lebanon? The role of Syrian

and Israeli military forces in particular, and the role of outside regional powers like the USA, USSR, France, need to be examined in this context.

The last chapter will try to define the main factors governing the Civil War in Lebanon. An attempt will be made to identify wars due to ethnic and religious causes in other Third World countries like Afghanistan and Sri Lanka and where such developments could affect the security perceptions of India.

CHAPTER TWO

CIVIL WAR OF 1975 - 76

(Not Peace, But a Sword)

``Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the world. No, I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. I came to set sons against fathers, daughters against their mothers, daughters-in-law against their mother-in law; a man's worst enemies will be the members of his own family''.

- Matthew, X, 34.

Political and Administrative System

In the previous chapter a brief description of the geographical and historical factors and their impact on the emerging political and administrative elements of Lebanese society was given to provide the background to the more recent events in Lebanon. The political system in Lebanon was structured in such a way as to provide adequate weightage to the Christian majority in Parliament as well as in the administrative machinery of the government. But with the shift of demographic balance in

favour of the Muslims, who became the majority community during the middle of this century, the political weightage still remained in favour of the Christian community. The Muslim population increased further after creation of the State of Israel and the resultant influx of thousands of Palestinian refugees, mainly Muslims, into Lebanon. There was another increase in the number of Palestinian refugees after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The Palestinians formed a strong political group under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), were better armed in their different groups and brought about a major change in the political aspirations of the Muslim population of the country. This population now became more demanding of its fair share in the political and administrative set-up. However, despite several peaceful agitations and negotiations, the Christians who held the reins of power did not agree to any changes and wanted to maintain the status-quo. This was the basic and fundamental cause for political instability in Lebanon and led to the 1975-76 Civil War.

The Lebanese society is divided into three major religious grouping or sects. These are the Maronites, the Shi'ites and the Druze. They are predominent in certain areas as shown in Map No. 4. Other religious groupings

The legend on the map reads:

Legend

Maronites and Greek Catholics

Greek Orthodox

Armenians

Sunnis

Shi'is

Druze

Map No. 4 Lebanon: Approximate Concentration Areas of Major Communities

Source : Itamar Rabinovich, <u>The War for Lebanon 1970-1985</u> (London: Cornell University Press, 1985) P. 23

like the Sunni Muslims may be considered a minority and not a sect as they are spread over almost entire territory of Lebanon and not concentrated in any one region.

The estimated increase on a percentage basis of the sectarian population of Lebanon as given by Helena Cobban is as follows:

	1932 Govt census	1968 Estimate by German Contractor	1975 Estimate by Youssef Courbage	1983 Rough Estimate by Lebanese Demographers
Christians				
Maronites	28.8	n.a.	23	n.a.
Greek Orthodox	9.8	n.a.	7	n.a.
Greek Catholic	5.9	n.a.	5	n.a.
Other Christians	6.8	n.a.	5	n.a.
Total Christians	51.3	46.22	40	33
Muslims				
Sunnis	22.4	n.a.	26	n.a.
Shi'ites	19.6	n.a.	27	33
Druze	6.8	n.a.	7	n.a.
Total Muslims	48.8	52.87	60	66
Total Population in Millions	0.786	2001	2550	n.a.

Note : The total population of Lebanon shown for 1932 and 1968 includes a small proportion (less than one percent) of Jews.[1]

Lebanon, despite its religious and ethnic diversity, and changes in its demographic composition, remained the most modern and democratically governed country in the Middle East. The evolution of Pan-Arabism during the middle of this century and Pan-Islamism subsequently, swept through the Muslim-Arab population of the country, particularly after the advent of Nasserism in the late 1950s. There was a growing dissatisfaction among the left-wing Muslim factions with the unfair distribution of political power after the demographic changes which gave the Muslims a significant majority in the country.

The presence of Palestinian guerrillas, armed with latest weapons supplied by Syria and Egypt as well as many other Arab countries to continue the fight with Israel, brought about a major change in the peaceful political climate of Lebanon. The PLO support to left-wing Muslim factions polarised the population in two major

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[1] Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon , (London, 1985), P. 16.

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divisions. The Christian population supported by Israel and the West, was bent on maintaining the status-quo, while the left-wing Muslim population, supported by Syria and other Arab states and internally supported by the armed guerrillas of the PLO, wanted to bring about a change in the constitution to reduce the powers of the Christian President, while increasing the powers of the Sunni Prime Minister. It also wanted to provide greater representation to the Muslims in the National Majlis proportionate to their numerical strength in the country.

In this build-up of sectarian forces opposing each other in the volatile Lebanese landscape, the role of the two superpowers was not directly visible. However, the fact that the USA was the sole supplier of weapons to Israel, which in turn, was assisting the Maronite Christian faction, and the USSR, the sole supplier of weapons to Syria which supported the PLO and other left-wing Muslim groupings in Lebanon, was not in doubt. Thus, the emerging political and security climate in Lebanon had its internal, regional and global dimensions, thereby presenting a complicated and complex picture of the Lebanese polity which already had a built-in instability due to the sectarian basis for its nascent political system.

Lebanese Armed Forces Since Independence

A small force of about three thousand troops took over the Lebanese Army when the French left Lebanon in 1945. It was commanded by Fu'ad Shihab, a Maronite Christian, till 1958. In the confessional political system, the post of the Army commander had to be held by a Maronite and the majority of the officers of the Army were also Christian. The Arab nationalists accused France of organising the Army to suit their colonial rule since the Christian-officered Army was more supportive of the French rule in Lebanon. Some of the other reasons for the pre-dominance of Christian officers in the Lebanese Army were the following :

1. The Lebanese Army was the ultimate guarantor of the Lebanese political system. This gave Christians in general and Maronites in particular a strong incentive to join.

2. Sunni resistance to the French mandate was manifested in opposition to French institutions, including the Army.

3. The Sunnis disliked military service and avoided it as far as possible

4. The Shi'as, on the other hand, joined the ranks of the Army in greater numbers to enhance their social status.

The above sectarian composition of the Lebanese Army did not create a feeling of nationalism inside the Army. The officers, being mainly Christians, looked to France and the West for Lebanese security and the majority of troops, being Shi'ite Muslims, had an Arab and Islamic orientation. The seeds of disintegration of the Army were sown right in the beginning of its history. According to McLaurin,

``all of these factors contributed to a serious imbalance in the Lebanese Army. The officer corps was disproportionately Christian, and while rank and file included all major groups, Sunnis were not equitably represented. Nor did the recruitment patterns shift markedly after the Army became Lebanese. Such a change would have required widespread Sunni acceptance of an independent Lebanon. Instead, a grudging acceptance of the state, and a conditional acceptance at that, emerged over time.''[2]

General Fu'ad Shihab, the Lebanese Army Commander, for the first 13 formative years played an important

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2 R.D. McLaurin, ``Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present and Future'' in Edward E. Azar and others, The Emergence of a New Lebanon (New York, 1984), p. 83.

role in shaping the future employment of the Army. He kept it out of the Arab Israeli conflicts which were endemic in the region during the 1950s and 1960s. This helped to safeguards the territorial integrity of Lebanon and prevented wasteful expenditure on defence.

The influx of Palestinian refugees, after the Arab defeat in the 1967 conflict with Israel, was an event of singular importance for the security and political climate inside Lebanon. Due to the defeat of Arab forces in the war, the PLO took the responsibility to continue its struggle from Lebanese territory and assumed a significant role in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Meanwhile, the role of the Lebanese Army became synonymous with support to the Constitution and the President and thus its became identified with the Maronite Christian population and the status-quo. In the words of McLaurin,

> ''as the Sunni community of Lebanon and its leaders in the Arab world as a whole were becoming more closely allied with Palestinians, the omnipresence of the Lebanese Army was eroding its public support. Its procurement policies, specifically, the acquisition of equipment suitable principally for internal security operations, showed clearly that the Army had no

intention of conducting military operations against any foreign power. It seemed to many observers that the Lebanese Army, despite the government's rhetoric to the contrary, was perpetuating a Christian state that was both anti-Arab and anti-Muslim."[3]

The Israeli commando raid on Beirut airport in which 13 civil airliners were destroyed on 13 . December, 1968 proved an important landmark for the future of the Lebanese Army. It was accused not only of not taking action against Israeli commandos but in fact of not wanting to do so because of its close links with the Israeli armed forces.

With the increase in Palestinian activity, the Lebanese Army became more and more involved in fighting the Palestinians to maintain its supremacy within Lebanon. However, with the signing of the Cairo Accord in November, 1969, (Appendix A) which allowed the Palestinians to establish and maintain armed units in their camps as well as in their bases in southern Lebanon, the hold

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[3] Ibid, p. 87-88.

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of the Lebanese Army over Palestinian activities was reduced to a significant extent.

After the signing of the Cairo Accord, the Palestinian guerrilla activities in southern Lebanon increased substantially thus inviting Israeli reprisal raids into Lebanon against Palestinian bases. This resulted in Syria and some other Arab countries providing weapons to the PLO to meet the growing Israeli threat. Internally, the growing military strength of the PLO which normally supported left-wing Muslim factions against the Christian militias, caused serious concern to the later, who in turn imported large consignment of weapons from their supporters in the West and Israel. While the various Lebanese militias were, so far, lightly armed, now with Palestinian armed military presence and their active guerrilla operations against Israel, the militias armed themselves to the teeth for any future sectarian conflict between the two major communities.

The expulsion of Palestinians from Jordan during the period 1970-73 caused a massive influx of refugees as well as an increase in Palestinian guerrilla activities against Israel from their bases in southern Lebanon. These Palestinian raids into Israel, understandably, led to swift

reprisals by Israel against the Palestinian bases. The villages in southern Lebanon, mainly inhabited by the Shi'as suffered great damage and the Shi'a inhabitants migrated to the suburbs of Beirut for greater safety. This influx created a number of refugee camps close to the Lebanese capital. By end of 1973 the Palestinian presence had increased so much that the Lebanese Army could not contain their activities.

Lebanese Forces Militia

With the weakening of the Lebanese Army and its inability to maintain internal sovereignty against well-armed guerrillas of the PLO, there was a reaction from the right and nationalist factions in the form of raising of a strong and armed militia with a political orientation towards the Christian population. The Lebanese Forces were created to meet the needs of internal security. These Forces were not active politically, they began as a joint political and paramilitary group under the leadership of the late Bashir Gemayel.

The Lebanese Forces militia is primarily a citizen's army and not a professional one like the armed forces of the state. Members of this militia are regular students, businessmen, workers in factories and others who are

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employed in their various professions They also do not have the conventional military ranks of organisation, but they are better organised than the other militias in Lebanon and, therefore, in a position to exercise greater influence.

This militia is tasked to remove all foreign fores from Lebanese soil. In this task it has to face not only the irregular forces of the Palestinian guerrilla organisation but also the regular forces of Syria and perhaps Israel. While the LF militia could easily match the irregular forces, their capability against the regular Syrian forces depends upon their greater knowledge of the mountainous terrain in which they have to fight and often take shelter when faced with a superior enemy.

The organisation of the Lebanese Forces' militia is generally on conventional lines. The various formations are similar to regular brigades, battalions, companies and platoons. In addition to the infantry troops, these formations include armour and artillery, engineers, a naval element as well as units equipped to fight in the mountains. The armour element comprises Israeli supplied Super Shermans, and AMX-13 tanks, and Panhard armoured cars.

The Lebanese Forces militia is primarily manned by volunteers, but recently a limited number of militia personnel have been conscripted. They do not exceed two to two thousand five hundred in a total of about twelve thousand troops including reservists. Maronite Christians form the majority in the militia, while Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox are in limited numbers. Muslim troops account for five per cent of the strength. It is reported that the quality of troops is of a high order and, therefore, they are expected to do well against the other militias of warring factions in Lebanon. Close ties exist between the Lebanese Forces' militia and Israel as most of its financing, training and equipping has been accomplished with the help of Israel.

Evolution of the Amal Militia

Amal is an acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyah (the Lebanese Resistance Detachments), a Shi'ite resurgent movement, under the leadership of Iman Musa al-Sadar, to project the political, social and security needs of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. It was trained by the Palestinian resistance movement, al-Fatah, but did not play any major role in the Civil War of 1975-76. Initially it·was grouped under the reform-oriented Lebanese National Movement, but after the Syrian intervention on behalf of

the Maronite-dominated Lebanese Front to prevent their defeat in the Civil War, the Amal has fully supported the Syrian policy in Lebanon.

In August 1978, Musa al-Sadr, the leader of Amal, disappeared during a visit to Libya. While the Libyan Government denied any hand in his disappearance and said that he had been put on an Italian airlinear which was bound for Rome, his followers claim that he never left Libya. Some of his followers believe that he is still alive but most impartial observers think that he died during or after his trip to Libya.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran gave a push to Shi'ite resurgence in Lebanon and provided it with an external support against the major communities of Maronite Christians and Muslim Sunnis who were internally more powerful and politically and economically much stronger than the Shi'ite community which had become the majority community in the demographic changes which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.

Now under the leadership of Nabih Berri, the Amal militia totals some 13,000 men of which 6,000 are active soldiers and about 7,000 are reservists. The militia has its own armour and artillery in the form of M-48 and

T-54/55 tanks and 155mm, 130 mm and 122 mm fielded guns
and 107 mm and 122 mm multi-rocket launchers. The breakaway
faction of Amal Known as Al Amal al-Islamic (Islamic
Amal). has close links with the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard and numbers about 600.

The Amal militia draws its main support from southern
Lebanon which is a strong hold of Shi'ite community.
Its main aim was to secure the Shi'ite inhabitants against
the rampant insecurity which had prevailed for the last
10 years. In addition, Amal stands for a unified Lebanon
and a gradual eradication of the system of confessionalism
in political structure. It feels that while confessionalism,
adjusted to recent demographic changes, may give the
Shi'ites greater political power in the Government in
the short-term, it would break up the Lebanese political
identity in the long-run and thus work against the unity
and integrity of the State.

The Amal militia is deployed in West Beirut and
its southern suburbs as well as in southern parts and
the coastal road. It exercises control in these areas
in collaboration with some other Shi'ite factions. It is
reported that there are some Amal positions in the Beka'a
Valley.

PSP Militia

This is the Druze militia founded by the late Kamal Jumblatt under the banner of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Its present leader is Walid Jumblatt. It controls a sizeable portion of the Druze heartland in and around the Shouf mountains. It also has some small contingents in West Beirut alongside the Amal militia. During most of its existence, the PSP militia has been armed by Syria with Soviet-origin weapons. But its leadership claims that in the recent past it has been importing weapons direct from the Soviet Union. There are about 5,000 regular fighters which could be augmented by another 7,000 reservists. In addition, it has close liaison with the 12th (Druze) Brigade of the Lebanese Army. Its major equipment includes 40 T-54 Soviet built tanks, BMP-I armored cars, BTR and BRDM Armoured Personnel Carriers and 122 mm artillery.

South Lebanon Army (SLA)

The SLA established by late Major Sa'ad Haddad was originally called the Free Lebanon Army. It was then entirely armed, supplied and paid for by Israel. Its main function was to provide a safe buffer between Israeli settlements in the north and the Palestinian guerrilla fighters operating from camps in southern Lebanon. The

SLA had mainly Christian troops and officers. From an estimated strength of nearly 20,000 troops during Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982-85, the strength of the SLA declined to about 2,500 men under the present commander, Major General Antoine Lahd, who is a retired officer from the Lebanese Army.[4]

The SLA has Israeli-supplied weapons, which were handed over to it in large numbers when the Israeli Army withdrew from southern Lebanon during 1985. These include 40 M-48 and M-50 Super Sherman tanks as well as 30 T-54 of Soviet origin and some AMX-13s from the Lebanese Army. It is also believed that Israel delivered 50 T-62 tanks from captured stocks in August 1985.

The SLA is mainly deployed in the Israeli ``security Zone'' in southern Lebanon where it can be easily supported by Israeli armed forces, if necessary. Its main opposition comes from the Amal and PSP militias. .

Some of the militias described above came much later in the fray and were not in existence in their present form during the Civil War of 1975-76. One of

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[4] ``Lebanon'' in <u>Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1989</u> (Alexandria, Virginia, International Media Corporation, 1989) p. 621.

the oldest, the Phalangist (Kata'eb) Party led by late
Bashir Gemayel and now under the leadership of George
Sa'adeh is mainly a Maronite Christian organisation with
a political wing and a militia. Though a separate body
earlier, it was absorbed by the Lebanese Forces, in
October 1988.

Events Leading to the Civil War

In the previous pages we have described some of
the major actors in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-76.
The weakening of the state machinery, in particular the
sectarian divisions in the Lebanese armed forces, and
the emergence of well-armed militias to serve the ends
of factional politics was a major cause of the Civil
War which has been going on in Lebanon for the last
15 years.

The sequence of violent events began in February
1975 with clashes between fishermen and the Lebanese Army
in the southern port of Sidon where the fishermen were
demonstrating against a Government decision to grant
extensive fishing rights to a company called 'Protein'
whose chairman was the former President, Camille Chamoun.
The fishermen claimed that this move of the Government
would deprive them of their livelihood. In the next five
days during confrontation between the Lebanese Army and

the fishermen of Sidon, 18 civilians and 6 Army soldiers were killed and many more injured. According to reliable reports, it was the Palestinian element of the population which had escalated the level of violence. When on March 2, the Lebanese Army was withdrawn from Sidon tension appeared to have subsided. But soon after, on March 6, fresh disturbances flared up because of the death of a prominent left-wing politician Maarouf Saad who had been injured earlier when the Army had fired on the fishermen on February 26.

Prime Minister Rashid Solh, at a press conference on March 9 announced his government's decision to accept the ''just demand'' of the agitating fishermen and to hold discussion with them'' with a view to guaranteeing their right to work and a decent life, bringing them into social insurance scheme and helping them to establish their own cooperative.''

Palestinian guerrilla fighters were reported to be active during the demonstrations in Sidon and according to reliable sources about 100 of them had joined the fighting on the side of fishermen. This report was, however, denied by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) which said that the Palestinian fighters had only been placed on alert.

The disturbances in Sidon and their after effects significantly changed the delicate balance in the complex political structure of the Lebanese State. Several Muslim leaders like Saeb Salam and Rashid Karami tried to use the unrest,

(i)   to break-up the recently appointed Government of Rashid Solh by claiming that it did not adequately represent the Muslim interests and

(ii)   to challenge the dominance of Christians over the Lebanese Army which was accused of over-reacting against the fishermen at Sidon.

Meanwhile, Christian leaders like Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Phalangists, and M. Chamoun, leader of the National Liberal Party, gave whole-hearted support to the Lebanese Army but they were highly critical of the intervention of Palestinian guerrilla fighters in the disturbances at Sidon as it was an internal affair of Lebanon. These leaders demanded that the Cairo Agreement which gave Palestinian guerrillas permission to establish bases in Lebanon and conduct activities against Israel should be, repudiated.[5]

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[5] Keesing's Contemporary Archives August 1975 (London, 1975) p. 27287.

Muslim leaders at a conference in Beirut on March 10, asked the Government to implement the following reforms:

(i) Structural changes in the Government to reduce the powers of the Maronite Christian President.

(ii) creation of nationally balanced Lebanese Armed Forces, and

(iii) establishment of an Army Council which would influence the leadership of the Army Commander.

Kamal Jumblatt, leader of the Druze community and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) strongly supported the case for the creation of an Army Command Council in order to reduce the influence of the Christian element and provide better representation to the Muslims who had by now become a majority in the population of Lebanon. Christian leaders Gemayel and Chamoun, however, strongly opposed any changes in the existing structure of the Lebanese armed forces and threatened to withdraw from the Cabinet if any move was made to introduce any changes.

Further Violence and Cabinet Resignations

On April 13 regular fighting erupted between the Phalangist (Kata'eb) militia and the Palestinian guerrillas in Beirut. In the clashes which occurred in the streets of the capital, it was reported that 300 people were

killed and several hundred injured. There was no intervention by the Lebanese Army in this fighting and a cease-fire was brought into force on April 16. The cause of the clashes according to reports of the PLO was the ambushing of a bus carrying a group of Palestinians by the Phalangist militia and killing of 27 passengers, men, women and children, while the bus was passing through the Phalangist dominated sector of Ain Rumaneh. Earlier, the Phalangists had ambushed another Palestinian transport and killed its driver.

On the other hand, spokesmen of the Phalangist militia blamed the Palestinian guerrillas for starting the fighting by opening fire near a church in Ain Rumaneh, where Gemayel had gone to attend mass, and killing three persons which included a party member. Soon after the firing at the church, a Palestinian bus had arrived carrying reinforcements which resulted in a major clash between the Palestinian guerrillas and the resident population.

After the fighting at Ain Rumaneh, Yasser Arafat sent the following message from Damascus to the Arab heads of state:

`` Armed cliques of the Phalangist Party in Lebanon this morning ambushed a civilian bus and opened fire on

it. As a result 27 men, women and children were martyred and a large number wounded. The bloody massacre by the armed cliques of the Phalangist Party against our unarmed people is an overt plot carried out by these cliques in co-ordination with and under the direction of imperialism and Zionism on the fraternal land of Lebanon in an overt attempt to create sedition and strike at Lebanese-Palestinian fraternity. While we call on you to take note of the inception of this sedition and its grave consequences, we expect you to intervene quickly and effectively to foil this plot and to call on all responsible authorities in fraternal Lebanon to strike at the criminals of the Phalangist Party.[6]

For the next three days serious clashes continued between the Phalangist militia, well-armed with machine-guns, rifles and pistols, and the rival Palestinian guerrilla troops who had heavier armaments like rocket launchers. The Palestinian guerrillas bombarded the Christian parts of the city with rockets and caused serious damage to a large number of buildings. It appeared that other Christian Lebanese groups had joined the Phalangists while the Palestinian side was supported by the Lebanese Muslims.

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[6] ibid, p. 27287.

Clashes between Palestinians and right-wing Christian groups were also reported from Tripoli, Tyre and Sidon.

On April 14, Prime Minister Rashid al-Solh ordered the Lebanese internal security forces into the Ain Rumaneh suburb. A number of persons suspected of attacking the Palestinians in the bus ambush the previous day were arrested. The Prime Minister also warned that those responsible for the previous day's fighting would be dealt with severely and that the security forces had been given strict orders to maintain law and order.

Meanwhile, President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt requested the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Mahmoud Riad, to go to Beirut and arrange a cease-fire between the opposing sides. He also appealed to the two sides to avoid bloodshed and maintain self-restraint. On April 16, a cease-fire was announced and the Prime Minister said that the two sides had agreed to cease firing and to withdraw armed men from streets and public squares. He added that he had asked the commanders of the internal security forces to observe, implement and enforce this agreement. He appealed to everyone to stop bloodshed so as to preserve Lebanon and the Palestinian brothers and called for patience and love during critical times. Security forces were charged with pursuing those who sowed sedition

and spread false rumours, and to strike with an iron fist against anyone who tried to harm the agreement which it was claimed, was desired by everybody. The cease-fire agreement was accepted by the Maronite Christian leader Gemayel, the Palestinian guerrilla command and also by other leading Lebanese political groups.

The cease-fire was generally observed and Beirut returned to normalcy, despite sporadic outbreak of fighting on April 16 and 17. Prime Minister Solh, in a statement on April 17, claimed that violent clashes had gone down by 70 to 80 per cent and he blamed Israeli agents for instigating the clashes. However, despite these assurances, six ministers of his Government resigned in protest against its failure to maintain law and order. A few days later when another group of five ministers resigned, the Government position became clearly untenable with the result that Solh submitted his own resignation to President Frangieh on May 15. In a statement before his resignation, Solh held the Phalangist Party fully responsible ``for the massacre on April 13 and the repercussions that followed, as well as for the human casualties and the moral and material damage caused to the country''. Solh also asked that Muslims be given a greater share in decision-making at all levels, particularly in the armed

forces. He declared that if this was not possible, then the entire Lebanese political system based on the 1943 ''National Pact'', providing for power-sharing on a sectarian basis by various confessional groups should be replaced by a non-sectarian administration. Further, he advocated Lebanese citizenship for those Palestinian Muslim residents who had been residing in Lebanon for a long time.

Military Government

During the cease-fire, tension continued to increase between the two sides and finally resulted in the breakdown of the cease-fire and serious fighting between the right-wing Christian groups and the Palestinian guerrillas. The three days of fighting took place in the vicinity of Tal Zaatar refugee camp inhabited by about 6,500 Palestinians and surrounded by Phalangist-dominated suburb of Dikwaneh. Cease-fires were arranged and broken on May 21,22 and 23. The casualty figures by May 23 stood at 50 people killed and over 200 injured. In these critical conditions President Frangieh appointed a military Government to help stabilise the situation. It was headed by Brigadier Noureddin Rifai, a Sunni Muslim, and six other military officer of senior rank. However, most of the leaders of the left-wing Muslim political groups strongly opposed

the formation of the military Government.

The Times correspondent in Beirut, while commenting on the formation of the military Government on May 25, described the underlying issues as follows:

`` No longer is it a conflict between the right-wing Christians and the Palestinian guerrillas and their supporters; the issue now is the polarisation between the Christian and the Muslim populations. Fundamental issues of state management, long swept under the carpet, have come into the open, and in the absence of political forum a resort to arms looms as an alternative.

``Even before President Frangieh formed a military Government on May 23 polarisation had set in. The right-wing Phalangists, who championed the cause of the Christian Maronites, had made it clear that the campaign they launched a month ago to curb the guerrillas would continue. Their political aim was to make the Christian voice heard in the running of the country's affairs. This provoked the Muslims to step up their own campaign.''

Military Government Resigns

With continued clashes between the rival forces of the Phalangist militia and the Palestinian guerrillas,

despite the cease-fire, there was a strong demand from the opposition for the resignation of the Military Government. This was further reinforced when heavy fighting broke out on the border between the Israeli and Lebanese forces. According to foreign sources the Lebanese Army had not taken part in any attempt to control and prevent the inter-sectarian fighting in Beirut or in other major towns of Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre. In view of the deteriorating internal and external security situation, Brigadier Rifai submitted his resignation to President Frangieh on May 26. This appeared also to be a fall-out of the pressures exerted on President Frangieh by the Arab states, in particular Syria, for restoration of a civilian government. On May 28, the President called on Rashid Karami to form a new government. However, the clashes in Beirut had continued between May 20 and May 28 in which about 100 people had been killed and over 300 injured. Meanwhile Palestinian and other left-wing Lebanese leaders in a joint press conference on June 6 accused the US Central Intelligence Agency for supplying weapons and advice to the Phalangist militia which was also infiltrated by Israeli agents-provocateurs.

On June 24, after three weeks of relative peace, fighting flared up again in the Ain Rumaneh district of

Beirut and spread to the entire city in which Phalangists and right-wing Christians fought pitched battles against Palestinians supported by left-wing Muslim groups. In a week of fighting the casualty figures were over 250 dead and at least 1,000 injured.

Karami's New Cabinet

On June 30, Rashid Karami announced the formation of a new Cabinet to ``Rescue'' the country from the brink of a civil war. A Cabinet of six members which included the leader of the National Liberal Party, Camille Chamoun, a Maronite Christian pledged to restore order in the country.

The Karami's Government announced on July 1 that a cease-fire had been agreed between the opposing forces in Beirut. He also said that the main task of his Government was to ``restore confidence and trust among the Lebanese and between them and the Palestinian guerrillas.'' According to reports, on July 2 the cease-fire was holding despite sporadic firing after the new Government assumed office on July 1.

During the period between April 13 and the coming to office of Karami's Government, it was estimated that

a total of 2,314 people were killed and 16,441 injured in the inter-sectarian clashes. About 35 international concerns had moved out of Beirut because of the fighting and the total cost of damage and losses due to the fighting amounted to 3,000 million Lebanese pounds (£ 600,000,000 sterling).

On July 15, Rashid Karami, in a policy statement in Parliament, promised that the Government would hold a''Just an honest investigation unaffected by influences and considerations'' into the causes of the sectarian clashes. Regarding the policy to be followed about the Lebanese Army, he observed that ''the events and developments in various fields have made it incumbent upon us to seize the initiative to deal with some of our problems with courage and profoundness. Our concern for Lebanon's security and sovereignty should prompt us to care for all our armed forces, particularly our Army. We must therefore, provide our Army with the necessary means to perform its duties in accordance with the dictates of our national interests. It should also be firmly balanced so that it will inspire the confidence of everyone and will be beyond reproach. This national institution will be our support in difficult times and our protective shield in the face of attack. We shall submit at the

earliest possible time an update bill for developing the Army. Work on the bill has almost been completed. In drafting this bill we have been inspired by the most up-to-date precepts of those countries whose situation is like ours. With regard to National Service Bill now before you, providing for the transformation of the Lebanese armed forces from a purely professional body into an Army based on conscription, we shall cooperate with you to expedite its debate and approval.''

State of Virtual Civil War

During the period between September 1975 and May 1976, the left-wing Muslim militias and the right-wing Christian Maronite militias fought pitched battles in Beirut and other parts of the country in a state of virtual Civil War resulting in heavy loss of life and property. The Government of Rashid Karami which was formed on June 30 1975, because of its internal division, was unable to control the growing violence. In this situation, there was a strong pressure from the left forces on President Frangieh to resign. To this end, a bill was introduced in April 1976 to amend the Constitution to enable the President to resign before the expiry of his term of office. Following the passage of the bill, Elias Sarkiâ was elected on May 8 to succeed President Frangieh.

The crisis, which had originally been caused by
clashes between the Palestinian guerrillas based in Lebanon
and Christian Phalangist milita led by Pierre Gemayel,
had now escalated into a full fledged war between the
right-wing Christian groups and the left-wing Muslim
population. This inter-communal fighting destroyed the 1943
''National Pact'' which had been the basis for the working
of the Lebanese political system since 1944.

While the Christian groups were fighting to maintain
political status quo which gave them a predominant position
in political and economic fields, the left-wing Muslim
population under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, a Druze
and the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, and
supported by the less-privileged Shia Muslims, were fighting
in support of their demand for fundamental changes in
the political and economic system and in particular,
recognition of their claim that Muslims were now the
majority community in Lebanon.

''National Pact'' of 1943
This unwritten pact established a sectarian system
of political and administrative working. On the basis of
a census taken in 1932, which had shown the Christian
community to be in majority, all major posts were

proportionately distributed between the leading communities. The agreement laid down that the President and the Commander of the Armed Forces should always be Maronite Christians. The Prime Minister was to be a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament was always to be a Shia Muslim. Further, the seats in the Lebanese Parliament, numbering a total of 99, were to be divided between the Christian community and the Muslim community, which also included Druzes, on a ratio of six to five respectively. Therefore, in the ''National Pact'', the Maronite Christian community had been given a predominant role in the political system of Lebanon. However, though no official census had been held in the recent past, it was clearly known by neutral observers that the Muslim population had become a majority in Lebanon by the 1970s.

Resumption and Escalation of Civil War

After the formation of the Karami Government in June 1975, there was a comparative calm in Lebanon. However, this was soon disturbed towards the end of August, when fighting erupted near the town of Zahle between the Christian residents and the Shia Muslims of a neighbouring area. Within a week the Civil War had spread to the entire country. The fighting was especially fierce in the northern region where the Muslim population of Tripoli

and the Maronite Christians of Zghorta fought pitched battles which were said to result in heavy casualties. In northern Lebanon alone more than 100 people were killed and several hundred injured.

After an emergency meeting of the Cabinet it was decided to use the Army to form a buffer between the town of Tripoli and Zghorta, but the Army was not to intervene in the fighting. The task of controlling the violence and maintaining law and order was to be left to the internal Security Forces. There was a delay in deploying the Army due to opposition from the Muslim leaders. However, by September 12 the Army had taken up position between Tripoli and Zghorta and the clashes between the rival militias had reduced significantly. The strike call given by Jumblatt and other Muslim leaders against the deployment of the Army in the North was cancelled after persuation by Rashid Karami. Meanwhile, an Army patrol, on the night of 14-15 September, killed 12 leftist guerrillas on the coastal road between Beirut and Tripoli. This was the first clash of the leftist guerrillas with the Lebanese Army after the Sidon fishermen's agitation. The Army involvement caused a rapid escalation in fighting in various parts of the country, particularly in the major cities of Beirut and Tripoli.

In Beirut alone, by September 19, the casualties were over 70 dead and 175 injured during the five days of fighting.

The law and order situation in Lebanon had deteriorated rapidly in the previous week. In these circumstances, the Syrian Government sent its Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister alongwith the Syrian Chief of Staff to Beirut for talks with Lebanese leaders to resolve the crisis. As a result of Syrian mediation, a cease-fire was announced on September 20, which was acceptable to all parties in the country.

Formation of a Committee for National Dialogue

The Lebanese Government announced on September 24 the formation of a ``Committee for National Dialogue''. The seven main Lebanese communities were represented in the committees on the basis of four Maronite Christians, four Sunni Muslims, four Shia Muslims, three Greek Orthodox, two Greek Catholics, two Druzes and one Armenian. The task of this committee was to secure peace and then negotiate a lasting solution to the political crisis. The Committee held several meetings in the presence of the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam to discuss measures for strengthening security and the

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Opposition Forces: Early 1976

According to a survey conducted by Le Monde in early 1976, the major Lebanese and Palestinian factions involved in the Civil War during 1975-76 were the following:[7]

Leftist Groups The progressive Socialist Party (PSP) headed by Kamal Jumblat, based mainly on the Druze community in southern Lebanon, controlled a 3,000 strong militia deployed in southern mountain area.

There were several other leftist groups which could be divided into four main categories.

(i) Nasserite Socialists, who derived their ideological inspirations from the late Egyptian President. It included the Lebanese Arab Army of rebel Muslim soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib and the Independent Nasserites under Ibrahim Koleilat;

(ii) Pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi Baathists under Assem Kanzo and Abdel Magidal Refei;

(iii) Syrian nationalist groups within the Popular Syrian Party (PPS) in two factions under Inaam Raad and Elias Girigi; and

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[7] Le Monde (Paris) January 22 and April 14, 1976

(iv) Marxist-Leninists which included the Lebanese Communist Party (PCL) under the leadership of Georges Haoul and the Organisation of the Communist Action in Lebanon (OACL) under Mehsen Ibrahim.

To being with, most of the leftist organisations had Christians as their members. However, during the Civil War the two major communities were so polarised that the leftist groups became totally identified with the opposing Muslim militias.

Moderate Muslim Groups. These groups comprised Sunni Muslim factions under traditional Muslim leaders. The Tripoli-based Arab Liberation Party under Rashid Karami and the Pioneers of Reforms under Saeb Salam, the Naijades group located in Beirut under Adnan el Hakim and the Islamic Movement centred in Tripoli with close links with pan-Arab Muslim Brotherhood, were some of the moderate Muslim groups. In addition, the moderates also included Shia Muslim organisations like the Social Democratic Party led by Kamal Assad, the Fityan Ali of Ahmed Safoun, and the Movement of Disinherited led by Imam Moussa Sadre, which had close links with the Syrian Government. In addition, there was the pro-Syrian Alawite Youth which had a militia wing in northern Lebanon.

Conservative Christian Factions

Right-wing Christian militias were led by the Phalangist Party of Pierre Gemayel and the National Liberal Party of Camille Chamoun. These were reported to number some 10,000 and 2,000 men respectively. Regional forces like the Zghorta Liberation Army of Tony Frangieh consisting of 7,000 fighters, and the Zahle Group as well as clandestine extremist group like Maronite League, the Maronite Organisation of Fouad Chemali, the Cedar Guardians led by Mr Said Akl, the Mardite Brigade and the Lebanese National Front were also included in this grouping. Further, the militia maintained by the moderate National Block of Raymond Edde in Christian majority areas of Beirut and other regions did not take part in the fighting.

Palestinian Groups in Lebanon. While Yasser Arafat, played a mediating and a constructive role during the Lebanese Civil War, many of the Lebanon based PLO guerrilla groups actively supported the left-wing Muslim factions against the right-wing Christian militias. The PLO guerrilla groups which took part in the fighting on the side of the Left-wing Muslim faction were composed of;

(i) the Marxist-Leninhist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) of George Habash;

(ii) the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

General Command (PFLP-GC) of Ahmed Jabril;

(iii) the pro-Iraqi Baathist Arab Liberation Front
(ALF) of Abdel Wahab Kayyali; and

(iv) the Iraq-backed Popular Struggle Front of the
Ghosheh brothers.

Left-wing Muslims were also supported actively by
two major Palestinian groups; the Syrian-backed Al Saiqa
of Zouheir Mohsen, which was later used by Syria to
intervene in Lebanon and the Popular Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine of Nayef Hawatmeh.

Meanwhile, Al Fatah guerrillas generally avoided
getting involved in the Lebanese fighting, though they
provided training to some left-wing Muslim groups. However,
the PLO's security and military wings the Armed Palestinian
Struggle Command and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA),
helped to contain the rival factions and to take on
peace-keeping and security functions under the direction
of Yasser Arafat and the Syrian Government.

Direct military intervention in Lebanon by Syria
initially caused a split in the Palestinian guerrilla
groups since the PLO Chairman Arafat was against Syrian
intervention while Al Saiqa supported it. These differences
were later partially reconciled under the ``Damascus

Agreement'' of April 16, 1976 between Syria and the PLO.

Split in the Lebanese Army

An event of major significance in the military balance
in the Lebanese Civil War was the polarisation of opposing
Christian and Muslim factions of the Lebanese Army. It
comprised about 16,000 men, with mainly Christian officers
and Shia Muslim ranks. The Air Force was predominently
Christian. The Lebanese Armed Forces had been traditionally
apolitical. However, during the 1960s and the early 1970s,
it was known that the right-wing Christian leaders and
the left-wing Muslim leaders had been in close contact
with the armed forces. In March 1976 the Christian and
Muslim factions in the army became directly involved in
the fighting; the latter tried to overthrow President
Frangieh by force while the former tried to protect him.

Palestinian Involvement in the Civil War

A new dimension was added to the Lebanese Civil
War in January 1976 when the Palestinian guerrilla forces
actively participated in support of Left-wing Muslim groups
after a blockade of a Palestinian refugee camp by Christian
militias. During the next two weeks left-wing Muslim and
Palestinian forces attacked Christian areas in strength.
This was followed by a fresh propaganda campaign and

armed attacks against the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, by the right-wing Christian groups. The Christian leaders Gemayel and Chamoun opposed any changes in the 1943 ''National Pact'' which allowed the Maronite Christian population a pre-dominant position in Lebanese political and economic system. They also denounced the Cairo Agreement which allowed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

Syrian Foreign Minister, Khaddam speaking about Christian military activities in Lebanon, said that the Christian militias were actively trying to bring about a partition of Lebanon and this was likely to invite ''Syria's immediate intervention''. While remarking on this statement of the Syrian Foreign Minister, Israeli Defence Minister Shimon Peres said that ''Syrian intervention would not, whatever the reason, leave Israel indifferent and will require Israel to consider what steps to take''. Israel also sent a message through diplomatic channels to make sure that the warning to Syria was conveyed to President Assad.

After the Palestinian guerrilla forces had joined the left-wing Muslim militias in attacking Christian positions, the Phalangist and other Christian militias attacked the Palestinian refugee camps in the Beirut region. This led to some of the heaviest fighting of the Lebanese

Civil War witnessed so far. The fighting between the left-wing groups supported by the Palestinians and the Christian attacks on Palestinian refugee camps continued to escalate during early 1976.

By the end of January, the Palestinian and leftist forces had captured Damour and other towns south of Beirut from where the Christian population had to be evacuated by ships to areas north of Beirut. This internal migration of Christian community to another area where it had a majority hastened the effective partition of Lebanon into zones of Muslim and Christian majority areas. Meanwhile, armoured units of the ``Yarmouk'' Brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the military arm of the PLO, had crossed the Syrian-Lebanese border and attacked Christian positions in the Beka'a Valley. During this fighting in the Valley a large contingent of the Lebanese Army comprising Muslim soldiers deserted under Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib and joined the Palestinian-leftist forces as the Lebanese Arab Army.

Attempted Army coup and Syrian Intervention

In early March 1976. In the northern parts of Lebanon there were serious clashes between the Christian militia and the rebel Lebanese Arab Army. By March 10, a number

of positions in the south and other areas were captured by the rebels and almost half of the country was in the hands of the Lebanese Arab Army. Maj General Saeed, head of the Higher Military Committee, promised general amnesty if they returned to the barracks. The rebels who rejected the offer captured three more army barracks which prompted Rashid Karami to renew his intention to resign.

Amidst mounting disaffection throughout the Armed Forces, the Muslim Commander of the Beirut area, Brigadier Abdul-Aziz Ahdab, asked for the resignation of President Frangieh and of Government within 24 hours. He assumed the title of ``provisional military governor of Lebanon'' and declared a state of emergency. On March 12, during a press conference, Brigadier Ahdab said that a ``military command council'' had been formed to govern the country till the take-over of power by a ``reformed democratic government''. He claimed the support of a number of high ranking officers of the armed forces, including the support of Major General Saeed. According to reliable reports Brigadier Ahdab was supported by a large number of senior military officers, among them the commander of the Air Force and the chief of military intelligence. However, the political forces represented by the Phalangist and

the National Liberal Parties strongly opposed the Brigadier's demands. On the other hand, the moderate Muslims and the leftist leaders including Jumblatt, opposed the military coup as a means of achieving the replacement of the President.

Brigadier Ahdab's demands were dismissed by President Frangieh as unconstitutional. He rejected further demands from the rebel officers as well as a petition signed by 68 of the 99 members of the Chamber of Deputies calling for his resignation. On the President's refusal to resign, Brigadier Ahdab and Lieutenant Khatib, with the help of Muslim rebel forces, tried to depose the President and attacked the presidential palace at Baabda, six miles south-east of Beirut.

Afterwards, the distribution of forces under Brigadier Ahdab's command was as follows:

(i) 2,000 troops directly under his command

(ii) Some 10,000 troops loyal to the official military command of Major General Saeed.

(iii) An estimated 2,000 troops of the Lebanese Arab Army.

(iv) 24 planes of the Lebanese Air Force.

The strength of forces opposed to Brigadier Ahdab was as follows:

(i) 1,000 regular troops and a brigade of tanks guarding the presidential palace

(ii) The 10,000 strong Phalangist militia

(iv) 7,000 men of ``Zghorta Liberation Army led by the President's son.

(v) 2,000 strong National Liberal Party militia.

However, on March 16 a full-scale attack on the presidential palace by Brigadier Ahdab' forces was prevented by the Palestinian regular forces and Syrian backed Al Saiqa guerrillas who halted the rebel advance and took up positions between the rebel forces and the troops guarding the palace. The Syrian intervention to save President Frangieh brought to a close Brigadier Ahdab's attempt to achieve a ``Lebanese solution'' to the crisis. Le Monde, commenting on the Syrian policy of support for moderate traditional Lebanese, wrote:[8]

``The Baathist regime of Syria has never looked favourably on the gradual effacement of the traditional

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[8] Le Monde (Paris), April 14, 1976

Muslim leaders and the strengthening of the influence of Mr Kamal Jumblatt and his allies in the nationalist movement, who include within their ranks communists, Nasserite nationalist and Arab Socialists. The Syrian leaders do not desire the creation in Lebanon of a state which would be situated to the left of Baathist and authoritarian Syria in the political spectrum. Doubtless they also judge that such a state would not be tolerated by Jerusalem and would bring on an Israeli military intervention.''

Despite Syrian mediation efforts and several steps taken by the United Nations Security Council, the United States, France and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, the Civil War in Lebanon continued to increase in intensity, spread to northern, southern, and central regions of the country and involved almost all the factions of the Lebanese society. Muslim left-wing forces were reported to have overcome several Christian strongholds all over Lebanon. President Frangieh, due to pressure of Muslim militias, left the presidential palace in Baabda and moved to Jounieh, a Christian stronghold. By the , end of March, Muslim left-wing militias had gained control of all the strategic points in Beirut.

With the continued escalation in fighting, and no
political solution in sight, Syrian armed forces intervened
in the Lebanese conflict on April 9. Syrian armoured
units crossed the Syrian-Lebanese border and took over
the Masnaa border post about three miles inside Lebanon
on the Beirut-Damascus road. Syrian forces also took over
some positions in the northern and eastern parts of the
country. However, Syrian advance into Lebanon was halted
when the Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami and Yasser
Arafat appealed to President Assad against Syrian
intervention in the fighting. While most of the Christian
factions supported Syrian intervention to restore peace
in Lebanon, Jumblatt strongly opposed it and called it
a ``blatant invasion'', which had been all ``cooked up
with American connivance''. He appealed to the League of
Arab States to take immediate action to ``end the illegal
Syrian presence''.

Reacting to the Syrian intervention in Lebanon, Israeli
Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin said; ``We are watching with
concern. When the Syrians overstep certain limits we have
set ourselves-and they are not necessarily geographical
lines but also in the manner of their involvement-we
shall have to take additional decisions.'' He added that,
``Israel's policy towards Lebanon was based on the

principle of non-intervention but was also governed by the extent to which Israel's security was affected. Israel regarded the Litani river in southern Lebanon as the ''red line'' beyond which any Syrian encroachment would be regarded as a security threat''.

President Gerald Ford, in a press briefing on April 20, confirmed an earlier official statement that Syrian policy towards Lebanon was ''constructive''. The leaders of the Libyan and Iraqi Governments, however, condemned the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon.

According to western estimates, the number of Syrian troops in Lebanon was between 3,000 to 4,000. In addition, there were about 5,000 regular Palestinian troops, including about 1,500 member of Al-Saiqa, the Palestinian guerrilla group supported by Syria.

The Syrian Military intervention in limited strength, appears to have had a very limited impact on the Civil War. It continued with short periods of cease-fires agreed one day only to be broken the next day.

While the Syrian, armoured forces were on the verge of moving deeper into Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, on pressure

from Yasser Arafat and the leaders of the other left-wing Muslim forces, called for a mini-summit at Riyadh on 16 October in which Kuwait, Lebanon, the PLO, Egypt and Syria were invited to participate.

The resolutions of the Riyadh summit were announced on October 18 (Appendix 'C'). The summit called for an immediate cease-fire which was to be supervised by an Arab force of 30,000 men under the newly installed Lebanese President Sarkis. The Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) had been given the power to search and confiscate heavy weapons and arrest people violating the cease-fire. All militias were to cease fighting and to disengage by October 21 when the ceasefire was to come into effect in all areas of Lebanon. It called on all Palestinian forces to return to their bases and camps in southern Lebanon as agreed upon in the Cairo Accord. The mini-summit at Riyadh also called for negotiations between all concerned parties in Lebanon to bring about national reconciliation on the basis of a political settlement acceptable to all parties. It did not spell out the composition of the Arab Deterrent Forces and thus allowed Syria to dominate it. The ADF, mainly Syrian with a strength of 30,000 moved into interior Lebanon and into Beirut replacing the PLO militia and other Christian and Muslim forces. The Palestinian troops

moved into southern Lebanon and President Sarkis in an appeal asked all Lebanese factions to end fighting and greet the Syrians ``in love and brotherhood''. The 56th cease-fire since April 1975 came into effect in Lebanon.[9]

The Civil war in Lebanon which began in April 1975 ended in October 1976 after a period of 18 months. However, total peace was not to return to the country for years to come. Internal strife between various factions appears to have become a way of life and continues unabated even today. During the 18 months of the 1975-1976 Civil War, according to Lebanese official estimates, the war had cost between 1,000 million and 1,600 million Lebanese pounds (some US $ 330,000,000- US $ 530,000,000) in material damage. During the war economic activity had fallen to less than 50 per cent of 1974 level, prices of basic commodities and transport had gone up by 100-120 per cent, and after the cease-fire in October 1976 inflation continued at an annual rate of 70 per cent. The Civil War of 18 months and the Palestinian and Syrian military interventions in support of rival militias resulted in a terrible loss of life,

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[9] Walid Khalidi, <u>Conflict and Violence in Lebanon</u>, (Harvard, University Press, 1979), p. 64-65.

estimated to be well over ten thousand, many more thousands injured, and physical destruction on a massive scale. The atrocities committed during the war were terrible by any standards. The Christian community had a feeling of having lost the war and become less powerful than it was before the Civil War. A sense of alienation gripped the community and many of its members emigrated to the West. Lebanon was no longer the commercial, economic, cultural and communication centre of the Arab world.[10]

Reorganisation of the Lebanese Army

The formation and deployment of the Arab Deterrent Force in most parts of the country had effectively stopped regular fighting between rival militias. However, in the southern parts of Lebanon, because of the Palestinian concentration and problems arising from Israeli reprisals, and Israeli objections to the presence of the ADF, these troops could not be deployed there. To overcome the security problems in the south, it was considered necessary to reorganise the Lebanese Army which had split into four sectarian factions during the Civil war. However,

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[10] Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon: 1970-1985 (London, 1985), p. 57.

these efforts were opposed by the Christian factions, who called for disarming of Palestinian guerrillas and their deployment only in southern Lebanon according to the Cairo Agreement of 1969. This was to be done before the Christian factions would agree to the reconstitution of the Lebanon Army. Further, the Christians demanded that the Maronite officers should be given their former ranks; this concession was not to be given to the Muslim officers. In view of the opposition to the restructuring of the Army by the Christian factions, President Sarkis postponed the move despite the support it had from Syria and several western countries.

Impact on International and Regional Environment

The Lebanese Civil War proved a major threat to the security and stability in West Asia. On the international plane, the Syrian role in the conflict and the Palestinian guerrilla support to the left-wing Muslim forces was strongly opposed by Israel. Syrian Military intervention in Lebanon created a situation in which the threat of Israeli retaliation could not be ruled out. There were repeated warnings from Israel that it would not tolerate any attempt by Syria to occupy Lebanon, even though Syria had always exercised considerable influence over the country because of its traditionally

close historical links and regarded Lebanon as a part of ''greater Syria''. In the Lebanese conflict, Syria represented the views of the other Arab states of the region that political reforms should be implemented to bring about a change in the balance of power in favour of the Muslim community which had now become a majority in the total population of Lebanon. Syria also rejected any extreme solution like partition of the country which was advocated by some Christian groups.

During the 18 months of the Civil War, Syria played an important part in mediating numerous cease-fire agreements, though these did not last for more than a few days at a time. Throughout the conflict, Syrian - backed forces of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) were deployed in Beirut and other areas of the country on security duties. In April 1976, Syria had to directly intervene militarily by sending its forces across the border. This Syrian military intervention, however, did not arouse any reaction from Israel because the Syrian intervention had been supported by the United States.

Most of the Arab states including Syria backed the moderate factions in Lebanon and supported a negotiated settlement to the crisis. However, Libya and Iraq provided

large amounts of money and weapons to the extreme left-wing Muslim factions who were fighting to overthrow the existing political structure. This extreme left-wing group prevented any compromise solution suggested by Syria.

According to an assessment carried out for the period April 1975 to April 1976 and published in Le Monde, a provisional estimate of those killed and injured was over 15,000 and 50,000 respectively and an estimated cost of damage to the Lebanese economy was about $ 5,800 million.[11]

The assessment in Le Monde added:

''The cruelty of the conflict, which has barely ceased for a year, the massacres, the kidnappings followed by summary executions, mutilations or torture, the indiscriminate and repeated bombardments of civilian districts, have created a deep divide between Christians and Muslims.''

An assessment of the effects of the Civil War on

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[11] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (London, 1976) June 11, 1976 p. 27765.

internal, regional and global environment can be summarised as follows:

(a) The Civil War caused a split in the Lebanese Army and broke it up into four different factions none of which now owes allegiance to the State.

(b) Because of its intensity and long duration the conflict polarised the two major communities and, therefore, made it extremely difficult to work towards a negotiated settlement of the political crisis caused by demographic changes.

(c) A major cause of the Civil War appears to be the massive influx of Palestinian armed guerrilla forces in the early 1970s into Lebanon from Jordan. The Cairo Agreement of 1969 permitted Palestinian guerrilla camps in southern Lebanon and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, this region became the main base for raids against Israel. Thus, Lebanon became the focus of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in West Asia

(d) The Civil War created a vacuum in the Lebanese State machinery because of the disintegration of its armed forces, internal security services and its economy. The weakening of the state structure enabled

the forces of the PLO and Syria on the one hand, and the force of Israel, on the other, to conduct their military activities inside Lebanon to achieve their own objectives without any consideration of the interests of Lebanese State or its people.

The Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 were the direct fall-out of the effects of the Civil War and the total loss of sovereign power of the state. The Israeli invasions caused a total collapse of the Lebanese state system from which it has not been able to recover so far. The next chapter deals with these invasions and their impact on the internal regional and global scene.

CHAPTER THREE

ISRAELI INVASION : 1982

`` Wheresoever the carcass is, there will the eagles be gathered together.''

- Matthew, XXIV, 28

The Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976, and the growing strength of the armed militias of the PLO in a situation where the Lebanese internal security forces or the Lebanese Army could have no control over them caused increased Palestinian guerrilla activity from bases in southern Lebanon against Israeli settlements. This, in turn, resulted in Israeli reprisal raids into southern Lebanon against Palestinian bases. These Israeli reprisals increased in intensity and were often carried out by aerial bombing of the Palestinian targets by Israeli fighter planes.

Operation ``Litani''

During March 1978, there were several raids into northern Israel by PLO `Fatah' guerrillas. In one of the most violent bus hi-jackings on the Haifa-Tel Aviv road, the Palestinian guerrillas killed 34 Israelis and

injured 78.[1] In addition, PLO terrorist activities had shown considerable escalation during early 1978. These attacks were carried out against buses and bus stations deep inside Israeli territory.

In retaliation, Israel launched a major invasion on the night of March 14-15, 1978, against PLO bases in southern Lebanon. The attacking forces consisted of about 20,000-25,000 troops. The force was backed by armoured columns of tanks, field artillery, Air Force fighter aircraft, and naval gunboats. The invasion, code-named ''Operation Litani'', was launched despite Lebanese denials that it was in any way responsible for the raids into Israel.

Commenting on the reasons for the Israeli action against Lebanon, the Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizman stressed that the operation has been launched ''to clear this infested area once and for all''. He also said that Israel would not vacate the occupied areas of Lebanon unless there was a guarantee that the PLO would not

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[1] Walid Khalidi, <u>Conflict and Violence in Lebanon</u>, (Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 123.

again use its bases south of the Litani River for mounting raids into Israel. Israeli Premier Begin endorsed the comments of his Defence Minister and added that Israel's action in Lebanon was an act of ``legitimate self-defence''. [2]

The Israeli attack was launched on a wide front along the total length of the border. The ground assault was supported by fighter aircraft of the Israeli Air Force and air attacks were carried out simultaneously on the port of Tyre, where the Palestinians were reported to have received a large consignment of weapons. Air attacks were also mounted on targets north of the Litani River and the town of Damour and the Palestinian refugee camps of Chatila, Sabra and Bourj al Barajni close to Beirut were bombed and rocketed from the air. By the end of the day on March 19, Israel had occupied the entire area south of Litani River except for the town of Tyre and the surrounding refugee camps, A cease-fire was declared on March 21.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council, at the request

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[2] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (London, 1979) June 8, 1979, p. 29648.

of Lebanon and Israel, met on March 19 and adopted the following resolution unanimously.

`` 1. The Council calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognised boundaries;

2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from the member states of the United Nations.''

The strength of UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon by June 1978 was 5,500. These forces had occupied areas vacated by the Israeli troops. However, a number of

positions close to the border were not handed over to the UNIFIL but were taken over by Lebanese Christian forces. These Christian forces under Major Saad Haddad, totalled about 1,500-2,000 troops and occupied an area eight-mile wide along the border with Israel.

Build-up for 1982 Invasion

While the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 have been selected from a series of events as the major landmarks in the continuing civil war in Lebanon during the period of 1975 and 1985, which is still being fought with greater ferocity than ever before, the PLO guerrilla activities against Israeli settlements and the reprisals by Israel showed a considerable intensification throughout this period against a background of growing internal unrest and violence in Lebanon. It was clearly evident that the Arab-Israeli dispute over the Palestinian issue had finally gripped the fragile Lebanese polity resulting in the total polarisation of Christian and Muslim communities and militarisation of political parties with light and heavy weapons obtained from their patrons.

The Civil War of 1975-76 and the continuing unrest and violence in the following years, followed by significant escalation of Palestinian guerrilla activities in southern

Lebanon against Israeli settlements close to the border as well as deep inside Israeli territory, and countered by strong Israeli reprisal raids into Lebanon, resulted in a situation where the Lebanese Government had no effective administrative machinery in Southern Lebanon. Whatever control was exercised in this region was by the PLO and its various factions. Because of the Israeli attacks on targets in this region, the whole area suffered a total destruction of its political, economic and social structure.

The limited military action by Israel in 1978 against the PLO and subsequent occupation of Lebanese territory upto the Litani River was, perhaps, to test the reaction of the international community to its aggressive policy in Lebanon, and to assess the response of the Arab States, specially that of Syria, the main component of the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon.

While the Israeli action in Lebanon was condemned by Arab states and Egypt officially supported the Lebanese and Syrian calls for the world powers to intervene, there was no immediate material or military support from any of the Arab countries; even Syria which had about 30,000 troops as part of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) in

Lebanon made no effort to counter the Israeli invasion which stopped south of the Litani River. Despite Israeli air action against targets north of the River, Syrian troops did not intervene in the fighting between the Palestinian guerrillas and the invading Israeli troops. However, Syria later allowed Iraqi volunteers sent by Iraq to fight Israeli forces in Lebanon free passage through Syria and agreed to support them with weapons and ammunition from Syrian supply. Syria is reported to have supplied the PLO with other reinforcement and weapons while South Yemen, Algeria and Libya - the Arab states of the resistance front - announced that they would continue their supply of arms and ammunition to the PLO.

When Israel found a soft Lebanese State on its northern border from where it was being repeatedly attacked by Palestinian guerrillas, who were not being actively supported by military elements of any of other Arab states but were positively opposed by the Christian-right militias of Lebanon, and even some of the Muslim factions, like the Shias of the southern Lebanon, it felt that the time was, perhaps, ripe for an attempt to get rid of the PLO problem for good and ensure peace on its northern border. Palestinians, with their militant organisations under the PLO and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA),

had been the primary, if not the only, cause of the military dimensions of the Civil War and the subsequent Israeli invasion of 1978. And this Palestinian presence on the Lebanese soil with armed activities against Israel from Lebanese bases was going to lead to a major Arab-Israeli confrontation in Lebanon. Describing the consequences of permitting Palestinian guerrilla bases in Lebanon, the former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had the following comments.

``It had two consequences. It drew Lebanon into Arab-Israeli confrontation in a way that could not conceivably correspond to its national interest, for the frontier between Lebanon and Israel had never been disputed. And it illustrated also the dynamics of the Palestinian liberation movement. It would seem that any country that plays host to organised Palestinian para-military forces risks its own sovereignty. Their principal purpose is to conduct raids into Israel, using the host country as a sanctuary; this draws the inevitable Israeli retaliation, engulfing the host country into a war it did not seek. (Hussein forbade such raids into Israel, which was one cause of his battle with the Palestinians in 1970. Lebanon was not strong enough to do so). If allowed to implant themselves and build up their military power, the

Palestinians can become a state within a state, first ignoring the writ of the central government in areas they control and then seeking to impose their own will. Again, what Hussein had prevented in 1970, backed by loyal Bedouins of the Jordanian Army, Lebanon with its jerry-built governmental structure and weak, divided army proved unable to overcome."[3]

Immediate Provocation

While confrontation on the border between the Palestinian armed guerrillas and the Israeli armed forces had become a routine activity since 1978, the further escalation of violence in 1982 in the form of Palestinian guerrilla raids deep inside Israeli territory and resultant Israeli reprisals by their ground and air forces had become progressively more frequent and bloody. In view of this situation an Israeli invasion in large strength had become a likely possibility. This was also confirmed by a build-up of Israeli troop strength on the border. However, the immediate cause for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London on the evening of June 3. The suspected assailant, carrying a Jordanian passport,

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[3] Henry Kissinger, <u>Years of Upheaval</u>, (London, 1982) p. 787-788.

shot him in the head and critically injured him as he was on his way home from dinner. In a statement given in Beirut on June 9, a militant Palestinian group formerly belonging to Yasser Arafat's Fatah, and associated with Sabri Khalil al Banna (Code-named Abu Nidal), owned responsibility for the attack. The Government of Israel, however, attributed the attack to the PLO and said that the main aim of such groups as Abu Nidal was to divert responsibility for such action from the official PLO leadership. As an immediate reprisal to the London attack on the ambassador, the Israeli Air Force launched several missions of strike against Palestinian targets in Lebanon, including Beirut, on 4-5 June.

Operation ``Peace For Galilee''

The full-scale invasion which Israel launched on 6 June 1982 was code-named ``Peace for Galilee''. The primary aim of invading Lebanon was to eliminate the threat posed to Israeli settlements in Galilee from the armed Palestinian groups based in Lebanon. In a letter to President Reagan, Prime Minister Begin said that ``the army has been instructed to push back the terrorists to a distance of 40 km to the north so that all our civilians in the region of Galilee will be set free of the permanent threat to their lives'' : he added that Israel ``does

not covet an inch of Lebanese territory'' but in fact wanted ''to sign a peace treaty with a free, independent Lebanon that will preserve its territorial integrity.''[4]

Israel carried out the invasion of Lebanon in a three-pronged assault in which armoured units, infantry and artillery units with an estimated strength of about 90,000 ground troops took part. They were strongly supported by the Air Force and the coastal ships of the Israeli Navy. In its rapid advance, the main column cut off and overran Palestinian camps in Tyre, Sidon, Saadiyat and Damour despite strong opposition. By 8 June some of the advance units had moved inland to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway east of Beirut with the aim to outflank the PLO and Syrian ADF forces deployed in Beirut. The second Israeli column, meanwhile, had moved ahead in the central sector and captured the PLO base of Beaufort Castle and also Nabatiyeh further north. Simultaneously, the third column which started from the Golan Heights in the eastern sector soon captured the PLO-held Arquob region on the slopes of mount Hermon, an area commonly known as Fatahland. (Map No. 5).

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[4] Keesings' Contemporary Archives (London, 1983) January, 1983, p. 31914.

Map. No. 5. Israel's Lebanese Campaign of June 1982, Major
Routes of Advance

Source : Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon 1970-1985,
(London : Cornell University Press, 1985) p. 136.

At the commencement of attack Israel had stated that Israeli forces would attack Syrian positions only if the Syrians fired on the advancing Israeli forces. However, the second and the third columns of Israeli forces moving across the central and the eastern axis soon encountered Syrian troops on June 7. The Syrian forces fought a delaying battle south of Jezzin but despite stiff resistance, the town was captured by Israeli forces the same day.

The central and the eastern columns of the advancing Israeli forces were now close enough to threaten the Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley in eastern Lebanon. Before the battle could be joined on the ground, air superiority had to be achieved, and to gain command of the air over the Beka'a, a fierce air battle took place between the Syrian and Israeli air forces on 8-9 June over the Beka'a Valley. In this aerial battle, Israel claimed to have shot down more than 60 Syrian fighter aircraft for only one lost on their side. The main factor contributing to the Israeli victory in the air was the total destruction of Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries in the Beka'a Valley on June 9 by Israeli Air Force.

An important Israeli objective during the advance

into Lebanon was the Palestinian position at Beaufort Castle. This was an old crusader fortress located on high ground just five kilometer north of the Israeli border. For many years this fortress had served as a command centre for the PLO and was also used to shell Israeli settlements in northern Galilee. The storming and capture of the fortress on June 7 was followed the same day by a visit of Begin, who said that the fortress would soon be handed over to the Lebanese Christian Forces under Major Saad Haddad.

The success of Israel's Air Force in the air battle over Beka'a was attributed by Western defence analysts to its technological superiority. To knock out the Syrian missile batteries, the Israelis used the technique of sending pilotless drones to draw fire from them and simultaneously to monitor and track their radar and radio frequencies with the assistance of monitoring equipment fitted on Israeli surveillance aircraft flying just outside the combat areas. Provided with this information, the strike aircraft sent to destroy the batteries were able to use electronic counter measures to render the missile's guidance system inoperative. The Israeli Air Force claimed to have destroyed 19 Syrian batteries in the first attack and carried out several attacks during the next two months

whenever the Syrians deployed new missiles.

International Reaction

On June 5 the UN security Council made a unanimous appeal for immediate cease-fire and end to all military activities across the Israeli-Lebanese border. The next day in another resolution which was also adopted unanimously, the Security Council demanded that ``Israel withdraw its forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognised boundaries of Lebanon''.

The US Government, which supported the UN Resolution, expressed regret over what it described as ``the spiral of violence'' started by the assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London, adding that ``Israel will have to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and the Palestinians will have to stop using Lebanon as a launching pad for attacks on Israel''.

The official Soviet news agency Tass, on the other hand, blamed Israel for unleashing a war of terror and attempting to carry out ``Physical extermination'' against the Palestinian people and accused the United States of having prior knowledge of the invasion and not taking any steps to prevent it. Further, in a statement on

June 14, the Soviet Union while warning Israel to desist
from such adventures, observed that, ``the Middle East
is an area lying in close proximity to the southern
borders of the Soviet Union and that developments there
cannot but help affecting the interests of the USSR''.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was condemned by
all the states in the Arab world. The Egyptian Government
called the Israeli action a ``blatant violation of
international law'' and asserted that it could not ``under
any circumstances'' be justified by the ``Crime'' of the
attack on the Israeli ambassador in London. Iran also
strongly condemned the Israeli action and promised to
send to Lebanon its Revolutionary Guards to fight the
Zionist invasion.

Encirclement of Beirut by Israeli Forces
The Israeli armoured units had moved north of Beirut
by June 15, thus laying a siege of the city, and cutting
off the Syrian and the PLO positions in the capital
from the rest of the country. The Israeli forces also
blocked the Beirut-Damascus highway to prevent any possible
withdrawal of Syrian and PLO fighters into the Beka'a
Valley and asked the PLO fighters in Beirut to lay down
their arms and surrender. However, Yasser Arafat, who

was himself trapped in the city, declared that the PLO forces would fight to death if Israeli forces attacked west Beirut.

Israel's Basic Objectives

On June 13 the Israeli Government laid down the following condition for a peace settlement in Lebanon.

1.   All foreign troops, including the Syrian and PLO forces, should be withdrawn from Lebanon.

2.   ``Iron-clad guarantees and safeguards'' should be established to prevent any return of the PLO to the area within an arc of 40-50 km from Israel's northern borders, which would become a demilitarised zone.

3.   An international force, independent of the UN and preferably including a US contingent, should be deployed in a peace-keeping role between Beirut and the Israeli border, thus acting as a security buffer.

4.   A strong Lebanese central government should be re-established in Beirut, with which Israel would seek to conclude a definitive peace treaty.

During the last week of June, to resolve the crisis in Beirut, there were intensive political discussions to find out an agreed basis of a supervised withdrawal of Syrian and Palestinian troops which were trapped in Beirut. This was being done under constant Israeli threat to storm west Beirut unless the Palestinian forces were evacuated from the city. While the PLO Chairman had agreed ``in principle'' to withdraw from the city, the entire procedure for the withdrawal, including logistics and timetable for destinations for the evacuated forces, had to be worked out. While the PLO leadership was willing to evacuate Beirut for some diplomatic concessions, the Syrian Government categorically refused to accept any withdrawal of the Syrian component of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) from Lebanon without the Israeli forces pulling out of the country.

Evacuation of Palestinian and Syrian Forces

The final arrangement for the evacuation of Syrian and Palestinian forces applied only to those troops trapped in Beirut. It did not include these forces outside the city in other areas of Lebanon. Neither did it require pullout of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The main points agreed upon were as follows:

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1.   The withdrawal of Palestinian and Syrian forces
from Beirut was to begin within two or three days
of the final approval of the plan and was to be
completed within fifteen days. The evacuation was
to take place in daylight, with those evacuated being
permitted to carry light weapons only and all heavy
arms being turned over to the Lebanese Army.

2.   The evacuation was to be partly by sea and
partly by way of the Beirut-Damascus highway. The
land route was to be used, in particular by The
Syrian troops in the ADF and by the Palestine
Liberation Army (the former to be relocated in the
Beka'a Valley and the latter to be withdrawn to
Syria). Palestinians evacuated by sea (mainly to
a staging-post in Cyprus) were to be transferred
later to various Arab countries willing to receive
them.

3.   Immediately before the first PLO contingent
embarked for Cyprus, a force of some 300 French
paratroopers would arrive in Beirut as the advance
party of the International Peace Keeping Force, which
would eventually consist of 800 American, 800 French
and 400 Italian troops, assisted by 3,000 regular
Lebanese Army soldiers.

The Syrian and PLO forces began their evacuation from Beirut on August 21. The French supervisory force of 300 was later joined by 800 US Marines. The Italian contingent on its arrival took position along the Beirut-Damascus highway. The entire evacuation of the Syrian and PLO troops from Beirut was completed by September 1. According to Lebanese official figures, the total number of Syrian and PLO troops who had left Beirut was 14,656. The entire withdrawal operation passed off without any hurdles. Yasser Arafat, left Beirut on August 30 for Greece, where he received a warm welcome from the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou.

Casualties During the Invasion

Official Israeli figures released on October 10 put the number of those killed on the Israeli side as 368 and injured as 2,383, during the two months of the war. Meanwhile, Lebanese sources estimated the number of non-Israeli casualties (i.e. including civilians as well as Palestinian and Syrian armed forces) as 17,825 killed and over 30,000 injured.

Efforts to Strengthen Lebanese Security Forces

Reports in 1981 indicated that the Libyan Government had offered to establish an air defence system in Lebanon

to provide protection against frequent Israeli air attacks on Lebanese targets. The system offered included surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles to guard against Israeli air attacks. In another report published in an American daily it was stated that the Lebanese Air Force had only ``10 ageing French Mirage fighters in uncertain repair''. Prime Minister had said that the Lebanese Government intended to request the French Mirage factory to assist in making the fighters air-worthy at a cost of about $(US) 24,000,000. He also said that Lebanon was willing to accept missiles from the United States or the Soviet Union, but that Lebanon did not want any American or Russian military personnel. He added that ``even from our Libyan brothers we will accept the weapons with thanks'' but these weapons will be used only by the Lebanese forces.

Rise of Amal Militia

Before and during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 there was a very significant increase in the strength of the Amal Militia. It grew from 4,000 to 30,000 men and thus became the most powerful militia in the country next only to the PLO. The influence of this militia increased tremendously during 1981 and 1982 because of polarisation of Shia resentment in southern Lebanon

against the never-ending Israeli ground and air attacks which affected them most. Amal also proclaimed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of Iran, as the Imam of all Muslims throughout the world.

The Aftermath of Israeli Invasion

On 23 August, 1982, soon after the cease-fire, and when the Israeli troops were still deployed around Beirut, the members of the Lebanese Parliament elected Bashir Gemayel as the President of Lebanon. While the election result was welcomed by the United States, Israel and France, it was strongly opposed by leftists groups and Muslims. However, before Bashir Gemayel could assume the office of President, he was killed in a powerful bomb blast while attending a meeting at the Phalangist Party headquarters on 14 September. Amin Gemayel, the slain-President's elder brother, was elected as President on 21 September.

Amin Gemayel assumed office of the Presidency on 23 September. In a statement on the same day he declared that his goal was ``a strong, independent and sovereign state which will safeguard public freedoms and will seek the evacuation of all foreign armies from the homeland''. He received messages of congratulations from all the Arab

Heads of Governments including one from President Assad of Syria which was particularly warm. In response, Amin Gemayel said that, ``we are determined to consolidate friendly and cordial relations with all the world, starting with those closest to us, our Arab brothers.''[5]

On September 15, Israeli forces moved into West Beirut in an effort to control the situation in the wake of the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. They took over control of most of the Muslim sectors of the city and some of their units were deployed around the Palestinian refugee camps located in those sectors. In a statement the Israeli Government said,'' the advance had become necessary to avert bloodshed, violence and anarchy and the forces would not be withdrawn until the Lebanese Army was able to maintain order''. In the same statement Israel asserted that, ``about 2,000 terrorists equipped with modern weapons had been left behind by the PLO and were sheltering in the refugee camps among civilian Palestinians''.

According to reports from Israeli and other sources, on September 16, armed men had entered Sabara and Shatila

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[5] ibid, pp. 31926-27.

refugee camps in west Beirut looking for PLO guerrilla fighters and in the process massacred a large numbers of civilian refugees, including women and children. That a large scale massacre had indeed taken place was confirmed on September 18, when, journalists and relief workers entered the camps to find a scene of carnage and devastation. There was a large number of bodies of men, women and children who had been gunned down at close range, many of them while they were trying to escape. Many houses had been blown up with their occupants inside and then bulldozed into rubble. There was also a mass grave just near the perimeter of the camp.

According to an estimate by the Israeli intelligence agency the number of those killed in the massacre at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps was between 700 to 800. According to a later account in the western press, the massacre at the Sabra and Shatila camps had been planned in advance at the highest level of Phalange leadership, including Bashir Gemayel before his assassination on September 14. According to these reports, the operation was carried out under the command of Elie Hobeika, the Phalangist intelligence chief and also their principal liaison officer with the Israeli secret service Mossad and the US Central Intelligence Agency.

Lebanese Army Deployment : 1983

For the first time since the Civil War of 1975-76, the Lebanese Army was deployed in east Beirut on February 5, 1983. This was made possible after prolonged discussions between the Lebanese Government and the Christian Phalangist Party and its military wing, the Lebanese Forces militia. The Government also announced plans for expansion of the Lebanese Army and stated that the US Government had agreed to supply Lebanese armed forces arms worth $ (US) 50,000,000 which included 36 M-48 tanks, 12 155 mm fieldguns and 25 armoured personnel carriers. Soon after, about 70 non-combatant advisors including 28 members of the Special Forces (``Green Berets'') arrived in Lebanon to help the army to train in security functions. On March 31 the Lebanese Government by a decree dissolved the Arab Deterrent Force and thus ended the peace-keeping mandate of the Syrian troops numbering about 30,000. The Syrian Forces, however, were not asked to leave Lebanon.

Israeli-Lebanese Agreement of May 1983

On May 17, the representatives of Israel, Lebanon and United States, after nearly five months of negotiations, signed an agreement which provided for the following:

(i) the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon;

(ii) the ending of the state of war between Israel and Lebanon; and

(iii) the establishment of a ``security region'' in southern Lebanon, to prevent the re-infiltration of Palestinian fighters into the area.

Simultaneously, the United States and Israel signed a confidential agreement in Washington which provided for the American consent to the continued stay of the Armed forces of Israel in Lebanon until such time as,

(i) all Israeli prisoners of war had been repatriated, and

(ii) all Syrian and PLO forces had withdrawn from Lebanon.

The Government of Syria strongly opposed the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement of May 1983, and stated that it was ``not acceptable as a basis for the negotiations for the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces''. It asserted that Syrian forces would remain in Lebanon in the foreseeable future and that Syria'' would do all in its power to prevent the agreement's implementation''. The

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agreement was also opposed by all Arab states except Egypt and Jordan; while Libya, South Yemen and the PLO denounced it. Finally, the agreement was abrogated in 1984 under Syrian pressure.

Israeli Troop Withdrawal to the Awali River

Despite US pressure to delay its withdrawal from positions held in and around Beirut, the Israeli Government ordered its forces to withdraw to the prepared defences south of the Awali River some 20 miles south of Beirut. All Israeli troops, therefore, withdrew on September 4 and Israel issued a warning that any attempt by Syrian forces to move into the evacuated areas would be repulsed by Israeli forces. Consequently, Israeli fighter planes attacked Syrian tanks which had started moving into the unoccupied zone.

Following Israeli withdrawal to the Awali River, severe fighting broke out between the Phalangist and Druze militias for the control of the areas vacated by Israeli troops.

There was general support in the Arab world to Israeli withdrawal south of the Awali River and the abrogation of May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese Agreement. The new Government in Israel decided to withdraw Israeli forces in three

phases to international boundaries during 1985. During the first two phases, there were serious violent clashes between retreating Israeli troops and the Amal militia. However, the withdrawal was completed as planned, except for a narrow ''security zone'' alongside the border and the presence of Israeli-supported South Lebanese Army under Major Saad Haddad as a buffer between Israeli forces and the Amal fighters.

The end of Israeli invasion of Lebanon marks a turning point in the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, the effect of Israeli invasion on the continuing internal conflict in Lebanon further polarised sectarian and communal elements and led to significant increase in the level of militarisation of the various contending parties and groups. Therefore, the prospects of a settlement of internal conflict seemed to have receded further. Itamar Rabinovich sums up the future of Lebanon after the impact of Israeli invasion as follows:

''The principal participants in the struggle over Lebanon's character and future enter this new phase with their outlooks and capacities affected by the developments of the past three years (1982-85). Israel is in a soul searching mood, its population and political and military

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establishments now reluctant to invest further in Lebanon and acutely aware of the discrepancy between military power and political nuance. Of the Lebanese communities, the Maronites and the Sunnis, many of whom enjoyed an illusory sense of power in the final months of 1982, have suffered a distinct loss of power and position. What was lost by these two communities has apparently been gained by Syria, the Shias and the Druzes. But no one is more acutely aware of the ephemeral nature of power and success in the context of the Lebanese crisis than the apparent winners themselves''.[6]

Israel did not attain its war aims after the invasion was over. It was unable to destroy the PLO or succeed in getting Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon which were there under the garb of the Arab Deterrent Force. Neither was Israel able to get a durable peace treaty signed with Lebanon and to instal a pro-Israel Government in Lebanon. Considering the nature of Lebanese polity its Muslim majority and Arab character, it would be difficult to forsee a Lebanese Government closely allied to Israel or to the West which would last very long.

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[6] Itmar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon 1970-1985 (London, 1985) p. 198-9.

In the foreseeable future, it may be unrealistic to imagine a scenario in which there would be a marked reduction in military activities between Israeli forces and the PLO-Amal fighters in the southern borders of Lebanon. This part of the Arab-Israeli confrontation is likely to continue and, perhaps, increase unless there is a permanent and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian question.

In the words of Hussein Sirriyeh, ``the failure of the 1982 invasion to achieve the desired political aims marked the collapse of the previously envisaged Israeli ``grand design'' for Lebanon. It is not yet clear whether any of the objectives entertained earlier have been decisively renounced, but Israel has certainly abandoned that of effecting internal change in Lebanon and forcing it to follow Egypt's example in entering treaty relations with Israel.''[7]

Israel cannot hope to stop even the frequent raids by the Palestinian guerrillas across its northern border. Its objectives, therefore, are rather limited; mainly a

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[7] Hussein Sirriyeh, <u>Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict</u>, (London, Brassey for IISS, 1989) p. 43.

reduction in the security risks arising from the presence
of the hostile elements of the PLO and Amal militias
in the close proximity to its northern border and the
threat posed by them to its settlements in the area.
To a great extent, this security to Israel is provided
by the double buffer created by the UNIFIL, and the
Army of South Lebanon. In addition, however, Israel relies
on its reprisal raids as a pre-emptive and preventive
policy to counter the hostile elements. Israel feels that
a strategy of limited, short duration raids will keep
the guerrillas in check and prevent local inhabitants
from cooperating with them.

Regional Military Balance : 1970-1985

West Asia has been the most crisis-prone region in
the world since the Second World War. Except for the
Iran-Iraq War, the cause for all other conflicts in the
region was the Arab-Israeli confrontation on the Palestine
issue. There were full-scale wars in 1948, 1956, 1967
and in 1973. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982
was a link in the long chain of conflicts resulting
from the struggle of Palestinians against Israel to recover
their own territory which they had lost to the Jews.

These frequent wars led to an arms race in the

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region. While the United States and some of the Western countries were supplying arms to Israel as well as to some of the Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States, the Soviet Union alongwith some of the East European countries supplied arms to the Arabs. Egypt, Syria and Iraq, in the early stages, received most of the weapons from the Soviet Union.

After the 1973 oil price hike, the Arabs were flooded with petro-dollars which enabled them to import a considerable quantity of sophisticated weapons from the United States and the Soviet Union. This made it possible for them to substantially increase the strength of their armed forces. During the period 1970 to 1980, the defence expenditure of Syria had gone up eight times, from $ (US) 460 million to $ (US) 4 billion, while the strength of its armed forces had increased three-fold. Similarly, Israel's defence expenditure had shown a large increase, from $(US) 1.71 billion in 1970 to $(US) 5.2 billion in 1980, mainly financed by US assistance. During the same period, the strength of Israeli armed forces had gone up from 75,000 to 1,69,600, the increase being more than 100 per cent over the ten-year period. Defence expenditure of Lebanon during the same period rose from $(US) 30 million to $(US) 286 million, a nine-fold

increase. The strength of Lebanese armed forces was rather modestly increased from 16,250 to 23,000. But it seems that the extra funds were used to purchase armoured personnel carriers whose strength was 46 in 1975, 80 in 1980 and 420 in 1985.(See Appendix 'G')

Between the period 1975 and 1985 the strength of PLO factions had risen to more than 10,000. In addition, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) had about 6,000 troops, mostly in Syria and some in Jordan. The PLA was equipped with about 90 T-54/55 main battle tanks (MBTs).

The shift in focus of Arab-Israeli confrontation to Lebanon because of the influx of large number of armed Palestinian fighters and their mounting activities against Israel, led to a massive induction of arms in the neighbouring countries of Syria and Israel during 1970-1985. The Lebanese Civil War and the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, though not totally an outcome of the regional arms race, could not have been so violent and long-lasting without almost all the parties to the conflict being armed to the teeth. The violent clashes which began in 1970 are still continuing unabated primarily because all the parties have enough arms and ammunition to carry on their deadly struggle for a long time to come.

Imports of Major Weapons and Sources

During the period of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1981-1982), the cost of imports of major weapons like tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft and missiles showed a sharp increase for Israel and Syria; in Israel the cost of imports went up from $(US) 520 million in 1979 to (US) 1741 million in 1981 while in Syria the increase in import costs was from $(US) 75 million in 1976 to $(US) 2590 million in 1982. For Lebanon, the import costs went up from a low of $ (US) 9 million in 1977 to a high of $(US) 315 million in 1984, mainly due to its import of 340 armoured personnel carriers during this period. (Please see Chart No. 1.)

The sudden spurt in the imports of major weapons by Israel and Syria during 1981-1982 was directly related to the needs of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in which Israel and Syria fought pitched battles on the ground and in the air. In fact, the Israeli invasion could be termed as the Arab-Israeli War of 1982. From Chart No 1, it can be seen that the cost of imports in 1981-82 increased almost as much as in the period of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973.

Chart No. 1. Imports of Major weapons 1971-1985 Israel,
Syria and Lebanon

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The main source of supply, in fact the only source
for Israel during the period 1981-85 was the United
States while during the earlier period of 1951-1970, some
weapons in small number were supplied to Israel by
France, the United Kingdom and West Germany. During the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the entire
imports of major weapons to Israel were from the United
States (Please see chart NO. 2). On the other hand,
the supplier of major weapons to Syria during the same
period was the Soviet Union. In the case of Lebanon,
the supply of major weapons was mainly from the
United States but some weapons came from France and other
Western countries like the United Kingdom and Italy.
(Please see Charts No.3 and 4).

Thus the tremendous increase in the import of weapons
during the period 1970-1985 was primarily due to the
Arab-Israeli wars of 1973 and 1982. In these arms
transfers, the client-patron relationship between the United
States and Israel and between the Soviet Union and Syria
is clearly evident. Lebanon also, because of its pro-
West leanings, had most of its imports of major weapons
coming from the United States and some other western

PRICES IN
US $
MILLION

10,000 —

9000 —

8000 —

7000 —

6000 —

5000 —

4000 —

3000 —

2000 —

1000 —

0 —

PERIOD — 1951-55   56-60   61-65   66-70   71-75   76-80   81-85

TOTAL IMPORTS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FOR EACH FIVE YEAR PERIOD
GIVEN IN U S $m AT CONSTANT (1985) PRICES, IMPORTS FROM EACH MAJOR
SUPPLIER ARE GIVEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL FOR EACH PERIOD.
SOURCE :- MICHAEL BRZOSKA AND THOMAS OHLSON ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE
THIRD WORLD 1971 - 85 (NEW YORK, OXFORD, UNIVERSITY PRESS FOR SIPRI,
1987) P-344.

Chart No. 2. Israel - Imports of Major Conventional weapons
(1951-1985)

Chart No. 3. Syria-Imports of Major Conventional weapons (1951-1985)

SCALE VERTICAL 1 CM : 25
SCALE HORIZONTAL 1CM : 2 YEARS

PRICES
IN US
$ MILLION

PERIOD

1951-55   56-60   61-65   66-70   71-75   76-80   81-85

LEGEND

USA SHOWN AS   ▦   USSR ---- ▭
FRANCE - " - " -   ▨
U K — - " — " -   ▥
ITALY — - " - " -   ▧

TOTAL IMPORTS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FOR EACH FIVE YEAR PERIOD
GIVEN IN US $m AT CONSTANT (1985) PRICES; IMPORTS FROM EACH MAJOR
SUPPLIER ARE GIVEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL FOR EACH PERIOD.
SOURCE :- MICHAEL BRZOSKA AND THOMAS OHLSON ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE
THIRD WORLD 1971- 85 (NEWYORK, OXFORD, UNIVERSITY PRESS FOR SIPRI,
1987) P·345.

Chart   No.   4.   Lebanon-Imports   of   Major   conventional
weapons   1951-1985

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countries.[8]

<u>Lebanese Security Forces</u>

The Civil War in Lebanon, which was at its maximum intensity during 1975-1976 and continues on its violent course even today, had brought the country to the brink of disintegration by polarising major communities in different regions of Lebanon. The weakening of the Lebanese state structure because of the Civil War and divisions in its political and social system was one of the major reasons for outside interference in the country's internal affairs, first by the PLO and then by Syria and Israel. The climactic 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, destroyed the remaining framework of the political and security system of the state.

However, all these tragic events in the recent history of Lebanon were the result of the Government's neglect of Lebanese security concerns. With an estimated population of 3.5 million in 1984 its defence budget was only $ (US) 286 million as against Israel with a population

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[8] Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, <u>Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-85</u> (New York, 1987) p. 334, 344, 345, 349.

of 4.2 million in 1985 and a defence budget of $ (US) 5.2 billion and Syria with a population of 10.9 million and a defence budget of $ (US) 4 billion in 1980.

It is obvious from the above figures that the Government of Lebanon did not take adequate measures to ensure its internal or external security. The total strength of the armed forces of Lebanon was only 20,000 in 1980 with another 5,000 in para-military forces. These forces were neither enough to tackle the growth of internal militias nor could they deal effectively with any external forces. The weakness of the Lebanese security forces was, therefore, a major cause of the Civil War of 1975-76 and the Israeli invasion of 1982.

A government backed by a strong army, like Jordan or Egypt, could have easily controlled and checked the growth of local militias as well as the activities of armed Palestinian guerrillas and prevented Israeli incursions in southern Lebanon. With the presence of a strong Lebanese Army, there would have been no justification for the presence of 30,000 Syrian troops for internal security duties.

The moral is clear. Whether it is Lebanon or Sri Lanka, Afghanistan or India, the security forces of the state must be more than adequate to cope with all types of internal and external threats.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION : LIMITS OF MILITARY POWER

`` This people will listen and listen,
but not understand;
they will look and look, but not see,
because their minds are dull,
and they have stopped up their ears
and have closed their eyes''.

                                        - Matthew, XIII, 14-15.

Death of a Nation

While the Civil War of 1975-76 polarised the Christian
and Muslim communities and split the Lebanese armed forces
along communal lines, the Israeli invasion of 1982, the
direct outcome of the conditions created by the Civil
War, practically divided the country into regions of
influence of various Lebanese militia forces, the PLO,
Syria and Israel. Therefore, the country's central
Government was no longer able to administer, or control
any of the activities of its citizens. In fact, there
was no single central authority any more. During the
last two years, there have emerged two rival and competing
centres of power, one under the Muslim Prime Minister

Salim al-Hoss and the other under the Lebanese Army Commander, General Michel Aoun.

In the fertile soil of sectarian divisions, which had existed since early history and normally kept under control by political agreements, the influx of large numbers of armed Palestinian guerrillas in early 1970s upset the fragile political balance and brought about a degree of militarisation the outcome of which was the Lebanese Civil War and the Israeli military intervention. Completely ignoring the crucial role of the United States in the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict, Henry Kissinger says,

``I think with sadness of these civilised men who in a turbulent part of the world had fashioned a demo- cratic society based on genuine mutual respect of religions. Their achievements did not survive. The passions sweep- ing the area were too powerful to be contained by subtle constitutional arrangements. As it had attempted in Jordan, the Palestinian movement wrecked the delicate balance of Lebanan's stability. Before the peace process could run its course, Lebanon was torn apart. Over its prostrate body at this writing all the factions and forces of the Middle East still chase their eternal dreams and act

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out their perennial nightmares."[1]

Factors of Geography and History

The mountain fastnesses of Lebanon provided refuge
to a large number of persecuted minorities of the region.
The various Christian communities like the Maronites, the
Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics, as well as the
various sects of the Muslim community like the Sunnis,
the Shias and the Druzes settled in Lebanon from A.D.
500 onwards in different areas of the country. These
communities existed independently of each other under their
own feudal chiefs. Even today most of Lebanon lives under
feudal conditions with patron-client relationships between
the leaders and the people. Most of the leadership is
still dynastic, with the son taking over from the father
as in the case of Chamouns, Franjiehs, Jumblatts and
Gemayels.

In earlier times there was no cause for conflict
as long as the sectarian groups kept to their own areas.
There was plenty of land for cultivation and cattle
breeding, no unemployment and no pressure on land. As
the population grew in the nineteenth and twentieth

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[1] Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheavel (London, 1982) p. 789.

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centuries, and cultivable land became scarce, the excess
population moved to cities on the coast creating an urban
problem due to overcrowding, extreme poverty alongside
over-indulgence by the rich business community thereby
superimposing a social divide on the existing sectarian
disparities. While most of the Maronite Christians were
well-off, as were some Sunnis, the majority of Shias
was poor and had to work hard for a living. This schism
divided the Lebanese society into two distinct group;
the Christian right and the Muslim left, the former
favouring the status quo while the latter agitated for
a change in the political system.

Demographic Changes

According to the 1932 census, the Christian popu-
lation was in a majority in Lebanon and the Muslims
formed a large minority. Therefore, the political agree-
ment accepted at that time by both the communities, known
as the ''National Pact'' of 1943 laid down the ratio
of 6:5 between the Christian and Muslim groups for the
purpose of allotment of seats in Parliament as well as
for filling all administrative jobs. By the 1950s and
1960s, it was reliably estimated that the Muslims had
become a clear majority due to higher birthrate and also
due to the migration of Christians. This demographic change

needed a revision of the working ratio for the purpose of allotment of parliamentary seats and government jobs. However, this change has been resisted by the Christian community so far as it wants to maintain the status quo to retain its predominent role in the Lebanese society.

Rise of Pan-Arabism

The Pan-Arab movement under President Nasser of Egypt supported Muslim left-wing groups in Lebanon, which became better united and organised. They strongly supported the Palestinians against Israel and wanted the Lebanese Government to adopt a similar posture. However, the Government, dominated by the Maronite Christian group, wished to emphasise the Lebanese and pro-West character of the state and therefore, it was opposed to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and any involvement in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon which was later augmented by the massive influx of Palestinian guerrillas and armed fighters of the PLO, numbering close to 10,000 became the catalyst for turning a political confrontation into an armed Civil War in 1975-76. Itamar Rabinovich describes the impact of Palestinian presence in Lebanon as follows:

``The unsettling effect of political changes was magnified by the presence in Lebanon of the chief bases

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and headquarters of the PLO and most of its constituent organisations. Until 1968, the Lebanese polity viewed the Palestinian problem as essentially one of refugees-some 180,000 of them came to Lebanon during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49. However, in the 1960s the Palestinian armed organisations had established their headquarters and several military and operational bases in Lebanon, from where they mounted raids against Israel, which in turn, invited Israeli reprisals against Lebanese villages in southern Lebanon and elsewhere. This new reality was a manifold challenge to the Lebanese state. For one thing, the state's authority and sovereignty were subverted by extra-territorial enclaves and an armed force that, unlike the traditional Lebanese militias, was not integrated into the political system. Second, relations between Christians and Muslims were further exacerbated by their different attitudes to the Palestinian issue."[2]

Syrian and Israeli Interests

Most of the present territory of Lebanon was not so long ago a part of Syria, and was added to ``Greater Lebanon'' only in 1920 when the new Republic of Lebanon

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[2] Itamar Rabinovich, The War For Lebanon, 1970-1985 (London, 1985) pp. 40-41-42.

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was created by the French. Syria, therefore, has a
sentimental and historical attachment to Lebanon and there
has been some talk about a ``Greater Syria'' which would
unite the present two countries. In fact, this was very
much on the cards when Egypt and Syria formed a Union
in the 1950s. Syria expected Lebanon also to join this
Union as the third member. However, the Maronite-
Christian-dominated government wanted to maintain its
own identity and a western orientated foreign policy.
This became one of the divisive issues in the
country.

In addition to historical attachments, Syria had a
strategic interest also in its soft left flank and to
ensure that there was no possibility of any Israeli
infiltration through Lebanon. This was possible only if
the Government in Lebanon could be brought under Syrian
influence. Therefore, during the Civil War and through-
out the last fifteen years of the conflict, Syria has
maintained 20,000 to 30,000 troops in Lebanon to prevent
any long-term Israeli influence in the country and to
foil any attempt to partition it. However, the Syrian
presence has always been opposed by the Maronite Chris-
tian forces. In the recent past, General Michel Aoun
has been insisting on withdrawal of Syrian forces from

Lebanon before he would agree to discuss any changes in the Constitution to provide equal representation to the Muslim majority community.

On the other hand, Israel has a vital interest in securing its northern borders with Lebanon to prevent frequent raids mounted across it by the Palestinian armed guerrillas from their bases in southern Lebanon. Israel would also like to have a government in Lebanon which was pro-Israel and which would stop any military activities by the PLO against Israel and not allow them to have bases in Lebanon. Israeli support to Christian factions during the Civil War and during the 1982 invasion was to achieve these aims. The short-lived 1983 Israeli-Lebanese agreement was the climax of the close and growing relationship between Israel and the Lebanese Christian right-wing groups.

With these opposing and divergent interests between Syria and Israel in Lebanon, it is not surprising that the two countries acted as patrons to their client militias. By providing them with weapons of heavy calibre they significantly increased the intensity of the Civil War which in turn resulted in a greater degree of violence over a much longer period and became almost impossible

to control either by the forces of the Lebanese state
or by the forces of Syria and Israel.

Iran and Iraq in Lebanon

After the Islamic revolution in Iran, its Shi'ite
leadership has been actively supporting the Muslim groups
against the Christian-dominated regime in Lebanon. Iran
also pledged to fight Israel and supported the Pales-
tinian demand to return to their homeland in Palestine.
During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Iran sent
about 500 to 2000 Islamic Revolutionary Guards to counter
the Israeli invasion. The other major aims of Iran were
to support the radical fundamentalists in their goal of
establishing an Islamic Fundamentalist state to counter
any Iraqi influence and to enhance Iranian influence in
the region. However, the impact of ''realpolitik'' was
quite in evidence in the relations between Iran and Israel.
These two countries, while fighting each other in Lebanon,
had reached a secret agreement under which Israel was
supplying American weapons and spares to Iran for its
military equipment supplied by the USA during the Shah's
regime.

In addition, Iran's fundamentalist Islamic regime was

also reported to be financing the ``Hezbollah'' militia of about 3,500 (it had a reserve force of another 25,000) with the objectives of establishing an Iranian-style revolutionary Shi'ite Islamic regime, eradicating non-Islamic influence, purging Lebanon of Western interests, eliminating the State of Israel and becoming the sole representative of the Lebanese Muslim community. ``Islamic Amal'', with a strength of about 1,000 fighters, and with a Shi'ite fundamentalist orientation, was also being supported by Iran under the general guidance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Beirut. It carried out joint military operations in co-ordination with ``Hezbollah''.

Another paradox in the Lebanese quagmire was the supply of military equipment by Iraq to right-wing Christian forces under General Michel Aoun who was fighting the Syrian Forces in Lebanon and asking for their withdrawal. The Iraqi interests at this stage were to oppose the presence of Syrian troops and to increase Iraqi influence in Lebanon. The long-standing rivalry between Iraqi and Syrian leadership was the cause of this split in Arab support to left-wing Muslim and Palestinian cause against right-wing Christian

groups and Israel.[3]

The fusion of Iraninan-type Islamic fundamentalism and the extreme wing of the PLO in southern Lebanon against Israel is described by Walid Khalidi as follows.

''The rise of the radical PLO in the mid 1960s was as much a revolt against moderate Arab regimes and their Western sponsors as against Israel. The PLO strategy of seeking bases in Arab countries for operations against Israel led to destabilisation of Jordan in 1970-71 and contributed to the disintegration of Lebanon. It took the PLO's operations against Israel and Israel's scorched earth strategy against southern Lebanon (which was designed to pit its Shi'ite inhabitants against the PLO) to make a new breed of Shi'ite militants receptive to Ayatollah Khomeini's message and install Iranian-style fundamental-ism on Israel's northern borders.''[4]

The Super-powers

The global rivalry between the United States and

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[3] ''The Middle East'', Defence and Diplomacy (Washington) May 1989, Vol 7(5) pp. 56-57.

[4] Walid Khalidi, ''Towards Peace in the Holy Land'', Foreign Affairs, Spring 1988, p. 774.

the Soviet Union had its impact on the main issue under dispute in West Asia; the Arab-Israeli confrontation on the Palestinian question. While the tripartite aggression by Israel, Britain and France against Egypt in 1956 was condemned by the Soviet Union as well as the United States, in the wars of 1967 and 1973 the United States supplied modern, sophisticated weapons including electronic countermeasure equipment and intelligence to Israel, and the Soviet Union armed Egypt and Syria during the 1950s and the 1960s. Iraqi and Libyan forces also were trained and armed by the Soviet Union. From this, it is evident that the United States and the Soviet Union were actively in the race for making friends and influencing people in West Asia, a region of considerable strategic importance to both of them. The major interest of the United States in the region was its oil-producing capability, so vital for the economic growth of the West, while the Soviet Union was keen on having friendly regimes on its south-western periphery.

During the last 15 years, while several attempts have been made to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute on the Palestinain issue, its impact has primarily been on the Lebanese scene. Firstly, there was the Civil War of 1975-76 caused due to the sharp division in

the Lebanese society by pro-Arab and pro-Israeli groups. And this conflict in varying intensity continues till this day. The polarisation of the two major communities of Lebanon, invited intervention, first from Syria and then from Israel, both supporting their rival clients.

The American support to Israel and the Soviet support to Syria during the period of the Lebanese Civil War and during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, is clearly shown by the extent of arms transfers by these countries to their clients. During the period 1971-85, almost the total arms transfer to Israel and Syria were from the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. The close links between the Lebanese Government and the West resulted in arms transfers from the United States, France, Britain and Italy.

The secret ``strategic understanding'' between the USA and Israel is now well known. Under this agreement the USA will obtain base and maintenance facilities in Israel to meet any emergency situation in West Asia. In pursuance of this goal, the United States will continue to support Israel by military and economic assistance.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon could never have

been mounted in 1982 except with tacit agreement of the United States. The close liaison between the Israeli secret Service ''Mossad'' and the US Central Intelligence Agency with the intelligence wing of the Christian Lebanese militia is well known. That the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was cleared by the United States is confirmed by Philip Mattar.

''In 1982 Israel received 'green light' from the Secretary of State Alexander Haig to undertake an of-fensive in Lebanon after the PLO had observed a US negotiated cease-fire for almost a year. The scale of that war far exceed expectations, and the consequences were disastrous for Israel, the US, and the region as a whole. The war took the lives of almost 500 Israeli soldiers and nearly 18,000 Palestinians and Lebanese more than 80 per cent of them civilians. The US, which had sent in Marines, extricated itself from Lebanon only at great cost in terms of lives and credibility. Those lost will never be recovered; and despite America's decision to talk to the PLO, its credibility has yet to be regained.''[5]

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[5] Philip Mattar, ''The Critical Moment For Peace'' in <u>Foreign Policy</u> (New York) no 76, Fall 1989 pp. 141-159.

American involvement in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
in 1982 and its evil consequences for the United States
seems to have had a sobering effect on American policy
during the last five years. To quote Walid Khalidi again:

``The Israeli hope of dealing a death blow to
Palestinian nationalism by the military destruction of
the PLO led to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon; for the
first time, Israel laid siege to and occupied an Arab
capital. The perceived opportunity afforded by the departure
of the PLO from Beirut induced the US (with not a little
encouragement from Israel) to assume the anachronistic
task of reconstructing Lebanon around the Maronite Christian
minority in colossal disregard of other Lebanese sects
and the heritage of the ancient city of Damascus next
door. The result was the tragic loss of American lives
and the first skirmish in history between America and
Syria, in which two American planes were shot down and
another American pilot was taken prisoner.''

Khalidi continues:

``The bizarre chain of events only grew longer.
Lebanon's central institutions broke down totally, creating
an ideal environment for anarchy and the unfettered pursuit
of vengeance through the taking of American and other
Western hostages. Eventually, the trail led to White House

pre-occupation with the release of hostages and to the scandal of the Iran-Contra operation.''[6]

More recently, the United States has sponsored direct talks between Israel and the PLO to bring about a solution to the Palestinian question, the resolution of which, many believe, would help solve the Lebanese crisis by removing the Palestinians in general and the PLO in particular from the Lebanese scene. The United States has also called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza strip and self-determination for the people of the area.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been calling for an early international peace conference on West Asia to be attended by all the countries concerned with the Palestinian issue. It is opposed to the American strategy of separate deals in the region like the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt. It wants to discuss a comprehensive treaty which would bring about a durable peace in the region and be acceptable to all the parties. The policy objectives of the Soviet Union were clear

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[6] Walid Khalidi, n. 4, pp. 774-775.

from its opposition to the Camp David Agreement and the subsequent Brezhnev Plan proposed after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

The Soviet Union is the major arms supplier to Syria and the PLO. However, it has suffered some loss of credibility due to the poor performance of its weapons against US supplied arms of Israel. When compared with the United States, Soviet policy in West Asia has been on a low key and its political and diplomatic support to the Arabs has been lukewarm thereby giving a propaganda handle to anti-Soviet elements in the Arab world.

There are several reasons for the Soviet Union's low-key approach in West Asia. Firstly it was keen to avoid any confrontation with the United States in the region. If it had intervened on behalf of the PLO or Syria, it would have invited US retaliation. Secondly, with the lack of Arab support to Syria and the Palestinians in the Lebanese crisis, it may have been counter-productive to support Syria and the PLO directly. And lastly, the Soviet Union had been fairly preoccupied with other major concerns like Afghanistan, Eastern Europe and the War in the Gulf between Iran and Iraq.

Lebanon: A Case Study

Lebanon provides a classic example of a small state plagued by internal divisions at the lowest level which have been brought to sharp focus by the presence of the PLO armed fighters. This polarisation of rival political groups and their militarisation in the form of sectarian militias has totally brutalised the Lebanese society. At the regional level, the Arab-Israeli confrontation over the Palestinian question has superimposed itself on the internal divisions in Lebanon. The global super-power rivalry, at a third and final level, has played, perhaps, a most significant part in the Lebanese crisis, since the major source of all weapons supplied to the rival internal and regional forces are the two super-powers. Without these weapons, neither Syria nor Israel, nor their clients in Lebanon, could have managed to escalate the violence and the duration of the conflict to a degree where it is impossible to control it.

Lebanon is an outstanding case study of a state with internal divisions and diversities based on commu-nal, sectarian, social and economic factors, trying to solve its political crisis by violent means and in the process falling prey to outside military intervention. Neither the internal security forces and the armed forces

of Lebanon nor the intervening troops from Syria and Israel or the Multi-National Forces (MNF) have been able to solve the crisis. It appears that military intervention from outside has further worsened the conditions in the fragile Lebanese state to the extent that today Lebanon has no viable existence.

Such crisis situations may be developing in several other regions of the Third World. Political divisions caused by ethnic, sectarian, communal and economic factors have clearly emerged in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Burma, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda and Nicaragua. In Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, internal divisions could not be solved by military means within the country and foreign forces were invited to intervene and control the situation. However, in both the countries, foreign military forces had to be withdrawn after considerable losses on both sides without any significant improvement in the internal situation. The USSR, though a superpower is experiencing its own ethnic problems on its south-western periphery.

In developing countries like India, there is a conflict between greater autonomy for states and a strong centre. Increased autonomy for regions with a weak centre

may cause a break-up of the State as in the Lebanese case. Therefore, while giving more powers to the states in every field, the central authority must be strengthened by having exclusive control and management of all internal security forces and the armed forces of the state.

Lebanese Security Forces

The un-checked growth of various Lebanese militias and the increased military activities of the PLO guerrilla fighters inside Lebanon was a clear indication of the inadequacy of the Lebanese state machinery for internal security functions as well as for tackling better organised, better trained and better armed Palestinian guerrillas. The total internal security force of about 10,000, and about 20,000 strong Lebanese Army, divided as it was on a sectarian basis, was no match for Israel or Syria with armed forces strength of 1,50,000 and 3,42,000. (see Appendix 'G')

It would be useful to analyse the causes for this weakness in the Lebanese state machinery. Lebanon, which was the most progressive, West-oriented and politically successful among all the states of West Asia till 1975, did not posses an effective machinery to ensure its own survival.

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The inadequacy of the security forces for the protection of the state could be due to the following reasons :

(i) The Christian-dominated government of Lebanon was rather complacent and did not visulaise any internal or external threat of major dimensions with which it could not cope. In case such a threat did arise, it was hoped that the United States, France and other Western Christian nations would come to its assistance as they had done in the past.

(ii) Even the small Lebanese Army and para-military forces were ill-equipped, ill-trained and in poor discipline to perform effectively against the Militias and the PLO. Their motivation was also low because of their sectarian composition which affected their political orientation. To being with, the Army kept away from fighting in the Civil War but when it did try to intervene in the fighting, its various sects broke away and joined their own sectarian militias.

(iii) The Lebanese Army was officered mainly by the Christian community while most of the other ranks were Lebanese Shias. With the increasing polarisation of rival

communities, the _esprit de corps_, which is a hall-mark of an army between its officers and men, was lost with growing divergence between the Christian and Shi'ite communities. In 1987-88, there were a total of 10 nominal brigades split-up as follows:

(i) with Christian forces (6 nominal brigades);

(ii) with Druze forces (1 nominal brigade);

(iii) with Sunni forces (2 nominal brigades); and

(iv) with Shi'ite forces (1 nominal brigades).

According to reliable reports, there were no longer any truly ``national'' forces. The Lebanese Army had split up and its various sects had joined the militias of the sects to which they belonged.[7]

Influence of Outside Forces

The Syrian Army came into Lebanon during the Civil War of 1975-76 at the invitation of the Lebanese Christian group which was losing out to the militias of Druzes and other left-wing Muslim groups. It intervened since any change in the status quo in favour of the Muslim

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[7] ``Lebanon'' _The Military Balance: 1987-1988_ (London, IISS, 1987) pp. 104-105.

group would have resulted in Israeli retaliation and a war between Israel and Syria, which Syria wanted to avoid. During the war when Christian forces began pressing on the Muslim militias, the Syrians changed sides and began supporting the left-wing Muslim groups.

The Syrian military presence in Lebanon was regularised and enhanced by the Six-party Arab Summit Conference held at Riyadh on 16-18 October 1976. The summit Conference decided that the 30,000 Syrian Army would become a part of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to remain in Lebanon till such time that the Lebanese forces could be reorganised for maintenance of law and order within the country. With the total break-up of the Lebanese Army during the Civil War and further fragmentation during the Israeli invasion, there was no hope of putting the Lebanese Army on its feet in the foreseeable future and, therefore, no possibility of Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon. The Syrian Army, while unable to control the divisive forces, has tried to maintain status quo for the time being and continues to remain in Lebanon to safeguard its national interests by installing, if possible, a friendly regime in Lebanon.

The influence of Israeli forces, on the other hand,

has been more destructive than helpful in resolving the crisis facing Lebanon. The Israeli invasion of 1982 was aimed at solving the Lebanese crisis to its own advantage by forcing the PLO fighters to evacuate Lebanon and by installing a pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon with whom Israel signed a peace treaty in 1983. These measures proved short-lived, since the PLO fighters returned to southern Lebanon to operate against Israel, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement was abrogated by the Lebanese Government under Syrian pressure and the Lebanese Government had to adopt a pro-Syrian and pro-Arab policy in order to maintain control, however limited, over its own people.

Israel, however, continues to provide weapons to the Christian militias to enable them to maintain pressure on the PLO and the left-wing Muslim groups in Lebanon. Any change in the status quo, in which at present the pro-Israeli right wing Christian groups play a pre-dominant role, would not be in Israeli interests. Therefore, it is in Israeli interest to continue the supply of weapons to Christian factions and thus prolong the Lebanese civil war as long as possible.

Commenting on the foreign military intervention in Lebanon, Dr Michel Aboukhater, Ambassaor of Lebanon in

India, blamed the presence of foreign troops, whether Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian or Iranian, for the present crisis. He was confident that if these foreign forces were withdrawn from Lebanese territory, the internal political dispute could be resolved by peaceful negotiations between the various Lebanese groups and a settlement reached on the lines of 1943 ``National Pact''. He asserted that there was no ``civil war'' in Lebanon but only a conflict situation, like in Punjab and Kashmir and the Sind and Baluchistan regions of Pakistan. This conflict situation was created by foreign interests for their own ends. He described the war in Lebanon as ``other people's war'' conducted to achieve the American Jewish design known as ``the Kissinger Plan'' which denied the Palestinians their right to return to Palestine by settling them in Lebanon.[8]

On the other hand, Dr. Khalid al-Sheikh, Ambassador of Palestine in India, disagreed with the view that the Palestinians were the cause of the Lebanese conflict. According to his assessment, the root cause of the Lebanese crisis was the internal political division between the

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[8] In an interview with the author in New Delhi on May I, 1990.

Christian and the Muslim groups on account of power-sharing problems arising out of demographic changes. He, however, agreed that military intervention by Israel, Syria, the United States and France had escalated the Lebanese conflict. Dr Sheikh did not expect any major breakthrough in Lebanon unless the fundamental problem creating the Arab-Israeli confrontation - the Palestinian issue - was resolved. He was of the view that the United States, France and other Western countries were not keen to settle the Palestinian issue at present[9].

Talking about the global design of the superpowers in West Asia Dr. Dahane Ahmed Mahmoud, Chief Representative of the Arab League in India, held the Western powers responsible for the ``original sin''of creating the State of Israel in the midst of Arab people of Palestine, This led to the eviction of more than two million refugees who settled in the neighbouring Arab states, including 500,000 in Lebanon. The creation of Israel in Palestine also led to wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. These wars destabilised the whole region and resulted in an arms race of colossal

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[9] In an interview with the author in New Delhi on May 2, 1990.

magnitude. Dr Mahmoud was not hopeful about the pros-
pects of peace in Lebanon unless the larger problem of
peace in West Asia between the Arabs and Israel was
solved. However, peace appeared a distant goal because
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was doing
anything substantive in this direction. He was also of
the view that the superpowers appeared to be interested
in maintaining conflict situations in the developing coun-
tries, in order to weaken the emerging nations from their
colonial past and also to find ready markets for the
weapons becoming surplus in the developed world due to
recent arms control agreements.[10]

One major theme during the discussions with the Arab
Ambassadors in New Delhi was the paramount importance of
finding a solution to the long-standing Palestinian issue.
Without resolving the Arab-Israeli confrontation on Palestine
there can be no comprehensive peace in West Asia.

Military Dimensions

The Lebanese Civil War of 1975-76, which is con-
tinuing for the last 15 years, has its genesis in the

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[10] In an interview with the author in New Delhi on
May 4,1990.

political crisis caused by demographic changes in the Lebanese population. A new political settlement between the rival Christian and Muslim communities on the lines of the 1943 ''National Pact'' but with proportionate increase in the ratio in favour of the Muslims who had now become the majority community would have resolved the political crisis. However, this was not done. On the other hand, the Christian-dominated government tried to maintain the status quo and suppressed by military means the rising political expectations of the Muslim community. In this situation of confrontation, the growth of sectarian militias was the natural outcome and the Civil War its final result.

The fragmentation of Lebanon, which began with the Civil War of 1975-76, was completed with the Israeli military invasion of the country in 1982. The military dimensions of the Lebanese Civil War can be appreciated by looking at the figures of arms transfers to Syria and Israel during the period 1978-82.

Imports of major weapons (in US $ million)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
(i) Israel	877	520	1170	1741	1008
(ii) Syria	488	1330	1810	1834	2590

(The sharp rise in arms transfers to Israel and Syria during the period 1980-1982 is clearly seen in Chart No. 1)

The growth of the Israeli and Syrian armed forces during the period 1970-1985, was as follows :   -

	1970	1975	1980	1985
(i) Israel	75,000	1,45,500	1,69,600	1,42,000[11]
(ii) Syria	86,750	1,37,000	2,46,000	3,45,500

During the same period the total armed fores of Lebanon had remained around 20,000. But the forces for internal security had been increased from about 5,000 to 13,000. [12] (Please see Appendix 'G' for comparative growth of the armed forces of Lebanon, Israel and Syria during 1970-1985).

Emerging East-West Detente and Arms Transfers

There is a growing perception that the cold war between the Unites States and the Soviet Union has ended thus introducing a new era of arms reductions in the

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[11] Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson; Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-85, (New york, 1987), pp. 334, 344, 345, 349.

[12] The Military Balance 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990.(London , IISS)

NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. These expected cuts in nuclear and conventional forces in Europe and the resultant surplus of arms will find their way to the sensitive regions of the Third World. In addition, till the arms production factories in the West and in the East change over to production of goods for civilian consumption, there will be excess production of weapons for which markets have to be found. In this situation of markets being flooded with arms, their easy availability will encourage rival groups to take to the path of violence. It is likely that the surplus arms in the international markets are already finding their way into the Lebanese quagmire. There are also some reports that in Lebanon arms are purchased by various militias from the profits made by illicit trading in drugs which are grown by each faction in its own area.

The influence of surplus weapons and their easy availability to the countries of the Third World can be well-imagined in radically changing the nature of the internal and external conflicts. Countries like the Philippines, Burma, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh which have internal insurgency problems could find themselves in much greater trouble if the insurgents were better armed with huge stocks of weapons

and ammunition. For smaller states like Sri Lanka and Burma, such insurgency would be difficult to control without external military assistance, which has its own problems as witnessed in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Lebanon.

While in the industrialised West there has been a movement towards unification between states despite differences in race, language and culture, in the developing countries of Africa and Asia ethnic, religious and linguistic differences are creating divisions an' diver- sities leading to insurgent movements and violence. South Asia in particular, is suffering from this malady at present. From Afghanistan in the north to Sri Lanka in the south and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh in between, terrorism, extremism and insurgency appear to be taking roots everywhere. It is also evident that the central state authority is not strong enough to resolve the issues by political or military means. In most of these countries shades of Lebanon are clearly visible.

Further, these internal divisions which lead to crisis situation within the country tend to invite outside intervention and thus create conditions for a regional confrontation between neighbouring states in which the superpowers get involved. This escalation of the inter-

nal crisis to regional and global levels and superim-
position of interests of such large numbers of actors
on the local conflict, makes it difficult to resolve
the original differences. External military involvement,
in most cases, often tends to worsen the situation.

Outlook in Lebanon

The present situation does not give much hope for
the future. The internal problem created due to demo-
graphic changes could be politically resolved by the two
rival groups in Lebanon. It is generally believed that
there will be no solution to the internal crisis in
Lebanon unless the larger Palestinian problem is resolved.

The Arab-Israeli confrontation and its fall-out in
the region in the form of Palestinian refugees and the
PLO's armed guerrilla fighters operating against Israel
from bases in southern Lebanon are an impediment to any
peace process in the region. It is difficult to foresee
peace in Lebanon without peace in West Asia. Lebanon
is too deeply involved in the major issue causing
instability in the region.

Finally, one major lesson concerning the military
dimension of the Lebanese conflict stands out clearly.

It is that no military power, whether global, regional or internal, has been able to crack the tough nut of the Lebanese crisis. The mighty Marine Corps of America with their Sixth Fleet cruising in the Mediterranean, the French Fleet threatening the Lebanese coast at will, the world-famous Israeli Army, and the 30,000 strong Syrian armed presence inside Lebanon, as well as the numerous Lebanese militias, have totally failed to achieve a political settlement of the Lebanese conflict. In fact, the employment of military power to bring about peace in Lebanon has been counter-productive as can be seen in the total fragmentation of the Lebanese State.

Therefore, Clausewitz's dictum, that a clear-cut political goal and the military capability to achieve it, keeping in view the forces of friction, is vital before the political process can be pursued by other (military) means.

THE CAIRO AND MELKART AGREEMENTS *

The Cairo Agreement, 3 November 1969

On Monday, 3 November 1969 the Lebanese delegation headed by Army Commander Emile Bustani and the PLO delegation headed by Yasser Arafat met in Cairo ... It was agreed to re-establish the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the basis of :

1. The right of Palestinians presently living the Lebanon to work, reside and move freely;

2. The establishment of local committees from Palestinians living in the camps to look after the interests of the Palestinians there, in cooperation with the local authorities and within the context of Lebanese sovereignty;

3. The presence of command centres for the Palestine Armed Struggle Command inside the camps to cooperate with the local authorities and guarantee good relations. These

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Source:

* Istvan Pogany, The Arab League and Peace Keeping in the Lebanon, (Aldershot, Avebury, 1987) p. 198.

centres will handle arrangements for the carrying and regulation of arms within the camps, taking into account both Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution;

4. Permission for Palestinian residents in Lebanon to join the Palestinian revolution through armed struggle within the limits imposed by Lebanese security and sovereignty.

Commando Operations

It was agreed to facilitate operations by (Palestinian) commandos through :

1) Assisting commando access to the border and the specification of access points and observations posts in the border region;

2) Ensuring the use of the main road to the Arqub region;

3) Control by the Palestine Armed Struggle Command of the actions of all members of its organisations and to prevention of any interference in Lebanese affairs;

4) The pursuit of mutual cooperation between the Palestine Armed Struggle Command and the Lebanese Army;

5) An end of the media campaigns by both sides;

6) A census of the complement of the Palestine Armed

Struggle Command through its leadership;

7) The appointment of representatives of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command to the Lebanese High Command;

8) Study of the distribution of suitable concentration points in the border region to the Lebanese High Command;

9) Organisation of the entry, exit and movement of Palestine Armed Struggle elements;

10) Abolition of the Jainoun base;

11) Assistance by the Lebanese Army in the work of medical centres, and evacuation and supply for commando operations;

12) Release of all internees and confiscated arms;

13) Acceptance that the civil and military lebanese authorities will continue to exercise effective responsibility to the full in all regions of Lebanon and under all circumstances;

14) Confirmation that the Palestine Armed Struggle acts for the benefit of Lebanon as well as for the Palestinian revolution and for all Arabs.

The Melkart Agreement, 17 May 1973

Both parties eagerly agree to serve the Palestinian cause and to continue its struggle, and to preserve the independence of Lebanon and its sovereignty and stability, and in the light of contracted agreements and Arab

decisions, comprising: the Cairo agreement and all its annexes; agreements concluded between Lebanon and the leadership of the resistance forces; and decisions taken at the Joint Arab Defence Council; it was agreed on all points as follows:

Presence in the Camps of Personnel

1) No commando presence;

2) Formation of permanent Palestine Armed Struggle Command units;

3) Confirmation of militia presence for the guarding and internal protection of the camps. By militia is understood Palestinians residing in the camps who are not members of the resistance force and who practise normal civilian duties;

4) Establishment of a guardpost for Lebanese internal security forces at a location to be agreed upon close to each camp.

Presence in the Camps of Arms

1) The militia will be permitted to carry light arms individually;

2) No medium or heavy weapons will be permitted

within the camps (e.g. mortars, rocket-launchers, artillery, anti-tank weapons etc.)

Presence in the Border Regions

1) Western sector: presence and concentration outside the camp is forbidden.

2) Central sector: According to agreements made at the meeting between the Lebanese High Command and the resistance forces leadership on 8 October 1972: Presence will be permitted outside Lebanese villages in certain areas by agreement with the local Lebanese sector commander. Resistance forces are not permitted east and south of the line running Al-Kusair/Al-Ghandouriya/Deir Kifa/Al-Shihabia/Al-Salasel/Al-Saltania/Tabnin/Haris/Kafra/Sadikin/Qana. This prohibition applies to all these points inclusively. Concentration of resistance forces at a guard post south of Hadatha is permitted. The number allowed is between five and ten men in civilian clothes, with all military appearance to be avoided. They will be supplied by animal transport. At all these places the total number permitted must not exceed 250.

3) Eastern sector: According to decisions taken by the Lebanese High Command and the resistance forces leadership, three bases will be permitted in the southern

Arqub at Abu-Kamha AL Kharbiya (Al-Shahid Salah base) and Rashaya Al-Fakhar (Jabal al-Shahr). Each base will contain no more than 30 to 35 men each. Supply for these bases will be by motor-transport. Elements at these bases will be forbidden to proceed in the direction of Marjayoun unless they have a permit. The carrying of arms in Marjoyoun is forbidden... In the northern Arqub and at Tashaya al-Wadi, presence is permitted at a distance from the villages, but not west of the Masnaa-Hasbaya road ... At Baalbeck no commando presence is permitted except at the Nabi Sbat training base.

Note: Medium and light arms are permitted in these sectors; commando presence inside Lebanese village is not allowed; all units which have been reinforced in Lebanon from abroad will be adjusted.

Movement (in the camps)

Movement will be allowed without arms and in civilian dress.

Movement in the (frontier) areas

Movement will be allowed by arrangement with the local Lebanese commanders and according to agreement.

Movement of Civilian and Military Leaders

Military leaders will be allowed to move freely
provided they are above the rank of lieutenant, carrying
no more than a personal weapon and are accompanied by
a driver only. Civilian leaders will be supplied with
numbered permits signed by the responsible joint liaison
committee. The number of permits issued to area leadership
will be determined by the Lebanese liaison centre and
supplied under the request of the Palestinian Political
Committee in Lebanon.

Military Training

(Military) training is forbidden in the camps, but
allowed at the training base at Nabi Sbat. Technical
military training is permitted at points to be agreed
upon by arrangement with the Lebanese High Command liaison
centre. Practising with arms is forbidden outside the
training base.

Operations

All (commando) operations from Lebanese territory are
suspended according to the decisions of the Joint Arab

Defence Council. Departure from Lebanon for the purpose of commando operations is forbidden.

Command

The Palestinian side reaffirms that the chief command base is Damascus, and that Damascus office has representatives in other countries including Lebanon. The Palestinian side pledged to reduce the number of offices (in Lebanon).

Information

The Palestinian side affirmed that the resistance in Lebanon only produces :

a) Filastin al-Thawra: b) Wafa news agency in addition to certain cultural and educational publications issued by Palestinian organisations publicly or for their own use;

c) The Palestinian side pledged that these publications would not touch upon the interests and sovereignty of Lebanon;

d) the Palestinian side adheres to the abstention from broadcasting in Lebanon; e) the Palestinian side pledges not to involve Lebanon in any of its publications

or broadcast news items or announcements emanating from resistance sources in Lebanon.

Controlling COntravention and Offences

Lebanese laws will be implemented on the basis of Lebanese sovereignty and offenders will be referred to the responsible courts.

1) Contraventions in military sectors will be submitted to local liaison committees. In cases where no result is achieved, they will be referred to Higher Coordination Committee which will give an immediate decision.

2) Contraventions inside the camps will be the charge of the internal security forces in cooperation with the Palestine Armed Struggle Command, regarding the pursuit of all crimes, civil or criminal, which occur within the camps whoever the offender. They will also be responsible for delivering all legal notices and orders pronounced against persons residing in the camps. Incidents occurring in the camps between the commandos which have a bearing on the security and safety of the Palestinian revolution will be excluded from this procedure and be the responsibility of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command.

3) Contraventions outside the camps shall be subject to Lebanese law. The Palestine Armed Struggle Command

will be informed of detentions and the procedures taken against offenders. In the case of commandos being apprehended in an offence and where the Lebanese authorities deem necessary the cooperation of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command, contact will be made through the Liaison committee and the decision on the offender will be left to the Lebanese authority.

The Palestinian side condemned detention of any Lebanese or foreigners and the conduct of any investigation by resistance forces and pledged no repetition of such matters.

Regarding traffic offences, it has been agreed previously that a census would be taken of cars with Lebanese number plates under the auspices of the Internal Security Forces, and cars entering Lebanese territory under temporary licensing regulations of the customs authorities. Therefore any commando vehicle on Lebanese territory will be prohibited unless it carries a legal license according to Lebanese traffic regulations.

Foreigners

By the term foreigners it meant not Arab commandos.

The Palestinian side pledges to deport all foreigners with the exception of those engaged in non-combatant work of a civilian or humane nature (including doctors, nurses, translators and interpreters).

Co-ordination

Implementation will be supervised by the Liaison Committee and its branches in co-ordination with the Palestinian side.

Highly Confidential

Aspirations of the Palestinian side after the joint meetings

- Re-establishment of the atmosphere to its state before the incidents of 9 May 1973;
- Gradual easing of armed tension;
- Reduction of barriers of suspicion;
- Aspirations towards the cancellation of the emergency situation;
- Dealing with the matter of fugitives from the law, particularly those persons pursued as a result of the incidents of 23 April 1973;
- Freeing of those persons detained as a result of

the incidents of 2 April 1973;

- Return of arms confiscated since 1970;

- Facilitation of employment for Palestinians resident
  in Lebanon.

For the Palestine side   For the Lebanese Side

Lt-Col. Abal Zaim   Lt Col. Ahmed al-Haji

Abu Adnan   Col. Nazih Rashid
                     (Col.Salim Moghabghab)

Al Sayyid Salah Salah   Col. Dib Kamal.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE
REGARDING THE WAR IN LEBANON *

Cairo, 9 June 1976

In the course of its session, the Arab League Council considered the deteriorating situation in Lebanon and the bloody incidents that are taking place there and, in the light of its responsibility to the Arab nation, resolves the following :

1. To thank the Secretary-General of the Arab League for his initiative in calling this extraordinary session to discuss this fateful issue.

2. To call on all parties to cease fighting immediately and to consolidate such a ceasefire.

3. To form a symbolic Arab security force under the supervision of the General Secretary of the Arab League to maintain security and stability in Lebanon, which force should start to perform its task immediately,

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Source:
* Istvan Pogany, <u>The Arab League and Peace Keeping in the Lebanon</u>, (Alderslot, Avebury, 1987) p. 186

replacing the Syrian forces. The task of this Arab Security force should be brought to an end if the President-elect of the Republic of Lebanon so requests.

4. That a commission representing the League Council and consisting of the Foreign Minister of Bahrein, chairman of the session, the Secretary of the Arab League and the heads of the Algerian and Libyan delegations, should be despatched immediately to cooperate with the parties concerned in following up the situation and ensuring security and stability in Lebanon.

5. The Council calls on all the Lebanese parties to bring about comprehensive national conciliation under the auspices of the Lebanese President-elect, to ensure the maintenance of the unity of the Lebanese people and the unity of their territory and the country's sovereignty, security and stability.

6. To affirm Arab commitment to support the Palestine revolution and to protect it from all dangers, and to ensure that it is provided with everything that can increase its strength and effectiveness.

7. The Council will remain in session to follow up the situation.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY SIX-PARTY ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE HELD IN RIYADH AND RELATED DOCUMENTS*

Statement issued by Six-Party Arab Summit Conference held in Riyadh from 16 to 18 October, 1976.

On the Initiative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait, a six party conference, attended by President Mohammed Anwar El Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Hafez El Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic, President Elias Sarkis of the Lebanese Republic, Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, Ruler of the State of Kuwait, and His Majesty King Khaled bin Abdel Aziz AL Saud of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was held in Riyadh from 16 to 18 October 1976 to discuss the crisis in Lebanon, to considered ways of solving that crisis, and to agree on the steps necessary to halt the bloodshed in the country, to preserve the security., safety, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon,

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Source:

*Istvan Pogany, The Arab League and peace Keeping in the Lebanon, (Aldershot, Avebury, 1987) P. 188.

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and further to safeguard Palestinian resistance as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The Conference recognised the national and historical commitment to enhancing the collective Arab role in such a way as to ensure the settlement of the situation in Lebanon and prevent any further outbreak of hostilities.

The Conference also recognised the need to transcend the attitudes and negativism of the past, to move towards the future in spirit of conciliation, peace and construction, to provide the guarantees necessary to ensure stability and normalcy in Lebanon, to preserve Lebanese political, economic and other institutions, to maintain Lebanese sovereignty, and to ensure that continuation of Palestinian determination.

The Conference examined the situation in Lebanon and considered the measures and steps necessary to restore normalcy in that country within the context of the preservation of the country's sovereignty and independence, the solidarity of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and the collective Arab guarantee of the foregoing. The Conference decided to declare a ceasefire and an end to the fighting, and pledged the full commitment of all parties to this agreement.

The Conference further decided to reinforce existing Arab security forces, so that they might act as a deterrent force within Lebanon under the command of the President of Lebanon himself.

The Conference requested all Lebanese parties to engage in a political dialogue with the aim of achieving national reconciliation and establishing unity among the Lebanese people.

Agreement was also reached on the implementation of the Cairo Agreement and its annexes, and the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation announced his full commitment to that Agreement. In that connexion, the Conference decided to establish a committee consisting of representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Kuwait to ensure coordination with the President of Lebanon in respect of the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. The Committee's mandate will cover a period of 90 days, beginning on the date of the announcement of the ceasefire.

The Conference affirmed its commitment to the decisions of the Seventh Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat

declaring the Palestine Liberation Organisation the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people, pledging the full support of all member States of the Arab League to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, as well as their non-interference in its affairs, and confirming the Organisation's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of any Arab country.

In that connexion, the Conference affirmed that participating States would guarantee the security, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon.

The Conference also discussed the question of reconstruction in Lebanon and the cost of removing the traces of the armed conflict and making good damage affecting both the Lebanese and the Palestinian peoples.

Resolutions adopted by this Conference will be submitted to the full Arab Summit.

Annex

Resolutions of the Six-Party Arab Summit Conference held in Riyadh.

The limited Arab Summit Conference, held in Riydah from

16 to 18 October 1976, on the initiative of His Majesty
King Khalad bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and His Highness Sheikh Sabha Al Salem Al
Sabah, Ruler of the State of Kuwait,

Having reviewed the resolution adopted by the Council
of the League of Arab States at its extraordinary sessions
on 8-10 June 1976, 23 June 1976 and 1 July 1976, and
at its session on 4 September 1976.

Recognising the national commitment to preserve the
unity, security and sovereignty of Lebanon, to ensure
the continuation of Palestinian resistance, as represented
by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, recognised by
the Rabat resolutions to be the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestine people and to increase
the capacity of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to
resist threats to the existence of the Palestinian people,
their right to self-determination and their right to return
to their national soil.

Having faith in the unity of objective and destiny
binding the two fraternal Lebanese and Palestine peoples
and in the impossibility of any contradiction of interests
between these two peoples.

Determined to transcend the attitudes and negativism of the past, to face the future in a spirit of reconciliation, dialogue and cooperation, to accelerate the establishment of conditions and guarantees necessary to ensure stability and normalcy in Lebanon, to consolidate the political, economic and other institutions of Lebanon, and to enable the Palestine Liberation Organisation to attain its national goals.

Recognizing the positive and constructive spirit demonstrated by the leaders attending this Conference, as well as their sincere desire irrevocably and decisively to end the crisis in Lebanon and to overcome any disputes that might arise in the future.

Decided the following:

1. That all parties should definitively cease fire and terminate fighting in all Lebanese territories as from 6.00 a.m. on 21 October 1976, and that they shall all be fully committed thereto;

2. That existing Arab security forces should be expanded to 30,000 men so that they might become a deterrent force operating inside Lebanon under the personnel command of the President of the Lebanese Republic with,

inter alia, the following principal tasks;

(a) Ensuring observance of the ceasefire and termination of hostilities, disengaging belligerent troops and deterring any violation of the agreement.

(b) Implementing the Cairo Agreement and its annexes;

(c) Maintaining internal security.

(d) Supervising the withdrawal of armed troops to positions they held prior to 13 April 1975 and removing all military installations in accordance with the schedule set out in the enclosed annex;

(e) Supervising the collection of heavy weaponry such as artillery, mortars, rocket launchers, armoured vehicles, etc., by the parties concerned.

(f) Assisting the Lebanese authorities when necessary with respect to taking over public utilities and institutions prior to their re-opening as well as guarding public military and civilian establishments;

3. That, as a first stage, the normal situation in Lebanon, as it existed prior to the incidents (i.e. prior to 13 April 1975) will be restored in accordance with the schedule set out in the annex;

4. That the implementation of the Cairo Agreement and its annexes and the observation of the letter and spirit of their contents shall be guaranteed by the Arab

States participating in the Conference; a committee is to be established, comprising representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Kuwait to ensure co-ordination with the President of Lebanon in respect of the implementation of the Cairo Agreement and its annexes; the mandate of the said committee will cover a period of 90 days, beginning on the date of the announcement of the ceasefire;

5. That the Palestine Liberation Organisation shall affirm its respect of the sovereignty and security of Lebanon, as well as its non-interference in Lebanese internal affairs, recognising in this respect its full commitment to the national objectives of the palestinian cause. For their part, the legitimate authorities in Lebanon shall, in accordance with the Cairo Agreement and its annexes, guarantee security to the Palestine Liberation Organisation with respect to its presence and activities in Lebanese territory.

6. That the Arab States participating in the Conference pledge their respect for the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Lebanon, as well as the unity of its people;

7. That the Arab States participating in the Conferences reaffirm their commitment to the decisions

taken at the Summit Conferences held in Algiers and Rabat to support and uphold Palestinian resistance, as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and to respect the right of the Palestinian people to use all means at their disposal in their struggle to recover their national rights;

8. That, with respect to information:

(a) All publicity campaigns and psychological warfare by all parties should be stopped;

(b) Information activities should be directed towards consolidating the termination of hostilities, establishing peace and promoting a spirit of cooperation and brotherhood on all sides;

(c) Action should be taken to unify official information activities;

9. That the attached Schedule concerning the implemention of these resolutions is to be considered an integral part of the resolutions.

Signed: Ruler of the State of Kuwait
           President of the Syrian Arab Republic
           Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation
           President of the Lebanese Republic
           President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
           King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Annex

Schedule Regarding the Implementation of the Resolutions of the Six-Party Summit Conference Held in Riyadh from 16 to 18 October 1976

1. Declaration of cease-fire and termination of fighting in all Lebanese territories by all parties as from 6.00 a.m. on 21 October 1976 (D-Day).

2. Establishment of check-points by the deterrent security force after the creation of buffer zones in areas of tension in order to consolidate the cease-fire and the termination of fighting.

3. Withdrawal of all armed troops, collection of heavy weaponry and removal of military installations in accordance with the following schedule:

(a) Mount Lebanon: within five days (D-Day + 5)

(b) Southern Lebanon: within five days (D-Day + 5)

(c) Beirut and outskirts: within seven days (D-Day + 7)

(d) Northern Lebanon : within ten days (D-Day + 10).

4. Reopening of international highways:

(a) The following international highways shall be reopened within five days (D-Day +5):

  - Beirut/Al Masnaa

  - Beirut/Tripoli/The Borders

- Beirut/Tyre

- Beirut/Sidon/Marjoyoun/Al Masnaa

(b) Checkpoints and patrols shall be established along unsafe routes, and shall consist of units from the deterrent security force as agreed by the parties concerned and the commander of the said force.

5. The legitimate Lebanese authorities shall take over public, military and civilian utilities and establishments :

(a) after the removal of armed troops and non-employees, the Arab security force shall be assigned to guarding such utilities and establishments and facilitating their operation by employees who shall begin work within 10 days (D-Day + 10);

(b) the utilities and establishments shall be handed over to an official central Lebanese commission which shall, in turn, be responsible for forming a sub-committee in each utility or establishment to make an inventory of its contents and to take over.

6. The forces required to strengthen the Arab security force shall be formed in agreement with the President of the Lebanese Republic, and these forces shall arrive in Lebanon within two weeks (D-Day + 15).

7. As a second stage, the Cairo Agreement and its annexes shall be implemented, particularly those provisions

concerning the existence of weapons and ammunitions in refugee camps and the exit of those armed Palestinian forces that entered the country after the beginning of the incidents. The implementation of the agreement is to be completed within 45 days, beginning on the date of the formation of the Arab deterrent security force.

Communique concerning the first extraordinary session of the Arab summit conference.

Cairo, 25-26 October 1976

The Kings and Heads of State of the League of Arab States met in Cairo in order to examine the crisis in Lebanon, to consider ways of solving it, to protect the security, sovereignty and unity of Lebanon, to safeguard Palestinian resistance as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization and to enhance Arab solidarity.

They recognize the national and historical commitment to enhancing the collective Arab role in such a way as to ensure the settlement of the situation in Lebanon and to prevent any further outbreak of hostilities, to provide the guarantees necessary to ensure stability and normalcy, to preserve the political, economic and other

institutions of Lebanon, to preserve the country's sovereignty and to ensure the continuation of Palestinian determination.

They are convinced that the liberation of the Arab territories occupied by Palestinian people, notably the right to return to their national soil and establish their own independent state, required the further strengthening of Arab solidarity, and the mobilization of Arab efforts and potential in the service of this great cause.

They are aware of the need to help Lebanon overcome its crisis and reconstruct its economy, institutions and utilities in order to restore normal life and the country's effective role in the Arab economic domain.

They have examined the present situation in Lebanon in context of preserving Lebanese sovereignty and independence and ensuring the solidarity of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples.

They welcome the outcome of the Six-Party Arab Summit Conference in Riyadh, and express their appreciation for its achievements with respect to promoting the settlement

of the Lebanese crisis, the continuation of Palestinian resistance and the further strengthening of Arab solidarity. The Conference decides to approve the resolutions of the Six-Party Arab Summit Conference published on 18 October 1976.

The Arab Kings and Heads of State reaffirm their commitment to providing the necessary guarantees with respect to the consolidation of the ceasefire announced at 6.00 a.m. on 21 October 1976, the aim being to put an end to all forms of fighting in Lebanon, and to restore normal life there. They further reaffirm that the Arab security force will be strengthened so that it might become a deterrent force operating inside Lebanon under the personal command of the President of Lebanon.

They unanimously reject the partition of Lebanon in any form, whether legally or in practice, expressly or implicitly; they are also unanimous in their commitment to maintain Lebanon's national unity and territorial integrity, and to refrain from prejudicing the unity of its land or interfering in its internal affairs in any way.

They have also examined with great attention the

situation in southern Lebanon, and are extremely concerned over the growing number of Israeli acts of aggression against Lebanese territory, particularly in the south, as well as over Israel's persistence in its aggressive expansionist policy in Arab territories.

They further stress the importance of implementing the Cairo Agreement and its annexes, to which the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation has declared his full commitment. They have agreed on the formation of a committee comprising representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the State of Kuwait in order to ensure co-ordination with the President of Lebanon in respect of implementation of the Cairo Agreement; the committee's mandate will cover a period of 90 days beginning on he date of the announcement of the ceasefire.

The Arab Kings and Heads of State reaffirm their commitment to the decisions of the Seventh Arab Summit Conference held at Rabat, decisions whereby the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was declared to be the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine, all Arab States belonging to the League of Arab States pledged their support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation

and undertook not to interfere in its affairs, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation affirmed its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of any Arab State.

The Arab Kings and Heads of State have agreed that Arab countries should contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon, to the removal of the traces of the armed conflict and to the making good of damage affecting the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and for that purpose have agreed to extend urgent assistance to them.

The Arab Kings and Heads of State have paid particular attention to the consolidation of Arab solidarity, this being the essential basis for the success of joint Arab action and for the realization of the Arab nations' objectives concerning liberation and development. In this respect, they also reaffirm their full commitment to implementing the decisions of the Arab summit conferences and the Council of the League of Arab States, particularly the Charter of Arab Solidarity issued by the Casablanca Summit Conference on 15 September 1965.

They have studied with great concern the explosive situation in the occupied Arab territories, a situation caused by continued Israeli occupation, the increasing

incidence of oppression, intimidation and expulsion, as well as the confiscation of land and the desecration of religious places, particularly the Al Ibrahimi Mosque; all of these measures are being applied by the occupying authorities in flagrant violation of the provision of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

They hail the steadfast Arab people in the occupied territories and their legitimate national struggle, and reaffirm the support of all Arab States.

They call on all countries and peoples of the world to condemn and stand up against continuing Israeli aggression and to discontinue any dealings with Israel that might consolidate the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, or allow the continuation of oppressive Israeli measures directed against the population of these territories.

Resolutions adopted at the first extraordinary session of the Arab summit conference.

Cairo, 26 October 1976

The Kings and Heads of State of the League of Arab

States meeting from 25 to 26 October 1976 at the head-quarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo.

Having examined the present situation in Lebanon and the outcome of the Six-Party Arab Summit conference held in Riyadh, as announced on 18 October 1976, and having examined also the importance of further strengthening Arab solidarity

Decide the following :

I. The situation in Lebanon :

1. To approve the statement, resolution and annexes, issued on 18 October 1976, by the Six-Party Summit Conference held at Riyadh, attached hereto:
(The Delegation of Iraq did not agree to this paragraph)
2. That Arab States should, according to their individual capabilities, contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon, and help meet the related material requirements in order to remove the traces of the armed conflict and make good damage affecting the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples; Arab States should also extend urgent assistance to the Lebanese Government and to the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

II Further strengthening of Arab solidarity :

To reaffirm the commitment of the Arab Kings and Heads of State to the relevant provisions of the resolutions adopted by Arab summit conferences and the Council of the League of Arab States, particularly the Charter of Arab Solidarity published in Casablanca on 15 September 1965, and to take steps towards their immediate and full implementation.

III Financing of Arab Security Forces :

The Arab Summit Conference' with a view to providing the financial resources required to maintain the Arab security forces in Lebanon, forces established in accordance with the second resolution adopted at the Riyadh Summit Conference,

Having reviewed the relevant report of Military Secretariat of the League of Arab States,

Decides the following :

1. A special fund shall be set up to meet the requirements of the Arab security forces in Lebanon;
2. Each member state of the League of Arab States shall contribute a certain percentage to the fund, to be

determined by each State according to its capabilities;

3. The President of the Republic of Lebanon shall supervise the fund, and, in consultation with the General-Secretariat of the League of Arab States and those States contributing at least 10 per cent, shall work out general rules governing payments from the fund and its liquidation when its term expires; the present regulations for the Arab security force shall remain in effect until new regulations are drawn up;

4. The fund shall be set up for a six-month period, renewable by a decision of the Council of the League of Arab States; the Council shall meet for this purpose at the request of the President of the Republic of Lebanon.

IV Renewal of the appointment of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States:

The Arab Summit Conference decides to renew the appointment of Mr Mahmoud Riad as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States for another term beginning at the end of his present term.

V. Special resolution :

The Arab Summit Conference, holding its first extraordinary session in Cairo, having met in an atmosphere of

brotherhood and concern with respect to the further strengthening of Arab solidarity, and having successfully concluded its work, is pleased to express its deep gratitude to the President, Government and people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, for hosting and welcoming the Conference and providing for its success. The Conference is also pleased to express its deep appreciation for the sincere efforts of President Mohmed Anwar El Sadat during preparations for the Conference, for his wise chairmanship, which enabled the Conference to attain its objectives, and for his efforts towards the further strengthening of Arab solidarity.

MAJOR LEBANESE POLITICAL ACTORS

Maronite/Christians	Muslim/Leftist
The Lebanese Front (LF)	Lebanese National Movement (LNM)
Formed 31 January, 1976	Formed in 1969, disbanded 1982
included : Phalange (Kata'eb)	Unification and Liberation
Party, National	Front formed July 1987
Liberal Party,	superseded by Lebanese National
Guardians of Cedars,	Front (LNF) of 13 organisations
Al-Tanzim,	including : Amal, PSP, Lebanese
Maronite Monastic	Communist Party, Populist
Order	Nasserite Organisation.
Government of General	Lebanese National Front formed
Michel Aoun formed in	August 1989, Anti-Aoun front
September 1988	supported by Syria and Iran
Office of the Maronite	16 organisations, including :
Patriarch, Nasrullah Sfair,	Amal, PSP, Hizbollah, Lebanese
at Bkirki.	Communist Party
	Islamic Assembly formed in the
	late 1970s, Traditional Sunni
	leaders.
	Muslim Government under
	Selim Al-Hoss

Source: Hussein Sirriyeh, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict, Adelphi Papers 243, (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1989), p. 77.

Major Lebanese Militias

Maronite:

Lebanese forces (LF) Samir Geagea

6 mainly Christian Army brigades, General Michel Aoun

Army of South Lebanon, General Antoine Lahd

Phalange (Kata'eb) Party Militia, (Absorbed by LF

in October 1988)

Zghartan Liberation Army (sometimes called 'Marada Brigades')

Suleiman Franjech

Sunni:

Nasserite Organisations, 6 organisations, including

Populist Nasserite Organisation (Sidon-Mustafa Sa'ad)

(The Independent Nasserite Organisation, with its

Al-Morabitoun militias, eradicated in West Beirut in

April 1985 by Amal and PSP)

Islamic Unification Movement, (Al-Tawheed) Sa'id Sha'aban 4

mainly Muslim Army brigades, General Sami Al-Khatib, Arab

Knights, Pro-Syrian, in northern Lebanon

Shi'ite:

Amal, Nabih Berri

Hizbollah, Clerics

6th Army Brigade, Nominally under Al-Khatib, actually under Amal

Islamic Amal, Hussein Mussawi, Absorbed by Hizbollah 1984

Druze:

Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Walid Jumblatt

12th Army Brigade, nominally under Al-Khatib, actually

under Jumblatt's control

Anti-Israeli Resistance Fronts in Southern Lebanon

Islamic Resistance Movement led by Hizbollah

Lebanese National Resistance Front led by Muslim/leftist

and Palestinian groups

Source: Hussein Sirriyeh, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict Adelphi Papers 243, (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1989) p. 78.

NON-LEBANESE FORCES IN LEBANON

Palestinian:

    Total about 10,000

    Fatah - Pro-Arafat

    Fatah dissidents - Abu Musa

    Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

    Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General
                                           Command)

    Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Al-Saiqa

    Palestine Liberation Front

    Popular Struggle Front

Syrian:

    About 30,000 troops in West Beirut and north and east Lebanon

Iranian:

    About 2,000 Revolutionary Guards in the Beka'a

Israeli:

    About 1,000 soldiers in the Israeli-occupied security zone
    in south Lebanon

UNIFIL:

    About 5,750 troops in south Lebanon

Source : Hussein Sirriyeh, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict
Adelphi Papers 243, (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1989) p. 78.

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COMPARATIVE GROWTH OF ARMED FORCES

LEBANON, ISRAEL, SYRIA AND PLO

1970-1985

	Lebanon				Israel				Syria			
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985
Total Defence Budget	$30.30 m	$ 133 m	$ 286 m	$ 311 m	$ 1.71 bn	$ 3.6 bn	$ 5.2 bn	$ 3.6 bn	$ 460 m	$ 2210 m	$ 4 bn	$ 3.3 bn
Total Armed Forces	16,250	15,250	23,000	17,400	75,000	1,45,000	1,69,600	1,42,000	86,750	1,37,500	2,47,500	3,42,500
Army Total manpower	15,000	14,000	22,250	16,000	61,500	1,25,000	1,35,000	1,04,000	75,000	1,25,000	2,00,000	2,70,000
Regular	--	--	--	--	11,500	15,000	15,000	16,000	--	--	60,000	1,35,000
Conscript	--	--	--	--	50,000	1,10,000	1,20,000	88,000	--	--	1,40,000	1,35,000
Major Equipment (A) Med Tanks	100	118	--	110	1,050	1900	3,050	3,600	850	1,670	2,920	4,200
(B) APCs	--	46	80+	420+	--	2,500	--	4,000	600	1,400	1,600	1,600

	LEBANON				ISRAEL				SYRIA			
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985
(C) Arty Guns	--	50	28	54	--	370	950	924	--	500	800	4,000
II Navy Total Man power	250	250	250	300	4,500	4500	6,600	10,000	1,750	2,500	2500	2,500
Regular	--	--	--	--	3,500	3,500	3,300	6,700	--	--	--	--
Conscript	--	--	--	--	1,000	1,000	3,300	3,300	--	--	--	--
Ships	5	9	7	4	39	66	68	97	30	23	32	31
Submarines	--	--			4	2	3	3	--	--	--	--
Destroyer	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
III AIR FORCE Total Manpower	1,000	1,000	500	1,100	9,000	16,000	28,000	28,000	10,000	10,000	45,000	70,000
Regular	--	--	--	--	8,000	15,000	26,000	26,000	--	--	--	--
Conscript	--	--	--	--	1,000	1,000	2,000	2,000	--	--	--	--
Total combat A/c	24	18	7	11 (4 hel)	330	466	535	684	210	300	395	500 (100 armed hel)

IV

	LEBANON				ISRAEL				SYRIA			
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985
IV Para Military Forces Total Manpower	2,500	5,000	5,000	13,000	10,000	9,000	9,500	4,500	6,500	9,500	9,500	1,800
(A) Gendar-merie & Border Guards	2,500	5,000	5,000	5,000	--	4,000	4,500	4,500	5,000	8,000	8,000	--
(B) Internal Security & Desert Guards	--	--	8,000	--	--	5,000	5,000	--	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,800

V. Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)	Lebanon				Syria				Jordon			
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1975	1980	1985	1990	1975	1980	1985	1990
1. Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)	--	--	--	--		6,000	4,500	4,500	--	--	2,000	1,200
T-54/55 MBT	--	--	--	--		50	90	90				
2. FATAH	--	--	--	4,500								
3. PLF (Palestine Liberation Front,Al-Abas					300							
4. FATAH (Dissidents, Abu Musa)				1,000								
5. PFLF (Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine, Habash)				900								
6. PFLF(GC) (Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (General Command-Jibril)				500								
7. SAIQA (al-Khaoli)				600								
8. PSF (Popular Struggle Front, Ghisha)				500								
9. DFLF (Democratic front for Liberation of Palestine, Hawatmah				1,000								
10.FRC (Fatah Revolutionary Council, Abu Nidal)				500								

Notes: 1. Strength are estimates of the number of active ``Fighters'', these could be trebled perhaps to give all-told figure.

2. Data from <u>Military Balance</u> 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 published by International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GROWTH OF ARMED FORCES :

1970 - 1985, LEBANON, ISRAEL & SYRIA

I.   Lebanon

1.   Defence expenditure increased tenfold from $ 30.30 million to $ 311.77 million.

2.   Strength of Army and Tanks, remains the same over the period.

3.   Strength of APC, Arty Gun increased. (APCs from Nil to 420).

4.   Naval personnel up from 250 to 300; but ships reduced from 5 to 4.

5.   Air Force manpower almost constant; but strength of Combat aircraft decreased from 24 to 11.

6.   Increase in para-military forces from 2,500 to 13,000.

OBSERVATION: Though defence expenditure has gone up ten times, there has been no significant increase in the strength of armed forces. Most of the expenditure appears to be due to acquisition of APCs (420) and for maintaining a larger para-military force of 13,000.

II.   Israel

1.   Defence Expenditure rose from a billion dollars in 1970 to five billion dollars in 1980 and then came down to $ 3.6 billion in 1985.

2.   Army strength up from 61,500 to 1,04,000 (almost doubled).

3. Tanks, APCs and GUns increased

    a)   Tanks from 1,000 to 3,600

    b)   APCs from 2,500 to 4,000

    c)   Arty Guns from 370 to 924

4. Naval strength up from 4,500 to 10,000

5. Naval Ships from 39 to 97

6. Air Force strength up from 9,000 to 28,000

7. Combat aircraft strength up from 330 to 684

8. Para-military Forces strength down from 10,000 to 4,500.

OBSERVATION: Defence expenditure went up five times in 1980 and then came down to
               b.
               $ 3.6 Two to Three fold increase in the strength of armed forces including

               weapon system. Strength of para-military forces down.

III. Syria

    1. Defence expenditure increased from $ 221 m to $ 4 billion in 1980 and then reduced

        to $ 3.3 billion in 1985.

    2. Army strength up from 75,000 (1970) to 2,70,000 (1985)

    3. Tanks, APCs, and arty Guns up as follows:-

(a)   Tanks from 850 (1970) to 4,200 (1985)

(b)   APCs from 600 (1970) to 1,600 (1985)

(c)   Arty Guns from 500 (1975) to 4,000 (1985)

4.   Naval strength up from 1,750 to 2,500.

5.   Number of ships remained the same.

6.   Air Force strength went up

(a)   Manpower from 10,000 (1970) to 70,000 (1985)

b)   Combat aircraft from 210 (1970) to 500 (1985)

7.   Para-military forces first increased from 6,500 (1970) to 9,500 (1980) and then decreased to 1,800 (1985).

OBSERVATION   Defence expenditure rose sharply to $ 4 billion in 1980 and then came down to $ 3.3 billion in 1985. Increase in strength in the Army and the Air Force and weapon system - Five to seven times. Naval strength constant in ships. Strength of para-military forces down.

General Comments.

The impact of the 1975-76 Civil War in Lebanon and the subsequent Israeli invasion of 1978 and 1982 is clearly evident in the massive arms build-up in all these countries during 1975-1985.

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