

THE SECURITY AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NAGA INSURGENCY

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "The Security and External Dimensions of the Naga Insurgency" submitted by Nehemiah Panmei is an original work and has not been previously submitted in part or full for any other degree or diploma in this or any other University.

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
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
And, finally, I would like to thank my family who have always been a source of inspiration and comfort. This work is a tribute to my father, Late P. Meingan, who was a part of the Peace Mission and lost his life waging for peace.



Nehemiah Panmei


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CONTENTS

Page No.

I.	INTRODUCTION	1-9
II.	GENESIS OF THE NAGA INSURGENCY	10-46
	(a) Background	
	(b) The Shillong Accord	
	(c) The Aftermath	
III.	THE SECURITY PERILS	47-72
	(a) Foreign Interests	
	(b) Naga-Insurgency and the North-East Unrest	
IV.	TOWARDS A PEACEFUL NORTH-EAST: Approaches and Options	73-79
	EPILOGUE	80
	APPENDICES	81-101
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	102-109

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION

'Security' was the main reason which compelled the British Indian Government to come into contact with the Nagas and assert its authority over them. As part of their overall concern for the security of the Indian borders, the British realised the strategic importance of establishing and securing a safe frontier in India's north-eastern border. The Himalayan ranges act as a barrier against invaders from the north. But in their calculation to have a control and influence over the Himalayan territories from Tibet to Burma, they became aware of the logistics and strategical demands, i.e. the territory south of the Himalayan watershed should be in their control. The British were also aware of the legend that the one who sits over the roof of the world (Tibet) will dominate the southern side of the Himalayas.¹ Thus in the logic of the British Indian Government, they had to have control over the Naga Hills since they lie on the southern side of the Himalayan watershed.

The Naga insurgents inhabiting this strategic region and facilitated by the British demarcation of their area in 1937 between two sovereign states India and Burma, have a tremendous potential to pose a security threat to North-East India. The reasons as to how the division of their contiguous area between the above-mentioned countries for altogether

1 Elwin, V., *The Nagas in the Nineteenth Century*, (Shillong 1969); p.169.

different reasons, has been advantageous to Naga insurgents and how this move has adverse effects to India's security is dealt with in the Third Chapter.

The vulnerable Burmese border to the east and the geographical isolation of the North-East, connected to the rest of the country by the narrow 20 miles wide Siliguri corridor, have posed serious problems to the Indian Government. To make things worse, communications both within the region and between it and the country are poor. There is only one bridge across the Brahmaputra river and some air services which link the North-East to other parts of India. Dimapur, 215 kms from Imphal, is the nearest railway station from Manipur. The 1962 Chinese aggression surely highlighted the vulnerability of this area to any external invasion. The Chinese with surprising pace infiltrated through the mountains of the North-East Frontier Agency and demolished every obstacle that came in their way till they reached the foothills of Kameng, close to the plains of Assam. This took the whole nation by surprise, especially the leaders in New Delhi. They virtually wrote off the entire North-Eastern region and decided to salvage what was left of the badly battered army by withdrawing it to the west of the strategic "Siliguri Neck". Thus the helpless people of the area were left at

the mercy of the Chinese.² The then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a broken man and bade a tearful farewell to the residents of the area by wailing "My heart bleeds for the people of Assam"³ in a broadcast from the All India Radio. But fortunately for India, the Chinese, for reasons fully known only to them, retreated. Indian Defences have come a long way since then and India is being regarded as the emerging Super Power of South Asia. However, there is no room for complacency and more so because the Chinese are laying claims over the then NEFA region, now Arunachal Pradesh. They have intruded and are now occupying the Somdurang Chu Valley.

The Chinese military activities all over Tibet, their power potential, aims and interests in Asia arouse speculations. Tibet is being made more accessible to the rest of mainland China. A railway connection to Lhasa is under construction and a large number of roads linking Tibet to Sinkiang and South-east China have already been built for heavy traffic. Fuel and communication dumps have been built along these passages. To make things more obviously suspicious and ominous for India, all these massive construction works are connected to a broad concrete highway, which like an arrow, points straight at the

2 Sareen, V.I.K., *India's North East in Flames*, (New Delhi 1982), p.8.

3 Ibid, p.8.

corner where India, Tibet and Burma meet.⁴ In 1982, the approximate strength of the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army in Tibet was reportedly 1,20,000 backed by 50,000 para military troops.⁵ The Chinese have increased their capacity to sustain a much larger force within the present development of surface communications.

The Nagas, with their fierce sense of independence, were not completely subjugated by the British and the Naga Hills were administered under the status of "Excluded Areas".⁶ The Indian leaders pointed out the fact that the British had established some control over the Naga Hills and more importantly because of strategic reasons refused to recognise the assertion of Naga sovereignty over their areas on the 14th August, 1947. The Nagas, under the organisation called the Naga Club, formed in 1918 had submitted a memorandum when the Simon Commission visited Kohima in 1929.⁷ In their memorandum, the Nagas had expressed their desire to be left alone when the British left India.⁸ The Indian leaders, for the aforementioned

4 Ibid, p.14.

5 Ibid, p.15.

6 The Government of India Act, 1935, Section 311(I), (2)a,b,c, cited in Luthra's *Nagaland From a District to a State*, (Gauhati 1974), pp.41-42.

7 Elwin, V., *Nagaland*, (Calcutta, 1961), p.51.

reasons, claimed the Naga Hills to be a part of India. This is the background which eventually led to the Nagas taking up arms to fight for what they believed to be their natural right. The Naga hostility began on a large scale in (1954).

The Naga Insurgency was the first in this sensitive area and became a trendsetter for other insurgent groups. The Naga rebels played a great role in the forming of the Mizo National Front (on 12th October 1962). They were alleged to have actively encouraged the Mizos to take up arms against the Indian Government and showed them the ways and means to do so. There has been no dearth of secessionist groups in the North-East. The PLA (Peoples' Liberation Army) of the Meiteis in Manipur, the TNV (Tribal National Volunteers) of the Tripuris, and even the Assam students' agitation have secessionist overtones.

The difference in ethnicity, culture and other ways of life of the people of the North-East from the rest of India have led to numerous problems in the integration of the country. Nari Rustomji with great insight has commented. "The unrest of India's north-eastern borders has arisen not from want of goodwill on anybody's part but from a failure of

8 *Naga Nation*, (a monthly magazine published by the Naga Club) February, 1930, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp.3-8.

understanding".⁹ Here it is important to point out that this sensitive part of India comprises of over 130 tribal groups.¹⁰ The tribals guard their traditions and culture with great tenacity. Thus it is understandable if they are apprehensive and antagonised when they feel that some alien culture is being imposed upon them. Various attempts to bring them to the national mainstream have had adverse effects. The emotional links between the people of the North-East and the rest of India are tenuous, a fact which should explain why it has been traditionally turbulent and plagued by successive tribal insurgencies. The official policy seems to have failed in this region so far, not so much for lack of good intention as for want of "empathy and sensitivity"¹¹ Elaborating further on this point Rustomji added: "If there has been failure, it has been in an adequate appreciation of man's instinctive resentment against interference in his inherited and accustomed way of life, however crude, and uncivilized it may appear to others".¹²

The Nagas belonged to the Tibeto-Burman stock and are believed to have come from a region in Western China, between

9 Rustomji, Nari, *Imperilled Frontiers*, (London, 1983), p.1.

10 Sareen, n.2, p.14.

11 Rustomji, n.9, p.3.

12 Ibid, p.3.

the sources of Yangtse-Kiang and Hwangho rivers.¹³ Since they are racially and linguistically different from the mainland Indians, they are treated as foreigners by some of the ignorant and insensitive citizens of India and such treatment alienates them further. The sending in of the army in 1956 to the Naga-inhabited areas too had some adverse effects. The Naga problem is a political one and should be treated as one. A long lasting solution can never be arrived at by treating it as that of law and order. I will substantiate this point of view in the Second Chapter, devoted to the historical account of the Naga Movement.

The other argument against the concentration and deployment of the armed forces towards counter-insurgency activities is regarding the security of the region as a whole. Major General Mohan Lal in his discourse on 'Harmony among Peoples of the North-Eastern Region, and between it and the rest of India' stated: "Except in Arunachal, where the state of communications precludes our land forces from defending our borders right up to Macmohan line, the security forces are involved in counter-insurgency measures at present and cannot seal the borders effectively"¹⁴ India cannot afford to divert her forces to any other

13 Ao, A., *A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland*, (Jorhat, 1970), p.18.

14 Abbi, B.L., (ed.) *North East Region: Problems and Prospects of Development*, (Chandigarh, 1984), p.207.

purpose and have security lapses in this area which had attracted the sinister interests of foreign countries. While the Chinese and Pakistani involvement in the tribal insurgencies of the area is public knowledge, the testimony of an erstwhile secret agent John Smith revealed that the C.I.A. had extended its activities into Nagaland and was financing the underground Naga Movement as early as late fifties. He revealed that "American spies handed the tribal leaders several million rupees, weapons and secret instructions prepared in Washington."¹⁵ The infamous "Brahmaputra Project" and other disruptive foreign designs in the North-East are analysed in detail in the Third Chapter entitled "The Security Perils".

This study is based mainly on the secondary sources, brought out by the Government and by individuals and organisations. The intensity and seriousness of the Naga Problem as well as the other tribal insurgencies in the North-East is directly linked with the Indian Government's policy and indirectly intertwined with India's relation with other countries, especially China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma. Thus taking the Naga Insurgency from the internal and international ambience, I conclude with some suggestions as to how to tackle

15 *Assam Tribune*, 16 November, 1967, Cited by Sareen, n.2, p.21.

this complex issue and other related problems, which is so crucial to India's security.

CHAPTER II

GENESIS OF THE NAGA INSURGENCY

a) **BACKGROUND**

The Nagas have been inhabiting the wild and ruggedly beautiful Naga Hills for centuries. Due to the location of their lands and their self-sufficient and self-contented nature, they had very few contacts with the outside world. Barring the few skirmishes and meagre trade exchanges with the plainsmen of Assam and the Imphal Valley, the Nagas' regular contact with the world beyond theirs started only in 1832 when the British encountered them. In this long indulgence and complete freedom in their own world, accentuated by their passionate spirit of independence, lie the foundation of the Naga Movement in which they assert their own sovereignty over their lands which they believe rightfully and naturally belong to them.

☒ GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS

The Naga-inhabited area popularly known as the Naga Hills are covered with mountain ranges that have steep slopes and generally form the natural watershed. With average altitudes varying from 900 to 1,500 metres, the serrated ridges, valleys, spurs and reentrants give rise to numerous springs, rivulets and streams that generally move in the north and north-western direction and form rivers like Dhansiri, Diyang, Dikhu,

Jhanzi, Disai and Jijit.¹ They finally flow into the Brahmaputra through the northern plains of Assam. Tiji river of Nagaland and some rivers from Ukhrul and Mao areas of Manipur flow in the east or South-eastern direction and join up with the Chindwin river of Burma. The rivers of Tamenglong in Manipur like Ahu (Barak), Alang (Irah) and Akhu flow westward and ultimately into the Bay of Bengal via Assam and Bangladesh. There are no proper bridges across most of these rivers and they, being in the catchment areas, swell up fast after a heavy downpour, making navigation and crossing almost impossible. The Naga Hills receive heavy rainfall averaging between 177.8 and 254 cm and have thick impregnable forests. These conditions make construction of roads a very difficult task. Landslides and fog contribute to the poor communication.. Treefalls and gushing water snap the telephone wires and the atmospheric turbulences and high mountains make radio contact unreliable and difficult. In the Naga areas, certain international borders have not been demarcated and have remained even unvisited by officials.² These factors have provided ideal conditions for the Naga insurgent activities.

1 Anand, V.K., *Conflict in Nagaland*, (Delhi, 1980), p.24.

2 Ibid.

ETHNICITY: The Nagas are mongoloids, speaking languages which fall under Tibeto-Burman group, a branch of the Sino-Tibetan languages.³ Many theories have been put forward as to the origin and migration of the Nagas. However the most commonly accepted theory, even as some Naga traditions (e.g. a Lotha folk song) say so is that the Nagas' original home is somewhere in China, most probably the Sikiang province. From there they are believed to have migrated to the Naga Hills via Burma. Dr.Hutton in his article 'The mixed culture of Naga Tribes' recorded his observation about the similar traits particularly head-hunting among the Nagas and the people of the south-East Asia. J.P Mills in his 'The Ao Nagas' listed many close parallels between the customs and beliefs of the Nagas with those of the tribes of Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Borneo, the Philipines, Melanesia, Polynesia and so on.⁴

The Naga Society: The Nagas have an egalitarian society with a very democratic political set-up. Every village was a complete political unit and lands were commonly owned. There is a strong sense of oneness among the Nagas with a very elaborate and encompassing community set-up. They help each other in cultivating their fields, constructing houses and even

3 Ao, A., *A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland* (Jorhat, 1970), p.3.

4 Mills, J.P., *The Ao Nagas* (Bombay, 1973).

share their produces in time of need. The Naga tradition testifies to the fact that not a single member used to go hungry. "The traditional Naga attitude to property is rather a charming one. The feast of merit which bestowed so much distinction on their donors, showed that it was the distribution of wealth rather than its possession that was important. And this distribution of wealth included every one, not merely one's own relations and friends but the poorest and the least important."⁵ Every Naga had maximum liberty but there was tremendous respect for elders who look after the administration and legal demands of the village through a village council. A.W Davies in his Census of India 1891 comments about the democratic set-up of the Ao Nagas: "Each village amongst the ~~Aos~~ is a small republic and each man is as good as his neighbours, indeed it would be hard to find anywhere else more thoroughly democratic communities. It is said of the Nagas that every man is his own master, and avenges his own quarrel." J.D. Butler observed the Angami Nagas and commented : "Whenever an important decision is to be taken, all the villagers usually assemble and take a collective decision. The Chief's voice would no doubt be listened to with respect and would be given weightage also, but it will not

5 Elwin, V., *Nagaland*, (Calcutta, 1961), p.104.

necessarily be the decisive voice"⁶ Thus womenfolk and even the young ones play important role when crucial decisions (e.g. when a battle is to be fought) have to be taken. The decision regarding marriage and selection of life partner is left entirely to the boys and girls. The Nagas encourage widow remarriage and the practice of giving bride price when taking a wife is an acknowledgement of the high social standing of women. There is no great disparity of wealth and absolutely no social hierarchy. The Naga society and community is quite different from and in contrast~~ing~~ to the caste-stratified society of the plain people viz. the Hinduised Assamese and the Meiteis. They were apprehensive of the people from the plains who, they suspected, would try to overrun them and degrade them to the status of lowest rung of the Hindu Caste System. Herein lies the crucial problem of ethical integration and adjustments because "the ordering frame is non-humanist and based on dominance and supremacy of exploitative class, race, sex, religious, language or ethnic group/nationality."⁷

Apart from the contrasting traditional and customary practices, the Nagas have always looked upon the plains people

6 Butler, J.D., "Routh Notes on the Angami Nagas and their Language", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Part-I, No.IV, 1875, p.314.

7 Datta, P.S., "Roots of Insurgency", *Seminar*, n.366, February, 1990, pp.48-49.

as natural enemies. Their relationship, if it could be called one, was marred with raids upon each other's territories. The people from the valleys, being worldly wiser, took advantage of the ignorant hill people and cheated them in their trade exchanges. The Nagas, going down to the plains to sell cotton and buy salt, were at times not allowed to even enter the market area by the Meiteis and Assamese and were meted with in-human treatment. The Assamese ~~and were meted with~~ contractors cheated the Nagas employed in the tea-gardens.⁸ The unpleasant exchanges go a long way in the Nagas developing an antipathy for anything outside their own world.

For the Nagas, fighting was a natural and normal way of life. They were trained in the art of dueling right from their childhood. Daring and bold as they are, they love challenges. Thus taking up arms against any intruder into their territories was a very spontaneous act. The bitter and stiff resistance they put up against the might of the British and later the Indian Army can thus be said to be something inevitable.

The British-Naga Relationship : The British encounter with the Nagas started in 1832 when they came on the invitation of the Hindu Princes of Manipur. James John

8 Ao, n.3, p.151.

stone wrote : "our first acquaintance with the Nagas practically began in 1832 when Captain Jenkins and Lieutenant Pemberton escorted by Raja Ghumbeer Singh's Manipur troops forced a passage through the hills ..." ⁹ Unlike the Hindu kingdoms of Assam and Imphal Valley who had placed themselves under the British in 1820s, the Nagas put up a strong resistance to the British who had combined forces with those of Assam and Manipur. "Ghumbeer Singh, Raja of Manipur, and Lieutenant Gordons who led the second invasion of Naga territory in the winter of 1832 and early part of 1833 had to fight every step.." ¹⁰

Upon coming to the knowledge of the constant Naga raids on the Villages in North Cachar, the British asked Tularam, its king, and the Raja of Manipur to control the Nagas. Tularam pleaded his inability saying that he did not have any control over the Nagas. But the Manipuris established a post at Semkhor and started ^{troubling} the Nagas to such an extent that as soon as the post was withdrawn, the Nagas raided the villages in the British Territory. Captain Jenkins, with practical knowledge of this area, realised the futility of asking the help of the Manipur king and wrote to the authorities in Calcutta to that effect. But the British

9 Johnstone, J., *Manipur and the Naga Hills*, (Reprinted in 1971), p.22.

10 Mackenzie, A., Quoted by Verrier Elwin (ed.), *The Nagas in the 19th Century*, (London, 1969), p.147.

persisted with their policy till 1837 when due to the continued resistance of the Assam Commissioner not to ask the Manipuris to control the Nagas, they decided that an European should occupy a post near the Naga country to endeavour to bring the Naga chiefs to agree not to carry out raids into the British Territory.¹¹ The fact was that the British never intended to annex the Naga Hills since they realised the expense of administering them would be many times more than the income. But for security reasons i.e. to prevent the Naga raids into the British territory, it was expedient to establish some sort of control over the Naga Hills.

Upto 1851, apart from few expeditions into the Naga territories led by Oranje (1839, 1840), Lieutenant Bigge (1841), Captain Butler (1845, 46-47) and others, the British inquest into the Naga areas areas was insignificant, characterised more prominently by its wavering policies towards the Nagas. They carried out a policy of non-interference from 1851 till 1865, expecting respite from the Naga raids. Several measures, like posting an officer in Asalu (in North Cachar) in 1854, establishing a line of frontier post, setting up of Kuki colonies and recruiting the Nagas into military police, were tried out. But none of these proved to be of any effect. The failure of non-

11 Ao, n.3, p.44.

interference policy compelled the British Government to adopt a bolder Forward Policy. In 1866 the Naga Hills district was formed with Samuguting (*modern Chumukedima near Dimapur*) as the Deputy Commissioner's headquarters.¹² Though facing stiff resistance in most of the areas, the British managed to consolidate their position progressively. In 1876, a sub-division of the Naga Hills District was started at Wokha, a Lotha area. After heavy fighting, Kohima was subjugated. The District Headquarter was shifted from Samuguting to Kohima in 1878. The revolt of the Angamis of the Khonoma Village in 1879 gave a terrible shock to the British. Deputy Commissioner Damant and his escorts were murdered on October 13, 1879. The Nagas put up a brave challenge and fought tenaciously. Only with reinforcements from Manipur could the British suppress the revolt.¹³

The British never could completely control the Nagas who defied them by way of refusing to pay house tax e.g. that of Lazema, a Sema Village in 1882 or not obeying the orders of the British by continuing inter-tribal conflicts and raiding. Due to the unyielding nature of the Nagas and other reasons like the rough terrains and unfavourable climatic conditions which made

12 Ghosh, B.B., *History of Nagaland*, (Delhi, 1983), p.97.

13 *Ibid*, p.102.

communication very difficult, the British could administer only over one-third of the Naga inhabited areas. The Government of Burma declared in 1895 its intention regarding the Nagas "that as long as the Nagas along the side of the border refrained from raiding the more settled districts, there should be no interference in their affairs".¹⁴

The British administration went about honestly and sincerely in their effort to win over the confidence and favour of the Nagas. Utmost care was taken in selecting officers to look after their areas and generally they were "chosen with some regard to their personal suitability for an unconventional charge and one in which personal responsibility and demands on physical fitness and activity were likely to be heavy".¹⁵

The customs and traditional practices of the Nagas were not interfered with as far as possible. In fact, they were administered according to their ways and styles of living : "Every officer posted in Naga Hills tried to understand the people by minute study of their way of life, their culture, customs, and manners. They lived with the people, ate with them, walked with them and sometimes even tested their temperament. It was a

14 Ao, n.3, p.121.

15 Ibid, p.131.


normal duty of every officer to submit a comprehensive report basing on his own field study and observation. Since the Supreme Government made its policy basing on these reports the question of implementation of the policy was not at all difficult. It was rather welcomed".¹⁶

This assessment was corroborated by another authority on this subject:. "Some of the DCs like Dr. J.H. Hutton (1917-35), Dr. J.P. Mills (1935-37), and C.R. Pawsey (1937-47) endowed with rare combination of exceptional ability and phenomenal devotion gave outstanding performances. Many of the British administrators tried to understand the tribesmen by living among them. They ate, drank and smoked the Naga way and saw, heard and did much what was beyond the call of their duty. Some of the magnificent treatises on tribal life produced by them would remain the envy of many anthropologists".¹⁷

Henry Balfour in his forewading note to "The Sema Nagas" of Dr. Hutton emphasised the importance of developing an intimate knowledge of and sympathetic interest in the local people, their customs and their point of view. After such a penetrating and confidence winning exercises of the British on

16 Ibid, p.134.

17 Anand, n.1, p.55.



the Nagas, the Indian Government officials after the independence started from a disadvantageous position. Their tasks were made more difficult by the Nagas' declared preference for the British rule and their movement for independence.

The Nagas' assertion of their own Sovereignty : The advent of the British into the Naga areas contributed to unity among the Nagas. This integrating factor, combined with their inherent spirit of freedom and indomitable temperament, laid the foundation of their unflinching Nationalism.

TH-3233

The exposure of hundreds of Nagas to European Nationalism when they were sent to Europe to fight for Britain in the First World War infused in them an awareness about their distinct identity. With this new consciousness, they started making serious efforts to unite all the different Naga tribes who were indulging in feuds amongst themselves. This promoted Naga Nationalism.

The formation of the Naga club in 1918 was a watershed in the history of the Nagas since it was their first organisation which was representative of all the different tribes. The Club was social and political in nature. Various relevant problems facing the Nagas were discussed in the Club's meetings and this made them more conscious of their rights. The Lothas formed their

Tribal Council in 1923 and the Aos in 1928. The Zeliangrong Movement led by Haipou Jaduanang and later by Rani Gaidinliu was born in 1925 with its aim to unite the three constituent Naga tribes viz. Zemi, Liangmei and Rongmei, to remove inter-village and inter-tribal ill-feelings, to struggle against the foreign rulers in order to achieve independence to free themselves from the suppressive and exploitative rules and orders of the foreign administration and officials and to establish an independent Nagaraj.¹⁸

By the 1920s, the Nagas could sense that the British were not going to stay in the Indian sub-continent for long. When the Indian National Congress under the charismatic leadership of Gandhi was mounting its campaign for more political reforms and ultimately for the liberation of India, the Nagas, untouched and insulated from the Indian National Movement, started their own movement for achieving complete Sovereignty once the British left the Indian shores. Driven by their own passionate instinct for freedom, members of the Naga club submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission which visited Kohima

18 Mukherjee, D.P., Gupta, P. and Das, N.K. in *Tribal Movements in India-1*, Singh, K.S. (ed.) (New Delhi, 1982), p.70.

in January 1929, stating that they should be left alone to decide and shape their own future.¹⁹

C.R.Pawsey the D.C. from 1937-47, helped establish an institution called the Naga Hills District Tribal Council in 1945 "with the aim of uniting the Nagas and repairing some of the damages done during World War II."²⁰ This Council met at Wokha in the following year where it underwent a ~~an~~ transformation. It became a political organisation and changed its name to Naga National Council. The body was originally meant to look after the Social welfare and fulfil the social aspirations of the Nagas. "It received wide patronage of the administration as an unifying and moderating factor. But gradually the Naga National Council refunded its activities into the political field and became a very powerful and all pervading political organisation."²¹ It comprised of twenty-nine members who represented the various tribes on the basis of proportional representation. They were selected by consensus. "Every citizen was supposed to be a member of the NNC and every family contributed voluntarily towards the maintenance of the Council."²² The Council "encouraged the Tribal Councils already

19 Elwin, n.5, p.49.

20 Ibid, p.51.

21 Ghosh, n.12, p.158.

22 Ao, n.3, p.165.

set-up by individual tribes and stated others to administer their own local affairs and consider possible reforms."²³ The NNC published a newspaper, the Naga Nation, for some years and used it effectively as a political weapon, educating the people on various political issues.

As the momentum of the Naga movement for independence picked up, there was some confusion among the Nagas regarding the next stage in their campaign for the attainment of complete independence. "While one group of Nagas favoured immediate independence some moderates favoured the continuance of governmental relations with India in some modified form until they were sufficiently schooled in the art of running a modern state. There was a third minority which wanted to bring Nagaland into the position of a Mandatory State under the British Government for a specified period of time."²⁴

The British were contemplating of forming a Trust Territory consisting of the Naga Hills which would be under the direct rule of the British Crown in order to ensure the Nagas a square deal. The expenses of looking after the Crown Colony was to be borne by the United Kingdom and perhaps by a contribution from

23 Elwin, n.5, p.51.

24 A Naga leader, quoted in Elwin, n.5, p.51.

India. Another proposal was put forward by Sir Reginald Coupland. He was for a treaty between the Governments of India and Burma with the British to work out the territory and to share the responsibility of administration. Both the NNC and INC were quite vehement in rejecting the plan.²⁵ T.Sakhrie who was the Secretary of NNC in his treatise on the 'Naga Case for Independence' opined; "There can be no doubt that if the Nagas had lent the slightest support or encouragement to the scheme, the Colony might well have been a reality."²⁶ He thus indirectly testified to the feelings of the Nagas to be completely independent.

The NNC had a plan to request the British Government and the Government of India to appoint India to act as the Guardian Power over Nagaland for a period of ten years, at the end of which it was proposed that the question of their political future be left for the Nagas themselves to decide. A Memorandum submitted to Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy contained the following terms -

25 Ibid, p.51 & 52.

26 Sakhrie, T., "Treatise on the Naga Case for independence", Kohima Raj Bhavan Records cited by Murkot Ramunny in his book *The World of the Nagas* (New Delhi, 1988), p.35.

- a) The interim Government of the Naga people will be a Government by the Naga people over all the people of Nagaland having full powers in respect of legislation, executive and judiciary.
- b) Nagaland belongs to the Naga people and will be inalienable.
- c) The Interim Government of the Naga people will have full powers in the matter of raising and expenditure of revenue, an annual subvention to cover the deficit being given by the Guardian Power.
- d) For defence and for aiding civil power in case of emergency, a force considered necessary by the NNC will be maintained in Nagaland by the Guardian Power. That force will be responsible to the NNC who will in turn be responsible to the Guardian Power.²⁷

The Nagas were asked to discuss their problems with the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly which visited Kohima in May 1947. There was an impasse regarding the provision which would allow the Nagas to decide their own political future after 10 years' interim period. The Committee left

²⁷ Quoted in Murkot Ramuny, n.26, p.36.

after expressing their inability to recommend anything outside the Indian constitution. Sir Akbar Hydari, Governor of Assam, came to Kohima and the Nine Point Memorandum known as the Hydari Agreement was drawn up in June 1947 (*See Appendix I*). But this Agreement turned sour when controversy arose regarding the interpretation of the 9th point. The Nagas interpreted it as a provision for the liberty to demand complete secession after the interim period while the Indian leaders maintained that it only allowed scope for more acceptable arrangements within the Union of India.

The Nagas went to meet Mahatma Gandhi to present their case for independence. The meeting actually took place on 19th July at Bhangi Colony, Delhi and Gandhiji is reported to have assured the Nagas of India's peaceful stance by telling them: "Nagas have every right to be independent. We do not want you to feel that India is yours, that this city of Delhi is yours. I feel that Naga Hills is mine just as much as it is yours. But if you say that it is mine then the matter must stop there. I believe in the brotherhood of men but I do not believe in force, and enforced union. If you do not wish to join the Indian Union, no one will force you to do that. The congress will not do that."²⁸

28 Quoted in Ghosh, n.12, pp.162-163.

The Naga leaders visited Delhi again and met Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to press their demand for a political future of their choice after ten years but were categorically denied any right of secession.

The NNC declared Nagaland independent on 14th August, 1947, and sent a telegram to the Government of India informing that the Nagas would be free to decide their own future after the end of the ten years period of the Hydari Agreement. The Nagas received two terrible blows in the passing away of Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948 and Sir Hydari on 28th December of the same year.

A Naga delegation met Gopinath Bordoloi, Premier of Assam, in Shillong on 9th November 1949. When the delegation brought up the Hydari Agreement for discussion, Bordoloi told them that India was never a party to the Agreement. The Nagas understandably felt cheated and hardened their attitudes towards India. The extremists began dominating the NNC and with the unanimous election of A.Z.Phizo as President on the 11th December, 1950, the Nagas' aspiration for independence took a new turn.

The Government of India, under the Sixth Schedule, is empowered to create an Autonomous Hill District Council in the

hill districts of Assam. The Council is to be constituted by elected members for day-to-day administration and is to be allotted seats in the Assam legislative Assembly. The Nagas outrightly rejected this offer and boycotted the elections which were held to constitute the District Councils. They also boycotted the General Elections of 1952.²⁹ The total boycott of the elections made a farce of the preparations carried out for them and was a very effective method of expressing popular ~~attitudes~~ opinion.

B) THE SHILLONG ACCORD

A plebiscite was organised in 1951 "when all the villages were visited, signatures or thumb impressions taken and oaths were administered in the tribal fashion to fight for Naga independence."³⁰ The Nagas began their revolt by refusing to pay house tax, not co-operating with government in the various schemes, the village headmen returning their red cloaks, the Naga-officials leaving their jobs and the students leaving their schools. The Indian national and official celebrations were boycotted. The separation of the Tuensang Sub-Division from the Naga Hills District and merging it with the NEFA in 1952 to

29 Elwin, n.5, pp.53-54.

30 Ibid, p.54.

insulate the area from NNC's influence³¹ whettted the hostility of the Nagas.

Apart from civil disobedience, the Nagas began using some force, threatening the Government employees, especially the Naga employees by posters and letters, sometimes going upto the extent of attacking and killing them. Official buildings were burnt and roads and bridges were damaged. It was thought that a visit by the Prime Minister would help in appeasing the Naga upsurge. Jawaharlal Nehru visited Kohima on 30th March 1953, accompanied by the Burmese Premier Thankin U Nu in whose country reside a sizeable Naga population. This visit could have gone a long way in bringing about a lasting peaceful solution but unfortunately it brought about a reverse outcome. Due to the inept handling of the situation by the D.C. of Kohima, the important public meeting at Kohima turned out to be a fiasco. After according the two Premiers a warm welcome, the Nagas, infuriated by the report that they would not be allowed to address the meeting, resorted to a mass walk-out, some allegedly forced by the NNC volunteers from the meeting ground, leaving only the officials and interpreters to listen to Nehru and U Nu.³² This unfortunate episode hardened the attitude and

31 Ramunny, n.26, p.60.

32 Ibid, pp.622-623.

stand of both the Nagas and the Indian Government. After this visit, there was a widespread rumour that the police had made a list of persons to be arrested. The NNC leaders decided to go underground instead of courting arrest and be separated from the people. After the police raided the house of the late Sakhrie, the Secretary of the NNC, on 14th April 1953, almost all the NNC office bearers went underground. Viswema, Jakhama, Kigwema, Phesama and Khonoma villages were searched and a number of people were arrested. In the meantime more people from all over Naga Hills went underground and the police force was strengthened to cope with the new situations.³³ But there was no let-up in the growing upsurge against the Government of India. In fact the sending in of more police force only contributed towards making more people join the underground and the confirmation of their preference for the British rule. The Naga underground established its control in most parts of the Naga Hills. Bimala Prasad Chaliha, President of Assam Pradesh congress Committee, on his visit to the Naga areas in October 1953 observed that the civil administration in the Naga Hills, "if not already collapsed was on its last legs".³⁴

33 Ao, n.3, p.181.

34 Ramunny, n.26, p.67.

As a gesture of rejecting the Government of India, many Government schools were closed down and started a Naga National High School in November 1953 at Kohima and another one at Mokokchung the following year. A Naga Home Guard was started and many Naga youth joined voluntarily or were persuaded to do so.

Though the NNC never officially approved a policy of violence,³⁵ the extremists started preparing for an armed uprising sometime in 1953. They picked the Tuensang area, near Chiangmei in Burma, as a base for their operations. The reasons behind this selection were because of its tactical advantages like its location at the international frontier with Burma, the poor and difficult communications, weak administration and the presence of more virile tribes in the area.

The NNC started off with a no-tax campaign against the house tax of Rs.2 originally levied by the British and continued by the NEFA administration. Lurid propaganda regarding such evil designs of the Government of Indian as depriving the Nagas of their freedom, the rights of land and forests and imposing alien culture on the Nagas helped in rousing the sentiments and emotions of the freedom loving people. In spite of earnest efforts

35 Elwin, n.5, p.55.

by the officials, the activities and influence of the NNC gradually increased. The Gaonburas and villagers were asked not to cooperate with the government. The tireless efforts of Phizo and his ability and mobility to be in many places within a short time enhanced his popularity and influence. No doubt he had to overcome many obstacles initially but slowly and more so after his unanimous election to the post of the President of the NNC, all the Nagas accepted his leadership and he became a legend. People began to look up to him as the Messiah who would unite the Nagas and deliver them from external rule.

Phizo found that his propaganda was receiving good response in the Tuensang areas. So on 18th September, 1954, he announced the installation of Khunak Kanlang Ngeukhum - "The People's Sovereign Republic of Free Nagaland" at 'Kautanga'³⁶ an imaginary place in Teunsang Frontier Division with 'Hongkin' as the President. "Orders and instructions were issued to the people under the name of Hongkin Government to overthrow the alien government and all their agents."³⁷ Phizo was alleged to have distributed arms and directed the Tuensang Nagas to fight the government and to kill all who were helping the government.³⁸ But Phizo, when questioned about the violent

36 Singh (Ed.), n.18, p.45.

37 Ramunny, n.26, p.77.

38 Ibid, p.77.

activities in the Tuensang Frontier Division, maintained that the NNC stood for non-violence.

Moderate leaders in the NNC were alarmed by the violent plans the extremists were preparing at the NNC meeting held in March 1955. Several reports regarding the recruitment of NNC volunteers and the training in handling of arms imparted to them in the NNC camps along the international border were received. By this time, the combined force of the army and the Assam Rifles was pressed into the Tuensang areas. Because of this pressure, a considerable number of armed groups had to shift into the Naga Hills District by October 1955. This necessitated the recruitment of the local people who were simultaneously trained for armed insurrection. Phizo was the brain behind these moves. Some of the leaders who were not in favour of taking up of arms resorted to issuing a notice on 26th October, 1955, appealing to the Nagas to realise the negative effects of resorting to violent methods reminding them of the morally attractive policy of non-violence which was the declared policy of NNC.³⁹ Actually the rift between the extremists including Phizo, and the moderates like Sakhrie, Silie Haralu and Jasokie became quite pronounced by June 1955. It climaxed in the murder of T. Sakhrie on 18th January 1956.

39 Ibid, pp.78-79.

This tragic event was a great set back to the NNC and in Sakhrie's death, it lost its most enlightened and articulate leader.

A new body 'Naga Federal Government', formed at Phensiyu in Rengma area, replaced the Hongkin Government on 22nd March 1956. It framed a constitution which declared Nagaland to be a Sovereign Republic and claimed that this has been so from time immemorial. There was an elaborate scheme for a parliamentary set-up, administrative, legal and foreign affairs. It declared "Nagaland will maintain permanent military neutrality."⁴⁰ It was to have no standing army but would maintain Home Guards who would perform police functions.

With the mounting number of people joining the rebels, the Indian Government called in the army to take control of the situation in 1956. There was incessant fighting between the rebels and the armed forces. Army outposts were attacked, convoys and patrolling parties were ambushed. The army resorted to burning down many villages and civilian inhabitants were rendered homeless.⁴¹

40 Ao, n.3, p.183.

41 Ibid, p.185.

The Nagas, caught in the crossfire between the two groups, had to undergo a lot of suffering. After so much violence and killings, people were looking for ways and means to bring about peace. Liberal leaders and the churches condemned violence and began appealing to the people to restore peace and order. The peace efforts resulted in the All Tribes Naga People's Convention at Kohima from 22-26 August 1957. The meeting was attended by representatives from all the tribes but the rebels did not participate. The main resolutions of the Convention advocated settlement of the Naga issue through negotiations and, pending a final political solution, the then Naga Hills District of Assam and Tuensang Division of NEFA to be constituted into a single administration under the External Affairs Ministry. It was hoped that the rebels would join in carrying out negotiations with the Government of India for the final political settlement and the Convention's resolutions were to serve only as an interim demand. The NPC sent a delegation which met the Governor of Assam and later the Prime Minister in New Delhi. The Naga Hills Tuensang Area under the Ministry of External Affairs was constituted with the Governor of Assam acting in his discretion as the Agent of the President of India from 1st December 1957.

The second NPC held at Ungma in May 1958 was also not attended by the underground in spite of special efforts made by the Convention's Liaison Committee. In this Convention, a 16

point Memorandum for the constitution of a separate state to be called Nagaland within the Indian Union was drafted. This memorandum was passed in the 3rd NPC held at Mokokchung from 22-26th October 1959.⁴² The NPC responded to an invitation by the Indian Government and sent a delegation to Delhi under the leadership of Imkongliba in July 1960. They met the Prime Minister, the Indian Foreign Secretary and other top officials and deliberated the clauses of the 16 point Memorandum (*see Appendix No.II*). The outcome of these negotiations was the creation of the State of Nagaland through the 13th Amendment Act of 1962. This proves that India is willing to do anything to appease the Nagas if it is within the Indian Constitution.

Phizo and the underground refused to accept the Delhi Pact between NPC and the Government of India. They continued with their anti-India activities and since there was no abatement of violence, the leaders of churches decided to initiate a peace process. This resulted in the formation of the Peace Mission consisting of the Rev. Michael Scott, B.P. Chaliha and Jaya Parakash Narayan. The members started the peace process from the month of May 1964. They received good response from the people and an agreement for a cease-fire was signed on 24th

42 Ghosh, n.12, p.171.

May 1964 at Sakrabama Village. The security forces of India and the Federal Government of Nagaland thus arrived at an understanding to cease operations in order to create the right atmosphere for bringing about a peaceful solution. The Peace Mission went about earnestly exploring the possibilities of bringing about a lasting peace, respecting and weighing the stands of both the parties. The Mission made neutral and balanced proposals. Thus it suggested that "the Naga Federal Government could on their own volition decide to be a participant in the Union of India and mutually settle the terms and conditions for that purpose. On the other hand, the Government of India could consider to what extent the pattern and structure of the relationship between Nagaland and the Government of India should be adapted and recast so as to satisfy the political aspirations of all sections of Naga opinion..."⁴³

There was some controversy regarding the agreement of the underground to these proposals. During the negotiations they wanted them to be raised to ministerial level. On the suggestion of Chaliha, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri agreed to meet the under ground leaders without any pre-conditions. But before the actual meeting took place, Shastri

43 Ibid, p.211.

passed away at Tashkent and this was a great shock and loss for the Nagas.

Efforts were made to bring Phizo to join the talks but there was disagreement regarding the meeting place since Phizo wanted it to be in Burma⁴⁴

After Indira Gandhi took over as the Prime Minister of India, she consented to talk to the rebels and six rounds of talks were held beginning from 18th February 1966 to 5th October 1967 but no concrete results came out of these rounds.

Jayaprakash Narayan resigned from the Mission in February 1966. The Rev. Michael Scott was asked to leave the country on 4th May 1966, on grounds of alleged partisan politics and efforts to internationalise the Naga issue. Chaliha also resigned as he was not happy with the proceedings. The Peace Mission thus came to an end in May 1966.

In the meantime, Kaito Sema, the former C-in-C of the Naga Federal Government, attempted a coup. He wanted to take control of the Naga affairs and expedite the settlement of the Naga problem. Efforts were made to win him back by the rebel

44 Ramunny, n.26, pp.221-222.

leaders but to no avail. The split brought about by Kaito's move had serious repercussions. His eventual murder on 3rd August 1968 led to the distancing of the Semas from the Underground Movement. The Kaito group kidnapped some Naga Federal Government leaders and established a new party called the Council of Naga People, and a new government called the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland with representatives from nine tribes. Kughato was the Party President and Scato Swu the acting Prime Minister, both being Semas. The new set-up pledged itself to work for a peaceful solution of the Naga Problem and the unity of the Naga people. One significant aspect of the Revolutionary Government was that, most of the leaders who had conducted negotiations earlier were in it. They had openly given up violence and were soon to declare that they would work within the Indian Union.⁴⁵

The Indian army inflicted a great blow to the underground when it could manage to intercept a large Chinese-trained group led by Mowu Angami and forced them to surrender on the 16th March, 1969. This was a sure indication of the inroads Indian army had been able to make into the underground outfit. Soon after, in the month of April, Kughato Sukhai and Scato swu categorically stated their preparedness to accept a solution

45 Ibid, p.277.

within the Indian Union. The moderate underground leaders of the Aos had meetings followed by that of Chakhesangs and Lothas in order to find out ways of forging unity among the Nagas and a peaceful solution acceptable to Nagas and the Government of India. Meanwhile some Lotha underground group favoured a solution within the Indian Union condemning the extremist policy.⁴⁶

There were renewed efforts and negotiations overtly and covertly carried out between the Naga underground, the Nagaland Government, the Indian Government, the Church leaders and the Nagaland Peace Council. The Naga people had undergone so much suffering and hardship and wanted peace. The entire underground 16th Battalion of the Naga Army from lower Sema area came overground in July 1975. The Ao and Lotha tribes followed suit.⁴⁷ Due to the many factions and splits, the movement was weakened and many underground leaders became pessimistic. They thought the movement was petering out. This eventually led to the signing of the Shillong Accord between the Government of India and the Representatives of the Naga rebels on 11th November 1975, whereby the underground accepted the Indian constitution.

46 Ibid, p.281.

47 Ibid, p.399.

c) **AFTERMATH** : The refusal of Phizo to accept any agreement with India short of complete sovereignty can be inferred from his message to his brother Keviyallay on the eve of the Shillong Accord. This introduced an element of uncertainty in the acceptance of the agreement by the whole community of the Nagas. His message reads: "Greetings to you all. Received and noted word by word of all your discussions upto fourth september (1975). We are confident the Indian Government will see reason and agree to settle the long-standing issue without further bloodshed. The World is closely watching situation in Nagaland. Remain as ever. Phizo, Khoddo, Yonkan"⁴⁸ The "Remain as ever" implied to stick to the old stand in the demand, ie, the demand for complete independence.

The refusal of Veeniyi Rhakho, one of the representatives of the underground, to sign the Accord even after much persuasion⁴⁹ and the vehement denunciation of the Accord by two leaders Isak Swu and Th. Muivah who returned from China in 1975 were indeed a shocking message to the singatories and the Government of India that the political aspirations of the Nagas have not been satisfied completely. The disowning of the

48 Ibid, pp.344-345.

49 Nibedon, Nirmal, *Nagaland The Night of the Guerrillas*, (New Delhi, 1983). p.345.

Accord by Phizo⁵⁰ weakened it and put its future in jeopardy. The signatories found it difficult to 'formulate other issues for final settlement' (*according to clause 3 of the Accord*). The leaders wanted Phizo to lead and formulate the final settlement. They made trips to London to request Phizo to do the same but unrelenting in his stand on the issue of independence, he refused to accept the first two clauses which state the Nagas' acceptance of the Indian constitution. Thus 14 years have passed since the agreement was signed and the signatories have not been able to formulate the "other issues".

The rejection of the Accord by Phizo, had a telling impact on the future of the Shillong Accord. Some of its supporters have conveniently forgotten the first two clauses and indicate that the final settlement is still to be achieved. This is not due to any lack of effort on the part of the Government. It has tried to rehabilitate as many former underground Nagas as possible. Many have been recruited into a special Battalion in the Border Security Force while some others have become M.L.A.s and Ministers.⁵¹ But in spite of these lucrative offers and special measures, the supporters and signatories of the agreement have to soft-pedal the Accord because of its rejection by Phizo,

50 Sareen, V.K., *India's North-East in Flames*, (New Delhi, 1982), p.145.

51 Ramunny, n.26, p.361.

Muivah, Isak Swu and others. "The ultras in the underground, in the meantime continued to collect 'taxes', recruit volunteers and sent them out to neighbouring Burma for training in guerilla warfare and subversion."⁵²

While making efforts and arrangements for a meeting of Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Phizo, Rano Shaiza, the niece of Phizo made a statement dated 12th May, 1977, which was in a way very vital for the proper understanding of the Naga situation. She said: "While the former underground members are now living in peace camps and their arms deposited with the Peace Council, a sizeable hardcore of them, led by well trained, experienced and dedicated leaders have established their base head quarters in the Naga territory of Northern Burma. This group of underground leaders have visited China a number of times and they are well experienced in organizational and tactical moves. They have so far restrained themselves from making any serious attempts to enter Nagaland. It is believed that they are closely watching the political developments in Nagaland. What they will do is difficult to forecast..."⁵³

52 Sareen, n.50, p.146.

53 Nibedon, n.49, p.348.

A meeting between Phizo and Desai took place on 14th June 1977 at the India House, London but it did not make any headway because Desai was not willing to talk about Nagaland outside India while Phizo persisted with it. The Nagas were angered by the alleged threat of Desai to "exterminate all the Naga rebels"⁵⁴ but were happy that a dialogue between their leader and the head of the Indian Government had taken place. They hoped the meeting was a start towards creating a better situation for a happy ending.

Attempts were made to contact the underground leaders, particularly Muivah and Isak Swu, since some feel that the Accord cannot be implemented without their participation. There is also a fear among the signatories that they might be assassinated as Keviyallay remarked: "In Muivah's eyes, We are traitors and we know what that means."⁵⁵

There has been no reciprocity to the feelers from the other side. Instead of responding to the call to join the "final settlement" of the Naga issues, Isak and Muivah formed the dreaded National Socialist Council of Nagaland in 1980 and since then they have been growing in strength. The NSCN even survived the crippling infighting that took place in April 1988

54 Ibid, p.353.

55 Ibid, p.373.

between the Khaplang group and the Muivah group. The NSCN are reported to have regrouped and is supposed to be very active in the Somra Tract located at the international border of India and Burma. They have shocked the Indian Government by daringly having a three day "National Assembly" session for the first time on Indian territory at "Jordan Camp", in Dimapur, Nagaland on November 6, 1989. The Assembly resolved to uphold for ever the historic national decision arrived at through the Plebiscite of 1951, to decide the future of Nagaland. According to sources close to the NSCN, they emphasised that they would not hold any talk with the Government of India under any pre-condition.⁵⁶

56 "No Conditional Talks: NSCN", *Times of India*, 29th March, 1990.

CHAPTER III

THE SECURITY PERILS

The Naga-inhabited area, used as a passage by hordes of immigrants of yore, like the Ahoms, gained strategical importance of international dimensions when the Japanese decided to invade India, then under Britain, an Allied Force, through it. From April to June of 1945, global attention was focussed on the Naga areas, particularly Kohima and its surroundings where fighting between the Allied Forces and the Japanese was going on, since the fate of India and the honour of the Allies was to be decided. The threat was even more serious since Subhas Chandra Bose with his Indian National Army and the support of A.Z. Phizo, had colluded with the Japanese to throw out the British from the Indian Sub-Continent. Commenting about the planned invasion of India through Kohima, Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi, Commander of the 15th Japanese Division in his order issued on 18th February 1945 said "...this operation will engage the attention of the whole world and is eagerly awaited by 100,000,000 of our countrymen. By its very decisive nature, its success will have profound effect upon the course of this war and may even lead to its conclusion..."¹ These areas witnessed some of the most stubborn, close and bloody fighting in the whole of the Second

1.* Arthur Swinson in his Kohima, quoted by Nirmal Nibedon in *Nagaland The Night of the Guerrillas*, (New Delhi: 1983), p.21.

World War"². The Allied armies with the invaluable support given by the Nagas defeated the Japanese forces at Garrison Hill in Kohima and they had to beat a hasty retreat. The Japanese invasion was thus halted and repulsed in the Naga Hills and British India was saved.

Little did the British realise when they compelled by security reasons, set out to establish their control over the Nagas, what a troublesome legacy they were to bequeath Independent India mainly and Burma to a lesser extent. The British attempt to appease the fierce Nagas by demarcating their areas between India and Burma in 1937 converted into the Nagas' favour in their anti-India campaign for their own sovereignty. Most of the people of the North-East as a whole are ethnically similar to the people of Indo-China region, China, the South-East and Far-East Asia. The racial affinity to the East and the narrow geographical connection to the rest of India, aggravated by near isolation due to poor communication, insignificant political representation in the Parliament due to the nature of the political set-up of the country and comparative under development in the economic fields have led to the predicament of the North-East which is a hot-bed of insurgent group demanding secession or others demanding for more

2. Arthur Swinson, Ibid p.23.

political autonomy and attention. The most serious of all these is the Naga Movement. I will deal on how some countries have been assisting the Nagas and later take the Naga problem vis-a-vis the North-East turmoil.

a. FOREIGN INTERESTS

The Nagas request to be left alone when the British left India did not get favourable response from the latter since it would not serve their vested interests. Apart from Sir Reginald Coupland's Plan for a Crown Colony which the Nagas rejected, there was no other arrangement and thus the Nagas were left to settle their cases with the Indian leaders. Though never wavering in their conviction of their own independence, they knew their historical and geographical bond with India. They had high regard for the Indian leaders and depended upon their magnanimity and respect for the right to self-determination of the people to grant them the right to determine their own future. The Nagas pleaded the Indian leaders, particularly Mahatma Gandhi, Jawahar Lal Nehru and Rajagopalachari with petitions memoranda, and by sending their representatives. But due to the political demands and considerations of India, they were refused the right to determine their own future outside India. The Nagas, in the pursuit for independence, were thus, compelled to seek assistance from other countries.

Pakistan was one of the first countries to provide assistance to the Nagas. The Indo-Pak relations for reasons well known were never cordial. Pakistan came into contact with the Nagas in the mid-fifties when the latter began appealing to various countries to lend them a helping hand in their cause. Facilitated by her proximity to the Naga areas then, Pakistan could give full encouragement and material assistance since Phizo reached Dacca in December 1956, on his escape to the West. Karachi was pleasantly shocked to learn from Phizo about the Nagas' potentiality in their anti-India campaign and initiated a special "Liaison Cell" to look after the training of Naga guerrillas. Phizo was also promised machine guns, sten guns, mortars and rockets launchers. Within no time, over a dozen guerrilla centres mainly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts were earmarked by Pakistani authorities in consultation with Phizo. Reports of camps being built at Rangamati and the Rangkhiong forests were received by the Indian intelligence.³

In spite of the successful nabbing of Mowu Angami in the Northern Cachar on 10th August 1957, who was on his way back from Dacca, the successful interception and elimination Phizo's intelligence Chief Zheketo and the capture of Phizo's confidant Thungti Chang and Pienyu in July 1958, there was no

3. Nibedon, Ibid, p.84.

let-up in the trickling of arms to Naga areas from Dacca and that of the Nagas to Pakistan's guerrilla training camps. In these camps, they were imparted training in the use of modern weapons and night operations in jungle terrain. The Nagas have been fighting the Indian army with arms they had picked from the war dumps of the Japanese and the British forces and the ones they had managed to capture from the Indian forces. But now they were being prepared to pose a more serious threat to the Indian military might with the full backing of Pakistan.

Pakistani Government supported Phizo's plan to go the United Kingdom and to raise the Naga question from there as the dispute between the Nagas and the Indian Government arose as a result of the British conquest. Phizo was provided by Pakistan an El Salvador passport and other travel documents and by May 1960, he was on his way to the West to present the Naga Case to the World. Before he left, he had acquired Pakistan's promise to give moral support and military aid in return for some concessions which she was to receive as and when the Nagas achieved their freedom. That Pakistan was earnest in its promise and was giving its best assistance can be borne out by the fact that Kaito and his group's training was hosted by none other than Ayub Khan himself.⁴

4. Ibid, p.167

Pakistan lent the service of its mass media to the Naga Cause and came out with statements like "the Nagas were not a part of India even during the days of British Paramountcy. But the Indians marched their troops into free Nagaland to cow down, subdue and suppress the proud, sensitive people. The Indian Jawans have since proved more brutal.⁵ The Nagas and Mizos were rendered the facilities to contact foreign missions in Dacca and were allowed free use of port facilities to enable them to send their representatives to foreign countries in pursuit of their cause.⁶ In September 1962, Pakistan arranged the necessary travel documents for Kaito, Mowa, Khodao Lotha and Yongkong Ao to go to London at the invitation of Phizo⁷ to deliberate and work out the future course of action.

India had been lodging complaints to Pakistan against her support to the Naga and Mizo hostiles but the latter never admitted her complicity. However, her role was brought to light by the documents captured from the underground elements and released by the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi on 4th

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5. Yunuo, Asoso, *The Rising Nagas*, (New Delhi, 1984-reprint), p.304.
 6. Ibid, p.305.
 7. Nibedon, n.1, p.98.

October 1968⁸ and when some rebel Nagas and Mizos including General Thino sellie alongwith 90,000 Pakistani troops surrendered to the Indian forces in Dacca on 22nd December, 1971, after the Indo-Pak war. The Indian victory inflicted a great blow to hte Nagas since Pakistan was disabled to continue assisting them.

Phizo and the Nagas had nurtured the hope of getting support from the West particularly from the United Kingdom and the USA. Though the former was responsible for the Naga problem historically speaking, she did not do anything more than giving refuge to Phizo and not stopping him from establishing NNC headquarters and continuing with his crusade from there the British support to the Naga cause is mainly from the sympathisers from among which the Reverend Michael Scott and Bertrand Russell, the great humanitarian philosopher were the prominent ones.

The support of the Americans was similar to that of the British. There was a group of Americans which have been lending material and moral support to the Nagas till the latter started leaning towards China in the mid-sixties. But the

8. "Pakistan's Complicity with Naga and Mizo Hostiles"- Documentary proof, *Asian Recorder*, October 8 to November 3, 1968, p.8590.

American involvement could have been of a much greater dimension as the former secret agent John Smith testified that CIA was active in Nagaland as early as the late fifties⁹ (mentioned earlier in the Introduction).

The United States' designs in the eastern part of the Indian sub-continent was revealed in the 'Blue Print' circulated by Agencia International De Prensa (International Press Service) on 7th December 1966. She had conjured a plan with some other western powers to create an "Independent Bengal" comprising of East Pakistan, West Bengal, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Sikkim and Bhutan. The "Blue Print" claimed support from the Nagas and the Mizos stating that "the formation of this new country is of special interests to the hill tribes of Mizo and Naga" and acknowledged that "the proposed settlement of the problem of Assam tribes, Mizo and Naga, in the framework of a new set-up is of great significance in the attainment of stable conditions in this corner of the world".¹⁰ The plan, fortunately for India, was crippled when Bangladesh was liberated and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman refused to cooperate with the schemers. The alleged CIA's conspiracy to assassinate Mujibur

9. *Assam Tribune*, 16 November, 1967, quoted by V.I.K. Sareen in *India's North-East in Flames*, (New Delhi, 1982) p.21.

10. Sareen, *Ibid.*, pp. 24-27.

Rehman and later its involvement in the sacking of Deputy Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Moudud Ahmed indicate the interests and the extent to which the United States of America can go to have an influence and foothold in parts of the Indian Sub-Continent.

In pursuance of their policy was the so-called "Project Brahmaputra". A circular issued on 21st June 1979, by the United States International Communication Agency under the aforementioned title explained the purpose of the project in the following words: "This type of research especially helps us in understanding the political situation in a region and helps us in extending our area of influence". The Research Project was to be carried out under the supervision and direction of the special research cell of George Washington University which had instructed several teams of investigators to conduct research in the North-Eastern states of India, Sikkim and Bhutan, with the approval of the State Department. The teams were to conduct public opinion poll on the constitutional position in different North-Eastern states and to probe the possibility of forming a "New State".¹¹ The strategy of the Americans was to find out the problems and grievances of the people and then try to exploit them to their advantage by winning over the people to secede

11. Ibid, pp. 23-24.

from India with a promise to bring them out of their plight. This was indeed a grave danger to the integrity and sovereignty of India.

CIA is believed to be operating in the North-East through its Indian employees which include journalists, academicians and public leaders. Blitz magazine alleged that American agents have been coming to Manipur from time to time to supervise anti-national activities.¹²

Even the KGB was supposed to have been having keen interest in the North-East. Approximately 175 KGB agents were believed to be based in Indian and interestingly they have their headquarters in Calcutta and not in New Delhi. Two Soviet diplomats were expelled from Calcutta and two of their alleged Indian accomplices Caro Martin, a Calcutta businessman, and Joseph Mahapat a former Defence Ministry official were arrested in 1979.¹³

Burma, with her own share of uncompromising and rebellious tribal groups, allowed the Nagas to use her territory to go to East Pakistan on the condition that they don't create law

12. "Sovereign State of Nagaland", *Blitz* (Bombay, 28 June, 1980).

13. Sareen, n.9, p.29.

and order problems in Burma. The Burmese Government continued with this policy till early 1962, not out of animosity to India but in order to avoid displeasing the fairly strong Naga rebel group and create more problems. From March 1962 till 1965, the Indo- Burma relation turned sour due to the expatriation of over 3 lakh Indians when revolutionary military junta under General Ne Win took control. In the meantime the Naga rebels took advantage and started contacting the rebel groups in Burma like the Shans, Karens and Kachins. When the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri visited Burma in 1965, both the countries felt the need to re-establish the friendly ties which existed earlier and mutually decided to come down hard upon the rebel groups in both the countries. The Burmese leader General Ne Win gave a return visit to India in March 1968 and assured India of continued Burmese pressure on the Naga rebels. This invoked Chinese condemnation on Burma for "carrying out conspiratory activities and plotting with Indian Premier" for a joint anti-China campaign and suppression of the armed struggle of the minority nationalities along the Indian Burmese border, meaning the Naga-Mizo underground activities.¹⁴

14 "Renewed Anti-Government Campaign by China", *Asian Recorder*, May 27 to June 2, 1968, p.8335.

Compelled by the disappointing response from the west to their call for help, and rooted in the racial similarity, the relationship between the Nagas and the Chinese was being bridged since 1962. On 29th May, 1963, the Nagas sent a letter to Peking probably through the Pakistani military authorities explaining that the Nagas were fighting for their "territorial independence". Through their letter, they appealed and hoped that the Chinese "Would honour and follow their principles of safeguarding and upholding the cause of any suppressed nation of Mongolian stock". The Nagas did not hide their Chinese leaning and endorsed the same letter to the Prime Ministers of India and the United Kingdom and also to their leaders A.Z. Phizo.¹⁵ When the Underground Nagas saw no hope of getting their demand from the Indian government through the Peace Mission and their talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, they decided to go for all out support from China in spite of heavy opposition from the people who feared imposition of communism against their Christian faith. The Nagas got encouraging response from China and in May 1966, the Federal Government of Nagaland selected Th. Muivah, Brigadier Thinosellie and few others to make their maiden trip to China to present the Naga case and ask "for any possible

15. Nibedon, n.1, p.131.

assistance".¹⁶ After bivouacking and overcoming many difficulties, the Nagas with the help and direction of the Kachins reached Yunan in January 1967. They were given the best training in arms and the Chinese instructors did not interfere with their religious practices. This impressed the Nagas and was in a way a departure from the usual Chinese practice. Indoctrination of the communist propaganda usually accompanied any Chinese assistance to others like the Burmese rebels. But with the Nagas they were willing to forego this practice in granting their then help to liberate them from the Indian control. If all the Nagas were convinced that the Chinese would not impose communism then none would have objected to seeking China's help. This would have had serious repercussion on Indian interests. But fortunately for India, not many Nagas favoured seeking assistance from China lest their Christian faith was put under pressure.

The Nagas were reportedly assured of the Chinese support and were asked to come in thousands of young educated persons, with unshaken conviction in Nagaland's sovereignty for training in arms and guerrilla tactics. They were also told to co-

16. Ibid, p.149.

ordinate their activities with the Meiteis, Mizos, Chins, Shans Karens and Kachins.¹⁷

After receiving training and arms, some Nagas from the first batch including Thinosellie came back in small groups. The China-returned Nagas were believed to have told the underground leaders that China would openly support them in their freedom movement, help in setting up a government in exile in the Chinese territory contiguous to the Indian Border and were to guide its foreign relations. The Nagas were also supposed to have been promised assistance in other ways like permitting the use of the propaganda machinery and setting up a rebel radio station.¹⁸ After the successful mission of the first batch, there was no turning back inspite of heavy opposition from the people, especially the church leaders. At a press conference of underground Nagas held at Chedema on May 21, 1968, Kughato Sukhai, a top underground leader justified the Nagas' action in seeking China's help saying that India got her independence with outside assistance. He then suggested sending emissaries to neighbouring countries like Burma and Indonesia.¹⁹ Earlier that year in February, General Mowu and

17. Yunuo, n.5, p.347.

18. *Times of India*, New Delhi, July 18, 1968.

19. "Hostile Naga Leader Justifies China's Help", *Asian Recorder*, June 17-23, p. 8371.

Isak Swu, Foreign Secretary of the Federal Government along with several hundred rebels went to China for training and to work out details on Chinese terms for extending all possible support. In a Mizo National Front Conference held at Silchar, the Mizos were reported to have agreed to allow entry of the Chinese troops and three years' occupation of the Mizo Hill areas by the Chinese.²⁰ Had the Nagas decided to go to that extent, it would have been a tremendous threat to the security of India.

The Chinese support became more overt and Peking Radio in its Burmese language broadcast on March 13, 1968, attacked General Ne Win for having "Secret talks" with the Indian Government to "suppress the Nagas and also the revolutionary working people who could not be defeated by him". China, through its radio broadcast threatened General Ne Win that he will pay dearly for his act.²¹

Officially China kept denying its involvement in the Naga cause but it was exposed when the Indian Army captured a rebel camp at Jotsoma. Photographs and documents found clearly proved the Chinese hand. Not only that the Peking broadcast

20. "Mizo Hostiles reported pact with China", *Asian Recorder*, May 6-12, 1968, p.8303.

21. "Ne Win's Visit - Peking Radio Comment", *Asian Recorder*, April 8-14, 1968, p.8256

talked of the cause "of the Naga hostiles and claimed that it was just". It tried to comfort and encourage the rebels by saying that they would "assuredly win the final victory in their struggle".²²

China even sent some of the Nagas to North Vietnam to learn from the Communist Vietnamese on how they were standing up against the might of a super power, the United States of America. North Vietnam promised the Nagas to extend whatever possible help within their ability passively and actively for the liberation of the Nagas from India.²³

In spite of the Indian protests and Russian accusations, the Chinese continued to help the Nagas by receiving batches of Nagas and training them in Yunan and later in Lhasa. China instructed the Burmese Communist Party and other Pro-Chinese rebel outfits in Northern Burma to help the Nagas. They have been of great help to the Nagas who claimed that these groups had even warned the Burmese Government not to interfere with them in Burma.²⁴

22. "Chinese Collusion with Naga Hostiles", *Asian Recorder*, July 8-14, 1968, p.8412.

23. Yunon, n.5, p.358.

24. Nibedon, n.1, p.359.

The Chinese felt betrayed by the Nagas' signing of Shillong Accord. What annoyed them most was the surrender of the arms given by them. The Indoo-China relations have been improving since the late seventies and the Chinese help to the Nagas has not been of the nature as rendered in late sixties and early seventies. But the Chinese interests and sympathy for the Nagas which was at one time as intense as to arouse the late Chou En-lai to promise a Naga delegation that even if only one guerrilla was left in Nagaland, the Chinese would continue to help them remain. Though in February 1979, the Chinese assured the Indian Government that such support was a thing of the past, the Chinese continue to help the Nagas in Northern Burma by providing Chinese instructors and arms from its stock of armoury with the Burmese Communist Party which include sophisticated arms and even U.S.3.5" rocket launchers.²⁵

b. NAGA INSURGENCY AND THE NORTH-EAST UNREST

Though it may be a bit debatable to say that there would not have been any insurgency in the North-East without that of the Nagas, no one will contend with the view that Naga Insurgency is the trendsetter. Not only were the Nagas the first

25. Nibedon, Nirmal, *The Ethnic Explosion*, (New Delhi, 1981) p.167 & 168.

to begin an insurgency against the Indian Government to achieve their freedom, they also encouraged, guided and assisted the other tribal groups to join hands with them in resisting and repulsing the Indian rule. The Naga leaders, particularly Phizo and T. Sakhrie went to all the tribal areas of the North-East and even some parts of Burma and tried to convince the people that they were a different race and should be under no domination. They made efforts to make others join the Nagas in their fight for political independence.

In this pursuit, Sakhrie, the Secretary of Naga National Council, visited the Mizo Hills in September, 1946 when the Mizo Union, the political organ of the Mizos, was having its first general assembly. After explaining the reasons-historical, political, ethnic and religious, he spelled out the Nagas' determination and plan to fight for political self-determination in the Mizo assembly and tried to instil in them a similar political aspiration. The Mizos were not persuaded but were courteous to him. The following year in the month of April, Phizo and some other Naga leaders decided to persuade the Mizos again and timed their visit to the Mizo Hills together with that of the Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly. This time the Nagas put forward some concrete Propositions. Phizo proposed the concept of an Independent State of the Naga and Mizo Hills with Mizo language as the lingua franca. The Mizo's politely turned down

the proposal and decided to work out their political future on a different line.²⁶ They decided to merge with India and not go with the Nagas. But at the same time, they had been shown the apparently more attractive and tempting alternative.

The Mizos did have some fears and doubts regarding their constitutional status but these were removed by the provision of Autonomous District Council under the Sixth Schedule. They were quite satisfied and happy till famine struck the Mizo areas. With the formation of the Mizo National Famine Front, supposedly for organising prime relief work but actually for political reasons, in 1959, the Mizos began to follow the lead taken by the Nagas. The Mizo National Famine Front transformed into Mizo National Front (MNF) with its demand for "sovereign independence of Greater Mizoram". The Nagas came to their help by advising them and showing the ways and means to mobilise and organise more support. More importantly the Nagas helped the Mizos in establishing contact with Pakistan, China and the rebel groups in Burma. The Mizos were given training by Pakistan in the camps set up for the Naga rebels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and later in the same bases of Yunnan by the Chinese. MNF in turn helped the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS), which was established with the help of CPI (M) on

26. Sareen, n.9. p.208.

10th June, 1967, as a non-political social organisation.²⁷ The younger generation led by Bejoy Hrangkhawl came out of the grip of the Marxist and CPI (M) came to be known as "Colonialist party of Indianised migrants". A militant wing of TUJS forged links with rebel groups based in Chittagong Hill Tracts, particularly the MNF. Echoing the call of Phizo: "We are all of the mongoloid stock and so let us merge ourselves with each other....."²⁸, The TUJS radical group began talking about the oneness of the whole North- East. They even had "Seven Stars" on their flag which represent the seven units of the North-East.

The Naga Movement and later that of the Mizos indirectly convulsed the Meiteis to come up with their own movement. In their effort not to be left in the lurch and their desire to come on equal footing with the politics of the Nagas and the Mizos, they began experimenting with revolutionary activities since mid-sixties. The Meiteis were alarmed because the Mizos and the Nagas were claiming the hill areas, which constitutes 75 percent of the whole Manipur State's area. The grant of statehood to the Nagas and the possible transfer of Manipur's contiguous Naga-inhabited areas to Nagaland invoked the anger of the Meiteis who went against New Delhi and started a move to drive out

27. Nibedon, n.25, p.84

28. Ibid., p.115.

outsiders whom they called 'Mayangs'. They came up with the Pan-Mongoloied Youth movement, the Meitei State Committee and the Revolutionary Government of Manipur. Following the Nagas, they started making trips to Burma and East Pakistan for training in the use of arms.²⁹ The seventies saw the emergence of Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) under the leadership of Biseshwar. Indoctrinated with Maoism and trained in urban guerrilla tactics, the PLA have been trying to liberate Manipur from the rule of outsiders or non-Manipuris. Even after heavy infighting, factionalism, and the inroads made by the Indian Army, PLA is still a force to reckon with. The Meitei rebels are being given training by the NSCN in their camps located in Burma.

In the 1940s, the Nagas had befriended the Cachar and Khasi tribesmen as Cachar would be the route of the guerrillas to East Pakistan and because the Khasis live in Shillong, a strategically important town. Phizo also won over the Nagas living in the Burmese territory who later constituted the Eastern Naga Revolutionary Council (ENRC). In their calculation and preparation for their operation to achieve independence, the Nagas started courting the support and friendship of the Assamese. Phizo urged the Assamese leader Omeo Kumar Das,

29. Ibid., p.62.

when he visited Kohima in 1947, after his election to the Constituent Assembly, to join the Nagas in the fight for independence. The Assamese people however have been relatively peaceful till the late seventies. With the fear of being engulfed by the influx of people from outside, mainly from Bangladesh, the All Assam Students Union started preparing for a struggle against the infiltration the monopoly of commerce by non-Assamese and in order to get a better deal for the Assamese.

In neighbouring Meghalaya, on 22 October, 1979, two khasi boys allegedly hit the image of the Goddess Kali which was being taken for immersion. The two boys were beaten up by the enraged Kali devotees and this sparked off a big clash between the tribals and non-tribals which resulted in the death of 20 persons and the eviction of non-tribals, mainly Bengalis from the tribal pockets. There was a widespread anti-outsider wave all over the North East. In April, that year, youth leaders from the seven units were reported to have gathered at Joshat and formed a movement against "foreigners" called NAMMAT which stood for Nagaland, Arunachal, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura. Another organisation called Seven Sisters United Liberation Army (SULA) was rumoured to have been formed about this time. There were also reports of an All Monogoloid Youth League with command headquarters somewhere in

northern Burma.³⁰ One of the many circulars clandestinely going around in December, 1979 reads: "We must take our destiny into our own hands and our only chance of survival lies in complete separation from India which was in fact, conceived some decades ago by Phizo, the great leader of the Nagas".³¹

Comments Nirmal Nibedon, an authority on the North-East insurgency: "It was strange but true that Phizo's name kept sprouting up since the very inception of the various movements . His fatherly image had persisted in Naga Hills, his long absence and uncompromising stand had won him many more children".³²

The above mentioned circular called for foreign help and reiterated: "We now need a leader, a great leader and we can hopefully look forward to our friend the great Phizo to come and take the lead..." It concludes with a daring call "Let the New Year bells from Kohima and Aizawl, from Gauhati to Imphal, from Shillong and Itanagar thansfar, herald the beginning of this new era. Let us from that day cease to call ourselves Indians".³³

30. Ibid., p.105,106 & 115.

31. Ibid., p.120.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p.124.

The initially reluctant Assamese seem at last to be going the way the Nagas wanted. The favourable change of attitude among some sections of the Assamese youth could not have come at a more opportune time for the Naga insurgents. With the pull-out of the MNF from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Nagas needed a reinforcement in the Southern sector of the insurgency belt (see map A). The contact which the Naga rebels had been maintaining with some radical Assamese, particularly the student leaders increased. United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the dreaded organisation of the Assamese is reported to have been formed by Pradip Gogoi and Someshwar Gogoi after consulting Angelus Shimray, the Foreign Secretary of the NSCN. Every year, a batch of 20 to 25 cadres is led by Paresh Barua, the Commander-in-Chief of ULFA, to the NSCN headquarters in Somra Tracts of Burma for training in handling of sophisticated arms and ammunitions.³⁴ "The ULFA connection gives Muivah a choice of options and sanctuaries...".³⁵

Like that of the Naga rebels, the aim of the ULFA is to create a Sovereign Assam in order to put an end to "the Indian Colonialist domination over the State". Through the NSCN, ULFA

34. "ULFA Unleashes Terror in Assam", *Organiser*, (New Delhi, 8th April, 1990).

35. Dev, S. Guru, "Overground in Honour", *Statesman*, (New Delhi, 29 December, 1986).

has developed links with the Kachin Independence Army. It has also forged close links with PLA and PREPAK of Manipur and the disenchanted sections of TNV of Tripura.³⁶ The ULFA leaders have been found on record saying that they have been supported by various like minded organisations in the country.³⁷ Revealing documents recovered by the Assam Police during a recent raid on ULFA hide-out at Maligaon (Gauhati) clearly indicate the ULFA nexus with the extremist outfits of Punjab.

Another extremist organisation with a close NSCN link has surfaced recently. It is called the United National Socialist Council of Eastern Region (UNSCER) and its goal is to make the North-Eastren States, a sovereign and independent country. It is also linked with secessionist outfits like ULFA, Kangleipak Union of Manipur and has already formed an armed wing called People's Revolutionary Voluntary Army, having received training abroad.³⁸

The threat to India's sovereignty and integrity has aggravated with the extremist groups trying to form a common front against India. So far they have not been able to settle

36. "New Peril in Assam", *Hindustan Times*, (New Delhi, 23 December, 1989)

37. "ULFA Training in Burma", *Statesman*, (New Delhi, 30 December, 1989).

differences among themselves. But an important achievement seems to have been made along this line with the formation of "Indo-Burma Liberation Front" by the NSCN, ULFA, PLA and the united nationalist liberation Front. They have set up training camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.³⁹

38. "New Extremist Outfit in N-E", *Hindustan Times*, (New Delhi, 4 May, 1990)

39. "New Front" (under 'ULFA wants money in Dhaka Hotel'), *Times of India*, (New Delhi, 14 July, 1990).

CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS A PEACEFUL NORTH-EAST:

Approaches and Options

The Naga problem which predates the Indian Independence continues to be one of the greatest challenge India has to tackle even after 42 years of effort. The many measures and manoeuvres undertaken by the Government like granting statehood to Nagaland, pumping in lots of money for developmental purposes and offering lucrative jobs and monetary grants to those who lay down arms led to the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975. This has been the single greatest achievement of the Indian Government. But much to the chagrin of signatories, the Accord has not brought about the expected results. On the contrary, the spurners of the Accord seem to be gaining more support and strength, with even many of the backers of the Accord retracing their stand and withdrawing their support. NSCN, the dreaded extremist outfit formed by those who condemned the Accord seem to be growing in popularity and threatening to engulf the whole North-Eastern region of India by playing instrumental role in the growth of other secessionist groups. This demands a serious re-thinking and a fresh approach to save the country from impending dangers and crises. No stone should be left unturned to bring about a long-lasting peaceful solution in the strategic North-East.

There is no denying that the Indian Government has taken some right measures towards settling the Naga Problem.

But at the same time it has intentionally or unintentionally misconceived some aspects of the Problem and thus pursued some wrong policies which have done great damage to India's endeavour to win the confidence of the Nagas. The lack of understanding of the roots of the problem and the underestimation of it have been part of India's undoing. The first and foremost step towards the right direction vis-a-vis solving of Naga problem is to develop proper understanding and knowledge of the historical and sociological background of the Naga movement. The policy of playing down the Naga Problem by trying to project that it is only some misguided elements who are carrying on with the Naga movement has done more harm than good to India. The very fact that the movement has persisted for over 42 years and that most of the Nagas still have reservations to call themselves Indians demand and merit greater attention and understanding from the Government.

The first and foremost blunder committed by the Indian Government regarding the Naga Problem was to treat it as that of law and order. Even the then Chief of Army Staff, General K.S. Thimayya had candidly told Prime Minister Nehru that it required political wisdom rather than military might to solve the Naga problem. But Nehru thought on the contrary and thus the

Army was sent into the Naga areas in March, 1956¹. The Army's role was strengthened by the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Regulation of 1958 which give excessive powers. This has led to abuse of powers by the army personnel and results in perpetration of anti-India feeling among the victimised innocent Nagas. There is urgent need to recall the Army from the Naga areas in order to win their confidence. No lasting peaceful solution can be brought about by the use of force. Comments Nari Rustomji, an expert in the Naga Problem : "The tragedy of the Naga Hills has been that we do not learn from experience, that we fail to understand that grown-up thinking persons cannot be coerced to loyalty by force of arms"². He wonders why it took the British only a single battalion to control the Naga Hills while India had to deploy more than thirty times this strength and over such a long time. He said : "It is ironical that the India of Mahatma Gandhi with high ideals of non-violence should have had to depend upon armed strength on such a massive scale over such a protracted period for the maintenance

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1. Nibedon, Nirmal, *The Ethnic Explosion* (New Delhi, 1981), p. 28.
 2. Rustomji, Nari, *The Imperilled Frontiers*, (New Delhi, 1983), p. 71.

of law and order amongst tribal communities, many of whom are still in a primitive state of civilization"³.

It has been the ardent wish of the Nagas to be united under one political unit. They have been embittered with the British for partitioning their areas between India and Burma. The further split of their areas into three units - Assam, Manipur and Nagaland has angered them more. The consolidation of the contiguous Naga Area, which was proposed in the Hydari Agreement, 1947 and in the 16-point Memorandum submitted to Nehru in 1960 and is very much within the ambit of Indian constitution, would contribute towards the fulfilment of the political aspirations of the Nagas.

Christianisation of the Nagas and the Naga Movement are two very separate aspects. The allegation of the role of the Christian Missionaries in the starting of the Naga Movement is ill-founded and completely false. This notion and the bias against Christianity as anti-national has done tremendous harm to India's integration policy. "The public has been perversely ill-informed in the matter and a quite wrong impression created that the tribals' holding of Christian rather than Hindu beliefs disqualifies them from being accepted, or trusted, as

3. Ibid., p.24

thoroughbred patriotic Indians"⁴. The removal of this baseless suspicion will go a long way not only in solving the Naga problem but that of other tribals too.

The Central Government has been very generous to Nagaland. But heavy doles of financial grants alone are not enough. The Government has not come up with any effective strategy to ensure that the central assistance benefits everyone equally. As a result, the funds are garnered by few and this has given rise to an elitist class among the erstwhile egalitarian Naga society and consequently resulted in anger and discontentment among the rest. The Government should come up with a plan to check this unhealthy trend. It also must tap the rich mineral resources of the Naga areas and start income-generating projects.

Honest interaction of the Nagas and the rest of the Indians should be promoted by the Indian Government. The tendency to project the Nagas as half-naked people with an exotic past, i.e., of head-hunting, should be curbed. Efforts should be made by both to appreciate each other's traditions, custom and culture. This will promote better understanding and confidence and help shed many reservations and apprehensions.

4. Ibid., p. 64.

The main reason for India's refusal to accept the Naga's declaration of sovereignty over their areas was the security of India as Nagaland is located at such a strategic place. The Nagas, realising their historical and geographical ties, expressed their wish to have the closest of relationships with India right from the start of their movement for independence. Thus some thought it might be better to have a friendly Nagaland as a neighbour of India than having dissatisfied and troublesome Nagas within India. Phizo and other Naga leaders were reported to have been willing to offer Nagaland as a military base to India. This could have served the security needs of India and averted much bloodshed and expenses.

With the NSCN sticking to the stand of having no pre-conditional talks with the Central Government, all the possibilities should be taken into consideration. They have struggled for so long and will continue to do so if no honourable settlement is reached. The Indian Government should realise the importance of solving the Naga crisis once and for all by taking everyone into confidence instead of the usual practice of playing one faction or tribe against the other. It should have the magnanimity and sagacity to invite the NNC, NSCN and other groups that have a popular mass base to talks without pre-conditions. It is the most opportune time before the impending peril of another mass Naga movement, started by the revival of

Naga Nationalism with the passing away of Phizo, erupts and leads to bloodshed. The Indian Constitution may be amended to give more autonomy to the Nagas. Even a separate Ministry for the Nagas may be created if it will satisfy their political aspirations.

Linked with the Naga problem is the problem of the whole North-East. The demands of some extremist outfits for the reorganisation of the whole North-Eastern region on a federal basis with defence, currency, communication and foreign affairs under the Central Government and the decentralisation of the rest to be looked after by regional government can be given serious consideration.

The main complaint and grievance of the representatives of the North-East States to the Parliament is that they have no voice in the Centre, constituting only 8% of the total strength. There is thus the need for re-structuring of the political set-up in order to give more say and importance to the North-East.

EPILOGUE

The Naga problem and consequently the problem of the whole North-East is indeed a serious one but is hopefully not beyond redemption. The nature and magnitude of the problem demands serious consideration. No reconciliation and peace can be brought about without some give and take. A radical change of attitude is needed from both the parties the Indian Government as well as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, United Liberation Front of Assam, Peoples' Liberation Army of Manipur and other extremist groups. No price is too high for peace.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX - I

The Nine-Point Agreement, June, 1947

Preamble : The right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their feely expressed wishes is recognised.

1. Judicial : All cases whether civil or criminal arising between Nagas in the Naga Hills will be disposed of by duly constituted Naga courts according to Naga customary law, or such law as may be introduced with the consent of duly recognised Naga representative organisation, save that where sentence of transportation or death has been passed there will be right of appeal to the Governor.

In cases arising between Nagas and non-Nagas in (a) Kohima and Mokokchung town areas, and (b) in the neighbouring plains districts, the judge, if not a Naga, will be assisted by a Naga assessor.

2. Executive : The general principle is accepted that what the Naga National Council is prepared to pay for the Naga National Council should control. This principle will apply to the work done as well the staff employed.

While the District Officer will be appointed at the discretion of the Governor, sub-division of the Naga Hills should be administered by a Sub-Divisional Council with a full-time executive President, paid by the Naga National Council, who would be responsible to the

District Officer for all matters falling within the latter's responsibility and to the Naga National Council for matters falling within their responsibility.

In regard to :

(a) Agriculture : The Naga National Council will exercise all the powers now vested in the District Officer.

(b) P.W.D.: The Naga National Council will take over full control.

(c) Education and Forest Department : Naga National Council is prepared to pay for all the services and staff. .

3. Legislative : That no laws passed by the Provincial or Central Legislature which materially affect the term of this agreement or the religious practices of the Nagas shall have legal force in the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga National Council.

In case of dispute as to whether any law did so affect this agreement, the matter would be referred by the Naga National Council to the Governor who would then direct that the law in question should have no legal force in the Naga Hills pending the decision of the Central Government.

4. Land : That land with its resources in the Naga Hills should not be alienated to a non-Naga without the consent of the Naga National Council.

5. Taxation : That the Naga National Council will be responsible for the imposition, collection, and expenditure of the land revenue and house tax, and of such other taxes as may be imposed by the Naga National Council.

6. Boundaries : The present administrative divisions should be modified so as (1) to bring back into the Naga Hills District all the forests transferred to the Sibsagar and Nowgong Districts in the past, and (2) to bring under the unified administrative unit, as far as possible, all Nagas. All the areas so included would be within the scope of the present proposed agreement. No areas should be transferred out of the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga National Council.

7. Arms Act : The District Officer will act on the advice of the Naga National Council in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Act.

8. Regulations : The Chin Hills Regulation and Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation will remain in force.

9. Period of Agreement : The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a

period of ten years to ensure the due observance of this Agreement; at the end of this period, the Naga National Council will be asked whether they require the above Agreement to be extended for a further period, a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at.

APPENDIX - II

The 16-point Agreement arrived at between the Government of

India and the Naga People's Convention, July 1960

1. *The Name* : The territories that were heretofore known as the Naga Hills Tuensang Area under the Naga Hills Tuensang Area Act, 1957, shall form a State within the Indian Union and be hereafter known as Nagaland.

2. *The Ministry Incharge* : The Nagaland shall be under the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India.

3. *The Governor of Nagaland* : (a) The President of India shall appoint a Governor for Nagaland and he will be vested with the executive powers of the Government to Nagaland. He will have his headquarters in Nagaland.

(b) His administrative secretariat will be headed by the Chief Secretary stationed at the Headquarters with other Secretariat staff as necessary.

(c) The Governor shall have special responsibility with regard to law and order during transitional period and for so long as the law and order situation continue to remain disturbed on account of hostile

activities. In exercising this special responsibility, the Governor shall, after consultation with the Ministry, act in his individual judgement. This special responsibility of the Governor will cease when normalcy returns.

4. Council of Ministers (a) There shall be a Council of Ministers with a Chief Minister at the head to assist and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions.

(b) The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Naga Legislative Assembly.

5. The Legislature : There shall be constituted a Legislative Assembly consisting of elected and nominated members as may be deemed necessary representing different tribes. (Further a duly constituted body of Expert may be formed to examine and determine the principles of representation on democratic basis).

6. Representation in the Parliament : Two elected members shall represent Nagaland in the Union Parliament, that is to say, one for the Lok Sabha and the other for the Rajya Sabha.

7. Acts of Parliament: No Act or law passed by the Union

parliament affecting the following provisions shall have

legal force in the Nagaland unless specifically applied to

it by a majority vote of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly.

(a) The Religious or Social Practices of the Nagas.

(b) The Customary Laws and Procedure.

(c) Civil and Criminal Justice so far as these Concern decision according to the Naga Customary Law.

The Existing law relating to Administration to civil and criminal justice as provided in the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills District shall continue to be in force.

(d) The ownership and transfer of land and its resources.

8. Local Self-Government: Each tribe shall have the following units of rule-making and administrative local bodies to deal with matters concerning the respective tribes and areas:

(a) The Village Council;

(b) The Range Council, and

(c) The Tribal Council.

The Council will also deal with disputes and cases involving breaches of customary laws and usages.

9. Administration of Justice: (a) The existing system of administration of civil and criminal justice shall continue.

(b) Appellate Courts:

(i) The District Court-cum Sessions Court (for each district), High Court and Supreme Court of India;

(ii) The Naga Tribunal (for the whole of Nagaland) in respect of cases decided according to customary Law.

10. Administrative of Tuensang District: (a) The Governor shall carry on the administration of the Tuensang District for a period of 10 (ten) years until such time when the tribes in the Tuensang District are capable of shouldering more responsibility of advance system of administration in other parts of the Nagaland.

(b) Provided further that a Regional Council shall be formed for Tuensang District by representatives from all the tribes in Tuensang District, and the Governor may nominate representative to the Regional Council as well. The Regional Council will elect Member of the Naga Legislative Assembly to represent Tuensang District.

(c) Provided further that on the advice of the Regional Council, steps will be taken to start various Councils and Courts, in those areas where the people feel themselves capable to establishing such institutions.

(d) Provided further that no Act or Law passed by the Legislative Assembly shall be applicable to Tuensang District unless specially recommended by the Regional Council.

(e) Provided further that the Regional Council shall supervise and guide the working of the various Councils and Tribal Courts within Tuensang District wherever necessary and depute the local officers to act as Chairmen thereof.

(f) Provided further that Councils of such areas inhabited by a mixed population or which have not as yet decided to which specific Tribal Council be affiliated to, shall be directly under the Regional Council for the time being. And at the end of ten years the situation will be reviewed and if the people so desired the period will be further extended.

11. Financial Assistance from the Government of India: To supplement the revenues of Nagaland, there will be need for the Government of India to pay out of the Consolidate Fund of Nagaland, and a grant-in-aid towards meeting the cost of administration. Proposals for the above grants shall be prepared and submitted by Government of Nagaland to the Government of India for their approval. The Governor will have general responsibility for ensuring that the funds made available by the Government of India are expended for the purposes for which they have been approved.

12. Consolidation of Forest Areas: The delegation wished the following to be placed on record: "The Naga delegation discussed the question of the inclusion of the Reserve Forests and of contiguous areas inhabited by the Nagas. They were referred to the provisions in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constituion, prescribing the procedure for the transfer of areas from one state to another".

13. Consolidation of Contiguous Naga Areas: The delegation wished the following to be placed on record: "The Naga leaders expressed the view that other Nagas inhabiting contiguous areas should be enabled to join the new state. It was pointed out to them on behalf of the Government of India that Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution provided for increasing the areas of any state, but it was not possible for the Government of India to make any commitment in this regard at this stage".

14. Formation of Separate Naga Regiment: In order that Naga people can fulfil their desire of playing a full role in the defence forces of India, the question of raising a separate Naga Regiment should be duly examined for action.

15. Transitional Period: (a) On reaching the political settlement with the Government of India, the government of India will prepare a Bill of such amendment of the constitution, as may be necessary, in

order to implement the decision. The draft Bill, before presentation to Parliament, will be shown to the delegates of the N.P.C.

(B) There shall be constituted an Interim Body with elected representatives from every tribe, to assist and advise the Governor in the administration of Nagaland during the transitional period. The tenure of office of the members of the Interim Body will be 3 (three) years subject to the re- election.

16. Inner Line Regulation: Rules embodied in the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, shall remain in force in Nagaland.

APPENDIX - III

The Peace Mission's Proposals, 20th December, 1964

1. It has been a matter of considerable satisfaction to the Peace Mission, as to all others in Nagaland and in the the rest of india, that since firing ceased on 6th September, 1964, for the first time in ten years, people in Nagaland are experiencing what normalcy is. The Peace Mission feels that it is the moral obligation of every one in Nagaland and more so, of the Peace Mission, in whom so much confidence and faith has been reposed, to see that peace becomes everlasting in Nagaland.

2. But first it should be placed on record to the honour of both parties that have been in conflict that the attempt to find peace and agreement to a cease-fire was an adventurous step which issued from their deep desire to find an honourable way to terminate such a bitter, wasteful and protracted conflict.

3. The marked difference in the atmosphere that prevails in Nagaland today as compared with that prevailing prior to the cessation of operation will probably be only realised by those who have lived or worked in Nagaland where there was fear as soon as darkness began and a sense of insecurity resulting from the ever present possibility of sudden violence. Today, the people are returning to their normal occupations. Families are being reunited, the biggest harvest for many

years has been gathered and there is a feeling of hope in Nagaland which makes every delegate engaged in the peace talks only too conscious of the heavy burden of decision on those who have to take it, the life and happiness of so many dependent on the decisions that are taken. In all this, it is fair to pay tribute not only to the Government of India for their humanity and imagination but also to the leaders of the Baptist Church for whom this initiative was the result of much thought and powerful consideration of the good of both India and Nagaland.

4. The Nagaland Peace Talks, which started on 23rd of September, 1964, have now come to a stage where the NFG delegation have placed their demands for consideration by the Government of India. This was in response to the statement of the leader of the Government of India delegation at Chedema on November 14, wherein the Government of India also stated their position and understanding of the problem, as they saw it.

5. The Nagaland Federal Delegation have claimed that the Nagas had never been conquered by the Indian Army or ruled by an Indian Government, although their territory had been forcibly annexed by the British Army and the British Government about a century ago. Nevertheless, their right of self-determination, they claim belongs to them separately as a people from the sovereign Independent State of India, and they are now demanding recognition of this independence,

which as they say, India herself demanded and heroically struggled for under the historic slogan of Swaraj.

6. The Government of India's position, on the other hand, is that Nagaland formed an integral part of India before 1947 and that with the transfer of power to India by the British Parliament, Nagaland became part of India in the same way as all other States in India. At the same time the Government of India claim that they have already accepted the need for granting the fullest autonomy to Nagaland by constituting the State of Nagaland so as to ensure the fullest development of the Nagas and to guarantee their separate ethnic and cultural entity and to ensure their traditional right and their resources. Accordingly, the Nagas are not ruled by the alien power but are ruling themselves.

7. The Peace Mission notes that a section of the Naga people accepted the status of Statehood thus conferred upon Nagaland as being in their best interest. Another section did not consider that satisfied the aims and objectives they had been fighting for. Thus, there are these two divergent positions of the Government of India and the NFG confronting each other.

8. Though the two positions appear to be far apart, the Peace Mission believes that, with goodwill and understanding on both sides, a solution acceptable to both can be found.

9. As earlier stated, the Peace Mission reiterates that it is under an inescapable moral obligation to ensure maintenance of peace and settlement of all outstanding problems through peaceful means. The Peace Mission believes that there is no human problem that cannot be solved by peaceful means. The Peace Mission further believes that the Governments concerned and the people concerned share and subscribe to this view.

10. While the Peace Mission fully agrees and endorses the principle that all subject peoples have the right of self-determination and that no group of people is competent to rule over another, it also has to invite the attention of the Nagaland Federal Government to certain historical processes that had taken place to give birth to the Union of India and to the emergence of the great concepts and ideals underlying the Union Constitution.

11. The British had conquered at several stages and in diverse manner, various parts of the Indian sub-continent, comprising different ethnic groups political system and religions. However, under the aegis of the Indian National Congress and since 1920, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, these various different peoples, representing diverse linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious elements, came together against foreign colonial rule and developed a consciousness of nationhood. Unfortunately, this common struggle against foreign imperialism, that had welded these diverse peoples in

the Indian sub-continent into the one nation, did not somehow have an appreciable impact on the Nagas. This was, no doubt, due to the policy of isolation and exclusion, so deftly practised by British rulers, who believed in creating pockets contrary to each other and hoping to rule in perpetuity by dividing the peoples. In any case, this great national movement of unification which freed India including Nagaland from the yoke of foreign rule did not bring within its embracing sweep the Naga population to the same extent as it did in the other parts of the sub- continent. Thus, in 1947, when all the diverse people of India, who had been brought under British rule, voluntarily agreed to form the Union of India and to share in the common endeavour to ensure that in this great Union the ideals of Fraternity, Liberty, Justice and Equality, as enshrined in the Constitution, are fully achieved for the common benefit of all, the same response and sense of participation was not noticeable in the Naga areas.

12. The Peace Mission, in the circumstances, appreciates and understands the desire of the Nagas for self- determination and their urge to preserve their integrity. The Peace Mission also appreciates the courage and tenacity displayed by the Naga people in their endeavour to achieve this goal. the objectives which they have placed before themselves in their memorandum "Naga Peace Declaration" dated 11th December 1964, and addressed to the Peace Mission, namely, their desire to find peace, their resolve to maintain their

integrity and to resist entanglement in war, are all extremely laudable and should commend themselves to all peace loving people. It is, however, to be noted that this Declaration, in itself, does not resolve the political issue. Therefore, some appropriate meeting point has to be found, where the aims and ideals of the NFG can be achieved, at the same time, making it possible for the Government of India to accept these within the framework of the political settlement to be mutually agreed upon.

13. The Peace Mission in the pursuit of a settlement through peaceful means, to which the Government of India as well the NFG should equally subscribe, would like both the Government of India and the NFG to consider seriously whether such a meeting point could be reached. On the one hand, the NFG could, on their own volition, decide to be a participant in the Union of India and mutually settle the terms and conditions for the purpose. On the other hand, the Government of India could consider to what extent the pattern and structure of the relationship between the Nagaland and the Government of India should be adapted and recast, so as to satisfy the political aspirations of all sections of Naga opinion and to make it possible for the ideals of peace as expressed in the Naga Peace Declaration to be substantially realised.

14. The Peace Mission would like, in all earnestness, to impress upon both sides that the approach, herein suggested, is not only the fairest,

but the only practical one in the given circumstances; and it fervently hopes that it will commend itself to the Government of India as well as to the Nagaland Federal Government.

15. The Peace Mission reiterates that the peace now obtaining in Nagaland should be made everlasting. With that object in view, the Peace Mission offered certain suggestions, whereupon both the parties had unequivocally affirmed and declared that they would renounce war and violence as a means for political settlement. This declaration of renunciation of war and use of armed force, it is earnestly emphasised, must not be deviated from by any means. The Peace Mission's proposal, following this bilateral declaration of renunciation of war, to deposit all underground arms in safe custody and to withdraw all Indian security force from law and order duties could not unfortunately be implemented.

16. Nevertheless, the Peace Mission would earnestly desire that, in faithful pursuance of the Declaration of renunciation of use of armed forces, both parties take concrete steps to remove all frictions. There have been numerous complaints and counter-complaints from both. The Peace Mission would suggest that the NFG require all arms issued to its forces to be concentrated at one or several place, in their armouries and under their custody, so that there can be no basis for any future complaint of their forces parading with arms or extorting money or supplies under threat. They should also seriously ask

themselves whether further recruiting and movement out of Nagaland towards Pakistan does not create an impression that these are only acts preparatory to resumption of hostilities and, if so, they should take remedial measures by putting a stop to such recruitment and movement. The Government of India should ensure that its security forces and the civil administration continue to abide strictly with the terms of the agreement, both in spirit and letter.

17. The Peace Mission makes a fervent appeal for consideration of the suggestions contained in this paper and for all action that is possible for the maintenance of peace.

Bimalaprasad Chaliha
Jayaprakash Narayan
Michael Scott.
20.12.1964.

APPENDIX - IV

The Shillong Accord of November 11, 1975

1. The following representatives of the Underground organisations met the Governor of Nagaland, Shri L.P. Singh, representing the Government of India, at Shillong on 10th and 11th November, 1975:

1. Shri I. Temjenba
2. Shri S. Dahru
3. Shri Veeniyi Rhakhu
4. Shri Z. Ramyo
5. Shri M. Assa
6. Shri Kevi Yallay

2. There was a series of four discussions. Some of the discussions were held with the Governor alone; at others, the Governor was assisted by the two Advisers for Nagaland, Shri M. Ramunny and Shri H. Zopianga, and Shri M.L. Kampani, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. All the five members of the Liaison Committee, namely Rev. Longri Ao, Dr. M. Aram, Shri L. Lungalang, Shri Kenneth Kerhuo and Shri Lungshim Shaiza, participated in the discussions.

3. *The following were the outcome of the discussions:*

(i) The representatives of the Underground organisations conveyed their ~~discussion~~^{decision}, of their own volition, to accept, without condition, the Constitution of India.

(ii) It was agreed that the arms, now underground, would be brought out and deposited at appointed places. Details for giving effect to this agreement will be worked out between them and representatives of the Government, the Security Forces and members of the Liaison Committee.

(iii) It was agreed that the representatives of the Underground organisations should have reasonable time to formulate other issues for discussion for final settlement.

Dated: Shillong November 11, 1975.

Sd/ - L.P. Singh
(on behalf of the
Government of India)

Sd/- (I.Temjenba)
Sd/- (S.Dahru)
Sd/- (Z. Ramyo)
Sd/- (M. Assa)
Sd/- (Kevi Yallay)

(On behalf of the representatives
of the Underground organisations)

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